Brazilian Diplomatic Thought

Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy

(1750-1964)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Foreign Minister

Aloysio Nunes Ferreira

Secretary-General

Ambassador Marcos Bezerra Abbott Galvão

alexandre de gusmão Foundation

President

Ambassador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima

Institute of Research on
International Relations

Director

Minister Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Center for Diplomatic History

and Documents

Director

Ambassador Gelson Fonseca Junior

Editorial Board of the
Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation

President

Ambassador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima

Members

Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg

Ambassador Jorio Dauster Magalhães

Ambassador Gelson Fonseca Junior

Ambassador José Estanislau do Amaral Souza

Ambassador Eduardo Paes Saboia

Minister Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Minister Paulo Elias Martins de Moraes

Professor Francisco Fernando Monteoliva Doratioto

Professor José Flávio Sombra Saraiva

Professor Eiiti Sato

The Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (Funag) was established in 1971. It is a public foundation linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose goal is to provide civil society with information concerning the international scenario and aspects of the Brazilian diplomatic agenda. The Foundation’s mission is to foster awareness of the domestic public opinion with regard to international relations issues and Brazilian foreign policy.

Copyright ©Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation

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Printed in Brazil

Originally published as Pensamento Diplomático Brasileiro – Formuladores e Agentes da Política Externa (1750-1964)

©Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2013

Editorial Staff:

Eliane Miranda Paiva

André Luiz Ventura Ferreira

Fernanda Antunes Siqueira

Gabriela Del Rio de Rezende

Luiz Antônio Gusmão

Translation:

Rodrigo Sardenberg

Paul Sekscenski

Graphic Design:

Daniela Barbosa

E-book:

Jefferson Mota - Gráfica e Editora Ideal

Map of the front cover:

Designed under Alexandre de Gusmão’s guidance, the so-called “Mapa das Cortes” served as the basis of the negotiations of the Treaty of Madrid (1750).

Map of the back cover:

World-map made by the Venitian Jeronimo Marini in 1512, the first one to insert the name Brazil in it. It is also unique in placing the Southern Hemisphere at the top.

Printed in Brazil 2016

B827

Brazilian diplomatic thought : policymakers and agents of foreign policy (1750-1964) / José Vicente de Sá Pimentel (editor); Rodrigo Sardenberg, Paul Sekscenski (translation). – Brasília: FUNAG, 2016.

3 v. – (História diplomática)

Título original: Pensamento diplomático brasileiro: formuladores e agentes da política externa.

ISBN 978-85-7631-693-0

1. Diplomata 2. Diplomacia brasileira. 3. Política externa - história - Brasil.
4. História diplomática - Brasil. I. Pimentel, Vicente de Sá. II. Série.

CDD 327.2

Depósito Legal na Fundação Biblioteca Nacional conforme Lei n° 10.994, de 14/12/2004.

José Vicente de Sá Pimentel

editor

Brazilian Diplomatic Thought

Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy

(1750-1964)

Volume I

Brasília – 2016

Foreword to the English edition

In 2013, the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (Funag), a think tank linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, convened a group of historians, international relations scholars, and diplomats, to discuss the formation of ideas and concepts throughout the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy. As a result of these meetings of highly respected intellectuals, the conclusion was reached that Brazilian diplomacy has historically developed its own patterns of thought in support of its actions. The promoters of the initiative endeavored to inspire further research and debate in order to advance and deepen the analysis of this broad and enriching field of study.

“Brazilian Diplomatic Thought – Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy (1750-1964)” constitutes the outcome of Funag’s pioneering project of promoting public debate in the area. This three-volume publication identifies and analyzes the underlying concepts of Brazilian diplomacy since its inception – even before the independence of the country in 1822 – up to the year 1964. The work highlights the contributions of remarkable personalities who distinguished themselves in this conceptual elaboration. It also discusses the contexts in which core values and interests guided Brazil’s diplomatic actions during the period in question and beyond.

Until recently, the available bibliography on this subject was limited. It even lacked an answer to the fundamental question: “Is there a Brazilian diplomatic thought?” And then, if one answers that question positively, “What are the foundations upon which Brazilian diplomatic thought was built, and what are its main features?” Additionally, one can ask: “What was the genesis of this thought, and where can one find the sources to document its evolution?” Then finally, “Who were the outstanding figures responsible for its formulation and implementation?”

Given the importance of Brazil’s regional standing and its global projection, this exploratory effort in the nation’s diplomatic history is of equal interest to researchers and scholars abroad. The English and Spanish editions of this collection are, therefore, justified by making the findings accessible to a larger segment of the public.

This scholarly work underscores the central role of diplomacy in the process of building the Brazilian nation-state. It also reveals how diplomacy helped to preserve the integrity of a land with continental dimensions, and peacefully settle the country’s borders with ten neighboring countries – among which were two European powers. The challenges of maintaining unity against a background of domestic ethnic and cultural diversity – in addition to external forces of fragmentation – were gradually overcome, and a common identity was forged. In a world in which nationalism and ethnicity, even today, make the concept of identity hard to achieve and sustain, this narrative on the construction of Brazil and the role played by its diplomats and statesmen will be of great interest to audiences beyond the country’s geographic borders.

Being acquainted with South American history, one can better gauge the contribution of Brazilian diplomacy to establish long-lasting conditions for peace in the region. Geopolitical factors in South America make this continent one of the few areas in the world without serious interstate conflicts. This is not, however, an accident. In contrast to what happened in North America, much of it derives from the patterns Brazil established through the peaceful settlement of its borders based on international law principles negotiated bilaterally or through international arbitration. Such conditions were not the result of fortuitous circumstances; nor did they occur by chance. Rather, they were created by diplomatic effort and initiative, which consolidated a regional paradigm of foreign policy. [1]

This three-volume collection should serve as a stimulus to further research on the evolution of Brazil’s foreign policy principles, traditions and practices in order to promote knowledge on how South American rivalry, conflict and instability transitioned into confidence-building measures and, ultimately, an environment of international peace, cooperation and stability.

The role of diplomacy in Brazilian history and the making of its identity are of such importance that one of the greatest heroes of the nation was a career diplomat, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, also known as the Baron of Rio Branco. Inspired by good neighborliness and a commitment to international law, Rio Branco’s successful negotiations of border issues established not only the final shape of Brazil’s territory, but also a regional and hemispheric standard, with positive consequences for the international community as they enhanced principles and values, contributing to the consolidation of diplomacy, jus gentium, and the rule of law.

In contrast to the fragmentation of Hispanic America, territorial integrity and the integration of diverse regions were challenging symbols of nation building in both the Imperial and Republican eras of Brazil. The dual processes of ensuring national unity through integrity and integration included elements of political, legal and diplomatic judgment, which were gradually formulated and established as a historical paradigm by diplomats and political leaders alike.

There are always methodological difficulties in the elaboration of a project such as this one. We readily acknowledge, for example, that the selected figures do not exhaust all foreign-policy makers and agents who contributed to the realization of the principles and ideas that represent Brazilian diplomatic thought. One aim of this initiative is to inspire others to improve and complete the narrative, in both its temporal dimension – beyond 1964 – and its geographic scope. The chapters in these three volumes could be enhanced by the inclusion of new research conducted by scholars, both Brazilian and foreign.

This edition is a valuable input on the subject matter; a further step towards meeting the growing demand for publications in English on Funag’s digital library webpage. The success of this initiative – launched originally in Portuguese, in 2013 - is largely due to the authors’ vast knowledge on the subject. What the readers have before their eyes is a contribution to the knowledge and the study of Brazilian diplomacy – its founders, circumstances, and ideas – all part of the history of the Americas.

Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima

President of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation

Preface

What is Brazilian diplomacy good for? What does a diplomat do? Throughout my career, I have often heard those questions and thought that Itamaraty could make more of an effort to ensure that the answers reach as many citizens as possible.

There would be good reasons to make such an effort. First of all, Brazil is one of the countries that has benefitted the most from its diplomacy. After all, we have more than 16,000 kilometers of borders with ten neighbor countries, which have had and still have serious disputes among themselves, but with which we live peacefully, without any war since 1870. That is no small feat. The Brazilian continental dimensions were established by negotiations, thus avoiding regional resentments that can be re-heated by opportunistic leaders and trigger stressful backlog. Moreover, even today, in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, national interests and the very image that we project are continuously marked and defended in international fora by diplomats or other agents responsible for ad hoc diplomatic tasks.

Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (Funag) is co-responsible for that effort, since its main mission is to divulge foreign policy and to encourage dialogue with scholars and other opinion makers.

This book is Funag’s attempt to address issues relating to the significance of Brazilian diplomacy through chronologically linked analyses based on the contribution of individuals whose legacies deserve to be recalled, discussed and, if applicable, revered.

Historically, the debate concerning the prevalence of the individual and ideas is both long and rich. The circumstances and the character of society have undeniable importance, but it seems doubtless that, when there are alternatives, individual choices have a powerful impact on the course of history.

Being acquainted with these outstanding personalities and their biographical journeys would be a valuable teaching tool. The image and the example of remarkable figures, to whom the readers may relate – or not – makes it easier to understand the historical facts and how the alternatives at stake are linked to one another.

The public par excellence of Funag is university students, professors, researchers and others interested in quality debates on the motivations, challenges and achievements of Brazilian diplomacy. The ambition of this book is to become a reference for that public. It intends to offer a starting point for debates on characters and circumstances of the diplomatic evolution that impacted Brazilian foreign projection and influenced the perception that Brazilians have of themselves and, in turn, the view foreigners began to have about us.

Some people might find a shortcoming in the title of the book. After all, it is not only about thought, since the political agents stand out for the actions and not necessarily for the reflections that they leave in writing; it is not only diplomatic, since the characters often seek inspiration in legal principles or in military theories, for example; it is also not only Brazilian, given the foreign origin of many of the ideas that have borne fruit here. In his introductory note to this volume, Paulo Roberto de Almeida exhausts that matter with remarkable expertise.

Nevertheless, what must be emphasized, and the title of the book does just that, is that the distinct diplomatic style of the Brazilian Chancellery has, to a great extent, been crystallized by contributions made by the characters depicted here. As such, we must remember their legacies – legacies that provide the foundations to deal with the increasingly complex conflicts that the current global environment presents to us. Similarly, we must preserve that style that has ensured the respect and won the confidence of our fellow negotiators in the international instances.

This project depended on the contribution of high-level intellectuals whose wisdom played a part in the design of the best work possible. Fortunately, they were available and became integrating members of an Editorial Board, or a scientific council that traced the execution lines of the project and defined the necessary methodology. They also helped to choose the characters who they felt best illustrated the history of diplomatic thought, and then sought out the scholars and diplomats (for the idea was to engage both) who would be in charge of writing the essays. A further landmark of Funag was that the scholarly authors were not centered only in the Brasília-São Paulo-Rio de Janeiro axis, but that they also came from other regions of the country.

I must emphasize the role played by Paulo Roberto de Almeida in assisting to compile the works. It was he who suggested names of possible members of the Editorial Board, organized the calendar of precursory meetings in which the periods that the book would address were defined, and suggested the basic methodology to be followed. Once that took place, the Publishing Committee, coordinated by Paulo Roberto and made up of Guilherme Conduru, Francisco Doratioto, Antônio Carlos Lessa, Estevão Martins and Eiiti Sato, chose, in the course of several remarkable meetings, the 26 characters and the 26 authors of the following texts. I want to acknowledge the participation of each one of them in producing this work and my admiration for their intellectual brilliance, for their commitment to the project and for the humbleness of giving up personal preferences, embracing majority opinion and admitting that what was possible should prevail.

The first meeting of the Editorial Board that I presided took place on December 12th, 2011. At that occasion, we established the goal to launch the book at the National Conference of Foreign Affairs – CORE, Conferência Nacional das Relações Exteriores – when Funag meets with scholars from all over Brazil and that often marks the end of the Foundation’s public activities of that year. The 2013 CORE had been scheduled for November 11th and 12th, which stressed the need to have all the texts proofread, as well as their typography and layout arranged and sent to the printer’s by October. Time created difficulties, but, on the other hand, it provided a horizon for each one to complete their obligations.

The invitations were issued on January 7th, 2013. Almost all of those invited accepted the challenge to write close to twenty pages about characters to whom they had already devoted an extensive and fertile research. Some of them expressed a preference for characters other than those offered to them. Professor Stanley Hilton, for example, would have rather written about Oswaldo Aranha. In that case, however, I chose to honor a great diplomat and historian, João Hermes Pereira de Araújo, who wrote in 1996 a chapter of the book “Oswaldo Aranha, a estrela da revolução.” Once again, Paulo Roberto de Almeida was kind enough to volunteer to sum up that work.

The scope of the project is to follow Brazilian diplomatic action since the Treaty of Madrid, which set the bases for the conformation of the national territory, until modern day. Given its extent, the current stage of the task ends in 1964, when the military coup began a period of political exception in Brazil, nourished instinctively in an international power configuration right after World War II and consolidated in what became known as the Cold War. The next step might be to continue the analysis until the restoration of democracy in Brazil, with the passing of the Constitution of 1988, one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the division of the world power into two blocks, led respectively by the USA and the USSR.

The characters depicted in this book stood out in unique historical periods and, thus, the work was divided into three major parts. Initially, the founding conceptions of the diplomatic thought are examined; in that first volume, the contributions made by Alexandre de Gusmão, José Bonifácio, Paulino Soares de Souza, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, Francisco Varnhagen, the Marquis of Paraná and by the Viscounts of Rio Branco and Cabo Frio are assessed. The second part is devoted to the First Republic and it includes analyses of the achievements made by Joaquim Nabuco, the Baron of Rio Branco, and also by Afrânio de Melo Franco, Rui Barbosa, Euclides da Cunha, Manoel de Oliveira Lima and Domício da Gama. The focus of the third volume is on the reform of the Brazilian State and the modernization of diplomacy, and the characters depicted are Oswaldo Aranha, Cyro de Freitas Valle, José Carlos de Macedo Soares, Admiral Álvaro Alberto, Edmundo Barbosa da Silva, Helio Jaguaribe, José Honório Rodrigues, Afonso Arinos, San Tiago Dantas, Augusto Frederico Schmidt and João Augusto de Araújo Castro.

It is obvious that all those figures do not have the same magnitude. Retrospectively, the diplomatic range of Rio Branco is undeniably above all others. It is enough to say that he was directly responsible for the increase of the national territory by almost 1 million square kilometers – one France and one Germany together! Rio Branco also had the visionary sensitivity to anticipate the need for a strategic partnership with the United States of America and to promote a Pan-American understanding that freed Brazil from wars and provided the conditions for the ongoing development of the country. His legacy is still a landmark for the performance of all his successors.

The chosen characters were also not the only ones to stand out in their respective periods. Others would also deserve to be studied and will certainly be in other works that this one intends to inspire. In order to make up for such an absence, an introductory assessment for each of the three periods was entrusted to three remarkable intellectuals. Those texts, written by Amado Cervo, Rubens Ricupero and Eiiti Sato, are the pillars of the book, which besides making the reading and the understanding of the historical evolution easier, help the chapters to fit alongside each other.

A project such as this one demands a certain formal homogeneity in the treatment of the characters. In our case, it was not a simple task. Just as when choosing the characters, the choice of authors also relied on somewhat arbitrary criteria, placing well known professors of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, traditional intellectual centers of Brazil, side by side with emerging talents from other regions. Different approaches on the characters’ works were respected, but, a deadline was established upon invitation for the essayists to submit the first drafts of their texts, which were then shared with the other members of the project, with whom they exchanged opinions in a seminar organized by Funag, in Brasília, in July, 2013 – that is, half way to CORE.

There were basically two possible methodologies: either strict parameters had to be established in an effort to homogenize both the form and the substance of the work, or, conversely, allow for a greater amplitude so that authors may express their own ideas. The former, like the Anglo-Saxon scholarly search for patterns with certain constraints, in many cases actually helps both the writing and the reading of collective works. But there are certain things that do not work very well below the equator and, for that reason, we opted for an approach that loosened the creative reins of the authors. They were able to choose the approaches that seemed most adequate for them to their assessment of the characters. The basic criterion is their common sense. I start from the understanding that, within a few decades, the attentive readers that go through those pages will have as a bonus a sample of the authors’ thought, a portrait of the Brazilian intelligentsia in 2013, providing an additional angle for researchers regarding the shades that mediate between the scientific strictness and the political views of each one.

Time was short and it placed an extra burden upon the shoulders of Funag’s team. I am happy to see that they excelled themselves, were able to complete all the stages of the work and print it on schedule so as to present the work in the opening of CORE, carried out at the University of Vila Velha, on November 11th, 2013. For the sake of justice, I emphasize the merits and make public my gratitude for Funag’s publishing team, led by Eliane Miranda.

Despite the devotion of my collaborators, there were some hiccups as a result of bureaucracy and other issues that delayed the presentation of some texts. This meant that some supplements that such a work should present had to be sacrificed.

I hope that the essays are, above all, useful for young diplomats and colleagues who will be in charge of keeping a light that has illuminated the characters depicted in these volumes. I also hope that they inspire new candidates to the Rio Branco Institute. To them, I wish successful careers, and hope that the examples of our greatests show that people make the difference.

José Vicente de Sá Pimentel

Brasília, November, 2013

Contents

Brazilian diplomatic thought: methodological introduction to the ideas and actions of some of its representatives

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Part I

FOUNDING IDEAS OF DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT

Introduction to foreign policy and the diplomatic ideas of the imperial period

Amado Luiz Cervo

Alexandre de Gusmão: the statesman who drew the Brazilian map

Synesio Sampaio Goes Filho

José Bonifácio: the patriarch of Brazilian diplomacy

João Alfredo dos Anjos

Paulino José Soares de Souza, the Viscount of Uruguay: building the instruments of Brazilian diplomacy

Gabriela Nunes Ferreira

Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro: defining the territory of the monarchy

Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Santos

Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, the Viscount of Porto Seguro: diplomatic thought

Arno Wehling

Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, The Marquis of Paraná: diplomacy and power in the Plata

Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa

The Viscount of Rio Branco: sovereignty, diplomacy and power

Francisco Doratioto

Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio: the development of Brazilian administrative thought

Amado Luiz Cervo

PART II

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC

The foreign policy of the First Republic (1889-1930)*

Rubens Ricupero

Joaquim Nabuco: an Americanist diplomat

Angela Alonso

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco: the founding of the Republic’s foreign policy*

Rubens Ricupero

The root of the matter – Rui Barbosa: Brazil in the world

Carlos Henrique Cardim

Euclides da Cunha: the South American scene

Kassius Diniz da Silva Pontes

Manoel de Oliveira Lima: the reform of diplomatic service

Helder Gordim da Silveira

Domício da Gama: the diplomacy of pride

Tereza Cristina Nascimento França

Afrânio de Melo Franco: the consolidation of foreign policy strategy

Stanley Hilton

PART III

THE STATE REFORM AND THE MODERNIZATION OF DIPLOMACY

Introduction to foreign policy and to the diplomatic ideas of modern Brazil

Eiiti Sato

Oswaldo Aranha: in the continuity of Rio Branco’s statesmenship

Paulo Roberto de Almeida;

João Hermes Pereira de Araújo

Cyro de Freitas-Valle: United Nations, Brazil first

Eugênio Vargas Garcia

José Carlos de Macedo Soares: liberal, nationalist and democrat

Guilherme Frazão Conduru

Admiral Álvaro Alberto: the pursuit of national development in science and technology

Eiiti Sato

Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva: from “Secos & Molhados” to multilateral economic diplomacy

Rogério de Souza Farias

Helio Jaguaribe: the generation of national developmentalism

Antonio Carlos Lessa

José Honório Rodrigues: historian of the national interest and africanism

Paulo Visentini

Afonso Arinos de melo Franco: his times and paradox

Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães

Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas: the East-West conflict and the limits of the rational argument

Gelson Fonseca

Augusto Frederico Schmidt: the poet of acquiescent dependence

Carlos Eduardo Vidigal

Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg

Authors

Brazilian diplomatic thought: methodological introduction to the ideas and actions of some of its representatives

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Historically, Brazilian diplomacy has its own set of ideas – its own patterns of thought – which support its actions. These patterns of thought include concepts such as: an undeniable adhesion to international law; the absence of the recourse to force, to resolve disputes among States; nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries; the observance of human rights; and a set of values unique to our civilizing heritage.

Whenever it was threatened, Brazil resorted to all the resources of international law – and, sometimes, to the power of its arms – to ensure its territorial integrity, its national sovereignty, or the honor and defense of its homeland. Thus, the country has relied on these ideas, this set of values and principles – this collection of thought – adapted to its specific needs, and to the circumstances that controlled the decision-making process of each challenge at hand.

Early challenges Brazil faced were often related to the definition of its boundaries, which were always set by negotiation since the country’s independence in 1822. As history progressed, the challenges also concerned matters, such as freedom of access in the Platine region; relations with the great European powers, and later, with the great hemispheric power; and the balance of powers in general. In addition, on the economic front, there were challenges related to the opening of markets for the country’s products, as well as access to funding sources for its development, and an equitable participation in the definition and maintenance of the world order, working adequately towards multilateral cooperation.

The ideas and actions utilized by Brazil were those of its political leaders and rulers, its body of diplomatic professionals and, in general, its intellectuals and elites. Ideas and actions do not exist in the abstract. Rather, they are linked to people; to the intellectual roles of people in society; to their engagement in public affairs, their initiatives and the mobilizations of causes that go beyond the specific dimensions of their private lives and professional activities. In this manner, these people personify the State’s interests.

Studies of intellectual history applied to foreign affairs are an acknowledged gap in the specialized bibliography of Brazil. Brazilian Diplomatic Thought represents a modest, though important, step towards filling that gap. It is probably the first attempt of its kind, in a field that will need to be explored in greater detail in the future. It is a precursor of more elaborate monographic studies; a general synthesis in this same historiographic category.

This kind of study has a special interest for professional diplomats. It is also of interest to anyone with a desire to know more about the formulation and implementation of Brazilian foreign affairs. Scholars, such as political scientists, who create templates for international relations, and historians, who deal with a posteriori interpretations, will find it particularly useful.

In this general introduction, we will examine the conceptual principles of this initiative of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (Funag). A simple proposal originally, the project was welcomed and immediately started to materialize through the efforts and support of Funag’s then president, Ambassador José Vicente Pimentel, who deserves the credit for proceeding with it, even facing the well-known budget restrictions that always affect eminently-cultural projects in tough economic moments.

To begin our study, we will look at what justifies the association of these three independent terms – “Brazilian Diplomatic Thought,” two adjectives and one noun – which, when combined into a single intellectual unit, attempt to discover some identity of purpose in the long continuum of ideas and actions in Brazilian diplomacy and international politics over more than two centuries.

First of all, we should ask: are the terms – and the concepts they represent – the appropriate ones for this endeavor? Are they coherent, justified, and adequate, to attain the goals of the small group of scholars and diplomats that organized and debated the initial drafts of the project and decided to proceed at an unprecedented pace? We will separately analyze each of the elements that compose the title, as each requires an explanation.

Brazilian

The first term in this English translation of the work’s title – “Brazilian” – is, of course, an adjective, which qualifies a place of birth or nationality. Is it, therefore, our intention to say that the “diplomatic thought” discussed in this work is specifically from Brazil?

As previously stated, Brazilian diplomacy has always been guided by certain values and principles that were present in the speeches and official decisions of its agents. Again, these principles include an absolute respect for the norms of international law; the peaceful solution of controversies; non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; an unyielding defense of the concept of national sovereignty; and bilateral and multilateral cooperation to the benefit of the harmonic development of all people. Is there, however, anything exclusively Brazilian in all of these elements? Are they not, after all, also shared by many other States? And just what does it mean to be “Brazilian”?

Alexandre de Gusmão, the figure who begins this series, was a diplomatic agent of the Portuguese Crown. Born in 1695, in Santos, Brazil – at the time a colony of Portugal – Gusmão acted on behalf of the interests of the metropolis. The territories he added to the “homeland” were, therefore, “pieces” of a Portuguese America, begun on a relatively limited strip of coastline, and then, by the actions of Portuguese explorers and the bandeirantes [early “Brazilian” explorers who went into the interior in search of minerals and slaves], expanded well beyond the Tordesillas line decreed by the famous treaty of 1494, and developed into the land that became the country of Brazil.

Hipólito da Costa, another Portuguese diplomat, was born in 1774 in the Colonia de Sacramento, currently a part of Uruguay, but then one of the “pieces” of Portuguese America. In London the year the Portuguese royal family moved to Brazil, 1808, da Costa, founded a newspaper, which after some thought, he called “Correio Braziliense,” explaining that the second word in his title – “Braziliense”– was chosen to distinguish those born in Portuguese America – such as himself – from those who merely traded in brazilwood – an important source of a red dye at the time, and the reason the name “Brazil” was given to the land. But when did Brazil, itself, begin?

Historian and diplomat Evaldo Cabral de Melo has stated that Brazil only emerged as a “homogeneous” entity, sometime after its independence from Portugal in 1822. Another historian and diplomat, Luís Cláudio Villafañe Gomes Santos, argues that a Brazilian national identity came about only with the creation of a national unit in administrative, political and economic terms, assisted by the geographic connection of the country through the extension of the telegraph into unknown and unexplored lands into the twentieth century. Indeed, as the writer, Euclides da Cunha, and explorer, Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon – both of whom worked on the telegraph-extension project – verified, there were Brazilians at the time who lived in such remote areas, that they did not even know they were Brazilians.

Not all the figures included in this work were born in Brazil. All, however, were or became “Brazilian” by their deep identity with the land, the territory, the State that is now recognized in geopolitical terms as being contemporary Brazil. All of them served on behalf of a Brazil that was being shaped – in the case of Gusmão, or José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, for example – or of a Brazil that would be realized in their lifetimes through diplomatic measures; that is, by instructing or by obeying instructions tied to a Secretariat, be it concerned mainly with foreign business matters, or eventually, with the entire gamut of foreign affairs. Such are the cases, for example, of Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, Paulino Soares de Souza, and Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, who participated in the building of the nation, after they had inherited an embryonic State threatened by regional fragmentation, and deeply marked by the Portuguese diplomatic traditions from which it had belatedly separated.

How does the term “Brazilian” relate to the concept of “Thought,” and more specifically, to the concept of “diplomatic thought”? Can a variety of it be identified as essentially Brazilian, different, for example, from the general mixture of doctrines, legal principles, political and economic ideas, which are also developed in other nations?

In reality, none of the statesmen or thinkers of the Imperial or Republican eras represent an exclusive contribution to the stock of practical knowledge applied to diplomacy. The concept of uti possidetis, for example, used both intensively and extensively as one of the negotiating principles throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to consolidate the national borders, was a resource of Ancient Roman law used to regulate land occupations. And in the field of asymmetric relations – so well studied by Rubens Ricupero in his text about José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, the Baron of Rio Branco – the jurists and diplomats from Argentina were able to innovate in the field of international law with the Calvo Clause, concerning the exhaustion of internal resources, followed by the Drago Doctrine, which sought to apply the unilateralist Monroe Doctrine against foreign interventions in the Americas – even against Monroe’s homeland itself. Such kinds of “legal nationalism,” presented as a defense mechanism of the national jurisdiction before foreign interests, plus the previous defensive formula, against the decision of the powerful, were not taken into consideration by the counselors of the Brazilian Empire.

Brazilian politicians, professors and writers of treaties, members of the Imperial Council and tribunes of the Republic, were all experts in the best literature available at the time. They had all read the enlightenment philosophers and the theoreticians of the State and public administration. Men such as Paulino Soares de Souza applied the then emerging principles of administrative law and of laws specific to the needs of the Brazilian people. It cannot be said, however, that they created doctrines or a Brazilian thought with general validity or of theoretical permanence, at least not in such a way as to justify an exclusive qualifier of origin. Rui Barbosa may have been the most theoretical of the formulators of Brazilian thought in international politics, yet even his “lessons” of diplomacy do not stray far from the main tenets of international law.

What Rui Barbosa demonstrated, however, was that law admits a single interpretation: that of the sovereign equality among all nations, not the de facto inequality that the powerful nations intended to see formally consecrated. This thought continued to be addressed in the speeches and declarations of Brazilian diplomacy, either in the League of Nations, as was clear in the actions of Afrânio de Melo Franco, or at the moment of the creation of the United Nations – mainly in the definition of the role of that entity’s Security Council. Even today, as the democratization of those aging structures is being debated, this Brazilian thought continues to be voiced.

All the figures selected for this volume – either Brazilian by birth or by option – thought and worked based on the stock of knowledge and practical experiences available to educated citizens of their respective times. They formulated suggestions for action based on their studies, their readings, and the observations they made from books and lessons learned in school. They also acquired much through living with other statesmen, magistrates, professors, diplomats or the military – others with whom they could discuss opinions and proposals, in order to determine those that were best for Brazil in the context of its regional and international relations. There was an extensive margin for the exercise of free will, but it is most likely that their decisions were based not on abstract considerations but, rather, upon reflecting on the best paths to take while facing concrete challenges.

Is the adjective “Brazilian” the result of a simple geographic accident? Is “diplomatic thought” a concept within the context of a more general set of ideas and actions, which can be applied to Brazil, but also to the country’s American neighbors, as well as to other national States in Europe and in Asia? In a certain way, the answer to both of these questions is, yes. The title of this book, therefore, could also be, “Diplomatic Thought in Brazil.” I believe that the country has not innovated “lessons” of diplomacy or of international politics in an unprecedented way. Yet the set of “solutions” applied to its external, regional and international challenges, might be the foundation for some overview of diplomacy as applied to foreign affairs.

Diplomatic

Methodologically, there are no doubts about the political or functional meaning of the term “diplomat.” Diplomacy is precisely the art of the word. As such, it is entirely concerned with ideas, concepts, and arguments, which later are incorporated into bilateral agreements, multilateral treaties, and universal declarations, to guide the external actions of States for cooperation or even conflict with other States. The central argument of this work concerns the possible link between diplomacy and some set of ideas – or “thought” – that might be considered specifically Brazilian.

The issue involves several nuanced questions that cannot be answered abstractly. Does the term “diplomatic” refer more to the players or to the acts themselves? In other words, does it derive from the quality of the agents, or from the nature of their actions? This is not meant as an exercise in Hegelian Dialectics; rather, it has a more practical sense, making it closer to English empiricism than to German philosophy. In order to avoid a useless terminological debate, therefore, without much relevance to the purpose of this work, let us say that “diplomatic thought,” refers to an ideal-typical formulation. It is a guide to be used for the actions of public men – as opposed to theoretical reflection, or a purely speculative concept, detached from history or from any concrete application.

What we are discussing here are the contributions of thinkers – and practical men – their words, their writings and their actions, as well as the positions they performed for the State, which, in various ways, impacted on the external actions of that State.

For various reasons, some of the individuals presented here did not leave an articulate body of proposals concerning an “ideal” foreign policy for the country. All of them, however, either as theoreticians or observers of that specialized activity, knew how to conduct themselves, through their values, and their principles, and each had ideas of how the country should respond to external challenges, and how it should affirm itself in the international order. Even when the “thought” was embryonic – as in the early phases of the construction of the Brazilian State – the options taken, in either regional or broader contexts, were always diplomatic.

For example, the debate on whether or not to preserve trafficking and slavery was an essential condition for the maintenance of the economic and social formation that characterized agrarian-exporter Brazil in the early nineteenth century. The preservation of those institutions, even in the context of the growing abolitionist movement since the beginning of that century, required a diplomatic action that involved most of the public men of that era. Although there was no absolute need to continue the institutions – as José Bonifácio had already argued to no avail – once this option was adopted, the diplomats of the Brazilian Empire had to defend the cause against the arrogance of the hegemonic power of the time, the British Empire – as, the young Tomaz do Amaral, the future Viscount of Cabo Frio, discovered from an early age. They then continued to defend the cause until the country’s Foreign Minister, Paulino José Soares de Souza, wisely, decided to end that sad defensive episode of Brazilian diplomacy.

Two examples of diplomatic decisions taken by non-diplo-mats were whether or not to participate in a foreign war that was not strictly in defense of the national territory, or more precisely, whether to become an ally of the enemies of the Argentine strongman, Juan Manuel de Rosas, in order to overthrow the dictator of Buenos Aires in the early 1850s; and whether or not to send troops to the front lines of World War II, against the forces of Nazi-Fascism. The men involved in those decisions – Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão and Paulino Soares de Souza, in the first case, and Oswaldo Aranha and Getúlio Vargas, in the second – may not have produced any substantive diplomatic explanation to justify their decisions, but they were fully aware of the relevant national interests.

Another example of bold and original diplomacy was the decision not to use arbitration to resolve the issue of Acre at the beginning of the twentieth century. Arbitration seemed to be the way such disputes were solved in the nineteenth century, as various arbitration treaties had already been signed.

It is known that Rui Barbosa, considered as one of the major “thinkers” of Brazilian international relations, rejected the Baron of Rio Branco’s solution for Acre that was presented to Bolivia, and he was kept off the negotiating delegation mainly for that reason. Rio Branco, however, who controlled as few others the thought and the action of diplomats, was able to innovate, whereas the Viscount of Cabo Frio managed explosive issues within the traditional standards to which he was accustomed since the beginning of the Second Empire.

Thought

What does the concept of diplomatic “thought” represent in the context of a study concerned with the history of ideas; of essays concerned with intellectual historiography? Is thought a too abstract concept for such an endeavor, and would a study of it be akin to gathering the writings of some esoteric club?

Is “thought” a topic more appropriate for a scholarly monograph, or could it be defined with a compilation of individual essays of varied styles and methodologies, such as those presented here? Could such a study be a precise set of articles about concrete action proposals that, throughout time, guide the leadership of a nation’s diplomatic corps?

Although there are some excellent examples of sectoral histories in this area – for example, there are some very good synthetic essays in the political field written by Nelson Saldanha, João de Scantimburgo, and Nelson Barreto; plus some brilliant philosophical work has been done by Antonio Paim and Ricardo Velez-Rodriguez, following up on pioneer efforts of João Cruz Costa – in reality, the history of ideas has scarcely been studied in Brazil.

One example that perhaps comes closest to the concept is the multi-volume work, História da Inteligência Brasileira, by the literary critic Wilson Martins, whose seven tomes, published from 1976 to 1978, addressed the growth of Brazilian intellectual writing from 1550 to 1960. As its name implies, national thought is represented therein by the intelligentsia of Brazilian culture, which, together with their respective schools, are correlated with the dominant ideas in each era. In this manner, Martins emphasized, in an elegant and refined analytical style, the contribution of each intellectual to what he called the construction of Brazil’s national intelligence.

This current endeavor is not as ambitious as the above-mentioned work, and it has its own set of limitations. Rather than having one author, for example, it is a collective work, and therefore subject to different historiographical approaches and to varied analytical methodologies.

Another limitation of this current book is that it does not encompass the complete universe of those who – with their writings, words and actions – contributed to the creation of what is being called, with some conceptual freedom, “Brazilian diplomatic thought.”

Many representatives of Brazilian thought and action related to the country’s international relations do not appear in this compilation of biographical and intellectual studies, even though they followed similar paths of those who were selected for the project. One reason for these omissions is that only a few of the selected figures have already been the objects of monographs specifically analyzing their thought in the field of international diplomacy. Those individuals who are included had an actual impact and a real influence on Brazil’s foreign policy, which can be assessed by their ongoing presence in the historical records, in the expert literature, and in the collective memory of the country. Thus, the present work comes close to a “history of Brazilian diplomatic ideas,” bringing together a set of essays about figures in the country’s history who influenced or led its international policy in certain fields or sectors. Therefore, there is a hope that the existing gap might be partially filled. At the very least, the endeavor represents a collection of studies focused on the contribution of the selected figures to the development of a national intelligence in the field of diplomacy.

The fact that this work is being published now indicates an intellectual maturation by the professional diplomatic community. It also reveals the growth of the scholarly community in this specialized field of the humanities: the study of Brazilian international relations. The task was not simple. Beyond biographical sketches on each of the individuals, the work included analyses of their specific contributions in the fields of foreign affairs and diplomacy, as well as some qualifications of those contributions in a historical context.

The purpose of the project was not so much to offer summarized biographies of individuals who have had an impact on Brazilian diplomacy, as that has been done before. Rather, we hope to offer a conceptual and human framework for the development of the previously mentioned diplomatic intelligence, through an analysis of the writings, works and actions of Brazilian thinkers and operators in the international arena. Regardless of whether or not the study constitutes a primary reference in this field, the books intend to be the seed of a more comprehensive project of systematic analysis of the contributions made by many generations of thinkers and practical achievers who gradually added their conceptual and pragmatic bricks to the building of Brazilian diplomacy.

One of the most important thinkers of Brazilian diplomacy was the Baron of Rio Branco. Even though he did not write much about the subject – as he was, above all, a major diplomatic formulator – almost all of his writings were about eminently practical situations. That was what distinguished him from most of his colleagues and admirers outside the realm of career diplomats, a field he had joined belatedly.

Oswaldo Aranha, in turn, who can be considered a kind of spiritual and practical follower of the Baron of Rio Branco, was not a career diplomat. Even before taking on incumbencies and functions in Brazilian diplomacy, however, he was already the most diplomatic of Brazilian politicians. His path included a long line of pragmatic negotiations, involving both politicians and the military, in order to reach goals with which he fully identified. The overthrow of the “rotten Republic” was one of those goals, and he exercised much “negotiating diplomacy” between figures from Minas Gerais and his fellow gaúchos [natives of the state of Rio Grande do Sul], before joining the revolution that overthrew Washington Luís in 1930. In the same way, Aranha considered the sending of troops to the European theater in World War II as the most diplomatic of all decisions the country would make, as it would ensure a place for Brazil in the post-war international order.

From the decisions highlighted above, it can be seen that even when “thought” is presented as something diffused; its specifically diplomatic nature immediately stands out. This becomes clearer by reviewing the ideas and the actions of the figures selected for these volumes, regardless of whether they were professional politicians, “improvised” diplomats, or even members of the military who exercised themselves more in writing and by their words than by their swords. If, as Clausewitz stated, “war is the continuation of politics by other means,” diplomacy is precisely an attempt to preserve the word when the sword is ready to be unsheathed. All the thinkers and agents previously mentioned were able to combine the virtues of soldiers and diplomats in order to achieve goals that had been defined as corresponding to the permanent national interests. In that sense, they were diplomats raised to the condition of statesmen. But was there – or is there – a special Brazilian type of diplomacy?

Using a popular Brazilian term, there is no “jeitinho” in diplomacy – meaning there is no special “knack” of doing things based on circumventing rules or breaking conventions. Those types of peculiarities are few and fortunately not persistent. For example, legislation of 1831 concerning slave trafficking, which resulted from one of the first bilateral treaties signed by the newly independent State – the convention for the abolition of trafficking, between Brazil and Great Britain in November 1826 – has been consecrated in literature, as something “for the Englishman to see.” The expression is still in use today, even though few people know that its origin had to do with a peculiarity of Brazilian politics of that time.

Yet, if Brazil did not always innovate according to standards or procedures, its rulers always sought to choose the best diplomatic solutions for the country’s challenges. That was the case in the conflicts that took place in the River Plata region, as well as in both global conflicts of the twentieth century: World War I and World War II. In its foreign affairs, Brazil always sought to conduct itself according to the same principles that guided the so-called “civilized nations.”

In a certain way, Brazil wanted to be like Europe, to have French manners, while it was supported by British money, even while it displayed a façade of parliamentarism, and maintained a stubborn slavery. The country was, however, able to maintain a relatively functional State and a certain sense of national unity. While neighboring nations were dismembered under caudillos and involved in civil wars, the Brazilian Empire at least wanted to advance and, roughly speaking, law prevailed. This allowed the president of Venezuela, Rojas Paul, to proclaim, in 1889, that Imperial Brazil, at the time of its demise, was the only Republic on the continent.

When the Brazilian educator, historian and statesman, João Pandiá Calógeras summarized the political and diplomatic evolution of the Empire at the end of the First Republic, he wrote:

The tasks carried out by the Empire had been large and noble. Brazil was threatened to be disintegrated by multiple factors and, nevertheless, it remained united... Regarding foreign affairs, the same ascending march was noticed... The generalized hostility against the Empire by the South American Republics... gradually weakened and was replaced by an environment of mutual trust. Both from Europe and from North America, identical proof of political and international credit flowed into Brazil... There was no doubt about the important place of the Empire in South America. New demonstrations of such feelings were lavished on the country at the Congress on Private International Law in Montevideo, as well as at the First Pan-American Conference in Washington, in 1889. (Formação Histórica do Brasil, 1930)

The important position of Brazil reflected in the text by Calógeras was largely due to the competent work of Imperial diplomacy, which at the time was already professional, despite adhering to criteria peculiar to the values of the monarchy. The Republic, at least as far as diplomacy was concerned, sought to preserve – although not always successfully – a sense of law, respect for the most advanced standards of international law, a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other peoples, peaceful coexistence among nations, and respect for sovereign equality among them, as Rui Barbosa stated at the Second Peace Conference of the Hague (1907).

Such a way of being and type of behavior, inherited from the Empire, had its principles and values incorporated into the professional diplomatic body by those who guided national foreign policy in the years and decades following the declaration of the republic (1889). This contributed to the practice of ascribing to Brazilian diplomacy those marks of quality, respect and seriousness that remained its acknowledged features throughout the period covered by this work. The features are so identified with Brazil, in the exercise of its foreign affairs, that after World War II, they were fully integrated into the training process for Brazilian diplomats, carried out by the Rio Branco Institute. Important intellectuals, respected professors, elite tribunes and major public celebrities not only trained several generations of diplomats, but they also served, in embassies or in delegations sent to international conferences, contributing with their eclecticism and professionalism to what became a distinctive feature of Brazilian diplomacy.

Ideas and actions through time, but above all thinkers and players

Ideas and actions do not exist in a vacuum; they are not the result of some “Hegelian spirit” that hovers like Minerva’s owl over foreign ministries. They cannot express themselves without the support of those who formulate and carry out foreign policy, in a certain historical context and in the circumstances offered by foreign, regional or global environments, with all the constraints such variables impose on the State and its agents. This, therefore, was the reason we opted for the mini-biographies of the selected figures. Each invited collaborator offers a synthesis of the contribution that each selected figure made to the collective thought of Brazilian diplomacy.

The expression “Brazilian Diplomatic Thought,” by means of its major figures, is thus justified and legitimized by a specific collective culture of the country’s diplomats, produced by the high level of socialization obtained in their training, and the adhesion to a certain esprit de corps, even by those who are “diplomats” only temporarily. And finally, the concepts embodied in those three words have been strengthened by successive waves of authorities in charge of the Brazilian Foreign Service, since Rio Branco enhanced it with his pragmatic spirit and his dominance over work dossiers based on a broad historic and political culture and on strict observances to the standards and principles of international law.

Certain figures presented here were much more practical than theoretical, or more enterprising than reflexive. This was true for Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, a diplomat “on horseback,” as described by diplomat/historian Luís Cláudio Villafañe Gomes Santos in his chapter on the Baron of Ponte Ribeiro.

Practicality may also be used to describe Oswaldo Aranha, a politician and diplomat, who understood Rio Branco and adhered to his international political teachings. Aranha was also influenced by and had much respect for Afrânio de Melo Franco, a great negotiator and an expert in international law. These men were some of the most distinguished among the many leaders of thought and action who built Brazilian diplomatic tools of the greatest quality throughout more than 200 years. The same can be said of the work and devotion of thousands of employees, and those who are called, both occasionally and regularly, to perform in the Foreign Service of the nation. The first of whom was the patriarch of Brazilian independence – and its diplomacy – José Bonifácio, who although he failed in his bolder endeavors, offered a complete agenda of economic and social change to the structure of the recently independent nation.

The Marquis of Paraná, the Viscount of Uruguay, and the Viscount of Rio Branco were all more successful than Bonifácio in their efforts to rebalance the power relationships in the Platine borders, albeit at the cost of having to resort to the power of arms, when that of words had failed.

Some of the figures – such as Rui Barbosa and Joaquim Nabuco – were perhaps more eloquent than practical. Many of these were exclusively diplomats, such as Cabo Frio, Freitas-Valle, Edmundo Barbosa da Silva and Araújo Castro. Others were basically pragmatic. This latter group includes men such as Domício da Gama, Macedo Soares, and Álvaro Alberto. Some of them were important professionals in their respective areas, such as the historians Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, Oliveira Lima, and José Honório Rodrigues, and the jurists Afrânio de Melo Franco and San Tiago Dantas. Still others seemed to be visionaries, maybe even ideologues (in the positive sense of the word); men such as Euclides da Cunha, Augusto Frederico Schmidt and Helio Jaguaribe.

The individuals in this book represent a comprehensive range of men of thought and action. Ultimately, their impact on diplo-macy will be measured by the work of scholars and collaborators known for solid research, with publications focused on the times and themes in which the individuals have distinguished themselves.

Chronology and the structural division of the work

One of the first points discussed at the beginning of the project was what historical time frame to use. Obviously, it should start with the formation of the Brazilian State – and the inauguration of an actual national diplomacy – and end somewhere in the contemporary era. The organizers opted to use 1964, the moment of the authoritarian break with the Republic of 1946, as the ending point.

The starting point is actually before 1822, the date of the country’s political independence from Portugal, since a reference work such as this one could not exclude the contribution of the “grandfather of Brazilian diplomacy,” the figure for whom the foundation in charge of the project, Alexandre de Gusmão, is named. Gusmão, therefore, is the focus of one of the first chapters of the book. The initial section also includes some of the “founding fathers” of the country, as well as of Brazilian diplomacy itself – men such as: José Bonifácio; Paulino Soares de Souza, the Viscount of Uruguay; Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, the Baron of Ponte Ribeiro; Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, the Viscount of Porto Seguro; Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Parana; José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, and the longest lasting general-secretary in the history of the ministry, Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio.

The second part of the book is directed towards the international politics of the First Republic. It mainly deals with some of the major names of the Empire, those who ennobled the diplomacy of the Republic, starting with Joaquim Nabuco. The Baron of Rio Branco also stands out in that phase, as do his friends, and occasional aids, Rui Barbosa and Euclides da Cunha, who carried out diplomatic missions even though they were not foreign-service professionals per se. This section also includes the jurist Afrânio de Melo Franco, who started a diplomatic career, then went into politics, and later carried out several diplomatic missions during the Old Republic – among which was the failed mission to turn Brazil into a member of the council of the League of Nations. Melo Franco also served the military junta that negotiated with the revolutionaries, continued under Getúlio Vargas’ provisional government, and he was the first Foreign Minister of the new Vargas regime. Two other diplomats, Manoel de Oliveira Lima, who was also a historian and essayist, and Domício da Gama, a journalist, writer and diplomat complete that first Republican cycle.

The third and last part of the book covers the Getúlio Vargas era, plus the Republic of 1946. It begins with the reform of the State, and the modernization of diplomacy initiated under Afrânio de Melo Franco and continued by Oswaldo Aranha, the man who ended the unification of the ministry’s careers. Aranha also led the Revolution of 1930, and he kept Brazil firmly in the democratic fold during the dark times of the rise of Nazi-Fascism in Europe and the Estado Novo in Brazil (1937-1945).

The first name to represent the multilateral diplomacy of Brazil was that of Cyro de Freitas-Valle, who had on his economic team, Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva, although both individuals are today, relatively unknown to the younger generation. Other names that illustrated both the Vargas era and the later democratic period were those of the businessman and politician, José Carlos de Macedo Soares, who was a foreign minister in both regimes. A representative from the military, Admiral Álvaro Alberto, is also identified both with the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) as well as the country’s nuclear program.

The end of the period, which encompasses the optimistic phase when Juscelino Kubitschek was the president and the turbulent years of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, was represented by individuals such as the sociologist, Helio Jaguaribe, the historian, José Honório Rodrigues, the poet, Augusto Frederico Schmidt, and the politicians/jurists, Afonso Arinos and San Tiago Dantas. Finally, the assessment of the major personalities ends with the name of Ambassador Araújo Castro, the last foreign minister prior to the military coup of 1964, who continued to shape Brazilian foreign affairs in the years following Goulart’s ouster, and is still influential today.

Many names were excluded due to practical difficulties of the project itself, as it is already very broad and perhaps overly ambitious. Among those not included, is Raul Fernandes, a jurist who participated in the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the first International Court of Justice. His name is connected to the so-called “optional clause of compulsory jurisdiction.” João Neves da Fontoura, a colleague of both Getúlio Vargas and Oswaldo Aranha in the Revolution of 1930, and twice Foreign Minister under the Republic of 1946, also deserves mention. They are examples of figures to be included in future editions of the book.

The decision to end in 1964 – at the beginning of the military regime – was due to practical considerations. Some of the figures who performed in the recent phase are still present in either the design or in the execution of diplomacy. A project for the contemporary phase, almost one of “immediate history,” would, therefore, have to be guided by other methodological requirements.

The meaning of intellectual enterprise

This work is one of the most serious intellectual projects carried out by Itamaraty. Not only is it a collection of brief biographies, with many analytical considerations about the ideas and actions of the selected figures, but it is also intellectual history. Although some of the figures have performed more by the practice of telegrams, memoranda, and speeches, than in the form of systematic writings, they still had precise ideas of what Brazilian diplomacy should be. All of them produced narratives outlining their views on foreign policy, either in official papers or in the works they carried out and the memories they inspired. They were statesmen in the broad sense of the word; in the sense in which a certain idea of Brazil was always present, guiding their steps in the most significant decisions.

It is that tradition this project seeks to rescue and bring to light. Even with its limitations, the work is a pioneer effort, to identify and present the ideas and concepts that oriented and guided the formulation and practical execution of Brazilian foreign affairs, since its dawn, as an autonomous State, until almost the end of the second third of the twentieth century. It is the hope and desire of the project’s organizers, that this project will inspire similar enterprises that will continue its important work.

Part I

Founding ideas of diplomatic thought

Introduction to foreign policy and the diplomatic ideas of the imperial period

Amado Luiz Cervo

The large number of historical studies published on the subject of international relations over the past few decades have increased attention on the role of the statesman, the politician and the diplomat – in addition to that of the social environment – while also uncovering occasional ingenuities in the discourse of leaders. All of this was made clear in the monumental 2012 work, Pour l’Histoire des Relations Internationales, organized by Robert Frank, heir to the group of intellectuals known as the French school of international relations. In their book, Frank and his collaborators followed the metamorphoses of studies conducted by various schools and research groups, beginning with, Introduction to the History of International Relations, published in 1964, by Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. In these studies, categories of analysis and interpretation are brought up to date, including: economics; culture; national identity; internal, external and transnational interactions; the complexity of the decision making process; and the multiple causes the French school called “forces profondes” (deep forces).

For their part, studies by Adam Watson, Hedley Bull and Brunello Vigezzi – the core of the English school – were mainly concerned with the European international society of the early nineteenth century and the international order derived from it throughout that same century. They also, however, apply their findings directly to a secular liberal-conservative understanding of the international insertion of Latin American nations since their independence. This is especially true for Vigezzi, for whom the concept of international society transforms into a powerful instrument tied to an expansion of capitalism as practiced by the central powers – an expansion carried out by inherent components, such as technological superiority, the law, diplomatic behavior, commerce, and the use of arms.

My own study of Brazil in the world of international relations began several decades ago. Most recently, I have focused on the role of schools of thought as the generator of ideas that inspire decisions. My 2008 book, Inserção Internacional: Formação dos conceitos brasileiros, for example, identifies three social groups of concept builders: major thinkers of national destiny; political and diplomatic thought; and academic production.

An interaction exists between the concepts of diplomacy, foreign policy, and international relations, and from this interaction the concept of international insertion is derived. The interaction is accomplished in such a way that one can perceive an intimate connection between political thoughts that explore the national interest, diplomatic negotiation conducive to results, and non-governmental players who act externally in search of specific interests. The sum of all this is equivalent to the national interest. In short, without diplomatic thought – one of the sources of applied concepts – and without measuring its impact on the national formation, one cannot satisfactorily study the international relations of any country. In other words, no globalization produced in the market without the participation of the state – as envisioned by authors imbued with a fundamentalist liberal dream – erases these conditionings of international relations.

Three major external goals of the Brazilian monarchy – derived from its interpretation of the national interest – were made evident by the country’s incipient diplomatic thought: the acknowledgement of sovereignty and the acceptance of Brazil’s autonomy by other governments; foreign trade and the flow of immigrants into the society and economy; and finally, a peaceful co-existence with the country’s neighbors, accomplished through the drawing of national territorial boundaries.

The “Patriarch of Independence,” José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of an independent Brazil, formalized a diplomatic thought that preceded the national formation. He conceived a community of sovereign nations made up of territories of the Portuguese colonial Empire on both sides of the South Atlantic – an idea that was quite utopian for rulers of colonial nations. Bonifácio also foresaw cordial and cooperative relations with neighboring countries, who mainly sought security in the face of attacks made by Portugal and Spain. He considered the benefits that could result from reciprocal relations with the United States and European countries. His ideas, however, did not coincide with those of the Emperor, Pedro I, and, in 1823, he was excluded from the ruling group and, indeed, spent the next six years in exile. In his absence, Brazil signed twenty treaties of recognition, between 1825 and 1828. The agreements were imposed on the country by the international powers, thereby interfering in the internal decision-making process, creating asymmetries between Brazil and the advanced capitalist nations along with deep roots of backwardness and dependence. In recognizing this international environment – and assessing the treaties as detrimental to the country – José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva becomes the originator of a truly Brazilian diplomatic thought.

The historical legacy of the independence era – beyond the diplomatic recognition issue – is viewed as an impoverishment of the national formation. In addition to stunting the fragile industrialization process initiated by Dom João VI, the interests of the agricultural sector as well as those of the exporters of primary products were also ignored by the European negotiators.

In exchange for nothing, Brazil became a market for European manufactured products and surrendered the possibility of its own industrial modernization. From that adverse conjuncture came the critical thought that emerged in the Brazilian parliament, in 1826, as well as in the diplomatic environment after the abdication of Dom Pedro I, in 1831. This thought, paradoxically, reinforced the decision-making autonomy concerned with foreign policy, while also subjecting it to the economically hegemonic group of planters and exporters of cotton, sugar, coffee and other primary products.

Three phases of Brazil’s national formation can be observed during the more than six decades of monarchy that followed independence in 1822. Each phase had its own perception of interests that many at the time believed the nation’s rulers needed to promote.

The Regency, 1831 to 1840 – when Pedro II was five to fourteen years old, and a series of regents governed the country – saw the forging of a nation State capable of exercising decision-making autonomy, with notable statesmen involved, although they were constrained by the internal environment as well as the international system.

Midway through the nineteenth century, an industrialist thought emerged, along with the first phase of capitalist modernization. This, however, was a short-lived experience, and it became weakened. There were difficulties in providing national security in the face of instability in the Platine basin, a relatively backward region compared to Brazil itself, especially concerning the implementation of a nation State capable of managing a country. Despite a coherent border policy, its design was slow in the making.

The final decades of the monarchy, disrupted by the Triple Alliance War, prolonged and consolidated the liberal-conservative paradigm which, itself, lasted more than a century – 1810 to 1930 – thereby spanning the dates of the country’s formal independence, 1822, to its change of political regimes, 1889.

The ideology embraced by Brazil’s rulers in the nineteenth century was that of European liberalism. Such liberalism was extended to the building of the monarchy’s political institutions and, later, to those of the Republic, as well as to the organization of society, with the exception of slavery. Liberalism determined how to establish property rules, how to organize production and trade, and how to behave with foreign countries. Liberal ideology was present at the time of the Regency, when the institutions of the national State were founded, and there was great controversy surrounding the issues of power centralization and decentralization. It was also present in the 1840s, when the unequal treaties of the independence period expired, and another intensive debate took place between free trade advocates and protectionists concerned with foreign trade policies and industrialization. In addition, liberal ideology prevailed during the second half of the nineteenth century and into the First Republic, 1889-1930, embedded in the mentality of the social group that held economic power and established a political system to benefit itself.

The domestic environment interacted with foreign policy as much as with systemic constraints. The agrarian exporter elites considered the State as part of their property, and they extended that “property” to diplomatic functions and positions. This all-powerful group interpreted the national interest from the top down and made decisions applied to the internal organization of the country as well as to its external actions. Diplomatic thought, as will be seen, when not fused with political thought – either in the idea or in the person – becomes intermixed with it, without jeopardizing that degree of freedom to think and decide, which comes from looking at an issue from multiple angles.

José Bonifácio, the Patriarch of Independence, and nation builder

The chapter written by the diplomat and historian, João Alfredo dos Anjos, reveals the comprehensive thought of Brazil’s first Minister of State and Foreign Affairs (1822-1823), José Bonifácio, a theorist of the nation itself and of its insertion into the international community. Bonifácio’s foundational ideas included a belief that Brazil’s recognition should not be bargained for – as it eventually was – with the sacrifice of national interests; rather, he said, it should only be traded for actual Brazilian interests. He also believed in a sovereign Brazil included in the modernizing trends of an international economy; a more equitable distribution of power; cooperation with the country’s southern neighbors, in order to provide regional security based on an efficient armed forces; negotiation with advanced nations – such as Great Britain, France, and the United States – to obtain the reciprocal benefits of foreign trade; a modernization of the new nation; a financial system open to capital from the outside, yet with a zealous concern for the nation’s wealth; and a maintenance of the country’s territorial unit, to avoid the disintegration of sovereignty, as had occurred with Spanish America. These and other facets of the diplomatic thought of José Bonifácio – at once an intellectual and a coherent public manager – are expanded upon and detailed by João Alfredo’s remarkable text.

During the sixty-seven years of the Brazilian Empire, three other statesmen – Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná; Paulino José Soares de Souza, the Viscount of Uruguay; and José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco – also exemplified diplomatic thought comparable to that of the Patriarch of Independence.

Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná, consolidates national diplomatic standards

Ambassador and historian, Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, explains the link between the thought of José Bonifácio, the originator of Brazilian foreign relations, and the maturity of the imperial institutions that elevated Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná, to the beginnings of a stable and rational management of the State, in both domestic and foreign matters. Paraná considered external actions the other side of the coin of domestic management, giving rise to the traditions of rationality and continuity in Brazilian foreign policy. At a time when the dangers came mainly from the south – from the Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel Rosas, and from a long war in Uruguay – Carneiro Leão conceived a national defense based on arms, and he invented a way to deal with the threats that caudillos presented to the nation’s integrity. He struck a balance between neutrality and intervention, subject to the opportunity of success, while preparing a future phase of understanding and co-existence.

Paulino José Soares de Souza, the Viscount of Uruguay, follows in the footsteps of the Marquis of Paraná

Although she does not make much direct reference to it, political scientist Gabriela Nunes Ferreira places both the thought and the work of Paulino José Soares de Souza, the Viscount of Uruguay, at the same level as those of Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão. Consolidating the centralized Empire and opening stable foreign perspectives, Paulino expelled the invaders from the Platine region, bringing stability to the area and creating an environment much friendlier to Brazil. He also negotiated the borders with a policy that proved generous to the Americas. In the north of the country, the Viscount of Uruguay avoided the penetration of American freebooters into the Amazon, while he encouraged the navigation of rivers along the borders. He also suppressed the trafficking of slaves, thereby avoiding another confrontation, and he stabilized the country’s relations with England.

José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco: the ideal Statesman

Historian Francisco Doratioto describes José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, as the epitome of the ideal statesman of his era, viewing him as logical, profound, and thoughtful, yet a man of firm action, seeking results. For these reasons, he saw Rio Branco as above petty struggles for power, able to face both domestic adversities and foreign arrogance, which, according to him, came from caudillos, such as those of the Spanish American foreign offices. Rio Branco’s work contributed not only to the political maturity of Brazil, but also to the formation of stable States in the Southern Cone.

Gusmão, Ponte Ribeiro, Varnhagen: geography and history

Alexandre de Gusmão, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, and Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, whose activity and thought are written about by Synesio Sampaio Goes Filho, Luis Villafãne, and Arno Wehling, respectively, were concerned with the territorial formation of the country as well as its history. All three of these early diplomats were, above all, scholars. Gusmão formalized the doctrine of uti possidetis, the ancient Roman principle of using human occupation as a legal right to a territory – a principle he included in the Treaty of Madrid of 1750. And for his part, Ponte Ribeiro persuaded both imperial and republican diplomats that this was the best doctrine to justify the Brazilian border policies, as well, according to him, as those of its neighbors. In turn, Varnhagen was an assistant to leaders in their border negotiations, and he was involved in several other diplomatic issues of his time, although his métier, even while pursuing the career of a diplomat, was that of a historian. The three of these men were, thus, instrumental in the configuration of the nation, as a single territory, one population, and a sovereign unit.

Many diplomats from the time of the Empire continued into the Republic with their behavior patterns, their diplomatic and political thought and, in some cases, even their noble titles. They became the institutional and functional continuity of diplomacy. Among those who spanned both eras were Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio; José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco; and Joaquim Nabuco, the first full ambassador of Brazil to the United States (1905-1910).

Alexandre de G usmão

Alexandre de Gusmão was born in 1695 in the then small village of Santos, a port in what would become the state of São Paulo, Brazil, although at the time it was a part of the colonial empire of Portugal. While details of his early life are somewhat sketchy, it is known that as an adolescent he studied in the colony’s capital of Salvador, Bahia, and later moved to Europe, where he studied in both Coimbra and Paris. After working as a diplomat in Paris, and then for a number of years in Rome, Gusmão became the private secretary to the Portuguese king, Dom João V; a position he held from 1730 to 1750, during which time he had great influence on decisions concerning his native Brazil. He was, for example, at the core of efforts to prepare the colony, as well as the mother country, for treaty negotiations, and in consolidating the Portuguese occupation in strategic zones – especially in South America – as well as encouraging cartographic studies.

Alexandre de Gusmão was one of the first Portuguese diplomats to clearly espouse the principle of uti possidetis, i.e., a land belongs to those who effectively occupy it. He also believed in the use of natural geographic features – rivers, mountains, plains, etc. – as national borders. Both of these concepts were consecrated in the Treaty of Madrid, the agreement for which he is most known, which was signed in 1750.

Almost forgotten in history – Gusmão was never a minister, nor did he sign any instructions or documents – this Portuguese diplomat is, however, currently considered the individual who gave the map of Brazil its basic shape. He died in Lisbon in 1756, just a couple of months short of 58 years of age.

Alexandre de Gusmão: the statesman who drew the Brazilian map

Synesio Sampaio Goes Filho

Disclosure of the unknown

In his 1942 biography of Bartolomeu de Gusmão, an eighteenth century Portuguese priest and inventor, Brazilian historian, Affonso d’Escragnole Taunay, wrote the following about Bartolomeu’s younger brother, Alexandre:

What is currently known about Alexandre de Gusmão is fragmentary and, above all, incomplete. It represents only part of the definitive study that, in a few years, will be written about this immortal Brazilian… (p. 21).

Indeed, until then, little had been said about Alexandre de Gusmão. Most early histories of Brazil were written by Europeans, and writers such as Robert Southey, from Great Britain, and Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius and Gottfreid Heinrich Handelmann, from Germany, do not even mention Gusmão. Likewise, already in the twentieth century, Brazil’s most famous early historian, João Capistrano de Abreu, who wrote a remarkable overview of the country’s colonial period, ignored Gusmão. And Caio Prado Junior, whose classic, Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo, is a valuable study on the settlement of colonial Brazil, including its material and social life, also overlooks this early Portuguese diplomat.

It is interesting to note, however, that unlike books written specifically about history, Alexandre de Gusmão is more often mentioned in literary volumes, including collections of classics. In 1841, for example, a work entitled Collecção de Vários Escritos Inéditos, Políticos e Litterários de Alexandre de Gusmão (A Collection of Various Unpublished Political and Literary Writings of Alexandre de Gusmão) was published in Porto, Portugal. Reissued in São Paulo, in 1943, under the name A. Gusmão – Obras (A. Gusmão – Works) the book was included in the series, Os mestres da língua (The Masters of the Language). In that work, the Santos native is specifically noted for the boldness and irreverence with which he treated the powerful of his time. Other books about his writings, including the 1981 volume, Alexandre de Gusmão – Cartas, dedicated to his letters, are part of the official collection: Biblioteca dos Autores Portugueses (Library of Portuguese Authors). The collection enjoyed much editorial success. By the late nineteenth century, Camilo Castelo Branco, in his Curso de Literatura Portuguesa, equated Gusmão to two of Portugal’s greatest writers:

For [his] wisdom of observation and cunningness of critique – and for those who put sociological studies before linguistic prolixity – the secretary of Dom João V is greater than Antônio Vieira and Dom Francisco Manuel de Mello (Cited in JORGE, 1946, p. 114).

Assessing Gusmão as a politician, Castelo Branco also does not withhold his praise. Indeed, in his opinion, Alexandre de Gusmão should be compared favorably to the Marquis of Pombal:

All of those measures for which Sebastião de Carvalho [Pombal] has been praised – currency matters, national industries, the colonies, business in America, Brazilian mines, [and] the obnoxious distinctions between new and old Christians – can be found in Gusmão’s writings (Cited in JORGE, 1946, p. 119).

There is definitely exaggeration in Castelo Branco’s assessment. What should be kept in mind, however, is that this prolific Portuguese writer places Gusmão at the greatest heights, comparing him favorably to the Jesuit, Antonio Vieira, in literature, and the Marquis of Pombal, in politics.

Today, we can make a more balanced assessment of Gusmão as a universal man who, although he never became famous as a writer, wrote very easily and gracefully. As the Portuguese historian and literary critic, Fidelino de Figueiredo, wrote of Gusmão’s work (1960, p. 300):

The boldness of the language, almost arrogant, with which the secretary allowed himself to caution and censor the great ones of the Kingdom on behalf of the sovereign, is what delighted Camilo [Castelo Branco] and other readers of the nineteenth century.

In addition to his writings, Gusmão’s work as a statesman – mainly in the conception and negotiation of the Treaty of Madrid – ensures him a significant place in Portuguese-Brazilian diplomatic history.

Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, a nineteenth century Brazilian diplomat and historian, was one of the first to write about Gusmão. Although he only wrote a few lines, concerning Gusmão’s role in the negotiation and writing of the Treaty of Madrid, those few lines do the Santos native justice: “On the Portuguese side, one who really understood everything in that negotiation was the famous Brazilian statesman Alexandre de Gusmão” (1975, Tome IV, p. 84).

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the head of Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for ten years, (better known by his title, Baron of Rio Branco), also wrote favorably about Gusmão. In his Efemérides Brasileiras (Brazilian Diary), published by the Jornal do Comércio, he said that “the real negotiator of the Treaty [of Madrid] was the honorable Alexandre de Gusmão, from São Paulo, even though his name does not appear on the document” (2012, vol. VI-A, p. 54). Later, when Rio Branco defended Brazil in the boundary dispute of Palmas, he also left no doubt about the importance of Gusmão’s work.

In 1916, Ambassador Araújo Jorge, a frequent collaborator of Rio Branco, gathered several historical essays into a book, including a chapter he entitled: Alexandre de Gusmão, o Avô dos Diplomatas Brasileiros (Alexandre de Gusmão – the Grandfather of Brazilian Diplomats). The book gives Gusmão the distinction he deserves, especially for his work during the final 20 years of the reign of Dom João V. Araújo Jorge paints a picturesque view of Portugal at the time of that king – especially Lisbon with its alleys full of life, mystery and dirt before the earthquake of 1755. He also includes a summary of the “Brazilian” works of Gusmão; a review of the problems of the Colony of Sacramento (now a part of Uruguay); a brief history of the conflicts for ownership of the southern lands that became Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay; as well as a debate concerning the crucial points of the Treaty of Madrid.

Finally, in the 1950’s, there was the imposing nine-volume work, Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madri, by the Portuguese historian, Jaime Cortesão, an expert in the territorial formation of Brazil. Cortesão’s work is unparalleled due to its great amount of documentation, which definitely rescues the political and diplomatic actions of Gusmão. The study has five parts. The first part (in two volumes, recently published by Funag), is a compilation of Gusmão’s studies of Brazil. (An analysis of the antecedents leading up to the Treaty of Madrid, along with the negotiations and execution of the treaty deserve special attention.) The other four parts (seven volumes) include all of the available documentation on the treaty. The work is not precisely a biography of Gusmão. Rather, it is a broad study of the “man and his greatest achievements and, as such, it is strictly concerned with the period of his life related to the Treaty of Madrid” (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome I, p. 9).

Thus, unlike most of the other individuals in this collection of thinkers and performers of Brazilian foreign policy, Alexandre de Gusmão does not have an extensive written biography, nor is there a large record of his speeches available to historians, as for example, there is with Araujo Castro, to cite another figure in this series.

In reality, according to scholars, such as the Brazilian historian, Fernando Novais, who has written extensively about his country’s colonial period, Gusmão is not even a Brazilian, as his birthplace of Santos – although currently located in the state of São Paulo – was, at the time, a part of the Portuguese Empire. We agree with Novais on this matter: Alexandre de Gusmão was Portuguese. Due to his expertise and qualities as a statesman, however, he proved himself an articulate and successful advocate of the territorial interests of that part of the Portuguese Empire, which later became Brazil.

Gusmão’s “diplomatic thoughts” and ideas are most present in the Treaty of Madrid, as well as in the letters and documents related to it. Indeed, it was because of his work on that treaty that the publisher of this book, “The Alexander de Gusmão Foundation” (Funag, from its native Portuguese), took his name. Additionally, it is for this same reason, Gusmão is one of the three figures – together with the Baron of Rio Branco and Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro – honored in the “Room of Treaties” of Itamaraty.

Although Portuguese by nationality, Gusmão is considered a precursor of Brazilian diplomats and is included in several works about Brazilian foreign policy, including two books written this decade: Missões de Paz, by Raul Mendes da Silva (org.), and Diplomacia Brasileira Para a Paz, by Clovis Brigagão and Fernanda Fernandes (org.).

We cannot talk about Gusmão without discussing his “masterpiece,” the Treaty of Madrid, but first let us anticipate a question concerning the importance of that treaty; namely: What was Brazil like before the treaty was signed in 1750? In response: Brazil was a large amorphous territory, not very well known, and no one really knew what it included, or even where it ended. If it is true that the exact line of the Treaty of Tordesillas was ignored in the early days of colonization, at least then there was a theoretical border. With the occupation of the Amazon River basin, however, along with the foundation of the Colony of Sacramento across the estuary from Buenos Aires, and the discovery of gold in the Central-West region of the colony, the notion of borders was completely lost. Where, for example, were the borders of the southern region of Brazil, the current states of Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul? There is no one definitive answer to that question, as it depended on who drew the maps. According to a map of South America made by the famous French geographer Bourguignon d’Anville, in 1748, Brazil was a land constituted by only a very narrow coastline – almost squeezed by a large Paraguay – and this may, indeed, have been a neutral and realist viewpoint at the time.

Portuguese historian, André Ferrand de Almeida, (1984) saw the colonial territory of Brazil in the following manner:

Well into the eighteenth century, Brazil appears as an archipelago of a few islands [...] a huge space fragmented into several population centers, specialized in various economic activities, and separated from one another by huge distances (p. 44).

It is, therefore, easy to imagine the insecurity of the Portuguese rulers, caused by an abundantly rich colony with ill-defined borders and an uncertain territory. By 1730, in addition to the traditional sugar cane plantations in the Northeast region, gold was being mined in the Central-West provinces of Minas Gerais, Cuiabá and Goiás. Additionally, for domestic use, livestock was being produced on the broad area of pastures, known as the vacarias, located between the Uruguay River and the coastline – currently parts of the state of Rio Grande do Sul and the country of Uruguay.

Biographical features

Born July 17, 1695, in the “village of Santos,” as people called it at the time, Alexandre de Gusmão was from a relatively poor yet locally-prominent family. His father, Francisco Lourenço Rodrigues, was the head medical doctor of the village jailhouse. Among twelve siblings, three took the family name of their father’s friend and family protector, the Jesuit, Alexandre de Gusmão, a writer and founder of the Belém Seminary, in Salvador, Bahia. (As is evident, Alexandre, himself, has both the given and the family name of this somewhat famous Ignatian priest.) One of his older brothers, Bartolomeu Lourenço de Gusmão, became a Jesuit, himself, and was known as “the flying priest,” due to his experiments with hot air balloons – one of which was involved in a disaster in front of Dom João V and his court.

When Alexandre was 15 years old, after studying at the school of his godfather and namesake in Bahia, he crossed the ocean and went to Lisbon. There the young man obtained royal protection, acquired – according to some authors – because the king, Dom João V, liked a poem written by the Santos native about his “royal person,” to use another expression of the time. After studying at Coimbra, his royal protection, as well as his talents, which had already revealed themselves, rendered him an appointment to a diplomatic post in Paris with the Portuguese Ambassador, Dom Luís Manuel da Câmara, Count of Ribeira Grande. On his way to Paris, Gusmão spent a few months in Madrid, where he got to know the problem that became the focus of his professional life: the colonial borders of South America, including the importance that the enclave of the Colony of Sacramento had for their establishment. In Paris, where he remained for five years, he attended higher education, obtaining a doctorate in Civil, Roman and Ecclesiastic Law. (As a curiosity, it should also be mentioned that while in France, perhaps due to his poor finances, he opened a gambling house and had problems with the police, activities that would not be acceptable for a diplomat today.)

After his years in Paris, Gusmão returned to Lisbon, where he was assigned, once again, to a mission abroad; this time to Rome, where he stayed for seven years. During his time in Rome, among other achievements, he acquired for his king the title of Fidelíssimo, thereby equating him to the kings of Spain and France, who already had obtained the respective papal titles of Católica and Cristianíssima. His mission was not a complete success, however, since he did not obtain the automatic cardinal hood for the nuncios in Portugal as Dom João V desired.

Gusmão returned to Lisbon for good in 1722 and began an intense literary and academic life. He also became part of a group, nicknamed the estrangeirados, derived from the Portuguese word for foreigner. The group believed that Portugal should free itself from old traditions, and open itself to the new winds of enlightenment and rationalism coming from France and England. At that time, one could already notice the humor and tendency to caricature that were to characterize Gusmão’s style of communication throughout his career. Below are examples of this style, taken from letters he wrote when he was already in service to the crown.

In one letter, Gusmão satirized the reaction of the Portuguese court – full of religious superstitions – to proposals made by a fellow estrangeirado, Dom Luiz da Cunha, the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris, who had recommended that Dom João V play a more active role in the negotiations of European peace, in 1745:

I tried to speak to His Venerable [Cardinal da Mota, Prime-Minister] more than three times before he listened to me, and I found him telling the story of the appearance of Sancho to his Lord. That brought Father Causino into his Holy Court, whose story was listened to with great attention by the Duke of Lafões, the Marquis of Valença, Fernão Martins Freire, and others. He answered me, saying that God had left us in peace, and that Your Excellency wanted to put us into quarrels, which was tempting God. Finally, I talked to the King, (Praise be God!). He was asking the parish priest how much was yielded by the alms of the souls, as well as the masses that were said for them! He told me that Your Excellency’s proposition was very appropriate to the French elites, with whom Your Excellency has co-nationality; and that he would not continue further (GUSMÃO, 1981, p. 128).

In the same vein, the French Ambassador in Lisbon, who complained about the Portuguese king for the delay to proceed with a certain topic, was admonished, although with grace:

Even though the King thinks he is free from giving explanations to Your Excellency, he commanded me to tell Your Excellency that he had already answered His Majesty, “Cristianíssima,” more than six months ago, as his Minister of State [the French Premier] has discussed the subject with Ambassador Dom Luiz da Cunha. Therefore, Your Excellency should not complain about the procedures from this court, but instead about those from France, whose Minister forgot the fact that he is Your Excellency’s Ambassador ... (GUSMÃO, 1981, p. 49).

Gusmão also once wrote a strongly worded letter to a major figure of the Kingdom, Dom Antônio de Almeida, Count of Lavradio, at the time, the governor of Angola. He began his letter by saying: “Your Excellency rules that kingdom like the Turkish pashas ...” (GUSMÃO, 1943, p. 34).

In 1730, Alexandre de Gusmão was designated the private secretary – “the Clerk of Purity,” according to many papers of the time – to king, Dom João V. That same year, he became a member of the Overseas Council. From then on, Gusmão became very influential in the decisions of the Portuguese government, above all in Roman affairs – although in Lisbon, he had much competition from the likes of cardinals, nuncios, chaplains, and confessors. On matters dealing with Brazil, however, it was he who was “the Pope” – as he was extremely prepared for functions related to this subject area.

Gusmão knew Brazil very well – less from having been born there, but more because he had studied a great deal about the colony. He also knew how important Brazil was to Portugal, which at that time had already lost several of its eastern possessions to England and the Netherlands. Therefore, to ensure that Portugal’s firm grip on its American colony went much beyond the Tordesillas line, he began the work that ensures him permanence in the history of Brazilian diplomacy. When his work was completed, in 1750, Portugal had signed an agreement with Spain on borders for Brazil, such that its territory included all lands occupied by the Portuguese-Brazilians.

In many ways, Alexandre de Gusmão was a polygraph who thought and wrote about a great variety of topics. When Jaime Cortesão studied his work from all available sources, he was surprised with its extent. Cortesão’s study included:

Official, unofficial and family mail; political and geographic memoirs; essays on political economy, literary reviews, social habits, and even a study about the new Portuguese orthography; academic speeches and panegyrics; opera librettos, poems, translations of poems and rhyming dictionaries; opinions as a member of the Overseas Council, and as an aid to Dom João V; and, finally, his drafts of laws, ordinances, charters, seals, letters and all kinds of royal orders, plus, above all, diplomatic instructions and mail about acts or treaties being negotiated with the Apostolic See, Spain, France and Great Britain (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome I, p. 9).

Gusmão also wrote a very funny and almost lewd theatrical play, O Marido Confundido [the Confused Husband], which was both staged and translated.

Among his extensive volume of work, of special significance to this current book, are Gusmão’s studies about Brazil. There, the hand and mind of this native of Santos can be seen in every major policy of Portugal related to the colony, especially during the years of its territorial formation between 1730 and 1750. Some of the topics included in his writings were the emigration of Azorean couples to occupy Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina; the capitação, i.e., a per capita tax on gold production; the visit to Brazil of specialists in the determination of longitude, to get an exact idea of what lands Portugal occupied; and the written defense of those Portuguese occupations in South America.

Once the Treaty of Madrid was signed in 1750, Gusmão’s star went out. His protector, Dom João V, died that same year, followed by the subsequent rise of Dom José I, along with his all-powerful minister, the future Marquis of Pombal, who was not a friend of Gusmão. Soon there came the sad times of political persecution and attacks on the agreement. There was also bitterness in his personal life, as his wife died, and he lost his home in a fire. On May 9, 1753, Alexandre de Gusmão, himself, died in Lisbon – poor, abandoned, and frustrated.

Today, however, more than 250 years after his death, Gusmão’s star is shining again; no longer with the ephemeral character of life, but with the permanence of his work. When he took on roles in the Court, his knowledge of both Brazilian history and its geography, insurmountable at the time, made him certain that it was absolutely essential, to ensure next to Spain the maintenance of the physical base, won with such sacrifice by the bandeirantes, soldiers, religious people and simple dwellers. With this objective in mind, he thought, acted and was lucky enough to complete his work. His negotiator qualities, served by his vast knowledge of the land of his birth, made him a great advocate of Brazilian interests in the eighteenth century – just as the Baron of Ponte Ribeiro, would be during the period of the Empire, and the Baron of Rio Branco at the turn of the twentieth century, the two men with whom he shares the “Room of Treaties.”

Productive ideas and background information on the Treaty of Madrid

In order to make an agreement that would divide an entire continent, it was necessary to be prepared in technical terms. The geographical knowledge of the Iberian nations was very poor, despite being pioneers in exploration at the time of the great discoveries, especially in South America. Portugal, however, through the direct encouragement of the Crown, was able to react, and in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, there was a real renaissance in the study of both navigation and geography. Experts from several European nations were invited to Lisbon and two of them – called “the mathematician priests,” as they were Jesuits – were sent to Rio de Janeiro in 1729, with a mission to elaborate a new atlas of the colony. What the Portuguese government wanted was to have a clear idea of the location of the occupied territories, in relation to the Tordesillas line, especially after the recent advances in the Central-West region of the colony. The Crown’s reaction had been spurred by the 1720 publication of the first scientific map of the Earth, with latitudes and longitudes observed from astronomic measurements, made by the French geographer, Guillaume Delisle. As a result of this publication, maps of South America showed that the Colony of Sacramento, the entire Amazon River basin, and the mines of Cuiabá and Guaporé were outside the territory assigned to Portugal by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. Dom Luiz Cunha, one of the greatest Portuguese statesmen of the century, who was in Paris at the time, had sent the maps to Lisbon, and Alexandre de Gusmão certainly got to know them.

It was shocking that an expert from another nation could carry out a work about South America – a region in which access was difficult for foreigners and geographic information was secret – while neither the Portuguese nor the Spanish, both with large colonial Empires and many interests in the area, had yet done so.

Jaime Cortesão exposed Portugal’s reaction to the Delisle maps in the following manner:

The King and the educated classes woke up to the study of geography, cartography and, as a consequence, to astronomy as well. It cannot be denied that sovereignty ... and the desire to affirm it on new, broad and rich territories, were at the base of that renaissance. But [whatever the motivation], Delisle’s maps were the warning sign (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 281).

And what did Spain do, especially, considering that it was also interested in proving that its American territory had been invaded, as it had reason to suppose? Cortesão answers the question by saying that Spain did nothing, or almost nothing; adding that: “such a cultural imbalance [meaning cartographic] had an influence... on the negotiations of the Treaty of Madrid, in favor of Portugal” (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 299).

The propositions on which the Treaty of Madrid are based include the following: Portugal occupied lands in America, but Spain benefited in the East; the borders would no longer be abstract geodesic lines, such as that of Tordesillas, but rather, whenever possible, they would be easily identifiable landforms; the origin of the right to property would be the actual occupation of the territory; and, in exceptional cases, there could be an exchange of territory.

A document from 1736, handwritten partly by Alexandre de Gusmão, with corrections and additions by Dom Luís da Cunha, proves the direct affiliation between the ideas of Gusmão and the basic articles of the Treaty of Madrid. As was common at the time, the document, originally in French, has a long title; translated it reads: “An essay that geographically describes the treaties between the crowns of Portugal and Spain concerning the borders of their dominions in America, this is to say, on the banks of the Plata River.”

The document’s goal was to spread in Europe the Portuguese position on yet another divergence between Portugal and Spain, concerning ownership of the Colony of Sacramento and the so-called Platine War (1735-1737). The essay is a complete anticipation of the Treaty of Madrid; it is easy to link articles of the latter to paragraphs of the former.

The dominant opinion today, in both Brazil and Portugal, is that no uncertainty exists concerning the fundamental role of Alexandre de Gusmão in the design and negotiation of the Treaty of Madrid. That, however, was not always the case. In the past, influenced by the fact that Gusmão never had the title of Minister of State, there were dissenting voices about the decision-making powers of this native of Santos in the final twenty years of the reign of Dom João V. The controversies began in his time, as he was hated by the “most genuine and orthodox” part of the nobility, which accused him, sotto voce, in that period of exacerbated religiosity, of being a new Christian. (He had Jewish friends, and his brother, Bartolomeu, the priest, had been accused of having converted to Judaism and was persecuted by the Inquisition.)

Even more recently, there have been dissenting opinions on Alexandre de Gusmão, as evidenced in the book, História Diplomática de Portugal (1992), by Pedro Soares Martinez. In his book, Professor Martinez is not sympathetic towards the estrangeirados, and he is annoyed with Gusmão’s critical and irreverent personality – which does not spare even the King whom he served. The historian alleges that Gusmão was merely a “scribe” of Dom João V, which he says is what justified so many official documents written by him. In addition, Martinez decreases Gusmão’s importance in the negotiations of the Treaty of Madrid, and he claims, curiously, that it is even “doubtful that the Treaty of 1750 was advantageous to Portugal” (p. 193). Because of the agreement, Martinez said, the country lost the much desired Platine border. This, in fact, was also the belief of the Marquis of Pombal, who in 1751, even said that there had been a trade of a large territory, stretching from La Plata River to the Ibicuí River, for “seven miserable Indian villages” – a statement which was not exactly true.

The case for Gusmão’s power, however, is strong. In the absolutist government of Dom João V, power was exercised by whoever had the confidence of the King, not just anyone who had an official position. Three examples prove the prestige and importance of Gusmão in the court. The first, concerning his prestige, is the perception of a foreigner who knew him well, and even had differences with him: the Count of Baschi, the French Ambassador to Lisbon. In a dispatch to Paris, on the occasion of Gusmão’s death, in 1753, Baschi wrote that it was: “A great loss for Portugal […] this man of the Kingdom was very much a genius” (ALMEIDA, L.F., 1990, p. 49).

Other examples of positive assessments of Gusmão’s power are from respected, and more current, Portuguese historians: José Hermano Saraiva, for example, has written that:

The king [Dom João V] was paralyzed in the last few years and the ministers were, similar to him, both old and tired. There was one exception: Alexandre de Gusmão, an “estrangeirado,” who had seen Portugal submerged by the waves of supers-tition and ignorance (SARAIVA, 1989, p. 247).

And António Henrique de Oliveira Marques, wrote:

Alexandre de Gusmão was appointed private secretary to the king and was practically Prime-Minister, between 1720 and 1750. (MARQUES, 1998, vol. II, p. 336).

Let us add that Gusmão’s famous caution or reprimand letters – which he penned to important noblemen and administrators for several years in a row – could never have been written, had he not enjoyed full royal authority.

As for the lost territory – currently Uruguay – it is enough to verify that the Portuguese-Brazilians never dominated in that region. They only had de facto control of the Colony of Sacramento, as the territory was, in the Spanish view of the Treaty of Utrecht, not beyond the perimeter of “a cannon shot.” Isolated from the Portuguese nuclei of the Atlantic coast, Sacramento could not be defended if the Spanish from Buenos Aires and Montevideo were ever really tempted to take it over. In Gusmão’s expressive words, it was nothing more than “a [Portuguese] jailhouse enclosed in Spain’s dominion” (1943, p. 132).

We have already extensively mentioned the work by Jaime Cortesão, which was crucial in establishing credibility for Gusmão’s major diplomatic work; now I would like to mention the Portuguese historian Luís Ferrand de Almeida, who may be the most important expert in the formation of Brazil’s borders in the Rio Grande do Sul region. Ferrand de Almeida’s book, Alexandre de Gusmão, o Brasil e o Tratado de Madrid, published in 1990, is devoted exactly to that subject matter. The book reviews the existing facts and opinions, and it has no doubt about giving a major political protagonist role to the famous Secretário d’El Rei – to use the title of a play by the historian and diplomat, Manuel de Oliveira Lima – confirming the Secretário as the basic engine of the agreement that gave Brazil its present shape.

In one part of his book, Ferrand de Almeida lists and comments upon eleven documental proofs, contemporary to the Treaty of Madrid, which conclude “that Alexandre de Gusmão’s role, both in the draft and the final text of the treaty, was actually fundamental” (1990, p. 57). Let us mention only one of the documents, chosen because it is a letter of the rival of the Portuguese, Dom José de Carvajal, the chief Spanish negotiator for the treaty. The letter, written in 1751, refers to the new Portuguese minister, the Marquis of Pombal, who had criticized the agreement:

I find it very interesting that you desire to destroy the opinion of a Minister who represented your Court [Gusmão]. He was very capable in this matter [the borders of Brazil] and very prepared for this work [the negotiation of the treaty]. Because of this [Gusmão’s abilities and preparedness], it was necessary to pretend there were errors in the unresolved matters. (p. 54).

Despite one or another opposing opinion, the mainstream of the current historical thought is that Alexandre de Gusmão was the statesman who most clearly saw the advantages of using the rules of uti possidetis and natural borders, to limit the huge colonial areas at the center of South America. Gusmão was also courageous to accept the trade for the Colony of Sacramento and give up the old dream of the Platine region – after so much effort, so many struggles, and so many deaths.

We should not, however, exaggerate. Alexandre de Gusmão’s ideas were not random; they were already present in an embryonic form in the documents of previous colonial administrators, as was justly stated by the North-American historian, David M. Davidson, in his book, “Colonial Roots of Modern Brazil” (1973, p. 73):

Like the members of the Council of India of the 1720’s, Gusmão suspected that much of the Brazilian hinterland was located west of the Tordesillas line and like his predecessors, he considered that an occupation was a much more solid base for sovereignty than the traditional division, and that the geographical landforms were the only appropriate marks to set the boundaries of the territory. Even though Gusmão was the first Portuguese official to state in a clear and sophisticated manner the principles of uti possidetis and natural borders, he relied on policies that were already present in the official Portuguese thought.

The negotiations of Madrid

Shortly before mid-eighteenth century, with Gusmão active in the decision making, Portugal was prepared to negotiate with Spain. Capistrano de Abreu (1963, p. 196) makes it clear that a border agreement was urgent:

The rapid expansion of Brazil – in the Amazon to the Javari [river], in Mato Grosso to the Guaporé [river], and now in the South – made urgent the need to deal head-on with the matter of borders between the Portuguese and Spanish possessions, which had [previously] always been delayed yet then always re-emerged.

What was missing during those delays was the historic opportunity that arose with the ascension to the Spanish throne, in 1746, of Ferdinand VI, the son-in-law of Dom João V. The dealings began immediately thereafter. In that same year, there were also two nominations made that helped to move the issue forward: the competent Dom José de Carbajal y Lancaster was appointed a Minister to the Spanish king, Ferdinand VI; and Tomás da Silva Teles, Viscount of Vila Nova da Cerveira, arrived in Madrid as the new Ambassador of Dom João V. (Although today it is known that the main articulator of the Treaty of Madrid was Gusmão, according to Admiral Max Justo Guedes, who rarely abused superlatives and said that one must not forget the important role played in the negotiations by “the very skilled Tomás da Silva Teles” (1997, p. 28)).

Among the many documents released by Jaime Cortesão, concerning the positions of each of the parties involved in the negotiations, two sets stand out. First, there was the initial Portuguese proposal with room for adjustments, along with the Spanish reply; and then there was a second Portuguese proposal, this time already articulating an agreement, along with a new Spanish reply that improved formal aspects of the proposal and introduced some new items.

It is interesting to note that the often-mentioned Article 21 of the future Treaty – which disallowed that any war be fought on the South American continent, even if the European powers were in combat – was, according to Cortesão, not written by Gusmão. Rather, he says that Carbajal is its author. The thesis – considered by many to be the seed of Pan-Americanism, and thereby links its author to the Monroe Doctrine – had been accepted by several Brazilian historians and diplomats, including the Baron of Rio Branco. It had also been disseminated by Rodrigo Otávio, an attorney, who gave a presentation at the Sorbonne in 1930 under the title “Alexander de Gusmão and the American Spirit in International Politics.”

Portugal sought to negotiate a balanced treaty which, at the expense of conceding the Platine region, if necessary, preserved for itself the Amazon and the Central-West region. The agreement would create a strategic border in the South, and block any Spanish attempt in the region where the balance of power tended towards Buenos Aires. Later, in 1751, when Gusmão defended the Treaty from accusations made by Brigadier Antônio Pedro de Vasconcelos, a former governor of the Colony of Sacramento, he said that its purpose was to “provide a large and competent base ... to round out the country and hold it together” (GUSMÃO, 1943, p. 132). The primary goal for Spain was to stop for good the Portuguese expansion, which had gradually taken pieces of its Empire in South America; then, to reserve the exclusiveness of the Platine estuary for Spain, thus avoiding the smuggling Andean silver which was going out through the Colony of Sacramento. And finally, with the peace provided by the agreement, the many European nations who were enemies of Madrid would be precluded from taking advantage of the peninsular rivalry and settling into the Americas.

The Portuguese proposals, developed by Alexandre de Gusmão, revolved around the following points:

•It was necessary to conclude a general boundary treaty and not make successive adjustments on specific parts of the border, as Spain had originally wanted to do;

•Such a treaty could only be accomplished by discarding the meridian of Tordesillas, which had been violated by the Portuguese in America, and even more by Spain in the Eastern Hemisphere;

•The foundation of the agreement would be the two principles of uti possidetis and natural borders, as referred to respectively in the preamble: “each party shall keep what it currently has” and “the borders of both domains ... are the origin and course of rivers, and the most remarkable mountains”;

•The Colony of Sacramento and adjacent territory were Portuguese, if not by the Treaty of Tordesillas, then definitely by the second Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1715;

•It could be said [clearly with the Colony of Sacramento in mind] “that a party trades with another party that which is most useful to it; that which does the most damage to it to own” (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 285).

Spain, in reply, argued the following points:

•Since the historical circumstances that led to Spanish sovereignty over several Pacific islands are complex, it is best for the negotiations to do without any claims in that hemisphere;

•It was intolerable for Spain that the Colony of Sacramento be the “reason for the loss of the riches of Peru” (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 296);

•It was advisable to trade the Colony of Sacramento for an equivalent area “easy to find in the territories of Cuiabá and Mato Grosso, even though, upon the death of Felipe V, the Spanish government would study the means to get it back” [supposedly without anything in exchange] (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 297).

As the negotiations advanced, there was a gradual focusing in on the territory of the Sete Povos das Missões as the bargaining chip for the Colony of Sacramento. The Sete Povos das Missões had been founded by Spanish Jesuits between 1687 and 1707, in western Rio Grande do Sul; some of the missions were set in the remains of settlements that had escaped the destruction by bandeirantes, who had explored there in the early decades of the seventeenth century. Spain also agreed to give up some of its settlements on the right bank of the Guaporé River – where, today, the Prince of Beira Fort stands, and the Jesuit mission of Santa Rosa had once been located. In compensation, Spain got a strip of land formed by the Solimões and Japurá rivers, where there was a Portuguese fort that was an ancestor of Tabatinga.

Little by little, the description of the borders became more accurate. The changes can be perfectly accompanied by reading the detailed letters that Gusmão sent to the Portuguese trader in Madrid. (The letters, however, were not signed by him, but rather the minister, Marco Antônio de Azeredo Coutinho.)

The borders described in these letters are basically those included in the treaty itself; the first draft of which was sent to Madrid in late 1748.

To serve as a visual support for the negotiations, in early 1749, Gusmão sent to Silva Teles a map, drawn up under his supervision, with the proposed boundaries. It is the first map of Brazil with the almost triangular shape that we all know today. This deservedly famous map, known as the Mapa das Cortes, was crucial to the Portuguese. On the map, which skillfully combined other well-known and trusted maps of South America, the extra-Tordesillas area of Brazil was greatly diminished, which gave the impression of there being meager territorial gains to the west of the meridian. The map, despite this defect, was the best there was at that time, because it included the data obtained by the latest penetrations of backwoods explorers. Accepted by both delegations, it was the basis for both the final negotiations and the subsequent demarcation campaigns. The map was rediscovered by the Baron of Rio Branco, and Itamaraty has one of the original copies in its map collection.

Roberto Simonsen, a Brazilian diplomat, economist, and historian is quoted by Cortesão, as saying the following about the Mapa das Cortes:

The map of Brazil is clearly deformed, with Cuiabá under the same meridian as the mouth of the Amazon River, next to which the line of Tordesillas was supposed to pass through (an error of nine degrees). This construction, which showed the occupied area smaller than it actually was, may have been made this way in order to make it easier for the Spanish to accept the uti possidetis principle, which integrated into Portuguese America much land to the west of the meridian of Tordesillas (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 329).

Cortesão, himself, is even harsher: “The Mapa das Cortes was deliberately tainted in its longitudes for diplomatic purposes” (s.d., Tome II, p. 332). Nevertheless, he advocated such a procedure:

At the time, Alexandre de Gusmão represented a policy of secrecy, which the Portuguese had been practicing in its geographic discoveries since the 1400’s. Dom João V, according to a secular tradition, kept the cartography of the mathematician priests a secret. The Mapa das Cortes was nothing more than the necessary consequence of an old policy that was still officially being used (s.d., Tome II, p. 333).

Leaving aside possible ethical considerations, the Spaniards also adapted maps to their political interests. This was revealed in a study published in a recent issue of the specialized magazine Imago Mundi, concerning a large map of South America drawn by Cruz Cano y Olmedilla that was used as the basis of the Treaty of San Ildefonso. (The map is displayed at the General Secretariat of the Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia.)

The Treaty of Madrid was signed on January 13, 1750. Thus, the occupation of the Amazon, the Centro-West and the South of Brazil, which had been carried out at various times throughout the 250 years of colonial life, was legalized, and the old Platine dream was abandoned. Although later annulled, the treaty provided close to natural borders for Brazil. Cortesão quotes the German geographer B. Brandt, who said that:

The borders [of Brazil] are considered, on the whole, reasonably natural lines, in correspondence with the configuration of the surface. In the South they almost coincide with the limits between the Brazilian mountains and the Platine plains; [and] in the North, the main dividers are the Amazon, the Orinoco and Guyanian rivers. In the West, they do not reach the area between the Brazilian plains and the mountain chain of the Pacific, but they stay in the Amazon River basin. There too, however, given the frequent river obstacles, they do not free themselves from nature. It can be said, without being very inaccurate, that they often come close to the continental divide of the river flow (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tomo II, p. 381).

This was the myth of the “island of Brazil” which, with the imperfections of reality, was materializing.

Death and life of a treaty

Several reasons led to the annulment of the Treaty of Madrid, in 1761. In the South, there was the Guarani War; while in the North, demarcation difficulties proved insurmountable.

Although controversial, some authors, such as Brazilian historians, José Carlos de Macedo Soares and João Pandiá Calógeras, allege that it was opposition from the Jesuits that provided the greatest obstacle to the treaty:

When one weighs the factors in the decision to annul Madrid, it seems that, in the environment of ill will against the precursory work of Alexandre de Gusmão, the major element was the long campaign of the Jesuits against the cession of the territory of the Sete Povos das Missões (1972, vol. 1, p. 224).

Others, however, such as the Brazilian journalist and histo-rian, Hélio Vianna, believed that the charges against the Jesuits were not supported by documents. Rather, he said there were excuses found at the time, to attack the Society of Jesus, which later, in 1759, was expelled from Brazil. The Portuguese historian, Viscount of Carnaxide (1979, p. 10), an expert on relations between Brazil and Portugal at the time of the Marquis of Pombal (1750-1777), arrived at an intermediate conclusion that distinguishes the reactions of local Jesuit rulers of the lands of the Sete Povos das Missões from the orientation of their European headquarters. In Carnaxide’s words:

The missionary Jesuits [in Brazil] opposed the trans-migration of the peoples from Uruguay, ordered in the Border Treaty of 1750 [Madrid]; while the Society of Jesus [in Europe] made as great an effort as the governments of Portugal and Spain for the transmigration to take place.

The deterioration of relations between both crowns, caused in 1760 by the rise of the Spanish king, Carlos III, an opponent of the agreement, and the consolidation of powers of another opponent, the Marquis of Pombal, of Portugal, was an important cause of the rapid death of the agreement – a death, however, which was only apparent, as the future revealed. Pombal was against the Treaty of Madrid because he did not agree with the cession of the Colony of Sacramento to Spain, an attitude that was admired at the time, but certainly exaggerated in the face of the evident advantages of the exchange. Perhaps the antipathy that the powerful minister harbored for his predecessor, Alexandre de Gusmão, also contributed to explain his stance.

The fact is that, in 1761, both countries signed the El Pardo agreement, whereby, according to its text, the Treaty of Madrid and the actions it caused were “cancelled, repealed and nullified as if they had never existed.” Thus, at least in theory, the uncertainties of the Tordesillas division were back, although disrespected on the ground and changed by subsequent agreements. In practice, however, no nation wished to renounce its territorial conquests or their legal titles. This was so much the case that it was exactly during the Pombal era, that major forts were built or re-built – Macapá, São Joaquim, São José de Marabitanas, Tabatinga, Prince of Beira, and Coimbra – which delineate until today the boundaries of Brazil.

The Treaty of El Pardo only created a pause during which one could await the proper moment for a new adjustment of boundaries. That moment came in 1777, the year in which a woman – an unprecedented fact in the history of Portugal – Dona Maria I, ascended to the throne and began the policy of reacting to Pombalism – a policy which became known as a viradeira (the turnaround).

A new treaty was already being negotiated, but the fall of Pombal in Portugal, and the replacement of Prime-Minister Grimaldi with the Count of Florida Blanca, in Spain, changed the balance of power “for the worse as far as Portuguese interests were concerned” (REIS, 1963, vol. I, p. 376). Spain made demands and imposed the signing of a Preliminary Treaty of Borders, which took the name of a palace of the Spanish Crown, San Ildefonso, near Toledo. By the Treaty of San Ildefonso, Portugal kept the western and northern borders for Brazil that had been negotiated in Madrid, although they were more accurate in certain respects. The Portuguese Empire, however, gave up the Colony of Sacramento, without receiving any compensation in return, for example, the territory of the Sete Povos das Missões. Thus, Rio Grande do Sul ended up in a fragile position and had only half of its current territory – a situation, which was almost the same as how it had been defined in the Treaty of Madrid.

The borders of Brazil

Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) .........................

Treaty of Madrid (1750) ------------------------

Treaty of San Ildefonso (1777) _ _ _ _ _ _

There is no doubt that because of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, Portugal lost territory in the South as compared to what it had gained from the Treaty of Madrid. However, it cannot be said that the treaty was totally bad for Portugal, as it confirmed the inclusion within the national territory of almost the entire area of the two thirds of current Brazil that is beyond the Tordesillas line. Most Brazilian historians, however, condemn the agreement, in line with Varnhagen (cited in VIANA, 1958, p. 71), who claims that San Idelfonso’s articles were “dictated by Spain almost with weapons in hand.” Capistrano (1963, p. 305) is the exception. Always thinking independently and believing that patriotism cannot overcome fairness, Capistrano considers the treaty to be “more humane and generous” than that of Madrid, since it did not impose any Indian transmigrations, which he considered hateful.

Similar to most of their Brazilian counterparts, a number of Hispanic-American historians also condemn San Ildefonso, but for opposite reasons. According to them, Spain could have obtained much more at the time. The Argentine, Miguel Angel Scenna (1975, p. 62), for example, says: “San Ildefonso...was bad [for the Spanish] because when it was negotiated, Spain already had victory in hand, and it had the conditions to invade Brazil militarily.” Indeed, at the time, the governor of Buenos Aires, Viceroy Pedro de Ceballos, occupied the island of Santa Catarina and his position was strong compared to that of the Portuguese-Brazilians in Rio Grande do Sul.

Maybe those Hispanic historians who, along with Capistrano, consider the Treaty of San Ildefonso a satisfactory agreement, reflecting the balance of power at the time – more favorable to Spain than when the Treaty of Madrid was signed – are closer to the correct assessment. Argentine internationalist, Carlos Calvo (Cited in SOARES, 1938, p. 168), for example, stated the following on San Ildefonso. Saying it was:

More advantageous to Spain than the treaty of 1750, leaving it in absolute and exclusive domination over the Rio de la Plata, flying it’s flag in the Colony of Sacramento, and extending its domination to the land around the Ibicuí [the region of the Sete Povos das Missões] on the left bank of the Uruguay [river], without sacrificing more than the return of the island of Santa Catarina, which had been seized by conquest.

Variations of the southern border

Madrid (1750) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

San IIdefonso (1777) ---------------------------------

Current ---------------------------------------------------

In 1801, the situation worsened with a new war between the peninsular nations, known as the “War of the Oranges,” taking place. In Europe, Portugal had part of its territory amputated with the Spanish conquest of Olivença and, in America, the Portuguese-Brazilians recaptured, this time for good, the territory of the Sete Povos das Missões, pushing the border all the way to the Quaraí River. Different from what had happened during the Guaraní War, the occupation was quite easy: “The Spaniards were not able to defend the territory ... they lacked the Jesuits to organize the Indians and lead them in an effective way in war” (MAGALHÃES, 1992, vol. III, p. 35). In the end, the southern border was nearly the same as that which had been set in 1750; it descended in the west from the Ibicuí to the Quaraí rivers, tributaries of the Uruguay, and then went from the tip of Castillos Grande to the Arroio Chuí, a small stream on the coast.

The conflict ended the same year it began with the Peace Treaty of Badajós (1801), which did not revalidate the Treaty of San Ildefonso, or any other previous border treaty. This was an omission that was inconsistent with the usual practice among the Iberian nations – to confirm borders when peace treaties were celebrated. In addition, it did not order that the status quo ante bellum be restored and, for that reason, Olivença became a Spanish city, and the western region of Rio Grande do Sul belonged to Brazil. Thus, in the early nineteenth century, even though the boundary line was not legally closed, there was a solid basis of occupation, which almost coincided with the historical outline of the colonial treaties. Therefore, as the Brazilian historian Francisco Iglésias has said: “By the end of the colonial period the Brazilian map was almost defined” (1993, p. 294). It is interesting to note that this did not take place in the rest of South America, nor in North America, where the major border changes took place after independence. (An example of this is that the United States “inherited” from England almost one tenth of its current territory.)

There are differences between Brazilian and Hispanic Americans on the validity of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, especially after independence. Most Spanish-speaking authors agree with the Peruvian historian-diplomat, Raúl Porras Barrenechea (1981, p. 23), who, in his Historia de los Límites del Perú (History of the Borders of Peru), characterized the treaty as “that which permanently fixed the borders between the colonies.” And Barrenechea further said:

The Treaty of San Ildefonso was the final agreement signed between Spain and Portugal concerning the borders of their respective colonies. It was the treaty in effect when the independence of South America was proclaimed. Brazil, however, following the expansionist tradition of its Portuguese colonizers, crossed over the Treaty of San Ildefonso line in many places. In diplomatic talks, when countries neighboring Brazil attempted to invoke the rights given to them in the treaty, Brazil denied the substance and the validity of San Ildefonso (p.23).

The Brazilian doctrine, developed during the Empire, was not attached to the text of the Treaty of San Ildefonso which, according to its official title, was “preliminary,” and it had been annulled by the 1801 war – which Brazil always disputed. Its basic principle, uti possidetis, was the same as that of the Treaty of Madrid. San Ildefonso was actually useful, but only as a supplementary guide and, in those areas where there was no occupation by any of the parties involved. The doctrine was formulated in its most complete version by the Viscount of Rio Branco, in a memorandum presented to the Argentine Government in 1857.

Ultimately, after Brazil had further defined its borders in bilateral treaties at the end of the Rio Branco era at Itamaraty, it was the concept of possession – the principle of uti possidetis – that continued to define the country’s territory. In this way, Alexandre de Gusmão’s work has lived forever.

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VIANNA, Hélio. História Diplomática do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1958.

José Bonifácio

José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, universally known in Brazil as “The Patriarch of Independence,” was born on June 13, 1763, in the modest port city of Santos, then part of the Portuguese colony of Brazil. Born into a well-to-do family of civil servants and merchants, he had nine brothers and sisters, two of whom, Martim Francisco and Antônio Carlos, also actively participated in Brazil’s process of independence. After his early years as a student in São Paulo, a 20 year old Bonifácio was sent to study at the University of Coimbra, in Portugal, as were many of his contemporaries from wealthy Brazilian families. At Coimbra, he studied law, philosophy, and mathematics, as well as the natural sciences – the latter in which he excelled. After graduation, he remained in Europe, joined the Lisbon Academy of Sciences, in 1789, and began a 10-year trip across the continent to further his scientific studies.

Upon returning to Portugal, in 1800 – already a renowned scientist due to courses he had taken, texts he had published, and memberships he had attained in recognized scientific academies – Bonifácio was integrated into the ruling elite of the Kingdom of Portugal. He was also appointed to various administrative positions, such as the inspector-general of Portuguese mines and natural resources. In addition, he taught at the national mint, as well as at Coimbra, where he created the discipline of Metallurgy. An early advocate of the environment, Bonifácio planned the recovery of forests and rivers, such as the Mondego, the longest river within the boundaries of Portugal.

When Napoleon’s army invaded Portugal, José Bonifácio fought the French invaders as a member of a volunteer corps of scholars, from 1807 to 1810, and due to his scientific knowledge, he also supervised the manufacture of ammunition used in the conflict.

Interested in political affairs in addition to science, in 1813, Bonifácio wrote a letter to Domingos Antônio de Souza Coutinho, the Count of Funchal, stating his views on the reforming role of the State. He believed, for example, that the State should stimulate science and remove obstacles to industry. In his writings, he also presented three issues he considered crucial to development in his native Brazil: the end of slavery, the assimilation of the native Indian population, and the promotion of miscegenation.

After 36 years in Europe, in 1819, at the age of 56, Bonifácio returned to Brazil with his wife, Narcisa Emilia O’Leary, and their daughters. He had planned to retire, but in 1820, he accepted the title of adviser to the king, João VI, who was still living in Brazil. That same year, José Bonifácio made a scientific trip around the province of São Paulo, accompanied by his brother, Martim Francisco, to research development opportunities in fields such as minerology, which he had studied and taught in Europe.

After a revolution that began in the city of Porto spread across Portugal, 1820-1821, João VI returned to Lisbon. At the same time, Bonifácio took on a leadership role in the government of São Paulo. After the decisive moment in January 1822, when João VI’s son, Pedro, declared that he would not follow his father back to Portugal but, rather, he would stay in Brazil – an event known as the Fico (Portuguese for “I shall stay”) – the 23 year old prince regent invited the 58 year old Bonifácio to be “Minister of the Kingdom and Overseas Affairs,” a position that combined the functions of prime and foreign minister. It was the first time a Brazilian-born figure had taken on the office of minister of State.

Throughout 1822, Bonifácio’s role in the executive branch of the government was instrumental in driving the process of Brazilian independence, which Pedro declared on September 7th of that year.

As minister, José Bonifácio worked to keep the country united, organize the new State, and prepare for its defenses. As the head of the newly independent country’s foreign office, he was in charge of issuing the initial instructions to its first diplomats, as well as developing Brazilian foreign policy.

In 1823, once a constituent assembly was installed, Bonifácio presented a proposal to end slavery. Growing opposition to his policies, however, led to a coup d’état and a closure of the assembly. Pedro, now the Emperor of an independent Brazil, centralized powers, and a number of political elites – including the Andrada brothers – were exiled. José Bonifácio spent the next six years in France. When he returned to Brazil, in 1829, he also returned to politics.

In April 1831, mainly due to a power struggle back in Portugal, Pedro abdicated and returned to Europe as his father had done a decade earlier. Before he left, he appointed José Bonifácio as tutor to his son and heir to the throne, Pedro Alcantara, who was then but 5 years old. Bonifácio, however, still had enemies, and after a couple of years, he was defeated in fierce political disputes with – among others – the powerful, statesman/priest, Diogo Feijó, then the justice minister and later (1835) the Regent, as Brazil waited for Pedro to come of age.

In 1833, José Bonifácio was removed from his position as tutor to the heir to the throne and, indeed, he was charged with treason and kept under house arrest on the small island of Paquetá, in Guanabara Bay. Although ultimately acquitted of the treason charges, Bonifácio basically retired from politics. He died, on April 6, 1838, two months short of his 75th birthday, in Niterói, just across the bay from Rio de Janeiro.

José Bonifácio: the patriarch of Brazilian diplomacy

João Alfredo dos Anjos

[...] Senhor d’Andrada goes further; I heard him say in the Court, in front of twenty people, all of them foreigners, that a grand alliance – or an American federation with freedom of commerce – was necessary; that if Europe refused to accept this, they [Brazil] would close their ports and become like China. If we attacked them, their forest and mountains would become their fortresses, and, in a maritime war, we would lose more than they [...].

Correspondence of the Baron de Mareschal to the Prince of Metternich, Rio de Janeiro, May 17, 1822.[2]

Although he is known as the “Patriarch of Brazilian Independence,” few also identify José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva as the creator of his country’s foreign policy. In truth, however, as the “Minister of the Kingdom and Overseas Affairs,” 1822-1823, he was the figure most responsible for the formulation of foreign policy for the newly independent nation. Bonifácio saw it his duty to rid the nascent State of Portuguese paradigms, and establish new guidelines and initiatives. Under his leadership, Brazil’s foreign policies included initiatives such as a more cooperative approach to Buenos Aires; the preservation of the decision-making autonomy of the Brazilian State, especially in relation to the hegemonic powers of the time; the building of efficient armed forces in defense of sovereignty; and the protection of the country’s domestic industry. In his search for the construction of a national territorial unit, the new minister established policies that built upon some of the ideas he had expressed much earlier in his life. He called for the “civilization” of the native (Brazilian) Indian population, an end to slavery, and the integration of indigenous and African communities into the national fabric. He also advocated agrarian and educational reforms, as well as economic development, with the diversification of Brazilian exports, environmental preservation, and the rational use of natural resources.[3]

Although his family was relatively wealthy, and his hometown of Santos was still a modest port when he lived there during the second half of the eighteenth century, while Bonifácio was a student at the University of Coimbra, he did not limit his studies to legal matters, as was more common for Brazilian-born students at the time. Rather, being a good representative of the era of “Pombaline Enlightenment,” he studied and excelled in many fields – especially the sciences.

After graduation – and a ten year scientific study tour around Europe – Bonifácio made contacts with the major European scientists of his time and published research papers in specialized media. When he returned to Portugal, despite being Brazilian-born, he became a member of the Portuguese elite, holding several public and academic functions, and getting involved in intense dialogue with high authorities of the Kingdom. It is no wonder, therefore, that when he returned to his native Brazil, in 1819, he was known as an expert and was called upon to take part in a variety of activities, including politics – especially those triggered by the so-called Liberal Revolution of Porto, in 1820.

Recognized as bringing stability to the government in São Paulo, Bonifácio became a political reference. In that capacity, he exercised a leadership role in the effort calling for the permanence in Brazil of the crown prince, Dom Pedro, whose father, Joao VI, had recently returned to Portugal, leaving his son as regent.

As a spokesman for São Paulo, Bonifácio made personal and decisive contact with Dom Pedro.[4] In January 1822, Pedro appointed Bonifácio, Ministro do Reino e Negócios Estrangeiros (Minister of the Kingdom and Overseas Affairs). His administration of the diplomatic functions of that office was marked by pragmatism, especially in negotiating the recognition of Brazilian independence with European powers. Regionally, he sent a political representative to Buenos Aires, instructing him to propose the creation of a confederation with the provinces of the Plata. And concerning the United States, José Bonifácio took the initiative to propose an agreement of cooperation and defense early in 1822 – a year and a half before the statement made by President James Monroe of that country that became known as the Monroe Doctrine.

Unlike the interpretation of traditional historiography, concerning negotiations for the recognition of Brazil’s independence, which mainly came in 1825, Bonifácio had a different view of the independence recognition process. He believed that diplomatic recognition would come sooner or later, a view he based on the qualities of Brazil and on the commercial interest of other countries, especially Great Britain, France and the United States. A study of Andrada’s view of the recognition process corrects some of the still ongoing ex post facto impressions concerning the inevitability of negotiations mediated by Great Britain, and its value to Brazil.

The Brazilian foreign office under Bonifácio was not willing to offer compensation or accept compromises that represented direct or indirect losses to Brazil. Such compromises had occurred with the Treaties of 1810 that Portugal had made with Great Britain. Instead, the minister used the economic interest of other nations – especially those of Great Britain, France and the United States – as a bargaining tool in the process. In this manner, Brazil would defend its own interests, and not merely conform to those of others.

Bonifácio instructed Felisberto Caldeira Brant, the Brazilian negotiator in London, to make Great Britain realize that Brazil was an independent country, and although recognition was important, the country would take its place in the international arena with or without any formal “recognition.” He also wanted it made clear that Brazilian ports would be closed – from the Plata to the Amazon – to all States that did not recognize the independence and sovereignty of the country.

In addition to the recognition issue, Bonifácio did not authorize Caldeira Brant to take loans out in London, a recourse insistently advocated by the Brazilian representative. On the contrary, he sought an internal solution to the country’s financial problems, with the emission of national treasury bills and the establishment of a fund for national emergencies (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, I, Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia Fluminense, 1922 to 1925).[5] Later, while in exile in France, due to the coup d’état against the Constituent Assembly, Bonifácio criticized the agreement of 1825, which he considered “a kick to the gut” of national sovereignty. He also criticized the role of Great Britain in the process, which he said wanted to “trick Brazil” into sharing “the burden of an agonizing Portugal” – a reference to the Portuguese government’s debt of 2 million pounds sterling – while actually arming itself to dominate Brazil. By the agreement, in Bonifácio’s own words, the debt entered onto the list of debts of the nominal “Empire of the Equator” (CARTAS ANDRADINAS, 1890, p. 10-11).[6]

The international scene at the time of Brazil’s independence

With the Industrial Revolution and the consolidation of its naval powers, Great Britain had become the global economic and military leader in the early nineteenth century. Since 1780, its foreign trade exceeded that of France and, in 1848, it was twice as large as that of its closest international rival. The defeat of Napoleon also meant the end of a cycle of more than 100 years of wars between Great Britain and France, with the establishment of military supremacy, especially naval, of the former over the latter. One of Britain’s goals in its war with France was economic: “to eliminate its main competitor in order to reach total predominance in European trade markets and have total control over overseas colonial markets which, in turn, implied maritime control.” The British political game, therefore, was to maintain the balance of power on the continent, making it infeasible for any possible rival to prevail. Then, with the end of the old colonial system, the new markets would be at the mercy of Britain’s business interests (HOBSBAWM, 1977, p. 41 and 69).[7]

British participation in the independence process of the Iberian-American countries must be understood as part of a strategy of new and promising markets for Great Britain’s manufacturers, while simultaneously ensuring their supply of cotton and other raw materials necessary for the industrialization process. This was a successful strategy, as Hobsbawm (1977, p. 51-52) said, when he pointed out that in 1820 imports of British fabrics by Latin American countries “amounted to more than a quarter of European imports of the same product.” As early as 1840, textile imports by Latin America reached “almost half of all that Europe imported.” China, which Bonifácio considered an example of the type of resistance Brazil should emulate, also lost, even with the ever-present aid of the British Navy, as it was forced to open its market to British traders during the Opium War (1839-1842). In practice, both Brazil (in 1808) and Buenos Aires (in 1809) had opened their markets to English products even before independence or, according to historian Amado Cervo (1998, p. 84), the colonial monopoly “fell apart” before “independence.”

On the other hand, France had started the revolution that profoundly changed the European political environment, influencing the States under formation in Iberian America. The Napoleonic invasions had installed the new administrative framework, the Civil Code and other French institutions, outside of France. Even with Napoleon’s defeat, the panorama permanently changed with the destruction of feudal institutions and reforms of the State. Likewise, the French Revolution proved that “nations exist regardless of their States; people regardless of their rulers” (HOBSBAWM, 1977, p. 108-109). This political aspect of the liberal-bourgeois revolution matches its economic counterpart: both revolutions, the English and the French, formed the core of liberalism as people understood it in the early nineteenth century. Industrialization was based on the advance of technical knowledge and world trade, supported by faster and safer means of transportation – albeit still without large commercial steamers and trains – and finally, within the legal framework of a constitution and civil law, as a guarantee of the bourgeois rights and freedoms.

Opposite this political revolution, there was the French Restoration, as well as the conservatism of Austria and Russia – representatives of institutions that had not modernized, and thus were relentlessly defeated. France had tried almost everything, since 1789: a parliamentary monarchy, the unicameral Republic of the Convention, the bicameral Republic of the Directory, and even the “plebiscitary” monarchy of the Empire. After 1814, it tried to conciliate a monarchy – supported by the historical legitimacy of the Bourbon dynasty – with constitutional principles. The conservatives, however, saw the constitution as a minor concession, to avoid the greater evil of Jacobin radicalism (WARESQUIEL, 2002, p. 7).

Concepts such as liberalism, constitutionalism and legitimacy were frequently utilized in that period and were at the center of the ideological struggle. The principle of legitimacy, so often repeated in conversations with Brazilian diplomats by Prince Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, resulted from a political need (Diplomatic Archive of Independence, IV, p. 58ff, letter from Teles da Silva to Bonifácio). On March 31, 1814, while in the midst of discussions about how the allies would treat the succession in France, Talleyrand argued that “intrigue” and “force” were not enough to establish a stable and lasting government in France: “... you must act according to a principle...” he said. That principle, legitimacy, returned the Bourbons to the French throne, as the dynasty that had been defeated by the Revolution was seen as the only entity that could be placed in front of the State. The reality of 25 years of revolution, however, came at a price, and the Bourbons had to live with institutions, laws and practices that were consolidated with the bourgeois order built by Napoleon. On the other hand, the absolutist monarchists saw the constitution – linked to the old European order – as a threat. In the words of the Abbé de Rauzan: “every constitution is a regicide.” Thus, Louis XVIII viewed the Senatorial Constitution drafted in 1814 as a “suggestion,” as, he believed, it was not the people that should give the law to the monarch, but the monarch that should offer it magnanimously to the people (WARESQUIEL, 2002, p. 36 and 61).[8]

This conservative backwardness was promoted by the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia, established in 1815. Later, in the early 1820s, Austria suppressed liberal movements in Piedmont and Naples, and in 1823, France invaded liberal Spain, to restore Ferdinand VII to the throne. At this same time, in Portugal, Dom Miguel was encouraged to stage a coup d’état against the Cortes of Lisbon, an episode known as Vilafrancada, which resulted in the restoration of João VI, returned from Brazil, to power. One could also add to this list, the coup d’état carried out by Dom Pedro, another Bragança, against the Brazilian constituent/general assembly in Rio de Janeiro, in November 1823.

José Bonifácio in the government of Brazil

Although 1823 was the year of the conservative counter-revolution in Brazil and Portugal, a Constitutionalist and Liberal environment existed just prior to that year, and it was such an environment that led José Bonifácio to join the ministry of Brazil’s regent prince, Pedro. Early in 1822, a few days after Pedro declared that he would not return to Portugal and would stay in the country – his famous “Fico” speech of January 6, 1822 – a tense atmosphere also existed in Rio de Janeiro, caused by the threat of rebellion of Portuguese troops under General Jorge Avilez.

José Bonifácio’s appointment as the de facto prime and foreign minister of Brazil’s Prince Regent resulted from his multifaceted career of scientist and public servant, as well as that of political advisor. His political career began in 1820 – soon after returning from Portugal – when he was named an elector from Santos. In June, 1821, amidst the unrest caused by a number of military uprisings by liberals, he played a decisive role in the restoration of political stability in São Paulo, while preventing the removal of the governor appointed by the Crown, João Carlos Augusto Oeynhausen-Gravenburg, the future Marquis of Aracati. During that time, Bonifácio, joined the São Paulo government and was acclaimed Vice Governor of the province. Although they had deeper roots, the events of 1821 were also influenced by the Porto rebellion, which began the previous year in Portugal (SOUSA, 1988, p. 122ff).[9]

After he left the ministry, Bonifácio discussed his political thoughts on Brazil’s independence in an interview with O Tamoio, a Rio de Janeiro newspaper. In that interview, he said he had made enemies because he was the first to preach:

the independence and freedom of Brazil, albeit a fair and sensible freedom, under the tutelage of a constitutional monarchy, the only system that could preserve this majestic and indivisible piece of social architecture from the Plata to the Amazon, [keeping it] both united and solid; ... about that I am certain, except if the salvation and independence of Brazil imperiously require otherwise (our emphasis).

Ultimately, therefore, Bonifácio believed that a constitutional monarchy was the best form of government for Brazil: to keep such a large and diverse nation united.[10]

As early as 1822, the management of foreign affairs under Bonifácio had two major achievements: the first administrative; the second, political. Administratively, he had presided over the autonomous reorganization and professional upgrading of the foreign office as well as of the nation’s negotiators abroad; and politically, with the publication of his August 6th “Manifesto to Friendly Governments and Nations,” and his instructions to Brazilian negotiators working abroad, his actions prescribed the paths an independent Brazil would follow in the realm of foreign policy.[11] Amado Cervo summarizes the foreign policy principles from the “Manifesto” with the following seven points:

1) The maintenance of political and commercial relations, without giving priority to any particular one; 2) The continuity of relations established since the arrival of the Royal family [in Brazil]; 3) Commercial liberalism; 4) Mutual respect and reciprocity in business dealings; 5) The opening up of immigration; 6) Facilities for the acceptance and use of foreign scholars, artists and entrepreneurs; and 7) An opening up to foreign capital.

One can also understand from the text of the document that Brazil would begin to act internationally, without requiring political recognition as a condition. After all, since the country had been declared the seat of a kingdom in Vienna in 1815, it would not accept attacks on its territorial integrity, its sovereignty, or on measures affecting its foreign trade. Commercial liberalism should be regulated by the State as it is in charge of managing trade relations with foreign countries in accordance with national interests (CERVO, 1978, p. 47-48).

On matters related to defense, Bonifácio organized a “peacemaking army,” commanded by General Pierre Labatut, of France, contracted to counter the siege of the Portuguese troops led by General Inácio Luis Madeira in Bahia in 1823. He also hired the services of Admiral Thomas Cochrane and hundreds of other British and French officers; plus he organized militias, and sought to integrate Indians into the fight in defense of independence.

On the naval front, with an efficient administration of public resources, Bonifácio made funds available for the purchase of six war frigates with 50 cannons each, in addition to resuming shipbuilding in the arsenal of Rio de Janeiro. Several measures were also adopted to develop and diversify the Brazilian economy (Diário da Assembleia Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil, 2003, I, p. 15-19).[12]

The first step in Brazilian foreign policy was towards the Plata.

After the initial domestic policy measures were reviewed, José Bonifácio turned his attention to foreign matters, beginning with the Plata. Already in May 1822, four months prior to the actual declaration of independence, he summoned Antônio Manuel Corrêa da Câmara, to represent the country in Buenos Aires, with the purpose of establishing direct relations of understanding and cooperation. Corrêa da Câmara’s mission was broad. He was to act not only on matters related to the government of Buenos Aires, but also on those related to Paraguay, the provinces of the so-called Argentine Mesopotamia – Entre Ríos and Santa Fe – as well as those of Chile. This was José Bonifácio’s first foreign policy initiative (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, V, p. 235-238).

The priority to establish relations of political coordination with Buenos Aires, which might currently seem natural, was not as obvious in the Brazil of the early nineteenth century. On the contrary, the Hispanic and Portuguese Americas had a history of conflict and political intrigue, exemplified in the matter of the Cisplatine and in the plots of Carlota Joaquina, the Spanish-born wife of Joao VI, who once aspired to the throne of the Vice-Kingdom of the Plata. Under Bonifácio’s leadership, Brazil left the paradigm of competition between Portugal and Spain and took the first step in the direction of a cooperative relationship with the Plata region.

Corrêa da Câmara was charged with expressing the commitment of the regent prince to recognize the independence of neighboring nations in addition to explaining:

... the incalculable benefits that could result from having a confederation – or an offensive and defensive treaty – with Brazil, to oppose with other governments of Spanish America the knowledgeable management of European powers; ultimately demonstrating to them that none of those governments could gain a more loyal and willing friend than the government of Brazil; in addition to the great advantages that would result from trade relations that they may reciprocally have with the Kingdom (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, V, p. 235-238, our emphasis).

Bonifácio was fully aware that the proposal would only have resonance if mistrust of the Brazilian government’s good faith was overcome. The minister argued exactly that point to Corrêa da Câmara, when he told him that he, himself, must be convinced that a country like Brazil, engaged in a contentious struggle for independence, could not stop being friendly with its neighbors. The delicacy of the mission assigned to Correa da Câmara pervaded the entire dispatch of Bonifácio’s instructions, which ended with Pedro’s recommendation that “the years and experience of the world, force him to work with full maturity, calmness and cold blood ...” (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, V, p. 235-238).

In Rio de Janeiro, Bonifácio worked to create a solution to the Cisplatine dispute. For example, it seems clear the minister played a role in the permanence of Lucas José Obes in Rio de Janeiro, in 1822, as well as in his inclusion on the Council of Prosecutors of the Provinces. Obes was one of the directors, who signed the minutes calling for the Constituent Assembly in June 1822. He was also appointed to the Council of State, and he was honored, at Pedro’s coronation, with the Order of the Cross – the same level as the Baron of Laguna, a military commander in Montevideo. Bonifácio and Obes shared the same antislavery opinion and, as Bonifácio eventually proposed in the constitutional text under discussion in September of 1823, they both understood the need to grant special status to the “Cisplatine State.”[13]

As a member of the Constituent Assembly, José Bonifácio proposed a special formula to incorporate Montevideo, in the draft constitution presented for discussion in September, 1823. Article 2 related the Brazilian provinces, from Pará to Rio Grande [do Sul] “and by, federation, the Cisplatine State.” Manoel Bomfim thought that such a solution “might have gracefully resolved the case of the South.” Bonifácio’s formula of special legal recognition for the Cisplatine State was, however, excluded from the text that the Emperor imposed after the coup against the Assembly.[14]

In Buenos Aires, Corrêa da Câmara carried out a rap-prochement with the foreign minister, Bernardino Rivadavia,[15] and Manuel José García, the finance minister. The Brazilian representative suggested to the Argentines the importance of deepening the “bonds of friendship and understanding” between their two governments. Câmara, however, considered that such an understanding should not have “untimely publicity,” so as to not “shock” the neighboring countries, or attract their “free” opposition. While visiting García, on August 10, 1822, he said that: “Brazil is a giant; nothing will ever force it to return to what it was [...]. I am certain that only a sincere and perfect union of all American States can give this part of the world ... the strength it needs” (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, V, p. 261, 262 and 263).

Rivadavia became the president of Argentina in 1826, and he attempted to resolve with Brazil, the impasse regarding the Cisplatine. Accordingly, he sent Manuel José García to negotiate peace. García signed an agreement with the Empire of Brazil, on May 24, 1827, giving up the Banda Oriental; thereby confirming that which Bonifácio had envisioned in 1822. Due to problems related to the short-lived Argentine Constitution of 1826, however, the agreement was poorly administered, and the crisis in Buenos Aires deepened. Rivadavia ended up rejecting the agreement and presenting his resignation to the Argentine Congress – believing he could return to office with renewed powers. But his resignation was accepted by a vote of 48 to 2, and Bernardino Rivadavia went into exile as a former president, in 1829.[16]

Relations with Great Britain

Relations with Great Britain during the period of independence – mainly under the management of José Bonifácio – can be seen from two different perspectives: first, Brazil’s need to affirm its sovereignty and ensure the indivisibility of its territory; and, second, the British desire to maintain and expand its political ascendancy over South America, especially by attempting to reproduce in Brazil the control it exercised over Portugal. In this context, while the Brazilian government sought recognition of its independence, Great Britain sought to use its power to ensure and improve its mechanisms of control over the new country. The British used two weapons in its quest: 1) the protected trade of its industrialized products, and 2) its naval superiority. Commercial protection was given to it by means of a 15% ad valorem rate on British products in the Brazilian market, as compared to a payment of 16% by Portugal and 24% by other nations; rates that had been established by the Treaties of 1810.[17]

Great Britain’s naval supremacy had been tested successfully in the continental blockade during the Napoleonic wars and in the war against the United States (1812-1815). Once peace was established, the British Kingdom sought legal sanction for its de facto naval superiority. One way of doing this was by obtaining recognition of the right of warring nations to carry out searches in neutral vessels on the high seas.[18]

Concerning Portugal (and Brazil), Great Britain went further in that area. Within the context of discussions about the abolition of slave trafficking[19] – the central issue in relations between these countries in those years – British Foreign Minister, Lord Castlereagh, in 1817, obtained approval of the Portuguese government “for the first time, a new public law of Europe, the right to search in times of peace – in limited cases – the merchant ships of other nations by the warships of any power.” Given the huge disparities between the navies of Great Britain and Portugal, the guarantee of reciprocity of this right was only a formality. As stated by Oliveira Lima (1996, p. 283): “If you stop for a moment to think about the naval importance of both countries, you will see at once how illusory [the concept of] reciprocity was.”

To the maritime and commercial supremacy of Great Britain, one must add its financial superiority. British loans granted to the new Hispanic-Portuguese American nations brought advantages to Great Britain by (1) ensuring the increased exports of industrial goods with the binding of credit, denominated in pounds, to purchases in the English market itself; (2) compromising new governments, by creating dependence on Great Britain; and (3) resolving the problem of increasing liquidity arising from British trade balance surpluses. The loans, granted to American governments by commercial houses supported by the British Government, were made with extortionate interest rates and foresaw the payment of fees and commissions in advance. Some authors, such as Hobsbawm (1977, p. 63), have argued that the loans ultimately proved to be unprofitable:

Loans to the South Americans, which seemed so promising in the 1820’s, and to the North Americans, who were emerging in the 1830’s, often became worthless pieces of paper: from 25 loans granted to foreign governments between 1818 and 1831, sixteen (which represented about half of the 42 million pounds sterling at emission prices) had not been paid by 1831.

For this reason the London financiers exerted pressure on the borrower governments to guarantee loan repayments with revenue from customs duties, income that would have gone to them after independence, which was the main source of public budgets.[20]

Bonifácio understood the importance of maintaining good relations with Great Britain; he even clearly recommended to the Brazilian diplomatic representative in London, to act cautiously in order to avoid friction. On the other hand, he sought to get out of the trap in which Portugal had lived since the Treaty of Methuen, signed in 1703. He did this through the affirmation of sovereignty of the Brazilian State over its territory, from both military and commercial points of view. This led to the conflicts that emerged in Brazilian ports and in its territorial waters; the decision to avoid foreign debt as much as possible; and the care taken in reviewing the renewal of commercial and legal advantages obtained by Great Britain in the treaties of 1810 – which were up to be “revised” in 1825 (LIMA, 1996, p. 257).

As Alan Manchester recognizes in his British Preeminence in Brazil, Great Britain wished to do to Brazil what it had done to Portugal since the restoration in 1640; that is, to turn it into a “vassal” by means of extortionate and unequal treaties. Nevertheless, as Manchester also recognizes:

[...] Brazil resisted in such a persevering manner that, around 1845, the special privileges granted to England were revoked, the treaties that regulated the trade and the trafficking of slaves were cancelled, and the Court of Rio de Janeiro united in full revolt against the pressure exercised by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MANCHESTER, 1964, p. 220-221).

Bonifácio contributed decisively to the establishment of an autonomous foreign policy, especially in relation to the hegemonic power of the period. As far as the Treaties of 1810 were concerned, the Minister warned by note to the British representative in Rio de Janeiro, Henry Chamberlain, that the Brazilian Government, by free will, observed “a treaty that any other government would find reason to consider as expired, after the dissolution of the social and political pact that made Brazil an integral part of the Portuguese monarchy.” Carneiro de Campos, who succeeded Bonifácio as foreign minister, maintained that policy with Chamberlain on the same terms. In July, 1823, Campos argued that the Treaty of 1810 existed de facto, “because the Emperor wished that to be so,” but not de jure, “since it was celebrated originally with the Portuguese Crown, having, therefore, expired when the separation [of Brazil and Portugal] occurred [in 1822]” (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, I, p. LXIV, LXIII).

In his talks with Chamberlain, the position of the Brazilian foreign minister was clear:

Brazil wants to live in peace and friendship with all other nations, [and] will treat all foreigners equally well, but it will never allow them to intervene in our domestic affairs. If there is a single nation that does not want to be subject to this condition, we will be very sorry, but that will not mean that we shall humiliate ourselves or subject ourselves to its will (DRUMMOND, 1885/86, p. 45).

José Bonifácio was opposed to slave trafficking, and he advocated the gradual abolition of slavery itself. The Andrada brothers included a section on this matter in a draft of the Brazilian constitution being written by the constituent assembly, in 1823. This proposal, however, was later withdrawn, when the Emperor, Pedro, closed the assembly and imposed a constitution on the country in 1824.

In a country whose elite survived from slave trafficking and the agrarian production of a single-culture crop raised on large estates, it is not hard to understand the opposition which the Andrada reforms endured (SOUSA, 1988, p. 196; CALDEIRA, 1999, p. 359ff; CARVALHO, 2006, p. 19).

Brazil and the United States of America

Shortly after becoming Brazil’s Minister of the Kingdom and Overseas Affairs, Bonifácio began intense discussions with the North American representative in Rio de Janeiro, Peter Sartoris, in an effort to sound out U.S. thoughts on the possibility of joint action in the field of mutual defense, especially in regard to the European powers.

As Acting Consul of the United States, Peter Sartoris was emphatic in his government communication. He spoke with the new minister as early as January 20, 1822, two days after the new foreign minister’s appointment. Indeed, by February 3, Sartoris had met twice with José Bonifácio – whom he called “Prime Minister” – and he left the meetings convinced that Bonifácio was firmly committed to making Brazil independent.

For his part Bonifácio asked Sartoris to respond to two questions: (1) would the American government be willing to have a friendly relationship with the Brazilian government; and (2) could Brazil count on the support of the United States, if it became necessary? The American representative reported to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, that he did not hesitate to answer Bonifácio’s first question, as he quickly said, yes. But he avoided even offering an “opinion” on the second question, claiming he did not know his government’s position (Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States..., 1925, II, p. 728-731).

By March 4, Sartoris had already had “three or four” interviews with Bonifácio. The central theme of their meeting was always the desire of the Brazilian minister to know if Brazil could count on the United States in case of a conflict with Portugal – as well as with Great Britain, because of its treaties with Portugal. Always cautious, Sartoris repeated himself, saying that it was beyond his powers to state any position on the matter, or even provide any personal opinion, as he did not wish to mislead the Brazilian government. He did, however, leave the following sentence in the air: “The government of the United States will always be glad to see both the happiness and the independence of other American nations” (Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States..., II, p. 732-733).

In late June, 1822, Peter Sartoris received a communication from the U.S. Secretary of State, informing him of President Monroe’s message, concerning the recognition of the newly independent States of Hispanic America, and he immediately communicated this to José Bonifácio. As Sartoris later wrote to Adams, the news “seemed to be especially satisfying to him [Bonifácio], and I have always noticed that both a desire to be close to and have a good understanding with the United States are very dear matters for him.” According to the American representative, the actual separation of Brazil from Portugal could be very profitable for American commerce (Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States., II, p. 737-738).

In the same conversation with the Brazilian minister, Sartoris expressed his opinion about sending Brazilian diplomats to the United States. According to him, it should occur after the installation of the Constituent Assembly, which would ensure the immediate and unconditional recognition of Brazilian independence by the United States and Great Britain. José Bonifácio replied in the following manner:

Dear Sir, Brazil is a nation, and it shall take its place as such, without expecting recognition by other powers or asking for it. Public agents or ministers shall be sent to represent it. Those that host them as such will continue to be accepted in our ports, and their trade will be favored. Those that refuse to accept [our ministers] will be expelled from our ports. Simply put, this will be our policy.

Once again, the message was clear: Brazil was already a nation, and the Brazilian State had sovereignty over its territory. For that reason, it did not need to wait for approval or to ask for the recognition of other States. The problem of recognition was, therefore, a false one, since Brazil already acted in a sovereign manner and expected treatment in reciprocal terms from any nation that wished to have a commercial and political relationship with it. José Bonifácio took that stance in mid-June, 1822, when the Zea manifesto to the European nations – which suggested that Colombia would close its ports to the nations that did not recognize its sovereignty, and was published in April of that year – may still have been unknown. At the same time, the United States recognized the independence of Colombia, which led the pragmatic British to accept in its ports vessels from the independent nations of the new world with their new flags (Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States..., II, p. 739).

José Bonifácio’s administration of Brazil’s foreign affairs in 1822 and 1823, and the actions of the first Brazilian consul to the U.S., Antônio Gonçalves da Cruz, contributed decisively towards the recognition of Brazil’s independence by the United States, which occurred a few days after the first Brazilian ambassador, Silvestre Rebello, arrived in Washington, in 1824. A year earlier, the choice of Gonçalves da Cruz, also known as “Cabugá,” to represent Brazil as the first consul of an independent Brazil to the U.S. brought with it a double message: To Brazilians it restored the role of a patriot, as Gonçalves, a participant of the Revolution of Pernambuco, had been sent as an emissary to the United States by the leaders of that rebellion, in 1817; and to the North Americans, the action showed that the monarchical system did not harm the constitutional and free spirit of the new government – that Brazil desired to establish constructive relations with the other countries of the Americas.

As historian and diplomat Manuel de Oliveira Lima observed at a conference in the United States, in 1913, “The Brazilian Empire sought, to no avail, both an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States. Washington’s position not to engage in alliances was both dogmatic and political.” (LIMA, 1913, p. 6) Nevertheless, Rio de Janeiro made the proposal not just with Rebello’s arrival in Washington, in 1824, but as early as 1822. The fact that it was not successfully acted upon, to build stronger cooperative relations between the two countries, was a direct result of political decisions and international policies of the United States.

Andrada’s view of Brazil’s place in the world

Territorial unit from the Plata to the Amazon region

The main concern of Brazil’s first foreign minister with the problem of territorial unity calls to mind the figure of another noted Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior – more commonly known as the Baron of Rio Branco – who once referred to José Bonifácio as “the great minister of independence.” Álvaro Lins, in his biography of Rio Branco, observed similarities in the backgrounds and actions of the two Brazilian statesmen and diplomats:

[In many respects] the personal history of José Bonifácio was repeated in Rio Branco: the education abroad and the execution of a profoundly Brazilian work. [...] José Bonifácio was the leader of Brazil’s independence, while Rio Branco drew its geographical map and built its territorial integrity (Lins, 1996, p. 254).

José Bonifácio decisive actions should receive credit for some of the consolidation of the Brazilian territory as it exists today, be it in his persuasion of the recalcitrant provinces, or by their subjugation through the use of force as, for example, the case of Bahia in 1823. In this sense, Bonifácio’s concerns with the problem of territory and with the development of the Brazilian State during the process of independence were present, once again, in the actions and thought of Rio Branco, who served as the foreign minister during Brazil’s transition from just after the fall of the monarchy into the first decade of the federal republic, 1902-1912. According to Joaquim Nabuco – who, himself, defended federalism – Rio Branco (1999, p.192), in a letter reproduced by Alvaro Lins (1996, p. 248), emphasized the need to preserve “above all, the national unity.”

Bonifácio, in his struggle for territorial unity, had to fight on two fronts: first, against provincial elites, who were eager for autonomy, or even for independence themselves, either from Rio or from Lisbon; and next, against foreign States, including Portugal, which hoped to take advantage of the possible fracturing of the Brazilian territory.

Great Britain, which saw in a Brazil under Dom Pedro the possibility to continue the domination it had over Portugal, did not oppose the maintenance of unity for the Brazilian territory. It should be kept in mind, however, that, after the 1824 failure of the Confederation of Ecuador – which attempted to create a separate country in the Brazilian northeast – Manuel Paes de Andrade Carvalho, the leader of that rebellion, sought refuge on an English vessel and later found asylum in Great Britain itself.

Perhaps the mindset of European leaders at the time can best be summarized by the French prime minister of the period 1821-1827. A practical man, Jean-Baptiste de Villèle, observed to Borges de Barros, the Brazilian representative in Paris, that European interest was to see South America “butchered,” for the new countries to remain colonies “under other names” (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, III, p. 138, 151, 167-8).

When one studies José Bonifácio, the first foreign minister of an independent Brazil, it is evident that the current geographical configuration of the country is due, to a large extent, to his actions – because of his organization of the armed forces that imposed unity on the provinces, and through the establishment of contacts and international negotiations that aided in maintaining that unity.

Brazil, “a transatlantic power”

The transfer of Dom João’s Court to Rio de Janeiro, in 1808, represented not only a political transformation for the colonial capital, but, above all, the beginning of a new economic era. Rio de Janeiro became the principle center of commerce for the Portuguese Empire, the point of intersection between the old metropolis and its Asian and African colonies, as well as with the Platine Republics (FREYRE, 1996; QUARRY, 2006, passim; DONGHI, 1975, p. 100-101).

José Bonifácio believed that Brazil had the conditions for economic self-sufficiency, which could allow it to use its consumer market as an important instrument of power. He, therefore, said that the new State should use its market, and the advantages of access to it, as a means to obtain diplomatic recognition of its independence.

Bonifácio further believed that Brazilians were the “Chinese” of the new world. According to him, Brazil was similar to China due to the magnitude of its territory, the size of its population, and because it had great agricultural production and basic manufacturing, characteristics he said would allow it the possibility of giving up imports of “luxury” products from Europe. The comparison to China is not surprising. According to Oliveira Lima (1996, p. 239): “in Brazil, in fact, economic life was very similar to [that of] the Chinese, with agriculture producing everything that the population needed – although one should not include labor and luxury manufacturing in the comparisons.”

In order to attain the condition of a transatlantic power, however, Brazil had to overcome the binomial that Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2005) divided into “domestic disparities” and “foreign vulnerabilities.” Jose Bonifácio’s vision saw two types of domestic disparities in Brazil: social and economic. He believed that the country’s social disparities could be overcome by “civilizing” the Indians – his word for assimilating them into the country – and by ending slavery. Economic disparities, he said, should be fought through reforming the use of and access to arable land, as well as through mass education and specialized technical training. Additionally, he believed it was necessary to manage the country’s natural resources, to enable their long-run economic exploitation.

In the foreign sphere, Bonifácio sought to fight Brazil’s vulnerabilities by: (1) creating a truly national Armed Forces, through the replacement of Portuguese troops with Brazilian militias, the inclusion of Indians and migrants in combat forces, and a modernization of the Navy; (2) establishing cooperative relations with Buenos Aires and the United States, in order to avoid recolonization attempts sponsored either by the Holy Alliance, or by Great Britain in association with Portugal; and (3) preserving the State’s autonomy, to avoid unequal treaties and international loans.

Final thoughts

José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva’s thought – diplomatic and otherwise – was expressed in two dimensions: first, the practical, concerning actions of the public man; and second, the intellectual, that of the thinker and formulator of policies for the Brazilian nation. As the de facto prime minister from January 1822 to July 1823, Bonifácio was in charge of preparing the country to assume its condition as a sovereign State. Likewise, as the de facto foreign minister, he was in charge of the autonomy of the foreign office operations and the elaboration of the first foreign policies of an independent Brazil.

While Bonifácio sought to establish diplomatic relations with other nations, he always endeavored to ensure the preservation of Brazil’s capacity to act and avoid agreements harmful to the country’s sovereignty or to the public treasury. Along those lines, on February 6, 1830, in Rio de Janeiro, he told Charles-Edouard Pontois, the French ambassador to Brazil, and future Count of Pontois:

[…] all those trade and friendship (Treaties) made with the European powers were mere foolishness. I would never have let them happen if I had been here. Brazil is a transatlantic power, it is not involved in any entanglements with Europe, and it does not need foreign nations; they, to the contrary, need Brazil very much. So let all of them come here to negotiate – nothing more – but in perfect equality, without any other protection than the universal rights of man, and with the express condition of not getting involved, in any way, in the affairs of the Empire. Otherwise it would be necessary to close our ports to them, and forbid them to come into the country (RODRIGUES, s.d., II. p. 25).

In the domestic sphere, José Bonifácio organized and structured the Brazilian armed forces, thereby creating not only the political, but also the practical conditions for the territorial unity of the Empire, from the Amazon to the Plata. The intimate relation between diplomacy and military power was always clear in his mind. The contingent facts of the centralization of power in Rio de Janeiro, or around the heir to the Portuguese monarchy, cannot be seen as crucial in Bonifácio’s political thought. In practice, it was he who began to build a proper legislative body for Brazil with the convening, on February 16, 1822, of the Council of Procurators of the Provinces, which later became the constituent and the legislative assembly.

Bonifácio considered Brazil a “transatlantic power.” As such it could not accept submitting to the interests of foreign powers, especially European, which were the main enemies of the consolidation of a united and independent Brazil. It was, therefore, necessary to: (1) take the indispensable steps to provide the country with effective defense forces (an army and a navy); (2) develop the country economically, by diversifying its industrial and commercial activities; (3) ensure a proper public administration, directed towards building the nation, by both organizing and moralizing the public service; and (4) avoid engagements that limited national sovereignty and made unacceptable ties – unequal international treaties and loans – that subordinated Brazil to other countries.

Bonifácio believed that the diplomatic recognition of an independent and united imperial Brazil was important but not crucial to its practical existence. As the country’s first foreign minister, he believed that recognition would be achieved, guided by the self-interest of countries that had – or desired to have – commercial relations with Brazil, and that the rules of the “Law of Nations” would be sufficient to provide guarantees to foreign trade in Brazil. The key was to obtain and preserve territorial unity and sovereignty.

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DIÁRIO DA ASSEMBLEIA CONSTITUINTE E LEGISLATIVA DO IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL, I. Brasília: Federal Senate, 2003.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES concerning the independence of the Latin American nations. Ed. William Manning, Nova York: Oxford University, 1925, II.

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Paulino José Soares de Souza

Magistrate and Conservative Party politician, Paulino José Soares de Souza (1807-1866), the Viscount of Uruguay, played an important role in the building of the Brazilian sovereign state – in both domestic and foreign policy spheres – during the Empire. He was a provincial representative in Rio de Janeiro (1835); a general representative (1836); the president of the province of Rio de Janeiro (1836-1840); the minister of justice (1841), and twice the minister of foreign affairs (1843-1844, and 1849-1853); a Senator for life (appointed in 1849); and a councilor of state (1853). As the justice minister, he invested in the political and administrative centralization of the government; and as the foreign minister, he left his mark on the definition of Brazil’s foreign policy as well as the organization of its diplomatic corps. At the end of his life, Paulino de Souza devoted himself to writing two lengthy and thoroughly researched works on the Brazilian sovereign state.

Paulino José Soares de Souza, the Viscount of Uruguay: building the instruments of Brazilian diplomacy

Gabriela Nunes Ferreira

Paulino José Soares de Souza, given the title, Viscount of Uruguay, in 1854, was a central figure in the formation of Brazil as a sovereign state. It is difficult to understand fully the thought of this important political author and participant in the Empire without taking into account his roles in both domestic and foreign policy matters.

The future Brazilian viscount was born in 1807 in Paris, the son of a French mother, Antoinette Gabrielle Madeleine Gilbert de Souza, and a Brazilian father – from Paracatu, Minas Gerais – José Antônio Soares de Souza, a medical doctor who had studied medicine in France. With the fall of Napoleon, Paulino de Souza moved with his parents to Portugal in 1814, and four years later the family moved, again, this time to São Luis, Maranhão. After finishing his primary studies in Maranhão, Paulino de Souza returned to Europe, to study law at the University of Coimbra. Due to political problems in Portugal, however, he returned to Brazil to finish his studies, graduating from the Law School of the Largo de São Francisco, in São Paulo, in 1831. One year later, he entered the magistracy. He began a political career, in 1835, as a provincial representative in Rio de Janeiro. The following year, he became president of the same province, a position he occupied almost uninterruptedly until 1840. Since 1832, he was tied by marriage to a family of large landowners to which Rodrigues Torres, the future Viscount of Itaboraí, also belonged. Along with Torres, and Eusébio de Queirós, he was part of the so-called “Saquarema Trinity,” a central core of the Conservative Party.

In 1836, Paulino de Souza also became active in the central government, as he was elected a general representative from the province of Rio de Janeiro. His election was part of the Regresso, a conservative movement seeking a return to political centralization. In the Second Empire, he served in a variety of positions including the minister of justice (1841 to 1843) and twice the minister of foreign affairs (for a few months in 1843/1844 and, again, from 1849 to 1853). He was designated a senator-for-life in 1849, and a councilor of state in 1853. In 1854, he received the title of Viscount of Uruguay. Towards the end of his life, he continued to act in the Senate, as well as the Council of State. He was twice appointed to missions abroad; and he devoted himself to writing. He died in 1866, at the age of 58, disillusioned with the decline of the Conservative Party.[21]

Twice during the 59 years of the Empire, Paulino de Souza had an especially remarkable performance in the formation and consolidation of the Brazilian sovereign state. In the period of the Regresso, first as a general representative and later as the minister of justice, he was one of the political and administrative leaders who crafted a greater centralization of power. In 1837, as a member of the Provincial Assemblies Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, he signed the opinion that gave rise to the 1840 “Law of Interpretation of the Additional Act,” which stated that the Provincial Assemblies created in 1834 had modified the judicial and police structure of their provinces and, therefore, weakened the uniformity with which the Empire should be governed.

By drastically limiting the powers of the provincial assemblies and submitting the judicial system as well as the police to the jurisdiction of the central government, the Law of Interpretation allowed for revisions, assigning more powers to the central authority. This was accomplished, in 1841, through a reform of the Criminal Procedure Code, which radically modified the structure of the 1832 code, centralizing enforcement with the national government. The predominance of an electoral system was replaced by a hierarchal system in the administration of justice and the police, thereby giving broad powers to the authorities appointed by the central power.

The reports and speeches of the future Viscount of Uruguay while he was justice minister expressed some of his main ideas concerning Brazilian society and its political institutions. They clearly show the impact that the provincial rebellions of the Regency and the period immediately thereafter had on his generation of politicians. The image described by Paulino de Souza, in the early 1840s, was that of a “spirit of anarchy” and chaos in some of the provinces. He also described Brazilian society as heterogeneous, marked by major disparities among the provinces. He contrasted the relative civilization of the coastal region with the barbarism of the hinterland – with its dispersed population – a region into which the law did not penetrate. He was also harsh on the country’s elites, saying that if the bulk of the population lacked education, morals and healthy habits of subordination and work, those with power were moved only by private interests, which reinforced disorder and arbitrariness.

Finally, as far as the political and administrative institutions were concerned, Paulino de Sousa said that the liberal order during the Regency was the result of inexperience, a lack of confidence in relation to power, and a lack of paying attention to the Brazilian social reality.

Paulino de Souza justified the centralization of power as a way to remove it from the various factions in Brazilian society, thus enabling the country’s authorities to maintain public order and, thereby, increase the individual safety of the population. He believed it was necessary to listen to the voice of “national reason”– the only one attentive to the public’s needs – as opposed to the “petty voices of the provinces.”

In addition to the Law of Interpretation of the Additional Act and the Reform of the Code of Procedures, the re-establishment of the Council of State – an institution provided for in the Constitu-tion of 1822, made extinct by the Additional Act in 1834 – was also part of the centralizing reforms of 1841. The minister explained that his goal was to increase the “moral force” of decisions made by the Crown and reinforce administrative powers, by creating fixed parameters, preserving traditions and, in the end, ensuring a stability that would serve as a counterweight to the changing winds of politics.

In the early 1860s, in a phase marked by a resumption of the debate on the political and administrative order of the Empire, the Viscount of Uruguay devoted himself to systematize his studies and ideas in two major works: Ensaio Sobre o Direito Administrativo (Essay on Administrative Law), in 1862, and Estudos Práticos Sobre a Administração das Províncias no Brasil (Practical Studies of the Administration of Brazilian Provinces), in 1865. In these works, Paulino de Sousa doctrinally justified and substantiated the sovereignty model that he also advocated in practice. Although in the second work he occasionally made a type of self-criticism – considering excessive the then current centralization plan – the idea that Brazilian society and politics required, at least in the medium term, a hierarchically organized administration, able to generalize the principle of order and to ensure the country’s unity, remained intact.

The second moment when Paulino de Souza played an important role in the construction of the Brazilian sovereign state occurred when he was foreign minister for a second time, in the early 1850s. He took over the ministry in October 1849, and faced challenges, such as the trafficking of slaves, which exposed the country to strong pressure exercised by England. He also tackled the definitive demarcation of the country’s borders, and the political situation in the Platine region – at the time dominated by Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas. When he left the ministry, in October 1853, these matters had largely been addressed.

The political path of the Viscount of Uruguay reflects the building and consolidation of the Brazilian centralized state in the mid-nineteenth century. The same man who, in the early 1840s, had talked about spreading order to the country’s hinterland and ending the “barbarism of the backwoods regions,” at the beginning of the next decade turned his attention abroad – to the “barbarism” of others. He believed it was then necessary to consolidate matters in a regional context, a delicate task considering – as a phrase common at the time stated – Brazil was an “exotic plant in America,” since it was a monarchy surrounded by republics.

With the defeat of the last provincial revolts (the Praieira Revolution, 1848-1850), the country entered a period of political stability. Indeed, political scientist and historian, José Murilo de Carvalho, has designated 1850 as a dividing line between two phases in the development of the Brazilian nation state. Once the task of accumulating power had been completed, new performance horizons could be exploited. In that year, the reform of the National Guard completed the political and administrative centralization process begun in 1840, and the government felt strong enough to confront issues such as immigration and a reform of the agrarian structure of the country, as well as ending the slave trade. A new commercial code was also approved, thereby providing legal certainty at a time that promised new business opportunities (CARVALHO, 1996, p. 229-237).

It was not by chance that 1850 was also the year in which significant policy shifts began in the Empire’s foreign policy: shifts led by Paulino José Soares de Souza.

It must be noted that the foreign minister did not act alone. Rather, he worked within a political context in which several institutions – including the Parliament, the Council of State, and the Crown – guided and controlled his actions. Intervention in the Platine region took place in a domestic environment marked by the political dominance of the Conservative Party, during a period in the Second Empire in which there was remarkable stability in the government. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, this was the only period during the Empire in which the same minister remained in office for almost four consecutive years. In contrast, in the years immediately prior – 1844 to 1849 – no fewer than eight ministers had occupied that post. Continuity during the Paulino de Souza years allowed for the careful preparation and gradual execution of an action plan for the Plata region after 1849.

As early as 1843, during Paulino Soares de Souza’s first administration in the ministry of foreign affairs, there were elements of the proper and indelible marks he imposed on Brazilian diplomacy during his second term.

Imperial policies in the Rio de la Plata river basin

The formation of nation states

To understand the deeper meaning of the actions and policies pursued by the Imperial government in the Rio de la Plata region during Paulino de Souza’s second term as foreign minister, it is important to review the processes of formation of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay as nation states.

Traditional historiography treats the independence of Hispanic America as if it were a moment of materialization or birth – after a long period of national gestation – of countries that were ready to be born. The countries in question, however, were not “born” directly from their respective independence processes. Rather, the historical period that started with independence witnessed the emergence of several alternative national development projects – projects that were often antagonistic to one another, with different territorial and socio-political outlines.

With respect to Argentina, two central points are worth mentioning: First, the rivalry between Buenos Aires and the provinces of that territory, with a huge advantage given to Buenos Aires. Since the formation of the Río de la Plata Viceroyalty in 1776, its capital, Buenos Aires, had political and economic supremacy over the rest of the territory. This supremacy was renewed after independence, with the opening of the port of Buenos Aires to foreign trade. And secondly, even superseding the rivalry between Buenos Aires and the provinces, since the time of independence there were two competing proposals for the organization of the Argentine nation state: federalism versus a unitary system of government.

Tensions related to the above issues complicated the Argentine nation-building process. Several attempts to provide a constitutional organization to the provinces failed, and halfway through the nineteenth century, the matter of national organization was not yet resolved. Since 1831, there was an alliance of autonomous provinces – the so-called Argentine Confederation – led by the governor of Buenos Aires, Juan Manuel de Rosas. Although Rosas was a leader of the Federal Party in Argentina, paradoxically he was able to assemble a centralized power system under the hegemony of Buenos Aires. One of the pillars of this hegemony was the exclusive monopoly exercised by Buenos Aires over foreign trade and navigation in the Platine river basin.

A major difference with the formation of Brazil, as compared to Argentina, is its independence movement. Unlike what had happened in Spanish America, where it was necessary to create new legitimate powers to replace the monarchy, in Brazil, the permanence of the monarchy as the legitimate power created a sense of continuity in the transition from colony to the Empire. This relative continuity did not, however, lead to “political unity,” as there were also several paths and possibilities involved in the Brazilian transition. The unitary, centralized, monarchist, and socially based on slavery sovereignty model that prevailed in Brazil after independence resulted from a process that was completed halfway through the nineteenth century.

The history of the creation of the country of Uruguay is proof that the various Ibero-American states were not born directly from their independence processes. The territory that eventually became Uruguay had already been the subject of much dispute between Portugal and Spain during the colonial period. Once the emancipation of Spanish America was triggered, the Uruguayan territory was successively the scene of struggles of local forces against Spain, Buenos Aires, and Portugal.

In 1828, after having been the object of a war between Brazil and what was to become Argentina, Uruguay was created as an independent country, complete with its own constitution. It did not, however, lose its historic vocation, to integrate different national political-organization models – such as the reconstruction of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, credited to Rosas, or the creation of an “Uruguay Grande” that would incorporate the coastal provinces of Argentina and Rio Grande do Sul, as dreamed of by the Uruguayan General, Fructuoso Rivera. The focal point of all of these “projects” was the fate of Uruguay.

Uruguay was valuable due to its strategic location on one of the banks of the Platine estuary. It also had great livestock potential as the area was a reservoir of wild cattle and good pastures, and livestock was the main economic activity of the province of Buenos Aires as well as the region that became Rio Grande do Sul. The history of Uruguay also clearly shows the political overlap that existed among several countries in the region as political alignments crossed the still-open borders.

In Uruguay, the political fights were between the Blancos and the Colorados. In the 1840s, an alliance was formed between the Blanco Party in Uruguay and the Federal Party of Rosas. Opposing the Blancos, there was an alliance of the Colorado Party, that included Unitarios – members of the Argentine Unitarian party, who advocated a centralized government in Buenos Aires – and, in Rio Grande do Sul, the Farrapos, who were the protagonists of the longest rebellion of the Brazilian Empire, the Revolução Farroupilha (1835-1845).

Since 1843, the Blanco general, Manuel Oribe, who was supported by Rosas, had surrounded and blockaded, Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay, where a government of Colorado resistance had been formed. If Oribe seized power in Montevideo, that would have meant a huge victory for Rosas – a victory which would have indirectly spread his power throughout Uruguay. Thus, the porteño (someone from the port city of Buenos Aires) would have been closer to achieving the goal attributed to him: that of restoring the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, including both Uruguay and Paraguay – the independence of which Rosas did not recognize.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Brazil was further ahead in its state-building process than its neighbors. One of the great threats to the nation’s still fledgling sovereignty, however, was the persistence of the question of which national political-organization model would succeed in the neighboring republics. Brazil was still vulnerable as the country’s boundaries had not yet been fully established. The closing of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers held by Rosas also made the country’s internal integration more difficult, since it jeopardized access to its hinterland. The Brazilian government considered the plan – attributed to Rosas – to restore the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata with the virtual cancellation of independence of Uruguay and Paraguay, as a serious threat. Finally, and very importantly, although the Farroupilha rebellion had ended five years prior, several of the factors that had originated it had not yet been settled.

Rio Grande do Sul

Rio Grande do Sul had a delicate insertion into the Empire. Economically, a source of tension and conflict existed between that province and the central government of Brazil. Rio Grande do Sul played a subsidiary role in the entire country’s economy, especially with the production of charque (a type of beef jerky, mainly used to feed slaves). The central government was interested in obtaining cheap charque, whether from the province of Rio Grande do Sul or from Uruguay, while the southern producers were interested in obtaining higher profits for their product, as well as government protection, to counter foreign competition. This situation was the cause of many complaints of Rio Grande do Sul charque producers.

Rio Grande do Sul was also unique for a variety of factors, including its military tradition, developed in recurring fighting on the open border; the personal ties of its inhabitants, especially its elite; its economic and social profile; and its geographic position, in the southernmost part of Brazil, giving it proximity to the country’s neighbors in the Platine region. The province often served as a conveyor of the Platine conflicts, bringing them across the Empire’s borders.

At various times, Rio Grande do Sul advocated, along with Uruguay, policies that were inconsistent with those from Rio de Janeiro. It is also worth emphasizing that the Imperial government was hostage to the Brazilian ranchers who lived on the border – with estates in both countries – who, with their small, private armies, were in charge of defending the open border. The government was often dragged into the conflicts of the neighboring Republics due to the actions of these border warlords.

When Paulino de Souza became the foreign minister, in October 1849, he was faced with an avalanche of complaints signed by the Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Argentine Confederation, Tomás Guido, who spoke on behalf of Rosas and his ally Oribe. Some of the most serious sources of tension were the actions of the Brazilian ranchers, who were also landowners in Uruguay. Unsatisfied with Oribe’s measures – such as a ban on the passage of cattle across the border and the requirement of heavy war duties that had been established in 1848 – they made armed incursions into Uruguay, to retrieve cattle and recapture fleeing slaves. According to the representative of the Argentine Confederation, these kinds of actions were politically motivated and supported by the “savages” of the Unitarian party.

Foreign powers in the Plata river basin

Another key element in the calculations of Paulino Soares de Souza, when he designed the policies of the Empire in the Plata river basin, was the presence of both France and England in the region. Both countries had business interests there, which led them to engage directly in the Platine conflicts.

These powers were interested in peace in the region, because a state of permanent war was very harmful for trade and the free movement of goods. They were interested in the freedom of navigation on the rivers of the Platine basin, as well as a guarantee of the internationalization of the Plata River, mainly through the maintenance of an independent Uruguay.

Paulino de Souza took into account the presence of both France and England in announcing his policy, and he proved skillful, especially at avoiding English interference. He waited for the right moment to set into motion the new policy in the Plata river basin, when both powers were about to end their intervention in the region. He also sought to increase Brazil’s margin of success, by resolving a source of conflict with England: the matter of slave trafficking.

In 1850, when tensions with England had reached a critical point, the minister advanced the adoption of effective measures against slave trafficking. Alongside Eusébio de Queirós, minister of justice, who signed the anti-trafficking bill that bears his name, Paulino de Souza played a key role in the matter. He helped to obtain the approval of government measures against trafficking, first within the scope of the Council of State and later in the Parliament. In July 1850, he addressed a memorandum to the members of the Council of State concerned with the trafficking of slaves, and he submitted several questions to them, the formulation of which led to the following response: the only feasible way for the government to face English pressure would be to take effective measures to abolish slave trafficking. A few days later, on July 15, the foreign minister addressed the Chamber of Deputies in an attempt to convince representatives to support the government in these measures. The argument he used was clear: it was useless to swim against the tide and continue to face a powerful nation such as Great Britain, which had been making an effort for over 40 years to end slave trafficking in the world.

Attempting to use a neutral tone, without attacking the traffickers, Paulino de Souza demonstrated that slave trafficking was a lost cause condemned by civilization almost all over the world. Brazil should accept this and get ahead of the process, rather than continuing to expose itself to episodes of national humiliation (NUNES FERREIRA, 1999, p. 141-142).[22]

An interesting link existed between the end of slave trafficking and policies related to the Plata River basin. In a September 30, 1850 letter to the head of the Brazilian delegation in London, Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, Foreign Minister Paulino de Souza, himself, made the link explicit:

It will be very bad if the new direction that the Imperial government has attempted to take, concerning the business of slave trafficking, does not make us more favorable to the British government. One of the main reasons why I sought that direction was because I realized that the accumulated complications during seven years of our relations with generals Rosas and Oribe were causing major problems; and poor Brazil, having within itself so many elements of dissolution, might not survive a war in the Plata River basin, [including] the irritation and shocks produced by the hostilities of English cruisers. Nec Hercules contra duo. We cannot burn in two fires.[23]

From neutrality to intervention

The policy pursued by the Imperial government after 1850, under the leadership of Paulino de Souza – whose most immediate goal was to overthrow Rosas and his allies –represented a turning point in Brazil’s conduct in the Plata River basin, hitherto guided by a position of non-intervention.

The underlying reason for the new policy in the Plata region was the consolidation of the Brazilian state. For this to happen, it was crucial to ensure the maintenance of the territorial status quo in the region, that is, to ensure the existence of Uruguay and Paraguay as independent states, and thereby put an end – in a manner favorable to Brazil – to the uncertainty as to which national political-organization model would prevail in the neighboring republics. It was, therefore, necessary to remove the specter of the restoration of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and pave the way for solutions to problems that hindered the consolidation of the nation state, including the matter of boundaries with neighboring republics; navigation on the rivers of the Platine basin; and a more definitive pacification of the territory of Rio Grande do Sul.

Although the Imperial government tried to remain neutral in the Platine conflicts during the 1840s, that did not stop it from attempting to influence regional policy. When he was foreign minister the first time, from June 1843 to February 1844, Paulino de Souza took measures that anticipated the policies he developed in his second administration. In October 1843, he named José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, the Marquis of São Vicente, to the post of chargé d’affaires in Asuncion. Instructions he wrote to São Vicente recommended the “use of all of his skills, to avoid that Paraguay become a member of the Argentine Confederation, and to counteract and decrease the influence of Rosas [in the region].” In more concrete terms, he said that Pimenta Bueno should formally recognize Paraguay’s independence – which Rosas did not accept – and negotiate a treaty of friendship, navigation and trade with the new republic.[24] Additionally, Paulino de Souza’s instructions to the Marquis of São Vicente said that the Brazilian diplomat should:

Suggest (to the government of Paraguay) that Brazil is greatly interested in supporting its independence as it is not advantageous to Brazil if Rosas increases his power. Therefore, the Republic of Paraguay can find in Brazil a strong ally against the ambitious views of that governor [Rosas], and – since both [Brazil and Paraguay] have the same interests – it would be very beneficial to both countries, to sign treaties affirming their friendship.

Since that time, Paulino de Souza was convinced Rosas planned to reconstitute the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, and that he would carry out this plan as soon as he defeated his enemies in the Banda Oriental (Uruguay). Therefore, from the time of his first term as foreign minister, Paulino de Souza’s diplomatic thought exhibited a lack of trust in Rosas and a mistrust of the expansionist intentions of the government of Buenos Aires – policy-determinant traits of Brazilian foreign relations that were pursued after 1850.

An interesting aspect of the instructions to Pimenta Bueno is that Paulino de Souza recommended caution in dealing with the Paraguayans, and that he denoted a feeling of superiority of the Empire as compared to the republics of Spanish origin. This sentiment was also present in many other documents. The Brazilian foreign minister said Pimenta Bueno should keep in mind that:

Americans of Spanish origin inherited from their grandparents a degree of aversion to the descendants of the Portuguese race, by which, we are often not appreciated. This aversion has been fueled by the jealousy that the greatness of our territory inspires in them; the excellence of our geographic position; the greater respect that we receive from Europe; our greater wealth, and abundance of resources; [and] the greater prosperity and tranquility that we have enjoyed, as compared to the maelstrom of revolutions that almost all the republics of Spanish origin have experienced.

In the end, the treaties were not signed. The Brazilian representative did, however, solemnly recognize Paraguay’s independence in September 1844, an action that sparked a protest from the Argentine representative to the imperial court, Tomás Guido. The fact that Brazil recognized Paraguayan independence was also important in widening the distance between Brazil and the Argentine Confederation.

A summary of the main measures of the new policies pursued by Paulino José Soares de Souza in the Plata river basin begins with the first and the most decisive: the breaking of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the Argentine Confederation, in September 1850, after an exchange of increasingly aggressive diplomatic messages from each side. On the same occasion, the Empire’s relations with Oribe’s government in Uruguay were also broken, and Paulino de Souza came to expect the outbreak of a war involving Brazil. In an October 14, 1850 letter written to Rodrigo Souza da Silva Pontes, the Brazilian chargé d’affaires in Montevideo, the minister reported: “We’re preparing. Two more battalions have already been sent to the Rio Grande and the Northern provinces shall send troops. Rego Barros has already gone to Europe to enlist troops” (Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty-AHI, 429/5/3).

The second measure taken by Paulino de Souza was the decision to provide financial support, in the form of a loan, to Montevideo, to counter the siege that Oribe had imposed since 1843. This step was all the more necessary since the French government, which had been financing the city’s resistance, decided to withdraw its allowance. In order not to jeopardize the Imperial government, however, on record the author of the loan was Irineu Evangelista de Souza, the future Baron of Mauá.

A third part of the new policy was to seek alliances in order to form a coalition of anti-Rosas forces. To achieve this goal, Paulino de Souza turned to the governments that had conflicting relations with the governor of Buenos Aires, at least potentially. One of these governments was that of Paraguay, whose independence Rosas had refused to recognize. The government of Buenos Aires was also struggling domestically with the dissatisfaction of governors from provinces affected by the centralization policies of Rosas. Among these, Justo José de Urquiza, the governor of Entre Ríos stood out. In addition, there was an intellectual and politically very active group of Argentine immigrants, who were enemies of Rosas and were, therefore, eager to see his downfall.

In a letter to Silva Pontes dated December 16, 1850, Foreign Minister Paulino de Souza wrote:

Rosas relies much on Brazilian domestic difficulties, those which our patriots can cause us, but he is also very vulnerable in that sense. I think that I will soon receive propositions made by emigrated Argentines and others in the Confederation, who offer to promote the fight against Rosas in the provinces themselves, if there is a war. Their only condition is that Brazil should not attempt anything against the independence of the Argentine Confederation. Rosas [therefore] runs the risk of being wounded with the same gun with which he intends to hurt us. (AHI, 429/5/3).

Then on March 11, 1851, when Justo José de Urquiza, the governor of Entre Rios, was already signaling his intention to break with Rosas, Paulino de Souza wrote to Pontes one of the most important letters of their entire correspondence; it concerned with the Brazilian government’s policies in the Plata region. In that letter, he clearly outlined his plan of action:

If Urquiza comes forward and decides to promote the candidacy of Garzón [General Eugenio Garzón, from the Colorado Party, a candidate for the presidency of Uruguay] (which Rosas would consider a terrible blow and a crime against humanity), we will break with Oribe because of the grievances we have against him […] and aided both by Urquiza and Paraguay, it will be easy to expel from the eastern territory [Uruguay] the Argentine troops that support Oribe. If this works and Garzón is elected president, once the [Uruguayans] are regrouped, Rosas will not be able to fight against [Uruguay], Urquiza, Paraguay, and Brazil, and put Oribe back at the head of [Uruguay]. He will have to retreat quickly as his fortunes will have changed. Garzón and Urquiza will have no choice but to seek the support of Brazil and be loyal to it. […] It will be easier, then, if we carry out a prudent and strict policy, providing definitive and advantageous solutions to these matters, in order to secure the future […] Without declaring war against Rosas (the case of Article 18 of the Convention of 1828), we will indirectly give him a fatal blow.

The idea of attacking Rosas “indirectly,” rather than directly, served the minister’s concern not to cause British intervention.

Urquiza’s formal statement was made on May 1, 1851, when he reassumed the leadership of his province’s foreign affairs, placing it on the side of the Confederacy. The government of the coastal province of Corrientes, led by Virasoro, went along with the decision of the governor of Entre Rios, also declaring that it was a sovereign state. On May 29, an agreement was signed in Montevideo for an offensive and defensive alliance between Brazil, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the state of Entre Rios. The purpose of the alliance was to:

maintain the independence and pacify the territory of Uruguay, as well as overthrow General Manoel Oribe and the Argentine forces that he commands and, once things return to normal, cooperate to ensure that there is a free election of the president of the republic, according to the constitution of the Eastern State [Uruguay] (Art. I).

The expected alliance with Paraguay did not, however, materialize. Although Brazil and Paraguay signed a treaty of defensive alliance in December 1850, the Brazilian government was unable to make the agreement an offensive one as well, and it could not attract Paraguay into the coalition against Rosas.

In conducting his policies in the Plata region, the Brazilian foreign minister did not lose sight of the long-term goals that needed to be achieved. While the immediate goals were the expulsion of Oribe from Uruguay and the overthrow of Rosas, it was also necessary to think about what would happen once these goals were accomplished. It was necessary to “ensure the future” and prevent the emergence of new situations unfavorable to Brazilian interests. In a letter to Pontes on April 22, 1851, Paulino de Souza listed the main problems that had to be resolved, to ensure a favorable position for Brazil. His list included:

•safeguards against “new ambitions” in Uruguay, such that “new Oribes and new Rosas” did not emerge;

•the resolution of border issues, and all matters concerning border policy and the extradition of slaves and criminals, as well as the fate of Brazilian subjects and estates in Uruguay;

•agreement on the navigation of the Plata River and its tributaries, and matters related to the Martin Garcia Island, so that its owner could not use it to lock the Plata river to people who used it (Letter from Paulino de Souza to Pontes, dated 4/22/1851-AHI, 429/5/3).[25]

The same combination of short and long-term goals marked Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro’s mission to the South American republics that border the Pacific Ocean, for which he received instructions from Paulino de Souza on March 1, 1851. The first purpose of the mission was to neutralize the influence of Rosas in the republics and “explain the broad, straightforward and generous policies of the Brazilian Imperial government.” Ponte Ribeiro was also in charge of negotiating treaties of trade, navigation and borders with Peru and Bolivia, with the latter being based on the uti possidetis principle (Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute - IHGB, File of the Viscount of Uruguay, Canister 2, Folder 8).[26]

The main “victories” achieved, from the Brazilian point of view, took place between late 1851 and early 1852. In October 1851, General Oribe surrendered to the forces of General Urquiza, putting an end to the Guerra Grande (the long civil war of Uruguay), and soon thereafter, treaties favorable to Brazil were signed with Uruguay. The treaties – of alliance, borders, trade and navigation, extradition and assistance – resolved or at least dealt with matters of importance to the Empire. On October 13, 1851, in a dispatch to Silva Pontes, addressing the five treaties that had been signed the day before, Paulino de Souza defined them as “a system that would be both lame and imperfect if one of them is not ratified” (AHI, 42953). The Treaty of Alliance converted the special and temporary alliance determined in the Agreement of May 29 into a perpetual alliance, the purpose of which was to support the independence of both states against any foreign domination (art. I).

It is obvious that concerning the “support of independence,” it was the defense of Uruguay’s, rather than that of Brazil, that was at stake.

Article I of the border treaty between Brazil and Uruguay[27] declared that all previous treaties upon which both countries based their territorial claims were thereby considered null. It also explicitly mentioned the rights established in the Convention of January 30, 1819, as well as in the Treaty of Incorporation of the Banda Oriental into the Kingdom of Portugal, signed on July 31, 1821. The new treaty, however, also implied an invalidation of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, signed by Portugal and Spain in 1777, as it included the territory of the Seven Peoples of the Missions. Therefore, if taken as the basis to establish borders, the new treaty would have resulted in a much larger territory for Uruguay than that which finally prevailed.[28] The criterion that was to be used would basically be uti possidetis, that is, the current and de facto ownership by the respective countries, with the introduction of some modifications.

Also included in the treaties of 1851, were the issues of trade and navigation between Brazil and Uruguay. A duty charged for ten years by Uruguay on the export of cattle to the province of Rio Grande do Sul was abolished, making the passage of cattle across the border free. This resolved an ancient source of conflicts. In an important point for Brazil, the treaty declared that the navigation of the Uruguay River and its tributaries (Art. XIV) should be shared, and it was determined that the other riparian states of the Plata and its tributaries would be invited to sign a similar agreement, to make the navigation of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers free (art. XV). In addition, the treaties also determined the neutralization of Martin Garcia Island, a small piece of land at the mouth of the Uruguay River (Art. XVIII).

The treaties also included provisions “for the reciprocal delivery of criminals and deserters, and the return of [fugitive] slaves” – the latter benefitting only Brazil, since slavery no longer existed in Uruguay. Finally, on the same day, Brazil and Uruguay signed a treaty of assistance.

As a whole, the system of treaties signed between Brazil and Uruguay on October 12, 1851[29], represented a victory for Brazil since they advantageously resolved several important issues that had caused, and still could cause, problems for the Empire. The treaties were, therefore, a significant advance in terms of the consolidation of the Brazilian state. At the same time, they left the door open for Brazil to exercise a direct influence on the neighboring republic – Uruguay – especially through the treaties of alliance and assistance.

The main agent of the next steps of Brazilian policies in the Plata region was Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the future Marquis of Paraná. Soon after news of the fall of Oribe reached Rio de Janeiro, Carneiro Leão was sent to the Platine region, with full powers, as the person in charge of a special mission to the governments of Paraguay, Uruguay, Entre Rios and Corrientes. José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the future Viscount of Rio Branco[30], was appointed secretary of the mission. In a letter to Pontes dated October 21, 1851, Paulino de Souza stated its purpose:

It is necessary to seize the opportunity, to pressure Rosas, drag him to the ground, and obtain the amendment to the treaties of the 12th of this month, linking those governments to our system and our policy. […] The first act of the play ended very well, but a strong second act is necessary (AHI, 429/5/3).

Paulino de Souza began his instructions to Carneiro Leão, dated October 22, 1851, by emphasizing the benefits of seizing the moment that the countries of the Plata region were undergoing, deriving from the ongoing events “the greatest possible advantage to the Empire. He assured the future marques that due to the importance of his position, resources would be made available to him, thereby launching a secure basis for lasting peace and tranquility.”

Rosas was finally defeated, on February 3, 1852, at the battle of Monte Caseros. Brazil participated in the battle with a division of 4,000 men led by Manuel Marques de Souza. It was the only possible outcome of a situation that had been outlined for quite some time, after the formation of the coalition against Rosas and the progressive dilution of his power.

After the fall of both Oribe and Rosas, the Brazilian government continued to consolidate the gains obtained in the Plata region. In both Uruguay and Argentina, the period after the fall of Rosas was marked by internal conflicts. In Uruguay, the Colorado Party – in charge of the alliance against Oribe and Rosas, and the treaties of October 12 – was defeated by the Blanco Party. In Argentina, a rebirth of the dispute between Buenos Aires and the other provinces of the Confederation – united since mid-1852 under Urquiza’s provisional government – characterized the entire process of national formation. It was in just such a context that Brazilian diplomacy sought to consolidate the advances of its policy in the region – always balancing itself between distinct poles; seeking to take advantage of disagreements in neighboring countries.

A phrase the foreign minister said to José da Silva Paranhos – resident minister of Brazil in Uruguay since June 1852 – summed up the Brazilian stance: “As do you, I still believe it is necessary to place ourselves between the Blancos and the Colorados, and between Urquiza and his opponents – as far as the circumstances allow us to do that – at least until we obtain a more fixed and secure position” (Letter from Paulino de Souza to Paranhos dated 7/18/52, AHI, Private File of the Viscount of Rio Branco, 321-322).

In Uruguay, the new political forces in power questioned the system of treaties. Both the wisdom and the assurance of Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, moving deftly “between Blancos and Colorados,” ensured recognition of the validity of the treaties. And, as made clear in a May 1853 letter from Paulino de Souza to Paranhos, the situation of Uruguay’s financial weakness also favored Brazil:

The financial difficulties [of Uruguay] were what gave us the treaties of October (1851); let us see if we can still take advantage of them in order to consolidate the policy that they founded. Therefore, we must continue to maintain the financial crisis (excepting the adoption of projects related to the consolidation of debt and the creation and improvement of incomes) in order to compel the eastern [Uruguayan] government to enter a true and good path. We must not let the eastern government fall off the cliff, but it is worth keeping it on the edge for the amount of time necessary such that, once grounded by its deep problems, it places things in the right direction. This is what will cause the legislative majority to decrease its popularity, creating positive outcomes [for us], forcing it to comply clearly with the treaties [of October 12] (Letter of May 12, 1853-AHI, Private File of the Viscount of Rio Branco, 321-322).

Likewise, the division between the Argentine Confederation and the province of Buenos Aires was useful to Brazilian interests, favoring Argentina’s accession to the “system of treaties.” Paulino de Souza and his agent in the Plata region were suspicious of Urquiza and his ambitious plans. Even so, in a letter to Carneiro Leão dated March 1852, he showed optimism – from the Brazilian point of view:

As for me, if Urquiza wants to inherit both the tyranny and the system of Rosas, anarchy and disorder in the Argentine Confederation can only result. Busy with domestic matters [and a] lack of resources, it will not be able to turn against us, and it will [therefore] not be very difficult for us – not having to deal with a solid and united organized power, such as that of Rosas – to obtain from such circumstances real advantages for the Empire, and consolidate our influence on the Eastern State [Uruguay] (Private letter to Carneiro Leão of March 20, 1852- AHI, special mission to la Plata River, 272/1/3).

In a speech to the Chamber of Deputies in June 1852[31], Paulino de Souza advocated the policy he pursued in the Plata river basin by comparing Brazil’s situation in the region before and after the “inauguration of the new policy.” Before the new policy the head of the Argentine Confederation was General Rosas, a sworn enemy who had forced a diplomatic rift with Brazil and sought to incorporate Uruguay and Paraguay into the Confederacy, thereby forming what he called, “a colossus at our feet, which would have caused us serious harm.” He told the deputies that Brazilians were mistreated in Uruguay, and that their complaints, as well as those of the Imperial government, were neglected. He also reminded them that General Rosas supported the 1777 Treaty of San Ildefonso, which would tear from Brazil more than a third of the territory, and would prohibit navigation on the Plata River and its tributaries vessels under the Brazilian flag. The foreign minister added that Brazil did not have any friends among the parties that split the Plata republics, and that the country had been considered militarily weak, by both its neighbors and the European powers.

Paulino de Souza said that the situation had changed completely after the new policy was implemented. The head of the Argentine Confederation was now General Urquiza, who Brazil had helped in the task to “free and regenerate” his country, and who was willing to celebrate with Brazil a definitive peace treaty. The independence of Uruguay and Paraguay were also ensured. The treaties of October 12, 1851 had provided guarantees to Brazilian subjects who live in Uruguay against new arbitrary acts and violence. The uti possidetis principle had already been recognized for the establishment of the country’s borders with Peru and Uruguay, creating a valuable precedent, and navigation of the rivers of the Plata river basin was virtually guaranteed – opening an outlet to the ocean, which would bring great benefits to the province of Mato Grosso, as well as São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. In addition, the victory of Monte Caseros had restored Brazil’s prestige among the country’s neighbors in the Plata region and the European powers.

The foreign minister was correct in saying that the policy developed in the Plata from 1850 to 1852 had produced positive results for the Empire. From the point of view of the consolidation of the Brazilian state, its greatest merit was to ensure the Platine status quo[32], thereby helping to establish Paraguay and Uruguay as independent states. Opportunities then developed for the resolution of issues with the neighboring republics on terms that were favorable to Brazil.

Borders and navigation: the defense of sovereignty

In his last report to the Assembly as foreign minister (1853), the future Viscount of Uruguay made clear one of the most common concerns throughout his term in office: the demarcation of the Empire’s territorial boundaries. According to Paulino de Souza:

In order to avoid the seizing of new lands by other countries, further complicating the future, it is essential to set the Empire’s cardinal points [north, south, east and west] (which is all that is possible at the moment), and later, through other diplomatic missions, determine, develop and explain the lines that should link them.

As a general principle the minister believed uti possidetis should always prevail in border treaties. He, thus, directed his instructions to the several people in charge of carrying out treaties with the neighboring republics: Peru and Bolivia (Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro), Venezuela and Colombia (Miguel Maria Lisboa), and Paraguay (Felipe José Pereira Leal). Even though not all the missions were successful, the concentrated effort of the minister laid the foundation for the demarcation of all the borders of the Empire, establishing the theory of non-validity of the Treaty of San Ildefonso (1777), and consecrating uti possidetis as the general norm of Imperial diplomacy. Later, even when he was no longer foreign minister, the Viscount of Uruguay became involved in the matter of national borders with the British and French Guianas.

The main motivation for the establishment of the Empire’s borders should be – Paulino de Souza stated on several occasions – the search for the security and stability of the territorial status quo: this should be greater than any prospect of aggrandizement of the national territory.

In addition to the demarcation of borders, the navigation of rivers was also considered fundamental to the consolidation of the state and the defense of its security and sovereignty. The free navigation of the Plata River was, therefore, one of the main goals of Paulino de Souza’s policies in the region. The restoration of the former Viceroyalty of the Plata River – or even the strict political control of the government of Argentina over a Confederation of Uruguay and Paraguay – represented, as far as the matter of navigation was concerned, the worst of all worlds for the Empire. It would have given to a single country – indeed, a rival – control over the waters of the Platine river basin. The defense of the independence of Uruguay and Paraguay was a guarantee of internationalization of the Uruguay, Paraná and Paraguay rivers – a goal shared by the European powers interested in trading in the region.

It is worth drawing attention to the contradiction regarding the issue of river navigation among the policies that the Imperial government adopted in the Plata region and those it adopted in the Amazon. While in the South, Brazil demanded the opening of the Plata River to international navigation, in the North it closed the Amazon to the republics located on the river. The Brazilian rulers themselves, who attempted to reconcile both positions, acknowledged this contradiction. In a query made by the Foreign Affairs Section of the Council of State, dated June 1845, rapporteur Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos observed:

If as owners of the Paraguay (river) – or of parts of the Paraguay, Paraná and Uruguay [rivers] – we believe we were perfectly entitled to navigate them until the mouth at the sea ...it would not be fitting to restrict the populations of Bolivia, Peru, New Granada, Ecuador and Venezuela from navigation on the Amazon. Our interests regarding the navigation of rivers are different or opposite in various points of the Empire. This is why we invoke the conventional law that establishes for us the use of the rivers that cross and divide Brazil (Council of State – 1842-1889 – Queries of the Foreign Affairs Section. Vol. 1 – 1842-1845).

The solution, therefore, is to adhere to conventional law, and seek to obtain and regulate – through agreements with the neighboring republics – the rights of navigation of the rivers, and refrain from considering it as a “perfect right.”

As foreign minister, Paulino de Souza had to deal with the pressures of opening up the Amazon River to foreign navigation – pressure not only from other countries that shared the river, but also from France and England, as well as the United States, which exercised especially strong pressure in this regard. A campaign in the press, by political and intellectual means, was carried out by U.S. Navy Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury who, after an expedition to the region, was convinced of the importance of opening up the Amazon River and the internationalization of the region. In his writings, Maury supported the view that the Amazon was an area of natural projection of the South of the United States, which, he believed, should send settlers – along with their black slaves – to populate and develop the region.[33]

In a report Paulino de Souza submitted to the Foreign Affairs Section of the Council of State, in 1854, the former minister’s opinion on the matter was clear: he expressed an intense nationalist and defensive stand against “powerful nations.” He said the United States, whom he described as a very powerful democracy, was so close to Brazil, it represented a more present threat than did European nations, especially France and England. As an example of the expansionary and invasive tendencies of the Americans, he recalled that the United States had annexed five Mexican provinces.

According to the future Viscount of Uruguay, the Americans were also interested in expanding into Brazil, using adventurers and greedy emigrants as their main instruments. The right to free navigation of the Amazon was, therefore, crucial to the American plans.

France and England, Paulino de Souza’s report also said, were interested in participating in “the imagined great commercial feast that the opening of the Amazon region would bring about.” And the three countries – the United States, England, and France – were encouraging the ambitions of other nations of the river basin, such as Peru and Bolivia, to increase pressure on Brazil, to open the river to international navigation. Paulino de Souza concluded that, as in the case of slave trafficking, it was useless to go in the opposite direction and persist in a position that everyone condemned, and against which there were powerful interests. According to him, the riparian nations should have the right to navigate the Amazon River, and the exercise of this right should be established through reciprocal agreements, or sovereign acts of each of these nations. Those rights, however, should not be extended to the tributaries of the river that began in neighboring states, and the passage of warships on the river should also be strictly forbidden.

Concerning the non-bordering states, Paulino de Souza said the Imperial government should allow navigation on the river, but only through specific agreements with the individual countries involved. He also said that a good way to reduce the influence of the United States, France and England on the riparian countries, would be to tie the granting of the right of free navigation to previous resolutions concerning the matter of borders with these neighboring countries.

In addition to the issue of navigation rights, Paulino de Souza voiced his opinion on other matters related to the Amazon. He said, for example, that the Brazilian government should encourage the occupation of the region, by establishing colonies there and supporting the national steam navigation company of Irineu Evangelista de Souza with an increased annual grant – thereby enabling it to compete advantageously with foreign steam navigation concerns.

Paulino José Soares de Souza remained committed, throughout his life, to the construction and the consolidation of the Brazilian state. It is difficult to dissociate his domestic efforts for the development of a solid and centralized state, from his zeal for the safety and sovereignty of such a state in the foreign arena. More than obtaining immediate gains, the Viscount of Uruguay was concerned with “ensuring the future.”

Externally, he believed an active policy, marked by clear guidelines would lead Brazilian foreign policy henceforth. As the minister of foreign affairs, he developed the formulation of a doctrinal basis that guided the basic issues and themes of Brazilian diplomacy of his time – such as the Platine policy, relationships with the foreign powers, the setting of territorial borders, river navigation, and international trade.

It was not by chance that it was also during his administration of the foreign ministry that the structure of diplomacy itself was improved. Law no. 614, of August 22, 1851, for example, organized the Brazilian diplomatic corps. The law was later regulated by two decrees issued on March 20, 1852: no. 940, which approved the Regulation of the Brazilian Diplomatic Corps (Regulation Paulino Soares de Souza) and no. 941, which regulated the number, the categories and the complement of diplomatic missions abroad. Finally, the Decree of April 6, 1852 established for the first time a table of wages, representations, bonuses and work funds for the diplomatic service.

After the legal instruments outlined above, the diplomatic corps gained the features of a career, with entrance through public competition and clear advancement criteria.[34] The scale of priorities in Brazilian overseas representations was also redesigned, which considerably increased the importance of the legations of America.[35]

Thus, it can be said that – both in the realm of the doctrine and in that of bureaucratic organization – Paulino José Soares de Souza was in charge of the development of the basic instruments that, from then on, would be used to lead Brazilian diplomacy.

Bibliography

CARVALHO, José Murilo de (org.). Viscounde do Uruguay. Coleção Formadores do Brasil. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2002.

______. I – A Construção da Ordem: A Elite Política Imperial. II – Teatro de Sombras: A Política Imperial. 2a. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. UFRJ, Relume-Dumará, 1996.

CASTRO, Flávio Mendes de Oliveira. História da Organização do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1983.

STATE COUNCIL – 1842-1889 – Queries by the Section of Foreign Affairs. Brasília: Senado Federal, 1978.

DORATIOTO, Francisco Fernando Monteoliva. Maldita Guerra: Nova História da Guerra do Paraguai. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002.

GOLIN, Tau. A Fronteira: Os Tratados de Limites Brasil-Uruguay- Argentina, os Trabalhos Demarcatórios, os Territórios Contestados e os Conflitos na Bacia do Prata. Vol. 2. Porto Alegre: L&PM, 2004.

HORNE, Gerald. O Sul Mais Distante – Os Estados Unidos, o Brasil e o Tráfico de Escravos Africanos. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2010.

MATTOS, Ilmar Rohloff de. O Lavrador e o Construtor: O Visconde do Uruguay e a Construção do Estado Imperial. In: Prado, Maria Emília (org.). O Estado como Vocação: Idéias e Práticas Políticas no Brasil Oitocentista. Rio de Janeiro: Access Editora, 1999.

NUNES FERREIRA, Gabriela. Centralização e Descentralização no Império: o Debate entre Tavares Bastos e Visconde de Uruguay. São Paulo: Departamento de Ciência Política da USP; Editora 34, 1999.

______. O Rio da Prata e a Consolidação do Estado Imperial – São Paulo: Hucitec (Coleção Estudos Históricos), 2006.

______. O Império e o Rio da Prata. In: Brandão, Gildo Marçal; Costa Lima, Marcos; Rocha Reis, Rossana. (Org.). Regionalismos, Democracia e Desenvolvimento. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Humanitas, 2007

______. Conflitos no Rio da Prata. In: Grinberg, Keila; Salles, Ricardo. (Org.). O Brasil Imperial, Volume I: 1808-1831. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2009.

______. Visconde do Uruguay: Teoria e Prática do Estado Brasileiro. In: André Botelho; Lilia Moritz Schwarcz. (Org.). Um Enigma Chamado Brasil: 29 Intérpretes e um País. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2009.

RIBEIRO, Pedro Freire. A Missão Pimenta Bueno (1843-1847) – Documentos Expedidos pela Secretaria de Estado. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Seção de Publicações, 1966.

RIO BRANCO, Barão do. O Visconde do Rio Branco. Rio de Janeiro: A Noite Editora, 1940.

SANTOS, Luís Claudio Villafañe Gomes. O Império e as Repúblicas do Pacífico: As Relações do Brasil com Chile, Peru, Equador e Colômbia (1822-1889). Curitiba: Editora da UFPR, 2002.

SOUZA, José Antônio Soares de. A Vida do Visconde do Uruguay. São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1944.

______. O General Urquiza e o Brazil. Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Vol. 206, Jan/Mar, 1950.

TORRES, Miguel Gustavo de Paiva. O Visconde do Uruguay e Sua Atuação Diplomática Para a Consolidação da Política Externa do Império. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2011.

URUGUAY, Visconde de. Ensaio Sobre o Direito Administrativo. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1960.

______. Estudos Práticos Sobre a Administração das Províncias no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1865.

VIGNALE, Julio Cesar. Consecuencias de Caseros. Montevideo, 1946. Chapters 12 and 23.

Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro

A physician, diplomat, geographer and cartographer, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro was, during the Empire, the greatest Brazilian expert in the border matters between Brazil and its neighbors. He was chargé d’affaires in Peru (1829-1832 and 1837-1841), Mexico (1834-1835) and Bolivia (1837-1841), resident minister in Argentina (1842-1843) and extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary in charge of the Special Mission to the Pacific Republics and Venezuela (1851-1852). He wrote almost 200 memoirs, mostly about the Brazilian borders. He organized the Itamaraty map collection and was in charge of the restoration or the elaboration of maps and studies about the entire extensive line of Brazilian borders.

Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro: defining the territory of the monarchy

Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Santos

Introduction

Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro (1795-1878) was certainly the best synthesis of a man of action and an intellectual of the Brazilian diplomacy under the Imperial period. His career began belatedly, when he was more than 30 years old, although, up to that time, he had a successful career as a physician, a trade he had embraced since his adolescence. He started his diplomatic activities in 1826, with the unsuccessful attempt to be nominated Consul at the Spanish Court – which would have meant the recognition of Brazilian independence, a decision, which at that point, the Government of Madrid did not consider convenient. From 1829 to 1832, he was the first diplomatic representative of Brazil in Lima, and after that he served as chargé d’affaires in Mexico, from 1834 to 1835.

In 1836, he was nominated once again chargé d’affaires in Peru and, on that occasion, also in Bolivia. By the way, shortly after the arrival of Ponte Ribeiro to Bolivia, early in 1837, both countries joined in a Confederation, which eventually did not last long. At that time, Ponte Ribeiro already had extensive experience in maritime voyages. After all, he had arrived in Brazil when he was 13 years old, with the Portuguese Court in 1808 and, later, as a physician on-board, he traveled to Europe, Africa and Asia, often under difficult conditions. As a diplomat, he had already crossed the Atlantic, both to Europe and North America, and he had also reached the Pacific Ocean, going around Cape Horn, in his first stay in Peru. During his second mission in the countries of the South American Pacific coast, he did not go by sea and crossed the continent from East to West by land. He toured in a mule’s back the path from Buenos Aires to the Bolivian capital, Chuquisaca (presently Sucre), from there he went down to Tacna, already in Peru, and continued his journey to the Peruvian capital, where he arrived in June, 1837. The journey from Rio de Janeiro to Lima took almost one year, full of difficulties and discomfort, an epic worthy of the great adventurers. In Lima, he witnessed the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation’s defeat to Chilean invaders and its dissolution, with the restoration of Bolivia and Peru as distinct sovereignties. In 1841, near the end of his mission in the Peruvian capital, he signed two treaties with that country: one of Peace, Friendship, Trade and Navigation and another one of Borders and Extradition. However, none of these treaties was ratified.

In late 1841, back in Rio de Janeiro, he took over the leadership of the Third Section of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in charge of the American themes, and devoted himself to researching and writing memoirs on border matters. On that occasion, he studied the limits with both English and French Guyana. His stay at the Court in Rio de Janeiro was, however, short-lived and, in April 1842 he was appointed Minister Resident in Buenos Aires, where he remained until the following year.

From 1844 to 1851, he resumed his functions in the Third Section of the Secretariat of State and started to consolidate his reputation as an expert on border disputes between the Empire and its neighbors. For that reason, he became a logical choice to head the Special Mission in the Pacific Republics and Venezuela, in 1851. That was certainly the most important initiative of Imperial diplomacy directed towards the countries of the West coast of South America. Ponte Ribeiro signed with Peru, in October 1851, the Special Convention of Trade, River Navigation, Extradition and Limits, which both countries ratified and which became a basic model for the subsequent border and navigation negotiations of Brazil with its other neighbors.

Back in Rio de Janeiro, by late 1852, he was placed in active availability with the post of Minister Plenipotentiary, as an acknowledgement to his “long and good services in the diplomatic career” (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1853, p. 5). Ponte Ribeiro did not take over the third section once again, but he continued to render advice to the successive ministers. He ended his career as a diplomatic representative, explorer and chronicler of the various countries where he served. From then on, however, he consolidated his fame as the most renowned scholar of the Brazilian boundaries (which had already been outlined in his stints at the Third Section of the Chancellery).

Castilhos Goycochêa consecrated Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro as the “major border expert of the Empire”. That author (1942, p. 20) noted that:

The greatest and the best part of the works by Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro was made after his retirement, in 1853. ... Until that date he had only written 45 of the famous Memoirs, each of which became a real treaty on the subject that he explored, from 1853 to 1876 he wrote 140 other Memoirs. Not to mention those that his widow donated to the government in 1884.[36]

The importance of Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro in the discussion and consolidation of the Empire’s doctrines concerning the Brazilian borders and its territoriality –ideas that were later inherited by the Republican government and that are effective, to a large extent, until today – cannot be minimized. The “major border expert of the Empire”, negotiator of pioneer treaties, renowned cartographer and author of nearly 200 memoirs about the borders was decisive for the establishment of the doctrine for the definition of the Brazilian territory. He supported it with detailed and meticulous empirical studies, documentary research and the elaboration of maps which, for its technical qualities, remained effective as an inescapable reference for many decades after he died.

Of all the Brazilian border, from Cape Orange to the Chuí stream, more than 16,000 kilometers long, running over mountain ranges, along the thalwegs of rivers, the margins of ponds, wetlands and dry lands, there might not be any fraction of a meter that Ponte Ribeiro has not studied, which he has not drawn or that he has not ordered to sketch, about the rights of which he has not meditated in sight of the documents that he gathered and that served as comparison with one another or with elements that might have adjacent sovereignties (GOYCOCHÊA, 1942, p. 28).

Beyond the matter of stricto sensu borders, it must be recalled, to paraphrase Yves Lacoste,[37] that geography served, above all, to unify the Empire. As many authors have already pointed out,[38] the discourse about a pre-existing “Brazilian” territory was one of the most important founding myths of the Brazilian identity. That territory (which in some readings possessed natural limits and therefore predated the colonization itself) would have its unit protected and legitimized by the centralizing monarchy against the dangers of the separatist and anarchizating tendencies to which the neighboring republics were subject.

Body of the country, soul of the monarchy

Today there is a consensually accepted interpretation that, when it separated from Portugal, there still was not in the former colony anything close to a national consciousness. As the French naturalist Saint-Hilaire concluded in an insightful manner, in a well-known passage, “there was a country called Brazil, but definitely there were no Brazilians”. Like the other nations of the American continent, Brazil had to invent itself as a nation, from an incongruous collection of “small-homelands”, some of which had scarce economic, political and cultural ties with one another. In the neighbouring countries, the option for the building of a fully nationalist identity since the beginning of their independent lives reinforced or even invented cultural differences and local policies that led to the fragmentation of the former Spanish colony.[39] In the Brazilian case, the impossible quest for a nationality that included both masters and slaves was avoided. The answer to the difficult challenge of the building of a politically operational identity that united such disparate regional realities and that preserved, at the same time, the main features of an extremely conservative proslavery society underwent two major themes: monarchy as a symbol of belonging to a especific civilization project and the idea of preexistence of a common origin, based on the notion of a single territory and of alleged natural and anthropological characteristics prior to colonization itself, emphasized, in a subsidized manner, by a common history (SANTOS, 2010, p. 108-113).

Poured in terms that were still dynastic, the identity of the new country was based on the idea of preexistence of a territory that would define it, and for the integrity of which the monarchy had to care. This was one of the key concepts for a Brazilian identity that united the various “small-homelands” of the former colony preserving both the hierarchies and the institutions inherited from the colonial period. As Magnoli emphasized (1997, p. 17): “in terms of legitimacy, the past is all the better the more remote it is. Perfection is about anchoring the nation in its own nature, turning it previous to men and history”. The core of this notion of a single territory, which was clearly identifiable and preexisting, was based on the formulation of the myth of an “Island-Brazil”: a portion of segregated land, outlined by the Atlantic Ocean, on one side, and, on the other, by the course of mighty rivers, the springs of which supposedly met in a legendary unifying lake located in the South American hinterland. Thus, Brazil, reified in its territory, supposedly had always been, according to Jaime Cortesão (1956, p. 137), “a geographical whole geometrically defined and almost isolated”. This territorial unit would have been equivalent to a “human Island-Brazil, which was both pre-historical and proto-historical”, expressed in the alleged homogeneity of the indigenous tribes that inhabited that territory. Cortesão even suggested that since the sixteenth century, “the Island-Brazil was, above all, a cultural island and, specifically, the island of the general language,[40] which became a strong unifying bond of the colonial State” (Cortesão, 1956, p. 141-142).

The imperial State would be in charge of preserving this territory, going on with the task carried out by the Portuguese Crown, which expanded the Portuguese colonization towards the “natural” limits of Brazil, ignoring the artificial line established by the Treaty of Tordesilhas. According to that logic, the Brazilian monarchy was the guarantor of the integrity of that Island-Brazil, sold as a gift of nature that the colonizer rescued and that the independent country would be in charge of preserving. The monarchy was related to the unity of the territory, in an ideological operation that turned it into being responsible for the maintenance of the “greatness” of Brazil. On the other hand, the Hispanic neighbors, by their political system, supposedly caused the fragmentation of the Spanish heritage in several small and anarchical Republics.

Therefore, such idea of greatness equated the immensity of the territory and the preservation of its integrity to the monarchy. The Brazilian identity was based on the territory and on the monarchy, having as a corollary the preservation of a certain civilization project: a highly hierarchical, oligarchic and proslavery society, in the molds of the Ancien Régime, a model that had been undermined by the American and French revolutions and was still being challenged within the autonomist movements of Spanish America, which recognized their new societies as Republics: a break with Europe and with the practices, ideas and forms of legitimacy of the Ancien Régime. On the other hand, the elites that promoted Brazilian independence imagined themselves as being “European” and civilised, in a challenge to geography and to its own logic, when it sees in the proslavery reactionary monarchy a bastion of the lights and of civilization in the midst of the warlord barbarism of the Republican America.

Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro: a negotiator with his own ideas

Born in Portugal, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro became Brazilian in the great naturalization that followed independence. During the colonial period he had occupied small public offices, without hindering his career as a physician: treasurer of the village of Praia Grande (Niterói), in 1819, and treasurer of the estate of the sick and the dead of the same locality, in 1820. His early diplomatic missions, however, were only obtained during the First Empire and, thereafter, he abandoned medicine in a definitive manner. After his scarcely successful mission in Spain (1826-1828), during his first stay in Lima, from 1829 to 1832, he started to engage directly with themes concerning the limits.

The foreign policy of D. Pedro I was basically reactive and scarcely consistent (SANTOS, 2012b, p. 20-31) and, within this framework, Ponte Ribeiro’s first mission in Peru, like that of Luiz de Souza Dias in Great-Colombia, represented only a response to the missions of the Peruvian José Domingo Cáceres (1826) and the Colombian Leandro Palacios (1827) to Rio de Janeiro. Both Hispanic-American envoys were unsuccessful in their attempts to discuss the Brazilian borders with their countries, since the Imperial government claimed not to have the necessary information to initiate these discussions, since much of the documentation and maps that would be indispensable were in Lisbon and new surveys and investigations would have to be undertaken to support the negotiations. The instructions provided by Ponte Ribeiro, as far as the possible Peruvian interest in defining the frontiers with Brazil was concerned were also in that same direction. He should repeat the argument about the lack of elements to negotiate “always saying that the Imperial government is taking care of clarifying everything, so that later it enters the negotiation of such a treaty” (Aracati to Ponte Ribeiro. In: CHDD, 2008, p. 108).

In fact, more than missing elements to discuss on a technical bases a certain stretch of the border, there was not any established doctrine to define the limits in broader terms. The Brazilian Consul in Asuncion between 1824 and 1829, Manuel Corrêa da Câmara, even addressed the outline of the border with Paraguay, without reaching an agreement, because the Paraguayan dictator Francia wanted the recognition of the lines defined by the Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777, and the Brazilian diplomat sought acceptance of the uti possidetis principle. As far as Uruguay was concerned, there was no continuation to what had been determined by the Preliminary Peace Convention (signed with Argentina, it should be noted), Article 17 of which provided for the conclusion of a “Definitive Peace Treaty”, which would determine the borders between Brazil and Uruguay. As it has been mentioned before, as far as Great Colombia and Peru were concerned, D. Pedro I’s diplomacy refused the proposals to start discussions on border issues. Thus, consistent negotiations about the limits of the Empire began only in the Second Empire.

The important aspect was the recognition or not, of the treaties and other arrangements between Portugal and Spain as the basis for the negotiations between Brazil and its neighbors. Once such logic was obeyed, the discussion would be focused on documentation exchanged between both ancient metropoles, on colonial maps and, as an alternative, only in the omissive cases or in those that were less clear, on actual occupation of the territory by the citizens and subjects of each of the countries. Another radically opposite alternative, adopting the uti possidetis principle, would be to regard the moment of the independences as the initial mark and delimit the sovereignties according to the actual possession of the land at that time, with or without titles, and even, ocasionally, going against the provisions of the old treaties between Portugal and Spain (even though these could serve as a subsidiary source, mainly in the case of the uninhabited areas).

It was only during the Second Empire that it was defined a coherent policy for the establishment of the Brazilian borders and Ponte Ribeiro had been one of the major players in this debate since the Regencies. After a brief stay in Mexico (1834-1835), Ponte Ribeiro was once again appointed chargé d’affaires to the Peruvian Government and, this time, to the Bolivian government as well. In December, 1836, Ponte Ribeiro arrived at the Bolivian capital, Chuquisaca, without instructions to negotiate the borders, but from Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian Chancellor Gustavo Pantoja had sent a Note, dated December 15th, 1836, suggesting that the border between Brazil and Bolivia was established according to the Treaty of San Ildefonso, a proposal which the Bolivian government rejected.[41] In the same line of taking as basis the agreements between the old metropoles, in 1844, Brazil signed a Treaty of Alliance, Trade, Navigation and Limits with Paraguay, which proposed to define the borders according to the Treaty of San Ildefonso.

In Lima, considering the interest of the Peruvian Government to negotiate its borders with the Empire, Ponte Ribeiro began discussions about a Treaty of Limits, despite having no specific instructions or powers to deal with this theme, which forced him to introduce a safeguard in the text, making it clear that he was negotiating ad referendum of his government. Going against the philosophy that prevailed until then (though irregularly), Ponte Ribeiro decided to adopt as a criterion for the negotiation the uti possidetis principle. He wrote to Rio de Janeiro to request powers to negotiate and instructions about what criteria he should use. The response to his request to accept the Peruvian proposal and instructions about how to carry out those negotiations came many months later, and when they finally arrived they contradicted frontally the criterion which had been chosen by Ponte Ribeiro and on which he had already been basing his activity, incidentally without having been authorized. Even so, against his instructions, he kept his negotiating strategy unchanged and explained to the Imperial government why he would not obey the guidelines received:

Even if [the dispatch] that includes instructions for me to stick to the Preliminary Treaty of 1777 had arrived in due time, I would still be forced to practice what I’ve been doing after the government of Bolivia stated that it does not recognize as valid and binding to it the treaties between Spain and Portugal; and I would have always expressed to Imperial government, as I did, my certainty that, instead of implementing them by force, Brazil should take advantage of that statement and argue only with the uti possidetis principle, which is favorable to us. .... I’m convinced that I have settled the common law principles that Brazil can claim in its favor, after the old treaties were unknown by that government (PONTE RIBEIRO, 2011, p. 153).

The Treaty of Limits and Extradition signed between Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro and the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuel Ferreyros by the end of the second mission of the Brazilian diplomat in Lima, in 1841, was the first legal instrument signed by a Brazilian negotiator according to the uti possidetis principle. However, it was rejected by both governments.

In 1842, the Treaty was examined in the State Council (session of June 16th) and the adoption of the uti possidetis principle was the subject of strong criticism, which resulted in the recommendation that it should not been ratified:

... far from being better defined by the uti possidetis clause, it fully exposes our limits to an innovation of the old conventions between Portugal and Spain; innovation all the more dangerous as the government of Your Imperial Majesty is not for the recognition of its advantages and prepared with previous and secure assessments. The foadera finium is one of those conventions in which any alteration or change should be made without the most scrupulous investigation of all the general circumstances that claim them (REZEK, 1978, p. 105-106).

In fact, it was only in Paulino Soares de Souza’s second term as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1849-1853) that uti possidetis was consecrated as doctrine to mark out the Brazilian border negotiations. Soares de Souza went beyond the theoretical recognition of this principle as being the most favorable for Brazil. Under his direction, it was triggered an important diplomatic offensive for the definition of the Brazilian borders. In 1851, Paulino commissioned Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro to be the head of the Special Mission in the Republics of the Pacific and in Venezuela, with accurate instructions on how to negotiate not only the boundaries, but also trade and the river navigation, when that was the case.

In the late 1840’s, with the internal pacification driven by the prosperity derived from the soaring exports of coffee, the Brazilian State finally began to consolidate itself and the foreign policy became consistent. However, in 1849, even though it was already strengthened and more confident, the monarchy still faced strong domestic resistances against a more active role in the Plata region, the politics of which had been dominated by the Argentinean leader Juan Manuel de Rosas since the 1830’s. The memory of the military and political disaster of the Cisplatine War was still present and, in the same way as that defeat had contributed to the resignation of D. Pedro I, a humiliation in front of Rosas would be a serious source of lack of prestige for young D. Pedro II and could jeopardize the monarchic institution itself.

With the fall of the Cabinet of the Viscount (later Marquis) of Olinda, Araújo Lima, in 1849, and his replacement by José da Costa Carvalho (Viscount and Marquis of Monte Alegre) – with Paulino as Chancellor – it was verified a strong transformation of the Brazilian attitude, towards an active and, even interventionist policy in the Plata region. The Empire started to support, even financially, the leaders of the Colorado Party besieged in Montevideo by the forces of Blanco Party of warlord Manuel Oribe, an ally of Rosas. In May 1851, the Brazilian Government signed a Treaty of military alliance with the Argentinean provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes. It also became an ally of Paraguay. In August, it began the invasion of the Uruguayan territory controlled by Oribe and then Rosas declared war on the Brazilian Empire and its allies.

The Special Mission to the Republics of the Pacific, whose instructions date from March 1st, 1851, was initially designed to ward off alliances and dispel any sympathies for Rosas in the rest of the continent, including acting next to the press of those countries to publish reports that were favorable to the Empire. In the Plata region, the military victory against the forces of Oribe was swift and, in November 1851, once the Uruguayan territory had been dominated, the allies already pointed their guns directly against Rosas. The Argentinean dictator was defeated in the battle of Monte Caseros on February 3rd, 1852. The promptness with which the campaign against Oribe and Rosas progressed and the little sympathy that the Argentinean arose both in Chile and in Peru allowed Ponte Ribeiro to focus in his negotiations about limits, trade and navigation with the government of Lima, after a brief stay in Chile.

Having been received by the Peruvian President, on July 12th, 1851, Ponte Ribeiro started talking to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joaquín de Osma, who presided the Peruvian delegation in the first four sessions of the negotiation – held, respectively on August 8th, 11th and 17th and on September 2nd. The last three (October 18th, 19th, and 21st) were in charge of the interim Minister, Bartolomé Herrera. Ponte Ribeiro reported that the greatest difficulty was the adoption of the uti possidetis principle to set the limits. Peruvian negotiators insisted on referring to the Preliminary Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777, which was rejected by the Brazilian. Finally, Ponte Ribeiro’s position prevailed, “setting the border from Tabatinga to the mouth of the Apoporis River, and along the Javari River to the South; and that there was the inclusion of the clause that the already determined Joint Commission, will propose the exchange of land for the border to have natural limits” (Ponte Ribeiro, 2010:136). In a long and detailed letter dated October 26th, Ponte Ribeiro informed the Chancellor Paulino Soares de Souza of the signing of the Treaty “and the difficulties and incidents that occurred during the negotiation” (PONTE RIBEIRO, 2010, p. 133-138).

The Special Convention of Trade, River Navigation, Extradition and Limits between Brazil and Peru was signed on October 23rd, 1851, and, where it was ratified both by the Peruvian Congress and by the Brazilian Emperor, its ratification instruments were exchanged on October 18th of the following year, in Rio de Janeiro. From the Peruvian capital, Ponte Ribeiro went to Bolivia, where he tried to negotiate, to no avail, a similar agreement with that country. In 1852, the Special Mission was divided into two and the negotiations with Ecuador, New Granada and Venezuela were entrusted to Miguel Maria Lisboa.

The practical justification for the adoption of uti possidetis as doctrine and for the urgency in setting the borders was made very clearly by Paulino Soares de Souza in his 1852 report presented to the Parliament:

Experience has shown that the population of neighbouring States with much smaller areas than the Empire, and especially of the landlocked ones, tends to expand across our borders, while our population, formerly drawn to those points by the mining industry, and led to that by the system of our old metropolis, currently tends to come closer to the coastline. Thus, not only new settlements have not been formed in our borders, but also part of the old ones have been abandoned, or are undergoing decadence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1853, p. 10).

Thus, the uti possidetis doctrine acquired, in practical terms, an eminently defensive sense, in order to ensure a border, which seemed to be at its maximum, since the Brazilian population seemed to flow towards the coastline. In terms of speech, this idea fit perfectly in the argumentation about the preservation of the territory bequeathed by the Portuguese colonization, defined in natural limits. The Brazilian territoriality was seen as a legacy of nature, which the metropolis had unveiled and populated along with the Indian tribes that gave, in this view, an anthropological support for the notion of a preexisting Brazil. Not by chance, indigenism was the most striking current of Brazilian romanticism, an intellectual movement whose self-proclaimed mission was to develop a national literature. On the contrary, on the one hand, with the United States – one of the basis of whose identity was territorial expansion, and the idea of an ever-expanding frontier – and, on the other hand, with most Hispanic-American countries – that very early on cultivated a sort of “withering territory syndrome” as part of their nationalist discourse – the Brazilian diplomacy has been building the narrative of a country “satisfied” with its territory, limited by natural borders (and, therefore, not historical ones) and whose origin and legitimacy preceded colonization.

The narratives can be suitable or not, consistent or inconsistent, but in itself, it is not very pertinent to discuss whether they are “true” or “false”. The States and the historiographies of the neighbor countries tend to insist on the narrative of territorial losses. Sometimes, with enough concrete bases, for example, when territories populated and actually controlled by a State were attached by another one after bloody wars. Other times, based on projections of territories, some of which were sparsely populated, which supposedly belonged to the Spanish Crown and, therefore, could be “transmitted” to the political units that succeeded the metropolis, based on titles and imprecise ambiguous and imprecise limits. Anyway, these quarrels would have to be analyzed in each individual case. It turns out, however, that the mere crossing of all demands and complaints about “lost” territories among the Hispanic-American countries would show that it is impossible to satisfy everyone, because the same territory is often simultaneously claimed by three or more countries. It must also be noted that even in countries considered as “usurpers” of the territory of neighbors, the idea of territorial loss remain present in versions of their national historiographies, as in the case of Chile, to mention a single example, which conquered territories of Bolivia and Peru, but which registers in some narratives that it has “lost” Patagonia to Argentina.

As far as Brazil is concerned, the idea of a nation “satisfied” with its territory, naturally outlined and that came before nationality itself, was developed slowly and often against the facts. Like moments in which one could argue (and in each case, with greater or lesser intensity, actually did) about territorial losses, recall the Cisplatine episodes, the limits with British Guiana, the clauses of the Treaty of Petropolis concerning the the border with Mato Grosso, the adjustement with Peru of 1909 and the rectification of boundaries with Uruguay promoted by the Baron of Rio Branco.

In the First Empire, the discourse about a country that was secure in its territory would seem highly incongruous with reality, not only of still undefined borders, such as it was threatened by its neighbors. The “loss” of Cisplatine seemed to be a major trauma, an unacceptable breach of the territorial integrity. It must be emphasized that the “withering territory syndrome” could have been an option for the identity discourse in Brazil as well. The Coat of Arms adopted by the Brazilian Empire was a simple adaptation of the personal banner of Prince D. Pedro, only with the addition of an Imperial Crown and nineteen stars representing the Brazilian provinces (which included the Cisplatine one). According to Pimenta (2002, p. 173, emphasis by the author), “since 1825 its consolidation [of Cisplatine] as an integral part of the Brazilian Empire acquired almost the same sense of integrity of the nation.” It is true that the province enjoyed a quite autonomous government, with its own laws and institutions and Spanish as its official language. However, that situation was no stranger to the political concepts of the Ancien Régime, a political model whose preservation attempt was embodied by the project of continuing monarchy in the former Portuguese colony. Therefore, the extraordinary nature of Cisplatine in the context of the colony and of the emerging Empire is highly debatable. The economic and social ties with the Province of São Pedro were intense, with that territory being one of the major suppliers of jerked beef to the colony. In addition, the port of Montevideo served as a gateway to the trade of slaves and commodities to the South of the Portuguese colony. In addition, both the communications and the transportation between Montevideo and the capital and the main cities of the Empire were much easier and constant than among many provinces. Even the language difference must be put into perspective, since many inhabitants of the Portuguese colony often communicated in general language, of Indian origin. Montevideo, in turn, traditionally housed a large population of foreigners and many languages were spoken there besides Spanish and Portuguese. In what currently is the territory of Northern Uruguay, the Portuguese language prevailed until the late nineteenth century.

The Cisplatine war was both unpopular and wearing for Pedro I, but the loss of the territory was seen, correctly from the perspective of the time, as a serious threat to the integrity of the Empire and was a very tough blow. The Congressman at the time and future Marquis of Abrantes, Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, summarized well, on a speech delivered on May 15th, 1827, the feeling about the possible loss of the province:

Everyone talks against the war, but I have no doubt about ensuring that it is extremely rare the Brazilian who wants to lose the Cisplatine. Let us grant, however, that the war is unpopular, but it should be noted that, if peace is made with the loss of Cisplatine, this peace will be even more unpopular (apud CALÓGERAS, 1998, v. II, p. 436, emphasis by the author).

Therefore, a narrative about a supposed territorial spoliation could have been adopted by the Empire. In fact, the defense of the integrity of a territory against threats from neighbor countries was one of the keys to the discourse on territoriality. The other cornerstone of this vision was the idea of natural limits and the contours of this territory, certainly, would seem more “natural” if it was marked off to the South by the Plata estuary rather than by the Quaraí-Jaguarão-Chuí line that currently separates Uruguay from Brazil. Much has been argued during the First Empire and the Regencies about the need to restore this “natural border”. Even an appeal for the European monarchies to help the Empire in this task was made, as proved by the Mission of the Marquis of Santo Amaro (1830). However, once Brazilian historiography accepted the existence of the Uruguayan nationality, it hid that breach of territorial integrity when it emphasized the own cultural traits that distinguished the new nation from the Empire and the precariousness of the Portuguese domination in the area.[42] The narrative that stood in Brazilian historiography turned out to conceal such imperfection in the speech about territoriality with the notion that one could not lose what it actually never had. It should be noted that this argument is inconsistent with the doctrine of uti possidetis, since in 1822 the territory that currently belongs to the Uruguayan State was (after a brief fight) under the control of the Brazilian Empire. In terms of the doctrine that supports the construction of the Brazilian territoriality, that fact, regardless of the specific circumstances of such ownership, would be the only condition necessary to legitimize this region as part of the Brazilian territory.

The major borders expert

The decisive importance Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro’s action in the establishment of uti possidetis as a doctrine for the discussions the Brazilian limits with its neighbours must be highlighted. In the negotiation of the Treaty of 1841 with Peru, the diplomat acted initially without accurate guidance from Rio de Janeiro and, later, going against the express instructions from his superiors. According to the opinion of Soares de Souza (1952, p. 116):

I believe that this was Ponte Ribeiro’s masterpiece as a diplomat, a personal work, which he started alone, since 1838; established in 1851 by the Viscount do Uruguay, and concluded by the Baron of Rio Branco in 1910. The work had been eminently national, which had been carried out by the former surgeon from Praia Grande, since, regarding the fact that it was of the Empire, the Republic accepted it, and our greatest statesmen always defended it.

In fact, apart from his personal contribution as a negotiator for the definition of Brazilian borders (the treaties of 1841 and 1851 with Peru), the Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro’s performance in the Chancellery turned out to be key for the consolidation of the uti possidetis as principle position of the Brazilian diplomacy. Since that doctrine, an entire narrative about the limits that lingers to this day was gradually assembled, detailed in each specific case. Since his retirement in 1853, until shortly before his death in 1878, Ponte Ribeiro worked hard on the crystallization of this view and in the creation of solid foundations to sustain it. According to Adonias (1984, p. 76), after 1853 “there is the emergence of the memorialist and the geographer that records the process of our formation and depicts the profile of our territory”. Still as Chief of the 3rd Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ponte Ribeiro had proposed the creation of a Commission of Limits, “intended to collect writings and maps, and survey the Empire’s border chart, accompanied by a historical exhibition of data on which it is founded” (ADONIAS, 1984:9). That Commission, which turned out not to be established, should base its work on the “Abstract of the State of the Empire’s Border, which he wrote in 1842. Two years later, Ponte Ribeiro published another general memoir: “Notes on the State of the Brazilian Border in 1844”.

After 1853, Ponte Ribeiro went on to devote himself exclusively to the study of the matter of limits and one of his first initiatives was to organize and update the Map Collection of Itamaraty, by transferring to there maps that were in other public offices, by purchasing and exchanging maps in other countries and by making charts and maps at Itamaraty itself. A special effort, supervised personally by Ponte Ribeiro, was made in relation to Portugal and resulted, in 1867, in an agreement between both governments for the exchange and copy of maps between them. Portugal received 78 rolls and 157 lots of maps, in exchange for the 182 lots surveyed at the Portuguese Military Archive, the Overseas Archive and the National Library of Lisbon.

The Map Collection, whose initial survey of 1852 recorded the existence of 127 maps, was the subject of priority attention, together with the restoration of the Archive. In 1854, in the first catalogue of the Map Collection organized by Ponte Ribeiro, that number grew slightly, to 138, and in 1876 it already had 433 maps (Ponte Ribeiro, 1876). This last catalogue (updated in 1896) was undoubtedly the greatest systematization work of cartographic information available, with analytical notes by Ponte Ribeiro on each of the charts, which he organized into ten different sections: a) maps of the entire territory of the Brazilian Empire; b) maps of the Brazilian coastline; c) maps of the Provinces of the Empire; d) maps of the colonies and States that share limits with Brazil; e) maps of Southern America; f) maps of Northern America; g) maps of Asia and Oceania; h) maps of Africa; i) maps of Europe; and k) maps of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The 1876 Catalogue was, in fact, a subproduct of the Ponte’s participation on the draft of the General Charter of the Empire of 1875, a large-sized map (122 x 131 cm) published by a Commission created specifically for that purpose, under the chairmanship of General Henrique de Beaurepaire Rohan “with the support of the Hon. Sir Baron of Ponte Ribeiro”, as pointed out in the very title of this document, one of the most important Brazilian cartographic works of the nineteenth century. That charter was based on the map drawn by Conrado Jacob Niemeyer in 1846, which in a new edition, of 1873, had border details either corrected or added by Ponte Ribeiro. The General Charter of the Empire was one of the main attractions of the Brazilian stand at the Philadelphia International Exhibition of 1876. This General Charter of the Empire was “the best one we owned for nearly half a century, that is, until the appearance in 1922, of the Chart of Brazil to the Millionth, organizad by the Engineering Club in 46 pages” (ADONIAS, 1984, p. 52).

Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro was also an active member of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB), which, is the main Brazilian scientific institution and a crucial legitimacy locus of the theses that were created concerning both the Brazilian limits and its territoriality. It should only be mentioned the heated debate in 1853, and reprinted in the pages of the IHGB Review, between Ponte Ribeiro and José Joaquim Machado de Oliveira, who had criticized the Treaty which defined the limits of the Empire with Uruguay[43]. Ponte Ribeiro, in response, became a staunch advocate of the Brazilian State’s official position. Other members of the Institute, such as Cândido Baptista de Oliveira and Pedro de Alcântara Bellegarde also became involved in the debate ended by Gonçalves Dias who moved the Institute away from either one of both positions on behalf of its neutral and scientific character.

With the diplomatic negotiations established on a firm base and, from then on, almost invariable, the discourse on the evolution of the Brazilian borders and the legal bases of the Brazilian position was gradually crystallized already during the Second Empire, a process which the Baron of Rio Branco continued and was a major exponent during the Republic. Shortly, the argument developed about the borders followed the evolution of the negotiations between Portugal and Spain since the Treaty of Madrid overcame that of Tordesilhas in 1750 (with emphasis on the figure of Alexandre de Gusmão), with an important highlight on the supposed invalidation of the treaties between both metropoles because of the so-called “War of the Oranges”, in which Portugal faced an alliance between Spain and France (1801). This narrative recognized the signing of the Treaty of San Ildelfonso (1777), but the war between both metropolises broke that legal tie and, to the extent that the Peace of Badajoz (1801) did not restore the status quo ante bellum there was no basis to define the borders by the Treaty of 1777. According to Ponte Ribeiro “by the universal principle of Public Law that, by war, the previous treaties are broken and the things as they were at the moment of the Peace Convention, must be considered legitimate” (apud SOARES DE SOUZA, 1952, p. 271). Thus, in the absence of valid legal instruments, the status quo prevailed, namely the actual occupation at the time of the restoration of peace, or in the South American case, of the independences. The matter, therefore, was reduced to the process of determining the actual possession and, eventually, making mutual agreement adjustments. Thus, the Brazilian borders ought to be established according to the uti possidetis principle, except for the border between Brazil and French Guiana, since the Treaty of Utrecht was recognized as valid.

Such doctrine prevailed since 1851 and was maintained and even reinforced by the Republican governments. In the troubled early decades of the Republic, beset by rebellions, messianic movements and a difficult civil war, the defense of the integrity of the territory won a renewed ideological importance, as a point of national union. The Brazilian greatness was compared once again to the integrity of the territory and initiatives such as the Treaty of Montevideo (signed by Quintino Bocaiúva, it shared the region of Palmas with Argentina on behalf of Republican friendship) were severely criticized. In addition, the occupation of the Island of Trinidad by the British caused a real national commotion, even though, according to Rio Branco, that island was a “worthless rock, not even for England, nor for us, but which is considered among us a sacred piece of the fatherland”(apud VIANA FILHO, 2008, p. 272, emphasis by the author).

The narrative about the Brazilian limits was crystallized with the work of Rio Branco, not only as a result of successful negotiations with the neighbor countries, which resulted in treaties that legally ensured all the extremely long borderline, but also in terms of the discourse on evolution of the Brazilian borders. The defenses that he wrote for the arbitrations of Palmas and Amapá, the study of the borders with British Guyana and the exposure of reasons that Rio Branco presented to Congress for the ratification of the treatries signed in his long administration are documents considered, until today, to be the final word on the subject from the point of view of the narrative consensually accepted in Brazil. Since then, Brazilian diplomacy (and its historiography) remains firmly tied to the arguments and to the spirit of that doctrine, in whose origin the figure of Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro played a prominent role. His intellectual influence, in that sense, surpassed by far all his already important role as diplomat and negotiator stricto senso.

According to Goes Filho (2012, p. 649), “the current view in Brazil about the formation of our land borders comes from Rio Branco: from the facts he presents and from the versions he gives them. The former are well chosen, while the latter are well articulated”. In fact, the work of Rio Branco as a negotiator and thinker of the Brazilian limits was invaluable, but the doctrinal bases, the arguments and much of the systematic survey empirical works of each sector of the border were inaugurated and structured mainly by Ponte Ribeiro: as a negotiator, in the treaties of 1841 and 1851 with Peru, as an intellectual, in his role as promoter of the adoption of uti possidetis and of the argument that sustained such doctrine, and with its thorough investigations about the entire borderline, and with his work as a geographer and cartographer, as well as by his tireless efforts in search of maps and documents.

Conclusion

From the point of view of the Brazilian thought on international relations, the matter of the territory might have been the most important theme for the diplomacy of the Empire and of the early decades of the Republican period. In addition to the structuring of generic arguments, the development of a detailed and consistent narrative and the support of each specific case, of each singular stretch of the boundaries, with empirical data, documents and maps was a first-rate negotiator effort, a monumental intellectual task.

The importance of that work, of thinkers and negotiators, often confused as being the same person, as in the case of Rio Branco and Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, was highlighted in a recent text by Ambassador Synésio S. Goes Filho (2012, p. 649), who compared the historiographical versions about current limits in Brazil and its neighbours:

Without thinking that we are always right, we see that de facto errors which occur in other histories do not exist or scarcely exist in ours. Personally, I’m not aware of any such error. The interpretation, yes, might sometimes be debatable. It is not an irrefutable truth to say that the Treaty of 1777 was annulled by the war of 1801; or that the one of 1867 was good for Bolivia. One can perfectly disagree with those versions, as our neighbors always did and we may eventually do, today, with a more ecumenical view of history. The point to be emphasized is that in the appropriate moments we had good agents and presented good arguments.

Ponte Ribeiro was, at his time, one of the keenest negotiators and, certainly, the most important Brazilian thinker on the frontiers of the Brazilian territory. He left an important intellectual heritage, superbly exploited and enriched by Rio Branco. Such legacy endures to this day, not only by the limits actually fixed and legally established, but also as a narrative for the diplomacy and to historiography.

Besides, Ponte Ribeiro also devoted himself to other matters of the period’s diplomatic agenda. Since his first mission in Lima (1829-1832), he sought to regulate by means of treaties the river navigation of the upper riparians along the Amazon basin to the Atlantic Ocean. According to the instructions, dated March 9th, 1829 (Aracati to Ponte Ribeiro. In: CHDD, 2008, p. 107), Ponte Ribeiro should point out to the Peruvian government the Brazilian intention to “animate and strengthen the political and commercial relations between both”. If there was good receptivity, the Imperial government would be “ready to enter the negotiation of a Treaty of Trade and Navigation”. That treaty should be “based on liberal principles, or to say it better, on the American politics, in order to increasingly animate the relations of friendship and good neighborliness between both neighboring States”. On that occasion, for lack of Peruvian interest, no agreement was reached.

The Brazilian government’s stance regarding the river navigation, however, then would change because of the interest shown by Europeans and, mainly, Americans to navigate along the Amazon. While in the Plata basin one of the priorities of the Brazilian policy was to ensure navigation to the interior of the continent through the international rivers, in the Amazon such franchise started to be seen as a possible threat to sovereignty. The Chancellery started to have as a rule to keep the navigation of the Amazon and its tributaries along the Brazilian territory to the exclusive will of the authorities of the Empire. Even so, on his second mission in Peru, one of two treaties signed by Ponte Ribeiro predicted that after ten years the Peruvian vessels would be free to navigate to and from the Atlantic Ocean through the rivers of the Amazon basin (PONTE RIBEIRO, 2011, p. 309). Since he had no instructions or powers to deal with it, he let the final word on the topic, for the Brazilian Chancellery, but he did not forget to clarify that “if this right is denied to Peru, Brazil may scarcely demand it from Buenos Aires, when it comes the desired time when we can sail along the Paraguay River until the Jauru. However, the ad referendum clause leaves to the will of the Imperial government to adopt, or not to admit the treaty”(PONTE RIBEIRO, 2011, p. 321). In fact, the treaty was not ratified, but the thesis of the river navigation regulated by bilateral agreements began to prevail again after 1851, with Ponte Ribeiro having rescued that principle in the negotiations of the treaty he signed with Peru on that year, during his Special Mission in the Republics of the Pacific.

Ponte Ribeiro was also a dissenting voice regarding another subject that currently occupies the center of Brazilian foreign policy: regional integration. The Empire saw itself as a foreign body in a convulsed continent of republics ruled by warlords. The only South American monarchy always resisted the calling of successive American meetings of the nineteenth century, with the fear that they led to the emergence of a large anti-Brazilian Alliance to adjust the boundaries in a coordinated manner, to demand the end of slavery or, even, to support a republican revolt against the peculiar form of Government in Brazil.[44]

Against the general opinion, already in 1841, Ponte Ribeiro prepared an interesting document entitled Reflexões Sobre as Vantagens da Reunião do Preconizado Congresso Americano (PONTE RIBEIRO, 2011, p. 356-359), in which he analyzed the prospects of convening of a new American Congress, as the one held in Panama in 1829. Despite the reticence of the Imperial rule against this kind of initiative, Ponte Ribeiro was clearly in favour of the participation of Brazil and of the need to create, among the American countries, a “uniform system of policy and of foreign public law, adapted to peculiar circumstances of this new world”. His conclusion about that pioneering trial of South American integration could not be more optimistic:

The Congress shall organize that system, in which our right must be effective and the other’s must be respected; it must be religiously observed in all fellow States; and there must be no fear that the old nations are opposed to it, because it suits them not only to respect it, but still give it strength and permanence, for their complaints that enter the sphere of common law to have good and prompt result in the sphere of the common law. ... Let me conclude by repeating my persuasion that it is interesting to Brazil the convening of the American Congress; that it should play an active role in its tasks; and that it can result from them, for now, the elements of order and stability that the Empire needs to see consolidated as soon as possible in the neighbors States.

As it turns out, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro may also be considered as a precursor of the idea of South American integration. It was, during the Empire, one of the few voices that proved to be sympathetic to the participation of Brazil in the Interamerican Congresses. Even though his point of view on that matter did not advance, once again it was confirmed his intellectual independence and the firmness with which he defended his positions.

In 1873, the diplomat received the title of baron of Ponte Ribeiro. It was the crowning of his career as a diplomat and intellectual, a man of action and ideas, whose legacy remains embedded in the discourse about Brazilian territoriality. More than just a diplomat of the Empire – title whose apparent modesty reveals the admiration of one of his main biographers – Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro was one of the most influential voices of the Brazilian Chancellery and a prominent intellectual also within the main scientific institution of its time, the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute. No one summarized better his role on the theme of the Brazilian limits than his other biographer, who condensed his performance in the title he gave Ponte Ribeiro’s biography: O Fronteiro-Mor do Império.

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SILVA, Manoel Cícero Peregrino da. “Apontamentos Sobre as Primeiras Relações Diplomáticas Entre a República do Peru e o Império do Brasil”. Revista do IHGB, Tome 99, v. 153, 1926. Available in: <http://www.ihgb.org.br/rihgb.php?s=20>. Access on: 2/13/2013.

SOARES DE SOUZA, José Antônio. Um Diplomata do Império (Barão da Ponte Ribeiro). São Paulo: Companhia Editora National, 1952, Coleção Brasiliana, v. 273.

VASCONCELLOS, Mário de. Motivos de História Diplomática do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: National Press, 1930.

VIANA FILHO, Luís. A Vida do Barão do Rio Branco. São Paulo/Salvador: UNESP/EDUFBA, 8th Edition, 2008.

Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen

Born in São João de Ipanema, Sorocaba, on March 17th, 1816, Francisco Adoldo de Varnhagen was the son of the German engineer and soldier Frederico Luís Guilherme de Varnhagen and of the “paulista” Maria Flavia de Sá Magalhães. He studied in Portuguese military schools, where he graduated in engineering and fought in the liberal troops of D. Pedro against the absolutists. He studied paleography and diplomacy in Portugal, where he began his historical researches. Back to Brazil, he entered the diplomatic career, to which he belonged from 1842 to 1878, when he died in Vienna, having served the country in Portugal, Spain, Paraguay, Venezuela, Peru, Chile and Austria. He was both Baron and Viscount of Porto Seguro.

He stood out for the historical research, carrying out critical editions of documents and publishing an extensive bibliography in the spheres of history, literary history, etnography, public policies and fiction, with his most important works being História Geral do Brasil (1854), História das Lutas Com os Holandeses no Brasil desde 1624 a 1654 (1871) and História da Independência do Brasil (posthumous).

Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, the Viscount of Porto Seguro: diplomatic thought

Arno Wehling

Was there a diplomatic thought in Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen? The question may sound preposterous if it is considered exclusively from the point of view of a professional career that spanned 36 years of uninterrupted activity and was exercised by someone with strong political, intellectual and scientific convictions. It would be perfectly reasonable to suppose that a diplomat under these circumstances had “clear and distinct ideas” both in relation to the international stance of his country and the functions inherent to his profession.

The doubt was instilled by fellow diplomat Manuel de Oliveira Lima (1911, p. 81), in his swearing in speech at the Brazilian Academy of Letters, in the seat of which Varnhagen is patron. According to the historian from Pernambuco:

Our historian had negative qualities in diplomacy: he was impulsive with bursts of choleric and let himself be instigated by considerations of equity and dignity. For him diplomacy was not the supreme art of swallowing insults and disguising pressure. He thought it was compatible with frankness and honesty. He was repulsed by lying, even on behalf of others, and he did not see quite well why he should hide what was fair.

Once the rhetoric of the Belle Époque psychologist was deducted, which condescended in the typologies of the personality, the portrait described by Oliveira Lima showed an anti-Machiavellian Varnhagen, grounded on moral values and principles. He was to be a diplomat hostile to Realpolitik and, therefore, scarcely suited to the international circumstances of the times of Metternich and Palmerton, which were soon succeeded by the no less difficult Bismarckeana era.

It is true that in this same speech the author remembered other presumably diplomatic qualities that he ascribed to his patron, such as being a “perfect hall man” and his interest in what we would currently call “cultural diplomacy”, by the contact with the intellectual circles of the countries in which he served.

The picture that remained was that of a diplomat that, if not rude, was at least dull and who had cultural and scientific interests that went much beyond his performance as a representative of his country: “... of refractory ordinary putting himself diplomatically in evidence, a strict post that is not a passive observant of his government’s instructions...” (LIMA, 1911, p. 80).

The reading of the diplomatic documentation produced by Varnhagen in his mission in the countries of the Pacific as well as the better knowledge of his performance, either diplomatic or not, before and after, which was due to successive researchers, shows a different portrait then the one described by Oliveira Lima. The very change of conception of what a diplomatic agent was, together with the transformations in perception that followed the First World War, contributed to the dating of the profile originally defined by Oliveira Lima.

An additional explanation for the dull perception of the diplomatic role - and thought - of Varnhagen is in the dimensions of the work itself. The work of historian, either by the books, or by the critical edition of documents, overshadowed the other aspects of his life, including his intellectual production. Thus, his contributions in the field of literary historiography or ethnology were pale in comparison to the weight of his role in the field of historical research. Similarly his role as a publicist, in the nineteenth century sense of the word, has stood out only very recently.[45]

The steps of a diplomatic career

Even though he had military and engineering training, Varnhagen opted for the diplomatic career at a time when it, like the rest of the Brazilian state bureaucracy, still organized itself, turning elements of ancient Portuguese administration and of the new constitutional model compatible with one another. His major interest at the time, as he reiterated in various occasions, was history. Since 1839 he collaborated in the critical edition of documents with the newly founded Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute, and when he applied for a diplomatic position, he did not fail to point out that this would allow him to do some research of sources about Brazil abroad.

At 26 years old he became a First-Class Attaché in Lisbon, where he remained from 1842 to 1847, and was also Acting Secretary of the Legation. In 1847, he was appointed as Secretary of the Legation in Madrid, remaining there until 1851. For two months, in 1847, he was acting chargé d’affaires.

In both two stations, aware of his diplomatic responsibilities, he devoted himself tenaciously to historical research both in the Portuguese and the Spanish archives. The result of those researches appeared not only in critical editions of important sources for colonial history, but also in his works, such as História Geral do Brasil, which he started to publish in 1854, in the História das Lutas com os Holandeses, 1871 and in more specific works, such as those dedicated to Americo Vespucci. Probably the comment by Oliveira Lima according to which, in his own researches in the Torre do Tombo Archive, “in almost all of those papers” he found “the discreet pencil mark” which he identified as being the “V.” of Varnhagen (LIMA, 1911, p. 63) was due to the work of that period.

After a short interregnum in Brazil, in which he advised the Viscount of Uruguay with regard to border issues he returned to the Madrid Legation as chargé d’affaires, where he remained for seven years.

During the sixteen years in which he stayed at the Iberian Peninsula, being aware of the historical research, he often expressed himself on a wide range of diplomatic issues, clearly preferring the routine ones that had to do with the problems of the Brazilian State from the international point of view or, in his own words, which referred to the “greatness of the country”.

Both versions of the Memorial Orgânico are from halfway through that period. They were published in 1849 and 1850, in which, as a publicist, he outlines a real project for Brazil, in which he does not cease to consider the international problems of the country.

From 1859 to 1867, the South American experience of Varnhagen took place, as the Brazilian representative of Brazil to Paraguay (1859), Venezuela (1861-1863, cumulatively with the representation in Colombia and Ecuador) and Peru (1863-1867, cumulatively with Chile and Ecuador). It was a period of less activity in historical research, due to the difficulty of access to the sources, but no less rich in terms of episodes and even diplomatic incidents, as the ones that occurred in Asuncion and Lima. In the first one, regarding the confrontation between Peru, Chile and Spain for the control of Peruvian coastal islands, Varnhagen’s position condemning the threats of blocking and bombing Chilean ports by the Spanish fleet was unauthorized by Brazilian Government, which aspired to pursue mediation in the conflict. In the second one, the criticism of Peruvian President Mariano Ignacio Prado to allies in the war against Paraguay, on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the Constituent Congress of the country, led Varnhagen, who was present at the ceremony, to protest. After a few months, without receiving the apology that he considered to be due to Brazil, but also without the authorization from Rio de Janeiro, he asked for passports and withdrew to Guayaquil, then heading to the capital of the Empire (WEHLING, 2005, vol. I, p. 7ff).[46]

It was mainly due to this South American experience, in which the Peruvian President referred to Varnhagen, according to his own correspondence to the Ministry, as “very susceptible”, that Oliveira Lima grounded the assessment of his diplomatic performance and the profile that was supposedly scarcely appropriate to the functions.

The last ten years in diplomacy elapsed in Vienna. The representation at the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to whose house the Reigning Brazilian Emperor was so close, was an important post and a recognition of Varnhagen’s merits, as well as his decoration with the titles of Baron and Viscount of Porto Seguro.

The stay at the Court of Franz Joseph allowed him to continue his historical and ethnographical research and the publication of new works. There, too, he wrote a legal-diplomatic work called Asilo nas Embaixadas, which was published only posthumously. But there was also an intensive diplomatic activity, twice receiving Emperor Pedro II in his visits to Austria, in 1871 and 1877 and acting directly in the Saint Petersburg Statistical Congress (1872), Stockholm (1874) and Budapest (1876), in the Universal Exposition of Vienna (1873) and in the Congress of Paris (1875), with the focus on the dissemination of Brazil and in the promotion of exports of the country’s products.

We can find the ideas that guided the diplomatic thought and action of Varnhagen along its trajectory in the official documents, such as reports that he sent to his superiors in Rio de Janeiro, in his correspondence with various personalities, in his work about the right to asylum and even in his historiographic work, especially in the points in which he analyzed and appreciated attitudes and procedures of diplomatic agents in crucial moments, such as the negotiations of the colonial treaties of limits.

Such ideas, clearly exposed despite not being systematized, can be grouped or sorted in different ways. We will be close to the way the author thinks if we gather them in some large sections, such as state and foreign policy, borders and Americanism, strategic view, war and economics and international law.

State and foreign policy

Varnhagen’s diplomatic thought is clearly inseparable from his idea of state and both are not differerent from the West European standard in relation to the theme.

Varnhagen ascribes to the State a seminal and guiding role in leading society, which is not news, neither in doctrinal nor in empirical terms.

In the first case, a Hobbesian-Hegelian perspective that ascribes to the State the role of organizer of the society, which in turn will only have an actual organicity if it becomes a nation, predominates in his ideas. Along with him, as in so many other intellectuals of the nineteenth century, are the premises of the political philosophy of the Enlightenment, a historicist reaction to the French Revolution and to nationalism.

From the Enlightenment political philosophy flow both the contractualist and the systemic views of the State, self-balanced by a system of checks and balances that prevents the hypertrophy of power over others. This mixed government defined by Montesquieu – one of Varnhagen’s favorite authors, even though he disproved his climate theory – and exemplified in the English institutional practice since the eighteenth century, was improved by a political and electoral representation that came from Locke and which foresaw the electoral body’s bottleneck by the census procedure.

However, the Hobbesian-Hegelian idea of State – Domingos Gonçalves de Magalhães, in a controversy concerning the indigenous peoples, expressely accused Varnhagen of being a Hobbesian – does not exhaust the view of the historian-diplomat. The mechanicist excesses of this combination are mitigated by the clear adherence to historicism, which makes him seek in past experiences to solve the challenges of the present. Instead of seeking the timeless laws and principles in the intellectual offices of rationalism in order to apply them to Brazil, he says, in the Memorial Orgânico, that it is necessary to know the Brazilian historical experience and that of its Iberian origins, in order to apply them to the country.

Nationalism, in turn, was perceived as a culture broth indispensable in order to amalgamate the nation – consisting of a people, as he said in different opportunities, that was ethnically heterogeneous and fragmented by slavery and the not accultured indigenous populations of the hinterland. A culture broth, moreover, that needed to be industriously drawn from State initiatives, such as the building of monuments, the institution of civic dates and the establishment of a strong historical knowledge based on documentary research – for which, by the way, the diplomatic missions abroad should collaborate.

That idea of State and nation implied in assuming that the Brazilian foreign policy was subject to the strict interests of both. The momentous question of slave trafficking in the 1840’s was thus seen as a matter of national interest, not by the fragility of the country before the English pressure or even due to anti-slavery international movement, but because the ongoing import of slave labor entailed the increase of the risk of social upheaval, such as happened in Haiti and in the delay of the solution he advocated, that is, the introduction of the European immigrant (WEHLING, 1999, p. 83ff).[47]

From the point of view of the State interest, a good example of that absolutely conditioning perspective by the author is his position regarding the relations with Buenos Aires, when, upon writing to the Emperor D. Pedro II from Asuncion, in 1859, he admitted that a war was inevitable:

those who know best these countries are certain that as soon as the current fight between Buenos Aires and Urquiza ends, the winner will add the Eastern State to the Confederation and, if it is able to do that without being punished, it will soon take their ambitions to Paraguay and even, as Rosas did, to Rio Grande and Santa Catarina Island themselves, by the mere fact that these provinces were someday subject to the Viceroyalty.

Thus, it seems that the day will come, when our Southern neighbors will provoke us to a war, and since it would be impossible to avoid it, we would be better off getting prepared for it and break as soon as the treaties are violated for the first time (VARNHAGEN, 1961, p. 275).[48]

He proved to be a bad prophet, based on the tradition of D. João’s diplomacy of fear of the reconstitution of the Vice-Kingdom of Plata and on the then recent Platine agreements of the Farroupilha Revolution, since five years later there actually was a war, but against Paraguay and with the Alliances of both Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

Such perspective was nothing more than understanding the foreign policy of the Empire as a clear continuity of Portuguese politics, especially the Bragantine one. To defend the mouth of the Amazon since the seventeenth century, to prevent the descent of the French Guyana until the great river and to establish “marks” in the Western Amazon, in the Midwest of Mato Grosso and in the Platine South seemed to him to be backgrounds that should be recognized, valued and certainly followed by the imperial policy.

Thus, there would be a line of continuity in foreign policy, with D. Luís da Cunha, Alexandre de Gusmão and D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho taking as their successors and followers the Viscount of Uruguay, the Viscount of Rio Branco and the Marquis of Paraná.

The reading of many of Varnhagen’s diplomatic documents, his correspondence and historiographical works enables to identify some premises or postulates as grounds for his ideas and attitudes in relation to what should be a Brazilian foreign policy and the behaviour of their agents.

Even though they have never been embodied in a creed or a handbook, they can, nevertheless, be identified with relative ease, especially if we remember the pillars on which Weltanschauung are based – the Hobbesian-Hegelian view of society, the historicist or culturalist perception, very close to that of Vico and Herder, of history and the appreciation of the nation, although this was more the result of a political will, as in the French model, than the action of the deep “Geist” of culture, as in the German model (WEHLING, 1999, p. 75).[49] Those premises or principles that guided his professional activity as a diplomat flow from the combination, not always consistently, of orthodox or non-contradictory elements.

They are the uncompromising defense of the Brazilian material interests as professional duty of the diplomatic agent, observing the rules of the law of the people and the justice of the claims; the zeal for the international prestige of the country, which is regarded as a valuable symbolic capital especially in an international framework dominated by large colonial powers and the emergence of countries such as the United States and Russia – in what proved to be the reader of Tocqueville, quoted in the preface to the História Geral do Brasil; and what today we call economic diplomacy, which became sharper during his stay in Vienna, when he took on the role of promoter and facilitator of the Brazilian exports and of the import of machinery, tools and qualified professionals.

Even though the theoretical positions that founded Varnhagen’s diplomatic and intellectual ideas came from Europe, he always practiced their suitability to the conditionings of the Brazilian foreign policy with great sense of reality. The own relationship of foreign policy with the internal context of the countries was diverse. In the nineteenth century Europe, the big international policy often conditioned the domestic life of the states, as occurred with Germany, Austria and Italy, while in Brazil, including, but not only due to its continental size, the opposite happenned – a diverse circumstance that has not gone unnoticed to Varnhagen.

Borders and americanism

One of the unsolved matters in Brazilian diplomacy of the mid-nineteenth century had to do with the demarcation of the borders with the various neighboring countries. In addition to matters that unfolded in the more densely populated border areas, such as those with Uruguay, Paraguay and the United Provinces of the Plata, there were also difficulties with Peru, due to problems between Brazilian and Peruvian traders in the Amazon region. This aspect becomes larger when we recall that the opening of the navigation of the Amazon River was at stake, which was the object of intense controversy in Brazil in the 1860’s. From the Peruvian side the matter had already been settled when Varnhagen arrived at Lima, in 1863, by a recent law which allowed foreign vessels to navigate along the Peruvian Amazon rivers on the same conditions as the national ones.

What did Varnhagen think about the demarcation and the opening of the Amazon to international navigation?

His ideas on the subject are expressed in Memória Sobre os Trabalhos Que se Podem Consultar nas Negociações de Limites do Império, Com Algumas Lembranças Para a Demarcação Destes,[50] presented to the Chancellor Paulino José Soares de Sousa in 1851. It must be recalled that Varnhagen interrupted his activity in Spain by order of the Minister, since the Brazilian Government needed his advice, as a competent historian and geographer, to provide subsidies to the actions of the Brazilian diplomacy in the negotiations of limits. Memória does not exhaust Varnhagen’s manifestations on the topic, which can also be found in the Memorial Orgânico of the previous year and, sparsely, in Correspondência and in his História Geral do Brasil.

Varnhagen separated the situation of the French and the English Guyanas from the countries of Spanish origin. In the case of French Guiana, he understood that “one must not discuss the role concerning the Oiapoques or not Oiapoques and of the Pinzons or not Pinzons” since the Convention of 1816 had defined the matter, although with the mistake of drawing geodesic limit lines. However, the matter remained open and this was exactly the matter that was discussed in the negotiations conducted by Rio Branco. As far as British Guyana was concerned, he considered absurd the English claim to bring domination until the watershed of the Rio Branco, suggesting the delimitation along the course of the rivers or even the division of the territory into equal parts. Even though he did not believe that Great Britain would impose its interests by force, he suggested the possibility to negotiate the support from other powers to the Brazilian cause, “even though this service would have to be returned with some trade treaty” (VARNHAGEN, 2013, p. 215).[51]

For the definition of the limits with the countries of Spanish origin, three aspects stand out.

First of all, the flexibility of criteria. Varnhagen understood that the traditional principle of uti possidetis was fair and it often served the Brazilian interests. Thus, it should preside the demarcation, having as subsidiaries the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso. That was stated in the Memorial Orgânico. But in the Memória presented to Paulino Soares de Sousa he considered that there were drawbacks in taking on a strict position in relation to the principle, since it “invites you to a possession acquired gradually and deceptively,” which could end up being disadvantageous to Brazil:

If we wanted first to impose general or overt bases as preliminaries for negotiations which are not defined at once, we can cause fears to our weaker neighbors and provide weapons to France and England that they will know how to sharpen and turn them against us: let us focus, therefore, openly on our and their public convenience and let us give some time so that they also give up something to us (VARNHAGEN, 1851, item 15).[52]

Second of all, the option for the criterion of the watershed rather than that of the course of the rivers. The latter, which, was widely used in the diplomatic negotiations of the eighteenth century, had a great chance of being correct when the geography of the place was well known, as often happened in Europe, which had a reasonable cartography since the Roman era. That was not the case of the South American countries, where the names of the landforms were often mixed up – mainly rivers and mountain chains – in different sources. This difficulty was well known to Varnhagen who, by then, had already studied the documents relating to the demarcation attempts of the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso.

The criterion of the watershed by the river sheds, in turn, had the advantage of being simple and the possibility to avoid expensive, complex and eventually controversial delimitations.

Once again flexibility was necessary, since the interests of the country were at stake. In the case of the limits between Paraguay and Mato Grosso do Sul, Varnhagen, in the late 1850’s, addressed a note to the Foreign Minister of Paraguay in which he advocated that the limit should be the course of Apa River, on behalf of the uti possidetis principle of both countries and what was written in the colonial treaties (LESSA, 1954, p. 141).[53] Thus, he gave up his preferred thesis of the watershed, since it entailed not only a large territorial loss for Brazil but because it also violated another criterion, uti possidetis, and meant the lack of compliance with the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso.

Thirdly, the concern about the restoration of the Vice-Royalty of Plata, as a way to avoid the formation of a powerful state in southern Brazil. Expressed in some occasions, this concern was present in the Memória delivered to Paulino Soares de Sousa. From that point of view, he advocated the strengthening of Paraguay and Bolivia and consequently the establishment of best possible relations with these countries, which would include special treatment to their territorial claims on the demarcation of the borders. He said:

Bolivia and Paraguay are our natural allies in the claims against the navigation of the Paraná and Paraguay, which are likely to have the nations that control the mouth of the Plata River and in this sense it is even advantageous for us to give them all the political importance, for which the size of the territory might contribute a lot (VARNHAGEN, 1851, item 28).[54]

He also suggested to Bolivia an outline of limits that would turn its access easier for the export of products by the rivers of the Amazon basin, until Belém (LESSA, 1954, p. 130).[55]

An aspect that must be recalled concerning Varnhagen’s performance in the matter of the demarcation of the borders is his insistence in the bilateral, rather than the collective negotiations. He was worried about the fact that these could involve a front against Brazil, given the official preventions and those of publicists and intellectuals expressed mainly in relation to the size of the country as compared to its neighbors and its form of government, a Monarchic exception within a Republican subcontinent.

When he was in Santiago, in early 1864 and he became aware of the convening of an American Congress in Lima, to discuss, among other things, matters of limits, he suggested to the Minister Marquis of Abrantes that he should postpone the adhesion of the country in order to “gain time”. The risk, he said in a letter to the Minister dated February 8th, was the country having the situation of facing one vote against 9 only from the South American countries. Thus, he suggested that the Brazilian position should be that, in the discussions of limits, there should be a plenipotentiary of the country and a representative of the other countries, or rather a larger representation for Brazil. The argument was historical: since before independence there were six separate governments in Spanish America against ten leading captaincies in Brazil, without the government of the vice-roys meaning an effective unit, the claim was founded (VARNHAGEN, 2005, p. 96).[56]

Despite this and other expressions that showed discomfort and even fear about what he considered negative in South American Republics – their form of government, their domestic fights and what he saw as a tendency to the presence of warlords – Oliveira Lima was given the task of drawing attention to the diplomat’s Americanism. Or what we could call in a less categorical manner an Americanist manifestation.

Oliveira Lima’s assessment referred to Varnhagen’s note offering his solidarity to the position of other diplomatic representatives accredited in Chile against the way in which the commander of the Spanish fleet had addressed the country in what was already a consequence of the Peruvian-Spanish conflict, including presenting an ultimatum. The communication, according to the historian from Pernambuco referring to Varnhagen, “honors his spirit of justice, confirms his independence of character and casts a bright light on his Americanism” (LIMA, 1911, p. 80),[57] although it has been overruled by the Brazilian government.

It can be added to Oliveira Lima’s interpretation that at that moment various expressions of solidarity towards Paraguay were already occurring in the Spanish speaking countries, mainly through the newspapers, since the war of the Triple Alliance had already begun. Varnhagen himself (2005, vol. I, p. 466), in correspondence sent to the Brazilian Chancellery on December 2nd, 1865 expressed concern with anti-Brazilian news published in the press of Valparaiso.[58] The performance of the Brazilian representative in favor of Chile, in that context, could only be welcomed.

The position of Rio de Janeiro discrediting Varnhagen was perceived by Chilean sectors in that climate of exalted patriotism, not as an attempt to maintain neutrality so that it could apply to mediate the conflict, which was actually the intention of the Brazilian government, but as an ideological solidarity between both monarchies.

There was still time, between Varnhagen’s note and its discrediting, for the American government to send, on behalf of the Monroe doctrine, a representative to Rio de Janeiro in order to congratulate Brazil for its “American fervor”. According to Oliveira Lima’s comment, when the delegate arrived “he found himself facing its disapproval [Varnhagen’s note] and he had to swallow his congratulations” (LIMA, 1911, p. 80).[59]

As a result of the diplomatic misunderstanding, Oliveira Lima emphasized the Americanism of Varnhagen. Nevertheless, knowing the concerns of the Brazilian diplomat regarding the countries of Spanish origin, based on extensive research about the colonial era, which demonstrated to full capacity the conflicts between both colonizations, another hypothesis can be suggested.

Varnhagen demonstrated with that attitude less of an active anti-European Americanist solidarity – he himself was keen to point out, in correspondence sent to the Ministry, his respect and admiration for Spain, where, he recalled, until recently he had been the chargé d’affaires – than the defense of the fairness of the Chilean case, even more accentuated by the inability of the Spanish Admiral Pareja. Oliveira Lima himself, whose references to the spirit of Varnhagen’s fairness and dignity referred exactly to the Chilean episode, can be called upon as a support to the hypothesis.

Strategic view, war and economics

According to Varnhagen’s idea, diplomatic performance should basically, be guided by a strategic perspective of national interests. Diplomacy would be nothing more than a means, like others, to achieve goals that would lead to the “greatness of the country”.

What were these larger goals to which the public agents would abide by and for which they should fight for is stated, in the situation of the early 1850’s, in his Memorial Orgânico (VARNHAGEN, 2013, p. 205ff).[60] From then on, although they were no longer systematically exposed, they made up a benchmark that almost did not change until 1878 and to which he reported in the concrete situations.

In the booklet, the author emphasized the definition of borders, the geographical situation of the capital, internal communications, territorial division, the defense and the homogeneity of the population as matters that were unsettled and critical for the future of Brazil. He gave a strategic approach to all of them, but the properly diplomatic interface is given mainly to protection.

Considering the Brazilian territory and its fluvial and maritime hydrographic potential, the naval strategy and the resulting diplomatic care are his major concerns.

To better understand such perspective, it must be recalled that his thought was basically geopolitical and geostrategic, which indeed was dominant in the diplomacy of his time. By proposing to transfer the capital to the central Plateau, he certainly presented as a reason, defense matters and the clearance from the coastline, but the place chosen occurs by the easy connection with the three rivers that make up the three basins, the Amazon, the San Francisco and the Plata: rivers Tocantins, San Francisco and Paraná/Paraguay.

In the case of the rivers, the navigation along the Amazon and the risk of foreign control of its basin were discussed on various occasions. When the future Viscount of Uruguay was the Plenipotentiary Envoy to Emperor Napoleon III, Varnhagen recommended strongly to him that, in the problem of French Guyana, the Brazilian interest in protecting the Amazon and its tributaries from external action was not forgotten, noting that he should beckon specifically with the risks of an American penetration in the region (LESSA, 1954, p. 132-133).[61]

His attentions were still directed towards the Amazon basin when he was chargé d’affaires in Venezuela, signing agreements on the navigation of people from both countries along the Orinoco and the Amazon Rivers (LESSA, 1954, p. 143).[62] And when he was in Peru the country opened foreign navigation in the stretch under its sovereignty, which was also a cause of great concern to him.

In the case of the Paraguay River, the focus was the defense of free navigation by Brazil, indispensable for the integration of Mato Grosso, including that of the Guaporé River region, although it also recognized the problem of the transfer of cattle herds from Mato Grosso through Paraguayan territory.[63]

Certainly Varnhagen (1961, p. 342) shared the prevailing opinion in the successive Brazilian governments, noticing the matter of navigability of the Paraguay River within the larger context of the balance of power in the Plata region. He showed samples of that perspective in 1870, when he was already in Vienna, when, in a correspondence he sent to D. Pedro II regarding the possibility of future problems with Argentina, he suggested, in addition to quartering Brazilian forces in Paraguay, the reinforcement of Brazilian ships in the area.

As for the war itself, even though he had not theorized about the topic, it is obvious in Varnhagen’s different manifestations who saw it as the other side of diplomacy and politics, in the style of Clausewitz. Even though he proposed a defensive, rather than an aggressive or expansionist foreign policy in South America, it was clear to him that deterrence was an important political instrument and an indispensable helper of diplomatic action. In that sense we understand both his interest and his effort to strengthen the Navy and the Army of the country.

Varnhagen (1967, vol. 175, p. 147) has already been portrayed a defender of war, although Américo Lacombe considered that he was only concerned about the security of the borders, in the context of “armed peace” in which he lived. That second aspect seems to be more compatible with his diplomatic and political thought; the criticism of the “defence of war” really appears, but in the controversies in which he was involved in the relationships with the indigenous people and the defense of the action of the bandeirantes, do not relate to the nineteenth century foreign policy.

In that context, the improvement of the Brazilian fleet caught his attention when, from Vienna, he helped Arthur Silveira da Mota, the future Baron of Jaceguai, who was on assignment in Europe, with information about ships, weapons and visits to shipyards (LESSA, 1954, p. 160-161). Still concerning weapons, he also collaborated with the Minister of War João José de Oliveira Junqueira, keeping him informed about new artillery pieces that the Austrian government was using.

Typical of this defensive point of view was the proposal, in the Memorial Orgânico, of military “border territories” in the new territorial configuration proposed for the country, which would become outposts to the defense of the country, in an updated evocation of the Pombaline policy of establishing army units in extreme points of the country. Ten years later, when he was on his way to Paraguay, he wrote from Montevideo to the Emperor suggesting him, that same logic, that is, to install a garrison in Bagé, with a dissuasive purpose:

In addition, I believe that with these [Platine] countries the less we hire (sic) and the less we intervene, the better. Currently, however, prudence called for having an army in the fields of Bagé, ready to maneuver from one day to the next. And with this simple step we would avoid having to maneuver (VARNHAGEN, 1961, p. 270).

As for economic relations, Varnhagen understood that he was in charge, as a diplomat, of facilitating the placement of Brazilian products abroad and the import of machinery, tools and technology. He made an effort in 1876 for the consumption of the mate herb in Austria and in Hungary, suggesting that these attempts should also occur in Hamburg, not without directing criticism to the Minister of Agriculture regarding frauds and negligence of the exporters, which sent the product with an overweight of sticks, stones and leather (LESSA, 1954, p. 160). In the Statistical Congresses of Budapest and St. Petersburg he organized and wrote by himself works with data on Brazilian products. For the first of those congresses he published the text entitled Quelques Renseignements Statistiques Sur le Brèsil Tirés des Sources Oficielles par le Delegué au Congrès de Buda-Pesth.

The actions of Varnhagen the diplomat in the economic area, only gets better clarified when we understand Varnhagen the publicist.

Can a supporter of economic liberalism, as he positioned himself on several occasions, put his diplomatic action on behalf of private interests, even though they benefit the country as a whole due to the growth of national wealth? That question, which was recurrent in discussions on the scope and limitations of economic liberalism, had already been answered by the famous words of William Pitt – “the Empire is trade”. But there is further data on Varnhagen, that is pointed out in the passage from the first to the second version of the Memorial Orgânico, in 1850.

For him, in a country with scarce resources and population and great territorial extension such as Brazil, notwithstanding the liberal profession of faith and the quotation of classical economists, it would be necessary, in addition to the supervision of the State, direct state promotion – the word is his – in certain areas in order to stimulate the production and circulation of goods (WEHLING, 2013, p. 2013). That position was reccurrent in the Brazilian political and economic thought, promoting cohabitation of liberalism with some degree of State interventionism and that repeated itself in the next generation, when an enthusiast of Spencer such as Rui Barbosa did not hesitate to praise the mercantilist economic policy of the Marquis of Pombal.

The right of asylum

Early in his stay in Vienna, Varnhagen wrote a short text in French, L’Asile dans Les Ambassades. In a correspondence sent to the Emperor, dated March 9th, 1870, gave news of the – work, which he had started a few years earlier in Lima, informing that he was advancing it after stopping the review of História Geral do Brasil. On June 20th he informed to the same interlocutor that the work was ready and that he had sent it to his friend Ferdinand Denis, who was the Director of Saint Geneviève Library in Paris (VARNHAGEN, 1961, p. 340-347).

Contrary to the author’s expectations, the text had never been published at the time. That happened only in 1955 in Anhembi magazine (p. 232ff).

Varnhagen was not a jurist, despite the extensive use of legal sources and the text, which revealed the author’s training as a historian, in a history of the matter of asylum and the indication, in conclusion, of a few suggestions to be implemented.

Anyway, L’Asile Dans les Ambassades is a significant text, which allows one to be surprised by the objective elements being debated about the topic in the second half of the nineteenth century (BOCK, 1863, vol. I, p. 135) as well as understanding the increase of the author’s readings in political and legal matters.

On both versions of the Memorial Orgânico, of 1849 and 1850 respectively, the authors worked were Montesquieu, Jean Baptiste Say, Humboldt, Vattel, Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira, Guizot, Foissac, Andrés Bello and Richard, among others just mentioned. Twenty years later appear basically jurists as Charles Paschal, Gentil, Vera y Zuñiga, Marsclaer, Grotius, Wicquefort, Thomasius, Binkershoek, Charles Martens and a dozen others just mentioned; of those mentioned in the earlier work, only Montesquieu, Vattel and Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira remain.

The very nature of the new text explains the specialized readings, the result of which the author showed with the erudition of all time, although without giving the article a proper legal framework.

Note that L’Asile is not only the result of a Cabinet job. It also corresponded to concrete experience he lived as a diplomat in South American countries and in Spain, in addition to the observation of what occurred at the time in other countries. The fall of governments and persecutions to those who were defeated often required him to foreign representations in search of protection. The failure to observe the right to asylum, in turn, caused situations such as the one that occurred in the American legation in Paraguay, quoted by Varnhagen (1955, p. 259), when Minister Washburn was unable to secure the integrity of Paraguayan refugees and was accused of conspiring to depose Solano Lopez (Cardozo, 1996, p. 297).

The text by Varnhagen (1955, p. 252) begins by distinguishing between the right of asylum in embassies and the old exemptions for gentlemen and corporations of the middle ages. These, according to the author, had a breadth that the right of asylum for humanitarian issues did not seek to achieve. On the other hand, the inviolability of the diplomatic representatives was based on the ratification provided by Canon law to the law of jus gentium.

The Brazilian diplomat distinguished two situations here, one of which was positive and the other one was negative. The former distinguished both rights by their own origin. The right of asylum in modern times was an exercise of sovereign power of the State, represented by the King, subjecting itself voluntarily to the law of nations. The corporate rights and guarantees of cities, for both lay and ecclesiastical Lords and guilds corresponded to a different time and they were only welcome or tolerated, from the point of view of absolute monarchy, – when they were not revoked. Varnhagen himself (1955, p. 252), exaggerating its scope and above all its effects, quotes the Ordinance of Francis I, from 1539 to conclude in favor of elimination of the privileges of the Lords would receive, at that time, “their final coup de grace”.

The positive argument asserts that the right to asylum was a consequence of canon law, which placed it within the wide area of common law received from the Roman world and the middle ages, giving such a scope to it that it somehow forced the State, which at the time was an absolute monarchy, to recognize rights observed since before its own Constitution.

This was Montesquieu’s conclusion about the inviolability of ambassadors, quoted by Varnhagen (1955, p. 254):

The jus gentium wanted the princes to exchange ambassadors ... no obstacle should hinder their action. ... Therefore, it is necessary to obey, concerning the ambassadors, the reasons taken from the Law of Nations and those that derive from political convenience.

After the history of the matter of asylum in the major scholars of public international law, Varnhagen leads his reasoning to conclude that it derived “logically” from the Law of Nations. Furthermore, although he did not say it, but he assumed it: in the same way as its main prerogative, inviolability.

To that purely theoretical argument Varnhagen added a practical consideration, that in the nineteenth century, “in some countries more or less civilized and moralized than others”, such as the American Republics and Turkey, the ongoing conflicts produced abuses that could be avoidable by means of the proposed resource.

The author identified in part of the legal doctrine a tendency to refuse the right of asylum as a form of interference of the diplomatic agent in the domestic affairs of the country. But he considers that the jurists with such a position did not consider the nuance that the asylum was requested or offered by the diplomat. And he asks:

Thus, no diplomatic agent has the right to offer an asylum at his own house. But, we ask, if an individual that thinks he is being followed, or who fears he might be, due to political passions, enters a legation ... and asks for hospitality to its head, as he could ask for it to the diplomat’s country (if by luck he had managed to get there), should he be handed over, other than by extradition? Would it be fine for a diplomatic agent to play the role of executioner or police? (VARNHAGEN, 1955, p. 255-256).

The author also recalls that all his references have to do with “the so-called political criminals” and not common criminals, although several of the scholars cited by him, writing at the time of absolute monarchy, could refer to those accused of crimes of Lèse majesté and similar ones. That typification without distinguishing between each of them came later in criminal law and was present in the nineteenth century, including the Brazilian one of 1830.

The author had two central theses around which he based his arguments. The first one, that “while the ambassadors are privileged, the asylum will not be abolished”, in a reasoning similar to the civil law principle that the accessory follows the main. The second one, metajuridical, states that the asylum is an act of humanity that “civilization should not abandon, in favor of tolerance in the political opinions” (VARNHAGEN 1955, p. 258).[64]

A point established by Varnhagen that is worth recording is the statement that the law of the people – referred to the contemporary constitutional framework, and, therefore, of the idea of sovereignty based on the context after the French Revolution and no longer of the Ancien Régime – could not be changed by “one nation alone, by itself”. That implied the existence of a supranational law, or at least of some supranational rules, replacing and continuing the common law and canon law as they came from the Middle Ages.

At the conclusion of his work, Varnhagen (1955, p. 263) pragmatically presents five “stipulations” to apply the doctrine to the practice of the embassies: the asylum cannot be offered by the diplomatic agent; if he is prompted and he grants it, he must communicate the fact in 24 hours to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he shall shelter the refugee inside the house, without any communication with the outside world, not even with family members, in order to eliminate the possibility of interference in the country’s politics; if the government decides that the refugee must be moved abroad, the diplomat will agree and shall have the right to accompany him to “outside the borders”; the failure to observe any of these stipulations, which are “authentically proved” will cause the temporary exit from the country of the diplomat and of asylum-seekers in 24 hours.

The effects of such measures, to Varnhagen (1955, p. 263), would cease conflicts and threats to legations, the diplomatic agents would be more careful regarding asylum, the Governments themselves would win with the removal of “active conspirators” and “the cause of civilization would win, receiving from the concurrence of diplomacy, in moments of bloody struggles, new pledges of tolerance and humanity”.

Although I have written very little about his idea of history, as compared to the volume of research and work arising therefrom that he prepared, the coordinates of Varnhagen’s historical thought can be identified. As far as his diplomatic thought is concerned, considering almost forty years of activity, can we say the same?

It is certainly possible to find in it some directing principles that have guided his career and his demonstrations. Those principles shaped his diplomatic thinking and are expressed both directly, in the reports, papers and diplomatic correspondence, and indirectly, in private correspondence and in his production as a historian and publicist.

There is a clear sense of Justice in his propositions and conclusions, which led Oliveira Lima to do a constraint about him of “having negative qualities in diplomacy”, which in some situations could sound almost naive. The honesty of purposes and the frankness, which he often advocated in the diplomatic practice and based on which he issued several value assessments in his historiographical work, which did not move him away, however, from Realpolitik.

He was not in any way an idealist to the utmost, hitting himself against reality like D. Quixote. On the contrary, he set an anchor on it and from there he also established his position, which ensured to his assessments contained a large dose of concreteness. In the episode of the conflict between Chile and Spain, his “Americanist” position not only coincided with the diplomats accredited there, but it also entailed an option – surely it cannot be stated if it was taken out of pure “sense of justice” or political calculation – which could benefit the Brazilians in Spanish speaking countries when some of them began to position themselves in favor of Paraguay in the Triple Alliance War. His overriding by the Brazilian government cannot be interpreted as a rebuke to a professional mistake, but as a result of another ongoing policy, the offer of mediation between Chile and Spain, of which he was actually unaware.

Another example of this thought can be found, among others, in the História Geral do Brasil. Referring to the preliminary aspects of the Treaty of Madrid, it claims that the solution proposed as general criterion for the allocation of territory, uti possidetis, served the justice of the Portuguese case and that it was recognized by Spain. He adds that such recognition only came after Portuguese traders showed that to put the Treaty of Tordesilhas into effect for Brazil, as was the initial position of Spain, entailed that it should also be done in the East, forcing the return of the severance pay for Maluku and the delivery of the Philippine archipelago to Portugal (VARNHAGEN, 1975, vol. IV, p. 85).

Another way that he found to temper the application of an absolute sense of justice was to fix it by equity, which he demonstrated many times. That adaptation of reality took it away from its historicist perception of the world and it appears clearly in the defenses that he made for the predominance of law rather than of force in the relations between states, without, however, dismissing Clausewitz’s recourse to war in the context of a political action.

The principle that he advocated, that of the predominance of the law without abandoning the injunction of the use of force, turned him into a pragmatist in the context of nineteenth century diplomacy, without being a priori either a pacifist or an advocate of war.

His own appreciation of the State, within the framework of Brazilian circumstances of a nation in formation and of the political philosophy of the time, which was so Hobbesian-Hegelian, found limits that were both domestic, in the defense of the constitutional monarchy, and foreign. In the study about the right of asylum that becomes clear by advocating the recourse to the law of the people as an instrument of moderation of the harassing outbursts of the governments.

On the other hand, it must be recalled that the specifically diplomatic and legal aspects of Varnhagen’s thought cannot be explained satisfactorily without the perception of his Weltanschauung. He was a man of order, which in the nineteenth century semantics meant to defend a conservative, but not necessarily reactionary position, which sought the midway between the Jacobin revolution and the return to the Ancien Régime. In terms of relations between States, that order corresponded, in turn, to the equilibrium of the balance of power, so that no power – like France of Louis XIV or Napoleon I – could obtain an international hegemony. The counterpoint that he suggested to Paulino Soares de Sousa at the time of his mission next to Napoleon III, to avoid the American penetration in the Amazon or the need to establish counterweights to England in the case of Guyana, clearly show that perspective.

He also defended civilization, in the sense of the term that was current at the time, to which the emergent ethnography and anthropology sought to give scientific outlines. To be in favour of civilization supposed to admit previous historical stages of savagery and barbarism that modern States exceeded by procedures based on enlightenment and the law – nevertheless they could impose on “not civilized” people the war without quarter whenever they refused to add to the “civilized” practices.

Oliveira Lima’s skeptical and disenchanted assessment about the “negative qualities” of Varnhagen as a diplomat, which after all had been drawn from a dated table of values taken as absolute, proved to be subsistent to this day only in one aspect, namely that of style.

When Varnhagen was in Lima, he oriented the General Consul of Brazil in Loreto, concerning conflicts between Brazilians and Peruvians, to act fortiter in re, suaviter in modo. The Jesuit maximum of the General Acquaviva was followed in diplomatic matters, by Varnhagen himself. However, applying only the fortiter, both in the thing itself, the national interest as he noticed it, and in the form. And by the form he sometimes got lost.

Bibliography

bock, Maurice (dir). Dictionnaire de Politique. Paris: O. Lorenz, vol. I, 1863.

Cardozo, Efraim. El Paraguay Independiente. Assuncion: El Lector, 1996.

Lessa, Clado Ribeiro. Vida e obra de Varnhagen. Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, vol. 225, Oct-Dec 1954.

LIMA, Manuel de Oliveira. Francisco Adolfo de Varnahgen: Viscount de Porto Seguro. In: Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de São Paulo, v. XIII, 1908. São Paulo: Typographia do Diario Oficial, 1911. Available in: <http://archive.org/stream/revistadoinstitu13instuoft#page/n0/mode/2up>.

Varnhagen, Francisco Adolfo de. Correspondência Ativa. Collected and noted edition by Lessa, Clado Ribeiro. Rio de Janeiro: INL, 1961.

Varnhagen, Francisco Adolfo de. História Geral do Brasil. São Paulo: Melhoramentos, vol. IV, 1975.

Varnhagen, Francisco Adolfo de. L’Asile dans les Ambassades. In: Anhembi, vol. 19, 1955.

Varnhagen, Francisco Adolfo de. Memória Sobre os Trabalhos Que se Podem Consultar nas Negociações de Limites do Império, Escrita Por Ordem do Conselheiro Paulino José Soares de Sousa, 1851. National Library, Manuscript Section, I, 4,4, 112.

Wehling, Arno. Estado, História, Memória: Varnhagen e a Cons-trução da Identidade Nacional. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1999.

Wehling, Arno. Introdução. In: Varnhagen – Missão nas Repúblicas do Pacífico: 1863 a 1867. Rio de Janeiro: FUNAG, vol. I, 2005.

WEHLING, Arno. O conservadorismo reformador de um liberal: Varnhagen, publicista e pensador político. In: GLEZER, Raquel; GUIMARÃES, Lucia. Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Miguel de Cervantes, 2013.

Suggestions to learn more

HORCH, Hans. Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, subsídios para uma bibliografia. São Paulo: Editoras Unidas, 1982.

LACOMBE, Américo Jacobina. As ideias políticas de Varnhagen: Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1967, vol. 275, p. 135-174.

ODÁLIA, Nilo. As Formas do Mesmo. Ensaios Sobre o Pensamento Historiográfico de Varnhagen e Oliveira Vianna. São Paulo: Unesp, 1997.

RODRIGUES, José Honório. Varnhagen, Mestre da História Geral do Brasil. Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1967, vol. 275, p. 170-200.

Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão

The son of Antônio Netto Carneiro Leão, a non-commissioned officer from Paracatu, and Joana Severina Augusta from an established family in Vila Rica de Ouro Preto, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão was born in the village of Arraial de Jacuí, on January 11, 1801, in the same province of his parents, Minas Gerais. The young Honório Hermeto was mainly raised and educated in Vila Rica, to where his father had moved in 1806 after becoming a widower and re-marrying, this time to a niece of his late wife. With assistance from an uncle, who was a prosperous merchant in Rio de Janeiro, Honório Hermeto studied Law at Coimbra University in Portugal from 1820-1825, and in 1826, upon his return to Brazil, he married his cousin, Maria Henriqueta Leme, the daughter of his benefactor uncle. In that same year, Carneiro Leão, the future Marquis of Paraná was appointed itinerant circuit judge in the village of São Sebastião (São Paulo). In 1828, he went to Rio de Janeiro, first as a magistrate and shortly thereafter as an appeals court judge for Bahia, as well as an auditor-general of the Navy. From 1830 to 1841 he served three consecutive terms as an elected representative from Minas Gerais in the lower house of the country’s legislative body, the Chamber of Deputies.

In 1832, together with Bernardo de Vasconcellos, a fellow representative from Minas Gerais, and others, Carneiro Leão founded the Conservative Party. In 1842, he became governor of the province of Rio de Janeiro, and he was appointed to the Council of State. One year later, his native province of Minas Gerais again selected him to represent it, this time in Brazil’s upper house of the legislature, the Senate. The Emperor also placed him in charge of organizing the Ministry, in which Carneiro Leão reserved for himself the post of Minister of Justice, as well as the interim head of Foreign Affairs. He was later appointed governor of the province of Pernambuco, a post he held from 1849 to 1850, and from 1851 to 1852, having been nominated the diplomatic representative of Brazil to the Plata, he headed the political and diplomatic operations that led to the fall of the Argentine caudillo (strongman), Juan Manuel de Rosas, as well as the institutional stabilization of Uruguay.

Upon his return to Brazil, the Emperor again asked him to form the Ministry, which eventually became known as the Conciliation Cabinet. In that body, Carneiro Leão served as the chief of the government (prime minister) as well as the Minister of Finance.

In 1852, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão was awarded the title of Viscount of Paraná, and two years later, that of the Marquis of Paraná, the name by which he is remembered in Brazilian history. Paraná died at the height of his power on September 3, 1856, a few months before he would have turned 56.

Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, The Marquis of Paraná: diplomacy and power in the Plata

Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa[65]

Brazil became an independent nation in 1822 due to a fortuitous set of circumstances well exploited by a small group of visionaries. The work of this first generation of Brazilians, whose main exponent was José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, the “Patriarch of Independence,” was relatively brief. Above all, it was distinguished by a nativist and anti-Portuguese sentiment, which eventually created tension with the Emperor himself. Shortly thereafter, the group was followed by another generation that – from the time of the abdication of that Emperor, Dom Pedro I, in 1831, through the period of the Regency, 1831-1840, and the hurried beginnings of Dom Pedro II’s long reign – built the foundations upon which the Brazil that we know today emerged: a nation with all its contradictions, polarities, shadows and luminosities; a huge country, new and disjointed, formed according to conservative ideas and the imperative of unity. Brazil was both a prodigy as well as a historical mystery.

One individual who stands out in Brazil’s multi-faceted process of independence is Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, awarded the title of Visconde (Viscount) in 1852, and two years later, that of Marquês de Paraná (the Marquis of Paraná): the name by which he is known in the country’s history. The somewhat overbearing Paraná has also been called: “The most insolent man of the Empire,” “The Vassal Equal to the King,” and “The man who did not bow.”

Honório Hermeto was born in the province of Minas Gerais in 1801; he spent his childhood and youth between his father’s home village of Paracatu, and the provincial capital of Vila Rica (currently Ouro Preto). He earned a degree in Law from Coimbra University in Portugal, where he studied between 1820 and 1825, and upon his return to Brazil, after a brief period as a judge; he took the path of politics, eventually representing his native Minas Gerais in both houses of the Brazilian legislature: first the Chamber of Deputies, and later the Senate. He also served his country as Minister of Justice and of Foreign Affairs, as well as a State Councilor; plus at varying times, he was governor of the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco. He thereby participated in the major events that, since the period of the Regency, marked the formation of Brazil’s political institutions. The Marquis of Paraná died at the height of his power, while President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) in the so-called Reconciliation Cabinet in 1856. He was authoritarian and even choleric, yet in the Brazilian political tradition, his temper did not prevent him from utilizing an array of conciliations. He thus embodied, as few others, the essence of his time. Brazilian writer/statesman Joaquim Nabuco called Paraná: “the strongest arm that our politics has produced” (NABUCO, 1997, p. 346).

As with the statesmen who preceded him, as well as those who accompanied and succeeded him – men such as José Bonifácio, Diogo Antônio Feijó, Euzébio de Queiroz, the Baron of Mauá, the Viscounts of Uruguay and Cairu, the Marquises of Abrantes and Olinda, the Duque de Caxias, and the Baron of Rio Branco, among many others – in the midst of countless domestic and foreign challenges, Paraná proved fully able to assess the peculiarities of the country being formed. His political path was invariably supported by a view of the future unity of his country and solidity for monarchical institutions. According to his spirit, both national unity and the monarchy were absolute values, and foreign policy was a projection and an integral part of domestic politics; one could not be understood without the other. Therefore, just as it was essential to eliminate any separatist movement within the country, it also became essential to ward off any possibility of fragmentation that came from the Platine or the Amazon borders. Foreign matters became important for what they represented, either positively or negatively, to the consolidation of Brazil’s unity under the monarchy. And therein may lie the key to understanding the importance the Brazilian ruling elite ascribed to foreign policy: to preserve the territory, to maintain unity, and to ensure the monarchy.

Diplomacy, combined with the use of armed force, was crucial in building the Brazil which, still today, remains territorially united, despite its huge size and anemic cohesion; despite its fragmented social reality. All of this happened because, in the past, men such as Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná, and so many others had the foresight, the courage and the determination to idealize and consolidate it in the midst of so many needs and so many challenges. Both feared and respected for his determination and his sense of authority, Paraná embodied the essence of the times in which he lived, updating simultaneously both his era and his world.

If Paraná’s contribution to the establishment of Brazilian political and institutional patterns was constant throughout his public life, his direct involvement with international affairs was rather casual and almost limited to matters related to the Plata region. Although as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1843) and as State Councilor (1842-1856), he had expressed his opinion on several recurrent problems on Brazil’s southern border, it was his mission in the Plata region, beginning in 1851, that was crucial to the establishment of certain ideas and of an operating style that remained intrinsic to the manner Brazil dealt in relations with its Platine neighbors: Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.

The historical context

The main elements of the process that led to the construction of Brazil’s territory during its colonial period were an impulse to expand, duly followed by effective consolidation policies. Expansion and consolidation historically succeed one another in a sui generis dialectical contraposition process in the Brazilian historical formation; forcing the country to develop successively active policies of review and revision in the foreign sphere, on the one hand, and of conservatism and status quo on the other. As a result of these policies, Brazil inserted itself into the world in an isolated fashion: definitely expanding yet contained in its own neighborhood; isolated in a closed relationship with an exhausted colonial power; all within the marginal and peripheral geographic space of South America, where strategic interest lines of the great powers rarely crossed.

As Brazil had been colonized by a country devoid of a power surplus, it had to deal with foreign antagonisms inherited from its Portuguese uniqueness in South America. In addition, at least initially, it had a relatively small territory, circumscribed by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which albeit was inapplicable in practice. Also initially, the country was thought to be without any apparent metallic riches, while surrounded by Hispanic units rich in gold and silver that were colonized by a country far more powerful and more integrated into the European concert.

In 1530, the Martim Afonso de Souza expedition along the southern coast of South America, in what is currently the Uruguayan city of Maldonado, left its mark on the area for Portugal. In response, the Spanish felt compelled to protect the Plata estuary, and in 1536, they founded the port, which later became the city of Buenos Aires. Helio Vianna (1994, p. 255) observes correctly in his História do Brasil that these happenings were the “basis for future international actions between the Portuguese and the Spanish, as later occurred between their Brazilian and Hispanic-American descendants.” These disputes lasted just over three centuries, until the fall of the Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, in 1852, an episode that distinguished Carneiro Leão, as both a strategist and a diplomatic negotiator; raising him to leadership levels in the Imperial government as well as into the ranks of the nobility.

With the Iberian Union (1580-1640), a wave of expansion gradually allowed for Portuguese ownership rights on the territory that later became Brazil. With the end of the union, Dom Manuel Lobo, governor of Rio de Janeiro, disembarked onto the current Uruguayan coast in 1680 and founded the Colony of Sacramento, a land which became the scene of one of the most extraordinary adventures of the South American colonial period: an extended cycle of conflict between Spain and Portugal for the possession of the eastern bank of the Plata River. The conflict between the two European nations lasted until the Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777; and that between Brazil and its neighbors remained until 1828, with the proclamation of the independence of Uruguay after the so-called Cisplatine War. The conflicts left many scars on the patriotic sensitivities of the civilian and military leaders of the countries in the region. It was a total of 148 years; a century and a half of war, the alternation of sovereignty, and diplomatic negotiations; all of which created the backdrop for the war against Rosas.

In 1801, the year in which Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão was born, the European events that would decisively affect Brazil were already underway. After the apogee of its colonial expansion, Portugal had declined to the point of becoming a peripheral State in the European context. With the Napoleonic Wars, however, it went on to represent a strategically valuable part of the continental balance of power. Since it was impossible to preserve the Portuguese territory, it became necessary to protect the Braganza Royal House as the core of the State. That was, at least, the logic that – when Honório Hermeto was but six years old – led to the transmigration of the Portuguese court to Brazil under the inspiration and protection of England.

Skillful Luso-Brazilian diplomacy had traded the Colony of Sacramento – an indefensible piece of land on the left bank of the Plata River, opposite what would later become the large city of Buenos Aires – for the entire extension of hinterland that had been explored by the bandeirantes in search of Indians to enslave and metals to exploit. Once the fort – which the Portuguese had used for decades to challenge Spanish power – was destroyed, Sacramento was abandoned, thus allowing the Spaniards to dedicate themselves to developing the port of Buenos Aires, upon which the country of Argentina would be built. Over time, both diplomacy and weapons defined the geographic territory of Brazil, the country that Carneiro Leão helped to consolidate, both physically, with his diplomatic performance in the Plata, and institutionally, with the reconciliation of parties and electoral reform, the so-called “Law of Circles.”

During the Brazilian reign of Dom João VI, an opportunity appeared for a new Portuguese onslaught in the Plata region. In 1817, Portugal annexed the Banda Oriental, or in other words, all of current Uruguay, then called the Cisplatine Province. This Portuguese decision was consistent with its permanent obsession to reach the left bank of the Plata. It was also justified, to a certain extent, by Portuguese frustration with the adverse results of the Congress of Vienna. The decision was made against British interests, and in that regard, it represented a gesture of autonomy, of seeking affirmation of Brazil’s own strategic interests.

From then on, the game of forces was characterized by periodic Argentine ambitions to rebuild the boundaries of the Viceroyalty of the Plata and, as well as by Rio de Janeiro’s strong will to maintain – at any cost – a status quo that prevented the formation of a formidable rival along the southern borders of its country. Emperor Dom Pedro I addressed this issue in successive “Speeches from the Throne.” In 1826, for example, he said:

The entire Empire is silent, except for the Cisplatine Province. ... Ungrateful men, who owed a lot to Brazil, rose against it, and today they are supported by the government of Buenos Aires, which is currently fighting against us. National honor requires that the Cisplatine Province be saved, as it is bound to the integrity of the Empire.

Then in 1827, he asserted:

This war [in Cisplatine] ... still continues and will continue while the Cisplatine Province, which is ours, is not free from the invaders, and [while] Buenos Aires does not recognize the independence of the Brazilian nation and the integrity of the Empire, including the incorporation of the Cisplatine, which freely and spontaneously wanted to be part of this same Empire.

In 1828, the Emperor pragmatically recognized the situation when he stated: “I have started peace negotiations with the Republic of Buenos Aires, establishing foundations for a fair and dignified agreement ... If Buenos Aires does not acquiesce… it will be necessary to continue with the war.” Then, in 1829, he announced, without any comment, a Preliminary Peace Convention with the Government of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata (FALLAS DO THRONO 1823-1889, 1889, p. 123, 124, 132, 141-2, 165).

The Spanish opposition to the Luso-Brazilian presence – no longer only in Sacramento, but throughout the Banda Oriental (the east bank of the Uruguay River) – was decisive in affirming Buenos Aires, in the context of the Viceroyalty of La Plata, as the center of Hispanic power in the southern part of the continent. For its part, Buenos Aires initiated the war of liberation of the Cisplatine Province (1825-1828). Inconclusive on the battlefield, the war ended under British diplomatic mediation with the independence of Uruguay – described as the “cotton between the crystals,” by a British diplomat.

Juan Manuel de Rosas, governor of the Province of Buenos Aires since 1829, became the leader of the Argentine Confederation in 1835. With a brief interruption, he remained in power until 1852 when, defeated by combined Entre Rios, Brazilian and Uruguayan forces, he sought asylum on an English frigate in the port of Buenos Aires and left for exile in Great Britain. While in power, Rosas had led a strong, nationalist government, basing his power on the predominance of the port over the Argentine provinces. Buenos Aires held the monopoly of foreign trade and the competence to lead the Confederation’s Foreign Affairs. Little by little, by imposing provincial governors who were docile to his command, the caudillo also began to exercise administrative and legal control over nearly the entire country. In order to ensure his power, Rosas maintained three armies: one in the north, one in the south, and the third one in the center of the country. Additionally, he had considerable backup power in Uruguay under the behest of his ally, General Manuel Oribe. During his long period in power, Rosas won countless rebellions in many parts of the Confederation.

In the foreign sphere, Rosas also faced a permanent framework of challenges. In the north, he found himself grappling with a war against Bolivia, which ended with the interference of Chile in 1839. He also had to deal with the French who had occupied Martin Garcia Island in the Plata River (at the beginning of the Uruguay River) and blocked the port of Buenos Aires. Arguing that the Argentine Confederation had the right to control access to the Paraná River, Rosas preached the inviolability of the Plata River basin to international navigation, something that naturally went against British, French, and certainly Brazilian interests.

In 1845, the British broke through a blockade that Rosas had imposed in Vuelta del Obligado, going up the Paraná River as far as Corrientes. There, they started a trade with the Argentine coastline that later reinforced the anti-Rosas and anti-Buenos Aires claims made by leaders of the Provinces of Corrientes and Entre Rios. Between 1846 and 1849, the English and French succeeded one another in vain military and diplomatic initiatives in the Plata region. Rosas repelled these French and British attacks with great domestic advantage.

In Rio de Janeiro, the events in the Plata were always followed with great concern. The southern provinces were still only loosely tied to the Empire. Since the independence of Uruguay in 1828, separatist ideas and men, the Farroupilha, crossed into Rio Grande and threatened the Empire’s unity. The intent to reorganize the territory of the old Viceroyalty of Plata under the leadership of Buenos Aires was attributed to Rosas. It was also believed that Uruguay’s independence was threatened. Rio de Janeiro was concerned about the possibility of the emergence in the South of a great national unity of Spanish origin, capable of unbalancing relationships so painstakingly developed since the colonial period, with the ability to jeopardize the territorial gains that Luso-Brazilian diplomacy had achieved and legitimized through negotiation. It was also believed that Rosas intended to fragment the Brazilian Empire into various small republics (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 82), and that, among other threats, he could encourage separatism in the southern provinces, as well as create obstacles to the free navigation of the rivers of the basin. The Empire was also concerned about continued French and British interventions in the region, which, in one way or another, had become a secondary theater on which these European nations exercised their global rivalries.

In addition to all of the above, there was also the problem of fixing the boundaries with Uruguay; a problem which was by no means easy to resolve, especially in light of the instability that prevailed in the Cisplatine country, and of the continued interferences by Rosas in support of Manuel Oribe, his caudillo ally, who controlled much of the country and represented a constant threat to the Brazilian borders.

Formally, the Preliminary Peace Convention that enshrined the independence of Uruguay established that the contracting parties – Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay – were supposed to negotiate a final peace treaty, which would specify the liability of each in defending the integrity of the Banda Oriental. The parties also agreed to maintain the free navigation of the rivers in the Plata basin. The negotiation of a definitive peace treaty, however, was hindered both by the instability that began to reign in Argentina, and by the threats to the continuity of the monarchical order in Brazil that had arisen with the abdication of Dom Pedro I in 1831.

The Treaties of 1828 that ended the Cisplatine War and ensured the existence of Uruguay as an independent country did not necessarily ensure the stability of Brazil’s southern border. Uruguayan and Argentine strongmen, as well as leaders from Rio Grande, alternated in disputes that put at risk the balance achieved in 1828 under British influence and threatened Rio Grande do Sul. In 1835, Manuel Oribe took power in Montevideo, Rosas installed himself for the second time in the government of the Province of Buenos Aires, and Bento Gonçalves put Rio Grande do Sul in rebellion against the Regency that was then ruling the Brazilian Empire. Rio de Janeiro feared, and reasonably so, the possibility of the emergence of a large Platine State. Several attempts were made for a diplomatic understanding without a favorable evolution of the situation according to Brazilian interests. Uruguay – divided between Oribe and José Fructuoso Rivera – oscillated between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Rosas feared the Uruguayan caudillos would give support to his enemies on the Argentine coast (Corrientes and Entre Rios) regimented under the leadership of General Justo José de Urquiza, of Entre Rios. Eventually, Oribe prevailed in Uruguay, having succeeded in immobilizing Rivera in Montevideo.

Over time, the Empire had to face constant antagonisms of perceptions and national projects in the Americas. On one side, there were the descendants of the Portuguese monarchy, inscribed within the context of the Restoration process that was occurring in Europe; and on the other side, there were the Hispanic countries plus the United States, imbued with republican and liberal fervors that would become the engine of subsequent changes in the international system.

These differences explain the circumstances and the transactions that surrounded the independence of Brazil; the so-called protectionist and egotistical way with which the country was inserted into the world; the perceptions of political leaders, including Carneiro Leão; as well as the variant course taken by the relations between an independent Brazil and the Hispanic countries throughout the entire nineteenth century. In the nine years of the Regency – when Carneiro Leão began his rapid political rise – in spite of all the existent instability and threats of secession in some provinces, both the young country’s isolation and the control exercised by the conservative monarchical elites were so large that republican ideas did not seduce Brazilian society very much. Perhaps out of fear of the disorder in which the neighboring South American republics lived, Brazilian elites soon associated the image of a republic with conflicts, political instability, and the loss of unity – values considered to be absolutes in Brazil.

These elements, then, both positively and negatively, distinguished Brazil’s insertion into the world. The country remained united, but with a very peculiar cultural mosaic, characterized by remarkable breadth and plasticity. Even as an independent country, it remained somewhat isolated. As if it had been in a time capsule during its long colonial period, therefore, Brazil found itself on the sidelines of ongoing transformations in the world.

Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão had lived in Coimbra during the period of Brazilian independence, and there is no information he expressed himself on the matter. When he returned to Rio de Janeiro, he married a cousin, Maria Henriqueta, the daughter of the benefactor uncle who had paid for his studies in Coimbra, and who had opened the doors to his career in the Court. He then passed through the Empire of Pedro II as a prominent figure of the Conservative Party.

Already established as a coffee farmer in the Paraiba Valley, and having been elected and re-elected a representative from Minas Gerais (1830, 1834 and 1838), Carneiro Leão was appointed governor of the Province of Rio de Janeiro in 1841. In 1842, he was asked to join the original nucleus of the Third Council of State, which was created by Dom Pedro II and lasted until the end of the Empire in 1889; Carneiro Leão remained a State Councilor until the end of his life in 1856.

In 1843, he was the head of the Ministerial Cabinet, while also accumulating the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs. At that time, however, he stayed in the cabinet only briefly, as he resigned in 1844 due to a controversy with the young Emperor, indirectly related to the negotiation of a tariff treaty with England. Prior to resigning, however, he voiced his nationalist sentiment, abolishing the position of a conservative judge that had been established in Brazil by England at the time of Dom João VI, to decide on issues related to British subjects.

Carneiro Leão’s career accelerated again in 1848, when he was appointed governor of the province of Pernambuco with a mission to appease the local situation still upset by the consequences of the Praieira revolt, the final internal rebellion of the Empire. He fulfilled the mission with his individual talent, alternating between firm attitudes and pragmatic policies. As a result of his success in Pernambuco, in 1851 he was asked to pacify the southern border threatened both in Argentina and in Uruguay by the caudillo, Juan Manuel de Rosas, governor of the Province of Buenos Aires; and it was this mission that turned out to be his greatest diplomatic accomplishment.

The mission of Carneiro Leão in the Plata

After Dom Pedro II was declared an adult in 1840 – allowing him to take the throne of the Empire – and stability was later achieved in southern Brazil with the winding down of the Farrapos War, conditions were created for the Empire to focus on resolving instability in the Platine region overall. Diplomatic envoys of Fructuoso Rivera, from Montevideo, and Juan Manuel de Rosas, from Buenos Aires, arrived in Rio de Janeiro, each committed to obtaining Brazilian support for his own purposes. In 1843, the envoy of Rosas, General Tomás Guido, proposed to Carneiro Leão, then in charge of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, an alliance to overthrow Rivera, whose support for the insurgents of Rio Grande do Sul was notorious. Carneiro Leão agreed to negotiate with Guido, but he conditioned the alliance against Rivera to a definitive peace agreement with the Province of Buenos Aires.

The Argentine representative rejected Carneiro Leão’s conditions. He insisted that Rivera should first be neutralized, and only after that occurred should a peace agreement be negotiated with Buenos Aires. Carneiro Leão, having become aware of evidence that tied Rivera to the Farroupilhas in Rio Grande do Sul, eventually accepted the Argentine proposal. He signed the agreement, and the Emperor approved it on behalf of Brazil. The Argentine strongman, Rosas, however, rejected it.

Feeling betrayed, Carneiro Leão put Brazil back in a position of neutrality regarding the caudillo battles on both sides of the Plata River. Before leaving the Ministry, he issued detailed instructions to Montevideo, in which, by exposing the complexity of the relationship Brazil/Rio Grande Sul/Uruguay/Buenos Aires, he clarified the goal of the Empire:

The goals of the Imperial Government ... are to bring peace to the province of Rio Grande, and to maintain the independence of the Eastern State. But as the independence [of the Eastern State] is secondary to the pacification of Rio Grande, the Imperial Government should prefer to work with Rosas, rather than remain sympathetic to the cause of the Eastern State and, thereby, endanger peace [in Rio Grande].

Carneiro Leão, however, instructed the chargé d’affaires not to put this in writing. Rather, he said: “In your written communications to the government, always remain neutral, leaving only to verbal and confidential conferences to inculcate that propensity of the government” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1964, p. 107 and 109). Implicit in Carneiro Leão’s formula was the pragmatic position of even accepting the incorporation of Uruguay into Argentina if that acceptance ensured the integrity of Rio Grande do Sul and its maintenance in the Empire. Although the situation unfolded in a different manner, and therefore the option he had considered was not necessary, the flexibility with which Carneiro Leão had planned the alternatives – according to the larger goal defined at the time – as well as the subtlety of his political-diplomatic maneuvers, clearly shows insight into his reasoning.

Carneiro Leão’s successor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paulino Soares de Souza, the future Viscount of Uruguay, main-tained the neutrality policy until Rosas blocked Montevideo. This action led the Brazilian representative in the Uruguayan capital, the Viscount of Sinimbu, to express himself emphatically against the policy pursued by Rosas and not recognize the blockade. In Rio de Janeiro, Soares de Souza reiterated the Brazilian determination to remain neutral in the fight between Rosas and Rivera. In practice, however, the autonomy with which the diplomatic representatives operated took the question to the extremes. Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, the Brazilian representative in Buenos Aires, retrieved his passport and was induced to leave the post. Meanwhile, the Argentine representative, Tomás Guido, taking advantage of the lack of clarity on Brazil’s part, was obstinate in his efforts to attract support for Rosas. Disagreements followed. Rosas, for example, became angry with Brazil’s recognition of Paraguay’s independence in 1844.

From 1836 to 1846, the Emperor’s Speeches of the Throne increasingly made alarmist references to republican and separatist struggles in Rio Grande and the efforts of the government to gather dissidents around the Imperial Crown. In 1846, Dom Pedro II announced the pacification of the Province. The main goal of the Empire in the region had been attained.

In 1849, as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paulino Soares de Souza - who, according to the words of Teixeira Soares (1955, p. 115), was “the real creator of the doctrine of firmness in the Plata River” – established the conviction that Rosas was determined to keep the situation “on ice” until he was able to overthrow Rivera, control Montevideo, and attack Rio Grande do Sul. War seemed inevitable. Guido retrieved his passport and left Rio de Janeiro in October 1850. Brazil guaranteed financial, diplomatic and military support so that Rivera would not abandon Montevideo to the forces of Oribe and Rosas. As peace in the Rio Grande had been ensured, the independence of Uruguay became the major goal once again.

Carneiro Leão, who had recently ended his mission in Pernambuco, was assigned to negotiate and sign a peace treaty with Montevideo. At the time a dividing line between both States based on the uti possidetis of the Empire was strictly recognized. Shortly thereafter, the governor of Entre Rios, General Justo José de Urquiza, expressed acceptance of Brazilian support to overthrow Rosas.

On May 29, 1851, the Brazilian Empire, the Republic of Uruguay, and the Provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes signed a Treaty of Alliance, the goals of which – both offensively and defensively – were expressly, to ensure the independence of Uruguay, and to pacify its territory, as well as to secure the expulsion of General Oribe and the Rosas’ forces that he commanded.

Nominated governor of Rio Grande do Sul and the head of Brazilian troops that would intervene against Oribe, Luis Alves de Lima e Silva, the future Duque de Caxias, arrived in the South in July 1851. Whether his actions were slow or General Urquiza’s were excessively quick or malicious; the fact is that the latter acted on his own and hastened the defeat of Oribe, without the help of the Brazilian forces. The caudillo from Entre Rios had decided to weaken Rosas and fight against him militarily, but as he did not have the resources necessary for such an ambitious endeavor, he sought financial, logistic and military support from Brazil. For his part, Caxias turned Urquiza’s needs into virtues and minimized the participation of the Empire in carrying out his power projects.

After Oribe capitulated, the Treaty of May 29 was supplemented by another treaty, which Carneiro Leão signed in October 1851. It was necessary to act quickly, in order to avoid Urquiza’s resourcefulness, to create facts capable of reducing the importance of Brazil in the resolution of the Platine dispute.

As a result, the problems between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires worsened. Brazilian monarchist elites perceived the situation predominant in Argentina as being threatening and revealing of uncivilized political customs; and Argentine perceptions about monarchical Brazil, the “Africa of America,” according to the words of diplomat Juan Bautista Alberdi, in turn, were extremely negative (ALBERDI, 1998 Cited in SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2004).

Appointed plenipotentiary on October 20, the future Marquis of Paraná left for Montevideo on the 23rd, accompanied by the young secretary he had chosen, José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the future Baron of Rio Branco. At that time, Carneiro Leão was a senator for Minas Gerais; he also occupied his seat on the Council of State. He was 50 years old and was one of the most powerful politicians in the country. With an irascible and authoritative personality, he did not possess attributes often associated with diplomats. It was the Foreign Minister, Paulino Soares de Souza, later named the Viscount of Uruguay, who suggested his appointment to Dom Pedro II; perhaps because he considered that the mission required not a diplomat of traditional character, but rather a politician of the importance, representativeness and temperament of Carneiro Leão. The moment required a man of authority, to prevent the anti-Brazilian and antimonarchical action of Rosas and his eastern allies from jeopardizing the country’s integrity. The symbiotic relationship between Brazilian domestic and foreign policies prevailed. Soares de Souza summarized in an objective manner the mission: Carneiro Leão should be in charge of calling attention to the institutional question – monarchy versus republic – which separated Brazil from its Platine neighbors. As he put it: “We must seize the opportunity, pressure Rosas, and pin him to the ground, in order to obtain the complement of Treaties on the 12th of this month, connecting those governments to our system and our policies” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 14).

Carneiro Leão took with him to Montevideo and Buenos Aires, the experience acquired as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1843, when he had dealt with threats posed to the integrity of the province of Rio Grande do Sul that had rebelled against the Empire. He had also gained vast experience on international matters as a member of the Justice and Foreign Affairs sections of the Council of State, when he had dealt with a variety of issues, including: disturbances in the Plata region; disputes with Great Britain about slave trafficking and the joint bilateral commissions; migratory problems and the settlement of accounts with Portugal; interferences by foreign consuls; episodes related to the guarantee of the independence of Uruguay established by the Convention of 1820 that had ended the Cisplatine War; Paraguayan themes and many others – all of which made him keenly aware of the Empire’s foreign agenda, enabling him to act with sharp political and strategic sense in Montevideo and Buenos Aires.

Responses to questions the Minister of Foreign Affairs had formulated in July 1844 when Carneiro Leão was Rapporteur – are also useful to illustrate his thoughts about the Plata region. For example, in response to: “Does Brazil have the right to intervene [in Uruguay]?” The Council responded, in Carneiro Leão’s handwriting: “Of course Brazil has the right to intervene” as the Treaty of 1828

separates the Cisplatine Province from the Empire, making it an independent State.... Therefore, if the independence disappears, Brazil has the right to intervene, to save it, or even to reincorporate the province back into the Empire; as it was only separated under the condition of it being an independent State.

Underlying that statement was the risk that a possible victory in Uruguay by the caudillo, Manuel Oribe, could have led to that country’s annexation by the Argentine Confederation, as championed by Oribe’s great ally, Rosas. And if that occurred, the Council was emphatic, “Brazil must prepare for war!”

Among the reasons for intervention mentioned in the report is the pacification of Rio Grande do Sul, which reinforces the thesis that foreign policy at the time was practiced under a logic similar to that which ruled domestic policy. Both of these issues related to the territorial integrity of the Empire. In addition, foreign policy was a tool to preserve monarchical institutions: “... if a foreign war begins, the rebels will give up their criminal attempts and support the Imperial Army; thus, atoning for their crimes, they will be able to re-enter – without disgrace or tarnish – the community of the Brazilian family.”

In a subsequent lengthy report, also signed by Carneiro Leão, the legal and political circumstances of the Brazilian relationship with Uruguay and the perennial ambition of Rosas, to incorporate the eastern bank of the Plata River into Argentina, are discussed. After analyzing the problems that this would create for Brazil, the report concludes that “the policy conceived as being less harmful is that of preserving the independence of the Uruguayan State”; and it went on, “Our statesmen shudder at the idea of turning Montevideo into a part of Buenos Aires” (STATE COUNCIL 1842-1889, 1978, p. 201, 103, 205, 225, 336).

The correspondence between Foreign Minister Paulino Soares de Souza and Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão is abundant, and virtually all of it is deposited in the archives of Itamaraty. Historian José Antônio Soares de Souza used this documentation to write his broad study: “Honório Hermeto no Rio da Prata, Missão Especial 1851-1852” (Honório Hermeto in the Plata River, Special Mission 1851-1852), published in 1959 as part of the Brasiliana collection of the Companhia Editora Nacional, and by virtue of a publication of the Center for History and Diplomatic Documentation of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation, these documents are fully identified and listed (INVENTÁRIO..., 2001).

Carneiro Leão’s mission in the Plata lasted six and a half months. He arrived in Montevideo on October 31, 1851. After a brief contact with General Urquiza’s son, Diogenes, while he was still anchored in the harbor, he disembarked in Montevideo on November 2 and presented his credentials to President Joaquin Suarez three days later.

When the war against Oribe was over, it was necessary to put an end to the constant threats that came from Buenos Aires. The treaties signed with the interim government in Montevideo laid the foundation for the relationship with Brazil. Caxias’ troops were already stationed in Uruguay. Urquiza let the Brazilian side know that he wished to cross the Paraná River at the head of an army of 20,000 men, to attack Rosas in early December. An agreement was quickly negotiated and completed. It was signed in Montevideo on November 21, by Carneiro Leão, for Brazil, Diogenes Urquiza, for Entre Rios, and Manuel Herrera y Obes, a diplomat for Uruguay. By that document, in support of the initiative of Entre Rios, Brazil undertook: (1) to offer the use of the Brazilian fleet (Urquiza did not have boats that would allow him to cross the Uruguay River so that he could then march to Buenos Aires); and (2) to provide 3,000 infantrymen, two batteries of artillery, one cavalry regiment and 1,000 swords. The Empire also ensured a loan to the Provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes totaling 400,000 silver coin currency (pataçoes), to be released in four monthly disbursements at 6% interest per annum.

The negotiation had been skillfully conducted. The agreement was legally configured as to define its objective as an offensive action against Rosas rather than a war against Argentina. It was, so to speak, a foreign war that looked like a civil war. For his part, Carneiro Leão could not be more incisive about the goals of the agreement that he had signed: “The results that the Imperial government must derive from the direct and effective intervention that it has recently undertaken on the matters between the states of the Plata region cannot be achieved without the fall of the governor, Juan Manuel de Rosas” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 25). Contrary to what was written in the agreement, however, the Brazilian Empire did not plan merely to “assist” in the matter. In order to respond to the “susceptibilities of Spanish nationalism,” as Carneiro Leão wrote in a letter to Rio de Janeiro, the Empire planned to play a very important and indispensable role in the fight, which, in fact, actually occurred, as Brazil contributed to the outcome “with its money, its naval fleet, and its soldiers” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 25). Moreover, Brazilian military forces would not be scattered; they would be preserved in a single block, and they would be commanded by Brazilian officers.

Carneiro Leão was perfectly aware that in order to obtain the expected benefits of the intervention the role that Brazil played in the fight should be dominant. He wrote to Foreign Minister Soares de Souza that the Empire should not be “afraid” of France and England, which he described as: “powers that desire to compete for the influence that is Brazil’s, and that [therefore] is proper for Brazil to exercise in the states of the Plata region.” If Urquiza won alone, the glories would belong to him alone, regardless of the Empire’s financial aid. If he lost, Brazil’s assistance to him would be “too late,” because surely then the European powers would intervene on behalf of Rosas (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 27). That type of thinking was impeccable reasoning; the result of a political view of power that Brazil needed to exercise in the region in order to preserve its interests. There was actually considerable mistrust among the Brazilian leaders concerning Urquiza’s true intentions. The understanding was not universal, nor was our ally’s behavior absolutely clear.

It became essential to ensure the exact fulfillment of the treaties and the timely implementation of the provisions of the military campaign. In a letter dated early December, General Urquiza assured Carneiro Leão that around the 15th of the month he would be underway “to pursue ... without interruption the enemy of the Empire and the tyrant of my country” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 63).

Operations began on time and successfully. On September 17, 1851, a Brazilian fleet of eight warships – including four steam corvettes, carrying three battalions, under the command of Admiral John Grenfell – managed to force through the Tonelero Pass on the Paraná River, despite strong opposition of the Rosas’ forces. Then, surpassing the territory controlled by Buenos Aires, they arrived to meet the forces of Urquiza in Corrientes. Significantly, aboard the Brazilian flagship, the Dom Afonso, were two future Presidents of Argentina: Bartolomé Mitre and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento.

Between December 23 and 24, 1851, the allied army crossed the Paraná River on Brazilian boats, ferries and on horseback. On January 1, 1852, Brazilian troops stationed in Colônia, under the command of Manuel Marques de Sousa, arrived by river to Rosário. On January 6, the Uruguayan and Brazilian divisions joined the bulk of the Army at Espinillo.

At this point, a series of incidents occurred. On one side, there was Urquiza’s concern to minimize the role of the Brazilian forces in the battle; on the other, the determination of Marques de Sousa to comply with the political strategy outlined by Carneiro Leão, to actively participate in the operations. As evident of this, Marques de Sousa complained bitterly that Urquiza did not greet him when he arrived on the scene, and that Urquiza had given him neither instructions nor support.

Despite the susceptibilities, it was essential to increase the tempo of the battle, as leadership in Rio de Janeiro feared a possible British intervention in favor of Rosas. Carneiro Leão obtained from Urquiza a commitment to accelerate the attack. At the same time, he and Caxias planned the idea of sending a contingent of Brazilian troops to the outskirts of Buenos Aires – a maneuver that forced Rosas to keep an important part of his forces in the capital, thereby weakening the troops that defended Caseros, another locality in Buenos Aires Province, named for its owner, Diego Casero. The Caseros site subsequently became one of the most important battles in the conflict.

The Brazilian strategy had left Rosas without the freedom of initiative. Fearful of an attack by the Brazilian Army encamped at the Colony of Sacramento; he remained in Palermo, a district of Buenos Aires, for almost the entire month of January. He finally left Buenos Aires on the 27, to fight a pitched battle with the Allied forces.

The meeting of the two armies took place at dusk on February 2, 1852. At night, Rosas consulted with his staff, and he hesitated. Reportedly, he even thought about negotiating with Urquiza because, as he supposedly commented to his generals, “our real enemy is the Empire of Brazil, because it is an Empire” (LYNCH, 1984, p. 366). Yet the inexorable course of hostilities disposed in the theater of operations – the port vs. the hinterland; the Empire vs. the republican caudillo – prevailed.

On February 3, 1853, the two armies fought at a site near Morón, a creek 30 km west of Buenos Aires. The Battle of Caseros was concentrated around two buildings where the bulk of Rosas’s troops were located: the farmer Casero’s house and his pigeon coop. The superiority of the allies was absolute and the battle lasted only four and a half hours. Just as Carneiro Leão had ordered, the Brazilian cavalry played a decisive role in the Allied forces victory. The military action had responded efficiently to the political goal. However the matter is analyzed, the participation of Brazilian diplomacy, as well as the country’s arms and funding were crucial. Soon after the ground battle ended, however, divergences regarding the role played by Brazil began to emerge.

Caxias arrived in Buenos Aires on February 4, 1852. Urquiza was already installed there. Accompanied by José Maria Paranhos, Carneiro Leão arrived on February 8.

During their first visit, in Palermo, Carneiro Leão, the Brazilian plenipotentiary, only had congratulatory words for General Urquiza. He realized, however, that the violence continued and the political intolerance, which had characterized Rosas’ regime, also remained; corpses hung from trees in Palermo. Lodged at the Lezama Residence – current headquarters of Argentina’s National History Museum, in downtown Buenos Aires – Carneiro Leão remained in the city for 16 days. During that time, and subsequently, there were episodes that well reveal the discrepancies between the parties. Carneiro Leão became angry with Urquiza’s stubborn determination to minimize the Brazilian role in the overthrow of Rosas. On at least two occasions, known as “the Palermo incidents,” the two leaders strongly disagreed; both times over the same issue. Gustavo Barroso recounted these disagreements in dramatic terms in his 1929 book, A Guerra do Rosas (The War of Rosas). Paraphrasing Barroso: On February 10, Carneiro Leão felt attacked, and he screamed his rejection of Urquiza’s accusation – made in the midst of a conversation about the Uruguayan situation – that the Alliance held on the Brazilian Emperor’s head, the crown that was about to fall. The insinuation was not dislodged from Urquiza’s mind, however, as on the 23rd of that same month, when Carneiro Leão was bidding farewell to the governor, the Argentine general and political leader repeated the same comment to Carneiro Leão’s secretary, Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos (BARROSO, 1929, p. 209-214).

Between one incident and the other, there was a parade of Brazilian troops in Buenos Aires. The Brazilian military leaders’ satisfaction with the victory was very evident; seeing it as true restitution for the defeat at Ituzaingó (Passo do Rosário) suffered on February 20, 1827, during the Cisplatine War.

On February 18, 1852, the eve of the anniversary of Ituzaingó, the Brazilian troops made their triumphal parade along the streets of Buenos Aires. There had been expectations they might be intimidated to parade alone and, therefore, not do so. It was also reported that, having given an order to convey to Marques de Souza that the parade would start at one pm Urquiza led his troops at noon. The Brazilians, however, were not intimidated. Argentine historian José Maria Rosa commented:

The Brazilians majestically entered ... Flowers fell all around them, applauses saluted the parade of flags... There was an emotional moment while going under the Arch of Triumph of the Recoba Vieja... Honório (Carneiro Leão), unbowing, alongside the arch, exalted the great victory of his country…perhaps he was thinking what would have occurred in Rio de Janeiro if an Argentine division had entered as the victor, to the beat of the Ituzaingó March, with their blue and white flag displayed, intent on passing beneath the Arch of Ipiranga (ROSA, 1963).

Carneiro Leão was certainly aware of the historical significance of the undertaking produced under his diplomatic leadership. The consolidation of the Imperial influence in the Plata region was a goal that corresponded to the Brazilian idea of power, but that, historically, was etched from an ancestral strategy of Portuguese origin. The parade of victorious Brazilian troops in Buenos Aires put an end to three and a half centuries of European and American wars. The palatial intrigues, diplomatic negotiations, arrangements, agreements and treaties; were all linked, in one way or another, to the definition of the borders between the Portuguese and Spanish colonizers in South America, and later among the nations formed from the collapse of the Iberian colonial empires.

Through a powerful, persistent and well-articulated combination of military might, diplomatic skills and national vision, Brazil had attained the goals it had established for itself. With the overthrow of Rosas, the dream of the formation of a large Spanish State derived from the Viceroyalty of Plata was definitively buried, and a modern Argentina was born, led by Justo José Urquiza. The rivers of the Plata basin were opened for navigation, and the dangers to the integrity of the Brazilian Southern provinces were gone. At the same time, the national personalities and the independence of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia – which had been threatened by the expansionism of Buenos Aires – had been ensured. An historical cycle – key to the building and consolidation of the Brazilian State – had ended in the streets of Buenos Aires.

Having considered his mission in Buenos Aires completed, Carneiro Leão left the city on February 24 going to Montevideo. Involved in a succession of intrigues that characterized the reorganization of power in Uruguay, he remained in the Uruguayan capital during March and April. The Blancos controlled the situation. Several politicians fought for Carneiro Leão’s support to occupy higher positions. Once Juan Francisco Giró was elected president, Carneiro Leão also tried to create the conditions for the approval of the treaties that ensured Uruguay’s independence and the borders agreed to with Brazil. He opened the halls of his residence to both the Blancos and the Colorados. Incited by Buenos Aires, however, the Blancos decided to repudiate the treaties previously signed with Brazil. Carneiro Leão tried to dissuade them, enticing them with the possibility that Brazil would agree to the common navigation of the Mirim Lagoon and the Jaguarão River. However, once a stalemate was reached – which he blamed on “sectarians of Rosas, who intended to demoralize the alliance between the Empire and Uruguay ... since they did not conceive the independence of the Republic” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 172) – Carneiro Leão consulted with both Caxias and Soares de Souza about beginning the withdrawal of the Brazilian troops that occupied Montevideo. Meanwhile, Urquiza, the new Argentine leader still sought further financial assistance from Brazil.

Throughout his time in Montevideo, Carneiro Leão remained perfectly in tune with Rio de Janeiro. In official correspondence, Foreign Minister Soares de Souza restated to him: “The Imperial government is willing to take coercive measures in order to enforce the rights of the Empire ... and if these measures are not enough, a war could break out between the Empire and the Eastern Republic” SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 183). For his part, Carneiro Leão was extremely cautious. In a letter to Soares de Souza he said: “They suppose that I do not follow the policy prescribed to me ... but, rather, my own policy. Be certain, sir, that I will do everything that is humanly possible to uphold our rights and interests. There is no sacrifice of self-love that I have not made” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 184.)

Carneiro Leão was, however, obstinate about one point: that Urquiza not send Tomás Guido to Brazil as a diplomatic representative, the same Tomás Guido who had previously served Rosas. Soares de Souza accepted the future Marquis of Paraná’s considerations and rhetorically asked: “Guido will come here? Don’t you think the nomination of a man…who sought to bribe our press and our senior officials and shall serve Urquiza here as he served Rosas is improper and unpleasant?” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 186). In the end, Carneiro Leão’s recommendation, joined by those of Caxias, were enough to prevent Guido’s appointment, thereby avoiding yet another problem in the already troubled relationship with Buenos Aires.

On May 1, 1852, Carneiro Leão returned to Buenos Aires, to bid farewell to Urquiza as the personal relations between them had been re-established. They reached an agreement about Uruguay in the last interview they had on May 5, and on May 8, Carneiro Leão went back to Montevideo, and never again returned to Argentina. Rosendo Fraga, an Argentine political scientist and historian, synthesized his country’s appreciation in a contribution he made to a seminar organized in Brasilia (Funag/IHGB) in 2001 on the centennial of the birth of the Marquis of Paraná: “For Argentine historians, Carneiro Leão remains a figure with overwhelming style. Some consider him to be overbearing. From the point of view of Brazilian interests, however, he obtained almost all the goals sought by his country” (FRAGA, 2004 p. 159).

On May 18, 1852, the Peace Treaty between Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina was signed, and soon afterward the political situation in Paraguay would be resolved. Urquiza ratified the treaty immediately. He sent a highly complimentary and affectionate letter to Carneiro Leão, praising him for having fulfilled his mission in an honorable and satisfactory manner, with both patriotism and political acumen. Two days later, after bidding farewell to President Giró on May 25, Carneiro Leão left Montevideo.

The Brazilian forces also soon left the city marching towards the border. At the end of an impressive parade that took place in Montevideo, there was, however, not a lack of boos and antagonistic gestures coming from those who perceived Brazilian policies as having been negative for their country. That was the high price to be paid for interventionist policies, whether justified or not!

Gustavo Barroso, again (1929, p. 231), described the scene:

A whooping and hollering crowd rampaged through the streets of the Uruguayan capital, celebrating the departure of their unwanted liberators. The chanting people raved, howling the worst verbal attacks against Brazilians and Brazil. At the front of the crowd, a comical person took on his shoulder a monkey wearing our army’s uniform ... shouts of DIE exploded everywhere. Passing in front of the closed Imperial Mission, a scoundrel broke the windows with stones [...]

Yet for Brazil, the country’s goals had been fully accomplished. Its actions had ensured the borders that it sought with Uruguay; prevented the resurrection of the Viceroyalty of Plata; ensured the independence of Uruguay and Paraguay; and established the right to free navigation of the Plata river basin. Brazil had imposed its order on a region in which instability had threatened its Southern border; unity, and by extension, the country’s monarchical form of government had been preserved.

On June 6, 1852, Carneiro Leão arrived in Rio de Janeiro. The following year, the Emperor summoned him to preside over the Conciliation Cabinet, a position he was performing when he died on September 3, 1856. In his short but crucial performance in the Plata region – and more specifically in the 30 days altogether that he spent in Argentina on three separate occasions – Carneiro Leão contributed decisively, with vision, boldness and strategic direction to the consolidation of the Brazilian national territory as well as its external security.

Study of that period – especially of the interaction between Carneiro Leão and the Argentine and Uruguayan leaders – proves to be valuable for an understanding of certain profound characteristics of the relationship between Brazil and Argentina. Influenced by a history that grew out of confrontations between Portugal and Spain, both countries developed a kind of adversarial interaction that more than a few times has led to diplomatic predicaments. Forces of expansion, growth, and consolidation on the Brazilian side versus impulses of prevention, containment, and a search for balance, on the Argentine side, are cyclical and occasionally counterbalanced by attempts at accommodation.

Argentines learn that their country only became possible because, in the first historical moment, it prevented the definitive establishment of the Portuguese Colony of Sacramento, and later it refused to allow the incorporation of Uruguay into an independent Brazil. The link between protective policies against Brazil and the success of the Argentine national project is something that is embedded in the Argentine imagination. For Brazilian society, relations with Argentina are contained within the present, while Argentine public opinion believes that interaction with Brazil still reflects the vicissitudes of the past. Rosas, the despot whose overthrow was due largely to Brazilian diplomacy and Imperial arms, is a Peronist hero.

These circumstances determine, on the Argentine side, a certain anxious behavior, sometimes aggressively defensive – as the one that Urquiza revealed in the negotiations with Carneiro Leão, in the episode of the parade of Brazilian troops in Buenos Aires and in the swagger of Palermo. On the Brazilian side, the historical experience and an excessive valuation of the country’s size, lead to a behavior in relation to Argentina that is characterized by a certain self-proclaimed pragmatism, which often degenerates into insensitivity.

Two military battles help define the relationship between the two countries: Caseros, the battle in 1852, in which the Brazilian naval and ground forces made victory viable for General Justo José de Urquiza, the caudillo from Entre Rios, thereby enabling the overthrow of Juan Manuel de Rosas; and Ituzaingó (or Passo do Rosário), the Argentine victory in 1827 that ultimately led to the independence of Uruguay. Together, these battles compose a tandem of warfare episodes that established – real or imagined – bilateral antagonisms that one could characterize as the paradigm of the divergence between the countries.

Later, the Paraguayan War, in which Argentine and Brazilian forces fought shoulder to shoulder to maintain the status quo threatened by the expansionism of General Solano Lopez, established the convergence paradigm.

Going from armed conflict, passing through dissimilar positions in both of the World Wars, to the long diplomatic conflict concerning the use of the waters of the Paraná River – the so-called Itaipu-Corpus dispute – up to the integration provided by the re-democratization of both countries in the 1980’s; from Caseros to MERCOSUR, there has been a long trajectory in which the perceptions outlined above occasionally continue to be felt, in the decisions and the reactions of the leaders of both countries.

Throughout that trajectory, the long shadow left by the soaring and imperial view of Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná – his coherence, his firmness to defend the clearly established Brazilian interests, as well as his ability to impose his will in a hostile context – have become permanent references in Brazilian diplomacy.

Bibliography

ALBERDI, Juan Bautista. Escritos Póstumos. Quilmes, ARG: Universidad Nacional, 1998, Cited in SEIXAS CORRÊA, L. F. O Marquês de Paraná, Brasília: FUNAG, 2004.

BARROSO, Gustavo. A Guerrado Rosas. São Paulo: Cia. Ed. National, 1929.

CONSELHO DO ESTADO (COUNCIL OF STATE), 1842-1889: Consultas da Seção dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Câmara dos Deputados: MRE, 1978.

FALLAS DO THRONO 1823-1889. Rio de Janeiro: National Press, 1889.

FRAGA, Rosendo. A Ciento Cinquenta Años de la Actuación de Honorio Hermeto Carneiro Leão en el Rio de la Plata. In: O Marquês de Paraná. Brasília: FUNAG, 2004.

INVENTÁRIO Analítico dos Documentos no Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty. Mission Especial de Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão ao Rio da Prata. Brasília: FUNAG/IPRI, 2001.

LYNCH, John. Juan Manuel de Rosas. Buenos Aires: EMECE, 1984.

NABUCO, Joaquim. Um Estadista do Império. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1997.

ROSA, José Maria. La Caída de Rosas. Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1963.

SOARES DE SOUZA, J. A. Honório Hermeto no Rio da Prata. São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1959.

________. A Queda de Rosas. Revista do IHGB, vol. 264, 1964.

SOARES, Teixeira. Diplomacia do Império no Rio da Prata. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Brand, 1955.

VIANNA, Hélio. História do Brasil. São Paulo: Melhoramentos, 1994.

Viscount of Rio Branco

José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, was a military engineer, journalist, teacher, politician, and diplomat born on March 16, 1819, in the city of Salvador, Bahia, then part of the Portuguese empire in Brazil. His father, Agostinho da Silva Paranhos, a prosperous merchant born in Portugal, died when José Maria was still a child; and his mother, Josefa Emerenciana de Barreiros, from a prominent Bahian family, died in 1836. Not long after his mother’s death, José Maria was sent to Rio de Janeiro, where he attended the Escola Naval (the Brazilian naval academy), from which he graduated in 1840. The following year, he enrolled in the Escola Militar (the military academy), and in May 1843, he was appointed as a substitute professor of mathematics back at the naval academy. Then, after earning a doctorate in Mathematical Sciences from the military academy, in 1846, Paranhos became a professor at that school. Throughout his career as a statesman and politician, he continued his academic work, until 1875 when he retired as the director of the Escola Politécnica, an engineering school that split off from the military academy under the name of the Escola Central, in 1858, and is now part of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

In the 1840s, José Maria da Silva Paranhos worked as a journalist at a number of newspapers in Rio de Janeiro, including Novo Tempo (1844-1846), Correio Mercantil (1848-1849) and, beginning in 1850, the Jornal do Comércio. In 1845, he also began his political career, being elected a deputado (representative) in the province of Rio de Janeiro with support from the Liberal Party. He was appointed secretary of the government of that province in 1846, and its vice-president the following year. Also in 1847, he was elected to the General Assembly of the Brazilian Empire, but his tenure there lasted only until 1848, when the assembly was dissolved.

In 1851, Paranhos was sent on a diplomatic mission to the Plata River region as the secretary of José Honório Hermeto Leão, the future Marquis of Paraná. The following year, he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary in Montevideo. While in that post, he was again elected to the General Assembly from Rio de Janeiro, and he returned to the Brazilian capital in 1853, taking over the position of Minister of Navy (1853-1855, and 1856-1857) in the Conciliation cabinet of his former superior in the Plata region, the Marquis of Paraná.

Paranhos subsequently held the top ministerial positions in Foreign Affairs (1855-1856; 1858-1859; 1861; 1868-1869), and Finance (1861-1862), and he undertook special diplomatic missions to the Plata region in 1857-1858; 1862 and 1869-1870. In 1862, he was the most voted candidate of those on a three-name list, to represent the province of Mato Grosso as its senator; and the emperor, Pedro II, selected him for the position. In 1869, Pedro again chose him, this time to negotiate peace with Paraguay, the success for which he was awarded the title: Viscount of Rio Branco. He also attained the most important position of the monarchical state – that just below the emperor – as the president of the Council of Ministers (basically, prime minister), a post he held simultaneous with that of Minister of Finance, between 1871 and 1875 – the longest such tenure of the Second Empire. It was while he was the council president, in 1871, that the Law of Free Birth – which he proposed – was promulgated. The Lei Rio Branco, as it is often called, basically declared that children born to slave women should be free. In addition to his positions in government, Paranhos also reached the highest level of masonic hierarchy – degree 33, the Grand Master of Brazil.

José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, died on November 1, 1880, in Rio de Janeiro, at age 61.

The Viscount of Rio Branco: sovereignty, diplomacy and power

Francisco Doratioto

Contemporaries called José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, one of the greatest public men of nineteenth century Brazil. Although that perception faded somewhat over the years – partly due to the projection onto the national scene of his son, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco – many historians also come to the same verdict.

Paranhos, who was born in Salvador, Bahia, in 1819, was part of the generation that consolidated the monarchical state in Brazil, during which time the feeling of being a Brazilian reached all provinces of the country. He also helped to build a solid foreign policy in defense of the gigantic territory inherited from the Portuguese. Joaquim Nabuco, a contemporary Brazilian historian, jurist, journalist, politician and diplomat, defined Paranhos as: “the most lucid monarchical awareness the Empire had.” He also said that among the Brazilian Empire’s foreign policy statesmen, Paranhos was: “the most moderate, constant and intelligent advocate of [the country’s national] interests” (s.d., t. 4, p. 187-188). The more current historian and political scientist, José Murilo de Carvalho, ranks Paranhos as “the brightest” diplomat of the Empire (1996, p. 15).

Towards the end of his life, in 1879, at the conclusion of a lengthy trip to Europe – during which he had visited southern France, Italy, Germany, Holland, Belgium and England – the Viscount of Rio Branco wrote to the writer and historian, Alfredo Taunay, that he needed to think more before expressing himself in detail on what he had just seen. He did, however, venture one conclusion: “[This overseas trip] made me feel even more Brazilian than I already was,” he said (TAUNAY, p. 35-36).

Paranhos’ childhood did not seem to destine him to develop such strong feelings towards Brazil nor, for that matter, undergo a successful political career. His father, Agostinho da Silva Paranhos, had been a prosperous Portuguese merchant in Salvador, who sided with his native land after Brazil declared independence in 1822. In fact, Agostinho favored the Portuguese general, Madeira de Melo, who resisted independence until the Portuguese troops were defeated by Brazilian patriots, on July 2, 1823. As a consequence, his father suffered great financial losses, although remaining with considerable possessions. But upon Agostinho’s death, while José Maria was still a child, those possessions and assets were used to settle alleged debts, leaving José Maria’s mother, Josefa Emerenciana de Barreiros, financially strapped, unsuccessfully attempting to overturn the legal judgements against Agostino’s diminished wealth (BARON OF RIO BRANCO, 2012, p. 151).

Relying on the support of his maternal uncle, the colonel of engineers, Eusébio Gomes Barreiros, the young José Maria continued his primary studies in Salvador. Within a few years after his father’s death, however, his mother also died, and the teenaged orphan was sent to Rio de Janeiro, where he enrolled in the Escola Naval. Next, after graduating from the naval academy, in 1841, Paranhos entered the Escola Militar for further studies, being promoted to second lieutenant of the Corps of Engineers in 1843. While still a student, he was also appointed to a chair in the artillery department of the naval academy. In 1845, he transferred his teaching career to the military academy where, three years later, he was appointed to a full professorship and the school’s chair of Artillery and Fortifications.

In 1856, Paranhos began to teach Mechanics at the Escola Militar, and in 1863, that same discipline at the Escola Central, which had split off from the military academy. He then accepted the position of a new chair of Political Economy, Statistics and Administrative Law, in which he taught the pioneer statistics course in the Brazilian academic environment (POUBEL, 2011, p. 7). The Escola Central was renamed the Escola Politecnica, and he was named its director in September 1875, a post he kept until his retirement in March 1877. Thus, Paranhos, the son of a Portuguese merchant who had resisted Brazilian independence, found in the country’s military schools an environment in which to develop feelings of being “Brazilian”: his paternal affiliation had not determined his fate.

Paranhos had arrived in Rio de Janeiro during a particularly politicized period in the Brazilian Empire’s history. Members of the literate sector of the political elite were often profuse, wordy, and emotional in debates held in the legislative assemblies, as well as in the press. Paranhos, however, used his training in mathematics in the debates in which he participated. He presented arguments that were connected to one another with a line of reasoning having a cause and effect relationship; he used logic instead of grandiloquent expressions infected with quotes from French authors, which were typical of the then current pretentious speech of college graduates in Brazil. Joaquim Nabuco stated that in Paranhos “the logical structure of his speech was vigorous; the language was perfect in terms of being appropriate and clear, current and spontaneous” (s.d., I, p. 169). He did not, however, lack erudition, and he could equal his pretentious colleagues – as can be verified in some of his replies to queries in parliamentary sessions. His scientific training was also present in his actions as a politician and as a diplomat, which were characterized by a definition of clear goals and methods of “the right and methodical rule.” He “very rarely lost his composure,” as “patience was his best feature” (TAUNAY, p. 19, 26).

The future Viscount was a rare individual in the elite circles of Rio de Janeiro. Despite the fact that in Imperial Brazil, wealth usually defined one’s social position and sustained political success, while he had to live off the payments of his own activities. Paranhos had a successful political career in the monarchy, reaching its apex: the presidency of the Council of ministers. As such, he was a member of the restricted circle of civil servants, whose loyalty was to the crown and the interests of the monarchy. And although this small group had been trained in the values of the slave society, by no means did all of its members automatically identify with the interests of the economic elite. They were bureaucrats in the Weberian sense, and they distinguished the state’s interests from those of the slave owners – although the latter were often pillars for the former – a situation which created important restrictions on the actions of men and public institutions.

Paranhos began his public life by identifying himself with the Liberal Party. In 1844, he became editor of the newspaper Novo Tempo, which belonged to that political bent. The following year, he was elected to the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro, in a rising political career that led him to be appointed secretary of the government of that province in 1846, and later, its vice-president. He subsequently was elected to the General Assembly of the Empire, although he remained there for only a year because, with the creation of the figure of president of the council, in 1847 – which in practice introduced the Parliamentary system – Pedro II soon dissolved the Camara dos Deputados (the lower house of the legislature), in 1848. The Emperor then called the Conservative Party back into power, appointing the Viscount of Olinda, as the leader of his cabinet.

While he was president of the council, Olinda sought to put an end to the Liberals’ control in his home province of Pernambuco. This action caused an armed uprising known as the Revolução Praieira, named for the street in Recife on which the rebels met. Part of the rebel Liberals, especially those of urban origin, had radical claims, such as federalism, the end of the moderating power of the emperor, and universal suffrage, albeit with a number of restrictions. Although the rebels were defeated when they attacked Recife in 1849, the praieiros sustained a guerrilla war against the forces of the Imperial government until the following year (FAUSTO, 1995, p. 178-179). The radicalism of the claims and the harsh repression by the Imperial government frightened the more moderate sectors of the population, which led to a strengthening of the Conservatives in the central government (the core of which were nicknamed the saquaremas for a village in the province of Rio de Janeiro, their stronghold). The Conservative domination of the General Assembly was astounding; from 1849 to 1852, for example, 99 percent of the representatives in the legislature were members of the Conservative Party, and from 1853 to 1856, they were 100 percent.

After losing his position as a deputado, Paranhos became editor of the newspaper, Correio Mercantil, which was basically an arm of the Liberal Party. According to a Paranhos biographer, Lídia Besouchet, while he had attended the naval and military schools, he had become a Liberal because everything in Rio de Janeiro at that time “converged” towards liberalism: “schools, journalism, the intellectual Bohemia of the Court ... the parliamentary debates.” Thus, a generation of liberals formed, and they led the political process “that caused the successes, [and also] led to the revolt in Pernambuco in 1848.” The radicalism of the latter had an impact on Paranhos who, also following the trend of the Masonic Order to which he belonged, eventually abandoned the Liberal Party. In 1853, he was elected a representative to the General Assembly, again; but this time from the Conservative Party without, however, changing his socio-political thinking (BESOUCHET, 1985, p. 28, 69).

Besouchet said that the Viscount of Rio Branco’s public figure should either be studied from the point of view of his individual path as a successful politician, or “as a national expression,” but never, she said, “as a regional power”: he did not represent any immediate regional or economic interests. Instead, she believed, he was an individual driven by a nationalist ambition, based on an interpretation of Brazil as a “child of Portugal, heir of a monarchy, with the ability to seek its natural evolution within those traditions.” His liberalism was not limited to the initial phase of his political career; it persisted throughout life and, at times, put him in disagreement with conventional conservatism. “Everything seems to indicate” that his transition from one political party to another reflected the evolution of the political stance of the Masonry, of which Paranhos was already a member by 1840 (BESOUCHET, 1985, p. 64-66). In the South Central region of Brazil – which was both official and moderate, as compared to that of the North, which was revolutionary – he found a warm atmosphere for his personal convictions, including an aversion to radical changes –such as those that had victimized him when he was young – an adherence to social reforms, and a compass for his political actions.

Concerning the influence of his affiliation with the Masons, Besouchet is precise:

His entire public life can be explained by his belief in the policies of Masonry; no one followed its instruction with greater zeal ... A transformation began in Paranhos that can only be explained by the change of the general policies of the Masonry in the course of [Brazil’s] political evolution. It is evident that the nationalism – “the “Brazilianism” – of Paranhos’ work can also only be understood as resulting from his affiliation with the Masonry movement in the country. (BESOUCHET, 1985, p. 67).

In 1850, Paranhos left his position as editor of the Correio Mercantil, devoting himself to teaching, as well as to writing a weekly column called “Letters to an Absent Friend,” in the Jornal do Comércio. In his column, he characterized his adhesion to the political ideology of the Conservative Party, which ruled the Empire through the Olinda cabinet, made up of Eusébio de Queirós, Paulino José Soares de Souza and Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres: the “Saquarema Trinity.” The following year, Olinda left the ministry over a disagreement with an armed intervention being planned in Rio de Janeiro against the leader of the Argentine Confederation, Juan Manuel de Rosas, which he considered risky (NABUCO, s.d.,v. I, p. 116). The new leader was the conservative Viscount of Monte Alegre (1849-1852), who appointed Paulino José Soares de Souza, the future Viscount of Uruguay, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In his column, “Letters to an Absent Friend,” Paranhos addressed varied topics, ranging from aspects of life in the Court to Brazilian foreign policy. The beliefs and opinions that he expressed in these “Letters” show that his thinking had converged towards the goals and values of the Conservatives in power. Paranhos supported the foreign policy carried out by the foreign minister, Soares de Souza, who occupied that position from 1843 to 1844, and again, from 1849 to 1853.

The new minister, the future Viscount of Uruguay, defined the goals and methods that should be used in the relationship with neighboring countries, especially those of the Plata region. He also maintained his refusal to allow the subordination of Brazil to the interests of the major powers. This refusal manifested itself in the first half of 1840, with the nonrenewal of trade treaties that had been signed by Pedro I. The treaties had granted privileges to Great Britain and other European powers in order to obtain recognition of Brazil’s independence.

At the beginning of Pedro II’s reign, his government needed to improve tax revenues since the low customs duties levied on imported goods – that had been established in the aforementioned trade treaties – jeopardized the Imperial treasury. In 1844, the Imperial government established the protectionist Alves Branco Tariff with import taxes ranging from 30% to 60%. Then, in July 1845, in an effort to demonstrate more autonomy, the Imperial government decided to end the validity of the 1826 Convention it had signed with Great Britain on the slave trade. The British government retaliated with the Aberdeen Act.

Under the unilateral Aberdeen Act, the classification of piracy that had been given to slave trafficking by the Convention of 1826 continued valid, and British warships began to pursue and seize Brazilian ships that carried slaves; their crews were judged solely in Courts with only British judges; while British warships violated the Brazilian maritime sovereignty, and even exchanged shots with fortifications of the Empire.

In his weekly column in the Jornal do Comércio, Paranhos repeatedly repudiated the British action and supported the Imperial government’s position on the matter. He blamed the “excesses that ... were perpetrated in the name of the law on people England had invented exclusively for itself,” and further said that the British actions showed they “were against weaker nations.” Although he said he was an “English enthusiast” in many ways, Paranhos classified the British government as arrogant, adding: “I do not forgive them for the villainy with which they are oppressing weaker nations, the markets of which they very much need in order to maintain their industrial power.” He believed that the real reason for the imposition of the Aberdeen Act was to force Brazil to return to the British commercial privileges that had been lost.

Paranhos also wrote that all Brazilians, regardless of their political affiliation, were subjected to “this humiliation,” and that no one was so naive as to believe that the arrogance of Lord Palmerston, the official in charge of the British foreign office, was motivated by a concern for the Africans. He further wondered: “would not an advantageous trade treaty calm their rage?” Playing the devil’s advocate, he suggested that the Empire respond to Britain “in a material fight ... and … strengthen its alliances with other nations” – actions that would have been very harmful to British trade. It was a matter of commercial retaliation, he believed (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 33, 37, 51).

The cause of Paranhos’ resentment was not the same as that of the slave traders and their owners, for whom the British action meant a permanent threat of financial loss. The future Viscount of Rio Branco was angry with the British government for what he considered the commercial motivation of the Aberdeen Act, as well as the attacks on the sovereignty of the Brazilian Empire. If this affront was accepted, he said, it could repeat itself on other matters; thus setting a standard in Brazilian foreign affairs. Paranhos condemned slavery “in all its nakedness and horror” (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 419), considering it “an evil that we inherited.” He said, however, that it was an evil from which “[Brazil] can only unbind gradually” (per a vote in Proceedings of the Full State Council 1865-1867, p. 37). Between the prudence of reform and the boldness of rupture, he opted for the former on behalf of preserving national production. Even prudent changes, however, were intolerable for more conservative and influential sectors of the Brazilian elite; as was seen in the critiques of the Law of the Free Birth (1871), an initiative of the Viscount of Rio Branco.

Despite the Aberdeen Act, slave trafficking persisted, reaching its apogee in 1848. The causes were various, including an increase in British demand for Brazilian-made products (ALMEIDA, 2001, p. 340). Ultimately, an end to the trafficking was imposed by the Eusébio de Queirós Law, in 1850.

The end of the slave trade is often related to the reinforcement of the British fleet in the Southern Atlantic, in that same year of the Queirós Law, 1850, and with official instructions to pursue slave ships in the territorial waters of the Empire, including its ports. The fact, however, is that only in the late 1840s did the Brazilian State have sufficient resources and means to impose major changes on the slave traders, and later, with the Lei de Terras (Land Law of 1850), was it able to restrain landowners who appropriated large tracts of public lands.

Brazilian justice minister, Eusébio de Queirós – author of the law that finally ended the slave trade – stated, in a session of the General Assembly, on July 16, 1852, that the Aberdeen Act postponed the end of the trade, which he said the Imperial government was ready to ban in 1848. The enactment of Aberdeen by the British government – and the first seizures of slave ships by the same – caused such popular opposition that it became politically infeasible for Brazilian authorities to implement the ban at that time. Paranhos, himself, repeated this argument, in 1855. Speaking before a session of the General Assembly of the Empire, as the foreign minister; he said:

The assembly knows that the Imperial government considered the moment opportune to deal its ultimate and decisive blows against slave traffickers. One of the obstacles with which it had to fight, in its own conscious and in public opinion, [however] was the Act of Lord Aberdeen (FRANCO, 2005, p. 37).

Another frequent subject in Paranhos’ “Letters to the Absent Friend” was the foreign policy of Paulino Soares de Souza, which he often complimented for its resistance to British abuses, and its firm stance on matters related to the Plata region. The adhesion of Paranhos to the management of foreign policy by the future Viscount of Uruguay led him to defend the permanence of Soares de Souza in the position on behalf of the “honor” of the Conservative Party. It was as if he already considered himself a part of that policy, and of the “honor and interests of the Empire”; which, he wrote in one column, “require that the mind that conceived and initiated the new Brazilian policy – concerning the serious matter of the Plata region – also guide it towards full development” (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 148).

The Platine policy that Paranhos praised concerned containment of the dictator of the Argentine Confederation, Juan Manuel de Rosas, including the Brazilian preparations to confront him. Even after Rosas’ fall, the consequences continued to be a part of Brazilian diplomacy until well into the twentieth century – the early 1980s – in order to contain the influence of Buenos Aires in the region. As far as borders were concerned, the uti possidetis principle – that the territory should belong to the country whose authorities or citizens were there when independence took place – was what was utilized. The justification for imperial diplomacy to use this principle was that the Treaties of Madrid (1750) and San Ildefonso (1777), signed by Portugal and Spain, had been unable to set indisputable colonial borders, and the official borders that existed had subsequently become obsolete.

The uti possidetis principle is fundamental in Brazilian diplomatic doctrine, but it is not the only policy. The statesman and diplomat, Rubens Ricupero, for example, recalls that several generations of Brazilian diplomats added political elements to the mix, in an action “that today we would call ‘soft’ or ‘smart power,’ used to achieve, in a peaceful manner, the goal of consolidating the territorial heritage” (RICUPERO, 2012, p. 35). The first diplomats to utilize such actions were Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, the Baron of Ponte Ribeiro; Paulino José Soares de Sousa, the Viscount of Uruguay; Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná; and José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco.

The goals of Brazilian foreign policy, regarding the Plata region, established during the administration of the Viscount of Uruguay as foreign minister, were to define the borders, obtain the freedom to navigate on the international rivers of the region, and support the independence of both Paraguay and Uruguay. Free navigation was important for trade with western Rio Grande along the Uruguay River, as well as for regular, administrative and commercial contact between Rio de Janeiro and the isolated province of Mato Grosso, located on the Paraguay River. Maintaining the international character of the Paraná, Paraguay and Uruguay rivers was one of the reasons the Brazilian Empire was interested in defending the independence of Uruguay and Paraguay.

Economically, gaucho (from Rio Grande do Sul) ranchers desired livestock and land access in Uruguay, which would have been very difficult if the latter became a province of Argentina. In the strategic sphere, Uruguay and Paraguay were “buffer” states between Brazil and Argentina, reducing the extent of a common border, thereby making the Empire less vulnerable to an invasion by Rosas’ troops. Soares de Souza, however, was convinced that the Argentine Confederate dictator would attack Brazil as soon as possible. He further believed that after Rosas’ blanco allies won the Uruguayan civil war – thereby reducing Anglo-French power in the region – the Argentine dictator would annex Paraguay. It would then be the time for Rosas to “come upon [Brazil] with greater resources and forces than he ever had, and involve the country in a fight in which much blood would be shed and huge sums of money spent” (Report of the Foreign Affairs, 1852, p. XIX-XX).[66]

Juan Manuel de Rosas was, in practice, the dictator of the Argentine Confederation since the mid-1830s, although formally he was only the governor of the province of Buenos Aires, the capital with the same name located on the banks of the Plata River. That strategic position allowed Buenos Aires to monopolize the foreign trade of other Argentine provinces and isolate Paraguay, the independence of which Rosas did not recognize. Under the mantle of nationalism, he blocked international navigation on the Platine river network, which helped him maintain better control over the Argentine hinterland and the commercial monopoly of Buenos Aires. All of this led to the hostility of the British and the French governments, as well as an internal rebellion in the province of Corrientes.

With all this opposition, Rosas proposed an alliance with the Brazilian Empire, to end the Uruguayan civil war, which, in turn, would make it easier for the Imperial government to put an end to a rebellion, the Revolução Farroupilha, then ravaging the southernmost province of the country. After some hesitation, the Imperial government of Pedro II and foreign minister, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, accepted the proposal, and Pedro II signed the treaty. When the document arrived in Buenos Aires, however, Rosas refused to sign it, under the pretext that General Manuel Oribe, the leader of the blancos in the Uruguayan civil war and his ally, had not been consulted. The real reason Rosas rejected the treaty, however, was that he no longer needed it, since the foreign pressures had subsided, and the revolt in Corrientes had been subdued.

In the Uruguayan Civil War, which began in 1839, the two political parties, the Partido Colorado and the Partido Nacional (known as the blancos), whose leaders were, respectively, Fructuoso Rivera and Manuel Oribe, fought one another. The Colorados identified themselves with a pro-European liberalism, while the blancos were antiliberal nationalists. Political disputes between the parties triggered the Civil War, which began with Rivera’s uprising, supported by Argentine Unitarians, opponents of Rosas against Oribe, who had taken shelter in Buenos Aires, and obtained the support of the governor of that province. The regional situation was delicate because the farroupilha movement in Rio Grande had started in 1835, and by 1836, it had proclaimed the Riograndense Republic. Forces loyal to Rio de Janeiro controlled Porto Alegre and the coastline, while the separatists, led by large ranchers, controlled the southern part of the gaucho territory. In summary, the Uruguayan Civil War involved the interests of the federal Rosistas, in favor of Oribe; the Argentine Unitarians, in favor of Rivera; the revolutionaries of Rio Grande, who had obtained shelter and armament in the Eastern territory; and the European powers – since Rivera received both financial and military support from Great Britain and France.

The farroupilha revolt ended in 1845, after an agreement negotiated between the Imperial government and the rebels; fighting continued, however, in Uruguay. Rivera, besieged in Montevideo by the blancos, lost English and French support, including financial, which made it impossible for him to sustain his position. Then, the Brazilian foreign minister, Soares de Souza, implemented a policy to support Rivera and isolate Rosas, by means of loans made to the latter by the bank of the Baron of Mauá.

In 1850 diplomatic relations between the governments of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires were broken and, in 1851, Justo José Urquiza proposed an alliance with the Empire, with the goal of defeating Oribe and his allies, as well as bringing peace to Uruguay. The treaty was signed on May 29, 1850, by the Brazilian Empire, Uruguay and the Argentine provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes, with a provision stipulating that if there were an opposing reaction by Rosas, he would be considered an enemy of the Alliance. Urquiza advanced along the Uruguayan hinterland and obtained Oribe’s surrender, while Rosas declared war on the Empire. Urquiza’s performance at that moment and in the following months aroused suspicions by the Imperial government, since the caudillo from Entre Rios tried to minimize Brazil’s participation in the political and military events.

So that they would not be surprised by a scheme against Imperial interests, immediately after Oribe’s surrender, on October 12, 1851, Brazil named Honório Hermeto Leão, the future Marquis of Paraná, and Antonio Paulino Limpo de Abreu, the future Viscount of Abaeté, to negotiate and sign five treaties with the Uruguayan representative in Rio de Janeiro, Andrés Lamas. They were treaties of alliance; borders, using the uti possidetis principle as a criterion; trade and navigation; the exchange of criminals, deserters and fugitive slaves; and for the rendering financial aid to the Uruguayan government. According to the treaty of alliance, the Empire would provide military aid to Uruguay, when requested, and lend a considerable sum of money to the Uruguayan government – part of the so-called, “diplomacy of patacões” – referring to loans made on behalf of the Brazilian allies in the Plata region, named for a silver coin of the era.

In his “Letters to the Absent Friend” newspaper column, Paranhos supported the performance of the Imperial government in the Plata region and allied himself with those who advocated a Brazilian armed intervention as a solution to the crisis. He classified Rosas as “nefarious,” and an “abominable … beast of the Pampas,” an enemy of progress and civilization (Paranhos, 2008, p. 49, 150, 388, 147). He considered Rosas not only a threat to the interests of the Empire, but also an obstacle to the progress of civilization, which the future Viscount of Rio Branco, consistent with his adherence to the principles of Masonry, was an enthusiastic supporter: “Forward! Forward! That is the motto of the nineteenth century” he said (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 131).

Paranhos was in favor of peace. In the absence of an international legal system that enabled it, however, he also believed that the Latin adage: si vis pacem, para bellum (if you want peace, prepare for war) was not only a military maxim, but also be a guarantee of domestic and foreign security for all civilized nations” (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 224). He was, therefore, a realist even before the theory of realism – outlined in the mid-twentieth century by Hans Morgenthau – became more widely accepted. The future Viscount of Rio Branco believed that peace “must surely be the alpha and the omega of our foreign affairs,” and that it was the necessary condition “of all the well-understood and stable progress.” Peace, however, was not an absolute value, as it was subject to the defense “of dignity and national interests” (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 211).

Paranhos was a monarchist. His writings and declarations in Parliament during the 1850s show him to be certain that Brazil and the world experienced an upsurge in scientific advances and material progress which, in the Brazilian case, he attributed to the political stability of the monarchy. He also believed that civilization would be ensured in Brazil through conciliation between both political parties, and greater attention paid to national interests (idem: 138-139). Accordingly, he advocated a foreign policy in defense of sovereignty against Britain, and interventionist action in the Plata River region that would guarantee borders and defeat Rosas, who he saw as the greatest threat of the time.

The arguments Paranhos used to justify his support for the Imperial government’s foreign policy led to an invitation by Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, who until then had never met him personally, to accompany him as his secretary on a diplomatic mission he was to perform in the Plata River region.

Carneiro Leão, one of the most important politicians of the Conservative Party and, like Paranhos, also a Mason, was chosen by the Imperial government to negotiate a peace agreement with Uruguay, and to deal with the alliance against Rosas after the latter had declared war on Brazil. He left Rio de Janeiro on October 23, 1851 accompanied by Paranhos, and on November 21, the alliance between the Empire, the Uruguayan government and the provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes was signed. A few months later, February 1852, in the battle of Monte Caseros, troops led by General Justo José de Urquiza, among which there was a Brazilian cavalry regiment, defeated the Confederation’s dictator, Rosas, who went into exile in England, where he spent the rest of his life.

By late 1851, elections were held in Uruguay for the country’s legislative body, which would subsequently elect the president of the Republic. The blancos obtained a small majority in the legislature and in March of the following year, they managed to elect one of their own, Senator Juan Francisco Giró, as president. The new president, then, sought to change the content of the treaties signed in 1851, by submitting them for ratification to the legislative power, which he knew was hostile to them. Carneiro Leão, however, had conditioned the signing of the peace treaty – among Brazil, the Confederation and Uruguay – to the declared acceptance and ratification by the Giró government. The Brazilian negotiator said, however, that if ratification occurred, the Imperial government – “encouraged by a desire to see the deal concluded peacefully” – could accept changes to the peace agreement, “to meet the demands of public opinion [in Montevideo] and facilitate compliance with [the treaties of 1851]” (Report of Foreign Affairs, 1852, p. 11) The Uruguayan government then submitted a list of proposed modifications to the treaties of the previous year, all but one of which were rejected by the Brazilian negotiator. The one that was accepted reduced the matter of the Jaguarão River in recognition of the uti possidetis principle.

The opposition of the Uruguayan government to validate the agreements of 1851 was considered a cause for war, and Carneiro Leão made Giró aware of that. As Paranhos, himself, stated, years later, in 1862 (FRANCO, 2005, p. 201):

Since the requirement [of the recognition of the treaties of 1851] made the resolution of the matter more difficult, the Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Argentine Confederation offered the guarantee to replace it, and the Brazilian Plenipotentiary accepted the offer. The Treaty of May 15, 1852 that modified the borders drawn by that of October 12 – from Chuí to Jaguarão – thereby reduced the matter to [the principle of] uti possidetis and recognized in full and in force the treaties of the latter date [.....] (Report of Foreign Affairs, 12).

The signing of the peace treaty on May 18, by representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, marked the beginning of the Empire’s hegemony in the Plata region; a hegemony that remained unchallenged until December 1864, when Paraguay declared war on Brazil. The Platine policy of the Conservatives had opened the waterways of the region to free navigation; removed foreign threats from Rio Grande do Sul; facilitated the maintenance of domestic order; reaffirmed Uruguay’s independence; and led to the recognition of Paraguay as a sovereign State by the Argentine Confederation.

When he accompanied the future Marquis of Paraná in negotiations in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, Paranhos made contact with some of the most important Argentine and Uruguayan figures of the day, consequently getting to know their political motivations. He also deepened his knowledge of the Plata region as he remained in Uruguay as the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Empire, after Carneiro Leão returned to Rio de Janeiro soon after the peace treaty was signed.

The perception that the future Viscount of Rio Branco “owed his career to his own efforts and to no one else,” (BAPTISTA PEREIRA, 1934, p. 75) does not represent the whole truth. Carneiro Leão had recognized Paranhos’ qualities, thereby creating the conditions for him to take over his diplomatic functions, which then catapulted him into a political career in the Conservative Party as he was elected a deputado to the General Assembly from the province of Rio de Janeiro, in 1853 – even as he remained in Montevideo.

In Uruguay, Paranhos was in charge of overseeing the approval of the Treaties of 1851 by the Congress and compliance by Giró’s government. The Uruguayan president sought to integrate into his government both major political parties in his country. One example of this was his appointment of Venâncio Flores, from the Colorado party, as the Minister of War and Navy; but the partisan struggle was only intensified.

In September 1853, a Colorado rebellion against the government took place, supported by private creditors who were threatened by a presidential initiative that had taken control of customs duties away from them. To stop the unrest, the Uruguayan government requested troops from the commanders of British and French naval stations near Montevideo. Invoking the 1851 Treaty of Alliance, which established Brazilian support to Uruguay when requested, Giró asked Paranhos to send Imperial forces. Paranhos, however, rejected the request.

Paranhos considered Giró responsible for the situation because he was surrounded by more exalted blanco politicians, and because he had ignored the advice of moderation given to him by the Brazilian diplomat (FRANCO, 2005, p. 46-48). Remaining evasive, therefore, he rejected the initial request for support from the Uruguayan president.

Giró was unable to end the disturbance, and he obtained asylum in the French Legacy. A triumvirate replaced him in power on September 25, 1853, and only on October 30 – after Giró had already been ousted – did Paranhos inform him that the Imperial government had communicated to him that he could rely on the support of Brazilian naval forces in the port of Montevideo and on land forces that could march from the Brazilian border “for the re-establishment of your constitutional authority.” It was made clear that the Brazilians should be an auxiliary line of the constituted authorities, to maintain order, and not the main force that imposed a government against the will of the nation.

Giró had been out of power for a month, and he did not have an armed force under his authority when he received the Brazilian offer of “auxiliary” support to a nonexistent main force. The offer by the Imperial government fulfilled the function of maintaining appearances and earned from Giró the educated reply that he “was unable to say anything about this topic” (FRANCO, 2005, p. 51-53).

The triumvirate that took over in Uruguay consisted of Fructuoso Rivera, Venancio Flores, and Antonio Lavalleja. The latter died the following month, in October of that year, and Rivera died in January 1854. Thus, to re-establish order and turn the domestic struggle to its advantage, Flores requested the intervention of Brazilian forces. This time, there were no delays or doubts by the Imperial Legation: Flores, who was from the Colorado faction sympathetic to the Empire, received the help he requested at once, in the form of a large Brazilian force of troops.

By December 15, 1853, Paranhos was no longer in Uruguay, as he had returned to Rio de Janeiro, to take over the naval ministry in the “Conciliation Cabinet” of the Marquis of Paraná. In June 1855, the foreign minister, Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu, the Viscount of Abaeté, left the cabinet, to go on a mission to the Plata region, and Paranhos replaced him, thus beginning a sixteen year span in which he was – off and on – Brazil’s top diplomat four times: June 1855 to May 1857; December 1858 to August 1859; then again, for about a month during the year 1861, in the cabinet of the Duque de Caxias; and finally, nearly decade later, during the critical period from 1868 to 1871.

While at both the Ministry of Navy and Itamaraty, Paranhos carried out modernizing measures. In the former, their purpose was to improve human resources, mainly of the sailors and the Imperial seamen, predecessors of the marines. In the latter, in 1859, the reforms –which were put into effect by Decree 2358, of February 19, 1859 – increased from 25 to 34 the staff allotted to the State Secretariat, while also updating wages, which had not been readjusted since 1842, even though prices had “doubled or tripled.” The structure of the ministry was increased from four to five sections and the function of Ministry Consultant was created – first occupied by José Antonio Pimenta Bueno, the Viscount of São Vicente, and later, by Paranhos himself (Report of the Foreign Affairs, 1858, p. 2-4, 7).

During his years as a minister, Paranhos gave many speeches in parliament, including in them his thoughts and ideas on foreign policy. Before the general assembly on July 17, 1855, he stated that diplomatic action should not only defend the interests of the country, but also those of its subjects (FRANCO, 2005, p. 35). Before and after his missions in the Plata region, Paranhos’ speeches defended both the State’s interests as well as those of gaucho farmers in Uruguay, with an interest in that country’s cattle for the jerked beef industry of Rio Grande. Later, after the war in Paraguay, he defended the interests of Brazilians who had suffered material damages as a result of Paraguayan invasions of Mato Grosso and Rio Grande do Sul; accordingly, he sought indemnity from the Paraguayan government.

Before the same general assembly, in the session of August 6, 1855, when Paranhos justified his performance as Minister Plenipotentiary in Uruguay, he also defended the need for “strong and energetic” governments. He did, however, say that force was not only about the use of material resources, as he believed that “the authority that is able to use more lenient means, rather than the extreme resource of force, often gives proof of courage and strength” (FRANCO, 2005, p. 75). When strong governments are recognized by other parties in the international sphere, they can give up the use of force in favor of negotiation and persuasion, and still achieve their ends. This position was based on his diplomatic experience in the Plata region, both by accompanying Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão’s negotiating practice, which was supported by the military and financial power of the Empire in the negotiations in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and by watching Giró’s government adopt intransigent positions in relation to the Empire as well as with the domestic opposition in Uruguay. Paranhos successfully used this negotiation strategy when he went on a mission to the Plata region in 1857/1858.

The government of Carlos Antonio López, in Paraguay, had created obstacles to the free navigation of the Plata River by Brazilian ships, even though this had been ensured by a treaty signed in Rio de Janeiro, in April 1856, by representatives of both countries. Before he arrived in Paraguay, Paranhos stopped in Paraná, capital of the Argentina Confederation, where he signed treaties for the extradition of criminals, deserters and fugitive slaves, as well as one that regulated navigation and trade on rivers belonging to both countries. On the same occasion, Urquiza received from Brazil a new loan of 300,000 patacões and, on December 14, a reserved protocol was signed. Throughout all of this, the Confederation, along with Uruguay, claimed the opening of the Paraguay River to free navigation, with the demand coinciding with Paranhos’ presence in Asuncion.

A military alliance had never been established against Carlos Antonio López because Paranhos rejected the Argentine claim regarding the definition of the border with Paraguay. The claim was for the possession of the Chaco region as a whole, on the right bank of the Paraguay River until 22 degrees south latitude, while the Brazilian diplomat accepted such ownership only to the Bermejo River (BANDEIRA, 1985, p. 190).

The reserved protocol created the possibility of cooperation between the Confederation and the Empire. In the event that a war broke out against Paraguay, the Argentine government would provide 6,000 troops, while Brazil would add 8,000, plus naval forces, to impose a river blockade of the enemy and attack the Paraguayan position. The allied Commander-in-Chief would be General Urquiza. Even if it did not participate in the conflict against Paraguay, the government of Paraná would allow Imperial forces to cross the territory of Corrientes. The Empire, in turn, would commit to prevent, with its navy, a possible attack on the Confederation carried out by Buenos Aires, which had refused, in 1852, to join it, and had become an autonomous state (BANDEIRA, 1985, p. 198-199). Paranhos also signed a border treaty, based on the uti possidetis principle, although it did not come into effect because the Argentine Congress did not ratify it. The border proposed in 1857 was that which was eventually defined between Brazil and Argentina in 1895, as a result of an arbitration verdict provided by the president of the United States, Grover Cleveland.

Paranhos was aware of the resistance from some neighboring countries, to accept the uti possidetis principle as the basis upon which to set their borders with Brazil. They believed that the principle was “a subtle invention” by the Imperial government, to increase its territory. In reality, however, it is a principle “enshrined in the law of nations and is the territorial basis of almost all nations.” He further stated that the Empire did not need new territory, on the contrary: “we actually need productive people to live there.” Therefore, he said, the Imperial government’s goal was not to extend the border “beyond that which we have the right to originally due to our holdings and tenure” (FRANCO, 2005,p. 128).

Paranhos’ thought reflected the belief of the generation that consolidated Brazil, both territorially and institutionally. The country did not need more territory; it had to approve of that which it received at independence. It had to populate the territory, and – to use a term dear to the future Viscount of Rio Branco – “civilize it.” This thought guided Paranhos in his negotiations of borders with the Argentine Confederation and, in 1856, with Paraguay. In that case, by virtue of not reaching an agreement designating which country had sovereignty over the territory between the Apa and Branco rivers, a six-year moratorium on the subject was established, during which time the status quo would be maintained. The governments of both countries vowed not to install any of its citizens in the disputed area.

Paranhos’ stance on this issue, and in the negotiations of 1858 in Asuncion, showed that his thought was more conciliatory and subtle than when he was writing his “Letters to the Absent Friend” newspaper column. He considered the use of force by the Empire in the Plata region in a discrete manner, seeing it as a tool to assist diplomatic negotiations; to be used with caution, even with speech. This was not a radical change of stance, since the possibility to use force still existed; rather it resulted from the adaptation of his thinking to the new regional context. The difference was that now, there was no direct potential threat to Brazil, as there had been in the Rosas case. Furthermore, in the mid-1850s, Paranhos had acquired greater political maturity, after the diplomatic experience he had had in the Plata region. In addition, when he was the foreign minister, he had been in charge of making decisions and coping with their consequences. Whereas when he was a journalist, he had analyzed decisions, but was not then responsible for their results.

When he arrived in Paraguay in 1858, Paranhos observed “that all the provisions of the government were pointing towards war.” When he passed in front of the Humaitá fortress that controlled navigation on the river, for example, there was a large military exercise made with the clear purpose of impressing him. In Asuncion, shortly after his arrival, there were live round exercises at the city’s military garrison – another way to show him that Paraguay was not defenseless. He was, however, not intimidated, and he maintained “with firmness and dignity,” a defense of the Empire’s rights (FRANCO, 2005, p. 222). The Imperial government’s determination to ensure free navigation on the Paraguay and Paraná rivers – including through the use of force – led the prudent and pragmatic Paraguayan leader, Carlos Antonio López, who had ruled his country for over a decade at that point, to cede. On February 12, 1876, Paranhos and the Paraguayan government signed a covenant on “the real intelligence and practice” of the 1856 treaty that, in practice, ensured navigation on the rivers.

There was, on the part of the Empire, a linkage between the search for a diplomatic solution – its priority – and a recourse to the use of force. The Imperial government was prepared to resort to the latter if Carlos Antonio López refused to observe the 1856 treaty as far as free navigation was concerned (FRANCO, 2005, p. 225). Furthermore, Paranhos’ strategy included isolating Paraguay on the matter, which was also in the interest of Argentina and Uruguay. The strategy relied on the support of the government of Uruguay, which depended on Brazil to have free navigation of the Jaguarão River and the Lagoa Mirim. It also required the cooperation of the Argentine Confederation, in the case of an eventual conflict between the Empire and Paraguay.

Paranhos obtained authorization for Brazilian forces to use Argentine territory as a base, as well as the possibility of military support from the Confederation. This shielded his position – both diplomatically and militarily – allowing him to arrive confidentially in Asuncion and negotiate out of strength with a psychological advantage.

Four years later, in 1862, during a session of the General Assembly, Representative Tavares Bastos questioned Paranhos about the military preparations that accompanied his mission to Paraguay, including the decision to send gunboats to the Plata region, and the purchase of 20,000 tons of coal to be used as fuel for the boilers of those warships. Paranhos replied that the treaty of February 1858 “was not dictated by the cannon; it [was] the result of much study and long negotiations.” He confirmed that he did not reject the use of force in Brazilian foreign policy but that he favored negotiation: “force is an auxiliary means, which does not dispense effort and intelligence to reach an amicable solution” (FRANCO, 2005, 225-226).

Diplomatic negotiation and military force, therefore, came together in the Plata region, where the Empire had become hegemonic. Even when it did not have the advantage, such as with the attempts of Great Britain, France and the United States to use the Amazon, the Imperial government did not retreat: it kept the Amazon closed to free navigation of boats from non-riparian countries, such as the United States, and it opposed British and French attempts to obtain territorial expansion into the Amazon river basin from the Guianas (DORATIOTO, 2003).

In the debate with Tavares Bastos, Paranhos clarified that his 1857 mission to the Plata region was motivated by the “vital” interest of the Empire to obtain from Paraguay the guarantee of free navigation: “that was the urgent objective, the causus belli.”

In that debate, Paranhos also said that the definition of borders was postponed for six years by the treaty of 1856, but that this problem had never been urgent to the Imperial government. He was adamant as he said that it “should not be, I repeat, it should not be such that you are at the point of wanting to resolve [the matter] by means of a war.” Paranhos ended his reasoning by arguing that Paraguay “cannot” provoke a war against the Empire, because “it is not in their interest to do so; one cannot disregard the inequality of resources between one country and the other” (FRANCO, 2005, p. 230, 233). He was, however, wrong on that point, as war began two years later, in 1864; although he was correct in that its immediate trigger was not the matter of borders.

The Paraguayan War began and was fought largely during administrations of Liberal cabinets (1862-1868). The conflict resulted from Platine political battles against a backdrop of the construction and definition of nation states in the region. It took Liberal diplomacy by surprise. The interests of the government of the Republic of Argentina, founded in 1862, presided over by Bartolomé Mitre; of Francisco Solano López, the ruler of Paraguay, 1862 to 1870 (the son of Carlos Antonio López); of the Argentine federales, whose main leader was Justo José Urquiza; and of ranchers from Rio Grande, all intersected in the Plata region, culminating in the Uruguayan civil war that was triggered by general Flores against the constitutional blanco government in Montevideo. Mitre and the Brazilian Imperial government – driven by a misguided assessment of the situation and pressured by gaucho farmers – supported Flores; while the Uruguayan government, led by the blanco, Atanasio Aguirre (preceded by Bernardo Berro), had the sympathies of Solano López and Urquiza. In October 1864, the Empire intervened militarily against Uruguay, reportedly in retaliation for the refusal of the Berro government to punish Uruguayan officials who had committed acts of violence against Brazilians in that republic. The intervention was preceded by an ultimatum to which the Paraguayan government reacted in an official note to the Brazilian delegation in Asuncion, stating that such an intervention would be considered contrary to Paraguayan interests. Francisco Solano López declared war on the Empire in November of that year, and the following month Paraguayan troops invaded Mato Grosso.

The war took the Imperial government by surprise. From Rio de Janeiro’s point of view, there was no reason for Paraguay to feel threatened by events in Uruguay. In fact, the Liberal cabinets of Zacarias de Góes e Vasconcellos (January 15, 1864 to August 30, 1864) and Councillor Francisco Furtado (August 30, 1864 to May 12, 1865) had many doubts concerning what was happening in Uruguay. In November 1864, the gravity of the situation prompted Furtado, the president of the Liberal Council of Ministers, to send Paranhos on another mission to the Plata region. Months later, Paranhos explained in the Senate that he had accepted the invitation because he believed “that foreign policy should not be subject to the vicissitudes of domestic politics; it must have traditional and fixed principles that are shared by all parties” (FRANCO, 2005, p. 306).

Because the Empire did not have enough military force to attack the city of Montevideo by itself, Paranhos left Rio with instructions to negotiate with President Mitre a joint Brazilian-Argentine intervention in Uruguay in support of Flores. His instructions resulted from common interests between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, whose relations in 1864 had reached unprecedented levels of cordiality in the history of bilateral relations. Mitre, however, could not undertake such action, as that would have caused an internal reaction from the opposition in his country and even from divergent sectors of liberalism. Meanwhile, Uruguayan President Aguirre’s term ended, and he was succeeded by another blanco, Tomás Villalba. The new president was pressured to negotiate peace, by merchants who would have suffered losses from a blockade of the Port of Montevideo declared by the Imperial navy.

Negotiations were opened on February 2, 1865, and a peace agreement was achieved, articulated by Paranhos and signed by him, by Manuel Herrera y Obes, a representative of Villalba, and by Venancio Flores, for Uruguay. As a result of this agreement, Flores – an ally of the Brazilian Empire became – president of Uruguay. His rise was a diplomatic success for Paranhos. Even more significant was the fact that the surrender of Montevideo had been obtained without any combat, as the seizure of the city would have cost thousands of lives. Despite this success, however, Paranhos lost his position, as he was dismissed by the Imperial government. The supposed justification was that he had been unable to punish Uruguayan officials who had attacked Brazilians and dragged a Brazilian flag through the streets of Montevideo. In reality, his dismissal was due to Brazilian domestic policy, as Furtado’s cabinet used foreign policy to strengthen itself against criticism for clashes between moderate and progressive factions of the party, and for not having responded to a financial crisis in Rio de Janeiro. Thus, “the cabinet tried to rely on belligerent public opinion with a measure of impact to redeem its foreign policy and to recompose its internal support base,” dismissing Paranhos under the guise that the agreement of February 2 had failed (BARRIO, 2010, p. 141).

The dismissal, however, was perceived as an act of injustice that left Paranhos even stronger, and the Furtado cabinet was overthrown shortly thereafter. Paranhos reported on his mission and defended himself before a session of the Senate, which Francisco Furtado attended. In a speech that lasted eight hours, he ended with the following:

We did not enter Montevideo stepping over corpses and ruins; the doors of that capital were wide open to us, covered with flowers. We were greeted by general applause, with the sympathies of all of the peaceful population of Montevideo.

(...)

The noble former ministers may say whatever they want about the diplomatic act of February 20, but they will not be able to take from me this grateful belief: that, because of my decision, I saved the lives of two thousand of my fellow countrymen; I avoided an important capital to be ruined; and I attracted the general sympathies of the Plata region to my country (FRANCO, 2005, p. 398, 405).

The Paraguayan attack on Corrientes, in April 1865, led to the signing of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance by the Empire, Argentina, and Uruguay. The document, among other things, determined the future borders of Paraguay with Argentina and Brazil. It also determined that the entire Chaco, up to Baía Negra on the border with Mato Grosso, would be Argentine, as well as the area of the Missions, located between the left bank of the Paraná River and Iguaçu River. The Empire’s border with Paraguay was bound by the line of the Igurei River, which the Imperial diplomacy had not claimed, up to the Serra do Maracajú; as well as by the Apa and Paraguay rivers. The allied countries undertook not to suspend the war except in mutual agreement and only after the withdrawal of Solano López from power. The treaty clearly forbade any separate peace initiative by any one of the allied countries.

The secret text of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was submitted to the Council of State by the Imperial government in 1867. Its content was heavily criticized by members of the Conservative Party, particularly with regard to the transfer of the Chaco to Argentina. This, according to them, was contrary “to the traditional policy” of Brazil in relation to Paraguay, which had been designed to maintain Paraguayan independence and sovereignty over the territory, and was necessary to prevent direct contact between Mato Grosso and Argentina.

The solution presented by the Conservatives was that the border between Argentina and Paraguay should be the Pilcomaio River. For Paranhos, the Argentine claim regarding the Chaco region was “outrageous,” but he did not think it prudent to make amendments to the treaty while the war was ongoing (Report of the Full State Council, 1867-1868, p. 21, 23).

At the beginning of the war, the liberal nuclei that led the Brazilian and Argentine governments established a climate of mutual trust. The long-running conflict, however, generated mistrust between military and political leaders from the two countries, especially concerning the intentions each had for Paraguay after the war ended.

In 1868, power in Brazil returned to the Conservative Party and, in Argentina, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento was elected president; both were critical of the Alliance and wanted to end it as soon as possible. The Conservatives feared that Argentina planned to annex Paraguay – which had been destroyed and was unable to resist – while Sarmiento thought the Empire wanted to establish a protectorate over the defeated country (Paranhos to Cotegipe, Buenos Aires, 05/22/1869. Archive of the Viscount of Rio Branco, Itamaraty Archive, 272-3-12).

With the return of the Conservatives to power, Paranhos became the foreign minister and, in February 1869, he left on a mission of more than a year’s duration, again going to the Plata region. His goal was to establish a provisional government in Asuncion, under Brazilian military occupation, in order to ensure the continuity of Paraguay as a sovereign State. It was with great difficulty that Paranhos convinced Sarmiento to accept this proposal. Ultimately, however a provisional government was installed – albeit precariously – in August 1869. Only the allied countries recognized the government, however, because Solano López remained fighting in Paraguayan territory, and European countries, as well as the United States, recognized him, as the head of state.

Francisco Solano López was killed on May 1, 1870, and the war ended. The allied representatives signed a protocol with the Paraguayan provisional government, which formalized peace. In the protocol, the provisional authorities accepted “en su fondo” the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. It was also established that definitive peace treaties would be signed by a future Paraguayan constitutional government. Paranhos used an earlier statement of the Argentine foreign minister, Mariano Varela, according to which “victory does not provide territorial rights” over the defeated, to include a partial acceptance of the alliance treaty by Paraguay in the protocol (Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1872, v. I, p. 122). This enabled the Paraguayan authorities to question their surrender of the Chaco region to Argentina. The future Viscount of Rio Branco then used all his shrewdness – and the contradictions of the Sarmiento government – to remove from that surrender the determinative, ultimate, and undisputable character that was present in the treaty.

Paranhos was convinced that Argentina planned to occupy the Chaco and use it as a base from which to expand its influence over the rest of Paraguay (Paranhos to Cotegipe, Asuncion, 04/23/1870. Archive of the Baron of Cotegipe, Can 920, Folder 133). He was further convinced that Argentine rulers desired a chaotic political climate in the Guarani country “so that they could say that Paraguay, as a nation, no longer existed” (Paranhos to Cotegipe, Asuncion, 03/13/1870. Archive of the Baron of Cotegipe, Can 920, Folder 133). Such a situation would have made it easier for them to annex Paraguay; and thereby Argentina would not only expand its territory, but also add a population that would rapidly multiply and whose men would eventually make a “great infantry.”

“Surrendering” Paraguay to Argentina, Paranhos said, would mean the Empire would have as a neighbor “a power more dangerous than that of Lopez” (Paranhos to Cotegipe, Asuncion, 04/13/1870. Archive of the Baron of Cotegipe, Can 920, Folder 133). He and other statesmen and opinion makers of his time believed that a war between the Empire and Argentina was very likely, with the latter playing the role of aggressor.

A year and a half after leaving Rio de Janeiro, in August 1870, Paranhos returned to that capital. He did so only after the election of a Paraguayan constituent assembly and after directing the presidential election to the victory of the candidate who was aligned with the Empire. Paranhos remained in Rio de Janeiro for a mere three months; it was then when he received the title of Viscount of Rio Branco from the emperor, Pedro II. He then returned to the Plata region, to negotiate with the governments of Argentina and Uruguay the terms of the definitive peace treaty, to be submitted to the Paraguayan constitutional government. As far as Paraguay was concerned, the fulfillment of the goals set by the Imperial government depended on the contents of that treaty.

The allied representatives met in Buenos Aires and Carlos Tejedor, the new foreign minister of Argentina, defended the terms of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. They rejected a proposal made by Rio Branco that the allies ensure Paraguayan independence forever. The refusal reinforced the Brazilian diplomat’s suspicions that Argentina planned to annex Paraguay at some point in the future (Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1872, Annex 1, p. 185-187).

Rio Branco, however, was called back to Rio de Janeiro, as he had been appointed by Pedro II, to preside over the Council of Ministers. His subsequent tenure in that position was the longest in the history of the Second Empire (1871-1875). João Maurício Wanderley, the Baron of Cotegipe, was sent to the Plata region in his stead, and he continued the informal alliance between one winner of the war, the Brazilian Empire, and the loser, Paraguay, against the other major winner, Argentina.

In 1872, Cotegipe signed a separate peace treaty with Paraguay, in Asuncion, making the end of the Triple Alliance explicit; this caused a huge backlash in Buenos Aires. The press of both countries even talked about war between the Empire and Argentina. The Rio Branco cabinet, however, did not flinch, as it ratified the peace treaty and maintained support for Paraguayan sovereignty over the Chaco. Only in 1876 – one year after the end of the Rio Branco cabinet – did the peace treaty between Argentina and Paraguay get signed. By that agreement, the possession of the Chaco Boreal was to be decided by arbitration of the president of the United States; who eventually decided that it belonged to Paraguay.

The Viscount of Rio Branco was in charge of carrying out the policy in the Plata region that had been designed in the 1840s: to ensure free navigation on Platine rivers; to contain the influence of Buenos Aires and defend the independence of Paraguay and Uruguay; and to define the borders of the Empire according to the uti possidetis principle. In this work, Paranhos was guided by his belief in the avoidance of radical ideas and actions; in defense of the monarchical state and its territorial integrity (both in the Plata and in the Amazon region); and in the use of diplomatic action as an instrument of progress. His performance in the Plata region – as well as his experiences as a minister plenipotentiary, as the foreign minister, as a special envoy, and as president of the Council of Ministers – were all intertwined with the building of the monarchical state’s hegemony in the region. He considered the monarchy an instrument of progress, both because it corresponded to Brazil’s historical reality, and because it ensured political stability. He also believed in the movement of goods, which required free navigation, as well as ideas that were propitious to progress. In this manner, in 1866, he was in favor of the opening of the Amazon River to navigation (Reports of the State Council, 1865 to 1877: 79-80).

The Viscount of Rio Branco was pragmatic. He advocated that international problems be resolved through diplomatic negotiation, dialogue, and the use of legal and historical arguments, albeit recognizing that military force was an auxiliary element necessary for the Empire to defend its rights. He was also optimistic concerning the future, stating, in 1870, that:

Christianity and the modern civilization that is based on it gradually establish a fraternity of thoughts and interests among peoples, which tends to put an end to the antagonism of races, the selfishness of retrograde policies or illegitimate ambitions. [And], from the point of view of religion and philosophy, all people are headed to the same destination, and it can be said, make up a single family, that is, the large family called humanity (FRANCO, 2005, p. 468).

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Joaquim Tomás do Amaral (1818-1907)

Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio, was born into a carioca (native of Rio de Janeiro) family of civil servants on August 16, 1818. His father, Antônio José do Amaral, had been instrumental in the creation of the Royal Military Academy, in 1810, in Rio de Janeiro, when the Portuguese royal family lived in Brazil. Joaquim Tomás’ brother, José Maria do Amaral, was a diplomat, as well as a journalist and poet. At age 22, Joaquim Tomás abandoned medical studies, to pursue a career in government service. In that capacity, he worked in a number of diplomatic missions abroad, including Sierra Leone, France, Great Britain and Belgium. An additional four years he spent in the Plata region was a real education in Brazilian diplomacy for him due to political fermentation in the area. Throughout his career, his accumulated experience, thoughts and knowledge were directed towards overcoming foreign relation challenges, including such diverse matters as dealing with the arrogance of the British diplomatic representative in Rio de Janeiro, William Christie; instability in the Plata region; the Paraguayan War; and establishing the country’s borders – all issues on which Brazil’s peace and tranquility depended.

Amaral enjoyed great prestige within the political and diplomatic environment. He was awarded titles by both Brazil – including being named the first Viscount of Cabo Frio – and foreign nations, receiving honors from the governments of Belgium, Prussia, Spain, Italy, and China. The fact that his diplomatic career spanned the years of the Brazilian Empire and the First Republic attests to his competence, as recognized by such figures as Quintino Bocaiúva, the Republic’s first foreign minister, and Floriano Peixoto, Brazil’s second president.

Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio, died in his native Rio de Janeiro on January 17, 1907, at age 88, after having worked more than six decades in service to his country, during four of which he was the director-general of Brazil’s foreign office.

Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio: the development of Brazilian administrative thought

Amado Luiz Cervo

Introduction

Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio, was the director-general of the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs (which later became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) for over forty years: from 1865 until just before he died in 1907. He, consequently, continued to exercise this function despite the country’s change of political regimes – from monarchy to republic – in 1889. One of the first questions a scholar may, therefore, ask is: How could the services of a senior government official have been requested by both an emperor, Pedro II, and those who overthrew him – the generals, Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca and Floriano Peixoto – plus four civilian presidents?

Specialized literature has produced controversial images of the Viscount. He has, for example, been called a “living archive,” in reference to his vast knowledge of Brazilian and foreign diplomatic documentation, which he believed to be essential to the instruction of informed decisions on matters dealing with the foreign relations of his country. He has also, however, been called an introverted “bureaucrat,” with a short-sighted view of foreign policy – which presumably obstructed innovation in that field.

Our working hypothesis is that the Viscount of Cabo Frio supersedes these and other images that history has given him. He was a complex individual, and ultimately, an example of great devotion and effort in the exercise of public service. His main contribution to the evolution of Brazilian diplomatic thought was the development of the administrative workings of the nation’s foreign office; something we here call, his “administrative thought.”

Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, Brazil’s foreign minister, 1979 to 1985, has said: to avoid that “everything end in a small cup of coffee,” diplomatic negotiation must weigh the potential liabilities with the final results. While Joaquim Tomás do Amaral was the director-general of Brazil’s foreign ministry, his concern with diplomatic efficiency focused the work of that agency on the end results. Other renowned Brazilian diplomats of the Empire, predecessors of Cabo Frio, had established the foundation of the agency’s administrative procedures, but it was Amaral who had the merit to give those procedures permanent value; indeed, making them useful to any area of government administration.

In this chapter, we will first analyze the interpretations of the specialized literature concerning the thought and actions of Cabo Frio; next we will delve more deeply into the genesis and profile of his “administrative thought”; and finally, we will point out some of the benefits and risks of his way of thinking – and working – in the diplomatic arena. Studies concerned with Brazil’s foreign relations during the passage from the nineteenth to the twentieth century will be used to illuminate the context of Cabo Frio’s thought and to analyze its applicability. We will also analyze the diplomat’s own writings, to identify the essence of his thought. And to conclude, we will join together both categories of sources in order to assess the benefits and the limits of his style of administrative thought, as it is applied to the conduct of Brazil’s foreign affairs.

Assessments of Cabo Frio’s performance and thought

With the exception of a short biographical essay published in 1903, by José Antônio d’Espinheiro, monographic studies of Cabo Frio are almost nonexistent. There are, however, insightful references of his performance as a diplomat inserted into the writings of such historians and political scientists as Sérgio Correa da Costa, Luís Viana Filho, Álvaro Lins, Pandiá Calógeras, Nícia Vilela Luz, Zairo Borges Cheibub, and Clodoaldo Bueno, among others. Most of these studies concentrate on the mature Cabo Frio, during the early years of the Brazilian Republic.

Sérgio Correa da Costa, for example, identified traces of Cabo Frio’s thought based on empirical evidence he found in the huge amount of diplomatic documentation available to scholars. According to this diplomat and historian, one trait Cabo Frio brought to the Republic was an aversion to treaties, a trait that had been cultivated by his experiences in imperial diplomacy. One such example came out of his perceptions of the infamous independence-recognition treaties – which, along with Amaral, most Brazilian statesmen of the nineteenth century said restricted the decision-making autonomy of the government and hindered national development. Such thinking was reinforced after the fiasco of a border treaty with Argentina, signed by the Brazilian republic’s first foreign minister, Quintino Bocaiúva. Similarly, a trade treaty with the United States hastily signed by the young republic, in 1891, also bolstered his beliefs on such matters.

Another concrete example of an aversion to treaties can be gleaned from a proposal made by Portugal during the time of the Count of Paço d’Arcos, the first Portuguese diplomat to the Brazilian republic, 1891-1893. Portugal had also sent a special envoy, Matoso dos Santos, to Rio de Janeiro, with a mission to negotiate a trade treaty, as Brazil had already signed the aforementioned one with the United States. Justo Leite Chermont, the second foreign minister of the Brazilian Republic, welcomed Matoso dos Santos and analyzed the proposal.

Leite Chermont was in favor of negotiation, but Cabo Frio – who had been kept on as the director-general – was suspicious of the agreement, and believed it more appropriate for Brazil to block it. This disagreement took place in the midst of instability in the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs – as indeed, from the Proclamation of the Republic, in 1889, to the beginning of the administration of the Baron of Rio Branco, in 1902, Brazil had no fewer than eleven foreign ministers. The ministers moved in and out so quickly, they often did not impose their will on the agency – nor on its director-general, Cabo Frio, who remained firm, feared and conservative. In many ways, he was the institution.

Correspondence of the Count of Paço d’Arcos reveals Cabo Frio as an individual with erudite qualities, yet also as someone who was very suspicious of other nations. He believed that many sought to deceive and exploit Brazil, and he included Portugal in this lot of deceivers, because in his mind that country still conceived of Brazil as its colony. Thus, Paço d’Arcos’ correspondence shows that Amaral was against the trade treaty, as indeed, he was against almost all treaties, since Cabo Frio simply was suspicious of and distrusted all nations.

Accordingly, as the director-general of the foreign office, Cabo Frio blocked Leite Chermont’s initiatives through the use of bureaucratic tricks, and even sarcasm, which he employed during negotiations on the treaty. Although the treaty was signed, on January 14, 1892, under foreign minister Fernando Lobo Leite Pereira, due to the opposition of President Floriano Peixoto – or perhaps that of Cabo Frio, himself – the Brazilian parliament did not ratify it. In fact, they neither received nor examined the treaty. The matter was at a standstill when a second naval revolt broke out, in 1893, and due to the hostile environment, the Brazilian president did not believe his country should be bound by any treaty with any nation at that time. Cabo Frio and Floriano (the name by which Brazil’s second president is universally known), thus, shared an aversion to treaties. This particular treaty eventually lost validity as the ratification period expired. Cabo Frio reported this to the Portuguese government with irony – without any formal refusal – and the treaty was dead (COSTA, 1979, p. 213-218).

Cabo Frio triumphed in the early Republic partly because of his conservatism, and partly due to these and other issues related to problems with treaties. For example, a border treaty with Argentina concerning “the Missions” region – that had been negotiated under Brazil’s first president, Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca and signed on January 25, 1890, just over two months after the Republic had been declared – was badly received by a majority of Brazilian political figures of the time. In addition, the trade treaty with the United States, signed in 1891, sparked complaints, as France and Germany, along with Chile, were frustrated when proposals for trade treaties negotiated by their diplomats in Rio de Janeiro failed.

Thus, in the early years of the Republic, some traditions of Imperial diplomacy – including an aversion to treaties, a proud negotiating style, and an elegant manner of making deals – were maintained. Referring to a note of May 13, 1894, by which the Brazilian government broke diplomatic relations with Portugal due to its stance on the naval revolt that had been put down in March of that year, the diplomat and historian Sérgio Correa da Costa said:

The note represents the best traditions of Imperial diplomacy built during the Republic and consolidated under the leadership and zeal of the Viscount of Cabo Frio. In short, it reflects the firm and patient personality of Marshal Floriano [Peixoto], as well as the archive of experience and knowledge of the old server of our diplomacy, [Joaquim Tomás do Amaral] (p. 71).

Correa da Costa, therefore, offers a clear interpretation of Cabo Frio’s role as the real driver of diplomacy, which – with the exception of a few cases – was greater than that of the pageant of foreign ministers during the early years of the Republic.

Most biographers of the Baron of Rio Branco tend to provide an unflattering profile of Cabo Frio, including the fact that the patron of Brazilian diplomacy [Rio Branco] did not often appreciate him. According to Luís Viana Filho, for example, Rio Branco only tolerated Amaral due to his position as director-general of the foreign office. Alvaro Lins and Pandiá Calógeras agree with Viana Filho in that respect.

For his part, Lins derided Cabo Frio, considering him a “dominating and dry figure” with “absence of imagination and creativity.” He added that beginning in 1865, the Viscount ruled the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs as a bureaucrat, not even acknowledging the transition from monarchy to republic:

[Cabo Frio] represented the past and tradition, but a stagnant past, and a stagnant tradition. Since the beginning of the Republic, he had been the de facto minister, except for the periods of Quintino Bocaiúva and Carlos de Carvalho. Because of his knowledge of foreign policy, and his continuity – ultimately for life – in the post of director-general, he created a situation of dominance within Itamaraty. He was the indispensable employee, the schoolmaster on whom the ministers relied, and to whom they eventually, almost completely, handed over the affairs of the ministry (LINS, 1996, p. 309).

João Pandiá Calógeras, a Brazilian historian and politician, was equally harsh on Cabo Frio. He accused him of ignoring any minister with ideas for new foreign policies, as he said the long-tenured director-general believed such ideas were nonsense. Although Cabo Frio also placed a value on competence, Pandiá says, he believed that tradition was most important; and he, therefore, used tradition as an almost exclusive source on which to make decisions and draft the opinions and procedures to be followed in the foreign office.

For his part, however, during his own decade-long tenure as the foreign minister (1902-1912), the Baron of Rio Branco wrote that Cabo Frio should stay in office until he died. Although they were not friends, the Baron, who was 26 years the Viscount’s junior, feared antagonizing Amaral.

Rio Branco followed his own advice, as he kept the older diplomat in office until the year Cabo Frio died, 1807. He did, however, end the director-general’s “functional dictatorship,” by not giving him any of the powers of a minister, thereby breaking his role of “minister-without-a-ministry.” In contrast, previous foreign ministers – many with ephemeral mandates and often no knowledge of diplomatic art – had allowed Amaral to be the de facto minister. In any event, throughout Cabo Frio’s four decades as the ministry’s director-general, his superiors often showered him with kindness, praises and honors – and gave him salary increases.

Alvaro Lins concludes his assessment of the relationship between Rio Branco and Cabo Frio during the former’s long tenure as foreign minister:

Both spirits remained at Itamaraty: that of Rio Branco and that of Cabo Frio, that of the minister and that of the director-general. Rio Branco, with the projection of his domineering personality, had the style of a great diplomatic policy maker and the stature of a statesman; while Cabo Frio was the figure of an efficient bureaucrat, with both the rank and the regularity of character of an admirable employee (LINS, 1996, p. 312).

Indeed, when he accepted the position of foreign minister, in 1902, Rio Branco outlined modernizing reforms for Itamaraty, but he took care not to let Cabo Frio know that the proposals would be sent to the president. (He felt Cabo Frio would eventually find the appropriate way to accept the necessary reforms.) In this way, Rio Branco avoided repeating the mistake made by one of his predecessors, Inocêncio Serzedello Correa – who had been foreign minister for less than a year, in 1892. Then, Cabo Frio had found out about Serzedello Correa’s proposals, and he boycotted them – with both ideological coherence and practical success.

Did the image that both Lins and Calógeras portrayed of the Viscount of Cabo Frio – of a dominant, introspective man, who lacked innovative thinking, a product of his time – correspond to reality? Most historians today do not believe this to be true; some earlier scholars, however, were less sure.

According to historian, Nícia Vilela Luz, the republican regime in Brazil brought encouragement to industrialists, who in turn, expected progress and support from it. Amaro Cavalcânti and (again) Serzedelo Correa, Brazilian politicians of the era, were confident representatives of that way of thinking. Cabo Frio, himself, isolated as he was in his traditionalist bureaucracy, ignored such criticism. He was also unaware of the opposition of liberals, such as Joaquim Murtinho and Américo Werneck, to industries with exaggerated protectionism, which raised production costs. He acted as if the national formation owed nothing to the maintenance of primary economic structures or to the advancement of industrial modernization.

Among academic studies on Cabo Frio’s performance, Clodoaldo Bueno, a modern analyst of Brazilian international relations during the advent of the Republic, does not think the Viscount stands out in the formulation of the new republic’s foreign policy. He suggests that although the director-general was a man with a worldview, he was stuck in his belief in the traditions of Imperial diplomacy; he was an administrator without creativity, not an innovator.

A dissertation presented in 1984 by Zairo Borges Cheibub goes beyond the usual sporadic and conventional observations in that it places the position of the director-general within the institutionalization of the ministry and the perspective of the evolution of the diplomatic career. According to Cheibub, diplomats during the Empire were no different from other sectors of the administration: they were rarely professionalized and were considered property of the elites. Order was perpetuated in that way, especially considering the existence of a stable and homogeneous elite. The Brazilian state was truly an expression of that order since, unlike its neighbors, it boasted a continuity of policies and thought. At least some of that continuity was due to Cabo Frio.

On the matter of borders, for example, the rationality inherent in diplomatic action derived from the post of the director-general, which superseded even that of the foreign minister. After Cabo Frio became the director-general, in 1865, and remained there until shortly before his death, in 1907 – he had more than sufficient time to imprint his personal mark on the position and on the agency. This mark we will call his administrative thought.

According to Cheibub, Cabo Frio’s importance to the institutionalization of the diplomatic career is perceived in many ways, including: a) the maintenance of the diplomatic tradition; b) an extension of the Imperial tradition into the Republic; c) a stability that overlapped the changes of ministers; and d) the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not change as much as other sectors of the national administration at the advent of the Republic. Cabo Frio “represented the institution regarding the maintenance of rules, customs and traditional behaviors. Power and prestige were not based on the personal element, but rather on its symbols, which were represented by Imperial traditions.” (CHEIBUB, 1984, p. 41).

Cheibub goes on to say that the Baron of Rio Branco both inherited and innovated in the foreign office; he modernized Itamaraty, and raised its prestige. He centralized the management around him, which generated an inevitable dispute with Cabo Frio and with section chiefs. He broke habits of reactionaries, and strengthened the minister’s cabinet to the detriment of the structure of the ministry. According to Cheibub’s severe judgment, Rio Branco weakened the institution and he strengthened the person. For that reason, he argues, only in 1931 was the function of Chief Secretariat-General – that of the current Secretary-General – created. (CHEIBUB, 1984, p. 42).

Cheibub concluded his study by establishing that: a) Itamaraty initially belonged to the elites, and it was only democratized after World War II with the creation of the Rio Branco Institute; b) that such an evolution did not prevent it from adapting its institutional structure to various foreign policy needs – such as: instability in the Plata region; the definition of borders; foreign trade and foreign debt matters; and industrialization – especially when the impulse for that adaptation came from outside the institution; c) the diplomatic corps analyzed foreign policy, a noble and superior purpose in and of itself, and it could create special moments, such as when the nation’s Independent Foreign Policy was developed; and d) it alone defined the country’s foreign policy – not other ministries, universities, federations, or confederations.

To summarize Cheibub’s analysis, we conclude that the administrative strengthening of Itamaraty underwent institutional continuity with Cabo Frio, as it also experienced an elevation in prestige despite a weakening of structure under Rio Branco. In addition, there has been a consolidation of the institutional balance since 1931 – when the current position of Secretary-General was created – and there has been a democratization and professionalization of the ministry since the creation of the Rio Branco Institute after World War II.

The development of administrative thought

The central argument of this chapter is that the development of administrative thought in Brazilian diplomacy was the work of Joaquim Tomás do Amaral; it is his personal legacy. The genesis of that administrative thought takes its strength from three mechanisms: Cabo Frio’s instructions to the Council of State during the monarchy; his opinions written for the various ministers of the foreign office during his lengthy tenure as the director-general; and ultimately, dispatches he sent to the heads of overseas legations – which were sometimes simply signed by those heads and assumed to be their own.

In addition to these three main mechanisms that strengthened his thought on how administrative matters should be conducted at Itamaraty, Cabo Frio honed his mental maturity through an extensive correspondence maintained with great personalities of the time – both Brazilian and foreign – as evidenced by documents concerned with his missions in Brussels, Buenos Aires, London, the Plata region, and Montevideo. These are records of his participation in administrative and international matters.

When he wrote these texts, Cabo Frio used the collection of Itamaraty documents that had been established with zeal and institutional responsibility since the era of Brazilian independence and were enriched with sources that even predated that period. He considered these documents useful to diplomatic management, and he extracted from them facts concerning the country’s insertion into the world, which he then used in his writings. Thus, Cabo Frio’s administrative spirit gave more weight to the historical experience, as opposed to the critical or innovative side.

It should not be supposed, however, that Cabo Frio ignored the level above diplomatic action, the one that tames and guides it: foreign policy. He knew very well that it was foreign policy that provides diplomats with the correct content with which to negotiate; by furnishing the data and information on interests, values and behavioral standards upon which the needs and desires of the nation are based.

When one assesses the means, purposes and risks of a foreign policy decision – taking into account both its domestic and international impacts – the decision maker raises that policy to the highest degree of the strategy level corresponding to its international insertion. It is not realistic to suppose that Cabo Frio was endowed with all the features of a Brazilian foreign relations strategist; he did, however, furnish the facts and data upon which those strategists could make informed decisions.

Since the time he took over the post of director-general, in 1865, Cabo Frio was requested to write routine instructions, granting requests from members of the Council of State. When we examine these instructions, in the Consultas da Seção dos Negócios Estrangeiros, which have been published, we notice that Cabo Frio frequently sent multidimensional instructions – ranging in length from just one page to full volumes – some of which have also been published.

The Council of State, which according to historian, José Honório Rodrigues, was the fifth power in the Imperial govern-ment – along with the emperor, the legislature, the judiciary, and the rather unique Brazilian entity of the moderator – was in charge of all the relevant matters of Brazilian foreign relations in the Empire. At the Emperor’s request, this council of advisors issued instructions on decisions that it endorsed. The work of the writer of those instructions went to the heart of policy decisions. Cabo Frio knew that. In fact, in his writings he took advantage of the political environment that he understood and mastered.

For the purpose of empirical demonstration, let us analyze some aspects of Cabo Frio’s actions, concerned with instructions he wrote on foreign policy matters. Our goal is to grasp his acquisition of administrative thought over time.

In July 1859 – six years before Joaquim Tomás do Amaral was the director-general of the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs – José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the most important statesman to lead the Brazilian Empire’s foreign policy, requested Cabo Frio to write instructions concerning the neutrality of the Island of Martin Garcia, located at the mouth of the Plata River not far from Buenos Aires. The legal status of the island was crucial to the control the estuary, and thus it was a very delicate security and geopolitical issue. While reserving to himself the operational decisions and a calculation of the risks, Paranhos asked Cabo Frio to send instructions to the commanding officer of the naval forces in the Plata region. Cabo Frio’s function, as Paranhos understood it, was to make the commanding officer aware of the facts concerning the island’s historical position as well as the negotiations going on between the regional governments.

A decade later, in 1869, the same Paranhos requested an opinion from Cabo Frio, by then the director-general of the foreign office, concerning a consular convention with Northern Germany and the Brazilian Empire. After he studied the Secretariat’s papers, however, Cabo Frio did not see any link between the facts and the decision. The consular conventions, five in all, beginning with one with France, ruled on the rights of foreign residents. Cabo Frio wrote that they were serious matters, but he excused himself from giving an opinion, leaving that to higher levels of government.

Often, therefore, the director-general sent to the foreign affairs office of the Council of State sets of documents concerning a particular matter under examination, without providing any opinion, only verifying the authenticity of the documents with his usual signature: According to the Baron de Cabo Frio. Sometimes, however, he did offer his opinion in writing.

Again in 1869, for example, based on previous resolutions, which were pertinent or similar – precedents – the director-general considered it just, to charge a duty on goods that entered the country by land from Uruguay, as a similar fee was already being charged on goods that arrived via navigation. Besides, he added with his usual practical sense, it was useful to raise funds, to pay for the wages of the consuls.

Cabo Frio also gave his opinion on such matters as the naturalization of Moroccans who had returned to their country, i.e., should they remain under the tutelage of the Empire or should they now be subject to the Sultan of Morocco? And he expressed himself on requests made by foreign governments for the extradition of alleged criminals. In all such cases, prior to issuing his statements, he consulted the relevant diplomatic correspondence and legal basis of agreements, treaties, and additional terms and arrangements already existing in other legal texts.

Procuring and compiling documents, and later sending them to the Council of State without offering an opinion was the most common task of Cabo Frio’s work as the director-general. Many state documents concerning such issues as border matters, reparation requests, guardianships, the presence of foreign companies in Brazil, and various other items, therefore, crossed over his desk. Although seemingly mundane, this work made him aware of the vast archive of documents present at Itamaraty and of their applicability and usefulness to diplomatic matters.

Cabo Frio did not always refuse to issue a written opinion on a matter debated in the Council; he even seemed to prefer to do so when the matter was relevant to foreign policy decisions. On those occasions, he provided details relevant to the facts of the issues at hand, using the vast amount of documentation that he handled each week, and he invested in the opinion a discernable common sense and political calculation. Such was the case of an opinion he sent concerning reparations resulting from the Paraguayan War. In this situation, Brazil, the victor, had every right to request reparations, as it is common throughout history to do so. On behalf of his country, therefore, Cabo Frio issued an opinion regarding reparations on January 15, 1875. The opinion was full of balance and common sense. It was a real lesson of political and diplomatic art.

The initial reparations requested of the Paraguayan government, a nation that at the time was both ruined and impoverished by Brazilians and foreigners residing in Brazil, were so high that they corresponded to the country’s total annual income. Cabo Frio recognized the anguish of the Paraguayan government, as expressed in official documents, which he had in his hands, and he knew they were unable to pay the huge sum. He, therefore, issued an opinion, which said it was a bad deal to take the loser to ruin, and that it was desirable to reduce the requested sum – which, according to Cabo Frio’s calculations, was as much as 10 million pesos, plus another 4 million pesos in interest.

The solution to the matter would come from a commission in charge of arbitrating the issue. Cabo Frio argued that the considerations of the Paraguayan government and its representative in Rio de Janeiro should be taken into account, along with those of the arbitration judges, whom he said had a sense of justice and fairness. In addition to providing the spirit that guided the decision, Cabo Frio revealed a full knowledge of the case under review, and he pointed to concrete ways of making the political decisions conform to the political spirit that suited them. He said that: a) the agreement should exempt interest payments; b) Paraguay should be allowed to pay in annual installments; c) the debt should be reduced; d) it should be received in insurance premiums; and e) reparations for damage to the public patrimony of Paraguay should be deleted.

Demonstrating the ability to supersede his role as a bureaucrat who only authenticated papers, Cabo Frio offered his advice to the council members through a draft treaty on the Paraguayan war debt based on the terms outlined above. As a result of his suggestions, the Council of State advised the Emperor: to reduce the debt to two million pesos, to reduce the interest charged, and to have the interest payments only begin in 1876.

Another important issue with which Cabo Frio diplomatically dealt provided a solution to a political situation involving the foreign section of the Council of State that had emanated from the Emperor’s announcement of 1882. More specifically, the issue concerned a pending adjustment derived from the Convention of June 2, 1858, which had created a joint commission set up to hear and settle Anglo-Brazilian complaints during the time of slave trafficking. Many of the issues revolved around the repression of that trafficking by the British Navy. The Council of State sought instructions from the director-general of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Cabo Frio, who thereby signed two letters of advice, called Informações, addressed to the Council.

The first Informação was eighteen pages long. In it, Cabo Frio detailed such matters as: the work of the joint commission; notes written by the British representative in Rio de Janeiro, William Christie; interpretations of the respective governments concerning the Convention of 1858; opinions of the Council of State; the amount of requested compensation – challenged and recalculated – as well as changes made by the commission. Cabo Frio, however, revealed that all negotiations had been useless, as no understandings had been reached by February 14, 1880, the date he signed the document. The director-general then made the suggestion that the complaints of both governments be judged separately – and later that same year that is precisely what was done.

Despite being technical, inconclusive regarding the sovereign judgment of the Council of State, and very detailed – reproducing abundant quotes of diplomatic documents on both sides – the content of the Informação had led to a rational solution. Cabo Frio had been charged with writing about “the state of the matter,” and he had used his knowledge and skills to resolve the issue.

The second Informação – this one of nine printed pages – was signed two years later, on February 27, 1882. In it Cabo Frio summarized the “state of the matter” since 1880. He seemed, however, to lose his temper as a result of the interminable discussions of the Council of State, and the inability of both countries’ diplomatic corps, to reach a renewed decision. This impasse caused him to change the tone of his wording, as he became clearly opinionated. Thus, in this second document, Cabo Frio went further than he had in the first. He reproduced the bilateral conventions on slave trafficking and their historical settings since before the date of Brazilian independence, 1822. He also raised the issue of the Aberdeen Bill and its impact. He concluded by saying that there were undeniable abuses committed by the British Navy against Brazilian ships, violating the terms included in the agreement.

Unlike the first document, more than half of the text of Cabo Frio’s second Informação clearly spelled out his personal opinion. He was no longer merely the bureaucrat; rather, he had become the manager. He had condensed into his nine pages a detailed review of the relevant diplomatic history, the legislation, and a history of slave trafficking – and its repression – ending his instructions with enough information for the Council of State to make, at last, a conclusive decision.

Cabo Frio also dared to warn the Imperial government that if it continued to insist in lodging complaints, as it had done for several decades, the situation would be “difficult, if not impossible.” Without losing his respect for the Councilors, he wrote of his concern for diplomatic efficiency. Again, changing his role from bureaucrat to manager, he wrote: “there is another way, which might be feasible: to compromise.” One solution, he said, might be if each government removed their claims and indemnified their own subjects. The Brazilian costs, according to Cabo Frio’s calculation, would reach 1,000 contos (a form of expressing Brazilian currency at the time; a conto being short for conto de réis, with one conto equivalent to 1000 réis). Such a compromise would avoid the creation of another joint committee, which had actually been considered. In Cabo Frio’s opinion, however, it would fail just as the previous ones had failed, thereby extending the bureaucratized, useless and inconclusive diplomatic discussions.

Cabo Frio’s thoughts were those of a manager concerned about the outcome of the diplomatic action when that diplomacy is extended indefinitely in sterile discussions – recorded in endless conventions, notes, correspondences, meetings, commissions, treaties and negotiations – without achieving an end result. In contrast, Cabo Frio’s style of diplomacy – using administrative thought – induced a better way. It was a self-assessment of diplomatic action.

Cabo Frio presumably observed the need for efficient management in diplomacy during his experiences in Africa, in the Platine States, and in Belgium. His intervention, prone to results, was decisive to obtain, in 1863, the appraisal report that ended the Christie Affair. In short: diplomatic efficiency was what mattered to the director-general.

Another burning matter before the Council of State, on which Cabo Frio did not refuse to give a written opinion, concerned the unresolved border issue between Brazil and Argentina. This issue was addressed by instructions he sent to the foreign section of the Council for its session of January 29, 1884. Facing three alternatives – the appointment of a bilateral commission to study the proposal, the appointment of an arbitrator, or some combination of the two – Cabo Frio agreed with the proposal made by the Argentine minister in Rio de Janeiro: that it would be advisable to objectively study the commission’s findings, and offer them to the arbitrator as a basis for the judgment. This was another demonstration of the director-general’s rationality and good administrative sense.

Cabo Frio dealt with the matter of borders with Argentina via both personal opinion and by compiling a huge documentary dossier on the subject. The written opinion, addressed to the Council, was included in the instructions mentioned above, and was inspired by an extensive survey of sources. The dossier, which was exhaustive in terms of documentation, was published in two tomes that same year, 1884.

Tome I of the dossier consisted of 138 pages; Tome II, 160. Together, they gathered diplomatic documents of both sides concerned with the arduous matter of boundaries between the two countries. They are an excellent compilation that was able to later instruct Rio Branco’s defense before the eventual arbiter of the matter: U.S. president, Grover Cleveland, in 1895.

Cabo Frio, therefore, performed two routine tasks in his relation with the Council of State: he sent selected dossiers for the appropriate debate under analysis, and he wrote opinions based on the documentation included in the dossiers. As a result of his work, Amaral developed his knowledge of foreign policy, including its twists and turns. He, thereby, had an influence on the decisions made at the heights of power, as well as on the diplomatic actions that took place after the decisions were made. Diplomacy, therefore, is not just about public and notorious performances – the kinds easily conveyed in the press. Often, it is the logistical support rendered to the manager that is most important. As with the case of the borders between Brazil and Argentina, Cabo Frio rarely had an instruction or an opinion praised in public.

Cabo Frio’s administrative thought was characterized by one key feature: a predisposition towards results. Diplomatic negotiation can go on for an indefinite period of time; it should, however, be questioned if it seems like it is going to be endless. The travel, the commissions, the meetings, the stewardship, and the conversation between acquaintances or new companions – would all this without results be enough to satisfy the opinion of those who pay the expenses? These types of functional abuses were absent from Cabo Frio’s administrative thinking. In their stead, thought and action, characteristics of an effective manager, were included.

Limits of the administrative thought

A predisposition towards results does not seem enough to qualify administrative thought in an appropriate manner. Two examples will be helpful to determine the quality of Cabo Frio’s administrative thought in the early stages of the Brazilian Republic.

The first example concerns a mission carried out by the initial envoy sent by Brazil to the Plata region, whose work led to the Treaty of Montevideo, on January 25, 1890. Negotiated and signed with the full support of republicanism – Brazil had finally become equal to the American states as far as its political regime was concerned – the Treaty divided the territory of Palmas in half, conforming to a proposal made by the Argentine foreign minister, Estanisláo Zeballos. The treaty, however, ignored the findings of lengthy bilateral negotiations; it also strangled the southern region of Brazil which, in turn, jeopardized the region’s security and integrity. Ultimately, the treaty did not conform to the national interest, which caused the indignation of public opinion and, ultimately, rejection by the national Congress. The situation was then returned to that which existed prior to the Republic, and the issue of borders between Brazil and Argentina was sent to arbitration.

In the second example, Rui Barbosa – a contemporary of Cabo Frio, who had organized much of the government during the early days of the Republic – had ideas to modernize the country. According to a study by diplomat and sociologist, Carlos Henrique Cardim, Barbosa’s aspirations included a series of innovative goals and measures aimed at raising the middle class such that it would eventually replace the predominance of elites in Brazilian society – a major change from the structural backwardness and monarchical conservatism of the past.

Rui Barbosa’s modernizing evolution would take place by means of:

a) An appreciation of the State through both hierarchy and order, with its power centralized in the Union;

b) The defense of individual freedoms by force of law and its application;

c) The promotion of a decentralization of power; in a federalism without excesses;

d) A struggle for rapid material progress;

e) A diversification of the economy by industrialization, immigration and education;

f) An effort to allow for social mobility and a preservation of the new status that is attained;

g) A universalist view of the role of Brazil in the world; and

h) An importance placed on the role of a good foreign perception of Brazil (Cardim, 2007, p. 21).

This set of ideas put forward by Rui Barbosa went unnoticed by Cabo Frio, who was incapable of thinking about innovation and progress as a basis for correcting archaic economic and social structures. This fault revealed a second limitation to the director-general’s style of administrative thought, namely, an inability at times to recognize reality. In other words, a predisposition towards results is not always sufficient to obtain success; an accurate perception of how those results fit into the nation’s reality is also necessary.

Cabo Frio’s personal level of alienation in the face of reality, therefore, did not allow him to operate amidst the three currents that competed for order in Brazil at the beginning of the Republic – which, according to a recent study by political historian Regina da Cunha Rocha, included: Jacobinism, as influenced by the French; liberal-federalism, of American influence; and positivism, inspired by Auguste Comte.

There was a need for an appreciation of the people, of their work, of entrepreneurship, and of social liberty. Why should one alienate oneself in the face of such matters? Why, for example, did Cabo Frio did not become a master to the lineage of diplomats on which the Republic relied at its beginning, figures such as Lauro Severiano Müller, Domício da Gama, Octávio Mangabeira, and even ushering in Oswaldo Aranha, Afonso Arinos, San Tiago Dantas, and Araújo Castro. Was it more comfortable for him to settle into conservatism and not think about reality, instead of reacting to the face of uncertainties and the effervescence of ideas that accompanied the implementation of the Republic?

The conservative current to which Cabo Frio’s intellect belonged did not impose itself on the minds of his time; it did, however, lodge itself in the administrative environment. The overriding foreign policy objective for Amaral was the resolution of unresolved issues – not the projection of goals and strategy. To obtain “his” results, he was willing to accommodate, forget reason, and mock the innovator, as he had with Inocêncio Serzedelo Correa, when the latter offered to inject the ideas of modernization and progress into the formulation of foreign policy.

Cabo Frio’s style of administrative thought, however, was both operational and conceptual. In his mind, an appreciation for the past – tradition – advised an inspiration able to shake the indolence of reasoning. On an operational level, Cabo Frio’s administrative thought, although conservative, did consider changes in the decision- making process of foreign policy. A proper reading of the national interest, for example, led him to overcome the model of international insertion designed at the time of the country’s independence, which had promoted a dependency based on unequal treaties. The new decision-making process incorporated the criticism of the 1840’s, including industrialist thought, into that model.

Other features were added to Cabo Frio’s model over time: a decision-making autonomy, a zeal for security, as well as definite borders outlined with all of the country’s neighbors, and a proud resistance to the massive claims of the great powers. Additionally, during the final decades of the monarchy changes in the foreign policy decision-making process were included to settle threats from neighbors, and to open the country to relationships with powers around the world, such as the United States, Russia, the European nations, Egypt, and China.

On a conceptual basis, showing maturity, Cabo Frio’s administrative ideas added the best that had been displayed by the evolution of thought applied to foreign affairs during the nineteenth century. These additions included: a cautious cooperation when dealing with powerful nations; an indispensable decision-making autonomy; a regional geopolitical balance; and the insertion of economic liberalism, tamed by the national interests – all used to preserve and promote a rapprochement between political thought and diplomatic action. The exponents of that evolution, who exhibited different strands that sought to dominate the decision-making process, were all figures of intellectual stature, politicians and diplomats – or sometimes both in the same person. At times they paid more attention to economic and commercial affairs, at other times more to security. Sometimes they were more regionally involved; desiring to resolve matters “in their neighborhood.” And sometimes they had a more universal view, and they were more interested in the world. Occasionally, they were brilliant – with the ability to embrace all aspects of foreign relations – such as the case of José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco.

The constellation of Brazilian diplomatic thinkers – whether or not they were members of the Council of State, members of the parliament or ministers – is long and illustrious. Included on this lengthy list are: José Bonifácio de Andrade,e Silva, Raimundo José da Cunha Matos, Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, Diogo António Feijó, José Clemente Pereira, Holanda Cavalcânti de Albuquerque, José Antônio Saraiva, Antonio Francisco de Paula, Francisco Gê Acaiaba de Montezuma, Francisco Carneiro de Campos, Pedro de Araújo Lima, Manoel Alves Branco, Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu, Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, Francisco de Sales Torres Homem, Irineu Evangelista de Sousa, Aureliano Tavares Bastos, João Lins Cansanção de Sinimbu, José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, Paulino José Soares de Sousa, Carlos Carneio de Campos.

Some of those named above – especially a number of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs – elaborated a consistent administrative thought, based on the idea of nation building with an evolution of stages towards a maturity of the historical process.

Accommodated within the comfort of his style of low assertiveness or constructive liability, Cabo Frio skirted this lineage of diplomatic leaders. The Brazilian transition from monarchy to republic, which his long career at Itamaraty spanned, did not entail changing the paradigm of international insertion, nor the nineteenth century liberal/conservative model that lasted until 1930. Instead, it merely mirrored the changes of the ruling group, that is, the old Imperial aristocracy and the rise of new elites linked to the same social stratum of coffee planters and exporters.

Ensconced within his conservative way of thinking, Cabo Frio contributed to the adaptation of Brazil’s foreign policy, to the interests of the new elites. In that context, he is at least partly responsible for the conservatism that was extended in the maintenance of the paradigm. A change of the paradigm would have required an awareness of four factors: the idea of nation building; a proper reading of the national interest in different stages of evolution; political elaboration resulting from both of these factors; and the ability to evaluate the results of strategic decisions, either past or planned.

Generally speaking, together with the new elites, who appropriated the State and submitted it to their group interests, Cabo Frio was not aware of the necessity of the paradigm shift. Indeed, the shift was in evidence in Brazil when the monarchy fell in 1889, and it would not be seen there until 1930. This flaw of the director-general, however, must not be ascribed only to Cabo Frio, as most of the renowned leaders of the time displayed similar imperfections.

Conclusion

Many early scholars of the diplomatic performance of Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio, did not appreciate his work. He was seen as a conservative depositary of the traditions of Imperial diplomacy; someone who extended the hold of the past and obstructed change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This less than flattering assessment of his performance, however, was often tempered by a common recognition of his domination, in detail, of the diplomatic archives, and by the shrewdness and agility with which he gathered documents on any matter relevant to the intricacies of negotiation.

The current literature – scant as it is – does slightly more justice to specific features of Cabo Frio’s performance. It praises not only his ability to assemble full documentary dossiers, but also how to analyze them, and know what to issue in instructions – and when to offer opinions and advice – to the Councilors of State during the monarchy, and to ministers, the heads of legations, and other authorities throughout his four-decades long tenure as the director-general of the foreign office. His contributions in this manner were an invaluable asset to the country’s diplomatic efforts.

Most of the literature also does not clearly show the superior quality of Cabo Frio’s performance that can be deduced from an analysis of the many documents that he, himself, wrote. Indeed, Cabo Frio created and expressed an administrative thought through his many writings, with a strong predisposition towards results as the main reason for diplomatic negotiation.

Cabo Frio was annoyed by endless and inconclusive negotiations, and by the abuses that he observed – supposedly in pursuit of diplomatic conquests; abuses considered by some to be natural to diplomatic action. The efficiency of Cabo Frio’s administrative thought was in stark contrast to these abuses.

Cabo Frio’s work was guided by an ingrained conservatism, at times showing an ignorance of the way foreign policy was made. He also at times lacked an inability to see economic and social reality, especially those that suggested changes in the transition from the monarchy to the republic; and he had a general ignorance of the role of the external sector, to advance an archaic stage of the national formation toward a more modern one.

In short, Cabo Frio was a complex man. He has been described as an uncritical bureaucrat, who valued tradition over the more creative or innovative trends that may have sped the evolution toward the nation’s maturity. Yet he was also a dedicated public servant who greatly cared about positive results in his work within the diplomatic arena of the nation he served for so many years.

Bibliography

BUENO, Clodoaldo. A República e Sua Política Exterior (1889-1902). São Paulo: Unesp, 1995.

BRAZIL, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. O Conselho de Estado e a Política Externa do Império: Consultas da Seção dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Brasília: FUNAG, 2005, Volumes.

BRAZIL, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Arquivo Histórico. Arquivo Particular do Visconde de Cabo Frio. Rio de Janeiro, 1967, mimeographed, 148 p.

BRAZIL, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Questão de Limites Entre o Brazil e a República Argentina. Rio de Janeiro: National Typography, 1884, Two Volumes.

CARDIM, Carlos Henrique. A Raiz das Coisas. Rui Barbosa: O Brasil no mundo. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira 2007.

CERVO, Amado Luiz. Inserção Internacional: Formação dos Conceitos Brasileiros. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008.

CHEIBUB, Zairo Borges. Diplomacia, Diplomatas e Política Externa: Aspectos do Processo de Institucionalização do Itamaraty. Masters Dissertation: IUPERJ, Rio de Janeiro: 1984, 140 p.

COSTA, Sergio Correa da. A Diplomacia do Marechal: Intervenção Estrangeira na Revolta da Armada. Brasília: EdUnB, 1979.

ESPINHEIRO, José Antônio d’. Traços Biographicos do Visconde de Cabo Frio. Rio de Janeiro: National Press, 1903, 28 p.

LINS, Alvaro. Rio Branco. São Paulo: Alfa Omega, 1996.

ROCHA, Regina da Cunha. Parlamento Brasileiro e Política Exterior da República (1889-1930). Curitiba: Juruá, 2010.

RODRIGUES, José Honório. Conselho de Estado: O Quinto Poder? Brasília: Federal Senate, 1978.

VIANA FILHO, Luís. A Vida do Barão do Rio Branco. Brasília: FUNAG, 1996.

COMPLAINTS Anglo-Brazilian. S.N.T., Rio de Janeiro: Library of Itamaraty, n. 234, 3, 28.

PART II

The foreign policy of the First Republic

The foreign policy of the First Republic (1889-1930)[67]*

Rubens Ricupero

The initial landmark of the period – the Abolition, the Republic, and the Federation in succession – differentiates it from the preceding period perhaps more sharply than the 1930 Revolution, its conventional closure, differs from what came later. The proclamation of the Republic, briefly anteceded by the abolition of slavery and followed soon after by the adoption of the federative system, represented an extraordinary and unquestionable change in the previous political, institutional, and social conditions.

The presidential republic, with presidents elected for four years and no reelection, replaced the monarchy of parliamentary governments, which were balanced by the Emperor’s “moderating” powers. The 1891 Constitution introduced the federative regime, which strengthened regional leaderships and de facto state parties. The Federation took the place of monarchic centralization, and the governors, increasingly the source of the federal power as of the Campos Sales’s presidency, took the place of the ephemeral provincial presidents chosen by the Emperor, nearly always from outside the provinces.

The end of slavery, which for 350 years had been the country’s “organic” institution par excellence, coincided with the unprecedented upsurge of the inflow of waves of immigrants from Western Europe, Japan, and the Middle East. The Old Republic marked the apex of immigration in Brazilian history: between 1890 and 1930, three million eight hundred thousand immigrants landed in the country. Immigration completed the development begun earlier toward a salaried labor regime and contributed to the emergence of a consumer market, helped by demographic expansion, internal migrations, and the growth of cities.

The coffee sector, whose expansion characterized the Empire’s last decades, reached in the First Republic the apogee of its politi-cal and economic influence, determining the macro economy’s orientation, and heavily weighing on exchange and foreign trade decisions. Capital accumulation in the hands of coffee producers and exporters, coupled with the existence of a consumer market and labor supplied by immigrants, created appropriate conditions for industrialization, further favored by the recurrent coffee economy crises and import financing difficulties. Industry, in turn, generated jobs and reinforced the urbanization trend.

In contrast, the Getúlio Vargas era (1930-1945) gives the impression of a transition phase to contemporary Brazil. The institutional arrangements – the 1934 Constitution and the 1937 Charter – seemed predestined to be short-lived. The ambitious idea of establishing a completely transformed political regime pompously baptized Estado Novo (New State) did not outlast Italian fascism, whose corporatism was its source of inspiration. This period’s innovative legacy was felt less in the durability of institutional inventions and more markedly in the social and economic changes that were already under way: industrialization, urbanization, and modernization of the State. Those fifteen years, which certainly do not belong to the First Republic, paved the way for the advent of the Second Republic and the 1946 Constitution, which would last until the 1964 military coup.

The fundamental internal logic, coherence, and continuity of the forty-one year long Old Republic had no correspondence in anything similar on the external front, a timespan that encompassed three heterogeneous phases of world history. The first twenty-five years (1889-1914), more than half of that period, were synchronic with the twilight of the protracted Victorian Era of European hegemony, the Age of Empires, and the intensification of imperialist and nationalist rivalries that would strike a fatal blow to the political and economic globalization of the Belle Époque. The little more than nine years of the Baron of Rio Branco’s tenure as Minister (1902-1912) were entirely encapsulated in that quarter century.

There followed the four years of World War I (1914-1918), its diplomatic final curtain with the Treaty of Versailles (1919), and the frustrated attempt at rebuilding the international order destroyed by the conflict and by the dissolution of the multinational Austro-Hungarian, Czarist Russian, and Turco-Ottoman Empires.

Lastly, the unstable decade that closed the First Republic overlapped the turbulent 1920s, the beginnings of the Society of Nations’ multilateralism, the trauma of hyperinflation, the consolidation of the Bolshevik Revolution, the 1929 New York Exchange collapse, and the approach of the Great Depression and of the 1930s crisis.

The interactions between the external context and the changes in Brazilian diplomacy gave shape in this historic phase to three structuring factors, that is, systemic factors destined to prevail far beyond the 1930s as differentiating features of the Brazilian foreign policy’s orientation.

The first of these factors was the emergence and assertion of the United States’ political power and of its economic radiation. The second had to do with the enhancement of a more intense, cooperative relationship among Latin American countries themselves, under the form of the Washington-sponsored Pan-Americanism or of autonomous Latin American initiatives. Finally, the third originated from the appearance of a new modality of diplomatic activity, the multilateral or parliamentary diplomacy, developed at the forums of the League of Nations and the Pan American Union that would succeed in creating in due time a strong multilateral tradition in the Brazilian foreign policy.

Diplomacy’s three structural changes in the First Republic assumed forms that may be thus summarized: (1) the “Unwritten Alliance” with the United States; (2) the systematic solution of border issues, and emphasis on greater cooperation with Latin American relations; (3) and the first multilateral diplomacy’s ventures in its regional, Pan-American version or in the League of Nations’ global mode.

Brazilian diplomacy’s “Americanization” was unquestionably the most visible and remarkable transformation of the time. Previously, under the Monarchy, Brazil’s relations with the United States had been peripheral on both sides, despite later attempts to date the strengthening of ties between the two countries back to the United States’ recognition of Brazilian Independence (1824). There was no lack of diplomatic incidents and sharp divergences between the two countries such as the episodes related to free navigation on the Amazon River, to the Rio de Janeiro Court’s stance toward the American Civil War, or to Washington’s refusal to recognize the Asuncion blockade during the Paraguayan War.

The proclamation of the Republic initiated the phase of identification with the American political model, when its institutions – the Constitution, Federalism, the country’s name, and, at one point, even the flag – were a source of inspiration at the inception of Republicanism among us. The prompt recognition of the 1889 regime by the Washington Government and its favorable attitude toward Floriano Peixoto during the Navy’s Revolt consolidated the empathy born of political and ideological affinities, eliciting denunciations from monarchists such as Eduardo Prado in his A Ilusão Americana [The American Illusion]. Breaking with the monarchic tradition of abstaining from signing trade agreements with more powerful nations, in reaction against the “unequal treaties” with England, Brazil signed with the United States its first modern trade treaty, in 1891.

Approximation to the United States did not begin in Rio Branco’s time, an erroneous later impression that aroused the jealousy of Salvador de Mendonça, a historical Republican, who, as the Republic’s first diplomatic representative to Washington, had signed the trade treaty with Secretary of State James C. Blaine. Exasperated at seeing stolen from him the merit of having pioneered the new trend, Mendonça would afterwards resort to irony, saying that when the Baron of Rio Branco sent Joaquim Nabuco to discover America, it had already been discovered, measured, and demarcated – by him, obviously.

Be that as it may, it fell upon Rio Branco to promote, in his own words, the shifting of Brazil’s diplomatic center from London to Washington. The establishment of a first Brazilian Embassy in the American Capital, at a time when embassies were rare (there were only six on the banks of the Potomac, and none in Rio de Janeiro) signaled, by its symbolism, that Brazil would favor relations with the United States from then on.

Suggestively, this happened in 1905, the year that, for historians of American diplomacy, coincided with the two events emblematic of the United States’ emergence as a world power with global interests: President Theodore Roosevelt’s mediation to end the Russian-Japanese War; and the American participation in the Algeciras conference on the Agadir incident between France and Germany over Morocco.

Learning from the rise of the first world power in the Western Hemisphere, Rio Branco conceived the idea of integrating the Brazilian foreign policy’s various dimensions, based on a close cooperation with the United States. What E. Bradford Burns would call the “Unwritten Alliance” consisted in pragmatically seeking assistance from the American power to further Brazilian diplomatic objectives – defense against the aggressive European imperialism, and affirmation concerning border issues or power litigation with South American neighbors. In return, Brazil was willing to support Washington’s policies in the Caribbean, Central America, Mexico, and Panama under the nascent Pan-Americanism sponsored by the Americans.

This Americanist, or Monroist diplomacy, as it was called, would become a sort of paradigm that fully encompassed the Brazilian worldview. The virtual or unwritten alliance would evolve into a formal military alliance in 1942, during World War II. Both before and after the war, Brazilian diplomacy often played the role of coordinator and catalyst of solidarity toward the United States on the part of the continent’s countries on occasions such as the Pearl Harbor attack, the rupture with the axis countries, the beginning of the Cold War, and the Quitandinha Conference for the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR).

Even as late as in early years of Vargas’ second government (1950s), Oswado Aranha, lecturing at the War College, would still declare that the only conceivable foreign policy for Brazil was to support the United States at world forums (on Cold War issues) and at regional forums in exchange for American support for Brazil’s political and military preeminence in South America. All of this would come much later, just as would the illusion that there existed a “special relationship,” that is, a privileged relationship between Brazil and the United States. This view had its roots in the policy introduced by Rio Branco himself, as he shifted diplomacy’s axis from Europe to North America, and firmly anchored it on cooperation with the USA.

The commercial and economic axis, on the other hand, had begun to move from Europe to the United States since 1870, much before Rio Branco, and even before the Republic. Early in the twentieth century, the American market already absorbed more than half of Brazil’s coffee sales – coffee was at that time our main export –, sixty percent of our rubber, and most of our cocoa. In the year when the Brazilian Embassy was established in Washington (1905), Brazil ranked sixth as the United States’ trade partner, after England, Germany, France, Canada, and Cuba. At one point, it was its third largest supplier. At the Baron’s death (1912), the US market accounted for thirty-six percent of Brazil’s foreign sales.

A similar trend could be noticed in investment flows and capital movements. American investments began to predominate in the manufacturing industry over British investments, which were concentrated on public services and infrastructure. Slowly, New York became the source for coffee valorization plans financing. In the twentieth century, the American financial center, particularly after World War II, replaced London as a source of funding and foreign direct investments, thereby bringing to an end England’s predominance inherited from the Portuguese.

The newly-inaugurated Brazilian Republic discovered Latin America at the same time it discovered North America. At the time, it was quite common to talk about Americanism as encompassing the entire Western Hemisphere, Pan-Americanism’s conceptual basis. This is what Positivists had in mind when they invoked the “fraternity of American homelands.” The end of the monarchic exception in the Americas would lead to a foreign policy turned both to the United States and to the Hispanic-Americans, in contrast to the diplomatic isolation, real or not, of the Empire, which supposedly had closer affinity with the Old Continent monarchies.

One of the facets of Latin America’s debut on the world stage took the multilateral form of Pan-Americanism. At a time when the parliamentary modality of inter-States relations attempted its first steps (at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences and at the 1906 Geneva Conference), the United States decided to preserve the area where they enjoyed unquestionable hegemony – the Western Hemisphere – to organize on it a system independent from the one dominated by European imperialism’s great powers.

Nabuco, one of the most brilliant cooperators with and interpreters of the United States’ project, believed that America, a peace continent, was a “neutral Hemisphere,” as opposed to the system of Europe and the imperialist rivalries in Asia and Africa, which he called a “belligerent Hemisphere.” The building of the Pan-American Union’s headquarters on the grand Washington esplanade, where are also located the Capitol, the Supreme Court, the Federal Reserve, all the centers of North American power, including the White House a short distance away, symbolized and proclaimed, in the regional domain, the impetus to organize the international order under the aegis of the United States.

As the American power outdid the other powers, that same impetus to organize a hegemonic order would be manifest in Wilson’s truncated proposal of a Society of Nations, in 1919, which would bear fruit to its maximum in 1944-1995, with the establishment of the United Nations Organization, in the political domain, and of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in the economic field.

Pan-Americanism’s backbone was the Monroe Doctrine, a unilateral American policy declaration, which Nabuco and Rio Branco would in vain endeavor to make multilateral and legitimate on the part of the other countries of the Hemisphere. Resistance to the United States’ designs, extant since the first Pan-American Conference (1989-1890), particularly in Argentina and in a few other Hispanic countries, would persist in the course of those years marked by numerous American interventions in Cuba, Panama, Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico.

Brazil depended then on the US market much more than it does today. It was far from maintaining with England the same kind of close trade and investment relations, which led Roque Sáenz Peña and Manuel Quintana, the Argentine delegates to the 1889-1890 Conference, to head the opposition to the customs union proposed by Secretary of State James C. Blaine. Distant from the area of direct US interventions, though, Rio de Janeiro did not feel threatened by the Big Stick policy, which Oliveira Lima would graphically put into Portuguese, as the “política do cacetão.”

For these reasons, and motivated even more by Rio Branco’s pragmatic calculation for reinforcing Brazil’s frail power through a virtual alliance with the emerging hegemonic power, Brazilian diplomacy endeavored to define its own stance under Pan-Americanism. In 1906, Brazil hosted the Third Inter-American Conference and received the visit of Secretary of State Elihu Root – the first such Conference away from Washington and the first visit of a chief of American diplomacy. The role Brazilians conceived for themselves – that of intermediaries between the United States and the Spanish-speaking neighbors – would find expression in the attempt to turn into multilateral the manifestations of American power and thus subject them to collective control.

Brazil’s inter-American policy sought to keep a relative distance from the more truculent expressions of that power, preferring to stress the moderation of conflicts between hemispheric countries and to prevent the rise of antagonistic situations between the United States and Spanish America. This stance had a long life after its adoption at the 1906 Rio de Janeiro Conference, chaired by Nabuco.

Many of the accomplishments much after the period under review, such as those related to World War II and the Cold War, developed from that initial concept. After disgraceful incidents such as the 1954 intervention in Guatemala and the conflicts over the Cuban Revolution, as the 1950s turned into the 1960s, the concept sang its swan song in the protagonist role the Castelo Branco government accepted to play in the military operation in the Dominican Republic, in the mid-1960s, sixty years after the Rio de Janeiro Conference.

Not everything, though, was owed to the American power’s direct or indirect influence. The Republic did trigger genuine enthusiasm for Latin America in Brazil, which was corresponded by the neighboring Hispanics. In the euphoria caused by Argentina’s prompt recognition of the new regime, Quintino Bocaiúva, the Provisional Government’s Foreign Minister, signed in Montevideo, with his Buenos Aires counterpart, Estanislao Zeballos, the agreement under which the two countries shared, in a Solomonic decision, the contested territory of Palmas, often called Misiones.

That may have been the first manifestation of a phenomenon that still recurs, namely, the premature, naive illusion of a definitive, qualitative change in relations with Argentina as a result of some event: Presidential visits, slogans such as “everything unites us, nothing separates us,” Presidential encounters at the border, convergence such as the “Spirit of Uruguaiana,” the overcoming of conflicts about the harnessing of hydroelectric power in the La Plata River Basin, Mercosur, and alleged ideological affinities. These were invariably followed by disappointment, and honeymoons were short-lived. The first such honeymoon, at the Republic’s advent, vanished owing to the Brazilians’s uncompromising refusal to give up territory, in a reaction that involved even the exiled Emperor, and led to the treaty’s rejection and to a return to arbitration.

The combative mobilization of monarchist remnants, which would revive in the Acre episode, betrayed the heavy Empire’s legacy of antagonism and resentment toward neighboring countries. One of the ingrained features of Brazilian foreign policy’s ideology is its reluctance to admit breaches of diplomatic tradition. There is no denying, though, that the Second Empire’s diplomacy toward the La Plata region, dominated by its “interventions policy” introduced by Paulino José Soares de Sousa, the Viscount of Uruguay, as of 1849-1850, contrasts sharply with the Republican Americanist pacifism.

The bellicose spirit of the interventionist policy, which culminated in the greatest war in South American history – the Triple Alliance war that ended on 1 March 1870 –, would still give rise to the Argentine Question regarding the dispute about the Chaco border between Argentina and Paraguay. From 1880 on, the consolidation of the national States in Argentina and in Uruguay, the prosperity generated by immigrants, the packinghouses, and the meat, wool, and wheat exports eliminated the chronic instability conditions and the internal conflicts that had been at the origin of Brazilian interventions. The Baron of Rio Branco clearly realized the change, as he expressed in a famous article in which he took stock of the imperial policy and considered the interventions cycle closed forever.

The developments in the La Plata region coincided with the last years of the already declining Empire. It is quite possible that, had the monarchy survived, it would not have been less sensitive to the need to change relations with the southern neighbors, as the imperial regime was intrinsically no more aggressive or militarized than the republican. Be that as it may, the first Brazilian Republicans clearly felt the need to differentiate themselves from the imperial legacy. This concern was reflected in the 1891 Constitution’s provision that required prior recourse to arbitration before any war.

The Acre crisis exposed the Republic’s pacifist determination to its most dangerous test. The successful approach to the problem through negotiations and willingness to compromise prevented it from establishing a fateful precedent for future relations with weaker neighbors. The close proximity to an armed clash alerted Rio Branco to the unpostponable priority of systematically solving all remaining border issues.

Rio Branco had previously been the victorious defender of Brazilian rights in the arbitration of the Palmas issue with Argentina (1895) and of the question of Amapá borders with France-Guyana (1900). The Treaty of Petropolis with Bolivia (1903), his masterpiece, paved the way for the long series of negotiations and arbitrations: a treaty with Ecuador, safeguarding possible Peruvian rights (1904) and one with Peru, at first provisionally (1904), then definitively (1909); the arbitration award against Great Britain-British Guyana (1904); the protocol with Venezuela (1905); the agreements with The Netherlands-Surinam (1906) and with Colombia (1907); and the rectification treaty with Uruguay (1909).

In fifteen years, Brazil had achieved with eleven neighbors, three of which were European powers, without wars, exclusively through diplomatic means, what Ambassador Álvaro Teixeira Soares correctly described as one of the greatest achievements in the diplomatic history of any country. The consensual definition of the space within which sovereignty could be legitimately exercised created conditions conducive to a constructive, cooperative relationship with border countries and with Latin American countries in general.

It is possible that the consummation of such an achievement would not have been possible, either before or after. Not before, because the process of national formation of many South American countries had not been concluded and because the constant armed conflicts made it impossible to think about consensual solutions. Not after, because the exacerbation of nationalisms, owing to the Great War, the subsequent extremist political stances, and the passions of public opinion, increasingly radicalized, left little or no room for negotiated solutions and compromise.

With the Belle Époque, died the delusion that it would be possible to humanize war, do away with passports, and solve all disputes through impartial arbitration. Brazil managed to sign more than thirty arbitration agreements, nearly all of them fated to accumulate dust in forgotten archives. The Republic knew how to take advantage, for a negotiated solution of all border issues, of a window of opportunity that would soon close, the first to open in more than one hundred fifty years since the Treaty of Madrid (1750).

The elimination of the territorial dispute proved easier than a qualitative change in relations with Argentina. The spirit of the time did favor resort to International Law, arbitration, negotiated solutions, the idealism that would revive after World War I with Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Principles. That spirit, though, coexisted in dialectic tension with the realism of the European Balance of Powers, the arms race, and the imperialist rivalries that would explode in the canons of August 1914 at the end of the “long nineteenth century”.

The influence of some of that was felt in South America, where Brazil and Argentina played their “great game” of strategic rivalry in the context of the La Plata subsystem. Nothing reflected more dramatically Rio Branco’s visceral mistrust toward the Argentine neighbors, classified as “permanent rivals,” than the irreconcilable mano a mano with Estanislao Zeballos, his nemesis. It was as if the emulation between the two States had taken the form of an interminable duel between two people, evocative of The Duel, Joseph Conrad’s short story on which Ridley Scott based his film The Duelists. The protracted personal dispute that began in the distant 1875 at the apex of the Argentine Question, culminated in the Cable no. 9 incident in 1908, and was actually over only after the two duelists died – the Brazilian in 1912 and the Argentine, three times his country’s Foreign Minister, in 1923.

Underlying this picturesque exchange of sword blows lurked a real, resilient layer of old suspicions, jealousies, and antipathies. This gradually weakening substratum would nevertheless outlast the two adversaries and underlie the euphoria of the presidential visits of Roca, Campos Sales, and Sáenz Peña. Every now and then, it would resurface and condemn to failure ambitious ideas of understanding and coordination, such as the ABC Pact (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), one of Rio Branco’s rare unsuccessful initiatives. Signed in 1915, after his death, the Pact was ratified only by Brazil and never entered into force.

Despite real achievements in terms of approximation and cooperation between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires during this period, diplomatic emulation and the dispute between Argentina and Brazil for prestige in their immediate surroundings (Paraguay and Bolivia) or in the world at large could not be dispelled. Neither was it possible to eliminate the military antagonism, intensified by the naval armaments race in the two first decades of the twentieth century, which for long continued to encourage the theoretical war hypotheses entertained by the General Staff on the two sides of the border.

Side by side with the trends toward an “Unwritten Alliance” with the United States and a more intense, cooperative relationship with Latin American neighbors, a third major long-term change introduced under the First Republic’s foreign policy was the innovative and extraordinary development of multilateral diplomacy. The Second Hague Peace Conference (1907) served as a backdrop for Brazil’s grand debut on the stage of a diplomatic modality that would become an inseparable element of its external personality.

Many of the features that still differentiate this personality were anticipated in Rui Barbosa’s performance at that Conference. They include active participation in proposals and in their formulation; action aimed at changing the status quo to allow Brazil to enter “the circle of great international friendships to which it was entitled,” in Rio Branco’s own words; willingness to face opponents of the reform of the international order; and promotion of equal treatment of all States.

Twelve years later, the element that had failed Rio Branco in The Hague, namely, the United States’ protective influence, proved decisive at the Peace Conference right after the end of World War I. Thanks to President Wilson’s support, Brazil succeeded in the recognition of its right to participate in the deliberations with three delegates (instead of only one as the “minor Powers”), as well as the basic satisfaction of its interests pertaining to coffee stored in Germany or on German ships captured during the conflict.

Modern multilateralism had its origin above all in the decision to create the Society of Nations, the first attempt in history to establish a political institution that theoretically brought together all the members of the international system. Once again, American assistance brought its weight to bear on Brazil’s choice as a temporary member of the League of Nations Council at its inaugural season. Taking full advantage of the opportunity, the Brazilian Government opened in Geneva its first multilateral mission (1924) and thereafter consistently sought to be reelected to the Council (terms lasted only one year then). Except once, it succeeded every time, winning the first or second majority of votes.

Notwithstanding such auspicious beginnings, Brazil would be the first country to withdraw from the League of Nations for political reasons, when it failed to become a permanent member, while Germany was included in that category (1926). The impeccable juridical and political quality of the Brazilian Representative Afranio de Melo Franco’s pronouncements at the time of the rupture could not mask the miscalculation on the part of President Artur Bernardes and his Foreign Minister, Felix Pacheco. Indeed, years earlier, Melo Franco himself had realized the isolation in which Brazilian foreign policy had fallen under Bernardes’s presidency, when he headed the Brazilian delegation to the Fifth Inter-American Conference, held in Santiago, Chile (1923), which had been marked by divergence about limiting naval armaments.

Other than the changes pointed out as the most significant, it would not be possible to draw a full picture of the diplomatic evolution in that period without mentioning the increasing importance the economic and immigration issues acquired in foreign policy. There were times when trade issues related to coffee, for instance, determined the tenor of relations with the United States. Foreign debt vicissitudes, often critically urgent, pervaded the four decades of the First Republic, from the funding loan of Campos Sales’s time to the devastating impact of the New York Exchange collapse in 1929.

It is thus not surprising that Nilo Peçanha’s Reform of the State Secretariat of External Relations was the first attempt to establish an Economic and Trade Affairs Section (Fourth Section) separated from consular topics. The same decree lists, among the measures consuls should adopt to promote Brazilian exports, the creation of and support to Chambers of Commerce, the maintenance of products display cases at the Consulates, the promotion of conferences on the economic and trade potential, the mailing of trade publications, and the display of a chart indicating the quotations of our main exports.

All through the First Republic’s cycle, the efforts to mod-ernize the Foreign Service were continuous. To have an idea of how modest this service was, it is sufficient to recall that in 1889 there were only 31 employees at the Secretariat, including from the Director-General (as always the venerable Cabo Frio, in office since 1869!) to one doorman, two office boys, and three couriers! The diplomatic and consular services, separated from the Secretariat until the 1930s, employed 70 people, half of them in Europe and the other half in the Americas.

When Rio Branco arrived in Rio de Janeiro in December 1902 to take office as Foreign Minister, the number of employees at the Secretariat had decreased to 27, rising thereafter to 38. Rio Branco undertook a personnel modernization reform, complemented by the restoration of the archives section and the installation of a library and of a map collection, in addition to other material improvements. Nearly all his successors added further improvements and personnel expansions, culminating in the major construction and restoration works during Otávio Mangabeira’s tenure. The Library building and the reform of the side buildings were solemnly inaugurated by President Washington Luis about two months before the 1930 Revolution.

The Foreign Service grew with the Republic, as the population rose from 14 million in 1889, of which 80 percent were illiterate, to an estimated 35 million in 1930. Material progress had been unquestionable. The First Republic’s 41 years formed the core of the 110 years (1870-1980) studied by Angus Maddison in World Economic Performance since 1870, in which he concluded that Brazil, with an average annual rate of 4.4%, had recorded the greatest growth among the ten representative economies (five form the OECD – the United States, Germany, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom; and five outside the OECD – URSS, China, India, Mexico, and Brazil). As pointed out, this was the era par excellence of immigration, which decisively contributed also to urbanization, industrialization, and the country’s modernization.

Complementing the focus on personalities adopted in the Brazilian Diplomatic Thinking volume, this Introduction has highlighted the main lineaments, the large sets, and the trends that traversed and unified ministerial and presidential administrations. This does not mean that the Republic’s initial cycle was a homogeneous, seamless period, a placid, tranquil river without rapids, whirlpools, or stagnant waters.

Rather, the opposite is true. Except for the few years that coincided with Rodrigues Alves’s four-year term and Afonso Pena’s two years in office, not incidentally the highpoint of the First Republic and of Rio Branco’s diplomacy, what preceded and what followed that golden age was far from creating conditions conducive to a prestigious foreign policy.

From the proclamation of the Republic coup to the 1898 funding loan, a succession of disasters demoralized the country. The extremely high inflation of the Encilhamento episode, the Navy Revolt, the Federalist Revolution in the South, summary decapitations and executions, the Canudos Rebellion, and the permanent agitation at the Military School and at the barracks gave the impression that a new, unstable, South American “republiqueta” had replaced the majesty and dignity of the Empire. Interestingly enough, the first three successful events that in some way helped legitimize the unruly new Republic were due to foreign policy: Rio Branco’s victories at the Palmas (1895) and the Amapá (1900) arbitrations and the satisfactory solution achieved with the restitution of the Trindade Island, which the British had abusively occupied.

The men that headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the turbulent years of the early Republican regime did not particularly distinguish themselves. As the Baron of Rio Branco said in a letter written when he was invited to assume that position, “nearly all the ministers became temporary employees at the Secretariat and go there daily to chat and sign papers. All the work remains concentrated in the hands of the Viscount of Cabo Frio, who has been the de facto Minister for many years.”

There is a slight exaggeration to this: Rio Branco did not like some of the Ministers, such as Dionísio Cerqueira and Olinto de Magalhães, for instance. Later, he would scratch his friend Carlos de Carvalho’s name from the list of those that “did not enjoy tedious work.” There is no denying, though, that between 1891 and 1894, the chiefs of diplomacy were seven Ministers whose names one can hardly remember (Who knows who were Leite Pereira, Oliveira Freire, João Filipe Pereira, or Alexandre Cassiano do Nascimento?). Even Olinto de Magalhães, who remained in that position the entire Campos Sales’s presidential term, came away irreversibly scratched from the first stirrings of the Acre conflict, owing to his inability to realize the seriousness of the challenge and to his ineptitude in wishing to apply to it a solution of a merely legal formalism.

Rio Branco was fortunate in working in a considerably more favorable time, not only in terms of duration (from December 1902 through February 1912) but also in terms of content, the international quality of the Belle Époque twilight, as well as, internally, the fleeting parenthesis of prosperity and civil peace. He was fortunate even to die when the situation irremediably deteriorated in both Brazil and the world. As Carlos de Laet remarked, the Revolta da Chibata (the Whip Revolt) and the threat of bombardment of the Guanabara Bay by the insurgent vessels deeply shook him, showing him how far we were from the ideal of a strong, stable country capable of projecting its prestige in the world. The armed interventions in the States (euphemistically called in the Hermes da Fonseca presidency’s “State salvations”), and the bombardment of Bahia killed his last illusions.

On the external front, the year of his death coincided with the Balkan wars, a sort of intimation of World War I, bringing closer the fateful day when the lights that had illumined his life would be extinguished one by one, paraphrasing Lord Grey’s famous phrase at the outbreak of the Great War. The war obviously narrowed even further the potential room for the diplomatic action of a country without military power, which participated in the conflict only at the end and in a merely symbolic manner. As long as the battles went on in Europe, even the Inter-American system conferences were suspended. Brazil made good business deals and exported much, but as it happened more than once under similar circumstances, it did not take long for the trade balance and the strong currency to vanish once the situation went back to normal.

The crisis of the Old Republic’s political system, which had been long under way, accelerated and hastened toward its fateful outcome. Artur Bernardes’s four years went by in a nearly permanent state of siege, as had happened to a goodly portion of the Hermes da Fonseca government. The internal problems absorbed all the available energies, leaving very little for the international front.

An emblematic example of the creative and turbulent character of the 1920s was the year of 1922, the Independence’s centennial, as well as the year of the São Paulo Modern Art Week, the foundation of the Communist Party, the introduction of the income tax, and the irruption onto the scene of Tenentismo [the Army Lieutenant’s frequent and rebellious interventions in political life] with the Revolt of the Copacabana Fort’s 18. Two years later, it would be the turn of the São Paulo Revolution, of minor movements in several States, particularly in Rio Grande do Sul, and the formation of the Miguel Costa-Prestes Column, that would cover thousands of kilometers in the Brazilian hinterland, fighting Government’s troops all along during several years, before seeking asylum in Bolivia.

The coffee-related problems aggravated and so did the difficulties in securing loans to maintain prices, owing to the New York Stock Exchange collapse. Prices plunged to a third of the original, and the export losses brutally affected foreign trade, which depended on coffee for more than 70 percent of foreign sales.

Of the six ministers after Rio Branco and before the 1930 Revolution, two (Nilo Peçanha and Domício da Gama) remained in office only few months. Of the others, four (Lauro Müller, Azevedo Marques, Felix Pacheco, and Otávio Mangabeira) it could never be said that their accomplishments were in any way comparable to the great Rio Branco’s. They lacked the requisite qualities and even if they had had them, the indispensable external and internal conditions were lacking.

I once wrote, half-jokingly, that the ministers that succeeded Rio Branco (not only the ones cited above) often gave the impression of being comparable to Portuguese writer Latino Coelho: “a style in search of a subject!” Leaving aside the exaggeration or injustice, what I meant was that Rio Branco practically exhausted the entire realizable potential of diplomatic initiatives within the reach of Brazil’s power at the time. After the definitive settlement of borders with all the neighboring countries, the “Unwritten Alliance” with the United States, and the approximation with the Latin Americans, what else was there to be done that he had not done?

Some, such as Lauro Müller, attempted to begin where Rio Branco had failed: the ABC Pact or the qualitative change in relations with the Argentines, the “permanent rivals.” As seen, none of the attempts succeeded. Artur Bernardes, Felix Pacheco, and Afrânio de Melo Franco thought they could triumph where Rio Branco had met with defeat: gaining admission into the “circle of the great international friendships,” or Brazil’s recognition as a permanent member of the Council of the League. Once again, it was appropriate to apply to these unsuccessful initiatives what Joaquim Nabuco wrote in his Diary a propos Rui Barbosa’s unsuccessful campaign in The Hague:

One does not become tall by jumping. We cannot seem tall, unless we become tall. Japan did not need to ask to be recognized as a great power after it demonstrated that it was one. (25 August 1907)

Nabuco’s argument is tantamount to criticism of diplomatic voluntarism. In somewhat more expressive terms, this is what I often heard from the late Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro: “Brazil is a country with global interests, but its power resources are limited.” Power limitation should be understood in a broad sense: the power not only to intervene decisively; it covers also the level of economic, scientific, cultural, and technologic development, as well as the degree of technical cooperation capable of imparting density to relations other than in a merely formalistic manner, from foreign ministry to foreign ministry.

The achievement of such conditions obviously results from a development process. In a speech at the Third Latin American Scientific Congress, held in 1905, the Baron of Rio Branco said:

It is essential that before half a century, at least four or five of the major Latin American nations, through noble emulation, may, similarly to our great, beloved sister to the North, compete in resources with the most powerful States in the world.

After the optimist deadline expired, Delgado de Carvalho remarked: “Fifty years since those words, it is still worth quoting them […], as they elicit meditation.” The First Republic ceased to exist more than eighty years ago and one century is past since Rio Branco’s words. Limitations may be less serious today than those confronted by Brazilian foreign policy then, or rather, they are different. However, it is still worth studying and valuing the legacy of the diplomats of that time, and not lose sight of the warnings of Joaquim Nabuco and Rio Branco.

Joaquim Nabuco

Son of the Senator and State Councilor José Thomaz Nabuco de Araújo and Ana Benigna de Sá Barreto, he was born on August 19th, 1849, in Recife. He studied at Pedro II School (1860-1865), in São Paulo (1866-1869) and Recife (1869-1870) Law Schools. He was an Attaché of the Brazilian Legation to the United States (1876-1878) and England (1878), a correspondent for Jornal do Commercio (1881-1884) in London, Deputy-General from Pernambuco (1879-1880; 1885; 1887-8) and one of the leaders of the campaign for the abolition of slavery in Brazil. In 1889, he married Evelina Torres Soares Ribeiro, with whom he had five children. With the fall of the Empire, he wrote pamphlets criticizing the Republic and went into self-exile in London (1890-1892). Back in Brazil, he participated in the organization of the Monarchist Party (1896) and of the Brazilian Academy of Letters (1897), of which he became Secretary General. In 1899, he returned to Europe on a diplomatic mission. He directed the Brazilian legation in London (1900-1905) and the recently created Brazilian Embassy in Washington (1905-1910). He chaired the Third Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro (1906). He made conferences throughout the United States (1906-1909), received doctor honoris causa titles from the Universities of Columbia (1906) and Yale (1908). He wrote newspaper articles, manifestos, poetry and books, among which stand out: O Abolicionismo (1883); Balmaceda (1895); A Intervenção Estrangeira Durante a Revolta de 1893 (1896); Um Estadista do Império: Nabuco de Araújo, Sua Vida, Suas Opiniões, Sua Época (1898-1899), Minha Formação (1900), Escritos e Discursos Literários (1901). He died in Washington, on January 17th, 1910.

Joaquim Nabuco: an Americanist diplomat

Angela Alonso[68]

Joaquim Nabuco, the diplomat, cannot be separated from Joaquim Nabuco, the aristocrat. It is as frequent as it is dangerous in the analysis of the trajectory of the individuals that stand out to resort to the argument of the “vocation”, the “talent” or the “genius”. As Norbert Elias demonstrates in his biography of Mozart, even the exceptional individual arises from a socio-political context and from social interaction networks. Taking that angle to deal with Nabuco’s diplomatic trajectory, first of all it is necessary to understand the social configuration that made it possible for this individual to ascend to the positions to which he ascended. Nabuco was not a self-made-man. Rather, to use the term dear to Pierre Bourdieu, he was an “heir”.

Being the son of an Empire statesman, born in Pernambuco, in 1849, he attended the traditional Law School, which he left in 1870, taking shortly after that an equally traditional trip to Europe for education. His first contact with diplomacy was in that condition as a member of the social elite, by means of the aristocratic salons. England dazzled him and, in it, the behavior and relations of the Brazilian Minister in London, the Baron of Penedo, in whose house he met the local political and intellectual elite (NABUCO, 1900, p. 121ff).

It was not in that so admired England that Nabuco debuted in diplomacy. His social position, the son of the political leader José Thomaz Nabuco de Araújo, gave him access to the double career (since neither of them was autonomous in the Empire) of diplomat and politician. There was a hierarchy between both, with the diplomatic posts being waiting places for political posts. Both Nabuco’s social and personal assessment was that the diplomatic position had less prestige and power than that of politics, which was what he always and firstly craved.

However, Nabuco was the son of a Liberal and he came to adulthood when the Conservative Party was ruling. Opponents occupied the political offices, filled by indication. The only thing left to do was to plead a post in diplomacy, manipulating the relations in the Court society. Nabuco sought, by means of his father, a position at Penedo’s shade. However, many other members of the social elite, equally rejected from political office, advanced similar pleas, which made diplomatic positions extremely disputed. Nabuco did not achieve his job at the Legation in London, but became Attaché at the legation of the United States. From 1876 to 1878, he lived there, in his first job. With the tolerance of the Brazilian Minister, Antonio Pedro de Carvalho Borges, he eventually went to live in New York, from where he sent his dispatches.

This first American experience was not among the most striking ones. His talents did not blossom, he lived lethargically and his enthusiasm was low. His fascination for the aristocratic society did not find a place to expand in the American bourgeois society. He lived in the new world wanting to migrate to the old one. The opportunity came when a co-worker from the Legation told him about a position in England, thanks to his own ascension to the rank of secretary (Letter from C. A. Viana de Lima to Joaquim Nabuco, August 16, 1877 CI-Fundaj).[69] Always by influence of his father, Nabuco tried to make the transference. However, none other than the son of the Baron of Penedo was one of the candidates. (Letter from the Baron of Penedo to Joaquim Nabuco, 05/16/1877 CI-Fundaj). The latter got the post.

Only with the change from the Conservative to the Liberal government, in 1878, when there was a great change of seats, did the father’s political influence fulfill the son’s dream: Joaquim Nabuco became a Brazilian diplomat in London. An ephemeral experience, which led him to believe in the superiority of European civilization.

Nabuco was not a diplomat thanks to a vocational call, he was rather compelled to be a diplomat by necessity. Diplomacy sounded to him like a provisional position. His personal ambition, as it was socially expected from the son of a statesman of the Empire, was for him to succeed his father in politics. That is what he did when Nabuco de Araújo’s death made him go back to Brazil in time to compete in the legislative elections and make his debut in Parliament in 1879. Politics stole Nabuco from diplomacy.

Interregnum

In the 1880’s, Nabuco stood out as leader of the campaign for the abolition of slavery. He plunged into politics, getting involved with the cause both intellectually and emotionally. The career as an oppositionist was full of comings and goings. During the decade, he invariably ran both into political and financial trouble. His alliance with abolitionists of civil society and his challenge to established political leaders also cost him the job of Attaché. The problem was that Nabuco only obtained a license from the post in England, expecting to come back, in one of the frequent plot twists of the party in power during the Second Empire. However, political independence charged its price, and he was forced to resign the post in 1879. The consequence was that, not being re-elected in 1881, he ended up without any post, without any partisan support and without any proper income to continue in politics.

The Baron of Penedo helped him in his plight. Guiding in extensive and powerful political and financial networks, the Baron arranged for him to be the correspondent of Jornal do Commercio in London. As such, Nabuco lived in England for the next two years. That was a time of learning. Immediately useful was the socialization in the forms of action and the pamphleting of the successful British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, which Nabuco used in the abolitionist campaign when he returned to Brazil. Another learning only disclosed its full dividends in the long run. Nabuco helped Penedo to head the Brazilian legation in London where he learned from him. Penedo represented for Nabuco the model of a kind of diplomacy based on the use of the aristocratic training – elegance, etiquette, erudition and self-control – plus a mannerism – the “charm”, the personal magnetism – for the cultivation of relationships within the social elite. A diplomacy based on sociability, which could be called social diplomacy. Nabuco put it into practice two decades later, when he reached the same, coveted post of Brazilian Minister in London, but in the 1880’s he had already understood and internalized the basic features and traits of the role. His refined Court education and his presence as a tall and showy man paved the way for the domain and the exhaustive use of the arts of courtesy – visits, cards, soirees, dinners, etc. – for the sake of diplomacy. He became a master of establishing, cultivating and maintaining multiple and various personal relation networks throughout several decades – with well-to-do families, politicians, journalists, scholars and businessmen. The latter case was due to the consulting that he obtained for companies with business in Brazil and to the demands of his column at the Jornal do Commercio, which included the coverage of foreign economics and policy.

Thus, although he did not have any diplomatic post, Nabuco’s residence in London in the 1880’s yielded dividends that became profitable for the diplomat in the future. On the one hand, the knowledge of foreign policy and economic matters, of which Nabuco was previously not even aware of, nor was he interested in them. On the other hand, getting along with Penedo made him improve himself in the requirements of social diplomacy: to speak well, to host well, to dress well, to write well and his unparalleled ability to captivate others.

In the short run, Nabuco used those skills in the campaign for the abolition of slavery. Between 1884, when he returned to Brazil, and 1888, when the end of slavery was approved in Brazil, Nabuco was a politician of body and soul. He wrote campaign pieces, his classic libel O Abolicionismo (1883) – which points to slavery as being the damaging roots of Brazilian society, economy and politics –, newspaper articles and pamphlets. He made important election campaigns and made memorable speeches in Parliament, obtaining huge public support. The combined successes in the public space and in Parliament gave him an aura, with which Nabuco entered into the national imagery: the Knight in shining armor of abolition, who had been away from diplomacy.

Anti-Americanism

By the end of the abolitionist campaign, when much of their coreligionists continued on the sister campaign, the Republican one, Nabuco isolated himself in a small group of monarchists, who envisioned the possibility of continuing with the social reforms under the monarchy. When the Republic imposed itself in 1889, many monarchists accepted it as a fait accompli. Nabuco was among those who resisted the new regime. That condition of opponent kept him away from public service for a decade, from both State policy and diplomacy. However, during that period he issued opinions on foreign policy in the pamphlets and books he wrote.

In the early years of the new regime, Nabuco wrote several texts defending the old regime and attacking the Republic, in which he compared Brazil to the other countries of the continent. Above all, he denounced the Republican emulation of the American institutions and equated the new Brazilian regime, for its faults, to Spanish America. That anti-Americanism appears in Por Que Continuo a Ser Monarquista, an open letter to Fernando Mendes, director of the Diário do Comércio, of September 7th, 1890, attacking Spanish America, that appears associated with a mischievous pair, that is, the action of “caudilhismo” and military dictatorship: “the Republic, in Latin American countries, is a government in which it is essential to give up freedom to obtain order” (NABUCO, 1890b, p. 14). In Agradecimento aos Pernambucanos, in the following year, anti-Americanism becomes more general and clearer, as American “plagiarism” (NABUCO, 1891, p. 15), in relation to the United States and as a negative view of South America: “I regret the suicidal attitude of the current generation, dragged by a verbal hallucination, that of a word Republic, discredited before the world when it appears together with the adjective South-American” (NABUCO, 1891, p. 4, emphasis by the author). Nabuco insisted on that key during Floriano Peixoto’s administration (1891-1894), denouncing that Brazil had become a victim of “caudilhos”, in the manner of the “South American forms of oppression and mismanagement” (NABUCO, 1895, p. 3), which he also went on to name as “Latin America” (NABUCO, 1893, p. 96).

During the Navy Revolt (1893-1894), Nabuco hopes to restore the monarchy and wrote against Americanism in newspaper articles, collected in two volumes: Balmaceda, in 1895, and A Intervenção Estrangeira Durante a Revolta, in 1896.[70] The pretext for the first book was to review José Manuel Balmaceda: Balmaceda, Su Gobierno y la Revolución of 1891, a work by Julio Bañados Espinosa, which narrated the Chilean crisis that culminated in the suicide of the President of the Republic. In this book, Nabuco traced a series of parallels between the Brazilian and the Chilean situation, with the latter mobilized to illuminate the former, as in the “Post-Scriptum – A Questão da América Latina”. The book operates with antithetical pairs: Monarchy and Republic, civilization and barbarism, settled and parvenus (newly wealthy people), which resulted in the parallel between both Presidents, Balmaceda in Chile and Floriano in Brazil, both of whom were leaders of the “assault of the mob to the positions defended by the ancient society” (NABUCO, 1895, p. 126; 127; 15).

In these writings, the negative assessment also included the model of the Brazilian Republican, the United States. Nabuco saw in the Americans the consubstantiation of values and lifestyle at odds with his customs and values as an aristocrat: the United States was supposedly a bourgeois and capitalist society, without the refinement of the European Courts, which lacked politeness, refinement, and high culture. Nabuco was against “Monroism”, which he defended in the following decade, because:

In our countries, where the nation stands at permanent minor age, the freedoms […] are protected only by certain principles, by some traditions [...] Institutions […] such as the American ones…do not adapt to those countries […] where the law is fragile (NABUCO, 1895, p. 36-37).

“Latin America” would be a peculiar cultural complex. Therefore, it cannot emulate the United States without artificialism. To do so would mean to transplant political institutions inadequate to the local reality. Instead, he defended the restoration of the liberal monarchy, with its social aristocracy (NABUCO, 1895, p. 142). A model that he recommended to the neighbors: “What South America needs is an extensive Moderator Power, a Power that exercises the function of arbitration between intransigent parties.” (NABUCO, 1895, p. 134-5).

His opinions about the United States stand out even more in A Intervenção Estrangeira Durante a Revolta de 1893. As the title says, the book takes the angle of diplomacy to deal with the conflict between rebels, partly monarchists, and the Republican legalists, during the Revolt of the Navy.[71] The thing is that the German, Portuguese, French, Italian, Dutch and American ships, docked at Guanabara Bay, eventually operate as arbiters of the domestic conflict. Nabuco was referring to all the countries involved, but his target was to point to the support of the Americans to the government of Floriano Peixoto as being decisive for the failure of the “Restorative Revolt” (NABUCO, 1896, p. 265). Nabuco appeared as fierce critic of the United States, which promoted an “unprecedented act”, from the point of view of International Law, of intervention in favor of the government and against the insurgents, when it sent warships that Floriano requested (NABUCO, 1896, p. 245).[72] Thus, the Americans would have acted “in relief of a South American despotism”, pretty much in accordance with their Monroe Doctrine, which Nabuco considered as being deleterious: “… the protection, the intervention, the help is always, in history, the first way in which the shadow of the protectorate is cast over an independent State” (NABUCO, 1896, p. 258).

Thus, in that early Republic, Nabuco presented himself as anti-Americanist. His association with Americanism, with the action of military “caudilhos” (Latin America) or intervention (the United States) was in tune with the writings of other monarchists, such as Rodolfo Dantas, Eduardo Prado and the Baron of Rio Branco – even though the last one was in the diplomatic service under the Republican government. All of them were involved, either directly or indirectly, in the organization of a Monarchist Party, for which Nabuco wrote the manifesto, on January 12th, 1896.

Thus, although Nabuco did not have any diplomatic post for almost the entire 1890’s, he systematically issued opinions about foreign policy. Brazil should stay the course given by the Empire, of solid friendship with Europe, independence in relation to the United States and critical detachment in relation to Spanish America.

Back to diplomacy

During the 1890’s, Nabuco made the policy that was within his reach, as one of the articulators of the Monarchist Party. However, Nabuco acknowledged that D. Pedro II’s death in 1891, and the outcome of the Revolt of the Navy, suppressed by Floriano Peixoto’s administration in 1894, made the return to the monarchy unfeasible. At that time he retreated to literary subjects and to historiography, publishing two books that became classics, Um Estadista do Império (1897-9) and Minha Formação (1900). The crushing of both of his restoration hopes and of his personal finances, which was the result of terrible investment decisions, forced him to make peace with the new regime by the late 1890’s. In that situation, the return to diplomacy again was not a choice, but as an imperative of circumstances.

The incorporation of a monarchist to the Republican public service can be explained by a peculiarity of the Republic regime setting, which, with scarce staff, kept men of monarchist belief in their diplomatic posts, such as the already mentioned case of the Baron of Rio Branco. Nabuco was re-incorporated to the diplomatic career thanks to his aristocratic background, which had provided him with the requested features – historical, political and literary erudition; the mastery of foreign languages, oratory, writing and etiquette. Thanks also to the social ties that, as an aristocrat, he cultivated as a value in itself. In 1899, when the president was Campos Sales, his former fellow at Parliament during Empire years Nabuco received from Olinto de Magalhães, Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposal to produce a document sustaining the Brazilian position on the dispute with Britain regarding the border with British Guyana. He replied,

in a matter that was entirely national, as is the case of the claim of Brazilian territory against foreign intentions, it would actually be going against the tradition of the past that for years I try to gather and grow, for me to invoke a political dissent. (...) (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Olinto de Magalhães, March 05, 1899 CI-Fundaj).

He was appointed on March 9th. On this mission, Nabuco worked within his circle of personal relations, which included the Brazilian Minister in England, Arthur Souza Correa, and the Baron of Rio Branco, whose reputation grew, thanks to successes in border disputes. Nabuco supposed that both Souza Correa and Rio Branco were involved with the matter of British Guyana. The problem had been going on since the expedition of the Royal Geographical Society in 1838, when the British declared that the Pirara region, which provided access to the Amazon basin, belonged to them. Brazil challenged that and, in 1842, the two countries signed a Treaty of Limits. The subject cooled until 1888, when a bilateral committee was established to study it and, in 1891, Lord Salisbury and Souza Correa started to negotiate. The diplomatic dispute became heated in 1895, when England invaded the Island of Trinidad. In 1897, Rio Branco prepared a memoir defending the watershed line, in the lowlands between the Rupunami and the Tacutu Rivers. In January 1899, it was decided that the matter should be solved by arbitration. That was when Nabuco came in, being in charge of providing the grounds for the Brazilian position. He, who admired England so much, returned to the public scene needing to go against the British.

The task forced Nabuco to make a professional conversion. Without any chance of a return to politics, for the first time, he looked to diplomacy as a profession and a career. At that time, he had to master new skills in order to rise in a new field.

In this field, Nabuco acted in two fronts. One of them was argumentative. The grounding of the Brazilian claim, to be presented to the arbiter, the Italian King, demanded him to write a memoir, compiling and commenting on abundant documentation, in order to support the central argument, uti possidetis. In this front, Nabuco also needed to develop coordination and command skills, in order to select and direct a team of assistants, who were experts in the topics he was not very familiar with, such as geography and topography, and whom he recruited within the younger generation, whom he had met in the circuit of the Brazilian Academy of Letters (his refuge during Floriano’s government): thus hiring Graça Aranha, his Secretary, Caldas Viana and Domício da Gama.[73] The other front was to build a base of political support for the Brazilian position. Nabuco handled his social capital, by using the network of personal relationships that he already had in Europe and building new relations within the Italian elite, thus seeking support alliances for the arguments of his memoir.

The process was full of incidents. After gathering a team, he went to France, where he went to talk to Rio Branco, who until then was a sincere comrade. Then he went to England in search of documents, where the relationship with Souza Correa, another friend from his youth, was tense. Although he could not negotiate directly with the British, Nabuco made use of his social network and his renovated charisma, and this ostensible presence in the diplomatic means bothered Souza Correa. The relationship between them soured and Nabuco ended up leaving England. After all, he could work anywhere to produce a memoir. Therefore, not being able to stay in his favorite place, London, he settled in St. Germain-en-Laye, with his family.

Soon after that, he went back. Souza Correa died suddenly. Nabuco was nearby, and he had all the qualifications to succeed him. He mobilized his social network. The backstage tack with Tobias Monteiro, Minister of Finance, and Olinto de Magalhães, Minister of Foreign Affairs, worked. In July 1900, at 50 years old, he was elevated to Provisional Chief of the Brazilian Legation in England and, later, to holder of the Post.

There, in a far-reaching post, Nabuco actually made diplomatic policy in a broad and strategic sense, operating as the active representative of the Brazilian interests. He was also able to put into practice all the knowledge of the years in which the Baron of Penedo was the head of the Legation. Nabuco orchestrated his social diplomacy, aware of the importance of sociability to obtaining and maintaining political relations, organized dinners and banquets with prominent figures, events appealing to the press – reported in the Daily News, the Express and eventually in the Times. When he was not the host, he attended. Thus, he came close to powerful families, such as the Rothchilds, the official bankers of Brazil. Nabuco considered that an indispensable part of diplomacy was to impress and persuade. He always chatted a lot and with many people.

This profession of weaving relationships, organizing and attending ceremonies, was what he liked the most in the diplomatic career. In turn, he did not like the bureaucratic routine: “To administer is the most complicated of all professions” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Tobias Monteiro, December 25, 1900. In: Nabuco, org., 1949). In addition, the pressures for influence trafficking and the attempts to catch him making bargains irritated him (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, 1/1902). He even had to disprove in public, in 1901, a Brazilian whom he did not even know and who had tried to do business using his name. Such petty affairs made him tired from the post.

However, he was not thinking about resigning at the time of the election that led Rodrigues Alves to the Presidency in 1902. As often happens in such occasions, both posts and people were changed. The new president was a politician from the Empire. Nabuco knew him well, they had been classmates at Pedro II School. Nevertheless, Rodrigues Alves was a politician trained in the old Conservative Party, who surrounded himself with similar people, starting with Rio Branco, the son of one of the Conser-vative leaders of the Second Empire. That similarity of origin, as Nabuco reminded Rio Branco[74], in addition to his recent diplomatic successes, guided the choice of Rio Branco as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Before accepting, the Baron indicated Nabuco for the position (Lins, 1995:246), entirely aware of the low chances that his friend would be invited to be the Minister. Nabuco thought that the courtesy included a plan by the Baron to transfer him to Rome. He got bored: that post was less important than London and “here at least it was not understood why I was offered a lower position” (Letter of Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, September 02, 1902. In: Nabuco, org., 1949). In addition, provisionally because Nabuco understood that Rio Branco wanted Rome to himself, if he did not like the ministry – so he was “very annoyed because I did not keep the place for him...” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, November 22, 1902 CI-Fundaj).

The dissent turned into a fight, when they saw each other in Paris. Nabuco thought about resigning[75]. However, his only occupation was diplomacy, his personal capital had been Dona Evelina’s dowry, which was entirely lost in disastrous applications in the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange, in the early 1890’s. He needed the job, but remained in it uncomfortably, since Rio Branco took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus becoming his boss.

It was in this environment that Nabuco concluded his memoir about Guyana. He worked in a comprehensive and tireless manner, with devotion and concentration only matched by his effort to write his father’s biography. He relied on the help of assistants, but little of Rio Branco, despite his requests by letter. In February 1903, the work began to be disclosed. Frontières du Brésil et de la Guyane Anglaise. Le Droit du Brésil, the first memoir, contained five volumes between main text and attachments. The reply to the British arguments was published in three volumes in August of the same year, under the title La Prétention Anglaise; Notes Sur la Partie Historique du Premier Mémorie Anglais; La Preuve Cartographique. In February 1904, there was the publication of the last part, the four volumes of the Rejoinder: La Construction des Mémoires Anglais; Histoire de la Zone Constestée Selon le Contre-Mémoire Anglais; Reproduction des Documents Anglais Suivis de Brèves Observations; Exposé Final. All the work was based on the same arguments, especially in the doctrine of uti possidetis, already used in the Second Empire and mobilized by Rio Branco in previous disputes. Nabuco tried to demonstrate that Brazil had priority over the disputed territory, for which he relied on documents such as records of travelers and international treaties, as well as of historical conjectures. The text was full of quotations, and was torrential, which was nothing like his own style or Rio Branco’s.[76]

The memoirs went, along with their author, to Rome, since King Victor Emanuel, of Italy, was the arbiter of the dispute. There, Nabuco put into practice “my campaign”: several social events, throughout 1904, by means of which he tried to persuade the Italian Court about the supremacy of the Brazilian arguments vis-à-vis the British. However, both the argument of uti possidetis and its social diplomacy failed. On June 14th, he received the opposite verdict. The Italian King defined that the territory in dispute should be divided based on the watershed, which gave three-fifths to the British, which England had offered to Brazil in 1891. In addition, the British gained access to the Amazon basin.

Nabuco got depressed with the defeat, but he was consoled by the Brazilian press and by approximately 50 letters of support from old friends. Rio Branco signed none of them.

The defeat in the dispute with England weakened Nabuco politically. On the other hand, Rio Branco’s prestige turned into popularity when he solved the conflict with Bolivia and the addition of Acre to Brazil. That was an unequal relationship, one was the boss, and the other was subordinate, one collected victories, and the other embittered a failure. The balance of power was swinging towards Rio Branco, who was able to have an influence on the permanence, or not, of Nabuco as Brazilian Foreign Minister in London. If he had to leave England, Nabuco preferred to go to Rome. He stayed in neither.[77] Rio Branco surprised him, naming him to a newly created position.

At that time, Rio Branco wanted to solidify the relationship with the United States and raised the Brazilian Legation to an Embassy. The Baron made a pragmatic decision (LINS, 1995, p. 315ff). Being a monarchist like Nabuco, he admired Europe, but he followed, vigilant, the development of the continent’s rich cousin. The Republicans not only looked at the United States, but they also increased business with them. Salvador de Mendonça, the first Republican to head the Brazilian Legation in Washington, put into practice political and economic cooperation agreements between both countries.[78] Subsequent heads of the Legation, Assis Brasil and Alfredo Gomes Ferreira maintained that approach policy. When it was time to nominate for the position, Rio Branco weighed that the United States was already the biggest buyer of Brazilian coffee and rubber and, in addition, Mexico had exchanged Ambassadors with Washington, and Argentina planned to do that, and that it was inconvenient for Brazil to do so. A greater rapprochement with the United States would also make it easier to protect the national territory, if the European imperialism advanced towards South America. There were also disadvantages, since with the “Roosevelt corollary” the United States became guardians of the continent, ready to intervene in domestic spheres if that was the case, of which Venezuela, Dominican Republic, and Cuba, among others, were aware. The economic and military superiority of the Americans, however, did not leave many alternatives. A negotiated Alliance was the best alternative available. This range of reasons placed within Rio Branco’s sight the consolidation of what Bradford Burns (1966) coined an “unwritten alliance”, in which Brazil was willing to open itself for a preferential bilateral collaboration with the United States. The signaling was to elevate the legation in Washington to an Embassy.

The national press – O País, Gazeta de Notícias, Jornal do Commércio, applauded his decision. On the contrary, for the incumbent it was “an earthquake” (Letter from Nabuco to Evelina June 19, 1904 CI-Fundaj). In 1905, Nabuco was named grudgingly. He did not achieve anything in his attempts to find another position, and he only left because he believed it was provisional, until he reached a better place. He never thought that he would die in Washington.

Pan-Americanist ambassador

While he still served in England, Nabuco gradually changed his mind concerning the international scene. His unlimited youthful admiration for the British was declining, partly because of the English expansionism in Africa and Asia, but also because of the disappointment produced by the diplomatic clash about British Guyana. Moreover, as head of Legation in London, his arrogance in face of Spanish America increased again, when he saw Brazil compared to the rest of South America. Of all people, he, who had criticized Americanism so much from an aristocratic point of view in the 1890’s, saw himself victimized by the British aristocratism: he noticed that the South American Chancellors were not invited to the English Royal House, unlike what happened with the Europeans. That sum of factors withered both his Europeanism and his anti-Americanism. Nabuco was somewhat disillusioned with the old aristocratic splendor of the British Empire and began to pay attention to the rising star in the sky of the nations, the United States.

Although annoyed, and always defining himself as interim in the post, he took over the Embassy in Washington, putting all his skills into practice. He had the immediate mercy of the press[79] and of local politicians in the United States, which was so hard to obtain in England. The warm welcome made him consider a longer stay, “If I see a) that I can serve and b) if the government provides me the means, I will stay until I can resign” (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, June 22, 1905). As in his first time in Washington, he went on a journey, this time from coast to coast, in order to get to know the environment in which he would perform. Gradually, he found advantages in the new post.

As an Ambassador, he operated in his two already common fronts. On the one hand, he used social diplomacy. In that sphere, he was magnificent. His aristocratic manners, his courtesy, his elegance, which made him, during his entire life, an expert in personal relations, had the best effects in the American environment. He opened a salon, offered large dinners and pompous events that attracted attention (from the Evening Mail and the New York Times, for example). He used Penedo’s lesson abundantly: the salons as a space for political tack. He cultivated friendships with diplomats from all over and built a special relationship with President Theodore Roosevelt and especially with the Secretary of State Elihu Root (Nabuco Diaries, 12/1905; June 11, 1906ff). Nabuco won prestige due to his manners and he never thought about taking on the local bourgeois lifestyle, with which he never sympathized, but, to be better accepted in the American society, he improved his own style, since “Here it is necessary to be American as in Rome, a Roman” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, May 22, 1905 CI-Fundaj). This “being American” to Nabuco meant a complete overhaul of his anti-Americanism.

His other front of action as Ambassador was exactly the diffusion of a rhetoric that he himself named “Pan-Americanism”. Nabuco, the Anti-American monarchist of the 1890’s, became an emphatic Americanist. His goal was to narrow the relationship between Brazil and the United States and make Brazil rise to the leadership of South American countries. Since his first speech in the new post, at the time of the official opening of the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, on May 18th, 1905, he revealed this new and even surprising stance to one who had been raised in fervent admiration for the European civilization. It was because now his assessment of the international scene was the expansion of imperialism, which made it urgent for Brazil to align itself with a strong ally: “Our choice is between Monroism and the European recolonization”. While as a monarchist intellectual he had preferred the political proximity with Europe, as Ambassador of the Republic he chose the other option: “I speak the Monroist language” (Letter from Nabuco to Graça Aranha, December 17, 1905. In: Nabuco, org., 1949).

His Americanism was in defense of bilateral economic, fiscal and political agreements. He always talked about “Pan-Americanism”. The word was in vogue since the conferences that grouped countries of the continent, which began in the nineteenth century (ARDAO, 1986, p. 157ff). Nabuco adopted it, but used it less to emphasize the continental integration than to denote the Alliance between Brazil and the United States. His “American policy” was “towards a perfect intelligence with this country [the United States]” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Afonso Pena, December 02, 1905, CP-Nabuco, 1949, emphasis by Nabuco). It is that, besides considering a superiority by the United States, Nabuco saw another one in Brazil: the Empire would have built a civilization, in politics, economics and manners, above the level of the Spanish former colonies (Cf. ALONSO, 2010).

The oratory skills of the times of abolitionist campaign were revived: the same passion, a new cause. Nabuco faced Pan-Americanism as an opinion movement in the manner of abolitionism. The strategy was the same: campaign journeys to “shape the opinion”. (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha February 15, 1906 CP - Nabuco, 1949). The difference is that now he had to convince the Americans instead of the Brazilians, hence the comparison between both campaigns, reliving in the American memory its own icon in this area: in a speech in Michigan he compared the present Monroism to Lincoln’s abolitionism (NABUCO, 1906c:02).

The resonance, however, was very different from the one that he had found during the abolitionist campaign. When he was young, while much of his generation ardently admired the United States, Nabuco admired the European civilization. When he finally turned to the Americans, many of his companions of the same generation had changed their reference. In the beginning of the Republic Brazil had undergone an emphatic Americanism, taking the United States as a mirror. At the turn of the century, Americanism changed its tone to point the community towards the former colonies of Spanish America (PREUSS, 2011). A Latin-Americanism that sought the commonality with neighbors based on cultural and even racial basis (Anglo-Saxons and Iberians) and moved away from the Americans, considered as being imperialists (MORSE, 1988). Members of the generation immediately subsequent to Nabuco who were also in the diplomatic service, such as Manuel de Oliveira Lima[80] and Manuel Bonfim[81], advocated that kind of alignment. Both of them criticized in an acute and public manner the American “imperialism”, according to the former, or its “parasitism”, as the latter named, in relation to Latin American economy, politics and culture. Such Latin-Americanism could jeopardize the rapprochement that Nabuco tried to operate between the United States and Brazil and that could strengthen another path, namely the ABC Alliance (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile).

For that reason, Nabuco asked Rio Branco for an explicit manifestation in favor of his position and to the detriment of the other[82]: “Never, in my opinion, a Brazilian was so much in charge of the destiny of our country as you are in face of the two paths you can take: the American and the other, which I do not know how to name, Latin American, independent or lonely” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, December 19, 1905 - CP Nabuco, 1949). However, Rio Branco was not an Americanist in the same way as Nabuco. At the same time in which he created the Embassy in the United States, he opened another one in the Vatican and smaller representations almost in the entire American continent – except for Haiti and Santo Domingo. He also did not close the doors to Latin-Americanism and the ABC Alliance. Thus, he did not have an exclusive tendency towards the United States, as Nabuco asked him to have. Instead, he sought to keep the line of the Second Empire, a discourse of independence and selective alliances with the United States (cf. BUENO, 2003). There were varying degrees of Americanism, the more moderate one by Rio Branco and the more emphatic one by Nabuco.

This was not the only divergence between Nabuco and Rio Branco. They diverged on several minor issues until they disagreed on a major one. It was in November 1905. A German vessel, the Panther, was singled out as having invaded a Brazilian port. In times of fear of expansion of German imperialism over Brazil, the episode generated strong reaction from the Brazilian government. Rio Branco asked Nabuco to talk to American newspapers to support the Brazilian position, but he did not instruct him to ask for Washington’s support. Nabuco did this for himself, even though informally, when he reported the facts to Root, which, in turn, called the German Ambassador in the United States. The news raced in the Brazilian press and raised protests in Parliament. Then the Minister ordered him to apologize somehow. Nabuco was offended, “because they want to turn me into a scapegoat” (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, January 12, 1906). The case soon fizzled out, since Germany apologized to Brazil, but the already weakening Nabuco-Rio Branco relationship suffered another blow because of it.

Political Pan-Americanism

The emphatic Americanism of Nabuco was opposed in Brazil. All the difficulties to turn his project of alignment with the United States into a policy proved themselves in two episodes: the Pan-American Conference in Brazil, in 1906, and The Hague Confe-rence in 1907. In these events a gradient was established, made up of three differential diplomatic positions: 1) that of Nabuco, who, being the Ambassador in Washington, endorsed that the axis of Brazilian diplomacy should be the alignment with the United States; 2) that of Oliveira Lima, for example, of preferred alliances in South America, a Latin-Americanism; and 3) that of Rio Branco, who was trying to balance these poles and not to move Brazil away from Europe.

In the Pan-American case, the very fact of hosting the Conference in Brazil already had Nabuco’s touch. His proximity to Root was profitable within the Bureau of the American Republics, a Forum that organized Pan-American Conferences aimed at advancing cooperation and non-aggression agreements, with rotating seats. After Washington (1889) and Mexico (1902), Venezuela had been a candidate to host the third one in 1906. However, Nabuco thought that taking the Conference to Brazil would emphasize the importance of the country as compared to the other Latin American countries. He obtained backing from Costa Rica and Chile. For Root it was not bad business, especially in the face of Nabuco’s Pan Americanism and of the far less close relations with Venezuela. Nabuco was bubbly when he achieved his goal: “I want to turn the Congress into a great success and the visit of the Secretary of State into a major event” (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, December 12, 1906).

The choice of Brazil, however, did not blow Brazilian politicians and diplomats away, as he expected. It was time for a new presidential change and each of them was concerned about ensuring their own space in the new government. Nabuco realized he had to do the same. He asked Afonso Pena, who had been elected, for support for his Americanist policy, otherwise, “maybe it would be best not to have in here such a declared Monroist as I am...” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Afonso Pena, December 02, 1905, CP Nabuco, 1949). In a draft letter in his diary, he was even more explicit: “If the American policy is not settled there with a visit by Mr. Root, I will feel uncomfortable in Washington” (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, December 17, 1905).

In the preparation of the Conference, scheduled for July 1906, Nabuco defined the program, in agreements with both Root and Brazil – Rio Branco, both Presidents, the new one and the one who was leaving, Rodrigues Alves – and consultations with the participating countries. His goal was to form a bloc that included, in addition to Brazil and the United States, the participation of Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica. On the other hand, he preferred to keep away from Argentina’s Latin-Americanism, whose Chancellor, Luís Maria Drago, wanted to discuss what became known as the Drago Doctrine, to ensure non-intervention in countries for debt recovery. Nabuco, who was already at loggerheads with Oliveira Lima because of his friend’s poignant Latin-Americanism, asked Rio Branco to transfer the debate about the Drago Doctrine to The Hague. “A general agreement of all American Nations is even more impossible than among the European ones” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to the Baron of Rio Branco, March 10, 1906 CI-Fundaj). Rio Branco agreed with this point.

In order to compensate for the problems with the program, Nabuco strived for the social side of the event, in which he always did well. He led the decorations, lodgings, parallel programming of dinners, guest list, always keeping the media abreast of everything, so that it reported best. To host, for the first time, the United States Secretary of State in Brazil was a high honor that Nabuco promoted as much as he could, which enchanted the American: “... President [Roosevelt] told me that if I had not come to Washington, Mr. Root would not have gone to Brazil, because his solution to go, came as a result of the impression I made on him.” (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, January 29, 1906). The visit itself was a victory of his Americanism.

However, Brazil did not seem to share the same joy. He wrote to Rio Branco, concerned about the “lack of Monroist warmth within the government and the country” while hosting Root (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, December 21, 1905). Even the condition about which he was certain at first, that he would be the Chairman of the Conference, was only accepted with some hesitation. Nabuco longed for demonstrations of prestige for himself and for his policy of preferential approach with the United States. Rio Branco was evasive because he had not the same conviction as Nabuco about said approach. Both the Latin-Americanist voices and the reservation in relation to American foreign policy started to rise in the country. Thus, Rio Branco preferred to be cautious and his Americanism was much more moderate than Nabuco’s. The fault of that was the anti-imperialist tendency, whose most furious and effective representative was Oliveira Lima, since, in addition to the diplomatic position in Venezuela, he wrote in the newspaper, O Estado de S. Paulo. His articles – which were collected and published the following year in Panamericanism (Monroe, Bolivar, Roosevelt), defended the South American unit and the refusal of the “imperialist” protectorate of the United States (Oliveira Lima, 1907, p. 78-9; 44).

Nabuco had asked Rio Branco for measures to moderate Oliveira Lima’s tone and he wrote to his, until then, personal friend, “You seem interested in the failure of the Conference, take the side of Venezuela, condemn those who assist me (...)” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Oliveira Lima, March 01, 1906. In: Nabuco, org., 1949). As explosive as usual, Oliveira Lima reacted in a violent manner, as Nabuco told Graça Aranha “... that my attitude of excessive Americanism was very badly seen by everyone in Latin America, in Brazil and in the government itself; that he was admired because I was angry not at Rio Branco who spoke behind my back, etc., etc.” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha, April 02, 1906. In: Nabuco, org., 1949). For all those reasons, when he embarked to Brazil, Nabuco feared a shipwreck, “both personally and regarding Mr. Root and the Conference” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, June 19, 1906 CI-Fundaj).

The Conference was not the disaster that he had foreseen, but it was not the reiteration of Pan-Americanism that he had longed for either. The event, which lasted one month, started on July 23rd, 1906, under the Chairmanship of Nabuco and the presence of representatives from 19 countries – Venezuela and Haiti boycotted. The press covered everything, a social success. In his speech on July 19th, at the Casino Fluminense, he tried to lighten the mood, backing his Pan-Americanism in the Brazilian tradition and calming those who accused him of American imperialism: “there is no American danger!”, he said. However, politicians reacted with less enthusiasm than he expected. Rio Branco was one of the Presidents of Honor of the Conference – the other one being Root – and he disappointed Nabuco in both his speeches. In face of the rising Latin Americanism, on the one hand, and the possibility to narrow the alliances with the United States, on the other hand, Rio Branco preferred to show balance. Although he pointed to the link with the United States, he did not let it overshadow the ties with the nations of the old world (LINS, 1995, p. 336ff).

Thus, even without a peremptory Pan-Americanist statement by the Brazilian government, Nabuco had a magnificent event, crowned with a symbolic gesture: the building where the event took place was named “Monroe Palace”. The practical result, however, was meager. Because of mutual vetoes of the several countries, part of the agenda did not advance. Few resolutions were approved: the indication of reorganization of the Bureau of the American Republics; the establishment of a committee to debate codes of International Law among American countries; the exchange of information on natural resources; the incentive to the continental trade; ideas about a Pan American Railway and a new event to discuss only matters concerning the coffee economy.[83] After the Conference, Nabuco received multiple and varied honors in Rio, in Minas Gerais, Recife, Salvador. He was still an icon, capable of arousing the love of crowds, but they still considered him a star of the old abolitionist campaign, scarcely interested in the new, Pan-Americanist one.

The blockbuster and the presence in Brazil when Afonso Pena’s Ministry was being organized, which welcomed Nabuco warmly, stimulated speculations that he could become Minister (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, August 10; August 16, 1906 CI-Fundaj). A Letter from the President himself gave rise to that: “For any reason, I would do without your cooperation during my Government, at the post in which you judge that you can serve our fatherland best” (Letter from Afonso Pena to Joaquim Nabuco, August 30, 1906 CI-Fundaj). Nabuco supposed that “Rio Branco’s reign” was about to end – “I fear that he might be his own successor” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha, in December 17, 1905. In: Nabuco, org., 1949) – and that his own reign might be about to start. Nabuco, however, witnessed Rio Branco being led back to Office and his own reconfirmation as Ambassador in Washington.

When he went back to Washington, he saw himself more or less as he was before the journey to Brazil. His relationship with the American government remained excellent, mainly the partnership with Root in the reorganization of the Bureau of the American Republics, which was renamed the “Pan-American Union” – and that became, much later, the Organization of American States. With Rio Branco, in turn, the relationship did not change. Nabuco asked him to reciprocate the visit of the American Secretary of State to Brazil, with Rio Branco himself going to Washington, which the Baron did not do. That state of fraying of relations defined the profile of the Brazilian delegation in the Second Peace Conference of The Hague, scheduled for June of the following year.

In the preparation for the new Conference, Nabuco thought it was natural that, since he had chaired the Pan-American Conference, he would be in charge of heading the Brazilian delegation,[84] especially because there were items in one Conference agenda that reappeared in the other, such as the Drago Doctrine. However, Rio Branco appointed Rui Barbosa. Nabuco would be part of the delegation, but without command. He felt neglected: “... I cannot go to The Hague as second and he [Rui Barbosa] can only go as first.... No nation sent an Ambassador to the Hague at the First Conference as a second delegate” (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, February 28, 1907). The solution he found was asking for sick leave. Later, he accepted a compromise solution: his appointment in an “extraordinary mission in Europe,” preparing for the Brazilian participation in The Hague – which he later tried to back out of. The fact is that he left towards Europe in an undefined position and, once he was there, he tried to coordinate preparations for The Hague.

His relationship with Rui Barbosa was full of difficulties. They had known each other for more than three decades, they were militants together in the Liberal Party and in the abolitionist campaign, but they had moved away from each other since the Republican coup. Nabuco tried a personal approach. He sent him Notas Confidenciais, in which he mapped the diplomats who might participate in the Hague and their possible strategies – since “you are not a career diplomat” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rui Barbosa, July 13, 1907), (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rui Barbosa June 13, 1907. In: Alencar & Santos, 1999). It took a long time before they chatted in person and, when that happened, he conveyed to Rui, “the American government has great interest that the Second Conference in The Hague lead to some progress of International Law with regard to the limitation of the use of force to charge pecuniary claims among nations” (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, July 21, 1907). This item, the right for capture at high-sea in wars and the organization of a Permanent Court of Arbitration, were under discussion. Nabuco wanted to influence the formulation of the Brazilian position on such matters, but Rui did not give him space. He rarely answered his letters – “Send me something that concerns you at the Conference, so I do not get to know what is of interest to me only by the newspapers” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rui Barbosa June 29, 1907. In: Nabuco, org., 1949). Thrown out of the center of decisions, Nabuco withdrew in the medicinal waters of Vittel. He was already thinking about retirement (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, June 25, 1907).

That was why in The Hague Conference, both information and opinions by Nabuco had relatively low weight in the definition of the Brazilian strategy, which was centralized in the hands of Rio Branco and Rui Barbosa. Contrary to the sincere approach with the United States, which Nabuco advocated, Rui and Rio Branco led the negotiation in the opposite direction. This also had to do with the stance of the Americans who also did not demonstrate to Brazil the deference that Nabuco expected in the organization of the Council of Nations that was discussed at the time. They lined up with Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, England, Italy, Japan and Russia, claiming permanent seats for this main group, while the other countries would have temporary mandates. In the face of this, Rio Branco instructed Barbosa (LINS, 1995) to block on behalf of Latin America. In letters from the period, it can be seen that if Nabuco had been the Brazilian delegate, he would have tried to act in another direction, that is, he would accept the deal suggested by the American Ambassador to elevate Brazil to the category of countries with a permanent seat at the Court. The rhetoric of Barbosa was that of the equality of all nations, but his group of supporters were the delegates from Latin America. In that sense, the Brazilian stance ultimately appeared to be closer to Latin-Americanism. Nabuco knew that the privileged relationship of Brazil with the United States would thus be jeopardized, without taking into consideration the principles of realpolitik. The demand for equality among the nations, however good as a principle, would have no effectiveness at all – “we cannot impose it on the world” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha, September 02, 1907 CP. In: Nabuco, 1949) since the economic and military inequality among the countries was a fact. In addition, before him, Nabuco preferred to align Brazil with those that were above it in this hierarchy, than to let it be levelled down. At some moment that direction was taken into consideration, but Rui Barbosa preferred other allies on the top floor, such as Japan and Germany. The Rui Barbosa-Rio Branco strategy was, in coalition with Latin America, not to sign the Convention. Barbosa left the conference praised as “Eagle of the Hague”, but the United States came out, at least temporarily, of the portfolio of preferred allies. According to Nabuco, Rio Branco “took advantage of the Hague to carry out South American politics, popularity and national legend” (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, October 10, 1907), while Rui Barbosa “undid everything I had achieved” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, September 30, 1907 CI-Fundaj),[85] in the bilateral relation between Brazil and the United States.

Thus, Nabuco’s position was minoritarian both in the Pan-American Conference, when he did not obtain from Rio Branco the peremptory statement in favor of the alliance with the United States, and in The Hague, where he could not be the Brazilian delegate, nor could he influence decisively on the position of the Brazilian government.

Back in Washington, Nabuco tried to correct the damage caused to the so well constructed approach with Root. He did damage control. He tried to convince Barbosa to go to the United States, in a friendship gesture between both countries (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rui Barbosa, October 22, 1907). Barbosa refused. He tried support from other Brazilian authorities to his Pan-Americanism, he insisted, “we cannot hesitate between the United States and Spanish America” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Alexandre Barbosa July 07, 1907, Nabuco, 1949). Nabuco considered that the pendulum was swinging to the latter: the alignment in the Hague strengthened Latin Americanists and advocates of the ABC Alliance, of Brazil with Argentina and Chile, which seemed to him as a change of the axis of the Brazilian foreign policy, in the opposite direction to that in which he worked. That was why he seriously considered leaving his post: “...start thinking about replacing me, if our foreign policy undergoes this transformation to change its security axis from the United States to the Plata River” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, January 18, 1908).

However, the ABC Alliance did not advance because of a disagreement between Argentina and Brazil, caused by the Argentinean Minister Zeballos. Not even in that case the United States was rehabilitated as the preferred friend, as Nabuco would have liked. It is because Root tried to calm down the tempers between Brazil and Argentina, and Rio Branco considered that gesture interventionism, another proof that the Pan-Americanist strategy would not be as profitable as Nabuco supposed it would be (Diary of Joaquim Nabuco, December 08, 1908). Also in the economic sphere, in 1909, the US Congress threatened to tax the Brazilian coffee in the United States. In this occasion Nabuco worked together with Rio Branco, always mobilizing Root and his replacement as Secretary of State, Philander Chase Knox, as American diplomats, members of Parliament and tradesmen. He won support, until he finally obtained the most important one, that of the president himself, who was now William Taft. The result was free entrance into the American market for Brazilian coffee, as well as cocoa, rubber and animal skins (DENNISON, 2006, p. 187).

Events like this made Nabuco somewhat less optimistic about the success of his emphatic Americanism. He was concerned about the growth of imperialism, suspecting that it would end, as it actually did, in a World War. For that reason, in the last few years of his life, he tried hard to avoid disputes proper to the continent, playing a decisive role, still in 1909, on a diplomatic incident between Chile and the United States – the Alsop Matter – for which he negotiated the solution by means of the appointment of an arbitrator. The episode, in which Rio Branco supported him, renewed Nabuco’s prestige within the United States. Nevertheless, there was no longer any space for the privileged relations that he had planned when he took over the Embassy in 1905. Rio Branco did not provide him with the decisive support and the full autonomy that he desired so much – “He had wanted a robot” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha, December 01, 1908. In: Nabuco, org., 1949). Nabuco complained about the difficulties to work because of the friction in their relationship:

He [Rio Branco] should start thinking about replacing me. In addition to our different orientation (he trusts Germany, France, England, Chile, and Argentina, and I do not know who else, while I only trust the United States), I am tired and disappointed with my mission here without full agreement with him. (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Hilário de Gouvea, January 19, 1909. In: Nabuco, org., 1949).

Nabuco wanted to migrate to another post and live out the end of his life – already seriously ill from Polycythemia, which, killed him the following year – in the Vatican. Rio Branco denied the transfer.

Cultural Pan-Americanism

The last few years of Nabuco were of loss of influence. Unable to set the dominant line of the Brazilian foreign policy, stuck in the United States, without being able to make the Americanist policy, as he would like to have done, aging and ill, he waited for his retirement or for the change of Minister. Despite yet another change of President, Rio Branco remained. Therefore, if the definition of the political line of the Brazilian diplomacy was not within his reach, he supposed that what he could do was cultural diplomacy.

That was when he started shining again, in a Pan-Americanist campaign, with which he went to clubs and several American universities. He rescued his youth strategy that was so successful in the abolitionist campaign, when he had tried to persuade the public opinion, when he considered the government refractory to changes. As an old man, he considered doing the same thing with Pan-Americanism, that is, to persuade the American public of the benefits of a preferred alliance with Brazil, using his attributes, his intelligence, his erudition and his charisma.

In the brief improvised writings, which he produced while he was at his post in Washington, mainly in the last three years, after which he migrated to a cultural Pan-Americanism, he underlined Brazilian cultural specificity in terms of language, culture and political tradition as compared to other Latin American countries. He spread those ideas in conferences in American universities. His Pan-Americanism appeared more multipurpose, unifying the Americas. At Yale University, in 1908, before Hispanics, he lectured “on behalf of Latin America” (NABUCO, 1909, p. 166). In two events of 1909, in the tribute to the sculptor Saint Gaudens and at the inauguration of the new building of the Bureau of the American Republics, he emphasized the unity of the Americas, “we are all sons of Columbus [...], all sons of Washington [...]”. The same sentence had appeared two years earlier, in a speech at the Liberal Club of Buffalo, New York: “(...) we, the peoples of all America are as much the children of Washington as we are the children of Columbus [...] [sharing a] common inheritance and the hope of a common destiny” (NABUCO, 1907, p. 8).

Unity under leadership – not imperialism. He said at the University of Chicago, in August 1908,

with your high civilization, you can do no wrong to any nation. Intimate contact with you will, therefore, under whatever conditions, bring only good and progress to the other part. The only certain effect I can see of a permanent and intimate intercourse of Latin America with you is a slow Americanization (NABUCO, 1908c, p. 3).

The defense of the American positions was made explicit at the ceremony of restoration of the national government in Cuba in the following year: “[...] the [North American] intervention had no other purpose than to establish the independence of this people on an unshakable base [...]” (NABUCO, 1909, p. 1). In “The Share of America in Civilization”, prepared for the University of Wisconsin, he ascribed the continental peace to the Monroe Doctrine (NABUCO, 1909, p. 4).

Nabuco spoke to the university audience or to an educated audience in general, insisting that Brazil should be singled out from the other nations of “Latin America”. Even when dealing with topics without direct relation to diplomacy, that is what he conveyed: “By drawing attention to the greatness of Camões and the Lusíadas, I seek to show to the Americans that our language is not a dialect of Spanish” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rui Barbosa April 11, 1908, CP Alencar & Santos, 1999). Language, culture, political tradition, everything that made Brazil different from Latin America and brought it closer to the United States.

Such speeches reignited Nabuco’s fascination by and over the crowd. He was always much appreciated. His Cultural Pan-Americanism, however, did not affect the direction of the Brazilian diplomatic policy. Less than two months before he died in Washington, Nabuco foresaw that few people like him, who were in favor of the privileged relationship with the United States, would attend the Fourth Pan-American Conference, to be held in Buenos Aires in 1910, while many Latin Americanists would attend (Diaries of Joaquim Nabuco, December 02, 1909). The thesis of the preferred approach with the United States was not very welcome in Brazil.

In January 1910, illness won the battle against him. He was 60 years old. However, Nabuco did not completely disappear, the effects of his five-year term as an Ambassador were clear. His funeral services provided the measure of magnificence of the figure. The American President, William Taft, the Secretary of State Philander Knox, accompanied him, along with members of Parliament, members of the Supreme Court, diplomats in a solemn funeral service with State honors, repeated when his body arrived in May, in Rio de Janeiro. There, the Baron of Rio Branco, always a Minister, was in charge of greeting him. His wake took place in the building of his apotheosis during the Third Pan-American Conference, which he himself had named Monroe Palace. However, in the extensive tributes that he received, he was remembered more as a leading abolitionist and monarchist intellectual than as a Pan-Americanist diplomat. Nabuco was celebrated as Primus Inter Pares, the creature of a network of social relations, the monarchical aristocratic society, and of a socio-political context of the late nineteenth century. A world that, like him, no longer existed.

Bibliography

ALENCAR, José Almino & SANTOS, Ana Maria Pessoa dos. Meu Caro Rui, Meu Caro Nabuco. Rio de Janeiro: House of Rui Barbosa, 1999.

ALONSO, Angela. Joaquim Nabuco: Os Salões e as Ruas. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2007.

ALONSO, Angela. A Década Monarquista de Joaquim Nabuco. In: Alonso, Angela e Jackson, David K (orgs). Joaquim Nabuco na República. São Paulo: Editora Hucitec/Fapesp, 2012.

ARDAO, Arturo. Panamericanismo y latinoamericanismo. In: ZEA, Leopoldo (coord.). América Latina en Sus Ideas. México: Siglo XXI, UNESCO, 1986.

BONFIM, Manuel. 1993. América Latina. Males de Origem. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1905.

BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República: os Anos de Apogeu (de 1902 a 1918). São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2003.

BURNS, Bradford. The Unwritten Alliance, Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Dennison, Stephanie. Joaquim Nabuco: Monarchism, Pan Americanism and Nation-Building in the Brazilian Belle-Époque. [S.l.]: Peter Lang, 2006.

ELIAS, Norbert. Mozart, Sociologia de um Gênio. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1995.

LINS, Alvaro. Rio Branco (Biografia). São Paulo: Ed. Alfa-Omega, 1995.

MORSE, Richard. O Espelho de Próspero - Cultura e Idéias nas Américas. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1988.

NABUCO, Carolina (org.). Joaquim Nabuco. Cartas a Amigos, Vol I (1864-1898), Vol II (1899-1909), Obras Completas. São Paulo: Editorial Progress Institute, 1949.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1897-9). Um Estadista do Império. Vol. I. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1997.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1900). Minha Formação. Clássicos Jackson – São Paulo: W. M. Jackson Inc. Editores, 1949.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1906). “Lincoln’s World Influence: Remarks of the Brazilian Ambassador, Mr. Joaquim Nabuco, at the Fourteenth Annual Banquet of the Lincoln Republican Club and the Young Man’s Republican Club of Grand Rapids, on February 12th, 1906”. Available at: <www.dominiopublico.gov.br>.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1907). “Lesson and Prophecies of the Third Pan-American Conference: Address Delivered by Mr. Joaquim Nabuco, Ambassador from Brazil, Before the Liberal Club of Buffalo, on February 20th, 1907”. Available at: <www.dominiopublico.gov.br>.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1908). “Address of the Brazilian Ambassador, Senhor Nabuco, at the Laying of the Corner-Stone of the New Building of the American Republics in Washington, on May 11th, 1908”. Available at: <www.dominiopublico.gov.br>.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1908). “The approach of the Americas: Convocation Address Delivered before the University of Chicago, August 28th, 1908”. Available at: <www.dominiopublico.gov.br>.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1908). “The Place of Camoens in the Literature: Address Delivered Before the Students of the Yale University on May 14th, 1908”. Digital Collection of Fundaj.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1909). “Mr. Root and Peace: Speech at the Dinner Given by the Peace Society of New York in Honor of Mr. Root on February 26th”. Available at: <www.dominiopublico.gov.br>.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1909). “The Restoration of National Government in Cuba: Speech of the Brazilian Ambassador, Joaquim Nabuco, at the Dinner he Offered to the Vice-President of the Republic and the Members of the Cuban Cabinet, at Havana”. Available at: <www.dominiopublico.gov.br>.

NABUCO, Joaquim (1909). “The Share of America in Civilization: Baccalaureate of the University of Wisconsin”. Available at: <www.dominiopublico.gov.br>.

NABUCO, Joaquim. Joaquim Nabuco. Diários, (ed. Evaldo Cabral de Mello) Volume 1 (1873-1888), Volume 2 (1889-1910). Rio de Janeiro/Recife: Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias/Editora Massangana. 2005.

NABUCO, Joaquim. (March 28, 1871) “A Viagem do Imperador”. A Reforma. apud GOUVÊA, Fernando da Cruz. Joaquim Nabuco Entre a Monarquia e a República. Recife: FUNDAJ/ Ed. Massangana. 1989.

NABUCO, Joaquim. O Erro do Imperador. Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Leuzinger & Filhos. 1886.

OLIVEIRA LIMA, Manuel. (1907). Panamericanismo (Monroe, Bolivar, Roosevelt). Brasília: Federal Senate/House of Rui Barbosa, 1980.

PREUSS, Ori. Bridging the Island: Brazilians’ Views of Spanish America and Themselves, 1865–1912.

PEREIRA, Paulo. Idealismo Continental e Pragmatismo Nacional na Diplomacia de Joaquim Nabuco. In: Alonso, Angela e Jackson, David K (orgs). Joaquim Nabuco na República. São Paulo: Editora Hucitec/Fapesp, 2012.

PREUSS, Ori. Bridging the Island. Brazilians´Views of Spanish America and Themselves, 1865-1919. Iberoamericana, Vervuert, 2011.

RICUPERO, Rubens. Um Doce Crepúsculo: A Diplomacia de Joaquim Nabuco. In: Alonso, Angela e Jackson, David K (orgs). Joaquim Nabuco na República. São Paulo: Editora Hucitec/Fapesp, 2012.

TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats. The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior*[86]

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior was born in Rio de Janeiro on 20 April 1845, the son of the Viscount of Rio Branco, a prominent Conservative Party politician and chief of the longest lasting government of the Second Empire. After finishing secondary school at the Dom Pedro II Lyceum, he attended Law School in São Paulo almost until graduation and, for the last year, he transferred to the Recife Law School, as it was the custom at the time. The beginnings of his public career were difficult, as he failed to continue in any of the professions he tried, as history teacher, public prosecutor, and deputy for the Mato Grosso Province in two legislatures.

After a romantic liaison with French-Belgian actress Marie Philomène Stevens, from which was born Raul, his first son, he decided, for personal and family reasons, to become Brazil’s Consul General in Liverpool, considered then as one of the Crown’s most profitable employments (1876). He remained in Europe until late in 1906, a total of 26 years, most of them in Liverpool. In the latter part of this period, he discharged functions at the Brazilian immigration services in Paris and, for a short time, in Berlin, as Brazilian Minister.

He took advantage of his prolonged voluntary exile to devote himself to studying diplomatic and military history, colonial geography, and maps and documents in files about Brazil and its neighbors, amassing exceptional knowledge in these areas, an expert’s scholarship, and utmost competence. During those years he wrote several circumstantial works, nearly all commissioned for special events. These include abundant, detailed comments on Ludwig Schneider’s History of the Triple Alliance War, whose translation and publication were commissioned by the War Ministry; Efemérides Brasileiras, written for O Jornal do Brasil; a substantial part of the entry about Brazil in Levasseur’s Grande Encyclopédie, prepared to mark the occasion of the 1889 Paris Universal Exposition; the masterly Esquisse de l’Histoire du Brésil, included in the informative book Le Brésil ; Emperor D. Pedro’s biography, signed by Rabin Benjamin Mossé but certainly written entirely by him; as well as numerous articles for O Jornal do Comércio, A Nação, and other newspapers.

Although he had been bestowed the title of Baron of Rio Branco in 1888, at the twilight of the monarchy, paradoxically it was the Republic, in its Floriano Peixoto’s stage, that gave this stalwart monarchist the opportunity to emerge from obscurity, appointing him the main advocate of Brazilian interests on the arbitration issue against Argentina, submitted to United States President Grover Cleveland, regarding the territory of Palmas (sometimes improperly called Missions), in the country’s Southwest. His complete, undisputed victory in the award handed down in 1895 turned him, overnight, into a celebrity known and admired throughout Brazil, making him indispensable as a lawyer in another dispute, namely, the arbitration entrusted to the President of the Swiss Confederation, regarding the border dispute between Brazil (Amapá) and the French possession of Guyana. Once again, the resounding success in securing for the country the entire disputed territory consolidated the myth that he was invincible (1900).

Two years later, President Rodrigues Alves appointed him his Foreign Minister, a position he assumed in December 1902. He would retain this position during Rodrigues Alves’ entire four-year term in office, as well as during the terms of his successors Afonso Pena, Nilo Peçanha, and Hermes da Fonseca. He died in office, on 10 February 1912.

Rio Branco had become a figure almost more indispensable than the chiefs of government, owing to the victories he had won in respect of virtually all the diplomatic problems with which he dealt and which were not few or simple. Right after taking office, he had to tackle the First Republic’s most serious diplomatic crisis: the rebellion against the Bolivian sovereignty by the Acre territory’s Brazilian settlers, under Plácido de Castro’s leadership. Through painstaking efforts, he managed to prevent the conflict from degenerating into open war between Brazil and Bolivia. He succeeded in incorporating Acre to the Brazilian territory after negotiations and concessions, both financial and territorial, which culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Petropolis (1902).

After that episode, he devoted himself to definitively solving, always through direct negotiations and arbitrations, all the remaining border issues. In addition to his personal contribution to the solution of border divergences with Argentina (1895), France (1900), and Bolivia (1903), his systematic endeavor led to the treaties with Ecuador (1904); Peru, first provisionally (1904), then definitively (1909); the arbitral award against Great Britain on British Guyana (1904); the protocol with Venezuela (1905); the agreement with The Netherlands on Suriname (1906); with Colombia (1907); and the rectification treaty with Uruguay (1909).

Very soon he became aware of the United States’ emergence as a world power and established in Washington the first Brazilian Embassy (1905), appointing as Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, undoubtedly national diplomacy’s most brilliant and illustrious figure. Just as he claimed that he had “drawn the map of Brazil,” he maintained that, with that decision, he had “shifted the Brazilian diplomatic axis from London to Washington.” With the United States, he established what North American historian E. Bradford Burns would call “the Unwritten Alliance.” This was a pragmatic arrangement whereby Brazil supported American diplomatic decisions in the context of the incipient Pan-Americanism, in Panama, the Caribbean, and Central America, in exchange for Washington’s support on issues related to Hispanic-American neighbor countries and in possible problems with three European countries, two of which, namely, France and Great Britain, were at the apex of the aggressive phase of imperialism and expansion.

He endeavored to improve Brazil’s relations with Latin countries, particularly with South America’s. He pioneered the proposal of the so-called A.B.C. Pact, namely, the Argentina-Brazil-Chile Pact, which would be signed only after his death (1915).” Notwithstanding the serious Cable no. 9 incident with Argentina, when the Argentine Foreign Minister was his rival and adversary Estanislao Zeballos, he continued to endeavor to dispel the reservations and mistrust engendered by the Brazilian plan to modernize its War Navy. He achieved popularity and high prestige in most countries of the Continent. He secured for Brazil the appointment of Latin America’s first Cardinal, and showed firmness and discernment in the serious conflict with Germany over the excesses of the commander of the German gunboat Panther in the country’s South. With the same firmness and discernment, he acted in perfect harmony with Rui Barbosa, the Brazilian delegate to the Second Hague International Peace Conference (1907), in refusing to agree to Brazil’s classification different from equality with the other powers.

No other diplomat or Foreign Minister, either before or after him, achieved comparable diplomatic victories or earned the widespread admiration that made him Brazil’s most popular man of his time. At his death, the A Noite newspaper summed up the country’s feeling in the banner headline “Rio Branco’s death is a national catastrophe.” Because of his diplomatic and moderni-zation work at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, he was officially named the Patron of Brazilian Diplomacy, and his birthdate is celebrated in Brazil as Diplomat’s Day.

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco: the founding of the Republic’s foreign policy[87]*

Rubens Ricupero

The exceptional position the Baron of Rio Branco tends to occupy in any study about Brazilian diplomacy is due not so much to the long, uninterrupted length of the timespan he spent at the helm of Brazil’s foreign relations. Rather, the rare nature of the historical and spiritual time in which he was active and his unique personal qualities combined to allow him to perform an undertaking his successors could hardly match.

There prevailed then an uncommon coincidence of internal peace and prosperity with a fleeting moment of international belief in arbitration, negotiation, and juridical solution of conflicts. A seemingly unprecedented opportunity since the Treaty of Madrid (1750) opened for meeting the challenge of territorial consolidation, thereby creating conditions that made possible the propelling forward of a more constructive foreign policy toward Brazil’s neighbors.

Borders are normally established at one time, and then remain unchanged. No other diplomatic accomplishment is so concrete and so valued in the public’s eyes. It has thus tended to overshadow other less tangible diplomatic contributions of the Baron, such as conceiving and implementing what was perhaps the first intellectual design capable of encompassing the entire universe of Brazil’s international relations, and organizing its various facets into a whole, coherent system.

Rio Branco’s thinking on this subject and on foreign policy in general is not explicitly expressed in his intellectual work. As a historian, he was above all a scholar intent on faithfully reconstructing events, rarely displaying in his writings a leaning toward theorizing and abstractions. What we might call the Rio Branco foreign policy paradigm has to be culled particularly from his texts focused on action: speeches, lectures, articles, interviews, explanatory statements, orders, memoirs on borders, and letters.

Before his administration, foreign relations were approached from a segmented, fragmentary perspective. In the view of the Empire’s statesmen and diplomats, the focus of attention remained centered, as in colonial times, on the circle of the La Plata River basin countries, namely, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. This was the setting of our “great game” of rivalry with Buenos Aires, of fears that the Viceroyalty of the Rio de La Plata might be restored under Buenos Aires’s hegemony. That was the scene of Brazil’s only, frustrated attempts to enlist the might of the great European powers, English or French, to help further its designs against Rosas.

Except for that, the different areas of relations with the world remained separate and isolated. It was with Rio Branco that foreign policy metamorphosed into a twofold movement of universalization and integration.

For one thing, Brazilian foreign relations became globalized, transcending its early limitation to the La Plata region, as it was well put in an article in Jornal do Comércio (12 May 1906), written by Minister Rio Branco under the J. Penn penname, titled Brasil, os Estados Unidos e Monroísmo [Brazil, the United States, and Monroism]:

Our intervention in the La Plata River basin has long ceased. Brazil has nothing else to do with the neighbor countries’ internal life […]. Its political interest lies elsewhere. Having lost interest for the South American countries’ sterile rivalries […], Brazil has resolutely stepped into the realm of great international friendships to which it is entitled by its culture’s aspiration, the prestige of its territorial magnitude, and the strength of its population. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 491. (Emphasis added)

As it took flight from the La Plata River to the heights of the “great international friendships,” diplomacy began to link its various action scenarios and to structure them into a whole in which the different elements could interact with each other. The three main axles on which the paradigm structure hinged were the territorial policy, the asymmetrical relationship with the great powers, and the relatively symmetrical relations with the South American neighbors.

Territorial policy

Rio Branco’s realistic pragmatism led him to approach each border problem in its specificity, without letting himself be bound by absolute principles. As he faced the first and greatest challenge – the Acre issue, 1903 – he did not hesitate to break (his own words) with the Brazilian Government’s unchanging interpretation over thirty-five years under the Empire and the Republic. In his last action pertaining to border issues, the rectification of the border with Uruguay (1909), he took the initiative of discarding the taboo that favored Brazil: the perpetual status of border treaties and “perfect” juridical acts.

The variety of case-by-case approaches is not incompatible with some general tendencies, though. The first lies in the methodologic criterion of preferring negotiation to other means of solution. As regards, for instance, the “disguised conquest” that might have occurred in Acre, if the incorporation of the territory dominated by the insurgents had been accepted, without negotiating some kind of compensation to Bolivia. In this case, there would have occurred the adoption of a “procedure contrary to the loyalty the Brazilian government never ceased to maintain […] toward other nations […], embarking on a dangerous adventure, unprecedented in our diplomatic history.” [RIO BRANCO, 2012.]

The stance Rio Branco assumed quite early in his ministry resurfaces later, as he writes about the dispute between Chile and Peru: “It is more prudent to compromise than to go into war. Recourse to war is always disgraceful […]. It was by compromising with our neighbors that we have put an end to all our border issues.” (Dispatches to the Legations in Santiago and Buenos Aires. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 683.)

His preference for negotiation was tempered by a practical sense of reality. He rejected Peru’s intention of transforming Brazil’s negotiation with Bolivia in respect of Acre into a tripartite process. Neither did he deem viable the formula put forth by Uruguay and Colombia about a collective border negotiation, assembling on the camp opposite to Brazil’s all the Hispanic heirs of the San Ildelfonso Treaty. Regarding the first proposal, he recalled that the past attempt of a collective negotiation of Paraguay’s borders with the Triple Alliance members caused tensions that nearly led to a new conflict between Brazil and Argentina.

Despite personal victories in arbitrations against Argentina (Palmas) and France (Amapá) and the more than thirty similar agreements he signed, he never again resorted to this method after the disappointment in the case of the border with British Guyana, entrusted to the arbitration of the King of Italy. In an unsigned article, he wrote:

Arbitration is not always effective. The cause may be magnificent, the lawyer unrivaled, and yet, as in this case, the award may be unfavorable. […] We should resort to [arbitration] only if reaching a direct agreement with the opposite party is definitely impossible. [Newspapers clippings. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 402.]

As he made clear in the instructions to Joaquim Nabuco in Washington, regarding the preparation of the Third International American Conference to be held in Rio de Janeiro (1906), he rejected “unconditional arbitration on any issues that might arise.” Neither did he accept “a previously designated arbitrator to solve all questions that might arise,” as “an arbitrator that is appropriate today may not be so afterwards.” His recommendation was that “each case requires a special compromise and the choice of an arbitrator” [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington, 10 March 1906. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 758] and this choice should be made with unstinting attention to the tiniest personal and national peculiarities. In his view, equal or greater care should be taken in precisely defining the object of the dispute and in minutely circumscribing and restricting the arbitrator’s margin of discretion.

Just as Nabuco, he was convinced that the principles applied to Africa’s partition by the European imperialist powers gathered at the Berlin Congress (1880) placed at serious risk the integrity of the scarcely populated Brazilian Amazon. Except for what he called “men of the old school,” he distrusted European arbitrators influenced by that approach. He preferred North-American arbitrators (his first major victory – Palmas – was owed to President Cleveland).

For even stronger reasons, he suspected Latin American jurists: “For solving issues between South American nations, arbitrators selected in North America and in Europe offer more assurance of impartiality.” He writes further:

With Hispanic American arbitrators we would be always at a disadvantage [...] We have territorial issues with Peru and Colombia, as well as river navigation issues […] We have consistently asserted the nullity of the preliminary, or provisional 1777 Border Treaty. All our neighbors, as Colombia and Peru, claim it is valid. Thus, they could not be accepted as judges by Brazil. [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington, 10 March 1906. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 759.]

The second characteristic of his policy was the refusal to accept the validity of the colonial agreements annulled by wars or incompletely implemented, save as a secondary, auxiliary element in the lack of clear identification of concrete settlement. This conviction bothered the Hispanic neighbors, for whom the sole legitimate basis for the borders between the successors of Portugal and Spain was the San Ildelfonso Treaty (1777), a juridical expression of the apogee of Spanish military power in South America.

The rejection of San Ildelfonso was complemented by the third, decisive principle of the Baron’s territorial policy: the utis possidetis (de facto), i.e., the actual occupation, with or without titles. In the memorandum in defense of Brazil’s right before the arbitrator on the Palmas issue, these two substantive criteria are categorically expressed:

The Brazilian government has consistently asserted that the uti possidetis at the time of independence […] and the 1777 Treaty provisions that are not contrary to the utis possidetis are the only foundation that should support the border agreements between Brazil and the adjoining States of Spanish origin. [RIO BRANCO, 2012, vol. I, p. 63.]

Armed with these principles and alerted by the seriousness of the Acre crisis, Rio Branco succeeded in definitively solving all the pending border issues with its neighbors. At one point, he said to Argentine Diplomat Ramón J. Carcano that he had “drawn the map of Brazil.” He did indeed define its territorial profile in relation to the external physical context, employing solely direct negotiation or arbitration. To this end, he resorted to legitimate power means; in no case, there was unilateral imposition by force.

The statement to Carcano and “territory is power,” another expression attributed to him, point to his understanding that although it may not be equal to power, territory is a precondition of power. Thus, as he drew the borders within which sovereignty would be exercised, and in doing it by consensus, without traumas, the Minister felt that he was creating the conditions under which Brazil could practice a foreign policy to deal, in the first place, with asymmetrical power relations.

Asymmetrical power relations

Nearly all border issues formed part of the axle on which hinged relations with countries from which we did not feel distanced by insuperable power inequality. All of us belonged in the same category and could thus play the same game. In this area of relative symmetry or equality, Rio Branco knew how to use with moderation the limited power at his disposal. Questions inherited from the past had to be solved with methods and concepts formulated in the nineteenth century.

The Minister’s creative and innovative capacity would find its best expression in a different domain: in reacting to an early twentieth century problem that opened a door of opportunity. He had now to learn how to deal with the powers from which we were separated by such power differential that we could not think of playing the same game with them or acting in the same category. Brazil was the only South American country that shared borders with three European powers, two of which were consummate examples of the aggressive imperialism of the time: the United Kingdom, which took advantage of the confusion of the early days of the Republic to occupy the Trindade Island; and France, with which we had had the bloody Calçoene incidents in Amapá.

During the transition from Colony to Independence, the British preponderance had imposed on us the 1810 “unequal treaties,” later reinstated as the price for Britain’s mediation in favor of the recognition of the newly independent country. The special jurisdiction of the “Conservative Judge from the English nation,” the trade preferences, the inhibiting interference in the Luso-Brazilian operations in Uruguay, and the violence employed in repressing the slave trade gradually coalesced to eliminate British political influence, leading finally to the breaking of relations in the Christie Affair (1863).

Although it had lost the capacity to weigh decisively on Rio de Janeiro’s diplomatic decisions, London remained the country’s main financial, commercial, and investment attraction center. In this international scenario still bearing the imprint of the Victo rian apogee and now darkened by the threatening rise of the Kaiser’s Germany, Rio Branco would be one of the first contemporaries to realize that a new power was beginning to assert itself. As he would write in a dispatch to Washington: “[…] there used to be great powers only in Europe; today they are the first to recognize that there is in the New World a new, powerful nation which they must take into account.” [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington, 1905. In: LINS, vol. 2, p. 496.]

That dispatch is from 1905, a time that for American diplomatic historians coincide with two events heralding the beginning of the United States’ global engagement, transcending hemispheric limits. The first was the mediation imposed by President Theodore Roosevelt to end the Russian-Japanese war. The second was North American participation in the Algeciras Conference after the Agadir incident between France and Germany over Morocco.

The emergence of a great power that began to cast an obstructing shadow over the continent was a new, impossible to be ignored fact. In the past, European powers, entangled in their endless power game, had little effect on South American diplomacy across the Atlantic. A new power was now emerging alongside them, whose gravitational force was increasingly making itself felt. Refusal to recognize reality would mean granting an advantage to potential adversaries. As Rio Branco had remarked in the mentioned article O Brasil, os Estados Unidos e Monroísmo, “Washington has always been the main center of intrigues and requests for intervention against Brazil on the part of some of our neighbors, permanent rivals or occasional adversaries.”

Other than the permanent rivals (the Argentines, obviously), or the occasional adversaries (Peruvians, Bolivians), he was concerned over the Europeans’ threat. The example of Cleveland’s interference in favor of arbitration between the United Kingdom and Venezuela had convinced him that fear of an American reaction had been the major factor that had prevented France from occupying Amapá. At the time of the negotiation that subjected to arbitration the issue with Paris, Rio Branco wrote to the Secretariat of State:

I believe […] that what keeps the French Government under restraint is fear of complications with the United States […] and England, and perhaps also the suspicion that we may already have some secret intelligence with the governments of these two great Powers. (Emphasis added)

His advice was thus “to arouse the interest of the United States in the French Guyana issue.” [RIO BRANCO. In: JORGE, 2012, p. 93-94.]

Echoing the old Portuguese heritage of a diplomacy conscious of military weakness and consequently in need of a powerful ally, those words preannounced the search for what Bradford Burns called “the unwritten alliance with the United States.” This expectation would become reality particularly at two decisive moments: the establishment of the Embassy in Washington, and the holding of the Third Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro.

The establishment of the Embassy in Washington was due solely to Rio Branco’s initiative; Joaquim Nabuco himself, who was chosen to be the Ambassador, thought it was premature. In 1905, when that decision was made, there were few embassies, which were considered a great powers’ privilege. There were only seven missions of that level in Washington (the six major European powers’ and the neighboring Mexico’s). There was none in Rio de Janeiro. The raising of a legation to Embassy was not a unilateral decision; it required prior negotiation between the interested governments.

Through this diplomatic gesture’s symbolism, the decision thus signaled a shift of emphasis in Brazilian-American relations. Conscious of the importance of such a measure, the Baron explicitly declared that he had moved the center of Brazilian diplomacy from London to Washington. The following year, thanks to Nabuco’s efforts, Rio de Janeiro hosted the Third Inter-American Conference, attended by Secretary of State Elihu Root, a rare occurrence at the time. A tacit alliance thus took shape, under which each party was ready to render mutual support to further its own interests.

Much calculation went into such approach, as this could be seen as the paradigm’s “pragmatic component”. Brazil could offer the United States advantages it would not be able to offer the European powers: diplomatic support on the continent to further Washington’s hemispheric interests in respect of Mexico, Panama, the rest of Central America, and the Caribbean, and cooperation in securing greater acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine by the Latin American countries.

In return, it expected support from the Americans concerning the Europeans in any border or political difficulties that might arise, as in the case of Germany’s Panther gunboat. Moreover, if it could not count on the United States’ active commitment, it could at least rely on its benevolent neutrality toward Brazil’s border problems with its neighbors, as it actually happened regarding the Acre negotiations with the Bolivian Syndicate and Bolivia, and, later, with Peru.

What was fundamental was not that an alliance in strict sense should exist between the two countries, with a military component (as it would actually happen much later, during World War II). The relation’s true nature found a perfect definition in one of Root’s Rio de Janeiro speeches: “Let the United States of America and the United States of Brazil join hands not in formal, written alliance treaties, but in their peoples’ universal empathy, confidence, and esteem.”[88] What mattered above all was a widespread perception in international circles that Brazil, more than any other Latin American country, had managed to establish close ties to the United Sates.

Nabuco had a similar opinion when he expressed his expectation by saying that approximation with Washington was equivalent to “the greatest army and the greatest navy – an army and a navy we could never have.” [89] Writing that France’s hesitation regarding Amapá was due to the “suspicion of a secret intelligence” between Brazil and the United States (as mentioned), the Baron hinted at the same phenomenon: the importance of perception and of image, two ingredients of diplomatic prestige, which in turn were a significant component of power.

Far from being a voluntarist gesture motivated exclusively by political considerations, the decision to intensify relations with the United States reflected the change that was taking place in the economic relationship. The shifting of the diplomatic front followed the economy, which moved increasingly toward North America, in the hope that it would once again move toward the Pacific in our days.

In Minister Rio Branco’ time, the North American market purchased more than half of the Brazilian coffee, sixty-percent of our rubber, and most of our cocoa. When our Embassy opened in Washington, Brazil ranked as the United States’ sixth trade partner, after England, Germany, France, Canada, and Cuba. At one point, we were the United States’ third supplier. The year of the Baron’s death (1912), the North American market absorbed no less than thirty-six percent of our exports.

Thanks to this privileged circumstance, wheat and other American products enjoyed a 20-percent tariff reduction, the same granted by Washington to Brazilian coffee. When Argentina applied for a similar treatment in 1907, Rio Branco denied the request, alleging that the Argentines bought only 120,000 bags of coffee, as compared with the 6.1 million bags imported by the American market. In a dispatch to Buenos Aires, he argued:

It is not enough for a country to lift rights on coffee for us to feel obligated to treat it on the same footing as the United States. Such a country should buy coffee from us in a quantity at least close to the quantity bought by the United States. [Dispatch to the Legation in Buenos Aires. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 586]

The Brazilian reply confirms that trade considerations had already a significant weight on the approximation to the Americans. At the same time, it showed how different was the approach to relations of relative equality or symmetry at a time when Latin American economic integration was not even a dream.

Relations of relative equality or symmetry

The dispatch continues:

We are and want to remain good friends with Argentina, but trade issues are not friendship issues and, as regards our exports, Argentina is far from being what the United States are today. It is not up to Brazil to grant compensation to a weak buyer, which Argentina is for us; it is up to Argentina to grant compensation to the great purchaser of Argentine products, which Brazil is. [Dispatch to the Legation in Buenos Aires. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 587.]

It never crossed the mind of statesmen then to grant preferences or advantages based on Latin American territorial proximity or common identity. In line with relative power equality, strict reciprocity was required. This was so particularly in dealing with permanent rivals.

Strictly speaking, Brazil’s relative symmetry or equality of power applied only to Argentina, which was experiencing an uninterrupted surge of wealth, prosperity, stability, and world prestige since the inception of the “cows and wheat” era, around 1880. After that transformation, the correlation of forces between the two was somewhat inverted. The turbulent Brazil of the Republic’s beginnings, convulsed by civil conflicts, affected by the speculative and inflationnary movement known as Encilhamento, and the debt crisis, seemed to subside. At least until Rodrigues Alves’s term as President, together with the following quadrennial, inaugurated the New Republic’s best period.

Already by 1882, when he was Consul in Liverpool, Rio Branco felt disturbed by the neglect suffered by the Army and the Navy after the Paraguayan War. In his letters, he complained that, differently from Argentina, Brazil no longer had an effective army, squadrons, or torpedoes. Later, as Minister, his efforts in favor of Army modernization and particularly the Fleet’s renewal would help intensify the tensions and mistrust with Buenos Aires.

Defending himself against charges that he was a militarist and arms race promoter, he said in a speech at the Military Club (15 October 1911):

I have never been a proponent or an instigator of mighty armaments […]. I have limited myself to point out the need for, after twenty years’ neglect, seriously reorganizing national defense, following the example of some neighbor countries that have, in a short time, managed to equip themselves with defense and attack elements far superior to ours. [In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 774.]

His use of the “neighbors” plural would not deceive his audience: the reference to Argentina was obvious.

The background of rivalries, of lack of trust and of empathy, coupled with border issues still a-brewing helps one to understand the predominantly problematic character of relations with neighbors early in Rio Branco’s administration. He had inherited the emotional, stereotyped residue of centuries of antagonism. He wrote in a dispatch to the Embassy in Washington:

[...] Your Excellency does not ignore that there are in Spanish America old ill feelings against the United States and Brazil, which only time perhaps might dispel. Truly, such ill feelings against Brazil are not to be encountered only in Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Central America. [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 524.]

What is curious about this text is that it identifies Brazil and the United States as common targets of Hispanic antipathy, a feeling hard to imagine today. More significant, though, is that at that precise moment (the dispatch dealt with the preparation for Secretary of State Root’s visit to Rio de Janeiro), the Minister was attempting to convince Washington to extend that visit to Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Santiago. This, he insisted: “…will dispel jealousies and ill feelings. The best way to secure the Hispanic Americans’ cooperation is by boosting their self-esteem, and this would but become a powerful nation such as America.” [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 521.]

It should be noted that early in the twentieth century and in Rio Branco’s administration, the panorama of neighbor relations still deserved the following description in the just mentioned main dispatch of instructions to Washington:

A look at the map shows that we are neighbors to many countries, but neighbors in America’s fashion, as Count Aranda said in the eighteenth century, “people separated from each other by vast deserts.” It was only through Europe and the United States that we communicated with some of our neighbors. As regards Brazil, we can exert our influence and offer our friendship’s good offices with a degree of effectiveness only in respect of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, while attempting to operate in line with Argentina and Chile. [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 769.]

Save for border issues, it was thus openly admitted that our relations with most neighbors was superficial, lacking the substance of trade, economic connections, cooperation, and cultural exchange. The filling of this void had to wait for decades to begin; and what is surprising is that Rio Branco, soon after the border issues were solved, began to attempt constructing a more solid political cooperation structure. When he said to Carcano that he had drawn the map of Brazil, the Baron added: “My program now is to contribute to union and friendship among the South American countries.” [In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 681.]

The boldest expression this program achieved was in the 1909 “Treaty of Cordial Political Intelligence and Arbitration between the United States of Brazil, the Republic of Argentina, and the Republic of Chile,” drafted by Rio Branco himself. The treaty’s focus was Art. 1, whereby the parties undertook to seek “to act always in agreement with each other in respect of all issues pertaining to their common interests and aspirations and of those that are conducive to ensuring peace and fostering South America’s progress. (Italics added)

The aim was thus the establishment in the Southern Cone subsystem of a regional equivalent to the Great Powers’ Concert of Europe. It was nothing as ambitious as UNASUR would be in our time. “A general agreement of all American nations is more impossible than among European nations,” the Baron remarked in the same dispatch. In America, the viability of such agreement would depend on circumscribing its composition to the countries with greater power, namely, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. “Should many become parties to it, we would be outweighed by their numbers whenever any resolution had to be adopted.” [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington. In: LINS, 1945.]

Despite the realistic circumscribing of the understanding to the three major powers of the Southern Continent, the proposal proved premature. Argentina justified its reticence by arguing that the arrangement would arouse Peru’s mistrust and, significantly, it might elicit negative reactions from the United States. Taken up again three years after the Baron’s death, the project would lead to the Treaty’s signing in Buenos Aires (May 1915), but the idea proved unfeasible once again, as only Brazil ratified it.

In the Baron’s view, the wish to oppose to the United States a general alliance of a hostile nature was but a chimera. As he wrote to Nabuco,

The much talked about league of Hispanic-American Republics to counter the United States is an unfeasible idea, owing to the impossibility of accord among people generally separated from each other. It is even ridiculous, given the known weakness and lack of resources of nearly all of them. [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 502.]

Given this incontestable truth, there were only two possibilities of introducing some counterweight to the power concentration in the United States: subregional arrangements, such as the ABC Pact, or the multilateralization of the Monroe Doctrine. The Treaty’s failure frustrated one of the designs for somehow counterbalancing the excessive American power with the establishment of an axis of South America’s most influential countries.

At about the same time, Brazil had attempted the multilateralization of the Monroe Doctrine, to free it from its character as a unilateral Washington policy and introduce into its application an element of joint control and oversight by the ensemble of the Hemisphere countries. Faced with scarce receptivity on the part of Argentina, Chile, and other Latin Americans, he was forced to give up the initiative at the Fourth Inter-American Conference (Buenos Aires, 1909).

An indication of the difficulty in building consensus among the Latin American governments of that time was the fact that two of the Baron’s rare failures occurred precisely in this regard. Nevertheless, he deserves the undeniable merit of having tried to harmonize Brazil’s relations with Latin American countries and its preferential relations with the United States.

To critical eyes, some Brazilian foreign policy decisions left the impression of subordinating its relations with Latin America to its preference for Washington.” To this category certainly belong the prompt recognition of Panama, the approval of the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine and of the intervention in Cuba (1906), the rejection of the Drago Doctrine on the forceful collection of international debts, and the silence regarding the American army’s intimidating maneuvers on the Mexican border (1911).

This notwithstanding, the Baron did not see any irreconcilable incompatibility between Brazil’s close friendship with the United States and increasingly better ties to its own neighbors. Being an idealist, saw himself as capable of serving as a bridge to approximate and harmonize North American and Hispanic-American policy. To this end, Pan-Americanism might be an instrument for “replacing unfounded mistrust and resentment with growing friendship among all the American peoples.” [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington.] It would not be long, though, before he found out the limits of the pro-United States paradigm.

Limits of the pro-United states paradigm

Despite the sincerity of Brazil’s wish to “be able to agree with the United States on everything,” [Telegram with instructions to Rui Barbosa. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 565.] the Second Hague Peace Conference (1907) would expose the insuperable limits of the orientation and the existence of possible alternatives. Headed by Rui Barbosa, the Brazilian delegation ended up by voting contrary to the American delegation on three of the four major issues that divided the Conference, thereby baring the lack of substance to the charge of automatic alignment raised against Rio Branco’s policy in relation to the USA. The divergences stemmed from Brazil’s aspiration for recognition as a prominent international power, denied by the classification criteria of the time. To the Baron’s disappointment, the North American delegation, now far from Pan-Americanism forums, voted with Europe’s great powers.

Once the various attempts at securing for the country a more prestigious position were exhausted, the Minister moved toward finally supporting the principle of strict juridical equality of States, a position maintained from the beginning by Rui Barbosa, to whom he telegraphed:

The Latin American countries have been treated […] with flagrant injustice. It is possible that some will resign themselves to signing conventions under which they are ranked as third, fourth, or fifth category countries, and acknowledge themselves as such. Brazil cannot be one of them […] Now, when we can no longer hide our divergence, we must openly defend our rights and the rights of the other American nations. [Telegram with instructions to Rui Barbosa. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 565.]

The shock caused by the United States’ stance led Brazil to assume at the Conference the leadership of the group committed to juridical equality, consisting of the Latin Americans and the European countries of minor stature. In his The Unwritten Alliance (1966, p. 126), American historian Bradford Burns remarks that “[...] this alternative to cooperation with the United States was not unpleasant to Rio Branco, who aspired to make Brazil a leader in Latin America.”

The episode did not entail major practical consequences, nor was it capable of changing the relationship to Washington. However, it served to dispel the delusion of being able to rely always on the United States’ assistance for raising Brazil to the circle of great international friendships to which it felt entitled.

The realization that already at that time American priority served power considerations, would be expressed by Rio Branco in the following dispatch to Nabuco:

The truth [...] is that (the head and members of the American delegation) consistently sought to work according to the great European powers, without attaching the least importance to Brazil and the other American nations, thereby going against the Pan-American policy followed by the United States government […]. [Dispatch to the Embassy in Washington. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 569.]

In the future, the paradigm’s successors and heirs would not always bear that lesson in mind.

More than one hundred years have elapsed since then. Two World Wars, Nazi-Fascism, the Russian Revolution, Communism, the Cold War, the League of Nations, the United Nations Organization, and mass destruction weapons have drastically changed international relations and destroyed forever Rio Branco’s world. However, nothing of this obliterates the feeling that many of the dilemmas the Minister grappled with in his thinking and action do reappear under other guises.

In Brazil’s pursuit of a central role at the hub of world decisions – a permanent seat on the League’s Council or on the UN Security Council –, the adoption of an Independent Foreign Policy to replace the dated preferential paradigm vis-à-vis the United States, the engagement in ever more comprehensive forums with the BRICS, Africa, and the Middle East, and the option for Mercosur and Southern America, each stage evokes one of the challenges of a century ago. Underlying these issues, runs a deeper conditioning one might call a dialectic tension between aspirations and capabilities.

A dialectical tension between aspirations and capabilities

Speaking at the Third Latin American Scientific Congress, held in Rio de Janeiro (1905), Rio Branco alluded to one of his consistent concerns, namely, the security of the Continent, which might perhaps be thought by some others as less “well occupied.” To ensure security,

he thought it essential that, before the mid-century, four or five at least of Latin America’s major nations, nobly imitating our great and loved Northern sister, should be able to compete in resources with the most powerful States in the world. [CARVALHO, 1998, p. 240-250.]

Delgado de Carvalho (1998, p. 250), who recalled this saying when the deadline for such transformation expired, remarked, with a tinge of melancholy, that “Fifty years after those words were pronounced, it is worth quoting the phrase […], which elicits meditation.” Even more reason we have to repeat that comment now that nearly one hundred eight years have elapsed, punctuated by relapses after illusory spurts of progress.

Although he underestimated the time needed for catching up with the developed countries, Rio Branco never shared the recent delusions about how much we still had to go to achieve power in the conventional sense. In another statement, he speculated: “When through years – many years – of work [our nations] have finally equaled in power and wealth our great sister to the North and the most developed nations of Europe […].” [In: CARVALHO, 1998, p. 250] (Italics added).

Nabuco expressed this in his Diary[90] in somewhat prosaic terms: “One does not become great by big jumps. We cannot seem great, save by being so. Japan did not need to ask to be recognized as a great power; it just proved that it was such.”

The Baron was not spared from fleeting moments of an-noyance. Luckily, though, the best part of his administration coincided with Rodrigues Alves’s and Afonso Pena’s two presidential terms, the First Republic’s high point. However, in the later part of his years, the government was under the shadow of the Revolta da Chibata [the Whip Revolt] and Bahia’s bombardment, the beginning of a prolonged agony that intensified under Hermes da Fonseca’s presidency and ended only with the 1930 Revolution.

Aware of the inherited, recurring weakness despite progress and achievements, he understood that these circumstances required another type of approach to power other than the conventional. In a letter to Minister Carlos de Carvalho at the close of the nineteenth century, before the Amapá arbitration, he anticipated: “Persuasion means are in my view the only ones for succeeding in delicate negotiations such as these employed by Brazil, which as yet does not have sufficient force to impose its will on a great military power.” [Letter to Carlos de Carvalho, 23 July 1986. In: VIANA FILHO, 1959, p. 234]. Based on this observation, he would first try to overcome the gap between aspirations and capabilities, resorting to power varieties that, differently from “force to impose one’s will,” were and are at our disposal and which we now call mild or soft power.

Mild, or soft power and intelligent, or knowledge power

The kind of power referred to by the Baron is “hard power,” the capacity to exert military or economic coercion, whereas “persuasion means” are mild, or “soft power,” in current terminology. To this should be added “smart” or “clever power,” the intelligent power born of intelligence, knowledge, and the capacity to persuade with arguments drawn from history, geography, and the general culture. Hard, soft, intelligent – all of these are modalities of the same reality, namely, power, which cannot be restricted to force and coercion alone. Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, who popularized these expressions, admits having been inspired by the concepts of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who clearly showed that hegemony might be derived other than from coercive force, but from moral and intellectual leadership.

Long before the modern power doctrines emerged, Rio Branco already intuitively understood them and anticipated them in practice. The program-letter he wrote from Berlin as he was invited to be Minister of Foreign Relations (7 August 1902), showed his understanding that a ministry of foreign relations should be an institution based on knowledge:

The Archive section [...] should be reestablished, as it is the arsenal where the Minister and intelligent, qualified employees will find combat and discussion weapons. It is necessary to establish a library and a geographical section under the Archive Department, as in France, England, Germany, and the United States. [Letter to Frederico de Abranches, 7 August 1902. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, pp. 748-749.]

He thus outlined a program he himself had followed during his career, as he accumulated the extraordinary scholarship in the colonial history and geography of the Americas, in cartography, old books and archive papers, a wealth of expert knowledge to which was owed a considerable part of his successes, particularly in the Palmas and Amapá arbitrations. After his death, his entire collection, accumulated in a lifetime, of more than six thousand books, some of them extremely rare, geographic charts and documents, furniture, pictures, and ornaments was purchased by Itamaraty for 350 contos de reis that the family impatiently waited for the government to pay, which was done only seven years later.

On essentially political issues, such as Acre’s, when erudition played only a complementary role, he showed remarkable skill in the dosage of the wide range of legitimate power means, including the preventive occupation of the territory in view of the threat of a Bolivian repressive expedition. He resorted to Brazil’s limited economic power to purchase, through indemnity for the Bolivian Syndicate’s desistance and compensation for the Bolivian government. He also placated the latter by ceding a small portion of Brazilian territory to maintain the appearance of a tradeoff and not only of a territorial purchase. He reinforced the attractiveness of the transaction by ensuring free navigation on Brazilian rivers and access to our ports.

The Acre conflict marked the moment when Brazil came closest to war against a neighbor, interrupting a tradition that began in 1870 with the end of the Paraguayan War and that has lasted for more than 147 years now (in 2017). The problem that totally absorbed the Baron’s first months as Minister left a definitive mark on him, determining both his concentration on border issues and his determination to solve all conflicts by peaceful means. In the Explanatory Statement to the Treaty of Petropolis, he indicates his preference for transaction, as he liked to call it, or negotiations, in a trenchant formula: “Arrangements whereby no interested party loses, and even better, those whereby all parties gain, are always the best.” [RIO BRANCO, 2012]. In the same text, he asserts: “the greatest advantages of the territorial acquisition under this treaty are not material. The moral and political advantages are infinitely superior.” [RIO BRANCO, 2012] (Italics added). His conviction is explicit and conscious that the ethical values should orient diplomatic action, a decisive element in the idealized construction of a peaceful Brazil, adept of International Law and moderation.

A peaceful Brazil, adept of International Law and moderation

More than anybody, Rio Branco contributed to giving birth to the concept of a country loyal to Peace and to International Law, not by imposition of circumstances, but by a sort of spontaneous manifestation of the innermost essence of the national character. Shortly before his death, he asserted, in a speech at the Military Club, October 1911:

Our entire life [...] attests to the Brazilian government’s moderation and peaceful feelings in perfect consonance with the nation’s nature and will. For a long time we were, incontestably, the foremost military power in South America, without this force superiority on both land and at sea representing a danger for our neighbors. [In: LINS, 1945, p. 774.] (Emphasis added)

One must reread history, if not with an apologetic, at least with a benevolent disposition, to be able to say, as the Baron did, “We started wars abroad only if provoked or if our territory was invaded.” [In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 685-686] This statement springs from the same intention of indirectly justifying the La Plata region interventions of the article cited earlier. In it, after asserting that our intervention in the Plata region had finished, he added that Brazil no longer had anything more to do with those nations’ internal affairs, as he was “convinced that freedom and international independence there will not suffer any violent disruption.”[91]

Resuming the argument of constitutional condemnation used eight years earlier at the Military Club, a propos the Acre case, he proceeds: “[…] we shall never engage in conquest wars. Much less could we entertain aggression plans, now that our political Constitution expressly forbids conquest […].” [In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 774.] The constitutional imperative, however, traduces something innate and deeper, as can be subsumed under the speech at the Historical Institute (1909). In it, the Baron explains the unilateral decision to rectify the Lagoa Mirim and the Jaguarão borders in favor of Uruguay, without accepting the compensations proffered: “Should we today want to correct part of our southern border to the benefit of a friendly neighbor country, this would be principally because this testimony of our love for Law becomes Brazil and is an action worthy of the Brazilian people.” [In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, pp. 674-675.] (Italics added)

Love for International Law, generosity, and moderation could thus be taken as attributes of a certain idea of Brazil and of Brazilians. As such, these qualities are timeless, practically independent from circumstances. Even if some day “some Latin American countries should fall prey to the madness of hegemonies or to the delirium of greatness through prepotency” [a veiled allusion to the Argentines?],

I am convinced that the future Brazil will unwaveringly continue to trust above all the force of Law and, as today, by its prudence, disinterestedness, and love of justice, to win the consideration and affection of all neighbor peoples, in whose internal life it will abstain from interfering. [Speech at the Military Club, 15 October 1991. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 774.]

All the quotes are culled from speeches, lectures, articles, explanatory statements, and documents aimed at explaining and “selling” foreign policy. In this sense, they form part of a systematic effort to shape what could be considered a “foreign policy ideology.” Ideology is taken here in the sense of a set of supposedly objective values and standards, which nevertheless mask or cover up interests. Thus, it would not be difficult to criticize or “deconstruct” the arguments, unveiling their hidden objectives.

Despite assuming that the intellectual construction of the Baron’s diplomatic set of beliefs falls into this ideology category, one must admit that the choice of International Law, moderation, and negotiation instead of their alternatives as content of the ideological construction, is not indifferent. There is indeed in other countries no lack of similar ideologies, which emphasized the idea of “greatness,” with strong reverberations of past military glory. Or the “manifest destiny,” race superiority in need of vital space, or the expansion of the Slavic, Orthodox empire, as well as numerous other more or less aggressive expressions. By choosing more specifically “diplomatic” aspirations to distinguish Brazilian diplomacy, Rio Branco deserved being pointed out by Gilberto Freyre as being responsible for Itamaraty’s transformation into a system of organization and definition of superiorly national values.

A system of organization and definition of superiorly national values

Freyre’s statement is taken from his Ordem e Progresso, in a passage describing

the idealization of Itamaraty under Rio Branco’s direction as a supreme body of radiation and assertion of Brazil’s prestige on the continent in particular and abroad in general [...]. Itamaraty, which in the Baron’s time was also a sort of Ministry of Education and Culture, helping attract to Rio de Janeiro prominent European intellectuals, artists, and renowned medical doctors; and an Information and Propaganda Ministry as well […]. [In: FREYRE, 1959, 1st tome, p. CXLVI.]

Freyre notes that the Minister was interested even in the establishment of schools by French nuns for the improvement of women’s education. He could add that his influence was felt in the most diverse sectors, beginning with the Armed Forces’ modernization. Freyre concludes that under the Baron’s direction Itamaraty ceased to be a merely diplomatic institution to become a system of organization and definition of superiorly national values: a system on which he imprinted his image as super protector of a homeland in need of being respected by Europeans and Anglo-Saxons for increasingly asserting its prestige.” [In: FREYRE, 1st tome, p. CLI.] (Italics added)

These superiorly national values are not made explicit. A plausible interpretation would suggest that Rio Branco had no delusion about the “real country” of economic backwardness, the Vaccine Revolt, illiteracy above 80 percent. There could be no delusion, as the real country insisted on intruding on the idealized picture. Carlos de Laet noted that the Revolta da Chibata [Whip Revolt] led by the sailor João Cândido had been for the Baron “a tremendous shock. He had dreamed of a strong Brazil, capable, owing to its union […] to dominate the destiny of this southern portion of the Continent.” At the sight of the threatened bay, “he might have realized how far we were from his ideal […].” [In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 691.]

Thus, it was not enough to sell abroad Brazil’s idealized picture in conflict with facts and events. It was necessary to transform reality itself to approximate it to the ideal model, by endeavoring to organize and define superiorly national values.

These values clearly coincided with those the Baron inherited from the Second Empire: juridical liberalism, moderate conservatism “to put an end to agitations and anarchy and ensure, above all, national unity.” [Letter to Joaquim Nabuco, 30 August 1902. In: VIANA FILHO, p. 317.] The letter spoke of a development Project, as he explained:

The Brazilian nation aspires to achieving greatness through fecund works of peace, with its own resources, within the borders where the language of its ancestors is spoken; and it wants to be strong among great, strong neighbors to the honor of all of us and the security of our continent […]. [Speech at the American Scientific Congress. In: CARVALHO, 1998, pp. 240-250.]

These values appealed to the best in the public’s civic and moral consciousness. In addition to their intrinsic ethical quality, they were confirmed and reinforced by the Baron’s diplomatic successes. The victories won in arbitrations, in the Acre question and in other border negotiations, in the Panther incident, in the case of Cable no. 9 with Argentina, somehow helped legitimate the Republic of the high inflation and acute economic crises, the rebellion of Canudos, and the Federalist Revolt. They restored the self-esteem of Brazilians, humiliated as they were by the follies and divergences of governments that seemed intent on making the country into another Latin American banana republic.

It is thus not surprising that contemporaries identified with the Minister and saw in him the personification of the ideal country, as Argentine diplomat José María Cantilo (1935) noted when he wrote: “Rio Branco enjoyed an extraordinary popularity. He was Brazil.” (Italics added)

A significant portion of this popularity was due to the role he had played “as definer of superiorly national values.” Among us, it was not obviously credible to create a “republican ideal” as did Jefferson and Lincoln for the United States or as the 1789 Revolution did for France. Neither was it possible to compensate the lack of political ideal with an extraordinary demonstration of material progress.

Into this moral and political void, the Baron brought a set of principles and values that made of foreign policy the only domain in which Brazil reaped undeniable success, ratified not only by the consistently concrete, tangible results on our borders but also by the prestige and respect enjoyed abroad. A virtual consensual unanimity surrounded diplomacy, facilitated by the Minister’s care in staying away from the temptation of internal or party politics and their inevitable divisions.

As he explained, he preferred to devote himself solely to foreign relations, because “by occupying myself [...] with incontestably national affairs or causes, I would feel stronger and could expect to deserve the enthusiastic support of all my fellow citizens.” [Rio Branco’s speech on 20 April 1909. [In: VIANA FILHO, 1959, p. 409-410.] On another occasion, he was more explicit in justifying why he had refused to run for President:

As a candidate or President, I would throw myself into the waves of militant politics and involve myself in the maelstrom of all the human passions and interests. I would be discussed, attacked, diminished, stripped of authority by the clash of fierce ambitions, and, as President, I would lack the strength I now have as Minister to direct foreign relations. [In: VIANA FILHO, 1959, p. 418.] (Emphasis added)

It is perhaps in these factors – consistent success, distance from parties and factions, and the system of values – that an explanation should be sought for the prolonged valorization of the diplomatic tradition by Brazilian society. Differently from what can happen in many countries, in Brazil past glory is more often associated with diplomacy than with military feats or achievements in other sectors.

Much is now dated in Rio Branco’s paradigm, beginning with the preferential approximation to the United States. However, the system of ethical and political values it expressed has earned the highest acclaim that could be desired for an intellectual design: from innovation, it became commonplace.

The concept of a non-expansionist Brazil, satisfied with its territory, trusting in International Law, in negotiated solutions, and in nonintervention, has become so ingrained in the Brazilian diplomatic discourse that it has become timeless, as if it had always existed. The Baron’s consolidation of the national foreign ideal content in terms of objectives and methods has been internalized so deeply and thoroughly that it would be impossible to imagine Brazil with a different international personality.

Although not everything in this frame of ideals has become reality to date, the program outlined more than a century ago already pointed the way to arrive at that destination. By setting as target “the circle of great international friendships” to which Brazil was entitled, Rio Branco put forth as reasons for this right the prestige of territorial magnitude and the strength of population, two factors already existing at the time. He did not allude to military power, a significant omission in a man with a passion for military history, nor did he refer to economic vigor.

The mention of the territory and the population was preceded by a curious expression, namely, “aspiration to culture.” Not to culture itself, which Brazil could not invoke at a time when more than eighty percent of the population was illiterate. Less than an existing element, it was a question of “becoming,” something that recalls Antonio Candido, who described in his Formação da Literatura Brasileira [Genesis and Development of Brazilian Literature] (1954, vol. 1, p. 27) as “a history of Brazilians and their desire to have a literature.”

Equally inspired, one might also say that the paradigm inherited from the republican diplomacy’s founder is not so much a repository of things experienced, a museum of past trophies, but a challenge addressed to today’s Brazilians to strive toward a foreign policy in the measure of the qualities dreamed by the Baron of Rio Branco.

Bibliography

BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten Alliance Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

CANDIDO, Antonio. Formação da Literatura Brasileira. São Paulo: Martins, 2nd revised edition, volume 1.

CANTILO, José Maria. Conferencias (años 1932-1933). Recuerdos de mi vida diplomática. Buenos Aires, 1935.

CARVALHO, Carlos Delgado de. História Diplomática do Brasil. Facsmile edition. Brasília: Senado Federal, 1998.

COSTA, João Frank da. Joaquim Nabuco e a Política Exterior do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1968.

FREYRE, Gilberto. Ordem e Progresso. Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1959.

JORGE, A. G. de Araujo. Introdução às Obras Completas do Barão do Rio Branco. Brasília: FUNAG, 2012.

LINS, Álvaro. Rio-Branco. (O Barão do Rio Branco: 1845-1912). Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1945, 2 v.

MELLO, Evaldo Cabral de. Joaquim Nabuco – Diários: 1873-1910. Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi, 2006.

RIO BRANCO, Barão do. Obras do Barão do Rio Branco. Brasília: FUNAG, 2012.

VIANA FILHO, Luiz. A Vida do Barão do Rio Branco. Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1959.

Rui Barbosa

Rui Barbosa de Oliveira was one of the organizers of the Republic, acting in defense of the Union and in promotion of individual rights and guarantees. His brief and controversial administration as the first Minister of Finance of the new regime is known for its modernization and economic reforms. Rui Barbosa served as both a representative in the Chamber of Deputies and as a senator; he was also twice an official candidate for the presidency of the Republic. In addition to his political career, Barbosa distinguished himself as a journalist as well as a lawyer. He was also a diplomat, having served as a delegate to the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague (1907), where he distinguished himself with a defense of the principle of the equality of sovereign States. Later, Barbosa played a key role in the entrance of Brazil into World War I.

Rui Barbosa was born in Salvador, Bahia, on November 5, 1849, the son of João José Barbosa de Oliveira and Maria Adélia Barbosa de Oliveira. After his early years of schooling in his native province, Rui, as he was universally known, graduated from the Law School of São Paulo (Largo de São Francisco) where he was a classmate of Afonso Pena, Rio Branco, Rodrigues Alves, and Joaquim Nabuco.

Rui Barbosa began his public life while still in the academic world; he participated in debates calling for the abolition of slavery during his Law school years. Returning to his native Bahia after earning his Law degree in 1870, he began his professional life as a lawyer and journalist.

The root of the matter – Rui Barbosa: Brazil in the world

Carlos Henrique Cardim

The question arose at the Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, motivated by the American proposal to create an International Court of Arbitration with an inherent inequality among nations. It was one of those major political problems that appear from time to time, to test the courage and challenge the judgment of mankind. The emergence of such a vital political issue rarely happens so suddenly and with such clarity. One year, or perhaps even one generation, would not be enough to resolve it without the hindrance of collateral issues; as it goes to the root of the matter, it is of interest to the most basic principles that rule human actions. The essence of the question was this: Should Force or the Rule of Law be the dominant factor in the conduct of man?

William T. Stead, in: O Brasil na Haia, Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1925.

Rui Barbosa and domestic policy

In 1878, when he was 29 years old, Rui Barbosa was elected to serve as a General Representative from his native province of Bahia in the Chamber of Deputies of the federal legislature, and he moved to Rio de Janeiro, to participate in the politics of the then Brazilian Empire. Rui was reelected in 1881, and he remained in the Chamber of Deputies until he lost the election of 1884.

Between 1878 and 1889, Rui Barbosa worked on issues related to education, producing important opinions on the methodology of teaching, and presenting a proposal for a reform of the educational system, which he considered a decisive factor for real progress in the country. Barbosa advocated the establishment of private colleges, the encouragement of industrial and technical education, and the access of women to higher education. In addition to fighting slavery, he promoted a reform of the monarchy as well as the idea of a federation, to meet the demands of decentralization.

Two days before the fall of the monarchy, Rui Barbosa wrote articles that criticized the decadent regime. These articles caught the attention of republican leaders, and immediately after the Proclamation of the Republic, on November 15, 1889, Barbosa was invited to occupy the Ministry of Finance. He was also second-in-command of the Provisional government until 1890.

Rui Barbosa advocated the separation of church and state, and due to his great knowledge of the American political system, he became one of the references on the inner workings of republican institutions.

Throughout his life, Barbosa was a systematic scholar of the huge variety of subject matters that interested him. He devoted much of his time to reading works in their original forms. In this manner, when the Republic emerged, he was one of the few scholars and politicians in Brazil who had mastered the English language and literature, as well as the Anglo-Saxon legal system. He was particularly interested in legal matters related to the United States, which at the time was the model for the emergent Brazilian Republic.

Rui Barbosa took over the Ministry of Finance in 1889 with a program to encourage industrialization, diversification of the economy, and the expansion of economic activity in the country. As San Tiago Dantas pointed out in his remarkable essay, Rui Barbosa e a Renovação da Sociedade, Rui understood the longings for progress and protection of the rights of the rising middle classes. Among his goals was a recovery of the agrarian structure of the Empire, which at the time was based almost exclusively on the export of coffee. His greatest goal, however, was to transform Brazil into an industrial nation.

Rampant speculation in the stock market that caused an inflationary outbreak, followed by bankruptcies, many of which were fraudulent, marked Barbosa’s period as the Finance Minister, November 15, 1889 to January 21, 1891. However, although this episode – historically known as the encilhamento – occurred during Barbosa’s administration as Minister, it had actually originated during the term of the previous government. In recent decades a scholarly reassessment of Barbosa’s pioneering attempts to modernize and industrialize the Brazilian economy, sees those efforts in a more positive light.

Within the legal arena, Rui Barbosa participated in the draft-ing of the first Republican Constitution (1891). The “Committee of Five,” headed by Saldanha Marinho, had established both a presidential and federalist form of government. Barbosa, drawing on his knowledge of other constitutions, introduced controls on the Executive and Legislative branches by the Judiciary branch. In addition, he recommended giving the newly created Federal Supreme Court control over the constitutionality of laws and, to guard against abuses of power, he added the right of habeas corpus to the document. Barbosa, thereby, made the Federal Supreme Court the guardian of both the overall Constitution and an individual’s rights and freedoms.

On April 18, 1892, Rui Barbosa submitted to the Federal Supreme Court, the first request for habeas corpus due to a political matter, to benefit opposition members arrested by President Floriano Peixoto’s administration.

As a result of his campaign in favor of the victims of “Floriano’s dictatorship”– during the term of Brazil’s second president, Floriano Peixoto (1891-1894) – Barbosa was accused of being one of the mentors of the “Revolt of the Navy” (1893). At risk of being arrested, he went into exile, first in Buenos Aires, and later in London. He returned from exile in 1895, during the administration of President Prudente de Morais.

The high point of Rui Barbosa’s trajectory in domestic politics was his presidential candidacy in 1910 against General Hermes da Fonseca. In that race, he took the opportunity to launch a “civil campaign,” criticizing not only militarism, but also the political process led by the oligarchies. Barbosa advocated constitutional changes, including the introduction of the secret ballot.

Defeated in the presidential election, Rui protested against alleged fraud, while he continued his political and journalistic activities, as well as his work as an attorney. He continued his focus on the protection of individual rights against the abuses of power, an example of which was his defense in the Senate of sailors arrested in the Revolta da Chibata [Revolt of the Lash], in 1910. In that case, after a protracted battle and trial, Brazilian sailors won the prohibition of whipping in the navy.

A multi-talented individual, Rui Barbosa was president of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, 1908-1919, and in 1914, he was elected president of the Institute of Lawyers of Brazil, a precursor of the Brazilian Bar Association.

The year 1918 saw Rui Barbosa’s Jubileu Cívico-Literário, celebrating fifty years since his speech in homage of José Bonifácio, the Younger, in 1868, that many say marked his entry onto the national and international stage. Again in 1918, at the unveiling of his bust at the National Library, Barbosa emphasized he saw his basic role as that of a “builder,” in which his “letters create words that overlay thoughts,” in order to “clarify opinions.”

Also in November 1918, with the death of President Rodrigues Alves, new elections were called, and Rui Barbosa, who was then 70 years old, submitted his name in candidacy, this time running against the establishment’s candidate, Epitácio Pessoa. In that election, his position of uncompromising defense of Constitutional Reform, however, greatly weakened his support within the political environment of the time.

A highlight of the 1919 campaign was Barbosa’s March 20 speech on the social and political situation in Brazil, in which he included the themes of inequality, relations between capital and labor and the backwardness of broad sectors of the Brazilian population, as expressed in the character, “Jeca Tatu,” created by Monteiro Lobato, which Barbosa quoted in the beginning of his lecture. Overall in that campaign, the themes he addressed in his platform: the building of workers’ housing; protections for the labor of minors; the limitation of hours in work days, especially on the night shift; equal pay for both genders; support for working mothers and for pregnant women, as well as maternity leave; compensation for accidents in the workplace; the legalization of agricultural labor; and pension insurance – were pioneering issues for the time.

That year, Rui lost another election, but he obtained great support in the state capitals, demonstrating the resonance his ideas found in an increasingly urban and progressive Brazil. Also, in 1919, Barbosa participated actively in the unsuccessful campaign of the opposition candidate, Paulo Fontes, for the government of Bahia. He undertook long journeys through the hinterland of the state, which affected his health.

Despite his advancing age and weakened health, Barbosa continued his activities. In 1920, as patron of the graduates of the Law School of São Paulo, he wrote the famous “Prayer to the Young,” which was read by Prof. Reinaldo Porchat.

Rui also continued to act in national public life as a Senator. His main thesis at the time concerned the urgent need to reform the 1891 Constitution. Although President Arthur Bernardes invited him to be the Foreign Minister, a serious worsening of his health prevented him from accepting the invitation. Rui Barbosa died on March 1, 1923, at age 73.

Rui Barbosa, diplomatic profile

Rui Barbosa’s contributions to both the theory and the practice of Brazilian foreign policy relate mainly to eight themes and moments in his life:

1) His defense of equality among sovereign States at the Second International Peace Conference of The Hague, in 1907.

Brazil’s participation in the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, headed by Rui Barbosa, Ambas-sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, marked the entrance of the country into international politics. Although Brazil had been invited to the First Conference, held in 1899, President Campos Sales had declined Russian Czar Nicholas II’s invitation to attend.

At the 1907 world conclave, which featured the presence of 44 sovereign states, Rui Barbosa played a significant role by going against a proposal made by the United States and supported by Germany that called for the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitration. The court would include 17 judges; eight would indeed be permanent, they would be indicated by the major powers, while the other nine would be appointed on a rotating basis by the remaining 36 nations. Rui Barbosa, with his speeches at the conference, and Foreign Minister Rio Branco, with his instructions to Brazilian diplomats and his liaisons among other Latin American foreign offices, developed an alternative proposal, opposed to the differentiated treatment of the less powerful nation states, which was based only on the criterion of power. The Latin American nations supported the Brazilian proposal, and, together, they were able to free the American proposal of its discriminatory content.

2) His critique of the old notion of neutrality, at a Conference in Buenos Aires, in 1916.

Rui Barbosa gave a lecture in Buenos Aires, in 1916, in which he criticized the then current notion of neutrality – understood, according to his vision, as passivity and inaction in the face of arbitrary and aggressive actions by any State. What was normal at that time was the establishment, by a decree published in the respective Official Gazette, of neutrality by countries not directly involved in a military conflict, leaving those Governments completely silent about the atrocities that took place, be they on the battlefield or outside of them. Rui rejected the notion of passive neutrality and proposed a new concept, based on an international responsibility of nations, all of which should be interested in conflicts occurring even far from their own territory. The motto of the new notion of passive neutrality became: Between justice and injustice, there cannot be omission.

3) His contribution to the debate on World War I and the change of the Brazilian position.

An even more important issue was that of the ideological debate between Anglophiles and Germanophiles in Brazil between 1914 and 1918. Rui Barbosa actively participated in that discussion when he harshly criticized the German policy and defended the entrance of Brazil into the war alongside the Allies. On October 27, 1917, President Venceslau Brás revoked the neutrality decree and recognized “the state of war, initiated by the German Empire against Brazil.”

4) Rui Barbosa, the first defender of Dreyfus.

In O processo do capitão Dreyfus [The Trial of Captain Dreyfus], an article published on January 7, 1895, Rui Barbosa was the first to defend the French officer of Jewish descent who had been falsely accused of treason for reasons of bias – as was demonstrated at the end of his trial. In this work, Barbosa even preceded Émile Zola by close to three years as Zola’s series of texts did not begin until December 1897.

In his autobiographical work Souvenirs et Correspondance, published by Dreyfus’ son in 1936, the famous French writer called Rui Barbosa: “The Great Brazilian Statesman” endowed with “a remarkable judgment and a great spirit of freedom.” Barbosa, however, did not receive much recognition for his work.

In the introduction of his book Rui Barbosa – O Processo do Capitão Dreyfus, Brazilian journalist, Alberto Dines, commented on the various literary and film biographies devoted to Dreyfus and Zola, contrasting them with the disparate way Barbosa’s contribution to the Dreyfus affair had been received. Dines lamented:

Our forerunner of Zola, Rui Barbosa, did not have the same success [as the French writer], nor did the recent biographical wave think of him in the same way. Things of Brazil; things of a minimalized Brazil, a country without nobility, unable to elevate lives for the pleasure of admiring them; cultivator of “tales” and anecdotes, nostalgic and perplexed; a wanderer in the world, unwilling to belong to it.

The poor treatment of Rui Barbosa in this case exemplified the known bias of European and North American authors concerning countries, such as Brazil, that go against the status quo in international politics.

5) Naval rearmament.

Rui Barbosa gave high priority to naval power. He devoted three important articles to the subject: Lição do Extremo Oriente [Lesson of the Far East], in 1895, A Lição das Esquadras [The Lesson of the Fleet], in 1898, and O Aumento das Esquadras [The Rise of the Fleets], in 1900. Also, in a letter dated May 7, 1908, addressed to President Afonso Pena, whose government had ordered three battleships, Barbosa wrote:

Upon my return to Brazil during the administration of Campos Sales, when I founded [the newspaper] “A Imprensa,” I used every occasion, to show the urgency of the need to re-establish our Navy and equip our army – in organization, education and fitness – to make them the equal of those of our most powerful neighbors.

The Brazilian Navy affirmed its ties to Rui Barbosa by placing in the Auditorium of the School of Naval Warfare, in Rio de Janeiro, a plaque with the following phrase from his article, A Lição das Esquadras: “The sea is the great siren. God placed it next to us, to roar, to preach; such that we should not sleep.” And the statement continues: “... the races born by the sea cannot be shortsighted; to look upon its horizon is to see into the future. ... The sea is a source of strength and a school of foresight. All that it shows are lessons; which we must not think of in a frivolous manner.”

6) “Two formidable volumes” [on Acre].

That was how the great jurist and historian, Clovis Bevilaqua, referred to the volumes in which Rui Barbosa advocated the right of the state of Amazonas to own northern Acre. Vicente Marota Rangel, a famous Brazilian internationalist, considers this work one of the highlights of Barbosa’s theoretical writings on international relations.

It was a precise work written on key concepts of the State. Concepts such as: territory; modalities for the acquisition and maintenance of territory; a definition of sovereignty and the exercise thereof, and more. Rui Barbosa devoted a chapter of his two volumes to a discussion of uti possidetis, including a history of the principle that came from Roman law, and which, as he understood, was the “key principle” of Brazilian diplomacy in the Empire and during the early years of the Republic.

7) Election to the Permanent Court of Justice, in 1921.

As Afonso Arinos, professor of history at the Instituto Rio Branco, emphasized in his book, Um Estadista da República [A Statesman of the Republic], (1955):

When the first judges were chosen to be members of the Court, in 1921, Brazil, with Rui Barbosa, achieved a great victory. Forty-two countries had signed the Protocol regarding the Statute of the Court. Eighty-nine lawyers from all over the world were submitted as candidates to the election; among them were Rui Barbosa and Clovis Bevilaqua, a Brazilian jurist. Once the election took place, it was found that, of all elected candidates, Rui Barbosa had received the most votes: 38 out of a total of 42. The distinguished Brazilian, however, never managed to take a seat on the court at The Hague due to his advanced age and deteriorating health.

8) The issue of Acre, in 1903.

Gilberto Amado considers Acre one of the most serious diplomatic problems Brazil has ever faced. According to him: “the Treaty of Petrópolis [which decided the Acre issue in 1903] represented the highest moment of Brazilian intelligence applied to the service of the making of Brazil.” Foreign Minister Rio Branco, in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Treaty that he sent to the President of the Republic, emphasized that this was the question that demanded his greatest effort:

I sincerely assure your Excellency that, for me, this work, in which I was lucky to collaborate under your Excellency’s government, was the most valuable for me. Thanks to the decisive support which I was given, [and] judged with such kindness by our citizens, we were able to conclude it undoubtedly on much more favorable conditions.

When he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1902, The Baron of Rio Branco’s priority was to resolve the issue of Acre. Considering the de facto situation, he only saw one solution: to make the territory – already inhabited by Brazilians – an actual part of Brazil, through acquisition. He was not optimistic about the possibility of achieving a favorable verdict on the issue in arbitration, because the Treaty of 1867 had been more beneficial to Bolivia than to Brazil.

As A. G. de Araújo Jorge, private Secretary of Rio Branco, narrates in the introductory essay to the Obras Completas de Rio Branco [Complete Works of Rio Branco]:

On October 17, 1903, one month before the signing of the Treaty, Senator Rui Barbosa, who since July of that year had been collaborating with the prestige and authority of his name in the negotiations as one of the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries, alongside Rio Branco and Assis Brasil, considered resigning from the delegation. It was repugnant to him to share the responsibility of concluding an agreement on concessions from Brazil to Bolivia, if it appeared extremely costly. At the same time, he did not wish to be an obstacle to the peaceful settlement of a dispute – scruples which his companions did not share – that threatened to perpetuate with imminent danger the domestic order and, perhaps, American peace.

Araújo Jorge transcribed, in the aforementioned work, the two letters exchanged between Rui Barbosa and Rio Branco on the Acre issue; letters which also reveal the degree of friendship and mutual admiration between the two men. These letters are important documents not only due to the dispute between Brazil and Bolivia concerning Acre, but also for demonstrating two distinct yet not antagonistic styles to deal with international matters. Patience with a degree of optimism marked Rio Branco’s letters, while Barbosa’s tone was much more dramatic and full of pessimism. Both men, however, shared common traits: patriotism and a sincerity to uphold the public interest of Brazil.

In the end, the resolution of the Acre issue demonstrated that Rio Branco’s strategy was the correct one, as Rui Barbosa’s pessimistic hypotheses did not prove to be true.

Brazil’s entrance into international politics: Rui Barbosa at The Hague

I saw all the nations of the world assembled, and I have learned not to be ashamed of mine.

Rui Barbosa

In an article on relations between Argentina and Brazil published on September 26, 1908, in the Jornal do Commercio, Rio Branco advised, in a clear and pioneering manner, that Brazil’s foreign policy should evolve away from the ancient and narrow continentalism in which it found itself. Utilizing the country’s relations with Argentina as an example, the Foreign Minister said that the policy had been dominated by an archaic heritage of LusoSpanish origin, and that what was required was a move towards a global relationship, exemplified by the growing rapprochement between the two countries. He further emphasized that Brazil’s foreign agenda was severely outdated, placing it in a strong imbalance with its potentialities and possibilities. In the same text, however, Rio Branco said the country was emerging from this negative situation and beginning to have a decisive projection on the international stage. The following two excerpts from that article demonstrate his belief in that emergence:

We live today [1908] outside the reality of current international politics, in the midst of an illusion, to which we became accustomed due to our past...

...Brazil entered decisively into the sphere of great international alliances, to which it is entitled by the aspiration of its culture, by the prestige of its territorial greatness, and by the strength of its population.

Rui Barbosa, leading player of change

Foreign Minister Rio Branco’s new perspective became a reality for the first time with Rui Barbosa’s thoughts and actions at the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907. It was at that conclave Brazil first entered international politics as a world player, claiming rights and duties to decide and act on global issues. The partnership between Rio Branco and Rui Barbosa inaugurated a new stage of Brazilian diplomacy, and marked the beginning of a new paradigm for the country’s insertion into the international arena.

The new general sense of Brazilian foreign policy was established with Rui Barbosa’s participation in the assembly at The Hague. Brazilian foreign relations, in the nineteenth and early twentieeth centuries, focused exclusively on regional issues, with an emphasis on themes from the Plata basin. When Rui Barbosa advocated the principle of the equality of States, at The Hague Conference, however, he put Brazil’s foreign policy on another axis and opened it to a broader view. He criticized the international system in force at the time, while acknowledging he was also in charge of reforming it. His criticism was from one who recognized that as a member of the greater community, he could not stay silent. On the contrary, he generously offered his contributions, while clearly recognizing the inequities of the then current system.

The Hague International Peace Conferences

The themes of the Hague International Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were, basically, twofold: the control of the arms race and the laws of war. Both subjects had global dimensions, and both had powerful contents that put forward reforms of the international system’s organization.

The Campos Sales administration made a foreign policy mistake when it refused Russian Czar Nicholas II’s invitation to participate in the 1899 meeting. Had President Sales accepted, Brazil, alongside Mexico, would have been the only Latin American representatives at that conference. Brazil had its entrance into international politics delayed by almost a decade.

The First Conference took place at The Hague from May 18 to July 29, 1899. Twenty-six countries attended: 20 from Europe, four from Asia; plus the United States, and Mexico, represented the Americas.

Referring to his country’s participation at The Hague Conference of 1907, Brazilian diplomat and historian, Oliveira Lima, said:

[In 1907] it was no surprise that the Brazilian government did not repeat the diplomatic mistake of 1899 – and refuse to attend the Assembly – which was honorable for so many reasons. [In 1899] we refused the invitation – offered only to Brazil in South America – because we were facing crises that were very well known, and Brazil needed to re-establish its forces. ... In any case, what I expect is that what happened [to me] in Paris this year will not happen again. There, I spent my time every day going to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to handle old papers. Once as we took the stairs together, the very kind director of the historical section commented on paintings depicting several congresses and celebrated participants. When he pointed to the huge painting of the 1899 Hague Conference, he said, “Search for the Brazilian delegates.” I hypocritically stared at the screen and answered him with as much diplomacy that my 15-year career allowed me: “They hadn’t yet arrived,” I said.

Rui Barbosa, a delegate at The Hague: a defense of the principle of equality of nations and a criticism of the principle of a hierarchy of sovereignty

Rui Barbosa led the Brazilian delegation to the Second International Peace Conference, held at The Hague from June 15 to October 18, 1907, a conference, which, as Ambassador Rubens Ferreira de Mello has described: “by the results obtained and the number of countries in attendance (44), stands out as one that most contributed to the development of contemporary international law.”

The agenda of this second international conference at The Hague was very specific in terms of diplomatic and military matters, and as with the first meeting, the word “Peace” was included in the title of the conclave. Without neglecting the formal dimension of the major theme of the meeting, Rui Barbosa had success in several areas concerned with technical and complicated issues. He also drew attention to the fundamental ideological issues related to the mindsets of the great powers and their discrimination against weaker and smaller states.

As Rui himself later described the Conference’s environment: “Freedom was not welcome there; it had been taken over by a distant, unknown and defenseless authority that was unable to equitably intervene in debates concerned with the main matters of peoples’ rights.”

The diplomatic environment in which Rui Barbosa worked in the 1907 conference at The Hague was also contaminated by the rigidity of the postures of the major powers. This, according to French diplomatic historian, Pierre Renouvin, made it impossible to work towards an agreement on the issue of disarmament. The delegations considered that the “special cases” were very different, thereby making it impossible for the governments to agree on the idea of a binding arbitration that would be regulated by a general formula and settle matters related to honor and “vital interests.”

Rui Barbosa brought with him to the magnificent and strict environment of The Hague Peace Conference of 1907, his wide experience of more than two decades in both houses of the Brazilian national legislature – the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate – as well as his many years as an attorney.

Rui Barbosa’s performance at the Hague Conference

Two key moments serve to highlight the diplomatic skills of Rui Barbosa at the Second Hague Peace Conference: an incident with the Russian delegate, Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens; and the matter of the creation of a Permanent International Court of Arbitration. These skills were clearly displayed when he defended the validity of democratic principles for international order.

The Martens Incident

In the preface of his book, Obras Completas de Rui Barbosa [Complete Works of Rui Barbosa], Ambassador Hildebrando Accioly presented the following remarks concerning the Martens Incident at the Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907:

It was still in the first stages of the Conference that it seems some concealed antipathy was directed at him [Rui Barbosa]. When he was before one of the committees, the following incident took place; later, it was widely talked about. Rui had just made a magnificent speech on the issue of the transformation of merchant ships into warships, during which he had made some incursions into the sphere of politics. At that point, the President of the Committee, Mr. Martens, the Russian delegate, noted that politics should be excluded from the deliberations of the Committee, because the Conference did not have jurisdiction over political matters.

Those remarks seemed to our first delegate to be censorship directed at him, and he felt, he had to reply. He did so immediately, in a famous impromptu statement, to show that such a reprimand – if this had actually been the intent of Mr. Martens – was not fair.

Rui exuberantly stated, that if the delegates were strictly forbidden to deal with politics, the very use of the word should be prevented because – as he said – “politics is the atmosphere of the States; politics is within the realm of International Law.” He added that politics is in the deliberations, in the reciprocal concessions, in the compromises, that it was always politics that inspired either the acts or the actions of countries and governments.

Given the significance of the so-called “Martens Incident,” it is worth mentioning that the full testimony of one of the members of the Brazilian delegation at The Hague, Rodrigo Otávio, is the primary source of this striking incident in Rui Barbosa’s diplomatic performance. As Rodrigo Otávio narrates in his remarkable book Minhas Memórias dos Outros [My Memories of Others]:

On that day, the weighty matter of the transformation of merchant ships into warships was discussed, and Rui Barbosa made one of his memorable speeches about the issue. Once the Brazilian delegate had finished, President Martens, surly and coarse, stated that “the speech would be printed and inserted in the minutes of the work.” He added, however, that politics should be excluded from the Committee because politics was not within its jurisdiction. Mr. Martens, in his bitterness, did not consider Rui Barbosa’s statement to be a speech, but rather he felt it was an emotional statement, and it was in that way he referred to Rui in his retort.

General applause greeted this impertinent observation made by the president of the committee. [...] The incident made the entire Assembly alert, and then there was a deep silence. Breaking the silence, Rui Barbosa stood up and asked permission to speak. It was as if an irrepressible force had propelled him.

I was in the room, sitting on a bench leaning against the wall. I also stood up, and that was one of the most thrilling moments of my life. I felt that a great event was about to happen, and it was Brazil’s name, Brazil’s prestige, and Brazil’s honor that were at stake. In a tense moment, everyone expecting a scandal, or at least a loud discussion, turned to the speaker [Barbosa], who as Honorary President of the First Commission had a seat at the main table, on the right side of the President [Martens], a circumstance that gave him an even greater spotlight.

For his part, Martens put on an ugly face and was nervous from the beginning.

Rui – starting with a faint voice, which he later raised and it became clear – began to deliver his speech, which was, indeed, the most remarkable speech the Conference heard. The incident gave [Rui Barbosa] his greatest moment of intellectual glow.

Induced by the occasion, this impromptu speech, given in a foreign language, in an Assembly in which all speeches were read, amazed the audience. Rui faced the President of the Commission and let it be known to the representative of the autocratic Russia that he had matured in parliamentary life. He further stated that he came to that Conference from the Presidency of the Senate of his country, where the Parliamentary institutions already had 60 years of regular practice, so he probably knew how to behave in such an Assembly. He noted that the words used by the President sounded like a censorship of his speech, made in a way that he could not ignore without an immediate response. And he proceeded, eloquently, showing with the most accurate and convincing arguments, that the observation was inappropriate. In his speech he said:

Pour sûr la politique n’est pas de notre ressort. Nous ne pouvons faire de la politique. La politique n’est pas l’objet de notre programme. Mais est-ce que nous pourrions le remplir si nous nous croyons obligés de mettre une muraille entre nous et la politique, entendue, comme il faut l’entendre ici dans le sens général, dans le sens supérieur, dans le sens neutre du vocable? Non, Messieurs.

Nous n’avons pas oublié que Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Russie, dans son acte de convocation de la Conférence de la Paix, a éloigné nettement de notre programme les questions politiques. Mais cette défense évidemment ne visait que la politique militante, La politique d’action, et de combat, celle qui trouble, qui agite, qui sépare les peuples dans leurs rapports internes et dans leurs rapports internationaux, jamais la politique envisagé comme science, la politique étudiée comme histoire, la politique exploré comme règle morale. Car, du moment qu’il s’agit de faire des lois, domestiques ou internationales, pour les nations, il faut tout d’abord examiner, en ce qui regarde chaque projet, la possibilité, la nécessité, l’utilité de mesure en face de la tradition, de l’etat actuel des sentiments, des idées, des intérêts qui animent les peuples, qui régissent les gouvernements. Et bien: est-ce que ce n’est pas de la politique tout çà?

La politique dans le sens le plus vulgaire du mot, celle-ci, personne ne le conteste, celle-ci nous est absolument interdite. Nous n’avons rien à voir avec les affaires intérieures des Etats, ou, dans les affaires internationales, avec les querelles qui divisent les nations, les litiges d’amour propre, d’ambition ou d’honneurs, les questions d’influence, d’équilibre ou de prédominance, celles qui mènent au conflit et á la guerre. Voici la politique interdite.

Mais dans l’autre, dans la grande acception du terme, la plus haute et pas a moins pratique, des intérêts suprêmes des nations les unes envers les autres, est-ce que la politique nous pourrait être défendue? Non, Messieurs.[92]

And using that same tone he went on, increasingly confident.

The impression that such an impromptu speech left on the audience was great. Rui, from the start of the conference, had come to show the world who he was. The Assembly, however, did not want to know, and it [initially] did not listen. The Martens Incident, which aroused the Assembly’s curiosity, made them pay attention to the speech of the Brazilian delegate. And Rui Barbosa, who was small, modest, and almost shy in attitude, grew on the audience. With firmness, confidence and eloquence, he gave a magnificent speech. After the incident, he continued growing in such a way that he gained the admiration of his peers.

Rui finished his speech and sat down. Martens did not comment, but he was visibly disheartened; he established the agenda for the next day and adjourned the session. Then in the buffet room, to which everyone went after the incident, Martens approached Rui and talked to him for a few moments. Considering the authoritarian personality of the old Russian jurist, it was the crowning achievement of Rui Barbosa’s prestige. He had pulled off a coup and become a conqueror on that memorable day.

The creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitration

The delegations of the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom presented a complete plan for the creation of a High Court of Arbitration. According to Ambassador Hildebrando Accioly, a Brazilian jurist and diplomat, this plan proposed a new court made up of 17 judges, nine of which would be appointed by the eight great powers of the time plus the Netherlands (certainly as a tribute to the country hosting the conference). The other eight judges would be appointed by eight groups of nations, one of which consisted of the 10 South American republics. The imbalance was stark, and Brazil’s delegation was opposed to the proposal.

Rui Barbosa suggested to Rio Branco that the Brazilian Foreign Minister negotiate changes to the proposal with the American Secretary of State, Elihu Root, as the plan was clearly oriented towards an unequal and degrading treatment of smaller nations. The head of American diplomacy, according to Accioly, proposed that Brazil – either for itself or because of its prestige on the American continent – should have the right to have its own arbitrator on the court. Despite this offer, however, neither Rio Branco nor Rui Barbosa was fully satisfied. Although the former was willing to accept a transactional solution if it did not harm or offend Brazil, Barbosa insisted on maintaining as paramount the principle of the equality of sovereign States. The situation was not auspicious for us as the delegations from the major powers did not change their points of view. In that context, Rio Branco, with the support of Rui Barbosa, decided that we should make a firm official statement before the Conference, to make it clear that we would not relinquish the principle as it was important not only to Brazil, but also to the other Latin American republics.

In the statement made at the session on August 20, Rui Barbosa emphasized that the rotation system designed for the International Arbitration Court structure “would be a proclamation of disparity between national sovereignties,” and on that occasion, he submitted to the Assembly, the Brazilian government’s proposal.

The Brazilian Proposal

The final proposal, developed by agreement between Foreign Minister Rio Branco and Chief Delegate Rui Barbosa, was preceded by several drafts that emphasized the following main arguments:

•“To set an arbitrary number of judges for the Permanent Court of Arbitration according to certain a priori ideas that assumed an extension of this number, which would then attempt to ensure that all the States would be represented, is to subvert the necessary and inevitable issues of the matter.”

•“To disrupt the natural terms of the problem in this way is to assign arbitrarily to the different States unequal representations on the international court.”

•“In the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed at The Hague, June 29, 1899, the signatory powers – including the European, North American, Mexican, Chinese, and Japanese delegates – agreed that the contracting States, regardless of their importance, would all have equal representation on the Permanent Court of Arbitration.”

•It is a fallacy to consider that a right is equal for everyone who holds it, as “for some [it] is limited to fairly brief periods; while others have the privilege of its continuous exercise.”

•“The establishment by contractual stipulation of sove-reignty categories that humiliate some and benefit others undermines the foundation of the existence of everyone, and proclaims – through a strange logic – the legal predominance of might over right.”

The Brazilian Proposal for the new Permanent Court of Arbitration was modelled on the following items:

1. Each State shall designate to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, under the conditions stipulated in the Convention of 1899, one person able to serve respectably as a member of that institution as an arbitrator.
The State shall also have the right to designate a deputy.

Two or more States may agree upon the designation of a common representative on the Court.

The same person could be designated by two different States.

The signatory States shall choose their representatives on the new court from those who are part of the existing Court.

2. Once the new court is designated, the current court shall cease to exist.

3. The persons designated shall serve for nine years and cannot be displaced except in situations in which, according to the legislation of each country, permanent magistrates lose their office.

4. A State may exercise its right of appointment only by engaging to pay the honorarium of the judge that it is to designate, and by making a deposit every year in advance and on the terms established by the Convention.

5. In order for the court to decide a case in plenary session, at least a quarter of the members designated must be present. To ensure this possibility, the members designated shall be divided into three groups according to the alphabetical order of the Convention’s signatures. The judges included in each of these groups shall sit in rotation for three years, during which time they shall be obliged to fix residence at a location from which they can arrive at The Hague within twenty-four hours of the first telegraphic summons. However, all members of the court have the right, if they wish, of always being part of the plenary sessions, even if they do not belong to the specific group summoned.

6. The parties in conflict are free to submit their dispute either to the full court or to choose from the court the number of judges upon which they have agreed to settle their differences.

7. The court will be convened in plenary session, whenever it is necessary to settle disputes in which the resolution has been entrusted to it by the parties; or whenever a matter is submitted to them by a smaller number of arbitrators, if the latter appeal to the full court, to settle an issue arising among them during the case proceedings.

8. In order to complete the organization of the court on these bases, everything in the provisions of the draft written by England, Germany, and the United States that is consistent therewith and seems proper to adopt shall be adopted.

In defense of the Brazilian Proposal, Rui Barbosa sought to undo several misunderstandings, especially the criticism of the American delegate Joseph Choate, according to which he [Barbosa] “was resolved to consider no other proposal except the Brazilian one.”

I do not attach an absolute importance to the Brazilian proposal. That has never been my intention. The proof of this is that in the meeting of August 20, I submitted the proposal under the title: “Provisional suggestions for use in the discussion on the creation of a permanent court.” What I consider important in that proposal relates to its main principles; that is what inspires it.

In our proposal, we find three essential ideas. First, the idea that constitutes its foundation, in other words, the substance: the principle of the equality of States. Second is the right of each State to designate a member of the court, which we regard as the only means of possibly establishing the principle [of States’ equality]. And finally, we consider inseparable from arbitration, the rule that assures sovereign States in dispute the right to choose their own judges for any arbitral court.

In the sphere of controversy, Rui Barbosa felt very comfort-able, and did not miss a single opportunity to rebut criticism or negative insinuations regarding the Brazilian proposal. Despite the vehemence of some of his speeches, Rui, as William T. Stead points out, “was cool, calm and undisturbed at the tribune. His speeches made a vigorous appeal to reason, a dialectic that required an intelligent audience, but through all his fierce argument, one can sense the passion of the repressed burning flame.”

Rui repeated himself in order to clarify misunderstandings, to counter what he considered to be the major argument – and actually the only argument – used so far against the Brazilian proposal:

[...] in defending their system of great nations – those largest in geographic area, in population, in wealth and in culture – they allege that the larger States will be judged before a court in which their representatives’ votes would weigh as much as the minimal States’ votes [...]. But that argument is in itself inaccurate. [...] in the Brazilian proposal, there is no such thing. The judges appointed by the small States, as those appointed by the large States, do have the right to sit permanently on the court; but they will exercise the function of judges only of those States, great or small, that freely chose them. The Brazilian proposal establishes in its Article VI that: “The parties in dispute are free either to submit their controversy to the full court or to choose from the court the number of judges that they agree upon to settle their differences.” Therefore, the large States will never run the risk of being subjected, against their will, to judges appointed by the small States or to any other judge in whom they may not rely. It is the States themselves who will choose all the judges of the court – whoever pleases them – creating for the settlement of each case a tribunal of three, five or seven members entirely at the convenience of the parties.

Rui Barbosa deepened the discussions about the different possibilities of structure for the new Court of Arbitration, and emphasized, once again, three basic points of the Brazilian proposal, namely:

1. The proposed institution is not necessary, as the existing court, if improved, will meet all the needs of arbitration.

2. If a new court is created, it has to be based on the principle of the equality of States, and the principle has to be strictly followed.

3. For this principle of the equality of States to succeed in a fully satisfactory manner, the only possible solution is the direct and equal participation of all the States on the court, thereby ensuring to each the designation of a judge, in accordance with the plan adopted by the Brazilian proposal.

Rui pointed repeatedly, to Article VI of the Brazilian proposal that gave the parties in dispute the right to choose their judges. Furthermore, this right fulfilled a role of great importance in the arbitration system: it conciliated the existence of a court of fortyfive members, imposed by the principle of the juridical equality of sovereign States, with the essential need for strict justice to have each case decided by a small number of judges. This is something we must never lose sight of in our assessment of the two systems.

After long and thorough debates, the conclave at The Hague finally approved a cold and formal suggestion made by a British delegate, Lord Edward Fry, according to which “The Conference recommends to the signatory States the adoption of the project voted for the creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice, and the entry into force as soon as an agreement has been reached respecting the selection of the judges and the constitution of the Court […]”.

When Rui Barbosa withdrew the Brazilian proposal, he emphasized that:

Its essential purpose was to make the principle of the equality of States practical, to concretely define it versus the principle of a hierarchy of sovereignties through a rotation system adopted in the Anglo-German-American proposal […] Thus, from the moment the proposal prevailed in its fundamental form, and also from the moment we did not present it with the intention of creating a new court – of which we neither recognized the necessity nor the utility – or with the intention of opposing principles contrary to our own, we had no interest whatsoever that our proposal should be discussed and put to a vote. We had succeeded in attaining all that we sought.

The last speech at The Hague: farewell in great style

In his last speech on the new Permanent Court of Arbitration, Rui Barbosa emphasized that the Brazilian government considered implicit in its vote,

[...] recognition of the principle of the equality of sovereign States and, as a consequence, the absolute exclusion in any future negotiation concerning the constitution of a new court of arbitration, either through a system of periodicity via the rotation of judges, or through a system that establishes the election of the judges by foreign electors.

While acknowledging that perhaps it would have been better “to keep quiet; to leave them with a good impression,” Barbosa continued, explaining the reason for his persistence in defense of the equality of sovereign States in the debate on the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

We persisted because along with the absolute necessity of preserving this right, we were determined to preserve other rights as essential and as inalienable as the previous: the judicial right to international arbitration, and the inherent right of each party to choose its own judges.

And he added that:

I have been told that it may have been wiser to wait, and make our proposal at the next conference, as they did not want this here. Why are we in such great haste? My responses are multiple:

The haste arises from a tendency whose dangerous nature I have already highlighted, concerning the caution which presided over the Conference of 1899, replacing arbitration, a form of justice for sovereign States, with a power that was never before considered in international affairs – except perhaps in the idle daydreams of utopia.

The peril of this adulteration of arbitration, of this seductive yet dangerous illusion, was foreseen and reported in 1899 at the First Conference, by a voice that succeeded in making a prediction for the Second Conference: that of our illustrious President, Mr. Leon Bourgeois [Prime Minister of France, 1895-1896, and French delegate at 1899 and 1907 Peace Conferences].

Once again, Rui Barbosa used the treasured diplomatic and political resource of evoking the historical background of an argument in favor of his thesis. Thus he used an excerpt from a speech made by Bourgeois, when the honorable French statesman launched, on July 9, 1899, the works of the Third Commission:

It is in the same spirit of great prudence and with the same respect for the national sentiment that the principle of judges’ tenure has not been included in either draft. It is impossible in fact to not recognize the difficulty in the world’s current political condition of setting up a tribunal in advance that would be composed of a set number of judges, representing the different countries, and seated permanently, to try a succession of cases. This tribunal would, in fact, offer the parties, not arbitrators but judges in the private law sense – respectively chosen by them and vested with a sort of personal warrant of office by an expression of national confidence. This tribunal would include judges, not arbitrators, respectively elected by the parties themselves. From a general perspective, a permanent court, however impartial the members might be, would run the risk of being characterized as a specific State’s representative. And the Governments, believing that the court was subject to political influence or to currents of opinion, would not agree to attend to it as a jurisdiction, as an entirely disinterested court.

Accordingly, Barbosa, used the best dialectic technique of crudely exposing the ideas of an adversary – even showing that he or she was absurd, in order to vigorously defend his own position – as he quoted an excerpt from The Times newspaper’s editorial of September 21, 1907, which said:

The fate of the creation of a new arbitral court makes it possible to determine the incapacity of the small States regarding political practice. They have insisted that each State, no matter what its material, moral and intellectual condition might be, should have an equal representation on the tribunal. Knowledge, character, experience and armed force, all these mean nothing in the opinion of these uncompromising doctrinaires. Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Salvador and Venezuela, Persia and China, all these are sovereign States. Therefore, so they reason, it will be necessary that each enjoy the same rights as Great Britain. France, Germany and the United States, in the settlement of the most subtle controversies of law and issues of fact between the greatest and the most enlightened States of Europe. Such assumptions make their argument irrefutable, and these assumptions are the skeleton of the Conference itself. From a juridical and diplomatic point of view the argument is perfect, but unfortunately, there is no sense to their conclusion. No other example can be given to blatantly expose the flimsy structure of the Conference. Hence, in view of the fact that the great powers are not at all disposed to place over them as their judges, the most corrupt and the most backward States of Asia and of South America, we shall not yet have the arbitral court.

Rui skillfully chose the text that reflected with harsh clarity the ideology of the great powers, in their discriminatory and arrogant views. Two viewpoints of international politics are clear: the real politik and the idealistic ones. It is a headon attack on the doctrine of power, as a source of wisdom and common sense.

In order to support his thesis of the equality of sovereignties, Rui Barbosa, as an idealist, transferred to the international sphere the ideal political model for national context, and he wished to apply to it identical values and mechanisms of the domestic practice of liberal democracy. When he continued his farewell speech at The Hague, he stated the following to defend the identical logic of domestic and the foreign policies:

Certainly, there are cultural, moral, wealth and power diversities between States and between individuals. However, does this fact create any difference whatsoever regarding essential rights? Civil rights are the same for every man. Political rights are the same for all citizens. In the election of the august sovereign Parliament of Great Britain, Lord Kelvin and Mr. John Morley have the same vote as the ordinary workman dulled by labor and poverty. Is the intellectual and moral capacity of this laboring man, who has been degraded by suffering and distress, equal to that of the statesman or of the scholar? The fact is that sovereignty is the elementary right par excellence of organized and independent States. Sovereignty means equality. In principle and in practice sovereignty is absolute. It does not brook ranking, but the jurisdictional distribution of right is a branch of sovereignty. Hence, if between the States there is to be a common organ of justice, all the States must have equal representation on it.

Once again, Rui Barbosa also attacked the so-called material criteria (maritime trade, naval capacity) used to rank countries. He showed that even in that apparently objective field, there is blatant unfairness, as he had already expressed in the debate on the International Prize Court, which was the result of a discriminatory perception by the major powers. To close his arguments, he asked: “Now, if this has been the experience in that field – where to be quite fair in our criticism, there would be no need to make use of anything but our eyes –what would be the result if we were to rank the weaker nations according to the vague and elastic criteria of intelligence, morals, and culture?”

Another interesting topic in Rui’s final speech at The Hague is the one in which he responded to an article published in a newspaper – “some transatlantic gazette” – in which it was stated that the major powers never involved the arbitration of countries such as Brazil, Haiti and Guatemala in their disputes. The Brazilian Delegate showed in that respect, that he was aware of everything that happened, both inside and outside of the Conference, and that he was also aware of the importance of the media to the operation of diplomacy in creating hostile or favorable environments. In his rebuttal of the claim, he once again, used the historical background of the case and demonstrated his knowledge of the history of national foreign policy.

Regarding the aforementioned article, he said the following:

To allow such arguments against Brazil one must have lost sight of the history of international relations in the last quarter of the 19th century. If it were not for this disregard, one might have realized that of all the countries in Latin America, Brazil is the only one to which the great powers, especially the United States, have gone to select arbitrators. In the most famous of arbitrations, the Alabama affair between the United States and Great Britain, the treaty signed by the two parties in Washington on May 8, 1871, spawned the Geneva Court, in which one of the arbitrators was a Brazilian diplomat, the Viscount of Itajubá. In the Franco-American Court of Washington, established to settle the claims of the two powers in dispute, in accordance with the Convention of January 15, 1880, the presidency of that Court consulted Brazil, with one of our diplomatic representatives, the Baron of Arinos. Finally, the four joint arbitration commissions that operated from 1884 to 1888 in Santiago, Chile – to adjudicate the claims of England, France, Germany and Italy against the American State – were successively chaired by three Brazilian counselors, Lopes Netto, Lafayette Pereira, and Aguiar de Andrade. [...] In 1870, 1871, and 1880, and from 1884 to 1888, Germany and Italy have called upon Brazil as arbitrators, each of them once, and France, England and the United States, each of them twice. This is a distinction that was conferred upon no other American State, except the United States.

Barbosa finished his argument by ironically asking:

But lo and behold, today they would scoff at the nations of South America, at our expense, by representing as a great absurdity the possibility that a great power might accept arbitration on the part of Brazil. Who is laughing now?

He ended by lashing out at the corruption label that The Times intended to impose on the countries of Asia and South America:

Nor is it true that if the nations have not been provided with another arbitral court, the blame for this must be laid at Asia’s or South America’s door, where ignorance and corruption reside. No, that is not the case at all. The facts are an overwhelming testimony against this fabrication.

When he previously assessed the results of The Hague Conference, Rui Barbosa held the great powers responsible for the failure to solve the problem of the creation of the new Court of Arbitration. In summary, concerning that dead end, he said:

The great powers have offered two solutions to the problem. First, there is the Anglo-Franco-American proposal. However, all the great powers, including the two that collaborated with the United States – that is to say Great Britain and Germany – have cut off their support in the subcommittee of eight and in the B Examination Committee. The United States itself, confronted by this unanimity, did not pursue its own proposal. Thus, the system of rotation, with the ranking of States, came to its end.

The second solution was the setting up of the court by election. It was presented by the American delegation to Examination Committee 13, on September 18, and in that same meeting the proposal was discarded as it secured only five votes against nine. Among those nine votes, apart from four States of secondary importance – Belgium, Brazil, Portugal and Romania – there were five great powers: Germany, Austria, Great Britain, Italy and Russia. Among the great powers, France alone supported the proposal of the United States, competing against the Netherlands, Greece and Persia.

Therefore, in the first case, it was the unanimity of the powers, and in the second, it was the unanimity minus only two votes that wrecked the American initiative in this matter.

As can be seen, Rui Barbosa demonstrated the level of disaggregation among the major players of the international scene who seek from the minor countries patterns of coherence, responsibility and rationality that they, themselves, are unable to practice. He made his case about this paradox with precise irony and numbers of votes.

Brazil’s stand: “moderate and circumspect, yet firm and proud”

In a speech made on October 31, 1907, when the Brazilian colony in Paris paid tribute to him after the Conference had ended, Rui Barbosa summed up the meaning of his mission at The Hague in the following manner:

Below the eight great powers that divide among themselves the control of the world, with regard to superiority among nations, no other State is greater than Brazil. Considering all of them, none among the secondary powers is greater than we are, and I believe none is as great as we are. Our diplomatic traditions put us, in certain respects, at a great level, side by side with governments who have arbitrated major disputes between the major powers of the world. Our military weakness places us far away from these armed powers.

This situation, in its extreme delicacy should have its own language: moderate and circumspect, but steadfast and haughty when necessary. It was necessary to recognize that, and to talk naturally about it, safely, calmly, and with tenacity. It was not easy; but it was not impossible. An instinctive feeling of responsibility for this duty came over me, after I crossed over the demanding thresholds of Ridderzall [the main building in which the Hague Conference was held]. During the first steps, I was filled with terror. I do not know how to express the dismay, the sense of helplessness, of dread, of complete abandonment of my own self that I felt during the first days, when I sat in my chair, staring at the circle of greatness that surrounded me. It destroyed my spirit. Forgive me if I say, however, that from the opportunity to defend the honor of our office, I found strength, courage, and resoluteness. I do not know where it came from, but I saw myself standing up, with words on my lips, and I plotted the straight line of behavior that I maintained until the end, thank God, with invariable perseverance.

“The new discovery of America”

Twenty six countries attended the First Hague Peace Conference (1899): 20 of them were European; four Asian; and two American, the United States and Mexico. (Brazil had also been invited, but decided not to participate.) At the Second Hague Peace Conference (1907), 44 countries attended: 21 were from Europe, four, again, from Asia, and now, 19 were from the Americas. As Brazilian delegate Rui Barbosa said, “It was the great international assembly in which all the sovereign and constituted States of the world gathered.”

In response to a speech of Dr. Virgílio de Leme, in Salvador, Bahia, on December 29, 1907, Rui Barbosa made an important assessment of the clash that occurred between South America and the United States at the recently completed Second Hague Peace Conference. The dispute concerned Washington’s proposal to establish a world Court of Justice, in which eight powers would have a permanent seat and the other nations of the world would have rotating seats. The proposal was abandoned by the United States, however, due to the negative reaction of other countries – especially other American countries. This negative reaction had been initiated by Brazil through the words of Rui Barbosa with a strong defense of the principle of equality among sovereign States. The expressive presence of South and Central American countries was not only quantitative, but it characterized a group of aware participants; nations with their own person-alities; accountable and high-level players – such as Saenz Peña, of Argentina, and Augusto Matte Pérez, of Chile.

Rui pointed out that “the lesson learned from Hague’s drama” was that “close observers immediately saw, without question, a new discovery of America, a political discovery, the uncovering of the political weight of this new discovery, which until then was unknown in the international arena.”

In the same line of thought, James Brown Scott, one of the most brilliant of the American delegates, stated that the Second Hague Peace Conference represented “the advent of South Amer-ica in the world.”

Brazilian writer, Euclides da Cunha, whom Rio Branco chose to greet Rui Barbosa on behalf of Itamaraty upon his return from the conclave at The Hague, emphasized that he saw in “Ambassador Rui Barbosa, not a delegate from Brazil, but rather, the Plenipotentiary of Latin America, ‘the Representative of the Continent’.” He noted, however, that “the role our delegate [Rui Barbosa] played cannot be ascribed only to his personal qualities. His appearance is as logical and geometrical as a parallelogram of forces.”

The strength of a new mentality

In his 1949 book, Rui Barbosa e o Código Civil, San Tiago Dantas, who would later become the Foreign Minister of Brazil, wrote that the first decades of the Republic presented:

a unique contrast between economic reality and ideas; between the country’s material weakness and the strength with which a new mentality burst onto the scene. ... [And] through that contrast, to the delight of the observer, the intellectual life of the country rose to a previously-unattained level. It could be said that an entire generation – filtering the problems stirred up by European culture of its time – cast among us, within a decade, the foundations of a great movement of ideas, without setting common guidelines, but open to the historical and current reality of the country, as well as to universal issues.

Rui Barbosa was a member of this generation; a generation which also prominently included Machado de Assis, Rio Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, Euclides da Cunha, Farias Brito, Silvio Romero, Eduardo Prado, Alberto Torres, Olavo Bilac, and Graça Aranha. Rui Barbosa, who did not obtain all of the victories in domestic policy that he desired, found in international policy his big success in life: the victory of the democratic ideas he advocated at The Hague, proclaiming the equality of nations. A shrewd observation by German philosopher, Georg Hegel (1770 - 1831) on the importance of theory in political life can be applied to Rui Barbosa’s performance at The Hague: “Every day I am more convinced that theoretical work represents more achievements in the world than practical work. Once the field of ideas is revolutionized, the current state of affairs no longer resists.”

Even in the tumultuous state of affairs of the early decades of the Republic, people like Rio Branco and Rui Barbosa revolutionized the “field of ideas.” The results emerged unexpectedly and rashly, but solidly. These new models of foreign policy – the paradigms of active and lofty participation in international politics, and the equality of nations – were rooted in courage and in republican institutional creation. They were the foreign policy models that Rio Branco and Rui Barbosa advocated at The Hague, in 1907.

The two patrons

Rio Branco, as diplomat and writer Gilberto Amado well defined, “was born a politician, an opener of roads, an initiator.” For these reasons, and for making history, he is known as “The Patron of Brazilian Diplomacy.”

Rui Barbosa, as journalist and Sociology professor, Alceu Amoroso Lima observed, “was the man whose dream was to turn Brazil, by force of law, into a global power. [...] He dreamed about Brazil in the world.” In this manner, Rui Barbosa can be considered “The Patron of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy.”

Bibliography

AMADO, Gilberto. Rio Branco. In: FRANCO, Álvaro Costa; CARDIM, Carlos Henrique (org.). O Barão do Rio Branco por grandes autores. Brasília: FUNAG, 2003.

ARAUJO JORGE, A. G. de. Rio Branco e as Fronteiras do Brasil – Uma Introdução às Obras do Barão do Rio Branco. Brasília: Federal Senate, 1999.

CARDIM, Carlos Henrique. A Raiz das Coisas. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2007.

HEGEL, G. W. F. Letters of January 23, 1807 and October 1805. In: AVINERI, Sholmo. Hegel´s Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 64 and 68.

LOPES, Mario Ribeiro. Rui Barbosa e a Marinha. Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1953.

VIANA FILHO, Luís. A Vida de Rui Barbosa. Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1977.

Euclides da Cunha

Euclides da Cunha was born in 1866, in the municipality of Cantagalo, Rio de Janeiro. He attended Military School in 1886, from where he was expelled two years later because of a protest against the Minister of War. The support to Republicanism and to Positivism marked his youth. He returned to Military School after the Proclamation of the Republic. Between 1892 and 1896, he worked as a military engineer. In 1896, he disconnected from the Army and started to work as a civil engineer in São Paulo. In 1897, he travelled to Bahia as a journalist for the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo in order to cover the Conflict of Canudos. His experience resulted in the publication, in 1902, of his masterpiece, Os Sertões. In 1903, he was elected a member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. Between 1904 and 1909, he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a consultant for the Baron of Rio Branco, and also headed the Brazilian Committee to Recognize the Purus River; it was under this duty that he travelled to the Amazon in 1905. In 1906, he published the book Peru versus Bolivia and, in 1907, the collection of articles and essays Contrastes e Confrontos. He left Itamaraty to take on the Logic professorship at Colégio Pedro II. He died shortly after, in Rio de Janeiro, in August, 1909, after engaging in a shootout with his wife’s lover, cadet Dilermando de Assis. The book À Margem da História was published, posthumously, in the same year.

Euclides da Cunha: the South American scene

Kassius Diniz da Silva Pontes

Euclides da Cunha was born in 1866, in the countryside of Rio de Janeiro state. Of humble birth, throughout his 43 years of life he carried out professional activities “under the State’s protective cloak”: he was member of the military, civil engineer, employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, for a short period of time, Logic teacher at the Pedro II School (VENTURA, 2003, p.33). His education at the Military School of Praia Vermelha, which he joined in 1886, happened in a context of great political instability – the movements supporting the slavery abolition and the establishment of a republican regimen were getting stronger – and under the influence of thinkers, such as Benjamin Constant, one of the main individuals responsible for spreading the positivist thought, especially among young officials of the Army. He graduated in Mathematics, Physical and Natural Sciences, and Military Engineering. His academic background in natural and exact sciences is clearly reflected on all his literary work.

After working as military and civil engineer in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, in 1897 Euclides traveled to cover the military campaign of Canudos, in Bahia, witnessing in loco the attempt of the republican regimen to suppress the rebellion of countrymen leaded by Antônio Conselheiro. The episode was described in his main work, Os Sertões (Rebellion in the Backlands), published in 1902. The book rapidly turned him into a literary celebrity. However, he still faced financial difficulties and frustrations with his work as engineer. According to Francisco Venâncio Filho, “as the glory and fame of the author were high, the life of the man remained burdensome and harsh” (VENÂNCIO FILHO, 1995, p. 40). Disappointed with his job in the countryside of São Paulo, he decided to seek an occupation that could provide him with better life conditions. Supported by friends who appointed his name to the Baron of Rio Branco, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, he started working, as of 1904, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quitting engineering for good.

In his five years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Euclides da Cunha was a privileged observer of the main international issues of his time, specially the events that were taking place in South America. As an assistant to Rio Branco, he helped in the process of defining the Brazilian borders with Peru and Uruguay. Going beyond the occupation of cartographer (for which he was prepared due to his education at the Military School), he reflected on and developed theses on issues of broader interest to foreign policy, such as the mistrust of the neighboring countries regarding Brazil and the imperialist dispute for the occupation of economic areas in South America.

Euclides was also an advocate of greater physical integration among the countries of the region. Like Rio Branco, of whom he was a keen admirer, he had both realistic and pragmatic views of the power game in the region: it was crucial for Brazil to define its borders with the neighboring countries by means of negotiation, seeking, at the same time, to beware of attempts of European intervention in the Americas. He recommended that industrialization and economic development were the main instruments of defense against the greed of foreign powers. True to his positivist convictions, he believed that the adoption of specific policies for the Amazon and the establishment of adequate infrastructure would be the only weapons that would be able to ensure Brazilian sovereignty over its extensive territory.

The purpose of this study is to outline the journey of Euclides in Itamaraty and to present his main texts on international politics. As a reflection of his own work, the focus will be placed on the South American political scenario of the early twentieth century. A better understanding of Euclides’ thought requires, however, a brief, previous analysis of the conceptual and ideological outline that permeates his entire work, which will be the first step of our study. Next, we are going to recall the time he worked at Itamaraty, before we discuss the texts on South American politics, focusing on four main aspects: the consolidation of the Brazilian borders; the book Peru versus Bolivia; the analysis of the dispute between the United States and Germany for areas of influence in South America; and the analysis of three sparse articles, included in the book À Margem da História, about the South American physical integration, the Plata basin and the Pacific. At the end, we intend to sum up Euclides da Cunha’s contribution to diplomatic thought. Despite the lack of a systematic approach, his writings on international politics accurately reflect many of the main concerns of the Brazilian government in the early twentieth century, clearly aligned with the view of the Baron of Rio Branco as far as the insertion of Brazil in the region and in the world were concerned.

The conceptual framework of Euclides da Cunha

A better understanding of Euclides da Cunha’s texts on international politics must be preceded by a brief review of the set of ideas that influenced him in the transition of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Most of the students of the Military School of Praia Vermelha were middle class, in contrast with the Law Schools, responsible for teaching the children of the great landowners (SODRÉ, 1995, p. 16). It was in that environment characterized by the study of the exact sciences that Euclides became aware of Auguste Comte’s Positivism, which was deeply inserted among the officers. Benjamin Constant presented to the young cadets – many of whom were from humble backgrounds – the “expositive syntheses and the philosophical formulations” of Comte, conquering several followers among the young cadets (VENTURA, 2003, p. 51). Euclides was, in that environment, enthusiastic about the proposals of social reformism, focusing on the change of political system and on the abolition of slavery.

An emblematic incident regarding his concern about the political system was the protest, where he was a protagonist, against the visit of the Minister of War of the Empire, Tomás Coelho, to the Military School, in 1888. During that authority’s visit, Euclides threw his sword to the ground, in a political gesture clearly in favor of the Proclamation of the Republic. Consequently, he was expelled from the institution, to which he eventually came back only in the following year when the new political system was established. Throughout his life, Euclides remained true to the Republican principles and to the defense of democracy and social change, values that, in his opinion, were not observed in the years immediately after the fall of the monarchy.

It is during that same period that the writer began to collaborate with the press. In addition to his reformist ideology, the articles published in the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo – formerly called A Província de São Paulo – explicitly demonstrate his belief in the Positivist thought and the cult to the sciences. This scientism was even more central in Os Sertões, which, in order to write, Euclides would go deeper into the study of the so-called “exact” sciences, from Geology to Botany. In doing so, he began to absorb the popular ideas in the main currents of thought, using concepts of race, climate, evolution and civilization present in the work of authors such as Saint-Hilaire, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Hippolyte Taine and Herbert Spencer. Despite the strong influence of scientific language in his works, the purpose of Euclides was not to write a merely descriptive study of the reality that he observed. By describing the reality of Canudos and of the life of the peasants, he eventually became, according to Gilberto Freyre, “a discloser of the Brazilian reality.” Unlike other thinkers imbued with a scientific mind, but without literary aspirations, his work also considered the interpretation of a part of Brazil still scarcely known at the time. For that reason, in his writings “the artistic virtues were more important than the scientific ones” (FREYRE, 1995, p. 30).

That conceptual framework was also reflected in Euclides’s work about international politics. Once again, there was the desire to explain the reality based on deterministic and evolutionist assumptions. The frequent resource of quoting foreign authors reflects a reality of the time: in the early twentieth century, the study of the sciences in Brazil was still rough. Its application to literary works was unprecedented. The fact that it eventually adhered to a “diffuse, not to say an arbitrary anthropological Darwinism” (LIMA, 2000, p. 35) is explained precisely by these characteristics of his thought, directed towards the revelation and interpretation, in a somewhat unusual literary style, of that Brazil far from the coastline, as well as by handling concepts that were typical of a thinker imbued with scientific ambitions who lived during the transition period between the nineteenth and twentieth century.

More broadly, Euclides’ thought reflected the concern of the Brazilian elite regarding the affirmation of the national identity and the race issue. It was sought, based on the European currents of thought aforementioned, to establish connections between the biological process of miscegenation and the historical process of nation building (SKIDMORE, 2012, p. 165). The abolition of slavery had occurred shortly before – in 1888, just 14 years before Os Sertões was published – and in the debate on racial themes the outright attempt to incorporate ideas designed by foreign authors into the Brazilian reality still prevailed. Euclides was not immune to such a process. He thought that the influence of determinism often resulted in a negative view of miscegenation, although his writings are permeated by contradictions: in many cases, Euclides also praised the strength and potential of the peasant, presenting him as the “core of nationality”.

When he talked about the South American political context, Euclides kept intact the desire to apply and conciliate science and literature. He often referred to ethnicity, to the climate or geography of the countries he talked about, as well the ambition to establish a cause and effect relationship between natural phenomena and the social and political ones. The articles published in Contrastes e Confrontos, À Margem da História and Peru versus Bolívia must be read from that specific point of view, taking into account the existing intellectual and cultural context of the time in which they were written.

Euclides da Cunha and Rio Branco

The hiring of Euclides at Itamaraty, where he worked as a counselor to the Baron of Rio Branco between 1904 and 1909, was the result of uncertainties that characterized his life after the publication of Os Sertões, in 1902. After serving for a brief interregnum as an engineer in the state of São Paulo, in 1903 and early 1904, he found himself unemployed and he decided to abandon his occupation. At the same time, there was an increase of Peruvian demands for the negotiation of new bilateral borders, due to the addition of Acre to Brazil by means of the Treaty of Petropolis, signed with Bolivia in 1903. Peru had not participated in the negotiations between Brazil and Bolivia and it thought that it had been impaired by the agreement executed by its neighboring countries. In July 1904, the Brazilian and the Peruvian governments decided to initiate negotiations for the future execution of a Treaty of Limits. As a first step, it was decided on the establishment of a Mixed Committee to navigate the rivers Juruá and Purus and to get to know in loco the border region between both countries.

Euclides hoped that obtaining a position at Itamaraty would provide him with the necessary peace of mind to more easily pursue his intellectual goals. He rejected, however, the possibility of asking for favors to obtain a position in the public office. In a letter to his friend Luiz Cruls, he lamented, “in this land, both the request and the effort, two things that disgust me are necessary for everything” (GALVÃO; GALOTTI, 1997, p. 149).

By refusing to seek a position by himself, the appointment of Euclides depended on the action of close friends, who had good relationships with Rio Branco. Two of them – the critic José Veríssimo and the diplomat Domício da Gama – played an especially relevant role in the intermediation of Euclides’ contact with the minister. The Baron himself – who was always interested in maintaining an entourage of important intellectuals – eventually interviewed Euclides, deciding, then, to appoint him as head of the Brazilian Committee for the Recognition of Alto Purus, a position he held from 1904 to 1905. During that period, he travelled to the Amazon, providing him the opportunity, as we will see later, to write several texts about the region. Once the Committee’s activities were over, Euclides returned to Rio de Janeiro and went on to be a cartographer, assisting the Baron of Rio Branco directly.

Euclides’ role in Itamaraty was never officially created by law. Indications are that Rio Branco employed and paid him directly. The precarious nature of his occupation in the Ministry was a source of distresses for the writer, who remained with no defined professional direction. From 1906 until early 1909, he nurtured the ambition to take on other functions – among them, he considered positions on the Committee of Limits with Venezuela and in the Committee of the Madeira-Mamoré Railroad. It is believed that he even cherished the desire to be assigned to work abroad, an idea that supposedly was not supported by Rio Branco (VENÂNCIO FILHO, 2002, p. 228). Although he was unsatisfied with his situation, he ended up playing important roles in Itamaraty. In addition to the aforementioned role in negotiating the borders between Brazil and Peru, he wrote, at the request of Rio Branco, the book Peru versus Bolivia, and worked in the formulation of the Treaty with Uruguay that established the joint ownership over the Rivers Jaguarão and the Lagoa Mirim. The respect that he enjoyed in Itamaraty was shown, moreover, by the fact that he was chosen to make the greeting speech to Rui Barbosa upon his return from the II Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907 – when he praised the performance of the Brazilian representative against the “crushing of the majority of people in favor of four or five strong and imperialist nations” (ARINOS FILHO, 2009, p. 35; CARDIM, p. 172-174).

The reasons for Rio Branco not appointing Euclides to a permanent position in Itamaraty are unclear. What we can notice from Euclides’s letters is that the Baron himself insisted that the writer, despite his distress, remained working in the institution. In a letter to the diplomat Oliveira Lima in November 1908 – when he had already worked for the Baron for 4 years –, he mentioned “the dangers of my position as a Commissioner in-partibus”. He also added, “It has already been 2 years of expectation and I am impressed with my own patience, although it can be explained by the own opposition expressed by the Baron of Rio Branco to my attempts of following a new direction”. Having continued to work in Itamaraty without any guarantee would turn him, in his own words, “into the last of the romantics” (GALVÃO; GALOTTI, 1997, p. 362 and 392).

The fact that he was not able to obtain a stable position in Itamaraty did not affect the admiration that Euclides had for Rio Branco. He often expressed his esteem for the minister at the time. In a letter to Domício da Gama, he pointed out that the Baron, with his “majestic kindness”, brought memories of “a golden age, an ancient one, or one which was over”, confessing that he came closer to him “always with unease and aware of the same respectful cult”. He also stated that it was inevitable not to consider him “a man superior to his time”. He also referred to the Baron as a “singular case of a great man properly appreciated by his contemporaries”, “the monopolizer of national charm” and “the only Man who gathers the rest of the hope of the country” (GALVÃO; GALOTTI, 1997, p. 335, 421 and 423). It is worth noting that Euclides, in his personal mail, was always thrifty in praising, in addition to being a notorious critic of the directions taken by the Republic and the posture of the public men of his time.

The duality of his relationship with Rio Branco is clear, characterized by the intellectual respect and the formality, given the position that the minister at the time had already achieved in the Brazilian political scenario. The Baron, in turn, already admired Euclides even before they worked together in Itamaraty, and even voted for him during the election to the Brazilian Academy of Letters in 1903 (VENÂNCIO FILHO, 1946, p. 15-16). It is also worth noting their background differences. Euclides was the son of a farm accountant in Rio de Janeiro’s countryside and his mother died when he was 3 years old. Rio Branco, in turn, was the son of a political leader of the Empire and a diplomat who had lived for several years in Europe. What brought them close to one another was their common desire to work for the preservation of the territorial integrity and the taste for the study of historical and cartographical documents that could provide support to the Brazilian ambitions in its borders disputes with neighboring countries.

In his continuous struggle against professional dissatisfaction – which was a reflection of the “uncomfortable contradiction between the public facet of an established writer and the inglorious search for a job more focused on literary activity” (VENTURA, 2002, p. 76) –, Euclides eventually left Itamaraty in July 1909, when he was appointed professor of logic of the Colégio Pedro II, after a public examination marked by controversies. The writer came in second place in the examination, just behind the philosopher Farias Brito. In letters to friends, Euclides claimed that a disagreement arose between him and the Examination Board during his oral presentation. Even so, President Nilo Peçanha appointed him, supposedly due to the decisive meddling of the Baron of Rio Branco himself. The minister, in a letter to a distant relative of the President at the time, claimed to be making his moves to benefit his friend since he became aware of a “scandalous conspiracy against him within the Congregation” and of the existence of other candidates’ “godfathers – or people of great influence, as people say” (ARINOS, 2009, p. 40). Euclides held the office for just a month, since he died in August 15, 1909, in a shootout with the cadet Dilermando de Assis, his wife’s lover.

The South American policy of the First Republic

a) Establishing borders with Peru

Euclides – appointed head of the Brazilian Section of the Recognition of Alto Purus in August 1904 – prepared himself to travel to the Amazon. He had already written about the region even before he started to work in Itamaraty. In articles published in 1903 and 1904, which were later gathered in the book Contrastes e Confrontos, he embraced models of scientism – geographical determinism, evolutionism and social Darwinism – that had already been used in Os Sertões. Thus, considerations about the relation between climate and adaptability of men and the recurrent use of expressions such as “natural selection of the fittest” and “vital competition among the peoples” prevailed (BARRETO DE SANTANA, 2000, p. 904).

The article “Conflito Inevitável”, published on May 14th, 1904 in the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo, is a good example of that use of deterministic and evolutionist theses to elucidate problems regarding international policy. Referring to the invasions carried out by Peruvians in Acre in search of rubber, Euclides stated that such movement was “determined” by “physical laws that cannot be violated”. The correct understanding of the phenomenon should take into account the “unfavorable position” of Peru in the Andes. Limited to a “sterile coast” and detached, by the mountain range, from its “broader and more exuberant portion”, the country could only try to seek an outlet to the Atlantic. Besides the geographical aspects, the article references to several racial matters. Euclides pointed out that Peru lacked “a predominant character”, “an incisive national feature” since a “large ethnographic gallery” characterized the country, which led to a “dissimilar miscegenation”: “from the pure Caucasian, to the retint Black, to the shred Asian and to the fallen Quechua” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 94). It is rather frequent to refer to race as the determining factor of the behavior of a people – in the case of neighboring countries, miscegenation and the lack of a single national trait could lead to disturbances and to a natural propensity to conflict.

Even when he argued against a possible conflict with Peru in the dispute for border territories, as he did in the article “Contra os Caucheiros”, Euclides used geographical and climatic theses. The physical traits of the region, permeated by an “inextricable maze of streams,” hampered the movement of regular troops. The climate, in turn, imposed on the soldiers a “difficult and painful” task. Thus, the defense of the Brazilian interests in the region was mainly a responsibility of the Brazilians who lived there: the “fearless peasants of the Northern States” (CUNHA, 1975, pp. 100-101). In the article “Entre o Madeira e o Javari”, Euclides referred to such ideas as “vital competition between the peoples” – an expression that was repeated in other texts – and to the “natural selection of the fittest” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 105).

Euclides’s contact with reality modified many of his initial perspectives. For this reason, his writings about the Amazon and the problems of the Brazilian border are specially complex, since a priori perspectives – highlighted by the use of concepts absorbed from the European thought and by readings he made before he travelled – and the in loco testimony of what was going on in the region coexisted side by side.

Although he was anxious to start his works, Euclides only travelled to Manaus in December 1904, four months after his appointment. In this capital, he came across various logistical problems, which led to successive delays in the departure of the expedition to navigate the Purus. Starting his journey in April 1905, the members of the Committee navigated the entire river, reaching its headwaters, and returned to Manaus in October of the same year. Euclides described a negative scenario of the support that the Committee received, mentioning, in a letter to José Veríssimo, that even the English Explorer William Chandless had been provided better conditions to carry out his work, whereas “we, Brazilians, with an official Commission, found indescribable obstacles” (GALVÃO; GALOTTI, 1997, p. 261-262).

The final report of the Recognition Committee was published in 1906 and the subhead was “Additional Notes by the Brazilian Commissioner”. Euclides commented, with more details, his impressions about the Amazon and as to the border problems with Peru. He criticized the delay in receiving instructions and discussed the Peruvian caucheiros – who explore a natural rubber (caucho), a non-renewable gum that imposes nomadism on its collectors – and the Brazilian rubber tappers, who are settled exploring the latex. The reference to those characteristics proved to be important to confirm the Brazilian claim over the territory of Acre: due to the nomadism of the caucheiros, it was difficult for Peru to prove the actual occupation of the disputed territory.

The negotiations of the Treaty of Limits with the neighboring country lasted for five years and it was only signed in 1909, less than a month after the death of Euclides. Due to the Brazilian persistence, the deal consecrated once again uti possidetis de facto as a principle for the definition of the bilateral borders. The work of the Joint Committee that navigated by the Purus River was the skeleton for the negotiation and identification of the border strip. With regards to the region in dispute, 403,000 square kilometers were granted to Brazil and approximately 39,000 to Peru (LINS, 1996, p. 421). Some people consider that negotiation as a “huge victory” for Brazil, since it thwarted Peruvian aspirations to embody Acre and enforce the Treaty of San Ildefonso that could, in practice, redraw all the regional borders (CUETO; LERNER, 2012, p. 58).

It is important to emphasize that the report that Euclides produced after the exploration of the Purus went beyond the matter of the borderline itself. The writer seized the opportunity to report what he considered as “abandonment” of the Amazon and its people. His feeling that the virtual neglect of the region could go on representing a threat to Brazilian interests prevailed in the text. He even said that, without an actual occupation of the region, “the Amazon, sooner or later, will be naturally and irresistibly detached from Brazil” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 106). Arguments in that regard also were eventually developed in his book À Margem da História, a collection of sparse studies that was completed shortly before he died in 1909.

Taking as his motto the possibility of conflict between Brazil and Peru, in other articles Euclides advocated once again that the difficulties Brazil faced with the neighboring Republics resulted from a series of racial and geographical factors. In “Solidariedade Sul-Americana”, also published in the volume Contrastes e Confrontos, he insisted on evolutionist theses in order to explain the geopolitical scenery of the early twentieth century. In his opinion, the emperor figure enabled, until 1889, to distinguish Brazil from the “revolutionary and dispersive activity” that were characteristic of other South American countries. The change in the political system, however, harmfully equated Brazil, from a foreign perspective, to the clutter of Hispanic countries. He assessed that it would prevail, “in the South American people”, a “reversed natural selection: the survival of the least fit, the retrograde evolution of the crippled, the total extinction regarding the fine qualities of character [...] and the rowdy victory of the weak over the misunderstood strong” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 108).

Euclides also emphasized the suspicions that neighboring countries nurtured regarding Brazil, despite Rio Branco’s efforts to maintain good relations and to solve occasional border conflicts exclusively by diplomatic means. Also in “Solidariedade Sul-Americana”, he considered that the Treaty of Petrópolis was the best certification of “the higher irradiation of our spirit” – in the sense that, even though Brazil already occupied de facto but not de jure the territory of Acre, it was willing to provide financial compensation to Bolivia – and drew attention to the Brazilian government’s efforts to avoid an armed conflict with Peru, which demonstrated interest in sacrificing “transient interests” in order to continue “ahead of the South American nations as the strongest, the most liberal and the most peaceful” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 109). The conclusion of the article was clearly pessimistic. In view of the neighboring countries’ misunderstanding with respect to Brazilian interest in maintaining good coexistence, we should accept, if necessary, “the fight with which we are threatened”. He ends by asserting that the South American solidarity – supposedly based on sharing the same political system and the interest in protecting itself from the “formidable competition from other people” – was nothing more than an “unachievable ideal”, with the single effect of keeping us tied to the traditional disorders of two or three hopelessly lost people” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 110).

b) Peru versus Bolivia

Once his work as the head of the Brazilian Committee for the Recognition of the Purus River was concluded, Euclides returned to Rio de Janeiro in January 1906 and had no clear role in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During this period, he worked as a cartographer and considered, as previously observed, being appointed for the team that would oversee the construction of the Madeira-Mamoré Railroad. The invitation to the post of controller of the construction was actually made, but Euclides later declined it due to objection from his family, mainly from his father. The possibility of eventually integrating the Committee of Boarders with Venezuela did not come true either (VENTURA, 2003, p. 245).

It was in that context that Euclides published the book Peru versus Bolivia. The Baron of Rio Branco possibly requested the work’s development which focuses on the border dispute between both neighbors. It was feared at the time that the dispute would affect Brazilian interests, especially the rights on the recently added territory of Acre. Peru wished to restore the boundaries that the Treaty of San Ildefonso had set in 1777, demanding that the border with Bolivia be determined by the midline between the Madeira and the Javari Rivers. Documents that referred to the Spanish colonization backed its claim. The President of Argentina arbitrated the process.

In the book, Euclides presented arguments in favor of the Bolivian expectation, since a Peruvian victory could lead to the rejection of the Treaty of Petrópolis. Not by chance, the Bolivian representative at the Court of Arbitration, Eleodoro Villazón, quickly translated the book into Spanish. In legal terms, Euclides pointed out that Peru could not invoke, to its benefit, texts that it had rejected by the time of its independence. Therefore, the Royal ballots and ordinances were “null and void, and often contradictory” (CUNHA, 1995, p. 811). Besides, the Treaty of San Ildefonso would only be an agreement prior to a Treaty of Limits between Portugal and Spain, which was never made since only Portugal appointed members of the bilateral Commission for its negotiation.

Euclides emphasized that both Peru and Bolivia had concluded limit agreements with Brazil throughout the nineteenth century – in 1851 and 1867, respectively – in which the boundaries determined by the Treaty of San Ildefonso were not considered. The invocation of the Treaty in the early twentieth century represented a “somersault of a hundred years, which blatantly violated all historical continuity” (CUNHA, 1995, p. 811). The supposedly contradictory position of Peru – to use, as an independent country, documents from the colonial period – made Euclides nickname the country “the dreamy Republic of the Pacific” (CUNHA, 1995, p. 814).

The writer uses, once again, racial arguments to explain the differences between the South American Spanish and Portuguese colonization. The borders originally established in the Treaty of Tordesillas and the Treaty of Madrid were overcome by the trailblazer spirit of the Brazilian bandeirantes, while Spanish legislation “enclosed the colonists within the impassable circle of the districts”. For that reason, the Portuguese territorial expansion in South America configured the “triumph of one race over another” (CUNHA, 1995, p. 815-816).

When he analyzed specifically the boundaries between Peru and Bolivia, Euclides used historical documents and maps to support that already at the period of the Viceroyalty, the audience of Charcas – later Bolivia – occupied the territory that corresponded to Acre. Therefore, there was no reason to challenge the validity of the Treaty of Petrópolis. The separation between Bolivia and Peru was also supposedly dictated by two other factors: a geographical one, since the Andes established a natural boundary between both nations, and a geopolitical one, since the creation of the audience of Charcas was a strategy of the Spanish Crown to meet the Portuguese expansion. Charcas even started to enjoy greater autonomy in relation to Lima and Buenos Aires – capitals of the viceroyalties of Peru and Plata, respectively. Thus, although Bolivia had not occupied de facto the territory of Acre, it would have the right of possession over the region, not Peru.

The arbitral decision of the President of Argentina Figueroa Alcorta was disclosed in July 1909 and it determined the division of the area in dispute between Peru and Bolivia. Although it partially upheld the Peruvian claims, the award did not harm Brazil at all.

The publication of Peru versus Bolivia eventually engaged Euclides in a controversy with the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Ernesto Zeballos, who saw Brazil as a rival country and openly advocated the Argentinean military strengthening, especially in the navy. Besides, he was the director of the daily La Prensa, which was notorious for its anti-Brazilian stance (BUENO, 2003, p. 254). Zeballos was the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1906 and 1908, and soon after he left Office, he disclosed an alleged telegram from Rio Branco to the diplomatic representations of Brazil in Montevideo, Lima, La Paz, Santiago and Washington, with instructions for them to carry out a campaign against Argentina. The allegations turned out to be false after the disclosure, in Brazil, of the original content of the dossier. Then, Zeballos claimed that he had obtained from Euclides – with whom he corresponded – “secret information” regarding Brazilian foreign policy. He even emphasized that he had received a copy of Peru versus Bolivia, which he saw as interference from Brazil on the possible decision to be made by the Argentine representative.

Euclides ordered that both letters he had received from Zeballos were published and he challenged the Argentinean interlocutor to do the same. The correspondences disclosed only praise to the works Os Sertões and Castro Alves e Seu Tempo and do not even mention Peru versus Bolivia, although Euclides had actually sent him the book. In a letter to Zeballos, the Brazilian writer claimed to be surprised to see “our exclusively intellectual relations involved in the solitary campaign you are fighting with imaginary antagonists”(GALVÃO; GALOTTI, 1995, p. 387). Zeballos did not publish the correspondence he received from Euclides and merely sent a telegram regretting the “nuisance”. Jornal do Commercio emphasized that it was the only one in charge of paying, without any order from Rio Branco, for the printing of Peru versus Bolivia (TOCANTINS, 1968, p. 231).

As was previously highlighted, Euclides’s dissatisfaction with his work at Itamaraty characterized the period between 1906 and 1909. Still without a stable position and mainly playing the role of cartographer, his personal correspondence revealed constant frustration with his professional life and the desire to seek new positions outside Itamaraty. In a letter to his brother-in-law, he pointed out that he would not leave his job because the Baron treated him “cordially, and I do not take heart to mention to him that position’s inconvenience and also to demonstrate instability or lack of persistence”(GALVÃO; GALOTTI, 1997, p. 393-394).

Besides having worked on the definition of the borders with Peru and having published the book about the dispute between that country and Bolivia, Euclides also collaborated in the elabo-ration of the Treaty of Limits with Uruguay, shortly before he died in 1909. In this case his cartographic knowledge was important to provide support to Rio Branco’s goal to revisit, voluntarily, the border with the neighboring country. In the agreement, Brazil relented to Uruguay part of the Mirim Lake and of the Jaguarão River, under the condition that only vessels of both countries would sail in those waters and that none of the parties would militarize the region (ARINOS FILHO, 2009, p. 38-39; LINS, 1996, p. 427).

c) The interimperialist dispute in South America

Euclides’ pessimistic view of the ideal of South American fraternity helps us to understand better his analysis of the interimperialist dispute waged between the United States and Germany to increase their influence on the continent. In accordance with Rio Branco’s policy, Brazil sought a closer relationship with the United States, in such a way as to ensure, pragmatically, its interests in South America. Euclides saw the greed of foreign powers over territories in the region because of the natural countries’ industrial expansion in the Northern Hemisphere. In the article “Temores Vãos”, he alludes to a supposed “collective stalking mania” which characterized South American nations, based on “fearing what is abroad” and the specters “of the German and the Yankee dangers”. Beyond that, he states that the goal of North American imperialism was not the control of territories or the “crushing of weak nationalities”, representing only the “irresistible course of an unparalleled industrial movement” and the

extremely natural expansion of a country in which an enlightened individualism, overcoming the official initiative ... allowed the disencumbered unfolding of all the energies guaranteed by an unrivalled practicality, a broad sense of justice and even by a wonderful idealization of the highest targets of existence (CUNHA, 1975, p. 116).

That point of view is a direct corollary of Euclides da Cunha’s concern with the affirmation of the Brazilian nationality and with what he considered lack of foresight of the economic elite and of the ruling class with the promotion of development. It does not embody what at first glance might seem an uncritical admiration of the achievements of foreign powers, but what it understands as being the verification of an unquestionable factual reality: that certain countries advance “in a triumphant and civilizing manner towards the future”, while the South American nations struggle to stabilize themselves in political terms and to advance in economic terms. Faithful to the hyperbolic style present in several periods of his work, he dealt ironically with the danger represented by imperialism to attack what, in his opinion, is the only “real” danger: the “Brazilian” one, characterized by the “loosening in the entire line of moral oversight”, by an “economic situation inexplicably dejected and tumbled over the largest and most fertile natural resources” and by the “breakdowns of the old virtues of work and perseverance”. He also assessed that part of the Brazilian crisis is due to the new political system and the “misunderstood federalism” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 119).

A similar consideration is present in the article “American Ideals”, which deals with the book of the same title, by the U.S. President at the time, Theodore Roosevelt. Although he considered the author a “mediocre stylist” and a pure “systematization of truisms”, he emphasized that the book “tells us everything that is useful”. While the South American Republics fear the imperialism of the Northern power, Roosevelt draws attention, instead, to the danger that the “South American anarchy” represents. Euclides makes it clear that he agrees with the criticism of the American ruler to the “depressing and dispersive localism” that characterized the federal system. Roosevelt’s reprimands to the disorder of the South American Republics made the book required reading for the Brazilian public servers, representing a warning. After all, the “absorption of Morocco or Egypt, or of any other incompetent race, is first and foremost a natural phenomenon” or “Darwinism roughly applied to the life of the nations” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 115).

In two other articles - “O Kaiser” and “A Arcádia da Alemanha” – Euclides discusses the German imperialism. In both texts, he is more critical than in the appreciation of American imperialism. He claims that Germany “woke up late to the colonizing expansion”. Its “robust industrialism” imposed territorial expansion as a “living condition”. However, whereas the “best bits” were already in other hands, it devoted itself to “plunder the last remains of the fortune of the weak countries” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 36). In “Arcádia da Alemanha”, when he talked about the alleged plan of the European country to conquer Southern Brazil, he warned that “Germany cannot comply, so early, with such a large enterprise”. In addition to the intrinsic difficulties to the competition with other powers, the South American countries could rely on the protection offered by the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, according to which the United States should play the role of “continental police”, with the purpose of ensuring that the countries of the American continent remained under its exclusive orbit of influence. The Roosevelt corollary, in addition to being a “political echo of the strictly commercial interests of the United States”, would have the effect of providing the South American countries “a long truce” from the greed of European countries. Even if the supposed conquest of territories in Southern Brazil actually took place, which at that period seemed unlikely, Euclides warned that the threat would last while Brazil limited itself to “behold ... our virgin coal fields, our iron mountains, our ranges of quartzite, our coastlines made golden by monazite sands and the stupendous channeled flood of our rivers...” (CUNHA, 1975, p. 40).

The analysis that Euclides made of the imperialist action had, as it can be observed, a realistic basis. The foreign greed did not necessarily represent a real danger at the time: the United States had no ambition to conquer territories in South America, but rather to exercise the role of gendarme; the Germans, who were late to enter the colonialist race, were unable to take on a more aggressive policy on the continent, due to the role played by the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Anyway, our vulnerability resulted from what he called the “Brazilian danger”, characterized by political disorganization, the lack of economic planning and our “old metaphysical nonsense”. In that and in other respects Euclides’ thought is shown in full accordance with Rio Branco’s policy to establish strategic alliance with the United States (SEVCENKO, 1999, p. 142), especially with the purpose of ensuring the region’s stability, avoiding the greed of European countries and strengthening the Brazilian position in relation to occasional problems with neighboring countries.

d) Physical integration in South America, the Plate River Basin and the Pacific

In addition to the articles included in Contrastes e Confrontos and the book Peru versus Bolívia, Euclides da Cunha also dealt with international issues in three studies published in the posthumous À Margem da História. The first of them – Viação Sul-Americana – bore special relevance by proposing greater physical integration between South American countries. Unlike what we can infer from the pessimistic view that he had of the political association between Brazil and neighbor Republics, in that article Euclides proves to be favorable of the establishment of railroads to intensify the trade among the countries of the region and with the rest of the world.

For Euclides, the fact that Argentina had, in 1902, a more extensive railway network than Brazil confirmed “our economic subordinateness”. In his opinion, the Argentinean advance was a direct result obtained from the railways; the Brazilian situation led to the opposite phenomenon: “our railways are a result obtained, first of all, from our progress” (CUNHA, 2005, p. 115-116). In his effort to explain such a reality, once again he reaches for racial arguments. The Brazilian situation: the conquest of the territory that lies beyond the coastline depended on a specific type of man – the bandeirante –, whereas in Argentina it was not necessary the “adapted races”, since the occupants of its territory changed hemisphere “without changing latitudes”. It was the “European culture stretching along the sea level” (CUNHA, 2005, p. 117).

Next, Euclides alludes to the opening of the first railway between two South American countries, La Quiaca, in Bolivia, and Buenos Aires. The rail allowed for a trip from Buenos Aires to Bolivia in two and a half days. As a result, he predicted that the Bolivian economy would fall “into the overwhelming orbit of the country that provides it with such relief” (CUNHA, 2005, p. 120). In addition, the connection between Bolivia and Argentina was to be the initial step towards a broader railway connection in South America, which could allow, in a few years, a trip from Lima to Buenos Aires in three days. Buenos Aires would become a “Spanish-American capital”, which could even facilitate the possible establishment of a political confederation involving Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. The most tangible threat to the interests of Argentina was the creation of the Panama Canal, since a significant part of the trade movement could shift to the North.

As a way to suppress what he envisioned as being a sort of Argentinean “railway imperialism”, Euclides then proposed the construction of the “Brazilian Northwest” railway, which would connect São Paulo to Bolivia. Starting from Santos, the railroad would cross Mato Grosso and Santa Cruz de la Sierra. From there, it could connect with the Argentinean and the Chilean railway network. The Brazilian railroad could make the Santos harbor the “native port of Bolivia”, since it was closer to Europe than the Buenos Aires one. Besides, it offered Brazil a connection to the Pacific (CUNHA, 2005, p. 135).

In the article “Martín García”, Euclides addressed the dispute between Argentina and Uruguay for the jurisdiction over the Plata region. As we have already noticed, the writer knew the geography of the area quite well, having worked for Itamaraty in the drafting of the Treaty of Limits between Brazil and Uruguay. The writer defended the shared jurisdiction of the Plate River Basin, challenging the Argentinean claims to stop the Brazilian control over the river. The excuse to analyze the issue was the review that he made of the book “Martín García y la Jurisdicción del Plata”, by Agustín de Vedia. Euclides began his analysis by dealing with the Island “Martín García” ownership issue, which was for a long time considered to have strategic importance for navigation in that region. The tiny island had even been claimed by Brazil in negotiations on the Cisplatine Province status carried out in the 1820s, in Rio de Janeiro. In Euclides’ narrative, Argentina – in order to keep governing Martín García – had resigned at that time to continue pleading to Brazil the addition of Uruguay. It was what he assessed as being “political color blindness” (CUNHA, 2005, p. 147). In addition, he believed that the ownership of the island would gradually lose its importance since the territory would tend to naturally “drown in the water”, disappearing in a few years.

The real dilemma that Argentina e Uruguay had to solve was the jurisdiction over the Plate River. Euclides saw Argentina’s ambition of exclusive domination of the area’s navigation as a “belated chimera” (CUNHA, 2005, p. 158); not only for its refusal to submit the dispute to arbitration, but also for contrasting with the previous stance of the Argentinean government itself – which in the mid-nineteenth century indicated as the dividing line of the river the halfway point of its current. Euclides invoked the “crepuscular government” of Juan Manuel Rosas, according to whom Argentina could not “alegarse titulo alguno, siendo comunes las águas” (CUNHA, 2005, p. 159), and several documents and statements by Argentinean authorities – all of which were described by Agustín de Vedia in “extraordinary pages” – recognizing the Uruguayan jurisdiction over the waters of the Plate River. Quoting Domingos Sarmiento – to whom he referred as a “South American glory” –, Euclides referred to the need for all the countries of the area to make an agreement concerning the use of common waters. In the case of the Plate River that shared jurisdiction was always “a ground rule” (CUNHA, 2005, p. 161).

In the last article about international themes included in À Margem da História – “O Primado do Pacífico” – Euclides da Cunha discusses, regarding what might have been his most comprehensive analysis of the international geopolitics, about the growing role of Asia in the global economy. That phenomenon led the United States to shift towards the Pacific the “best of its national energies” since the East offered the best trade potential. That explained its “unique expansionism”, since the Asian countries were not only a source of stocks, but also a broad consumer market for manufactured products. The building of the Panama Canal was inserted in this logic of penetration in the East. The goal of the United States – that Euclides exemplifies with the Philippines situation, confirming the same viewpoint he had of the country’s “imperialism” in South America – was not colonization (in the sense of territories conquest) or tutelage, but that of “mercantile primacy”, to create bases that ensured the achievement of its commercial interests. The growing American influence could, however, generate conflicts, “an encounter between two worlds”. Euclides speculated what could occur in the East as a “clash between both opposing races [...], the initial struggle between the United States and Japan” (CUNHA, 2005, p. 170). The several islands in the South Pacific would be the setting for that clash, for which the Japanese “rejuvenation” contributed. The fact that the American future depended on its “full hegemony” in the Pacific would eventually lead to a conflict that “no political or diplomatic arrangements, would be able to halt” (CUNHA, 2005, p. 173).

The three articles from À Margem da História have different natures, but confirm Euclides’ clear interest of Euclides in foreign policy. None of them was directly related to his work at the Brazilian Chancellery nor do they constitute an organic set of texts. They echo, however, several of the concerns that have marked Euclides’ considerations about international themes, including the physical integration of the continent, the rivalry with Argentina and the rise of the United States. Viação Sul-Americana had a constructive character and, as it was natural for an engineer, it presented objective suggestions for the establishment of a railway network connecting Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Argentina, under the excuse of avoiding the increasing dependence of neighboring countries on the Buenos Aires’ marina. It is worth mentioning that in the same book Euclides stood up for a proposal of similar integration in the Northern region, represented by the construction of a railroad between Brazil and Peru – the Transacreana. Martín García, in turn, defends the Uruguayan interests in the shared jurisdiction of the Plate Basin, challenging the Argentinean claim to dominate the area itself. In both cases, the fear is clear – in a consideration regarding the Brazilian government’s own concern – with respect to the rise of Argentina and its increasing ability to influence neighboring countries. In the article O Primado do Pacífico, in turn, Euclides reaches again for the analysis of the imperialist phenomenon and of American industrialism, a theme that he had already addressed, in shorter articles, in the book Contrastes e Confrontos, particularly focusing on its impact in South America.

Euclides’ contribution to Brazilian diplomatic thought

Euclides worked for Itamaraty late in his life, from 1904 to 1909, but he was never appointed to a permanent position and his main focus was never the major international policy issues. Those issues are present in his work to the extent that they affect, either directly or indirectly, his considerations about the affirmation of Brazilian nationality, but they are not – perhaps except for the book Peru versus Bolívia – an autonomous corpus within his work. The primary motivation of the beginning of his collaboration with Rio Branco was the desire to travel to the Amazon and to write about the region. Therefore, international policy permeates his work with the development of his considerations on what he saw as the two main threats to Brazilian sovereignty: the mistrust of neighboring countries and the interimperialist dispute in South America.

Despite that subsidiary character in his intellectual pro-duction, the texts by Euclides on the foreign policy of the First Republic contain original formulations for the time and articulate a strategic view of what the presence of Brazil should represent in the South American scenery. Among his concerns was the need for effective measures to integrate the Amazon to Brazil and to promote economic development. That would be the only way to counteract the greed of foreign powers in territories and markets in South America. His pessimistic view regarding greater political approach among the South American countries was tempered by the defense of greater physical and economic integration, such as was originally articulated in his article Viação Sul-Americana, in which he called for the establishment of a railway network that would connect marinas on the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Euclides analyzed diverse international phenomena from the point of view of factors such as climate, geography and race, as a consequence of his intellectual training in the field of the natural and exact sciences. Therefore, we must place his work at the time when it was written – in which the definition of the Brazilian identity, including the issue of race, was a pending theme and, furthermore, take into account the unique and problematic interaction that exists, in his thought, between literature and science. In his position in the Brazilian Chancellery, Euclides was both an observer and a commentator, from a privileged position, of the international events of the first decade of the twentieth century, leaving as his legacy a series of texts that, in spite of his lack of organicity, reflect the main concerns of the Brazilian State at the time. Such concerns were the defense of sovereignty, the preservation of Brazilian territorial integrity through the negotiated settlement of border disputes and the articulation of a realistic and pragmatic view of the international scene of the time, marked by the demarcation of borders and the search for a strategic alliance with the United States. In the articulation of those ideas, he proved to be a faithful defender of Rio Branco’s policy and of one of the Brazilian intellectuals that best represented the dilemma that was common to the “intelligentsia” of that time: to serve the State, seeking at the same time to maintain independence and consistency of thought.

Bibliography

ARINOS FILHO, Afonso. Euclides da Cunha e o Itamarati. In: Revista Brasileira, Stage VII, Year XVI, n. 61, October-November, 2009.

BARRETO DE SANTANA, José Carlos. Euclides da Cunha e a Amazônia: Visão Mediada Pela Ciência. In: História, Ciências, Saúde, Manguinhos, vol. VI, 2000.

BUENO, Clodoaldo. A Política Externa da Primeira República: Os Anos de Apogeu (1902 a 1918). São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2003.

CARDIM, Carlos Henrique. A Raiz das Coisas – Rui Barbosa: O Brasil no Mundo. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2007.

CUETO, Marcos and LERNER, Adrián. Indiferencias, Tensiones y Hechizos: Medio Siglo de Relaciones Diplomáticas Entre Perú y Brasil. Embajada de Brasil en Perú/Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2012.

CUNHA, Euclides. À Margem da História. Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Letras, 2005.

______. Contrastes e Confrontos. São Paulo: Cultrix/Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1975.

______. Obras Completas. 2v. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Aguilar, 1995.

FREYRE, Gilberto. Euclides da Cunha – Revelador da Realidade Brasileira. In: Obras Completas. v. 1. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Aguilar, 1995, p. 17-32.

GALVÃO, Walnice Nogueira; Galotti, Oswaldo (Org.). Correspondência de Euclides da Cunha. São Paulo: Edusp, 1997.

LIMA, Luiz Costa. Euclides da Cunha – Contrastes e Confrontos do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto/Petrobras, 2000.

LINS, Álvaro. Rio Branco. São Paulo: FUNAG/Alfa-Ômega, 1996.

SEVCENKO, Nicolau. Literatura Como Missão: Tensões Sociais e Criação Cultural na Primeira República. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1999.

SKIDMORE, Thomas. Preto no Branco – Raça e Nacionalidade no Pensamento Brasileiro. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012.

SODRÉ, Nelson Werneck. Revisão de Euclides da Cunha. In: Obras Completas, Rio de Janeiro: Nova Aguilar, 1995, v. 2, p. 11-59.

TOCANTINS, Leandro. Euclides da Cunha e o Paraíso Perdido. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1968.

VENÂNCIO FILHO, Alberto. O Barão do Rio Branco e Euclides da Cunha. In: Cardim, Carlos Henrique; Almino, João (Org.). Rio Branco – A América do Sul e a Modernização do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: EMC, 2002.

VENÂNCIO FILHO, Francisco. Rio Branco e Euclides da Cunha. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Imprensa Nacional, 1946.

______. Estudo biográfico. In: Obras completas. v.1. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Aguilar, 1995, p. 33-54.

VENTURA, Roberto. Retrato Interrompido da Vida de Euclides da Cunha. In: Carvalho, Mário César; Santana, José Carlos Barreto de (Org). São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003.

______. Folha Explica Os Sertões. São Paulo: Publifolha, 2002.

Suggestions for further readings

ANDRADE, Olímpio de Souza. História e Interpretação de “Os Sertões”. Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Letras, 2002.

FREYRE, Gilberto. Perfil de Euclides da Cunha e Outros Perfis. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1944.

SANTANA, José Carlos Barreto de. Ciência e Arte: Euclides da Cunha e as Ciências Naturais. São Paulo: Hucitec; Feira de Santana: Universidade Estadual de Feira de Santana, 2001.

VENTURA, Roberto. Memória Seletiva – À Frente da História. In: Cadernos de Literatura Brasileira, nos. 13 and 14. São Paulo: Instituto Moreira Salles, 2002.

Manoel de Oliveira Lima

Manoel de Oliveira Lima was born in Recife, on December 25th, 1867, the son of a Portuguese merchant. When he was 6 years old he moved with his family to Lisbon, where he studied at a school of French Lazarists and graduated at the College of Language and Literature. The Portuguese scholars of the late nineteenth century influenced him and from a very young age, he began his journalistic activity and historiographical research. He returned to the home country for the first time in 1890, when he entered the diplomatic service as Attaché of the Legation in Lisbon. He served as Secretary of the Legation in Berlin, Washington and London, between 1891 and 1900, a period in which he consolidated his trajectory within the Brazilian scholarly environment, becoming correspondent-partner of the Historical and Geographical Institute and a member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. He was the head of Legation in Tokyo, between 1901 and 1902, being removed towards the end of this period to Lima, a post he never actually assumed, remaining in informal availability in Rio de Janeiro, between 1903 and 1904, when he started a public conflict with Rio Branco. He was transferred to Caracas and Brussels cumulatively with Stockholm, between 1904 and 1913, when he also retired from diplomatic service. He lived in London for a while and, between 1916 and 1920, he lived in Pernambuco. Also in 1920, he permanently moved to Washington, after completing negotiations with the Catholic University of America for the transfer and shelter of his monumental library. He died on March 24, 1928.

Manoel de Oliveira Lima: the reform of diplomatic service

Helder Gordim da Silveira

In Oliveira Lima, what can be called diplomatic thought is just one of the expressions of broad intellectual production with multiple faces. The face of historian, diplomat, journalist, professor, collector, traveler, without being able to say that one is clearly superior to the other, always appears in the “singular and plural” Pernambuco, at the same time Brazilian, American, and European, both in his influences and in his placements.

It is hard to lean, even though on a very limited way, on any aspect of this work and of the individual figure of Oliveira Lima without evoking the image of the “fat Don Quixote”, consecrated by his friend and, in some senses, disciple, Gilberto Freyre. It is the sociologist from Recife who claims that his fellow countryman

as an individual, was different from his fellow citizens and his generation’s companions. [...] Sometimes, he was a foreign body among them: a huge foreign body..., singular, almost unique, in certain aspects of a personality that, however, asserted itself in various and even contradictory activities (FREYRE, 1968, p. 37).

He courted controversy and accumulated frictions and enemies in various spheres of his political and intellectual activity throughout his life and even after his death. As a diplomat, he lived almost half of his career “in the shadow” of the great Baron of Rio Branco (ALMEIDA, 2009, p. 97), who was perhaps the most important of the windmills of the Don Quixote of Parnamirim.

Therefore, when it comes to Oliveira Lima, it is especially difficult to notice the dimension and the limits of the diplomat’s thoughts regarding what he considered a necessary reform in the structure and the functioning of the Ministry, as well as in the primary sense of Brazilian foreign policy. Thus, we must consider these independently from his trajectory and his positions – both contradictory and controversial – in the political and cultural spheres in which he operated and located himself. Thus, based on his classical (FREYRE, 1968; GOUVÊA, 1976; LIMA SOBRINHO, 1971) and contemporary (FORSTER, 2011; MALATIAN, 2001) biographers and commentators, we shall propose, without any ambition to innovate, an assessment of his views on the reform in Itamaraty necessarily as part of a broader and unique diplomatic thought in his generation.

The boy from Pernambuco and the European man

Manoel de Oliveira Lima was the youngest son of Luiz de Oliveira Lima – a native of the city of Porto and a successful merchant living in Recife since 1834 – and of Maria Benedita de Miranda Lima – a descendant from a traditional family from Pernambuco tied to the large sugar estate, an economic sector in clear decadence in the late nineteenth century. In 1873, Manoel, who was 6 years old at the time, moved with his parents to Lisbon, where the Porto merchant of Recife, also for health reasons, intended to take advantage of the solid and well renowned fortune that had accumulated in Brazil. The older brother, Luiz, and both sisters, Amália and Maria Benedita remained in Pernambuco. The latter, nicknamed Sinhá, the closest to Manoel, married the diplomat Pedro de Araújo Beltrão, who rendered service first in London, as Secretary of Legation, and was an important contact for Oliveira Lima’s career.

When the Republic was proclaimed in Brazil, Oliveira Lima, who soon after that became an acclaimed historian within the Brazilian scholarly environment, being 22 years old at the time, was rendering extraordinary service in the Brazilian Legation in Lisbon, where he had been in attendance since he was an adolescent. At the time, the young Luso-Brazilian scholar professed vigorous sympathy for the Republican ideals, seasoned with some influence by Comte – which, apart from that, was neither profound nor lasting – coming from some of his professors at the College of Language and Literature of Lisbon where he had graduated, after he went to Elementary School at the school of the French Lazarist priests. Since then he started to provide information to the Provisional government about the political and journalistic reception of the young Republic in Portugal and in Europe and he organized a campaign to respond to attacks suffered by the new Brazilian system, made especially by the Portuguese monarchist press.

Having been a devoted student and loving the books since his adolescence – for which, according to him, his father’s influence was decisive, with a refined autodidactic training, despite the intensive lifelong devotion to the commercial activity –, Oliveira Lima met important figures of the Portuguese scholarly environment of the end of the century, receiving from them the most striking influences, particularly within the College of Language and Literature, such as Jaime Moniz, Adolfo Coelho, Vasconcelos Abreu, Pinheiro Chagas, Teófilo Braga and those from previous generations, such as Alexandre Herculano. He had begun early in the journalism of the time, in the editorial office of O Repórter, where he had contact with Oliveira Martins. Since he was 15 years old he edited the Correio do Brasil, a vehicle through which he expressed his intellectual interest for his homeland and his affective link with Pernambuco, surely nourished by the domestic environment in Lisbon – the Lima household was a meeting and reception place of Brazilians in Portugal and the parents preserved daily habits that kept alive the memories of his childhood in Recife. Throughout his youth, Manoel de Oliveira Lima also maintained a rich and permanent collaboration in the Jornal do Recife, in which he published impressions of holiday trips to European cities, especially London, which was always his favorite, and Paris, as well as analyses of the European political panorama, particularly of cultural events in the Old World and, occasionally, Brazilian domestic issues in these spheres. The trips he made as a young man and the frequency in the Legation in Lisbon were also marked by contacts with important Brazilian scholars and diplomats, in which stood out, at that stage, Eduardo Prado, of whom he came to know well and grew close to, Carvalho Borges and the Baron of Penedo, to whose residence he often went during his trips to London.

In 1890, the year his father died, he returned to Brazil for the first time in order to negotiate his definitive appointment to the diplomatic service, a yearning nourished for a long time and now strongly anchored in his Republican profession of faith, in the recent actions in defense of the new regime from the Legation in Lisbon, as well as in the contacts indicated by his diplomat brother-in-law Araújo Beltrão and by other family friends somehow integrated with the newly installed regime. He went personally to Rio de Janeiro to implement the necessary procedures for the desired appointment, obtaining decisive interviews with President Deodoro, Vice-President Floriano and Foreign Minister Quintino Bocaiúva. About these meetings with the leaders of the infant Republic, Oliveira Lima said in his Memoirs:

Deodoro liked to sit in a large rocking chair in the dining room of the old Itamaraty before the décor was Italianized by commander Betti, and he liked to say what he had to say loud an clear for all to hear coram populo which was not the case with Floriano, this clearly shows their different tempers (apud GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 172).

About Floriano, to whom he was introduced by Marshal Pires Ferreira, he said that he “was very gentle to me: he spoke of my services to the Republic, and Quintino Bocaiúva also referred to them when I visited him in his cabin of Cupertino”. Oliveira Lima had been introduced to the Minister – a decisive contact for the appointment – by the Count of São Salvador of Matosinhos, a friend of the family and owner of the newspaper O Paiz, which at the time was strongly linked to the interests of the Portuguese colony in Rio. About those demarches to his appointment, Oliveira Lima, recalled then:

the fact was that I had won my spurs of knight of the Republic and when later, in the face of the outrages of this lady, said aloud what many said softly, namely, that the monarchy was better, Pinheiro Machado, who was as intransigent as Robespierre, but was not incorruptible as him, referred to me as our companion who abandoned us (apud GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 173. Emphasis in the original).

Thus, on November 10th, 1890, the Act of Appointment of Oliveira Lima to the position of First-Class Attaché of the Brazilian Legation in Lisbon was signed, at the time headed by José Coelho Gomes. Before returning to Europe to take on the position to which he aspired since he was an adolescent, Oliveira Lima spent a season in his hometown, where he met Flora Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, the daughter of traditional families linked to the large sugar estate, such as her mother, whom at 27 years old, was a teacher at a private school in Recife – something non-standard for girls of her social background – owned by the former governess of her father’s house, the English lady, Mrs. Rawllinson, who at the time was her close friend and with whom she had learned, in addition to the habits of social behavior in her early childhood, a solid English accent which she carried for her entire life. The practicing Catholic Flora confessed, many years later, to the family friend and fellow citizen Gilberto Freyre, that she only knew how to pray in English (FREYRE, 1944, p. 82). The author of Casa Grande & Senzala mentioned that D. Flora “was almost born and raised to be an Ambassadress ... Her air, her manners, her elegance of a somewhat English aristocrat – that, however, did not hinder her sweetness as a Brazilian – were the manners and the elegance of an Ambassadress”, and that “it is impossible to imagine Oliveira Lima without the collaboration of Dona Flora, whom he considered as being more than precious: it was essential. She completed Don Quixote” (FREYRE, 1944, p. 82-83). Sometime later, in October 1891, Manoel, who was in Europe, married by proxy with Flora, who was his wife and close partner for life, of active female personality (MALATIAN, 2004), of her many intellectual, political and diplomatic activities – and battles.

The experiences that formed a unique diplomatic thought

As a diplomat in Lisbon, Oliveira Lima consolidated his already very solid circle of relationships within the Portuguese scholarly and journalistic environment and increased his contacts with many Brazilian scholars, besides diversifying his collaboration with several important journals in the country, both in Recife and in Rio de Janeiro. However, the hostility of the diplomatic environment of the Portuguese monarchy with the new Brazilian regime, associated with the confrontation of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by the Count of Valbom, in which his brother-in-law, Araújo Beltrão – who had been appointed Plenipotentiary Prime Minister of the Republic in Lisbon – was involved, determined his transfer, already promoted to Second Secretary, to Berlin, in April, 1892.

Having taken on the new post, which was headed by the Baron of Itajubá, in June of that year, Oliveira Lima remained in the capital of the German Empire until 1895, during which the diplomat-historian projected himself in a definitive manner among the Brazilian scholars. A milestone in that trajectory was the publication, in 1894, of his first book, Pernambuco – Seu Desenvolvimento Histórico, in Leipzig. The work, which showed the strong influence of the masters of German historiography, of which the author was aware of since the days of the College of Language and Literature, received unanimous praises amongst Brazilian scholars, among which the positive assessments of Capistrano de Abreu and José Veríssimo stood out.

In July 1895, before being transferred to Washington with a new functional promotion, Oliveira Lima enjoyed some time off in the State of Pernambuco. Back on Earth, as always, he renewed and narrowed contacts among scholars and politicians, even rejecting an invitation made by the governor at the time, Barbosa Lima, of whom he had become a friend and a correspondent, to be a candidate as a federal representative for the ruling party. About the episode, the diplomat-historian recalled many years later:

in 1895, I resisted the political temptation that more or less everyone nourishes [...] and I preferred to stay in the diplomatic career, to which contributed the benevolent reception that Carlos Carvalho gave me in Rio, certainly the most competent Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new regime, even better than Rio Branco, if not in the services actually rendered as far as the delimitation of the country was concerned, at least in perseverance, the endured and ongoing diligence rendered to the matters of his Ministry, in the method of work that he was able to instill in his staff dependent on his action, the legal skill to deal with international problems without losing sight of the political character (apud GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 259).

More than the compliment to Carlos Carvalho, this passage of Memórias somehow explains the kind of criticism that Oliveira Lima made about Rio Branco, beyond the personal and functional issues that led to the deterioration of their relationship. In the late nineteenth century, the diplomat from Pernambuco seemed to already have sedimented a modern and modernizing idea of diplomacy and of the diplomatic service – in an era of clashing imperialist systems and colonial expansion – grounded on the systematic and professional promotion of trade and on the equally ongoing scientific and cultural dissemination of the country – for which the German influence and the professional presence at the capital of the German Empire, which was in full splendor at the time, were decisive in many respects, including in terms of the philosophical bases of his thought.

Promoted to first Secretary in the beginning of 1896, Oliveira Lima was transferred to the Legation in Washington, which at the time was headed by Salvador de Mendonça, a historical Republican who developed solid ties of friendship and of moral and intellectual admiration, otherwise reciprocal, which remained until he died. Américo Jacobina Lacombe even said that such admiration was “almost religious” and the fact that Salvador de Mendonça had been transferred to the diplomatic staff only in 1889 – for the urgent need of the novel Republic to change the representation in Washington because of the I Interamerican Congress that was being held there –, after developing a fruitful work of Brazilian advertising and of creating an important network of contacts as Consul-General in New York, since then Oliveira Lima became “a champion of the fusion of careers, which generated frictions and ill will” (LACOMBE, 1968, p. 6). We will discuss that again later.

From the post in Washington, Oliveira Lima started to collaborate assiduously to Revista Brasileira, a periodical headed by José Veríssimo and around whose founders occurred the creation of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. The diplomat-historian had moved closer to this intellectual circle during his stay of a few months in Rio during the above-mentioned time off in 1895, when he also took office as a partner-correspondent of the Brazilian Historic and Geographical Institute (IHGB). Thus, the closer relations and the systematization of contacts through correspondence with Machado de Assis (MALATIAN, 1999) and other regulars of the circle of Revista Brasileira, date from that time. In addition, during this period in Washington, there occurs the consolidation of the journalistic career of the already famous historian and diplomat from Pernambuco, with an emphasis on frequent collaborations to the Revista de Portugal and in the journals Jornal do Brasil and in the newspaper from Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Comércio.

In 1896, his second book, Aspectos da Literatura Colonial Brasileira, was partially published in Revista Brasileira. Overall, it had a positive review, although it no longer had the unanimity verified regarding Oliveira Lima’s first historiographical work.

In the following year, there was the foundation of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, with 30 initial members, who were supposed to elect 10 others. Among these were Oliveira Lima, who was 29 years old at the time, overcoming in the election to fill seat number 39, figures as important as the Baron of Rio Branco and Assis Brasil, his future enemies. The supplementary group that was elected included, besides Oliveira Lima, Salvador de Mendonça, Domício da Gama and Clóvis Bevilacqua.

In 1899, Nos Estados Unidos, the first book of his travel impressions, was released. Also printed in Leipzig and partly published in Revista Brasileira. That year saw the climax of the deterioration of the relationship between Oliveira Lima and Assis Brasil, the new head of the Legation in Washington, who had replaced his friend, who was admired almost religiously, Salvador de Mendonça, who was removed from post, according to the assessment of the diplomat from Pernambuco, by political intrigues in Rio de Janeiro, after more than 20 years of consular and diplomatic service in the United States. Otherwise, right from the start Oliveira Lima had criticized the new gaucho boss, which he considered as being clearly unprepared for diplomatic functions, either by the superficiality of his intellectual training, in which the ignorance of the English language stood out, or by what he considered as little affection to everyday work. The professional conflict between the Chief and the First Secretary ultimately reached both the personal and the family spheres – with some people claiming that things happened in the reverse order – with their respective wives breaking in an irreconcilable manner, which ultimately made Assis Brasil request in a radical manner the removal of the subordinate, or his own, from the American legation. The old Viscount of Cabo Frio, who at the time controlled the Secretariat of State, ironically suggested to the Minister Olinto de Magalhães that their wives should be transferred. By the end of the year, Oliveira Lima was actually sent to London, which seemed, to both enemies, more an award than a punishment, with Assis Brasil having reported to the Ministry, accusing the removed Secretary of inaction at work and abandonment of post, which resulted in a formal warning.

In the beginning of 1900, Oliveira Lima took on the new functions in London, in the Legation headed by Souza Corrêa. At that time, the young diplomat started to flaunt himself around, projecting a certain image, established mainly by the growing voices of his enemies, led by Assis Brasil, of a subordinate who did not like the discipline that characterized the function. In the Memórias, Oliveira Lima reports that his new boss received him with indifference, since intrigues of his predecessor had already poisoned him, which qualified him as a “Secretary who thought he was a writer”.

However, Souza Corrêa’s death, in March of that year, made the First Secretary become, for a long interim period, the chargé d’affaires in London, a first level post in the service, which must have caused nuisance to his enemies, considering that Oliveira Lima had been a diplomat for only 9 years and he was 33 years old. As Interim Head of the Legation, the diplomat from Pernambuco represented Brazil at the funerals of Queen Victoria, whose death he considered a milestone in the decline of the British international power. It was also as Interim Head that the diplomat-historian directed initial negotiations and hosted the Special Mission to the British Guyana, headed by his fellow citizen Joaquim Nabuco, who was returning to public life by the hand of President Campos Sales. The slight disagreements with Graça Aranha and with the working group of the Mission, although limited to a few incidents, contributed to consolidate the public image of diplomat-historian, even though at the time he had consolidated an excellent personal relationship with Nabuco, with whom he exchanged frequent correspondence until they parted, which was quite traumatic for Oliveira Lima, given his deep admiration for his famous fellow countryman.

Back to the proximity of the European archives, notably of the British Museum, Oliveira Lima complemented the search for jobs that were in progress, some in conclusion, and later he published in the magazine of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute, an excellent research guide to Portuguese and Brazilian manuscripts sheltered in that institution. The brief presence in Europe ended by late 1900, with the appointment of Joaquim Nabuco as Head of the Legation in London and Oliveira Lima’s transfer to Tokyo, in the actual condition of Head of Legation, as chargé d’affaires. The return to the Old Continent, or at least the transferring to a Legation of major importance in the Americas, became a career goal systematically sought by Oliveira Lima.

During the period he stayed in the East - which led to the production of the book of impressions No Japão (ABREU, 2006) – he published O Reconhecimento do Império – História Diplomática do Brasil, in 1901, in which he condemned the famous “payment” by the Empire, with which the historian Rio Branco disagreed. In the diplomatic sphere, as Américo Jacobina Lacombe understood it, “the philosopher and historian showed [in Japan] that he was a practical man as few others were” (LACOMBE, 1968, p. 8). In fact, both studies about the relationship with Japan, which Oliveira Lima included in the controversial compilation Cousas Diplomáticas, established the explanation of the predominantly economic sense that the author thought should preside over modern diplomatic activity. Somehow, the presence in Westernized and imperialist Japan of the Meiji era strengthened in him the pragmatic and commercial idea of a positive diplomacy, which he had outlined at least since he was in Berlin.

Always eager to return to Europe, Oliveira Lima expected favorably presidential succession in 1902 and announced changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In that sense, he was optimistic enough about the news of Rio Branco’s appointment, with whom he maintained, since his youth in Lisbon, sparse personal correspondence to head the Ministry in Rodrigues Alves government. He expected above all that the old correspondent, fellow historian and new Minister reviewed his removal to Peru, promoted to Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, by Olinto de Magalhães, published in November of that year. According to his greatest biographer, Oliveira Lima considered that post to be “a nightmare” (GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 525).

The Peruvian Mission never taken on and the war with Rio Branco

Rio Branco not only confirmed the removal, but also, as it seems, he relied on Oliveira Lima so that, as Minister in Peru, his participation in the negotiations regarding the issue of Acre was decisive, known to be of the utmost importance and urgency to the Baron. In that sense, since January 1903, the new Chancellor started to telegraph his Minister in Lima who was still in Japan, requesting maximum promptness to present himself in Rio de Janeiro to receive instructions concerning the serious ongoing negotiations.

However, the Lima couple left Tokyo only in March of that year, for a long journey to Rio through Europe. Claiming health problems – which from Italy, where they met, Joaquim Nabuco attested to the Baron (GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 525-6) that they were true – and family issues to solve, Oliveira Lima answered vaguely to his superior that he would only be able to return to Brazil around the middle of the year, which provoked the infamous Telegraph Minister ultimatum

four months have gone by and I still do not know when you can be in the position to which you were appointed or if you will be able to arrive in time to intervene in the serious pending matters whose negotiation will begin soon [...]. Therefore, I request you to declare to me by telegraph if your health condition or other reasons do not allow you to respond to the government’s appeal, so that arrangements can urgently be made to send for another Minister and I must warn you that other than this once, the government will think twice about using your services (apud GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 530).

It is worth reproducing here, the considerations of the great biographer:

as Minister of State and because of the seriousness of the international situation, Rio Branco had plenty of reasons to carry out that interpellation [...]. On his part, incapable by temper, to accept the discipline and the hardships imposed by the public service, the Minister’s telegram caused an impact on Oliveira Lima that he was never able to overcome. Without exaggeration, it can be said that his feelings changed since Rio Branco’s interpellation: an outraged Oliveira Lima, put on guard against the Baron, a man prone to harsh and negative criticisms, started since then to replace the independent, but optimistic scholar.

He goes on: “Oliveira Lima considered that his self-respect was hit, and his inability to receive orders, to be part of a corporation ... exacerbated his ecstasies of independence, turning him ever since into a relatively difficult man” (apud GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 531).

If the relative exaggeration of the relevance of the telegraphic episode itself was discounted, what is certain is that the Peruvian Mission – which was never taken on – represented a deeply negative inflection point in his career and it was certainly striking, if not for the thought of the intellectual-diplomat, for the way in which this thought started to express itself as well as for the reasons of the enemies that multiplied. It might be stated that the “Peruvian Mission” that took place in Rio de Janeiro, during 1903 and 1904, when Oliveira Lima was at the same time present at and away from the scenario that enshrined Rio Branco in national politics, has been one of the main conditions of the set of actions and discursive expressions that were attached to the future image of the Don Quixote of Parnamirim.

In fact, the Baron took a stance that put Oliveira Lima in an at least embarrassing functional and political situation: he received “amicably” in Rio his Minister in Lima, not giving, however, any order or instruction to take on the post and, mainly, to participate in the negotiations around the momentous and mediatic issue of Acre, for which he had called his archenemy Assis Brasil, which caused even greater discomfort for the diplomat and historian and, it is never too much to remember, his always present wife.

Therefore, it is impossible to dissociate from this original context the public criticism that Oliveira Lima started to make of the Baron’s policy ahead of the Ministry and to his own career, although these always appear based on his profound intellectual training and in the significant professional experience that he already had. It was striking, in that sense, the three articles he published, between August and September 1903, on the front page of the opposition newspaper Correio da Manhã, by invitation of its Director, Edmund Bittencourt, entitled “Diplomatic Reform”, which were later added into the not less controversial collection, Cousas Diplomáticas. We will discuss this subject later.

Being aware of the delicate and troublesome functional situation in Rio de Janeiro, Oliveira Lima used to stay in the city to intensify actions and contacts in the intellectual sphere. He advanced the research for Dom João VI no Brasil at the National Library and he finally took office in the Brazilian Academy of Letters. In a ceremony at the Portuguese Reading Office, he delivered the provocative speech of apology to his fellow diplomat and historian Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, whom he chose as his patron (ALMEIDA, 2009, p. 101-102), in which he reaffirms, in many ways, the criticism of the career that had been carrying out by the press and even to the very role of the Brazilian Chancellor. Certainly, the absence that Oliveira Lima felt the most at the ceremony was that of the Baron of Rio Branco. Judging by the codes of sociability and recognition that intertwined in the political and intellectual spheres of the Republic, the diplomat from Pernambuco was right to interpret his remarkable absence as a clear signal of his removal from the central circle of power in the Ministry.

Only in August 1904 Oliveira Lima was appointed to a new post, as Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister in Venezuela. Since he already expected the transfer to an American Legation that he considered even less important than that in Peru, Oliveira Lima, according to his correspondence with his friend at the time Nabuco, was seriously inclined to refuse to assume the new post and be formally placed on availability, living in London. The considerations of the fellow citizen and the hint that there could be some functional advantages, as well as the appointment of his close friend, Luiz Lorena Ferreira, as the Secretary in Caracas, seem to have contributed to Oliveira Lima’s reconsideration, ending “the case of what was arguably one of the longest and most tempestuous transits of a chief of post in our diplomatic history” (FORSTER, 2011, p. 40-41).

The articles in the Correio da Manhã and Cousas Diplomáticas – views of the Reform in the shadow of the Baron

Analysts often agree when they consider Oliveira Lima’s proposals for reform in the diplomatic service – exposed in these three articles of the Correio da Manhã, in 1903, and later, in 1908, together with other texts under the title Cousas Diplomáticas – both controversial and sarcastic for the time and, above all, because of the functional situation of the author in 1903 and of his conflict with Rio Branco that became evident from then on. However, from a historical perspective, they are a set of realistic and consistent criticisms and suggestions, in the wake of the modernization process that Itamaraty underwent shortly after that, still under Rio Branco himself (ALMEIDA, 2009; FORSTER, 2011; LACOMBE, 1968; GOUVÊA, 1976).

That is how Maria Theresa Forster argues: “his ideas, many of which were both relevant and promising for the modernization of the structure of the Ministry could perfectly have been exploited if they had not been introduced in such an untimely manner” (FORSTER, 2011, p. 157-158). Américo Jacobina Lacombe went in the same direction when he said:

It may be that at the time its appearance [Cousas Diplomáticas] had caused the deaf anger of the stubborns and uneventfuls, but the truth is that today it makes us smile, because the ills that it indicates are exactly those that the people in charge of this House [Itamaraty] have been fighting and winning consecutively (LACOMBE, 1968, p. 16-17).

From that point of view, Oliveira Lima’s idea regarding the reform of the diplomatic service and of the prevailing sense of Brazilian foreign policy based on a severe criticism of the conditions in which this service was structured, as well as of vices and historical inadequacies of which it was a victim in the early twentieth century. According to the diplomat from Pernambuco, the core of the solution would be found in the unification of the careers of the Consular and Diplomatic offices, which would result in real democratization of the service, making up the basis for the establishment of a future foreign policy based on expanding market relations in the country.

In the first of the famous articles of Correio da Manhã, Oliveira Lima introduces the theme in his colorfully controversial and provocative journalistic writing style:

Absolutely every year diplomatic reform is discussed. The constas show up with the cool breezes of May and falter with the heat of November. The current year was not different from that and the matter has been even more agitated because everyone expected, those from inside and outside the career, the aspiring and disenchanted ones, the indifferent and the curious ones, that the current Foreign Minister took advantage of the enormous prestige in which after unforgettable services he returned to his homeland to introduce in that sphere, as well as in others of his Department, the imprint of his remarkable individuality. A newspaper already explained that the matters of Acre took up all his time, and that reform would come later, at dessert (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

Oliveira Lima added to the malicious introduction that “the ideas of the Baron of Rio Branco on the subject have not yet become known, which, by the way, enables me to present these brief considerations on the subject, without them taking the appearance of criticism and being an act of indiscipline” (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

In that direction, the diplomat believes that both reforms implemented by the Republic, by Quintino Bocaiuva, in 1890, and by Carlos Carvalho, in 1895, had addressed “much more the classification of legations and salary scales than services themselves” and, above all, both had been “carried out without a thought that defined them, without a guidance that characterized them” (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1). Thus:

reforms to improve wages, to increase pensions, to increase the difficulty in achieving promotions or to ensure access, are not true reforms: they are forms of work, administrative details. However, since it was organized in Brazil, the diplomatic career has been undermined by an evil worsened by the regime change and of that is must be freed: it is a privileged career, which leads to envy and dislikes. Two unprotected vines grow alongside it, the consular career and the hierarchy of the Secretariat, the former without mirages of greatness, and the latter without even the reality of fortune (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

According to Oliveira Lima, the remedy for this evil of origin is “simple, depurative and tonic at the same time”,

while the three careers do not merge with one another, while there is the current separation, which causes jealousy and destroys the efficiency of the service, we will have a false and harmful situation. It occurs with it the wicked case of consular employee, more trained by the nature, extent and variety of his work, which includes acts of notaries, the study of economic and commercial issues... to see his legitimate ambitions limited to a Consulate General, to an always subordinate post, while the diplomatic employee, who as Secretary was often never more than a copyist, rises sharply to head of a legation (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

The separation of careers also conditioned two other disastrous iniquities according to the view of the author-diplomat: on the one hand,

An offspring of diplomats that […] ignore their language, their fellow citizens and their own customs and ideas about their land, spend their lives in the capitals of the Old World – since those of the New World do not deserve those figures of cosmopolitanism – without ever learning how to breathe in their moral environment.

And, on the other hand,

an official of the Secretariat [who] spends his whole life [attached] to the ruthless bureaucratic discipline, [...] to the meager wages, without any distraction, a pleasure of intelligence, an unraveling of new horizons, just because he was born a pagan and never found a sponsor (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

Once the ailments and their origin were thus described, the author could plan the advantages of the remedy he indicated. In that sense, he foresaw the image of a future ideal Foreign Minister, which resulted from a unified service:

the Minister really prepared for his post would be one who, having started as a scribe of the Secretariat, then, as a Chancellor, a Consulate and, as Secretary, went by a legation, later occupying a consular post of responsibility, to then become section chief in the Ministry and ultimately be promoted to head of a diplomatic mission. (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

And, still projecting future benefits:

If the diplomat knew well the department that he was in charge of heading, having both affections and ties within it, he wouldn’t live in constant terror of incurring in his easy displeasure [...]; as well as, if he was used to deal, as Consul, with practical things, to inspect loads of onions, to collect spoils and to label small coffee jars, he wouldn’t consider it a breach of dignity [...] caring for our pressing interests at hand, only because they are positive (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

The author still claims the need to move along differentiated professional experiences for the ideal consul-diplomat, stating that, “foreign languages cannot be learned by simply reading passports, nor can rubber, sugar, cotton, and coffee be disseminated by wearing silk stockings to go to concerts… or by wearing an irreproachable tail coat”. Thus, “the consul lacks the opportunity to move around in high society, and the diplomat lacks the opportunity to learn how the trade market works”. (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

Thus, Oliveira Lima was able to conclude with a question:

Why not truly democratize the career - democratize it, not demote it – saving all its tradition, surrounding it with all the warranties, and turning even its prestige more expensive with the infiltration in it of new and more serious concerns, equivalent to inoculating new blood in it? (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

Once the foundations of his thought about reforms were supported in that manner, Oliveira Lima proposed legitimizing contrasts between what he considered positive situations present in “advanced” countries and the situation in Brazil. Thus, the author informs that

the French Republic enjoys an organization similar to [his proposal] and it was that diplomacy of Consuls and Secretariat employees that obtained Taiwan and handed it to England to defend Korea from the Russians. [...] For Director General of the Foreign Ministry the Japanese Government appointed its Minister of Russia, a former Consul in Shanghai. On the contrary, we are the ones who think that an internship in Itamaraty unables for diplomatic tact, and that a Consul serves only to elaborate statistical maps and to authenticate proxies (CM, 08/25/1903, p. 1).

The second article is predominantly devoted to develop the contrast between the diplomatic services that the author considers standards of advanced and progressive countries, and the Brazilian ones of that time. Accordingly, he maintains that, thanks to the nefarious isolation of the career, “our legation secretaries reach ministerial positions absolutely unaware of what they’re worth: they are lottery tickets that can either be winning or not”. And, in contrast: “in England that’s not how it happens” because “the secretary works for himself, produces personal work, he’s not limited to copying what has been elaborated by a boss who sometimes is worth less than himself”. Moreover, “every new language that he learns, of those languages that few people care about, such as Russian, Arabic, Persian, Japanese, Chim (sic), provides to the secretary a substantial additional bonus per year” (CM, 08/28/1903, p. 1).

For example, in the case of a certain Mr. Elliott, Second Secretary in Washington, who had already noticed three bonuses for three exotic languages he dominated and for that reason he had been chosen by the Foreign Office to represent British interests in connection with the matter of Samoa, Oliveira Lima can conclude that England “has many such a diplomat, which they cultivate with care”. And again in contrast: “among us, in order to stand out, the Secretary must write books, which does not prove anything, because being a good literate is not always synonymous with being a good diplomat” (CM, 08/28/1903, p. 1).

In this second article, Oliveira Lima also supported, based on a historical perspective, the greatest relevance for Brazil of an economic diplomacy in relation to a political diplomacy, being impossible not to see here a new criticism of Rio Branco. In that direction, he pointed out that the last shadows of Luso-Brazilian imperialism at the colonial era had been perpetrated when the Court of D. João was in Rio de Janeiro, with the conquest of Cayenne and Montevideo. However, “the Congress of Vienna and Ituzaingó made us turn back to the primitive boundaries”. From then on,

our imperialism came to consist more modestly […] in ensuring our supremacy in the Plata region, which the great advance of the Republic of Argentina turned later into balance, and our good right in discussions about borders.

And, about those, “what the Empire obtained [...] was to prepare the solution of the border issues that the Republic has been very successful in clearing with the help of the knowledge and skill of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs”. It is interesting that, by commenting on such “knowledge and skill”, Oliveira Lima did not mention the case of Acre, which was under way at the time, referring to Washington and Bern and the “good law” put forward by the Baron in those cases. Maybe to support the assertion:

a country such as Brazil, which should not have territorial ambitions, because its territory is huge for its population and for the prospects of its immigration in a near future, nor can it aspire to now play a major role on the world scene [...], doesn’t need so much a political diplomacy as an economic diplomacy (CM, 08/28/1903, p. 1).

And later:

If the period of hegemony has passed, if we can no longer be prevalent and have to be content with being influential, since others have grown with us; if on the other hand we have been liquidating, without fear of the arbitration, because we knew that we were right, old backlogs that worried our Portuguese parents and grandparents [...], our diplomatic action does not remain without purpose or activity because of that. In these cases, to preserve is already to improve, and the current base of the good international relations is above all mercantile, as well as the base of the mistrusts and hostilities […]. The main duty of our rulers is to put on and, thus, to turn profitable the national production, since without fortune there’s no force and without force one can’t impose respect (CM, 08/28/1903, p. 1).

It is impossible not to see there, beyond a realistic and well-articulated proposal, a criticism to the Baron and to what became the “purchase of Acre”. Reading between the lines, this was opposite to a good law.

In the third article, Oliveira Lima basically resumes his theses in order to enrich them with what he calls a few details and special cases, such as the fact that, for legations in courts such as Russia or Austria, of high refinement and complex protocol in the diplomatic sphere, it would never be polite, and much less productive, to send an employee with consular training, which would be far more useful in Japan or Switzerland, as he exemplifies.

Finally, the author partially justified the emptying of the consular function as an inheritance of the Empire, in order to direct the conclusion of its propositions:

the consulates were positions not to work, but to rest. They were distributed among politicians or scholars, who were sick, tired or simply wanted to live in other environments. [...] Our Consul, in turn, was an employee whose activity were encoded in signing manifestos and repatriating destitute Brazilians, besides going to museums and shops with the fellow citizen friends and acquaintances who sought him. Our articles were very profitable: coffee was like gold, sugar was sold for high prices, cotton, rubber, tobacco, every thing sold. At home, the farmers and sugar lords relied on their slaves to feed in a cheap manner the rich source of export trade. There was nothing more necessary than planting, harvesting, packing and boarding. The markets were ready and payments in good British pounds were about to be made (CM, 09/01/1903, p. 1).

However, when the recent past is thus described in a somewhat regretful way, the diplomat from Pernambuco, whose family was tied to the world of the decadent sugar business, stated:

We know to what extent all that has changed, how hard agriculture struggles nowadays, how it anxiously seeks consumers for its products, how the customers have become a matter of life or death for them, how the misery of that class is reflected on the entire national economy, generating discouragement, causing pessimism, nourishing the discontent, encouraging rebellion! The solution of the economic problem lies entirely, not in the restriction of the production, but in the enlargement of trade relations (CM, 09/01/1903, p. 1).

Thus,

the function of our diplomats and consuls, besides being practical, became essential. They became in charge of making an effort to remove custom tangles, achieve reductions in import taxes and at the same time open up new markets and gain wider acceptance in the articles, thus proclaiming the origin and enforcing the superiority of the genre.

Oliveira Lima maintained in short that the diplomats “should be ashamed to descend from courtiers to traveling salesmen of their countries, when the monarchs themselves are not disgusted to relate with the dictators of trusts” because, ultimately, “it is the time of commercialism” (CM, 09/01/1903, p. 1).

When Cousas Diplomáticas was published, the first results of the reform implemented by Rio Branco were already known, based on the Regulation of 1906. Oliveira Lima demonstrated satisfaction in seeing the implementation, if not formally at least in practice, of some degree of fusion in the careers, not without making ironic references, such as the use of typewriters in the Ministry, which he had suggested only in passing in one of his articles of 1903. However, according to the diplomat, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the achievement of an economic sense for the country’s foreign policy was still far away.

In Latin America and Europe: against Roosevelt and in favor of a cultural diplomacy

The period in Venezuela of the caudillo Cipriano Castro, which went until June 1906, marked Oliveira Lima’s rapprochement to several scholars of the Hispanic-American world and the sedimentation, in the thought of the diplomat and historian, of a well-grounded image of that portion of the continent, which was expressed in several articles, many of which to the Estado de São Paulo – which became his favorite newspaper in Brazil – later collected under the title Impressões da América Espanhola, published after his death.

In the sphere of diplomatic activity, Oliveira Lima, beyond the routine services and the elaboration of acclaimed reports concluded in a successful manner the Special Mission of which he was in charge concerning border problems, thanks to the cordial relations that he was able to establish with President Castro, who even went so far as to award him with the Busto do Libertador. The Brazilian diplomat complained that his success in the only border issue in which he worked was completely disregarded and suppressed in Rio de Janeiro, even though, according to himself, he acted under boycott of his leadership and that the territorial gains obtained, although small, were the only ones that, in the short-lived Republican history, had not generated any expense to the Public Treasury, in a new mention to what he often qualified as the “purchase of Acre” by the Baron.

The interventionist imperial action of the United States in Venezuela, in the famous case of this country’s public debt, and its contradictory invocations of neomonroism were the context from which Oliveira Lima started to publicly and vehemently condemn Theodore Roosevelt’s “big stick policy”. In fact, since 1903 he had already stated that he was in favor of the famous Doctrine by the Argentinean Luis María Drago on this issue. That extremely anti-Roosevelt and, to some measure, anti-Monroe belief (SILVEIRA, 2003), which Gilberto Freyre called “critical Pan-Americanism”, as well as Paulo Roberto de Almeida classified as “principled” (ALMEIDA, 2009, p. 99), led to a new personal breakup, apparently the most traumatic of all, for Oliveira Lima: that with the first Ambassador in Washington, Joaquim Nabuco, which confirmed the interpretation according to which the diplomat from Pernambuco did not hesitate to jeopardize friendships for the sake of a controversial issue that was dear to him (MOTA, 2002).

In early 1906, with the III Pan-American Conference scheduled to be held in Rio de Janeiro that year – for whose Brazilian delegation Oliveira Lima, surprisingly, requested from Nabuco his appointment – with the spectacular attendance of Secretary of State Elihu Root, which Nabuco considered to be directly related to his action in Washington, Oliveira Lima, besides addressing himself in a letter to his friend condemning what he considered an excessive and inconvenient Monroism although grounded on good intentions (GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 689-6810), in the Estado de São Paulo published a series of articles condemning the spirit that presided over the future conclave and renewing his positions against the American interventionism and imperialism in the continent. The writing unrestraint of his fellow countryman and friend, as Nabuco qualified it at the time, together with the fear of everything that could impair his Conference, led the Ambassador to interrupt definitely the correspondence exchange with Oliveira Lima, who never stopped to make either positive or negative references to the former confident and, in many ways, idol in the spheres of politics, culture and diplomacy.

That series of articles against the dangers of which he considered subordination to Washington of the Brazilian policy was gathered, in 1907, under the title Pan-Americanismo, devoted to the Baron of Rio Branco, justifiably by the famous speech at the opening of the Conference, praising the country’s traditional relations with Europe, which greatly pleased Oliveira Lima. The Baron would have appreciated the position of equilibrium that he flaunted at the time among the most important Brazilian diplomats from Pernambuco.

The year 1906 was also marked for Oliveira Lima by the deterioration of his health because of the worsening of his nephritis. Sick and deeply dissatisfied with the post, in many senses the materialization of the “nightmare” that he had only foreseen in Peru, the diplomat decided to present his formal request for functional release to the Ministry, after losing the hope of obtaining regulatory license. The Baron, however, demonstrating, as in other opportunities, actual consideration for the subordinate – of whom he seemed to expect only not to be bothered so much by the press – ignored the request and granted medical leave for six months for health treatment. Thus, in June 1906, the Lima’s left Caracas and headed towards London.

After treatment in German and French seaside resorts and a visit to his sister Sinhá in Madrid, Oliveira Lima returned once again to Rio de Janeiro in October, always hoping to be appointed to Europe. Once again, his functional situation became delicate and once again, he thought about being put in availability, which he even complained directly to President Afonso Pena. Once again, the Baron ignored the request and renewed his leave. Oliveira Lima used that time to finally complete his masterpiece, Dom João VI no Brasil, whose first edition was released in 1908. In this new period that he stayed in Brazil he made a triumphant visit to São Paulo for a series of conferences on the role of José Bonifácio in the independence, where he was received, according to provocative comments in the press, with honors of a Minister of State.

In December of 1907, because of the diplomatic movement of the period, the diplomat from Pernambuco was finally appointed to Brussels, cumulatively with Stockholm, the last post in his career.

In Europe, Oliveira Lima represented the Brazilian scholars in several scientific events, sometimes in special missions appointed by Rio Branco, such as in the conference promoted by the Société Royale Belge de Géographie, which had the Royal family in attendance, and in the Congress of the Americanists, in Vienna, with extensive coverage of O Estado de São Paulo, which published their communications between 1908 and 1909. The paulista newspaper, by the way, translated and published almost all the conferences by Oliveira Lima in Europe during the period he spent in the legation in Brussels. That is the case, for example, of the series of conferences at the Sorbonne, gathered in the form of a book, in 1911, under the title Formation Historique de la Nationalité Brésilienne. Thus, the intense activity in the field of what today would be called cultural diplomacy made Oliveira Lima receive from the Swedish poet Björkman the famous epithet of “cultural Ambassador of Brazil”. In private, Oliveira Lima complained of what he considered indifference and even envy by his boss of the impact in Europe of his cultural activity, as in the correspondence to his friend Joaquim de Souza Leão: “The Baron neglects the conferences [at the Sorbonne], poor thing! That only proves his downfall. There is nothing worse than senile envy” (apud GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 902).

In the field of the standard diplomatic activity, he completed, in 1909, the negotiations with Sweden for a bilateral Arbitration Agreement, which he considered, in the spirit of his idea of diplomacy, perfectly useless, given the absence of an economic-commercial Treaty between both countries. He also condemned in public the arms race with Argentina, in the famous confrontation of Rio Branco with Estanislao Zeballos, referring to the Baron ironically as “our Bismarck”.

The following year, Oliveira Lima engaged with unprecedented intensity and enthusiasm in his public life until then, in Brazilian domestic policy, which brought new and serious negative consequences for his diplomatic career. That was the support of the presidential candidate and leader of the civilista movement, Rui Barbosa, in the notorious campaign against Marshal Hermes da Fonseca, supported by the Baron and by the oligarchic articulation led by Pinheiro Machado. There were comments at the time that, if Rui was elected, Oliveira Lima would succeed Rio Branco in Itamaraty.

His civilista enthusiasm, which Rui Barbosa later called “my political belief”, associated shortly after that with the beginning of rumors about his monarchism since an article in which he praised D. Luiz de Orleans e Bragança, regarded as the articulator of a virtual restorationist movement, whom he met at the Universal and International Exhibition in Belgium – were fatal for his definitive departure from career. Moreover, in this exhibition, the head of the Brazilian Legation also had to deal with the visit of President-elect, Hermes da Fonseca, which he did within the best protocol, without escaping, however, from charges in Brazil about a possible inadequate and even disrespectful attitude towards the Marshal.

In order to complicate his career situation even more, Oliveira Lima, and his unrestrained quill, engaged in a new direct confrontation with the Baron, in mid-1911, when the historian-diplomat stood up for his fellow diplomat, Mr. Gabriel de Piza, a Minister in Paris, who had confronted the Chancellor. Piza, by the way, reconciled with the Baron soon after that, which left the most enduring consequences of the affair on the wide back of the D. Quixote of Parnamirim.

That was how, according to Maria Theresa Forster, “in a particularly shadowy moment of the relationship with the Chancellor” (FORSTER, 2011, p. 48), Oliveira Lima received the news of his death, in February 1912. Then he dedicated to him a praiseful article, though sober and without forgetting past disagreements (GOUVÊA, 1976, p. 940).

Sick and, perhaps, already without hope of obtaining a top-level post in the career, the diplomat from Pernambuco was satisfied with the news of the appointment of his friend from Santa Catarina Lauro Müller to head Itamaraty, but he consolida-ted the decision to ask for retirement for health reasons, which he could do according to the law, since he had already reached twenty years of career. The new Minister, planning finally to reward him with the desired Legation in London, ignored the terms of his request, granting a new license for medical treatment. It was in that context that, in September 1912, the Lima couple left Brussels and headed towards the United States.

Oliveira Lima was invited by his friend John Casper Branner, Vice-President of Stanford University, for a series of lectures in the country, which unfolded in several other top US universities, such as Yale, Harvard, Cambridge and Columbia, which was the basis for the insertion of the Brazilian historian in the life of the American University. In O Estado de São Paulo, Oliveira Lima published at that time Cartas dos Estados Unidos, a series of articles with impressions of his return to the United States. The work of the lectures was collected and published in 1914, under the title Evolução Histórica da América Latina Comparada com a da América Inglesa.

A last scandalous passage in Rio, retirement and voluntary exile

By late 1912, Oliveira Lima returned to Rio de Janeiro, for yet another noisy stay in the capital of the Republic, this time the last one as a diplomat. When he arrived, the historian was even amazed with the amount of reporters, from virtually every major daily newspaper in Rio, which, in an American way, at the dock, just knocked down questions demanded agile answers by an Oliveira Lima who considered himself almost retired, since he was unaware of Lauro Müller’s intentions who, by the way, was counting on his vote to join the Brazilian Academy of Letters.

It was in the midst of the reception, both warm and eventful, that Oliveira Lima gave his famous response to Gazeta de Notícias, an American style newspaper of João do Rio, attesting to its sympathy for the monarchical system compared to Republican and confirming his personal relations with D. Luiz, as well as positive assessments regarding the Prince, which dropped like a bomb in the headlines in Rio. There was an immediate burst of the rumors that Oliveira Lima was returning to the country in order to reorganize, on behalf of D. Luiz, the monarchical party and lead the restoration movement. The rebuttal given to the newspaper O Imparcial, denying the party links with monarchism, but confirming the theoretical sympathy, as well as the old civilista beliefs, did not erase the fire released around the D. Quixote, but it poked the fire. Américo Lacombe Jacobin was right when he stated that “all the intrigue against Oliveira Lima occurred around two points: his monarchism and his attacks on the career” (LACOMBE, 1968, p. 14).

It was in the midst of this fire that Lauro Müller took the risk of sending to Pinheiro Machado’s Senate – warned at the time against a possible candidacy of the Minister to the Presidency – the assessment of Oliveira Lima’s transfer to London. Facing the journalistic scandal, the senator from Rio Grande do Sul demanded a formal declaration of Republican loyalty by the diplomat, who refused to do so. Next, there was an extremely aggressive campaign against the appointment, which hit hard his personal plan – ironically led by Edmund Bittencourt’s newspaper, who many years before that, had published, upon invitation, the infamous articles about Diplomatic Reform.

That was how, in a secret session, on July 4, 1913, the Senate of the Republic rejected the appointment of Manoel de Oliveira Lima to the Legation in London. In August, the diplomat-historian, based on a medical report that indicated that he was overweight and that he had kidney lithiasis, required retirement due to disability. Oliveira Lima published his impressions regarding this last affair of his career in the leaflet called O Meu Caso, still in 1913.

Retired into private life, Oliveira Lima lived initially in his London, where most of the vast library that he had collected throughout his life was located, watching the beginning of World War I in Germany, whilst undergoing medical treatment. The Fat Don Quixote did not escape from a new intrigue regarding his germanophily which, fueled by the articles of ardent defense of pacifism that he had been publishing, ultimately made it unfeasible for him to live in London, from where he left and never went back, in September 1915, once again heading towards the United States for a new cycle of lectures at Harvard.

He spent in his Pernambuco the years between 1916 and 1920, when he came into contact with the young students and with the new generation of intellectuals from his State, especially the teenage Gilberto Freyre and Assis Chateaubriand. He carried out a successful cycle of lectures in Argentina, in 1918-19, which was the basis for a new book of impressions, Na Argentina, published in 1919.

In 1920, he decided to move to Washington for the last time, based on the acceptance of the invitation made by the Catholic University for a post of full professor at the Law School, as well as in the support of the transfer and of the shelter, negotiated since 1916, of Oliveira Lima’s library and his monumental collection (LEÃO FILHO, 1968; LEAL, 2004), which ultimately became a world reference for Iberian and Brazilian studies in Washington.

According to Ângela de Castro Gomes (GOMES, 2005), the Lima couple’s household in Washington, masterfully described by the anthropological genius of Gilberto Freyre (FREYRE, 1968), was “an address that became a Brazilian lounge in the United States during the 1920’s, being attended by American intellectuals and other nationalities, in addition to being a place of shelter for Brazilians” (apud FORSTER, 2011, p. 56). In many senses, if Oliveira Lima’s view of diplomacy as a means of cultural dissemination is retained, the house located at 3536, 13th Street, was a true Embassy of Brazil in the United States.

“Here lies a lover of books”, the D. Quixote of Parnamirim, who died in the morning of March 24th, 1928, asked to be sculpted in an anonymous shallow grave gravestone graveyard of Mount Olivet, Washington, made of a good stone that came from Pernambuco. The Brazilian diplomat also stated, in his will the desire not to have his body removed in one more and final voyage, as well as the refusal of any posthumous distinction by the Brazilian Government. Miss Flora, “the tragic widow”, according to Gilberto Freyre, remained guarding the House and the manuscripts of the eternal Mr. Lima until she died in 1940. The efforts of the Victorian-Pernambucan Grand Dame – enabled the posthumous publication of D. Miguel no Trono, in 1933, and of the unfinished Memórias – Estas Minhas Reminiscências, in 1937.

Bibliography

ABREU, Bernardino da Cunha F. O Japão na Visão de Oliveira Lima. Revista Intellectus. Year 05, Vol. II, 2006.

ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Oliveira Lima e a Diplomacia Brasileira no Início da República. Historia Actual Online, nº. 19, 2009.

Correio da Manhã. Rio de Janeiro. National Library. Brazilian Digital Newspaper Archive. August-September, 1903.

FORSTER, Maria Theresa D. Oliveira Lima e as Relações Exteriores do Brasil: O Legado de Um Pioneiro e Sua Relevância para a Diplomacia Brasileira. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2011.

FREYRE, Gilberto. Perfil de Euclides e Outros Perfis. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1944.

______. Oliveira Lima, Don Quixote Gordo. Recife: Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 1968.

GOMES, Ângela de Castro. Em Família: A Correspondência de Oliveira Lima e Gilberto Freyre. Campinas: Mercado de Letras, 2005.

GOUVÊA, Fernando da Cruz. Oliveira Lima: uma Biografia. Recife: Archeological, Historical and Geographical Institute of Pernambuco, 3 Vs., 1976.

LACOMBE, Américo Jacobina. Oliveira Lima: O Diplomata. In: MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES. Centenário de Oliveira Lima. National Press, 1968.

LEAL, Maria Ângela. Longe da pátria, Mas Sem a Esquecer: Print and Non-Print Collections at the Oliveira Lima Library. Campinas, Remate de Males, n. 24, 2004.

LEÃO FILHO, J. de Souza. Oliveira Lima, o Colecionador. In: MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES. Centenário de Oliveira Lima. National Press, 1968.

LIMA SOBRINHO, Barbosa. Oliveira Lima: Sua Vida e sua Obra. In: OLIVEIRA LIMA. Obra Seleta. Rio de Janeiro: National Institute of the Book, 1971.

LIMA, Manoel de Oliveira. Pernambuco, Seu Desenvolvimento Histórico. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1894.

______. Aspectos da Literatura Colonial Brasileira. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1896.

______. Nos Estados Unidos. Impressões Políticas e Sociais. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1899.

______. O Reconhecimento do Império. História Diplomática do Brasil. Paris, Rio de Janeiro: H. Garnier, 1901.

______. No Japão. Impressões da Terra e da Gente. Rio de Janeiro: Laemmert & Cia., 1903.

______. Relação dos Manuscritos do Museu Britânico de Interesse para o Brasil. Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1 vol., 1903.

______. Elogio de F. A. Varnhagen. Discurso Pronunciado na Academia Brasileira de Letras. Ed. do Jornal do Comércio, 1903.

______. Pan-Americanismo. Bolívar-Monroe-Roosevelt. Paris, Rio de Janeiro: H. Garnier, 1907.

______. Dom João VI no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Tip. do Jornal do Comércio, 1908.

______. Cousas Diplomáticas. Lisbon: Comp. Editora, 1908.

______. Formation Historique de la Nationalité Brésilienne. Paris: Librarie Garnier Frères, 1911.

______. Evolução Histórica da América Latina Comparada com a da América Inglesa. Paris: H. Garnier, 1914.

______. O Meu Caso. Rio de Janeiro, Leaflet, 1913.

______. Na Argentina. Impressões de 1918-19. São Paulo: ed. Weiszflog Irmãos, 1919.

______. Dom Miguel no Trono (1828-1833). Coimbra: Ed. da Imprensa da Universidade, 1933.

______. Memórias. Estas Minhas Reminiscências. Rio de Janeiro: Liv. José Olympio Editora, 1937.

______. Impressões da América Espanhola (1904-1906). Rio de Janeiro: Liv José Olympio Editora, 1953.

MALATIAN, Teresa. Oliveira Lima e a Construção da Nacionalidade. Bauru, São Paulo: EDUSC-FAPESP, 2001.

______. O Diaries of Flora. Campinas, Remate de Males, nº. 24, 2004.

______. Diplomacia e Letras na Correspondência Acadêmica: Machado de Assis e Oliveira Lima. Estudos Históricos, n. 24, 1999.

MOTA, Carlos Guilherme. Oliveira Lima e a Nossa Formação. In: COSTA E SILA, Alberto da (org.). O Itamaraty na Cultura Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves Editora, 2002.

SILVEIRA, Helder Gordim da. Joaquim Nabuco e Oliveira Lima. Faces de um Paradigma Ideológico da Americanização nas Relações Internacionais do Brasil. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2003.

Domício da Gama

Domício da Gama was born on October 23rd, 1861 in Maricá and died in Rio de Janeiro on November 8th, 1925. The son of Domingos Affonso Forneiro and Mariana Rosa do Loreto, he was a writer, journalist, founding member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. He was a friend of Raul Pompéia, João Capistrano de Abreu, Eça de Queiroz, Eduardo Prado and the Baron of Rio Branco. With the latter, he started to work in the diplomatic field through the Immigration Service of the Ministry of Agriculture. He was also secretary to Rio Branco in the missions of Palmas, French Guyana and Acre. He served in the Legations of Brussels and London. Since 1903, he served in Rio Branco’s Cabinet until he was promoted and removed to Lima. From there he served in the Legation of Buenos Aires and represented Brazil in the Fourth International Conference of American States. He was the second appointed Ambassador in the history of Itamaraty and went to the United States of America where he served between 1911 and 1918. There, besides having been an attentive server, he participated in the mediations in the case at the time of the Mexican Revolution. Appointed for the Chancellery in 1918, he played a key role for the inclusion of Brazil among the eight members of the Council of the League of Nations. In 1919, he replaced Rui Barbosa as President of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. In July of the same year, he resigned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to head the Embassy in London, where he remained until 1924 when he was put in availability. He died on November 8th, 1925 at the Copacabana Palace Hotel.

Domício da Gama: the diplomacy of pride

Tereza Cristina Nascimento França

Domício da Gama was born in Maricá on October 23, 1861.[93] The son of the Portuguese Domingos Affonso Forneiro and of Mrs. Mariana, he had six siblings: Maurício, Maria Agnelle, Antônio, Domingos, José and Sebastião. His father had three beliefs for the seven children. The first was that they should make their own names throughout their lives, hence the different surnames: Forneiro, Faustino and da Gama. The second had to do with the studies. Forneiro established that Maurício and Antônio would be doctors, “in order to be respected by the rich farmers”; Domingos and José would be lawyers, “in order to always win in the matters of land and taxes”, and Domício and Sebastião, engineers since “Brazil, which was so big, naked and backwards needed them very much”.[94] Finally, if they failed in school, they would have a second chance, but if there was recurrence, their allowance would be cut and there would be two choices: return to their father’s house and to the hoe, or open their own path in life.

When he was 16 years old, Domício fostered a vocation for literature. His tales of 1878 describe religious doubts and dissatisfaction with the desires of his father regarding his fate. In the Polytechnic School, Domício “lasted until the end of the first year, in the second he was barely approved and in the third year he was a complete and definitive failure. A shameful and unquestionable failure”.[95] In his second attempt, when he was 18 years old, he rarely appeared in the Polytechnic School since he was already engaged with the Garden of Academus Literary Guild, a society made up of 20 members who talked about reforming the world and, for that purpose, they studied politics, religion and art, physiology and grammar and poetry. The weekly meetings took place at the second floor of a building that served as workshops of the Gazeta de Notícias, a Rio newspaper that began in 1875. Later, Domício stated that he made a vow to change from mathematics to literature. By the end of the year, despite having failed and with no allowance, he was able to get rid of the hoe when Ferreira de Araújo, the editor of the Gazeta de Notícias, gave him a job as a short story writer in the Sétima Coluna. While he collaborated in that journal, he had contact with two major influences both in his personal and in his professional lives: Raul Pompéia and João Capistrano de Abreu. He dropped out of the Polytechnic School, but he did not stop studying. He engaged in the task of filing classical authors, studying French, participating in literary discussions, as well as thinking about an experimental method of literature and, besides writing short stories, he became a geography teacher in private schools of Rio de Janeiro. When he was 24 years old, he even took a civil service entrance exam for the post of Secretary of the National Library, obtaining second place.

Chosen by Ferreira de Araújo to cover for his periodical the Universal Exhibition of Paris, Domício took the steamer to Paris, carrying in his luggage introduction letters by Capistrano and Ferreira de Araújo addressed to Eduardo Prado and the Baron of Rio Branco. When the steamer stopped in London, he met Eça de Queiroz. In Paris, he appeared at the door of Eduardo Prado to deliver the introduction letters. After reading the letter, the latter shouted to the next room, “Juca, do not be afraid: the lad is a friend of Araújo arriving from Rio”. And so appeared Rio Branco who entered muttering, “I thought it was some dumbhead [...]”.[96] The first meeting was fast and ceremonious. While Rio Branco only watched, Prado asked him to appear from time to time to give news. A few days later, when Domício strolled along the Champs Elysées on his way to the Place de la Concorde, he found Prado and Rio Branco in the midst of a crowd. Prado called him to join them and, from that night on, they became friends. Domício thus began a period of bohemia, studies, bookstores, restaurants and conversations in Eduardo Prado’s library.

When Eça de Queiroz and his family started to live in Paris, at the Rue de Neuilly, Domício started to attend the household and to see the family as his “shelter”. According to him, while Rio Branco turned him into a diplomat, Eça turned him into a writer. While the coexistence with Queiroz immersed him in literature, diplomacy entered Domício’s life by means of an invitation from Rio Branco to work as Secretary in the General Superintendence of Emigration, a division of the Ministry of Agriculture whose main function was to advertise Brazil. He remained in office between August 27th, 1891 and February 28th, 1893, when he left to be a member of the Special Arbitration Mission in Washington, also by invitation of Rio Branco.

Domício and the Brazilian borders

The Republic received from the Empire a nation virtually without any borders, except for the agreements with Peru (1851) and Bolivia (1867). Not all attempts to set limits with Argentina, which took place since 1857, reached a positive solution. The last attempt at negotiations held in the Empire, on September 7th, 1889, had foreseen a decision by arbitration in a period of 90 days. The first Chancellor of the Brazilian Republic, Quintino Bocaiuva, who was eager to solve the problem quickly, signed with his Argentinean counterpart, Estanislau Zeballos, a Treaty by which the disputed territory would be divided in half. The negative reaction of public opinion and the subsequent refusal of the Treaty by the Brazilian Congress made the controversy progress, that is, to the arbitration of the U.S. President Groover Cleveland.

The leadership of the Brazilian Demarcation Committee was in charge of Francisco Xavier da Costa Aguiar de Andrada, the Baron Aguiar de Andrada, who even travelled to Washington and started preparations for the mission, but he died unexpectedly on March 28th, 1893. The next day, Rio Branco was invited to be the Plenipotentiary negotiator of the mission. The team, formed by General Dionísio Cerqueira, as second Plenipotentiary; Olinto de Magalhães and Domingos Olímpio, Second Secretaries and Admiral Cândido Guillobel as technical helper, Rio Branco requested the inclusion of Domício da Gama as Third Secretary and of the English professor Charles Girardot as a translator.

Rio Branco imposed on the mission the motto to work slowly, which demanded absolute dedication to work, and silence about what they were doing. On the eve of the delivery of the memoir, the team was divided among correctors and proofreaders of the text, while Rio Branco drilled and sewed the pages. The pace of work caused serious health problems to Domício, which had uraemia attacks. Yet he remained proofreading the evidence from 2:00 pm to 6:00 am in the following morning. On February 6th, 1895, the decision of the arbitration report was announced in favor of Brazil. The result reflected public acts all over the country. The Republic had solved the border pendency where the Empire had failed.

Domício da Gama had been in charge of organizing Rio Branco’s books, manuscripts and maps and was still carrying out this task when another border problem became more serious: the issue of French Guyana, or of Oiapoque. In the wake of the victory in Palmas, the name of Rio Branco was naturally appointed to make up the team that would deal with the new challenge. At that time, his requests to appoint Domício da Gama and Raul Rio Branco for the mission were stunted in the procedures of the then Chancellor Dionísio Cerqueira, who resented that Rio Branco had signed the memoir of Palmas and had received full credit. Thus, Domício’s appointment took place only on December 22nd, 1898, already under the administration of Olinto de Magalhães.

The literate side of Domício was highlighted in 1897, when he was elected to Chair 33 of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. Domício said he was embarrassed with the choice made at the expense of other elders, such as Ferreira de Araújo, Capistrano de Abreu and Rio Branco himself.[97] He commented that the friends who remembered his name and voted for him “forgot to explain to me what this society does, to whose composition they gave me the honor to be chosen”.[98] For patron of his chair, he chose Raul Pompéia, paying homage to the friend, who had shortened his life two years earlier.

The call of the Academy made him recall the vote he had made when he was young, at the Academus Garden, about the importance of literature in his life. However, how could he reconcile that with the troubled diplomatic life?

During the five years of the mission of French Guyana, Gama divided himself among copies, translations and travels. The pace of work, as well as the difficult relationship of Rio Branco with the negotiator Plenipotentiary of the case, Gabriel de Toledo Piza had a negative impact on the morale of the members of the mission. At almost 40 years old, Domício complained that his tasks were useless and he sought a reason to live. In that state of mind, Olinto de Magalhães called him to take a written exam in order to qualify for the diplomatic career.

Joaquim Nabuco and Rio Branco were troubled with Olinto’s initiative, who was certainly aware of a decree, which was moving through Congress at the time, which foresaw the entrance of Rio Branco and his assistants in the diplomatic system, without an exam. Nabuco even pleaded with Olinto that Domício was appointed to the post of First Secretary of the Legation in London, or that he was sent to some other post as chargé d’affaires. He argued that his services differed from those of other secretaries, since he had started his career for a longer time. The decree that was moving through Congress foresaw not only the recognition of the period of service of those who were at Domício’s position, but it also gave them preference for the first appointments.

Although he did not feel comfortable with the situation, Domício left for Rio de Janeiro. There, besides taking the exam, he seized the opportunity to articulate support for the project that was moving through Congress, something that Olinto had not done, and to work on the possibility of increasing the allowance for Rio Branco, on the issue of French Guyana. After the written exams, Olinto decided to leave Domício on that mission, keeping the post in London. However, he did not promote him to the level of First Secretary, as Nabuco had suggested. Claiming lack of vacancies, he appointed him Second Secretary, failing to acknowledge his 7 years of seniority and, in practice, demoting him to the post for which he had been appointed in 1893.

With the mission finally close to an end, Domício was concerned about Rio Branco’s uncertain fate and interceded with Tobias Monteiro, who was close to President Campos Salles, in favor of Rio Branco’s appointment to Lisbon, as he wished, and he also asked Nabuco to talk to José Carlos Rodrigues about the embarrassing situation in which the Baron found himself. In turn, Rio Branco wrote to Olinto to inform not only the completion of the mission’s works, but Domício’s personal qualities and to his job.

With the arbitration decision in favor of Brazil, the Brazilian Congress granted to Rio Branco an annual allowance of 24:000$000 and a prize of 300:000$000. Exactly at that moment, there was the approval of the law regarding the officialization of the diplomatic career. Through it, Rio Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, Oliveira Lima and Magalhães de Azeredo entered officially into the career. Since the law foresaw the retroactive acknowledgement of working time in the missions, Domício hoped to be promoted to First Secretary. However, Olinto exonerated him from the post in London and removed him to the legation at the Holy See, not as First, but as Second Secretary. Olinto messed with him a third time, consulting with him about a possible transfer to Rome in August 1901, and suddenly removing him to Brussels, as Second Secretary, regardless of his period of service and the fact that he dealt in that legation with the responsibilities of a chargé d’affaires.

The paradoxical situation increased Domício’s chagrin with his career and prevented him from improving his wages. At that time, he even thought about retirement,[99] but he eventually decided to invest 2,000 francs in the publication of his book Histórias Curtas, to see if it provided him financial return. Later, he was deeply upset at the news that the publication did not sell any copies, because the Gazeta de Notícias had distributed it for free.

Nuances of an invitation

In early July of 1902, President-elect Rodrigues Alves, invited Rio Branco to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The invitation appealed to Rio Branco’s patriotism, and Domício da Gama disagreed with that kind of appeal: “it is the most perfidious way of forcing the decision of a man, who, even against his will, is a national figure”.[100] He thought that Rio Branco considered the head of the Ministry as an act of “pure sacrifice. I’m sure that he will often regret having agreed to the contract, but that does not mean that he will not work to carry it out”. On the other hand, the acceptance would actually be “a great good, not only for all of us, but also for the public service” because “it can be expected that the good line is renewed, that the program of Itamaraty’s policy is established”.[101] One month later, Rio Branco was still undecided and Domício urged him to make a decision, whatever it was: “Those agonies of his disappeared as a result of the need to act”.[102]

After Rio Branco had accepted Rodrigues Alves’ proposal, Domício continued in Brussels. His wish was to be able to collaborate with Rio Branco, but from afar, “in Peru, Bolivia, in Washington.”[103] Capistrano de Abreu warned him, however, that Rio Branco wished not only to promote him, but also to come and get him. When he received a telegram from Rio Branco confirming such appointment, Domício thought that the possibility was interesting. He admitted that “it is my passion that makes me dream at night, which entertains me during the day, as absorbing as a feather or a great contained desire”.[104] However, he feared that to accept according to his conditions was a mistake. In a letter, he expressed his uncertainties to Rio Branco: “In order for me to take advantage of the momentum you gave me, without running the risk of ultimately being seen as a simple satellite, it would be better if I continued that collaboration outside, which might often be more effective for the public service and for both of us”.[105]

He ultimately accepted the invitation. The next day, there would be the long-awaited promotion to First Secretary. The Legislative Decree no. 754, dated December 31st, 1900, determined his time as Second Secretary of Legation from December 31st, 1895, as well as the count of seniority in the rank of First Secretary since November 22nd, 1898. Domício’s expectation was to stay at “the foot of the boss,” at the “position of a son who has to wait for the best opportunity to ask a service to another”,[106] but he would wait for the vacancy “even letting it be filled, if he still needs me”.[107]

Back to Brazil

Rio Branco dispatched from time to time, following the action superficially. Domício said that when there was talk about “anything other than Acre, he entrenched with the most urgent obligation: that he had to finish his annual report, which thus has been delayed from one month to another, after having delayed it from one week to another”.[108] His initial plans for Domício da Gama was for him to work as a secretary to Rio Branco in the settlement of the foreign policy machine, help him to grease his cogs and get away from him. However, he ended up staying in the role for four years, divided among the routine of the Cabinet, the movement of the diplomatic environment and the negotiations of the Treaty of Petrópolis.

His greatest challenge was to move away from Rio Branco. The latter did not take into consideration his personal requests for movement, unless he had an interest in them. Domício managed to be appointed to Paris in August 1904. He actually travelled there, but one month and a half later Rio Branco called him back as Support Attaché to the Cabinet, though he was still stationed in Paris. Four months later, he received from the Viscount of Cabo Frio the presidential decree that promoted him to Minister resident in Colombia. However, Domício was not displaced to that post.

There was an opening in Lima, which was an extremely important post for Rio Branco considering the border issue with Peru. The position of head of the Legation was granted on November 14th, 1902, to Manuel de Oliveira Lima, who did not hasten to take it. In fact, when he left Japan, Oliveira Lima made a trip that Almeida called “the longest diplomatic transfer, ever”,[109] although he was aware not only of the urgency of taking over, but also of the significance of the position to the Chancellor. Ultimately, Domício da Gama was appointed to Lima, where he arrived on December 13th, 1906, that is, in the beginning of Rio Branco’s second term.

Taking over a post

On April 2nd, 1907, Domício da Gama arrived in Lima taking orders to submit to the local government a proposal for the recognition of Peru’s Eastern boundary. His performance, however, was beyond instructions, dedicating himself to the softening of the harsh tone of the newspapers against Brazil. Two months after his arrival he already reported to Rio Branco the result of his work: “for some weeks now, annoying adjectives expressing regret or simple malevolence against us have failed to appear”. In his Spanish lessons with an Augustinian friar, he realized that the Peruvian society did not know the Brazilian writers. When he became aware that the National Library of Lima was still recovering from the attack made by the Chilean soldiers during the occupation of the city, he started to work for its recovery, asking his scholar friends to send him books.

After watching a military parade, Domício wrote a confidential letter to Rio Branco, in which he recommended the appointment of military attachés to the three legations of South America “that are most interesting for us to know”.[110] The profile of the attachés should be carefully evaluated, because they needed to be reserved without looking reserved, and to be sociable without intimacies. Rio Branco took note and promised a response, but he did not do that. Gama’s intuition regarding the desirability of naval and military attachés only became important with Nilo Peçanha’s regulation, in 1918.[111]

The pace of the border negotiations under Domício da Gama was slow. The completion of the Peruvian issue only occurred in 1909, when Gama was already in Argentina. In a later assessment of his stay in Peru, Domício said he was convinced that he had been able to solve the relationship problems of both countries, because during his stay there was no open hostility or indifference. The delight of the Peruvians was attested to by several vehicles of Lima’s press, such as the Magazine Actualidades, which even considered him a standard diplomat.

In Buenos Aires

Domício’s transfer to Buenos Aires was published in December 1907, but he only moved in May 1908, and not without tribulations. Telegrams sent by Rio Branco, received when he was on his way, informed Domício that he had to go to Rio de Janeiro, no longer Buenos Aires. At the same time, Rio Branco instructed the legation in Buenos Aires to consult the Argentinean government about the appointment of a naval attaché. These unusual instructions by Rio Branco were due to the increase of tension in the diplomatic relations between Brazil and Argentina, which took place after the rise of Estanislau Zeballos, the Argentinean negotiator in the matter of Palmas, to head of the Argentinean Chancellery in November 1906.

Given that background, Domício da Gama’s trip to take over the post in Buenos Aires was long and busy. After 34 days of travel from Peru to Brazil, the twenty days spent in Rio de Janeiro were of intensive studies and works next to the “chief who was oblivious, ill-tempered and tormented by dispersive occupations”.[112] Nevertheless, he thought that the Argentinean capital would be an interesting post, mainly for the challenge of an “advertisement of a Brazilian gentleman’s personal experience and gradual action in a frankly, hostile environment”.

On August 2nd, he arrived in Buenos Aires within an environment, which was at its peak of distrust regarding Brazil. For that reason, at first, based on conversations with Assis Brazil, whom he succeeded at the post, Domício suggested the promotion of a Triple Entente among Argentina-Brazil-Chile, since “if the authorization for the armaments is simply not voted, a friendly gesture from us (the Entente) will promote détente”.[113]

The official reception occurred only 18 days after he arrived, but the Diário of Buenos Aires interviewed him the next day. The ultimate assessment of the journal was that Brazil had made a good choice, since the circumstances demanded someone direct, rather than contradanzas de espadín. Yet the mood of the press was not friendly. Domício told Rio Branco that Zeballos’s goal was to work for his candidacy for Representative and advised him not to feed the controversy, adding that Zeballos had more friends than enemies. Meanwhile, he had to keep calm and to seek the means for conciliation. Because of the continuation of the alarmist campaign of Zeballos, Gama asked Rio Branco to intercede with the Brazilian press in order to prevent the Argentinean game, whose purpose was to provoke unrest in Brazil.

The increased distrust in the Argentinean scenario led Domício to advise against the continuation as attaché of the Brazilian Navy commander Batista Franco, for he has not “been able to fulfill his mission to study naval advances of this country whose Government refused him permission to visit military ports and establishments”.[114] To agitate the political scenario even more, Estanislau Zeballos made criticisms in the Argentinian newspapers about the content of a telegram that the Brazilian Chancellor supposedly sent. Making efforts to find out the problem, Rio Branco associated the telegram from Zeballos as being his telegram sent to the Brazilian legation in Santiago of Chile, the number of which was 9. Since then, the efforts were made in a triangular action: Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Santiago. The function of Domício da Gama was to obtain through Victorino de la Plaza three copies of the true encrypted telegram, comparing his text with the content of the complaint made by Zeballos and with one of the alleged copies that the Argentinean Chancellor circulated. Once that was done, the documents were published in the Platine newspapers, and the debates were divided regarding the truth of such instructions.

Domício interpreted that the events advanced favorably, since the newspapers were tired of the subject, while the European diplomats admired the Brazilian patience in the case. His expectation was that the incident was near its end and he was waiting for a statement by the Argentinean Government, or a cordial word of Victorino de la Plaza about the case. Domício feared, however, that de la Plaza used the strategy of silence to bury the incident, and thus avoid waves that could hinder his project to be nominated for President. During a dinner at the Jockey Club, Gama and de la Plaza got what Domício called one hour of heated discussion, in which “I raised my voice several times”.[115] That public irritation, unprecedented in his career, resulted from Domício’s non-acceptance of the Argentinean government’s attitude, which intended to consider that the incident was over without a formal explanation, which was what actually happened.

To Domício da Gama the end of the episode of telegram no. 9 was not satisfactory. It served to strengthen his argument that the frankness that he had used was justified, because he was certain that to speak loud and clear was a tactic that would yield good results in that episode. For him, the Argentineans were impulsive and changed their opinion and their resolution very quickly: “That’s how we must treat them, yelling when it is needed, and lowering the voice when they admire that they were ‘extra limited’”. Domício did not fear a breakup, since the Argentinean conservative interests were “indifferent to all that seem to them as a simple game of politics, or even entertainment of ambitious exhibitionists”, but they would arise to “suppress any attempt or threat of harm to the material life of the nation”.[116]

Gama was also not shaken with the suggestions of reduction of armaments. “To the third one that mentioned that to me,” he said, “I already answered almost impatiently that even if we were convinced that we had made a mistake to build big ships, we wouldn’t give way to bitter foreign pressure in terms of national dignity, and that no one can believe that the law of armaments in Argentina is a consequence of ours”.[117] Because of rumors about a possible foreign mediation, he claimed that the only possible policy option would be the non-admission of intervention in internal affairs. He was concerned about the possibility that “Nabuco’s pacifism or his Americanism could lead to American mediation”,[118] if the level of the discussion reached such levels.

Ambassador in the United States of America

With Joaquim Nabuco’s death in January 17th, 1910, the newspapers in Argentina and in Brazil speculated widely about who would be his successor in the office. While the name of Domício da Gama pleased the Argentineans, the Brazilian press was split. Domício da Gama’s career was assessed and his qualities were emphasized, at the same time that there arose allusions to the indication of Rui Barbosa or of Oliveira Lima for the post.

On April 18th, 1911, Rio Branco informed Domício that his appointment as Ambassador in the United States of America was signed, although it had not been published yet. The approval by the Brazilian Senate occurred one month later, on May 17th, 1911, without debate and by unanimous vote. At 49 years old, Gama became the second Ambassador (the first one had been Nabuco) in the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a rare public demonstration of esteem, Rio Branco welcomed Domício on his departure for the United States of America, in what turned out to be the last time they met in person:

I met him when he was still a young man, more than 25 years ago, being at the time already very loved by my father and my uncles, who were old servers of the homeland. Since that time, I was able to enjoy the beautiful endowments of his spirit and his heart, and to follow with affectionate interest his laborious and worthy career both in Europe and in America, and even here in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With his personal qualities, and having worked in the early years of his public life, successively, subordinate immediately to Antônio Prado, Rio Branco and Joaquim Nabuco, his career had to be what it has actually been: an example of fruitful devotion to the service of the homeland.[119]

Going to Washington gave Domício the pleasure of ending his diplomatic career in the same country in which he had begun it. However, his view of the United States of America was different from that of Joaquim Nabuco. In his view, “Nabuco’s Americanism” made him believe that the United States of America would reciprocate the friendship with the same intensity. An assumed Monroist, Nabuco interpreted the doctrine as a good will warning to foreigners, a possession ban that ensured Brazil the possibility to sleep profoundly while the Americans “watched all night long”.[120] Domício, in turn, believed that the sense of watching was understood in an opposite way. He adopted what he himself called psychology of the watch, “whomever wakes up is alert, and must be suspicious”. He praised the attachment to the domestic home, which for him was the extension of the feeling of the homeland, and he believed that if “we had the time to be patient, in moral terms this (Brazil) would be the higher land”. Unlike Nabuco, he would hardly let a foreigner watch his homeland – his home – from so close.

Domício studied broadly what he called the spirit of the North American people, that is, their political tradition, their ruling processes, and their domestic and foreign expressions. He reached the conclusion that since the country was made up of so many different peoples, it started to feel superior to other countries. Business had urged the North Americans to privilege material life, increasing individually egocentrism that was shaped in the national egoism itself. Domício understood that the alliances or even the expressions of friendship did not move him as they were seen as calculated interest. In that sense, it was important to be aware, for “when the American interest, either national or simply private, is in conflict with ours”.[121]

It could be concluded that the American spirit was in full expansion. The idea of being able to intervene “as a big brother in the political life of the unsafe sisters, to teach them how to live” was a practice even before it was established as a doctrine. “This will be the doctrine by Taft or Knox, if Roosevelt does not claim that his name is given to it”.[122] He believed that the United States of America was not only growing as a nation, but that it was also increasingly aware of its weight in the world. Thus, he understood that it was both a necessity and a national duty to only give way to the United States of America in what was fair and useful. His thought was that Brazil should relate to the Americans based on the samples of consideration actually received, not before them. Besides the absence of prestige, an accommodation could lead to an imbalance in the bilateral relations of both countries, especially due to the unequal competition, since, according to Gama, Brazil was still a small nation in the international system.

The pragmatic Domício did not believe in collective friendships or in certain kinds of cooperation either, especially when they occurred between powers and weak countries. He understood that, when put to the test, when faced with a clash of interests, the power would abandon its good intentions and put their powers in action. Thus, the collaboration with the power should be clearly delineated to avoid traps or tainted competitions that would leave the weakest ones exposed to outrages from the strongest ones. Treating with independence the affairs of the United States was even more necessary since more people started to think that the concessions should be made to that country indefinitely. The trend to increase the importance of the US market, which was already in charge of about 40% of the Brazilian production of coffee and in decisive expansion, after having obtained the status of trading partner of Brazil and having received customs favors of 30% for several products, required the attention of the Brazilian government. Domício foresaw that the Americans would always have new demands, which they expected that were promptly satisfied. “Now this is where you might want to put a base if we do not want to be reduced to a simple economic province of the United States”.[123] Concessions shall not be made in exchange for political interests, because the more you gave, the more concessions would be demanded and the requirements would have no limit. According to Domício da Gama’s understanding, one country, any country, should not take on condescending behavior that can be confused with an open door to foreign intervention in its domestic affairs. According to him, in international politics one shall never seem to be weak. Not understanding one’s own interest is also showing weakness. He said that we should present ourselves to the world as a Self Made Nation, which develops without harm to the right of others, entertaining friendships in the same level line, aware of its responsibility, zealous of its sovereignty.

The case of coffee

In the United States, Domício da Gama plunged immediately into the problem of Brazilian coffee in the local market. The main Brazilian product had a unique situation: in domestic terms, it was almost entirely produced and financed by the national farmers and 90% of their export was made by British, American and German exporters.[124] In this scenario, the Brazilian Government was a hostage to the requirements and demands of the coffee bourgeoisie, which was reflected in the policy known as café com leite. In order to sustain its overproduction the surplus of the product was purchased by the US Government or by the federal government. Successive valuation policies were directed by the coffee barons with the endorsement of the federal government. The world recession of 1907 affected the promise of the Brazilian federal government to help raise funds for the Government of São Paulo who had begun to negotiate a new loan with German bankers. By the end of 1907 and with the opposition of the Rothschilds, traditional Brazilian bankers, the scheme was already doomed to fail. Without money, the natives of São Paulo appealed to coffee importers and exporters of coffee.

In December 1908, the government of São Paulo concluded an agreement for 15,000,000 pounds with the Schroder Bank, of the Englishman Henry Schroder, and the Société Générale. 10,000,000 of Schroder and 5,000,000 of the Société; however, later the Société sold 2,000,000 to the American bankers, J.P.Morgan and First National City Bank. The loan was ensured by the special rate of 3% gold on each sack of coffee exported at the prices of the Covenant of Taubaté and by the value of the coffee purchased by the government of the State of São Paulo. With the loan, the government of São Paulo repeated the action of 1905, buying large quantities and retaining a portion to keep the price, selling the other part to pay the loan.[125]

Thus, of the approximately 11 million sacks purchased by the Brazilian State, approximately 7 million were stored, at the disposal of the Executive Committee of the loan, made up of seven members: four of them were backed by Schroder, two by the Société Générale and one by the government of São Paulo, Paulo Prado, of the Prado Chaves House. The sacks were arranged in New York, The Hague, Antwerp, London, Rotterdam, Bremen, Trieste and Marseilles. Pari passu, the bankers who financed the operations overtaxed the coffee and created the Recovery Committee to coordinate its sale, which was in turn controlled by the merchant Herman Sielcken. In February 1911, the American Representative George Norris, claiming danger of exploitation of the American consumer, filed a request for information, in view of the possibility that Brazil retaliated by imposing customs taxes. As a result, the Justice Department endorsed several investigations by Congress.[126]

When he started to talk to Philander Knox, the US Secretary of State, Gama argued that the intention of the government of São Paulo had been to protect farmers against the gradual decrease of the product’s prices.[127] He emphasized that, despite the rise in price of all commercial items, coffee prices had maintained, especially in the United States of America, a stable level for 25 years. Gama knew that he and Knox did not agree on the fundamentals of their arguments, but he claimed that it was better for Knox to know about his political stance in order not to prevent excessive “claims with us or, at least, to be cautious in presenting them”.[128] However, Domício da Gama’s greatest concern was with the possibility that the US government became an official sponsor of the cause, which would be counterproductive to Brazil, due to our extreme susceptibility when dealing with a powerful nation”.

Domício da Gama and Lauro Müller

With the death of Rio Branco on February 10th, 1912, Lauro Müller took over the Ministry. As early as February 23rd, he requested Domício to survey the opinion of the Americans, “with whom we always want to march together”, about the case of Paraguay. Even though he did not know Lauro Müller in person, Domício responded the next day, advising him to maintain the freedom of action that Brazil always had. He proposed that the new Minister avoided asking for advice or seeking the approval of the Americans on Brazilian politics in South America, “in order not to pave the way for inadmissible claims, in that realm and in another, as has been the tendency”.[129] Domício consulted if the Minister agreed with his way of thinking and if he authorized him to pursue that line. The response to this consultation, however, never arrived. Müller’s stance was to avoid coffee-related matters altogether.

Gama informed the Brazilian Chancellery that the American Ministry of Justice was preparing to submit an opinion on the coffee issue. His intuition was that the American government would be strict and he feared the establishment of a criminal prosecution, which would lead the public opinion to complain against the foreign product.[130] He feared that the rumors of the judicial sale of the coffee damaged business, and could decrease the action of public authorities, preventing them from retaining the products and from maintaining the prices. Such an action could have an unpredictable impact on the Brazilian coffee crop. On May 30th, 1912, Müller responded to Domício da Gama authorizing the hiring of a lawyer and defining a stance on the case: to prevent the judicial sale of the coffee.

Despite an elusive Knox, Domício was able to tear from him the promise that he would talk to the Minister of Justice. Two hours later, Knox called Gama stating that the Minister had refused to intervene ex officio and that the process could only be decided by the Court. In a further visit to the State Department, Gama found out that it intended to delay the procedure, rather than to suppress it altogether. As a result, he protested with Knox for the unfriendly and unfair treatment and he asserted that he would address the subject in the speech that would be held at the Pan-American banquet at the Waldorf Astoria. Knox agreed that the attitude of the Minister of Justice had been reckless and that he himself had protested to the Ministry of Justice.

In turn, Lauro Müller advocated the argument according to which only the cancellation of the process was interesting to the Brazilian government and that, if that did not take place, Brazil would have a right to complain formally. Assuming that Müller and he were working in unison, Gama left for New York, spent the night in Long Island and from there he went directly to the banquet at the Waldorf Astoria. Thus, he did not go to the Embassy and he did not read the telegrams of Lauro Müller and Enéas Martins who instructed him not to speak about the incident of coffee.

The ballroom of the Waldorf Astoria was full of Latin American politicians, businessmen, Ambassadors e Ministers. Domício da Gama’s 4-page speech was right after the one by Philander Knox and took everyone by surprise. Following the advice of John Barrett, who was the Director of the Pan-American Union, he made the most remarkable speech of his life. He started lecturing about South America, going through the feelings of justice of the North American citizens and describing their ignorance about South America. According to the New York Times, when the word coffee emerged “throughout the hall, there were heard whispered words ‘coffee trust, coffee trust’”.[131] Gama went on calling the attention for the need that the development of trade took South and North America to a new era of trade relations. He stated that he had received a harsh blow with the endorsement by the American government to the “somewhat arbitrary and totally revolutionary doctrine to pay the commodity of the others not at the price they ask for, but at what the United States of America, that is, the American traders are willing to pay for it”. He concluded that by interfering with the authority of a foreign State and by admitting that an American Court of Justice would determine the loss of the sovereignty of that foreign State, the government of the United States committed a “lapse of consideration due to a friendly government on the brink of international discourtesy”.[132]

Only when he went back to the hotel, Domício became aware of the previous instruction made by the Chancellor. He replied, asking him not to spread any news, in order not to weaken the coffee process. In the next day, Müller stated to Domício that his purpose was to create an embarrassing situation for the United States of America. The speech had great repercussion, having been reported in many ways not only in the United States of America, but also in Buenos Aires and London.[133] Five days later, Knox requested to President William Howard Taft the end of the coffee suit, and one month after the banquet, the Attorney-General of the case was fired. Domício da Gama’s speech, in addition to internal debate nurtured by the press made the attorneyship restate that the lawsuit was against individuals and traders, not against Brazil.

Müller’s reaction was to be silent. Again, he did not answer Gama’s service letters. The latter asked Enéas to convince Müller to let him issue a note asking the North American government for a definition of its trade policy. Müller’s silence made him question, “how can I know which policy I am serving, if nobody writes to me, not even to approve previous procedures”? Yet, Gama persisted in his position against the excesses of the United States of America. In August, Müller made the first attempt to move him from Washington by suggesting that it would be convenient for him to go to Japan for the Emperor’s funeral, together with Philander Knox. Gama answered that it was no longer possible to reach the ship that was taking Knox. Six months after the banquet, Müller remained silent. Gama received news from São Paulo via Herman Sielcken and he continued to suggest in his letters to the Secretariat of State that that was the moment to eliminate the tax favors granted to the North Americans, since the rise of the price of coffee would prevent them to retaliate by taxing the product. He argued that the victory of the democrats in the election of 1912 would turn the situation easier for Brazil, since some of the leaders of that party were among his best friends. In November, Müller made the second attempt to move him away from Washington, inviting him to head the Brazilian Legation in London. Gama replied that his exit at that moment would hinder the cause, that he was thankful for the trust and he said that he never desired the post in London. It must be emphasized that the proposal, even though honorable, was for a London that only reached the level of an Embassy in 1918, when Domício da Gama became Minister of State.

Gama’s firmness was based on his certainty that it was preferable to jeopardize his personal position than to show political weakness or to taint the national character. He often had to deny, in Washington, rumors that the coffee would be sold by the Brazilian government and to go against the pressures that Müller said that he had received from the North American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro. With Sielcken having stated that the North-American government would not go on with the lawsuit, Müller asserted to Edwin Morgan, the North American Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, that, the statement made by Sielcken was not the desire of the Brazilian government. At that stage, Gama clarified that the indiscretions did not come from him, but from the Ministry of Justice, which had apologized to the Embassy, and warned the Chancellor about the biased news that was published in the newspapers and that he promptly denied. He also argued that the United States would be the greatest loser if the situation lasted longer and, having in mind the rise of the democrat administration, scheduled to occur soon, the moment was opportune to settle the relations between both countries.

Despite Gama’s advice, when, in November, Ambassador Morgan proposed to the Brazilian Foreign Office the sale of the sacks in the market, free from restrictions and in the short run (before or until April 1st, 1913), Müller accepted the arrangement without consulting Domício, and, in January, the stock was liquidated in London. It must also be emphasized that one month after the negotiation with Morgan, the Ministry of Finance renewed the reduction of rights to certain North American products, “previously granted for the terms of 1904, 1906, 1910, 1911 and 1913”.[134] Thus, in the serious financial crisis of 1914, at the same time as World War I, Brazilian coffee underwent serious value losses.

Gama still tried to call the attention of the Chancellor for a likely collateral effect of this attitude in the region: mainly Argentina could feel harmed. He emphasized that a withdrawal of Argentina from the Pan-American Union would be a blow to Pan-Americanism that was so dear to both the American statesmen and traders. He warned Müller that the representative from Argentina had let him know that the issue of the flours would be brought up at the debate. With this in view, he suggested that Müller request to Morgan the exclusion of wheat flour from the list of products favored by the Brazilian tax, and that he re-established the reduction to 20% for other items. Even knowing that he would not be heard, he reiterated his assessment that it was necessary a reciprocal equalitarian treatment, a friendship without dependence.

With the rise of the democrat Woodrow Wilson, North American policy started to give priority to the effort to reduce the prices of coffee. Such a stance went against all the efforts of the Brazilian Embassy, which, since 1907, tried to prevent a special policy regarding coffee. Angry, Domício da Gama unburdened with his friend José Veríssimo about the Müller’s negotiation attitude and about his inhibition to complain against the offense he received: “now we have a special law against the entrance of the valuation coffee in the United States of America. This was what Mr. Lauro Müller gained with his unsuccessful negotiation: an inciting lawsuit that is still pending and a special one against the government of São Paulo and its coffee. Is not that a great diplomacy?”[135]

In March 1913, Domício received a telegram in which Müller requested that he used the beginning of Wilson’s administration to expose the situation of coffee and to request greater commercial facilities.[136] According to the instructions, Gama sought the new Secretary of State, William J. Bryan, who asked him for a brief memoir about the subject. There was a heavy game between both governments about the taxation on coffee for fiscal reasons, having in mind the increase of the income of the treasury.[137] Gama insisted with Bryan that the action would hinder the relations between both countries. In April 1913 the Attorney-General Bryan withdrew the lawsuit, which was concluded one month later. Domício da Gama’s stance was a counterpoint to servility in diplomacy and right at the moment of expansion of the diplomacy of the dollar. However, Gama’s realistic view suffered the counterpoint of Lauro Müller’s servility, and Domício’s action in the coffee case started to be seen as the dissonant voice within Brazilian diplomacy.

The Conference of Niagara Falls

The Mexican Revolution did not have profound repercus-sions in Brazil. Itamaraty followed the case through its Consulate in Mexico City and its Embassy in the United States. With the breaking of diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico, the Brazilian consul, Cardoso de Oliveira, came to represent American interests in the country.

On April 9th, 1914 one American officer and nine sailors disrespected Mexican authorities, entering the forbidden zone of the port of Tampico that was besieged and they were arrested. The Counter-Admiral considered the arrest an insult and demanded the raising of the American flag on Mexican soil, accompanied by 21 cannon shots, an act that the Mexican President at the time, Victoriano Huerta, refused to carry out. The reaction of the US President Woodrow Wilson was to ask the authorization of the Congress for use of the armed forces against Mexico. Ten days later, the Americans occupied the port of Veracruz before the German steam Ypiranga landed with war material for Huerta. The tension increased and both Huerta and the first Chief of the Constitutionalist army, Venustiano Carranza, considered the American action as an act of war.

On April 25th, Domício da Gama, along with the Ministers, Rómulo S. Naón, of Argentina and Eduardo Suárez Mujica, of Chile, sent a joint proposal of good offices to the Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. The Mexican newspapers welcomed the proposal of the so-called “A.B.C. Powers” as a means capable of restoring peace. Suarez Mujica, who called two other colleagues to discuss the Mexican crisis with the Satate Department, had taken the initiative. The next day, all three chancelleries supported the joint mediation effort. The historian Frank H. Severance, contemporary of the case, noted that with the blockade of the Mexican ports, the bombing of cities and the invasion of the territory by the United States, “an offer of mediation came like a ray of light through the storm clouds”.[138]

Even though both parties initially accepted the mediation, President Wilson changed his mind. The real problem, he claimed, was the Mexican chaos and so, before the negotiation, Mexico should present a government worthy of recognition. The mediators requested a cease-fire both to Carranza and to Huerta. Carranza replied that the conflict between the United States and Mexico was independent from a domestic war and that the suspension of hostilities would benefit only Huerta.[139]

In March 1915, the US Congress granted to the mediators the Gold Medal, its highest honor, for their generous service in conflict prevention. According to Stephen W. Stathis, only 17 non-Americans received the award.[140] It is noteworthy that the mediation showed the South American countries that it was both possible and useful to work together. In May, the Chancellors from the three South American countries signed in Buenos Aires, the peace treaty of ABC, pledging to preserve the peace and refrain from wars, sending any controversy to an unbiased Commission.[141] This Treaty was based on bilateral treaties of peace of William Jennings Bryan reportedly intended a “cooling off period” for international disputes. Two months after Domício da Gama, Naón, Suarez Mujica and Bryan signed bilateral peace treaties between the respective States in Washington.

The meetings among the mediators, the US representatives and those of Huerta in Niagara Falls began on May 20th, 1914 and lasted for 5 weeks. Carranza did not send any delegates because he considered unacceptable the enlargement of the Conference’s scope, since the United States had no right to intervene in the Mexican domestic affairs. Domício da Gama’s stance was against any interference in Mexican domestic affairs, both during the meeting and in subsequent work. Lauro Müller assessed that Brazil should follow the United States if they recognize a Government in Mexico, but should not influence the establishment of this Government. Gama maintained that Itamaraty should have an independent policy from that of the United States, because greater was the desire to help them “it would not be okay for us to attach them unconditionally as true satellites in actions that must be promoted with entire independence of judgment and security reasons”.[142] In addition, Brazilian domestic opinion was more linked to Domício’s position than that of Müller, tended to oppose any attack on Mexican sovereignty.[143]

During the Pan-American meeting of September 18th, 1915, Domício took a stance contrary to the approval of a draft resolution that, in his view, violated Mexican sovereignty – a stance, according to Arthur Link, which was correct and sensitive.[144] Fifteen days later, on October 18th, there was a new Conference between the Secretary of State Robert Lansing and the mediators. He concluded that the Carrancista party was the only one that substantially had the crucial characteristics to be recognized as a de facto government. Domício was authorized by the Brazilian government to recognize the carrancista government separately, but on the same day as the others did. On the same day in which he received this statement, he sent a letter to Müller, advising him not to immediately accredit a Minister by the government only. He considered that Itamaraty would recognize Huerta’s government in an isolated manner as a gesture of Pan-Americanism.[145]

In the following years, Domício continued to follow the case through newspapers and in conversations with Mexican politicians such as Eliseo Arredondo. In his letters to Müller, he returned the thesis that the ruin of the Republic of Mexico was hurried, if not determined, by the neighborhood of the United States, but if the war broke out, the blame would be only of the government.[146]

World War I

Lauro Müller instructed Domício da Gama in the sense that the Brazilian government stood for peace and therefore it reserved the right to wait for an opportunity to cooperate or act in any case that involved its sovereign rights. On February 5th, 1917, two days after the rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany, Gama informed Müller that he had reported directly to President Wilson the reason why Brazil took on the position of neutrality: “The Justice of history would say that we broke with Germany because we follow unconditionally the United States that only communicate to us the consummate acts for us to support them”.[147]

In June, already exchanging correspondence with the Chancellor Nilo Peçanha, Domício expressed his opinions about the war and about the United States. He was certain that the Americans appreciated the moral value of Brazilian cooperation in any act of international politics. Reiterating that he did not criticize any orders, or neglected to fulfill them in the best way possible, he stated that it was his duty, as a governmental agent, to say confidentially what he thought would be useful in the sense of contributing to the success of Brazilian foreign policy, which “has always been correct and haughty and, as such, I am proud to serve. But your Excellency knows that it is not enough to be, but you also need to appear to be, since appearances are able to make and destroy reputations”.[148]

Minister of Foreign Affairs

In mid-1918, Domício da Gama was invited to be the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs. As a Minister, he was certain about his participation in the Peace Conference in Paris since the ally Chancellors would attend. He had already begun the organization of the mission when, 20 days after taking office at Itamaraty, he became aware that President Rodrigues Alves wanted Rui Barbosa to head the Brazilian delegation. Even though he was surprised by the news, Domício did not oppose any argument and he soon told the US Secretary of State Frank J. Polk that he would not attend the Congress due to domestic political reasons.[149] Meanwhile, he continued to instruct the Brazilian legation in Paris about the preliminaries of the Conference, confirming, in the same document, not only the invitation to Rui (“today we will invite Senator Rui Barbosa to head the delegation”), but also the fact that he had sent a wire to “the United States and England appreciating good domestic policy effect that we are also represented in the preliminary conferences and insisting that we are invited now”.

On the contrary, when Rui received the letter from the hands of Rodrigues Alves’s son, he claimed that the invitation had been late, since the press had already announced that the Chancellor would be the head of the delegation. Then Domício went to Rui’s house and reiterated the president’s invitation. In vain: Rui rejected the invitation, despite the “loyal explanations of the honored Minister, it was not him who raised his candidacy, and considered his appointment as consummated. All that took place by the newspapers”.

According to Moniz Bandeira, based on Rui’s interpretation about the case, the United States vetoed Rui’s name in a sordid international intrigue. Francisco Vinhosa, in turn, claims that Rui did not want to submit himself to the instructions of Domício da Gama. Joseph Smith claimed that “Domício feared that Rui’s selection would diminish his own authority as Foreign Minister”.[150] What is certain was that, since that controversy, the nomination of Epitácio Pessoa emerged to head the delegation, which was made up of Raul Fernandes, João Pandiá Calógeras and Olinto de Magalhães, the latter being Minister of the Brazilian legation in Paris.

As far as the organization of the Conference was concerned, Domício made an effort to ensure the participation of four Brazilian representatives in the event and, for that to happen, he resorted to American support. Woodrow Wilson supported the Brazil claim, sustaining in the meeting of the Higher War Council, on January 14th, the argument of the Brazilian population density. It was decided that the major powers would have five delegates, while Belgium, Brazil and Serbia, three, and the other delegations would have one or two delegates. It must be emphasized that both Belgium and Serbia were, unlike Brazil, largely affected by the conflict. The decision of the Higher War Council demonstrated Domício da Gama’s personal prestige, whose interests were advocated by the US Secretary of State Robert Lansing himself.

On January 13th, the proposal of 2 delegates was approved for the “Committee of representation of the minor powers in the Executive Council of the League of Nations, nominated by the Legislative Assembly”.[151] Epitácio Pessoa protested and proposed that it should be four delegates and, facing the possibility of Brazil not being among the four, he set Domício in motion who once again, asked for American help. He addressed not only the State Department, but also President Wilson. According to the Undersecretary of State, Frank J. Polk, the tough request was granted exclusively by the personal intervention of Domício da Gama.[152] Brazil secured the place and a 3-year term.

Brazilian interests had to do with the sale of coffee from São Paulo, which was stocked in European ports as guarantee of two loans and with the possession of the German ships that Brazil had seized in April, 1917, when the country broke diplomatic relations with Germany. Epitácio Pessoa managed Brazilian interests regarding the German liability for the payment within the scope of the Finance Committee. The result was favorable because of Article 263 of the Treaty of Versailles. As far as the case of the seizure of the German ships was concerned, the Brazilian situation was similar to that of the United States, as Vinhosa noted. Both States had seized more tons than they had lost. In the end, the thesis of rejecting the sharing of the ships in the maritime proportion prevailed, as France had claimed.

On January 15th, 1919, Rodrigues Alves died. Three months later, Epitácio Pessoa was elected President of Brazil. Upon his return to Rio de Janeiro, Epitácio fired Domício. One year later, he justified that his goal had been to reorganize the Ministry with aids of his choice, and that Domício wanted to go to the Embassy in London. However, Domício never found out why he was fired. He considered that Epitácio was against him choosing the collaborators who did not please him, but in fact, the delegation was already almost organized when Epitácio was chosen to head it.[153] According to Heitor Lyra, a more plausible explanation is that the new president did not want to have in his administration someone on whom he relied so much while he was in Europe, and without whom he would not have been able to obtain the results he did.[154]

Domício da Gama’s term was short and troubled, yet victorious. Relying on his personal prestige, he obtained for Brazil the result that perhaps no other diplomat in his position would be able to obtain. Despite the successes, his fate was suspended for three months. In September, indications of his transfer to London emerged, the legation was raised to the category of an Embassy. The official announcement of his transfer to London took place on October 18th, 1919. Ten days later, he took over his last diplomatic mission.

From the embassy in London to availability

While he was the Ambassador in London, Domício da Gama once again had the League of Nations in his path. In it he was a delegate, President of the Council during the Third Assembly of the 21st Session, in 1922,[155] and he represented Bolivia in the territorial dispute between Bolivia and Peru against Chile, regarding the territories of Tacna and Arica. In 1923, Brazil was re-elected as a provisional member. The administration of Artur Bernardes, who succeeded Pessoa, turned the quest for a permanent seat into a real obsession. On March 13th, 1924 there was the creation of a Permanent Delegation in Geneva with the category of an Embassy, of which, on May 19th, Afrânio de Melo Franco was nominated head. After intervening in the government of Rio de Janeiro, Bernardes sent the recently elected governor of Rio de Janeiro, Raul Fernandes, to coordinate the Brazilian campaign for a permanent seat. In mid-September, Domício wrote to Melo Franco:

I believe that you do not have much hope to see Brazil as a permanent member. Everything I know goes against that claim. When, since the end of the 3rd Assembly, I wrote and telegraphed about the convenience for us to make diplomatic works so that we could ensure votes in the Assembly of this year, I predicted that we will not be able to convince anyone, except theoretically of the advantage of Brazil occupying a permanent seat to which all countries claim they are entitled... Nevertheless, what could be expected from a separate diplomatic work, we should not expect from a delegation on a majority already unsatisfied... Tyrrell asked me if Brazil was excluded from the Council it would withdraw from the League and I answered that not, but that we would be very disappointed and we would lose the passion to work and to pay. The threat to leave and the withdrawal itself are not kind gestures in those cases.[156]

This letter was transformed into what became the emphatic telegram that Franco sent to the Chancellor at the time, Felix Pacheco, about the need for “an anticipated, methodical and energetic work next to the other chancelleries for the cause of the permanent seat”.[157]

The scenario of the League of Nations had changed with the withdrawal of the United States, mainly due to the increase of the influence of France and England.[158] The various attempts by Domício to create a situation that was favorable to Brazil always came up against the lack of interest and the arrogance of Lord Curzon, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Domício opted for working with other employees of the Foreign Office. This fact, plus his various health problems made Itamaraty consider that he had a limited entry in the Foreign Office, due to “neglect or lack of interest”, and for that reason, he did not obtain British support.[159] On October 17th, 1924, the Artur Bernardes administration retired him because of that very questionable assessment, since the British government would never give in to anyone, as was clear with the successors of Domício da Gama, Raul Fernandes and Régis de Oliveira. Gama remained at the Embassy in London until November 12th, the date of his last signed letter. The next day, he went to Paris, on his way to Brazil. Still hoping to revert his situation, he sent letters and telegrams that had no reply.

Despite his fragile health, Domício stated that he would not resign to the official impairment. He expected that Brazil gained prestige in the League of Nations due to the quality of its representatives, when they had contact with the representatives of other nations, becoming more known. The most important thing for him was the distinction of the Brazilians “in the Council, in the Committees of the Assembly, in the special unions, emanations of the League, and in the International Court of Justice”. He advocated the annual payment of 40,000 pounds for the honor to be able to be present there, and he expected that Itamaraty created “a special and technical section of liaison with the Brazilian Delegation in Geneva, which enables it to fulfill its mission, transmitting information to it, clarifying instructions, helping from within those who work abroad and using and disseminating the work done abroad”. That was quite a prophetical view of the Brazilian diplomacy.

Heitor Lyra described in an impressive manner Domício da Gama’s exit from the scene, recording the disrespect with which he was treated in the Itamaraty Palace. When he was ignored both by the President of the Republic and by the Chancellor, limited to the corridors and to the auxiliary rooms of the Cabinet, where he sat in silence waiting for a call from the Minister. He did not seek, nor was he sought:

One afternoon, as always, when he arrived at Itamaraty, he went up to the room of the Cabinet aids and went to look for his chair. He could no longer find it. It had been taken away. So he understood. He took, silently, his hat and left. He left never to come back. In fact, he left to die.[160]

His physical death took place at 6:30 pm of November 8th, 1925, when he was 64 years old, in a room at the Copacabana Palace Hotel facing Ponta Negra Beach, where he had spent his youth. The report signed by the physician Oscar Clark pointed to arteriosclerosis and uraemia as the cause of his death, but it was actually the sorrows and the melancholy that had a decisive impact on him.

Conclusions

Domício da Gama’s diplomatic views were based on 3 intertwined and key dimensions: the love for the homeland, anti-interventionism and the self-made nation. He used to say that he would jeopardize his personal situation before scratching the defense of the country. This was a lesson that he learned with Rio Branco, who often said that the public man must submit with all his strength to the service of the country.

A fierce anti-interventionist, he took a stance against the Monroe Doctrine, claiming that America for the Americans was equivalent to a condemnation of unfortunate people to barbarism. Paying attention to everything that was interesting to Brazil, he advocated in an intransigent manner the possible bargains, even when there did not seem to be a real reciprocity of interests. He took his beliefs literally both in Buenos Aires and in the United States, in the defense of the coffee and of the Mexican case. Such zeal to defend the international conciliation and friendships without dependencies was supplemented by the frankness in his dealings and by a pragmatism that made him advocate both a stance without retractions as compared to the United States and the approximation from the Hispanic-American countries.

He said he was an agent of the State. His goal was to contrib-ute to the success of Brazilian international policy, which was both correct and proud, and for that reason he was proud to serve it. His idea of self-made nation implied the right and the duty of a country to development, without harming others and fully aware of its responsibility towards the international system. Domício da Gama believed that working hard in the international conciliation was more useful than any advertisement campaign. This was the view that he advocated along his entire diplomatic journey, a proud proposal and one took for granted, a necessary national density as a platform to be able to fly in the international scene. As his friend Rio Branco said, Domício da Gama’s career was an example of useful devotion in serving the homeland.

Bibliography

Books, articles and letters by Domício da Gama

GAMA, Domício da. Atlas Universal de Geografia Física e Política – published under the direction of Domício da Gama. Paris: Garnier Irmãos Livreiros Editores, 1898.

______. Contos a Meia Tinta. Paris: Imprensa Lahure, 1891.

______. Difficulties of Democratic Control of Diplomatic Negotiations. In: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Vol. 7, n. 2, The Foreign Relations of the United States: Part I (Jul., 1917) , p. 159-163.

______. Histórias Curtas. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1901.

______. The Neutrality Rules Adopted by Brazil, by His Excellency the Brazilian Ambassador Domício da Gama. In: The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, July, 1915. Publication n. 910.

______. Contos. Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Academy of Letters, 2001.

______. Letter to Joaquim Nabuco. Buenos Aires, August 15th, 1908. Fundaj, CP P252 DOC 5163.

______. Letter to Joaquim Nabuco. Brussels, January 25th, 1903. Fundaj, CP P107 DOC 2270.

Files used in this article

Brazilian Academy of Letters (ABL), Domício da Gama Archive (ADG), 9.4.13.

Brazilian Academy of Letters (ABL), Graça Aranha Archive (AGA) 10.3.13.

Historical Archive of Itamaraty (AHI). Private Archive Baron of Rio Branco (APBRB). Part III (34). Tin 824 Pack 2. Issued and Received.

______. Tin 811, Pack 1, p. 7.

______. Tin 877 Pack, Folder 12 – June 11th, 1908 to October 15th, 1911. Originals.

Historical Archive of Itamaraty (AHI). Sylvino Gurgel do Amaral Archive (ASGA). Tin 346, Pack 3.

Historical Archive of Itamaraty (AHI). Brazilian Diplomatic Missions (MDB). Buenos Aires, Dispatches, 1905-1906, 207.4.9.

______. Buenos Aires. Telegrams received, October, 1908 to June, 1909, 208.1.08.

______. Lima. Dispatches 1906, 1909, 213.3.02.

______. Lima. Letters. 1906-1907, 212.4.05.

______. Lima. Letters. July-December 1908, 206.2.04.

______. Washington, Letters Apr/Dec 1911, 234.1.12.

______. Washington, Letters, 1912. 234.1.13.

______. Washington, Letters, 1913, 234.2.01.

______. Washington, Letters, July, 1914 to October, 1915, 234.2.03.

______. Washington, Letters, 1914 to October, 1915, 234.2.04.

______. Washington, Reserved Confidential Political Dispatches Issued 1914 to 1919, 451.4.05.

______. Washington, Issued Telegrams, 1911 to 1915. 235.4.2.

IHGB. Domício da Gama Collection (CDG), Tin 645.

______. Tin 646.

______. Tin 648.

Articles and books

BRASIL. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Relatório, 1914, v.1, Part I, p. XX.

BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República e os Anos de Apogeu (1902 to 1918). São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2003.

CADERNOS DO CHDD. Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, Brasília: Year IV – n. 7. 2nd Semester, 2005.

CARDIM, Carlos Henrique, FRANCO, Álvaro da Costa. (orgs). Rio Branco, a América do Sul e a Modernização do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: EMC, 2002.

CASTRO, Flávio Mendes de Oliveira. História da Organização do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Brasília: Ed. da Universidade de Brasília, 1983.

FRANÇA, Tereza Cristina Nascimento. Self Made Nation: Domício da Gama e o Pragmatismo do Bom Senso. 2007. 408 f., il. Thesis (Ph.D. in International Relations) - Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2007.

LINK, Arthur. La Política de los Estados Unidos en América Latina – 1913-1916. México-Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Econômica, 1960.

LYRA, Heitor. Memórias da Vida Diplomática – Coisas Vistas e Ouvidas – 1916-1925. Secretariat of State and Embassy in London. Lisbon, Centro do Livro Brasileiro, 1972.

New York Times, May 28th, 1912.

Revista da Academia Brasileira de Letras, Rio de Janeiro, 1933, vol. 41.

Revista da Academia Brasileira de Letras. Rio de Janeiro, 1933, vol. 42.

SEVERANCE, Frank H., ed. Peace Episodes on the Niagara: Other Studies and Reports (Including Severance’s Essay, “The Peace Conference at Niagara Falls in 1914”). Buffalo, N.Y.: Buffalo Historical Society, 1914.

SMALL, Michael. The Forgotten Peace: Mediation at Niagara Falls, 1914. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2009.

SMITH, Joseph. Unequal Giants – Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991.

STATHIS, Stephen W. Congressional Gold Medals 1776-2002. CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web. The Library of Congress, 2002.

TOPIK, Steven. A Presença do Estado na Economia Política do Brasil de 1889 a 1930. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1987, p. 73.

VINHOSA, Francisco Luiz Teixeira. A Diplomacia Brasileira e a Revolução Mexicana (1913-1915). In: Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro. Brasília/Rio de Janeiro: 1980, n. 327, April/June, p. 19-82.

______. O Brasil e a Primeira Guerra Mundial – A Diplomacia Brasileira e as Grandes Potências. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1990.

Afrânio de Melo Franco

Member of a traditional family from the state of Minas Gerais, Melo Franco was born in Paracatu on February 25, 1870. He graduated from the São Paulo Law School in 1891, served in the state assembly from 1903 to 1906, and then began his long career (1906-1930) as a federal congressman, during which time he periodically held a post in the federal government. After a diplomatic mission to Bolivia in 1917, he became Minister of Transportation during 1918-1919, and represented Brazil in the first International Labor Conference in Washington in 1919. He headed the Brazilian delegation at the V Inter-American Conference in Santiago in 1923 and that same year embarked for Geneva to serve as Brazil’s representative to the League of Nations. During 1923-1926 he led the unsuccessful and controversial campaign to gain a permanent seat on the Council of the League. Reelected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1927, he played a prominent role in the formation of the Liberal Alliance, under the banner of which the Revolution of 1930 occurred. From 1930 to 1933, he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Provisional Government of Getúlio Vargas. Highlights of his performance as head of Itamaraty were the “Melo Franco Reform” (1931) of the ministerial administration and his effort as mediator in the Letícia conflict between Colombia and Peru; in 1934, after resigning from Itamaraty, he once again accepted the role of mediator and was able to negotiate a peace agreement between those two countries. In 1938, he headed the delegation to the VIII Inter-American Conference at Lima and, during the early years of World War II, served as president of the Inter-American Neutrality Committee. He died on January 1, 1943.

Afrânio de Melo Franco: the consolidation of foreign policy strategy

Stanley Hilton

The telephone call on the night of October 24, 1930, made on behalf of the Army’s Chief of Staff, put an end to the voluntary asylum of Afrânio de Melo Franco in the Peruvian embassy, where he had taken refuge to escape police pursuit. Summoned to Catete Palace and invited that same night, by the military junta that had just deposed President Washington Luís, to accept the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Melo Franco agreed. A few days later, Getúlio Vargas, the leader of the victorious revolutionary forces, assumed power in Rio de Janeiro and, on organizing his Provisional Government (1930-1934), asked Melo Franco to remain at his post. A professed partisan of the movement that had overthrown the Old Republic, Melo Franco accepted the task and thus became the Chanceler da Revolução (“Foreign Minister of the Revolution”) in charge of Brazilian diplomacy during what was one of the most tumultuous periods of contemporary history. This would not be his first experience with challenges abroad – in the decade prior to the Revolution of 1930, he had participated closely in some of the most dramatic moments in Brazil’s diplomatic experience, earning an international reputation for his knowledge of law and talent as a negotiator and diplomat. The problems he would now face, however, would put all his qualities as a statesman to the test. His tenure at Itamaraty took place during the Great Depression, an era that saw the outbreak of the Chaco War and the Leticia conflict, Japan’s military conquest of Manchuria, which represented the initial phase of Tokyo’s imperialistic program in the Far East, and the rise to power of Adolf Hitler, an event that triggered a political crisis in the Old World that would result in the most catastrophic war in modern History. To complicate Melo Franco’s mission even more, sharp internal political divisions led to civil war in 1932 as the state of São Paulo rebelled against the Provisional Government. All of this, as well as the challenge of modernizing the country’s diplomatic apparatus, Melo Franco met with uncommon tact, firmness, and ability. And his services to Brazil would not end when his supervision of Itamaraty came to a close. With a new global conflagration imminent by the end of the decade, he was summoned to represent the country at the 8th Inter-American Conference in Lima; and, when World War II broke out and spread across the globe, he found himself presiding over the Inter-American Neutrality Committee. Melo Franco died in 1943, having contributed in a fundamental way, with his long public life, to the consolidation of the ideas and values that served as basis for Brazil’s foreign policy strategy.[161]

Diplomat of the First Republic

It was in July 1917, at the height of the Great War, that Melo Franco, at the request of President Venceslau Brás, carried out his first independent diplomatic mission. Seemingly only ceremonial – to represent the government at the inaugural ceremony of Bolivia’s new chief executive – the mission had a broader political dimension. Because of the conflict in Europe, there was considerable tension throughout the Western hemisphere. Since the beginning of the year, the United States, with the collaboration of Brazil, had been trying to mobilize Latin American support against Germany in the face of strong opposition from Argentina and Mexico. When the United States entered the war in April, after attacks on its merchant ships by German submarines, and Rio de Janeiro broke relations with Berlin, that campaign naturally became more intense. Argentina, in turn, immediately redoubled its efforts to forge a neutral Hispanic-American bloc.[162] The diplomatic battle, sharpened by the declarations of war by several American states, generated multiple political and legal problems, and Melo Franco, according to his instructions from Itamaraty, was to discuss the situation with his Hispanic American colleagues in the capitals he visited. More specifically, he was to endeavor to strengthen Rio de Janeiro’s bilateral dialogue with La Paz in the face of Argentine pressure on Bolivia.[163]

During the trip, both in interviews and speeches, Melo Franco made clear his personal sympathy, and that of Brazil, for the cause of the Allies – and also proclaimed his beliefs about the moral and ethical uniqueness of a hemisphere united around New World ideals. “This remarkable show of Pan-American solidarity,” he stated in a speech greeting the Bolivian president, “is all the more comforting and full of hopes the greater its contrast with the sinister picture our stupefied eyes behold on the battlefields of the Old World.”[164] With his public declarations, Melo Franco not only expressed his personal feelings, but also fulfilled his instructions by implicitly reminding officialdom and public opinion in Latin America that there was an alternative to Argentina’s neutralist and anti-United States policy – that of the solidarity with the sister country forced into war. As far as the second part of his mission was concerned, he was able to create an atmosphere of bilateral cordiality in La Paz that would redound to Brazil’s benefit during subsequent negotiations. In a broader sense, his contacts with various diplomats and South American leaders – the Argentine President Hipólito Irigoyen, for example – gave him a deeper understanding of Spanish America and deepened his conviction that détente with Argentina was indispensable. Once back in Rio de Janeiro, during a secret session of the Chamber of Deputies after Brazil’s declaration of war on Germany, Melo Franco used his influence to calm resentful passions arising from Argentina’s hesitant attitude toward the Pan-American movement led by the United States. The goal of the session was to examine Brazil’s military situation in light of the state of war and growing tensions in the Southern Cone. Designated to assess Brazil’s position vis-à-vis Argentina and other Spanish-American countries, Melo Franco sought to counterbalance the scaremongering of some of his colleagues by vigorously defending the need for greater efforts to strengthen Inter-American solidarity.[165]

Melo Franco subsequently found himself in the vortex of the two most controversial episodes of Brazilian foreign policy in the 1920’s[166] – the V Inter-American Conference in Santiago in 1923 and the withdrawal of Brazil from the League of Nations in 1926. The gathering at Santiago was the most controversial in the history of the Pan-American movement up to that point because of the heat-ed public debate over disarmament that occurred both before and during the Conference. Chancellor Felix Pacheco, seeking to avoid friction at Santiago, inadvertently played into the hands of Brazil’s adversaries when he proposed to the governments of Argentina and Chile a preliminary tripartite meeting hopefully to define a common position regarding disarmament.[167] Brazilian strategists believed not reasonably that the armed forces of a country should be proportional to its territory; a nation such as Brazil, with a coastline of more than 5,000 kilometers, needed a larger navy than it possessed. The lamentable state of the Brazilian military was an open secret at that time; in fact, General Maurice Gamelin, head of the French military mission to Brazil, had commented recently in a confidential report that Argentina spent four times as much as Brazil in the Armed Forces.[168] For the Brazilian leaders, therefore, it was unthinkable to agree to a reduction of armaments and Pacheco, in good faith and supported by Rui Barbosa, hoped that Argentina and Chile would form a united front with Brazil in that regard.[169] Pacheco’s démarche, however, was counterproductive: Chile accepted his invitation to a preliminary meeting, but, while the Buenos Aires press denounced Brazil’s alleged militaristic impulse, the Argentine government rejected the idea of tripartite talks, claiming that “brother countries might be resentful.” Thus, Melo Franco, who had been invited to lead the Brazilian delegation, arrived in Santiago in the middle of a diplomatic storm.[170]

His task was delicate: to prevent any restrictions on Brazil’s right to acquire the means of defense considered necessary and, at the same time, to counter intrigues and mitigate fears of a Brazilian military build-up. He arrived at the Chilean capital on March 24 and immediately sought out President Arturo Alessandri to emphasize Brazil’s peaceful intentions and warn him against what appeared to be an attempt to sabotage the Conference by certain Argentine sectors. The maximum concession that he could make, the Brazilian envoy indicated, was a general statement of principles along the lines of those already approved by the League of Nations and that took into account the individual security needs of each nation.[171] At the Conference the debates at times were heated, the friction palpable, and the tension constant. Brazil was the target of “acrimonious attacks” by the head of the Argentine delegation and the Buenos Aires press kept up its “campaign of virulent hostility” toward Brazil. The pressure on the Brazilian delegation was thus intense, but Melo Franco, a courteous, patient, affable man by nature, conducted himself, in the words of then Major Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, one of his military advisors, with “good judgment, conciliatory spirit and firmness.”[172] To counter the accusations of militarism levied against Brazil, he reminded the Spanish-American delegates that the country’s Constitution prohibited wars of conquest and that Brazil, moreover, had signed thirty arbitration agreements over the previous quarter of a century, those negotiated with neighboring Spanish-American countries being especially noteworthy. Moreover, of all the members of the sub-committee that drafted the final text of the so-called Gondra Pact, which reinforced arbitration as a means of avoiding armed conflicts, it was Melo Franco who most assiduously devoted himself to consensus-building; Brazil, furthermore, would be the first country to ratify it after its adoption at the Conference. Meanwhile, he had the satisfaction of achieving his main goal at Santiago: deflecting the debates away from the idea of making specific recommendations on armaments.[173]

The experience in Santiago left Melo Franco more impressed than ever by the Luso-Spanish dichotomy in America and thus reinforced in him the central conviction of Brazilian strategic thought, deepening his fears of even greater politicization and fragmentation of the Pan-American movement. “It is clear that the formation of a Hispanic-American bloc [...] can never be favorable for us,” he warned in a telegram to Pacheco on April 20. How could such a trend be fought? The key component of the national strategy was the use of diplomatic cordiality as an instrument of containment of Argentina; Melo Franco firmly embraced that line of action, which promised to help weaken Spanish-American suspicion toward Brazil. His enthusiastic support for the Gondra Pact was a calculated step in that direction; he also acted to prevent what might have been interpreted as a gesture of open discourtesy or resentment toward the Argentine government. According to Leitão de Carvalho, several other members of the Brazilian delegation, fearing that hostile elements in Buenos Aires might engage in patently unfriendly gestures toward Brazil when the group passed through on its return trip to Rio de Janeiro, urged Melo Franco to omit the customary stopover in that capital. Melo Franco decided against their recommendation,[174] not only because he thought it would be undignified, but because he did not want to miss an opportunity to try to dispel animosity arising from the debates in Santiago. Thus, when passing through Buenos Aires he had a friendly meeting with the Argentine president, Marcelo Torquato de Alvear, in which he made a point of emphasizing Brazil’s cordial sentiments toward Argentina. His efforts may have helped to facilitate management of bilateral friction, but Argentina held to its course of seeking to counter Brazil’s influence in the Southern Cone: in ensuing months newspapers in Buenos Aires continued to criticize Brazil’s alleged expansionist impulses, while the Alvear government pushed ahead with its own rearmament program that saw Argentine military expenditure reach unprecedented levels in the 1920’s.[175]

The diplomatic battle in Santiago was excellent preparation for Melo Franco’s next trial by fire. A few weeks after his return to Brazil, President Arthur Bernardes persuaded him to head the delegation to the IV Assembly of the League of Nations in September. After that first mission in Geneva in 1923, Melo Franco returned the following year as ambassador and occupied that position until mid-1926. Brazil had been a temporary member of its Council since its inception and the main objective of the Bernardes government was to obtain a permanent seat alongside the major powers, a position that would have increased Brazil’s international prestige and influence – and therefore would have strengthened the government domestically.[176] That goal, however, was unrealistic and the campaign undertaken to attain it was thus doomed to frustration. Brazil was the largest nation in Latin America and the only one that had participated directly, although on a much reduced scale, in World War I alongside the Allies. But it was an under-developed country, weak in both military and economic terms, and it could not legitimately claim to speak for Latin America, where Spanish-American governments tenaciously denied it that right. The reality of Brazils’s situation, both internally and within Latin America, thus ensured that the major European powers would not accept it as an equal player on the international stage.[177]

Melo Franco nonetheless made a made a supreme effort to garner votes for Brazil’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the Council. “I do not write much because I do not have time to do so, since I spend entire days working until 7 o’clock in the evening and sometimes much later. . . . ,” he commented in a rare letter to his mother.[178] In the 1923 session he addressed a memorandum to the other members of the Council proposing that two additional permanent seats be created for the United States and Germany and that, until those two countries joined the League, Brazil and Spain occupy the new positions. Because of Washington’s adamant refusal to join the international organization, Melo Franco’s proposal, if adopted, might be a way for Brazil to become a de facto permanent member. Any modification of the Council’s composition, however, would require amendment of the League’s Covenant, which in turn would depend on the unanimous vote of the Council – and the British government clearly stated its opposition to any such change. Melo Franco did succeed in obtaining Brazil’s reelection to another non-permanent term, but a special meeting of the heads of the Latin American delegations to discuss the subject revealed no change in their strong opposition to Brazil’s ambition to gain a permanent seat.[179]

Over the next two years, Melo Franco struggled unsuccessfully to convince his colleagues in Geneva of the legitimacy of Brazil’s claim.[180] For their part, the European nations that actually controlled the League were concerned almost exclusively with the Old World’s problems, demonstrating as a result a marked indifference toward Latin America. “I am not aware of any American interest whatsoever, of any continental problem of ours, that has appeared on the agendas of the sessions of the Council or of the Assembly,” Melo Franco noted. The “ignorance” of European leaders regarding Latin America, he thought, was almost total.[181]

The possibilities of Brazil’s being able to occupy a more prominent place within the League were thus almost non-existent as the Council early in 1926 prepared for a special session to decide on a request made by Germany to join the League and simultaneously gain a permanent seat on the Council created exclusively for it. Berlin’s démarche came as the result of an understanding reached by the major European countries at Locarno late in 1925; the aim of the so-called “Pact of Locarno” – in reality a series of agreements – was to stabilize the situation in Europe through border guarantees and the full reintegration of Germany into the political life of the continent. Implementation of the Pact depended on the creation of a permanent seat for that country on the Council, so broader issues underlay the determination of the European powers to impose that special arrangement in Geneva. Artur Bernardes, however, curiously saw in the admission of Germany an opportunity to insist on Brazil’s claim. If that effort failed, he was even willing to retaliate by exercising Brazil’s right as a member of the Council to veto German admission, even though it might have only temporary effect. Melo Franco, on the other hand, fully appreciated the wider political significance of Germany’s admission and its possible contribution to the maintenance of peace in Europe, so he warned Pacheco about the inconvenience of disrupting the process. “The use of the veto at this moment would probably result in the failure of the Pact of Locarno, in which mankind has put so much hope. . . ,” he stated on a telegram on February 20. “We would expose ourselves to a very unpleasant situation and to universal condemnation, if we took on that odious responsibility,” he argued one week later.[182] Bernardes nonetheless stubbornly maintained that Brazil would lose “international authority” if it acquiesced in a permanent seat for Germany alone. Thus, in the early part of March he sent through Itamaraty repeated instructions to Melo Franco to use the veto if Brazil did not receive a permanent seat as well.[183]

The period of the special session may have been the most arduous of Melo Franco’s diplomatic career. “I am so tired of the tough battle that I have been waging here for 12 days, working day and night, not resting even in the shelter of home . . . ,” he wrote to one of his sons at the end of the month. “I lived on nervous energy, without food, without sleep, without being able to go off alone, just to close my eyes and think.” The ambassador exhausted all his legal and ethical arguments with Council members, but they ended up closing ranks in favor of granting a permanent to Germany alone. Foreseeing diplomatic disaster, Melo Franco urged Bernardes to modify his instructions, remonstrating in a message on March 12 that it would be “a fatal mistake” to resort to the veto and thereby shoulder the “awesome responsibility” of jeopardizing the Locarno agreements, “when all other members of the Council shrink in the face of this very serious danger.”[184] The president paid no heed and adamantly insisted on a veto. What made Brazil’s defeat even more bitter was the attitude of the Hispanic American delegates. Demonstrating what Melo Franco labeled “thinly disguised hostility toward Brazil,” they not only expressed to the Council their disagreement with Brazil’s attitude, but sent a collective appeal to Bernardes asking him to withdraw the veto.[185] The final humiliation came when the Council, faced with Rio de Janeiro’s intransigence, set up a special committee to study a reorganization of its composition – in other words, to find a way to remove Brazil – and placed Argentina, which had just rejoined the League, on that committee. The beneficiary of Bernardes’s misguided diplomacy was thus, ironically, Brazil’s arch-rival. While the mainstream press in Buenos Aires condemned Brazil’s stand in Geneva, the Argentine representative on the special committee openly questioned Brazil’s qualifications to serve as spokesperson for Latin America. In view of Brazil’s diplomatic isolation in Geneva, Bernardes sent official notice in June that his country was withdrawing from the League of Nations.[186]

His experience in Geneva left a deep mark on Melo Franco. Hoping to protect what he could of Brazil’s reputation in Europe, he wanted no questions about the country’s trustworthiness to surface, so he reminded Otávio Mangabeira, who had replaced Pacheco at Itamaraty with the advent of the new government of Washington Luís, to make certain Brazil should make sure to fulfill promptly all its financial obligations when it closed its representation in Geneva. He also remained attentive to the work of the League of Nations and to European politics, corresponding occasionally with European politicians. He urged continued cooperation at some levels with the League, recommending to Mangabeira in February 1927, for example, that Brazil send a representative to a League-sponsored economic conference. But Melo Franco retained from his sojourn in Geneva if not resentment, at least greater reserve, toward Old World political leaders whose disinterest in Western Hemisphere issues seemed patent. In the absence of the United States and Brazil, the League of Nations would increasingly become a purely European institution, he predicted in a letter to Pacheco in 1929.[187] Given what he saw as a political abyss between Europe and America, Melo Franco returned to Brazil convinced that Brazil should redouble its efforts to promote Pan-American solidarity, maintain close cooperation with the United States, and, by extension, avoid European interference in the affairs of the American continent.

Foreign minister of the Revolution

The Revolution of 1930, which put an end to the so-called “Old Republic,” was the major watershed of Brazilian history, one that ushered in an era of political and administrative centralization as well as rapid economic and social change, all within the context of political turbulence at home and abroad. At his post in Itamaraty Palace, Melo Franco was not only a keen observer of those events, but he played an important role in decision-making with regard to many of them, helping to strengthen key elements in broad national strategy. In addition to his proven skill and experience in the diplomatic sphere, he enjoyed immense prestige in “revolutionary” circles. He had been a major figure in the negotiation of the political understanding between Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul that had resulted in the opposition candidacy of Getúlio Vargas, governor of the latter state, for the presidency in 1930 under the banner of the Liberal Alliance. When outgoing president Washington Luís attempted to impose his hand-picked successor, those two states, supported by democratic, reformist elements in other states, rose in rebellion in October 1930. João Neves da Fontoura, the main gaúcho political agent in Rio de Janeiro during the period preceding the uprising, credited Melo Franco with having seen early on that force would be necessary to end the oligarchical rule exemplified by the high-handed political tactics of Washington Luís. According to João Neves, Melo Franco had employed all of “his consummate diplomatic skill, his savoir-faire, his power of persuasion” in the service of that ideal. He gained additional prestige from the fact that his eldest son, Virgílio, was one of the main conspirators and a close friend of Oswaldo Aranha, the real organizer of the “Revolu-tion of October.” For the leaders of the Liberal Alliance, Melo Franco was “an inspiration, an arbiter, a source of wisdom, and at times a judge,” recalled Aranha, who joined him in Vargas’s cabinet and admired Melo Franco’s capacity for impartial judgment. Vargas wrote later that he had invited him to be foreign minister because of his international “moral projection” and proven diplomatic skill.[188] Indeed, the achievements and personal qualities of the sixty-year-old Melo Franco, did give the new government, in the eyes of international observers, a dimension of moral legitimacy that facilitated initial consolidation of the new regime.

Moral authority was necessary for the agenda Melo Franco set for himself and he intended to maintain it. One of his imme-diate goals was reform of Brazil’s diplomatic service and, to carry that out, he thought it particularly important that he maintain a line of ethical conduct that would place him above reproach. When his chef de cabinet Hildebrando Acioly wanted to place one of Melo Franco’s sons, who were diplomats, on the foreign minister’s staff, the latter quickly vetoed the idea. “I have really missed having one of you on my staff,” he admitted to them a few weeks after the Revolution, “but, to have the moral authority to carry out the tremendous responsibility that falls to me at this difficult time, I was forced to forego that measure.” If his projected reform should end up hurting their careers, he added, “your family name will be compensation for the service that, by chance, I may have rendered our country.”[189] His experience in Geneva years earlier had convinced him of the need for an administrative overhaul at Itamaraty – diplomatic functions, he had written in 1925, should not be “a simple decorative element for individual enjoyment” – and the inefficient, somewhat chaotic situation he found in 1930 was a decisive stimulus. “I intend to effect profound reforms in all services . . . ,” he stated in a private letter on December 2. “I will not make any exceptions, because that is the only way I will be respected.” He recognized the difficult nature of the task, but was determined. “I will not commit injustice, but I will not court popularity, because the period we are going through requires from everybody a sincere spirit of sacrifice and renunciation of any material interest.” The foreign minister’s “very conciliatory” attitude as he implanted his reforms made a lasting impression on young diplomats just beginning their careers, among them future foreign minister Vasco Leitão da Cunha, who was a second-secretary in 1930. “There was no persecution, he would not engage in anything like that,” Leitão da Cunha recalled.[190]

In attempting to carry out his reform program, which was designed to improve the efficiency of the diplomatic service, Melo Franco operated in an atmosphere of severe budget constraints. Vargas, worried constantly about the general financial disorder and wanting to avoid a suspension of payment on the foreign debt, more than once in the early weeks of the Provisional Government urged his foreign minister, as he did other members of his cabinet, to cut back on spending;[191] Melo Franco, predicting that he would find himself operating in “an ocean of hatred and resentment,”[192] was thus forced to impose painful retrenchment. He drafted decrees for Vargas to sign that dismissed excessive staff en masse and abolished all positions deemed not essential to the operation of consulates and diplomatic missions. In just two months, he was able to reduce Itamaraty’s expenditures by almost 21 percent and managed, “almost at the cost of his own blood,” to find new ways to save money in ensuing weeks. Even so, Itamaraty, like the other ministries, would continue to suffer pressure from the Finance Ministry to restrict spending even more.[193] Melo Franco had to struggle to persuade Vargas to authorize sending a delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference the following year. Such participation, the foreign minister remarked to the British ambassador, would be the “only luxury” that Itamaraty could afford at that time.[194]

It was, therefore, in the context of a constant effort to reduce expenses that Melo Franco sought to carry out the first major structural reform of Itamaraty since the mid-nineteenth century. Hopefully to end the tradition of friction and rivalry between the functionaries of the Secretariat of State, that is, those working at Itamaraty itself, and those serving abroad in consulates and in legations or embassies, and between the consular and diplomatic personnel, he planned to merge the three groups, or quadros, into a single, unified diplomatic service. This, he reasoned, would be an important step toward creating a corps of public servants – a “civic militia,” he privately called it – dedicated to the democratic ideals of the Revolution of 1930, imbued with a healthy nationalistic spirit, and equipped by intellect and training to defend national interests in the face of the multiple challenges of the modern world. In other words, as he told Aranha later, the reform had been intended to create “a seedbed for future heads of mission – ones trained in the realistic school of the industrial, economic and commercial competition of our times.” The preliminary purge caused by cost-cutting measures helped to prepare the ground. Mandatory retirement for age and length of service would be a way to open space for younger personnel at senior levels, and that measure was part of Decree-Law 19,592 of January 15, 1931[195], which implanted what became known as the “Melo Franco Reform.”

To complete the first stage of the merger of the three quadros, the decree-law created two mechanisms. The first was periodic rotation of personnel between posts abroad and at Itamaraty (Secretariat of State). Melo Franco wanted “maximum rotation” not only to enhance the professional competence of functionaries by giving them a broader outlook and deeper understanding of Itamaraty’s operations and requirements, but to eliminate gradually the cause of bureaucratic friction. Thus, the text of Article 16 stated that, “for all intents and purposes, the Secretariat of State becomes a ‘post’ for members of the diplomatic and consular Corps.” Melo Franco intended to get the program under way by first calling home the better-performing personnel from posts outside Brazil. The second mechanism was the transfer of functionaries from consular to diplomatic posts, and vice versa (Article 22). This represented a partial merger, with the complete unification to come at a future time after the “purge” of current personnel – that was the explanation he gave Vargas in an official report. The foreign minister was fully aware that the reform would not please everyone, but that did not affect his determination. “I am making the greatest sacrifices in order to be fair and impartial,” he commented to one of his sons. “I keep in mind not friends or enemies, but only Brazil and service to it.”[196]

In the realm of foreign policy per se, one of Melo Franco’s most significant and characteristic areas of action was his conciliatory intervention in the conflicts of the Chaco and Leticia. The goal of maintaining détente in the La Plata Basin and peace on the borders proved unattainable because of the volatility of the political situation. When he took office, the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaco region was already threatening to degenerate into war, and he quickly began searching for a conciliatory solution that would avoid armed conflict between the two neighboring countries.[197] Itamaraty participated in inter-American talks in Washington about the problem, suggested arbitration on more than one occasion, and advised Bolivian authorities to proceed with restraint, assuring them that Brazil “would make every effort to find a solution satisfactory to both sides.”[198] The two adversaries, however, resorted to arms in June 1932, creating a tense situation in the Southern Cone that caught Melo Franco with an agenda already full. In addition to normal administrative demands on his time, Vargas had asked him to chair a special committee to draft a new national Constitution, he faced special circumstances arising from the paulista revolt, and there was the Leticia problem. Still, he did everything he could for over a year to bring about a cease-fire between Bolivia and Paraguay, but, in the atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue that prevailed on the continent, his effort failed to bear fruit. Impressed by Melo Franco’s selfless, impartial diplomacy, the new American ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, Hugh Gibson, mentioned to the State Department in 1933 his admiration for the Brazilian diplomat, but he recognized that Melo Franco’s sincerity in seeking peace in the Chaco had not been matched by others involved in the process. Due to the lack of disinterested support, Melo Franco, after making a final attempt to secure arbitration of the conflict, abandoned the effort in October of that year.[199]

In the hope of putting an end to the bloody struggle and also improving Brazil’s strategic position in the heart of the continent, Melo Franco held out the lure of bilateral cooperation programs. Bolivia had been interested in closer ties with Brazil for some time, and, because of Paraguay’s marked economic dependence on Argentina, there were also influential sectors in that country interested in broader options. Building on the modest progress made by governments prior to 1930 in that sense, the foreign minister took advantage of the VII Inter-American Conference, held in Montevideo in December 1933, to take the matter up again. Since the lack of communications was one of the greatest obstacles to the expansion of Brazilian influence, the main project he had in mind was the construction of railways linking both neighbors to São Paulo. Rio de Janeiro had signed an agreement with La Paz in 1928 to finance construction of a railway between the Bolivian province of Santa Cruz and Brazilian territory; Melo Franco, in Montevideo, proposed to his Paraguayan colleague, among other bilateral projects, the construction of a railroad that would link Paraguay to São Paulo. In Itamaraty’s broader strategic view, São Paulo would become, at some point in the future, the center for the supply of industrial products to both neighboring countries, with all that such a situation would mean not only in commercial, but also in political and, therefore, strategic terms.[200] Even though Melo Franco did not achieve peace in the Chaco, his impartial efforts in that sense and the resumption of discussion about possible economic cooperation helped to pave the way for bilateral agreements with La Paz and Asunción at the end of the decade.

Simultaneously with the Chaco issue, Itamaraty faced an-other military crisis on its borders, this one between Colombia and Peru. The episode began when an armed Peruvian group seized the fluvial port of Leticia, which belonged to Colombia, in late August 1932. The Peruvian government ended up supporting the group, triggering conflict with Colombia. Once again issues of neutral rights and national security arose. The incursions of combatants into Brazilian territory were frequent; Vargas dispatched troops to the border area; and Melo Franco found himself striving to find a conciliatory solution, insisting at every turn on the need for Brazil to remain equidistant from both parties to the dispute. Explaining to Vargas that it was crucial for us “to take measures which put us above any suspicion of partiality for one side or the other,” he reported that he had asked the Army and Navy high-commands to “use great tact so as not to displease either of the belligerents.”[201] After nine months of war a special committee of the League of Nations, with which both the United States and Brazil collaborated, finally managed to secure a preliminary agreement stipulating that, while formal negotiations between the warring countries took place, a troika composed of Brazilian, American, and Spanish officers would administer the disputed territory. The Brazilian representative received instructions from Melo Franco to demonstrate “perfect impartiality” in his work.[202] The governments of Peru and Colombia subsequently agreed that Rio de Janeiro would host the peace talks so that the Brazilian foreign minister could oversee the negotiations.

Argentina presented a special problem for Brazil’s foreign relations. Throughout his public life, Melo Franco suffered one disappointment after another in his interaction with Argentine authorities – the experiences in Santiago and Geneva were particularly bitter ones – but even so he kept his sights firmly set, in large part for reasons of national security, on the need to persist in the effort to forge more harmonious relations with the historical adversary. He made a profession of faith in that regard in a letter he had written to Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1928, on the eve of the election that would take the former Argentine president back to the Casa Rosada. “Deeply convinced that Argentina is, among all the American nations, the one with which we have to make continent-wide policy . . . ,” he said, “I have made it one of the goals of my parliamentary life and of my activity as a citizen to preach the need for harmony and trust between Argentines and Brazilians. . . .” As chancellor, he sought to take advantage of every opportunity, no matter how small it seemed, to open cracks in the wall of prevention and suspicion that separated both countries. He thus gave full support to the idea of holding a Brazilian industrial exhibition in Buenos Aires, encouraged negotiation of a new bilateral trade agreement,[203] and persuaded Vargas to invite General Agustín Justo, president of Argentina, to visit Brazil, an initiative Melo Franco had been considering for some time to “help dispel mutual suspicions” – a phrase he used in a private letter. The drafting of an innocuous Antiwar Treaty by his Argentine counterpart, Carlos Saavedra Lamas, which Melo Franco made sure to praise on a circular telegram to Brazilian diplomatic missions, led him to take the subject up again, suggesting to the Argentine government that a presidential visit would be a perfect opportunity for Brazil to become the first country to sign that treaty, which condemned “wars of aggression” and called for arbitration of disputes. “I have always been in favor of a broad policy of understanding with Argentina...,” he had explained to the embassy in Buenos Aires and he now commented in a memorandum to the Argentine ambassador in Rio de Janeiro that Brazil’s formal endorsement of the pact during a state visit would be “a truly happy moment of their political history.” Lamas did not want to miss any opportunity to generate publicity for his treaty, so Buenos Aires accepted the invitation. The signing of the “Saavedra Lamas Pact” was, for President Justo and his foreign minister, the high point of the visit to Brazil in October 1933, where the new trade treaty and other agreements were also signed. Vargas was more than pleased with Melo Franco’s initiative and with the arrangements made by Itamaraty. “Everything went perfectly: the affectionate greeting, the spontaneous enthusiasm of the people, ... the brilliance of the official acts, the impact of the treaties and the good impression they made,” he wrote in his diary.[204]

While Melo Franco sought to improve bilateral relations with Argentina, create conditions for a strengthening of ties with Bolivia and Paraguay, and reestablish peace on the borders, he strove to cultivate special relations with the United States. That was precisely why the decision, for financial reasons, to give up the American naval mission was so painful. The Navy high command objected that naval instruction would be seriously degraded, and Melo Franco agreed completely, but, as he reported to the director of the School of Naval Warfare in December 1930, Vargas unfortunately remained “adamant” about the need to avoid the expense. In an apologetic letter to Edwin Morgan, the American ambassador, Melo Franco explained that the financial crisis was necessarily the “primordial and basic concern” of the government.[205] International circumstances at that time did not call for largescale bilateral initiatives, but Itamaraty, through diplomatic gestures and political coordination, sought to compensate for the unexpected setback in the naval sector. In an effort to coordinate diplomatic action, Melo Franco maintained frequent contact with Morgan and his successor, Hugh Gibson, during the Chaco crisis. The foreign minister welcomed the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt as president of the United States in early 1933 and became a profound admirer of the New Deal. “I know very well that the Washington assignment outweighs all others in importance and interest, especially now, when the vast program of economics and finance is being carried out... ,” he noted. Gibson, who was at his first South American post after several years in Europe, was impressed by the friendliness shown by Itamaraty and the Provisional Government and quickly came to view Brazil as a dedicated friend of the United States. “These strange people really seem to like us . . . ,” he commented in a letter to a friend. The signals of goodwill sent by Itamaraty were welcome in Washington, and Roosevelt, in conversation with Ambassador João Francisco de Assis Brasil, expressed “sincere interest” in Brazil, a country that naturally occupied a central place in the “Good Neighbor” policy and also represented a key partner in the liberal trade program that Roosevelt intended to launch. In order to meet Washington’s interest, Melo Franco ordered preliminary discussions for a new trade agreement with the United States.[206]

As far as Europe was concerned, Brazilian diplomacy dealt mainly with trade and foreign debt problems, avoiding any political involvement. The series of trade agreements that Itamaraty began negotiating in 1931 – it ultimately signed more than thirty – was designed primarily to revive commerce with the Old World. But the only politicalmilitary episode pertaining to Europe in which Brazil participated during Melo Franco’s tenure at Itamaraty was the Geneva Disarmament Conference, which began its sessions in February 1932. The foreign minister, with his realistic view of the problem and quite aware of the climate of opinion in Europe, was deeply skeptical about any contribution the Conference might make to international peace. “I do not think there will be any appreciable results,” he confessed to his son Afonso Arinos, who accompanied the delegation as its secretary, “but our duty was to attend and collaborate.” Melo Franco was well aware of the precariousness of Brazil’s means of national defense and, thus, to “collaborate” meant to insist on the right to acquire weapons. In consultation with military leaders, he had already turned down an invitation from the League of Nations to join a moratorium on arms purchases, and it was during the gathering in Geneva that Brazilian authorities completed their studies for a program of naval rearmament and Melo Franco began seeking possible suppliers abroad.[207] Aside from sending delegates to Geneva and cooperation with the special committee of the League of Nations in the case of Leticia, political interaction with Europe was minimal. Melo Franco not only made it clear in talks with British diplomats that Brazil was not interested in rejoining the League of Nations, but also resisted its interference in the Chaco question. In mid-1933 he even expressed to the Bolivian and the Paraguayan governments his “sadness” over the possibility that the inter-American system might not be able to solve a “peculiarly American” problem and have to hand it over to what was basically a European entity, a point he made to the American chargé d’affaires as well.[208]

There was another political influence coming from Europe that Itamaraty resisted tenaciously during this period: communism. The information that arrived from various European posts on the activities of the Third International (Communist), or Comintern, headquartered in Moscow, were somber and, in South America, the Communists appeared to be dangerously active, fomenting strikes and subversive movements in several countries. What was even more serious, the Comintern seemed to be channeling agents, weapons and funds to Brazil itself, its main target in the region. In that connection Melo Franco received constant news from the Brazilian diplomatic missions in neighboring countries about alleged movements of Luís Carlos Prestes, the former leader of the protest and reform movement in the 1920s known as tenentismo, who had converted to Marxism and who actually was not in South America at that time, but in Moscow where he was indeed developing plans for a revolution in Brazil. The information from abroad gained credibility, however, because of the abundant signs of Communist-sponsored agitation inside the country.

Melo Franco, therefore, took several steps to strengthen the cordon sanitaire that governments in the 1920s had tried to erect around Brazil in the face of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, with which Rio de Janeiro had broken relations in 1918. Itamaraty and the Federal District police developed an intensive exchange of information on subversive activities, Melo Franco helped forge an understanding between the Brazilian and Argentine police forces on anti-Communist cooperation, sought to interest the authorities in Montevideo in a similar service, and supported new restrictions on Russian immigration. He also firmly opposed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Kremlin and any direct trade with the USSR.[209]

The most arduous episode for Melo Franco as foreign minis-ter was undoubtedly the civil war unleashed in July 1932, when the state of São Paulo, with the aid of dissident military elements, rebelled against the Provisional Government, demanding an end to the dictatorship and immediate reconstitutionalization. Melo Franco believed sincerely in the cause of the Revolution of 1930 insofar as it promised to eliminate injustice in the political system and democratize it. The rebellion launched by São Paulo he saw as an attempt to restore the oligarchical practices of the Old Republic. He thus had no qualms about contributing to quell the uprising. Inevitably, the conflict created several areas of friction between federal authorities and foreign diplomatic missions, including the interruption of communications, the sea and air blockade, foreign involvement in the fighting, and damage to foreign property – all leading to inquiries, complaints, and even veiled threats, requiring constant attention, patience, and tact by the foreign minister and his aides.[210]

Melo Franco’s service at Itamaraty ended unexpectedly in December 1933. He was in Montevideo as head of delegation to the VII Inter-American Conference at the time of the denouement of the so-called caso mineiro, that is, the dispute over whom Vargas would appoint as federal interventor (governor) in the state of Minas Gerais. Virgílio de Melo Franco, backed by Oswaldo Aranha and several other leaders of the Revolution of 1930, was a candidate for that post and Vargas had given to understand that he intended to appoint the foreign minister’s son. He was, consequently, stunned when the dictator, to ensure himself control of that key state as part of his Machiavellian maneuvering to get himself elected under the new Constitution that was being debated, selected a politician with no significant support of his own in Minas Gerais, meaning that he would owe his position and authority to Vargas personally. Feeling betrayed, Melo Franco departed abruptly from the Conference, returned to Rio de Janeiro, and presented his resignation. In vain Vargas attempted to dissuade him. “Moral reasons that concern only me, but which I considered imperatives of conscience, forced me to leave the Government,” he commented in a letter to Acioly, his chef de cabinet.[211]

Final act and diplomatic legacy

Ironically, Melo Franco rendered one of his greatest services to peace in South America after leaving Itamaraty. Responding to repeated appeals, he agreed in January 1934 to broker the Leticia peace talks under way in Rio de Janeiro. The British ambassador, confessing his disappointment at no longer being able to count on the presence of Melo Franco at Itamaraty, referred to him in a message to London as the principal mediator for the troubled countries of South America. The fact that there had been little progress in the negotiations in Melo Franco’s absence seemed to confirm that judgment, which was one that Ambassador Gibson shared. As he explained to the State Department, Melo Franco was the “sole existing motive force” in the search for peace in the Leticia region. From his vantage point in Washington, Secretary of State Cordell Hull likewise concluded that only Melo Franco, with his “high sense of impartiality and justice”, could guide the negotiations to a successful conclusion. Late in May the governments of Colombia and Peru finally did accept the draft agreement prepared by the Brazilian diplomat, their representatives in Rio de Janeiro expressing, according to Gibson, “great satisfaction” with the tireless effort of Melo Franco, who had soldiered on despite family tragedy. “In spite of the death of a brother and a daughter during the critical period of the negotiations,” the ambassador commented, “it was largely on account of his patience, tact and resourcefulness that any agreement was concluded.”[212]

After the successful conclusion of the negotiations, which brought Melo Franco applause from the entire continent, he considered his long career in the diplomatic sphere over. “It’s now a place for younger men and my time has passed,” he said in a letter to his son Caio. Although he had gone into retirement, he was not forgotten; indeed, the possibility of an extraordinary capstone to that career now emerged. Five European and nine South American governments, including those of Colombia and Peru, announced support for his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, as did several cultural, academic and professional entities in various countries. Gibson, who personally thought that the former foreign minister more than deserved the honor, endeavored unsuccessfully to persuade the State Department to make an official endorsement. In the end, Melo Franco’s candidacy did not bring the result for which his friends and admirers had hoped.[213]

Melo Franco withdrew from national service at a moment when the global crisis was entering its critical stage. In the Far East Japan was continuing its imperialist expansion, starting a brutal war of conquest against China; Hitler’s regime openly began to rearm in 1935, disregarding the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles; Benito Mussolini unleashed war in East Africa by invading Ethiopia that fall; in March 1936 Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, in July the civil war broke out in Spain, which sparked the intervention of Germany and Italy in favor of the rebels; and, late that year, Berlin and Rome proclaimed the formation of the Axis, completing the ideological polarization of Europe. In March 1938, Hitler carried out his first territorial conquest by abruptly annexing Austria and immediately afterward launched a campaign of pressure on Czechoslovakia that culminated, in late September, in the infamous Munich Conference, at which France and England acquiesced in the dismemberment of that unfortunate Central European country by Germany. Although he had no official position at the time, Melo Franco attentively followed events, evincing in letters to family and friends a deep disgust for dictatorships, growing disillusionment with the major European powers in general, and the conviction that the appeasement policy adopted by London and Paris toward Hitler would end up being counterproductive.[214]

With war clouds gathering over Europe, the government once again summoned Melo Franco to service. His friend Oswaldo Aranha became foreign minister in 1938, representing the liberal current in the Estado Novo, the dictatorial regime erected by Vargas and the military high command in November 1937, and he wanted Melo Franco to head the delegation to the VIII InterAmerican Conference, scheduled for December in Lima to study Pan-American cooperation in case war broke out in Europe. Despite the rigors of travel to that Andean capital, the elderly diplomat accepted and met with a warm reception by the Peruvian people and authorities, who, in a series of banquets, paid tribute to the mediator of their dispute with Colombia. Melo Franco was elected chairman of the main committee at the Conference, that of Peace Organization, charged with drafting the text of the most important resolution of the conclave, one dealing with continental solidarity in case of extra-Hemispheric war. Due to Argentine obstructionism, debate over the text of the draft proved time-consuming, but Melo Franco once again effectively played the role of mediator. In order to appease the Argentines and thus show to the world at least a façade of hemispheric unity, the final resolution on inter-American consultation in the event of a threat to the Hemisphere made such consultation voluntary, rather than mandatory.[215]

International tension continued to increase in the coming months and, as Melo Franco’s pessimism deepened regarding European leadership – that “half-dozen crazed fools fellows who presently govern the decrepit European continent” was how he privately described it in February 1939 – , his PanAmerican convictions grew stronger, out of both idealism and national security considerations. “Because of all that,” he noted in a letter to Acioly, now ambassador to the Vatican, “each day I cling more and more to the idea of strengthening our solidarity in the Americas, because this continent is the refuge of peace.”[216] The long-feared conflict broke out in September, when Hitler set in motion the invasion of Poland, provoking declarations of war on Germany by Great Britain and France. Late that month representatives of the Pan-American countries gathered in Panama, where they announced the creation of a neutrality zone around the Hemisphere and established an Inter-American Neutrality Committee to examine the multiple issues arising from the war in Europe. The logical choice for the Brazilian representative on the committee was Melo Franco; the logical place for its headquarters, given Brazil’s strategic significance and its devotion to the hemispherical solidarity, was Rio de Janeiro. At the inaugural session of the Committee in January 1940, Melo Franco was elected chairman by acclamation.

During the period of hemispheric neutrality (1939-1941) two things dominated Melo Franco’s intimate thoughts: the hope that the Americas could escape direct involvement in the war, and, above all, his faith in Pan-American solidarity. “I am absolutely convinced that the unity of the Americas is the basis of happiness for its people and the most powerful force for universal peace,” he said in a letter to his son Afrânio in March 1940, the eve of the Blitzkrieg against Western Europe.[217] One year later, while half of Europe subjugated by the Third Reich, the Luftwaffe bombed British cities, the war at sea became increasingly destructive, and Hitler opened a new battlefront in Southeast Europe, Melo Franco once again stated his conviction that the American nations would find their salvation in pulling together. “Europe is again under the darkness of the Middle Ages...,” he pondered in a letter to Acioly. “So let’s turn our sights to the Americas, because only here can peace prevail.”[218] International circumstances would not allow the permanent isolation of the Hemisphere from the war, but even during the rapid march of the United States towards belligerency in 1941, which progressively eliminated options for the Latin American countries, Melo Franco worked assiduously as chairman of the Neutrality Committee to ensure that the American community marched together as much as possible.[219]

The Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, led to the outcome that Melo Franco had anticipated for some time. Now that the United States had become a formal belligerent – Hitler, in solidarity with Japan, declared war on that country on the 11th – most Latin-American nations either broke relations with the aggressor and its European allies or declared war on them. Late in January 1942, a special inter-American conference convened in Rio de Janeiro to define a common hemispheric position in view of the belligerency of the United States. Once again, the Argentine government was able to block more decisive action and the Conference merely recommended that those countries that still maintained diplomatic relations with the Axis sever them. On the last day of the Conference, Foreign Minister Aranha dramatically announced that Brazil was also breaking its official ties with Tokyo, Berlin and Rome. Melo Franco, lauded by the plenary for the work of his Committee, saw it transformed into the Inter-American Juridical Committee with much broader tasks. In the following months, while Brazil moved rapidly towards belligerency, that diplomat par excellence devoted himself to the coordination of what would be his last legal study: a preliminary examination of postwar problems, which he completed in September 1942. Three months later he suffered a heart attack and, in the early hours of January 1, 1943, he passed away. Getúlio Vargas paid final tribute to him by decreeing a three-day period of official mourning and extending to him the honors of a Minister of State. High authorities of the entire continent expressed their grief, especially those of Bolivia and Peru, but it was felt in all American Governments – and also authorities and entities in European countries that still enjoyed enough freedom to allow such demonstrations.[220]

Melo Franco, one of the major figures of Brazilian and inter-American diplomacy, was a profound student of International Law and his expertise in that field was widely recognized by the international community. But he was not a theorist of international relations and he left no collection of writings on the subject. What, therefore, was his influence on the set of ideas that governed Brazilian diplomacy? Conclusions in that regard emerge from assessment of his actions. During the Rio Branco period, that is, during the time Melo Franco was beginning his career in the Chamber of Deputies, Brazilian leaders adopted a foreign policy strategy that originated in a perception of external threat that varied in intensity, but was permanent. Argentina was the main source of that perception, although trends in European policy also periodically represented, in the eyes of the Brazilian elite, an actual or potential threat. The image of Argentina as a country hostile to Brazil was a permanent element in the Brazilian worldview, one that resulted from the historic division of South America into two areas: Spanish and Portuguese America. For Brazilian leaders, Argentina’s strategic goal was the resurrection in modern form of the old Viceroyalty of Plata through expansion of its influence over neighboring Spanish-American countries and the progressive isolation of Brazil.

To counter that general threat, the strategy adopted by Rio de Janeiro consisted of six basic components: (1) the peaceful settlement of disputes through diplomacy or arbitration; (2) the strengthening of Pan-American solidarity; (3) diplomatic containment of Argentina through the use of official cordiality and the intensification expansion of bilateral trade; (4) the expansion of Brazilian influence in other countries of the La Plata Basin, especially in Bolivia and Paraguay, to counterbalance the influence of Buenos Aires; (5) a special relationship with the United States, based on similar historical experiences vis-à-vis Spanish America, economic complementarity and commercial dependence, and potential assistance in time of war; and (6) increased militaryindustrial capacity.[221] Brazil was not an imperialist country and had no territorial ambitions; its strategy, therefore, was a defensive one with one fundamental goal: to maintain peace in the Southern Hemisphere.

The development of a doctrine, either diplomatic or military, begins with the study of the past, of previous experiences, and the assessment of the current situation, in order to define both the problems and the challenges. There may be a dose of theory in the calculations, but, generally, the more pragmatic the conclusions about the course of action, the better. The strategy formulated in the early twentieth century was highly pragmatic, but it did not have the character of a doctrine. It was not set down in any document. It was not the result of a debate about its components by a National Security Council (which did not exist at that time). It emerged from historical experience, analysis of national problems and vulnerabilities, the attentive observation of hemispheric and transatlantic politics – and from simple common sense. It would be only in the application of this strategy to concrete situations, and in the evaluation and reevaluation of the results obtained, that its components would be gradually solidified and institutionalized as doctrine. It was in this process that Melo Franco contributed in a significant way to Brazilian “diplomatic thought.”

It is important to emphasize that his diplomatic career began in the period when the components of national strategy and their character as an integrated plan of action had not yet acquired a well-defined profile. Thus, Melo Franco’s profound knowledge of international law, his observation of international politics in general, his scrutiny of the positions taken by South American governments on various issues involving Brazilian interests, and his personal experience in negotiations, especially with Hispanic American diplomats, contributed to the consolidation of that strategy even before he became foreign minister. During the period between 1930 and 1933, when he possessed a considerable degree of autonomy in decision- making, he was able to apply that strategy to its fullest and deliver it consolidated to his successors.

The historian discovers in the diplomatic activities of Melo Franco a reflection of that strategy, point by point, mainly the political ones, and of the thought that underlay it. His dedication to the peaceful solution of the disputes was a function not only of his deep attachment to the law, but also of reasons of State and of his personality – factors exemplified in his performance before 1930, especially in Santiago. As foreign minister, he made an extraordinary personal effort to avoid war over the Chaco and Leticia, maintaining the strictest impartiality while he sought solutions that were acceptable to both sides in those disputes. His disinterested and generous performance greatly increased Itamaraty’s prestige and the reputation that he personally enjoyed in the international community – to such an extent that, after leaving Itamaraty, he was urged to continue, as a private citizen, his effort to mediate the Colombian-Peruvian dispute, managing to conclude a peace agreement applauded by both belligerents.

Melo Franco’s interest in the restoration of harmony between neighboring countries was part of a broader policy of promoting inter-American solidarity whenever possible as a means of better ensuring peace. The goal of his first diplomatic mission, in 1917, was precisely that: to promote greater Pan-American cooperation at a time of growing tension within the hemisphere. Despite the difficulties often found when seeking to strengthen Brazil’s ties with Spanish-American countries, Melo Franco devoted himself body and soul to that task in ensuing years. The unpleasant experience in Santiago in 1923 did not discourage him, nor did the disappointing episode in Geneva. After 1926 he remained a champion of the policy of Inter-American unity, consistently advocating American solutions to American problems, without the intrusion of European governments or entities. His opposition to the involvement of the League of Nations in the political and military crises in South America in the 1930 was the logical consequence of that attitude. In face of the global turmoil of that time, Melo Franco believed that Inter-American solidarity was the only means of protecting the Western Hemisphere against the contagion of war. At the Lima Conference in December 1938 he had to use all his talent as a conciliator and mediator to avoid public disruption of hemispheric unity, and, with the outbreak of war in 1939, his dedication to Pan-Americanism became even more intense.

Cultivating a cordial relationship with Argentina as a means of keeping bilateral friction within manageable limits was an indispensable part of the national strategy. Whether in Santiago or Geneva, while at Itamaraty or in Lima, and in spite of all the disappointment, Melo Franco sought to dispel suspicions, demonstrate good-will, and maintain or lay the foundations for greater bilateral cooperation. Preserving détente in the La Plata basin was a primary mission and, if there had been no financial crisis, the Chaco War, and the paulista rebellion, Melo Franco, as foreign minister, undoubtedly would have attempted to do a great deal more to improve relations with Argentina. He and his colleagues in the government understood the value of trade as a means of mitigating political differences, which helps explain the support given to the idea of a Brazilian industrial exhibition in Buenos Aires and the negotiation of a new trade agreement. During World War II, there was a tremendous surge in the exports of Brazilian manufactures to Argentina,[222] which was partly the result of the discussions that had led to the modest initiatives taken by Itamaraty during his tenure there.

Initiatives to draw Bolivia and Paraguay closer to Brazil were partly due to a purely commercial interest, but they also represented a logical part in the strategic machinery – a complement to the pursuit of Pan-American solidarity and to the efforts to moderate the anti-Brazilian thrust of Argentine policy. Once again the financial crisis and the Chaco conflict prevented greater initiatives in the period when Melo Franco headed Itamaraty, but his personal effort to reconcile both neighbor nations and plans for economic cooperation once the dispute over the Chaco ended was a clear sign of Brazilian interest in creating the bases for more beneficial relations in the future. It bears repeating that Itamaraty, at that moment, helped to sharpen the profile of an image of Brazil as the industrial center of the Southern Cone – a vision that led to several steps in following years to make it a reality.[223]

As for the special relationship with the United States, it existed much more in Brazilian thought than in reality. The fact is that Washington attached importance to it only in moments of crisis – thus during the World War II there was a true special relationship.[224] As a component of the national strategy, however, it progressively lost its salience in the post-war period as Brazilian frustration grew due to the lack of genuine correspondence from Washington. That, however, belonged to an unforeseeable future; for Melo Franco’s generation, the need to strive for a special relationship with the United States was an article of faith. In the difficult circumstances he faced as foreign minister, Melo Franco did his best to maintain close and especially cordial contacts with the United States embassy, working as much as possible in harmony with it during the Chaco and Leticia episodes; and, in view of the interest shown by Washington, he ordered preliminary negotiations for a new bilateral trade treaty that was eventually signed in 1935. The Lima Conference in 1938 provided a special opportunity for him to demonstrate to American diplomats the value of close cooperation with Brazil. Secretary of State Hull, who headed the American delegation, wrote in his memoirs that the talks in Lima with the Argentines had been “among the most difficult” of his career; on the other hand, according to Hull, Melo Franco “worked with me 100 per cent.”[225]

Melo Franco helped to define the national strategy and, as foreign minister, he consolidated its components, thus giving direction to Brazil’s foreign policy for the next quarter of a century. None of his successors in charge of Itamaraty and none of the chief executives whom they served thought seriously of modifying that strategy – until the Juscelino Kubitschek administration (1956-1961). During that period, policy-makers finally reached the conclusion, dictated by facts that had been obvious for a long time and especially since the end of World War II, that Washington was not interested in a special relationship with Brazil, as the latter conceived it, and it did not intend to provide economic and military aid of the kind and quantity sought by Brazil and proportional to the services it had rendered to the United States. Therefore, they argued, Brazil should abandon the effort in favor of the special relationship, desist from seeking the role of intermediary between Washington and the Spanish-American countries of South America, and, instead, ally itself with those countries to form a South American bloc vis-à-vis the United States for the purpose of increasing the region’s bargaining power.[226] Ironically, the decades of Brazil’s diplomacy of continental fraternity, such as Melo Franco had followed, facilitated that extraordinary shift.

The diplomatic activities of Afrânio de Melo Franco, especially during the period when he headed the Itamaraty, contributed significantly for the consolidation of “diplomatic thought” – the amalgam of ideas, images, perceptions, expectations, suspicions and hopes that produced a worldview shared by the Brazilian foreign policy elite and that led to the formulation of a well-defined, pragmatic, coherent strategy that served the interests of the country admirably during a time of dangerous international transformations. As he confronted, as foreign minister, the multiple external challenges of his time, Melo Franco did not ignore the human element in the diplomatic equation. He thus pursued, within Itamaraty, a goal he considered crucial: the formation of diplomats with a broader vision, with more varied experiences, and imbued with a collective spirit. His eyes always on the future, he began his reform of Itamaraty by gathering around him functionaries who had demonstrated superior capability and a keen sense of duty to create “a sort of general staff for our future peaceful Army at the service of Foreign Affairs”, as he stated in 1931. The goal of the reform initiated that year was to train a new generation of diplomats who were capable of meeting the demands of the modern world, regardless of how difficult the circumstances might be. After all, as Melo Franco once pondered, diplomats “should be considered a kind of military, since they also are charged with defense of the Fatherland abroad.”[227]

Bibliography

Unpublished sources:

ARANHA, Oswaldo G. Archive. CPDOC. Getúlio Vargas Fundation. Rio de Janeiro.

ACIOLY, Hildebrando. Archive (private). Rio de Janeiro.

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GIBSON, Hugh. Papers. Hoover Institute. Stanford University. Palo Alto, California.

GREAT BRITAIN. Foreign Office. Records. Public Records Office. Kew, Great Britain.

MACEDO SOARES, José Carlos de. Archive. Brazilian Historic and Geographical Institute. Rio de Janeiro.

MANGABEIRA, Otávio. Archive (private). Rio de Janeiro.

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MELO FRANCO FILHO, Afrânio de. Archive (private). Rio de Janeiro.

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PACHECO, Felix. Archive (private). Rio de Janeiro.

PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA. Archive. National Archive. Rio de Janeiro.

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BRASIL. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Circulares 1930-1939. In: “A Versão Oficial, Parte VI”, Cadernos do CHDD, Ano V, Num. 9 (2° Semestre, 2006).

______. ______. Relatório Apresentado ao Chefe do Governo Provisório [...] Anno de 1931. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1934.

CARVALHO, Estevão Leitão de. Memórias de um Soldado Legalista, Tomo II, [...], Atividades Diplomático-Militares (Rio de Janeiro, 1962).

CORRÊA DA COSTA, Sérgio. A Diplomacia Brasileira na Questão de Letícia. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1942.

CORRÊA DO LAGO, Luiz Aranha. Oswaldo Aranha: O Rio Grande e a Revolução de 1930; Um Político Gaúcho na República Velha. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1996.

DORATIOTO, Francisco. Relações Brasil-Paraguai: Afastamento, Tensões e Reaproximação 1889-1954. Brasília: FUNAG, 2012.

FONTOURA, João Neves da. Memórias, Volume II, A Aliança Liberal e a Revolução de 1930. Rio de Janeiro, 1963.

GARCIA, Eugênio Vargas. O Brasil e a Liga das Nações, 1919-1926: Vencer ou Não Perder. Porto Alegre/Brasília: Editora da UFRGS/FUNAG, 2000.

______. Entre América e Europa: A Política Externa Brasileira na Década de 1920. Brasília: Editora UnB/FUNAG, 2006.

HILTON, Stanley E. Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939: The Politics of Trade Rivalry. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1975.

______. “Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930-1945: A Reappraisal of His Attitude Toward Industrialization and Planning.” Journal of Economic History 35 (December 1975): 754-778.

______. “Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro ‘Axis’ During the World War II Era.” Hispanic American Historical Review 59 (May 1979): 201-231

______. “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World: Elite Images and Foreign Policy Strategy, 1919-1929.” Journal of Latin American Studies 12 (November, 1980): 341-364.

______. “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship.” Journal of American History 68 (December 1981): 599-624.

______. A Guerra Civil Brasileira: História da Revolução Constitucionalista de 1932. Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Nova Fronteira, 1982.

______. “The Armed Forces and Industrialists in Modern Brazil: The Drive for Military Autonomy (1889-1954).” Hispanic American Historical Review 62 (November 1982): 629-673.

______. Rebelião Vermelha: A Intentona Comunista (1935) da Perspectiva de 50 anos. Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1985.

______. “Latin America and Western Europe, 1880-1945: The Political Dimension.” In Wolf Grabendorff e Riordan Roett, eds. Latin America, Western Europe and the United States: Reevaluating the Atlantic Triangle. New York, 1985.

______. “The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy.” Political Science Quarterly 100 (Spring 1985): 27-52.

______. Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917-1947. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991.

______. Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia. Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Objetiva, 1994.

HULL, Cordell. Memoirs. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1948.

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MELO FRANCO, Afonso Arinos de. Um Estadista da República (Afrânio de Melo Franco e seu tempo). 3 vols. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1955.

MELO FRANCO, Afrânio de. Brazil’s Declaration of Principles [...] April 21st, 1923. Rio de Janeiro, 1923.

______. Episódios da História Internacional Recente. Rio de Janeiro: s.ed., 1941.

OLIVEIRA CASTRO, Flávio Mendes de. Dois Séculos de História da Organização do Itamaraty (1808-2008), Volume I. Brasília: FUNAG, 2009.

PINHEIRO, Paulo Sérgio. Estratégias da Ilusão: A Revolução Mundial e o Brasil, 1922-1935. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991.

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ROSENBERG, Emily S. “World War I and ‘Continental Solidarity’.” The Americas 31 (January 1975): 313-327.

TEIXEIRA SOARES, Álvaro. Afrânio de Melo Franco: Diplomata e Internacionalista. Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1970.

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______. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1934. 5 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951.

VARGAS, Getúlio Dornelles. Diário. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1995.

PART III

The State reform and the modernization of diplomacy

Introduction to foreign policy and to the diplomatic ideas of modern Brazil

Eiiti Sato

The essays written in this part of the book refer to a period which spars over two decades remarkably plagued by turbulence and significant changes in the international order. Approximately 2,500 years ago, Thucydides started his History of the Peloponnesian War by saying that, “the Athenian Thucydides wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning from the first signs expecting that it would be bigger and more important than all the previous ones [...]”.[228] Since then, many other authors, somehow, repeated such a feeling that the time which one lives in is always the most complex and the most crucial. In many respects, however, Thucydides was right since, in fact, the war between the Athenian League and Sparta’s allies was decisive for the decline, until the complete collapse of that world of City-States that formed classical Greece, which left to us the huge cultural heritage we learned to admire so much. Indeed we can say something similar about the period between the late 1930’s and the early 1960’s, which is the period covered by this part of the book. It was a time marked by lots of events and changes that produced a truly new world, with many unprecedented elements in history that reflected both in the content and in the form of doing diplomacy.

Brazilian foreign relations in a changing world

In the late 1930’s, the nations were still trying to find a way out of the Great Depression when the world was plunged into World War II. Then there was a period of reconstruction which brought about completely new initiatives in international relations, such as the Marshall Plan and the creation of the European Communities. The post-war period also witnessed the emergence of the phenomenon of a bipolarized world around opposing ideologies and where the power poles were no longer in the hands of the traditional European powers. By the end of the war, there was an international hierarchy in which, at the top, were the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain – the Big Three – the three powers that effectively commanded the arrangements of Yalta, Potsdam and San Francisco. However, only ten years later, the Suez crisis, of the mid-1950s, soon exposed the British inability to continue to be an actual global power. At the same time, the decolonization process in Africa and in Asia advanced quickly bringing along dozens of new nations with demands and values that substantially increased the complexity of the international order; not to mention the advent of the nuclear age in the field of international security and the incorporation of multilateralism as inherent components of the forms of doing diplomacy.

Those developments, among many other changes which were not mentioned, turned the period into an “interesting time” in the sense referred to by the Ancient Chinese wisdom: a time of change, novelties and many uncertainties, anxieties, and anguish. It became very difficult for the national governments to accompany the frenzy succession of new realities and untold initiatives in the international sphere. International integration intensified, but the national economic and political institutions still were not acquainted to multilateralism and to the coexistence with more structured international regimes. As a matter of fact, most of the acting rulers and diplomats were from a generation trained within a political culture in which the perceptions of the Victorian era, focused on permanence and stable instituitions, had not completely disappeared yet. Thus, the ministeries of foreign affairs had much difficulty to understand the most important outlines of a changing international order.

Today, having in our favor the passage of time, which consolidated tendencies, transformed the facts into history and, especially, without the need to make decisions on the verge of events, we can analyze and identify the place that Brazil actually occupied in those times of change. The reading of the essays of this part of the book can lead us to understand that two developments were particularly important in defining the Brazilian diplomatic concerns. On the one hand, the introduction of new elements in international relations, such as the recognition of the prominent role of economic diplomacy, multilateralism and diversification of diplomatic partnerships. On the other hand, substantial domestic changes of the economic and political life of Brazil which increasingly sought modernization as a goal to be pursued with eagerness. The texts of this part of the book focus on the responses of the Brazilian diplomacy, but they show that there was such a widespread effort among other nations too, which, regardless of their international status, needed to adjust their national institutions to more political and economic developments, which showed themselves increasingly integrated in international terms.

Indeed, the range of the new weapons became wider and able to reach targets thousands of kilometers away, turned the problem of investment in security into an issue impossible to be addressed only from the point of view of the strict limits of the geographical frontiers of sovereign nations. In the sphere of the economy and society, the notion of wealth and welfare of nations was becoming more connected with life and with the interests of other nations through trade. Furthermore, the advances in information technology and transport, led the individual and collective as-pirations and demands to have increasingly intense connections with the way of life of other societies. Thus, everywhere, authorities were trying to find new ways to organize the State, both in terms of the instruments to collect resources and the mechanisms to use those resources for goals that disseminated internationally, such as the promotion of wealth and the supply of services directed towards welfare and social security. In this context, the diplomatic agenda and the ways of conducting foreign relations changed considerably. Brazilian diplomacy – like in all other nations – had before it, the difficult task of adapting appropriately to that new emerging reality while it took initiatives to cope with the demands of the events that unfolded unexpectedly in the context of international relations.

The portrait of an era through its characters

In the general presentation of this work, both the form and the goals of the texts gathered here were already made explicit. However, it seems important to emphasize some aspects to understand better this set of characters whose actions were developed between the late 1930’s and the early 1960’s. The general purpose of the book is to bring together the experience and views of diplomats, scholars, and of those who have played a relevant role in the study and implementation of the Brazilian foreign policy. Such an approach, based on what the most relevant players saw and thought, allows us to observe developments in foreign policy not only from the point of view of political circumstances and conditions of each moment, but also to observe certain elements, such as the human factor, which are often decisive though imponderable for the outcomes of a crisis or for the product that results from the controversies that occurred in the context of an international conference.

The present compilation may complement and even help to better understand other works such as the now classic História da Política Exterior do Brasil, by Amado Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, which presents an overview of the Brazilian foreign policy since the country became an independent nation in the international scenario.[229] It also complements works such as the one organized by J. A. Guilhon Albuquerque entitled Sessenta Anos de Política Externa Brasileira: 1930-1990 in which several scholars present their thematic views, that is, issues and problems that, over the chosen period, occupied the attention of the rulers and designers of the Brazilian foreign policy.[230] We can also say the same thing about the numerous works and authors who addressed specific Brazilian foreign policy themes, such as the issue of atomic energy, economic development and regional cooperation or even of the Brazilian relations with a certain country or group of countries.

In the beginning the organizers of this panoramic view of Brazilian foreign policy intended to establish standards and editorial rules that should provide homogeneity to the texts. However, when the first texts began to arrive in the hands of the editorial committee that idea began to shake. Indeed, the first reaction was to ask the authors to review their essays to accommodate them to the editorial established standards in the work’s original idea, but upon reading the texts, it became clear that much of the information and observations brought were too interesting to be excluded, and thus it was realized that in many respects, to homogenize, implied, not only hurting the style of their authors, but to a certain extent, even impoverishing the character’s presentation. In fact, the organizers realized that to look at the Brazilian foreign policy by means of the thought and of the deeds of those who acted in it or influenced it in a prominent manner, meant bringing to the reader a true mosaic of moments and views in which the variety of styles and approaches was also a way to reflect on a period of time studied, with its characters and its own idiosyncrasies.

Among various characters which are portrayed in this book much has already been written, while about others, even though important, there is relatively little written although their passage through the paths of Brazilian diplomacy was striking despite the discretion, as the conditions and circumstances of the moment required. In such a mosaic, one can identify some relatively obvious virtues, common to those characters, such as the concern with the building of a good image of the country, but each moment in history demanded different attitudes by her diplomats and by those who acted in instances where Brazil was represented. A remarkable quality, present in all characters portrayed, especially in an environment of great changes, is the discernment. Good discernment is a quality easy to be verbalized but hard to be actually practiced. In diplomacy it is crucial to have the capacity for both small and large-scale actions. As Monsieur de Callières, who had served Louis XIV in several diplomatic missions, used to state, to register the events as they actually happen and, especially, to understand properly their meanings is a talent that not even the most powerful Prince can neglect. According to Callières, that talent allows you to build good alliances and to prevent the Kingdom against the formation of hostile articulations.[231] Two centuries after Louis XIV, the wars were no longer an ordinary fact for most nations, but they became more destructive and many new forms of international interaction emerged leading the national segurity and the interests of the societies to depend on the forces in action within the international reality, thus reinforcing the importance of discernment as a core virtue to diplomacy.

One can say that two developments that took place after World War II in the sphere of international relations were remarkably important to reinforce the role of the ability of discernment for diplomacy: the speed of the changes and the access to increasing amounts of information. As it has been already mentioned, when change became an intrinsic component of the international order, it brought about the constant concerns about the future, turning it less distant and more unpredictable. On the other hand, the access to increasing amounts of information also led to increasing difficulties, among so much data and information, to select and capture accurately what is, in fact, relevant to Brazil. In this way, discernment became a virtue even more valued and desired, both to carry out personal life undertakings and to run public affairs.

Some characters were important not because they had accomplished any deed that changed the course of Brazilian diplomacy, but because they understood that good policy is not always made up of noisy and sounding initiatives to the public. Understanding their own time is not an easy task and it is even harder to translate such understanding into decisions and actions, considering that a nation becomes powerful when it can hold its course with persistence and steadiness when facing adverse situations. Even though the attention will always go back to the times when a defiant posture or a bold initiative was necessary, diplomacy is a much more complex activity and, although sometimes it is necessary to find out new courses of action, there are also circumstances in which discretion, persistence and even cold blood are the required qualities. The novel writer C. Virgil Gheorghiu used to say that the true man is not in the acts and in the heroic moments. One must seek the true man in the calmness, in the simplicity of what he does in his daily life.[232] According to Gheorghiu the heroic act is actually an undesirable accident, sometimes needed just before “interesting times”, which the Chinese actually considered a curse.

Using a metaphor, one can say that the organizers’ option was to prefer to let authors choose vehicles that seemed more appropriate to go through the path of the Brazilian foreign policy made up sometimes of plains, rough terrain and sometimes slightly firm and even wetlands. In other words, the set of essays could not be different from the reality, which is always varied and often paradoxical, bringing together elements of harmony and homogeneity with the diversity that characterize humanity. Furthermore considering that most readers of this book are students and professionals well acquainted to international politics, the reader must also contribute using his sensitivity and patience to take into account the circumstances, the style and the peculiarities of each contribution.

Diplomats and non-diplomats: thinking about Brazilian foreign relations

As the reader will notice, the idea of discussing the Brazilian diplomatic thought does not imply the notion that, at some point, there would have been a perfectly structured and articulated view about what foreign policy is or how the Brazilian foreign relations ought to be. The understanding, implicit in the collection of essays is that over time, there has always been, to a greater or lesser extent, a concern to establish broader purposes and also to turn the course of diplomatic actions more organic. Accordingly, by way of introduction, it might be interesting to draw attention to a few remarkable facts of the period, which appear in the collection of texts.

In that period, there was an increasing engagement of influential figures in Brazilian diplomacy who were not career diplomats or Chancellors, and even without ever occupying leadership positions in permanent missions. Helio Jaguaribe, for example, stands out for the growing importance of the Brazilian intellectual world’s initiatives, which started not only to discuss in a systematical manner the problems and prospects of the Brazilian foreign affairs, but also became an agglutination factor of thinkers with various backgrounds who were willing to exert some influence on Brazil’s performance on international scene from structured institutions. Later, those initiatives were identified by the English term think tanks. In the same way, Jose Honório Rodrigues, who was also a historian gave remarkable contributions to the study of history that helped to understand the Brazilian participation in the world politics. Although he used to insist strongly in the defense of principles such as national sovereignty and “national interests”, the inclusion of his work in this collection can be mainly seen as a proper recognition of the historical studies for orienting diplomatic issues and also as a way of legitimizing the work of other historians, for instance, Amado Cervo, Clodoaldo Bueno, and Varnhagen himself - who was also included in this collection, and despite being a diplomat, his remarkable legacy was in the field of the study of history. Another remarkable case that stands out is that of Álvaro Alberto, who was a career military and represented Brazil at the UN Atomic Energy Committee, in 1946. He did not produce any ideas or interpretations about the Brazilian foreign policy, but his importance derives from the fact that he noticed and he actively experienced adjustments in the organization of the Brazilian State based on the observation of international politics. It can be said that, to a large extent, the creation of CNPq was due to his participation in the UN Nuclear Energy Committee, which provided him a unique opportunity to observe the new paths of scientific research in the world, especially in terms of their relationship with State institutions.

Besides those aspects, several other developments are reflected in the essays that were included in this book. All of them were quite significant to the Brazilian diplomatic activity. During the 1930-64 period, there were changes in the relative importance of the players with whom Brazil needed to interact while, at the same time, the demands of the international environment brought about many initiatives influencing the reorganization of the diplomatic career, both in the form of entrance to said career and in the training of the diplomatc skills. In the sphere of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, certain action areas were strengthened, such as the economic diplomacy, and the instances of diplomatic representation because of the creation of the UN system and of the establishment of political and commercial relations with a growing number of countries. Old themes, such as disarmament, resurfaced with completely new drapery because of the advent of the nuclear age, while new issues such as decolonization and the Cold War became conditioning factors of the international agenda. The essays also reflect several moments of Brazilian diplomatic trajectory such as the frustrated prospect for Brazil to become the sixth permanent member of the UN Security Council, the controversies around the launching of the Pan-American Operation, the formulation of the Independent Foreign Policy and the Brazilian defense in the UN of the idea that disarmament, economic development and decolonization were distinct faces of a same strategy geared towards the promotion of peace. The readers can always understand that such a collection should include other characters, but obviously, the editors had limitations, including resources and the availability of specialists to write about essays. In short, the understanding is that the present set of essays offers a sufficiently faithful portrait of a time of turbulence in the international order and of adjustments in the activities and instruments of the Brazilian diplomacy. In fact, any effort to understand the Brazilian foreign relations today should always include the major transformations that occurred over the two decades following the World War II.

OSWALDO ARANHA

Born into a traditional gaúcho family in the far southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, on February 15, 1894, Oswaldo Aranha attended military school early in life and earned a degree in Law and Social Sciences in the then capital of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro in 1916. Returning to his home state, he worked as an attorney for eight years, and he entered politics, becoming mayor of his home city of Alegrete and later a Federal Representative. As one of the leaders of the Liberal Alliance, Aranha was active in the armed movement that overthrew the Old Republic in 1930 and brought his friend and mentor – as well as fellow gaúcho – Getúlio Vargas, to the country’s presidency. Appointed Minister of Justice in the Vargas’ Provisional Government, Aranha became Minister of Finance in 1931, and in 1934, Vargas nominated him Ambassador to the United States. While in the U.S., Aranha built a special relationship with the Roosevelt administration, cultivating friendships that became relevant to the military alliance during World War II. He resigned his post after the coup d’état of the Estado Novo, in 1937, and returned to Brazil as the virtual leader of the opposition. His friendship with Vargas, however, eventually prevailed, as he agreed to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1938-44), during which time he acted to keep Brazil in the coalition of democratic and antifascist forces.

Aranha left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 15, 1944, over disagreements with Vargas, who was then a dictator. Vargas, himself, was deposed a little over a year later, and by that time, Aranha had accumulated huge political prestige, which many believe could have catapulted him into the presidency had he so chosen. Aranha, however, briefly returned to the private sector, devoting himself to business and law for a few years. Then, in 1947, he returned to government service as he accepted a nomination made by Vargas’ successor, President Eurico Dutra, this time to represent Brazil at the United Nations. While at the U.N., Aranha chaired the session that approved the partition of Palestine and shortly thereafter the creation of the State of Israel. He also served again as Brazil’s Finance Minister (1953-54) in the second Vargas government.

After Getúlio Vargas’ suicide, in August 1954, Oswaldo Aranha devoted himself, once again, to business and consulting. He died in Rio de Janeiro, on January 27, 1960, less than a month short of his 66th birthday.

Oswaldo Aranha: in the continuity of Rio Branco’s statesmenship

Paulo Roberto de Almeida;[233]

João Hermes Pereira de Araújo

Brazilian diplomacy is the school of peace, the organization of arbitration, the politics of harmony, the practice of good neighborliness, the equality of peoples, the protection of the weak, the defense of international justice, [and] therefore, one of the purest and highest glories of a universal and legal civilization.

Oswaldo Aranha, inaugural speech at Itamaraty Palace, Rio de Janeiro, March 15, 1938[234]

The political and diplomatic trajectory of Oswaldo Aranha

Although Oswaldo Aranha was not a career diplomat, he was possibly the most diplomatic of the Brazilian politicians of his time. Even before he engaged in the external representation of his country, Aranha was one of the most important players in the political transition that ended the Old Republic and began the so-called Vargas Era (1930-1945), during which he was one of his country’s major public servants, especially in the early phase of that era.[235]

Aranha’s political career began in his home state of Rio Grande do Sul during the 1920s; his leadership and prestige were recognized even after the death of his mentor and friend, Getúlio Vargas, in 1954. He was faithful to Vargas, who hailed from his same home state, throughout his active life, even to the detriment of his own political career. The impact of this great political leader, on both internal and external policy matters, however, goes far beyond this crucial period of Brazilian modernization. It was felt throughout the twentieth century.

As a diplomat, Aranha distinguished himself in one of the most challenging moments of contemporary Brazilian history – a history which might have been different had he not led the Ministry of Exterior Relations, Itamaraty, especially during the dramatic years of World War II. Aranha can be considered a pragmatic heir to the Baron of Rio Branco, as he realistically evaluated the external environment regarding Brazilian safety and – based on grounds similar to those of Rio Branco – established strong cooperative ties between Brazil and the United States, an alliance that proved to be decisive in those turbulent years. His drive was propelled by his vision of the future: identifying the full Brazilian interest in the continuation of a relationship he wished was increasingly egalitarian and in compliance with the respective sovereignties. In many ways, his performance in foreign policy was an extension of his personal trajectory within the framework of the intensive activism that characterized his life in national politics even before the Revolution of 1930.

Had it not been for Oswaldo Aranha’s decisive action and proven leadership in the assembly of the armed movement of the Liberal Alliance against the oblique presidential succession of Washington Luís, in 1930, Brazil might not have undergone the top down process of modernization that was eventually associated with the name of Getúlio Vargas. The hesitations of Vargas at decision-making moments were well known, and the Revolution of 1930 might not have occurred without the initiatives of Aranha, who has been identified as “the star of the Revolution.”[236]

Brazil would probably also have followed other paths without Oswaldo Aranha’s decisive action during the World War II era. The country could even have been very different if Aranha had become President of the Republic – which could have happened at numerous times, including: the 1930’s, when he was at the height of his political prominence; in 1945, when Getúlio Vargas was deposed; and again in 1950, when his mentor returned to power, this time through the ballot box. Aranha, however, preferred to remain loyal to Vargas. Even in 1955 – the year after Vargas’ death – Aranha had various options of partisan alliances available to him, yet he chose not to pursue them.[237]

Likewise, Brazilian foreign policy could have been different had this man of thought and action not been at the head of the Ministry of External Affairs during the crucial times of choosing between the major coalitions of hegemonic forces during the late 1930’s: the growing power of Nazi-fascism, which had the clear sympathies of several political and military leaders of the Vargas government; and the apparently hesitant and perhaps declining British Empire, along with the erratic isolationism of the growing American power. If Brazil placed itself on the “right” side in the military disputes of World War II and, above all, on the side of the democracies and market economies, it was basically due to the firm and decisive actions of Oswaldo Aranha.

As Minister of Finance, both before and after his diplomatic missions, Aranha also had a preeminent role in handling Brazilian weaknesses in its foreign economic relations. His actions in that arena contributed to the solution of currency crises and to macroeconomic stabilization. During his first term as the Minister of Finance, November 1931 to July 1934, Aranha adapted Brazil to the impacts of the global crisis, competently dealing – in a Keynesianism avant la lettre way – with overproduction in the coffee economy – and creating a solution for the foreign debt problem. The so-called Aranha Plan, which reduced the amount of principal that had to be paid in the proceeding four years, obtained a savings for the country of 57 million (out of a total of 91 million) British pounds. [238]

During his second term as Finance Minister, June 1953 to August 1954, again on behalf of his friend, Getúlio Vargas, Aranha also dealt with serious foreign exchange problems, along with inflationary pressures that Brazil’s Labor Minister, João Goulart, had sparked. In addition, Aranha proved himself competent at dealing with the exacerbated nationalism of the Brazilian president on the issue of profit remittances by foreign subsidiaries, thereby minimizing Vargas’ populist instincts, which had resulted in heavy pressure for an irresponsible expansion of the money supply.

Born in the small town of Alegrete, in Getúlio Vargas’ home state of Rio Grande do Sul, on February 15, 1894, Oswaldo Euclydes de Souza Aranha participated in several political episodes of his state before reaching national politics in 1927, when he became a representative in the federal Chamber of Deputies. The following year, Getúlio Vargas, who had been elected governor of the state, invited Aranha to be his Secretary of the Interior, and shortly thereafter, both he and Vargas became engaged in the national political renewal effort, within the context of the Liberal Alliance.[239]

When Getúlio Vargas became president, in 1930, Oswaldo Aranha was successively the Minister of Justice (1930-31) and Finance (1931-34) in Vargas’s provisional government. In these positions, Aranha left his mark in both the preparations for the new constitution and in overcoming the effects of the international crisis on the economy. His choice as Ambassador to Washington, which many believe was a Machiavellian move on Vargas’ part – to “exile” a possible successor – proved to be crucial, to both Aranha and Brazil, as it offered him the opportunity to weave a network of alliances within the American political scene, starting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Undersecretary Sumner Welles. In particular, Aranha’s close friendship with Welles turned out to be the most powerful factor of the so-called Brazil-United States military alliance in the turbulent World War II years.

Less than a year after renouncing his position in Washington, over objections to the 1937 Estado Novo coup, Aranha was nominated to head Itamaraty, a position in which his decisiveness again proved crucial, especially as the rise of Nazi-fascism seemed irresistible to some. It is within the framework of his activities as diplomatic representative and Foreign Minister, during the stormy decade between 1934 and 1944, that one must evaluate this individual, who can be placed in the intellectual and practical realm of the Baron of Rio Branco. Both Oswaldo Aranha and José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the Baron of Rio Branco, defended Brazilian sovereignty and its interests in the context of an unwritten yet real alliance with the United States. Aranha can thus be considered a spiritual follower of Rio Branco, “the father of Brazilian diplomacy,” one of his predecessors at the head of Itamaraty.

Ambassador in Washington: foreseeing the Brazilian future[240]

Domestic policy problems drove Oswaldo Aranha to leave both the Ministry of Finance and the leadership of the government in the Constituent Assembly in 1934; however, that same year, he was named ambassador to Washington. He traveled to the United States via Italy, aiming to undertake trade agreements directly with Mussolini (which did not happen). In a letter to Vargas, dated September 5, 1934, Aranha described Europe in a “potential state of war,” with Italy fallen into Bonapartism and Russia in the Thermidor. “If war does not break out,” he wrote, “we will live a peace without justice, without humanity, [and] with general misery.”

Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Aranha expressed a most vivid admiration for the country with which he was to have a close relationship: “It is a Herculean construction of the American miracle. (...) Everything is huge, colossal, and unimaginable.”

Aranha handed his credentials to President Roosevelt on October 2, 1934 and started to act immediately. A trade agreement, based on an American proposal of July 1933 that had faced difficulties due to competing bids from Germany, was finally signed in February 1935, during the visit of the new Finance Minister, Artur da Souza Costa. (Brazil concluded another agreement, with Germany, in June 1936.) In the final stages of negotiation of the agreement, the Americans insisted on inserting a clause of most-favored-nation in the case of foreign exchange controls, which Sousa Costa accepted, in view of delicate financial negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom. The American government was divided between the advantages of commercial liberalism, advocated by Secretary Cordell Hull, and strict reciprocity, which the president’s economic advisers preferred.

In mid-1935, President Roosevelt proposed to Brazil, through the exclusive channel of the Embassy in Washington, a Conference of Union of the American Peoples, to ensure both peace and hemispheric security. Vargas welcomed the idea, and Aranha saw a possibility to extend Monroism to a truly Pan-American understanding. Itamaraty, however, sought to involve the U.S. Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, and proposed an “inter-American collective security pact” to be agreed upon in Buenos Aires, which contradicted the goals of the United States.

Aranha warned about the negative spirit of the American Congress to this type of plan, which had already motivated their refusal of the League of Nations. The State Department reduced the text of the formal pact proposed by Itamaraty from six to three articles, but the Brazilian foreign office considered it too vague. In a letter to Vargas on August 26, 1936, Aranha complained about Itamaraty’s attitude, considering the initiative for the pact “a great thing for Brazil, even if other countries eventually refuse it in Buenos Aires.”

En route to the special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held in the Argentine capital, December 1-23, 1936, President Roosevelt made a brief stop in Rio de Janeiro, in late November, consolidating relations and reinforcing positions Aranha advocated concerning bilateral and hemispheric affairs.

At the conference opening itself, the president of Argentina even looked for arguments from the discourse of the late Brazilian Foreign Minister, the Baron of Rio Branco, to guide his country’s position. President Roosevelt supported the idea of the pact in terms very similar to those that Aranha advocated. As Aranha had predicted in Washington, however, Buenos Aires objected vehemently to Itamaraty’s idea of a collective security pact. But the principles of consultation and non-intervention – the latter proposed by Mexico – were approved. Always defending unanimity and conciliation, Aranha was tireless to deal with the ill will and the opposition of Argentina on minor issues. The Herald Tribune, of Chicago, even referred to an “Aranha Doctrine,” and The New York Times wrote an editorial, stating that the Brazilian Ambassador had become the “major exponent of Monroism.”

Brazil’s relations with Argentina, and the U.S. desire for neu-trality in the competition of both countries concerning military training, influenced parallel negotiations on the acquisition of new naval and military defense equipment. Before Aranha arrived in Washington, the Brazilian Navy had planned to acquire 12 coast guard vessels from the U.S. After he presented his credentials to President Roosevelt, however, he changed his mind and decided to purchase two cruisers. Then after the London Naval Conference (December 1935 to March 1936), Roosevelt informed Vargas in a letter, dated July 8, 1936, that “he could not provide the cruisers anymore,” and he promised to offer a counterproposal.

Another complicating factor was the need for Congressional approval, and the contract included a clause whereby the lessee could use the ships only for education and training purposes, pledging not to employ them against any nation. The Ambassador of Argentina in Washington asked the State Department to postpone the matter until “there was prior understanding among the American nations.” Aranha agreed to wait for an easing of the tensions, but on August 14, 1937, he made it clear to the U.S. State Department that it should not compromise under pressure from other countries.

The negotiations were suspended, and the Estado Novo coup d’état in Brazil less than two months later fully buried the entire deal. The episode caused the worst impact on American public opinion. Aranha submitted his resignation, but still as an Ambassador, he embarked to Brazil. The plan to lease destroyers was considered ended.

Immediately after the coup Rio de Janeiro, Aranha resigned his position in the U.S., arguing: “I cannot continue to represent Brazil, efficiently, because neither its government nor its people can believe in my statements and information as before. In this situation, my presence would not only be useless but, it seems, it would be detrimental to the interests of Brazil” (Tel. Conf. 188, November 12, 1937). And in a telegram to Vargas on November 15, 1937, he stated unequivocally: “I don’t agree, in fact, I condemn, what has been done in our country, and what’s expected to be done, of which the new Constitution is an alarming indication. Thus I resign in an irrecusable manner.” Vargas tried to dissuade him by telegram on the 17th, but Aranha retorted the next day: “The disagreement with what has been done, mainly with the text of the new Constitution, is of such a nature that it does not allow me, with dignity, to continue to carry out my current duties.”

In a new letter dated November 24, 1937, Aranha prepared his exit in order to preserve the future collaboration with the United States. Even with the undeniably Fascist tendencies of the new Constitution, he argued, it would be of interest to the U.S. government – as well as to Roosevelt, himself – to continue the close relationship with Brazil, and seek to “Americanize or Pan-Americanize Brazil, before it became fully Europeanized under the influence of Hitler or Mussolini.” Finally, he agreed to remain an ambassador despite his “call back” to Brazil, in order not to have it appear he had opposed the new political realities in Brazil. Thus, it was in this context that Aranha embarked, on December 11, 1937, on his way back to Brazil; confident that he had fully carried out all his responsibilities as Ambassador in Washington.

Minister of Foreign Affairs: the reformist democrat

Oswaldo Aranha arrived in Brazil as a symbol of opposition to the Nazi-fascist currents that, even within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wished to extrapolate the ideas and principles in the Constitution of 1937 to the international field. It was to avoid such transposition that Aranha decided, in March 1938, to accept Vargas’ appointment to become the country’s Foreign Minister. He did so to balance the opposing trends to his convictions, and to avoid modifications to Brazilian foreign policy that he had fought since his term in Washington. He accepted the invitation with the understanding that Vargas would lead domestic policy, while he would be in charge of foreign policy. He made that clear in his inaugural speech on March 15, when he said: “At Itamaraty, I will be one of the ministers of the President of the Republic, limited only to the exercise of this function.”

Globally, the biggest events of 1938 were the annexation of Austria by Hitler’s Germany, followed by the Munich Agreement – which represented the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by that same Nazi State. In the Western hemisphere, a peace treaty marked the end of hostilities between Paraguay and Bolivia in the Chaco War, and the Eighth International Conference of American States was held (December 9 to 27) in Lima, Peru.

Relations with Germany and Italy, and their expectations of an ally in the Americas with the Estado Novo coup of 1937, were soon frustrated, when Vargas abolished all political parties and refused to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. He also carried out a nationalization policy that affected German immigrants, of which there were many in southern Brazil, as well as much of the Italian immigrant population and their descendants. In addition, a decree strictly forbidding the political activity of foreigners in Brazil prompted protests from the German ambassador, which created such animosity it made Itamaraty qualify him as persona non grata. Relations between the two countries, however, remained unaltered in the commercial sphere.

Aranha was personally engaged in negotiations with other South American countries that led to the signing, in July 1938, of the definitive Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries between Bolivia and Paraguay, ending a war that had lasted two years, leaving behind a legacy of an almost insoluble armed truce. Shortly thereafter, in October, an arbitration report sponsored by the countries of the Southern Cone ascribed most of the Chaco region to Paraguay.

The undertaking of the Eighth International Conference of American States, planned for Lima in December of that year, was jeopardized for some time due to border hostilities between Ecuador and Peru. Aranha worked towards having Ecuador participate in the conference. His greatest effort, however, concerned Argentina, which was strictly against giving the project the formality of a treaty or a convention. Itamaraty, in 1936, had submitted it as a Collective Security Pact, thereby consecrating its passage from the stage of consultations to that of solidarity. Despite Argentine concerns regarding form, however, it was possible to reach a Declaration of Principles of American Solidarity, preserving the substance of what Brazil desired: the reaffirmation of continental solidarity; defense against any intervention or threat to the sovereignty of the American countries; and the coordination of consultative mechanisms in case of threats to the peace, security or territorial integrity of any of the American republics, by means of meetings held at the initiative of any one of them.

In the domestic sphere, Aranha continued the reform process of careers at Itamaraty, begun by Melo Franco in 1931. Two staffs had been created – one consular and one diplomatic – which could serve both abroad and within the Secretariat of State. By a decree dated October 1938, Aranha ended the centuries-old separation, unifying both careers and establishing a single staff.[241]

Between January and March 1939, upon the invitation of President Roosevelt himself, Aranha also made an official visit to the United States. Among the issues discussed during his visit were the Brazilian national defense program, American investments in Brazil, and the Brazilian debt situation. Aranha met alone with Roosevelt for an extended period of time, dealing with the Euro-pean situation, its impact on the Americas, as well as American domestic politics. Shortly after Aranha’s visit, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George Marshall, traveled to Brazil, and the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Army, General Góes Monteiro, visited the United States. President Roosevelt met the Brazilian general twice at the White House. The American president had already drawn attention to the Fernando de Noronha Islands and Cape São Roque. He revealed fears that the Germans intended to establish air and naval bases off the western shores of Africa from which they could attack American countries. It was clear that the United States had already planned its future logistics support from Brazil for operations in Northern Africa and Europe.

The option for neutrality: an awareness of Brazil’s fragility

With the start of the war in Europe, Itamaraty acted to reinforce the bonds of hemispheric solidarity, mainly with the United States, and the Brazilian foreign office acted to resolve the many issues that emerged from the declaration of neutrality in the face of the warring countries.

Brazilian neutrality was proclaimed by decree on September 2, 1939; the next day, the U.S. government proposed a consultative meeting, in accordance with the agreements made in Buenos Aires and Lima. The first such meeting took place in Panama from September 23 to October 3, 1939. Aranha guided the work of Itamaraty at the meeting.

Although President Roosevelt had offered him the Cruiser Trinidad for the trip to Panama, Aranha decided to stay in Rio, while maintaining close contact with the main protagonists throughout the preparatory period as well as during the meetings. Aranha also wrote a statement on the continent’s territorial waters, which was approved, together with two other statements: one on security and the other on neutrality. In fact, the neutrality of the American waters was broken by the Graf Spee incident shortly thereafter, in Uruguayan waters, followed by another incident with a German freighter, this time in Brazilian waters. Aranha and the military leaders anticipated difficult days for the American countries, mainly Brazil, which had an extensive Atlantic coast.

The year 1940 witnessed a complete change of the political and military map of Europe, with victories by German troops, and the occupation of both belligerent and neutral countries. The changes led to complex problems for diplomatic and consular representatives of neutral countries such as Brazil. Aranha wrote a lengthy letter to Getúlio Vargas, dated November 5, 1940, echoing some of the arguments of Rui Barbosa, made at a Conference in Buenos Aires in 1916. Some of the topics in his letter included his beliefs that there could be no indifference between right and wrong, and one cannot be impartial between legality and crime.

Despite Aranha’s clear statements on such matters, however, on June 11, 1940, during a celebration of the seventy fifth anniversary of the Brazilian Naval Battle of Riachuelo – during the Paraguayan war – President Vargas gave a speech which was quite ambiguous, if not even pro-Axis. While proclaiming support for Pan-Americanism, Vargas also denounced “short-sided liberalism,” and he proclaimed an organization of the economy and work by the State.

International repercussions to his speech were immediate. Many interpreted it as a demonstration of independence from – or even a rejection of – the United States. Aranha immediately considered resigning, again. He decided to stay, however, precisely to not reinforce the Fascist faction of the government.

Warring tensions become deeper

In Italy and Germany the official reactions to Vargas’ June 11th speech were positive, contrasting sharply with the repudiation of democratic countries. Reactions in the United States were strong. On June 14, the U.S. government issued a statement that had the visible collaboration of Oswaldo Aranha: confirming the maintenance of a Brazilian foreign policy “of full American solidarity, in the continent’s common defense against any foreign attack.” Nevertheless, on June 29, Vargas gave a new speech, in which he emphasized his authoritarian – and some even said his anti-Semitic – leanings as he spoke of something he called “cosmopolitan financial capitalism” of “those without a country.” Vargas was somewhat ambiguous, however, as he continued to confirm Brazil’s neutrality, and he defended Pan-Americanism with full respect for national sovereignties and the rights of each people to choose their own political system and form of government.

In the face of activism by the Germans – Friedrich Krupp AG, a firm very friendly to Hitler, had offered Vargas a steel plant – Aranha urged the U.S. Ambassador in Rio, Jefferson Caffery, to hasten the supply of credits for a steel plant and military equipment for Brazil. The question of the steel plant was resolved extremely quickly, via an unusual scheme, as state property and control, by means of funding from the Eximbank, and technology from companies in the United States (e.g., the U.S. Steel Corporation) became available to Brazil. In addition, the re-equipment of the Brazilian armed forces was decided between late 1941 and early 1942. Thus, the political and military alliance between Brazil and the United States was strengthened.

At the Second Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Havana, Cuba, July 21 to 30, 1940, there were discussions on the issues of neutrality, economic cooperation and peace in the Americas – the latter included a defense of “Inter-American ideals,” and the Brazilian government feared that the political regimes of the countries were inappropriately raised. Aranha claimed that there were “reasons beyond his will” not to attend. Instructions given to the Brazilian representative, the Secretary-General Mauricio Nabuco, did not fail to note that “Pan-Americanism was never a doctrine for the defense of political regimes, nor a practice of intervention.” The Havana Conference dealt with the situation of European colonies in the Americas, which could be placed under a “provisional administration scheme” by the American republics. A resolution on Reciprocal Assistance and Defensive Cooperation of the American Nations stated: “Any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against the States which sign this declaration.”

In 1940 and throughout 1941, Aranha sought to strengthen ties with the United States, overcoming the “equidistance” and “pragmatic balance” phase, present in some of Vargas’ speeches. In January 1941, when Germany appeared to consolidate an unshakable dominance in Europe, Aranha issued a statement in which he said that Brazil would “remain faithful to its continental, political, economic, and military commitments,” and “loyal to the historic solidarity, both in peace and in war, which always related its government and its people to the United States.” He concluded by reaffirming that “the European war, with its unforeseen events, complications or possible outcomes, does not have any influence capable to alter the always coherent Brazilian position on the Americas, which is dictated to it by the country’s best interests.” Shortly thereafter, Vargas himself confirmed, to an American executive who had brought him a personal letter from Roosevelt, that the unlimited collaboration with the U.S. was the cornerstone of Brazil’s foreign policy: if the United States was attacked, Brazil would not remain neutral; it would take the U.S.’ side.

Germany, however, was the second largest commercial partner of Brazil. Trade between the two countries dispensed with the use of foreign currency, and Vargas himself addressed trade issues with the German ambassador, without knowledge of his Foreign Minister. But the trade flow had virtually stopped due to an intensification of the British naval blockade. Since 1940, Aranha had already warned the Americans of the intensity of trade with Germany, urging them to be more dynamic themselves. In 1941, bilateral trade between Brazil and the U.S. almost doubled.

Washington intended to install bases in the northeast of Brazil, possibly with American troops, within the framework of a true “military alliance.” The Brazilian military preferred to ensure the defense of the territory themselves, but with materials they hoped to buy from the United States. In April 1941, the Eximbank opened a line of credit for ordinance (which was not used because the Brazilian military considered it insufficient). That same month, an agreement was signed for anchoring and supply facilities for American warships in the northeast in exchange for cooperation with the Brazilian Navy. A new agreement in July of that year created a joint military commission, headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, which greatly increased the scope and the dimension of bilateral cooperation in that sphere. It was followed by another agreement in October concerned with the supply of defense material.

Pearl Harbor and the American consultations meeting in Rio de Janeiro

The Japanese attack on the American bases on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941, caused great commotion in Brazil. The very next day Vargas telegraphed Roosevelt, informing him that, having assembled its government, Brazil declared itself sympathetic to the attacked country. Aranha reported to the American Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, that all the Brazilian cabinet ministers declared themselves ready to carry out the solidarity policy. The Foreign Minister immediately called the Latin American representatives urging them to act, and he accelerated preparations for the Third Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the Americas, which took place in Rio de Janeiro, January 15 to 28, 1942. Nearly all of the nations in attendance at the meeting supported the U.S., but the Argentine government faltered. That country’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Navy and Justice tended towards the totalitarian countries; while those of War and the Interior tended to support the United States. Aranha was kept perfectly informed of these matters.

On January 7, 1942, Roosevelt personally wrote to Aranha, demonstrating that he fully trusted his ability to lead. When President Vargas opened the consultation meeting, on the 15th, in Rio, he gave priority on the schedule to defense matters, leaving economic cooperation in second place. In the face of threats made by the ambassadors of the three Axis countries, Aranha wrote to remind them that the breaking of diplomatic and commercial relations is a measure with restricted range, which does not imply war. If their governments “understand otherwise, however, the Brazilian government was very sorry for that, but Brazil is certain its acts exonerate it of such liability.”

While he led the meeting, Aranha confronted two major problems: one internal and one external. Internally, the military leaders - Minister Dutra and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Góes Monteiro - complained that Aranha had made decisions unilaterally, and that the breaking of diplomatic relations almost represented war against the Axis powers, a situation for which Brazil was not militarily prepared. Externally, Argentina made an effort to maintain neutrality, for which it obtained the support of Chile and a lack of decision by Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay, although these countries did support the final declaration a few days later. Argentina, however, attempted to exercise a veto right over decisions of the entire hemisphere. Despite Aranha’s efforts to arrive at an acceptable formula for them, the Argentines refused to accept a unanimous decision on the breaking of diplomatic ties. The final resolution, therefore, included only a “recommendation” of such action, and this was interpreted as a victory for Argentina.

In the course of the meeting, Vargas delivered to U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, detailed lists of the ordinance that Brazil wished to acquire. It was in this context the two countries signed, in March 1942, the most important of their mutual assistance agreements: that of “Lend-Lease,” by which Brazil would be equated with Great Britain and the Soviet Union in ordinance supply, up to a limit of 200 million dollars. A new agreement, in May 1942, created two military commissions – one in each capital – with the one in Washington subordinated to Itamaraty. Aranha engaged directly in the military acquisitions.

The conscious involvement in war

After the Conference in Rio de Janeiro, there was an intensification of torpedo attacks against Brazilian ships, including on the Brazilian coast itself, as well as against passenger ships on cabotage trips. On August 22, 1942, Aranha informed all Brazilian diplomatic missions in the Americas that Brazil was declaring war on the Axis powers of Germany and Italy; and on the 31st, Vargas decreed that the entire national territory was in a state of war. Aranha’s popular prestige grew during this period; he began to be identified as the leader of the Anti-Fascist currents and a possible new national leader.

The year 1943 witnessed decisive developments in the trend reversal that until then had favored the Axis powers. There were also important initiatives towards the effective involvement of Brazil in the military effort that would lead to the defeat of the totalitarian countries. Returning from a meeting with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Casablanca, President Roosevelt stopped in Natal in late January 1943, and he and President Vargas had long talks there. Although Oswaldo Aranha was absent from the meeting, in a preparatory letter he outlined the points he considered relevant from the Brazilian point of view.

The two national leaders discussed all the major issues Aranha had addressed in his letter. Vargas had shown the letter to the U.S. Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, who advised President Roosevelt. Soon after the meeting, Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S., Carlos Martins, with full powers on behalf of Brazil, signed the United Nations Declaration in Washington, in the presence of U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.

One year after the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Argentina and Chile were the only countries of the Western hemisphere that still remained neutral in the war. Finally, in late January 1943, after having failed to convince Argentina to change its position, Chile decided to follow the recommendation of the group. The president of Argentina, however, said that neutrality was the cornerstone of his country’s foreign policy. The pressure of pro-Nazi military officers – which included Juan Peron – made any change of position difficult. It was not until a change of presidents in early 1944 did Argentina break relations with the Axis powers, and even then, most of the officers were against the decree.

Torpedoed by Vargas, Aranha leaves Itamaraty

Oswaldo Aranha’s absence at the presidential meetings in Natal in January 1943 was surprising. It is difficult to explain why he did not attend since he was the main adviser to President Vargas on foreign policy matters. His absence was even more shocking as President Roosevelt was accompanied by his special advisor, Harry Hopkins, and by U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Jefferson Caffery. Such a diplomatic presence should have had as a counterpart the participation of the Brazilian Foreign Minister.

In 1938, when Aranha had accepted his position as Foreign Minister, he was clearly against the Constitution of 1937, which he believed was of totalitarian inspiration. Thus, he decided to devote himself exclusively to foreign policy in order to prevent the ideas that prevailed in influential sectors from projecting themselves into the international field, and possibly translating into ostensible support for the Axis countries. An issue that attracted Aranha’s attention – even though the Constitution was not formally in force, since the plebiscite that it called for had not been carried out – was the establishment of a presidential term of six years duration. Vargas’s term was, therefore, scheduled to end on November 10, 1943. Aranha believed that Vargas would be re-elected and thus, legitimized, and that he would, therefore, have more authority to participate in the post-war negotiations. Others claimed that the declaration of war of 1942 had suspended the term of the presidential mandate, and that Vargas would still have, according to this interpretation, one year and two months in office after the end of the period of exception. This latter thinking, however, did not stop the beginning of unrest, with popular pressure calling for elections and statements by leaders in favor of democratic ideals. Some believed that Aranha could crystallize that movement and emerge as the political figure of the transition towards democracy.

The exit of Sumner Welles from the U.S. State Department, in August 1943, also affected the level of dialogue that Aranha had achieved for several years with top level American diplomats. In March 1944, the State Department published a document about the U.S. foreign policy that stated: “There is no more need for spheres of influence, alliances, balance of power or any other special agreement.” Aranha complained to Ambassador Caffery that the U.S. was relegating Brazil to a lower level of countries. Cordell Hull sent him a telegram that intended to be reassuring, saying that relations with Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China were the sine qua non condition to win the war, but that such a situation did not weaken relations within the hemisphere. Aranha retorted on May 17, saying that those claims seemed to reduce the strength of the Brazilian-American Alliance. He considered that interdependence and cooperation were the basis of the Brazilian hemispheric policy, and that only unlimited confidence of the Brazilian government in the loyalty of the American leaders to these principles could justify the unprecedented Brazilian policy of concessions, cooperation and openness.

In reality, the change of the military scenario and the loss of the strategic importance of Brazil changed the American policy of special relationship. The United States was now more focused on cooperating with all the American republics, without singling out Brazil – except when it was in its interest. Two months later, Cordell Hull sent a friendly letter, inviting Aranha to Washington on August 17, to have a meeting with President Roosevelt and discuss with him, in direct and private talks, several issues of hemispheric and international security matters. In his invitation, he referred to Brazil as a power, able to participate in the organization of the security of the new postwar world.

Aranha responded to the invitation on August 7, by means of an interlocutor, saying that he and President Vargas were entirely in accordance with the proposal, but that “for reasons beyond their will,” it was not possible to travel at that time. The response demonstrated the difficulties that existed between Aranha and Vargas.

Having been invited to be Vice-President of the Friends of America Society, Aranha should have formally taken on duties of the office on August 10. The day before, however, police officers invaded and closed the headquarters of the entity, located at the Automobile Club in Rio de Janeiro. The next day, officers, again, invaded the Club, this time including its restaurant, where Aranha happened to be located, and they arbitrarily evacuated the premises.

Certain of the connivance of Vargas in the episode, and having waited for several days, in vain, for some explanation, Aranha wrote a letter of resignation to the head of government, and he issued, on August 22, a telegraphic circular to the diplomatic missions abroad, informing them that he was leaving his duties. Aranha was losing his official status, but he kept his prestige intact.

The international repercussions of Aranha’s actions were enormous. The American and the Argentine press especially devoted much attention to his resignation, and he received numerous expressions of solidarity from American, Hispanic-American, as well as Brazilian figures.

At the United Nations: an episodic return to international politics

After leaving Itamaraty, in 1944, Aranha again devoted himself to the practice of law and later, to business activities. He did, however, serve Brazil again with much success on two more occasions, both times in the foreign arena. In 1947, he was nominated to head the Brazilian delegation at the UN; a position he again held in the Twelfth United Nations Assembly, in 1957.

Aranha was in the United States in January 1947 for a meeting of leaders of the Council on World Affairs at the invitation of Time magazine. While there, he received the unexpected invitation from Vargas’ successor, President Eurico Dutra, to head Brazil’s delegation at the UN, a position which had become vacant with the death of Pedro Leão Velloso. Aranha’s name had been suggested by the publisher of Time, Henry Luce, who had chosen to use one of Aranha’s phrases at that meeting: “The people who disintegrated the atom now have the mission of integrating humanity.” When Aranha sent his report of the meeting to the Brazilian government, he reported on Brazil’s image abroad, concluding that “the general opinion in relation to Brazil is of mistrust” and that “Pan-Americanism is in crisis.”

Even though there was no mutual sympathy between Dutra and Aranha – for reasons dating back to their having had opposing political views on both domestic and foreign matters during the Vargas era – upon the recommendation of Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes, President Dutra accepted Aranha to occupy the “position of most responsibility abroad,” as he telegraphed to Aranha on February 5, 1947.

The international situation and Brazil’s relations with the United States had changed substantially since Aranha had resigned in August 1944. Brazil had not participated in the Dumbarton Oaks talks, which had laid the foundations of what would be the United Nations as an organization, in 1944; nor was the country seen positively at the Yalta Conference, in 1945, when the three major powers – the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Great Britain – discussed what would become the UN Security Council. Later, during negotiations at the UN Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco in 1945, Brazil defended the universal character of the organization, insisting on the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. The country failed, however, to have its claim awarded as a permanent member of the Security Council.

When Oswaldo Aranha was nominated, the second part of the First United Nations General Assembly was already over and a meeting of the Security Council was taking place, the presidency of which, in February 1947, was held by Brazil. Great Britain had requested that the matter of Palestine be included on the agenda of the Second United Nations General Assembly, and a special session was held, to establish and instruct a committee in charge of studying the matter.

In addition to participating, in February, in the Security Council proceedings, which he chaired; in April, Aranha also headed the Brazilian delegation to the First Special Session of the General Assembly, to which he was elected president. At the end of May, he returned to Brazil, but then he went back to New York in September for the General Assembly’s Second Special Session. In his duties, Aranha demonstrated that he had all the qualities to be a perfect mediator of debates, and soon he made Brazil stand out among the member States.

The matter of Palestine was the most complex issue with which he had to deal at the beginning of his term of office. The only item on the agenda of the special session was the establishment of a committee and the preparation of a report to be forwarded to the General Assembly. Some of the Arab States, however, had requested the inclusion of an additional item: “the end of Great Britain’s mandate over Palestine, and the declaration of its independence.” By means of a maneuver by the Secretariat and the support of several Latin American delegations, Aranha ended up being elected to head the session by the lopsided vote of 45 to 5.

The second UN General Assembly began in September 1947 at Flushing Meadows, NY, with Aranha as provisional president since he had headed the previous special session. Despite reluctance from Rio de Janeiro, Aranha was eventually elected with a large majority to head the General Assembly. Itamaraty hinted that he had been elected with votes from the Soviet bloc, whose own candidate received few votes in the first round. A second election to the UN Security Council, with Soviet support, made Aranha seen, in certain media, as a “supporter of Russia” and “anti-American.” Itamaraty, however, intended that Brazil always followed the American positions, regardless of rules of procedure and established practices of equilibrium in representations on UN bodies. Amid disagreements with Itamaraty and President Dutra, who had decided to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Aranha, accompanied by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, was honored with the title of doctor honoris causa in Law at Lafayette College, in Easton, Pennsylvania, one of the most traditional educational institutions of the United States.

As expected, the theme of Palestine was the most complex and difficult issue on the agenda of the second session of the UN General Assembly. Aranha had a brilliant performance, not exactly to fight for the partition, but for the plenary to decide the problem immediately, without delays or postponements. His performance was the subject of unanimous praise from virtually all the delegations, and the explicit recognition of the future State of Israel. His closing speech at the second session of the General Assembly had huge acclaim: it obtained a headline on the front page of the New York Times as well on the covers of the World Report and UN World magazines, and it was included in a book that compiled the world’s most famous speeches.[242]

Oswaldo Aranha’s name was always remembered when delegations to subsequent General Assemblies were chosen. An invitation was made to him, to lead the Brazilian representation at the world body, again, in 1956, but he did not accept. The following year, however, President Juscelino Kubitschek reiterated the invitation, and Aranha considered it his duty to head the delegation to the twelfth session of the UN General Assembly. It was at the height of the Cold War and his opening speech, in the general debate, addressed the issue of nuclear disarmament. There was a conflict between Turkey and Syria going on, and it seemed at the point of war. There were also liberation wars ongoing in Algeria and in the Portuguese colonies. The focus of Aranha’s speech, however, was development. He suggested that the United Nations should focus its efforts on that issue, although in a letter to President Kubitschek he recognized that the international moment was not the most conducive to obtain economic aid. On the other hand, he acknowledged in the same letter, that support to colonialist Portugal had almost cost Brazil a defeat in the election to the Commission on Mandates:

Our attitude in favor of the colonial powers, yet opposite to our training ... heavily weakens our position and reduces our authority, even among the Latin American countries. I restricted myself to the letter of our instructions but, now, I think it is my duty to advise a review of that guidance…There has been the creation of a global state of mind in favor of the liberation of people still enslaved, and Brazil will not be able to counter that current without compromising its international prestige and even its continental position.

The head of the delegation to the twelfth UN General Assembly was the last diplomatic activity of Oswaldo Aranha, who passed away in January 1960. Until he was 40 years old, he had devoted himself to domestic affairs. Nominated Ambassador to Washington in 1934, a function that he held until 1937, Aranha managed, as few others, to perform not only in bilateral diplomacy, but also in hemispheric arrangements. He was perhaps the only person that was ever in charge of an era in the relationship between Brazil and the United States, during which time he obtained full American cooperation for the beginning of Brazilian industrial development.

As the head of Itamaraty at a particularly difficult period, from 1938 to 1944, he justifiably was considered one of the country’s greatest Foreign Ministers. It was at that stage – the most difficult of his career as a public man – that he demonstrated his political leadership qualities at the highest degree, managing to lead the Brazilian international position in the right direction, at a crucial moment in history.[243]

Oswaldo Aranha: in the practical continuity of the Baron of Rio Branco

Oswaldo Aranha died at the age of 65, in January 1960, a little more than two years after his last diplomatic mission. Two years before his death, in an article published in the Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (n. 2, of June, 1958), he recommended the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The USSR along with other countries of the Soviet bloc were potentially large buyers of Brazilian coffee, an export business to which members of Aranha’s family from the state of São Paulo had been associated. His two terms as the country’s Minister of Finance – separated by two decades – had caused him to realize the relevant role of that basic product in Brazil’s balance of trade. But there was more to it than that.

Both of the times Getúlio Vargas had placed Aranha at the head of the national economy were periods when the Brazilian economy was facing especially difficult international problems. As Mário Henrique Simonsen, an economist and, himself, a Finance Minister of Brazil (1974-1979) has said of Aranha: his “double passage through the command of the nation’s finances, in 1931-34 and again in 1953-54, is less important in his biography than the achievements both in politics and in diplomacy. But, if his life were limited to what he did in the Ministry of Finance, Aranha would have already conquered his private seat in Brazilian history.”[244] Simonsen, who fully agreed with both of Aranha’s macroeconomic stabilization plans, considered that his actions in the crisis of the 1930s were crucial to reduce the impact of the Great Depression on the Brazilian economy, and that the “most controversial aspect [of Aranha’s second term] was the coffee policy” (p. 437).

Aranha was basically a pragmatic individual. In both of the situations mentioned above, as well as when he was Ambassador in Washington and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he took the practical course of action. Armed with democratic principles in politics and liberal ones in economics, without limiting himself to theories or ideologies, his way of work, his philosophy of life – his political and diplomatic thought – was similar to that of the Baron of Rio Branco: both were guided by a practical spirit enabling them to overcome obstacles and difficulties, while always bearing in mind the larger interests of Brazil.

Aranha was not a systematic memorialist. However, his personal files, consisting of an immense wealth of letters, speeches and work notes, as well as official documents, provide the basis upon which some historians have already worked. A thorough review has been conducted by the Brazilianist Stanley Hilton – allowing us to recover fragments of his thoughts on several topics of international politics.[245]

The ideas gleaned from Aranha’s letters, notes, and speeches clearly illustrate his thought on relevant issues of Brazilian foreign relations, in which his truly democratic positions in the political and institutional sphere should be highlighted. This might have been an inheritance from his younger years, when, in defense of the Western democracies, he sided with Rui Barbosa, who had fought against the imperial autocracy of the German Reich during World War I. His disagreements with Getúlio Vargas, concerning the organization of the State as well as his adhesion to constitutional rights subject to the rotation of the ballot box, were both notorious and consistent, culminating in his departure from the Embassy in Washington, due to the coup d’état of the Estado Novo, in November 1937.

Aranha’s practical side, however, usually prevailed. Thus, few months after resigning as Ambassador to the U.S., he agreed to serve the dictatorial regime, in order to reinforce the fragile democratic pole in a government filled with supporters of European fascism, some even willing to align Brazil with Nazi Germany. Much later, when he had already left Itamaraty, which was still under the Vargas dictatorship, in 1945, in an interview that Radio Tupi should have transmitted, but was banned by the censorship regime, Aranha gave a more detailed explanation of his political decision at the time:

I joined the government in 1938, not to serve the Estado Novo, but determined to avoid the repercussions of its internal harm the Brazilian international diplomacy. (...) Much of for the Constitution of 1937, many of its innovations – almost all of which were translated from European and Asian totalitarian constitutions – I let it be known, were repugnant to me, to my beliefs and my fidelity to democratic commitments and purposes of the October Revolution. (...) During that period, when I attended government meetings, and I was very intimate with the Head of Government, I did not have any responsibility for Brazilian domestic affairs, except when they threatened to jeopardize the achievement of foreign policy. I was, uniquely and exclusively, Foreign Minister, exercising my functions,closed in the room where the great Rio Branco lived and died: the biggest and best example of how every Brazilian has a duty to serve his country at Itamaraty, without it resulting in the sacrifice of his political and personal convictions. I did not resign my ideas nor did I deny a single one of those principles that were, are and will be an inseparable part of my life of devotion to Brazil. In that role, I defended those ideas and principles and, thanks to my fidelity to them, I avoided, with the agreement of the people, that Brazil was dragged into error and defeat by the political trends enshrined in the Constitution of 1937. (...) The course of the war was threatening and my intransigence seemed to jeopardize the position with the winners at the time. I, myself, had days of perplexity, and if I did not vacillate, it was because I have always believed that man still has not invented a weapon capable of defeating ideas. (...) The victories of force are ephemeral, albeit spectacular, in the face of the determination and courage of a well-formed conscious and heart.[246]

Aranha’s reference to the Baron of Rio Branco was not random. It added to the qualification he made of the duty to serve one’s country, “without it resulting in the sacrifice of political and personal convictions.” This way of thinking corresponded entirely to his thoughts and actions during the Estado Novo, a period in which he faced several political and personal setbacks, mainly caused by actions of the Minister of War, Eurico Dutra, the Minister of Justice, Francisco Campos, and the Chief of police, Filinto Müller. Yet, despite these setbacks, Aranha always endeavored to serve Brazil in the best way possible.

Aranha was inspired by Rio Branco, to address the difficult relations with Argentina. A gaúcho from the border, a lover of Buenos Aires, where he had treated his eyes when he was young, Aranha was also deeply aware of the military threats that always focused the attention of the Brazilian military on the Southern borders. He, therefore, struggled throughout his diplomatic administration to find a modus vivendi that respected the peculiarities of Argentina, in both regional and international contexts, which he hoped could be conciliated with Brazilian interests. He strongly desired to deepen hemispheric solidarity in the face of the Fascist threats.[247] This, however, was not an easy task, especially because Aranha had to reconcile American unilateral positions with the susceptibilities of the regional neighbors, often repeatedly engaged in potential or actual conflicts – such as Paraguay and Bolivia around the Chaco, or Peru and Ecuador in border disputes. In the American conferences, Aranha had to use all his diplomatic skills to avoid Argentina adopting an isolated stance, which might have led to a break in Pan-American solidarity, or even, in the worst case scenario, to the implementation of that nation’s Nazi-Fascist sympathies, as several officers of its high military summit desired. Different from Rio Branco, however, Aranha saw in the intensification of commercial ties with Argentina, the possibility of closer ties between the two countries. As a result, he sought, incessantly, to multiply agreements and to expand reciprocal trade.[248]

A program for development and the international presence of Brazil

Although he was the head of Itamaraty from 1938 to 1944, Oswaldo Aranha had no control over decision-making on important diplomatic issues[249], and he saw himself marginalized by Getúlio Vargas on several occasions, such as those concerning relations with Nazi Germany or the establishment of an alliance with the United States.[250] Some observers attribute Vargas’ treatment of Aranha, in this respect, to his viewing the Foreign Minister as a rival and possible presidential contender. The most dramatic and symbolic example of Vargas’ personal attitude towards Aranha took place when the Brazilian president met the U.S. president, Franklin Roosevelt in Natal, in January 1943. Already aware of his exclusion from the meeting, Aranha was still worried about the direction the talks could take, and in a long letter to Vargas in preparation for the meeting, he laid out his thoughts, concerning the international scene and the positions be believed Brazil needed to take – both immediately in relation to the war and during the medium-term post-war years.

The key aspects of Aranha’s thought, regarding the foreign policy Brazil needed to adopt, can be summarized in the formula: “support the United States in the world in exchange for its support in South America.” The guidance that he thus recommended to Vargas was to follow the United States “in the war, until the victory of American weapons and, in peace, until the victory and consolidation of American ideals.” As Aranha also pointed out, in the postwar period the U.S. would be in charge of leading the peace, so Brazil “must align itself alongside the United States,” initially by joining the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration, and then by seeking a seat on military councils and by participating in studies of a future international organization. In the Western Hemisphere, Brazil should confirm its adherence to Pan-Americanism, since without a perfect understanding with the United States on that principle, “Pan-Americanism would not be possible and the United States could not rely on the unanimous support of the continental peoples in the war.” Aranha acknowledged that Brazil was a weak country, in both economic and military terms, but he had no doubt that, in the future, “it would inevitably be one of the great political and economic powers of the world.” Nothing, therefore, justified Brazil’s withdrawal from world politics. On the contrary, he believed it should fully engage in the war effort, and in this way it would achieve advantages in times of peace.

Aranha recommended that after the war, the economic policy should be one of liberalization of international trade, intensifi-cation of the American cooperation in Brazil’s industrialization and development program, the broad freedom of immigration, and the attraction of foreign capital to Brazil. Early in 1943, Aranha did not think it was necessary to send troops to the war front, although he thought that perhaps later it would be in Brazil’s interest to do so. In any event, Brazil needed to prepare as if it were on the verge of going into combat because “the preparation, itself – even if the country were not called to battle – would be counted as a victory at the peace table.”

Summarizing his thoughts, the Brazilian Foreign Minister finally referred to the goals that Brazil should pursue both internationally and in the area of development. Internationally, Aranha desired a better position for Brazil, a strict collaboration with the United States in order to stimulate the development of Pan-Americanism. Additionally, he was concerned with global reconstruction.

Domestically, Aranha was concerned with the country’s development of its armed forces as well as its heavy industry; the creation and development of industries related to defense, to agriculture, and to mineral extraction; plus all other industries necessary for the progress of the country. He gave a special emphasis to the exploration of oil and other fuels.[251]

Aranha’s ten-page letter[252] included his thoughts on Brazil’s positions in both regional and international arenas – at that time and in the future. Several elements of his diplomatic thought easily approximated those of Rio Branco three decades earlier. As a synthesis, he offered eleven goals that Brazil needed to pursue over the course of the war and immediately thereafter. He believed the goals were worth the entire effort of the government, then and throughout the process of political and economic modernization of Brazil, which he thought should be a national project. In its basic structure, Rio Branco could also have, mutatis mutandis, delineated the same goals that Aranha summarized. For the historical record, Aranha’s eleven goals justify their full transcription:

1. A better position in world politics;

2. A better position in the politics with neighboring countries;

3. A more confident and closer solidarity with the United States;

4. An increasing influence on Portugal and its possessions;

5. Development of a maritime power;

6. Development of an air power;

7. Development of an industrial park for heavy industries;

8. Creation of a defense industry;

9. Creation of agricultural, extractive and light industries complementary to those of the United States, necessary for world reconstruction;

10. Expansion of railways and highways for economic and strategic purposes;

11. Exploration of basic fuels.[253]

Corresponding to the highly promising expectations that Aranha nurtured for the maintenance of the bilateral alliance – that he had been building laboriously since his arrival in Washington, almost ten years prior and that his letter to Vargas clearly anticipated – Roosevelt, in one of their conversations in Natal, confirmed to Vargas that he hoped to have him by his side at the expected peace conference. The comment had made the dictator especially satisfied.[254]

The points covered in his letter were precisely Aranha’s plans for the future of Brazil. His careful preparations for the international insertion of Brazil into world affairs immediately after the war and in the post-war years, an insertion that he foresaw as the result of a constant and exhausting process of negotiations with the United States – even an effort to “educate” the U.S. about what Brazil really was – in order toshed some light on this new posture of the country. It was his belief that Brazil could not fail to closely associate itself with this vision of the world and the values of American democracy, which he regarded as also Brazilian in a full and indivisible way.

The concerns of Vargas, in Natal, to negotiate armaments and Brazil’s involvement in the war, were to ensure his own maintenance in power; while those of Aranha were of a leader who wanted to use the meeting as leverage to build a post-war Brazil. This is why Aranha rejected the emerging view – hinted at in the meetings of the three main Allied powers – of a hegemonic accommodation in the world and in the functioning of the future United Nations. To Aranha, the basis of Brazilian hemispheric policy was a relationship of cooperation and interdependence with the United States and, starting from there, creating the foundations of a future projection into the world.

Roosevelt was very aware of Aranha’s beliefs and ideas. He knew that within the context of Brazilian politics, the best possible relation that the United States could desire in South America, and even in the world, was that of Oswaldo Aranha. It was with that in mind Cordell Hull wrote an important letter to Aranha on July 17, 1944, inviting him, on behalf of President Roosevelt, to come to Washington in August of that year. In the letter, Hull wrote that he and the president accepted in an “unrestricted” manner the basic concept, which Aranha had stated on May 17, of continuing the “extraordinarily strict and productive cooperation that characterized our relations during the war.” He continued by inviting Aranha to visit Washington for a long enough period of time, to develop a new understanding:

Besides matters that concern specifically Brazil and the United States, there are others of a hemispheric nature and also some of a global scope, which may only be discussed in the intimacy of private talks. I believe that your suggestions, concerning your situation and the participation of powers, such as Brazil, in the organization of the security of the new post-war world, as well as concerning the Inter-American system in the face of the organization mentioned, deserve special attention. I do not know any other way to examine those matters on which depend our peace and welfare in the future, other than through direct and private conversations. (...) The president, who will be very pleased to have a long conversation with you, may see you on August 17, if you are in Washington at that date.[255]

The invitation – certainly one of the most important ever made in the history of the bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States – probably prognosticated a favorable political evolution to American interests in Brazil, at the end of the war. That might have been exactly the reason Vargas vetoed its acceptance.

It must have been much against his will that Oswald Aranha had to respond to Cordell Hull, not by direct letter, but by means of a telegram to the Embassy in Washington, issued on August 7, 1944, three days before the beginning of the crisis that led to his definitive removal from Itamaraty, after so many disappointments. The Brazilian Embassy was simply instructed to transmit the position of Aranha and Vargas concerning the invitation: “I cannot travel now, for reasons beyond my will. The President is assessing the possibility [to travel] at some mutual time to be scheduled.”[256] Then on August 10, Aranha, insulted by Vargas in the episode of the Friends of America Society, decided to leave Itamaraty.

At that point, Brazil might have lost its best chance to build a mature relationship with the main hemispheric and global partner, a relationship which could have been leveraged into a more intensive participation in the negotiating forums that were building the principles of the international post-war order. The next year – when it elected a president who was not trusted in Washington and London, and even less so in Moscow, due to his ambiguous stances early in the war, to the detriment of the one who might have represented an infinitely more cosmopolitan perspective for a country that was still backwards in material terms – Brazil witnessed the closure of an opportunity that would not open again during the turbulent years of the Cold War and during its own years of political and social instability.

To a certain extent, Oswaldo Aranha lacked the ambition to impose himself decisively in the political sphere. He had been the “star of the Revolution” in 1930, the embodiment of the best values of the rising urban middle classes – who, themselves, desired a kind of political leadership different from the old rural oligarchs, the new opportunistic people of labor, or even the caudilhos that existed here and there. In his own way, however, he was also a charismatic leader, having left his deep mark in the institutions in which he had worked and led in the public sector, as well as in the history of the country itself.

Brazil might have developed in another way had Aranha aspired to and obtained positions of even greater responsibility than those he occupied throughout his extraordinary political trajectory. Regardless of what might have been, however, Oswaldo Aranha certainly contributed to turning Brazil into a better country, in all of the numerous areas in which he exercised his competence and his extraordinary intellectual honesty.

References and further reading

Primary sources:

ARANHA, Oswaldo. Oswaldo Aranha, 1894-1960: Discursos e Conferências. Brasília: FUNAG, 1994.

_______. Fronteiras e limites: A Política do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Mi-nistério das Relações Exteriores, Seção de Publicações; Imprensa Nacional, 1940.

_______. A Revolução e a América. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda, 1940.

Itamaraty Historical Archives; various files.

OSWALDO ARANHA File, Center of Research and Documentation of the Contemporary History of Brazil (CPDOC)/FGV, Rio de Janeiro.

BRAZIL. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Relatórios, 1934- 1944.

General bibliography:

ABREU, Marcelo de Paiva. “Crise, Crescimento e Modernização Autoritária: 1930-1945”. In: ABREU, M. P. (org.). A Ordem do Progresso: Cem Anos de Política Econômica Republicana, 1889-1989. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1989, p. 73-104.

ALENCASTRE, Amílcar. Oswaldo Aranha, o Mundo Afro-Asiático e a Paz. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Editora Nap, 1961.

ARANHA CORREA DO LAGO, Luiz. Oswaldo Aranha, o Rio Grande e a Revolução de 1930: Um Político Gaúcho na República Velha. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1996.

BARRETO, Fernando de Mello. Os Sucessores do Barão: Relações Exteriores do Brasil, 1912-1964. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2001.

BOUÇAS, Valentim F. História da Dívida Externa. Rio de Janeiro: Edições Financeiras, 1950.

CASTRO, Flávio Mendes de Oliveira. Itamaraty: Dois Séculos de História, 1808-2008. Brasília: FUNAG, 2009, 2 vols.

COHEN, Esther. Oswaldo Aranha. Porto Alegre: Ed. Tchê, 1985.

COPELAND, Lewis (coord.). The World’s Great Speeches. 2nd ed.; New York: Dover, 1958.

DANESE, Sérgio. Diplomacia Presidencial: História e Crítica. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1999.

EIZERIK, Moysés. Oswaldo Aranha. São Paulo: Israeli Federation of São Paulo, 1985.

FLORES, Moacyr. Oswaldo Aranha. Porto Alegre: State Institute of the Book, 1991.

GARCIA, Eugênio Vargas. O Sexto Membro Permanente: O Brasil e a Criação da ONU. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2012.

HILTON, Stanley. Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 1994.

_______. “The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 100, n. 1, Spring 1985, p. 27-51.

_______. “Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930-1945: A Reappraisal of his Attitude Toward Industrialization and planning”, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 35, n. 4, December 1975, p. 754-778.

HULL, Cordell. The Memories of Cordell Hull. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 2 vols.

LOVE, Joseph L. Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971.

McCANN Jr., Frank D. The Brazilian-American Alliance: 1937-1945. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1973; Braz. Ed.: A Aliança Brasil-Estados Unidos, 1937-1945. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1995.

MOREIRA, Regina da Luz. Entry “Aranha, Osvaldo”. In: Digital Archives of the Center of Research and Documentation of the Contemporary History of Brazil (Cpdoc) of Getúlio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro.

MOURA, Gerson. Brazilian Foreign Relations, 1939-1950: The Changing Nature of Brazil-United States Relations During and After the Second World War. Brasília: FUNAG, 2013.

_______. Autonomia na Dependência: Uma Política Externa Brasileira de 1935 a 1943. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1980.

O’DONNEL, Francisco Talaia. Oswaldo Aranha. Porto Alegre: Garatuja, 1976.

SEITENFUS, Ricardo Antônio da Silva. O Brasil de Getúlio Vargas e a Formação dos Blocos, 1930-1942: O Processo de Envolvimento Brasileiro na Segunda Guerra Mundial. São Paulo: Nacional, 1985.

SILVA, Hélio. 1937: Todos os Golpes Se Parecem. O Ciclo de Vargas, vol. 9. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1970.

_______. 1942: Guerra no Continente. O Ciclo de Vargas, vol. 12. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1972.

SKIDMORE, Thomas. Brasil: de Getúlio Vargas a Castelo Branco, 1930-1964. Rio de Janeiro: Saga, 1969; Edition of the 40th. Anniversary: Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

VELINHO, Moysés. Oswaldo Aranha: Pequenos Registros À Margem de Uma Grande Personalidade. S.l.: Liv. Lima, 1978.

VILLELA, Annibal; SUZIGAN, Wilson. A Política do Governo e o Crescimento da Economia Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Ipea-Inpes, 1973.

WELLES, Sumner. Seven Decisions That Shaped History. New York: Harper, 1950

Cyro de Freitas-Valle

Cyro de Freitas-Valle was born in São Paulo, on August 16th, 1896, the son of Senator José de Freitas-Valle and Antonieta E. de Sousa Aranha de Freitas-Valle. He graduated from São Paulo Law School (1916). He joined the diplomatic service in 1918 and occupied various functions both in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and abroad. He was the Brazilian Ambassador to La Paz (1936), Bucharest (1937), Berlin (1939-42), Ottawa (1944), Buenos Aires (1947-48) and Santiago (1952-55). Twice nominated Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs (1939 and 1949-51). He headed the Brazilian delegation to the 1944 meeting of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). He attended the San Francisco Conference and the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (1945), as well as the 1st UN General Assembly in London and the Paris Conference among the Allied countries (1946). He represented Brazil in the Security Council, having chaired the organ between February and March 1946. He headed the Brazilian delegation to the 4th and 5th Sessions of the UN General Assembly (1949 and 1950), when the tradition of Brazil being the first country to speak began. He was the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations in New York (1955-61). He attended sessions of the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) and chaired the Conference on Disarmament, in 1958. He retired from Itamaraty in 1961 and died in Rio de Janeiro on November 7th, 1969.

Cyro de Freitas-Valle: United Nations, Brazil first

Eugênio Vargas Garcia

Introduction

Cyro de Freitas-Valle might have been, in his time, the Brazilian who knew best the intricacies of the United Nations, the emergence of which he witnessed. He was one of the delegates who had the privilege of signing the UN Charter, on behalf of Brazil, on June 26th, 1945. Until his retirement, he witnessed pivotal moments in UN history, attended several conferences and meetings, often led the delegations representing Brazil and always kept a close link with the practices of multilateralism in all its dimensions.

His first contact with the new structure that was emerging had been in the 1944 meeting of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), created to provide aid to millions of refugees and displaced persons during the war. Ambassador in Ottawa, he was nominated delegate to the San Francisco Conference. Shortly thereafter, he joined the United Nations Preparatory Commission, which was responsible for preparing the operational measures necessary for the first sessions of the General Assembly and other UN organs, including its Secretariat. He attended the General Assembly, held in London, and was the representative for Brazil when the country exercised for the first time, as a non-permanent member, the Presidency of the Security Council, in 1946. At the opening of the annual general debate, he spoke before the General Assembly in New York four times. He exercised other functions as Ambassador and culminated his multilateral career as Permanent Representative to the UN, from 1955 to 1961, a period of political effervescence and growing diplomatic challenges.

Despite his expertise and his personal engagement with multilateral issues, and even the recognition he received in life from his peers and subordinates as a differentiated Ambassador and a reference within Itamaraty, little has been written so far about his legacy. There are no substantial specific studies and references to Freitas Valle’s diplomatic thought are scarce in the bibliography. One reason for that may have been that he, a pragmatic man, identified with the Zeitgeist of the Brazilian society of the mid-20th century, did not consider himself a theorist of international relations. Even though political reflection was part of his daily life, he left relatively little material structured in such a way that could establish a line of thought liable to systematization. Directed towards action and concerned about solving problems as they emerged, Freitas-Valle represented a tradition of diplomats who, being efficient in their function, did not feel compelled to theorize in depth about their profession or about the major international issues that absorbed them in their daily work. Maybe for that very reason, to understand better their worldview also means to honor countless individuals who, although not necessarily engaged in formal or academic considerations, printed their mark as foreign policy practitioners.

Present at the creation: the place of Brazil

The major powers that led the winning military alliance in World War II carried out the preparatory process that led to the creation of the UN. The political-strategic planning for reestructuring the postwar world order took place in absolute secrecy. In 1944, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which brought together the four Policemen (USA, USSR, Great Britain and China), a preliminary text was approved, in October of that year. That draft Charter was the negotiation basis for the Conference carried out in San Francisco, with the explicit purpose of establishing a new organization to replace the discredited League of Nations.

At Dumbarton Oaks, Brazil was the only country considered as a possible sixth permanent member in the future Security Council. Both Great Britain and the Soviet Union resisted President Franklin Roosevelt’s proposal. The American delegation itself, after an internal meeting, recommended that Roosevelt gave up the idea. Both the British and the Soviets rejected an increase in the number of permanent seats larger than five. They claimed that, if it was too expanded, the effectiveness of the Council could be jeopardized. In addition, both Churchill and Stalin were against the possibility of allowing the entry of a further “certain vote” for the United States.

Without being aware of Roosevelt’s plans and of the discussion that took place at Dumbarton Oaks, Freitas-Valle foresaw that a window of opportunity was opening to Brazil. He confided to an American diplomat that nobody would dispute the need to include the Big Three as permanent members, along with France (to deal with European affairs) and China (representative of Asia). He suggested that such was the same position of Brazil and asked if something could actually be done in South America “without Brazilian cooperation”. For that reason, he dared saying, if a UN Charter was to be written for the next century, it would be a “good investment for all” to grant a permanent seat to Brazil.[257]

It is worth recalling that such position was not unanimous in Itamaraty. In fact, there was no consensus about that within the Government. Hildebrando Accioly, Raul Fernandes and José Carlos de Macedo Soares belonged to the group that, in the committee of notables that reviewed the Dumbarton Oaks project, was against the participation of Brazil in the Security Council. Pedro Leão Velloso, who was the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs after Oswaldo Aranha’s exit, tried to remain neutral, even though privately sympathizing with that group. The other camp, led by President Getúlio Vargas, included Carlos Martins, Ambassador in Washington, Freitas-Valle and other diplomats and jurists who wished to see Brazil recognized for its contribution to the war, by the size of its territory and population, as well as by its position in South America.

It might have been weighed in the consideration of the problem the memory of the crisis of March 1926 in the League of Nations and the subsequent withdrawal of Brazil in June, amid criticism and condemnation, after the failed attempt to get a permanent seat on the Executive Board of that organization. To the skeptics, avoiding the repetition of such an embarrassing situation seemed to be a solid reason to discourage a new investment in the world organization that was set up in 1945. For the advocates of the idea, however, the historical experience imposed a “duty of consistency” and it should be worth reintroducing the Brazilian bid to reinforce the old aspiration for the same reasons pointed out before in the League.

Another name deserves to be recalled here. Afrânio de Melo Franco, who before being the Ambassador of the Revolution of 1930 had been Ambassador to the League of Nations in Geneva, had defended the permanence of Brazil in the Council: “I still believe that, for us to be considered in the Society of Nations and to have, within it, the authority to which our greatness, our devotion to the ideals of the Society and our large population entitle us, we must have a seat on the Council”. Melo Franco argued that the work towards success could not be done “in the turmoil of the Assembly’s activity, but rather in the intermissions of the sessions and by negotiation among governments”. However, he disagreed about the uncompromising way in which President Artur Bernardes decided to address the subject, which embarrassed the Locarno agreements and threatened to veto the entry of Germany in the League (“win or not lose”).

Freitas-Valle accompanied that crisis from a distance, but he did made public his opinion. In an article for a newspaper from São Paulo, he acknowledged that with its attitude (the veto to Germany), Brazil had “torpedoed” Locarno. The country lacked the support of the major powers and other Latin American nations, which “inexplicably were jealous of us.” The 1926 aftermath would have been the “alienation” of solidarity from the rest of the continent, with disappointing results for Brazil, isolated in the region and seen in Europe as responsible for the fiasco of the Assembly.[258] Like Melo Franco, Freitas-Valle supported the Brazilian aspiration. The mistake in the League had been of method and tactics: Bernardes turned the claim into a zero-sum game, he overestimated his abilities, opposed the country to the European powers and deprived himself of the alternative of a negotiated solution or a strategic retreat.

At the San Francisco Conference, the works of which began in late April 1945, the number of five permanent members had already been closed by the great powers. The unexpected death of Roosevelt, two weeks before, sealed any prospect of review of the Brazilian claims to the Security Council. Leão Velloso still talked about it to the US Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, but he got nothing. Freitas-Valle was in charge of the technical-level discussion. At the First Committee of the Third Commission (on structure and functioning of the Security Council), the position that the delegation took on represented, in practice, an indirect candidacy. Brazil supported the creation, in the first place, of a permanent seat for Latin America (that Itamaraty believed it should go to Brazil). Without realistic chances of success, Freitas-Valle took on a cautious approach, according to the instructions he had received.[259]

The Brazilian strategy of discretion in San Francisco was exactly opposite to the histrionics shown in the League of Nations, but neither one was successful. Here is a dilemma that must be weighed. Excellent credentials and a well-articulated campaign can contribute to strengthen the election, but the achievement of the goal, due to its inherently political nature, also depends on other broader factors and on a global foreign policy project that gives credible support to the candidacy. Those requirements were absent both in 1926 and in 1945.

The only option left to Brazil was to become a non-permanent member by the ballot of the General Assembly. Freitas-Valle deemed that it was necessary to ensure that Brazil was elected to the Security Council and other main organs of the United Nations. He knew the dispute would be close. “That is why I previously said that it will not be an easy task for His Excellency [Leão Velloso], to claim to Brazil, in the concert of nations, the place it really deserves. Do not forget that Ukraine, Egypt and Canada also intend to be the sixth country (after the Big Five) in the world”.[260]

Thus, when Brazil was elected for the first time as a temporary member for a two-year term (1946-47), with an expressive voting, Freitas-Valle evaluated that the victory was fair, since in that way Brazil fulfilled “its sole and legitimate aspiration within the United Nations”, that is, to integrate the maximum organ of the structure that the Charter created. It might have been a way to reward the effort that Brazil had made in the war, as the only Latin American country to send military forces to fight in Europe.[261] The outcome of the experience, however, remained as an accomplishment not fully achieved. Still for a long time, Brazilian politicians and diplomats pondered about what “could have been” if there had been a different setting of factors by the end of the war to make Brazil the sixth permanent member.[262]

The founder of a tradition

Some hypotheses have already been suggested to try to clarify why Brazil is the first country to speak at the opening of the general debate of the UN General Assembly, in September. Considered as “established practice” by the Secretariat, such honorable privilege obtained formal recognition in the protocol of the organization by means of the Resolution 51/241 of the 1997 General Assembly, entitled “Strengthening of the United Nations System”. Paragraph 20 of the annex to the resolution, item (d), concerning the general debate, provides that the Secretariat shall prepare the list of speakers on the basis of the “existing traditions” and in expressions of preference to best accommodate the needs of the Member States (GARCIA, 2011, Special Attachment).

Based on the historical knowledge available to date, Freitas-Valle stands out as the likely founder of that tradition. We know that Brazil did not inaugurate the debates in 1946 and in the years immediately following. It was only in the 4th General Assembly, in 1949, when Freitas-Valle actually became the first one to speak in plenary as head of the Brazilian delegation. The following year, that happened again. According to Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, the invitation to Brazil resulted supposedly from a disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union: “Since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wished to open the debate, the Secretariat probed several European countries which refused, it claiming in general that they could not speak in a useful manner before listening to the superpowers. Once the European possibilities were exhausted, the Secretariat turned to Brazil and Cyro immediately accepted it”(GUERREIRO, 1992, p. 41-42).

However, even though Mário de Pimentel Brandão was also the first one to make his speech in 1951, the deference to Brazil was interrupted for three consecutive years. Nobody knows exactly why. In 1955, nominated once again to represent Brazil, Freitas-Valle did not approve the situation that he found. Throughout his career, he always had in mind the question of the country’s image. Before the start of the General Assembly, he addressed a letter to the Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes, complaining about the “declining prestige of Brazil at the UN”. The fault, he said, could not be blamed to “anyone specifically”. It was only a matter of fact observed over the years. After landslide elections to the Security Council and ECOSOC in the recent past, Brazil now had difficulty to compete with much smaller countries for elective posts in major organs of the United Nations. Freitas-Valle regretted the accusation that Brazil voted “almost invariably and in accordance with the United States” and that the list of its initiatives in ten years of existence of the organization was “small and poor”.[263]

It is perfectly plausible that Freitas-Valle had decided to seek ways to raise Brazil’s shaken prestige. One of the ways could have been, to place Brazil back in the position of first speaker. Indeed, in 1955, he opened the debate of the 10th General Assembly and again in 1956. From then on, the sequence was no longer discontinued and the tradition of Brazil having that honor was consolidated. The speech is currently often made by the President of the Republic or, in his absence, the Foreign Minister. If this is true, it is time to give credit where it is due.

Politics at the UN: orign of its predicament

The UN is an institutionalized space for dialogue, negotiation and debate among sovereign States. It is an intergovernmental organization that seeks to discipline the conduct of those States, but it does not propose to have supranationality functions. One of its challenges is to harmonize the individual and the collective, the community and the raison d’état. According to the concept developed by Gelson Fonseca Jr., the States have certain “multilateralizable interests” that can be forwarded through cooperation. The multilateral sphere, in that sense, can be either the locus to legitimize norms, concepts and practices of States or to the identification of common interests with potential to take on a concrete manifestation of a jointly coordinated action (FONSECA, 2008, passim).

Of course, in the UN the political differences manifest themselves in all their fullness. Several months of tough nego-tiation can result in a fragile consensus or simply sink without reaching any port. That prospect may seem frustrating and, in fact, some good faith negotiators and much of the public opinion see it that way. However, this must not obscure the fact that, in the face of conflicts or problems that require a collective response, there are few credible alternatives to replace diplomatic negotiation. It would be a serious mistake to ignore the problem and to choose, from the beginning, inaction or, even worse, allow differences to be solved in a violent manner without a genuine effort to solve them peacefully.[264]

A practical example, which Freitas-Valle witnessed, was the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1955, which eventually led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That Conference, despite the division between East and West, was “proof of the rewards gained by using our organization extensively”. Thus it became apparent, the instrumental role of multilateralism in offering cooperative spaces for the negotiation of international agreements and mechanisms that, if successful, change the way that States deal with dissent, even in those issues of high political sensitivity.

Still, in the long run, few are really satisfied with the results. The uneven balance of UN accomplishments does not offer enough solace. Marcos Azambuja summarized the problem well in the following way:

For the visionaries, everything that was obtained in terms of fair international planning, of peacekeeping and respect to the law was far shorter than what they had dreamed. For pragmatics, multilateralism is diffuse, declaratory, romantic, and seeks to escape the brutal constraints of force and power. With those two pillars of public opinion being displeased, multilateralism continues to operate in a narrow area of relative dissatisfaction and tinted skepticism (AZAMBUJA, 1989, p. 190).

It is useful to recall the assessment Freitas-Valle made about the San Francisco Conference. Despite the large number of amendments to the Charter, the Security Council, the “master gear of the organization”, kept its powers virtually intact, as well as the aura of “almighty” entity that had presided over its design. Freitas-Valle argued that the minor powers (Brazil included) tried to change basic provisions of the plan of 1944, “but strength prevailed, since it was well noticed that the Big Five would not succumb in what they considered as rights deriving from the sacrifices incurred and from the duty to prevent its renewal.” He emphasized that, “the authority of the major powers derived from their suffering, of their greater experience with the doom of war, of the cataclysm that it was and still is, that needs to be the last one”. In the face of that juncture, its conclusion derived from the very roughness of those facts of international life, exacerbated by the global carnage that had wiped over the world: “Among all the concessions made, the veto was the most costly. Then, the conflict between the idealism of the minor powers and the pragmatism of the major ones appeared in its full force. And yet, the right to veto is something that arises from the fact that there are major powers and small States”.[265]

In San Francisco, Freitas-Valle was in charge of presenting the Brazilian position in the Committee that had the task to study the controversial question of the veto. He stated that Brazil “firmly” opposed, as a matter of principle, the granting of such power to the permanent members and did not believe in the effectiveness of the veto system for a quick action by the Council. The unanimity rule, adopted in the Council of the League of Nations, had demonstrated “in practice its inefficiency and it quickly became the unfortunate weapon that turned that organization untrusted”. Thereby, the Brazilian delegation would support all proposals to reduce the chances of exercising the veto. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate that the main concern of Brazil was to “contribute to the complete success of this Conference”, if no amendment reached the majority required for its adoption, so – if the Brazilian vote was “useful to form majority” – Brazil would vote in favor: “Such constructive step is given to show that we believe in the good faith that the four sponsoring powers [France was later included in the P-5] claim to be an unquestionable need for peacekeeping that they should have the right to veto and that we should trust they will use it in a prudent manner”.[266]

At the same time, with the support of other medium-sized powers, Brazil sought to advance a proposal for a periodic review of the Charter. In internal discussions, Freitas-Valle launched that idea, which became known in the hallways as the “Velloso amendment”, as a reference to the head of the Brazilian delegation. There would be a new constituent Conference, in which any change in the provisions of the Charter could be adopted by a majority of two-thirds (with no veto). That would be the way to make the public opinion in countries that opposed the veto understand and accept such a concession, intended to be provisional, of an emergency character. After a few years, the Charter would be reviewed and the anti-democratic privileges could be abolished.

Unfortunately, the Brazilian suggestion in the hope which expected to “soften the brutality of the granting of the veto”, was not enough to overturn the victorious motion of the sponsoring powers, which eventually prevailed (Article 108). Nor did the promised review of the Charter ten years later take place, as had been stipulated in Article 109. In 1955, when the General Assembly considered the matter, Freitas-Valle verified that the existing disharmony among the Member States and the cracks of the international scenario did not provide much hope to obtain support for the approval of a broad reform of the Charter: “This applies not only to its adoption in terms of votes, but also to the slower ratification process” (made dependent on the agreement of the P-5). Thus, realistically, the Brazilian delegation merely proposed a decision in favor of convening that Conference, leaving to the next session of the General Assembly the task of scheduling it for a future date (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 144). As it is known, that date was never set.

After the signing of the Charter, the United Nations Preparatory Commission met in London in order to take the practical measures for the convening of the 1st General Assembly. Represented by Freitas-Valle, Brazil participated in the work as one of the members of the Executive Committee. The general guideline, according to Leão Velloso, was “to follow the United States on issues of capital importance to its policy”. Once that work was completed in late 1945, Freitas-Valle sent to Itamaraty considerations about the preparation that was needed for the international meetings that Brazil would attend. He gathered practical suggestions in order to improve the efficiency of the service of the delegations, such as making arrangements in advance, collecting material regarding the schedule of the meetings, drafting instructions and appointing representatives in a timely manner so that they did not depart late. The lack of detailed instructions often led to improvisation. The Ministry, in Rio de Janeiro, should be equipped and centralize the tracking of each event. The delegations would also need to be provided with adequate staff, resources and facilities, including attention to payment of daily expenses. All that would help strengthen the country’s presence since “Brazilian importance did not exist for more than a quarter of a century” and now it would be “a reality”. However, Freitas-Valle considered that in order to maintain that situation of “preeminence”, it was crucial to ballast it with an efficient collaboration: “Not to do that would be to jeopardize that same prestige”.[267]

Freitas-Valle was the first to suggest to João Neves da Fontoura, in 1946, that a permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN in New York should be created. It is interesting to verify that, fifteen years later, according to his assessment, “the Mission’s work may be fascinating, but it is extreme”. He regretted that it had a limited staff for the needs of the job and the material conditions were precarious for the good exercise of the diplomatic function: remuneration, additional benefits and wage adjustments abroad. He also complained about the delay to receive answers to the consultations made to the Ministry. The lack of quick instructions led to all kinds of problems: “When there are no orders about a certain matter, deadlines, and opportunities to communicate points of view and to formulate suggestions are lost”. His proposal (later accepted) was to create a United Nations Division within the Foreign Ministry, “with qualified staff”, to improve the quality of service and give more agility to dispatches. Freitas-Valle feared that the delay in replying would diminish Itamaraty in the eyes of other Latin American countries (Vale Dico, p. 56).

Another historic moment happened in February 1946, when Brazil took on the Presidency of the Security Council, with Freitas-Valle as the head of the delegation. In drafts of his statement, he was “standing by, in the same way that the fireman does not need fire to be ready, and if any threat occurs to world peace, then soon I will have the duty to convene and put to work the Security Council,which during one month, rendered so much talk”. He recalled that the Council had been in charge of the Iranian complaint against the Soviet Union, the latter’s complaint against the presence of British troops in Greece, that of the Ukraine regarding the situation in Indonesia and, finally, the complaint made by Syria and Lebanon against maintaining British and French troops in their territories. “All these cases were solved or, at least, the Security Council was convinced that it indicated its solution”. The eleven members of the body were permanently represented in its headquarters, in order to be able to attend meetings immediately, whenever they were summoned. He claimed that Brazil had been performing “with clear votes” on principles that constituted the country’s foreign policy tradition.[268]

The Cold War and its multilateral impact

Freitas-Valle often referred to the fact that, in 1945, Brazil had shown its confidence in the ability of the major powers to use the veto “wisely”. In the face of the Cold War conflict, his main concern was “to rescue the spirit of San Francisco”, that is, to rescue the sense of unity that would have been the uniting element of the Alliance that defeated Fascism and guided the design of peace under the guarantee of the United Nations. The discredit that befell the UN, he said in 1949, was the result of the attitude of the States, or more precisely of the governments, who gave more attention to the interests attached to their “own subsistence”, rather than worrying in a genuine manner with the progress of the UN.

After the war, the idealism that had characterized the work of the delegations that attended the San Francisco Conference went into sharp decline. The unity of the major powers did not happen as expected:

Although it is admitted that international politics should not be subject to violent changes, it is no less real that it is extremely difficult to maintain the balance in a structure whose foundations have been established under the auspices of a group of countries that, since the beginning of the work, lost the capacity for mutual understanding and began to walk along antagonistic paths in the sphere of collective security.

He explained that it was not the UN that was wrong, “but the world itself” (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 83).

The Western countries dominated the early years of the UN. With more members, the bloc led by the United States, which included Brazil, was able to approve, by vote, resolutions of their interest in the General Assembly. In the Security Council, however, the Soviet Union used its veto power to block decisions that it believed could damage its interests (from 1946 to 1955, the Soviet delegation used the veto 75 times). It should be recalled that Brazil had severed diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1947, amid an atmosphere of external antagonism and of a virulent anti-Communist campaign by Dutra’s government internally.

The year 1949 was especially tense. As early as January, in Moscow, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecom) was established among the Eastern European countries. In April the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also established fo forge a military alliance among the Western countries opposed to the Socialist bloc. In the Central Europe, the German territory was divided into two distinct States. As if that was not enough, in August the USSR tested its first atomic bomb and broke up the American nuclear monopoly.

That context of confrontation had intense repercussions at the UN, where the Soviet government proposed, to the surprise of many, a “new peace pact”. In the debate on the subject in Lake Success, in November 1949, Freitas-Valle stated that Brazil would vote against the proposal and expressed himself in the following manner:

The United Nations Charter is the most beautiful instrument of international cooperation that man has ever elaborated, such a perfect and balanced document that the world’s governments consented to take the unexpected measure to admit that five among them, due to services rendered in the domination of Nazi-Fascism and to the strength and fidelity they had shown, had primary responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security. Mr. President, it was not easy to take such a measure, but we did so because we had full confidence in the five permanent members of the Security Council. [...] Unfortunately, the Soviet Union was not favorably disposed towards this. As a result, the fear of war, of a new total war, became once again the constant obsession of all of us. In addition, this kind of concern is extremely harmful, because it can lead people to lose faith in the United Nations.

Later, he regretted that the veto, intended to be used in an “exceptional and conscientious manner, “had become an instrument of pressure and partisanship”. He added that both the TIAR and NATO were regional agreements that fit the Charter clauses and that “they were celebrated only because of the Soviet policy of obstructing the peace mechanism of this organization”. He concluded: “If the Soviet Union persists in its current tactic of disturbing the normal life of peaceful nations, through an unrestrained imperialist expansion, we can only stick to the security clauses of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and of the Atlantic Pact”. The difficulty caused by the “abuse of the right of veto” was coherent with to the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Brazilian diplomacy. According to Freitas-Valle, “the Soviet foreign policy and communist propaganda are inseparable phenomena, as we all know”. He considered the growth of communism as being dangerous and he abhorred “the dissemination of a wicked creed throughout the world, in an insane anarchy fever”. The acrimony that stopped the action of the Security Council had a defined guilty party, according to him: Moscow was inciting “the growing condemnation by the whole world with its negative attitude”.[269]

In that loaded context, under the threat of a nuclear conflagration, security issues were high on the agenda. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States mobilized the General Assembly instead of the Security Council, which resulted in the adoption of the famous resolution Uniting for Peace, of 1950. Freitas-Valle considered the American proposal “downright subversive” in relation to the original plan of the United Nations. He admitted, however, that the delegates changed his point of view “because of the need” (the resolution was approved by 52 votes in favor, including Brazil, five against and two abstentions). This episode demonstrated, for better or for worse, the ability of the Organization to adapt to different political scenarios. Although the Charter is virtually the same as it was in 1945, the practice of States can produce new formulas or mechanisms, not always legally well founded – and much less seen as consensual.

In the discursive sphere, Freitas-Valle sought to safeguard the congruence of the Brazilian conduct, in line with his proposition that nobody “would discuss the honesty of Brazilian international purposes”.[270] Aware that political expediency does not resist for long without support from international legitimacy, he went on to argue that it was necessary to better equip the Organization with a view to establishing an international force or a system for the immediate mobilization of common resources that Member States could contribute. He deplored the fact that the UN had not been able to put together a military force to ensure an energetic action wherever there was a threat of aggression or imminent breach of peace. Therefore, in the 11th General Assembly, he welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force to intervene in the Suez conflict. He saw that experience as a possible core “from where it will emanate the force that will give this Organization the physical power that it has been lacking so much” (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 152).

In fact, UNEF I was later considered, in the classic sense, the first strictu sensu peacekeeping operation, since it used troops under the UN flag, wearing blue helmets, to create a buffer zone and oversee the withdrawal of the warring forces at Suez.[271] In a way, Freitas-Valle collaborated for the concept to be strengthened. He was in charge of presenting, in 1956, Brazilian suggestions to endow the UN of ways to act at the right time. The Brazilian proposal foresaw that the armed forces of each Member State should have, on permanent basis, one or more units always at the disposal of the United Nations. The size of those units, would be defined sovereignly by the interested government according to its ability to contribute. Freitas-Valle said that

the psychological effect obtained, if that suggestion was accepted, might create, in global bases, a feeling of greater respect for our Organization, and the convening of troops in compliance with resolutions adopted by both the Security Council and the General Assembly would become a normal procedure. (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 155).

Obstacles and adversities were common in the daily work in New York. As Freitas-Valle understood it, the Organization was conceived “not to complicate, but to simplify international life.” He was worried about the excessive and loosely meetings of organs, functions, agencies, funds, programs, bodies and various other forums: “The result of that is the almost automatic creation of institutions and commissions to solve problems submitted on a daily basis to the Organization as being new ones. The problem is not solved, but an international apparatus to study it is immediately created, which only turns it more complicated and with a more difficult solution”. Consistent with his operational vision of doing things, he did not consider auspicious the exponential increase in the amount of meetings. Quantity did not mean quality nor guarantee of effectiveness. The excessive proliferation of activities of the UN and its specialized agencies could result in overlapping, that is, redundant and unworkable services. Satisfactory conclusions were not reached in the same proportion as the effort expended. Once a certain problem was detected, a committee was created to analyze the matter and to submit a report, followed by other studies and technical meetings that continuously fed themselves automatically.

Once the works of the 4th General Assembly were concluded, Freitas-Valle noted that, among the decisions taken, a Brazilian proposal to try to contain this trend, and turn the administrative machine leaner to obtain greater budget savings,[272] had been accepted by a unanimous vote of the 59 nations represented. In that same vein, he advocated greater fairness in the distribution of posts in the Secretariat. He wrote to the Secretary-General Trygve Lie specifically to request more transparent criteria: “Without a broad geographical representation of nationalities on its staff, the United Nations Secretariat would not be able to acquire a broad international profile, a combination of culture and experience and impartiality essential to the performance of its functions”.[273]

Last but not least, the question of development also stood out in his list of concerns. Freitas-Valle spoke about the need for “greater effort to correct the tremendous disparity of economic development among the various regions of the world.” This was one of the main purposes of the Organization. He argued that Brazil should apply for membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in which it could submit its claims with more authority as a developing country. His goal was not to require that all countries should be “equally rich,” but that inequality in the international arena, including the deterioration of terms of trade or protectionism, did not represent an additional obstacle to the well-being and quality of life in poor countries.

The industrialization of the underdeveloped countries and the price stabilization of primary products were recurring themes on the ECOSOC agenda in the 1950’s. Unfortunately, disenchantment soon came. The scarce results were cause for criticism by the Brazilian delegation, which accused the organ of being “old-fashioned and negligent”, unable to close the growing gap between rich and poor countries. Freitas-Valle complained that part of the problem arose from the deep ideological division between capitalist and socialist countries. Bloc politics affected the least developed countries,

whose peoples can no longer accept underdevelopment, in a desperate search of the means by which they can speed up their development process, involving themselves in various systems of military alliance in the hope that we can count on larger aid by leaders or subleaders of these systems (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 153).

The bonds of the Cold War could not be easily undone.

Against the “duplication of the vote”

During a lecture he made in 1950, Freitas-Valle praised the cooperation with the United States, according to the Brazilian Government’s official position:

A recurrent factor of Brazilian foreign policy has been our close alliance with the United States of America. However, that is not the result of planning, but the spontaneous product of Brazilian political genius. All men, of all parties, in the Empire and the Republic, always considered the intimate understanding with the United States the cornerstone of our foreign policy. It is natural, therefore, that our intimacy always increases. Two wars in common, in which we enter at a risky moment, contributed to accentuate among us a spirit of collaboration, which is indispensable both for them and for us.[274]

However, it is necessary to tint his public statements and confront them with his real thought about the meaning of the relationship that Brazil should maintain with the greatest power in the world. Even during the war, Freitas-Valle was one of those concerned with the effects of a priori alignment in foreign policy. In 1944, he wrote a private letter to Leão Velloso to caution him about this matter that he believed “it was wrong within the correct policy by the Itamaraty of friendship with Washington: to always know, in any international event, that Brazil will be invariably with the United States”. He understood that forming a bloc with the American countries might not be, in all circumstances, the best for Brazil. The problem would be the loss of credibility caused by the perception that the Brazilian vote in multilateral forums was already known in advance. “I am not naive enough to ignore how much we need the United States and to follow its policy. But we’re actually harming it when the others consider us their servants”. Other countries, for example, would be opposed to a permanent seat for Brazil at the Security Council if that represented a “duplication of the American vote”. That belief, he said, did not serve either Washington or Rio de Janeiro, since “in order to make our common policy triumph, they need to respect our opinions every now and then and always our interests”.[275]

Freitas-Valle sustained that critical view on other occasions, even in disagreement with the line established by his Government. His repairs had to do with the rigidity of a position that, on the contrary, should be considered on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with national interest. As a non-permanent member of the Security Council, in the 1946-47 period, Brazil followed the American vote. Freitas-Valle alerted his bosses to the risks inherent in the lack of flexibility in his statements: “it always seemed to me that the Brazilian representative should not try to agree, systematically, his votes to those of the Americans, which weakens its position, since it creates the impression of duplication of votes”.[276] After Brazil was elected for its second term, in 1951-52, he said that the delegation should have the ability to act with autonomy and firmness, because of the “clarity of our attitude, defending principles of international cooperation and not bending the Brazilian delegates in the face of difficulties arising, to serve or contradict interests of this or that country”.[277] Providing a basis for his thought was the perception that automatism would weaken the possibility of obtaining a permanent seat, in so far as the possibility of a “double vote” generated mistrust in other countries and caused support to diminish.

Another aspect that invited reflection was his defense of principism as a multilateral strategy. According to him:

When we all believed (more than today) in the UN, still writing from London, I insisted to Itamaraty that temporary members of the Security Council focused on the principles, not getting involved in the concrete cases, except to make up high-level decisions.[278]

This feature of his thought has two conflicting elements. Firstly, it is suggested that a posture based on principles is the most appropriate one as a guide to take on positions, which certainly provides a right prescription from the point of view of the formulation of a policy that intends to be consistent, based on international law and on other basic principles of relations among the States. His second suggestion, however, proposed the lack of engagement in concrete cases, except to “compose high-level decisions”, which seems to indicate that, as a rule, the Brazilian delegation should not participate in the debates when they were outside the realm of principles and entered the contentious sphere of the clashing interests. In those situations, Brazil would only contribute with its vote, but without intervening in the matter as such.

Freitas-Valle’s recommendation fits nicely within the guidelines of foreign policy of his time: a country with limited economic interests, modest ambitions and scarce projection outside its region. For a reasonable multilateral performance at that time, it was enough to protect itself under the cloak of principled statements and to abstain in major discussions. When it was the case, Brazil would follow the consensus or, a more common hypothesis during the Cold War, it would help make up a decision that the Western pro-USA bloc had approved. It is clear that there is nothing wrong about joining a position, regardless of what it might be, if it actually corresponds to the national interests, to Brazilian values and to its worldview. The difficulty emerges when, a priori, the Brazilian vote is defined without a critical consideration of the problem, from all possible angles and regardless of the definition of its own position, as well, which may coincide (or not) with the position of another country or group of countries.

Public service at Itamaraty: “not just a job”

Shortly before his retirement, in 1961, Freitas-Valle sent from New York a series of telegrams that he entitled Vale Dico (from Latin meaning, “I say goodbye”). His purpose was to share the knowledge he had acquired in 43 years of career, which he called “knowledge from actual experiences”. He did not try to carry out high politics analyses about the major themes of foreign affairs. He focused on management and on the operational aspects of daily life, inserting here and there some personal recollections.

For him, working needs were definitely more important than the convenience of the employee. He was annoyed with the cases of abuse in the enjoyment of vacations and removals, claiming that he rarely used that benefit. He was constantly worried about the form, the protocol and the worship of the vernacular, which he believed was a tradition of the correspondence at Itamaraty. The service had to be “pure and neat”, from the writing of protocols to technical opinions, from archive to cryptography. His often irreducible stance made many people consider him a severe and disciplinarian boss, who demanded the work to be carried out to the letter and the full devotion of the employees. That motivated the nickname he received after he took on the General Secretariat of Itamaraty for the first time, in 1939: Broadway Dragon.

He valued the “silent work” that was made in the House, which he also called, in a more self-sacrificing and ascetic tone, “spirit of contrition”. He always repeated that the diplomat’s mission was to think about the nation’s permanent interests, “Brazil of tomorrow and 50 years from now”[279]. He called such mental attitude as a “sense of projection”. Even taking into account the past experience and current reality, long-term had to be on the agenda of the international operators. This was his strategic view of diplomacy as vanguard of a country that still had to be built. It is not enough to defend present-day Brazil. It is necessary to act with future perspective and prepare the field now for a country that is changing, which will be something else in a few decades. He considered this a task inherent to the diplomatic profession when exercised with zeal and responsibility.

Freitas-Valle was the typical representative of a time that no longer exists. The old-fashioned Itamaraty, headquartered in Rio, was restricted to an elite and relatively small core of people who knew each other or who often were relatives or old friends. There were those who proudly cultivated the belief that they belonged to a selected group of connoisseurs with their own peculiarities and idiosyncrasies, many of whom descended from aristocrats or from traditional families. In fact, they were rarely in contact with the deep Brazil that represented the reality of most of the population. The emphasis in the protocol and their isolation in relation to society often contributed to derail professional priorities.[280]

Needless to say over the last few years, the social composition, habits and available technologies in Itamaraty are also clearly changing. The challenges of the 21st century are such that there is no handbook good enough to guide any student of the Rio Branco Institute, regardless of how well they are trained, to the situations that they will inexorably have to deal with in real life. In the 1950’s, Freitas-Valle foresaw that the transformations that were taking place were already starting to have an impact on the traditional organization of the Ministry: “The formulation of a foreign policy is, by its own nature, very complex and a single man as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot take on such a great task”. Itamaraty was “made to explain Brazil to the foreigner and the foreigner to Brazil”. He acknowledged, at the same time, the need for openness and dialogue with other government agencies, with Congress and civil society.[281]

Freitas-Valle supported the project to create a permanent Consultative Foreign Policy Council, in charge of discussing diplomatic policy with former Foreign Ministers, the Committes of Foreign Affairs of the Senate and the House of Representatives and other authorities. In the UN, he gave attention to the composition of the delegations to the General Assembly: he advocated the appointment of Congressmen or personalities from public life to act as delegates to represent the country’s interests, regardless of its partisan filiation “being in favor of the government or against it”. He understood that Itamaraty should fully take on its role of ultimate coordinator of governmental actions in the international arena. Finally, his warnings and suggestions show his commitment to foster motivation and the high level of the work to be carried out:

Itamaraty must create volume within the national opinion. [...] The staff of the Ministry must be sure that each one of us, large or small, have a mission to fulfill, rather than only a job. Within our staff there is such hedonism that it justifies the phrase, popular there, that some of our staff serve for everything and many for nothing at all. Most of the staff does only what it is specifically ordered to do, according to the justified belief that the person who does not do anything cannot make any mistake. There is an absolute absence of esprit de corps and a flagrant lack of concern for collective work.[282]

Conclusion

A distinctive feature of Freitas-Valle’s diplomatic thought was the notion that the United Nations reflected the wish and the state of the relations among its Member-States, embedded in the condition given by world politics in a certain historical context. Because of that, the work in the UN was basically political, even when the discussion seemed technical. Decades after its creation, international analysts do not hesitate to agree on that, but few people had the merit to distinguish it so quickly. As he stated in the beginning of the Organization: “The United Nations currently suffer from the same evil as the world. If the five Foreign Ministers [of the P-5] do not reach an agreement, how can the Security Council work?”.[283]

Freitas-Valle was aware of the tension between the outside world and the somewhat hermetic reality that multilateral space builds for itself. Those two worlds may often communicate with one another, get into conflict or remain apart from each other for a long time. The diligent representative may believe for one moment that procedure and the legal apparatus of multilateralism – in addition to much effort and some creativity – will provide the key to unlock the problems. However, the outcome is often conditioned by forces and elements that belong to the “outside” world, despite what is said or done at the negotiation room or at the plenary.

In that sense, Freitas-Valle was a witness of how the UN changes itself, even though its Charter remains unchanged. As it was originally thought, the Security Council would be at the center of power of the institution, the main task of which was to preserve peace. The Cold War jeopardized that assumption.[284] Even though the Council remained a restricted committee with undeniable powers, its paralysis due to the veto turned the organ less able to carry out its function according to those who conceived it. It was necessary to wait for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the changes of the 1990’s for the dynamics of the Council to acquire another meaning.

The Security Council is often related to power (its ability to impose decisions), while the General Assembly, since its resolutions are non-binding, is related mainly to representativity (its universal character). Such dichotomy, which arises out of the Charter’s structure, must not be treated as an unchangeable element. There is broad space for States to claim – and that actually already occurs – that the General Assembly should have its role strengthened and the Council be more representative, which would result in the reinforcement of its legitimacy in the long run. The combination of those two changes would be beneficial for the Organization since it could enable the unbalances present at the Charter to de addressed. Freitas-Valle knew about the importance to ensure a future reform of the text. After all, in San Francisco, he was the one who had the idea, which Brazil supported, to call a Review Conference after a few years. That wide reform is still to come, but Cyro’s thought might serve as an inspiration for the new generations that seek to harmonize what is ideal and the possible in the fulfillment of national goals.

Sources and bibliography

CFV/CPDOC Archive

Cyro de Freitas-Valle’s Archive is at the Center for Research and Documentation in Contemporary History (CPDOC) of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, in Rio de Janeiro.

AHI-Rio de Janeiro and CDO-Brasília.

Documents about the Brazilian participation in the United Nations may be researched at the Itamaraty’s Historical Archive (AHI), in Rio de Janeiro and, for the most recent part, in the archives of the Coordination of Diplomatic Documentation (CDO), of the Department of Communications and Documentation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brasília.

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______. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Relatório da Delegação do Brasil à Conferência das Nações Unidas Para a Organização Internacional. Rio de Janeiro: mimeo, 1945.

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______. Entre América e Europa: A Política Externa Brasileira na Década de 1920. Brasília: Ed. UnB/FUNAG, 2006.

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WEIS, Warren Michael. Cold Warriors & Coups d’État: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993.

José Carlos de Macedo Soares

José Carlos de Macedo Soares, the son of José Eduardo de Macedo Soares and Cândida de Azevedo Sodré de Macedo Soares, was born on October 6, 1883 in São Paulo. He graduated from the Largo São Francisco Law School, in São Paulo, in 1905. A respected lawyer, he married Matilde Melchert da Fonseca in 1908, the daughter of a wealthy São Paulo family. He worked in the law, as well as in his family’s school. He was also a leader in a São Paulo business group, a position that caused him to become a mediator in the July 1924 Revolta Paulista (São Paulo rebellion). When the rebellion was over, however, he was accused of collaborating with the rebels, and he was arrested. Freed a month later, he went to Paris, where he lived in exile from 1924 to 1927, writing two books while he was there. Back in Brazil, he supported the Liberal Alliance and the Revolution of 1930 that brought Getúlio Vargas to power. In 1932, he headed special diplomatic missions, among which was the Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva. In 1933/34, he was a representative to the national Constituent Assembly, and from 1934 to 1936, he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position in which he distinguished himself during negotiations that led to peace between Bolivia and Paraguay, in 1935. He was also the Minister of Justice in 1937 but, unhappy with the direction of the government, he resigned shortly before the coup d’état that established the Estado Novo of the Getúlio Vargas government.

In addition to his private and political work, Macedo Soares was also the president of a number of prestigious institutes, including the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, for Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), the Brazilian Academy of Letters (ABL, for Academia Brasileira de Letras), and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and History (IHGB, for Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro). After Getúlio Vargas was deposed, in 1945, Macedo Soares was appointed the federal interventor (provisional governor) of São Paulo state, a post he occupied until 1947. In 1955, interim president Nereu Ramos appointed him to head the foreign office for a second time. Among other achievements during that tenure, he created the Museu e Arquivo Histórico e Diplomatico (MHD), in the Palácio Itamaraty in Rio de Janeiro. President Juscelino Kubitschek kept him in the position when he came into office, in 1956, but Macedo Soares had personal disagreements with the government at the time of introduction of the Operação Pan-Americana (OPA), and he resigned in July 1958.

José Carlos de Macedo Soares died on January 28, 1968, in his native São Paulo, at the age of 84.

José Carlos de Macedo Soares: liberal, nationalist and democrat

Guilherme Frazão Conduru

This paper outlines the contributions of José Carlos de Macedo Soares (1883-1968) to Brazilian foreign policy. It puts into context, the performance of this statesman in important events of Brazilian political and diplomatic history. It also seeks to identify the characteristics of the thought of this man who twice served his country as foreign minister. The facts are presented in an episodic manner without biographic intention, to provide the reader with highlights that might serve as a guide to a closer investigation of Macedo Soares’ character and, in turn, as benchmarks for comparative evaluations of other leading figures in Brazilian foreign policy.

José Carlos de Macedo Soares was a leader of action. In his varied professional life, he worked as a teacher, a secondary school principal, a São Paulo businessman, and a lawyer, as well as the executive director of a number of public institutes. In the political sphere, Macedo Soares was a state secretary, a representative to the constituent assembly of 1934, a state Interventor (appointed governor), and a cabinet minister. From the time of the second Revolta Tenentista (revolt of the “lieutenants,” or low-ranking Army officers), in São Paulo, in 1924, until the Conference of Punta del Este, in 1962, he was present in many of the important events of Brazil’s domestic and foreign politics. This paper concentrates on his presence in the diplomatic arena.

The son of an enterprising pharmacist from a wealthy family, originally from the state of Rio de Janeiro, Macedo Soares, with his education in law, was a typical representative of the urban liberal elite of São Paulo. In 1882, his father, José Eduardo de Macedo Soares, had emigrated with his family from the hinterland of Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo, the capital of the fastest growing Brazilian province, which at the time was also beginning to receive a large influx of immigrants. In São Paulo, José Eduardo founded a secondary school that bore the family name, and the future minister eventually became the school’s director (AMARAL, 1983, p. 14).

In addition to exercising various professional activities, José Carlos de Macedo Soares also distinguished himself as an intellectual, particularly in the field of history. In the technical and administrative arenas, he made important contributions to the government’s usage of statistics and geography, as for 15 years he was the president of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, for Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística). Additionally, in 1955, when he was the country’s foreign minister for a second time, he created the Historical and Diplomatic Museum of Itamaraty Palace (MHD, for Museu e Arquivo Histórico e Diplomatico Palácio Itamaraty), an entity devoted to the preservation and divulgence of Brazil’s diplomatic history.

As a precondition to evaluating Macedo Soares’ thought on diplomatic relations and foreign policy, it is useful to know something about his political performance. We will, therefore, describe his participation in different historical periods, when he distinguished himself with his sense of ethics, his loyalty to the democratic system of government, and his search for a conciliation of views and interests.

From local to national and international: projection in the political scenario

Mediation, arrest and self-exile: acting during the Revolt of 1924 in São Paulo

A decade before his first appointment to the position of foreign minister, José Carlos de Macedo Soares had already played a major role in the public life of his country. On July 5, 1924, a military rebellion, part of the cycle of rebellions known as tenentismo (named for junior Army officers, including lieutenants), took place in São Paulo. The matter became complicated after the state government and its armed forces withdrew from the site of the protest, leaving an absence of legal authority. Macedo Soares, then the president of the commercial association of São Paulo, spoke with leaders on both sides. He led actions to defend order and protect property, seeking to limit the destructive effects of the confrontations on the city and the population of São Paulo. To prevent looting and the destruction of warehouses and shops, he obtained the cooperation of the rebels to support the municipal militia and restore order. He signed several dispatches and bulletins written to the population at large, and he asked – unsuccessfully, as it turned out – that the legal forces spare the city from bombardment. In addition to the local destruction, he was concerned with the negative repercussions the continued fighting would have in the international sphere, as São Paulo had a large amount of foreign interests and investments (AMARAL, 1983, p. 25-49). To demonstrate his commitment, during the period of revolt, July 5 to 28, Macedo Soares hosted negotiations in his home, to search for an to end the hostilities. At one point, general Isidoro Dias Lopes (1865-1949), the leader of the rebels, even proposed that Macedo Soares become a governor of São Paulo, in a triumvirate that would also have included two military officials. Soares, however, refused the suggestion, claiming that since the beginning of the conflict, he had only positioned himself to defend the law and the established authorities.

When the conflict ended in late July, however, the federal government of President Artur Bernardes (born 1875 - died 1955) accused Macedo Soares of having collaborated with the rebels. He was arrested on August 4 and transferred to Rio de Janeiro the next day. Although he was freed on September 22, and the city of São Paulo hosted a great popular demonstration in his honor, he did not attend it, as pressure from police authorities led him to avoid the capital. In December of that year, he decided to go to Europe in exile, and for the next three and a half years, he lived in Paris (AMARAL, 1983, p. 50-9; GUIMARÃES, 2008, p. 8).

A host of Getúlio Vargas in São Paulo: giving support to the Revolution of 1930

Although he acknowledged the role that political parties play as organizers of opinion and instruments of democracy, Macedo Soares’ enthusiasm to serve the public cause did not “mean a submission to a partisan political life.” He did not, for example, join the Partido Democrático (PD), which had been organized by Councilor Antonio Prado (1840-1929), in 1926, as an offshoot opposition to the Partido Republicano Paulista (PRP). When the Liberal Alliance was created, in 1929 – combining the forces of the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais – however, he did join its ranks (SOARES, 1937, p. 19-35). He also aligned himself with the revolutionaries of 1930, eventually becoming the Interior Secretary of the state of São Paulo in the first government established after the ousting of Washington Luís (1869-1957) from the presidency on October 24, 1930. The cabinet then established included mostly members from the Partido Democratico, which had become part of the Liberal Alliance. He did not, however, have direct participation in the movement that arose on October 3rd.

When Getúlio Vargas (1882-1954) arrived in São Paulo on October 29, 1930, enroute to the federal capital of Rio de Janeiro, he nominated a veteran from the tenentista rebellions, Colonel João Alberto Lins e Barros (1897-1955), as his military advisor. He convinced members of the Partido Democratico to accept his nomination, and they remained with most of the civilian offices of the cabinet. During his brief stay in São Paulo, Vargas, the leader of the Revolution stayed in the house of José Carlos de Macedo Soares; it was then that they began a relationship of mutual friendship and respect (GUIMARÃES, 2008, p. 8).

During the 40 days that Macedo Soares was the Interior Secretary of São Paulo, he began the task of modernizing its archives. He also took measures to improve the quality of education in the state’s technical schools, and he paid attention to the Instituto Butantã, a biological research facility, in addition to the state’s medical school. The divergences between João Alberto, the appointed governor of the state, and the federal cabinet soon, however, became serious. In December 1930, the discretionary arrest of members of the Republican Party of São Paulo and the nomination of members of the Democratic Party to positions as deputies of the chief of police, Vicente Rao (1892-1978), – contrary to the wishes of the Interventor – led to the collective firing of the entire civilian cabinet. In April 1931, there was a failed coup attempt against João Alberto, which caused the arrest of more than 200 civilians and military individuals related to the Democratic Party. It was in this context – with a lack of compatibility between the federally appointed Interventor and state politics – that Macedo Soares established a strong relationship with Getúlio Vargas, which allowed him to intercede on behalf of his state (CARONE, 1974, p. 289-94; GUIMARÃES, 2008, p. 8).

Ambassador: between a commitment to his state and loyalty to the Head of State

In 1932, Macedo Soares was nominated to head the Brazilian delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and the XVI International Conference on Labor, which convened in Geneva. The Conference on Disarmament, called by the League of Nations, did not lead to any formal commitment. Indeed, Germany, which had been unarmed at Versailles and had not obtained its desired equality of rights, decided to withdraw from both the conference and from the League of Nations.

Macedo Soares performance at the Conference garnered praise from the president of the United States, Herbert Hoover (1874-1964) (OLIVEIRA, 1968, p. 52). That same year, he was nominated to represent Brazil as the special and plenipotentiary ambassador to the special mission paying tribute to general Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) as well as to the opening of a monument in Rome honoring the memory of Anita Garibaldi (1821-1849), both of whom had participated in the Farroupilha Revolution in southern Brazil in the late 1830s. Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) received him, when he assisted the Holy See on matters concerning bilateral relations between the Vatican and the Quirinal Palace – then the residence of the Italian royalty – which rendered him privileged access to the Vatican (BOSI, 2008, p. 50).

When he became aware of a rebellion begun in São Paulo, on July 9, 1932, calling for the state’s autonomy and the constitutionalisation of the country, Macedo Soares resigned from his diplomatic missions by means of a telegram addressed to the foreign minister, Afrânio de Melo Franco (1870-1943). On that same day, he informed Getúlio Vargas of his resignation and, confident of the conciliatory spirit of the Brazilian leader, he pointed out that, “the conflict cannot have a military solution; it will only have a political [one].” In response, Vargas said that Macedo Soares’ return would be appropriate, to collaborate in the restoration of peace.

During the crisis between the São Paulo political class and representatives imposed by the provisional government, Macedo Soares took a stand against the policies of the federal government. Nominated to head the diplomatic mission of Brazil in Brussels, he did not take the post for reasons that he said were “on behalf of the autonomy of São Paulo.” He risked taking the ambiguous position of defending the restoration of the state’s autonomy, while also trusting Vargas’ leadership and his “extraordinary qualities of political spirit” (SOARES, 1937, p. 26-8).

In new correspondence with Vargas, Macedo Soares informed the Brazilian leader of his willingness to participate in negotiations, in order to end the fratricidal fight. In his letter, he said he would return to Brazil earlier than planned, if Vargas thought that would be useful. In an expression of honesty and loyalty – both to his state’s political leadership and to the national head of state – the Ambassador confirmed that, regardless of what happened, he was firmly with those from his state. “I would rather lose with São Paulo than win against it,” he said (cited in SILVA, 1967, p. 171-176).

Constituent Representative on the Single Slate for a United São Paulo” (1933-1934)

In the elections that took place for the Constituent National Assembly, on May 3, 1933,[285] Macedo Soares was one of the representatives elected on the “United São Paulo” slate that included members of the Partido Democratico and the Partido Republicano Paulista. During the debates of the Constituent Assembly, which was installed on November 15, 1933, Macedo Soares, again, maintained a neutral profile, taking on the difficult position of supporting his fellow members from São Paulo, while also remaining loyal to Vargas.

Even before the installation of the Constituent Assembly, the Vargas government was greatly concerned with the control it would have over the writing of the country’s new constitution. Beyond the antagonism that existed between those who favored centralization and those who supported more autonomy for the states, there was also the issue of Vargas’ own continuity in power. Most of the elected representatives supported the government, which had made an effort to consolidate ties with the state oligarchies, articulated around the appointed governors, the Interventors. This situation produced a plan to alternate political support, similar to that which had occurred during the First Republic. The opposition was concentrated in the remaining members of the “lieutenants’ movement,” the opposition of the state oligarchies, and the São Paulo delegation (SILVA, 1969, p. 30-1).

Early in the workings of the Constituent Assembly, a telephone conversation between Macedo Soares, in Rio de Janeiro, and Armando de Sales Oliveira (1887-1945), then the Interventor in São Paulo, was recorded and transcribed for Vargas. This example of the discretionary powers of the head of state demonstrated his ability to follow – even through illegal means – the politics of the Constituent process, thereby exposing limitations on the full exercise of democracy during the era. In that telephone conversation, Macedo Soares described the environment on the first day of meetings at the Assembly, as being antagonistic towards paulistas (members from the state of São Paulo). He explained to the Interventor that it would be best if the representatives abandoned a confrontational and revengeful stance in relation to the government (SILVA, 1969, p. 50 e 123-4).

In an April 8, 1934 letter to Vargas, Soares complained of the difficulties he had with the paulistas, saying that measures that could have been taken, to garner their support – such as an amnesty; the re-employment of those who had lost their jobs after the 1932 rebellion; an end to the military occupation, and the removal of military personnel deemed incompatible with the state government – had not been taken.

In a new letter, dated April 11, Soares informed Vargas of the decision of the paulistas to submit an amendment, to prevent the election of the head of the provisional government [Vargas],the then current cabinet ministers, as well as the Interventors. The letter also said that the paulistas would not support any other candidate. It added that most of the Brazilian military were against the liberal democracy, and it warned that the candidacy of general Góes Monteiro (1889-1956) would represent an antidemocratic solution. And, as a way to denounce what they considered to be Vargas’ neglect of their interests, the letter insisted on the “need to coordinate the political currents of Brazil” (SILVA, 1969, p. 463-5).

The new constitution was promulgated on July 16, 1934. The next day, the Constituent National Assembly elected Getúlio Vargas as president of the Republic, and he was inaugurated four days later. Vargas chose a new cabinet, in which he kept only the ministers of the Navy and of War. José Carlos de Macedo Soares was the first foreign minister of the new constitutional government of Vargas, and Vicente Rao, from São Paulo, was selected as the minister of Justice and Internal Affairs. One reason for the selection of Macedo Soares could have been that it was in Vargas’ interests to cultivate the paulista elite and its political representation; it could also, however, have been that Vargas was acknowledging the support he had received during the writing of the constitution, as demonstrated by Soares’ stands of moderation and neutrality.

As a Minister of State under Vargas: at Itamaraty and Justice (1934-1936 and 1937)

Macedo Soares replaced Félix de Barros Cavalcanti de Lacerda (1880-1950) as the head of Itamaraty on July 26, 1934. Lacerda, a career diplomat, had been general-secretary when Afrânio de Melo Franco, the first foreign minister of the regime established by the Revolution of 1930, resigned on December 28, 1933. In full constituent process, Vargas decided to keep the general-Secretary as minister, first as acting, then as titular.

Inaugural address at Itamaraty: giving value to tradition and continuity

In his inaugural address at Itamaraty, Macedo Soares mentioned all the foreign ministers who had preceded him, beginning with the Baron of Rio Branco (1845-1912). He also invoked tradition as the reference for the behavior he would take on. Macedo Soares identified foreign policy as a “conservative” function, an issue of international continuity and credibility. He ascribed importance to precedents and historical antecedents as the sources upon which to make decisions and, consequently, he emphasized the need to maintain the archives in an organized fashion (SOARES, 1937, p. 11-4).

In the introduction to a report referring to events of 1934, Macedo Soares stated his thoughts on the relations between tradition, foreign policy, and history:

No department of public administration is so tied to the past as the ministry of which I am in charge. It has responsibility for the country’s foreign policy, and [as such] it represents the nation internationally. Even before [political] parties and governments, its basic feature is continuity. [...]. In the conduct of foreign policy [...] one can sense the essence of the nation, an inherent force, marching in a movement intertwined with tradition and the future – the permanent nation, with its basic problems and its unchanging principles, over which we have to keep watch so that they remains eternal, unperishable. This is the basic reason of all foreign policy of a nation. Thus, the administration of the Ministry and its political guidance are subordinate to this very conservative concept. This is, therefore, the basis of all our research, our quest to find solutions to international problems; it takes precedence over everything we do.[286]

For Macedo Soares – a servant of the country and, therefore, an advocate of the nation state – the nation is natural, “permanent,” “eternal,” “unperishable.” This justifies his attachment to tradition and the value he places on continuity, in addition to his belief in a conservative foreign policy. Although the content of tradition has not been elaborated in terms of doctrine – since tradition is a value in itself, a positive that defines the nation, and gives it international legitimacy – a pacifistic dimension of Brazilian diplomacy was also implicit there. In that sense, all good foreign policy should be conservative, that is, attached to tradition and based on “precedent.” In addition, pacifism would be Brazil’s diplomatic tradition. There would be the defense of peace and the search for peaceful solutions to international controversies.

Instinct of conciliation in the negotiations to end the Chaco War

From May 16 to June 8, 1935, aboard the battleship São Paulo, Getúlio Vargas conducted the so-called “journey to the Plata,” the second official journey of a Brazilian president abroad.[287] The trip included visits to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, in return for visits to Rio de Janeiro by the president of Argentina, general Agustín Pedro Justo (1876-1943), in October 1933, and the president of Uruguay, Gabriel Terra (1873-1942), in August the following year. In Buenos Aires, the visit coincided, by design, with the beginning of another round of negotiations, in an attempt to establish peace between Paraguay and Bolivia. The negotiations resulted in the end of the war that had been fought, since 1932, over the sovereignty of the broad region of the Chaco Boreal. The war had depleted both countries. The role of Macedo Soares, who remained in Buenos Aires after Vargas went on to Montevideo, was praised in the Brazilian official record of diplomatic mediation. The negotiations led to the signing of the Protocol on the Calling of a Peace Conference (DANESE, 1999, p. 292-6).

After successive attempts at mediation, involving the neighboring countries, the United States, and the League of Nations – in which conflicting strategic interests reflected the need for diplomatic leadership – the negotiations conducted in Buenos Aires, in May and June 1935, ended the hostilities. Then, illustrative of the rivalries in the region, Brazil was initially not included as an addressee on the invitation made by the foreign offices of Argentina and Chile for a conference on economic issues resulting from the conflict. Attributed to a typing error, the omission was later excused, but not before Macedo Soares expressed his surprise in a note to the ministers of Argentina and Chile in Rio de Janeiro, concerning the absences of Brazil, United States and Uruguay. The reaction to the incident caused discord between Macedo Soares, who had planned to place Rio de Janeiro at the center of the negotiations, and Oswaldo Aranha (1894-1960), then the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, who had advocated the formation of a new negotiating group because of the proposal made by Argentina and Chile. Certain that the negotiations would not advance if representatives of the warring countries did not participate in them, Macedo Soares suggested that the foreign ministers of Bolivia and Paraguay – along with the support of mediators –be invited to direct negotiations with one another (SILVEIRA, 2008, p. 16-23; LANÚS, 2001, p. 494-521).

The Argentine foreign minister, Carlos Saavedra Lamas (1878- 1959), reiterated to the Brazilian minister in Buenos Aires his excuses for the supposedly inadvertent omission and, on May 9, a group of mediators – composed of representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the United States, Peru and Uruguay, were joined by the foreign ministers of Bolivia and Paraguay on May 22. After intensive negotiations, in which Macedo Soares’ skills as a conciliator stood out, the peace protocols were signed on June 12. They established, among other items, an immediate end to the hostilities, a demobilization of the armies, a prohibition to acquire military supplies, and the establishment of a neutral military commission that would oversee the cease-fire. In order to acknowledge the Argentine government for its behavior in the negotiations, Macedo Soares returned to Rio de Janeiro aboard the 25 de Mayo, a cruiser of that country’s Navy. The territorial issue was only defined after a long peace conference, assembled in Buenos Aires, from June 1935 to January 1939. As a result of his contribution to the restoration of peace, in December 1936, Saavedra Lamas became the first Latin American to receive the Nobel Prize. For his part, when he visited La Paz in his second term as foreign minister, Macedo Soares was the object of a simple, yet meaningful demonstration: Bolivian mothers and wives of veterans of the Chaco War, stood in front of the Brazilian Embassy to show their gratitude, and they honored him with flowers (LANÚS, 2001, p. 521-532; AMARAL, 1982, pp. 146 and 165-189).

In a speech he made during an internal ceremony in his honor, when he returned to Itamaraty after his trip to Buenos Aires, Macedo Soares invoked the “noble and generous traditions of this house” as the basis for his performance during the negotiations of the peace protocol. And, he added, those traditions were epitomized in the desire for peace, which was the “common purpose of Brazilian diplomacy.”

In order to demonstrate, with facts, Brazil’s diplomatic tradition to cultivate peaceful relations and legal solutions to international conflicts, Macedo Soares listed the following: the constitutions of 1891 and 1934, which condemned wars of conquest and espoused the principle of obligatory arbitration and international litigation; the peaceful solution of border matters by Rio Branco; the defense by Rui Barbosa (1849-1923) of the principle of the legal equality of States; the contribution of Raul Fernandes (1877-1968) in the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice; the mediation of Afrânio de Melo Franco, to resolve the conflict between Colombia and Peru concerning the Letícia case, as well as his contributions to the Antiwar Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, signed when the president of Argentina, Agustín Pedro Justo, visited Brazil. Later, in a speech to law students, Macedo Soares reiterated that, during the negotiations, he based his work on the peaceful traditions of Brazilian foreign policy; adding to the list: the diplomatic work of José Bonifácio (1763-1838) and Gonçalves Ledo (1781- 1847); the manifesto to friendly nations signed by the regent prince, the future Pedro I (1798-1834); the action of the Empire in the fight against tyrannies; and the performance by Epitácio Pessoa (1865-1942) as a magistrate of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague (SOARES, 1937, p. 51-5 e 65-8).

International cooperation to fight the communist threat

The insurrections in November 1935 that aimed to establish a communist government in Brazil, the Intentona Comunista, triggered violent repression and intensified the government’s hostility towards the Soviet Union – a nation with which Brazil did not then have diplomatic relations. According to Macedo Soares, there were no doubts concerning the communist nature of the revolt, nor that it had been funded by Moscow, and the divulgation of information on large financial movements of the Soviet Legation in Montevideo strengthened his conviction about that country’s engagement in the attempted coup. Once the revolt in the Northeast broke out, but before the rebellion at Praia Vermelha, in Rio de Janeiro, the Embassy in Montevideo had already been instructed to intervene in the government of Gabriel Terra, to disavow the operation of the commercial agency of the Soviet Union (Yuzhamtorg) in the Uruguayan capital. With news of the insurrection in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’s goal was the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Montevideo and Moscow. Convinced of the proof that the Soviet Legation had purchased Brazilian currency, on December 27, President Terra severed the relations (HILTON, 1986, p. 121-8).

Cooperation with governments that were also in the fight against communist infiltration was intensified. From Buenos Aires, Saavedra Lamas sided firmly with Macedo Soares in favor of suppressing the rebellion. In London, the British government provided clues that led to the apprehension of two agents of the Comintern. In Rio de Janeiro, documents that the police apprehended after the insurrection had been dominated were made available to the U.S. Ambassador, and an American diplomatic agent was authorized to talk to supposed American political prisoners. The death in a Rio de Janeiro jail of an American citizen, Victor Barron, caused the intensification of criticisms towards Brazilian police in the American press. The U.S. government, however, accepted the official version of suicide (HILTON, 1986, p. 128-148).

When the Soviets were recognized as enemies, attempting to subvert order in Brazil, Brazilian diplomacy began to identify those who were against the Soviet Union as its allies. In that context, Macedo Soares advocated, to no avail, the recognition of the state of war that rebellious Spanish forces, led by general Francisco Franco (1892-1975), were engaged in, against the Republican government of Madrid, considered to be an ally of Moscow. Additionally, the foreign minister instructed José Joaquim de Lima e Silva Moniz Aragão (1887-1974) – who, in 1936, was nominated the first Brazilian Ambassador in Berlin – to contact the political police and other German agencies with the purpose of gathering information on the activities and plans of the Comintern in Brazil (HILTON, 1986, p. 148-159; RODRIGUES, 1995, p. 352-9).

Resistance to the closing of the regime and Interventor in the democratic restoration

Macedo Soares resigned from Itamaraty on November 26, 1936, and Mário de Pimentel Brandão (1889-1956) replaced him as the foreign minister. Soares had intended to run for president in January 1938, but he soon realized that he lacked the necessary support. In early 1937, he represented Brazil in the second inaugural ceremony of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) as president of the United States, and Vargas invited him to return to the Ministry. Before he accepted his role as Minister of Justice, however, Macedo Soares negotiated a commitment from Vargas that constitutional guarantees would be restored, and that the state of war would not be renewed. He believed that the fight against subversion could be carried out within the constitutional framework, which ensured individual rights.

Macedo Soares became Minister of Justice and Domestic Affairs on June 3, 1937, a time still under the effects of the communist insurrections of November 1935. To ensure support during the return to constitutionalism, he held meetings with leaders of the national Congress who, for the first time since November 1935, refused to renew the state of war. In a desire to ensure the validity of the state of law and, thus, to create an environment of political détente, he determined the freedom of 345 political prisoners who had not been formally accused. This action rendered him the antipathy and lack of trust of the high military command. In a humanitarian gesture, he also visited the headquarters of the special police, which held in precarious conditions the prisoners, Luís Carlos Prestes (1898-1990) and Harry Berger-Arthur Ewert (1890-1959), who had both been militant communists. The hostility of the military became clear when the chief of police, Filinto Müller (1900-1973), along with support from the Minister of War, general Eurico Dutra (1883-1974), refused to obey the order to transfer both Prestes and Berger-Ewert from the police headquarters to the reformatory (HILTON, 1986, p. 160-7).

In a meeting with President Vargas at Guanabara Palace, then being used as the president’s official residence, the military ministers and the police chief complained about the freeing of the political prisoners and the end of the state of war. Also in attendance at the meeting, Justice Minister Macedo Soares argued that the indefinite interruption of the constitutional guarantees would not lead to social peace. He claimed that a modernization of the judiciary and the police, within the framework of the constitution, would be the best way to deal with the propaganda that Moscow was funding. The divergences between Macedo Soares and the heads of the military became deeper, despite the anti-communist efforts of the Minister of Justice, who participated in the creation of the Defesa Social Brasileiro (DSB), an entity whose purpose was to support the regime through propaganda and information against communist infiltration in Brazil[288] (HILTON, 1986, p. 168-171).

In such an atmosphere of political tension, in September 1937, the military hierarchy decided on a subversive, authoritative solution called the Cohen Plan, under which the government justified the suspension of constitutional rights of citizens for 90 days. The Cohen plan was decreed on October 2. In an earlier meeting in general Dutra’s office, in mid-September, Macedo Soares attempted to convince the military command that it was possible to reform the constitution without the need to suppress basic freedoms. Vargas created the Superintendent Commission of the State of War (CSEG, for Comissão Superintendente do Estado de Guerra), to which he nominated Macedo Soares and two generals, whose roles were to coordinate repressive actions, such as preventing the reception of Soviet radio broadcasts, developing an anti-Communist educational program, and identifying press agencies and books that should be censored. Macedo Soares favored the guarantee of individual freedoms and the preservation of the representative democratic system.[289] He, therefore, conflicted with the other members of the CSEG, and in a letter dated November 5 addressed to President Vargas, he resigned from both the commission and the ministry. On November 10, a coup d’état, establishing the Estado Novo (New State) took place, with the closing of the Congress, the dissolution of political parties, and the cancelation of elections that had been scheduled for January 1938. A new constitution of corporatist inspiration that granted vast discretionary powers to the president was also promulgated[290] (SKIDMORE, 1982, p. 49; HILTON, 1986, p. 178-83; AMARAL, 1982, p. 190-203).

Although he was far removed from the top level of the government, Macedo Soares, as with many scholars of his time, still collaborated with the Estado Novo, as he remained president of the IBGE. But after a military coup led by general Góes Monteiro deposed Vargas, on October 29, 1945, elections for the state governments and legislative assemblies were suspended and new Interventors were nominated to replace those that Vargas has indicated. José Linhares (1886-1957), the president of the Federal Supreme Court, who was sworn in as president of the Republic, nominated Macedo Soares as the new Interventor in São Paulo.

In his inaugural address as Interventor, on November 5, 1945, Macedo Soares praised the restoration of democracy, calling for the re-establishment of public rights and freedoms as well as a commitment to the free expression of the popular will through the election of political representatives. He also praised the Armed Forces, which he said were in charge of implementing the new political regime, with “detachment, generosity and patriotism.” As Interventor, he gave priority to balancing the state budget as well as to public education, with the creation of high schools and normal schools in dozens of towns. He re-established the state symbols – the flag and the coat of arms – which had been forbidden during the Estado Novo. He also organized state elections, which were held on January 19, 1947, and on March 14, of that year, he delivered the state government to the winner, Ademar de Barros (1901-1969) (AMARAL, 1983, p. 67-73).

Cultural symbiosis and the promotion of international academic cooperation

When Macedo Soares was the foreign minister, in 1936, Getúlio Vargas nominated him as president of the National Institute of Statistics (INE, for Instituto Nacional de Estatística), and after Soares repeatedly refused to accept the nomination, Vargas appointed him against his will. Created in 1934, the INE became the IBGE in 1938, and Macedo Soares was its first president, a position he held until 1951, and later again in 1955-1956. In his first inaugural address at the institute, he emphasized the significance of statistical data, to guide the development and conduct of public policies, as well as to identify and prevent deviations from principle. He also recognized the important contribution of the standardization of data to the workings of public agencies and to government services in general (SOARES, 2008, p. 59-61).

In 1938, Macedo Soares was also elected to the Brazilian Academy of Letters (ABL, for Academia Brasileira de Letras), which he served as president from 1942 to 1943, simultaneously with the presidencies of the IBGE and the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB, for Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro). His link to the IHGB dated from 1921, when he was accepted as a partner-correspondent after the publication the previous year of his book, Falsos Troféus de Ituzaingó. In 1939, his quick rise from benefactor and partner to president of the institute was mainly due to the coincidence of the institutes needs, and the recognition by Max Fleiuss (1868-1943), the perpetual secretary of the institute, of Macedo Soares as an enterprising scholar with leadership spirit, generosity, and availability – in addition to having many acquaintances in political, diplomatic, business and other cultural institutions that could assist the institute (GUIMARÃES, 2008, p. 9-11). Macedo Soares election as president of the IHGB was, thus, a symbolic exchange of respect between the politician, former minister, successful businessman and philanthropist, and the nation’s most traditional institute of historical knowledge in a permanent search for the continuity of official support. As a consequence, during the Estado Novo, the IHGB had the support of Vargas at a time of great change in the official and the private worlds of culture, resulting in the creation and organization of a number of institutes concerned with the preservation of patrimony and memory.[291]

As president of prestigious cultural institutes – whether official, such as the IBGE, or semi-official, such as the IHGB and the ABL – Macedo Soares developed joint activities that benefitted all of them, while also reinforcing his personal prestige. Taking advantage of his simultaneous positions at the top of a number of the institutes, he nurtured intensive academic cooperation. There were international meetings concerned with geography and cartography as well as several scientific congresses, seminars and conferences promoted by the IBGE and held at the IHGB. He also took the initiative to foster closer ties with other South American historical institutes, especially those of the Plata River Basin countries, with the purpose of strengthening a common South American identity. Accordingly, he increased the staff of foreign correspondent partners, and he both promoted and attended cultural missions and international academic events held throughout the region. A significant example of his desire for approximation was the symbolic donation of a gold coin, minted in 1851, with the face of Pedro II (1825-1891) on one side, given to the Argentine National Academy of History. Thus, even outside of Itamaraty, Macedo Soares implemented a “cultural diplomacy” through an intensification of relations with the neighboring countries (CAMARGO, 2008, pp. 28-9).

Historian and ideologist of “territorial nationalism”

As it is possible to get to know facets of Macedo Soares thoughts on Brazilian foreign policy when one studies his role in the promotion of cultural activities, the same can also be said about his historiographical production. His works in this area include two that today may still be considered useful to contemporary history: Justiça: A Revolta Militar em São Paulo, an account of the tenentista movement of 1924, written during his voluntary exile in Paris, and O Brasil e a Sociedade das Nações, which he also wrote while abroad and was published in 1927. The latter is a study of Brazil’s participation in the negotiations at Versailles after World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, as well as an analysis of Brazil’s withdrawal from that Geneva organization.

All of the important works of history written by Macedo Soares have in common transcription from primary sources, presentations in luxury editions, and a documental value more significant than their analytical content. Fontes da História da Igreja Católica no Brasil (Historical Sources of the Catholic Church in Brazil), for example, is a 1954 work of rare erudition in Brazilian historiography. It offers material on documentary collections of museums, archives, libraries and public ecclesiastic and private institutions, both Brazilian and foreign. The reader obtains information on where to find documents that can be consulted for a historical study of the Catholic Church in Brazil, a personal ambition of Macedo Soares.

In Santo Antonio de Lisboa, Militar no Brasil, published in 1942, Macedo Soares transcribed documentation concerning the Portuguese Franciscan friar from the thirteenth century, who was canonized by the Roman Catholic Church in 1232. Portuguese military units in America developed a cult around the saint, believing that one garnered payments corresponding to one’s rank. This was an original theme of Macedo Soares, and it demonstrates his sensibility to a historiographical perspective. Such a study would currently be classified in the field of the history of thought or of the mindset of ideas (NEVES, 2008; LACOMBE, 1968, WILLEKE, 1968).

To explore more of the “diplomatic thought” of José Carlos de Macedo Soares, itself, his book, Fronteiras do Brasil no Regime Colonial (Brazilian borders in the colonial period), would be the most useful source. This thesis was originally submitted, in 1939, to the III Congress of National History, in celebration of the centennial of the founding of the IHGB. The publication is composed of an introduction and eight chapters, followed by a bibliography and comments. There are also eight maps and various graphic designs by José Wasth Rodrigues (1891-1957). The text transcribes 10 papal bulls of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, along with seven border treaties, signed between 1494 and 1821, plus a treaty of 1825, concerned with the recognition of the Brazilian Empire by Portugal.

In Macedo Soares’ work, the writing of history is conditioned by an ideological perspective that does not hesitate to resort to “territorial nationalism,” to justify the establishment of Brazil’s borders. Accordingly, he said: “In the New World there was never a dynastic feeling; we were all born with a nationalist idea.” In other words, American nationalism came even before the formation of nations, before nation States. The historian/ideologist believed that the territory had value as an original patrimony and a constituent of nationality. In that sense, the territory was a maker of the national identity: “The complete border defines the country, the seat of an organized people. The border ensures the property instinct that is as natural and necessary in peoples as it is in individuals.” According to this “territorial” idea of nationalism, the fullness of the national awareness would only be attained when the borders were no longer an abstract idea to most Brazilians; only then would Brazilians own the entire national territory (SOARES, 1939, p. 5; NEVES, 2008, p. 38-9).

One can identify in his work an emphasis on the expansion of Luso-Brazilian territory, along with the consequent shape of the territory that became Brazil. This expansion was the result of efforts made by the bandeirantes (literally, flag-carrying explorers): “The late sixteenth century was the beginning of the trail blazer epic of western and southern Brazil, which the bandeirantes carried out brilliantly.” For Macedo Soares the bandeirantes were the creators of the Portuguese colonial empire in America. To illustrate this, in an epigraph to a chapter concerned with negotiations on the 1750 Treaty of Madrid, he mentions a phrase by Rocha Pombo (1857-1933), a consecrated historian of the time: “Without the work of the paulista bandeiras, Brazil would not be the same.” Although it is not a historiographical classic, Fronteiras do Brasil no Regime Colonial shares with other works of its time a concern for the creation of a national awareness, a Brazilian nationality (SOARES, 1939, p. 92 e 122; NEVES, 2008, p. 39).

It is also worth noting that the book was conceived as a tribute to the Brazilian Army, the defender and demarcator of the borders, their “innate guard [...], both in peace and in war.” And it was especially a tribute to general Cândido Rondon (1865-1958), the “peasant general,” a selfless and exemplary servant of Brazil. The Army, as represented by Rondon, with effort, devotion and patriotism in their “work of conquest and national foundation,” according to Macedo Soares, was a continuation of the bandeirantes.

The anachronism of the ideologist/historian is clearly revealed in the following passage concerned with the period between 1580 and 1640, the Iberian union: “Portugal might have lost something with the Spanish domination, but there is no doubt that Brazil greatly profited during the reigns of the three Felipes” (SOARES, 1939, p. 6 and p. 92).

According to that perspective, Brazil was a non-historical entity that existed before its political independence. The territorial definition of Brazil – Portuguese lands beyond the “ocean” – came before its historical and geographic awareness. Thus, the territory existed before the nation and the State. Although this is a view of the historian Macedo Soares, its nationalistic logic was also the basis of his political and diplomatic thought: Nationalism existed prior to the nation; it was based on the unity of a large territory. It was a counterweight in the thought of Macedo Soares, the diplomat and statesman (SOARES, 1939 p. 3-4; NEVES, 2008, p. 38-9).

Back to Itamaraty: history and foreign policy during the Juscelino Kubitschek era (1955-1958)

Diplomacy at the service of history and vice-versa: research, “consultancy” and a museum

On November 12, 1955, José Carlos de Macedo Soares, at 72 years of age was appointed foreign minister for a second time. It was a period of institutional instability and political confusion in the country, following the suicide of President Getúlio Vargas, in August 1954. Juscelino Kubitschek (1902-1976) had won the presidential election of October 3, 1955, and he was scheduled to be sworn in as president the following January; some members of the armed forces, however, did not want him to take power. Faced with the prospect of a coup, to prevent Kubitschek’s inauguration, one day prior to Macedo Soares’ appointment, general Henrique Teixeira Lott (1894-1984), the Minister of War, staged a pre-emptive coup, deposing the interim president of the Republic, Carlos Luz (1894-1961). Luz, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, who occupied the national presidency for just a few days after the heart attack of Café Filho (1899-1970); who, in turn, had been the vice president under Getúlio Vargas, and had assumed the presidency after Vargas’ suicide. After Trott deposed Luz, who had been opposed to Kubitschek, Nereu Ramos (1888-1958), the vice-president of the Senate, was sworn in as another interim president of the Republic. Ramos allowed the Kubitschek inauguration to go forward, but for the two and a half months prior to Kubitschek, he formed his own ministry, and he invited his former colleague from the Constituent Assembly of 1933-1934, Macedo Soares, to be the foreign minister. When Juscelino Kubitschek was inaugurated, on January 31, 1956, he kept Soares at the head of Itamaraty. Macedo Soares remained in the position until his resignation in July 1958.

Three initiatives by Macedo Soares during his second administration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demonstrate his belief in the political application of historical knowledge. With these initiatives, he sought to: (1) facilitate the availability of the diplomatic service for historical research; (2) revitalize the Commission of Studies of Texts of the History of Brazil (CETHB, for Comissão de Estudo dos Textos de História do Brasil); and (3) create a historical museum and archive (MHD, for Museu e Arquivo Histórico e Diplomatico) to be used in the formulation of foreign policy.

By means of a ministerial order on January 16, 1956 – resuming a practice from the era of the Brazilian Empire – Macedo Soares determined that research should be undertaken in European countries, using documents of interest to the history of Brazil. Accordingly, employees at embassies in Lisbon and Madrid were appointed to draw up a general index of documents related to Brazil. The documents were then sent to the CETHB, and – as the IHGB had done during the Empire – that entity indicated which should be used to give instructions to the diplomatic corps, and also determine where the documents should be archived.[292]

Such an initiative revealed an “instrumentalist” view of diplomacy as a facilitator of historical research. The use of diplomats and diplomatic missions to search files could, therefore, be interpreted as an “instrumentalization” of the Foreign Service for historiographical reasons; thereby reproducing a practice, inspired by the Enlightenment – of using history as a diplomatic tool – all in accordance with the original purpose of the IHGB, which had been created in 1838.

Another initiative taken by Macedo Soares during his second term as foreign minister gave more value to history itself, as seen in the revitalization of the CETHB, a consultative unit created by the ministerial decree on April 13, 1943, of then foreign minister Oswaldo Aranha. When originally established, the commission had five members – including historians, diplomats and the military – all appointed by the Minister, who presided over the unit.[293] The Commission met 29 times in 1955 and submitted 150 opinions.[294] Now headed by Macedo Soares, the “new” CETHB was reorganized by means of another ministerial decree issued on May 28, 1956. The commission’s membership was increased to ten, including the head of the Documentation Service of Itamaraty, who was its secretary-general. The commission also now had three assistants and a representative from the IHGB – of which, Macedo Soares was the president.[295] Soares did not, however, plan to improve the commission’s work only by increasing its numbers; he also saw to an increase in the skill levels of its members.

In addition to creating bibliographies on all major works and articles related to the history of Brazil with transcriptions, summaries, and reviews of the information gathered – some even indicating inaccuracies – other accomplishments of the revitalized commission included: the reorganization and re-publication of a journal whose publication had been interrupted, the Anais do Itamaraty, along with transcriptions of primary sources from the collection of the Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (AHI), and other archives on themes related to Brazilian foreign policy history; instructions to guide researchers in the archives; as well as recommendations as to what should be kept in the Ministry’s archives and where it should be kept. In addition, the writing of opinions on historical matters related to foreign policy continued. According to its 1957 Report, Macedo Soares sought to “ascribe to the commission a similar role as that of the Historical Division of the U.S. State Department, which maintained a large program of research abroad.” The Minister was, thus, in tune with initiatives of foreign offices outside the country, to build Brazil’s diplomatic history and preserve its memory.[296]

One of the tasks that the reorganized CETHB performed for the Minister was the aforementioned writing of opinions on historical subjects related to foreign policy. The role of the historian as a consultant for political purposes was acknowledged, and historical knowledge was valued as complementary to diplomacy. Thus, the revitalization and institutional strengthening of the CETHB, as well as the acknowledgement of its function as an information source for the formulation of political and diplomatic policies, show the pragmatic view that Macedo Soares had of historical knowledge.

A third initiative of Macedo Soares’ second term as Brazil’s foreign minister, which also demonstrates his pragmatic view of diplomatic history as a political tool, was the creation of the Museu e Arquivo Histórico e Diplomatico (MHD). Approximately 40 days after he became the foreign minister, Macedo Soares submitted to interim President Nereu Ramos the decree that created the museum, after first listening to Ambassador Hildebrando Accioly (1888-1962), the legal counsel of the Ministry. Immediately after the museum’s creation, Macedo Soares requested advice from the director of the National Historical Museum, who at the time was Gustavo Barroso (1888-1959), the same individual who had created that museum in 1922 and had been responsible for the development of a pioneer course for training museum professionals.

The decisions to create the MHD, to revitalize the CETHB, and to order the research of historical documents in foreign archives all have in common a concern for the building and preservation of diplomatic history, integrated into a strategy of giving value to historical knowledge as a tool for diplomatic and political action.

Critique of “legalism”: “depolitization” and the immobilization of diplomacy

The initiatives of Macedo Soares reveal a view of diplomacy in which the history of the nation plays a central role, thereby, identifying traces of the man’s “diplomatic thought.” An analysis of two texts he wrote also enriches a reflection on his thoughts, on international politics, and on Brazil’s presence in the world.

In response to a questionnaire formulated by the Jornal do Comércio, concerning a draft of the UN Charter written at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, in Washington, D.C., during September and October 1944, Macedo Soares demonstrated he was skeptical about the future of the organization then in gestation. He thought it would be a coercive international organization which, in order to prevent wars, would use the armed forces of the major powers. In the final analysis, he believed that the United Nations would be the union of the military chiefs of staff of the members’ armed forces used to control turbulent states. He acknowledged, however, that it could be useful to carry out the transition from war to peace. The Security Council would be the trustee of international peace and security. Thus, it would act with mandates and resources from the member countries. He pointed to the contradiction between the professed sovereign equality of States – set forth as a basic principle of the organization – and the composition of the Security Council, which provided for permanent and temporary members. He also observed that the peace the new organization would ensure – obtained not by an armistice, but through the unconditional surrender of the Axis forces – would be established by a group of the major powers.

Despite his criticism of the United Nations, he pointed out that Brazil had already recognized the reality of power in the League of Nations when it accepted the permanence of the major powers on the Council, in 1918. An idealist, he did not refrain from voicing an opinion, at the right time, about the commitment to representative democracy and the guarantee of democratic freedoms, despite disparities between levels of culture and political organization of the member States. Macedo Soares believed that Brazil should not take on the responsibilities of membership on the Security Council; rather, he felt it should become a member of the Economic and Social Council, with a view towards discussing solutions to economic, social and humanitarian problems and the promotion of respect for human rights and basic freedoms (SOARES, 1945, pp. 22-7).

The idea of foreign policy as a factor of continuity, which Macedo Soares announced during his inaugural address as foreign minister, in 1934, was confirmed in the agency’s Report of 1955, in which he said that by preserving and displaying the objects, furniture and documents at the Itamaraty Palace, the MHD was contributing “to preserve a feeling of worship and respect that all owe to Brazil’s noble past.” As a legal consequence of such a view, Macedo Soares believed that the solution to international problems would come from the study of precedents; that international controversies should be resolved according to criteria based on history, rather than politics. In addition, the Minister shared a “positivist” view of historical investigation, as an inquiry that would disclose the truth hidden by the vestiges of the past.[297]

Based on Macedo Soares’ school of thought, there are two leading consequences of the use of history as the key to resolving international controversies: the first is “to depoliticize” diplomatic activity, limiting it to a legal dimension. And the second is that since there are a great variety of possible interpretations of history – some even contradictory to others – such a perspective runs the risk of immobilizing diplomacy.

Concerning the idea that the law should be at the forefront of foreign affairs, the historian, José Honório Rodrigues (1913-1987), wrote the following about the stagnation of Brazilian foreign policy from the time of the death of the Baron Rio Branco, in 1910, until the mid-1950s:

Diplomacy had been a class dynasty. With the creation of the Rio Branco Institute [in 1945, however], the law began to dominate the political and diplomatic arena. The role of international law – although reduced in relations among States – was given more value and politics was subordinated to it. The law is a kind of straitjacket that diplomats use to disguise their lack of political expression or their inability to defend the State’s interests (RODRIGUES, 1966, p. 57-8).

A positive consequence of giving more value to history was its “instrumentalization” – the ability to use it as a tool – for political and diplomatic purposes. Through a modernization of the archives, diplomats were able to use history and institutional memory as vehicles of social communication. This was the purpose of the creation of the museum – and especially the archives – at Itamaraty. It was also the reason for organizing the archives, to facilitate access to the documents for consultation.

The foreign policy of Juscelino Kubitschek: ambiguities and contradictions

The ability to conciliate economic growth and industriali-zation, along with democracy and institutional stability – despite coup attempts, a succession of financial crises, inflation, and strikes – contributed to the belief that the era of Juscelino Kubitschek was a “golden age” for Brazil. It was not, however, without its critics. Although controlled, the polarization of public opinion around the economic development model that combined State intervention and the participation of foreign capital was a main feature of the period that was also reflected in its foreign policy.

As time went on, the external dimension was perceived as fundamental to national development: industrialization advanced, the economy became diversified, and both society and the State became more complex. Under these conditions, the formulation of foreign policy received the interest of various players and bureaucratic agencies. It is, therefore, difficult to define the foreign policy of Juscelino Kubitschek, as it had both ambiguities and contradictions (MOURA, 1991, p. 24; cited in GONÇALVES, 2003, p. 165).

Macedo Soares was the foreign minister during half of the presidential term of Kubitschek. His resignation from the Ministry, in July 1958, was related to the introduction of the Operação Pan-americana (OPA), considered a turning point as it distinguished the period of alignment with the United States – 1954 to 1958 – from that of 1958 to 1961, when a policy of bargaining with Washington was resumed, and the there was an attempt to increase international partnerships (VIZENTINI, 1995, p. 133-9). Although the exact periods of time are debatable, the fact is that during Macedo Soares’ second administration of the Ministry of Exterior Relations, there were major repercussions in public opinion, with Itamaraty labeled as conservative, if not regressive, in its formulation of foreign policy (GONÇALVES, 1993, p. 165-195).

Limitations on the traditional Alignment: Suez, Noronha, Portugal and Eastern Europe

A number of examples of Brazil’s foreign policy during the Kubitschek years reaffirm the country’s traditional alignment with the West. These include: the 1957 decision to send troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in the Middle East, after the October 1956 to March 1957 closing of the Suez canal and the war that resulted from the nationalization of the canal by Egypt; negotiations with the United States for the installation of a missile-tracking base; support to Portugal in defense of its colonial possessions; and limitations on a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

The January 21, 1957 agreement authorizing the installation of a base in the archipelago of Fernando de Noronha for the observation of guided missiles was an attempt by Kubitschek, to cultivate the support of the United States for its development programs while, simultaneously ensuring the internal support of the military. Although the agreement restated a traditional alignment, it involved the political trade of re-equipping the Brazilian Armed Forces. The negotiations on the missile-tracking base produced a strong parliamentary reaction from nationalist sectors of the president’s own political party. After a heated debate, however, the Congress concluded that the agreement did not need to be approved by the legislature, since it was protected by the Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement of 1952 (WEIS, 1993, p. 100-2).

Concerning relations with Portugal and Brazil’s position on the decolonization process, rhetorical manifestations of solidarity with movements of national liberation, and an acknowledgement of the principle of self-determination contrasted with the support given to the colonial powers at the United Nations. Brazilian foreign policy during the Kubitschek period did not criticize or condemn colonialism. The alignment with Portugal, in 1957, had one of its most shameful and, at the same time, most eloquent moments in a speech made by the Brazilian delegate to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, which defended the thesis that Portugal did not have any colonies, just “overseas territories” (CERVO; BUENO, 2008, p. 300-1; GRIECO, 1957).

One regressive and narrow aspect of Brazil’s foreign policy during the Kubitschek years expressed itself in the debate concerning rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which arose from the need to open new markets for Brazilian exports. Macedo Soares opposed the resumption of relations, which was mainly defended by sectors – including within the government – who were tied to the export of agrarian products. Oswaldo Aranha, the Brazilian representative to the United Nations in New York, was in favor of the resumption of diplomatic relations and, once again, he went against Macedo Soares. Eventually, the resumption of economic relations prevailed, while that of diplomatic ones did not. In November 1959, Brazil sent a trade mission to Moscow – although, by then, Macedo Soares was no longer the Brazilian foreign minister (MOURA, 1991, p. 38-9).

Final actions: a nationalist in the Roboré Agreements; without prestige during the OPA

Another foreign policy issue that emerged as a major issue during the second administration of Macedo Soares at Itamaraty was that of the so-called Roboré Agreements between Brazil and Bolivia. The agreements were a set of 31 diplomatic notes, negotiated in Corumbá and Roboré by the country’s respective foreign ministers, Macedo Soares and Manoel Barrau Pelaez (1909-1972), and signed, on March 29, 1958, in La Paz. The most important of the diplomatic notes related to the exploration of oil in Bolivia and efforts to upgrade the bilateral treaties of 1938. They were also concerned with the export and use of Bolivian oil, and issues related to railroad connections.

A controversy surrounding the agreements developed and impacted public opinion. The reasons for the controversy were basically twofold: First, there was an ideological divide between “nationalists” and “cosmopolitans” – or entreguistas as they were called by those on the left: people they felt were too willing to entregar (give away) the country’s natural resources. The issues also concerned the State’s intervention in the economy and the role of foreign capital in national development. The second reason for the controversy revolved around the debates on the agreements. These were amplified by those in the opposition, and converted into a harangue between the legislative and executive branches, serving as a tool to harass the government – with eyes on the next election.

The government’s position on Bolivian requests to review the treaties of 1938 demonstrates the complexity of the deci-sion-making process of foreign policy. With many divergent interests and bureaucratic rivalries, the need for specialized public administration increases the functions of the State and causes a multiplication of new bureaucracies – which, in turn, represent a tool the president can use, to overcome the traditional organs (SKIDMORE, 1982, p. 228). In the case of the Roboré Agreements, various units of the federal government participated in the decision-making process. In addition to organs of direct administration, such as Itamaraty and the military, there were technical entities involved, such as: the CACEX (the Carteira de Comércio Exterior – the foreign trade division of the Bank of Brazil), and SUMOC (the Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito – the Bureau of Currency and Credit); along with public enterprises, such as Petrobrás (the state oil company), the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE, for Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico), the Bank of Brazil, itself; plus councils, such as the National Council of Oil, and the National Security Council.

Negotiations on the Roboré Agreements involved three issues of great controversy and political manipulation: 1) The role of Petrobrás; 2) The definition of “Brazilian,” especially as it related to companies that could receive concessions to explore for oil; and 3) The ability of diplomatic notes to change the content of previously signed contracts.

Although Bolivian legislation prohibited the participation of state-owned companies in the exploration of oil, this did not prevent Itamaraty from attempting to obtain concessions for Petrobrás – a situation which the opposition presented as a threat to the State oil monopoly.

With regard to the second item – the definition of a “Brazilian company” – the BNDE was in charge of defining the term “Brazilian nationality.” Contrary to the content of the agreements, the BNDE, the president of which was Roberto de Oliveira Campos (1917-2001), made provisions for the participation of foreign capital in companies involved in oil exploration. And regarding the use of diplomatic notes to alter the content of previously signed contracts, it was argued that Bolivia’s requests to update the Treaties of 1938, allowed for revertive notes, which would be submitted to the Congress for ratification – according to Gabriel de Resende Passos (1901-1962), who wrote an opinion against the revertive notes.

Throughout the negotiation process, Itamaraty sought to include Bolivian interests in the agreements – something to benefit both countries. Despite this, it was written into the revertive notes that companies participating in the exploration for oil in Bolivia were exclusively Brazilian in nature. All of this produced a strain on the executive branch, in particular, on Itamaraty. Called to testify in a congressional investigation looking into accusations of improper preferences in the selection of the companies, Macedo Soares – who sought a nationalist solution to the issue – defended the Roboré Agreements, while he also expressed disagreement with the criteria that BNDE used to select the Brazilian companies (GUILHERME, 1959, p. 209-14).

The replacement of José Carlos de Macedo Soares by Francisco Negrão de Lima (1901-1981) as the head of Itamaraty began with a cascade of events related to the Operation Pan American (OPA) which, itself, began with a letter written by Juscelino Kubitschek addressed to the president of the United States, Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969), on May 28, 1958. In his memoirs, Brazilian diplomat, Mario Gibson Barboza (1918-2007) presents his version of the story. Barboza writes that when he was the chargé d’affairs in Buenos Aires, he was officially called to report to Rio de Janeiro and summoned to Laranjeiras Palace, then the official residence of the Brazilian president, Juscelino Kubitschek. He further states that Kubitschek then put him in charge of obtaining the support of the president of Argentina, Arturo Frondizi (1908- 1995), for a speech he, Kubitschek, would make, explaining the principles of OPA. After meeting with Kubitschek, Barboza presented himself at Itamaraty, where he informed the secretary-general of the mission he had received. The secretary-general said that he was not aware of the mission and, indeed, the foreign minister, Macedo Soares, was also not aware of it. Less than two months later, the foreign minister resigned his position (July 1958). (BARBOSA, 1992, p. 47-55; GONÇALVES, 2003, p. 185).

The question remains open: Did Macedo Soares resign strictly because he felt slighted by Kubitschek, or did he disagree with the content of the OPA? The fact is, that instead of first presenting the initiative to Itamaraty, Kubitschek entrusted an aide who did not even belong to the diplomatic staff – the poet, editor and businessman, Augusto Frederico Schmidt (1906-1965) – with the plans’ conception, development, and execution, even though OPA was intended to be the most important diplomatic proposal of his government: an innovative plan that linked the fight against communism to a need to overcome poverty and underdevelopment; which many say, became the model for the Alliance for Progress of U.S. president, John F. Kennedy three years later.

Final thoughts

In this attempt to evaluate the role and influence of José Carlos de Macedo Soares on the doctrine and practice of Brazilian diplomacy, we would be remiss if we failed to mention an article published on January 17, 1962, in the Rio de Janeiro newspaper, O Globo, which Macedo Soares co-authored with three other former Brazilian foreign ministers: João Neves da Fontoura (1887-1962), Vicente Rao (1892-1978), and Horácio Lafer (1900-1965). In the article, concerned with the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, to be held in Punta Del Este, Uruguay the following week, the four diplomats said Brazil should position itself in favor of isolating Cuba, by breaking diplomatic relations with the island nation. The article further argued that, since the goals of Pan-Americanism were the consolidation of democratic regimes and a ban of all totalitarian regimes, and Fidel Castro (1926- ) had implemented a dictatorship in Cuba and allied himself with the communist powers, the attitude that should be taken – without violating the principle of non-intervention – was to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) (GARCIA, 2008: 513-6).

Macedo Soares was an ethical politician and a democrat; he also had an instinct for conciliation. As a diplomat, he always advocated the primacy of the law. It is possible that his worldview was too influenced by the rigidity of the ideological bipolarity of the Cold War and by a fear of the threat that Marxism-Leninism could represent to Brazil. Perhaps for that reason he could not see that the breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba by the American republics would have a counterproductive effect, and it would contribute to integrating Cuba even more into the socialist bloc. In addition, the expelling of Cuba from the OAS, at that conference, violated the Charter of Bogotá itself, as Brazil’s then foreign minister, San Tiago Dantas (1911-1964), pointed out.

Macedo Soares’ “diplomatic thought” was conditioned by a liberal worldview, which advocated a representative political system and a respect for democratic freedoms, while also defending the national interest. His style of nationalism was expressed by an attachment to the traditions of a pacifistic foreign policy, devoted to the search for legal and conciliating solutions. In both liberalism and nationalism, Macedo Soares acknowledged that the centrality of the law sometimes inhibited diplomatic action. Thus, if one were to list the basic characteristics of Macedo Soares’ “diplomatic thought,” they would be: liberalism, nationalism and “legalism.”

In the mid-1930s, the São Paulo city government decided to install a monument in a residential zone near the historic downtown, to honor Augustus (63 BC–14 AD), the first Roman Emperor. The Italian government donated the bronze monument, cast in Naples; it reproduced the original statue, Augusto de Prima Porta, with the right arm of the emperor extended, as if he is saluting a military parade. The condition of a great metropolis had already infused in the inhabitants of São Paulo the casualness typical of major urban centers in the tropics. Popular humor soon led to a nickname for the monument. Referring to the location to which the extended arm of Emperor Augustus pointed, the people said: “That is where Carlito lives” – an allusion to the large house of José Carlos de Macedo Soares, on Major Quedinho Street.

That small urban anecdote – related, without onomastic accuracy, by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009), and mentioned, again, by the historian Guilherme Pereira das Neves – reveals the intimacy and fondness that Soares’ fellow paulistanos (residents of the city of São Paulo) had for the former teacher and political representative. It is a fitting tribute to close this fragmented outline of the diplomatic thought of José Carlos de Macedo Soares, the statesman known as “Carlito.”

Bibliography

I. Works by José Carlos de Macedo Soares

Discursos: Rumos da Diplomacia Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1937.

Fronteiras do Brasil no Regime Colonial. Rio de Janeiro: José Olímpio, 1939.

A Organização Internacional da Paz, Resposta ao Inquérito Realizado Pelo “Jornal do Comércio” Sobre o Projeto de Dumbarton Oaks. Rio de Janeiro: Jornal do Comércio, 1945, p. 21-7.

O Espírito do Itamaraty. Rio de Janeiro: MRE, 1948.

Conceitos de Solidariedade Continental. Rio de Janeiro: MRE, 1959.

II. Works about José Carlos de Macedo Soares

AMARAL, Antônio Barreto do. José Carlos de Macedo Soares: Embaixador da Paz - Chanceler das Américas: Ensaio. São Paulo: São Paulo Cia. Nacional de Seguros, 1983.

BOSI, Alfredo. “Oração de Posse na Cadeira 12 da ABL”, em Embaixador Macedo Soares, Um Príncipe da Conciliação: Recordando o 1º Presidente do IBGE. Rio de Janeiro, IBGE, 2008, p. 45-56.

CAMARGO, Alexandre de Paiva Rio. “As Fronteiras Institucionais das Administrações do Embaixador Macedo Soares: Uma Abordagem Preliminar”, em Embaixador Macedo Soares, Um Príncipe da Conciliação: Recordando o 1º Presidente do IBGE. Rio de Janeiro, IBGE, 2008, p. 25-36.

GUIMARÃES, Lucia Maria Paschoal. “José Carlos de Macedo Soares: The Investiture as President of the Brazilian Historical and Geographic Institute”, in Embaixador Macedo Soares, Um Príncipe da Conciliação: Recordando o 1º Presidente do IBGE. Rio de Janeiro, IBGE, 2008, p. 7-12.

KELLER, Vilma, “José Carlos de Macedo Soares”, term in CPDOC/ FGV. Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro Pós-1930.

LACOMBE, Américo Jacobina. “Macedo Soares – Historiador”. Revista do IHGB, vol. 279, 1968, p. 45-9.

MARTINS FILHO, Enéas. “Biographical Review”, in Revista do IHGB, vol. 279, 1968, p. 45-9.

NEVES, Guilherme Pereira das Neves. “Carlito, Historiador”, in Embaixador Macedo Soares, Um Príncipe da Conciliação: Recordando o 1º Presidente do IBGE. Rio de Janeiro, IBGE, 2008, p. 13-24.

OLIVEIRA, Antônio Camilo de. “Macedo Soares e a Política Externa do Brasil”. Revista do IHGB, vol. 279, 1968, p. 51-6.

SILVA, Edmundo de Macedo Soares e. “O Embaixador José Carlos de Macedo Soares: O Homem e a Obra”. Revista do IHGB, vol. 346, Jan./Mar. 1985, p. 175-90.

SILVEIRA, Helder Gordim da. “Macedo Soares e a Atuação da Diplomacia Brasileira na Questão do Chaco Boreal (1932-1935)”, in Embaixador Macedo Soares, Um Príncipe da Conciliação: Recordando o 1º Presidente do IBGE. Rio de Janeiro, IBGE, 2008, p. 13-24.

WILLEKE, Venâncio. “Doutor José Carlos de Macedo Soares e a História da Igreja”. Revista do IHGB, vol. 279, 1968, p. 56-8.

III. Works about the history of Brazil and Brazilian foreign policy

BARBOZA, Mario Gibson. Na Diplomacia, o Traço Todo da Vida. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1992.

CERVO, Amado & BUENO, Clodoaldo. História da Política Externa do Brasil. 3rd ed.: Brasília, 2008.

CARONE, Edgar. A República Nova (1930-1937). São Paulo: Difel, 1974.

DANESE, Sérgio. Diplomacia Presidencial: História e Crítica. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1999.

GONÇALVES, Williams da Silva. O Realismo da Fraternidade: Brasil- Portugal: do Tratado de Amizade ao caso Delgado. Lisbon: Social Science Press, 2003.

GRIECO, Donatello. Defesa de Portugal na ONU (January 30th, 1957). Lisbon, Acadêmica de D. Filipa, Rio de Janeiro: H. Antunes, 1957.

GUILHERME, Olympio. Roboré: A Luta pelo Petróleo Boliviano. Rio de Janeiro: Freitas Bastos, 1959.

HILTON, Stanley. A Rebelião Vermelha. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1986.

LANÚS, Juan Archibaldo. Aquel Apogeu: Política Internacional Argentina (1910-1939). Buenos Aires: Emecé, 2001.

MOURA, Gerson. “Avanços e Recuos: A Política Externa de JK”, em GOMES, Angela de Castro (org.). O Brasil de JK. Rio de Janeiro, FGV/CPDOC, 1991, p. 23-43.

RODRIGUES, José Honório & SEITENFUS, Ricardo. Uma História Diplomática do Brasil (1531-1945). Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1995.

RODRIGUES, José Honório. “Uma Política Externa Própria e Independente”, in Interesse Nacional e Política Externa. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966, p. 46-75.

SKIDMORE, Thomas. Brasil: Getúlio Vargas a Castelo Branco (1930-1964). Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982 (9th ed.).

SILVA, Hélio. 1932: A Guerra Paulista (O Ciclo de Vargas – Volume V). Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1967.

SILVA, Hélio. 1934: A Constituinte (O Ciclo de Vargas – Volume VII). Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1969.

VIZENTINI, Paulo G. F. Relações Internacionais e Desenvolvimento: O Nacionalismo e a Política Externa Independente (1951-1964). Petrópolis: Vozes, 1995.

WEIS, W. Michael. Cold Warriors and Coups d’État: Brazilian- American Relations (1945-1964). Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993.

IV. Sources and reference works

FAUSTO, Boris. História do Brasil. São Paulo: Edusp, 1995.

GARCIA, Eugênio Vargas. Cronologia das Relações Internacionais do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto; Brasília: FUNAG, 2005 (2nd ed.).

GARCIA, Eugênio Vargas (org.). Diplomacia Brasileira e Política Externa: Documentos Históricos (1493-2008). Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2008.

MRE/Subsecretaria-Geral de Administração e Comunicações/ DCD/CDO. Ministros de Estado e Secretários Gerais das Relações Exteriores. Brasília, MRE, 1988.

Nosso Século: Memória Fotográfica do Brasil no Século 20. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1980.

PRESIDÊNCIA da República/Casa Civil/Biblioteca. Governos da República: 11/15/1889 to 03/15/1996. Brasília, Presidência da República, 1996 (3rd, ed.).

Admiral Álvaro Alberto

Born in 1889, he was a navy officer and was appointed Admiral by a Presidential Decree in recognition of his contribution to the training of Naval and Army officers and to science and research in Brazil. Among the many achievements, Álvaro Alberto stood out as a pioneer in the study and research of nuclear power and, in 1939, the study of this subject was included in the curriculum of the Navy Academy. His importance to Brazilian foreign policy is associated with his role as the Brazilian representative to the Atomic Energy Commission established by Resolution no. 1 of the United Nations, in 1946. As member of the Commission, one of his concerns was to use the reserves of atomic minerals, which was supposed to exist in large scale in the country, to develop the Brazilian technological and industrial capacity in the atomic energy sector. Álvaro Alberto chaired the Working Group that designed the project of creation of the National Research Council (CNPq). The project was sent to President Dutra and it was approved in January 1951. It can be said that largely the project that created CNPq also resulted from his experience and his sensitivity to capture with accuracy the international scenario. Álvaro Alberto was the President of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences (1935-37 and 1949-51) and the first President of CNPq (1951-1955). He died in 1976.

Admiral Álvaro Alberto: the pursuit of national development in science and technology

Eiiti Sato

The objective of this essay is not to present a brief biography of Admiral Álvaro Alberto da Mota e Silva, nor to discuss the leadership role he played in the establishment of important institutions for the development of the scientific community in Brazil. Other works have already done it, and certainly many others will follow without, necessarily, exhausting the subject. The objective of this essay, according to what was established in the general purpose of the book, is to find out among Álvaro Alberto’s achievements, elements that significantly have marked the trajectory of Brazilian foreign policy. In general, the essay discusses possible explanations for two aspects or issues that, in Álvaro Alberto’s work, present themselves as two sides of the same coin. On one side, why Alvaro Alberto, a career military with remarkable involvement in the scientific community in Brazil, should be included among those who played a significant role in the country’s foreign policy? On the other side of the coin, the essay discusses how and to what extent international relations and Brazilian foreign policy played a significant role in the establishment of CNPq as the main institution of the Brazilian science and technology system. Indeed, the public figure of Admiral Álvaro Alberto became strongly related to his works and deeds in the field of scientific research in Brazil, ahead of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences and leading the creation of CNPq and other institutions dedicated to scientific research, but also at the same time was associated with the Brazilian representation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission and the concern with the management of national mineral resources that could be used in the nuclear energy sector.

From the point of view of foreign policy, Álvaro Alberto’s actions left several important legacies. Probably the most general among these legacies was the recognition of science and technology as a relevant dimension of the interface between nation and the international environment. Álvaro Alberto understood that it was not enough to recognize such importance and to bring to Brazil’s foreign relations agenda the theme of scientific and technological development. His understanding was that the research and the use of scientific knowledge were increasingly related to the transformations and to the national defense policies and development of all nations.

A second legacy of his performance was to show that the observation of the international environment was crucial to capture scientific and technological development trends in the world and as their directions as crucial elements to establish the guidelines that national authorities should provide. Strategic security and science had become much more integrated especially in the area of nuclear energy, and international cooperation in that field demanded the participation of experts capable of understanding the meaning and the implications of the scientific findings.

A third legacy of Álvaro Alberto was his perception that the notion of “defense of national natural resources” could only be properly applied by means of the development of the technological capacity of the country to take advantage of the incorporation of new developments in its own industries. To Álvaro Alberto to develop a national industry in the nuclear area was the only way to actually disseminate to the entire nation the benefits of owning mineral fields. The fact that the concept of “Dutch disease” only emerged many years later does not mean that the problem did not exist. On the other hand, only in this way foreign nations, especially the major powers, would not need to be seen as opponents or as greedy adversaries to be fought, but as nations with which, to the extent possible, the country should fetch new forms of both commercial and technological cooperation.

Science and technology in a changing world

A starting point for the discussion of possible explanations to the issue analyzed in this essay is to consider that any interpretation of possible motivations for the action of entrepreneurial minds must take into account both the man’s intellectual profile and his concerns about the political and sociological context of his time. The phrase “Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia...” has become one of the most quoted among those phrases taken from the work of Ortega y Gasset because it synthesizes the inescapable symbiosis between man and his time.[298] Such symbiosis between man and his environment, between the thought and its time, was always important. However, in the 20th century, to understand this relationship became more complicated, since the 20th century was a period of great turmoil due to a flurry of changes. Several thinkers produced remarkable works showing that the 20th century was a century that went through true earthquakes in the political and social sphere, which led to transformations and uncertainties in which both beliefs and traditional institutions were replaced, and in which technological standards, which affect human existence, started to last for less than one generation.[299]

Indeed, in the international sphere, throughout the first half of the 20th century, the European political geography was redesigned more than once, the United States and the Soviet Union became the world’s major powers, and the ideological and strategic bipolarity combined with the advent of the nuclear age, showing the need for new concepts for any attempt to understand properly the play of forces in action in the international sphere. In this changing environment, the military issues extended radically the strict domain of strategic thinking, in order to become integrated with government policies for the benefit of industry and scientific research. Even for a country like Brazil, which has always valued inward looking attitude, the dynamics of international politics in the years after World War II became an increasingly relevant factor. Among the changes under way, the use of atomic energy emerged with great prominence influencing perceptions about diplomacy, security strategies, and the future of scientific research and industrial development.

The perception that the advent of the nuclear age changed many things in radical ways was quite generalized, but not always its implications were clearly interpreted. The mainstream press and the people in general could be astonished with or concerned about the devastating effect of nuclear weapons, but they had difficulty to notice the many implications and political consequences of the new weapon. Ordinary people may feel horror, outrage or concern when they see a crime scene or they witness the collapse of a bridge, but the experienced police officer or the expert engineer, although they may have the same feeling of repulse in the face of a destruction scene, they also have a more technical vision of the scene, allowing them to establish plausible hypotheses about causes and consequences of the event they are witnessing. Álvaro Alberto was among the few who, due to his military training and to his knowledge about the scientific world, could understand more clearly the extent and the significance of the ongoing changes in the Brazilian nation.

In the military domain, the atomic weapons changed completely the notion of strategic balance. It was no longer about increasing the range and the accuracy of existing weapons or of increasing permanent and moving troops to more regions. The atomic bombs dropped on Japan made in less than a week what dozens of well-armed traditional divisions would have a hard time to carry out in several months of bloody fighting. The devastating character of nuclear weapons had left political leaders, analysts and the general population before questions of basic concepts about the problem to understand and to formulate security strategies on completely new basis. It was a feeling radically different of the previous experiences such as, for example, upon the fall of Constantinople when the traditional notions of strategic security also began to be questioned. When the writer Stefan Zweig made an account of the fall of Constantinople, he recalled that the walls surrounding Constantinople had proved to be efficient to protect the city for more than a thousand years, but the large cannons that Muhammad II ordered to manufacture, soon showed that those solid walls could not withstand the firepower of the new war weapon. In fact, for millennia, high and solid walls had been crucial to resist the attack of armies made up of soldiers, archers and knights supported by catapults and other war machines used over the centuries to lay siege to fortified towns (ZWEIG, 1999, p. 41-73). According to history, since Troy had the means to ensure food and other supplies, it was only conquered because of the cunning of Ulisses, who noticed that the city walls were invulnerable to attacks of the mighty Greek army. In other words, to build walls – as did Adrian, Theodosius and many other famous kings and generals in European cities until the Middle Ages – was no longer decisive to protect cities or regions. Nevertheless, until Constantinople’s fall, more than two centuries had passed since gunpowder had been invented and, more important, about four centuries still would pass until the technology of firearms turned traditional bladed weapons totally obsolete.

Indeed, the advent of the nuclear age was something completely different. It was suddenly brought with the impact of the first blows and much more basic changes were produced. The atomic bombs that had devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, more than a formidable weapon of destruction, in a single blow had made it clear that the world was on the threshold of a new era, bringing with it a series of new dilemmas. However, to have nuclear weapons was not an issue which depended only on the political decision of rulers and on the availability of financial capacity. In this respect, governmental decisions also depended on the existence of an active domestic scientific community and a wide complex of technological and industrial infrastructure, which few societies actually had. Furthermore, in the international sphere, humankind had never been faced with the possibility that a war could produce such a broad destruction and even put at risk the very continuity of the human species. Before such a tragic reality an inevitable option of governments in order to build their capacity in nuclear technology started to demand the approval of the international community, specially of the major powers.

Within such a new global framework, the standards of international coexistence were also changing, which demanded new forms of diplomatic action and new institutional bases. The holding of international conferences, and even the existence of international organizations was already a fact, however, along with the creation of the United Nations to replace the League of Nations, it can be said that our current multilateralism actually began. The UN differed from the League of Nations, both in its formal institutions and in the circumstances as well as by its operational mechanisms, including multilateralism. A characteristic element of that multilateralism is the recognition that many issues that, in principle, were bound to the sovereign decisions of the nation-states started to be assessed by the international community due to its inevitable implications for the interests and the needs of other nations. In this sense, it is symptomatic that Resolution no. 1 of the newly established organization was the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission, the purpose of which was to discuss and to submit proposals for a system able to regulate and to supervise the issues derived from the development of nuclear technology.[300]

Given those circumstances, one can better understand the reasons that led the Brazilian government to appoint Álvaro Alberto, a military man and scientist, to head the Brazilian representation at the UN Atomic Energy Commission. One can also understand to what extent that position was privileged to someone like Álvaro Alberto – who knew both the military environment and that of scientific research – as an observer of the ongoing trends in the world of science and of the security issues. Indeed, the experience of Álvaro Alberto in the Commission served to show not only the extent of the difficulties of obtaining consensus on international security, but also enabled to realize more clearly that security should be seen beyond the strictly military aspects. In the new era, science and technology gained importance for the development of modern societies and could only be properly seen and evaluated with reference to developments in international politics. The debates about the implications and the meaning of atomic weapons for security and for the world political order made clear that a pretty radical distinction between those who possess this technology and those who do not possess atomic weapons started to exist. On the other hand, in many ways, the owning of nuclear technology was a real “passport” for the maturity of the science and technology of a nation. As a result, nations that sought to develop that capacity could not be seen necessarily as aggressive and potentially hostile to world peace.

The strong rejection to the Baruch Plan by the Soviet Union and other countries, including Brazil, derived largely from those perceptions.[301] In the case of the Soviet Union, the concern focused more on the issue of security, but it was clear that in Brazil’s case the concern of Álvaro Alberto focused more on the question of the field of nuclear technology as a factor of scientific development and as a basis for the exploitation of natural resources which was believed to be abundant in the country. Considering the fact that his mind was also well familiar with the world of science, he could see with particular clarity the crucial role that scientific and technological activity was increasingly important to modern societies, both in security matters and in the process of yielding prosperity of nations. In fact, the Commission’s works had a clearly diplomatic purpose, but they directly involved a good deal of knowledge of the strategic and scientific aspects brought by atomic energy. It is within this framework that it should be seen the appointment of Álvaro Alberto for the UN Atomic Energy Commission, as well as his performance while the Commission remained active.

Civilian technology and the resources of military power

The perception that the civilian technology and the devel-opment of armaments were always very close to each other is very old, but it was in the 20th century that this relationship became more evident, more complex and more critical.[302] It was especially with the advent of the nuclear age that the concept of dual technology was gradually included in the current vocabulary of international policy, designating the technologies that can have both civilian and military use. In addition to nuclear technology, in other areas this dual use was also becoming increasingly evident, such as in space technology, in the construction of satellite launcher rockets, in the aviation industry, in the development of computers, in chemical industries, etc. Rockets can be used to launch satellites, but they can also be used to carry nuclear warheads; the satellites, in turn, can serve to transmit images and monitor environmental changes, but they can also serve to spy on and to guide the missile firing. All technologies, to some extent, allow a potential dual use. The problem is that in the case of certain technologies it is more difficult to separate the civilian use from the military one. In discussions within the UN Atomic Energy Commission, the Soviet Union feared that without nuclear weapons the nation would remain dangerously vulnerable in the face of American power dramatically disclosed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the same time, the representatives of other nations, including Brazil, saw how close the investments in security and the future of scientific and technological research were. The nuclear age made it much more difficult to bound the scientific and technological development just to the civilian sphere.

In fact, the development and the production of the first atomic bombs had shown that the relationship between the pure scientific research and its use for military purposes had been reversed. That is, traditionally, first there was some advancement in knowledge because of research conducted in universities or laboratories for civilian purposes and then its use in military artifacts was developed afterwards. Among the many developments that followed such a procedure perhaps the most remarkable case was that of dynamite. The development of the potential for the use of dynamite gave Alfred Nobel a large fortune by its use in mining, to open tunnels and to build dams and other works that demanded the use of explosives. However, dynamite also served as the basis for a substantial increase in the destructive power of bombs, grenades and other war weapons. Paradoxically, the fortune amassed by Alfred Nobel with the industrial exploitation of that technology of war and destruction served to establish the most remarkable incentive to action and reflection on peace: the Nobel Peace Prize. Especially in the case of Álvaro Alberto, the example of Alfred Nobel must have always been present since he used to teach the course on “Chemistry of Explosives” at the Navy Academy and, although he did not achieve the same success as Alfred Nobel, he had also an industrial plant to produce explosives.

To a large extent, the advent of the nuclear age reversed the traditional logic in which scientific knowledge was developed at universities and laboratories and, after that, strategists sought to apply this knowledge in the development of weapons and other military equipment. That does not mean that previously, in some cases, the military research did not generate new knowledge. Many improvements made for military purposes, especially in World War I, were later used to increase efficiency in transportation and productivity in the industry. In the nuclear age, however, the search for military purposes was identified with scientific research and the advancement of knowledge.

While the duality between civilian and military purposes was increasingly evident in weapons and equipment employed in the war, the same thing had to happen with man in relation to his occupations, that is, with the scientist and his findings. The names involved with the development of nuclear weapons became the same as those who debated the issues located on the edge of physics: Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, Carl von Weiszacker, Ernest Rutherford, Richard Feynman, Arthur Compton, Eugene Wigner, Von Neumann, among others.

In order to understand the atmosphere of scientific research of those days it is necessary to take into account the fact that it belongs to human nature to be interested in what attracts the attention of the vast majority of people at a certain moment. In human societies, fashion, the issues of the moment, or the latest events always caught the attention of people everywhere, and with the scientific community, it could not be different. It would be hard to think that the scientific community in Brazil, which was booming, was not concerned with the research topics that moved the institutions and the most renowned names of science in the world in the first half of the 20th century. By the time of Galileo and Newton, astronomy was considered as the “Queen of Science”, that is, the great names of science were astronomers such as Kepler, Huygens, Cassini and Tycho Brahe, besides Newton and Galileo themselves. Obviously, scientific activity was not restricted to astronomy, other names stood out, such as Francis Bacon, Blaise Pascal and Leibniz, who devoted themselves to other branches of science, but it is noteworthy the interest that astronomy caused for the vast majority of those who acted as scientists or thought about joining the scientific community. When Louis XIV founded the Académie Royale des Sciences, in 1666, one of the first initiatives was to build an astronomical observatory and, a decade later, in England, King Charles II established the Royal Observatory of Greenwich and created a new position of high social recognition – The Royal Astronomer – which corresponded to the position of Director of the Royal Greenwich Observatory.

Something similar was happening to the scientific environ-ment in the wake of World War II in relation to Physics, especially in relation to Nuclear Physics. A country to become a full participant in the international scientific community, it needed to build its capacity in the field of nuclear energy. That is, what scientists such as Fermi, Bohr and Arthur Compton thought and researched, is what appeared relevant and stirred the curiosity and interest of scientific societies everywhere, including in Brazil. Indeed, there are several facts in the history of science in Brazil that are clear evidence of this close connection between the scientific community with that circle of scientists who were developing Atomic Physics. Simon Schwartzman, writing about the formation of the scientific community in Brazil says that, in 1941, Arthur Compton organized a scientific expedition to measure the impacts of cosmic rays on the Bolivian Andes and on the city of São Paulo. The project included such scientists as Gleb Wataghin, who had come from Italy to lead the installation of the Physics Institute at the University of São Paulo, as well as the young Brazilian scientists Marcelo Damy de Sousa Santos and Paulus Aulus Pompéia. In 1942 Arthur Compton left this project to be nominated Director of the Metallurgical Laboratory, where he was in charge of developing the Manhattan Project, with the purpose of producing the first the atomic bomb (SCHWARTZMAN, 2001, p. 204).

The case of Gleb Wataghin is quite revealing of this dominant environment on the Brazilian scientific community. Wataghin came from Italy to Brazil together with Luigi Fantapié to join the project of creation of the Physics Institute and of the University of São Paulo itself, in 1934. His role was to turn the Physics Institute into a cutting-edge scientific research center, which meant being connected to that remarkable circle of scientists involved in nuclear research, such as Arthur Compton and Enrico Fermi. By means of Wataghin names that became famous in Brazilian science, such as Cesar Lattes, Paulus A. Pompéia, Marcelo Damy, Mario Schenberg and Oscar Sala, could learn and discuss the developments the occurred at the thresholds of new paths in the field of Physics (SCHWARTZMAN, 2001, p. 204). Another fact the revealed the close connection between the Brazilian scientific community and the core of the thinking group of Nuclear Physics in the world was the arrival, already in the 1950’s, of Richard Feynman, who had worked directly as a theoretical physicist on the Manhattan Project and who later, in 1965, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics. Feynman stayed in Rio de Janeiro as a teacher for almost a year in the early 1950’s teaching physics at the Brazilian Center for Physical Researches.[303]

In short many remarkable events showed that the relationship between the world of scientific research and that of strategic security had been clearly reversed, that is, the possibilities of military use of knowledge served as encouragement and guidance to scientific research. Any national scientific community, which wanted to participate in the most relevant scientific debates and developments needed to act in the field of research in nuclear energy and nuclear research, in turn, was inevitably associated, as it still occurs today, to the production of atomic weapons.

The observation of those facts is very important to understand why the creation of the CNPq in the early 1950’s, under the leadership of Álvaro Alberto, is related to the concern with the development in Brazil of the scientific and technical capacity in nuclear energy. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the creation of the CNPq sent to President Eurico Gaspar Dutra, prepared by a Commission of scientists of high recognition, headed by Álvaro Alberto, it is stated that:

...All the revolutionary countries of civilization seek to develop culture as much as possible, increasing the science, technique and industry as bases of their progress and their prestige…. The foundation of the atomic power industry looms large among the objectives collimated. There are already some ancillary industries, and others depend on the training of technicians and on the economic and financial possibilities[304] (A CRIAÇÃO..., 2000, p. 184).

In other words, from the perspective of the scientific re-search community there was a clear concern that the Brazilian scientific community should be integrated into the ongoing advances in science in the world, and capacity in the area of nuclear energy seemed to be of major importance.

The idea that it was necessary to create an institution to promote and coordinate scientific activity in Brazil, was a natural consequence of the observation of these developments that were taking place in major countries in the world. Furthermore, in order to understand properly the meaning of the creation of the National Council of Research for a country like Brazil at that moment, is also important to consider, the experience of the development of atomic energy by its institutional side. In Brazil, the universities focused primarily on teaching, while applied science laboratories, such as the Biological Institute, the Manguinhos Institute and the Agronomy Institute of Campinas focused on specific purposes, such as fighting the coffee plague or developing vaccines to prevent epidemic diseases and, therefore, they were not really aware of the cutting-edge scientific research.[305] The creation of the University of São Paulo, in 1934, resulted from the growing concern that was spreading out among the illustrated circles in relation to the development of a real Brazilian scientific community able of actually “doing science”. In that context, it is easy to understand how this perception was present in an environment such as that of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences, where Álvaro Alberto had already become a prominent leader. The current understanding was that the State should play a decisive role in the promotion of scientific and technological development and, for such a purpose, the natural channel would be the establishment of a National Research Council. The case of the United States was the most well known, but other countries, such as Canada, Italy, France and England are specifically mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum to the creation of the CNPq, as examples or models that Brazil should use to establish its own National Research Council. After summarizing the role and the trajectory of the National Research Council of Canada, the Explanatory Memorandum argues:

The results provided by this excellent organization inculcate it as a paradigm, which it actually has been for similar institutions. Other very useful cases were products of similar legislations in France, Italy, England, and in the United States (A CRIAÇÃO..., 2000, p. 185).

The beginning of the nuclear age brought about another development that served to push even further that perception that scientific activity was increasingly dependent on direct governmental policies. It was at that time that the notion of Big Science was consolidated as an organization standard for the scientific research. The term Big Science derived from the understanding that the advancement of scientific knowledge was no longer the product of the findings made by the hidden genius behind the romantic figure of the scientist, somewhat maladjusted and misunderstood in society, working alone in his laboratory at the University or in the basements of his own home with his burettes, test tubes, retorts and other rudimentary equipment. Knowledge now started to advance by means of large integrated projects involving several scientists from different areas of expertise, organized into multidisciplinary teams and based on facilities and on expensive and complex technological resources, such as particle accelerators, spectrophotometers and generators and power transformers hundreds of times more powerful than the domestic ones. Later, when Alvin M. Weinberg, Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, observed those events, he wrote that Big Science resulted from three separate developments, but, to a large extent, simultaneous: 1) the massive increase of the scientific production and, consequently, the amount of scientific information available; 2) the multidisciplinary institutionali-zation of applied science and focused on far-reaching purposes and established with political and strategic objectives; 3) perhaps the most important, the increasing complexity and the high cost of the necessary equipment and facilities for scientific research (WEINBERG, 1972, p. 113-140).

In those circumstances, only the large corporations and, in certain cases, only the rich and powerful governments actually had the necessary financial resources to sponsor those projects of Big Science. In other words, the findings of science and of the research no longer resulted only from the individual genius, interest, and inspiration and became products of governmental policies. Project Manhattan, which generated the atomic bomb, had been the most paradigmatic case of doing science in such a way. It was born from a strategic decision of the American government and it was remarkably organized as a Big Science project. Arthur Compton was the Director of the Metallurgical Project, but the project was broad and the chain reaction technology would need physicists, mathematicians, chemists, metallurgists, experts in the handling of sensitive and complex equipment, engineers of various fields of expertise to transform the findings into controlled instruments and processes, and it was revealed that even biologists were necessary in order to track and to avoid the radiation levels which could jeopardized the environment of the laboratories. Compton and his fellows believed it was very clear that the chain reaction went well beyond a work of experimental Physics but a great deal of work had to be done by the team. That set of researchers had to work in an integrated manner and they needed that a huge sum of resources and laboratory facilities were available. All that, in turn, was subordinated to the Office of Scientific Research and Development – OSRD, which was an agency directly linked to the White House.[306] OSRD was headed by Vannevar Bush, an experienced scientist and engineer, but more important, he was part of the small group of decision makers put on top of the U.S. government responsible for conducting the official policy.

Originally the CNPq was not considered to be large bureaucracy or an agency for the distribution of financial resources for research in atomized manner, but simply as a high level Council working directly with the summit of the government and setting the general guidelines of a scientific policy for Brazil. The understanding was that the existence of that Council was the way for Brazil to make it feasible to join the small group of nations able to act effectively on the edge of scientific discovery. In a lecture delivered at the Brazilian Academy of Science in December 1948, Álvaro Alberto mentioned the Vannevar Bush Report to the President Truman and later published under the title Science, the Endless Frontier. John R. Steelman, scientific councilor to the President, stated when he submitted the report:

In war, the laboratory became the first defense line and the scientist became the indispensable warrior [...]. The nation that stays behind in basic scientific knowledge – that allows itself to fall much behind in the exploration of the unknown – will be severely handicapped in any war that occurs (EXCERPTS..., 2001, p. 250-1).

A lesson to be done drawn, Álvaro Alberto argues that, “the examples – both the positive and the negative ones – that we invoked are fertile in terms of useful precepts. We must establish a science and research policy, in accordance with the national interests” (EXCERPTS..., 2001, p. 252).

The mineral reserves for nuclear power: a political issue

In addition to the concern with the scientific research, another concern of Álvaro Alberto and of the Brazilian representation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission was with the control of the nuclear technology. Decisions on the subject would be very important to define the ways by which a country like Brazil could explore and use its mineral resources used in the atomic technology industries. Technical surveys had noticed that the country had considerable reserves of uranium, thorium and other minerals used in the nuclear industry, and Álvaro Alberto, understood that the only way to ensure the protection and the effective use of those resources was by mastering the nuclear technology and by using those reserves by the national industry. To protect the mineral reserves supposed to be existent in Brazil by the simple imposition of restrictions to the exports would not only be ineffective, but it would also be sterile as a source of wealth for the nation. Only those nations able to develop research and to have their own nuclear industry could benefit and make the mineral reserves of uranium or any other raw materials of the nuclear industry not to become just a source of greed and international pressures. The expression Dutch disease appeared in the field of Economics only later, but it is obvious that many people, even if they did not say it in a systematized way, noticed intuitively that only exporting commodities brought limited benefits to the countries. The term started to be used only in the 1960’s as a result of the observation that, while on the one hand the prices of gas favored the exports of that resource by the Netherlands, on the other hand, the increase in the Exchange revenues brought as a side-effect the valuation of the national currency (Florins) harming, by that manner, other industries of the country. The logic that justified that claim is that the valuation of the national currency reduces the prices of imports and, at the same time, turns more expensive the exported goods and that effect has an influence on the sector of manufactured products that competes directly with products which are manufactured in other countries. The concept is still controversial, but the facts show that the great majority of the industrially advanced economies are countries that do not export commodities, but, on the contrary, are strongly dependent on the import of raw materials and other primary goods.[307]

Álvaro Alberto’s proposal of “specific compensations” for the exports of minerals used in the nuclear industry can be undestood under the light of the “Dutch disease” argument. In other words, minerals such as uranium and thorium should be exported having as counterpart the transfer of technologies directed towards the development of Research and Development of a nuclear industry in Brazil. Before he went to his mission to represent Brazil at the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Álvaro Alberto sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the proposal to create, within the scope of that ministry, a National Atomic Energy Commission as a way to have actual control of the execution of the policy of “specific compensations”. João Neves da Fontoura, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, established a Commission to prepare a bill for the formation of that National Atomic Energy Commission (or Council).[308] Therefore, that Commission, should go beyond the simple control of the exploitation and the exports of atomic minerals and their by-products. The Commission should also guide the development strategies for atomic energy industry, in which the “specific compensations”, that is, the technological cooperation by the importing countries – mainly the United States – in the form of the supply of equipment and training of experts would be important. According to the proposal, such a Commission should be composed by representatives of the military ministries and of the Ministry Foreign Affairs. The Commission should also include representatives of the main Brazilian universities and research institutes, and of the Brazilian Academy of Science, and of the Brazilian Department of Mineral Production.

The enthusiastic effort of Álvaro Alberto to promote insti-tutionally the scientific research and the defense of the national mineral reserves expressed his strong nationalist feeling. It is important, however, to understand that such nationalism did not have the somewhat pejorative meaning that is currently associated to the term. At that time, the expression was much closer to what is currently referred to as patriotism, in the moral sphere, and as the promotion of national interests, in diplomatic language. Nationalism basically meant to produce policies that benefitted the nation as a whole and was a feeling cultivated everywhere. In the cultural sphere, when Álvaro Alberto was still a young Navy officer, one of the most remarkable events that took place in Brazil, which turned evident that generalized feeling of valuation of the nationality was, no doubt, the Cultural Week of 1922, where such figures as the painters Di Cavalcanti and Anita Malfatti, the writer Mário de Andrade and the musician Heitor Villa-Lobos stood out as leading characters in the Brazilian cultural circles. The Week was marked by the activism of such groups as the Movimento Pau-Brasil, the Grupo da Anta, the Movimento Verde-Amarelo and the Movimento Antropofágico. The two remarkable aspects in those manifestations were, on the one hand, the presentation of a new aesthetic perception for the art and, on the other hand, the valuation of the historical and anthropological bases that had shaped the national culture.

In the political sphere, Álvaro Alberto’s generation saw the birth, in 1916, of the National Defense League, with the participation of remarkable characters of Brazilian history, such as Olavo Bilac, Rui Barbosa, Pedro Lessa and Miguel Calmon, and whose first chairman was President Wenceslau Braz himself. The League exerted a significant influence in the training of the youngsters and its actions were directed towards public spirit and the national pride feelings, and the League had in the Armed Forces one of its most active and better-structured operation bases. Among the many campaigns that marked the trajectory of the League at the time of Álvaro Alberto were the diffusion of the National Anthem and other national symbols, as well as the “O Petróleo é Nosso”(The National Oil for Brazilians) campaign, which mobilized the entire nation and that was ultimately decisive in the creation of Petrobrás. Thus, it would be unthinkable that someone like Álvaro Alberto, even being a career military, was indifferent to that movement represented by the National Defense League.

In fact, it is also important to consider that, in the first half of the 20th century, civic movements with the purpose of spreading the nation values were common all around. Robert Baden Powell, an officer of the British army, had founded the Boy Scout movement in 1907, which spread worldwide. In England, the mobilization effort in World War I benefitted a lot from the civic feeling transfused by movements such as that of the Boy Scouts. In the United States, the National Civic League was probably the most influent one, but there were many other local associations with similar purposes, that is, to spread feelings of public spirit and of praise of the national values and symbols.

Ultimately, there is no doubt that patriotic or nationalist reasons played an important role in Álvaro Alberto’s initiatives and that they were present both in his actions ahead of the Brazilian representation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission and in his proposals to protect the national natural reserves of raw materials, and to establish the institutional bases to modernize Brazilian scientific and technological research. Álvaro Alberto’s nationalistic feeling was, in a certain way, shared by the entire society. As a consequence in such a political atmosphere the most important was his evaluation regarding how to handle both the development strategies of the scientific research in Brazil and his understanding that the Brazilian mineral wealth should not be protected, but rather, should be used by the nation by means of the establishment of a real national atomic energy industry.

Álvaro Alberto’s initiatives and the international political atmosphere

The difficulties that Álvaro Alberto had to face were strongly related to the international political environment that was changing drastically due to the events brought about by World War II. Largely, obviously those changes also influenced the role and acts of political forces in the domestic sphere of the countries, often creating additional obstacles to the implementation of public policies. The two decades after the end of World War II were marked by the political environment of the Cold War which may be summarized in two terms: fear and lack of trust. Fear due to the catastrophic dimensions of the destruction caused by war and to the devastating effect of the nuclear weapons. Lack of Trust which resulted from the uncertainties of a new order that was emerging and of the conflicting and opposing ideologies that prevailed within the main powers.

Within the Cold War environment that emerged after the war it became difficult to claim the legal principle that the only acceptable reason for a just war was an aggression or a serious injury. The Western legal tradition had introduced this principle into International Law. However, in the nuclear age, an aggression could take on unacceptable proportions. Pearl Harbor had become a perfect symbol of what would be a just war in the sense that the Japanese aggression against Peal Harbor was a clear act of armed hostility which justitfied a declaration of war on Japan perfectly in accordance with the principle of just war of International Law. In fact, the principle that only an aggression or a serious injury would be enough justification for a war was an important part of the evolution of the International Law codes which painfully had emerged in Europe under the social and political strains of the religious wars. The notion that religion could justify the war had divided Europe in a bloody manner and, only slowly, the social philosophers built the bases of an International Law for modernity in which religion was no longer a reason for war. Francisco de Vitoria, one of such thinkers, even though he was a religious man from the Dominican Order, was a precursor of that principle when he did not recognize the right of the Spanish Empire to go to war against the indigenous peoples of America because they were not ruled by Catholic kings.[309] However, it is interesting to note that in the arguments of Francisco de Vitória one of the clauses associated to the concept of “just war” said that only the princes and kings had the right to declare war when facing a serious injury or an aggression. The attack of Japan on Pearl Harbor was against a military base, but there was no previous declaration of war. However, to what extent could a power wait to be attacked with nuclear weapons to strike back? Furthermore, could not a nuclear attack be made by a power without any formal declaration of war? Which ruler, in the nuclear era, would be willing not to take pre-emptive measures to avoid a possible attack? It is important to consider that the UN Atomic Energy Commission had started its works less than six months after the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In the aftermath of World War II, the debates which dominated every intellectual circles were driven to understand the meaning of those dilemmas. Even a thinker like C. P. Snow, whose main concerns were the education and the nature of scientific knowledge, became notorious for his lectures published in the book The Two Cultures (1965), in which he identified the huge gap between the knowledge that can produce the atomic bomb and the knowledge that make men decide to produce it and, even worse, to use it. Another very influential thinker in the 1940’s and 1950’s, was Reinhold Niebuhr (1952), who saw the tragic and ironic dilemma with which the United States and the West were facing: although they trusted their virtues, it was necessary to have atomic bombs ready to be used with the purpose of avoiding a new world conflict and also to avoid that those weapons were used again. In other words, it was ironic that the possibility of a conflict became increasingly inevitable due to the threat and, however, the threat had to be kept exactly with the purpose of avoiding that such possibility came true.

The most complete theoretical interpretation and the one that reflects most fully the international environment of the Post-War appeared in the works by Hans Morgenthau.[310] In fact, at least three reasons made the so-called realism to emerge as the prevailing thought in the world politics. The first one, more obvious, was the fact that the world had just left a war of unthinkable consequences that severely affected all the major nations. The general perception was that bad rulers, which were either ambitious or based on hate and resentments had promoted aggressive nationalist policies, bringing about a war which involved in a tragic manner the entire international community. The second reason was the lack of trust which became a generalized dimension of the political practice. Within an environment of uncertainties in which the fear and the lack of trust prevailed, the States and its rulers should observe and should be observed continuously since in their actions were the best hopes that tension areas did not degenerate into conflicts that could tragically affect their interests and, above all, their security. In the individual sphere, it is necessary much moral force to respond to the feelings of threat and to the lack of trust with trust. In the sphere of the States, such thinkers as Machiavelli, Rousseau and Hobbes had taught that, in most circumstances, to respond to a threat and to the lack of trust with trust is close to irresponsibility.

The third reason had to do with the changes in the relation between government and the industrial and technological activity. The rulers always declare good and virtuous intentions, but as in the Greek tragedies, in the end, it is the political logic which ultimately prevails and determines the course of events. In addition to that, even a cooperative and virtuous government one day will be inevitably replaced by another one, which might have other purposes and other perceptions about their neighbors and even about their allies. In such an environment of fear and lack of trust, the atomic bomb became a kind of “sword of Damocles” pending on the governments and on the societies’ head.[311] The most concrete expression of such atmosphere of tensions and lack of trust in the international policy was the Cold War and the possibility to build atomic weapons transformed the feelings of threat into something dramatic, unsettling and even unacceptable.

In chronological terms, the landmark for the beginning of the Cold War was the publication of the famous X Article, by George Kennan[312], but the facts show that by the time of the capitulation of Nazi Germany and Japan, the Cold War was already present in the division of Germany, in the occupation of the Eastern European countries by the Soviet troops and in the launching of the atomic bombs on Japan. The X Article is very important since it brought to the world of politics a conceptual and theoretical basis to understand and to interpret the phenomenon of the ideological and strategic bipolarity in international politics.

It is worth highlighting that the political leaders in both sides, as well as in Great Britain – the third power that made up the Big Three alliance, which had established the peace terms of the end of World War II, shared such interpretation of international politics based on the bipolarity and on the perception that a war between the U.S. and the Soviet Alliances was an inevitable outcome. Indeed, that fact became clearer only with the end of the Soviet regime half a century later. The opening of the Kremlin archives after the end of the USSR brought to light documents showing that almost one year before the publication of the famous X Article, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union in the United States, Nikolai Novikov, had sent to the Kremlin a long telegram in which he discussed the foreign policy of the United States arguing that the conflict between both powers was inevitable, since, for the American capitalist system, the imperialist expansion was a consequence that belonged to the nature of capitalism and that only the USSR was able to check such expansion (JENSEN, 1993). In turn, the long telegram sent to the State Department by George Kennan in early 1946, when he was the Chargé d’Affaires in the American Embassy in Moscow, which originated the X Article, had a very similar content to that of Ambassador Novikov, only the direction was, obviously, the opposite, and it based its arguments on the observation that the Soviet security was associated to the expansion of the communist doctrine worldwide and that the United States was the only power able to stop the Soviet advance. At that same time, in March 1946, Richard Cables, the British Ambassador to Moscow, had also produced a long telegram in which he reported to the Foreign Office (the British Ministry of Foreign Relations) the deterioration process of the diplomatic relations among the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. In the telegram, Richard Cables argued that since the end of World War II the policy of the USSR became increasingly hostile to the West (JENSEN, 1993).

In short, the facts show that while the UN Atomic Energy Commission carried out its works, the environment of confrontation and even of political hostility between the USSR and the powers of the capitalist West were already obvious and were deteriorating in the statements and in the attitudes relating to the many issues which the alliance that had defeated the Axis powers did not solve. The division of Germany, the occupation of the Eastern European territories and the dispute for the influence on the governments of Turkey, Greece and Egypt, were only few among the many issues that revealed themselves intractable in the immediate Post-War. Even between allies, such as the United States and Great Britain, there was not a perfect atmosphere of understanding and cooperation able to reduce the tensions in the international environment. There are reports, for example, that in the Bretton Woods Conference, there was a remarkable lack of trust between Henry White and Henry Morgenthau, on one side, and Keynes and the British government, on the other side. The American government believed that the major purpose of the British was to use the American money in order to maintain and reinforce their colonial system, which was in sharp decline and that the Americans rejected and even suspected (STEIL, 2013). Arms race is an old issue in international politics. Even Thucydides reported the occurrence of arms races more than two thousand years ago, but with nuclear weapons, the issue became both more dramatic and more urgent. Nothing could better illustrate that logic than the so-called prisoners’ dilemma, a metaphor characteristic of the political realism, which seeks to illustrate the fact that in politics one cannot even trust the allies.

The fact is that a real paranoia took over the American politics, even in the domestic sphere, to such an extent that someone like Harry Dexter White himself, who had represented the United States at the Bretton Woods Conference, was considered a suspect of collaborating with the Soviet Union (STEIL, 2013, p. 44-46). Certainly, “McCarthyism” was the most remarkable phenomenon involving that real paranoia that took over the American politics in the years subsequent to the end of World War II. If the Americans did not even trust their own citizens, why should they trust the foreign governments? In Brazil’s case, obviously the pressures came mainly from the United States, since Brazil was within the American influence area, but in the Soviet sphere the term “pressure” did not even apply since there was a real control on the rulers and on the institutions of the countries under her influence. In a certain way, the situation reproduced the environment of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. It was in that environment of lack of trust and conflict, which affected almost all the organized European nations and States, that Thomas Hobbes (1993, p. 56), had written “really, one can think of nothing more absurd than to liberate and to let a weak enemy become strong, which was previously restricted to our power.”

The importance of the political environment’s description enables us to better understand the nature and the size of the difficulties conditioning the negotiations which were going on within the UN Atomic Energy Commission. It also helps one to notice how difficult it was for Álvaro Alberto to carry out the “specific compensations” and even to create an Atomic Energy Council tied to the Ministry of Foreign Relations with the purpose of building between Brazilian development strategy and the world great powers policy. In the First Report of the UN Atomic Energy Commission it had been included, by initiative of Álvaro Alberto, a clause stating that “the ownership, by ADA (Atomic Energy Agency proposed to be created by the UN) of the mines and the minerals that still were not extracted must not be considered as obligatory”. However, in that same year, the American Congress enacted the McMahon-Douglas Law in order to restrict the access of foreign companies and governments to scientific and technological knowledge which were developed in the area of atomic energy in the American territory (MOTOYAMA, 1996, p. 65-69). As a consequence, already in the 1950’s, the Brazilian initiative to acquire centrifuges in Germany to enrich thorium, another Álvaro Alberto’s proposal, was interrupted by pressures from the United States (CERVO; BUENO, 2008, p. 282).

Final considerations: hostile international political environment and expanding national scientific community

Under any perspective, there is no doubt that Admiral Álvaro Alberto left an important heritage strictly related to the Brazilian foreign relations. Among his most remarkable legacies, there is the fact that his experience as the Brazilian representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission was essencial to provide the decisive drive for the creation of CNPq. The position of privileged observer of the most momentous issue of his time – the beginning of the nuclear era – allowed him to consolidate the idea and to reinforce his perception of the importance for Brazil to create a National Research Council able to transform the scientific and technological development into a State policy to be followed by Brazilian authorities in the future.

Resolution n. 1 of the UN General Assembly, which created the Atomic Energy Commission, determined that it would include the representatives of the countries that were members of the Security Council and Canada. Brazil was a member, although a non-permanent one, and such participation was important, among other reasons, due to the reserves of atomic minerals that were supposed to exist in great quantity in the country. His simultaneous knowledge of security matters and scientific research, allowed Álvaro Alberto to observe that the reserves availability did not mean only the ownership of a source of raw materials with both commercial and strategic value that the Brazilian rulers should protect, but it also implied something much more complicated and more difficult to be carried out: the capacity for the country to develop the nuclear technology capacity. In fact, the mere ownership of any kind of natural resource may benefit few people, but the only way to turn those resources into a source of benefits for the entire nation is by the development of its technological capacity to use them industrially.

The possession of mineral reserves, which are considered strategic turns such reserves into a merely object of greed and international pressures, unless the country can use them in their own industries. In fact, the International Law tradition acknowledges that the access to basic goods is a “perfect right” of the nations. Jurist Emer de Vattel (2004, p. 65), in his Law of Nations, published in 1758, already recognized that “[...] a nation has the right to obtain by a reasonable price the things that she lacks, buying them from the peoples who do not need them for themselves. That is the principle of the right to trade among nations and, above all, of the right to purchase”. In other words, as far as essential goods are concerned – that is, goods with strategic interest – the nations that own them may discuss prices and conditions, but they cannot refuse to supply them to those who need them. The concept of “specific compensations” clearly brought that understanding: Brazil should not rest on the condition of mere supplier of input to the nuclear industry of other countries, but to fulfill such a purpose Brazil needed to develop her own technological capacity to use properly that kind of raw material.

The Post-War conjuncture, however, imposed major political difficulties due to the environment of fear and lack of trust that characterized the international politics. Thus, while on the one hand, the proximity between scientific research and technological development turned the international cooperation into a basic dimension, on the other hand, the environment of fear and lack of trust that prevailed in the world politics scene turned the international cooperation into a hard task, mainly in such a sensitive area as that of nuclear technology. The importance of the cooperation and informative exchange among scientists is well illustrated by the play called Copenhagen, written by Michael Frayn (1998). The play describes the meeting between Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr, in 1941. There was not any documented registration of what they have discussed during that meeting, but in 1941, Heisenberg actually visited Niels Bohr and his wife Margrethe, and they probably had dinner and strolled together along the gardens of Bohr’s house. In the play, Margrethe even feels offended by Heisenberg’s request, made between the lines for her husband to cooperate with him, who was supposedly working in the development of a nuclear weapon at the laboratories of Munich. The war had placed in opposite fields a disciple and his master, two scientists, two old friends. Even so, it was important to talk about the principle of the indetermination, about the possibilities to split the atom in a chain reaction and about what his old acquaintances, such as Enrico Fermi and Otto Hahn, were doing those days.

In addition, the beginning of the nuclear era brought the notion that national policies of scientific and technological development, should be discussed by the international leaders and organizations due to their close relations with defense and security matters. Even today, the development of capacity in nuclear technology goes beyond the sovereign decision of the governments, being the object of attention of other countries, mainly the major powers. In that sense, it was symptomatic that the first resolution that the UN produced was the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission with the purpose of trying to establish a regime to regulate the development and the use of atomic energy by the nations. As far as Brazil is concerned, the episodes that involved the nuclear issue also serve to question the rather simplistic hypothesis, but very common in the historiography of the Brazilian foreign policy, that the period when Dutra was President there was a phase of “automatic alignment” with the commands of the American policy.

If on the one hand the international environment was a difficult obstacle to overcome, on the other hand, Álvaro Alberto had as his allies the entire Brazilian scientific community which, in many ways, worked with the same purpose and, even without an explicit understanding, saw the relations between the world of politics and of the scientific and technological development from the same point of view. Álvaro Alberto’s understanding and his initiatives had the same impulses that led to the foundation of the University of São Paulo around the creation of the Faculty of Philosophy, Science and Letters, in 1934, and to the creation of the University of the Federal District (UDF), in Rio de Janeiro. Antônio Paim (1981, p. 77-79) assessing the importance of UDF to build, around the universities, of a scientific community that was more dynamic and more compatible with the modern scientific research. In his analysis, Paim emphasizes the leadership role played by Anísio Teixeira who, as Secretary of Education of Rio de Janeiro, taught the inaugural class of UDF proposing that model of university in which, beyond the traditional teaching, scientific research should be performed sistematically.

In that same direction, another initiative is quite instructive regarding the way by which in Brazil the military sphere, the society, and the international scientific community became very close to each other. In 1946 the Brazilian Air Force decided to establish a compounded center for technological development in the outskirts of the city of São José dos Campos. The technological compound included an Aeronautical Institute of Technology (ITA) and an Aeronautical Technical Center (CTA) - currently called the General Air & Space Technology Command. The initiative was led by a military, Brigadier Casimiro Montenegro Filho, who understood that aviation had played a decisive role in the fate of World War II and that, in addition, aeronautics would be increasingly important in any future scenario, both in military terms and in the civil aviation industry. Three important vectors can be identified in the implementation strategy of the technological complex of São José dos Campos: 1) the strategic decision of the Brazilian government to invest in a broad and long-term scientific and technological project; 2) the attainment of an agreement between the Brazilian Air Force and the American government, which enabled remarkable and experienced scientists and professors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Cornell University to come to Brazil; 3) the gathering of remarkable Brazilian experts not only around a complex of laboratories, but also around a school of engineering that was innovative and able to integrate basic research and tecnological development. Like Álvaro Alberto, Casimiro Montenegro had noticed that to be up to date with the current advances in science and technology was essential to Brazilian security and its position in the international scenario. Needless to say that such initiative was the real embryo that, later, originated Embraer which is currently one of the largest jet plane producers in the world market.

While, on the one hand, the international environment was an obstacle to Álvaro Alberto’s projects and those of the Brazilian diplomacy to develop the national capacity in nuclear energy and the scientific and technological autonomy of Brazil, on the other hand, there were good reasons for Álvaro Alberto to have the support and the recognition of the Brazilian scientific community. In fact, Álvaro Alberto was more a scientist than a military officer. In his classes at the Navy School, although he taught the course on “The Chemistry of Explosives”, his concerns used to be well beyond the strict content of the processes of producing explosives, their effects and their military and civilian applications. He stood out for his active participation in the current scientific debates. He became a member of the Brazilian Academy of Science due to his constant search for new knowledge typical to the scientists. He discussed the logic of Aristotle and always taught his students to look at Physics and Chemistry from the perspective of the minds that build modern science, such as Berthelot, Newton and Lavoisier. He also revealed to be very much up to date with the science of his time presenting reflections on the works of Nils Bohr, Heisenberg, Rutherford, Irving Langmuir and Wilhelm Ostwald. A collection of his writings was organized by the Navy Press and was published since 1960 under the suggestive title of “Alongside Science” (v. 1, 1960; v. 2, 1968; v. 3, 1970; v. 4, 1972). The four volumes include lectures delivered at the Brazilian Academy of Science, in scientific congresses and in the Brazilian and foreign universities. The collection also includes articles published in newspapers and scientific journals. In his writings, his concern with the nature of science and its advances is remarkable. In fact, in the lecture he gave in 1948 at the Catholic University of Washington he discussed the crisis of materialism from the point of view of the current knowledge of atomic Physics (v. 2, p. 61-90). Still in the 1920’s he debated the theory of relativity and the meaning of the works of Marie and Pierre Curie (GARCIA; ALBERTO, 2000, p. 14-15).

In short, while Álvaro Alberto had against himself an adverse, almost hostile international political environment, he had on his side an active scientific and military communities, which noticed the importance of science and technology for the nation. Álvaro Alberto’s professional career was a live testimony that the world had turned diplomacy into an activity that was more complex and more integrated to important segments of society, mainly the scientific community. It started to become clear that a good negotiator could not have much success, unless he had been supported by a society that was active and organized in solid institutions, and able to interact in a relatively balanced way with other nations. Because of World War II, it also became clear that the practice of diplomacy introduced multilateralism and the need for experts to act in a systematic way together with the diplomatic missions. Even though the UN Nuclear Energy Commission did not produce agreements and consensus like Bretton Woods, it served to show that multilateralism – which turned certain national topics into a concern directly used to other nations – it had become a regular dimension of the diplomatic activity. The nuclear issue also reflected the fact that a new relationship between government, diplomacy and society had emerged.

A rich and complex legacy was left by Álvaro Alberto under the form of institutions as CNPq, for example, but it can also be considered that something less visible to the eyes was left as an important legacy by Álvaro Alberto: he transferred to the practice of diplomatic actions the perception that science and technology were essential to promote national interests. When it is observed that the young diplomat nominated to integrate the Brazilian representation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission was Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, one must think that the Brazilian participation in that Commission was also important for the training of staff in the Brazilian diplomacy with a more modern view of the international politics and of the relation between the possession of natural resources and their effective use. In fact, 30 years later, already as Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Saraiva Guerreiro was important in the negotiations of the Nuclear Agreement with Germany and in the building of the Brazilian diplomatic actions in a period in which the Brazilian government had to face the pressures of the major powers again, mainly from the United States[313]. Certainly, in the fulfillment of his functions and in the missions in which he engaged throughout his path as a diplomat, Saraiva Guerreiro might have had in his mind the images of his experience within the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 around the issue of atomic energy as a set of references to guide his actions.

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Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva

Graduated in Law, Barbosa da Silva was a diplomat, farmer, philanthropist and businessman. He was attaché to the Brazilian Embassy in London, from 1939 to 1941, when he worked in the Special Division for the Safeguard of the Italian Interests in Great Britain. He participated, as a member, of the Brazilian delegation to the International Conference of Civil Aviation, in Chicago, in 1944. He negotiated agreements about air transportation with ten countries between 1946 and 1948. He was executive secretary of the Consultative Commission of Commercial Agreements (1950) and president of the Consultative Commission of Wheat (1951). He headed the Economic Division and, later, the Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1952 to 1961. In that period, he led the negotiations with various countries for setting up the Limited Convertibility System of Multilateral Payments. Among those countries were Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Austria and France. He organized the trip abroad of the elected President Juscelino Kubitschek and headed several sessions of the Contracting Parties of GATT. After leaving Itamaraty, he worked in various private companies. His greatest achievement was to expand and consolidate the role of the Ministry in the economic sector.

Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva: from “Secos & Molhados” to multilateral economic diplomacy

Rogério de Souza Farias[314]

On April 3rd, 1939, eighteen young men entered the Foreign Minister’s office in the Itamaraty Palace. They soon stepped on the Persian Oushak rug that decorated the majestic room. The gaucho Oswaldo Aranha, who was the Chancellor at that time, hosted them “with frugal gestures and a glowing sympathy” (Silva, 1994, p. 3). The room was solemn. Not for the large jacaranda table or for the faded green curtains. The reason were the golden letters engraved in the green frieze, imitating marble, which covered part of the the environment’s ceiling, recalling that the Baron of Rio Branco, patron of the Brazilian diplomacy, and the creator of traditions still in use, had worked and died there.

Aranha was one of the main leaders of the revolution that broke out in October 1930 and in March 1938, he became Foreign Minister. One of his first administrative measures was to complete the unification of the consular and the diplomatic careers. Another effort was to change the profile of the organ’s labor force. Among the almost 300 employees of the Brazilian Foreign Service in 1939, 70 of them were born before the Proclamation of the Republic. The average age was 42 years old. However, it was not enough only to increase the number of diplomats. It was necessary to improve the recruitment system, using the public exam as the only hiring process. For that reason, he supported the Administrative Department of the Public Service (DASP) in the task to expand the base of candidates and to turn the procedure more based on merit. The public exam opened the ministry’s doors to the growing urban middle class not necessarily linked by blood and friendship ties to the ruling political class.

The immediate result of that initiative was the group of young people that had entered the office. They underwent the strictest selection process ever carried out by the government until that moment in Brazil. The competition was not high by contemporary standards – 55 candidates for 18 places. What turned the competition hard was the number of exams and their requirements, in addition to uncertainties about the nomination. In the following decades, Antônio Borges Leal Castello Branco, Sergio Corrêa da Costa, Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva, Antônio Correa do Lago, Paulo Leão de Moura, Celso Raul Garcia, Roberto Campos and the other members of the class proved that the selection process was successful. It was a new tradition that became integrated into the Brazilian diplomacy. The young people presented there adapted the ministry to a new era, respecting, at the same time, the basic principles laid down by the Baron of Rio Branco.

One of the youngest of the group was Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva. Born in Curvelo (MG), on February 11th, 1917, he graduated in Law from the University of Brazil, in 1937. He had a long life, dying in 2012 after a great career in the diplomacy and in the private sector. Today, his importance is ignored, in clear contrast with the prominent role he played. The diplomat, strangely enough, was never posted abroad after he came back from his first mission. From 1942 until 1961, when he left the Economic Department, he, together with his generation of classmates, forged a new language to justify the diplomacy’s control in the area of international economic negotiation and, beyond that, he created a tradition in the economic sector of Itamaraty, which stopped being a marginal area of the organ and started to play a central role in Brazilian foreign policy.

World War II and the emerging multilateralism

Right after passing the entrance exam, Edmundo received a scholarship from Cultura Inglesa to study in the United Kingdom (Vinícius de Moraes was one of the winners in the previous year). His purpose was to study in prestigious British universities and, later, to work on a PhD about the commercial relations between the UK and Brazil, from the Methuen Treaty (1703) until the Opening of the Ports (1808). The choice of the subject showed how the young law bachelor was already concerned about the economic themes.

Barbosa da Silva was unable to conclude his academic project. World War II started while he was crossing the Atlantic Ocean and, about one year after he installed himself in Cambridge, the Brazil-ian government was in charge of safeguarding the Italian interests in Great Britain. The young diplomat was called to London to carry out the delicate job to defend the interests of an enemy before authorities who were not very willing to respect the law of war. The small team that he integrated as sub chief cared for 12,000 civilian interns and some 250,000 prisoners of war (including 91 Generals) in the United Kingdom and other places – Lybia, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, India and Canada. Here he began to learn the difficult art of persuasion, acting as an intermediate between the Italian and the British interests. His stay in London coincided with the horrors of the Blitz. Many times, he was almost seriously injured in the bombings.

After he came back to Brazil, in early 1942, Barbosa da Silva went to work in the transport area of the Economic and Commercial Division of Itamaraty. At that time, the subject was very important, since the eclosion of World War II had broken most of the ties of international transportation. There was a further relevant factor. Since the 1920’s the transportation by airplane promised to be an alternative to the long and tiresome sea travels. However, there was no significant framework to regulate the economic and logistical dimensions of that kind of transportation. It was in that environment that Barbosa da Silva started to study the subject. His first important role was being a member of the Brazilian delegation at the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944).

Multilateralism after World War II was richer and more complex than the League of Nations period. The institutional architecture of the emerging multilateralism was based on the assumption that interdependence would lead to many opportunities, but also to many clashes, which called for a more aggressive dialogue and policy harmonization. According to Barbosa da Silva, there was “a progressive universal trend to use the international economic cooperation organs to discuss and seek solutions for the major problems that afflict humanity”. In 1946, he already stated that such reality would demand from Brazil a close review not only of the domestic regulatory framework, but also of the domestic process by which it was articulated – “problems grow and those in charge of politics, both in the international and the national spheres, will have to seek the appropriate solution for them” (Silva, 1946, p. 4).

The Chicago Convention analyzed complex subjects in an environment of great power unbalance. It was undeniable that the international system comprised highly unequal states, with Brazil in a disadvantageous position. Such situation, for many diplomats and observers of that time, was a source of resentment. Although Barbosa da Silva agreed with the conclusion, he had a different opinion about its consequences for the country. He believed in the Brazilian capacity to obtain gains in negotiation, but without sliding to nationalist proselytism or opportunistic blackmail. He was certain that the diplomatic isolationism was equivalent to deny reality. While that prevented the inherent risks of an unequal relationship, the position also eliminated the possibilities of benefits – which Brazil urgently needed. According to him, the responsibility of the Brazilian diplomat was “not to turn his back on international cooperation, either receiving it or providing it, depending on the case”. Working in this field, Edmundo learned a lesson that guided him in the future: “Today [in 1946], governments no longer leave their companies alone in other countries asking for rights. They discuss those rights themselves, and they know how to defend them very well [...]” (Silva, 1946, p. 1 and 21). That was a call to narrow the ties between the public and the private sectors and the acknowledgement that the Brazilian government (that is, the Itamaraty) could defend the interests of Brazilian companies in an increasingly integrated international economy. He put that teaching into practice in the following years, when he negotiated agreements on air transportation with 10 countries.

“Secos & Molhados”

In the mid-1920’s, there were still three separate careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - the diplomatic, the consular and the Secretary of State. One of the few moments when all employees interacted was during the extraordinary vacation, when both diplomats and consuls packed the hotels in Rio de Janeiro. On one such occasion, Raul de Campos, its director-general for Commercial and Consular Affairs, organized a visit to some industrial establishments. One of the most enthusiastic about the project was José da Fonseca Filho, the Brazilian Consul in Cádiz. He was pleased about the idea to gather samples of Brazilian products to send them to Brazilian consulates abroad. The Minister of State ordered the Itamaraty Palace to provide a room for him to receive the commodities. Fonseca Filho, one day, arriving at the scene, encountered an extraordinary poster: “Big Secos & Molhados warehouse. Fonseca Filho e Cia”. Scattered in the room were strings of onions and garlic, a few kilos of jerked beef and two gigantic pieces of cod.[315] That was a joke made by his colleagues from the Secretary of State. Being used to associate the Itamaraty Palace to major social events and to the sober solemnity of the bureaucratic daily life, the activities that were becoming stronger in that environment were strange. However, they had to get used to the increasing importance of the commercial area. During Félix Pacheco’s and Octávio Mangabeira’s administrations, the celebration of commercial agreements and the promotion of the Brazilian products abroad started to receive more attention from the head of the organization.

That situation did not last long, since there was resistance to the advancement of the economic activities. When a commentator pointed to the “commercial excitement” of that time, he censored those who wished to “convert the diplomats into commercial travelers”.[316] The jurist Pontes de Miranda criticized, a few months before Barbosa da Silva took over, the “solid conviction that the diplomat had to stop being a politician in order to become a mere commercial agent of his people” (Miranda, 1939, p. 51). Immediately after World War II, however, other economic institutions progressively marginalized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The greatest challenge occurred in the late 1940’s, with the creation of the Consultative Commission for Foreign Exchange (CCIE) of the Export and Import Portfolio of Banco do Brasil (CEXIM), in December 1949, which took the coordination power in the commercial area from Itamaraty. Shortly after that, CEXIM created a sector of International Agreements, negotiating commercial treaties directly with foreign governments – seven of them between 1949 and 1950 – without properly informing Itamaraty. In that period, the ministry was so unequipped that foreign diplomats rarely addressed the organ to deal with economic matters. Most of the agreements, at that time, arrived in Itamaraty only to be signed.

In early 1950, there were enough diplomats of Edmundo’s class who worked together with their superiors, to reverse that. In fact, during that period, several diplomats from what can be called “DASP’s generation” acted in the area – Roberto Campos, Otávio Dias Carneiro, João Baptista Pinheiro, Antônio Correa do Lago, Sergio Armando Frazão, Maury Gurgel Valente, Celso Raul Garcia, George Maciel, Miguel Osorio, Paulo Leão de Moura and Alfredo Valladão. Celso Raul Garcia and Roberto Campos, in particular, led the formulation process and Barbosa da Silva the implementation of the reform. They disagreed with the fact that trade policy was conducted without any consideration of their impact on the Brazilian foreign policy and on the country’s commitments with its international partners. There was neither a concern with the background, nor with the preparation of delegations sent abroad. They did not conform to the situation, especially when they were criticized when problems occurred in negotiations conducted or led by CEXIM or other government agencies (FARIAS, 2012, p. 68-69). However, Barbosa da Silva, Roberto Campos and Celso Raul Garcia did not have the means to reverse, in Itamaraty, the situation in the short term. The legal framework was inadequate. Contacts with the private sector was fragile, and there was not any information repository, which added to the serious lack of staff to expand the performance in the area. Finally, although it had the support from the top, the prestige of the economic area did not help, since most diplomats still considered it as a banishment – the image of “Secos & Molhados” remained.

In an entrepreneurial manner, Roberto Campos started the process that solved those problems in the future. He came back to Brazil in the late 1940’s, after several years of intensive learning abroad. In the multilateral meetings he had attended, he noticed the lack of information to guide an adequate formulation of the Brazilian position. For that reason, he proposed the creation of an economic policy research unit in Itamaraty. The proposal was not to respond to specific daily problems, but to try to “anticipate the problems and formulate adequate economic guidelines in advance”. The service would have to introduce “practical suggestions”, which, if they were approved, could be conveyed to other government organs “as a contribution from Itamaraty to define national guidelines”. Such ambition is interesting, since it shows that they sought in expert economic knowledge the legitimacy to converge the economic policies of other organs to the preferences of Itamaraty. In order to solve the problem of lack of personnel, Campos requested employees from other ministries and Banco do Brasil. With such a maneuver, important government sectors with qualified labor were emptied and there was the creation, within the Itamaraty, of a team of statisticians and economists. Raul Fernandes approved the proposal in January 1950. The second initiative by Campos, which both Cyro de Freitas-Valle and Celso Raul Garcia supported, was the approval of the Commercial Agreement Consultative Commission (CCAC). Campos, however, soon moved away from the daily activities of the Economic Division to act outside the organization and Barbosa da Silva was in charge of implementing CCAC and the Section of Studies and Research (Farias, 2012, p. 69-70).

His first struggle was to ensure both budget and human resources to the recently created organs. In 1946, when there was the fusion of the Economic and the Commercial Divisions, the area had over 20 employees. Five years later, that number had been reduced to less than 10, in a situation of increasing responsibilities – the Economic Division received an average of 80 demands daily. Its employees, plunged into excessive tasks, did not follow much the matters that interested the organ when they were abroad. Edmundo made successive waves of requests to his superiors to obtain resources. His greatest victory was to transfer the economists and the statisticians hired to the Section of Studies and Research to operate in the daily activities of the economic area. Several professionals participated in that group – Antônio Patriota, Lúcia Pirajá, J. O. Knaack de Souza, Olintho Machado, Mário Guaraná de Barros, Joaquim Ferreira Mangia, Jayme Magrassi de Sá, Benedicto Fonseca Moreira, Wander Batalha Lima, among others. The ministry lost the think tank that Roberto Campos had planned, but gained a technical base that projected it to the forefront in the formulation of the foreign economic policy in the government.

Barbosa da Silva, like Roberto Campos, assumed that Itamaraty was a political ministry par excellence, but the economic factor was one of the most determinant variables of Brazilian foreign policy. According to him, the economic relations with foreign countries had to be planned according to political purposes, with the most important one being to to guarantee the welfare and the economic security of the Brazilian people. However, what institution should guide Brazil abroad? In his opinion, Itamaraty had to play the leading role, since it had a view of the whole. The diplomat understood, however, that the support of the domestic organs and the private sector as a condition to strengthen the Brazilian foreign position was extremely relevant. It was a major challenge to obtain both.

From the point of view of domestic bureaucracies, Barbosa da Silva behaved with a humble stance, always encouraging their participation in Brazilian delegations abroad. His strategy was to create broad contacts with them. After all, they were the ones who had the expert knowledge necessary for a good performance in international negotiations and, often, it was through them that international commitments were carried out domestically. It was due to that effort that those institutions accepted, over time, Barbosa da Silva as a domestic leader, as well as both head and guide to diplomats abroad, when the matters of their respective areas were discussed in bilateral or multilateral activities. He also introduced businessmen as members of CCAC and invited them to participants in negotiations abroad. Barbosa da Silva believed that the diplomatic success was intimately related to the articulation with the private sectors.

It was by the hands of Vasco Leitão da Cunha and Vicente Rao that, as a young second-class minister, Barbosa da Silva became head of the Economic and Consular Department. The nomination showed the trust of his superiors, since they preferred to nominate a diplomat with a legal background instead of others with an economics background. His superiors assessed correctly that the international economy was regulated by a system of rules and principles, and that the capacity to be a great negotiator and to act within the parameters of diplomatic legalism were more significant than the specific background in economics.

The relations with other government sectors, the contacts with politicians, the constant trips abroad and the quick promotions for which Barbosa da Silva fought tirelessly for his employees was a powerful source of attraction for the most brilliant young people who entered the diplomatic career. Many of his subordinates would have major impact on diplomacy (and outside it) in the following decades – an incomplete list would include Paulo Nogueira Batista, Sérgio Bath, Raul Leite Ribeiro, Marcílio Marques Moreira, Luiz Paulo Lindenberg Sette, Luiz Augusto Souto Maior, Octavio Rainho, Carlos Proença Rosa, Amaury Bier, Sérgio Paulo Rouanet, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandes, Arnaldo Vasconcellos, Marcelo Raffaelli and Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima.

When he became head of the Department, a position that he kept until the early 1960’s, his persona was already consolidated before his peers and subordinates. At that time, Barbosa da Silva was an Apollonian figure. He wore his linen suit like a Lord. His English was Etonian in terms of wit and manners – ironic without being sarcastic, affirmative without being arrogant, cautious without being passive, educated without being distant. He had one of the greatest qualities that François de Callières saw in a diplomat: the capacity to listen attentively to everything and rule his behavior according to equilibrium (Callières, 1983 [1716], p. 145). He was calm, focused, skillful when he spoke and persuasive when he wrote. An employee introduced to him in the early 1950’s said he was “a young, handsome and elegant man”, in addition to being “very serious” who spoke “like a British”. According to Antônio Patriota (Senior), he was a “sympathetic personality, physically similar to actor Robert Taylor, nicknamed Lord Ho-Ho because of his strong British accent”. For, Gibson Barboza, he was “one of the best diplomatic negotiators” he had met (Barboza, 2002, p. 55; Moreira, 2002, p. 21-23; Patriota, 2010, p. 95). Even though he obtained such recognition, Barboza da Silva preserved a rustic simplicity, a personality from Minas Gerais that was, at the same time, proud and circumspect. He sharpened his pencil with a blade and, whenever he had the chance, he put on his boots and fled to his family’s farm, in Campos.

The first problem he faced was the serious situation of the Brazilian balance of payments. During the beginning of the second Vargas government, the system of import licenses was overly relaxed, causing, in an environment of overvalued exchange rate, problems in the country’s ability to pay its imports. Later, that dynamic was aggravated with the decline of export earnings. Barbosa da Silva led, in that first moment, the renegotiation of commercial contracts, at the same time in which he reviewed the system of bilateral commerce and payments (there were 30 in force in 1953). In 1955, he was able to restructure the payment system with six European countries.

In early 1956, he participated in a mission that changed his career forever. Once Juscelino Kubitschek was elected president, he decided to make a trip to the United States and Europe before his inauguration. The purpose of the journey was to get away from the political disputes, and to present to the international community a plan for the rapid development of Brazil. Edmundo was chosen to organize the delicate initiative. First, it was necessary to ensure that the president was well received in the countries he would visit. The struggle for protocol and ceremonial was a major success. He was able to schedule a visit to Eisenhower in Key West and the Queen of England left her vacations to meet JK. In Spain and Portugal, the reception was an apotheosis. In all ten countries he visited, the president-elect and his aides were followed with interest by businessmen and potential investors – many of whom started or increased investments in Brazil in the following years. Those results were obtained through intensive work. That involved writing dossiers of information that presented the profile of his interlocutors, bilateral agendas of controversies, notes for conversations, reports on the economic and political situation and, above all, a guide to present an optimistic position about the economic potentials of the country for international investors. During the trip, Barbosa da Silva enjoyed both the trust and the intimacy of JK.

With the prestige of relying on the president’s trust, Barbosa da Silva devoted himself to the activity of strengthening even more the economic area of the ministry. First, he was able to move away from the Economic Department and the consular issues. Second, he made provisions to separate the Commercial and the Economic Divisions, increasing the staff of both. Third, he promoted greater delegation of competencies for subordinate areas, leaving for himself more time for the high-level articulation of the area’s guidelines. Fourth, he made the agenda be addressed by pairs of economists and diplomats in the daily routine. In addition, despite the resistance of many diplomats, he turned himself to the internalization, within the scope of Itamaraty, of the activities from the Commercial Offices that the Ministry of Labor kept abroad for the commercial promotion activities – a transference that only took place in the mid-1960’s. As in the 1920’s, there were serious critics to the expansion of the economic area. One of the most eloquent of them was Vasco Leitão da Cunha. Both in the Reform Commission of 1953 as in that of 1958 he was vehement in his opposition to what he considered an excessive distortion of the diplomatic activity (Cunha, 2003, p. 21, 171 and 303; Farias, 2012, p. 335-336). Although they held totally opposite views about what the diplomat should do and how the Brazilian Foreign Service should be organized, Leitão da Cunha and Barbosa da Silva were great friends and did not let the confrontation interfere in their professional and their personal lives.

Relying on the collaboration of Antônio Correa do Lago, one of his best friends and who took the exam at the same time, Barbosa da Silva worked to reposition the Brazilian foreign trade, in order to reduce the serious balance of payments problems that Brazil was facing since the early 1950’s. Like other members of his generation, he believed that economic development depended on the ability to import, which, in turn, depended on the exports. Even though he was more liberal than most of his contemporaries, the diplomat considered the deterioration of the exchange terms a crucial term of the Brazilian commercial life. That influenced his view that the country should diversify its export agenda, broaden foreign markets, work to avoid cyclical oscillations of international markets and have an economic policy profile focused on attracting foreign capital.

The first task he engaged in was to follow the long and complicated process of reform of the Brazilian trade policy (tariffs). Since it was specific, not ad valorem, inflation constantly corroded the protection level of the economy. In the late 1940’s, the government used the system of licenses, later replaced by the mechanism of currency auction in order to face the problem. Import duties could not be raised because of the commitments that Brazil consolidated at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The solution was first to obtain a waiver in GATT, approve a new tariff schedule in the Brazilian Congress (more protectionist and ad valorem) and, finally, to renegotiate new commitments with commercial partners. Barbosa da Silva delegated almost all the work to his competent peers and subordinates, but he worked in the background – with the Ministry of Finance and the Congress. The negotiations with commercial partners were the greatest that Brazil carried out in commercial multilateralism between 1947 and the late Cold War period. Many countries criticized the fact that the transposition of the rates from the specific system to ad valorem was accompanied by an aggressive increasing of the protection level. Brazil, in turn, answered that if commitments could not be renegotiated, he would denounce the multilateral arrangement. In the end, the Brazilian Congress approved, with changes, the renegotiations, but the country continued to request for the next 30 years waivers in GATT (Farias, 2012, p. 217-225).

The increase in trade protectionism was a sign to international investors that Brazil would deepen its process of development by import substitution. The closing of the economy, however, raised instead of decreasing the need for dollars. To make the situation worse, Brazilian exports faced increasing difficulties to be competitive in world market. Besides the reduction of the price of coffee, the greatest challenge resulted from the consequences of the Treaty of Rome. The creation of the European commercial bloc led to the rise of preferences to former colonies, the rise of the domestic taxes on commodities (such as coffee, sugar and cocoa) and the inappropriate harmonization of the tariffs to other countries, which seriously harmed Brazil. In the meetings of the Contracting Parties of GATT, Barbosa da Silva sought compensation for the harm that the arrangement caused to Brazilian exporters and requested repeatedly that the institution preserve multilateral rules.

The results were discouraging. From then on, many Brazilian diplomats sought an alternative and more aggressive way to reformulate the multilateral trade system. Barbosa da Silva agreed with them that the international economic and financial cooperation system established by the end of World War II, despite having created a dialogue environment and a better technical understanding of the reality, had failed in the correction of the most adverse aspects of the underdevelopment conditions in the Third World. However, he believed, unlike that group, that even with all the mistakes, Brazilian problems could still be solved in GATT. It was worthless the unstoppable search for institutional arrangements to replaced it, since the players were the same and they would defend their interests in a similar way wherever it was. GATT attracted Edmundo because of its flexibility to fulfill its mission, since it was considered that, if it carried out its mandate in a strict and intransigent way, it would no longer serve as an element of discipline of international trade. He had the opportunity to support GATT in a crucial moment. He was chosen, in 1959, to head the meeting of GATT’s Contracting Parties in Tokyo. At that occasion, Edmundo led the creation of the Council of Representatives, an instance for managing the multilateral trade system, he raised from 70 to 90 the staff members of GATT, and, finally, he articulated the launch of the Dillon Round, the fifth cycle of tariff negotiations after the war (Farias, 2012, p. 286-7).

The fact that he appreciated GATT did not mean he believed that there were not other actions to favor Brazilian interests. In the second half of the 1950’s, he led two initiatives that had a major impact on Brazilian foreign policy: regionalism in Latin America and the expansion towards Eastern Europe.

Barbosa da Silva not only articulated domestically the coalition of government technicians and businessmen that led to the creation of ALALC, but he was also the most important player in the defense of the regional arrangement in GATT meetings. In both tasks, he relied on the support of the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL). He still had great admiration for the institution. In the future, when, according to him, the Commission was immersed in an “autarchic position,” he revered his position. As far as Latin America was concerned, during the period of the Pan-American Operation, he considered that the initiative would provide “a sense of objectivity to what should be done, instead of always adapting an empty speech characteristic of the Pan- American meetings.” According to Edmundo, “it is worthless to seek theoretically valid formulas, but without any support”. For him, the countries of the region were unprepared both to formulate plans and to benefit from foreign assistance – they lacked clear purposes and discipline in the application of resources of the national and foreign financial organs. According to him, instead of requesting foreign help, recipient governments had to rationalize their domestic budgets and avoid waste (Silva, 1984).

Since the Pan-American Operation meetings, Edmundo already noticed that Brazil was a very different country from its neighbors. In the following decades, already far from diplomacy, he refined such perception. According to him, countries like India and Brazil, despite being underdeveloped, had “a much greater notion of responsibility than the rest”, since they were undergoing a rapid process of economic transition. He believed that Brazil would be a major power. What differentiated his theses as compared to those by his peers was the defense that, despite being able to understand the Third World, an “alignment from below” should not be carried out. He also disagreed with the confrontation tactics of the group (Silva, 1984).

Even if it was successful, regionalism would not solve Brazilian economic problems. It was for that reason that Barbosa da Silva bet on the expansion of Brazilian trade to the Iron Curtain. He did not do that, in a blind and ideological manner. He was not persuaded by the thesis that the socialist block had millions of eager consumers and, therefore, it was crucial to invest in that trade relation. He believed that it was worthless to foster commercial ties if there was not demand for Brazilian products or if the block could not supply products Brazil needed.

The trade expansion project was controversial. It caused serious conflict in Brazilian society – which was reproduced even within the Itamaraty, where the Political Department and the minister’s office itself were against increasing economic ties with Eastern Europe. The first tactical position of Barbosa da Silva to overcome the resistance was to limit the Brazilian goal to the economic relationship. The second one was to start by the satellite countries of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and, later, gradually establish trade ties with the Russians. The third one was to seek allies in the private sector and other governmental areas as a way to raise the legitimacy of the initiative. The fourth was a serious technical work to detect trade opportunities. The fifth was to make the contacts throughout several months, in order to get the public opinion used to the movement. In November 1959, after several years of political and bureaucratic battles, Barbosa da Silva led a trade mission to Moscow – the first Brazilian diplomat to deal with official affairs in the Soviet capital since both countries broke diplomatic relations in 1947.

Diplomacy as equilibrium and moderation

By the end of JK’s government, Barbosa da Silva had great prestige. He was the first one of his class to reach the highest post of the career – first class minister. The promotion, which took place in May 1959, caused consternation. He was only 42 years old and he ranked 30th in the antiquity list. Since he had come back from London, in 1942, he had not been posted abroad. The ascent was the acknowledgement of his work and served as a sign for all young diplomats. The economic area now was far from being a Groceries Warehouse as it was in the past – at least 10 of the 17 graduates of the Rio Branco Institute in 1956, showed interest in working in the economic area[317]. Many presidents and foreign ministers had thought about posting him abroad – Bonn, London, Buenos Aires and Paris. He repeatedly refused the appointments. Edmundo considered Itamaraty a citadel, and had no interest in abandoning it. The fact that he had no interest in posts abroad and that he had already reached the top of the career diminished conflicts with colleagues from the career. That relative independence and his competence eventually made him ascend to the post of Secretary General and, later, head of Itamaraty, both provisionally (1960- 1961).

When he entered the career, the stereotype of the diplomat was of one of pretentious conservatives removed from Brazilian reality. The effort made by his generation changed that image. That was one of the few themes Barbosa da Silva left his ideas systematically, because of his speech as patron of the 1959 Rio Branco class. Edmundo appreciated the Alexis Saint-Léger’s definition that diplomacy

Is about imagination, preparation, suggestion, representation, execution. The diplomat is an authority in critical analysis and the creator of great plans. He must have the courage, he must have the patience, and he must humbly accept the limits of the possible. In disagreement with his ministers, he must fight against falsehood using all his skill, but always in a loyal way, as their subordinate. Whether in the building or the prevention, his role must be both recluse and anonymous. He is an innovator, but also a doer tied by the disciplines of the civil servant (Silva, 1959, p. 9).

That quotation shows the great tension between tradition and innovation, between hierarchy and reform. In that clash, Barbosa da Silva was at the side of renewal. It can be stated that he agreed with the Joaquim Nabuco’s saying that “a little bit of tradition is necessary, a little bit of past, mainly regarding the habits, but it is also necessary, and much more so, the transformation and future” (Nabuco: 2006, 578). Not for the attachment to ideologies, not for the search of a renewal as end in itself. What he desired was a diplomacy that was closer to the challenges that the country was facing and, above all, according to the Brazilian social reality. In his speech he stated:

Therefore our duty – yours and of all of us – was to bring Itamaraty right into the core of national life, to make it representative of the current Brazil, its problems, its contradictory aspects and its uncontrollable hopes. We cannot close ourselves within the refuge of our offices, with our ears sealed to the echoes of the agricultural works, to the varied sounds of the plants where our material progress is forged, to the roar of the engines that displace men and their goods without stop, through land, sea and air, with the purpose of creating wealth. We cannot disconnect from the productive work of the schools, universities and the patient research from their laboratories where the elites of rulers, technicians, engineers, jurists, professors and philosophers, who will prepare the country to the multiple tasks that result from the new Brazilian structure, are trained. Therefore, we cannot remain limited to the contemplation of our past, our tradition, old formulas or diplomatic formalities (Silva, 1959, p. 10).

However, the defense of the renewal did not place Barbosa da Silva among the most radical diplomats of that period. He believed that Brazil faced instability, and political and social crises. He criticized those who defended instant, automatic or painless solutions with blind nationalism. He believed that such position had already caused great problems to the country and it was necessary to fight it. The nationalist populism was a recurrent, easy and convenient way, but it only delayed the day of reckoning. Creativity, courage and persistence to face the unpopular, the painful, the unpredictable and, above all, the imperfect were necessary. The trade agreements with the communist area, for example, were far from being ideal tools, but they were ways that could not be discarded due to ideological bias. Another difference in relation to the most radicals was his belief that Brazil was not a unit, in the sense that there were various interest groups. Radical formulas, in that environment, had no agglutination power and polarized society unnecessarily. That was why he admired the ability to compromise, separating the vital interests and defending them with persistence, but with enough maturity to know where and how to conciliate.

Diplomacy at the service of the private sector

By the end of JK’s government, Barbosa da Silva was invited to head the Institute of Sugar and Alcohol (IAA). In October 1961, he took over the position and remained there until September 1962. His nomination, as he stated, “caused perplexity to many people”, even to several who knew him. He was leaving Itamaraty, where he had completed his training to serve the Republic in another area. It was an acknowledgment of his skills, both as a negotiator and a sugar cane farmer, the difficult and complex task to guarantee a new policy for a strategic sector of the economy.

Barbosa da Silva identified that the main source of constraints and opportunities was abroad. Between 1953 and 1958, sugar production worldwide increased by 47%, while consumption increased only 23%. The price of the product had fallen by half in the 1950’s. That was a situation very convergent with Cepal’s assumptions. Facing that situation, Edmundo defended the stabilization of the market, in order to protect the sector from sudden price variations, from the deterioration of terms of trade and from trade barriers that closed international markets. Maybe his greatest victory, in that sphere, was the expansion of the Brazilian exports to the American market in the context of the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution (Oliveira, 1975, p. 59-61; Silva, 1961, p. 118-122).

The diplomat knew that Brazil could only profit from foreign opportunities if the domestic sector was increasingly efficient, which did not occur. Both the production and the industrialization faced growing costs and low yields. Unfortunately, change public policies for the sector in order to change that situation was a task that the diplomat was not able to achieve during his short administration. At that time, the economy was extremely regulated. While the government controlled the price of final products in order to control the inflation, it limited the supply and granted punctual subsidies to the productive chain. In that bureaucratic network of contradictory incentives, Barbosa da Silva dared to establish the urgent need to privatize Companhia Usinas National (Pérola Sugar) because of its high operational costs. The measure was carried out only after 20 years and much harm. The lack of prior willingness by politicians and diplomats to carry out the difficult short-run measures because of the fear of being unpopular irritated him. He believed that crises had the effect of slowly reduce the resistance of the population to the inevitable economic reforms. That situation of waiting, however, weakened the social and economic fabric in such a way that it turned the adjustment process even more painful. Talking many years later about that period, he asked himself: “Who talks about saving? Who carries out a violent policy to contain public expenses?” (Silva, 1984).

Those questions were certainly on his mind when he followed, from a distance, the deterioration of the economic conditions of the Goulart administration. After the 1964 Coup, Vasco Leitão da Cunha invited him to be Secretary General of Itamaraty. Edmundo refused the invitation, but he accepted to lead delicate negotiations. The first one was to substitute Dias Carneiro as head of the delegation to Unctad, in May 1964. Then, he dealt with the restoration of the Brazilian foreign credit. Finally, he negotiated two important agreements of guarantees of investments – one of them with Germany and the other one with the United States.

From 1963 to March 1979, when he retired, despite being a career diplomat, he did not earn much by the Treasury and he did not carry out any executive function. After he withdrew from the Itamaraty, he did not settle down. As he once stated, “life is like riding a bicycle: if you stop, you fall down”. His skills in leading teams, and in the art of negotiation placed him in a privileged position in the private sector. After he retired, he worked in the Administrative, Fiscal or Consultative Council of several companies, such as Pirelli, Honeywell Bull, Mercedes Benz, MBR, Swift-Armour, Eletro-Cloro, Bank of Montreal and General Polyclinic of Rio de Janeiro. He had a great performance at CAEMI: he presided Generali do Brasil and the holding JARI. He participated in the creation of the Communitary Action of Brazil (1967), of the Regional Development Institute of Amapá, the Milk Cooperative of Campos (1965) and of the North Fluminense Regional Development Foundation (Fundenor).

The new diplomacy

In a famous text, Sir Harold Nicolson claimed that the diplomacy in the early 20th century underwent a considerable change. The main change was the growing use of methods, ideas and practices used domestically to prescribe how international relations should operate. Thus, characteristics of the old diplomacy (absence of advertisement, limited attention by the public and lack of urgency) were overcome by a new reality (Nicolson, 1962, p. 100-104; Drinkwater, 2005, p. 104). The statement was exaggerated, but it did capture the sense of a new era. The elders continued to dream that diplomacy was a level basically apart from the domestic policy, including in terms of goals, methods and establishment of forces. The new generation, however, knew that such ideal had never actually existed and that the world had changed a lot.

Barbosa da Silva was a member of a group of diplomats that worked in that fluid transition. It would be a mistake to ascribe to the diplomat the responsibility for having created the economic area of the Brazilian diplomacy. When the Marquis of Barbacena made an effort to seek the recognition of the Brazilian independence, the economic diplomacy was already present. Later, as Renato Mendonça, biographer of the Baron of Penedo, demonstrated, the Brazilian Legation in London “dealing with the economic issues was as important as the political ones” (Mendonça, 2006, p. 225). As we could observe, in the 1920’s, there had been a great effort to expand the economic side of Brazilian diplomacy. In the face of such front, what was the contribution of the diplomatic thought and action of Barbosa da Silva and his generation?

The first one was the assumption that the pressure of society on the state was normal. Diplomacy could not disconnect from the nation. That does not mean that it should accept the domestic political mood. Quite the contrary, the diplomat should be guided by a national interest that transcended the disaggregation of the specific to reach the general, without being tied to the past, but, at the same time, considering precedents and tradition when scrutinizing the future. Edmundo managed to deal with those tensions as few others did.

The second one was his perception that, in that new era, the diplomat was not the only voice and ears for the country abroad. He had a basic role to play in the domestic life of a democracy. In the face of political and social turmoil, often it was not noticed that domestic measures had foreign impacts and that the international obligations could not be broken to fulfill the illusions of the day. His many years at Itamaraty were largely spent in close contact with business, academic and bureaucratic circles, in an ongoing exercise of consultations focused on the prevention of those conflicts.

The third contribution by the diplomat was to understand the new role that Itamaraty would play in the post-war. Barbosa da Silva and his contemporaries correctly recognized that the grandeur of the Baron of Rio Branco was related to his competence to interpret the problem of his time (the definition of the national borders) and to work to solve it. Barbosa da Silva and his generation faced another kind of challenge: to support the national economic development. Edmundo and many of his contemporaries thought that the nature of the international economic system brought serious constraints to development, particularly for a predominantly agricultural country. Without an active vigilance policy to remove such obstacles, the domestic effort could become jaded. Another equally important work was to look for opportunities abroad, mainly in terms of investments, technical cooperation and building an appropriate image for attracting foreign capital. He believed that the diplomat, because of his training and his position in the state, should be placed at the vanguard of that movement.

However, Barbosa da Silva’s greatest contribution was to make the economic diplomacy as a basic mission of Itamaraty. In fact, when he entered the ministry, the economic area still kept its disdainful status of “Secos & Molhados”. The fact that other organs negotiated trade agreements with foreign diplomats without the intermediation of Itamaraty shows the level of alienation that existed by the late 1940’s. It was with patience, intelligence, tact and competence that the diplomat helped to transform that situation. When he left diplomacy, the economic area was a disputed destination for the new diplomats who entered the old palace at Marechal Floriano Street.

Bibliography

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CALLIÈRES, François de. The Art of Negotiating With Sovereign Princes. In: Keens-Soper, H. M. A. and Schweizer, Karl W. The Art of Diplomacy. Lanham: University Press of America, 1983 [1716], p. 55-188.

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Helio Jaguaribe

Helio Jaguaribe de Mattos, born April 23, 1923, in Rio de Janeiro was the son of geographer, cartographer, and Army general, Francisco Jaguaribe de Mattos, and Francelina Santos Jaguaribe de Matos, a Portuguese-born daughter of a wine exporter from Porto. Helio, who graduated in law from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, in 1946, participated in a regular gathering of intellectuals, who came to be known as the Grupo de Itatiaia. The meetings led to the foundation, in 1953, of the Brazilian Institute of Economics, Sociology and Politics (Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Política – IBESP), an entity on which he served as the Secretary-General for a number of years. In 1955, he was also one of the founders of the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros – ISEB) a political-economic think-tank in his native Rio, tied to the Brazilian Ministry of Education. In 1958, however, he published the influential and somewhat controversial book, O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira (Nationalism in the Brazilian Reality), which was considered by some as the cause of an internal crisis at ISEB that culminated in his expulsion from the organization in 1959.

After his expulsion from ISEB, Jaguaribe devoted his time to managing his family’s business operations, including an expansion of the Vitória Iron and Steel Company. With the military coup in 1964, however, he moved to the United States where he taught sociology at major universities, including Harvard (1964-1966), Stanford (1966-1967) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1968-1969).

Returning to Brazil, in 1969, Jaguaribe joined the Cândido Mendes University, in Rio de Janeiro. In 1979, he was a founding member of the Institute of Political and Social Studies (Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais – IEPES), an entity of which he remains a Dean Emeritus. In 1992, he was the Secretary of Science and Technology in the Fernando Collor de Mello administration. After his short stint in the government, Jaguaribe devoted a number of years to research and writing, and in 2001 he published the two-volume work, Um estudo crítico da história (A Critical Study of History). In 2005, he was elected to occupy Chair 11 of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, which had been held by the Economist, Celso Furtado.

Helio Jaguaribe: the generation of national developmentalism

Antonio Carlos Lessa

Introduction

A sociologist from Rio de Janeiro, Helio Jaguaribe is considered one of the most lucid interpreters of the vicissitudes of Brazilian society and an exponent of the national ideology known as “developmentalism.” The author of influential works of political and sociological analyses of contemporary Brazil, Jaguaribe has inspired many generations of social scientists. He is also part of a productive generation of public scholars who, since the 1950s, have served to promote the ideology of nationalism and articulate a resolute development strategy.

Jaguaribe’s interpretations of Brazil – both domestically and internationally – during the 1950s and 1960s were crucial to the development of some of the most important and celebrated creations of Brazilian international relation strategies. Examples of his influence include the country’s “Independent Foreign Policy,” begun in the early 1960s and resumed again in the 1970s, along with the policy known as “Responsible Pragmatism.”

Helio Jaguaribe was one of the core players of the intellectual community that extended beyond the boundaries of traditional modernization since the 1940s. These scholars not only criticized the existing environment, but they also recommended policies to promote economic growth in order to overcome the social evils that have long plagued Brazil.

Jaguaribe was the central figure of institutes of major importance in Brazilian intellectual and political life, such as the Itatiaia Group, the Brazilian Institute of Economics, Sociology and Politics (Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Política – Ibesp), and the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros – Iseb). He is one of the leading names of a generation that believed in the ability of such institutes, to interpret and act in Brazilian politics, albeit with different instruments and focuses. The Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (Instituto Brasileiro de Administração Municipal – Ibam), for example, focuses on matters at the urban level, while the Brazilian Institute of International Relations (Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais – Ibri), has a more global vision. Despite their differences, all of the institutes endeavor to understand the challenges – and overcome the parochialism and other roadblocks – existent in Brazil.

Two of the most important theses Jaguaribe sought to demonstrate – from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s – were that reform and political transformation must be understood as dynamic factors of social transformation; and that State planning – with a focus on a development strategy – must necessarily start from such transformations. Jaguaribe was the precursor of a pragmatic interpretation of nationalism, which laid the foundation for a modernization strategy of the State, and highlighted the supplementary role that foreign policy played in national development.

The prominence that Jaguaribe’s thought is given in the formulation and implementation of Brazilian foreign policy is the subject of this chapter. We will also analyze the origins and development of the institutional environment of the time, including vehicles such as the Brazilian Journal of International Politics (Revista Brasileira de Relações Internacionais – RBPI). We do not intend to analyze Jaguaribe’s works in a critical and comprehensive manner; rather, we will examine his production through the lens of national-developmentalism, in order to review how his work synthesizes and represents a modernizing thought that has inspired Brazilian international policy since the 1950s.

An effervescent intellectual and political environment

A number of scientific studies analyze the role of scholars in Brazilian politics. Such a role has been even more incisive since the early twentieth century, when the country’s intellectuals began to focus on more nationalistic themes – such as seeking the roots of a “Brazilian nature,” during the modernist generation of the 1920s; or claiming a national awareness role as an interpreter of social life in the 1930s (PÉCAUT, 1999, p. 10). Between 1930 and 1945, a re-structuring of the State’s bureaucracy also occurred with the creation of various economic planning agencies, to address issues related to development, especially those based on industrialization. At that time and into the next decades, the State – informed by militant scholars, supported by industrial businessmen, and served by a growing and competent group of civilian and military technicians – took upon itself the responsibility of directing the top-to-bottom modernization program that Brazil required (BIELSCHOWSKY, 2000, p. 253-258).

One of the main characteristics of this modernization process was a growing economic nationalism, which sought to legitimize the State’s intervention in the economy and claim control of the development process by national forces. This was evident with the triumphant return of Getúlio Vargas to power in 1951, and it was also the political environment that controlled the development debate when a group of young scholars began, in August 1952, to meet regularly, to address the country’s major problems. As the group met in a building in the Itatiaia National Park – on the border between the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro – they called themselves the Grupo de Itatiaia.

In a column in the Jornal do Comércio, Cristina Buarque de Hollanda, a political scientist at the Universidade Federal Fluminense in Rio de Janeiro, has speculated that the Itatiaia Group may have been the direct heir of another group of intellectuals who also focused on Brazil’s problems in 1947 (HOLLANDA, 2012). Whatever their origins, the Itatiaia Group ambitiously sought to “clarify issues related to economic, political, cultural and sociological interpretations of [its] time with an analysis of the then current ideas and political phenomena, and a systematic and historical study of Brazil.” The trajectory of the Itatiaia Group is unequivocally tied to the conceptual sophistication of the ideology of nationalism.

In 1953, some members of the Itatiaia group created the aforementioned IBESP, which was headed for many years by Helio Jaguaribe. This research entity maintained a schedule of debates and studies, and produced the periodical, Cadernos do Nosso Tempo (Reports for Our Time), which, although it had a short period of circulation – its only 5 volumes were published from December 1953 through March 1956 – became an anthological publication. The periodical was not a perfect translation of the diversity of thought and analytical perspectives attained by IBESP, but Cadernos brought to light many issues that became influential in economic, sociological, and political analyses of Brazil.

It would be an exaggeration to say that all the participants of the Itatiaia Group unequivocally shared the same interpretations of Brazilian reality. What one can say, however, is that everyone in the group shared ideas, the most important of which was a concern for what they saw as the underdevelopment of Brazil. In addition, according to Schwartzman (1979), there was a “search for a non-aligned international position, that of a ‘third force’, a type of nationalism that became especially strong in relation to Brazil’s natural resources. There was also a desire for a greater functioning of the country’s public administration, and a greater participation of the population in political life.”

As with Jaguaribe, the group’s members were highly educated; they were also from varied backgrounds and training. Their ranks included sociologists, political scientists, historians, politicians and others from the social sciences. They were scholars and intellectuals, such as: Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, Juvenal Osório Gomes, Moacir Félix de Oliveira, Carlos Luís Andrade, Cândido Mendes de Almeida, Ewaldo Correia Lima, Heitor Lima Rocha, Fábio Breves, João Paulo de Almeida Guimarães, and Oscar Lorenzo Fernandes.

In addition to their advanced educational levels, a second characteristic the IBESP members shared was a desire to create a political program to develop the country; one in which scholars would play a major role. The best example that demonstrates this was the collectively written article, Para uma Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento (For a National Development Policy), published in the final issue of Cadernos do Nosso Tempo. The political program they sought would be founded on:

…an ideological clarification of progressive forces […] – the industrial bourgeoisie, the proletariat and technical sectors of the middle class – along with a political regimentation of these forces. Both of these conditions, they believed, required the active support and guidance of a capable and well-organized political vanguard.

Theirs was essentially a reformist political program, designed to engage in transformation; it was not, however, revolutionary. The scholars of IBESP and Cadernos do Nosso Tempo were, themselves, the vanguard of a great intellectual endeavor that had its most concrete expression in a modernization of the nationalist ideology. They wanted a progressive – as opposed to a conservative – form of nationalism. At the same time, the scholars began the process of apprising others of limits the Cold War imposed on countries such as Brazil. This led to the defense of a “third way”: a position of independence with respect to liberalism and Marxism-Leninism, an independence from both blocs led by the superpowers of the time: the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Although Cadernos do Nosso Tempo was not focused strictly on international matters, it was a pioneer publication in that respect as two thirds of its articles were concerned with an analysis of international policy matters (Almeida, 1998).[318] According to Hollanda, although there are no detailed studies of Cadernos, the publication became the preferred vehicle through which this intellectual network sought to “clarify the state of the art of politics in the country, consider ways to act in the various segments of society, and both nurture and adjust their movement” (HOLLANDA, 2012).

The scholars of IBESP comprised the base of ISEB, which was created by decree no. 37.608, within the Ministry of Education of the Café Filho government, on July 14, 1955. The emergence of ISEB is the apogee of the formation of such institutes based on vague visions of nationalism and a modernization of the country’s political, economic and social structures. The government – already expanded since the end of World War II, especially in the first half of the 1950s[319] – saw the creation of institutes, such as IBAM, in 1952, and the IBRI, in 1954. Although in different spheres and with their own agendas, they each carried out their interpretations of the “modernizing” thought that was characteristic of the era.

Although some of the institutes were private, they often interacted with the State in ways similar to ISEB, as they either received some funding from official sources, or a large part of their members were linked to the state bureaucracy in some way. In addition, the institutes often shared members – which at times were common to two or more of them. The modernization theories – plus their interpretations and reinterpretations – were, therefore, widely circulated, as they were distributed to this large group of inter-related people. As Raphael Nascimento wrote in a study published in 2005: there existed an “epistemic community,” which can be described by what would come to be called “national-developmentalism.”

The multiple participation of members of the “epistemic community” involved in “national developmentalism”:

Personality

IBRI

IBAM

ISEB

Adroaldo Junqueira Alves

X

X

Cleantho de Paiva Leite

X

X

X

Evaldo Correia Lima

X

X

Helio Jaguaribe

X

X

Herbert Moses

X

X

X

Hermes Lima

X

X

José Honório Rodrigues

X

X

Luiz Simões Lopes

X

X

X

Marcos Almir Madeira

X

X

Mário Augusto Teixeira de Freitas

X

X

Mário Travassos

X

X

Oswaldo Trigueiro

X

X

Rômulo de Almeida

X

X

San Tiago Dantas

X

X

Temístocles Cavalcanti

X

X

Source: Nascimento, 2005, p. 60.

In the agenda of public municipal administration, the focus of IBAM, the principal goal was to break the patterns of the patrimonial State and improve public services in response to the rapid urbanization that Brazilian society had undergone.[320] Nascimento, again, said (p. 54):

[IBAM] … fit within a broader movement that began in the 1930s. It advocated a streamlining of public administration with the creation of the Administrative Department of Public Service (DASP), [in 1938],… more specifically, [it was] an effort … to provide municipalities – which had gained prominence with the Constitution of 1946 and … the ongoing process of Brazilian urbanization – with the technical staff trained to respond to new challenges. Similarly, the appearance of institute is related to a specific group of people, including Luiz Simões Lopes, Rafael Xavier and Mario Augusto Teixeira de Freitas, responsible for transferring the values of the public administration movement from the federal to the municipal level. This same group was also responsible for the creation of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and the Brazilian School of Municipal Administration (EBAP), in addition to the aforementioned DASP.

The goal of the IBRI was to promote and encourage reflection on “international problems, especially those of interest to Brazil.” This was the first effort of Brazilian intellectuals concerned with world issues at an especially complicated time in international politics. The Cold War was a reality for almost a decade, and all countries sought to learn how to deal with it.

Shortly after the traumas of World War II, the outbreak of the Korean War reminded everyone that the possibility of new conflicts was very real. At the same time, the effects of the global ideological confrontation created new and profound divisions in domestic environments. In the Western bloc, efforts to contain communism were used to justify the curtailment of fundamental liberties; making political life a game of rules that played good against evil, as with McCarthyism in the United States and similar examples in the politics of its subordinate allies.

At the time, disarmament was not a significant agenda item. Quite the contrary; the superpowers sought the technological means to ensure military supremacy at all costs. Decolonization and the fate of the former colonial territories were beginning to emerge as increasingly important issues by the early 1950s. In 1951, a long journey towards the construction of Europe’s integration process began with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and a joint effort to overcome European rivalries. The Bandung Conference, held in 1955, just one year after the creation of the IBRI, pointed to the existence of a much more varied international life, one that contrasted with the schematic nature of bipolarity. The concept of the Third World began at this time. The situation offered many challenges to countries such as Brazil, especially in understanding the risks of the new world order and envisioning the opportunities it offered.

In Brazil, the creation of an organization such as the IBRI was more symbolic than practical, as the institute did not maintain a professional secretarial structure, nor did it intend to intervene in Brazilian foreign policy matters. It was, above all, an authentic expression of the urgency to understand, on a national level, problematic international situations. The institute was created by individuals who were partly from IBAM and partly from what would soon become ISEB. In addition to the scholars, who defended the causes of modernization, several career diplomats also made up its membership base.

The opening ceremony of the IBRI took place on January 27, 1954, at the Itamaraty Palace in Rio de Janeiro, the then headquarters of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The location – and thus its connection with the State – cause one to ask what impact the institute’s ideas and debates had on Brazilian international politics. The IBRI dealt with a diverse complexity of events large and small, such as the organization of lectures series and seminars. Its major effort, however, as declared in its articles of incorporation, was to publish social science research, beginning with the 1958 launch of the aforementioned Brazilian Journal of International Politics (RBPI).[321]

ISEB, in turn, during its relatively brief existence (the military regime dissolved it in April 1964), played a central role in the debate of ideas, especially those concerned with modernization programs in Brazil. The institute, thereby, provided the theoretical part of national development. In the specific context of its early operation, during the initial years of the Juscelino Kubitschek administration, the institute and its members became important players in the debate, especially since the government recognized their importance to the process of public-policy formulation.

Since ISEB was strictly a state agency, as with IBAM, it had a regular structure. Roland Corbisier was the institute’s first executive director (1955-1960). He led a departmentalized structure, which revealed its goals: Helio Jaguaribe was in charge of matters dealing with Political Science; Cândido Mendes, History; Ewaldo Correia Lima, Economics; Álvaro Vieira Pinto, Philosophy; and Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, Sociology.

According to Cândido Motta Filho, a writer, teacher, and politician, who served on the Supreme Court of Brazil, 1956 - 1967:

[ISEB’s purpose was to] devote itself to the Social Sciences; applying the categories and data of these sciences to an analysis and critical understanding of the Brazilian reality; using their theoretical tools, to stimulate and advance national development (apud PÉCAUT, 1999, p. 110).

ISEB assembled numerous scholars, who were “invited for their abilities not only to intervene directly in the management of economic policy, but also to participate in the construction of a new legitimacy; thereby, placing themselves at the creation of a national developmentalist synthesis” (PÉCAUT, 1999, p. 110). ISEB’s trajectory, therefore, was irreversibly linked to nationalist thinking with a focus on development.

Jaguaribe, himself, in a critical and retrospective analysis he wrote on the trajectory of ISEB, recalled that the analyses developed there attempted to overcome the limitations of Marxist and positivist perspectives, to seek a new understanding of the era and the country. He knew the institute was engaged in a very complicated task (JAGUARIBE, 1979).

The scholars who participated in ISEB at the beginning, whose names were immortalized as “historical Isebians” – Jaguaribe, Álvaro Vieira Pinto, Cândido Mendes and Roland Corbisier – understood that nationalism had unifying and motivating powers, which allowed for the transformation of progressive interests of society. They also believed there was a need for autonomy in relation to foreign constraints, more specifically, concerning its ties to the domestic environment. In other words, whether it is imperialism or foreign capital – whatever is proposed – it should have a “rational and functional” view with a goal of benefiting the international insertion of the country and its modernization.

National developmentalism and Jaguaribe’s work

Helio Jaguaribe is one of the most consistent advocates of an autonomous and multidimensional approach of nationalism. He understands it as a historical and social phenomenon related to the poignant transformations that Brazil has undergone since the 1930s. In his influential book, O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira, Jaguaribe sought definitions for the terms: “political” and “economic nationalism.” He also sought to understand how they could be used to articulate different positions within the spheres of Brazilian international policy and action. In his perspective, nationalism acquires its own sense, an “awareness of Brazilian interests in contrast to those of other nations” (JAGUARIBE, 1958, p. 31-32).

According to Jaguaribe, the economic transformations accompanying industrial growth, allow one to see basic changes in a country’s social make up. In his mind, there were two sectors driven by different worldviews: one nationalist, and the other cosmopolitan. Nationalism, he believed, was tied to industrialism, a new form of production that demanded that the State act in favor of development. He said this would come about from the industrial bourgeoisie, the growing middle class, and a modern State bureaucracy working together.

Jaguaribe saw the cosmopolitan worldview as tied to the primary and export sectors of the economy, led by large estates and the commercial bourgeoisie. Economic development, he believed, was the natural ambition of the nationalist sector (JAGUARIBE, 1958, p. 35).

What separated Jaguaribe from other scholars of the group of historical Isebians was his interpretation that nationalism must be pragmatic; it should be a means and not an end in itself. In that sense, Jaguaribe’s ideas came very close to those also advocated by the economist and diplomat, Roberto Campos, who at the time was part of the Juscelino Kubitschek administration. Both Campos and Jaguaribe defended the central role of the State and, consequently, of State planning, in industrialization and development strategies. One difference between the two was that the ideas Campos defended had immediate application in Kubitschek’s Progama das Metas (Plan of Targets), and in the establishment of a non-ideological approach regarding the role that foreign capital should play in Brazilian development (BIELSCHOWSKY, 2000, p. 105).

Although Jaguaribe’s ideas were not directly part of a government program at that time, they were the basis of a radical process of modernization that began to be outlined in the spheres of foreign policy and development during the Kubitschek administration. The nationalist sector, in Jaguaribe’s conception, had to define a modernization strategy in which foreign participation had a central importance. According to Nascimento (2004):

[In] foreign policy, the projection of the nation’s interest [is] expressed by pragmatism; by means of a cost-benefit analysis of the results vs the efforts; by a relatively non-ideological approach to international relations. The core goal of a national developmentalist foreign policy [is] to increase goods and services: that is national development.

A good definition of pragmatism can be found in the aforementioned Plan of Targets of the Kubitschek administration. The tripod upon which that plan’s design rested its development strategy was composed of an association of state monopolist capital, national private capital, and foreign capital. This model also characterized the later mature phase of the modernization strategy of national developmentalism.

The most remarkable influence of Jaguaribe’s ideas in the international arena, however, came relatively soon after the Kubitschek years. Although it did not yet offer any immediate concrete results, it actually occurred when the strategy of Independent Foreign Policy was developed during the government of Jânio Quadros. Jaguaribe’s book, O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira – which outlined a similar strategy – was published almost three years before the public disclosure of Quadros’ Independent Foreign Policy plan appeared in the journal, Foreign Affairs, in 1961. Jaguaribe, therefore, had already espoused many of the arguments that were later incorporated into the nation’s foreign policy.

Jaguaribe stated that a change in Brazil’s foreign policy was crucial, and that a clear connection should exist between the country’s foreign policy and its development strategy. He then classified two worldviews with different forms of international insertion for the country: a “cosmopolitan view,” in favor of an alignment with the United States, part of an essentially American axis; and a “nationalist view,” which sought a neutral position, tied to a better understanding of the nation’s interests, in which the country would permanently be in a state of nonalignment. The consistent criticism of these two approaches, along with a third – the so-called “realistic” approach – is at the center of debates concerning the course of Brazilian foreign policy.

Jaguaribe’s analysis of the options concluded that the “neutralist” way offered the greatest possibilities to fulfill the interests of a country such as Brazil. This conclusion was supported by a recognition of the historical ties the country had with the West, and above all, the weight the United States had on this bloc – especially, in defense of “Western civilization,” to which Brazil unequivocally belonged. Neutralism allowed Brazil to expand. It could fulfill its interests in its asymmetric relations with the United States and other developed countries, while simultaneously seek new opportunities in the developing world.

Among those new opportunities, one constant and highly valued theme in Jaguaribe’s writings was a search for better relations with Argentina. Indeed, in O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira, as well as several of his other works, the need to overcome the historic rivalry between the two countries and enter into a mutually beneficial cooperative economic relationship was one of the most remarkable constants in his thought. He believed that Latin American economic integration, especially more collaboration with Argentina, was necessary, to limit the supremacy of the United States in the region and, consequently, increase Brazil’s autonomy.

Jaguaribe acknowledged the difficulties Brazil would face with the adoption of a “neutralist and pragmatic” foreign policy. In the domestic sphere, there would be the need to overcome the interests of the Estado Cartorial, a term coined by Jaguaribe, himself, in 1950, roughly meaning a public entity whose main purpose is to provide jobs, but not necessarily function efficiently. In the international sphere, he recognized that major difficulties could arise, depending on the United States’ reaction to the country’s claim of a neutralist position and – although to a lesser extent – how such a policy would be received in the bipolar world; in other words, how both superpowers would behave relative to neutral countries.

Although Helio Jaguaribe’s internationalist thought and its interpretations were present in the Independent Foreign Policy developed in the early 1960s, by those such as Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco and Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas during the short presidency of Jânio Quadros, it is important to note that Jaguaribe was not necessarily the intellectual father of that plan. It is credible to assume, however, that his earlier thoughts and writings were included in the political debate, and they decisively influenced the making of the policy.

Interpretations of a time of crisis and transformation: the Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional – RBPI

The Brazilian Journal of International Politics (Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional – RBPI) is one of the most traditional of Brazilian scientific publications.[322] The quarterly periodical was created in Rio de Janeiro, in 1958, by the IBRI. Initially, not a scientific vehicle; it acquired that feature, in 1993, when its publication was moved to Brasilia.[323] Conceived as a vehicle to disseminate ideas and debates on international issues, it established an important dialogue with the Brazilian academic environment as the debate about international relations gained stature with the strengthening of the Brazilian university system. The RBPI was devoted to stimulating thought and reflection on international matters, especially those significant to Brazil.

The RBPI was not the first Brazilian periodical to publish studies on international issues. The aforementioned Cadernos do Nosso Tempo had already included many studies with international themes in its brief existence; and military journals – such as the Revista Marítima Brasileira, as early as 1851, and A Defesa Nacional, in 1913 – had also done the same (Almeida, 1998). Additionally, the Revista Brasileira de Economia and the Boletim de Conjuntura Econômica, both created in 1947, had published documents and analyses about international economics, as had the Revista Estudos Econômicos, published by the Federation of Commerce of Rio de Janeiro (Almeida, 1998). The RBPI was unique, however, in that it was not connected to the State, and because – from its initial edition – it sought to offer Brazilian views on international matters. The ambition to frame international politics from a Brazilian perspective, at the time of the spectacular transformations of the Cold War when the publication was launched, says much about the intentions of the group of scholars and diplomats in charge of its design.

From its beginning, the Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional was considered a vehicle of national thought devoted to the central theme of modernization with a broadening of the country’s international horizons and a connection to national development. That feature was clearly established in its first few issues, and throughout its many volumes of constant publication. The direction and oscillations of Brazilian international politics – along with ideas related to the international order, major confrontations among world powers, the rise and fall of empires, and numerous other themes on the international agenda – were all systematically followed and critically analyzed.

When the creators of IBRI published the RBPI, their aim was to produce a medium that could explain both the challenges of international politics, and the resulting transformation of Brazil’s international insertion. Since its origins, the Revista discussed each of the crucial moments of Brazilian history, as seen from the point of view of their foreign challenges. The Revista addressed such varied matters as: the launching of Operation Pan-America, by the government of Juscelino Kubitschek; the Independent Foreign Policy of the Jânio Quadros government; changes of political regimes; the complexity of relations with neighboring countries; the universalization of foreign relations; national security issues and their relations to national defense strategies; relations with international partners, especially the United States and Europe; the building of new relationships, including openings towards Africa and Asia; the connections of foreign policies with economic development strategies; and the evils of structural dependence. As such, the RBPI became the preferred vehicle of the national debate concerning the international choices of Brazil (Almeida, 1998).

Major themes of contemporary international politics were also the object of attention by analysts, who found in the RBPI an appropriate space in which to discuss their research and ideas. Topics such as international trade, economic integration, international financial flows, scientific and technological development, the environment, human rights, Antarctica, international cooperation, international security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, among many others, received pioneering treatment in Brazil in the pages of the Revista (Lessa, 2007). Indeed, the RBPI was the first publication – both in Brazil and in Latin America – to address some of these issues from an internationalist perspective.

Throughout its existence, the RBPI has maintained an extraordinary consistency with its founding purpose. The teams that have published it, have made decisions to ensure that it is not only a vehicle of academic debate, but also a way to view and think about international relations, as well as current issues in general. That may be the reason for its survival while so many similar publications have folded.

Conclusion

Helio Jaguaribe is considered one of the most eloquent intellectuals of his generation – the “national developmentalism generation.” Some have even called him the last “public scholar” of Brazil. He is the survivor of a dynamic network that sought to discover reasons for the country’s lack of advancement and solutions to its problems.

The term public scholar is a proper description for Helio Jaguaribe. He was not an academic in the strictest definition of that word as he did not conduct most of his work in universities. His trajectory should, therefore, not be confused with a long university career, which has become the norm with other Brazilian scholars due to the expansion of universities and the subsequent growth of the social sciences in the country since the 1960s. Jaguaribe was, however, an important figure for universities. His passage through major academic centers in the United States, for example, asserts the extraordinary prestige of his thought. The university environment may, however, have been too narrow to support his restless thought and the unusual ways he interpreted Brazil along with the difficulties of national modernization.

Much of Helio Jaguaribe’s broad analytical thought is related to the international sphere of Brazil. He is concerned with the traditional political, economic and social structures of the country: how they could be obstacles to international policies, the tools of national development, or both. His interpretation of international constraints and his prescriptions for action were fundamental to those who developed Brazil’s foreign policy during the past half century. It is not difficult, for example, to see the marked influence of his ideas in the strategy of Independent Foreign Policy. His vision of the state of the world is relevant to the future of Brazil.

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José Honório Rodrigues

José Honório Rodrigues was the son of the merchant Honório José Rodrigues and Judith Pacheco Rodrigues. Although he was a graduate of Law from the old University of Brazil, in 1937, his interest in History started when he was 24 years old, standing out in the field as a prestigious scholar and soon after as a professor of Brazilian History in important teaching institutions. His knowledge endowed him with a seat at the Brazilian Academy of Letters in 1969 and various awards, including a Medal of the National Congress in 1980. He worked to improve the methodology in the study of History as science with the purpose of changing the attitude towards History. He was a great admirer of Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen and Capistrano de Abreu for their incomparable works on both General and Brazilian History. He was married to the historian Lêda Boechat Rodrigues.

José Honório Rodrigues: historian of the national interest and africanism

Paulo Visentini

The Brazilian foreign policy is a clean reflection of all its history. It has the same unstable and endless framework, of advances and regressions of the domestic history. Dominated by an oligarchy who is served by the Nation instead of serving it, headed by an elite alienated by its training, the foreign policy had, as our entire history, the hours of autonomous and free creation, and rulers that knew how to firmly defend the Brazilian interests.

José Honório Rodrigues

The historian José Honório Rodrigues was mainly a scholar and intellectual, not having exercised diplomatic activities or occupied political positions. However, this does not mean that his work, since a certain moment, has not become politically engaged and inserted in a broad movement of change of the Brazilian diplomacy. When he studied the diplomacy of the Empire, he was able to identify some axis of the Brazilian foreign policy, along the line that Pierre Renouvin called Deep Forces. That was specifically the case of the national interest, of sovereignty (or, at least, of the autonomy), of the mixed nation and of the development.

In the effervescence of the nationalism of the 1950’s and the first half of the 1960’s, with the Independent Foreign Policy, his work and his position acquired some aspects of “organic intellectual”. His theses on the Brazilian diplomacy found great materiality in the foreign policy of Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart and, obviously, it suffered a deep impact with the implementation of the Military Regime, in 1964, and its apparent break regarding the paradigm of the Brazilian international insertion. In this aspect, his contemporary and most important works, Brasil e África: Outro Horizonte and Interesse Nacional e Política Externa, are marked by some pessimism, not sensing that the Military Regime would give continuity to various basic policies of the previous phase. Although the works analyzed here are about the pre-1964 period, many of them were published later as a compilation of sparse texts prior to the military coup. For that reason, they were included in this chapter.

The academic trajectory of José Honório Rodrigues

José Honório Rodrigues was one of the greatest names of the Brazilian historiography (history of history), as well as of the Brazilian Diplomatic History. He was born in Rio de Janeiro, on September 20th, 1913, and he died in the same city, on April 6th, 1987. He was the son of the merchant Honório José Rodrigues and of Judith Pacheco Rodrigues. He studied in the Law School of the old University of Brazil, where he wrote for the magazine A Época and graduated in 1937. Despite graduating in Law, his interest in History became evident when, by the age of 24, he won the Knowledge Award of the Brazilian Academy of Letters with the book Civilização Holandesa no Brasil. He spent one year (1943-44) in the United States, with a scholarship of the Rockefeller Foundation, for historical research at Columbia University.

When he came back to Brazil, he worked as a librarian in the Sugar and Alcohol Institute, in 1945, and head of the Research Section of the Rio Branco Institute, in the Ministry of External Relations (1948-1951). In the National Institute of the Book, he worked with Sergio Buarque de Hollanda, between 1958 and 1964, and was the director of the Division of Rare Works and Publications of the National Library and provisional director in some occasions. Here, Rodrigues had available to him a great amount of bibliography and sources about the history of Brazil, absorbing the knowledge that he conveyed in his works. One of the high public positions where he worked was as head of the Rio de Janeiro National Archive, from 1958 to 1964, where he carried out a major reform. In addition, from 1964 to 1968, he was executive secretary of the Brazilian Institution of International Relations (as well as Editor of the Brazilian Journal of International Politics) and was a member of the Commission of Texts on the History of Brazil of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also collaborated in the Program History of America, of the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History of America, mainly in the book Brazil – Colonial Period (1953).

As a professor, Rodrigues began his career in 1946, teaching disciplines of Brazilian History, Brazilian Diplomatic History, Brazilian Economic History and Brazilian Historiography, in various teaching institutions, such as the Rio Branco Institute, the School of Economic Science of Guanabara State, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, the Federal Fluminense University and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. He was also a lecturer, collaborator and visiting professor in many other universities, both Brazilian ones, such as in the Higher School of War, where he graduated in 1955, and American ones, such as those of Texas and Columbia, in the 1960’s and 1970’s. He also taught at Oxford University, in the United Kingdom, as a visiting professor. He was a member of various societies, academies and institutes that taught History, both in Brazil and abroad. He was elected member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters in 1969, and won various awards, including a Medal of the National Congress, in 1980. He worked to improve the methodology in the study of history as science, freeing himself from the narrative and questioning the Brazilian historiographical production. His purpose was not to be a simple spectator, he wanted to understand the reality and reach a combative attitude towards History that not only projected current problems in anachronistic procedures (IGLÉSIAS, 1988, p. 77). He was a great admirer of Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen and Capistrano de Abreu, for their incomparable works of General and Brazilian History. He was married to the historian Lêda Boechat Rodrigues.

According to Francisco Iglésias (1988), José Honório Rodrigues has an extensive work, made up of books, articles, prefaces, lectures, small works and collaborations in books, which may be classified into:

•Theory, methodology e historiography, with such publications as Teoria da História do Brasil (1949); Historiografia e Bibliografia do Domínio Holandês no Brasil (1949); A Pesquisa Histórica no Brasil (1952); Brasil, Período Colonial (1953); O Continente do Rio Grande (1954); and História da História do Brasil, a Historiografia Colonial (1979).

•History of specific themes, with writings such as Civilização Holandesa no Brasil (1940); Brasil e África, Outro Horizonte (1961); O Parlamento e a Evolução Nacional (1972); A Assembleia Constituinte de 1823 (1974); Independência, Revolução e Contrarrevolução (1976); O Conselho de Estado: Quinto Poder? (1978); O Parlamento e a Consolidação do Império – 1840-61 (1982).

•Historiographical essays, in texts such as Aspirações Nacionais (1963), a work based on lectures made at the Higher School of War, between 1957 and 1964; Conciliação e Reforma no Brasil (1965); História e Historiadores do Brasil (1965); Vida e História (1966); Interesse Nacional e Política Externa (1966); História e Historiografia (1970); História, Corpo do Tempo (1976); Filosofia e História (1981); História Combatente (1983); História Viva (1985); Tempo e Sociedade (1986).

•Reference works: Catálogo da coleção Visconde do Rio Branco (1953); Índices da Revista do Instituto do Ceará (1959) e da Revista do Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano, (1961); As Fontes da História do Brasil na Europa (1950) e Situação do Arquivo Nacional (1959).

•Finally, editions of texts, with dozens of titles, mainly Os holandeses no Brasil (1942); Anais da Biblioteca Nacional (vols. 66 to 74); Documentos Históricos da Biblioteca Nacional (vols. 71 to 110); Publicações do Arquivo Nacional (vols. 43 to 50); Cartas ao Amigo Ausente, de José Maria da Silva Paranhos (1953); Correspondência de Capistrano de Abreu (3 vols., 1954 to 1956); O Parlamento e a Evolução Nacional (7 vols., 1972); Atas do Conselho de Estado. (13 vols., 1978); Capítulos de História Colonial, de Capistrano de Abreu (4.ed., 1954), whom he admired very much; and prefaces of various books.

Works of historical grounding

Some of those writings will be analyzed here for the understanding of the work by José Honório Rodrigues concerning the study of history and of the Brazilian foreign policy. When he analyzed the Brazilian history of the colonial and imperial periods, he gathered a set of material information and theoretical analyses that allowed him to observe certain problems and constant elements of the Brazilian diplomacy, which grounded his statements about the contemporary period. Above all, it can evaluate the essence of the national interest and the importance of autonomy, as a base for the development of the nation, both in its domestic and its foreign dimensions.

Civilização Holandesa no Brasil (1940)

José Honório Rodrigues and Joaquim Ribeiro wrote the book Civilização Holandesa no Brasil (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1940) that won the 1st Knowledge Award of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, in 1937. In the preface by Joaquim Ribeiro, the author states that José Honório practically wrote the entire work, with his collaboration being limited to the work’s general outline and a few chapters. In the introduction, the book was considered an instrument to understand preliminary problems for a “clear and authentic reconstruction” of the period of Maurício de Nassau. The authors claimed that the first problems had to do with the Atlantic matter, with the episode of the Dutch invasion in the Brazilian Northeast being only part of its expansionism in America. The preliminary issues continued with the land problems, of “anthropogeographic” (p. 1) reasons to understand the reason for the Dutch to settle in Pernambuco; and of the problems of the peoples, the study of the races and anthropology, of the cultural elements and the linguistic influence of Dutch Brazil. In addition, throughout the book, the figure of Maurício de Nassau, as political leader, will also be addressed, through a general bibliography about the theme, as a source guide. José Honório did not abandon the theme, studying deeply the Northeast, becoming a reference in terms of Dutch domination, even editing basic texts of the national and international bibliographies (IGLÉSIAS, 1988, p. 65).

Teoria da História do Brasil: introdução metodológica (1949)

The main theme of the book Teoria da História do Brasil: introdução metodológica (São Paulo: Instituto Progresso, 1949), by José Honório Rodrigues is history as science, using basic themes of the Brazilian historiography to question history (IGLÉSIAS, 1988, p. 62).

Already in the preface to the first edition, Rodrigues showed the importance of Methodology for the study, the research, the historiography, the theory and the philosophy of History. The author indicated that there is a mistake in the teaching of history in Brazil, where the discipline of Methodology was not taught, unlike the European, American and Argentinean universities. Such book was considered, at that time, a guide for the historiographical study in Brazil, an introduction to history and the historical research for the scholars of the subject, in the exhibition of theories, methods and criticisms. In the second edition, in turn, in 1957, the author praised the creation of the discipline of Introduction to the Historical Studies, by the regulation of Law 2594, of September 8th, 1955, which provided autonomy for the courses of History and Geography, for a new series. The second edition also underwent many changes in order to fulfill the new restlessness of the history scholars.

Historiografia e bibliografia do domínio holandês no Brasil (1949)

Rodrigues believed that such work resulted from a systematic process to gather material and to sort both in bibliographic and in critical terms the Dutch domination in Brazil. Much of the material gathered came from Brazilian and Dutch historical magazines. The period began in 1621, with the analysis of the consequences of the war against Spain, of 1555, and reaching the warring expansion and the capitalist logic by the sea “Oceanic” sea and the Atlantic beaches. Thus, the books and small works were distributed along the book into nine chapters, which include works on general and Dutch history, on the history of the Brazilian States, mainly those of the Northeast, in order to understand the Dutch colonial expansion in Brazil, as well as on the general history of the Dutch in Brazil, diplomatic history of the Netherlands and the Iberian Peninsula, among other chapters that serve as guide to understand the theme, based on the set of bibliographies gathered in the text.

Pesquisa histórica no Brasil: sua evolução e problemas atuais (1952)

Many years of investigation about historical research in Brazil made José Honório lecture about it at the International Colloquium of Luso-Brazilian Studies, in Washington D.C., in October 1950, in the Commission of Work Instruments, which resulted in this book. Rodrigues claimed the historical research in Brazil included the gathering of informative data, existing written documents of historical value, surveys, personal observation, “in short, what provides to us material for the reconstruction of the historical life” (p. 19). Rodrigues distinguished the public and private historical researches, and throughout the book, he analyzed and described the evolution of both, with the introduction of Historical Institutes both in Brazil and abroad; researches by various historians, such as Varnhagen (whom he considered the Master of Brazilian General History) and Capistrano de Abreu, Rio Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, among others; national and international missions; and analyses of archives and libraries. Finally, Rodrigues justified and idealized the creation of the National Institute of Historical Research to solve the current problems of the historical research in Brazil. A pesquisa histórica no Brasil: sua evolução e problemas atuais. Rio de Janeiro: National Press, 1952.

Vida e história (1966)

In the work Vida e história (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966), José Honório Rodrigues showed lectures, contributions, seminars, essays and articles about the tendencies, the conceptualizations and the renewals of the Brazilian and the foreign historiographies (p. XV). Thus, this book gathered the studies about tendencies and interpretations of the new and Brazilian historiography, and about the characteristics of the people from Rio de Janeiro, in the first part, articles about foreign historians, scholars of the history of Brazil, in the second part, and, in the third part, it showed foreign historians about General History, given the lack of knowledge of the Brazilian scholars as compared to the foreigners. In that work, a passage by Rodrigues stated that “the historian must never have a longing or reactionary purpose, since that means avoiding the dialogue between past and future, [...] the historian must not see life like a moralist, since he knows that virtue is not on one side and sin is on the other” (p. XVI).

História da história do Brasil (1979)

The book História da história do Brasil (2nd ed. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1979), by José Honório Rodrigues, belongs to a collective effort to analyze the historiographical evolution concerning Brazil and to make a triptych of theory, research and historiography (IGLÉSIAS, 1988, p. 9). In his preface, the author established the criteria of delimitation of the historical work, the proper inclusion in historiography, and the difficulties of application in the study of the historiography of the history of Brazil. The author believes that the value of the historical work is its contribution for the epistemological evolution of the discipline, rather than its formal and literary aesthetic aspects (p. XV). Thus, the work concerning the study of history is the one that gives sense to its description or interpretation since the interaction with the historical process, while the past gives sense to the analysis (p. XVII). That excludes from the historiographical study “[...] official documentation (legislation, for example), historical documents, such as mail, representations, writs, requests, petitions, certificates, consultations, etc. [...]” (p. XVII) and the chronicles. The latter, according to the author, include the greatest difficulty in the historiographical study of Brazil. According to the author, the historical study is different from the chronicle since the latter is made up of a narrative without any “historical awareness”, being the object of the historical study, not of the historiographical one and the one that distinguishes itself for historical awareness. The author exemplified his argument in the analysis of the bandeirante lack of productivity and Jesuit productivity, “He [the bandeirante] does not long for the current approval, did not care for the future historical assessment, unlike the Jesuits, whose historical awareness suggested narrator, next to the missionary or in himself” (p. XVIII). Finally, for the Brazilian historical case, the author emphasized the specific character of the exclusion of the reports of the European travelers to Brazil in the early colonial period in the historiographical analysis, which is closer to the chronicle than to the historical study (p. XIX). In that sense, the referential historiographical production by José Honório Rodrigues is focused on the idea of “avoiding that a historiography eventually becomes a history of the historical documentation” (p. XIX).

A revolução americana e a revolução brasileira da independência (1776-1822) (1977)

In the article “A revolução americana e a revolução brasileira da independência (1776-1822)” (Revista de História de América. Mexico, n. 83, January/June 1977, p. 69-91), Rodrigues presented, first, the evolution of the concept of the word Revolution, from the Latin, meaning return, until the application to politics, as a violent and total change in the government and the State, as macro-historical change and break in the system. According to Rodrigues,

the structure is the set of the economic, social, political and psychological conditions. The revolutionary situation may be defined as a short-term crisis within the system, with domestic long-term tensions, which offer a revolutionary awakening. The structure may be a pre-condition, while the situation is a precipitating factor (p. 70).

According to the author, the American Revolution had a significant importance, since it was the first struggle to stop imperial relations in the modern time, and for that reason it has three interpretations about the causes of the Revolution, which emphasize more the political, or economic or commercial issues. Later, Rodrigues states that the liberal-bourgeois American Revolution represented the victory of capitalism and of the Calvinist Protestantism (p. 76). The United States broke relations with Great Britain, and established a new economic structure and they tied the economic liberalism to the political one, and such structural change affected the economic, social and political spheres.

The author claimed that in Brazil there was a revolutionary succession between 1789 and 1817, despite the oppression, the militarization, the injustices and of the spoliation of colonialism and absolutism. There were expressions of revolution in structural chain, such as the Inconfidência Mineira, conspiracies in Rio de Janeiro, in Bahia, of the Suassunas, until the Revolution of 1817, with the permanence of the rebels for two months in power. Rodrigues presented the Revolution of 1822 with its revolutionary and counterrevolutionary features of control, based on the repercussion of the American and the French Revolutions according to José Bonifácio. It is worth emphasizing that even though a Portuguese monarch carried out the Independence, the USA was the first country to recognize it, even supporting a total break with the metropolis. According to the author, in the USA there was a radical change, an actual revolution, unlike ours, which was carried out by a counter-revolution, which resulted in the economic, political and social underdevelopment (p. 91).

Uma História Diplomática do Brasil: 1513-1945 (1995)

This book was an effort of Lêda Boechat Rodrigues and of Professor Ricardo Antônio Silva Seitenfus with the purpose to edit José Honório’s classes on the History of Brazil and Diplomatic History in the Rio Branco Institute, where he began to teach in 1946, by invitation of the Ambassador Hildebrando Accioly. In a first moment, his classes were transcribed into study aids about the theme, and José Antônio Soares de Sousa analyzed them, for some possible publication. Rodrigues remembered the study aids only in 1986 because of a letter from Editora Paulistana, regarding some publication project. However, with the stroke he had on May of that same year, there could not be any review. When he died, in April 1987, Lêda, his wife for 46 years, saw the need to publish many works that her husband wrote and organized, with the help of Professor Ricardo Seitenfus, who kept contact with Rodrigues since the 1970’s, the post-humous book of Rodrigues, Uma História Diplomática do Brasil.

In chapter 1, “The Concept of Diplomatic History”, the author tries to emphasize the role of periodization in history, as a collection of structural elements and spiritual goals that mark a characteristic phase (p. 25). Thus, periodization was considered a distinction in historical terms, not a division, taking into account the several factors that influence the aspects of human activity. The author claimed one cannot study and isolate diplomacy within itself, with the economic, geographic, social and political contexts, in addition to foreign policy being an expression of the National Power, or a sum of contracts among the national policies of the independent sovereign States (p. 27). Rodrigues pointed out that the techniques that we use during the history of the international relations were isolation, expansion, neutrality, arbitration and pacifism, in face of the dichotomous alternatives of peace and war. In this book, Rodrigues, with the review of Seitenfus, emphasized the game of the power politics, more than the simple diplomatic history, to create true permanent national goals for our foreign policy (p. 29), such as the improvement of the Brazilian economic power to a new position of National Power.

In the topic about the periodization, the authors applied Jung’s theory of extroversion and introversion, according to Klingberg, to distinguish a pattern of alternance among those first positions since 1776, in the United States, in order to explain the history of the foreign policy in that country. Thus, Jung’s theory was presented as the introversion position being “inwards character[...], distracted, full of self-esteem, often ill-adapted to his environment”, and the opposite extroversion, outwards, “sociable, expansive, submissive to fashion, friend to all novelties [...] it did not correspond to the warrior, conqueror, imperialist and annexing behavior [...] but to the pacifist, conciliator, internationalist” (p. 35). Thus, because of events such as wars, armed expeditions, annexations and diplomatic warnings, Jung set phases of introversion (that lasted 21 years on average) and extroversion in the USA (that lasted 27 years on average), the causes of which had both foreign and domestic factors (p. 40).

Starting here, the authors presented a suggestion for the periodization of the Diplomatic History of Brazil, into 1) Imperial or Expansion Period (From the Treaty of Tordesilhas to the loss of Uruguay, 1928); 2) National Period, or of consolidation of the political and military defense of the territory (until Rio Branco); and 3) Interamerican Period, or of integration in the continental community (p. 45). According to the theory, the first extroverted phase included the expansion of the bandeirantes, the Treaty of Tordesilhas, the papal bulls, the concept of ownership (uti possidetis), among other issues. The first introverted phase was the greater awareness of the geographic reality of the continent and it limited the national willingness to defend and preserve its territorial heritage, opposing the expansion of Argentina (p. 46). The second extroversion phase included, for example, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance against Rosas, in 1850 and later the intervention in Uruguay and the Paraguay War. The second introversion phase is “to solve serious domestic problems: slave abolition, the matter of the bishops, Republic, progressing in that manner until the occupation of the Trindade Island (1895)” (p. 47). Rio Branco and the definition of the Brazilian territory are the greatest examples of the third extroversion phase, and when he died, the foreign policy turned inwards for the third time, to maintain the position conquered, until the fourth extroversion phase, when Brazil entered World War I, against an extra continental country, passed by the League of Nations and participated in the world matters (p. 48). With the crisis of 1929, in the 10 following years, our position was of introspection in the world scenario (unlike Latin America, which participated in resolutions such as the Letícia matter and the Chaco War), which eventually changed with World War II, in the fifth extroversion phase.

Despite the contribution of José Honório Rodrigues for the development of History as Science, endowing it with a stricter methodology, this work was inserted more in the traditional line of the Diplomatic History. However, this contradiction might only be a reflection of the conservative demands of the institution, Rio Branco Institute.

An engaged analysis of Brazil’s African policy and the Independent Foreign Policy

Interesse Nacional e Política Externa (1966)

The author, already as a diplomatic history professor, described the work Interesse nacional e política externa (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966) as “a work that is neither organic nor planned”, a compilation of studies focused on “the search for the regularities and tendencies of the Brazilian historical process, influenced in its foreign sphere by the outside pressures, or seen according to its international effects” (p. 1). From the methodological point of view, the author claimed that, given the bureaucratic isolation and the elitist nature of the decision making in the national politics, “the long silence of the Brazilian people”, which is the object of analysis of the book is at the study of the “leaders” (p. 3). Following this consideration, the author developed his analysis based on the dispute between the “archaic and the new Brazil”. The materialization of this debate in the context in which it is written is expressed in the criticism to the “harmful aspects of militarism” (p. 4-5). According to the author, the latter derives from the fact that security overcame development as the core of the political agenda, which was established by the penetration of ideas foreign to the national thought and, consequently, moved away from an authentic nationalism on behalf of interdependence. The last phrase of the author’s preface showed his view: “independence is a condition for existence and interdependence is the ideology of national suicide” (p. 7). Iglésias (1988, p. 74) claimed that José Honório addressed themes as grounds of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, of the Independent Foreign Policy, of the relations between Brazil and the United States, Brazil and the Far East, and Brazil and Africa.

In his conclusion, the came back to the debate of the preface and explained the compilation of analyses of the book.

During half a century as a republic, the Brazilian foreign policy was unreal, too modest, shy, irrelevant, but was never so hopeless about international victories indispensable to development, before the deadlines are over, which the demographic boom shortened.

The quotation showed the predominance of archaic Brazil in its foreign policy and the need to return to the unwise ideas focused on national development (p. 215).

Política externa independente: a crise do pan-americanismo (1965)

In the book Política externa independente: a crise do pan-americanismo (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1965), José Honório Rodrigues inserted an article called “Uma Política Externa Própria e Independente”, in which he presented the foreign policy grounded on power and means of action, regardless of those resources being economic, populational power or national characteristics. According to the author, already at the time of the Empire, there were permanent goals in the Brazilian Foreign Policy, such as the defense of sovereignty and independence, of the territorial integrity and the peaceful relations, as well as the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. However, the latter was part of a transitory policy, covered with legal formalities, which, after being exhausted, if necessary would give space to the imposition of decisions based on the use of force. In addition, such goals could undergo breaks because of other larger goals, in the defense of basic interests. Peace was crucial for the country to maintain a path of progress and consolidation in relation to the dominant European powers, mainly in the mid-19th century, when there were such events as the Bill Aberdeen and the Christie Matter. Thus, during the Empire, it was impossible to have a proper policy, because of the loans and the international prices, which were controlled by the major powers, which increased the Brazilian dependence.

Because of his more political than legal worldview (which was typical of the bachelors, who were the majority in the Empire), Rio Branco, by means of the definition of the borders and his political skill, took the first step to defend the territorial status quo and the equilibrium in South America, and to unlink the European influences to the Brazilian Foreign Policy. In order to maintain an equilibrium in the international system, the foreign policy carried out the considerable inflection towards the United States of America, through an integral follow-up of the policies, both the Interamerican and the global ones, even with restrictions. Thus, Law played again a predominant role in the face of politics, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is worth emphasizing the author’s critical stance in relation to the Brazilian political elites of the Northeast, minoritarian and shaped according to the European image, of bachelors who lived in an Africanized world and had great lack of sense of representativeness of their people, which was a reflex of the domestic policy. The author claimed that, “truth is that the country had been ruled by a representative oligarchy of rural interests, expressing [basically] its opinions and desires, [more] than those of the people, which did not exist in political terms until a short time ago. The diplomatic exercise was tied to the existence of this means and it was almost a monopoly of a kind of caste voted in a hereditary manner to the foreign policy do country” (p. 27). Thus, it can be stated that the diplomatic staff could even be partyless, but it was not socially neutral.

In “Uma Política Externa Própria e Independente”, Rodrigues also introduced the idea of underdevelopment, which raised in the national awareness after World War II, in paradox with the following of the American policy by the Brazilian Foreign Policy. The author claimed that only with Juscelino Kubitschek there was an intensive development policy, pointing, for example, to the Pan-American Operation, which, nevertheless, maintained the pro-United States line. Rodrigues stated that OPA, “as an economic policy of regional block, took away all intercontinental character from the Latin American international policy” (p. 32) since there did not seem to be any intention of universal participation or Latin America seemed an isolated portion of the world, in an almost impossible attempt to flee from the interdependence in relation to the West. Besides, the author criticized the “whitewashed” Brazilian elites and Positivism, as an ideology that he considered as underdeveloped, a subproduct of the European culture imposed on the Latin American countries, which eventually generated in their elites a thought of superiority as compared to the African and the Asian countries. José Honório indicated that the foreign policy option of that time between “Western orthodoxy or heresy” (p. 33) was not the most correct one, but that cooperation would be the best solution for the development. A passage from the author exemplifies that thought: “We’re not against anyone, we’re only in favor of ourselves, as a people willing to obtain economic progress and social justice” (p. 33). Thus, the principles of pacifism, legalism, non-intervention, self-determination, anti-colonialism and the right to one’s own policy were those that ruled an own and independent foreign policy, according to Rodrigues.

With Jânio Quadros and his attempt of “globalization”, in addition to the change of our position in the Western free area, this led to an

adjustment policy that respected the hemispheric regionalism, did not devalue the intercontinental goals, broadened the trade and the political relations, refused the absolute commitments and ensured the interests of the representative regime and of the defense of peace (p. 35).

According to Rodrigues, since Quadros, the global significance of Brazil became stronger and our country more important, being able to request the equality of rights, treatment and competition. It is considerable that the relations with the United States were never neglected, because of their economic and commercial weight for Brazil. However, it became clearer that there could be some disagreement and contestation between both countries when our interests were differentiated or harmed. The author also points to the agreement of the public opinion about the Brazilian foreign policy with the administrations of Jânio Quadros, and later, João Goulart, being the agenda of party programs. However, it is worth emphasizing that, “the own and independent policy is not partisan. It is inspired in the radical nationalism, that is, in the roots of the national independence, in the idea of progress, in the real sources of the national behavior and in the democratic belief that the power comes from the people” (p. 39).

Brasil e África, um outro horizonte (1964)

In this work (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1964, 2 vols.), which became one of the main exponents of the intellectual production of José Honório Rodrigues, and of the studies about relations between Brazil and Africa, it can be observed the analysis of the elements that make up the close ties between both sides of the South Atlantic, through mutual relations and contributions, as well as its low level of interaction nowadays (in relation to the 19th and 20th centuries). In the preface, he clearly showed his goals in the work: “I believe that this book, written from the Brazilian point of view, maybe even too parochial, represented an effort towards understanding and a fraternity message” (p. XVII). However, he makes it clear that what guides his analysis is not any sentimental tie with Africa, but the perception of the benefits to the national interest that the better understanding of this theme could bring. The contribution that the author intends to make in the book is organized, still in the preface to its second edition (1964), in 19 theses about the ties between Brazil and Africa.

If the theses are analyzed as a whole, they offer a high power of synthesis to the content explored throughout the book, besides turning explicit the contribution that the author intends to offer. First, there were more intensive ties between Brazil and Africa than between Brazil and Portugal between the 16th and the 19th centuries, which meant that there existed an intercolonial community within the Portuguese Empire, in which the metropolis was the least important part. In this context, the period of slavery represented a phase of intensive Africanization of Brazil. Thus, both the African and the Native Indian collaboration contributed decisively to make up the basic structures of our society, with Brazil as the most Africanized nation in Latin America.

However, with the interruption of traffic around 1850, the 19th century represented an inflection point in the Brazilian Africanization. Despite that, Brazil became “one of the most perfect existing forms of racial friendship”, since the racial mix became a characteristic of the nationality and grounded the previous thesis. Brazil became a mixed-race Republic, with Africa making up a basic element of the Brazilian civilization matrix, although there was the distancing from Africa, since the 19th century, because the dynamics of the post-independence foreign policy moved Brazil away from Africa. Although there were solid ties between the Brazilian and the African settlers at the time of the Brazilian independence, the end of the slave traffic led to the ideological identification of the elites with Europe. Great Britain was considered an “ally” of Brazil in this context.

Thus, the work may be analyzed according to three groups, having the reading guided by the theses mentioned above. The focus of the first one is the analytical description of the relations established between the Brazilian settlers and the colonies in Africa and how those relations generate ties, mainly those deriving from the demographic interchange, which makes up the Brazilian civilization matrix. The second one shows how the intensive European immigration in the 19th century, first with the arrival of the Portuguese court in 1808 until the “whitening” of Brazil by the end of the century, together with the end of the slave traffic halfway through the same century, started a process that reduced the relations of Brazil with Africa. The last group points to the permanent ties that derived from the relations with Africa in the first few centuries of Brazilian colonial history as they were materialized in the formation of the Brazilian mixed-race society. This information lived with a distance from these populations of Africa itself, given the current moving away.

First, it is worth emphasizing the analysis made by the author of “Imagem da África”, in its first chapter. According to Rodrigues, the image of Africa and the African resulted from the confluence of myths cultivated in the midst of the lack of knowledge of Medieval Europe regarding Africa and of the discoveries and interpretations that derived from the first contacts with the continent in modernity. Distrust and fear predominated in the myths that added to the difficulty to dominate the African people, as well as their conversion to Christianity. The absence of a conscious denial to conversion led to a perception by the Europeans, of the incapacity by the Africans to join the Christian faith. The author claimed that this perception is at the base of how the Brazilians see Africa and in the secondary and stereotyped place that we have of it. That image “of a difficult territory because of the natural conditions, the barbarism of its people and the ferociousness of its animals” was fed by the extremely low level of formal knowledge offered to the Brazilian people about the African reality (even though within a broader Eurocentrism).

Next, he analyzed the first stage mentioned above. The author described and analyzed the role of the Brazilian settlers in the African colonial dynamics. According to the author, settlers of Brazilian origin dominated the evolution of the colonial enterprises and of trade in itself. Ultimately, the trade of African slaves supposedly created a tie between the Brazilian and the African colonies in a solid an autonomous manner in relation to Portugal.

In chapters 3 and 4, the author exploited the second group of the theses addressed in the work. In chapter 3, called “The African Contribution”, he stated that this resulted from the demographic increase that resulted from slavery and of the civilization content that resulted from this flow, as he exemplified in the passage: “by the number of the population of African origin, by the mix of races, by the labor force and by the civilization fact that it represented, we must acknowledge the black and mixed-race contribution to Brazil”. The author also claimed that there is a Brazilian-Afro-Asian society, with limited participation from Portugal, in the 18th century, with Africa making up a path of relations closer to the Brazilians than to the Portuguese. For States like Angola, Dahomey and Mine Coast, there was greater contact with Brazil than with Portugal, even because of the figure of Brazil as a former Portuguese colony. In chapter 4, Rodrigues exploited the influences of mixed-races in the formation of the Brazilian society. The author claimed that the plurality of cultural contents that resulted from the ethnic fusion of the mixed-race produced a society with a high level of interracial tolerance, which was crucial for the peace and social stability of Brazil.

Then, Rodrigues reaffirmed his defense of the ties between Brazil and Africa, based on the “Brazilian Contribution”. According to the author, besides the Brazilian settlers having been in charge of the viabilization of the Portuguese colonization in Africa, products of Brazilian origin started to make up the productive agenda of these places. Thus, it was supposedly the geographic similarity itself that turned easier the general interchange between both sides of the South Atlantic.

In chapter 6, the author analyzed the process of the distancing of Brazil from Africa in the 19th century. That distancing might have originated in the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Brazil, which redimensioned the Portuguese significance and, as a consequence, the European one, in the Brazilian daily life. The end of the slave traffic, halfway throughout the century, turned this process stronger since it broke the support axle of the trade and political relations between Brazil and the African colonies. Finally, the European immigration policy of the late 19th century, which he called the “whitening” of Brazil, represented a reflex of an increasing tie of the Brazilian elites with the European powers, whose development started to be a reference to ours.

An important dimension of the relations with Africa is the role of the South Atlantic, which became significant as an economic space as compared to the North Atlantic in the 17th century. Since the 16th century, there were intensive commercial exchanges between Brazil and Africa, the tropical nature of the human expansion and the Africanization or our ethnic group. José Honório Rodrigues even mentioned “an alliance that lasted three centuries” between Brazil and Africa. However, since the 18th century, with the beginning of the European industrialization, the North Atlantic became a greater protagonist and, with the end of the slave traffic in 1850, there was the alienation of the Brazilian elites, which claimed to be “white and Western”. In order to complete the picture, the Monroe Doctrine and the British squad, which dominated the seas, excluded Iberian America from the global balance of power.

Only with the end of World War II, the situation changed, with the advance of anticolonialism and of decolonization. From then on, José Honório Rodrigues became a member of the Third World, showing that most of the new States would be “underdeveloped” and made up the region known as Third World, which should unite for a more effective international action. Mainly because, in the case of Africa, before the decolonization there had been the formation of the European Economic Community, which had articulated neocolonial ties, mainly through France. Such ties created strong commercial competition between the new States and Brazil, as far as the European market was concerned. The competition took place mainly concerning tropical products, such as coffee and cocoa, benefitted in comparison to the Africans by the European preferences regime.

As far as the Brazilian policy towards Africa was concerned, the author highlighted its shyness and its mistakes. He considered that decolonization represented a decisive historical phenomenon, since it ended an era marked by colonialism. Vasco da Gama was replaced by Kwame Nkrumah (President of Ghana), one of the major paladins not only of the independences, but also of the autonomy of the new States. The ties between Brazil and Africa at the time were mainly with South Africa, which led to the aversion by the other States. The problem is that such relations did not have only a domestic issue, but also an international one, since the United Nations Organization condemned the racist regime of Apartheid and the occupation of the African Southwest (currently Namibia).

Another serious problem was the impact of the relations with the Salazar regime of Portugal on the African States, mainly the issue of the decolonization of the so-called Portuguese “Overseas Provinces”. Rodrigues considered that the Treaty that created the Luso-Brazilian Community represented a victory of Lisbon. The Brazilian stance, which was one of abstention in the condemnation of Portugal in the UN, when there was the start of the armed fight and Salazar’s repression, was harmful to our diplomacy. In fact, the Brazilian international policy oscillated between the theses of the geopolitics of the Cold War and the principles of the Independent Foreign Policy of Quadros and Goulart.

The foreign policy of autonomy and national interest

The principles that guided Brazilian international policy were identified in the work Interesse Nacional e Política Externa, by José Honório Rodrigues.

The Manifestos of 1822 define well our initial goals. Together with the integrity and the unity, since then there are many idealist or utopic elements, as well as other ones that are both subtle and complex. It involved many purposes and ideas, such as: security and prosperity, glory and national honor, happiness, the sense of dignity, sovereignty, peace, free trade, anticolonialism, non-intervention and self-determination (p. 10).

However, the difference between desire and reality was huge. When José Bonifácio addressed the acting American Consul, P. Santoris, in 1822, he expressed the Brazilian desire in the following way:

My dear Sir, Brazil is a Nation and, as such, it will occupy its place without the need to wait for or request the recognition of the other powers. Diplomatic agents or Ministers will be sent to them. Those that receive us in that way and treat us from Nation to Nation will continue to be admitted in our ports and will be benefitted in their trade. Those that deny it will be excluded from it (apud Rodrigues, p. 10).

After that solid demonstration of political will, there was a very different reality. According to José Honório Rodrigues himself,

we were born weak, baptized in infamous treaties, in which the economic grants combined with extraterritorial rights of the European Powers. We suffered intermittent violations and insults, threats and intimidations, we had incidents and we paid undue indemnities. In turn, the powerful from Europe, mainly the English and the French, as well as the Americans, disrespected us (p. 12).

According to him, our foreign policy was shy until 1844, since it was “dominated by the Europeans, not allied to them, [since they supplied] the capital, the markets and labor, the latter mainly after 1850” (p. 49). The hemisphere was almost an absent dimension: in 1841, Chancellor Aureliano de Souza e Oliveira Coutinho stated that “it is an unchangeable principle of the imperial policy to observe strict neutrality in the ongoing wars that dilacerate the American States, mainly in their domestic affairs” (apud Rodrigues, p. 18). Thus, we had a bitter submission in relation to the North and an inescapable distancing in relation to the neighbors.

Rodrigues did not believe that there were major strategic projects in the Brazilian diplomacy. According to him,

I believe more in an admirable improvisation capacity and in the extraordinary intelligence of some builders of this policy. I also do not believe that we have undergone cycles of introversion and extroversion, of isolation and expansion. Unlike the United States, where this theory has been applied, we have always been directed towards the sea, towards communication and an extracontinental policy (p. 13).

This situation, once the ties with Africa had been cut and those with Europe had been reinforced in the mid-19th century, made our elite try to become more “latinized and westernized”, which led to the “whitening” thesis. Although always taking on the perspective of a developmentalist capitalism within the framework of a democratic system, he always fought what he considered an inconsistent argumentation by this segment of the elite. According to him,

Western, although heretic, is Marxism, which dominated continental China and influences the Asian policy. What concerned the “non-caiada” elites[324] and the majorities was the fear that Europe led us to the horrors of the Asian exploitation (p. 3).

In another passage, he quoted the dialogue in which the Italian Prime-Minister Amintore Fanfani told President Kennedy that

it is an irony that the communists, who believe in the dictatorship, are always addressing the masses, while the West, which believes in the democracy, always addresses the leaders (apud Rodrigues, p. 3).

In this context, he points to the fact that the foreign policy was ruled by a minority elite, without any ties to the mass of the population, alienated from the national reality and directed towards the Northern Powers. And turned easier the pressure of the powers on the nation, restricting its desires, submitting those elites and made its international strategy less independent, with the submissions always being economic, not political ones (p. 83).

Rodrigues claimed that the grounds of the Brazilian foreign policy were pacifism, legalism (international law), non-intervention, the right to self-determination, anti-colonialism and the right to formulate a proper policy. Basically, those are the same elements that San Tiago Dantas indicated when he defined the Independent Foreign Policy. Also in the same line, he suggested the need for a really global policy:

Brazil is a continental nation that must think in intercontinental terms, not only in the relations with America as a whole, but with everyone, including in the restoration of the tie to Africa, which Great Britain made us break in the mid-19th century (p. 74).

Such view was followed by a criticism to the policy of President Juscelino Kubitschek, who emphasized the diplomatic regionalization through the Pan-Americana Operation, decided in the Catete Palace instead of the Itamaraty.

Another extremely relevant paradigm in the work by José Honório Rodrigues is the definition of the national interest:

The national interest is the one that defends both the permanent and the current aspirations of the nation, and its purpose is basically to ensure two goals, namely the well being of the people, its rights and guarantees and those of the political unit and the territorial integration of the Union (p. 77).

Historically, in the foreign sphere, he claimed that he did not believe in doctrinary influences of the national policy and, consequently, of the domestic or foreign national interest. There was a radical constant, anti-Europeanism, because of what it meant in terms of the struggle against supremacy, preponderance and submission of our interest to the Europeans, mainly the British and the French (p. 84).

Later, this situation led to alliances with the United States and Chile, against Argentina and Europe, which allowed the Brazilian elite to take on the “Polar Star Thesis”. Rodrigues claimed that

the advocates of interdependence have existed for a long time and rank themselves in the same ideological group of the export economy rather than that of the production for Brazil as the priority economic solution. His ideal is an associated or interdependent development, having as its gravity axle the Polar star. The Polar Star Thesis, formulated in 1913 by Columbian Marco Fidel Suárez, stated “el Norte de nuestra política externa deve estar allá, en esa poderosa nación, que más que ninguna outra ejerce decisiva atracción respecto de todos los pueblos de América”, gained many supporters (p. 212).

The assessment that José Honório Rodrigues made of the Republican foreign policy, right after 1964, is as follows:

During half a century as a republic, the Brazilian foreign policy was unreal, too modest, shy, irrelevant, but was never so hopeless about international victories indispensable to development, before the deadlines are over, which the demographic boom shortened. Thus, the interdependent policy is an ideology as abusively internationalist as the universal communism and for that reason it cannot be accepted neither by the civic nature of the patriots nor by the policy of the consequent nationalists, the first major task of a healthy policy is the progressive nullifying of the alienations of the sovereignty (p. 215).

Conclusion

The work by José Honório Rodrigues is based on a deep analysis of the Brazilian history, specifically of the colonial and imperial periods and of the early decades of the Republic. Then it extracts elements to argue in favor of the autonomy of the international action of Brazil. The notion of nationalism is inescapable, which permeates the author’s view in all the books and articles that he wrote. Although he did not exercise any political and diplomatic function, his classes had great influence on more than one generation of diplomats and politicians. As far as the most recent period (1950’s and 1960’s) are concerned, his studies became more instrumental and prescriptive, also strongly based on the analysis of the major international events, instead of only on the Brazilian foreign policy. Throughout the entire work, the structural significance of the relations between Brazil and Africa as support for the Brazilian international insertion is axial.

However, there are two issues that denote a sort of analytical frailness: the mystification of the “people” and the idea that what is “fair and rational” must impose itself on what is dysfunctional in a nation. In the same line, its engagement in favor of the Independent Foreign Policy turned obscure his assessment about the diplomacy of the Military Regime. In this point, he was more interested in the appearance than in the essence and its continuity elements. Before 1964, his work had a more academic focus and, later, it was more engaged in political terms, although it was controversial. The South American dimension of the Brazilian Foreign Policy is absent, even when it addresses the need to unite the developing countries (Third World).

Curiously, his progressive stance coincided with the one considered “conservative” by Gilberto Freyre about the benefits of mixed-race for Brazil. The diplomacy of Presidents Lula and Dilma, which is largely based on the view by Rodrigues, among others, considers Brazil a “multiracial and multicultural” country, thus denying what he considered the essence of the Brazilian nature: a mixed-race country. The racialization that dominated the direction of the current social relations eventually merge the “Brazilian people” in sectorial struggles and hides the social contradictions, which pleased a certain anthropology that was popular in the North Atlantic nations.

Nevertheless, his contribution is decisive concerning the division of the ruling elite, with part of it betting on a “minor Brazil”, junior partner of the United States and Europe, as well as in the identification of the controversial notion of national interest and in the long-term elements of history and of the international insertion of Brazil. In the same line, his defense of a more proactive stance for our diplomacy and of a global and extra-hemispheric engagement, denote solid intuition regarding the future imperatives. The foreign policy of the 1970’s and 1980’s, and later that of the 21st century, reveal to what extent his view was right. This is also true about the notion that Brazil should have a proud stance as compared to the major powers. In short, even though he was a man of his time, José Honório Rodrigues showed that he had a view of the future. By tortuous paths, the later evolution showed to what extent his perception was right, rooted in national history.

Works by José Honório Rodrigues

Civilização Holandesa no Brasil. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1940. 404.

Teoria da História do Brasil: Introdução Metodológica. São Paulo: Instituto Progresso, 1949, 355 p.

Historiografia e Bibliografia do Domínio Holandês no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1949, XVII, 489 p.

A Pesquisa Histórica no Brasil: Sua Evolução e Problemas Atuais. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1952, 286 p.

Política Externa Independente: A Crise do Pan-Americanismo. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1965, 294 p.

Interesse Nacional e Política Externa. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966, 232 p.

Vida e História. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966, 278 p.

A Revolução Americana e a Revolução Brasileira da Independência (1776-1822). In: Revista de Historia de America. México N. 83 (January/June 1977), p. 69-91.

História da História do Brasil. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1979.

Uma História Diplomática do Brasil,1531-1945. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1995, 512 p.

Brasil e África: Outro Horizonte; Relações e Política Brasileira-Africana. 2nd ed. revised and extended. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1964, 2 v.

O Continente do Rio Grande. Rio de Janeiro: São José, 1954, 81 p.

O Parlamento e a Evolução Nacional. Brasília: Federal Senate, 1972, 5 v.

A Assembleia Constituinte de 1823. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1974, 325 p.

Independência: Revolução e Contrarrevolução. Rio de Janeiro: F. Alves, 1975-1976, 5 v.

O Conselho de Estado: O Quinto Poder?. Brasília, DF: Federal Senate, 1978, 417 p.

O Parlamento e a Consolidação do Império, 1840/1861: Contribuição à História do Congresso Nacional do Brasil, no Período da Monarquia. Brasília: House of Representatives, 1982, 213 p.

Aspirações Nacionais: Interpretação histórico-político. 4th ed., revised. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1970, 234 p.

História e Historiografia. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1970, 306 p.

História, Corpo do Tempo. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1984, 282 p.

Filosofia e História. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1981, 129 p.

História Combatente. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1983, 407 p.

Tempo e Sociedade. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1986, 221 p

Afonso Arinos

Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco was born on November 27, 1905, in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais. He graduated from a law school in Rio de Janeiro, in 1927. Returning to his native Belo Horizonte, he was the director of the newspapers, Estado de Minas and Diário da Tarde, in 1933. He also founded another newspaper, the Folha de Minas, in 1934. In 1943, Arinos was one of the main writers of the Manifesto dos Mineiros, an open letter calling for an end to the Estado Novo of Getúlio Vargas and a redemocratization of the country. In addition, in 1945, he wrote the inaugural manifesto of the União Democrática Nacional (UDN), a conservative political party opposed to Vargas. Arinos became a Deputado Federal (federal representative) in 1947. He was a professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Rio de Janeiro, in 1949, and the University of Brazil, in 1950, the year in which he was again elected a federal representative. In 1951, the Brazilian Congress approved the so-called Afonso Arinos Law, making racial discrimination a federal crime.

Arinos became the head of the Udenista (members of the UDN party) bench in Congress in 1952, and he was re-elected a federal representative, in 1954. In 1955, he published his major literary work, Um Estadista da República (A Statesman of the Republic), a biography of his father, Afrânio de Melo Franco, who had been a politician, as well as Brazil’s foreign minister for the four years immediately following the Revolution of 1930.

Afonso Arinos was elected to the Brazilian Academy of Letters, in 1958, and that same year as a Senator from the Federal District. He was made the president of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 1959, and he became the country’s foreign minister, in 1961, during the Jânio Quadros administration. Also in 1961, as well as in 1962, he headed the Brazilian delegations to the sixteenth and seventeenth UN General Assemblies respectively, and he led the Brazilian delegation to the first (1962) and second (1963) sessions of the UN Disarmament Conferences. Arinos was also foreign minister, again, in 1962, in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Francisco de Paula Brochado da Rocha, during the country’s relatively brief period of parliamentarism following the resignation of Jânio Quadros.

In the political field, Arinos participated in the formation of the Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA – National Renewal Alliance) political party. In the legislature, he defended parliamentarism and agrarian reform, and secured the right to vote beginning at age 16. He also wrote the chapter on Individual Rights and Guarantees of the Constitution of 1967; supported Tancredo Neves as a presidential candidate, in 1984; and he coordinated the commission that prepared the Constitutional reform project in 1985. Elected Senator, in 1986, he headed the Systematization Commission of the Constituent National Assembly. In 1988, he helped found the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) a democratic socialist political party.

Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco died August 27, 1990, at the age of 84, while he was still a federal Senator.

Afonso Arinos de melo Franco: his times and paradox

Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães

Brazil’s fate is to be a satellite of the United States for an undefined period.

Raul Fernandes, Brazilian Foreign Minister, August 26, 1954 to November 12, 1955

I repeat; I am a man without conditions or restrictions of any kind or nature.

Jânio Quadros, interview to the press, October 19, 1960

We, therefore, have a triptych of values that must preside over the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy: sovereignty, democracy and peace.

Afonso Arinos, in his Memoirs

Sir, allow me to congratulate you on the firmness and fidelity with which you planned the outlines of our foreign policy in the federal Chamber of Deputies. I am proud to have you as a partner in the government.

Jânio Quadros, to Afonso Arinos, September 5, 1961

Although at the time I still could not clearly evaluate the deep causes of the difficulties that Brazil faced, any Minister of Foreign Affairs who desires to be successful should be willing to carry out a policy of true national affirmation.

Afonso Arinos, in his Memoirs

[...]I can evaluate his extraordinary qualities as a major manager of Brazilian foreign policy

Afonso Arinos, in his Memoirs

[...] a conservative ministry, to carry out revolutionary politics.

Pedroso Horta, cited by Castello Branco

The times and paradox of Afonso Arinos

The foreign policy that Afonso Arinos, Minister of the Exterior under Jânio Quadros (1961), directed with great political and diplomatic skill was extraordinary. It addressed the need to open up markets for industrial products – in Africa, the Near East and Asia – caused by balance of payment difficulties, and a re-focusing of the economy and foreign trade on primary products. It recognized the need to maintain political and economic relations with all nations, regardless of their domestic political organization – just as all developed countries do – even as the press attempted to limit this. It sought an integration of South America, with a priority given to relations with Argentina – a policy which continues to be criticized today by those desirous of destroying the Mercosur trade bloc – composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela – resurrect the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and prevent the strengthening the Union of South American Nations (Unasur).

Arinos defended the vital principles of non-intervention and self-determination – even more critical today for the coexistence of sovereign States – despite their being ignored by those with the most powerful arms. He also recognized the importance of China at a much earlier time than other countries.

Arinos saw a relationship between social development and world stability, the benefits of which can be seen in the fight against poverty and misery today. And, finally, he believed in a democratization of the Brazilian foreign office itself, Itamaraty. All of these thoughts were central to the foreign policy of Afonso Arinos and Jânio Quadros. They remain as challenges in the current world.

The paradox of Afonso Arinos is that he was a conservative politician; a member of Brazil’s landed, social elite; a founding-member and parliamentary leader of the UDN (União Democrática Nacional), the main conservative political party in Brazil, (1945-1965); and a friend, until 1961, of Carlos Lacerda, the main political conservative of his era. Yet, Arinos brilliantly conducted a progressive program – Brazil’s “independent foreign policy” – in defense of development and peace, marking a new period for his country in the international arena. As such, he was a precursor of policies that recognized the potential of the Brazilian State and society. “Brazil is the largest and richest country of Latin America and has the potential to become a world power. Its good will and cooperation are of maximum importance to us” (Outline for the Policy of the United States towards Brazil, 1961. US State Department).

Brazilian foreign policy and its environment

No foreign policy can be understood and even less evaluated without taking into account the international, regional and national environment of the times in which it is implemented; when it reaps its fruits, be they bitter or sweet. It is also interesting to examine and compare the personalities and experiences of foreign ministers with those of the presidents they served. This is especially true of Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, during his meteoric 205 days at the head of Itamaraty during the administration of President Jânio Quadros.

The diplomatic experience of Afonso Arinos stretched over much of his lifetime, beginning when he attended meetings of the League of Nations in the 1920s with his father, Afrânio de Melo Franco, and extended to a period as president of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, two periods as Brazil’s foreign minister – first under Jânio Quadros in 1961, and next during the country’s brief period of parliamentarism, under Prime Minister Brochado da Rocha. He also had lead roles in the Brazilian delegation to the Sixteenth and Seventeenth UN General Assemblies, as well as the UN Disarmament Commission. He stood out in all of these situations, yet none more than when was he was foreign minister, in 1961, during the seven-month administration of President Jânio Quadros.

The international environment

The international environment during the 1950s and up to 1961 were different from those of today, although some of their characteristics – such as the interventionist policies of the major powers – survive. In those earlier times, during the Cold War, people were told that actions were taken in defense of freedom, democracy and Christian civilization; today the reasons are disguised as the so-called right to “protect” populations from being the victims of human rights abuses. There is still a vagrant disrespect for the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, both of which are consecrated by the UN and are keys for sovereign States to live together, especially weaker ones.

The 1950s and early 1960s were the height of the Cold War. Images of the successes of the Soviet Union were projected onto the world scene, symbolized by the launch of the first satellite, Sputnik, in 1957, and the success of the first manned space flight of the astronaut, Yuri Gagarin, four years later. These events also had important military implications, as they revealed Soviet technological, scientific and military capabilities in areas such as intercontinental missiles, thereby exposing the vulnerability of even the Americas.

The ideological dispute of the Soviet Union and its socialist Eastern European allies with the United States and other highly developed capitalist countries – albeit still recovering from the effects of World War II – was intense. The successes of the Soviet Union and socialism had major repercussions in the underdeveloped world, which was going through the beginning of the decolonization process. This was especially true in Africa, starting with the independence of Ghana in 1957, led by Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Pan-Africanism.

The peaceful coexistence policies of Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, were announced in February 1956 at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In his speech, Khrushchev proclaimed that socialism would overcome capitalism, while confrontations would take place on the periphery, with the Soviets supporting socialist liberation movements. Later that year, in November, the Soviet military intervened in Hungary. Less than five years later, tensions in Germany led to the building of the Berlin Wall.

In Asia, the Korean War, which began in 1950 and ended with an armistice in 1953, had no winner. The war demonstrated that although the United States was able to mobilize its allies and obtain support for its military actions through a resolution of the UN General Assembly, the socialist countries, mainly China, were able to face up the that power.

The French had lost at Dien Bien-Phu, in 1954. Later, U.S. President John Kennedy began his country’s military presence in Vietnam, which turned out to be disastrous with the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1973. The lasting effects of the war were the transformation of the American military from a drafted army into an enlisted force, and the eventual conversion of a reunified Vietnam from socialism to capitalism.

Ideological divergences and Russia’s refusal to transfer nuclear technology to the People’s Republic of China led to a Chinese-Russian schism in 1960, and, therefore, to the end of the monolithic nature of the communist bloc. As a consequence, a competitive phase between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China developed, especially concerning their support of national liberation movements in Africa. Along with the competition, there was a poignant denunciation of Russian revisionism.

The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 – attended by the Chinese premier, Chou-En Lai; the president of Egypt, Gamal Nasser; the prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru; the long-term president of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito; and Sukarno, the president of the host country – was the beginning of the future association known as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The major principles of NAM were: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; the equality of all races and nations; non-intervention and self-determination; the right of each nation to defend itself, both individually and collectively; the refusal to participate in a collective defense directed towards serving the interests of the superpowers; abstention from every act or threat of aggression against the integrity or the independence of another country; and the peaceful solution of controversies.

While France and Great Britain began to grant independence to their colonies – at times after serious conflicts, such as the Algerian War, which ended in 1962, and the fight in Kenya, which created the basis of economic neocolonialism – there was the crystallization in the southern part of Africa, of a white racist stronghold, led by South Africa and Portugal.

In a dispute for the support of allies among the new States, the United States was also interested in the decolonization of Africa. Its participation in the process was especially important in UN political and economic forums, with a goal of eliminating obstacles put in place by the European colonial regimes to the actions of its huge companies. Likewise, the Soviet Union was interested in obtaining the support of the former colonies, as it sought to prevent American control of the new States. And finally, China had an interest, especially considering its ideological and political confrontations with the Soviet Union.

The European Economic Community emerged in Western Europe, in 1957. It had six founding members, a supranational structure, and agreements with the former colonies to create a European common market with a goal of maintaining peace in Europe, as well as recovering its power and influence in the world, both of which were destroyed by the two world wars.

In military terms, the world was divided into two blocs, the West structured around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO (1949) and the East, structured around the Warsaw Pact, (1955). In Europe, there was a system of bases and military agreements with the United States, which actually extended through the Near East, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, all of which surrounded the communist world. China, which had not yet employed its first nuclear device, was a world apart, as it was confronted by the United States in Taiwan, Japan and Australia and, to the north, by the Soviet Union.

The risk and fear of nuclear war were real concerns in Europe as well as in the United States, where millions of residential bunkers against nuclear attacks were built. The United States had emerged from World War II as the major economy in terms of production, trade, finance, technology, and science, and it participated in a hegemonic manner in the world’s economic organizations, mainly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The U.S. dictated the rules to the capitalist countries, whether they were developed or not. The Soviet Union was the political, social and economic rival to the United States. Its high growth rates showed the world’s underdeveloped economies and societies that economic planning and State intervention in the economy could lead in a short period of time to industrialization and better standards of living.

Both Africa and Latin America had high demographic growth rates, and mostly rural, underdeveloped economies, which mainly produced and exported primary goods. They were without significant industrial parks, without military might, and without technological vigor. In Asia, the newly industrializing countries had not emerged, and an unarmed Japan had not yet experienced its “miracle,” as it was still in the process of recovering from World War II. China did not begin its rapid and sustained growth process until considerably later, in the late 1970s.

It was, therefore, in this tense and highly asymmetrical international scenario – with the dangers of an arms race and a world nuclear war threatening humanity – that the foreign policy of Afonso Arinos was developed under President Jânio Quadros.

The regional environment

One characteristic of Latin America during the Cold War was an absence of political ties amongst neighbors, a situation that often led to conflicts, resulting from past grievances – although the conflicts were usually limited to States located in well-defined subregions, such as the Southern Cone, the Andes, and Central America.

The United States exercised military hegemony in the region through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty for the city in which it was signed in 1947, along with bilateral military agreements. Politically, it acted through the ideology of Pan-Americanism, and the Organization of American States (OAS), created in 1948. Ultimately, it exercised hegemony through its support – and even the organization – of coups d’état, as occurred in Guatemala, in 1954, when the democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz was ousted.

The disjointed economies of South America had been structured by the foreign trade interests of Great Britain, with British loans and investments made to the governments, to build railroads from production zones to export ports, and to supply electricity and sanitation in urban systems.

The populations of Latin American societies were predominantly rural and illiterate; they were in a precarious state of health and poverty, and there was a great demographic and economic emptiness in the center of the continent. Despite an incipient industrial development in some countries, which had been encouraged by the disorganization of international markets during the Great Depression and World War II, the basic practice of exporting primary products had been maintained. Transportation and power systems were very precarious, with the latter often relying on imported oil to move vehicles as well as to generate electricity. Transportation ties among the countries of the region were almost inexistent.

Commercial ties among the Latin American countries were extremely tenuous, even inexistent. Many countries competed with one another on the global market as exporters of agricultural or mineral raw materials. They had very incipient industrial parks and scarcely diversified export agendas. Investments of national capital in other countries of the region were non-existent, with the prevalence of foreign investments mainly coming from the United States after World War II, due to the devastation of Europe during that war.

The political and economic scenario of the region was greatly changed in 1959 with the victory of the Cuban Revolution, and the consequent Russian challenge to Pan-Americanism. All of this, combined with the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States, led to American hegemony on the continent. It was, therefore, also in this tense and asymmetrical global scenario, combined with a regional scenario of poverty and vulnerability that the foreign policy of Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos developed.

Conditions within Brazil at the time

When Jânio Quadros was elected president, in 1960, Brazil had 71 million inhabitants. The 55 percent of its population that lived in the countryside were illiterate and poor, and subject to political, economic and social rules set by traditional and conservative rural chiefs. The urban population was mainly distributed along the coastline, with the great majority professing to be of the Catholic religion, and subject to the influences of its leaders.

Three major parties dominated the political system in Brazil at the time of the Cold War. The Partido Social Democrático, represented rural interests and was tied to the bureaucracy. The party had been founded by Getúlio Vargas, who was ousted in 1945. It then remained that of the subsequent administrations of Eurico Dutra (1945-1951), the return of Vargas (1951-1954), the brief interregnum of Café Filho (1954-1955), and Juscelino Kubitschek (1955-1961). The Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, a labor party, which was also founded by Vargas, mainly represented the interests and claims of industrial workers. The UDN included representatives of the urban middle classes, and included intellectuals, merchants, and professionals, such as lawyers. Many UDN leaders had fought the Estado Novo dictatorship of Vargas begun in 1937, but they failed in their various attempts to take power through the electoral process.

There were other political parties, but most were minor or had only state or regional influence. These included the Progressive Social Party (PSP) of Adhemar de Barros; the Liberator Party (PL); the Christian Democrat Party (PDC); the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB); and the Popular Representation Party (PRP), of Integralist origin. The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), although illegal, was still the eternal bogeyman of the Brazilian political, economic and military elites.

The economy was at the beginning of industrialization, mainly concentrated in the consumer non-durable goods sector. An automobile industry had just emerged, aiding the effort to integrate the large national territory through the building of roads, thereby facilitating major domestic migrations. Foreign trade, however, still was concentrated in a few agricultural and primary products. On the import side, products of necessity, such as oil and wheat, were brought into the country in large quantities, and a large foreign debt to public and private creditors, mainly from the major developed countries, accumulated.

Social agitation, such as the Peasant Leagues led by Francisco Julião in the Northeast region of the country, caused major fear in Brazilian elites as well as in the foreign elites associated with them. A great importance was given to programs such as Sudene (Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste), a government development entity, in search of American funding for projects in that region.

Inflation and the debt service – which always relied on irregular currency incomes due to fluctuations in the prices of commodities and weak demand in the markets of developed countries – were the two main concerns of the government and of society in 1960. They were the same concerns of previous moments in Brazilian history, and for that matter, are still valid.

Inflation, which monetary economists blamed on budget imbalances, corruption and the intervention of the State in the economy, was considered the greatest evil – mainly because of differentiated systems of currency exchange and the action of state companies. Inflation was also having an impact on relations with foreign creditors, who conditioned a renegotiation of debt deadlines and the granting of new loans, on the implementation of severe domestic economic adjustment programs that mainly affected workers.

And so it was, again, in this tense and asymmetrical world scene – militarily weak, politically disjointed, and economically poor, within an undeveloped and traditional national scene, with deep tensions – that the Brazilian foreign policy of 1961 developed with the participation of Afonso Arinos.

Brazilian foreign policy

Brazilian foreign policy seemed destined to remain within its traditional guidelines, exclusively concerned with hemispheric topics; aligned with the United States in regional matters, as well as those in confrontation with the communist bloc; in solidarity with the colonial policies of Portugal and France, in Africa; and, within its economic sphere, maintaining strong commercial and financial ties with Western European countries, as well as with the United States – the main investor in and lender to Brazilian projects, and the largest purchaser of Brazilian coffee. For many years, however, there were signs of a desire to reorient the policy. During the 1920s, for example, Afrânio de Melo Franco, Afonso’s father, had vigorously defended that the country receive a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations, which the major European powers rejected, and led to Brazil’s withdrawal from the League. The arguments Brazil then presented, to justify its claim for a permanent seat on the Council, were very similar to those put forward much later – from 1945 to the present – in its campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Another sign of change and a desire for greater autonomy was the Brazilian close relationship with Germany in the 1930s – not only in the trade sphere, but also militarily. In the commercial field, Brazil made trade deals with Germany in which payments were delineated in deutschmarks, the German currency at the time. This drew firm American objections, since the United States was engaged in building a network of bilateral agreements based on the most favored nation clause. In military terms, Brazil made agreements to acquire equipment and hosted German training missions.

Before the United States entered World War II, in late 1941, Brazilian president, Getúlio Vargas, skillfully led a policy not to declare itself between the conflicting parties; the purpose of which was to obtain funding and technological help – from either side – for projects such as the construction of the country’s first modern steel plant and the re-equipping of its Armed Forces.

American interest in strategic raw materials found in South America, coupled with the a desire to use the Brazilian Northeast as a support point for American military operations – due to its location as the closest part of the Americas to Africa and a possible German invasion point – led the United States, in 1940, to grant funding to build what became the Volta Redonda steel plant in the state of Rio de Janeiro. In return, Brazil agreed to the construction of eight air bases in the North and the Northeast regions of the country.

The purpose of sending a contingent of over 25,000 soldiers of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force to fight in Italy, in 1943 – which the British resisted – was to create the conditions for Brazil to attend post-war negotiations in an advantageous position. The goal was a greater inclusion in the world, especially as a permanent member of the Security Council of the new organization that was already known to be under creation: the United Nations.

Thus, with the United States as a victor in World War II, and the subsequent American supremacy in the world, Brazil began to request that it be treated as a preferred U.S. ally in Latin America with political expectations of a position on the Security Council and economic access to the resources of the Marshall Plan.

The denial to become a permanent member on the Security Council and later disappointment with the American refusal to provide more assistance for development projects, as well as a denial to participate in the Marshall Plan – the U.S. thought that Brazil should help Europe after World War II, and refused to create a “Marshall Plan for Latin America” at the meeting of the “Committee of the 21,” in 1958 – gradually generated growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the building of a privileged relationship with the United States. Even during the Dutra administration (1946-1951), which was sympathetic to the United States, with its domestic anticommunist policies and the following of conservative economic guidelines, Brazil complained about the lack of financial assistance.

In the second government of Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954), friction points with the United States multiplied with a long list of issues, such as: Brazil’s refusal, in 1951, of an American request to send troops to Korea; the 1953 creation of Petrobrás as a State monopoly in all stages of the extraction, refining, distribution and trade of oil; a decree signed in 1954, which limited the remittance of profits to 10% of the capital expended without the possibility to include reinvestments in the calculation of the capital; the creation of Eletrobrás; and finally, Brazil’s closer relations with Argentina, whose antagonistic relations with the United States, since much before World War II, became more serious in 1946, with the rise of Juan Perón; Perón being the individual who created the concept of the “Third Way,” a precursor to the non-aligned movement.

After the brief sixteen-month period (08/24/1954 - 11/08/1955) of President Café Filho’s administration – and its policy of closer ties with the United States – more tensions devel-oped during the Juscelino Kubitschek years. This was especially true in 1959 with Brazil’s split from the IMF due to pressures from that entity to accept a strict economic adjustment program, leading to a paralysis of Kubitschek’s Plano de Metas (program of targets). In addition, the Pan-American Operation, launched a year earlier, in 1958, after the failure of U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon’s visit to Latin America, required major financial support from the United States, yet it did not obtain the sympathy of the Republican president, Dwight Eisenhower. Only the Cuban Revolution and John F. Kennedy’s Democratic administration turned it into the Alliance for Progress, a program full of conditionalities, although that term only appeared later, to describe the limited ambition of a 10-year program of 20 billion dollars encompassing 20 countries. In the same year, 1961, however, there was the creation of a program at the School of the Americas, in Panama, to train Latin American military in “domestic and revolutionary war,” which led to a future wave of military coups in the region.

Therefore, in 1961, because of the Cold War environment and tensions that derived from the Cuban Revolution, as well as continued inflation, budget imbalances, plus currency and foreign debt problems, one could predict that in the incoming government of Jânio Quadros – elected with the backing of the UDN and strong support from the conservative and business classes, as well as the Catholic church and the middle class – Brazil’s foreign policy would be one of alignment with the United States and the West. That, however, did not occur.

Jânio da Silva Quadros, Jânio Quadros

Jânio Quadros established his political views, from age 28 to 43 years, as the national, regional and international contexts evolved between 1945 and 1960. He was born in Campo Grande, in 1917, then part of the state of Mato Grosso (currently, Mato Grosso do Sul). His father, Gabriel Nogueira Quadros, a physician, originally from the state of Parana, and his mother, Leonor da Silva Quadros, often moved, from one small city or town to another –Campo Grande; Curitiba, Parana; Garça, Bauru, and Cândido Mota, São Paulo – as well as to rural areas. For this reason, the young Jânio studied in many places between childhood and adolescence. According to available records, he was not an outstanding student. In the early 1930s, his parents moved to São Paulo, and Jânio studied at the Colégio Arquidiocesano administered by the Catholic Archdiocese of that state capital city. In 1931, after one more move, he attended the Ginásio São Joaquim, in Lorena, a small city about 160 miles east of the capital, and finally, in 1933, he returned to study at the Colégio Arquidiocesano, back in the city of São Paulo.

Jânio (as he was universally known) began his political life as part of the student movement. He was also Secretary of the Centro XI de Agosto, an entity that offered pro bono legal services to the poor of the city of São Paulo, located at the Largo de São Francisco Law School – which he attended from 1933 to 1939. In that capacity, he served on the board headed by Francisco Quintanilha Ribeiro, a dear and intimate friend, and his future chief of staff. In order to support himself, he taught Geography, History and Portuguese in a traditional school of São Paulo, the Colégio Dante Alighieri, as well as in the Ginásio Vera Cruz, a high school located in the working-class neighborhood of Brás. He lived modestly with his wife, Eloá, the daughter of a pharmacist, whom he married in 1941. He and Eloá had a single daughter, Dirce Maria, named after his sister, who had died when she was 15 years old. An accident with perfume spray at a carnival ball when he was 18 years old had affected his left eye, making him slightly cross-eyed.

His career rise was meteoric, marked by a reputation of efficiency and austerity, and by activities he conducted above and beyond the work of the political parties, which he ostensibly despised. He was an intransigent anti-communist. He was concerned for the petit bourgeois, the media, the causes and effects of matters, as well as the pure Portuguese vernacular and metric pronunciation. Above all else, however, he had an extreme concern for his authority.

Jânio Quadros was elected to the São Paulo city council with 1,707 votes, in 1947. In 1950, he was the most voted state representative, with 18,000 votes, and in 1953, he was elected mayor of the city of São Paulo – an office he held for only one year – with 284,000 votes. In 1954, he became governor of the state of São Paulo with 660,000 votes, and he was elected a federal representative – by the state of Paraná – in 1958, with 79,000 votes. He reached the pinnacle of political success as the President of the Republic, in 1960, at age 43, with 5,600,000 votes, almost 48% of the total, 2 million more than the second place candidate, General Henrique Teixeira Lott, who had had the backing of the then current government.

In his campaigns, Jânio represented himself as the candidate of the poor, of the “penny against the million,” the candidate of “the broom,” to sweep up corruption, and a man of austere habits. Often he would resign, or threaten to resign from elected offices and candidacies, including his presidential candidacy. On those occasions, parties and political leaders would urge him to return, and make concessions. Ultimately, however, he was deceived by this practice, as he was surprised when he resigned from the presidency of the Republic, in 1961, and the Brazilian Congress quickly accepted the resignation. The interests affected were much more powerful and external, not being limited to the influence of parties and politicians or to the distribution of municipal and State offices.

As a city councilman and state representative, Jânio worked intensely in the poorest areas of São Paulo. In his rallies, he appeared with shaggy hair, dandruff on his shoulders, and eating bologna sandwiches. He submitted more than 2,000 projects to the Council and the state legislature, but he never attended a session of the federal Chamber of Deputies, except for his inauguration. After winning the election, he often embarked on extensive trips aboard long haul cargo ships. This allowed him to be away from the political pressures of the parties that supported him, which he did not respect, or rather, he despised for the organization of his government teams, at the municipal, State and presidential level.

His administrations, both as mayor of São Paulo and later as governor of the state, were characterized as economic endeavors. He appointed Carlos Alberto Carvalho Pinto, from an old paulista (someone from the state of São Paulo) traditional family – a great nephew of former-President Rodrigues Alves – as Secretary of Finance, with full powers to sanitize the spending with the purpose of balancing the budget.

His group of closest and oldest friends – including those from his days at law school, whom he addressed formally – was composed of old militants from the paulista state politics, such as Francisco Quintanilha Ribeiro; Carlos Castilho Cabral, who founded the Jânio Quadros Popular Movement (MPJQ); Oscar Pedroso Horta, a great criminal lawyer; Lino de Matos, Emilio Carlos, and Auro de Moura Andrade. José Aparecido de Oliveira, from Minas Gerais, an ally of Magalhães Pinto, joined this group many years later. All, including Jânio, were politicians with scarce or no experience in national policy matters and even less in the foreign arena, although José Aparecido, his private secretary – and a friend of Afonso Arinos – had a great interest in the subject area and was a growing influence on Jânio. Aparecido was the progressive or leftist influence on the government, always in a dispute with Pedroso Horta, who represented the traditional interests and views of the conservative political party, the UDN.

Jânio Quadros had always demonstrated his admiration for Abraham Lincoln, Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Nasser, and Josip Broz Tito, with whom he spoke in 1959, while still a deputado federal representing the state of Paraná, before taking over as president the next year. He, also, visited Cuba, Egypt, India and Yugoslavia, plus the Soviet Union, where he spoke with Nikita Khrushchev.

Upon an invitation of Fidel Castro, in 1959, Jânio Quadros visited Cuba, a trip on which he then invited Afonso Arinos – who since 1952 was the leader of the UDN in the Camara dos Deputados, as well as its most respected scholar – and a large contingent of political journalists, organized by José Aparecido, including Castello Branco, Villas Boas Correia, Hélio Fernandes, Murilo Melo Filho, Rubem Braga, Márcio Moreira Alves, and the young Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, a future major historian. Quadros also invited Dom Jorge Marcos de Oliveira, the Catholic bishop of Santo André, but the bishop refused the invitation.

On the domestic policy front, Jânio Quadros aligned himself with the ideas of the most conservative currents of the time, represented in the governments of Café Filho and Eurico Dutra. Their main and permanent concern was the control of inflation which, according to them, was caused by the budget deficit, the intervention of the State in the economy (various subsidies, artificial exchange rates, etc.), and restrictions on foreign capital, all of which reduced the ability to increase the production of goods in the country.

A permanent challenge for Brazilian governments of all political leanings is the foreign sector of the economy, so often complicated by difficulties to expand and diversify primary exports, deterioration in exchange rates, increases in the demand for imports – especially for basic products, such as oil and wheat – along with the payment obligations, including interest and amortization payments on the foreign debt.

One of the biggest issues facing the Quadros government was a renegotiation of the foreign debt, which had reached 700 million dollars in 1961, a high amount for the GDP and for the foreign trade of that time. The purposes of the renegotiation was to increase the country’s ability to import, guarantee the possibility of new loans for investments, and attract new investment capital, all of which had been a challenge for the previous governments and for ministers as varied as Oswaldo Aranha, Lucas Lopes, and José Maria Alckimim. Renegotiation was also the permanent recommendation to the Brazilian government of the International Monetary Fund, the Treasury Department, and creditors of foreign private banks.

Jânio Quadros chose Clemente Mariani – a member of the UDN party, a banker from Bahia, and former president of the Banco do Brasil in the administration of Café Filho – as his finance minister. Mariani immediately took measures that corresponded to the recommendations and expectations of the conservatives: an end to subsidies for the purchase of wheat and oil; an end to the systems of control and currency exchange; cuts to the Banco do Brasil’s credit, as well as cuts in various other areas of government spending.

The measures caused a strong inflationary impact, which left the middle class, workers, and sectors of the industrial business community unhappy, but satisfied the exporters of coffee and other commodities.

The general dissatisfaction in the country was joined by a sense of isolation caused in part by the personal nature of the president, who believed he was beyond the classes and beyond political parties. Quadros’ ostensive hatred for Congress caused the Church and members of the military to be concerned with his foreign policy, the more it unfolded and became explicit. This set of factors helps to explain the scarce support he received after his unexpected resignation on August 25, 1961, despite his clear expectation that “he would not do anything to come back, but that his return was inevitable.”

Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Afonso Arinos

Afonso Arinos, the faithful, loyal and intelligent conductor of foreign policy, could not have been more different from Jânio Quadros, except for their shared conservatism in terms of domestic policy. A scholar with great legal and literary culture, a writer – member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters – a full professor of Constitutional Law, a journalist, a four-time elected representative to the federal Chamber of Deputies, and a federal senator, Arinos belonged to a traditional family of politicians from the state of Minas Gerais. Both sides of his family – maternal and paternal – were involved in politics.

Afonso’s mother, Silvia, was the daughter of Cesario Alvim, who had been president (the term formerly used for governor) of the province of Rio de Janeiro during the Empire, and, of the State of Minas Gerais, during the Republic. He had also been a representative in the federal legislature, the Minister of Justice, in 1890, and, according to Arinos himself, a descendent of an older lineage than his father’s side of the family – the Melo Francos – since the Alvim family had been among the first to settle in the province of Minas Gerais. His father, Afrânio de Melo Franco, born in 1870, whose biography Afonso wrote, was a professor of International Law, a federal representative, the Minister of Transportation in the administration of Rodrigues Alves, and during the provisional period of Delfim Moreira, he exercised the so-called Melo Franco Regency; later he was a leader of the government of President Epitácio Pessoa. He was also the first and only Brazilian ambassador to the League of Nations, and a member of the Diplomacy Commission of the House since 1906. A revolutionary of 1930, he was the Foreign Minister of Getúlio Vargas from 1930 to 1933, until he resigned, to demonstrate solidarity with his son, Virgílio, whom Vargas had neglected in the appointment as interventor for the state of Minas Gerais.

As a young man, Afonso Arinos accompanied his father on many diplomatic missions, and he exercised many of the positions that he had occupied such as a professor of law, a federal representative, a member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, and the country’s foreign minister. Afrânio de Melo Franco, an example that Arinos always mentioned with affection and admiration, died in January 1943.

Afonso’s brother, Virgílio Alvim de Melo Franco, eight years his senior, had distinguished himself as one of the first revolutionaries of 1930. As the liaison between political forces and the “lieutenants,” he earned the nickname of “civil lieutenant.” After the Revolution, Virgílio expected to be appointed to the positon of interventor (governor) of Minas Gerais, in a dispute with Gustavo Capanema and with the support of Oswaldo Aranha with whom he was tied politically. Getúlio Vargas, however, chose Benedito Valadares, an obscure federal representative from Minas Gerais. This greatly dissatisfied Virgílio and he moved to the opposition, eventually becoming the secretary general of the UDN party when it was founded in 1945. A year later, Virgílio did not want to be a candidate to the Constituent Assembly of 1946; instead, he convinced his brother, Afonso, to be one.

As one of the main creators of the Manifesto dos Mineiros, an open letter published in October 1943, on the anniversary of the Revolution of 1930, criticizing the government of Getúlio Vargas. He was also one of the founders of the UDN political party, whose name was supposedly his suggestion. As such, Afonso Arinos participated in the political battles against Vargas. The UDN assembled the strongest opponents of Vargas since the revolt of 1932, and worked nonstop until the military coup of 1964, when they mistakenly imagined that they would participate in power. Although this did not occur, many of the party’s most important members – such as General Juarez Távora, Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, and General Golbery do Couto e Silva – collaborated with the military governments, the latter having major influence on the foreign policy of the military governments due to his geopolitical views.

The foreign policy of Jânio Quadros had major repercussions on Brazilian domestic policy. Many say it was the main cause of the implacable opposition of Carlos Lacerda to Jânio Quadros, partly the cause – or pretext – of Quadros’ resignation, and for the distrust of the military leaders who never sought, firmly, to keep him in power or promote his return. This episode, as so many others in Brazilian history, reveals the entangled domestic and foreign policies and, therefore, the need to assess them together along with economic matters.

When Jânio Quadros invited Afonso Arinos to head Itamaraty, Arinos was a consecrated conservative politician, a famous writer, scholar, and professor of Constitutional Law. He had also been a journalist, both in Minas Gerais and in Rio de Janeiro.

Arinos was well connected. In addition to his connections in national politics, as well as those of Minas Gerais due to the situation of his father, Afrânio, and his brother, Virgílio, Afonso had married Ana (Anah) Rodrigues Alves, a grand-daughter of former President Rodrigues Alves. He had also developed a friendship and kinship with the Nabuco family, descendants of Joaquim Nabuco, who had great influence in Rio de Janeiro.

A citizen of immaculate behavior and reputation, with the best and most traditional political and social ties of the time, his family origins, and his own political activities, Afonso Arinos’ circumstances could not have been be more different from those of Jânio Quadros, the son of a modest physician, who had travelled from one city to another in the states of São Paulo and Paraná, without any political, social or economic relationships. In contrast to Arinos, Quadros – who had been an obscure high school teacher – was a demagogical politician, tied to the popular classes.

Arinos had been a parliamentary leader of the UDN for seven years, a historical landmark, and as such, he was an inexorable adversary and accuser of Getúlio Vargas during his administration, from 1951 to 1954, making memorable speeches, including one in which he asked for Vargas’ resignation, which he regretted after Vargas committed suicide.

Arinos, as the leader of UDN and the opposition, also fought intensely against the government of Juscelino Kubitschek, 1956-1961. He did not, however, support the attempt to nullify the election of 1955 based on the thesis of the absolute majority, and the communist votes were illegal, as Prado Kelly advocated. The political climate was such that Representative Carlos Lacerda said that Kubitschek could not be a candidate; if he was a candidate, he could not be elected, and if he was elected, he could not be inaugurated. Since Brigadier General Eduardo Gomes had been defeated in 1950, and Juarez Távora, in 1955, the inconsolable UDN saw a unique opportunity in October 1960, to win and get some revenge with the candidacy of Jânio Quadros, even though Quadros considered himself outside of parties. Their hope to achieve power, however, was frustrated once again.

Independent foreign policy

The foreign policy of a country is not only the one carried out by its foreign office; it is also conducted by other organisms of the State, not only by the foreign minister, but by other ministers as well. It is also not disconnected in any way from the contingencies and needs of domestic policy. A balance took place in the government of Jânio Quadros, in which the strategy to carry out a conservative economic domestic policy and a bold and left-leaning foreign policy has been attributed. In fact, both policies were deeply interconnected since the crucial issue in the foreign sector was the economy.

Afonso Arinos was not especially tied to Jânio Quadros; he had supported him earlier on due to his strong ties to Carlos Lacerda, who had been instrumental in his own election as a Senator – with the greatest number of votes in the history of the Federal District, Rio de Janeiro – in 1955.

Neither Arinos nor Lacerda listened to the warnings of Juracy Magalhães, the candidate who lost out at the UDN convention of 1959, which chose Quadros as its candidate for the presidency. Juracy had foreseen that everyone would regret the selection. He prophesized this would quickly come true, due to Jânio’s public loathing of the allies and politicians who helped him get elected.

For his part, Jânio Quadros was convinced that his crushing electoral victory – by more than 2 million votes over General Henrique Lott, out of a total of 11,700,000 electors – granted him a mandate that went beyond the parties. He further believed it gave him great freedom of action, as in his previous experiences, as mayor of the city of São Paulo and governor of its state.

Although Quadros was provincial, with little experience in the complexities and meanderings of national policy, and with limited and biased knowledge of politicians outside of São Paulo, in terms of foreign policy, he had extremely bold ideas – even when compared to those emanating from the main countries of his time, developed or not. Hence, there was interest, admiration, and some perplexity raised by his actions. His foreign policy strategies were based on the principles of self-determination, non-intervention, continental solidarity, a struggle for peace and disarmament, a struggle against any type of colonialism, the struggle for development, and a struggle against communism.

When Jânio Quadros chose Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco as his foreign minister, he chose a citizen of conservative reputation, an advocate of the continental solidarity, a member, in 1945, of the old Society of the Friends of America, a strong adversary of communism, with Christian values, great political experience as a federal representative and senator, the president of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and acknowledged intellectual skill as an author and Constitutional Law professor. He was, therefore, not suspected of being someone who would execute and carry out an independent foreign policy.

During the electoral campaign, Jânio Quadros had made clear the principles that would guide his foreign policy. The parties that supported him in the campaign might have heard it, but most believed his statements had been made to attract voters from the left, and they did not believe he would follow through on them – at least not with determination. They also felt that, if it became necessary, they would have the political means to persuade him of the inconvenience or the contradictions of the policies, and he would return to the earlier commitments and traditions of Brazilian foreign policy, which were Christian, Western and aligned. Two foreign policy events right at the beginning of the Quadros administration, however, were keys to warn his adversaries that Jânio would carry out the principles he had announced with determination.

The first event was the incident of the ship Santa Maria, hijacked by the Capitan Henrique Galvão in January 1961. The incident served to highlight, the diplomatic skills of Afonso Arinos and his knowledge of international law. The second event was the visit to Brazil of U.S. Ambassador Adolf Berle Jr., in an attempt to obtain Brazilian support for an invasion of Cuba that was being prepared with the political, propagandistic, financial and armed support of the United States.

The outcome of the first incident – that of the Santa Maria – took place on Quadros’ inauguration day, and it was a message to the Salazarist Portuguese community in Rio de Janeiro – and to the world – to show that the policies the new president had announced during his campaign would be carried out. The captain of the ship, Henrique Galvão and his associates, alleging a shortage of fuel and supplies, had requested to refuel in Brazil before returning enroute to Angola. The ship had 600 passengers – including many Americans – and 300 crew members. The Portuguese classified the incident as an act of piracy and demanded that the ship, the passengers and the hijackers be returned. After an interpretation of international conventions and talks with the hijackers, however, the passengers and crew members were allowed to disembark, asylum was granted to Galvão and his associates, and the ship was then returned to the Portuguese government.

In the second incident, Adolf Berle Jr., special envoy of U.S. President John Kennedy, who had been an ambassador in Brazil in 1945, had gone to Brasília to meet with Jânio Quadros on March 3, 1961, the still new capital of the country. In order to preserve him, Quadros ordered Arinos to remain in Rio and not travel to Brasília to attend the meeting. In fact, Arinos often did not accompany the President in his interviews, but he usually hosted the visitors beforehand, which is what happened with Berle, and the meeting was useful.

Direct dispatches by Arinos were rare; talking by phone was always difficult, so the President constantly sent his instructions by telex. Kennedy’s special envoy, who eventually had a rough conversation with President Quadros had waited for two hours in the waiting room. When the two finally did meet he represented the American plan to conduct military interventions “on the right,” in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, to “justify” interventions “on the left,” in Cuba. Quadros, however, firmly refused to give Brazilian approval to the enterprise – which eventually failed.

This episode was the second warning to the press, traditionally aligned with the United States on the pretext of the struggle against communism and the defense of the West and the Christian values, as well as to the community of political and economic interests tied to the United States. It strongly announced that Brazil would strictly apply the policies of non-intervention and self-determination that Jânio Quadros had talked about during the presidential campaign.

Immediately, at the beginning of his administration, in a Cabinet mainly composed of politicians from the UDN and members of the military that tended to side with the UDN – such as Silvio Heck, Odílio Denys and Grun Moss – plus some rather unknown figures of national politics, Jânio Quadros appointed Clemente Mariani, a conservative banker from the state of Bahia, as his Finance Minister. The new president also made three foreign policy decisions of major domestic importance, sending: 1) Roberto Campos – a diplomat and economist with impeccable credentials who had served Kubitschek – to negotiate with European creditors the extension of debt deadlines that were about to mature, as well as the taking out of new loans; 2) the banker and Ambassador Walter Moreira Sales to both the American government and to international financial entities, such as the IMF and World Bank, without the support of which the private loans would not be granted; and, finally, 3) as a political and economic counterpoint, he sent his strong supporter, João Dantas, the owner of the Diário de Noticias, to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe in search of new markets for Brazilian exports. This last mission was one that would mainly depend on political gestures – such as the recognition of these governments, and the establishment of diplomatic relations – due to the centralized character of the economies of those regimes.

Three days after his inauguration, Jânio Quadros also ordered the revocation of the symbolic credentials of the representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Right from the outset Brazil re-established diplomatic relations with Hungary and Romania, created legations in Bulgaria and Albania, announced measures to re-establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, and reassess the country’s position at the UN on the credentials of mainland China. In August 1961, a trade mission was sent to China, headed by Vice-President Goulart, with great repercussion on the political and military scenes. With less repercussion, an important trade mission was also sent to the Soviet Union, headed by Minister Paulo Leão de Moura. Jânio, himself, in a visit to the Soviet Union, while he was still a candidate, had the opportunity to meet with the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev. Those initiatives led to some apprehension on the part of American authorities, who increasingly feared an even more intensive turn to the left by Quadros.

The João Dantas mission to Eastern Europe would have major domestic policy repercussions. The so-called Hallstein Doctrine – named for the German Chancellor – adopted by West Germany, forbade relations with countries that recognized the government of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). This was important to Brazil due to the significant German economic, investment and financial interests in the country, and because of the populations of German origin in Brazil, which were largely sympathetic to Bonn.

João Dantas, a journalist acting as an Ambassador on a request from President Jânio Quadros, had been sent to East Germany on a trade mission. There, he signed a memorandum with the East German Minister of Foreign Trade in Pankow, the district of Berlin in which much of that government’s agencies were located. The document implied an implicit recognition of the communist regime. The memorandum even announced an invitation to visit Brazil, and it foresaw the signing of a future trade agreement. Urged by Roberto Campos, who was conducting financial negotiations in Europe, Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Secretary-General of Itamaraty, distributed a press release, without previous knowledge of Arinos or Quadros, unauthorizing the agreements of João Dantas.

Jânio Quadros, who had already announced in his presidential message to the Congress that he supported Bonn (the seat of the West German government) instead of Pankow as the only German government, for authority reasons considered that Vasco Leitão da Cunha committed an act of inexcusable indiscipline, and he requested that Leitão da Cunha be fired. This caused major concern to Arinos, who considered him his best and oldest friend. However, when Arinos addressed Vasco, he had already requested and announced his resignation, which caused major shock within the political and social environment, as well as at Itamaraty. The credentials of Leitão da Cunha, his prestige within the UDN, and within the traditional conservative environment can be evaluated by the fact that, later, he was appointed foreign minister in the Castelo Branco administration.

In order to make way for the successful missions of Roberto Campos and Moreira Sales, Jânio Quadros had previously taken economic measures that the Brazilian conservative circles considered to be very positive. The measures mainly concerned large farmers and the exporters of commodities, such as coffee and sugar, as well as relations with international creditors. Instruction 204 of the Superintendence of Currency and Credit (SUMOC), for example, re-established the so-called “currency exchange truth” by eliminating subsidies to oil and wheat and by depreciating the Brazilian currency at the time, the cruzeiro, by 100%. On the negative side, the measures seriously affected Brazilian companies, especially industrial ones, and those with debts abroad, while they increased the cost of living, especially for the middle class. Major reductions to the official credit of the Banco do Brasil to companies and several measures to reduce government expenses were also announced.

Quadros’ entire foreign policy was guided by means of the famous and ridiculed “small notes,” messages that surrounded the traditional, slow and formal communication of public administration, a practice that Jânio had applied as the mayor of São Paulo. The messages were sent by the telex installed in his office and were often announced to the press, which placed huge pressure on the bureaucracy. In addition, Itamaraty was still located in Rio de Janeiro at the time; there was only a small office in Brasília, and only a few diplomats served there. For the other ministries, the notes were delivered by motorcyclists with as many as 1,200 being used – approximately 400 of them just for Itamaraty alone. It was, in a certain way, an anticipation of the current claims of transparency and efficiency of public administration.

The new foreign policy – which Arinos, himself, did not like to call “independent” – according to him, suffered strong resistance from the older, higher level diplomats of Itamaraty, those deeply involved in Rio de Janeiro by the influential Portuguese, American and European circles, as well as by the traditional UDN, which could be characterized as anti-Vargas, anti-industry, and anti-Kubitschek due of the move of the capital to Brasília. Itamaraty, itself, did not officially move to Brasília until 1970.

A third and innovative aspect of Jânio Quadros’ foreign policy had a major impact on the country’s domestic policies due to the reaction it caused in the conservative media, especially in Rio de Janeiro. This was the position taken against Portuguese colonial policies in Africa – which was greater than the position against European colonialism in general – as well as initiatives to develop closer relations with new African States.

Since the beginning of the decolonization movement, Brazil had been in favor – albeit timidly – of the independence of the European colonies, even those in Africa. Its vote in favor of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the fifteenth UN General Assembly in December 1960 – when 16 countries had already become independent in Africa – exemplifies this. Emphasizing the special character of its relations with Portugal and the civilizing role of Portugal in its colonies, however, Brazil abstained from condemning Portugal.

Afonso Arinos seemed to have tended towards a more careful treatment in relation to Portugal than Jânio Quadros. He sought an agreement that would fulfill the commitments of a 1953 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation. He, thus, attempted to avoid a direct and more vigorous condemnation of Portugal at the United Nations. Arinos considered that his entire training was in Portuguese, but that, before being Portuguese, he was Brazilian and, for that reason, he could not support the Portuguese policy that he considered destined to fail.

The origin of the anti-colonial thought by Afonso Arinos can be found in his position against racial bias in Brazil; in his certainty about the moral debt that Brazil has to Africa; in his perception that Brazil, having been a colony, should be against all colonialism, and that since its society was the result of a mixing of races it should be against any type of racial discrimination. Thus, Brazil should provide the world with an example of its ethnic fraternity – very similar to the justifications of the current Brazilian policy towards Africa.

The Kubitschek administration had been in full support of Portugal. Jânio Quadros’ position oscillated in the beginning, initially attempting to persuade the dictatorial and racist Salazar administration to organize a new political regime, a type of federation with its African colonies, and thereby, give them a high degree of autonomy. That, however, was in vain, as the Portuguese authorities, and Salazar himself, refused to accept what Afonso Arinos directly conveyed to them in Lisbon. Having fulfilled the obligation of consultation, Brazil considered itself with free hands to address the subject in the United Nations.

The sometimes stated purpose of the African policy was that Brazil, by getting closer to the recently independent countries of Africa, both in bilateral terms and through the United Nations, because of its non-colonial past and its ethnic characteristics, could help to preserve the influence of Western values in Africa. Brazil could be a bridge to Europe, the West and Africa, and avoid the expansion of communism in the new African states. Another goal, of a truly economic nature, was justified by the urgent need to expand Brazilian exports, as it was felt that Africa could become an important market for Brazilian manufactures.

Four symbolic facts, marked Jânio Quadros’ new African policy: 1) a trip by Afonso Arinos to Senegal’s leader, Leopold Sedar-Senghor, to celebrate that country’s independence – Arinos being the first Brazilian foreign minister to Africa; 2) the opening of new Brazilian embassies in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Ethiopia and, mainly, the urgency shown to occupy them; 3) a scholarship program for African students, and 4) the appointment of Raimundo de Souza Dantas, a black writer and journalist, as the Ambassador of Brazil to Ghana.

One of the justifications of the new Brazilian policy towards Africa had to do with concern for African competition – considered to be “unfair” to Brazil – in markets for tropical commodities because of lower labor costs in Africa, which the colonial regimes had degraded. The independence of the colonies provided new rights to the workers and, by giving them the right to better wages, caused them to increase the prices of their products on the world markets. This is a somewhat similar argument to one made much later, concerning the so-called “social clause,” which the developed and highly industrialized countries often advocate in current trade negotiations. Additionally, there was a concern for the extension of preferences that the new African States enjoyed in their former colonial powers to all members of the European Economic Community (EEC), especially Germany.

The Independent Foreign Policy initiative, which according to Leite Barbosa was the most important event on Jânio Quadros’ foreign agenda, also included efforts to obtain closer ties to Argentina. The Argentine president at the time, Arturo Frondizi, a radical civilian, elected with the support of Juan Peron, met with Jânio Quadros in Uruguaiana, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil in April 1961, in a meeting at which a Friendship and Consultation Covenant was signed.

There were natural resentments and historical suspicions on the behalf of the military of both countries, specifically Argentine concerns about the foreign policy of Jânio Quadros. The Argentine military was considered anti-American and pro-communist. Brazil was interested in closer ties with other South American countries in order to promote and encourage economic integration. This had been one of the main reasons for the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LATFA), in 1960; the country’s political defense of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, and their common interests in relation to the United States. Finally, there was the economic goals, to reduce the trade deficit with Argentina and to obtain Argentine commitments to import manufactured products, mainly of the steel industry.

The meeting between presidents Quadros and Frondizi took place in Uruguaiana because of the difficulty Quadros had obtaining a license from Congress to leave the national territory after the episode of the Senate refusal of José Ermírio de Moraes as the Ambassador in Bonn. The Friendship and Consultation Agreement as well as the Joint Declaration established commitments of common action, to resolve international matters; the preservation of democracy and freedom to benefit of development; the repulsion both of extra continental interference and the intervention in the sovereignty of other nations; a continental joint action, to defend political and social stability in the Americas; and a defense of natural resources.

The Declaration reflects a willingness to cooperate and coordinate positions, as well as identify common points of view and interests between Brazil and Argentina. The meeting also, however, demonstrated to Jânio the difficulties of Frondizi, who had to face 60 military declarations during his administration. Uruguaiana was an important moment of inflection for the nation’s foreign policy since previous attempts of friendship and cooperation, such as the meetings between Vargas and Perón, in 1954 – known as the ABC Pact, for Argentina, Brazil and Chile – had failed. The failure was due to reciprocal suspicions of hegemony, the fear of military imbalance, and a strong domestic opposition in Brazil, which feared a “labor union republic.”

Another theme of great importance and controversy was that of neutralism and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Brazil, whose foreign policy was admired by the main leaders of NAM, received a letter of invitation signed by Gamal Nasser, Josip Tito, and Sukarno, to attend the Preparatory Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries that would take place in June in Cairo. Due to internal matters at Itamaraty, however, only one observer, Minister Araújo Castro, was sent.

The Cairo Conference approved three principles that made it difficult, or even impossible, for Brazil to participate in NAM: 1) not to participate in military alliances with the major blocks; 2) not to grant military bases in its territory to foreign powers, and 3) to actively support national liberation movements. The meeting was difficult; on several occasions, Arinos had to defend the distinction he made between neutrality, neutralism and independence.

Relations with the United States were crucial for both domestic and foreign policies during the period Arinos was at the head of Itamaraty. One item given much importance was Jânio Quadros’ position in favor of legislation to limit the remittance of profits by foreign companies – an issue that had also generated serious problems to Vargas and, in turn, led to similar problems for João Goulart, and that was revoked at the beginning of the Castelo Branco administration.

After Jânio Quadros visited Cuba, in March 1960, Arinos sought to define Brazilian policy in relation to the Cuban Revolution based on the principles of self-determination, non-intervention, and solidarity, plus the goal of bringing Havana and Washington closer together. Arinos was an intransigent defender of the non-intervention principle and of self-determination. He considered the latter a fundamental starting point for world peace, and that the non-intervention principle prohibited any intervention, either individual or collective, even if done to impose a democratic regime. He did, however, agree that the principle of continental solidarity imposed a defense against communism, and thus, he said that Brazil should be against an intervention in Cuba if done strictly to fight communism. At the same time, be believed that Brazil should agree to preemptive measures, to avoid the risks that communism would bring to the most fragile countries of the Americas. He also defended the isolation of Cuba in a type of cordon sanitaire and the adoption of a statute similar to that of Finland. In the case of Brazil, Arinos said that the best defense against communism was the revitalization of democracy, especially in a social context, through the elimination of misery, injustice, inequality, and the promotion of economic development.

Shortly after the meeting of Jânio Quadros and Adolf Berle Jr., in February, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba took place, in April 1961. The failed incursion was carried out by mercenaries who were funded, armed and supported by the United States. The attack had been planned by the Eisenhower administration – specifically by the brothers, John Foster Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Allen Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State. With the 1960 elections, and the change in presidents, John F. Kennedy, who had been elected by only 120,000 votes more than his Republican rival, Eisenhower’s vice president, Richard Nixon, inherited the plan and made the decision to go forward with it.

The failure of the invasion caused an assessment made by high-level special envoys, such as Adlai Stevenson and Douglas Dillon. The political damages had increased the fear the Americans had concerning the Cuban Revolution, including a fear that social and economic conditions in Latin America could bring about similar revolutions in the region. Thus, in his first speech on foreign policy, on March 13, 1961, Kennedy, the first Catholic president of the United States, a scion of a family of Irish origin, launched the Alliance for Progress, a 20 billion dollar program, to be conducted over 10 years in 20 Latin American countries. The plan sought to condition access to the resources and support given by the United States to a process of gradual political isolation that would lead to the future exclusion of Cuba from the Interamerican system. The plan was used to justify an American blockade, as well as a trade, financial and political isolation of the island country.

A meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES, for Conselho Inter-Americano Econômico e Social) was called, to represent the program of the Alliance and to obtain the adhesion of the Latin American countries. Cuba was the only country that did not accede, because it considered its resources insufficient and the conditions unacceptable.

The CIES meeting held in Punta del Este, Uruguay eventually had a decisive effect in the Brazilian domestic policy. On his return from the meeting, Che Guevara, the Cuban Minister of Finance and head of the his country’s delegation, went to Buenos Aires and met Frondizi; then from Buenos Aires, he went to Brasília, where he met with Janio Quadros, who asked to intervene in a matter dealing with Catholic priests in Cuba. Quadros also awarded Che with the Order of the Southern Cross.

Members of the Catholic Church attacked the act of awarding Guevara the Order of the Southern Cross. Despite the award’s political meaning, however, it was not such an unusual gesture, as the award – which is only given to foreigners – had already been given to many others, including a president of Cuba, foreign ministers, and even to Soviets. Arinos also recalls in his Memórias, that a letter defending the Cuban church was written at the request of the Apostolic Nuncio and delivered by Jânio to Che, who was asked to give it to Fidel Castro.

Che Guevara’s award, however, was only the pretext to trigger the political crisis that was already being articulated by Carlos Lacerda and the entire conservative press and media. Lacerda had published a series of violent articles in the Tribuna da Imprensa on August 22, 23, 24 and 25, all against Jânio Quadros, mainly opposing his foreign policy. On television the evening of August 24, Lacerda also accused Quadros of organizing a coup d’état which, supposedly, would be announced by Quadros’ own justice minister, Pedroso Horta. In all the controversy, Afonso Arinos vigorously defended the administration’s foreign policy in the press and in the Congress, and he was praised for this by Jânio Quadros. Arinos was, however, also virulently attacked by others. And as a sign of protest, military people, returned awards – except for the Southern Cross, which was exclusively given to foreigners.

Feeling attacked in his authority and declaring that he could not rule, Jânio Quadros, abruptly resigned on August 25, 1961. He did so in a calculated manner, however, expecting to return to power. After attending ceremonies celebrating Soldier’s Day that morning, he flew to Cumbica airport in São Paulo, where he waited for the resignation letter he had written to be delivered – and the outcry for his return. As Jânio had ordered, Pedroso Horta delivered the letter to Senator Auro Moura Andrade, at 3:00 pm, and the senate promptly declared the position to be vacant. At 5:00 pm, Ranieri Mazzili, the president of the Chamber of Deputies was inaugurated as the country’s president.

Thus, the first and glorious period of Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy headed by Afonso Arinos had ended, and a new period began under a new series of foreign ministers, including San Tiago Dantas, Hermes Lima, Evandro Lins e Silva and Araújo Castro. The policy lasted until 1964, when it was both condemned and rejected on the very first day of the Castelo Branco administration. Then, after a brief interlude, the policy was revived during subsequent military governments – albeit under other names – thereby demonstrating its compatibility with Brazil’s needs as an underdeveloped and peripheral country. In 1990 and for a long period thereafter – with the exception of the Itamar Franco administration (1992-1995), the governments gave up their independence as well as their desire for autonomous development, as they were immersed in globalization and encouraged by neoliberal optimism.

Afonso Arinos at the United Nations

In his speeches at the Sixteenth UN General Assembly, Afonso Arinos revealed how advanced his political positions were. Included among the many and varied topics he spoke about were: a belief that human rights are also social; that freedom depends on social progress; that the world was not divided only into East and West, but also into North and South; that peace could only be attained with respect for self-determination; that the path to peace was disarmament; that there existed a domestic colonialism in South Africa; that Brazil was absolutely against any type of colonialism; that, although Brazil had chosen democracy, the United Nations could not impose any form of government on its members; that, in the Organization of American States, the adoption of a form of government other than representative democracy may lead to the exclusion of the State from the Organization, but that it does not justify intervention.

The eighteen-nation Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was created by a UN General Assembly resolution in December 1961, with a mission to submit a project for a general and complete disarmament treaty under effective international control. The work started in Geneva with the presence of Minister San Tiago Dantas who, back in Brazil, made Afonso Arinos head of the delegation. At the Conference, Arinos focused his efforts in the negotiations to obtain a treaty to ban nuclear tests. He also emphasized the importance of the reconversion of militarized economies, and the destination of resources liberated to constitute an international fund to eliminate poverty as well as economic inequalities among States.

Afonso Arinos’ second administration at Itamaraty was short lived as he served only under the government of the Brochado da Rocha Cabinet which, itself only lasted from July 12 to September 18, 1962. Arinos had intended to give priority to trade matters, and he was concerned about preferences granted by the EEC to former colonies, with the protectionism of the Common Agricultural Policy, as well as the transformation and deepening of the Latin American Free Trade Association.

Afonso Arinos led Brazil’s delegation to the seventeenth UN General Assembly in 1962. The position was obtained via an invitation from Hermes Lima, another of the country’s prime ministers, September 18, 1962 to January 23, 1963 (the latter date marks the end of the parliamentary experiment). Arinos and Hermes Lima were friends since they were students and later professors together at the National Law School as well as fellow representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. In this UN Assembly, Arinos addressed new themes, such as the regulation of radio and television programs that broadcast by satellite, the denuclearization of Latin America, and the calling for a conference on trade and development, which became Unctad (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). He also addressed old issues that concerned him, such as disarmament, a ban of nuclear tests, and decolonization.

In the second session of the Conference on Disarmament, which began in February 1963, regional denuclearization treaties were Arinos’ major concern. The treaties aimed to stop nuclear experiments and provisional agreements to suspend tests. The issue of control was the object of special attention for Arinos, who made a great contribution to the so-called Memorandum of the Eight Powers that established a system of flexible distribution of inspections and was rejected both by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Bibliography

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San Tiago Dantas

Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas was born in Rio de Janeiro, on October 30th, 1911. In 1928, he was accepted to study law at the University of Rio de Janeiro, where he graduated in 1932. His political activity began, between 1932 and 1937, when he was a member of the Brazilian Integralist Action. He made a career as a university professor, which began in 1937, when he became permanent, by competition, as Professor of Legislation and Political Economy of the National School of Architecture. In 1940, also by exam competition, he became a full Professor of Civil Law of the National Law School of the University of Brazil, of which he was dean between 1941 and 1945. His international activities began when he was appointed, in January 1943, delegate to the First Conference of Ministers of Education of the American Republics, in Panamá. In March 1951, he was the Brazilian delegate to the 4th Consultation Meeting of the American Chancellors, in Washington, D.C. In 1952, he was appointed Member of Permanent International Arbitration Court, in The Hague and an expert of the UN in the Committee on Food Obligations and Execution of Sentences Abroad, in Geneva. In 1953, he was the Brazilian Delegate to the 3rd Meeting of the Interamerican Council of Jurists, in Buenos Aires and, in 1954, Councilor of the Brazilian Delegation to the 4th Meeting of the Political and Social Interamerican Council, in Rio de Janeiro. Between 1955 and 1958, he was elected member and President, since May 12th, 1955, of the Interamerican Legal Commission, seated in Rio de Janeiro. In 1959, he was Councilor of the Brazilian Delegation to the 5th Consultation Meeting of the American Chancellors, in Santiago in Chile. In 1958, he was elected Federal Representative by PTB of Minas Gerais and he carried out his term until 1963. In 1960, he was the Chairman of the Executive Commission of PTB. In 1961, the President Jânio Quadros nominated him head of the Permanent Delegation of Brazil to the UN. He did not take over the function because of Jânio’s resignation. Between September 1961 and July 1962, he was nominated Chancellor in the Parliamentary government of Tancredo Neves. As Chancellor, he headed the Brazilian delegation to the 8th Consultation Meeting of the American Chancellors in Punta Del Este, travelled to Argentina, Uruguay, Switzerland, Poland, Israel and the Vatican, and accompanied President João Goulart to the United States and Mexico. In June 1962, he was appointed to head the Council of Ministers of João Goulart’s parliamentary government, having been defeated in the House of Representatives. He was re-elected Federal Representative by PTB of Minas Gerais. Between January and June 1963, he was the Minister of Finance of João Goulart’s presidentialist government. In 1963, he was chosen the first “Intellectual of the Year”, and given the Juca Pato Award, by the Brazilian Union of Writers and was elected “Man of Vision 1963”. He died in Rio de Janeiro on September 6th, 1964.

Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas: the East-West conflict and the limits of the rational argument

Gelson Fonseca

Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas became Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 11, 1961 in an especially difficult political context. Domestically, President Jânio Quadros had resigned just a few weeks prior, and a parliamentary system of government had been installed, albeit not out of the conviction of the political elite or through the popular will of a vote. Rather, parliamentarism was established in a negotiated and artificial way, designed to allow Vice President João Goulart – whom rightwing groups and military sectors opposed – assume a weakened office of the presidency. Tancredo Neves, a respected representative in the Chamber of Deputies (Brazil’s lower house of the federal legislature) was chosen Prime Minister, and Neves invited San Tiago Dantas – an elected representative of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (a Brazilian labor party) in that same legislative house – to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also known as Itamaraty. Externally, the Cold War was at full strength, as evidenced by the construction of the Berlin Wall, which had begun in August that same year. In the Americas, the Cuban problem dominated the agenda. For its part, Brazilian foreign policy had acquired new outlines with Jânio Quadros, who without abandoning Western values had proposed a more universal conduct of diplomacy.

It was, therefore, in this context that San Tiago Dantas carried out his functions as Foreign Minister for a period of ten incomplete months, until June 1962, when Tancredo Neves resigned as Prime Minister and a new Ministry was selected, including the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Despite his relatively short tenure at the head of Itamaraty, San Tiago Dantas left a significant mark on the history of Brazilian diplomacy. How can that mark be characterized, and what were his specific contributions to the evolution of Brazil’s presence in the international arena? The purpose of this essay will be to outline answers to those questions, while focusing on San Tiago Dantas’ views on the East-West conflict.

San Tiago Dantas’ knowledge of international issues began long before he became Foreign Minister. Marcílio Marques Moreira, who has served Brazil in positions as Finance Minister and Ambassador to the United States, once stated that “the familiarity, both theoretical and practical, of San Tiago with international problems was gradually built on a long path”; a path that included participation in the negotiations of the Abbink Mission, in 1948; attendance at conferences held at the Escola Superior da Guerra (ESG, Brazil’s military academy) in the 1950s; tenure as president of the Inter-American Committee of Jurists, 1955 to 1958; attendance at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the Organization of American States, Santiago, Chile, 1959; as well as the authorship of various newspaper articles on international matters.[325] A need to articulate his “diplomatic thought” in a more complete manner, however, emerged when San Tiago was appointed Foreign Minister, to which he left a legacy in his book, Política Externa Independente (Independent Foreign Policy), published by Civilização Brasileira, in 1962. In that book – with the assistance of Professor Thiers Martins Moreira and diplomat, Dario Castro Alves – he gathered and organized the texts that were important while he was Foreign Minister; texts that include such matters as the foreign policy of the first parliamentary government, speeches given at his inauguration as Foreign Minister, his visit to Argentina, and joint releases issued in bilateral meetings with other Foreign Ministers. The texts are published with two lengthy transcriptions of debates in the Chamber of Deputies, one concerning the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the other about the Conference of Punta Del Este, which, in January 1962, led to the exclusion of Cuba from the Inter-American system. The transcriptions of the debates and related themes occupy more than 140 of the book’s 255 pages, thus demonstrating their importance in San Tiago Dantas’ administration not only for diplomatic reasons, but also for public opinion, as reflected in the sessions of Congress.

In both cases, the debate followed the Cold War logic. Although the themes are new, they are also not untold in the history of Brazilian diplomacy. Ideas of restoring diplomatic relations with socialist countries, especially with the USSR, which Jânio Quadros had launched, had actually been initiated during Juscelino Kubitschek’s government in the 1950s – although then, they were limited to the commercial sphere. The Cuban issue had been outlined with the fall of the dictatorship of Fulgêncio Batista, in 1959. At that time, after initial applauses, Fidel Castro’s nationalization measures triggered a growing antagonism between Cuba and the United States – plus other western hemisphere countries, especially many in Central America – and major implications ensued.

The first model to deal with the presence of a socialist country in the hemisphere had been outlined by San Tiago Dantas’ predecessor in the Foreign Ministry, Afonso Arinos, who had presented it in a lengthy session of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.[326] A difference between the time of Arinos and that of San Tiago Dantas, however, is that in the first stage of the Independent Foreign Policy (although it was not yet known by that name), the Soviet, and especially the Cuban, issues were more intellectual than diplomatic. In the case of Cuba, the Organization of American States had not yet established a forum that would open the game of pressures and counter pressures in order to obtain a decision on how to live with socialism within the Inter- American system.[327] That forum occurred during San Tiago Dantas’ tenure as Foreign Minister, when the policy to reunite with the USSR was also a core issue. The two issues became critical processes that demanded from the Foreign Minister an intensive work of intellectual elaboration and diplomatic strategy, which, as will be seen, Arinos had outlined but had not carried out.[328] In short, the fulcrum of San Tiago Dantas’ diplomatic thought has to do with crises in the bipolar East-West confrontation.

Develop and systematize

Only one text of San Tiago Dantas’ aforementioned book does not correspond to the period of his administration of the foreign office: the introduction, written in 1962. In that text, San Tiago summarizes the general sense of Independent Foreign Policy. The text begins with a curious statement, which is worth transcribing:

Independent Foreign Policy, which I found already initiated at Itamaraty, and sought to develop and systematize, was not conceived as a doctrine or designed as a plan before coming to fruition. The facts came before the ideas. Activities that had been taken on because of concrete situations the Foreign Ministry faced, revealed themselves to be of an internal nature, thereby allowing for their unification around a central thought of the government.

This does not mean that the policy’s elaboration was either empirical or fortuitous. In the origin of each position – during the establishment of each policy – one constant was present: the exclusive consideration of the interests of Brazil, seen as a country that seeks (1) development and economic emancipation and (2) a historical conciliation between a representative democratic regime and a social reform movement capable of suppressing oppression of the working class by the ruling class (DANTAS, 2011, p. 9).

The text is meaningful for many reasons, but one in particular stands out. When San Tiago Dantas reviewed his performance as Foreign Minister, he indicated that besides the political aspects of the work, there was also an intellectual component, designed to “develop and systematize” what used to be merely reactions to “concrete situations” – while constantly being guided by principles. For those who study San Tiago Dantas’ thought, the questions are immediate: Did he fulfill his goal to systematize the operation of Brazilian diplomacy that had begun with Jânio Quadros? And if you respond positively to that question: How did he do it?

His concern about systematizing expresses one of the distinctive features of San Tiago’s personality, namely, his extraordinary ability to think in a clear and consistent manner, that is, to systematize. Another question relates to the criticism embedded within his statement that prior to then, Brazilian foreign policy was about empirical reactions, which, he said, did not result in consistency. San Tiago Dantas, himself, proposed criteria to assess his own thought; criteria which must undergo the two sieves of development and systematization. In fact, San Tiago believed the two need to be seen together as he said: development identifies itself with systematization. Indeed, he believed that foreign policy at the time lacked a doctrine to organize itself. For him, Independent Foreign Policy would become that doctrine.

In analyzing San Tiago Dantas’ statement, we can begin with the idea of systematization and later evaluate to what extent it develops previous theses. We are, of course, dealing with very flexible categories, beginning with limits to the concept of “systematic” diplomatic thought. Nevertheless, in the context of the Cold War, certain requirements were identifiable to define it, the first of which concerns how to address the bipolar East-West antagonism. In this case, San Tiago said, the antagonistic condition itself opens a range of possibilities that allow you to treat it, at one extreme, as an absolute conflict – the purpose being to destroy the enemy; and at the other extreme – the variation of détente – there is competitive coexistence, that is, the parties remain adversaries, yet they admit various forms of rapprochement – the purpose no longer being to destroy each other, but to win by other means.[329] These variations in the diagnosis of global antagonism lead to adjustments of diplomatic behavior. If the perception is one of conflict, the possibility to have a relationship with the “enemy” is restricted or even blocked. If, on the other hand, the perception is one of competition, diplomatic behavior will necessarily be more flexible.[330]

As has already been seen, the two core problems of San Tiago Dantas’ administration were modelled by understandings of the East-West bipolar antagonism, on whose central dynamic we had scarce influence. That, however, had a direct repercussion on our options, even when it was transposed to the domestic debate. This situation was shown in an eloquent manner in parliamentary sessions about Cuba and those concerning the restoration of diplomatic ties with the USSR.

Ultimately, to be worth more than the paper on which it was written, any foreign policy doctrine created at the beginning of the Cold War, would have to be made with a view of the bipolar East-West conflict.

The Cold War and the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union

San Tiago Dantas believed that the first key to understanding the Cold War was in recognizing that

instead of being a simple stage...it is a permanent coexistence from which we will only leave when the evolution of events has overcome the present forms of antagonism that oppose the West and the East (DANTAS, 2011, p. 118).

In this statement, it is necessary to emphasize the idea of a “permanent coexistence” – which removes any idea of an immediate, short-term solution; it does not, however, preclude competition. Another important aspect to note is that San Tiago Dantas does not make both sides equivalent. Rather, he continues:

If it is a coexistence that will last for an unpredictable period, the immediate conclusion imposed on us is that, for us to fight for the ideals of Western and democratic civilization, we have to start from the conviction of the uselessness of measures of force, as they will inevitably generate other, similar measures. Therefore, in all circumstances, we have to seek not the aggravation of international tensions, but rather their progressive reduction (DANTAS, 2011, p. 118).

San Tiago Dantas further explains that the isolation of both ideological spheres would only be harmonized with a policy that, consciously or unconsciously, focused on

the elimination of one of the antagonists through a military decision, and while that may have been a certainty that existed in 1947 and the years immediately thereafter – when the West had a monopoly of atomic weapons and the Cold War could seem to be the prelude to a real conflict [...], today, [...] – when the perspectives opened by atomic retaliation are those of mass destruction – not only of the vanquished, but also of the victors – one can no longer suppose, nor above all hope, that the chronic tensions between the U.S. and the USSR could be resolved by war. Therefore, as the prospect of splitting the world into two tight influence spheres is no longer conceivable, [...] what remains as the only solution is to accept coexistence, with a deliberate effort to reduce tensions through understanding and trade (DANTAS, 2011, p. 11).

Once the nature of the Cold War was thus defined, San Tiago Dantas explored some of the implications for Brazil in the international sphere, the first being the need to universalize diplomatic contacts, even with those located at the other extreme of the ideological spectrum. The second – if dialogue with the antagonist is accepted – is the need to be certain that the arguments used in that dialogue are the very best available. Accordingly, it is worth going back to the crystal clear words that the Foreign Minister used in the Chamber of Deputies, when he discussed the restoration of relations with the USSR. The political and economic arguments, he said, related to the need for coexistence. Explaining why the great Western countries should exchange embassies with Moscow, he said:

The one and only reason is simply the desirability of diplomatic contacts between the peoples of the nations in question. As even when there are profound differences, when the points of discord and friction are deep – which is the majority of time – it is advisable to keep open channels, to discuss and to talk, such that the frictions and antagonisms do not exacerbate and become even greater disagreements.

It is the duty of every public man to reveal to the people that political isolationism is a bellicose position (DANTAS, 2011, p. 71).[331]

Dialogue, therefore, should be the means to “provide peace,” and thus it is the core purpose of Brazilian diplomacy in the world.[332] The absence of dialogue – or restrictions to its universalization – becomes its opposite: an aggressive and bellicose policy.[333]

In further analyzing San Tiago Dantas’ thought on the Cold War, we find the second key to his beliefs: that the west should accept dialogue because it has advantages, or to remain in the same verbal sphere – it has better arguments. For San Tiago, democracy is the key, and because of democracy, dialogue should be encouraged as we have more to offer than socialism:

The belief in the West has been that the reciprocal knowledge of democratic and socialist societies favor the influence of the former over the latter because of the higher levels of individual freedoms that democracy ensures (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 12).

San Tiago Dantas had no doubts that the distinctive feature of the West is democracy; that, in the sphere of the government’s goals, an ideological commitment to the principles of representative democracy is crucial; yet also that there was no “ideological ambiguity” in also believing in rapprochement with the USSR (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 54). This theme, summarized in the preface of his book and recurrent in his work, is always with the same emphasis, as evident in the following passage of testimony he gave in the Chamber of Deputies: “Of all the forms of government, democracy is the one that best resists confrontation and, therefore, it is the one that best survives in an environment of coexistence” (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 72).

The political argument allows for the dissolution of the antagonist’s threat, which, in turn, leads to implications for the diplomatic options of Brazil. Therefore, there is room for pragmatism, such that, in the relationship with the socialists, the consideration of economic advantages prevail.[334] Again, in testimony to the Chamber of Deputies, San Tiago Dantas made a detailed report of the Brazilian economic situation, pointing to the need to increase the country’s trade flows. In his analysis of Brazil’s export markets, he did not see any dynamism with respect to the United States, and with the creation of the European Common Market, he saw threats more severe than those of the African countries. In the final analysis, his report showed that international trade with the Soviet bloc was that which was growing the fastest. Consequently, he favored the “concrete” advantages of restoration.

It is interesting to establish the evolution of San Tiago Dantas’ argument because, I believe, it is one of the main girders of his thought. The confrontation among ideologies has its own logic, and in the case of the Cold War when the conflict is dissolved by the mutual contention imposed by the nuclear impasse, coexistence and competition must prevail among the blocs. In the long run, he believed, democracy would prevail because it has intrinsic advantages over socialism – freedom being its greatest advantage. This situation had political consequences, the first being the need to sustain dialogue, even under difficult or adverse conditions. As will be seen, this was the conceptual base that guided San Tiago Dantas’ thoughts in relation to Cuba. The second consequence is to disconnect diplomatic options from ideological parameters. The restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR, for example, took place not because of any sympathy towards the socialists, but because of the concrete advantages that were predicted. In fact, pragmatism was one of the core elements of San Tiago Dantas’ thought and, in the case of Cuba, his “defense” that the regime should remain in the Inter- American system had more to do with continental stability than with any sympathy towards the socialism of Fidel Castro. In fact, one of his few criticisms of the politics of Jânio Quadros was that it had been ideological in the consideration of the Cuban problem.[335]

Another implication of the perspective of the Cold War as an environment of coexistence is perhaps curious and raises the issue of relations between the national and the international spheres. According to San Tiago Dantas, however, although democracy is able to prevail ideologically over socialism, socialism does have something to teach democracies. This theme, included in the preface of his book, begins with the idea that contacts between the socialist and the democratic worlds are beneficial to democracies. This is especially true for democracies such as that of Brazil,

in which the regime of political freedoms – a characteristic of the State of Law – is superimposed on a social structure based on the economic domination of one class by another, and, therefore, on the actual denegation of freedom itself. This situation results in a permanent encouragement of social reform, with the creation of growing societal pressures that can be captured for progressive structural modifications without breaking the continuity of the democratic regime (DANTAS, 2011, p. 12).

The statement is actually an indirect tribute to socialism, and it reflects the idea, popular at that time, that the main difference between the two ideologies was that democracy offers freedom at the expense of inequality, whereas socialism offers equality at the expense of freedom. In other words, capitalism could be the solution for economic development, yet it alone would be insufficient for social progress. Hence, San Tiago Dantas emphasized the necessity of solving the problem of inequality, first as a goal in and of itself, and next as the best antidote to avoid an unwanted turn to the left by the regime. Capitalism, he believed, could be “corrected,” since it is grounded in freedom, and therefore, contains the possibility of political debate – which can then lead to change.

It is also worth emphasizing that San Tiago Dantas’ policy of defending coexistence was rooted in the Brazilian diplomatic tradition. Therefore, his position – or that of the Goulart administration – was not new. On the contrary, one of its merits is precisely its continuity. Therefore, he said, that the policy of “peaceful coexistence is not an invention of the [then current] Brazilian government…it is not an idea that may be considered new, neither by the Congress, nor by the people,” and in order to demonstrate the tradition, he quoted a long passage – which he called “refined” – of Horácio Lafer, Foreign Minister at the time of President Juscelino Kubitschek.[336]

To what should we ascribe the importance of emphasizing continuity within a conceptual framework of newness? The structural reason is that international relations involve commitments (mainly treaties), which tend to be permanent. Keeping commitments, therefore, reinforces the credibility of a country. The norm, especially for a country that values, as one would say today, soft power, is to emphasize continuity, in order to reinforce to its partners the notion that it is trustworthy. [337]

Additionally, there were some very specific reasons that led San Tiago Dantas to reinforce the idea of continuity. As Brito Cruz showed in a key study of the period, San Tiago Dantas’ Independent Foreign Policy is different from that of Afonso Arinos for many reasons, one of them being the ideological care by which the government, born “under suspicion,” avoided accusations of being leftist (CRUZ, 1989). Continuity, therefore, supported by the quote of Horácio Lafer, serves as an attempt by San Tiago Dantas, to reinforce the policy’s pragmatism, based on the country’s permanent development interests.

Brazilian Perspectives regarding the Cuban Revolution

San Tiago Dantas’ model of interpreting the Cold War was tested for the first time in the episode of the restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR. The argument that sustains the advantages of the restoration is basically pragmatic, based in the perspective to obtain concrete advantages, opened by the interpretation of bipolar antagonism as competitive coexistence. It was also considered that the restoration could be limited to the bilateral sphere (which was not a theme that could be discussed in multilateral forums – as, he believed, the Cuban one could be). The second test was the policy concerning the Cuban Revolution, the solution of which is considerably more complex for several reasons: First, because there is a clash of principles between the policy of non-intervention and the preservation of democracy as the goal of the Inter-American system; and second, because the solution involves multilateral politics, in which an internal equilibrium should be sought among Latin Americans, as well as between them and the United States. Yet another factor concerns the fact that, more than the restoration of relations between Brazil and the USSR, the Cuban issue had greater domestic repercussions. It had become an ingredient of national political debate. Before discussing this directly, however, a brief explanation of the term “clash of principles” needs to be given.

The principle of non-intervention resulted from a long battle within the Inter-American system, culminating with its acceptance by the United States at the VII Inter-American International Conference (1933). The principle was conceived as an instrument to contain the frequent interventions by the United States in Latin America – mainly in Central America – throughout the 20th century. The principle became a binding rule of International Law, consecrated in Article III of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter (as well as in the UN Charter). In the words of San Tiago Dantas: “It can be said that the Organization of American States has flourished in the last few decades as an instrument par excellence of the non-intervention policy” (DANTAS, 2011, p. 115).

The perspective that the principle had embedded within it an absolute rule was always “qualified” by political circumstances and realities within the Inter-American system itself. Accordingly, the U.S. intervention in Guatemala, in 1954 and, on the socialist side, the Soviet intervention in Hungary, in 1956, should be remembered. In theory, the principle serves to legally protect a State against forms of aggression – whether open or not – by foreign powers that want to interfere in its domestic processes of political organization. Thus, during the Cold War, the legitimacy of ideologies competes with that of sovereignties, sometimes operating as an argument to supersede them. In what sense is this true? In either of the world’s then two ideological blocs (Soviet or Western), the sovereign is limited (words of Nikita Khrushchev, Premier of the USSR, 1953-1964) when a State practices models of social organization that diverge from the loyalty necessary for the ideological character. This, then, was cited as the core “legitimacy” for the interventions carried out by the superpowers. The Cuban case generated special tension because it opened the possibility of the presence of a socialist State within the Western influence sphere (a situation which happened again, later, with Salvador Allende’s Chile). At the time of the Cuban issue, the question was not would the USSR defend Cuban loyalty, but rather to what extent it would do so? Also, would the United States allow such a divergence from its sphere of influence? (The sphere of influence in Latin America was deemed to be nothing more than the confirmation of ideological fidelity, and therefore, the open door to intervention).

There would be, however, a specific argument, which became effective, especially after the explicit adhesion of Fidel Castro to Marxism-Leninism, since, according to the interpretation of the United States and some Latin American countries, a socialist regime was, by its very nature, interventionist.[338] If that were true, those countries argue, Cuba deserved some kind of “punishment,” an isolation, to prevent any interventionist actions that it might attempt. Another factor in the equation is that in the Inter-American system, self-determination (and, therefore, the domestic condition that a non-intervention policy should protect) was tied to the idea of democracy – a condition ratified at the Fifth Consultation Meeting, held in Chile, in 1959, which San Tiago Dantas had attended as a delegate of the Chamber of Deputies and to which he had made a significant contribution. At the time, then Foreign Minister Horácio Lafer had appointed him to write and present the Brazilian proposal on democracy and human rights of the Declaration of Santiago, suggesting that its mechanisms be added to the national legislations. As Marcílio Marques Moreira later reminded me, Lafer’s choice was based on the fact that San Tiago Dantas had presided in the previous year (1958) at the Inter-American Legal Committee that had received the mission to develop the theme. The final declaration of that conference, among other elements, characterized the democracy that the American countries desired as the supreme Law of the land. It is a principle that places rulers under the authority of the legal norm, via free elections, the rotation of power, and the protection of individual rights.[339] Cuba, by the authoritarian solution that it had adopted, denied its citizens the principles of self-determination.[340]

Therefore, San Tiago Dantas’ challenge, in the intellectual perspective he had outlined concerning the dynamics of the Cold War, was to deal with the Cuban problem, which clearly evolved while he was Foreign Minister. As we have seen, he worked with the preference for dialogue, even when there are antagonisms; this explains his recommendation to coexist with the socialists. The Cuban case becomes more complex, however, because coexistence was not simply of distant adversaries, but also of close ones, and it took place in a context in which important principles of Brazilian diplomacy clearly clashed.

Now, let us look at the Brazilian reactions. Fidel Castro took power in January 1959, initially to general applauses as we stated earlier. Gradually, however, the Cuban problem turned into a crisis for the Inter-American system when the United States broke diplomatic relations with the country in January 1961, and simultaneously, began to work towards a policy of multilateral isolation of the island nation. It was then – with the adhesion of majorities in multilateral bodies – that interventionist interests, especially regarding regime change, gained legitimacy, and eventually exceeded their unilateral origin. Hence, this explains the North American policy, which at that moment, in 1962, was partially victorious.[341]

Brazilian responses to the situation were, therefore, required, with this coming precisely at the beginning of the implementation of what would become known as Independent Foreign Policy. And since the evolution of the Cuban problem took place in several stages, it required our diplomacy to have differentiated responses. Initially, during the administration of Afonso Arinos, the forum in which the issue would eventually be discussed had not yet been created. This allowed Afonso Arinos to have a position limited to a declaration of principles, without any diplomatic conflicts.

The context allowed Arinos to acknowledge the problem – the contradiction between non-intervention and the “commitments pertaining to the defense of America against ideological intervention, or, better said, against Marxist ideology, against the communist threat” – as recommended in the resolutions of the Conference of Bogotá, in 1948, and again in the Declaration of Santiago, in 1959 (Cited in FRANCO, 2007, p. 84).[342] Yet, precisely because it was unnecessary to define negotiating positions, Arinos completed his argument with two other elements, including a categorical statement of broad repudiation of intervention: “we shall fight against the invasion of capitalism, which tends to repress our wealth and constrain our development”; as well as a statement against international communism: “the purpose of which is to subvert the democratic principle, enslave the freedom of the peoples and intervene in the American way of life” (Cited in FRANCO, 2007, p. 86). All of this meant opposition to either the United States or the USSR imposing a regime on Cuba. The statement also expressed the hope that through negotiations and agreements, Cuba would evolve to become representative democracy. The Arinos formula which tried to resolve the contradiction between fidelity to non-intervention and fidelity to democracy – was based, therefore, on a hypothesis concerning the future behavior of Cuba, which would be influential in negotiations and agreements attempting to return it to the democratic fold. At that moment, however, given the new closeness the USSR and the nationalizations that heralded a state economy, the expectation concerning the behavior of Castro’s government was perhaps only an expression of “wishful thinking.”

With the change in Foreign Ministers in 1961, it was left to San Tiago Dantas to define Brazil’s behavior in the next stages of the Cuban problem. Circumstances had also changed, as we have seen, as there was a diplomatic attempt to resolve the confrontation with the announcement of a Consultation Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to be held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962. It is worth recalling that at first San Tiago attempted to avoid that the meeting take place, yet with pressure from the United States, as well as from some countries in Latin America – especially Colombia – the meeting did take place. It is also worth noting, that the major countries of the continent, namely Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, were not satisfied with the outcome of the meeting.

At the time of Arinos, there was a need to express foreign policy, but not necessarily diplomacy.[343] Initially, the situation that San Tiago Dantas faced was similar in that: relations between the United States and Cuba had been severed, the rhetorical confrontation between both countries had increased, nationalizations in Cuba were continuing, and the socialist mood of Castro became more clear; yet Brazilian policy was basically the same, as it was still based on the hypothesis of a return of Cuba to democracy. The modalities of action, however, were necessarily different.[344] The clearest fear was that with pressure from the United States, violent action against Cuba would be precipitated, thereby creating a clear violation of the non-intervention principle. Therefore, the first diplomatic goal of Brazil was to “slow down the hurried proposals to resolve the Cuban case by violent means,” with this to be followed by important discussions with Argentina and Mexico. The goal required two negotiations, one with the United States, which assured a “moratorium on violence,” although not for an indeterminate period, and the second with Cuba, based on the fact that the country, after Batista was ousted, had signed the democratic commitment at the Fifth Consultation Meeting.

San Tiago Dantas met with the heads of Itamaraty in the beginning of his administration to determine how to carry out the Ministry’s goals. The meetings were recorded in minutes called the Colóquios da Casa das Pedras, as they took place in a stone house located in the neighborhood of Gávea Pequena just outside of Rio de Janeiro. There, a plan calling for the Finlandization of the island nation was conceived – the name referring to the neutralization of the Scandinavian country bordering on the USSR.[345] Although never carried out, the plan was a perfect conceptual elaboration based on assumptions about the Cuban behavior: Conquests of the Revolution would be maintained; “democratic externalities” restored; purchases of weapons from the USSR interrupted; and the Cuban regime would not make any ideological propaganda. A counterpart of the plan was the restoration of relations between Cuba and the United States, which would reopen the market for sugar from the island nation. There would also be gestures by the U.S. government in relation to anti-Castro refugees. And an allowance of continued economic relations with the USSR – with restrictions on military cooperation – would be allowed, thereby creating a socialist showcase in the hemisphere (DANTAS, 2011, p. 346).[346]

Before moving to the next stage of the Cuban issue, a few comments should be made concerning the Fino Plan, the clear merit of which was to offer diplomatic consistency to the goal of ensuring respect for the non-intervention rule. The plan clearly noted that the goal would not be sustained without a process of negotiated grants that involved Cuba, the United States and the USSR. The plan’s “persuasive methods” of allowing the return of Cuba to the Inter-American system had a very concrete and specific roadmap. However, as will be seen, the conceptual clearness was relatively disconnected from reality, as it was mainly based on the hypothesis that the course of the Cuban Revolution could be negotiated, as was mentioned above, to maintain democratic externalities, to abandon the purchase of weapons from the USSR, and to give up propaganda. It was not understood, that due to the unique character of Castro’s regime, its very nature became stronger with the deepening of its socialist character. Another false hypothesis was that the United States would accept the presence of an antagonistic regime in its “backyard,” if some of the features of that regime were diluted. San Tiago Dantas’ ideas about the need for dialogue between adversaries did not apply since the U.S. government considered Castro to be a threat, and the maintenance of the regime meant a strategic defeat of the United States by the USSR. (U.S. opposition to the plan also grew due to domestic policy implications, along with the growth in numbers of Cuban exiles arriving in Florida). In short, in this sort of context, there was no space to negotiate only to confront. [347] The rationality of the arguments had found its limits in the universe of political needs, those of both of the United States and those of Cuba.

The actions that followed were completely diplomatic. The ideas were open for debate in the Consultation Meeting of Punta Del Este, which San Tiago Dantas attended as head of the Brazilian delegation. The forum for decisions about Cuba was now open, and the meeting demanded from Itamaraty a careful preparation that had begun at the Colóquios da Casa das Pedras and continued in the Planning Commission, as the documents of the time show. [348] The new and key piece of information was that the Cuban situation had changed when Castro proclaimed, in November 1961, that the regime he presided over was Marxist-Leninist. The contradiction between the defense of non-intervention and the democratic commitment became stronger. After all, the possibility to maintain “democratic externalities” had disappeared and the interventionist attitude resulted from the announcement of Cuba’s adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology. According to San Tiago Dantas:

The evolution of the revolutionary regime in the sense of the configuration of a socialist state, or – according to Prime- Minister Fidel Castro – Marxist-Leninist, inevitably created deep divergences, and even incompatibilities, between the Cuban Government’s policy and the democratic principles upon which the Inter-American system is based (DANTAS, 2011, p. 103-104).

In other words, the political position of defending non-intervention on principle had to be reviewed or, at least, other sources of legitimacy had to be found. In addition, for San Tiago Dantas, as Marcílio Marques Moreira has reminded me, it was a core concern because he believed that “having legitimacy in his favor represented an extraordinary reinforcement of power in any conflict of interests. Rational and moral certainty was his ally.” (The quotation, which Marques Moreira suggested, is from the first, still unpublished, lecture that San Tiago Dantas made at the ESG, on March 24, 1953.)

The articulation of the policy’s legitimacy was, therefore, based on three pillars: an “objective” view of the Cuban reality, an evaluation of its consequences to the Inter-American system, and a perspective of values that should guide the Brazilian foreign policy. It is worth analyzing them separately.

San Tiago Dantas believed that Cuba had become a communist country whose political organization was, therefore, incompatible with the values of the Inter-American system. In this sense, he disagreed with the attitudes of Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos, who, according to him, articulated the policy in relation to Cuba with some sympathy for the Castro regime. San Tiago Dantas explained:

In that vein (during the time of Jânio Quadros-Afonso Arinos), there was a slight amount of ideological sympathy and a systematic refusal to talk about the democratic nature of Fidel Castro’s government.... Our idea was the opposite. We started with the recognition that the Cuban regime was not democratic... Thus, the problem of ideological sympathy was eliminated. The Brazilian government has no ideological sympathy for Fidel Castro’s regime: although some political groups within the government might have it, the government only has sympathy for what is written in the Constitution and in the treaties (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 314).

That is, by moving away in ideological terms from the West, from democracy, Cuba is on the opposite side of Brazil. The diplomatic problem is clearer and, at the same time, it is more complex. As San Tiago Dantas admitted, the defense of the status quo, of non-intervention and the maintenance of diplomatic relations, opened one side of the argument. He, however, raised questions that he imagined would be made to him later: “they’re against breaking relations, but what do they think? The more Marxist and Leninist, the better? To what extent, besides protests, what do we have to explain?” (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 315).[349] Thus, when Castro’s regime chose “the other side,” the Cuban issue was inserted within the larger framework of the East-West conflict: “... the Cuban case is inseparable, in its meaning and its treatment, from the great problem of antagonism between the West and the East and the struggle for democracy versus international communism” (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 130).

The socialist condition led to consequences in two spheres: that of the evaluation of the facts (what Cuba is) and that of the prediction of behaviors (what Cuba can be). Initially, there is the risk of the country becoming a disturbance factor in the continent; then in dealing with the future of the regime, which becomes a key parameter for us to understand San Tiago Dantas’ thoughts on the subject. Thoughts which he shared with Arinos concerning the expectation that Cuba return to the Inter-American system:

We do not believe that Cuba is interested in remaining for a long time outside the system that it contributed to build. Geopolitical factors strictly condition the life of nations, and Cuba, because of its culture and the imperatives of its economy, must feel the need to return to the American democratic universe, through a natural evolution that is greater than political passions and ideologies (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 106).

In fact, both elements go together as the risk of disturbance must be contained precisely for Cuba to return to the system. It is also important to emphasize that the negative consequences of Cuba’s socialization – and the radicalization of its regime – affect the Inter-American system. When it divides the member States on key points of interpretation of the OAS Charter, this affects the political lives of the States taken individually.[350]

Once the diagnosis of the reality of the Cuban Revolution has been made, and its perspectives have been analyzed, we reach the core of the diplomatic argument itself. The clearest challenge is to conciliate the fidelity to non-intervention with the interventionist trend that is common to the behavior of governments of the Marxist model, beginning with the USSR. There exists a line of thought that wishes to deny Cuba’s fundamental right of self-determination (greater than during the time of Arinos), justifying it with the principle of non-intervention based on a defense of the Inter-American system. The base of this argument remains a legal one, founded on rules and laws. San Tiago Dantas believed that the essential value of the Inter-American system was to offer a set of rules, which become a reference of stability for the nations of the continent. To defend the system was, therefore, to defend its laws, starting with that of non-intervention. It must be respected and protected because it is a founding tenet of the system, that ensures coexistence among unequal partners, yet who are equal in the sovereign condition. In this manner, San Tiago Dantas believed that any “punishment” of Cuba that violated non-intervention should be challenged and discarded by definition.

San Tiago Dantas did not recognize legality in the proposals that suggested punishment for Cuba, such as the hypothesis of military intervention, which was suggested and subsequently abandoned, and especially, the expulsion of Cuba from the Inter-American system. He was right when he stated that, unlike the UN Charter, the OAS Charter had not foreseen norms to suspend a member-State and, therefore, for that to happen, it would be necessary to call an Inter-American conference to introduce such a rule, followed by the ratification of the decision by the respective parliaments. That was different from the possibility to suspend Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board (IDB), since the IDB had been created at a Consultation Meeting, hence a meeting of equal status could set the legal requirements for such an action. Respect of non-intervention became the core of his argument to prevent the OAS, through the Consultation Meeting, from suspending Cuba and going against the legality of the Charter. Non-intervention, therefore, not necessarily protect Cuba; it protected the system and its legality.

The defense of non-intervention raises some problems, beginning with how to deal with our loyalty to democracy in the face of a regime that clearly had authoritarian connotations. To address this question, San Tiago Dantas began with the recognition of democracy defined as another key element of the system, a definition that is in the OAS Charter, and that gained consistency at the Conference of Santiago, Chile, which, as we have seen, San Tiago attended as a delegate of the Chamber of Deputies. In order to overcome this dilemma, San Tiago Dantas proposed a distinction between rules, which the Inter-American system imposes, through the OAS Charter and other treaties, and aspirations, which are set by statements, which, in turn, are goals that the States should seek, without any real sense of obligation. Non-intervention, he said, is an inevitable rule, and democracy is an aspiration that should not overrule it.

San Tiago Dantas further believed that the principle of non-intervention should only admit exceptions in the very specific cases foreseen in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty, the Rio Pact, signed in 1947):

If the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro was made for the common defense against concrete facts, against armed attacks or equivalent aggressions, it cannot be used against a regime, because this refutes a basic principle of the peoples of this hemisphere: the principle of non-intervention of one State, or group of States, in the domestic affairs of another (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 129 e 175).

In other words, there were no rules that allowed the OAS to sponsor regime changes, even when such changes corresponded to the realization of a continental aspiration. Fidelity to democracy required fidelity to the rule of law and, therefore, we are prohibited from expanding its interpretation, and using it in support of interventions.

Still within the legal sphere, San Tiago Dantas recovered something that was in the Finlandization plan, developed in the Colóquios da Casa das Pedras: the idea of “negative obligations.” He explained that, unlike the UN, in which being “peace loving” is sufficient for a State to be admitted, the OAS demands of its members:

full agreement with the principles and goals set out in the Charter of Bogota, which requires “the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy.” The momentary loss of that effectiveness does not involve a permanent incompatibility with the system and the body in which it is found, although the deliberate and permanent acceptance of a political ideology that it contradicts and fights generates a crucial situation of incompatibility, from which legal consequences are necessarily drawn (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 126).

Although San Tiago Dantas does not list what negative obligations Cuba would have to accept, I believe he had in mind those that he had organized for the Fino plan. The solution he proposed in the Consultation Meeting was less substantive than procedural, with the creation of a

body composed of the various opinions represented at the Consultation Meeting, with enough latitude to take charge of a study about the obligations and the status of relations between Cuba and rest of the Hemisphere, and about which the OAS Council would make a statement once the parties were heard (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 127).

The procedural solution revealed limits to the non-interven-tion argument as San Tiago Dantas recognized, as an assumption of the argument, the incompatibility between the Cuban regime and democracy. And while doing nothing – simply becoming a type of spectator protected by principle from what would happen – may have been a way to “stop history” – the Foreign Minister knew that that was impossible as well. Therefore, the statute of negative obligations would have to protect democracies from the undesired consequences of the socialist State established on the continent. It would be the “realistic” reverse side of the argument of simply hoping that Cuba maintained the desire to return to the system.

To complete the legal argument, San Tiago Dantas developed another argument, which was basically of political design, one that discusses the negative effects of the punitive solutions to the crisis. The parameter here is San Tiago Dantas’ view of the global conflict. In a certain way, it adapts to his interpretations about the Cold War and what was happening in the regional sphere, with the important addition of addressing what the immediate consequences radicalization of the Cuban process would cause to political stability of the nation States. The general line of the argument has been presented in previous paragraphs and, as we have seen, there is no military solution for the Cold War; dialogue is the necessary path among the countries that diverge in ideological terms; and trust in the Western values ensures that, in terms of the exposure to dialogue, democracy has clear advantages over socialism.[351]

Although the firm position of maintaining Cuba within the system had a legal dimension, it also had a political one: dialogue would be the natural instrument to relieve tensions and allow for the country’s (desired) return to the Inter-American system. In this context, punishment no longer made sense:

Interventionist or punitive formulas, which have no legal grounds and only result in an aggravation of passions and the exacerbation of incompatibilities, cannot expect the support of Brazil (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 106).

In addition, San Tiago Dantas said that measures such as the breaking of diplomatic relations or trade embargos would not bring advantages, and that they would reduce influence on the Cuban government, thereby undermining possibilities to grant asylum to dissidents. More importantly, such measures would “displace the Cuban issue from the continental sphere to the area of litigation between the West and the East, whereas we believe it should not go beyond the limits of the Hemisphere” (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 107). A trade embargo, he said, was simply a politically useless action, given the low level of trade between Cuba and the rest of Latin America.

Another political factor that suggests dialogue and moderation are the domestic repercussions of the measures. Military action, for example, would cause a justified reaction in the Latin American public opinion, which would favor the radicalization of the domestic policies of the countries of the Hemisphere, while simultaneously weakening the ties of mutual trust; ties, which, San Tiago Dantas said, are the keys to the very existence of the Inter-American system (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 106). Therefore, while San Tiago acknowledged that it was necessary to do something about Cuba, he also believed the solution must be calibrated in such a way that the consequences did not harm the goals of maintaining Cuba within the Inter-American system, thereby avoiding national political fractures and ensuring the stability of the system.

Ultimately, San Tiago Dantas’ position was defeated at Punta Del Este, since Cuba was suspended from the OAS. San Tiago, however, pointed to the fact that Brazil, together with other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Ecuador, had avoided the worst, in that the imposition of sanctions or even military intervention – that some had suggested – had not occurred. Had they done so, San Tiago says, they would have gone against International Law with disastrous political effects ensuing. In May 1962, in a debate in the Chamber of Deputies on a censorship motion against him, San Tiago Dantas added the following argument to prove that the Brazilian stance at Punta Del Este was valid. In defense of the policies he had elaborated, he rhetorically asked:

What happened after Cuba was excluded from the Organization of American States? Was the regime modified? Were its activities changed? Did the American States acquire some new way to influence Cuban public opinion or to change from this or that manner the evolution of its own domestic situation? Everyone knows that the answers to these questions are no. Already at that moment, therefore, the exclusion did not represent anything more than a verbal punishment that did not correspond to the desire we actually had and for which we contributed with the ideas that we took to the Consultation Meeting, concerned with setting limits to the expansion of the Cuban regime and containing it in the face of any possibility of armed expansion or of subversive activities abroad (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 250).

To complete the argument, San Tiago Dantas stated that the fact that Brazil maintained diplomatic relations with the Cuban government was useful for the democratic cause, as the Embassy became a shelter for dissidents, that Brazil

is a State that has intervened several times to soften the strictness of a political situation [in Cuba]; and that Brazil has above all, been the open door through which the democratic world maintains its presence in that country, whose traditions of fidelity to democratic principles will certainly triumph over a momentary episode of dictatorship (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 250).

If we grant to “rhetoric excess” the reference to democratic tradition in Cuba, what can be seen in those words is the perfect closing of his argument and, especially, his views of the Cold War. According to San Tiago Dantas, what must prevail is the constant search for dialogue. Punitive measures, such as cutting communication, are useless, as they do not transform regimes. Cuba, at that moment, completely demonstrated his thesis, and even more so, it was the correct policy of Brazil, to keep its Embassy in Havana open. From the general conception of the East-West confrontation to the diplomatic problem of relations with Cuba, the diplomatic argument was fully concluded.

The analysis of the Cuban issue clearly shows that, for San Tiago Dantas, Brazil had a role to play in the world, and that, especially on continental issues, it was an important player in the political game. As he once eloquently stated: “We are a country whose future perspectives make certain that we will be a major power, in charge of our own destiny and able to ensure our citizens full participation in the benefits of culture and civilization.” He acknowledged, however, that negative factors still had a weight and prevented the complete fulfillment of that destiny (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 255). Brazilian policies were an example of what he considered “independent” in the arena of foreign affairs, with positions clearly based on national values and interests. He even contrasted independence with neutralism, when, in a document after April 1964, he said that

While it has all the inconvenience of rigidity, independence allows the country to move from one political and military bloc to another, opting for positions that best suit it, while also effectively serving the community of nations – without being permanently subordinated to any of them (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 314)

Conclusions: San Tiago Dantas’ contribution

It is now time to return to the initial questions concerning San Tiago Dantas’ specific contribution to Brazilian diplomatic thought. It is important to emphasize that this essay did not address other issues that were the object of reflection and action of the Foreign Minister, for example, his views of relations with Argentina and other Latin American countries, his position in relation to colonialism, and his defense of disarmament have all not been addressed. In fact, these issues broaden the scope of reflection and introduce dimensions that go beyond those which the East-West conflict proposed. In the case of Argentina, for example, cooperation between equals stands out, and his speech to the Commission of Disarmament is a landmark, since the positions defended in it became permanent. Yet, in conclusion, we remain with San Tiago Dantas’ own ideas on the theme in question, which seem sufficient to understand some of the key aspects of his thought.

Initially, an observation about the style of his argument is worth mentioning; in whose construction two characteristics attract attention. The first of which is the careful manner in which the Foreign Minister relied, almost exclusively, on the advantages of logic, and on the intrinsic value of the argument. For him, there are no resources outside of reasoning, that is, the authority comes from the clarity and logic of what is said. In the book called Fantasia Desfeita, Celso Furtado (1989, p. 153-165) made a revealing statement when, in speaking of San Tiago Dantas, he said: “I met few men who deposited so much faith in reason as an instrument to remove obstacles.”

The contrast between the debating styles of San Tiago Dantas and Afonso Arinos –his immediate predecessor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a man not less distinguished nor less clear than he – also helps to emphasize the point. Arinos had a more traditional style, sometimes quoting authorities from outside the discourse to complete his argument. One example was when, in a hearing at the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, in May 1961, he presented a long list of antecedents concerning evolution of the defense of the human rights, starting with the French Constitution of 1791, “reminiscence of old professor”, he said (FRANCO, 2007, p. 82). Although San Tiago Dantas also made use of quotations, he often used them more to puzzle his opponent and throw him off guard, than merely to reinforce his ideas. The source was not anticipated, but eventually revealed after the quotation. The previously mentioned, Horácio Lafer’s quotation, for example, was used to demonstrate that his view of the Cold War was not new in Brazilian politics. On another occasion, in order to refute some angry arguments by the federal representative, Abel Rafael, San Tiago quoted a document of the Consultation Meeting, that had been elaborated by a commission that included the U.S. delegate, Walt Rostow. The quotation was compatible with the position he defended. In order not to lose the argument, Abel Rafael ultimately said that he did not know Rostow’s ideological roots and talked about the communist infiltration in the US Senate and the US State Department (Franco, 2007, p. 144).

A second element to be emphasized in San Tiago Dantas’ character is his lack of concern with newness just for the sake of something being new. He does not, for example, claim that he developed a new method of foreign policy, and nor is newness, as I indicated previously, necessarily, the most explicit argument in diplomacy. It cannot, however, be said that San Tiago did not innovate, because he did. He merely felt no need to say that he did. The values he praised, such as Brazil’s philosophy of peace, have greater value precisely because they are sustained historically, not because they are new.

Finally, then, what was San Tiago Dantas’ contribution to Brazilian diplomatic thought? And going back to what he himself had asked: Did he systematize the diplomatic project of Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos?

When Ambassador Álvaro da Costa Franco analyzed the paragraph transcribed in the beginning of this essay, he qualified the statement of the Foreign Minister in a pertinent way:

It is understandable that, for San Tiago Dantas, with his mental organization and discipline, the non-systematized and explicit thought of President Jânio Quadros, did not seem sufficient for a foreign policy.

Yet, according to Costa Franco:

[...] under instructions of the president – that were apparently isolated and apparently disconnected – there was an evaluation of the geo-political climate, an idea of the role that Brazil should play in the global scenario, a desire of – as far as possible – to fulfill the potentials of the State and the nation – to paraphrase an expression by General De Gaulle: “a certain idea of Brazil”...

the seven incomplete months of Jânio Quadros as president saw an innovation of our foreign policy, abandoning the practice that was later called automatic alignment, which had tended to prevail since 1942 ... Once the path was open, San Tiago Dantas was able to continue the policy that his predecessor began, give it a name, and develop it, far from the coercive tutelage that Jânio Quadros had imposed on his ministers (FRANCO, 2007, p. 11).[352]

The doctrinarian foundation of the Independent Foreign Policy corresponded to an “implicit system.” What San Tiago Dantas did was to apply this system to the diplomatic issues he faced. The general outline of Independent Foreign Policy was published in Jânio Quadros’ famous October 1962 article for Foreign Affairs, in the chapter on foreign policy of his Presidential Message to the Congress, in the inauguration speech of Afonso Arinos at Itamaraty, and in other actions by the Foreign Minister (FRANCO, 2007, p. 21-135). San Tiago Dantas had no intention of reinventing Jânio Quadros’ foreign policy; he was, however, the correct choice when given the role of “systematizer.” As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, there are many ways to speak about foreign policy. To simplify the matter, Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos talked about the perspective of the principles of a pre-diplomatic, pre-negotiating, and pre-confrontation stage, and they proposed diplomatic behaviors that opened space for a new place of Brazil in the world. Their key contributions were in the sphere of political innovation. When San Tiago Dantas articulated for the Brazilian international agenda ways to think diplomatically, in some respects, he completed what they had begun.

San Tiago Dantas’ greatest contribution was not so much to initiate new political guidelines, but rather to carry out policies from a new perspective. During his tenure, he had inherited the two core issues related to the East-West conflict during, namely, the restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR and the Cuban crisis. The positions were set forth in general outlines and there was no interest or reason to change them. The restoration was inexorable, and we could not stop the historical evolution of the Cuban Revolution. However, the task to “develop” arguments and to think about them “systematically” had barely started with Arinos. In the first case, San Tiago would extend the motivations, give them a concrete sense, reveal advantages, and overcome ideological traps – as, for example, conservative sectors strongly challenged the restoration of relations with the USSR. In the more complex issue of Cuba, it was necessary to go beyond the positions of principle or, more accurately, to turn the principles into diplomatic arguments.

In neither of these issues, did San Tiago Dantas change the political principles that Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos had elaborated. He did, however, extract consequences and supply doctrinarian outlines more complete than those of the first stage of Independent Foreign Policy. The reflection on the meaning and limits of confrontation in the Cold War is a good example: although it had originated with Arinos and, even before, with Lafer.[353] It was San Tiago Dantas who more fully elaborated it. Likewise, in face of the debate on the restoration of relations with the USSR, San Tiago made a great elaboration of the theme, and as we have seen, by having proposed an interpretation of the nature of the bipolar confrontation, which exempted from danger rapprochement with socialists, he validated the pragmatic benefits of the restoration, and the position, thereby gained systematic consistency – there was an articulation between the general and the private.

Another example of San Tiago Dantas’ diplomatic philosophy is seen in the process of setting the Brazilian position in relation to Cuba. The core of the conceptual problem is the limit of the non-intervention principle, but who had intervened against the principle: the countries that wanted to punish Cuba, or Cuba itself, when it took on Marxism-Leninism? San Tiago Dantas understood the complexity of the debate as well as the contradiction among values included in the norms and resolutions of the Inter-American system. When he accepted democracy as a basic requirement to participate in the system, this created a dilemma for him: Where, for example, should he place Cuba in that scheme? In practice, hadn’t Cuba denied democracy to its people?

It is interesting to observe the several stages of San Tiago Dantas’ argument. How, for example, he accompanied the evolution of the Cuban process, and how he combined the legal argument concerning defense of non-intervention with its political counterpart, that of respect for the norm as a tool for the contention of radicalization of the national situations. In this way, he garnered broader support and, again, a systematization of the Brazilian position. In the entire argument, what stands out is the expectation that Cuba would correct itself and, somehow, return to the Inter-American system. The idea had come from Arinos; it was included in the Fino Plan, and it remained even after the self-proclamation of the regime as Marxist-Leninist. The idea that the revolution was irreversible was clear since early 1961; Guerreiro’s memorandum is explicit about that.[354] The dose of “wishful thinking” was justified, first, because Cuba was a “novelty” – an untold political reality, socialism implemented by means of a popular revolution (different from the Soviet and the Chinese models) – and because Cuba is in the periphery of the United States.

It was difficult to make safe bets about the future of the Cuban regime and, although optimistic, the ones made by Afonso Arinos and San Tiago Dantas were not completely unrealistic. On the other hand, without the perspective of regime change, and given the fidelity of both Foreign Ministers to the values of Western democracy, the non-intervention argument did not complete its task. The principle may have been valid in itself; it may have ensured the stability of the Inter-American system; and it may have avoided radicalization from being transplanted into the national picture – but this may have achieved little, if the defense of the status quo did not mean a reversal, even if in the uncertain future, of what had caused such a crisis with so broad consequences.

The period in which he was Foreign Minister seems short for the decisive landmark that San Tiago Dantas left on foreign policy. He gathered the best that there was in the Foreign Ministry into an open dialogue with its employees; a policy that represented the vanguard of diplomatic thought. In rough parliamentary debates, he consistently presented arguments that supported controversial positions. He articulated in a skillful manner the Brazilian position at the Consultation Meeting of Punta Del Este. In short, in a variety of ways, San Tiago Dantas transformed the quality of the Brazilian diplomatic argument – as if he were teaching diplomats to practice diplomacy. In addition, his positions reinforced key values of the Brazilian view of the world.

Maria Regina Soares de Lima, a professor of Political Science at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, has said that “the specific contribution by San Tiago Dantas was to combine this movement of national affirmation with a proposal that built the common interest to the entire international collectivity.”[355] This contribution can be observed in many of his more general speeches, such as that concerning disarmament – revealing his Grotian tendency – which Celso Lafer considers a permanent feature of Brazilian diplomacy. Lafer adds that when San Tiago accepted the idea of an international society among sovereigns, he conceptually combined the need to affirm political autonomy with the perspective to build a more stable global order with more solid anchors for peace. It is not by chance that one of the permanent features of San Tiago Dantas’ discourse is that peace is the only option for the international system – a situation that became particularly true at the moment opposing ideologies and superpowers each acquired huge nuclear arsenals.

Finally, let us recall that the goals to obtain autonomy and act with independence – keys in San Tiago Dantas definition of the international philosophy of the Brazil – were nuanced by a careful realism. In a context in which ideologies dominate, as occurred during the Cold War, and they conditioned the options of domestic and international policies, San Tiago Dantas understood that, in our case, choices of foreign policy inspired by ideological fidelity were limiting, both in the national and in the diplomatic spheres. The policies he recommended toward Cuba were symptomatic of this understanding. Through his thought, as articulated at the Consultation Meeting of Punta Del Este, he showed that the best policy for Brazil was to understand Cuba as it really was – an authoritarian government – and in this manner, to shift the axis of legitimacy of support to the non-intervention principle. His realism did not exclude values, however and, in that case, the preference for democracy is an intrinsic factor in the argument. The work of Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas as Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs demonstrates that values are, indeed, and important part of the formula: they do not reduce diplomatic flexibility, but rather, they provide consistency to the outcome.

Bibliographical Notes

In the field of international relations, San Tiago Dantas left circumstantial texts, almost all of which were written because of his positions, as a legislator and as a minister. One exception to this list is the introduction he wrote for the book Política Externa Independente, published by Civilização Brasileira, in 1962. It is a short text, of less than 10 pages, which summarizes, with the clarity and sense of synthesis that characterize San Tiago Dantas’ texts, the core of his thought on Brazil’s international presence. The book includes almost all the texts that San Tiago Dantas wrote about foreign policy. To this some parliamentary interventions could be added, such as his speech on the Declaration of Santiago, and the case of the Santa Maria ship, both transcribed in his book of the Perfis Parlamentares collection, organized by Marcílio Marques Moreira and published by the Chamber of Deputies, in 1983. FUNAG re-edited the book Política Externa Independente in 2011. Besides recent articles about San Tiago Dantas’ foreign policy, the book transcribed the Colóquios da Casa das Pedras, informal meetings that San Tiago Dantas had with the leadership of Itamaraty, to discuss the issues that he would face as minister. Another document that failed to appear in the original edition of Política Externa Independente is the set of reports by the Planning Commission of the Ministry that continued and complemented the debate carried out in Colóquios. The reports were transcribed in Documentos da Política Externa Independente, Brasília, FUNAG, 2007, vol. 1, p. 221-247.

Bibliography

DANTAS, San Tiago Dantas. Política Externa Independente, (updated edition), Brasília, FUNAG, 2011, p. 351.

FONSECA, Gelson. Os Colóquios da Casa das Pedras: Argumentos da Diplomacia de San Tiago Dantas. In: Caderno do CHDD, n. 11 (Second Semester, 2007).

FRANCO, Álvaro da Costa (org.). Documentos da Política Externa Independente. Rio de Janeiro: Centro de História e Documentação Diplomática; Brasília: FUNAG, 2007.

FURTADO, Celso. A Fantasia Desfeita. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1989. 3rd ed.

GUERREIRO, Ramiro Saraiva. Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro (Depoi-mento, 1985). Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getulio Vargas/ CPDOC, 2010.

LAFER, Celso. A Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a Política Externa, São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2001.

LESSA, R.; Hollanda, C. B. de (org.), San Tiago Dantas, Coletânea de Textos sobre Política Externa. Brasília: FUNAG, 2009.

MOREIRA, Marcilio Marques; Niskier, Arnaldo; Reis, Adacir (org.). Atualidade de San Tiago Dantas. Rio de Janeiro: Lettera, 2007.

Augusto Frederico Schmidt

Born in Rio de Janeiro, on April 18, 1906, he lost his father when he was 10 years old and traveled to Europe during the war, where he saw violence and hopelessness. When back in Brazil, he was raised by his grandfather. His harshness resulting from these experiences, his shyness and his obesity have made him a lonely young man. After a period in São Paulo, he returned to Rio de Janeiro in 1928, and his meeting with Tristão de Athayde enabled the birth of the poet, who published more than twenty books, and merged his literary activity with a business and political career. His failure in publishing has led the businessman to the trade and financial sector, activities which he performed brilliantly. He joined politics, without ever having had an elective office, though Juscelino Kubitschek and had the opportunity to participate in the creation and implementation of Pan-American Operation (OPA), one of his legacies to the Brazilian diplomatic history. He died of a heart attack on February 8, 1965.

Augusto Frederico Schmidt: the poet of acquiescent dependence

Carlos Eduardo Vidigal

Introduction

“I want to get lost in the world to escape from the world”. It only takes a fragment of Canto do Brasileiro, by Augusto Frederico Schmidt, of Heraclitean inspiration, to notice the versatility and strength of his thought, regardless of the assessment made on the quality of his poetry. The eccentric man, who was president of the Botafogo Regatta Club and who raised a white cockerel – the name of his memoirs was O Galo Branco (1948; 1957) –, was a successful businessman and a politician who never had any elective office. His friendship with Juscelino Kubitschek, of whom he was an adviser even before he became President, opened the path to politics and diplomacy (TOLMAN, 1976, p. 15). Schmidt was responsible for creating the slogan for JK’s Presidential campaign, “50 years in 5”, that is, 50 years of economic growth in 5 years of government.

As an adviser to the President, he developed the idea of Operation Pan-America, OPA, an initiative that had the purpose of challenging the Eisenhower administration as to engage in a broad program of development support for Latin America.[356] Juscelino, frustrated after unsuccessfully trying to obtain preferential loans and direct investments from Washington after 2 years of government, was convinced that the initiative was reasonable. He then asked Minister Horácio Lafer to intervene with the Head of the Political Department of Itamaraty, Manoel Pio Corrêa, to receive Schmidt, who would introduce him to OPA (CORRÊA, 1996, p. 603).

Pio Corrêa stated in his memoirs that there was a mutual antipathy between Schmidt and him, which was both “solid and sincere”. To the diplomat, Schmidt thought of himself as a genius of diplomacy, but in fact he was just an “obscenely obese” writer, a seller of sausage and jerked beef, who annoyed him with his arrogance, and his pathological “and almost feminine vanity in its jealous susceptibility”. Receiving him in the room where the Baron of Rio Branco worked and died was a sort of sacrilege. Therefore, it was with “ice cold politeness, typical of the House,” that Corrêa received “all the 20 stones of the big man” and tried to convince him that OPA was a “joke”. At least in the rhetoric and the extensive use of adjectives, Schmidt found an intellectual up to his own level.

Corrêa’s behavior, praised in his own memoirs, reveals the conservative nature of certain sectors of Itamaraty in the defense of corporate values and their apprehension when faced with an initiative that was not formulated within its own rooms and that could move its bureaucracy away from its comfort zone.

Although Corrêa thought OPA was a “venerable foolishness”, which Juscelino supported only because of Schmidt’s insistence, that was not the President’s thinking. The resistance against OPA within Itamaraty explains the replacement of Chancellor Macedo Soares by the politician Negrão de Lima, in July 1958. Before that, Juscelino sent to Washington the Secretary of the Presidency, Vítor Nunes Leal, to meet Amaral Peixoto, who at the time was the Brazilian Ambassador to Washington, in order to deliver him a letter from the President to start OPA. Amaral Peixoto considered Schmidt an intelligent man, with great culture, but “a lunatic”. His craziness could harm the Brazilian position in the United States, but unfortunately he had already convinced the President who, in his naivety, saw in OPA an opportunity to stand out in the international scenario (CAMARGO, 1986, p. 415-416). Only a politician with the experience of Amaral Peixoto could consider Juscelino Kubitschek naive.

Among the advisers to Amaral Peixoto in Washington was Miguel Ozório de Almeida, who asked for vacations when he learned that Schmidt would arrive soon, since the poet would probably arrive without any text and request a draft of OPA within 24 hours. Almeida was right. Schmidt arrived at the Embassy without any papers and, in Peixoto’s view, without a proposal. Almeida had to assemble the team that would provide consistency to Schmidt’s initiative.

Ozorio de Almeida coordinated the work group made up, among others, by Holanda Cavalcanti, Lindenberg Sette, Otávio Rainho, Osvaldo Lobo and Saraiva Guerreiro, whose main idea was to warn the United States of the possibility of an advance of communism taking place in Latin America, including in Brazil, which would put Washington’s own interest at stake. When Juscelino Kubitschek learned of their work, he praised what had been done, but said that that he wanted a bolder project than that.

Ozorio de Almeida complied and asked for freedom to work with some economists and diplomats of his choice. Since the USA had excess liquidity in its economy and foresaw inflation in the horizon, it should relocate investments in its own economy to the Latin American market. The Brazilian proposal should be that the North-Americans made public investments in the form of international aid to be applied in universities, schools, training, and improvement, among other areas, including, for example, in Brazilian ports (ALMEIDA, 2009, p. 59).

What boldness was there in requesting public resources from the US to be allocated in universities, schools, training, and improvement? Was this proposal in agreement with Schmidt and his idea that a country must be built from on its own resources, but supported by foreign capital? Or was the Brazilian diplomacy, placed at the service of Schmidt, working to empty OPA? The conflict between productive investments and aid investments was outlined, around which the poet had already taken sides, as can be verified in his articles published by the Correio da Manhã newspaper.

Without the nonsenses of false patriotisms

Schmidt was realistic. He was aware of the peripheral condition of Brazil, both regarding its political power and in international relations, and he considered that the destiny of millions of Brazilians was at the hands of few men capable of running the country, both domestically as well as abroad, in the struggle against colonialism. The agents of that struggle were neither the labor unions, or the oppositionists or the people.

He believed that the struggle for the country to become richer, on which depended our survival and our national continuity, had many adversaries, both foreign and domestic, located among the scholars, the pseudoscientists, the Jacobins, the false technicians, and the representatives of the overpowering bureaucracy.

According to the writer, “the adversaries are those who do not know what Brazil is, nor what it could become if there was a healthy revolution in the people’s mentality, a renewal, a clarification that took it out of the shadow where it has been for so long” (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 64). Schmidt’s realism was marked, largely, by elitism and, consequently, he was aware of the idealism.

In the key aspects, he was not different from the other men of his time. Overcoming the Brazilian problems through the action of scholars endowed with an extraordinary ability to understand the nation was the prerequisite to identify the problems, their causes and, therefore, the policies needed to overcome them. The scholars of the decade that started with the suicide of Getúlio Vargas, whose best example were the members of the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB), who supposedly had the keys to access to the knowledge of the society, presented themselves as followers of Getúlio’s last message, in particular in relation to nationalism and developmentalism. More than his heirs, they were ideologists who intended to gather forces that enabled nothing less than the transformation of the real (PÉCAUT, 1990, p. 104).

The transformation of the real, according to the chronicler of Correio da Manhã, consisted in the economic development of the country, based on national resources but supported by foreign resources, which left him partly displaced from the nationalism of the time. Schmidt believed that in Brazil it would not happen what took place with certain European countries, which received a huge amount of US resources in the form of funding, donations and loans without interest (and without a deadline) (2002, p. 74). The motivation of the White House was to avoid the communist expansion in the West, a challenge that justified its efforts to accelerate the reconstruction of Europe and to strengthen it economically speaking. What Schmidt knew from his observations and readings on the international scenario was verified in the Brazilian historiography of the following decades: the priority of the United States was to stop the Soviet expansion and, in that context, Latin America was a region of relatively secondary importance.

The problem was that maybe in no other Latin American country the level of expectations regarding the US cooperation was as high as in Brazil. A majority of its elites, both civilian and military, believed in a “new era” of the special relation with the United States. In Latin America, its economic, military and political hegemony was unquestioned and Brazil emerged as the privileged partner in the building of the new international order (MALAN, 2007, p. 72-76). That interpretation justified, to a great extent, the alignment that Eurico Dutra’s government promoted with the United States and the huge spending that took place in his government.

Schmidt considered that money was key in the economic life of a country and the Brazilian reserves were, undoubtedly, insufficient to cope with the country’s needs, which made it one of the countries that most depended “on everything”. The Brazil of the early 1950’s, without increases in its exports, could not nurture the fantasy of industrial development, since it had no conditions to build industrial plants with its own resources, always needing foreign machinery and materials in order to supply its emergent industries. There would neither be foreign financial aid without the country demonstrating it would be able to pay it back. The criticisms to the US foreign capital turned that kind of nationalism a harmful doctrine to the country, “an ideal of reclusion and a condemnation of Brazil to misery and backwardness” (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 69). The opening to foreign capital emerged naturally as the realistic alternative for those who did not want to wait for the “miracle of coffee”.

Schmidt believed that the Minister of Finance, Horácio Lafer, should turn his attentions to the topic of exports, a concern as important as living within the budget. His experience as a cashier and businessman allowed him to apply the basic notions he had acquired in the daily life of business to the major themes of the national economy. In a country where everything was an indiscriminate improvisation, it was praiseworthy the care with which Horácio Lafer addressed the budget, but the minister could advance to extend and diversify the “real” riches of Brazil. In that sense, Schmidt valued the effort of the minister in order to endow the country with services of transportation, power, ports, among other resources, which would become feasible thanks to the studies of the Joint Commission Brazil-United States. Almost half a century before Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Schmidt concluded his article, published in the Correio da Manhã, in mid-April 1952, with the following exhortation to Lafer: “Export, anyhow, in order to survive!” (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 69-70).

Exporting was the natural path for either the businessman or for the liberal thinker. In the path towards development, the free exchange rate was key, rather than “the slave exchange rate”. Unlike what many managers of the government of Getúlio Vargas thought, the exchange rate could not depend on restrictions, since it needed freedom to reach its beneficial purposes. The role of the exchange rate freedom was to bring the exchange rate problem back to reality, which was aggravated by a management of “bad sampling, one-eyed and grotesque”. The economic interventionism, although presented under the mantle of good intentions, intended to suffocate everything that existed in the country, in favor of the more traditional privileges.

The main political dispute in the Brazil of the 1950’s was between economic liberalism and state planning, between the forces of the economic progress and those of backwardness, which became clear with Cepal’s intellectual production, of the advocators of development and the early advocators of dependence. It was always convenient for the North-Americans to encourage the liberals and, if necessary, the Cepal scholars, whose creation had been boycotted by Washington (FURTADO, 1997, p. 61). The communists, however, had little weight in the national political game or in the North-American concerns.

Schmidt was aware of the domestic and foreign contexts of the time. He knew that the Brazilian communism had no significance to the State Department, especially because the Brazilians were “not dangerous”. In addition, the new North-American President, Eisenhower, would not foster blind investments. Besides:

Who sees all that from up close, without scales in their eyes, without demagogical inflation, without the stupidities of false patriotisms and the assumption that we are very important in the US global political game, who sees this very clearly, necessarily concludes that the image of a generous

and providential United States, a kind of Father of Them All, must be swept from the imagination (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 74-75).

It was neither the assumption about the importance of the country in the international scenario, or the belief in the role of provider of the United States. Critical of the performance of the political and diplomatic elites, Schmidt took as the starting point the decision of the Brazilian society to help itself, as this was the only way in which the country would be able to rely on the North-American help. The United States had rebuilt and restructured the economy of European countries, including Germany, its former enemy, while Latin America had been forgotten. In the case of Brazil, the investments would depend on how much the country was prepared to receive foreign aid, the serious cooperation, and the responsible management of the resources. Our difficulties derived from the fact that we trusted the rule of the country to unskilled and incompetent men.

The poet often attributed the country’s failures to our nature, to our fatalist mentality, to the perpetual bad public management, to the insensitivity of our elites with regard to inequality, to the hindsight and neglect, the difficulties that afflicted the country. In that analysis, which imitated the text by Paulo Prado about the Brazil of the first Republic, published in 1927 under the title Portrait of Brazil (PRADO, 1997), Schmidt questioned himself about the colonial – and republican – heritage and if, without it, the country could have avoided the debt, the budget imbalance, and the import of food. The Brazilian problems were rooted in its history and could not be ascribed to the United States. The Brazilians themselves were in charge of Brazil.

However, the lack of mobility was not the solution. Once the heritages that had a negative influence on the country’s development efforts were verified, the false ideas that misplaced our policies through unfruitful paths were nullified, and the path of development was identified, it was necessary to take the first step, that is, to favor the entrance of foreign capital. The closest example, in November 1953, was that of Juan Perón, whose government had abandoned its strict nationalism and had opened the country to the foreign capital. According to the chronicler, while Perón returned or seemed to return to reason, Brazil was not showing any sign of an objective policy in terms of foreign investments. Argentina was also considered an example in the oil sector, an area in which Brazil needed to recover the foreign trust. Schmidt trusted the work of Osvaldo Aranha, who had returned to the Ministry of Finance that year, to fight the backward mentality (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 86).

The articles written for the Correio da Manhã between 1947 and 1953, partially summarized in the paragraphs above, express the thought of Augusto Frederico Schmidt about development and the international insertion of Brazil even before the beginning of Juscelino Kubitschek’s government. A peripheral country of relative importance in the international scenario, distant from the main conflicts of the international politics and an exporter of commodities, Brazil was in charge of fostering its own development, with the help of foreign capital. The greatest challenge was to overcome its historical heritage and the atavistic nationalism.

Without getting lost in vague day dreams

Operation Pan-America was not a magic trick, as its idealizer pointed out. It would be impossible to sustain a development surge, or development itself, without a base on culture, i.e. without the creation of a mentality and the elaboration and a doctrine towards development. OPA, which brought within it the challenge to take millions of human beings out of misery, could not be restricted to a set of economic measures, but it needed to raise awareness, “without getting lost in vague day dreams” (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 92-93). Realism and idealism walked together in the thinking of the poet: the initiative of JK’s government should be a continental revolution, accompanied by an “Operation Brazil”, a movement that relied on the adjustment of the Brazilian thinking.

The obscenely obese scholar, seller of sausage and jerked beef, was aware of the resistance of Itamaraty against OPA and he certainly noticed the cold politeness with which the head of the Political Department of Itamaraty received his 20 stones. In concrete terms, Pio Corrêa argued that the mere mention of the Brazilian leadership in Latin America was enough for its Hispanic neighbors to articulate themselves against Brazil, and that we had no resources to participate in a hemispheric project of economic development (CORRÊA, 1996, p. 603). The refusal to support OPA was mainly because it was conceived outside Itamaraty by a businessman and poet who was a friend of the President. What Pio Correa considered a “venerable foolishness”, the JK government considered the only alternative to years of unrequited concessions.

The relationships with Latin America would have their historical logic inverted, from the fear of the Brazilian expansionism to a cooperation in favor of development. As for the resources of the country, there was no doubt that Brazil, as well as its neighbors, faced difficulties, but it would be neglectful to deny the existence of domestic resources, be it mineral wealth, arable lands, traditional manufacture or human resources. The studies of Cepal had already indicated the importance of the integration and the cooperation amongst Latin American countries. Obviously, most of the resources and the technical knowledge would come from the United States, which had to be convinced of the advantages of playing the role of paymaster of the regional development.

It was around that issue that Schmidt’s most original contribution to Brazilian diplomacy was formed: the possibility of articulation of Latin American countries among themselves and before the United States in order to join efforts in favor of the fight against underdevelopment. Aware that leadership is not to be declared, but to be exercised in the diplomatic practice, it was up to the Brazilian Chancellery and the Presidency to convince the neighboring countries of the benefits that could arise from the coordination of the regional interests. That was the political arm of the integrationist ideas of Cepal and the Inter-American forums.

The persuasion of the neighbors would result from two movements, from the power of the Brazilian example and its recognized ars diplomatica. In the first one, the Brazilian example was that of the developmentalist economic policy and the Plan of Goals, with which JK infected the Brazilian society and impregnated it with a rare optimism. The diplomacy was used, for example, even before the official launching of OPA, in order to obtain the support of Argentina to the Brazilian initiative. With that double movement, Kubitschek’s government opposed the diabolic forces – in a pre-Christian sense – of political conservatism, the symbolic elements of the construction of Brasília.

Gibson Barboza revealed in his memoirs that the coincidence of having two developmentalist governments, in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, has made the negotiations easier. Having received the task from JK to convince Arturo Frondizi, the President of Argentina, to support the Brazilian initiative, Gibson Barboza found a politician interested in bringing alternatives for the promotion of the economic development in his own country and in the region, and Barboza handed him a letter from JK, dated June 15, 1958, in which he introduced OPA (BARBOZA, 1992, p. 67).

Frondizi’s support has made Kubitschek feel confident of the initiative’s results and contributed for him to give the speech that can be considered the launch of Operation Pan-America, a name which was disclosed on that occasion. On June 20, 1958, Kubitschek showed his proposal to the diplomatic representatives of the American States accredited with the Brazilian government. He stated that Brazil and the other countries of the continent were already mature enough to refuse the role of being in the background in the Inter-American political game. He urged for a dynamic participation by the Latin American countries in the world’s problems, preceded by a rigorous analysis of the continental policy, as he had indicated to President Eisenhower.

Without confronting the United States, whose political and economic influence in Latin America had to be recognized, Kubitschek proposed the multi-lateralization of Pan-Americanism. Although Pan-Americanism had long been considered multilateral, by definition, it lacked consistency to that dimension, through a more active participation of Latin American countries and with a division, even if disproportional, of the responsibilities. Such change would bring about at least two advantages: it would contribute to reduce the weight of the United States in such negotiations, supposedly alleviating its burdens, and would favor the overcoming of the regional rivalries, by refusing a leadership role from individual countries, starting with Brazil. Juscelino believed that the OPA was not his idea, “but of all the peoples of America” (OPA n. 1, 1958, p. 34-37).

The role that the United States should have in the building of a new Pan-Americanism was essential, considering its natural importance in the relationship with its neighbors. In the same speech, Kubitschek mentioned the Marshall Plan[357] and its “uninterested” aid, the US loans to the Latin American countries after the War and the help directed towards the European reconstruction, which supposedly neglected the development needs of countries that still had rudimentary economies. The Brazilian president himself oscillated between the investments in the industry and welfare, demonstrating that the domestic contradictions of the country corresponded to an ambiguous and ambivalent foreign policy. Was Schmidt convinced that it was possible to obtain financial and technological resources for industrial development, along with actions on welfare? On the other hand, would it be possible to convince the United States of the strategic character of the “autonomous development” of Latin America?

How to convince the White House, the Congress and the State Department that OPA could bring great benefits to the United States? For that to happen, the diplomatic and political dimension of the Brazilian initiative should be joined up with the technical and economic dimension, of which Ozório de Almeida was in charge. Indeed, the assembly of a team of diplomats-economists, with the support of other diplomats and economists, bore fruits. As Marcílio Marques Moreira recalled, Washington had a group of diplomats who had brilliant careers ahead of them in Itamaraty: Geraldo Holanda, Lindenberg Sette, Sérgio Paulo Rouanet, Amaury Bier, Saraiva Guerreiro, Maury Gurgel Valente, among others. He claimed that OPA was welcomed at the Embassy and that the studies that Ozório de Almeida coordinated provided consistency to the initiative. According to Moreira, the importance of Schmidt was more linked to the missions in which he participated rather than to the elaboration of OPA, which supposedly gained in density only with the arguments presented in the study ‘Tendências Básicas das Economias Brasileira e Mundial no Período 1958-1980’ (Basic Trends of the Brazilian and Global Economies for 1958-1980). The study foresaw, among other things, that the Soviet economy would overcome the North-American one in 1972, becoming the world’s greatest economy in 1980 (MOREIRA, 2001, p. 46).

The document considered that the democracies had to face a challenge: to offer the underdeveloped nations a solution to the problem of development or to allow them to be attracted by the totalitarian nations. Both Europe and the United States were still not aware of that reality, which explained the neglect with which the Latin-American problems were treated. Thus, OPA presented itself as the best alternative to avoid serious consequences to the major economies and their democratic regimes, besides contributing for the unity of thought of the Latin American countries (MRE, 1958).

The greatest vulnerability of the country was in its reduced import capacity, which would demand from the Brazilian State the use of resources that could otherwise be destined to the private industry sector, by means of infrastructure works. At that time, the country had a low growth rate, depended greatly on imports, had a rapid population growth, low capitalization and the national resources were still insufficient to leverage an industry with greater added value, as was intended. OPA could channel resources to increase the exports, whose expansion was estimated, on realistic bases, from US$ 1,470 million, in 1959, to US$ 4,449 million, in 1980.

The study that Miguel Ozório and the other diplomatic and economic authorities elaborated converged with Schmidt’s ideas regarding the main problem of the national economy, the low level of exports and the need to tackle the advance of communism. The main difference was in the fact that Tendências Básicas put the potential economic growth of the communist bloc in numbers, while the poet’s discourse only had a voluntarist approach, according to which the project of OPA should be embraced by Washington when it considered Brazil a partner decided to deal with the overcoming of its historical constraints, with correcting the misbehavior of its politicians and with making a preponderant use of its own resources in the development process. The US perspective, however, did not consider any of these arguments.

To the United States, fighting communism in Latin America was not as urgent as it was in Greece and Turkey right after the War, or in Eastern Europe and Japan shortly thereafter, nor was it a complementary area in economic and financial terms, as was the case of Western Europe. The official announcement of the Alliance for Progress, on August 18, 1961, signaled for the US help to Latin America countries, but without addressing what was the most essential in Juscelino Kubitschek’s proposal, the actual development – potentially autonomous, as conceived by Cepal – of the Latin American economies.

A meeting of exuberant speeches

OPA had quick divulgation in May and June 1958 and was under discussion by the neighboring countries for the following months. The multilateral meetings, the exchange of correspondences among the American presidents and the debates in the press justified it being welcomed by the OAS. The Inter-American Economic and Social Council was in charge of creating a committee, the Committee of the 21, to analyze the feasibility of the Brazilian proposal and to identify the best means for its realization. In August, the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, Douglas Dilon, announced in the CIES the creation of an Inter-American development institution, which may not have been exclusively a result of the political and diplomatic movement of the Latin American countries in the previous months, but was, at least, a response to it.

It was clear that OPA was a program to eradicate underdevelopment from the Latin American countries, whose resources were supplied mainly by the United States, under the pretext of providing stability to the continent in its fight against communism. The Committee of the 21 was assembled three times: between 1958 and 1960 (in Washington, Buenos Aires and Bogotá), occasions when the USA would reveal their resistance in providing actual support to the initiative. Even in mid-1958, the USA did not hide the coldness with which they received the proposal of OPA, but they revealed their interest in creating a financial institution, marking the beginning of the process that resulted in the created of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).

The US government welcomed measures in favor of the stabilization of commodity prices, the integration of Latin American markets and the strengthening of institutions in charge of financing development projects, such as the Eximbank and the IBRD. This positioning, reinforced by the negative consequences of Nixon’s visit to South America, has brought reinvigorated support for the Latin American countries, although, in a certain way, they would not support the proposal of OPA, which urged for an increase of US investments in the region and the establishment of a medium-term investment timetable.

In that context, it is likely that Schmidt devoted more attention to the internal criticisms against OPA than to the path of the Brazilian proposal within the scope of the Organization of American States (OAS), in whose Committee OPA was emptied by the US diplomacy. The State Department instructed its representatives to dismiss the argument of the Brazilian representatives, which tied the economic development to the fight against communism. The US strategy was to request from the neighboring countries concrete and specific proposals, respecting the budget limitations. It meant, in practice, to delay responses to the claims of countries that, for administrative or political reasons, were unable to elaborate consistent projects at that time, and to limit substantially the developmentalist dimension, in favor of welfare actions (VIDIGAL, 2009, p. 42).

According to Schmidt, the works of the Committee of the 21 confirmed, at first glance, the acceptance of OPA by Washington; however, the slow pace of the negotiations, the recurrent way in which the US negotiators presented the resistance from its Congress in authorizing the release of resources, the progressive lack of interest demonstrated by the neighboring countries and the internal criticisms to OPA changed his mood. In an article published in O Globo, of December 1960, two years and a half after the launching of OPA, and based on the government program of Jânio Quadro’s campaign, which proposed the continuity of the Pan-American policy of Juscelino, Schmidt (2002, p. 105) was categorical: “OPA is irreversible”.

Three months later, he regretted that, in the beginning of OPA, both Brazilian and North-American journalists accused him of incompetence to fulfill the international missions of which he had been in charge, without him asking for them or wishing them, and of being unethical, because he used methods that seemed more like blackmail than diplomatic action. There seemed to gather a wave of unwillingness around his name and OPA had been received with “cold indifference by the State Department”. On the other hand, Schmidt recognized that some sectors of the neighboring countries had valued the initiative and that even in the Brazilian press there were some voices of support; after all, for as long as Latin America continued to be undervalued, left to an uncharacterized background, there would be a need for OPA to exist (2002, p. 108).

It was with that resignation spirit in face of the difficulties, both domestically and in the dialogue with the United States, that Schmidt witnessed the progressive watering down of OPA and attended the Uruguaiana Meeting, between the Presidents Jânio Quadros and Arturo Frondizi, in April 1961, in which 14 protocols of bilateral cooperation between Brazil and Argentina were negotiated, without any consideration of OPA, except for one mention that did not relate to the previously agreed commitments. The title of two articles published within less than one month, between May and June 1961, set the tone of a new moment: The Disappearance of OPA and The Denial of OPA. According to the poet, “instead of OPA, it was the Alliance for Progress that started its career, using much of what we did and thought and putting in the background what might seem to us the most important of being treated as priority” (2002, p. 113).

Schmidt’s pessimism derived from the fact that the North-Americans themselves refused beforehand any kind of planning directed to the economic development of the continent. The President of Colombia Lleras Camargo, who had praised the change of behavior of Brazil in relation to its Latin American neighbors as a very significant event, recalled that the Brazilian proposal was seen with much distrust. Among the problems that Brazil faced in Jânio’s government was the fact that Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco did not value the effort made in the negotiations of OPA. Schmidt insisted that the Alliance for Progress derived from the negotiations made in the Committee of the 21. The US initiative could not be mixed with OPA, because Melo Franco had no sympathy at all for Juscelino or for Schmidt himself (2002, p. 113).

OPA could be forgotten, but it should not be abandoned, since it was a good project that the Brazilian diplomacy was barely starting to execute. According to Schmidt, OPA’s central idea – that the defense of the West, through the fight against communism, would be more effective with the economic strengthening of the Latin American countries – was becoming “increasingly solid and unquestionable”. Schmidt did not hide his disagreements with Jânio and Afonso Arinos, but he demanded a respect to OPA that the following governments were unwilling to pay.

Much closer to the moon

The contradictions with which Schmidt referred to the Alliance for Progress were not just superficial, but they expressed his difficulties in accepting the denial from Washington regarding the Latin American development claims, as well as the use of the Kennedy government’s initiative in criticisms directed to Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy program (PEI). Indeed, both Schmidt and Juscelino valued the Alliance for Progress, interpreted as a North-American response to OPA, but they did not hide the atmosphere of animosity that accompanied the negotiations of the Committee of the 21. It was that perception that led Schmidt to call attention, in a harsh but safe way, to the indifference our allies showed for the future of the region.

The poet recalled that, “more than once I found it convenient to use slogans that were against the public opinion of the United States, showing the insensitivity and coldness that guided our relations”. In addition:

To the representatives of the State Department and the international journalists who followed the works of the UN General Assembly – witnesses of my several irritations [...], I complained about that coldness, not to say disdain, with which our longtime allies analyzed what I brought to tell them (2002, p. 149-150).

Schmidt’s resentment in relation to the United States might not have been so different from the frustrations accumulated during the governments of Dutra and Vargas, but because of the new regional context, had a deeper impact on him.

The extent of the disagreement between both countries was not seen only in the meetings of the Committee of the 21, where there were strong frictions between Schmidt and Thomas Mann. The Brazilian president even stated clearly that the United States not only did not help Brazil, but it also hindered its negotiations with the IMF, according to an interview given to Moniz Bandeira (2011, p. 76). The US government was not satisfied with the program of currency stabilization adopted in late 1958 and started to demand the reduction of public investments, mainly in Petrobrás, which would make the Plan of Goals unfeasible. The result of that disagreement was the aggravation of the bilateral tensions, and Kubitschek, unable to confront the United States, chose to break with the IMF[358]. The conflicts between Rio de Janeiro and Washington, despite the dramatic character it embarked upon in mid-1959, were not enough for the president and the poet to take their resentments to the next level. Both adopted a dubious position in relation to the Alliance for Progress.

During João Goulart’s government, Schmidt, as a chronicler for O Globo and other Brazilian newspapers, triggered a systematic campaign against what he considered to be treason to the country (TOLMAN, 1976, p. 17). In the “Open Letter to President Goulart – I” (O Globo, 1962, April 3), Schmidt admonished to the president, on the occasion of his upcoming trip to the United States. The Alliance for Progress was the last opportunity the country had to free itself from underdevelopment. The problem was that the Foreign Minister (San Tiago Dantas) was a loyal follower of Jânio’s policy and his intelligence, which besides being very small, was directed towards the Eastern lands of coastal Africa. In other words, “I can see inside that Mr. Dantas is wearing today the same strange and exotic uniform with which Jânio Quadros meets his most important visitors”. Nothing could be expected from the Foreign Minister, as he was so well-trained in the hard task of agreeing, as in the case of the Independent Foreign Policy.

A more consistent lesson was in Schmidt’s view about the role of the IMF and its relations with the North-American interests. Despite the view of Roberto Campos about Schmidt, who considered him the expression of the nouveau riche, of bad taste, of datedness and the lack of information, the poet did not accept the argument of the economic abstractionism of Campos, about the differences between the IMF and the White House. Indeed, there was no difference, since the IMF was not only an institution, but a whole way of thinking, “a kind of freemasonry”. The goal of the monetarists of the fund was to prevent the developed world from being more elastic in relation to the needs of the developing countries. What characterized the fund’s ideology was the despise for the reality in which its rules would be applied.

In the second “Open Letter” (O Globo, 1962, April 5), Schmidt stated that we did not lack the conditions for development and that we were able to make welfare and social justice work by our own means. Goulart should show that he was aware that we were not claiming given money, but the commitment to pay what would be trusted to us. In the bitter and melancholic Latin America, we were a country that was able to grow and move ahead of the others. Goulart should make himself understood by President Kennedy that Brazil did not wish the rosy Alliance for Progress, with its soft landscapes, with its children playing, but a fundamental impulse, a deep “operation”.

As for the “Inventor of Independence” (O Globo, 1962, April 26) and its fluid words, so well linked together that were easy to remember, they made Schmidt bored and saddened for its lack of authenticity. According to him, the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) resulted from the theoretical elaboration of partisan intellectuals of a policy grounded on the submission and on the lack of affirmation from Brazil. He was among those who were convinced that the famous “Independence of San Tiago” was nothing more than a folding screen to hide a neutral sectarianism of scarcely noble origin. Nobody could wish for their own country another position that was not independence. San Tiago Dantas positioned himself as a “servant of popularity, of bad-taste leftism, of the missionary spirit”, according to Schmidt, “for the simple fact that I fight him and repudiate him”. Ultimately, “this Dantesque independence is of the most partisan nature”.

Going on with his argumentation, in a slightly less aggressive tone, Schmidt recalled that Brazil had been receiving aid and collaboration from the United States to build its own democracy and that we should not complain about the collaboration that could only be legitimately received from allies. The policy by Dantas, on the other hand, invited the participation of countries in universal causes. For Brazil, however, exactly because it was an independent country, it would be more important to fight in favor of democracy and for the freedom of our beliefs. The Independent Foreign Policy was not even an original idea, as Jânio Quadros had inaugurated it and had renewed the own criteria of the country, including the geographic ones, inserting it in “amid the neutral zone, among the Sukarnos and the Nassers”.

Introverted in his criticism of the “Inventor of the Inde-pendence”, the poet condescended with welfare and distinguished it into two different types, what contributed and what did not contribute to the Brazilian development. The thesis of developmentalism had become a difficult theme to be dealt with, in face of those who advocated welfare without development. The ideal would be that the American cooperation was received in a priority scale for the investments, starting with the industrialization, on which the funds of the Alliance for Progress should be applied:

increase the already existing conditions to allow the creation of a really important industrial park; increase of our steel production capacity and of all the elementary chemical industries; expansion of the industries that use national raw materials (O Globo, 1962, October 5).

The US policy would enable and facilitate welfare more substantially than just installing fountains in the drought polygon, as was being planned.

Schmidt’s conservatism turned his articles in O Globo into pieces of artillery against the Parliamentary government of João Goulart, with the weapons either turned against San Tiago Dantas, or to the President of the Council of Ministers, Brochado da Rocha, or towards the Archbishop Dom Hélder Câmara (among others). Goulart, however, was the main focus.

The reforms that the president announced in late 1962 – the plebiscite that restored Presidentialism would take place on January 6, 1963 – pointed to the adaptation of institutions towards the economic growth of the Kubitschek government and, according to the president himself, the main sector responsible for them would be the business sector. Schmidt denounced the fact that the businessmen did not attend any of the meetings or made any agreements on the measures that destroyed the private initiative, they in fact disagreed with these initiatives. According to the poet, “the businessmen cursed to the heavens and others angrily punched their desks, the more desperate pulled their hairs out.” (O Globo, 1962, April 12)

The attacks on Goulart became more intense along 1963 and included criticisms to his ministers, his policy and the electorate, since “the nation accepts anything, if not delighted, at least in a faded and lethargic manner”. Thus the coup advocator was born, who placed himself among the “crazy people or considered to be crazy” because they were against the “insubstantial mass”. The latter played a ridiculous role, noticed by the government itself, which considered them moody and hasty. The victory was of Goulart, who “found in the clergy, in the nobility and in the people puppets to handle, vassals to serve him” (O Globo, 1963, May 12).

Schmidt asked himself if Goulart was really aware of what was going on in the country, if he knew what he was doing or if he was unaware of the dangers to which Brazil was subjected. As a parody of the famous sonnet by Machado de Assis, he asked himself “has Brazil change or have I?” Goulart certainly had not changed. He was still the same young man that Brazil got to know, who left the Ministry of Labor, in the Vargas government, because of the famous manifesto of the colonels. As the president, Goulart led, almost without any opposition, the disintegration ball (1964, p. 71).

Not by chance, Schmidt would be included among the “civilian generals” of the 1964 military coup – the Revolution, according to the version of its protagonists – and was almost considered a candidate to the presidency, but soon discarded (TOLMAN, 1976, p. 17). A personal friend of General Humberto Castelo Branco, he supposedly insisted that Juscelino promoted him to Division General, in August 1958. The president supposedly accepted Schmidt’s suggestion without enthusiasm. When the military dictatorship started to repeal the civilian politicians, including Kubitschek himself, Schmidt tried to defend him, intervening with President Castelo Branco, but was unsuccessful. He could not avoid the repeal and the apparently honorable solution of the voluntary exile of his main defender.

In the defense of Operations Pan-America, supposedly transformed into the Alliance for Progress, Schmidt was one of the fiercest adversaries of the Independent Foreign Policy, either under Quadros-Melo Franco, or under Goulart-Dantas. His stance was easily understood because of his conservatism, of his admiration for the United States, of his belief in the country’s ability to be the main one in charge of its own development. In Goulart’s government, he was against the establishment of an unstable situation in the country, the relative detachment from Washington, through PEI, and the emphasis given to neutralism.

PEI changed Schmidt’s willingness in relation to the Alliance for Progress. The welfare approach of Kennedy’s initiative was unquestionable. Lincoln Gordon clearly expressed that it was a cooperative effort, without the foreign resources replacing the internal ones and without being configured as a bilateral cooperation between the United States and each Latin American country. Part of the initiative was led by Inter-American institutions and global international agencies. The ideological dimension was given by a motto: “the common devotion to the democratic institutions and the respect to the human being”. With the “operation alliance”, Brazil not only could accept the challenge of its heavy social and economic problems, but become a model (GORDON, 1962, p. 1-19). The deconstruction of OPA was underway.

Schmidt avoided embracing that interpretation, especially because his priority was the relationship with the United States and obtaining resources for the Brazilian development. But from 1961, his discourse changed substantially. Before that, still as head of the Brazilian delegation to CIES, in OPA conferences in Washington and Buenos Aires, he was aware of the American neglect and, as previously observed, the neglectful way with which OPA was received in the United States. The Brazilian representative stated more than once that the “United States are much closer to the Moon than to the countries of our community” (Senhor, March 1961). Wasn’t the universal character of PEI the response to that observation?

Conclusion

OPA was a white cockerel. That might have been Schmidt’s assessment when he considered the rareness, the visibility and the strength of its crow. In the context of the post-war era and of the Latin American demands for resources to foster its development, the Brazilian initiative was actually a rare action moment, in which the interests at stake became explicit. Juscelino spared no efforts in order to call the attention of the Latin American presidents and the White House itself for the Latin American problems. However, he knew that OPA would only gain density with the adhesion of the neighboring countries, starting with Argentina, which, in a certain way, did happen.

When the historian of Brazilian international relations, Clodoaldo Bueno, commented on the meaning of OPA, he used his habitual academic refinement to state that, “as a response to OPA, however, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) is often considered as its only concrete outcome. But the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Alliance for Progress of President Kennedy were related to the Brazilian proposal” (BUENO; CERVO, 2011, p. 314). No doubt, OPA directly contributed to accelerate the creation of IADB and had a positive influence on the creation of LAFTA. However, as mentioned above, the Alliance for Progress was more of a counterpoint than a natural consequence.

Other analysts identified OPA as a division milestone in the changes of the Brazilian foreign policy guidelines, which since then started to be characterized by the diversification of international partners of the country, besides making clear the conflict of interests between Rio de Janeiro and Washington (OLIVEIRA, 2005, p. 86-87). Schmidt did not actually formulate the idea of the autonomy by means of the diversification of the international ties of Brazil, but saw the deepening of the bilateral relations with the Latin American countries and in the multilateral instances, such as the OAS and its Committee of the 21, IADB and LAFTA, as instruments to coordinate the development of the region and to overcome the backward conditions.

The context in which Schmidt elaborated his ideas was the same in which Cepal profoundly reviewed its texts from the previous years, still considered to be valid, but insufficient for the purposes of industrialization. The theory of the belated industrialization proposed the progressive differentiation of the productive systems, which would lead to a self-sustained growth (FURTADO, 1997, p. 61). That was, from another perspective, what Schmidt was suggesting since the late 1940’s.

In December 1947, when he analyzing the situation of Panama and the abandonment of the US bases in the region, Schmidt stated categorically that the position and the concept of the United States in the world were reinforced when they yielded in face of the fair claims of Panama. There was in the US resignation a sense of high continental policy and a movement to recover confidence, which the Americans needed (something that would happen again later, in May 1958). The main difficulty was to establish a balance and greater tranquility in the continent, which required facing the central problem of the region, the differences between the nations.

The poverty and the misery of certain Latin American countries should be of great concern to the American empire: “will Pan-Americanism actually exist, as the American people gradually become free from economic dependence and poverty” (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 17). According to the poet, the union of the Americas would require a support to the economic development of the poor areas of the continent. That is the sense of Schmidt’s assent faced with the dependence in relation to the United States. In the case of Panama, the United States had proven that its imperialism was very different from the Soviet one.

In his liberal and conservative view, which favored the narrowing of the bilateral relations with the United States, the poet believed, based on the natural, financial and human resources already available in the Brazil of the 1950’s, on the possibility to advance along the path of industrialization. He might have made a mistake in relation to Washington’s purposes, both when OPA was launched and in the meaning of the Alliance for Progress for the development of the region. He certainly made a mistake in relation to the power of the most backward economic sectors of the country and its behavior in face of an autonomous foreign policy.

However, Schmidt understood as few others did, the limits imposed on Brazil by the international scenario, the presence of US interests in the country, and our financial and technological frailty. Aware of those limitations, he recognized Brazil’s condition of a dependent country and acquiesced in face of the influence of Washington on the affairs of Brazil and its neighboring countries. The poet of acquiescent dependence and of political conservatism was not an advocator of autonomy, but, just like a cockerel that announces the dawn, he turned Operation Pan-America into a presage of PEI, even though he rejected it.

Bibliography

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CAMARGO, Aspásia et al. Artes da Política: Diálogo com Amaral Peixoto. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1986.

CORRÊA, Manoel Pio. O Mundo Em Que Vivi. Rio de Janeiro: Expressão e Cultura, 1996.

FUNAG. Miguel Ozorio de Almeida: Um Depoimento. Brasília: FUNAG, 2009.

FURTADO, Celso. Obra Autobiográfica, Tomo III: Entre Inconformismo e Reformismo: Os Ares do Mundo. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1997.

GORDON, Lincoln. O Progresso Pela Aliança. Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record Editora, 1962.

MALAN, Pedro Sampaio. Relações Econômicas Internacionais do Brasil (1945-1964). In: FAUSTO, Boris (org). História Geral da Civilização Brasileira, Tomo III: O Brasil Republicano, volume 11: Economia e Cultura (1930-1964). Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 2007, 4ª ed.

MRE. Tendências Básicas das Economias Brasileira e Mundial no Período 1958-1980. Estudos Econômicos da Pan-American Operation, November 1958.

OLIVEIRA, Henrique Altemani de. Política Externa Brasileira. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2005.

PÉCAUT, Daniel. Os Intelectuais e a Política no Brasil: Entre o Povo e a Nação. São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1990.

PRADO, Paulo. Retrato do Brasil: Ensaio Sobre a Tristeza Brasileira. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1997.

SCHMIDT, Augusto Frederico. Antologia Política. Rio de Janeiro: UniverCidade: Fundação Yêdda e Augusto Frederico Schmidt, 2002.

______. Prelúdio à Revolução. Rio de Janeiro: Edições do Val, 1964.

______. Seleta em Prosa e Verso. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora; Brasília: INL/MEC, 1975.

TOLMAN, Jon M. Augusto Frederico Schmidt. São Paulo: Edições Quíron. Brasília: INL/MEC, 1976.

João Augusto de Araújo Castro

He was born in Rio de Janeiro, to a family from Maranhão, on August 27th, 1919. He entered the diplomatic career in 1940, and graduated from the Law School of the Federal Fluminense University, in 1941.Throughout his career he occupied the following main positions: in 1951, officer at the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN, in New York; in 1958, Head of the Political and Cultural Department of Itamaraty, and member of the working group charged with the formulation of the Pan-American Operation (OPA), launched by President Juscelino Kubitschek; in August 1961, he accompanied Vice-President João Goulart’s delegation, in a special mission to Moscow and the Far East – this trip was interrupted in Beijing on account of the resignation of president Jânio Quadros (on August 25th, 1961); in August 1963, he was named Minister of Foreign Affairs of President João Goulart’s government (1961-1964); in the following month of November, he headed the Brazilian Delegation to the 18th Session of the UN General Assembly, in New York – in his speech in the General Debate, he launched the policy of the “Three Ds”– Disarmament, Economic Development and Decolonization; in 1968, he was appointed head of the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN and represented Brazil in the Security Council; in May 1971, he became the Ambassador of Brazil in Washington, where he died on December 9th, 1975. He was married to Míriam Sain-Brisson de Araújo Castro, with whom he had three children.

João Augusto de Araújo Castro: Diplomat

Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg

Among the many issues that Araújo Castro[359] addressed throughout his diplomatic career, were his speech in the UN General Assembly about the Three D’s – Disarmament, Economic Development and Decolonization, as well as his statements about the freezing of the world power and the negotiations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As an introduction to the present chapter, concise notes on those two issues are included next.

The Three D’s Speech

In the remarkable legacy of Araújo Castro concerning international relations, the formulation of the so-called “Three D’s” – Disarmament, Economic Development and Decolonization – which proved to be core themes in the international politics of his time – stand out. In the speech he made at the opening of the 18th UN General Assembly, in 1963, Araújo Castro argued that within the UN itself it was possible to notice the emergence of a Parliamentary articulation, – at the margin of the East-West confrontation – gathering small and medium powers around those three themes. According to him,

[...] the struggle for disarmament is the struggle for Peace itself and for the juridical equality of States that strive to place themselves beyond the bounds of fear or intimidation. The struggle for development is the struggle for economic emancipation and social justice. The struggle for decolonization in its broader sense is a struggle for political emancipation, for freedom and human rights (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 27).

Araújo Castro claimed that the great powers hesitated to accept the importance of those elements as major components of the world scene, in those early 1960s, although they had already been contemplated in the UN Charter itself, signed in 1945, in San Francisco. The efforts in favor of disarmament, although remarkable, advanced very slowly, while the arms race continued at a fast rate, consuming precious resources that could be channeled to economic development and to other important peace building purposes.

Araújo Castro made reference to the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, which assembled in Geneva and of which Brazil was a member, noting that the negotiations carried by it remained tough and concluded that “an elementary sense of realism leads to admit that we are still very far from signing a general and complete disarmament treaty [...] as far as the text of such treaty was concerned, we advanced very scarcely beyond a few paragraphs from the preamble” (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 28).

He understood that, given the difficulties to reach a more general agreement, the Powers should advance one step at a time, as they identified coinciding points of view and, in that sense, he suggested the advance in stages that started from the limitation of the nuclear experiences, so that they could later move towards an acceptable agreement that stopped the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the ways to prevent war by the accidental launching of that kind of armament. His considerations reflect, largely, the stage reached in the international debate on the nuclear issue in the early 1960s. He had very much in mind the memory of the crisis lived by the whole world in the 13 days before October 28th, 1962, when Nikita Khrushchev finally decided to withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba, after protracted negotiations with John F. Kennedy.

As for the economic development, Araújo Castro noted that such issue tended to become a source of growing pressure on the stability of the nations and on the international order itself, which could not disconnect from the emergence of social tensions with the growing potential to become political turbulences.

At that time, few people noticed, as he did, that the unsteadiness between the efficiency in the programs to reduce infant mortality rates and endemic and epidemic diseases, on the one hand, turned growing pressures on the economic and social development. On the other hand, the demonstration effect itself, carried out by the wealthier nations, turned the demand for economic development into an aspiration and a source of pressure on the international order. In that sense, he claimed that even though development was a struggle that would take place in several fronts, the UN was in charge of the role to lead internationally and articulated strategy in that effort. “The activities of the UN in the field of development must, according to my government, fulfill three priority areas: industrialization, mobilization of capitals towards development and international trade”, stated Araújo Castro, in the same speech of 1963 (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 33).

Decolonization had gained a strong impulse after World War II. The recognition of India’s independence started the movement for the establishment of new States born from the separation from their metropoles. In fact, it was a new movement that involved mainly Africa and Asia, since Latin America had become independent in the early 19th century, and the new colonial domains were established in those continents, by the end of the same century. Araújo Castro noticed the anachronistic nature of the colonial process, which helped to incite problems and was an obstacle to the progress of regions with huge populations, which required an improvement in their life conditions.

Why those regions that were colonized late should not follow the path of countries such as Brazil or the United States? That condition generated growing pressures, wherever it was in place, and it led to the establishment of political associations and “national liberation movements”. Many years later, Araújo Castro observed that “the liquidation and the eradication of the historical and sociological archaism of colonialism represented a measure of high defensive interest of the economies of all former colonies, regardless of the stages of their political liberation and regardless of what continent they belonged” (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 37).

In a certain way, reports by the UN itself shared Araújo Castro’s point of view, who saw the colonialism as a historical and sociological anachronism. However, the political advance of the process still required both time and effort[s] – Angola, for example, became independent only in the mid-1970s. However, thanks to Castro’s views, the Brazilian foreign policy professed, since then, a new way to understand the international order.

Brazil and the freezing of the global power: the Treaty of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

A remarkable element in Araújo Castro’s view on the international order was the notion that there was a tendency towards the freezing of the global power. According to him, “when we talk about power, we do not talk only about the military power, but also of the political, the economic, and the scientific and technological ones.”[360] Araújo Castro believed that such dimension was a conditioning factor of the standing of nations such as Brazil in the international scene, since it limited their actions and turned harder the development of economic, technological and social potentialities. In other words, such freezing trend in the standards of Power distribution was a problem for small and medium Powers, to which the economic and social development was a priority and to which the social and political change was an inevitable consequence.

Araújo Castro emphasized the case of the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) as a visible demonstration of that trend. He argued that the TNP had been the summit of the process of building the détente, that is, the policy of limiting tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had become stronger after the previously mentioned crisis of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. At that time, the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation were debated in Geneva, with both superpowers presiding, a practice that deserved a bitter opposition by Araújo Castro, since it discriminated against the countries that did not have nuclear weapons. The US agenda was directed towards all countries, while the Soviet one seemed to be more focused on preventing the military nuclearization of Germany and Japan, the powers defeated in World War II, and sought to immobilize the distribution of the strategic power that had been established in 1945. According to Araújo Castro,

the superpowers carry out a joint effort towards the stabilization and the freezing of the global Power as a result of two historical and arbitrary dates: October 24th, 1945, when the UN Charter came into effect, and January 1st, 1967, deadline for the countries to be qualified as militarily nuclear powers, according to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 200).

The assumptions that sustained the NPT contributed with new problems for the international order, as they established different categories of nations, a few of which were nuclear power States, which were to be considered strong, adult and responsible, while the others were taken as non-adults and non-responsible. Araújo Castro argued:

The Treaty derived from the assumption that, unlike all historical evidence indicates, Power brings within it both prudence and moderation. It institutionalized the inequality among the nations and seemed to accept the assumption that the strong countries will become increasingly stronger and the weak countries will become increasingly weaker. On the other hand, the NPT extends to the field of Science and Technology some privileges and prerogatives in the specific field of peace and security, that the UN Charter had limited to the five permanent members of the Security Council (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 200-1).

That statement reflected how much Araújo Castro remained up to date in relation to current theoretical and analytical literature on international relations. In that literature, the influence of thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau was remarkable for their devotion to Power politics.

The détente policy promoted a relative peace as the major goal in the international order. Among the main designers of that policy, the so-called realists, one should mention Professors Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington.

In 1963, Brzezinski, who was later the National Security Secretary of Jimmy Carter’s government, published, together with Samuel Huntington, a study of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, in which emerged the notion that, in the international order, both superpowers had more convergent than divergent interests with one another (BRZEZINSKI; HUNTINGTON, 1963). Both Powers profited from international stability, while the competition and divergence brought instability, insecurity and uncertainty, while, in fact, the military nuclear elimination of one or another was out of the question.

Araújo Castro saw a problematic side on this agreement as regards countries like Brazil, which were supposedly condemned to remain in the second class among categories of international order. As Brzezinski and Huntington were publishing their book on the role of the relations between the USA and the URSS within the international order, Castro already identified the “invisible veto” that was expressed in international forums and that paralyzed initiatives such as those relating to disarmament, made more difficult to advance the decolonization process and reduced the pace of the economic and social development in the peripheral regions.

Araújo Castro stated:

It is against that invisible veto that the efforts of nations with common desires and claims – those of peace, development and freedom – must be directed because, in the struggle for peace and development, freedom cannot be jeopardized (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 28).

Other seminal texts

This chapter will assess four other especially remarkable moments of Araújo Castro’s diplomatic performance, which nowadays are not always praised, namely:[361]

•Lecture at Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) in 1958, by the young Counsellor Araújo Castro;

•Inauguration Speech, in March 1963, as Minister for Foreign Affairs;

•Speech as Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN on the Strengthening of International Security, in the UN General Assembly in 1969 and 1970;

•Speech as Permanent Representative of Brazil against Apartheid in the United Nations, in 1970.

The lecture at ESG, in 1958, and the inauguration speech in Itamaraty, in 1963, are seminal occasions. They enabled Araújo Castro to articulate both ideas and concepts, developed throughout his political and diplomatic career. In turn, the texts on the strengthening of international security and about the condemnation of the Apartheid regime in South Africa as a crime against humankind, both from 1970, are remarkable for their theoretical scope and for their political perception.

As was noted in the beginning, Araújo Castro had an extremely broad array of substantive concerns. His immediate themes in New York and, later, in Washington, were, without trying to be exhaustive, peace and war; the political and strategic evolution of the Cold War to the détente; the international security and the freezing of Power; the bitter international realities and the possibilities to build a more fair and equitable order; the United Nations as a debating and negotiation forum, as a legal and political commitment and as hope of international reordering; the nuclear arms race and the pressing need of disarmament; the decolonization, the struggle against racism and the needs of development of the poor countries; the handling of the ecological theses; the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the access of all peoples to the achievements of contemporary science and technology and to the characteristic welfare of the economically developed societies.[362]

The diplomatic reputation of Araújo Castro derived mainly from his themes of intrinsic importance, scope and repercussion, from the quality and the innovative capacity of his analysis, and from the political courage to the success of his enterprise.

It is worth recalling that in the months before the 1964 military movement, Araújo Castro was the Foreign Minister of João Goulart’s government (by the way, his appointment broke the taboo preventing employees of the Ministry to became its head). Thus, at the maximum moment of his creative power, he had to co-exist with an especially disturbing domestic political situation.

Lecture at ESG, in 1958, by the young counsellor Araújo Castro

In 1958, when he was still a Counsellor of the diplomatic career, Araújo Castro gave at the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) his first lecture that had repercussion, under the title, which was standard at the time “National Power: Domestic and Foreign Limitations”. This text marked the beginning of his public life and of his highly successful career. He proposed ideas and concepts that were later worked upon and deepened. Therefore, already in 1958, Castro projected himself as a valuable source of political and diplomatic thinking.

The year 1958 was very special for Brazil. The lecture reflected the positive climate that prevailed in various fields. Hopes emerged of a better Brazil, and a proposal of a renewed, open and constructive foreign policy was within the range of the political discussion.

Also in 1958, the Vice-President of the United States, Richard Nixon, visited eight Latin American countries, which became, as a result of serious street incidents, a symbol of a lack of understanding in the hemispheric relations. It was also the year of the launching of the Pan-American Operation, by President Juscelino Kubistchek, and of the beginning of the painful reclaiming of the Brazilian role in the Inter-American relations, a role which experienced remarkable difficulties in the following decades.[363]

In the global sphere, the relaxation of tensions process (détente) still had not really started. That was the time of the long East-West post-war confrontation, among the remains of the earlier relaxation that took place after Stalin’s death, in 1953. However, the prospects of that incipient decrease in tension underwent a great change due to the events of Suez and Hungary, in 1956, that is to say, the invasion of Egypt by forces of the United Kingdom and France, as well as the occupation of Hungary by the Soviet Union and associated countries to it. It was only with the visit of Khrushchev to the USA, in 1960 that the détente policy gained momentum, although brief (and opposed by People’s China). Détente finally prevailed after the crisis generated by the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. That crisis enabled the strengthening of the nuclear disarmament talks in Geneva, as if the members, starting by the superpowers, had suddenly noticed their vulnerability to the nuclear stalemate.

On his lecture at ESG, Araújo Castro revealed his remarkable way of thinking. He sought historical and sociological support for the diagnosis of the international relations, but he always sought to look ahead, he always anticipated the hypotheses of evolution of the world order and outlined possible paths for the Brazilian foreign diplomatic action. He consistently avoided fatalism, since his proposals were always mediated by political instances.

As one reads that text, it becomes clear the author’s determination not to enter, as he says, in “filigrees of inter-pretations and subtleties,” while he emphasizes the ambiguities of the concept of power and the variations in its application to the domestic and the foreign orders. Castro warned against the surplus of rationalism and intellectualism that led to the lack of trust and skepticism, but also to the surplus of naivety and attachment to overcome political myths.

The theories of power, which he brilliantly articulated in the following years, did not emerge suddenly in his thinking. They were elaborated gradually. In that lecture, he even turned relative all forms of power and placed them almost at the point of indetermination. He distinguished a clear dose of convention and will in the formulations of international politics current at the time.

One of the many interesting topics of that lecture was the recourse to the thought of Machiavelli, the first modern philosopher of power:

Man, iron, money and bread make up the power of war, but among these four elements, the first two are the key ones, because man and iron find money and bread, but bread and money do not find man and iron.

Although he admitted that each of those elements retains its key importance in the contemporary world, he emphasized that, in modern times, they would equate in a different way and under a different political logic from that of the Renaissance. He warned that today Machiavelli might have very few to learn about the deep reasons, the psychology and the goals of war, but certainly many new things would be revealed to him concerning the means used and the resources, weapons and tools that support domination and conquest.

He noted that, in the international balance of power, the wealthier and more developed countries will always be the strongest ones: no specific military preparation, regardless of how intelligent it is, may correct the vulnerabilities, weaknesses and shortcomings of an underdeveloped economy, and he added:

We will continue to need the four elements of Machiavelli, but they will no longer be enough. The improvement of the life conditions of a people, its health, and its social welfare, is a key element for the strengthening of the national power.

Therefore, Araújo Castro took the risk of reinterpreting Machiavelli from the perspective of the main requirements of the Brazilian life and conciliated our need for development with a realistic picture of international politics. Besides, he sharply anticipated the importance of the social problems and their inter-relation with strategy.

The lecturer explained without hesitation the different features of the national problem and the insertion of Brazil in the world. He stated that, despite the lack of adjustments and uncertainties of the economic and financial panorama, the goals of development – that are mixed up with strategic and security goals – will have to be kept and extended.

It is not surprising that Araújo Castro has resorted to Machiavelli, since, in fact, he used what is best in the traditional and contemporary political literature.[364] The major currents of thought are represented, in his research and bibliography, but it can be seen in them, mainly, a solid reading of realistic authors, and even conservative ones, within the context of the Cold War, such as Hans Morgenthau, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Robert Strauss-Hupé and Stephan T. Possony, among others.

However, he did not do that to display knowledge, but because he noticed that, in order to look ahead, it is necessary to add the Western political experience. For that reason, he assessed very carefully the available literature. Taking advantage of the opportunity, his effort was, above all, to develop, with new shades, the concept of national power that, at the time, was outlined at ESG. He made clear the usefulness of that concept, as well as the need to review it permanently. However, he did boast that:

The words are man’s slaves and name the things and concepts that he wishes to establish, turn accurate or limit. However, in our case, not always we will be able to keep them loyal to the single, immobile and intangible concept of national power.

In his great task, Araújo Castro reinterpreted his sources and overcame them. He placed himself, in an advanced manner, in an international scenario dominated by the ideological confrontation and, in the scenario of the Brazilian foreign policy, in a process of reform that had just begun. Already in that first attempt, he attested his quality as a theoretician on international relations and foreign policy.

He emphasized that “the quickest and most direct path towards strengthening the national power is that of economic development itself.” Despite scarcely encouraging indications as for the possible evolution of the international order, Castro believed in Brazil and favorably considered the path to be taken, despite all difficulties.

He pointed out that, only 20 or 25 years earlier, therefore, in the 1930’s, Brazil was a small power with illusions of medium power, and that in 1958 it was already placed, with advantage, in the category of the medium powers, despite afflicted with some undesirable, and even dangerous features, or the psychology of a small power.

With the safeguard that, at the time, Brazil was on the eve of the industrial revolution and the fading of the “still remarkable vestiges of our political and social ruralism” – he observed how all that is recent in the Brazilian history – he evaluated that our country already had specific weight in the international politics game, even though he recognized that such perception was received, in certain sectors of the national life, with reservation, distrust or skepticism.

He foresaw that in a few years, Brazil would become an exporter of manufactured goods and that such strengthening of the economic power would certainly lead to an important strengthening of the national power. Both the domestic and the foreign field were, according to his avant-garde view, strongly intertwined and the overcoming of the limitations and vulnerabilities of the former would soften or would lead to the disappearance of the latter.

In that context, he cautioned the need for ensuring that our mentality or psychology about the international field be adjusted to the new relative position of Brazil and avoid to tie itself to semi or paracolonial conceptions and attitudes.

In his conclusion, Araújo Castro warned, in a perceptive manner, that we Brazilian waver between boastful nationalism and despair, between the rosiest optimism and the gloomiest pessimism, between the goal of our economic development and the “unfortunate metaphor of the cliff about to swallow us.” Using correctly an image by Arthur Koestler, he concluded that “we went too quickly from the ultraviolet to the infrared, in a world of power that encompasses all the gradations and shades of the spectrum.”

He insisted that power is neither eternal nor unchangeable, and that it was enough to recall the world situation since the 1930s to observe how the European power migrated to the East and the West. He observed that power had nomad habits, it moves easily and, thanks to the new resources of technology, it may settle anywhere in the world. I comment this observation, which was reconfirmed by the transformations, sometimes gradual, other times sudden, in the international order, such as the variations of the insertion of China in the world political and strategic spectrum.

The lecturer clearly saw that the progress and the development of Brazil would be inevitably affected by what happened in the world. He added that geopolitics did not foresee the technological revolution that, in a relatively brief period, changed the political panorama of global power. Despite all dreams, that picture is still ruled by power politics. National power determines, as Hans Morgenthau wrote, the limits of the policies of each State. If it was necessary to validate Araújo Castro’s ideas and to verify their longevity, it would be enough to emphasize those considerations.

He suggested, at that moment – and this is another precious proposal for the analysis of foreign policy –, that the national power be the object of an accurate, unbiased and objective evaluation, so that the useful limits on internal or external action not to be overcome, but also not to leave them unexplored. In other words, so that not even by pride we lose the sense of reality, not even for the lack of action we may leave still means and resources that may be mobilized to our advantage in both the domestic and the foreign spheres.

Araújo Castro’s diplomacy was not reduced to the multilateral sphere. It contemplated the global insertion of the country and did not stop taking care of the bilateral relations. His thought, as well as his later political action must be evaluated without any biases. Above all, we must avoid any anachronistic shift of Araújo Castro’s public performance – which, let us not forget, extended from the already remote years of 1958 to 1975 – to nowadays.

Having said that, it is only historical justice to recognize the wealth of his reflection, whose principles provide an important contribution to the discussions that, in the last few decades, mainly, address the themes of the globalization, regionalization fragmentation. When one talks about globalization, it is postulated, very naturally, a violent displacement of the perceptions of that time. It is still being verified the reality of the disappearance of the East/West confrontation, while the so-called North-South dialogue is strongly shaded. The compass of international politics stopped guiding itself by the cardinal points, as Araújo Castro had already anticipated. The theories concerning the center and the periphery of the world do not seem operational anymore. Despite that, each region, each country of the so-called peripheral world and even each sector of those societies seeks to adapt to the new reality – the globalization model – and to create a new kind of relation with the dominant poles of the global economy and politics.

Araújo Castro was actually right in the observations that power takes new contents and that the reality is not in accordance with pre-established models. It is for that reason that his theory, expressed in the 1970s, on the fallacy of the freezing of the world power had so much interest and continues to serve as a parameter for the political analysis.

In turn, the phenomenon of regionalization has now new nuances. I point out that regionalization now seems a stage of the globalization process, or at least as the way by which different countries, in a same region, unite themselves, get closer to one another, and ultimately integrate themselves to defend themselves of the worse consequences of the globalization and to maximize their opportunities in the world sphere. That is true especially as far as the so-called open regionalization is concerned. Getting out of the straightjacket of the East/West confrontation, the tendencies to fragmentation, which remain subjacent to the international system, appear with more strength and clearness.

Today, more than previously, the role of the national State is questioned. Global tendencies are redirected beyond the Cold War, without abandoning, however, the concept of power. Moreover, it is exactly the view of power, as an aspect of reality, which makes Araújo Castro avoid any shadow of romanticism, or of romanticized idealism in his thought. That view turns him pragmatic and useful, and makes his thinking into a tool that can be applied to different strategic and diplomatic situations.

Certainly Araújo Castro would be fascinated with the current ambiguities of the concept of national power, when the States seem weakened, as paradoxical as it is, they self-affirm exactly in the peak moments of financial, military or terrorist crisis. The self-affirmation continues to take place in decisive moments, but all the attentions turn to resources in the hands of the States. It is only after listening to the statements by the governments, the international economic organs and the markets are encouraged to seek again solutions for problems that seemed impossible to deal with. The power of the States is also reaffirmed in the moments of organized international violence when the society, the market and the citizenship often feel threatened. Only the States can take the risk of generating military solutions for international policy matters, and when they do not do that, they risk losing their credibility.[365]

Today, Araújo Castro would certainly pay attention to analyses about the circumstances in which the concept of global power and its ambiguities were almost entirely deleted from the discourse on the international order. The analysis of this issue has key implications for the Brazilian foreign policy. Curiously these implications actually became absent from the specialized literature. That did not lead, however, to the end of the iniquitous structures of global power, which only transformed themselves throughout the decades.

I believe that even Araújo Castro, who often emphasized the historical improbability of the freezing of the global power, would have been surprised with the flexibility of the international power relations. Those relations still subsist today, despite the disappearance of the East-West confrontation and of the stress on the economic questions, as keys of our times. In the context of globalization and how to carry it out, in a near unipolar world, the international power is still present, despite several and well-known differences between the Cold War and the post-Cold War. In order to assess such differences, it is enough to mention a few of the basic tendencies of our time, such as the information technology society, the volatility of the short-term capitals, post-Fordism and, perhaps, post-modernity.

Nevertheless, already in 1958, Araújo Castro proposed a comprehensive national security policy to face global challenges, a general strategy that included a decided effort for the building of the national power, by means of the recovery of man, the development of the economy and society, the modernization of the Armed Forces, the consolidation and improvement of the national institutions, the extension of the scope of diplomacy, and the improvement of the collective security system of the Hemisphere to which it should now be added the financial stability and the strengthening of the international security. This last idea was, in the late 1960s, an original contribution of Castro himself.

In 1975, again in a lecture at ESG, Araújo Castro assessed the advances already made, the lessons already learned, and stated, “Today nobody is able to understand Brazil, except when placed in the world map. Brazil belongs to the world, to its human problems and its desires for peace, security and development.”

In the years before the latest world economic crises, both the Western experts and its media had seen the tendency towards globalization in an extremely optimistic manner. On the hand, Araújo Castro’s ideas seemed condemned to gradual irrelevance. However, the positive consensus was broken. The globalization process might go on, but the international reality proved that it does not accept a model fatally pre-established. The noises asking for review were already present and still are. Not that the old ideas should or can be revived, but the building of an innovative way of thinking and its discussion must restart where they were interrupted, at the point in which the technological innovation, as it mistakenly seemed, started, for the first time, to overcome its social and political repercussions.

That debate will start very closely from the point where Araújo Castro left us. In that emerging context, the dialogue capability and the diplomacy action will be valued. Considering the new world problems, the so-called global ones, the need for qualified diplomatic personnel becomes decisive again. Araújo Castro, our Ambassador and Chancellor, always stated the need for a focus on foreign policy. The current students of the Rio Branco Institute and the young diplomats – those who will soon be Ambassadors and Chancellors – throughout their careers will review the current and past ideas, and then afterwards evaluate them, as Castro said, “in the relentless scale of the defense of national interest and of the promotion of the ideals of humanity.”

Araújo Castro’s inaugural speech as the minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, in 1963

This speech is a diplomatic jewel, a beautiful analysis of the global insertion of Brazil expressed in an accurate and elegant style.

First, the new Chancellor reminded everyone in the attend-ance that his inauguration was taking place in the old and symbolic working office of the Baron of Rio Branco, in the Itamaraty Palace, in Rio de Janeiro. He recalled that in the preceding administration of Professor Evandro Lins e Silva, Itamaraty had prepared an evaluation of the Brazilian foreign policy and what had to be done to carry out the reactivation of the different sectors of the Ministry. He emphasized, the “practical, direct and objective treatment given in that document to all our diplomatic subjects, without preconceived ideas, without strict and unmovable positions, and with the clear and lucid notion of the new responsibilities of Brazil in the international sphere.”

The inaugural speech was, above all, thematic. It was devoted to the major concerns of the humanity and Brazil. It moved away from minor issues that often made up the daily life of diplomacy. No doubt, the new Chancellor showed that he was interested in solving the existing bilateral differences that hinder diplomacy and block the main difficulties as well as the solution of broadly collective problems. He proposed a useful thesis, which still finds echoes, according to which “every political problem is characterized by its extreme complexity and it cannot be reasonably expected that absolutely any initiative that we take is immediately victorious or even understood”. He stated that “all that involved the problem of the political maturity of the Chancelleries” – and I add, of the public opinion. He also stated that, in all moments, it is “indispensable that our thoughts are directed towards Brazil and towards what this country represents, as a new experience in the history of mankind [...]. He concluded that it is indispensable that, when we pursue such broad goals, we do not lose the sense of objectivity and political realism that we have been able to keep in our diplomacy”.

He recalled that he had previously emphasized that today,

Brazil is in an ideal position to make a positive and original contribution to deal with the major international problems [...], since it has neither pending political problems in the foreign sphere, nor restraint or limit conditions upon its sovereignty, nor historical causes of resentment, nor territorial claims.

In addition, he averred that

We have natural bridges to all people and all continents. What we did not have, until a short time ago, was the will or the tendency to use these bridges. Now, we are willing to use all of them, since such a young and vigorous country as Brazil cannot be condemned to isolation, or anyway wants to close its ports that were open during the colonial era. We cannot allow hurried generalizations or false options to jeopardize such effort to adjust the tendencies of our diplomatic action to the universal calling of the Brazilian people.

He also emphasized that

Today Brazil is sufficiently mature and aware so that it can negotiate and take on commitments with anyone. To the alarmed and unfaithful, wherever they are, in the center, to the right or to the left, I ask to trust a little more both our country and Itamaraty.

He ensured that

We have never been so present or so active in the international scene. What is indispensable is that the Brazilian people unite, in all its social classes, in all its political or partisan groupings, when a legitimate Brazilian interest appears abroad. The only purpose for the existence of Itamaraty is to defend the permanent interests of Brazil, and those interests of our homeland include the establishment of a climate of peace, agreement and understanding among all members of the community of the nations, and the permanent work in favor of the improvement of life conditions of the underdeveloped and unprotected part – and it is much more than a part – of the humanity.

This was certainly the core of the inaugural speech. However, Araújo Castro also alludes to items that were already being discussed in the diplomatic agenda, such as the need for political persistence in relation to the major issues of disarmament, economic development e decolonization, which led to his great speech on the 3D’s at the opening of the 14th Session of the UN General Assembly.

He acknowledged that “it becomes clearer every day that those three goals inform an entire political action, to be developed, in full and strict cooperation with the sister nations of the hemisphere and with all those that want to join us in a common diplomatic effort.” He explained that “when we claim an effective and ongoing action in those three major areas of political and social progress, we will be claiming nothing more than the fulfillment of the promises made in San Francisco.”

Araújo Castro restated the Brazilian position regarding the multilateral negotiations of the disarmament, a crucial issue since the Thirteen Days in October 1962. He predicted, having in mind the soon upcoming I UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) that Brazil will have to carry out major efforts to obtain from the international organs the recognition of the strict correlation between the structure of the international trade and the problem of the economic development. That’s why, as he stated, Brazil fought and would continue to fight for the “establishment of an International Trade Organization, which corrects the harmful effects of the distortions that determine and condition the pernicious deterioration of prices of raw materials and commodities in the international market.” He stated that Itamaraty will do anything for “the expansion of our foreign trade, diversification of the export agenda and the intransigent defense of the position of our products, mainly coffee, in the international market”.

In that broad picture, he revealed our major goal is that of relying on a collective security system in the economic sphere, parallel to the one we helped to build in the political and security spheres.

Before ending his speech, he sought to detail the core issue of the insertion of Brazil in the world. In what became one of the main points of future speeches of his career, he emphasized the universalist, humanitarian and generous calling of the Brazilian foreign policy – a picture in which he included the policy in favor of decolonization, in whose context he stated that we must be intransigent in the defense of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.

He said that Brazil did not belong to any block, but that it was a member of the Inter-American one, which, however, he restricted with the observation that for us the system is a work tool in favor peace and the understanding among nations. He emphasized, “it is crucial that the Inter-American system becomes a dynamic element of renewal and social justice.”

He explained that, on the one hand, for us, Pan-Americanism is “a solidarity attitude in face of common problems, rather than a rhetorical position of legalism or academicism. The Latin American problems are too urgent and serious for us to be satisfied with the restatement of the inexpressive formulas – and, exactly for that reason, unanimous ones – that characterized certain collective statements of the past. We cannot allow an extremely serious political problem to hide under the lyric language of the communicated classics and proclamations.”

He noticed, on the other, the need for us “to work decisively to solve some pending economic issues in the field of the bilateral relations with countries that were traditionally our friends.” He professed “a stance of calmness and objectivity, without preconceived attitudes, suspicions and resentments. In this, as in other cases, Brazil only wants the open and sincere dialogue.”

He emphasized that the entire Itamaraty shared that responsibility and that, as far as possible, he would continue to carry out the Independent Foreign Policy – of Brazilian affirmation, continental fraternity and universal calling – that “will be totally preserved and that places Brazil in the world where it will have to live.”

Finally, he recalled the friends and peers of the House, where he already worked for 23 years, “[my] peers who always fought for a more living and acting voice of Brazil in the international sphere [...] always rebelled against the routine, conformism and the exteriorities and conventionalities of a diplomacy that had been surpassed for a long time”, and he concluded that “this generation of diplomats takes on a serious responsibility towards the government and towards Brazil.”[366]

The strengthening of international security

Araújo Castro had an extraordinary ability to formulate global theses, which allowed him to find, in a moment, the path to articulate concepts and to outline, beforehand, his future reasoning, mainly when it had to do with the core tendencies of the international scene.

On the 25th Anniversary of the UN, in 1970, it became necessary to establish a relation, a tie, between the solution of its vices and the political behavior of its members, as well as a relation of what happened in the sessions of the UN main organs and what actually happened in international politics. Based on that diagnosis, Araújo Castro engaged in the defense of the strengthening of the international security, a subject that until then was controlled by the most powerful countries. He universalized the international concern with that theme and he explored the lack of flexibility of the permanent members of the Security Council, when he used the issue of reform of the UN Charter, which was the true symbol of the immobility of the international power macrostructure since 1945.

Benefitting from the general interest to ensure that the celebrations of the silver anniversary of the UN, in 1970, were brilliant, with the approval of significant declarations, Araújo Castro led many delegations in the negotiations about the elaboration of a Declaration on the strengthening of the international security, an item that, in the previous year, had been included in the agenda of the General Assembly, on the initiative of the USSR. The inclusion of that item raised scarce interest, and even hostility, in many member States, mainly in the Western ones.

First, Araujo Castro worked together with the Latin American group, which gave him unanimous approval to submit a draft Declaration, whose writing was mainly a task given to the Brazilian delegation. That maneuver forced the other political groupings (Socialists, Western and Non-Aligned) to submit their own projects and, later, all those groups to gather to negotiate, under the coordination of Araújo Castro himself, a conciliation text that was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly at the end of that process.

He used all possible parliamentary techniques to reach a positive result. He even circulated a supposed internal memorandum of the Brazilian Delegation, to which he gave the fictional number 63, with a series of ideas to break the impasses that had appeared during the negotiations. He claimed that his aids wrote that memorandum, when, in fact, the text was elaborated under his own guidance.

Araújo Castro made two speeches about the strengthening of the international security in the First Commission (Political Commission) of the General Assembly, on October 13th, 1969 and September 28th, 1970, in which he detailed the principles of the Brazilian initiative. The USA and other Western countries soon provided an adverse and symmetric resistance.

Araújo Castro, however, changed the pace of the debates and renewed the reading of the item, when he snatched it from the USSR Delegation and placed it at the service of the “non-aligned countries,” or, as he used to say, of “all members of the UN.” In order to attract the attention, he used his rhetorical qualities and gave new political substance to the item. Besides addressing the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation – after all, the TNP had been signed in 1968 – he introduced, in those speeches, other clearly relevant variations for the role of the United Nations in the major security issues of that time.

When he referred to the procedures of the issues concerning disarmament and non-proliferation, he claimed that the tendency to move away certain international issues prevailed in the UN and, consequently, the Organization was being condemned to silence, inaction and impotence. He went on to say that some people preached that certain items exacerbate tensions, poison the world atmosphere and feed the fears of the danger that the “political pollution is added to the hazards of the physical pollution,” which have an impact on the environment and contaminate it.

Nonetheless, on the one hand, he observed, never in history the medium and small nations felt so vulnerable and crime, violence, aggression and piracy, subversion and terrorism were so abundant, spread so much along the different crossroads of the world. As it is well known, these plagues still exist.

He emphasized, on the other hand, that, “with the concept of superpower, power became respectable and became the object of a new cult”. The world threatened to be divided among “adult, responsible and powerful countries” and the non-adult ones and, consequently, irresponsible and non-powerful.

Araújo Castro stressed, however, that no collective solution for the conflicts would be possible if it was based on the “quicksands” of power and violence or on the freezing of certain situations. “For the States, national security corresponds to the preservation of peace”. Security is a previous requirement for the existence and the development of the States and, consequently, for the “normal” operation of the community of nations, which shall not be degraded to the condition of a community ruled by fear and intimidation.

Araújo Castro disapproved the measures towards “depo-liticizing” the United Nations. His proposal was exactly the opposite of that process, since he insisted that a reform of the Charter will be necessary to accommodate the emergent world circumstances. In addition, he said that it must be based on refraining from using or the threat of force, as well as of the political and military pressure. There must no longer be space for the existence of spheres of influence, deriving from the unbalance of power, of the arrangements confined to the closed doors negotiations carried out by the superpowers.

In his two speeches, Araújo Castro made explicit a lucid theory of peace, when he stated that:

•for the superpowers, engaged in the nuclear career, peace gradually started to be only the survival of the humanity and the absence of a nuclear outcome;

•for the medium and small countries, peace is much more than the opposite of war. It is a daily effort of understanding and creative behavior or, more simply, it means immunity from aggression, preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity. For those countries, any use of force, outside terms of the Charter, is against the peace.

Speech against the South African apartheid, in 1970

As another example of performance that stood out in burning issues that shook the world order, recall the speech made in 1970, before the 25th ordinary session of the General Assembly, in which Araújo Castro qualified apartheid, for the first time in the history of the Brazilian diplomacy, as a crime against the humanity. Thus, that crime could be compared to those that the Nazi committed during World War and it could lead to international responsibility.

Thus, he revealed not only the needs of the moment, but also deeper dimensions. The first of these, the moral need to fight, on behalf of the humanity, racial prejudice, segregation and injustice, wherever they are located, and to prevent that evil thrives, as well as that harmful and anti-human practices may consolidate in some way.

Aware of the racial complexity of our country, Araújo Castro was concerned about the interface of the Brazilian diplomacy with its own ethnic panorama. In that context, he claimed that apartheid could not be left to be forgotten, since it was a direct aggression to the Brazilian experience, to our desires and to the mode of organization of our society. That dimension had to do, specifically, with the African policy of Brazil and our parliamentary position in the United Nations.

As in other episodes, Araújo Castro made diplomacy with braveness, in face of an issue that was emotional to the international public opinion and affected established interests. “The cruel nature of apartheid justified considering it a crime against the humanity”. Only much later, after three decades and after so many changes in the international relations that theme started to leave, thanks to the task carried out by the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation of South Africa itself, the agenda of the moral concerns of the humanity.

Without favor, that speech was an important parliamentary achievement, a victory, thanks to the understanding that the Brazilian delegation was able to forge among the Latin American countries and those of Africa and Asia, a victory against the direct Western opposition. The speech against apartheid resulted from a deep research that dissected the racist behavior of the South African authorities of that time.

Besides rejecting insinuations about an undesired partnership relation or a Brazilian alliance with South Africa, Araújo Castro aligned different South African legal devices of racist content, such as the institutionalization of the massive inequality based on racist criteria, the field of the fundamental rights of man, the use of brutal force and racial discrimination, the denial of the basic unity of the human species, which went against the spirit of time, when it reduced the blacks to a situation inferior to the human condition; of the confinement of the non-white African population in impoverished “reserves”; of systematic exploitation of labor, of the systematic denial of the access to the benefits of the development; of the reduction to the condition of labor mass; without the right to property and education; the total absence of control over its own job; and, finally, when it violates the right of the peoples to the self-determination. He culminated his speech when he stated that those facts, reported in a cold and unpassionate way, “make up the integral violation of the aspirations of the non-white population of South Africa, which is a crime against humanity”.

Final comment

Araújo Castro expressed, in all the themes studied, a way to face the human adventure, an analysis of the international relations and a doctrine of Brazilian foreign policy, attention levels that interact in a creative manner. He rejected the tendency to consider the foreign policy as a serial reaction to external events more or less topical, separate and, to some extent, impossible to understand. He sought to integrate those events from a specifically Brazilian perspective, as well as of a global view of the movement and the fate of the international relations.

He understood that, alone, neither of those two currents is enough to formulate the foreign policy. For that reason, he systematically compared them and submitted them to the filter of the humanistic ethics. He was concerned about the international profile of Brazil in a world threatened by insecurity and violence, the arms race and hunger.

Araújo Castro taught that, in practice, it is possible to imagine original foreign policy solutions that, by reflecting, in terms of sovereignty and development, the needs of Brazil and other coun-tries, enrich the worldview and the understanding of the major problems that humanity lived. He represented a new, modern and democratic Brazil. He was concerned that the international profile of Brazil showed what we actually are, as culture, and what we want to be, both as a country and as a society. He was against clichés, trivialities and mannerisms, which showed values and behaviors against our realities and, sometimes, against our interests.

His key view has to do with freedom, which he defined as the major goal of the political activity, when he stated that nothing will be gained, if the freedom to live, to think and to act cannot be ensured – that having been said in a Brazilian moment when the political struggle was being radicalized.

He distrusted the import of political models. He considered the foreign experience an important reference, but he used it only as part of the material available to build the set of his ideas. He rejected mimicry and copy in the sphere of diplomacy, as well as in the broader political and ideological universe.

He did not feel inferior because he was Brazilian, which had been a very common attitude in the past and that still has traces nowadays. Although he was fiercely patriotic, he did not see Brazil as a country better than the others, but he also rejected that the nation could only learn and that it had nothing to teach. He faced the world with a cold and attentive view and clear critical willingness, without fascinations.

Brief note on Araújo Castro’s irony

Even today, in the corridors and dispatches of Itamaraty, certain observations by Araújo Castro are used to clarify certain arguments. Not only his comments on interpersonal relations, but also those on the evolution of international politics itself have a fine irony.

Everyone called him simply “Araújo Castro.” In Washington, he had fun when some American peer, trying to be intimate, called him “João.” So he used to tell us, with a naughty smile: “imagine that, even Miriam (his wife) calls me Araújo Castro.”

In the conclusion of the 24th Session of the General Assembly, when he spoke on behalf of the Latin American and Caribbean Group, he thanked the Norwegian president of that Session, who was very strict and had importuned many people with punctuality and, aware of other ironies, he proposed that it should be considered the possibility to grant him an imaginary Patek Philippe Peace Award. Neither did the Norwegian like the idea, nor did Araújo Castro’s proposal appear in the “verbatim records” of the session.

The ability to see the many sides of a same situation, and the willingness to laugh from some of them, often gave a sense of reality to the ambitious hypotheses for the building of a fairer order and of a better life he articulated. His irony was not focused on skepticism or in the softened form of Nihilism, but on a permanent self-discipline that submitted the evolution of his thought to the determinants of the reality. On the other hand, it was not about mere conformism, since he consistently attacked those determinants when he revealed its meaning of oppression of the potentialities of man and domination of the international life.

Thus, for example, he fustigated the irony that the United Nations devoted itself to the maintenance of the peace when its Charter reflected the power distribution that resulted from World War II. He saw a deeper irony in the fact that the international community was already organized for the maintenance of the peace, without, at the same time, predicting a distributive justice system among the nations, when, ultimately, peace depends on justice and not simply on power relationships.

Another fine observation had to do with the negotiations of the disarmament, which he described as an issue of power and, consequently, as one of the issues that, traditionally, have been solved by the use of power itself. Irony served as a starting point for him to deepen the analysis and as a tool to reach perfectly realist syntheses. He was a remarkable diplomat, who marked his time and who still enriches those who plunge into his diplomatic thought.

Bibliography

AMADO, Rodrigo. Araújo Castro. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1982. (Coleção Itinerários).

ARAÚJO CASTRO, João Augusto de. O Poder Nacional: Limitações de Ordem Interna e Externa. Escola Superior de Guerra (mimeo). 1958.

______. Opening the General Debate (Plenary Meetings). 16th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (Speech “DDD”) UN Records. September 19th, 1963.

______. Speech on “Não Proliferação Nuclear”. Disarmament Commission in Geneva. February 8th, 1968.

______. As Nações Unidas e a Política de Poder. Lecture at the Inter-American Defense College (mimeo). May 14th, 1969.

______. Intervenção. Agenda Items 29, 104, 30 and 31 Relating to Disarmament. Agenda of the First Commission of the 25th UNGA. UN Records. November 18th, 1969.

______. Memorandum. The Government of Brazil on the Strengthening of International Security. April 3rd, 1970.

______. Statement. Item 32: “The Strengthening of International Security”. 25th UNGA. September 28th, 1970.

______. Apartheid, Um Crime Contra a Humanidade. Speech to the Special Policy Commission of the 25th UNGA (mimeo). October 8th, 1970.

______. Intervenção. Agenda Items Relating to Disarmament. First Commission of the 25th UNGA (mimeo). November, 1970.

______. O Congelamento do Poder Mundial (Política Externa e Política Internacional do Brasil. O Brasil na Comunidade das Nações. Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos da América). Lecture to the Trainees of the Higher War Course, of the Higher War College (ESG), Embassy of Brazil in Washington (mimeo). June 11th, 1971.

______. O Fim do Após-Guerra. Lecture to the Trainees of the Command College and Aeronautics Chief of Staff, Embassy of Brazil in Washington (mimeo). October 23rd, 1971.

______. National Development and Foreign Investment. Conferences for Corporation Executives, School of Advanced Studies of the Johns Hopkins University with the International Management and Development Institute, Washington D.C. March 15th, 1972.

______. Relações Brasil-EUA – Lecture to the Trainees of the Higher War Course of ESG (mimeo) Confidential. May 22nd, 1972.

______. A Brazilian View of a Changing World. 2nd. Annual Conference on Latin America Sponsored by The Inter-American Studies Program of Temple University and St. Josephs College. 1973.

______. O Brasil e o Mundo de 1974. Conferences for Corporation Executives, School of Advanced Studies of the Johns Hopkins University with the International Management and Development Institute, Washington D.C. January 30th, 1974.

______. Relações Brasil-EUA à Luz da Problemática Mundial. Lecture to the Trainees of ESG. Embassy of Brazil in Washington (mimeo). June 22nd, 1974.

______. Brazil in the Years Ahead. Remarks at the Johns Hopkins University. March 5th, 1975.

______. Relações Brasil-EUA. Lecture to the Trainees of ESG. Embassy of Brazil in Washington (mimeo). June 17th, 1975.

BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew; HUNTINGTON, Samuel (April 1963). Political Power: USA/USSR. American Political Science Review. New York, v. 58, n. 4, p. 976-977, December 1964.

Authors

Amado Luiz Cervo

PhD in History from the University of Strasbourg. Full Emeritus Professor of the Institute of International Relations of the University of Brasília. Professor of the Rio Branco Institute. Senior Researcher of the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development-CNPq. Emeritus Partner of the Brazilian Association of International Relations. He has published 18 books and 37 other chapters of books. He has published 40 articles in specialized journals. Main books published: Contato Entre Civilizações: Conquista e Colonização Espanhola da América (São Paulo, McGraw-Hill, 1975). O Parlamento Brasileiro e as Relações Exteriores, 1826-1889 (Brasília: EdUnB, 1981). O Desafio Internacional; A Política Exterior do Brasil de 1930 a nossos dias (Brasília: EdUnB, 1994). Relações Internacionais dos Países Americanos (Brasília: 1994, with W. Döpcke). História do Cone Sul (Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 1998, with M. Rapoport). Depois das Caravelas: As Relações Entre Portugal e Brasil, 1808-2000 (Lisboa and Brasília, 2000, with José Calvet de Magalhães). Metodologia Científica (São Paulo: Prentice Hall, 2010, with P. Bervian). Inserção Internacional: Formação dos Conceitos Brasileiros (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008). Imagens da Diplomacia Brasileira (Brasília: Funag, 2010, with C. Cabral). Relações Entre o Brasil e a Itália: Formação da Italianidade Brasileira (Brasília: EdUnB, 2011). História da Política Exterior do Brasil (Brasília: EdUnB, 2011, with C. Bueno). A Parceria Inconclusa: As Relações Entre Brasil e Portugal (Belo Horizonte: Fino Traço, 2012).  Relações Internacionais da América Latina: De 1930 aos Nossos Dias (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2013).

Angela Alonso

Associate Professor of the Sociology Department of the University of São Paulo, Scientific Director of Cebrap (Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning) and researcher of the National Counsel of Technological and Scientific Development - CNPq. She holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of São Paulo (2000) and a Post-PhD from Yale University (2009-2010). She was a Fellow of the Guggenheim Foundation (2009-2010), researcher of the Development Research Centre on Citizenship – University of Sussex (2000-2010), a member of the editorial committee of the Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais (2008) and coordinator of the “Pensamento Social no Brasil” Working Group from ANPOCS - National Association of Graduate Studies and Research in Social Sciences (2010-2012). She wrote Ideias em Movimento: a Geração 1870 na Crise do Brasil-Império (Paz & Terra/Anpocs. 2002; CNPq-Anpocs Award, 2000); Joaquim Nabuco: Os salões e as Ruas (Companhia das Letras, 2007; nominated for the Jabuti Award of Biography and the Telecom Brasil-Portugal Literature Award); and she was co-editor, together with D. K. Jackson, of Joaquim Nabuco na República (Hucitec, 2012). She researches intellectual and political movements and she is currently preparing a book on the movement for the abolition of slavery in Brazil.

Antonio Carlos Lessa

Professor of the Institute of International Relations of the University of Brasília (UnB). He holds has a PhD (2000) in History (focusing on the History of the International Relations) from the University of Brasília and a post-PhD from the Université de Strasbourg, in France (2008-2009). A researcher of the National Council of Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq, he is an editor of the Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional – RBPI and of the Boletim Meridiano 47. He works as a consultant of scientific publications of the major area of humanities in Brazil. Since July 2013, he is Executive Secretary of the Brazilian Association of International Relations – ABRI. He works in various initiatives related to scientific dissemination and to the organization of teaching in the area of International Relations in Brazil. He is one of the leaders in the field of History of International Relations in the University of Brasília and his research interests, teaching and guidance are related to themes of International Relations of Contemporary Brazil.

Arno Wehling

A PhD (USP), Associate Professor (USP) and Post-PhD (University of Porto). Full Professor of Theory and Methodology of History (UFRJ, retired) and of History of Law (UNI-RIO) by title competitions, exams and defense of thesis. Full Professor of these disciplines at Gama Filho University. Researcher of CNPq. Coordinator of the Interinstitutional Nucleus of Research in History of the Brazilian Law (with Maria José Wehling). Professor in Graduate Programs in History and Law, he was and still is a mentor of Masters dissertations and PhD theses. A visiting and collaborating professor of the Classical University of Lisbon. Dean of Gama Filho University. President of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute. He produces surveys in the areas of Political History (Colonial State), History of Law and Theory of History. A consultant of fomentation entities (CNPq, Conicet - Argentina, FAPERJ, FAPESP, CAPES, and Araucária Foundation). Member of professional and scientific institutions both in Brazil and abroad. Member of publishing councils of specialized journals. Councilor of IPHAN (National Institute of the Historical and Artistic Heritage). Member of various cultural institutions both in Brazil and abroad, such as the Historical Institutes of the states of Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Alagoas, Bahia, Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina, Goiás, Mato Grosso and the Federal District and member of the History Academies from Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Brazil Pen Club and the Brazilian Academy of Education. Awards: Medal of the Pacifier, Orders of the Military Merit (official) and Order of Rio Branco (comendador). He has published around 100 works (articles in specialized journals, congress records and chapters of books). He published, among other books, Os Níveis da Objetividade Histórica; Fomentismo Português no Brasil, 1769-1808; Administração Portuguesa no Brasil (1777-1808); A Invenção da História (Estudos Sobre o Historicismo); Pensamento Político e Elaboração Constitucional; Estado, História e Memória (Varnhagen e a Construção da Identidade Nacional); Direito e Justiça no Brasil Colonial (O Tribunal da Relação do Rio De Janeiro) and Formação do Brasil Colonial, the last ones in collaboration with Maria José Wehling.

Carlos Eduardo Vidigal

Professor of the History Department of the University of Brasília since 2009, in the area of History of America. He graduated in History from the University of Brasília. In 1999, he entered the Masters course of the Graduate Program in History in the same university. After completing his Masters in 2001, he became a professor of International Relations in private teaching institutions, such as IESB and UCB. In the master’s course, he developed a dissertation entitled Relações Brasil-Argentina: O Primeiro Ensaio (1958-1962) and in the PhD (2003-2007), a thesis entitled Integração Brasil-Argentina: A Construção do Entendimento (1958-1986), published as a book that was a synthesis of the dissertation and the thesis mentioned above. He was a History teacher in private schools of Brasília and in public education, mainly in the area of education of youngsters and adults. He was the principal of the Center for the Education of Youngsters & Adults of Asa Sul (CESAS), between 1996 and 1997, and he currently develops research on the Falklands War and the geopolitics of South America; History of the South American Integration; and History of the Brazilian Diplomatic Thought.

Carlos Henrique Cardim

A career diplomat – Ambassador – and a Professor of the Institute of Political Science of the University of Brasília (UnB). He served in the Brazilian representations in Buenos Aires, Santiago, Asunción, Ciudad Guyana (Venezuela), and Washington. He was the Ambassador of Brazil in Norway and Iceland. He was the Director of the Institute for Research on International Relations (IPRI), of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG). He was the Extension Dean of the University of Brasília, and President of the Publishing Council of the University of Brasília’s Publishing House. He was the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Science and Technology. PhD in Sociology from the University of São Paulo (USP) with the thesis entitled Anomia: Realidades e Teorias. He wrote the book A Raiz das Coisas – Rui Barbosa: O Brasil no Mundo (Editora Civilização Brasileira, 2007). He was editor of the journal Diplomacia Estratégia Política DEP, devoted to the South American themes. He is a member of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB), of the Brasiliense Academy of Letters and of the Publishing Council of the Federal Senate.

Estevão Rezende Martins

Graduated in Philosophy from the N. S. Medianeira College of Philosophy, Science and Letters (1971) and holds a PhD in Philosophy and History from the Universitaet Muenchen (Ludwig-Maximilian) (1976). A professor (since 1977) and full professor (since 2008) of the University of Brasília. Completed Post-PhDs in Theory and Philosophy of History and in History of the Ideas in Germany, Austria and France. He works with the following themes: theory and methodology of history, political and institutional history of Brazil, historical culture, contemporary history (Europe, European Union and international relations) and political history (Brazil, Western Europe and international relations).

Eiiti Sato

Master in International Relations from Cambridge University and PhD in Sociology from the University of São Paulo. He is a professor of International Relations of the University of Brasília since 1983, where he has been teaching and researching on international political economics, Brazilian foreign policy and theory and history of international relations. He was the President of the Brazilian Association of International Relations (2005-2007) and Director of the Institute of International Relations (2006-2014). In addition to articles on his themes of interest, he published in 2012 the book Economia e Política das Relações Internacionais. He was a consultant for the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs and one of the editors of the collection Clássicos IPRI with classical works by authors considered key for the study of international relations.

Eugênio Vargas Garcia

A Ph.D. in History of International Relations from the University of Brasília and a diplomat. He was born in 1967, in Niterói-RJ. He graduated as a Bachelor in International Relations from the University of Brasília in 1991 and he later concluded his graduate course in the same university. He entered the diplomatic career and served in the embassies in London, Mexico City and in the Brazilian Mission to the United Nations, in New York. He worked in the Secretariat of Diplomatic Planning of the Itamaraty and was an assistant in the Chancellor’s Office from 2005 to 2009, besides being a Full Professor of the Rio Branco Institute. He was an Associate Visiting Researcher at the Center of Brazilian Studies of Oxford University in 1999-2000 and a Professor of Socioeconomic History of Brazil at the Center of Latin American Studies from the School of Philosophy and Letters of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in 2004-2005. In addition to articles in specialized journals, he published the following books: O Sexto Membro Permanente: o Brasil e a Criação da ONU; Diplomacia Brasileira e Política Externa – Documentos Históricos, 1493-2008; Entre América e Europa: A Política Externa Brasileira na Década de 1920; Cronologia das Relações Internacionais do Brasil; and O Brasil e a Liga das Nações (1919-1926): Vencer ou Não Perder. He is currently a minister counsellor in the Brazilian Embassy in Asunción.

Francisco Fernando Monteoliva Doratioto

Bachelor and licensed in History and Social Sciences from the University of São Paulo and Master and PhD in History from the University of Brasília. He wrote books and articles on the history of Brazilian foreign policy and Brazilian military history. He is a Professor in undergraduate and graduate courses of the History Department from the University of Brasília, and teaches History of Brazilian International Relations at the Rio Branco Institute. He is a correspondent member of the Academia Nacional de la Historia (Argentina); the Academia Paraguaya de la Historia; the Military Geographical and Historical Institute of Brazil and the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute.

Gabriela Nunes Ferreira

Professor of Political Science at the School of Philosophy, Letters and Human Science of the Federal University of São Paulo (Unifesp), researcher and treasury director of the Center for Studies of Contemporary Culture (Cedec). Bachelor in Social Science from the University of São Paulo, she is a master and Ph.D. in Political Science from the same university. She wrote Centralização e Descentralização no Império: O Debate Entre Tavares Bastos e Visconde de Uruguai (São Paulo, Editora 34, 1999) and O Rio da Prata e a Consolidação do Estado Imperial (São Paulo, Hucitec, 2006). She organized the volumes Os Juristas na Formação do Estado-Nação Brasileiro (São Paulo, Editora Saraiva, 2010) and Revisão do Pensamento Conservador: Ideias e Política no Brasil (São Paulo, Hucitec, 2010), and published various articles in the fields of political theory and Brazilian political thought.

Gelson Fonseca

A career diplomat. He was President of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation – FUNAG (1992-1995), Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations (1999-2003), Ambassador in Santiago (2003-2006) and General Consul in Madrid (2006-2009). He wrote A Legitimidade e Outras Questões Internacionais (Paz e Terra, 1998), O Interesse e a Regra: Ensaios Sobre o Multilateralismo (Paz e Terra, 2008) and various articles on Brazilian foreign policy and international relations.

Guilherme Frazão Conduru

A diplomat graduted in History from the Federal Fluminense University, in 1983. He attended the Rio Branco Institute between 1994 and 1995. He is a Master in History from the University of Brasilia, in 1998, when he defended the dissertation “A Política Externa de Rio Branco e os Tratados do ABC”. He was a Visiting Researcher of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Center for Brazilian Studies at Oxford University during the academic year 2000-2001, when he submitted the essay “Os Acordos de Roboré: Estudo de Caso do Processo Decisório da Política Externa de Juscelino Kubitschek”. In Brazil he worked in the Division of Archive and Documentation, in the Special Advisory of Federative and Parliamentary Relations and in the General Coordination of Cultural Exchange and Sport Cooperation. He was an assistant professor of International Relations of Brazil in the Rio Branco Institute in 1999/2000 and in 2008/2009. He served in the Embassy in London and in the General Consulate in Montevideo and Buenos Aires. The Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional published his article “O Subsistema Americano, Rio Branco e o ABC” (vol. 41/2, 1998) and the Revista Estudos Históricos, “Cronologia e História Oficial: A Galeria Amoedo do Itamaraty” (vol. 23, n. 46, 2010). FUNAG published in the book O Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória, of 2012, his article “Rio Branco, Patrimônio e História: A Cronologia na Galeria Amoedo do Itamaraty” and, in 2013, his thesis for the Course of High Studies from the Rio Branco Institute: “O Museu Histórico e Diplomático do Itamaraty: História e Revitalização”.

Helder Gordim da Silveira

An Assistant Professor of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUC-RS) since 1990, has been working in the Department of History and was the coordinator of the Graduation Program of History. He was born in São Borja, Rio Grande do Sul, on February 15th, 1963. He graduated from Colégio São Pedro in 1979, a high school of the Marista friars in Porto Alegre. He made his Higher Studies at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) and at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), obtaining the degree of Licensed in History (1985) from the former, and Bachelor in Legal and Social Science from the latter (1998). In his graduate studies, he became a Master (1990) and Ph.D. (2000) in History of the Iberian and American Societies, from PUCRS. The core theme of his research work is foreign policy and the international relations of Brazil within the American system throughout the 20th century, by focusing in specific studies and publications, the political relations between Brazil and Argentina and the forms of ideological legitimation of the regional and hemispherical insertion of the country, in the press and scholars. He worked professionally as an elementary and high school teacher in the public education system of Rio Grande do Sul State and in the town of Porto Alegre, between 1984 and 2002.

João Alfredo dos Anjos

A diplomat from Pernambuco, he has graduated in Law from the Law School of Recife and is a Master in History from the Federal University of Pernambuco.

João Hermes Pereira de Araújo

Director of the Historical and Diplomatic Museum of Itamaraty (1992-2005). He was born in Rio de Janeiro, on March 30th, 1926. Son of Walter Pereira de Araújo and Maria da Glória da Fonseca Hermes Pereira de Araújo. Bachelor in Law from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-RJ). He attended the course of Rio Branco Institute and was Third-Class Consul, in 1951. Promoted by merits to Second Secretary, in 1956; to First Secretary, in 1965; to Counsellor in 1967; to Second-Class Minister, in 1971; and to First-Class Minister, in 1976. He was the head of many divisions of Itamaraty, between 1975 and 1981, Head of the Americas Department, between 1975 and 1981. Third and Second Secretary in the Vatican (1954-1960), First Secretary and Counsellor in Buenos Aires (1964-1967). Ambassador in Bogotá (1981-1983), Buenos Aires (1984-1987), and Paris (1988-1991).

José Vicente de Sá Pimentel

He graduated in Law from the University of Brasília and served in the Embassies in Washington, Santiago, Paris, Guatemala, New Delhi and Pretoria. He was General Consul in Rome and Los Angeles. He was an Assistant Secretary of the State Minister; Special Assistant to the Undersecretariat General for Political and Economic Planning; Head of the Secretariats of Press and Diplomatic Planning; General Director of the Department for Africa and the Middle East. Thesis for the Course of High Studies from Rio Branco Institute: “François Mitterrand e os Países em Desenvolvimento: O Dito, e o Feito”. Among others, he published the following works, Relações Entre Brasil e a África Subsaárica and O Padrão de Votação Brasileiro na ONU e a Questão do Oriente Médio. He was the Director of the Institute for Research on International Relations (2011/2012) and former President of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation.

Kassius Diniz da Silva Pontes

He is a diplomat and the author of Euclides da Cunha, o Itamaraty e a Amazônia (FUNAG, 2005). He is a Bachelor and Master of Law from the University of Brasília (UnB) and Master in Diplomacy from the Rio Branco Institute (IRBr).

Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Santos

He is a diplomat, historian, Ph.D. and Master in History from the University of Brasília. He took postgraduate studies in Political Science at New York University. He wrote several books on the history of Brazilian foreign policy, among them, O Império e as Repúblicas do Pacífico (UFPR, 2002), O Dia em que Adiaram o Carnaval (UNESP, 2010) and O Evangelho do Barão (UNESP, 2012).

Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa

Ambassador. General Consul of Brazil in New York. He started his diplomatic career in 1965, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was the Brazilian Ambassador to Mexico, Spain, Argentina, Germany and the Vatican. He was the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the World Trade Organization and to the United Nations, in Geneva. In Brazil, he was Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs twice (1991 and 1999-2001). He taught International Relations and Diplomatic History of Brazil at the Rio Branco Institute and he is a member of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute since 1993. He published several books and articles on Diplomacy, International Relations and History.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Ph.D. in Social Science (University of Brussels, 1984), Master in Economic Planning (University of Antwerp, 1977), a career diplomat since 1977. Professor in the Master and Ph.D. programs in Law from Uniceub - University Center of Brasilia. Minister-Counsellor of the Embassy in Washington (1999-2003), head of the Division of Financial Policy and Development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1996-1999), economic counsellor in Paris (1993-1995) and alternate representative in the Delegation to ALADI (1990-1992). Selection of books: Integração Regional: Uma Introdução (2013); Relações Internacionais e Política Externa do Brasil (2012); Globalizando: Ensaios Sobre a Globalização e a Antiglobalização (2011); O Estudo das Relações Internacionais do Brasil (2006); Formação da Diplomacia Econômica no Brasil: As Relações Econômicas Internacionais no Império (2001; 2005); Os Primeiros Anos do Século XXI: O Brasil e as Relações Internacionais Contemporâneas (2002); O Brasil e o Multilateralismo Econômico (1999). Website: www.pralmeida.org.

Paulo Fagundes Visentini

Full Professor of International Relations of Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul - UFRGS. He was born in Porto Alegre, in 1955. Graduated in History and Master in Political Science from UFRGS, Ph.D. in Economic History from University of São Paulo - USP - and Post-Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics. He was a Visiting Professor in the University of Leiden/Netherlands, in NUPRI/USP and in the University of Cape Verde. He was the Director of the Latin American Institute of Advanced Studies, Coordinator of the Brazilian Nucleus of Strategy and International Relations and, he is currently the Director of CEBRAFRICA and of the Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies of UFRGS. Researcher level 1B of CNPq. He wrote several works, among which were A Política Externa do Regime Militar Brasileiro, As Relações Diplomáticas da Ásia and A África e as Potências Emergentes.

Rogério de Souza Farias

Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Brasília (2012), he worked in Brazil’s Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX), in 2005, and at the Ministry of the Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), in 2009 and 2010, as an Expert in Public Policies and Governmental Management of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MPOG). He published, in 2009, the book O Brasil e o GATT: Unidades Decisórias e Política Externa. His thesis “Industriais, Economistas e Diplomatas: O Brasil e o Sistema Multilateral de Comércio (1946-1993)” got Honorable Mention in the CAPES Award of Theses in the major field of Political and International Science in 2013, having been chosen the best one in the subfield of international relations.

Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg

Brazilian diplomat. He graduated from the National Law School – University of Brazil (RJ), in 1963. He passed the exam of the Rio Branco Institute (IRBr), in 1964, and was promoted to First-Class Minister in 1983. He served as Ambassador of Brazil in Moscow and Madrid. He was twice the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations (ONU), in Nova York. He was the head, in 1993-94 and 2004-05 biennia, of the Brazilian Delegation to the UN Security Council. He served as Head of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic, in charge of the nuclear and space-related policies; the themes of the Sipam/Sivam Project; the research on the security of communications; the 2020 Brazil Project; and the Calha Norte Program (PCN). He was Minister of Science and Technology, from July 1999 to 2002, in charge of achievements of the presidency of the National Conference of Science, Technology and Innovation; launching and institutionalization of the Sectorial Funds for Scientific and Technological Development; creation of the Center of Management and Strategic Studies (CGEE); the National Programs of Information Society; Elementary Industrial Technology and the Technological Services for Innovation and Competitiveness, Science and Technology for Social Development. He was also in charge of structuring the international cooperation of the Ministry of Science and Technology, the nuclear and space-related policies, and headed the Inter-ministerial Commission on Global Climate Change.

Rubens Ricupero

A career diplomat, born in São Paulo (March 1st, 1937), Rubens Ricupero retired after being the Ambassador of Brazil in Geneva, Washington and Roma. He was Minister of the Environment and the Amazon, as well as Minister of Finance of Brazil, when he was in charge of launching the new Brazilian currency, the Real, in 1994. Between 1995 and 2004, by election from the UN General Assembly, he headed, as Secretary-General, the Conference of the United Nations on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in Geneva. He is currently the Director of the School of Economics and International Relations at the Armando Álvares Penteado Foundation (FAAP), in São Paulo. He taught History of the Brazilian Diplomatic Relations at Rio Branco Institute and Theory of International Affairs at University of Brasília. He wrote several books and essays on diplomatic history, including two biographical studies of the Baron of Rio Branco, in addition to works on international relations, economic development and world trade.

Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães Neto

A Bachelor of Law, from the National Law School (1963); Third Secretary of the Diplomatic Career, Rio Branco Institute (1963); Director of the Advisory Board for International Cooperation of Sudene (1964); Head of the Technical Service of Analysis and Planning of Itamaraty (1967); Master in Economics from Boston University (1969); Economist at Serete S.A Engenharia (1972); Professor of International Trade at the University of Brasília (1977); Professor of Microeconomics at the Rio Branco Institute (1978); Vice-President of the Brazilian Films Company (Embrafilme) (1979); Promoted to Second-Class Minister, by merit (1986); Head of the Economic Department of Itamaraty (1988); Promoted to First-Class Minister (1994); Director of the Institute for Research on International Relations of Itamaraty (1995); Professor at the Course of Master of Law at Rio de Janeiro State University (1997); the author of Quinhentos Anos de Periferia, Contraponto Editora (1999); General Secretary for Foreign Affairs (2003); Desafios Brasileiros na Era dos Gigantes, Contraponto Editora (2006); Scholar of the Year of 2006, by the Brazilian Union of Writers, Juca Pato Award winner (2007); Professor at the Rio Branco Institute (2008); Doctor Honoris Causa from the Integrated Colleges of Brazil (UniBrasil) (2009); Minister of State, Secretary for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic (2009); Doctor Honoris Causa from Cândido Mendes University (2010); Doctor Honoris Causa from the National University of Rosário, Argentina (2010); High General Representative of Mercosur (2010 - 06/2012).

Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima

A career diplomat, with a degree in Law from the Rio de Janeiro State University, a Master’s in International Law from the University of Oslo and a High Studies diploma from the Rio Branco Institute. He is a licensed member of the Order of Attorneys of Brazil. He served in the Brazilian Mission to the UN and at the Embassies in Washington, Lisbon, London, Tel Aviv (cumulative with Ramallah), Oslo and Budapest. He was President of the Governing Council of the UN Common Fund for Commodities (the Hague). He was Secretary for Internal Control and Director of the Institute of Research on International Relations. In 2014, he was appointed President of Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation. His publications include A Time for Change; The Expanding Powers of the UN – Security Council and the Rule of Law in International Relations; A Reflection on the Universality of Human Rights – Democracy and the Rule of Law in International Relations. He presented and organized the Spanish and English versions of Brazilian Diplomatic Thought – Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy / 1750-1964. He received the Grand Cross of the Order of Rio Branco, the French, Norwegian and Hungarian Orders of Merit, the Portuguese Order of Christ and the British Royal Victorian Order.

Stanley Hilton

He was born in 1940 and concluded High School in Long Beach, California, in 1957. He graduated in Spanish from California State University (Long Beach), in 1962. During his master’s course in History at the University of Texas (Austin), he studied with Professor José Honório Rodrigues, who had a major influence on his decision to focus his research on Brazilian History. He completed his master’s in 1964 and his Ph.D. from the same university in 1969. He taught at Williams College (State of Massachusetts) during 1969-1972, and CAPES hired him for the biennium 1972-1974 so that he could collaborate in the organization of the master’s course at the Federal Fluminense University. In August 1974, he became a Professor of Latin-American History at Louisiana State University (LSU), remaining there until he retired, in December 2012. Since the 1980’s, his intellectual interest gradually evolved towards Military History. He was a Visiting Professor in the History Department at the United States Air Force Academy, in 1980-1981 and at the Air War College, in 1989-1990. During 1998-2012, he headed a master’s course of Military History at LSU. He wrote several books, both in English and in Portuguese, among which are Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939; Hitler’s Secret War in South America; A Guerra Civil Brasileira: História da Revolução Constitucionalista de 1932; Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917-1947; and Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia. He has received the Order of Rio Branco.

Synesio Sampaio Goes Filho

Diplomat, (1967-2010), born in Itu, São Paulo, on June 13th, 1939. He graduated in Law from University of Sao Paulo, 1960-1964. At Itamaraty, he was Head of the Protocol, Inspector of Foreign Service, Chief of Cabinet of Chancellors Celso Lafer and Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Abroad, he was Minister in London, Consul in Milan, Ambassador in Bogotá, Lisbon and Brussels.

Former Professor of Diplomatic History at the Rio Branco Institute and International Trade at Armando Alvares Penteado Foundation (FAAP). As far as Brazilian themes are concerned, in addition to chapters in collective works, he has written articles in the journal of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute, of which he is a member, and in “Política Externa” journal of the University of Sao Paulo. In 1999, he published Navegantes, Bandeirantes, Diplomatas (Martins Fontes) and, in 2013, As Fronteiras do Brasil (FUNAG) and A Bela Viagem – Frases Para Pensar (Migalhas).

Tereza Cristina Nascimento França

Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Brasília, Master in History from the Rio de Janeiro State University (2000), graduated and licensed in History from the same university (1996). She was born in Rio de Janeiro, on May 1st, 1967. Tereza Cristina Nascimento França is currently a Professor of the Nucleus of International Relations (NURI) at the Federal University of Sergipe.

1 Examples of Brazil´s soft power are frequent in this work; they shape the narrative and characterize the country’s foreign policy. Although less conspicuous, cases in which hard power was used also play an important role. Brazil was, for example, the only country in Latin America to have participated in the two World Wars. In the Second World War, it was, again, the only Latin American nation to have fought in the European military theater.

2 Correspondence of the Baron de Mareschal, In Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Tome 80, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, p. 65.

3 The reference texts for the related themes are the following: Representação à Assembleia Geral Constituinte Sobre a Escravatura; Apontamentos para a Civilização dos Indios; Lembranças e Apontamento do Governo Provisório da Província de São Paulo para os seus Deputados; Memória Sobre a Necessidade e Utilidades do Plantio de Novos Bosques em Portugal, published in the volumes organized by Jorge Caldeira (José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva. São Paulo: Ed. 34, 2002) and Miriam Dolhnikoff (Projetos para o Brasil. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1998).

4 On José Bonifácio’s background and his political rise, see Dolhnikoff, Miriam. José Bonifácio. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012.

5 For the Decree, see: Instructions and correspondence from Bonifácio to Brant, on August 12, 1822, see p. 5 to 14. For the loan, see: Obra Política de José Bonifácio. Brasília: Federal Senate, 1973, I, p. 139; Obras Científicas, Políticas e Sociais. Santos: Executive Work Group of the Tributes to the Patriarch, 1963, II, p. 244-246.

6 The dissolution of the Assembly is considered as a “coup d´état” in the Réfutation des Calomnies Relatives aux Affaires du Brésil, written by the three Andradas brothers. See Obras Científicas, Políticas e Sociais, II, p. 387-446.

7 See p. 101 for an assessment of the Anglo-French War and the British strategy.

8 For the “Senatorial Constitution,” see p. 45 and ff.

9 It is also from 1821 the publication of the Estatutos para a Sociedade Econômica da Província de São Paulo (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1821), which may be consulted in the Manuscript Section of the National Library of Rio de Janeiro, 5,1,39.

10 Interview in O Tamoio, of Tuesday, September 2, 1823, in Obras Científicas, Políticas e Sociais, II, p. 381-386. He was called “Old Man from Rocio” (or “Rossio”), a reference to the square in Rio de Janeiro where he lived. According to Hobsbawm (1977, p. 77), the “classical liberal bourgeois of 1789 (and the liberal of 1789-1848) was not a democrat, but rather a believer in Constitutionalism, a secular State with civil liberties and guarantees for private enterprise and a government made up of taxpayers and owners.”

11 Historical Archive of Itamaraty, Laws, Decrees and Ordinances, 321-1-1. Castro, Flávio Mendes de Oliveira. História da Organização do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Brasília: Editora UnB, 1983, p. 16-22. According to Fernando Figueira de Mello, in the dissertation A Longa Duração da Política: Diplomacia e Escravidão na Vida de José Bonifácio, UFRJ-PPGIS, 2005, p. 153, “[...] José Bonifácio was the first one to make an effort towards the administrative structuring of a Brazilian government agency in charge of both diplomatic and international affairs.”

12 See the case of the “Indian” Inocêncio Gonçalves de Abreu, who received “40 to 50 shotguns with ammunition” in order to constitute “an artillery of shooters” (sic). Obra Política de José Bonifácio, I, p. 414-415. For the economic measures, see Sérgio Buarque de Holanda Fund, Unicamp, doc. 1696 or Obra Política de José Bonifácio, I, p. 166-168, 261 and 369.

13 As João Paulo Pimenta explains in, Estado e Nação no fim dos Impérios Ibéricos no Prata (1808-1828). São Paulo: Hucitec; Fapesp, 2002 p. 178, Obes was the defense lawyer of two female slaves accused of having murdered their female master in Montevideo, in 1821. Obes defense presented to the Court “is a real manifest against African slavery, which he considered a savage and degrading institution.” See the Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro, supplement to the issue of 12/3/1822, in the digital archives of the Coleção da Biblioteca Nacional, (www.bn.br). Bonifácio included Obes among the first people to receive the Order of the Cross at the officer’s level, the same as that of the Baron of the Laguna. Diário da Assembléia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil, II, p. 689.

14 In the Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro, of 12/10/1822, there are several official documents Bonifácio ordered published that address the acclamation of Dom Pedro as “Emperor of Brazil and of the Cisplatine State” or “Constitutional Emperor of Brazil and of the Cisplatine State.” See the Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro, Biblioteca Nacional, digital archives (www.bn.br). Bomfim, Manoel, O Brasil Nação, Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1996, p. 73-74, nota 22, p. 596. Diário da Assembléia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil, II, p. 689.

15 Bernardino Rivadavia was President of Argentina from February 8, 1826 to July 7, 1827. See Floria, Carlos Alberto; Belsunce, César A. García. Historia de los Argentinos, I, p. 467-471.

16 According to Raul Adalberto de Campos, in his Relações Diplomáticas do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia do Jornal do Comércio, by Rodrigues & Cia, 1913, pp. 134 and 135, García had been sent to Brazil, as a “confidential agent, from 1815 until June, 1820”. Later, he was an Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister, until May 7, 1827, when he “came to negotiate peace, under the mediation of the British government.” He signed the peace treaty dated May 24, 1827, “by which the United Provinces of the Plata River gave up their claim to the territory of the Cisplatine Province.” The treaty, however, was not ratified by the government of Buenos Aires (Floria; Belsunce, 1992, p. 452, 478 and 479).

17 The treaties of 1810 include the Treaty of Trade and Navigation and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, both dated February 19, 1810. Later, by decree on October 18, 1810, British commodities transported by Portuguese vessels also began to pay 15% ad valorem. The rate charged to Portuguese commodities became equal to that of the British in 1818. See Lima, Manuel de Oliveira. Dom João VI no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1996, p. 255, 256 and 265.

18 One of the British victories in the Congress of Vienna had been that it excluded from the deliberations of the winning powers the matters that involved the law of the sea. (Kissinger, 1973, pp. 33 and 34). Nicolson (1946, passim) defines “maritime rights,” on p. 282, as being “a phrase employed by Great Britain, to designate what other countries called freedom of the seas. The British contention was that a belligerent had the right to visit and search neutral vessels on the high seas. The opposing contention was that neutrality carried exemption from interference on the principle of ‘free ships, free goods’. Britain claimed that if this principle were agreed to, no naval blockade would prove effective since any blockaded country could import goods in neutral bottoms. Others said that to extend British maritime supremacy to the point of interference with legitimate neutral commerce was against the rights of nations.”

19 This issue has been the object of an extensive specialized bibliography, and a detailed discussion of it would not fall within the scope of this article. The study by Leslie Bethell, A Abolição do Comércio Brasileiro de Escravos: a Grã-Bretanha, o Brazil e a Questão do Comércio de Escravos (1808-1869). Brasília: Federal Senate, 2002, stands out. In addition, although more general, see the volume by Robin Blackburn, The Fall of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2002. In it the author reviews the most important items concerning the issue. He agrees, in general, with the thesis that the economic and strategic-military interests of the British campaign against slave trafficking, go beyond the justification of humanist and philanthropic elements.

20 “In theory, these loans should have yielded to the investors 7 to 9% of interest, but they actually yielded, in 1831, an average of only 3.1%.” In Fodor, Giorgio. The Boom That Never Was? Latin American Loans in London 1822-1825, Discussion paper n° 5. Trento: Università degli Studi di Trento, 2002, p. 22 and 23. It should be noted that Brazil of the First Empire was not among the debtor nations. Concerning this issue, see Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

21 The only extensive biography of the Viscount of Uruguay was written by his great-grandson, José Antônio Soares de Souza, A Vida do Visconde do Uruguay (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1944). Also see: Ilmar Mattos, “O Lavrador e o Construtor: o Visconde do Uruguay e a Construção do Estado Imperial”; as well as, José Murilo de Carvalho, “Entre a Autoridade e a Liberdade.” In: José Murilo de Carvalho, Visconde do Uruguay.

22 See speech by Paulino de Souza dated July 15, 1850 in: CARVALHO (2002). p. 537-572.

23 Letter quoted in SOUZA (1950).

24 Instructions from Paulino de Souza to Pimenta Bueno. In: RIBEIRO (1966), p. 3-15.

25 Paulino de Souza also listed these long-term goals of imperial rule in his letter to the president of Paraguay dated June 13, 1851.

26 About Brazil’s relationship with these countries, throughout the imperial period, see Luis Cláudio V.G. Santos, O Império e as Repúblicas do Pacífico: As Relações do Brasil com Chile, Bolívia, Peru, Equador and Colômbia (1822-1889).

27 Tau Golin (2004, vol. 2) carefully analyses the circumstances that led to the signing of this treaty, its subsequent modifications and the resulting demarcation work.

28 On the border treaty, Uruguayan historian Julius Caesar Vignale (1946, p. 130) said: “the Brazilian Empire appeared to defend us from Rosas, when in fact what it expected was to take from us another portion of territory, as had been done in the unjust treaties of 1851!” On the other hand, after the Treaty was signed, some people in Brazil condemned it because it was harmful to the Empire. The adoption of the criterion of uti possidetis in the demarcation of boundaries between both countries has generated intense controversy, most notably in the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute. See: GOLIN (2004), vol. 2, Chapter 5.

29 The five treaties of October 12, 1851 are attached to the 1852 report presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the General Assembly (Annex F).

30 See RIO BRANCO (1940). Later, in April 1852, Paranhos was appointed resident minister in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, where he remained until December of the following year.

31 Speech delivered on June 4, 1852, reprinted in CARVALHO (2002), p. 599-631.

32 This status quo, according to Doratioto (2002, p. 44), was characterized by an imbalance in favor of Brazil in the Platine region. In reality, this was Brazilian hegemony in the region.

33 About that, see HORNE (2010), Chapter 6.

34 CF. Flávio Mendes de Oliveira Castro, history of the Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Book 1, Chapter 7.

35 According to Miguel Gustavo de Paiva Torres (2011, p. 176) : “In Decree no. 941, dated March 20, 1852, which determined both the amount and the category of Brazilian diplomatic missions, the priority that Paulino gave to the American neighborhood was clear”.

36 The collection donated by Baroness da Ponte Ribeiro was a catalog object organized by Isa Adonias and was published, in 1984, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

37 Cezar (2005) refers, of course, to the 1976 book of Yves Lacoste, La Géographie ça Sert à Faire la Guerre.

38 See, among others, the book of Magnoli (1997), “O Corpo da Pátria”, which analyses in detail the construction of the discourse about the Brazilian territoriality.

39 The question of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the former Portuguese colony in contrast with the fragmentation of America before Spanish is of course a fairly complex question to which merged many diverse factors, structural and random orders (SANTOS, 2004, p. 52-56). There is no doubt, however, that the common interest of the various regional elites, albeit in very different degrees, in the maintenance of slavery and the slave trade figure so important in this explanation.

40 The general language was a language invented by the jesuits - based on a mix of “Tupi” and “Guarani” languages - to be used as “língua franca” among the various indigenous groups.

41 That matter is addressed in details in Soares de Souza, 1952, p. 83-99.

42 The legitimacy of the Uruguayan nationality is obviously not in question, but it is only highlighted that, like the Brazilian one, by the way, it was to a great extent built by the State that came before it.

43 The discussion deserved an issue of the Review (3rd Series, n. 12, 4th Quarter of 1853) devoted entirely to it. Available at the website of the IHGB Magazine: <http://www.ihgb.org.br/rihgb.php?s=19>, Tome XVI (1853), p. 385-560. Access on 03/11/2013.

44 The theme is extensively addressed in Santos (2004).

45 See: Wehling, Arno. O Conservadorismo Reformador de um Liberal: Varnhagen, Publicista e Pensador Político. In: Glezer, Raquel; Guimarães, Lucia. Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen. Rio de Janeiro: Miguel de Cervantes Foundation, 2013, p. 160ff. It is the introduction to the critical edition of Varnhagen’s Memorial Orgânico.

46 WEHLING, Arno. Introdução, in Varnhagen – Missão nas Repúblicas do Pacífico: 1863 a 1867. Rio de Janeiro, FUNAG, 2005, vol. I, p. 7ff.

47 WEHLING, Arno. Estado, História, Memória: Varnhagen e a Construção da Identidade Nacional, Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1999, p. 83ff.

48 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. Correspondência Ativa, collected and noted edition by Clado Ribeiro Lessa, Rio de Janeiro, INL, 1961, p. 275.

49 WEHLING, Arno. Estado…, op cit, p. 75.

50 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. Memória Sobre os Trabalhos Que se Podem Consultar nas Negociações de Limites do Império, Com Algumas Lembranças Para a Demarcação Destes, [Memories of avaliable works on boundary negotiations of the Empire, with some references to their demarcations.], National Library, Manuscript Section, I, 4,4, 112.

51 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. Memorial Orgânico, op. cit., p. 215.

52 Idem, Memória..., item 15.

53 LESSA, Clado Ribeiro. Vida e obra de Varnhagen, Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, vol. 225, oct-dec 1954, p. 141.

54 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. Memória…, item 28.

55 Aspect already emphasized by Clado Ribeiro Lessa, op. cit., p. 130.

56 Letter dated February 8th, 1864, fromVarnhagen to the Minister Marquis of Abrantes. In: Varnhagen – Missão..., vol. I, p. 96.

57 LIMA, Manuel de Oliveira. Op. cit., p. 80.

58 Letter dated November 24th, 1865 to the Minister José Antonio Saraiva. In: Varnhagen – Missão..., vol. I, p. 466.

59 LIMA, Manuel de Oliveira.Op. cit., p. 80.

60 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. Memorial Orgânico, op. cit., p. 205ff.

61 LESSA, Clado Ribeiro.Op. cit., vol. 225, p. 132-133.

62 Idem, p. 143.

63 Notes exchanged between Varnhagen and minister Nicolas Vasquez; National Library, Manuscripts Section, I-29, 25, 22.

64 Both aspects are also included in the entry about the right to asylum of the dictionary directed by Maurice Bock.

65 This text includes elements belonging to previous essays of the author, among which are: O Brasil e a Argentina: Uma aproximação Histórica na Construção do Mercosul (Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1998); A Missão Carneiro Leão no Prata: A Guerra Contra Rosas. In: O Marquês de Paraná. Brasília: FUNAG, 2004; Da Colônia ao Reino Unido e à Independência: A Inserção Internacional do Brasil (Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 2008).

66 The reports are available at: <http://brasil.crl.edu/bsd/bsd/hartness/relacoes.html>.

671* Translated by João Moreira Coelho.

68 This text uses materials and arguments included in my book Joaquim Nabuco: os Salões e as Ruas, Companhia das Letras, 2007, mainly the last chapter, and my article L’Americaniste Depassé in Cunha, Diogo (Ed). Intelectuels et Politique au Brésil-19ème Siècle (In the printing press).

69 CI refers to the unpublished letters of Joaquim Nabuco stored at the archive of the Joaquim Nabuco Foundation – Fundaj, in Recife.

70 For further analysis of both books, see ALONSO, 2009.

71 About the uprising, see TOPIK, 1996.

72 And the “…hostile attitude of the United States stirred up in the fleet the fear that it was the beginning of the execution of a political plan, based on the official information given to the American legation that the purpose of the revolt was the restoration of the monarchy” (NABUCO, 1896, p. 230-1).

73 Later Raul Rio Branco, Aníbal Veloso Rabelo and the cartographer Henri Trope, in addition to a translator, a stenographer and a typist, worked with him.

74 “Unlike you, I couldn’t act in the ministry, since it is, as you say, reformer, (political, I mean). My entrance would require my full acceptance of the current constitutional regime, which I cannot do. I am not talking about the Republic, but of the way in which it is organized” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, July 30, 1902 CP-Nabuco 1949).

75 “... Rio Branco and I had an almost acrimonious discussion ... about that matter of the Italian Legation, which he will not accept to see me resign. His attitude coerces me extraordinarily and if I could I would fire myself...” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco of the Evelina Nabuco, September 14, 1902 CI-Fundaj).

76 Álvaro Lins (1995) observed that Rio Branco’s tactic was to produce drier and more objective petitions, which favored clarity and for the purpose of not fatiguing the judges.

77 Rio Branco appointed Régis de Oliveira to London.

78 That was the case of his commercial agreement of liberalization of trade for certain products, signed in 1891 and that remained in effect until 1895. On the other hand, as we have seen, the Americans supported Floriano Peixoto during the Revolt of the Navy.

79 His speech at the ceremony of credentials handover, when the Brazilian Embassy was installed, was covered by the Evening Mail, the New York Times and the Tribune, from Chicago.

80 Oliveira Lima, Minister in Caracas, adopted an extreme Latin-Americanist position, advising in this sense his friend Rio Branco (Oliveira Lima, 1907, 78-9; 44).

81 Manuel Bonfim wrote along that line in América Latina: Males de Origem, a book from 1905, in which he addressed the Americans without any issues, as being parasites of Latin America.

82 He asked him to warn Manuel Bonfim: “You can evaluate the damage that this defacement of everything that is ours, made by a Brazilian “educator”, can do to our reputation among the illustrated classes of the country” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to the Baron of Rio Branco, January 18, 1908, CP-Nabuco, 1949).

83 Beyond that, “The conference, in terms of concrete policy development, was of little importance” (DENNISON, 2006, p. 169).

84 “Be aware that I will be appointed to the Hague” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, June 25, 1906 CP-Nabuco 1949).

85 “I would prefer a thousand times not to have gone to the Hague than leaving there with our intelligence shaken by the United States ...” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha. September, 02, 1907, CP-Nabuco, 1949).

86* Translated by João Moreira Coelho.

87* Translated by João Moreira Coelho.

88 Cit. in Burns, 1966, p. 164.

89 Nabuco’s view was expressed in a letter transcribed by COSTA, 1968, p.107.

90 Volume II, p. 408, 25 August 1907 entry.

91 O Brasil, os Estados Unidos e Monroísmo, article published under the pen name J. Penn in Jornal do Comércio, 15 May 1900. In: LINS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 491.

92 For sure, politics is not our responsibility. We cannot do politics. Politics is not the focus of our program. But can we fully do our work if we believe we have to put a wall between us and politics? Politics understood as it should be understood, in the general sense, in the higher sense, in the neutral sense of the term?

We have not forgotten that His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, in his act of convening this Peace Conference, clearly removed political issues from our program. But this preventative measure obviously referred only to militant politics, political actions and combat, that which would create disorder and agitation, separating peoples in their internal relations; politics never envisioned as a science, politics studied as history, as moral law. From the moment we as nations make laws, domestic or international, we must first consider in regard to each project, the possibility, the necessity, the usefulness of the measure in the face of tradition, of the current state of feelings, ideas and interests that animate the people that govern governments. Well, is this not politics?

Politics in its most vulgar sense is personal disputes, and it is absolutely forbidden here. We have nothing to do with the internal affairs of States or in international affairs, with quarrels that divide nations, in self-interested disputes, in ambition or honors, in issues of influence of balance or predominance, those that lead to conflict and war. These are the forbidden politics.

But in the other, the larger sense of the term, the highest and not the lowest practice, the supreme interests of nations towards each other, is that the type of politics we could defend? No, gentlemen?

93 The birth date mentioned both in the IHGB files and in Alberto Venancio Filho is October 23rd, 1862. The biobibliographical dictionary of Argeu Guimarães indicates the birth year as being 1863. However, the tombstone on Gama’s grave says October 23rd, 1861, thus being the closest to the one attested in the book of Baptism of the Maricá Head Office, Book n. 4, leaves 19 and 19th back, according to which he was born in October, 1861. In: FRANCA, Tereza Cristina Nascimento. Self Made Nation: Domício da Gama e o Pragmatismo do Bom Senso. 2007.408 f., il. Thesis (Ph.D in International Relations) – Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2007.

94 Diary of Maria Luiza Frederica Ave Precht de Mesquita, niece of Domício da Gama. In: GAMA, Domício da. Contos. Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Academy of Letters, 2001. p. XIX.

95 Idem.

96 LYRA, Heitor. Memórias da Vida Diplomática - Coisas Vistas e Ouvidas – 1916-1925. State Department and Embassy in London. Lisbon, Center of the Brazilian Book, 1972, p. 227 to 233.

97 Domício received thirteen votes while Rio Branco only seven. FRANÇA, Tereza Cristina Nascimento. Self made nation: Domício da Gama e o pragmatismo do bom senso. 2007.408 f., il. Thesis (doctorate in international relations) – Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2007, p. 91.

98 Letter of Domício da Gama to José Veríssimo, 02/27/1897. In: Revista da Academia Brasileira de Letras, vol. 41, Rio de Janeiro, 1933, p. 235.

99 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Graça Aranha, Brussels, 01/21/1902. ABL, AGA 10 3 13.

100 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Graça Aranha, Brussels, 07/16/1902. ABL, AGA 10.3.13.

101 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Sylvino Gurgel do Amaral, Brussels, 07/28/1902. AHI, ASGC. 346 Tin, 3 Pack, 31 Folder.

102 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Rio Branco, Brussels, 08/16/1902. AHI, APBRB. Part III (34). 824 Tin Pack 2.

103 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Graça Aranha, Brussels, 10/05/1902. ABL, AGA 10.3.13.

104 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Graça Aranha, Brussels, 01/13/1903. ABL, AGA, 10.3.13

105 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Rio Branco, Buenos Aires, 08/03/1908. IHGB, CDG, Tin 646 12 folder.

106 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Joaquim Nabuco. Brussels, 01/25/1903. Fundaj, CP P107 DOC 2270.

107 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Graça Aranha, Petrópolis, 03/19/1903. ABL, AGA 10.3.13.

108 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Graça Aranha, Petrópolis, 01/28/1904. ABL, AGA 03/10/2013.

109 CARDIM, Carlos Henrique, FRANCO, Álvaro da Costa. (orgs). Rio Branco, a América do Sul e a modernização do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: EMC, 2002, p. 251.

110 GAMA, Domício da. Official communication addressed to the Baron of Rio Branco, Lima, 06/06/1907. AHI, MDB. Lima. Ofícios. 1906-1907, 212.4.05.

111 CASTRO, Flávio Mendes de Oliveira. História da organização do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Brasília: Ed. da Universidade de Brasília, 1983, p. 242.

112 Letter to Joaquim Nabuco, Buenos Aires, 08/15/1908. Fundaj, CP P252 DOC 5163.

113 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Rio Branco, Buenos Aires, 08/03/1908. IHGB, CDG, Tin 646 12 folder.

114 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Lauro Müller, 04/18/1912. AHI, MDB, Washington, Letters of 1912, 234.1.13.

115 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Rio Branco, Buenos Aires 12/04/1908. AHI, MDB. Lima. Letters. July- December 1908, 206.2.04.

116 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Rio Branco, 12/22/1908. AHI, APBRB. Part III (34). Tin 824, Pack 2.

117 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Rio Branco, Buenos Aires, 08/11/1908. IHGB, CDG, Tin 646, Folder 12.

118 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Rio Branco, 12/22/1908. Op. Cit.

119 RIO BRANCO, Barão do. Salute to Domício da Gama, Rio de Janeiro, 05/18/1911. APBRB. 877 Tin Pack, 12 Folder.

120 JORNAL DO COMMERCIO. O Sr. Joaquim Nabuco e a Doutrina de Monroe, 09/23/1905 apud in: CADERNOS DO CHDD. Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, Brasília: Year IV – n. 7. 2nd Semester, 2005, p. 266.

121 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Marshal Hermes da Fonseca, Washington, 12/29/1911. IHGB, CDG, Tin 648, Folder 5.

122 Idem.

123 Ibidem

124 TOPIK, Steven. A presença do Estado na economia política do Brasil de 1889 a 1930. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1987, p. 73 and 86

125 FRANÇA, Tereza Cristina Nascimento. Op. cit., p. 282.

126 FRANÇA, Tereza Cristina Nascimento. Op. cit., p. 280-285.

127 Letter to Philander Knox, Washington, 06/19/1911. AHI, MDB, Washington, Ofícios. apr/dec 1911, 234.1.12.

128 Official communication addressed to the Baron of Rio Branco, Lima, 06/18/1907. AHI, MDB. Lima. Ofícios. 1906-1907, 212.4.05.

129 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to the Baron of Rio Branco, Washington, 01/31/1912. AHI, MDB. Washington, Letter, 1912. 234.1.13.

130 GAMA, Domício da. Craft to Lauro Müller, 01/18/1913. AHI, MDB, Washington, 234.2.01.

131 New York Times, 5/28/1912.

132 GAMA, Domício da. Discurso no banquete da União Pan-Americana, Washington, 27/5/1912. Anexo numero 2. AHI, MDB, Washington, Ofícios 1912, 234.1.13.

133 FRANÇA, Tereza Cristina Nascimento. Op. cit., p. 293-297.

134 BRAZIL. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report, 1914, v. 1, part I, p. XX.

135 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to José Veríssimo, Washington, 24 February 1913. Revista da Academia Brazilian de Letras. V. 42, Rio de Janeiro, 1933, p. 120 and 121.

136 MÜLLER, Lauro. Telegram to Domício da Gama, 7/3/1913. AHI. MDB. Washington, Telegramas Expedidos, 1911 a 1915. 235/4/2.

137 BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política externa da primeira república e os anos de apogeu (1902 a 1918). São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2003, p. 377.

138 SEVERANCE, Frank H., ed. Peace Episodes on the Niagara: Other Studies and Reports (including Severance’s essay, “The Peace Conference at Niagara Falls in 1914”). Buffalo, N.Y.: Buffalo Historical Society, 1914, p. 6.

139 VINHOSA, Francisco Luiz Teixeira. “A Diplomacia Brasileira e a Revolução Mexicana (1913-1915)”. In: Magazine of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute. Brasília/Rio de Janeiro: 1980, n. 327, April /June, p. 64.

140 STATHIS, Stephen W. Congressional Gold Medals 1776-2002. CRS Report for Congress Received Through the CRS Web. The Library of Congress, 2002, p. 28.

141 SMALL, Michael. The Forgotten Peace: Mediation at Niagara Falls, 1914. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2009, p. 132.

142 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Lauro Müller, 09/29/1915. AHI, MDB, Washington, 1914 to October 1915 Letters, 234.2.03.

143 VINHOSA, Francisco Luiz Teixeira. “A Diplomacia Brasileira e a Revolução Mexicana (1913-1915)”. In: Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro. Brasília/Rio de Janeiro: 1980, nº 327, April / June, p. 70

144 LINK, Arthur. La Política de los Estados Unidos em América Latina – 1913-1916. México-Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1960, p. 212.

145 GAMA, Domício da. Letter to Lauro Müller, 10/09/1915. AHI, MDB, Washington, Letters 1914 to October, 1915, 234.2.04.

146 GAMA, Domício da. Confidential Letter to Lauro Müller, 07/14/1916. AHI, MDB, Washington, Letters Confidential Reserved Political Dispatches 1914 to 1919, 451.4.05.

147 GAMA, Domício da. Confidential Letter to Lauro Müller, 03/03/1917. Op. cit.

148 GAMA, Domício da. Confidential Letter to Nilo Peçanha, 06/21/1917. AHI, MDB, Washington, Confidential Lettera Reserved Political Dispatches 1914 to 1919, 451.4.05.

149 Telegram of Domício da Gama to Alberto Jorge de Ipanema Moreira. Rio de Janeiro, 12/3/1918.Versailles Peace Conference. Dossier supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1916-1919. AHI

150 SMITH, Joseph. Unequal Giants – Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991, p. 127.

151 VINHOSA, Francisco Luiz Teixeira. O Brasil e a Primeira Guerra Mundial - A Diplomacia Brasileira e as Grandes Potências. Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute, 1990, p. 235.

152 LYRA, Heitor. Op.cit., p. 279.

153 VINHOSA, Francisco Luiz Teixeira. Op. cit., 1990, p. 198.

154 LYRA, Heitor. Op. cit., p. 100.

155 Session conducted between August 31 and October 4, 1922. Rol of meetings of the council and the Assembly, AHI, Tin 1271, pack 29.087.

156 Letter of Domício da Gama to Afrânio de Melo Franco in 9/18/1923.

157 Telegram of Melo Franco to Felix Pacheco, Genebra 9/29/1923, AHI, 274/2/3.

158 VINHOSA, Francisco Luiz T. Op. cit., 1990, p. 245.

159 LYRA, Heitor. Op. Cit., p. 331.

160 Idem, p. 341.

161 This essay was translated by the author. He wishes to thank Dr. Paulo Roberto de Almeida for his friendly and valuable cooperation in its preparation.

162 Emily S. Rosenberg, “World War I and ‘Continental Solidarity’,” pp. 313-327.

163 Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco (henceforth Afonso Arinos), Estadista, II, 881-882.

164 Ibid., 885.

165 Ibid., p. 898.

166 On the foreign policy of that era, see Eugênio Vargas Garcia, Entre América e Europa.

167 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1113-1119.

168 Quoted in Stanley E. Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World,” pp. 347-348.

169 Felix Pacheco to Minister of War, November 28, 1922; Rui Barbosa to Pacheco, November 30, 1922, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (henceforth AHI).

170 “Never, in any other international congress, had Brazil found itself in such a difficult situation,” General Tasso Fragoso, a member of the delegation to Santiago, aptly observed. Quoted in Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1120-1123.

171 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Pacheco, March 25, 30, 1923, AHI.

172 Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, Memórias, pp. 86-87.

173 Melo Franco, Brazil’s Declaration of Principles… April 21, 1923 (Rio de Janeiro, 1923), pp. 3,5; Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1148-1151.

174 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Pacheco, April 20, 1923, AHI; Leitão de Carvalho, Memórias, p. 89.

175 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1158-1159; Robert A. Potash, Army and Politics in Argentina, p. 8.

176 Afonso Arinos, Estadista , III, 1173.

177 Essential reading on Brazil’s effort to achieve a permanent seat on the Council of the League is Eugênio Vargas Garcia, O Brasil e a Liga das Nações, 1919-1926.

178 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1178-1179, 1215-1221; Afrânio de Melo Franco Ana Leopoldina de Melo Franco, February 7, 1925, Arquivo Virgílio de Melo Franco (VMF).

179 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1173, 1175.

180 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Pacheco, September 9, 1925, AHI.

181 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Pacheco, March 19, 1925, Arquivo Afrânio de Melo Franco (henceforth AMF). Sir Robert Vansittart, head of the American Department of the Foreign Office at the time, indirectly confirmed Melo Franco’s judgment, recalling that British diplomats tended to scorn Latin America. Vansittart, quoted in Stanley E. Hilton, “Latin America and Western Europe, 1880-1945,”p. 5.

182 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Pacheco (for Bernardes), February 15, 1926, Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1239; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Pacheco, February 22, February 28, 1926, AHI.

183 Bernardes to Afrânio de Melo Franco, March 05, 1926; Pacheco to Afrânio de Melo Franco, March 7, 9, 11, 1926, AHI.

184 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Afrânio de Melo Franco Filho, March 26, 1926, Arquivo Afrânio de Melo Franco Filho (hereinafter AMFF); Afrânio de Melo Franco to Bernardes, March 12, 1926, Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1243.

185 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Pacheco, March 17, 1926, AMF; Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1246.

186 British ambassador (Buenos Aires) to Foreign Office, March 24, May 3, 1926, Records of the Foreign Office (hereinafter RFO); Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1266-1271.

187 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Otávio Mangabeira, May 10, February 23, 1927, Otávio Mangabeira Archive; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Melo Franco Filho, June 28, 1926, October 09, 1927, AMFF; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Austen Chamberlain, February 26, 1927, AMF; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Pacheco, February 4, 1929, Félix Pacheco Archive.

188 João Neves da Fontoura, Memórias, p. 51; Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1305-1355; Oswaldo Aranha to Afonso Arinos, June 30, 1955, Oswaldo Aranha Archive (hereinafter OA); Getúlio Vargas to Afrânio de Melo Franco, 12/14/1931, Getúlio Vargas Archive (hereinafter GV). On the Revolution of 1930, see Stanley E. Hilton, Oswaldo Aranha, and Luiz Aranha Corrêa do Lago, Oswaldo Aranha.

189 Oswaldo Aranha to Afonso Arinos, June 30, 1955, OA; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio de Melo Franco and Afrânio de Melo Franco Filho, December 8, 1930, February 1, 1931; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio de Melo Franco, March 29, 1931, VMF.

190 Afrânio de Melo Franco (Geneva) to Melo Franco Filho, January 5, 1925; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Zaide and Jaime Chermont, December 11, 1930; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Afrânio de Melo Franco Filho, December 2, 1930, AMFF. According to a survey made by the Secretary-General of Itamaraty, 63 percent of functionaries were not at their posts when Melo Franco took over the Ministry. Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1374. For Leitão da Cunha’s comment, see his Diplomacia em alto-mar, p. 39.

191 Gregório da Fonseca (Casa Civil da Presidência da República) to Melo Franco, November 11, November 12, December 3, December 8, 1930, AHI 292/2/2.

192 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Zaide and Jaime Chermont, December 8, 1930, VMF.

193 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Vargas, December 4, 1930, Arquivo Presidência da República (hereafter PR); Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio de Melo Franco, January 12, March 29, 1931, VMF; Minister of Finance to Afrânio de Melo Franco, April 10, 1931, AMF.

194 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Vargas, November 24, 1931, PR; Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1374-1375; Amb. William Seeds (Rio de Janeiro) to Foreign Office, August 11, 1931, RFO 371, W9794/8838/98.

195 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio de Melo Franco, February 16, 1931, VMF; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Aranha, February 22, 1935, OA. The text of the Decree-Law is in Ministério das Relações Exteriores (hereinafter MRE), Relatório apresentado ao Chefe do Governo Provisório [...] 1931, II, Annex C, pp. 25-32. For a careful analysis of the reform, see Flávio Mendes de Oliveira Castro, Dois Séculos de História da Organização do Itamaraty, pp. 315-321. Aranha, as foreign minister, oversaw completion of the fusion of the quadros.

196 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Vargas, January 19, 1931, PR; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio de Melo Franco, February 16, February 01, 1931, VMF; MRE, Relatório [ . . . ] 1931, I, xiv-xv.

197 For a careful analysis, based on an extraordinary wealth of sources, of Itamaraty’s involvement in the Chaco question during the crisis period of Melo Franco’s tenure at Itamaraty, see Francisco Doratioto, Relações Brasil-Paraguai, pp. 387-408.

198 MRE to Brazilian Legation (La Paz), April 11, 1932, AHI.

199 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1384-1406; Hugh Gibson to State Department, September, 1933, United States, State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereinafter FRUS], Diplomatic Papers, 1933, V; Doratioto, Relações Brasil-Paraguai, p. 404.

200 Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World,” pp. 357-358; Hilton, “Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930-1945”, p. 769; Paraguayan Legation to MRE, 17 January 1934, AHI. Doratioto, Relações Brasil-Paraguai, chapters 4-5, provides a detailed discussion of Brazil’s pre-1930 efforts to strengthen relations with Paraguay.

201 Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, A diplomacia brasileira na questão de Letícia; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Vargas, March 10, 1933, PR.

202 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1448-1463.

203 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Hipólito Irigoyen, [?] April 1928, Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1297; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Embassy of Brazil (Buenos Aires), June 11, 1931, AHI; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Ambassador João F. de Assis Brazil, January 25, 1933, AAMF.

204 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio de Melo Franco, October 01, 1933, VMF; MRE, Circular no. 741, December 28, 1932, “A Versão Oficial”, part VI, pp. 74-81; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Orlando Leite Ribeiro (Buenos Aires), October 17, 1932, GV; Getúlio Vargas, Diário, vol. I, p. 243.

205 Almirante José Maria do Penido (Escola de Guerra Naval) to Minister of Navy, December 2, 1930; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Penido, December 03, 1930; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Edwin Morgan, December 04, 1930, AHI.

206 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Hildebrando Acioly, April 10, 1933, Hildebrando Acioly Archive (henceforth HA); Hugh Gibson to J. Phillip Groves, September 25, 1933, Box 46, Hugh Gibson Papers (henceforth HG); João F. Assis Brasil, report, June 9, 1933, AHI; Gibson to State Department, August 21, 1933, FRUS, 1933, V, 13, 18; Stanley E. Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939, p. 50.

207 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Afonso Arinos, April 19, 1932, AAMF; Vice-Admiral Augusto C. De Sousa e Silva to Afrânio de Melo Franco, January 7, 1931, AMF; General Augusto Tasso Fragosos to Minister of War, October 29, 1931; Chief, Army General Staff to Minister of the Navy, November 6, 1931, Arquivo José Carlos de Macedo Soares (henceforth JCMS); Minister of Navy to Afrânio de Melo Franco, November 24, 1931; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Ambassador Raul Regis de Oliveira (London), November 25, 1931; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Brazilian Embassy (Washington), November 28, 1931, AHI; Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, p. 113-114.

208 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1397-1405; U.S. Embassy (Rio) to Department of State, July 26, 1933, FRUS, 1933, V, p. 350; Foreign Office, memorandum, November 29, 1933, RFO 371/16515. An official of the Foreign Office actually attributed to Itamaraty an effort to sabotage the work of the League in South America. Robert Craigie, memo, January 22, 1934, RFO 371/17441.

209 Stanley E. Hilton, Rebelião Vermelha, Chapter 5; Hilton, Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917-1947, chapter 2. For restrictions on immigration, see MRE, Circular Reservado No. 637, October 10, 1931, “A Versão Oficial”, pp. 39-40. For further discussion of Communist activities in Brazil and those of Luís Carlos Prestes in the Soviet Union, see Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Estratégias da Ilusão.

210 Stanley E. Hilton, A Guerra Civil Brasileira, pp. 223-229.

211 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III,. 1503-1507; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Hildebrando Acioly, December 30, 1933, HA; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Vargas, January 10, 1934, GV.

212 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1466-1484; Seeds to Foreign Office, January 19, 1934, RFO 371/17485; Gibson to State Department, January 29, 1934; Cordell Hull to Gibson, April 4, 1934; Gibson to State Department, June 1, 1934, FRUS, 1934, IV, 321, 332, 360-361.

213 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1512-1513; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio de Melo Franco, October 18, 1935, VMF; Gibson to Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, September 27, 1934, HG.

214 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Melo Franco Filho, September 7, 1935, September 18, 1938, October 5, 1938, AMFF; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio de Melo Franco, October 5, 1938, VMF.

215 Afrânio de Melo Franco (Lima) to Aranha, December 20, December 22, 1938, AHI; Rosalina Coelho Lisboa Miller to Aranha, n.d., OA; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, I, 605; Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1569- 1587.

216 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Melo Franco Filho, February 8, 1939, AMFF; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Acioly, May 13, 1939, HA.

217 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Melo Franco Filho, March 20, 1940, AMFF.

218 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Acioly, March 1, 1941, HA.

219 Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1589-1615.

220 See, for example, the telegrams to Vargas sent by the presidents of Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela, PR. Also Afonso Arinos, Estadista, III, 1623-1624.

221 The formation and consolidation of this strategy, on the basis of foreign policy elite perceptions of national and international conditions are analyzed in Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World”; “The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy”; and “The Armed Forces and Industrialists in Modern Brazil: The Drive for Military Autonomy (1889- 1954),” Hispanic American Historical Review, 62 (Nov. 1982), pp. 629-673.

222 Hilton, “Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development,” p. 769.

223 Ibid., pp. 769-770, 773-776.

224 Hilton, “Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro `Axis’ During the World War II Era.”

225 Hull, Memoirs, I, 605-606.

226 Stanley E. Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960”.

227 Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio de Melo Franco, February 16, February 1, 1931, VMF; Afrânio de Melo Franco to Pacheco, September 6, 1923, AHI.

228 Thucydides. História da Guerra do Peloponeso. Editora UnB, IPRI/FUNAG, Official Press of the State of S. Paulo, 2001. Book I, p. 1.

229 A. L. Cervo & C. Bueno. História da Política Exterior do Brasil. (Ed. Ática, 1992) Editora Universidade de Brasília, 3rd edition, 2008.

230 J. A. Guilhon Albuquerque. Sessenta Anos de Política Externa Brasileira, 1930-1990. Cultura Editores Associados and NUPRI/USP, S. Paulo, 1996 (4 vols.).

231 “One may say that knowledge of this kind is one of the most important and necessary features of good government, because indeed the domestic peace of the state depends largely upon appropriate measures taken in its foreign service to make friends among well-disposed states, and by timely action to resist those who cherish hostile designs. There is indeed no prince so powerful that he can afford to neglect the assistance offered by a good alliance…” (M. de Callières. On the Manners of Negotiating with Princes. University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p. 12. The first edition of the work dates from 1716 and was entitled De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains).

232 The image that the author uses is “moving with the speed of the human step,” referring to the steadfastness and tranquility for which the man of integrity in their craft not swayed by fashion, by the temptations of easy gain and momentary or shrill noise from the streets. C. Virgil Gheorghiu. A Casa de Petrodava. Livraria Bertrand, Lisbon, 1961.

233 Special thank yous are due to Stanley Hilton and Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago for their various topical corrections and specific suggestions that helped prevent factual errors in the text and perfected the conceptual arguments about Oswaldo Aranha’s political action.

234 CF. Oswaldo Aranha, 1894-1960: Discursos e Conferências. Brasilia: FUNAG, 1994, p. 25. The same excerpt, ipsis litteris, is included in a speech made at Tiradentes Palace on 12/23/1940; CF. ARANHA, Oswaldo. A Revolução e a América. Rio de Janeiro: Department of Press and Advertisement, 1940, p. 9.

235 The historian Stanley Hilton drafted the most complete biography on Oswaldo Aranha’s life and political action, Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 1994.

236 CF. Aspásia Camargo, “Oswaldo Aranha: A Estrela da Revolução “. In: CAMARGO, Aspásia; ARAÚJO, João Hermes Pereira de; SIMONSEN, Mário Henrique. Oswaldo Aranha: A Estrela da Revolução. São Paulo: Mandarin, 1996, p. 15-102. The Brazilianist Joseph Love calls him “the main architect of the Revolution of 1930”; CF. Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971, p. 219.

237 Francisco Iglesias stated that the performance of Oswaldo Aranha as a “possible candidate for the Presidency of the Republic ended in 1954, with the death of Getúlio Vargas. The latter cut his career in 1934, in 1938 and in 1944. Aranha did not reach the supreme rank due to a certain lack of effort: a competent politician, he lacked the ambition that animates and guides those aspiring to power, and he was excessively loyal to Getúlio,” in CAMARGO-ARAÚJO-SIMONSEN. Oswaldo Aranha: a estrela da revolução, op. cit., cf. p. 9.

238 Cf. HILTON, Oswaldo Aranha, op. cit., p. 177.

239 The episodes of his life until the Revolution of 1930 were widely reported, including unpublished elements in historiography, in Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago: Oswaldo Aranha: O Rio Grande e a Revolução de 1930; Um Político Gaúcho na República Velha. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1996.

240 Here begins Paulo Roberto de Almeida’s summary of the chapter about João Hermes Pereira de Araújo, “Oswaldo Aranha and the Diplomacy”, in: CAMARGO-ARAÚJO-SIMONSEN, Oswaldo Aranha: A Estrela da Revolução, op. cit., p. 105-379.

241 Cf. CASTRO, Flávio Mendes de Oliveira. Itamaraty: Dois Séculos de História, 1808-2008. Brasília: FUNAG, 2009, vol. I: 1808-1979, p. 365-374.

242 Cf. Oswaldo Aranha, “A New Order trough the United Nations.” In: COPELAND, Lewis (coord.). The World’s Great Speeches. 2nd ed.; New York: Dover, 1958, p. 621-623. The same speech is included in the gathering made by Itamaraty in order to celebrate one hundred years of his birth: Oswaldo Aranha, 1894-1960: Discursos e Conferências, op. cit., p. 101-106.

243 Here ends the summary of the text by Ambassador João Hermes Pereira de Araújo.

244 See Mario Henrique Simonsen, “Oswaldo Aranha e o Ministério da Fazenda”, in: CAMARGO- ARAÚJO-SIMONSEN, Oswaldo Aranha: A Estrela da Revolução, op. cit., p. 381-442; cf. p. 383.

245 Compared to letters and documents, the specifically conceptual texts of Oswaldo Aranha’s authorship are relatively few, and they are generally restricted to issues linked to positions he held throughout his political life. An exception, perhaps, are those of a conference that occurred on the Jubilee of the Republic, on 11/27/1939: Fronteiras e Limites: A Política do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1940. A compilation of his speeches and lectures produced on the occasion of the centenary of his birth (Oswaldo Aranha, 1894-1960: discursos e conferências, op. cit.) contains exactly 120 pages, although several other texts could be added, especially those relating to domestic policy; some of which can be found in the collection organized by Moacyr Flores: Oswaldo Aranha. Porto Alegre: IEL, 1991.

246 Cf. O Jornal, 02/24/1945, apud ARAÚJO, “Oswaldo Aranha e a diplomacia”, op. cit., p. 176-78.

247 See the article by Stanley Hilton, “The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 100, n. 1, Spring 1985, p. 27-51, as well as his biography of Aranha already mentioned, which is particularly rich, regarding the Brazil-Argentina relationship.

248 Bilateral trade actually increased significantly during World War II, in part due to the interruption of Argentina’s transaction with Great Britain, but also, as Stanley Hilton demonstrated, due to the Brazilian agreements and missions to its neighbor; CF. “Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930-1945: A Reappraisal of His Attitude Toward Industrialization and Planning”, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 35, no. 4, December, 1975, p. 754-778; esp. 775-76.

249 According to Hilton, Aranha “was an influential factor, sometimes crucial, in the decision-making process on foreign policy, but he could not control this process. And he should not have been expected to have mastered it because, after all, the president was, for more than a decade, a man with whom he had a relationship of younger brother to elder brother. It would even be surprising if Vargas had ceded control over foreign policy, especially in an era when the events abroad threatened to affect the country’s destinations like never before. “ CF. Oswaldo Aranha: uma biografia, op. cit., p. 354.

250 According to Sérgio Danese, Vargas was probably the first Brazilian representative practicing presidential diplomacy, being, on several occasions, his own Foreign Minister; see Diplomacia Presidencial: História e Crítica. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1999, p. 307.

251 Excerpts from the letter from Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, January 25, 1943, reprinted in Araújo, “Oswaldo Aranha e a Diplomacia”, op. cit., p. 297-299.

252 Eugenio Vargas Garcia, in turn, mentions a letter with only seven pages, included in the Estevão Leitão de Carvalho Archive, Lot 507, Book 3, IHGB; see GARCIA, O Sexto Membro Permanente: o Brasil e a Criação da ONU. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2012, p. 45 and p. 46, note 110.

253 Cf. McCANN, Frank D. A Aliança Brasil-United States, 1937-1945. Rio de Janeiro: Library of the Army, 1995, p. 244.

254 CF. McCANN, p. 245; Vargas and Roosevelt spoke directly in French.

255 Cf. Araújo, op. cit., p. 314. 24 Idem, p. 315.

256 Idem, p. 315.

257 Freitas-Valle to Sumner Welles, letter, Ottawa, October 16th, 1944, CFV ad 44.02.00.

258 Correio Paulistano, São Paulo, March 23rd and April 11th, 1926, CFV 25.12.28d.

259 On May 14, 1945, the Brazilian delegation withdrew its proposal and, as a result, the Committee decided “not to favor the creation of a sixth permanent seat representing Latin America”.

260 Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, Ottawa, July 28th, 1945, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

261 Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, London, September 17th, 1945, CDO, Pack 40,235.

262 Years later, João Neves da Fontoura, Foreign Minister during the second Vargas Government, perhaps reflecting the view of the President of the Republic, expressed himself in favor of that goal, not without a sense of regret and contained frustration: “I have always thought that our country should have been a permanent member of the Security Council. But history repeated itself in 1945 as in the deceased League of Nations. And then we’re out”. Fontoura to Freitas-Valle, letter, Rio de Janeiro, January 21st, 1953, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

263 Freitas-Valle to Raul Fernandes, letter, New York, July 06th, 1955, CDO, 6,727 Folder, UN 1945-56.

264 As a positive note, no country becomes a Member State except by its free consent. If today those 193 States do not intend to abandon the UN, maybe it is because at least they see some benefit, no matter how small, in staying there. Or it can be imagined that they estimate that the losses would be greater if they were outside.

265 Report of the activities of the III Commission of the Conference and of the Coordination Committee, as well as of the 1st meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, Ottawa, July 9th, 1945, CDO, Pack 42,949.

266 Words by Freitas-Valle, Committee III/1, San Francisco, May 21st, 1945, CDO, Pack 42,949.

267 Another suggestion was to include in delegations “public men, representing all Brazilian parties”, as was being done by the USA, France, Canada and other governments, which invited parliamentarians to compose their delegations. Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, London, December 31st,1945, CDO, Pack 40,235.

268 Declarations by Freitas-Valle, London, February 1945, CFV ad 44.09.20.

269 Speech by Freitas-Valle on the Soviet proposal, New York, 1949, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

270 Speech by Freitas-Valle when he took over the post of Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro, February 18th, 1949, CFV ad 1949.02.18.

271 The UN even sent observer missions to monitor prior agreements, such as the truce after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (UNTSO) and the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in 1949 (UNMOGIP). International intervention in the Korean War was more properly described as an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN, different, therefore, from the traditional model of peacekeeping.

272 Press releases by Freitas-Valle, Rio de Janeiro, December 1949, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

273 Freitas-Valle to Trygve Lie, letter, New York, November 25th, 1949, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

274 "A Escola Superior de Guerra e o Itamaraty", lecture at ESG, Rio de Janeiro, 1950, CFV 03f.

275 Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, Ottawa, December 13th, 1944, CFV ad 44.02.00.

276 Freitas-Valle to Fontoura, telegram, London, February 4th, 1946, AHI 79320.

277 Declarations by Freitas-Valle, Rio de Janeiro, November 10th ,1950, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

278 Freitas-Valle to Ernesto Leme, letter, Santiago, May 27th, 1954, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

279 Speech by Freitas-Valle in his inauguration as Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro, February 18th,1949, CFV ad 1949.02.18.

280 As Azambuja pointed out: “Two books might have summarized the spirit of Itamaraty of that time. One – the Yearbook – said who we were, where we were and what we did. It was our Who’s Who. The other one, The Service Handbook, was our Vade-Mecum, the almost Koranic compilation – because it was exhaustive and categorical – of how to act in every circumstance. The two basic books were on the table of each Brazilian diplomat of that time. Texts about international relations were only occasional visitors” (Vale Dico, p. 13).

281 The War College and the Itamaraty, lecture at ESG, Rio de Janeiro, 1950, CFV 03f.

282 Freitas-Valle to Fontoura, letter, Paris, 5/5/1946, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

283 Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, London, 7/10/1945, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

284 As Freitas-Valle had pointed out in 1956: “Everyone knows that the alliance that could be made against the destructive force of the fascist aggression could not be kept during the years after the establishment of an unstable peace. This unfortunate circumstance is at the root of all the problems of the world today” (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 151).

285 In February 1932 – therefore, prior to the Constitutionalist Revolution – Vargas had approved, by decree, the Electoral Law that called elections for May 3rd of the following year that would choose members for a Constituent National Assembly. Among the innovations of the new electoral legislation were the establishment of the secret vote, the extension of the vote to women, and the creation of an electoral judicial system.

286 Report of the MRE referring to 1934, Introduction, p. XI-XVII.

287 The international trips of Pedro II had been made privately. In 1900, President Campos Salles had visited Buenos Aires to return the visit of the president of Argentina Julio Rocca to Rio de Janeiro the previous year.

288 Presided by Cardinal Sebastião Leme (1882-1942), the official ceremony of introduction of DSB took place in the Itamaraty Palace.

289 Macedo Soares’ belief in representative democracy may be summarized in the following excerpt of a speech he gave in Campinas, SP, in 1934: “Partisan politics is the organization of opinion. It expresses itself by the vote, which is the instrument of democracy. Therefore, the ballot is the source of political legitimacy and, at the same time, the moral and legal base of the modern State” (SOARES, 1937, p. 24).

290 The Constitution, which became known as the “Polaca,” because of its similarities to that of the fascist regime of Poland, had been written by Francisco Campos (1891- 1968), the new Minister of Justice, Macedo Soares’ successor just before the coup of November 10, 1937.

291 Examples include: the University of São Paulo (USP), created in 1934; the University of the Federal District, created in 1935, eventually absorbed by the University of Brazil, in 1937; the Service of National Historical and Artistic Patrimony (SPHAN, for Serviço do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional), created in 1937; and a number of museums created during the Estado Novo, such as the National Museum of Fine Arts, in 1937, the Imperial Museum of Petrópolis, created in 1940 (opened in 1943), and the Museu da Inconfidência of Ouro Preto, which opened in 1944.

292 The Order of January 16, 1956, by Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Carlos de Macedo Soares. AHI, Part II, Internal Documentation, 134/3/15, Orders (1943-1959). Despite the determination of the Minister of State, the nomination of researchers was not welcome in the diplomatic missions. This is evident from the letters of Eliseu Araújo Lima, a researcher from outside the ministry, who was sent to Madrid as an employee of the National Archives. The Archives of the IHGB has letters from Araújo Lima to Macedo Soares, from 1956, in which he described the progress of his research, as well as the difficulties of relationship with Embassy staff. IHGB, José Carlos de Macedo Soares fund, Tin 796, File 11.

293 Order dated April 13, 1943 by Minister Oswaldo Aranha. AHI, Part II, Internal Documentation, 134/3/15, Orders (1943-1959).

294 Report of the MRE referring to 1955, Rio de Janeiro, MRE/Publications Service, p. 205.

295 During the administration of Macedo Soares, the number of members of CETHB was raised, again, to 11. In 1959, Negrão de Lima, Soares’ successor, raised it to 12 members, more than twice the original membership. AHI, Part II, Internal Documentation, 134/3/15, Orders (1943-1959).

296 Report of the MRE referring to 1957. Rio de Janeiro, MRE/Publications Section, 1958, p. 329.

297 Report of the MRE referring to 1955. MRE, Rio de Janeiro, “Exposição”, p. 199.

298 The complete sentence says “yo soy yo y mi circumstance y si no la salvo a ella no me salvo yo” and was extracted from Meditaciones Del Quijote, by José Ortega y Gasset, in 1914.

299 See, for example, the works by Hobsbawn (2002) and Galbraith (1977).

300 The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was established on 24 January, 1946. It was Resolution n. 1 of the UN General Assembly and it established as the Commission’s purpose to produce specific proposals on: (a) how to promote the exchange among the nations of basic scientific information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy; (b) how to control atomic energy to ensure that it would be used only for peaceful purposes; (c) how to promote the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction existing in national arsenals; (d) how to provide effective guarantees to protect the nations that joined the proposed measures, of fortuitous factors and violations by other nations.

301 Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal prepared a proposal for a system of licensing for countries seeking nuclear energy technology for peaceful purposes. Licensing would stimulate the civilian use of nuclear energy, however, President Truman appointed Bernard Baruch, successful businessman and White House councillor to present the plan to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. Baruch modified the proposal prepared by Acheson and Lilienthal proposing a regime far more rigorous and intrusive to any research and atomic products — both civilian and military — through an Atomic development authority, under the more direct supervision of the United States, not the UN.

302 The Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, organized by Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1986) includes the Vauban essay: The Impact of Science on War (p. 64-90) in which Henry Guerlac discusses the importance that Luis XIV attributed to Sébastien Le Preste de Vauban, military engineer whose job was to guide the French army regarding techniques to defend strongholds and lay siege to fortified towns.

303 Feynman wrote a book where he recounted his memories in the form of good-natured chronicles. His passage by Brazil is reported in the chronicle entitled O Americano outra Vez! (R. P. Feynman, Deve Ser Brincadeira, Sr. Feynman, Editora UnB, 2000 p. 225-245).

304 The Commission included 22 members, mostly scientists and researchers, such as César Lattes, Francisco Maffei, Luiz Cintra do Prado, Marcello Damy, Theodoreto A. Souto and Álvaro Alberto himself.

305 See especially chapter 4 of Schwartzman (2001).

306 In a letter addressed to Vannevar Bush, President Roosevelt said “... the Office of Research and Scientific Development, of which you are the director, represents a unique experience of team and cooperation work in the coordination of the scientific research and in the application of the existent scientific knowledge for the solution of basic technical problems in war. His work is unfolding with maximum secrecy and without any kind of public recognition. However, tangible results can be seen in the memoranda that arrive from the battle fronts worldwide... However, there’s no reason for the lessons learned in that experience not to be applied in an advantageous manner in times of Peace...” (Letter on Plans for Postwar Scientific Research and Development, Document Archive, 122, 22/11/1944).

307 The concept of “Dutch disease” is still controversial and the most structured economic formulation of the claim was proposed as a consequence of the Oil Crisis of the 1970’s by W. Max Corden and J. Peter Neary.

308 Among those invited to make up that Commission were: J. A. Alves de Souza (Director of the Mineral Production Department) and the Professors J. Carneiro Felippe and J. Costa Ribeiro, of the University of Brazil (currently UFRJ) and Professor Luis Cintra do Prado, of USP (J. C. Vitor Garcia, Álvaro Alberto. A Ciência do Brasil, p. 22, footnote 43).

309 Among the most remarkable works left by Francisco de Vitória (1483-1546) are De Indis and De Jure Belli Hispanorum In Barbaros (1532), which deal with the relations between Spain and the Native Indians in America. He was one of the thinkers who resumed the discussion of the “fair war” concept developed in the Middle Ages.

310 The first edition of Politics Among Nations, by Hans Morgenthau, was released in 1948 and caused huge repercussion among the policy formulators everywhere, mainly in Washington. “The purpose of this book is to introduce a theory about international politics”, wrote Morgenthau, and the power of his statements came from his careful and even obsessive observation of the reality around him, that is: the current facts, the fears and the behavior revealed by States and their rulers.

311 Cícero, in his Tusculanes tells that story or moral fable in which, when Dionysius heard the flatterer Damocles praise the glories of power, he offered him the possibility, in a banquet, to sit in the royal throne and to enjoy all the honors of the position. Damocles lost all enthusiasm when he saw that, over the throne, there was a sword tied only with a thread taken from a horse’s tail.

312 The title of the article was The Sources of Soviet Conduct and it had been published in July 1947 in the magazine “Foreign Affairs” as “X”, instead of the author’s name, since Kennan had a high post in the State Department. Kennan had sent the long telegram, which was the base for X Article, in February 1946, when he was a Minister-Councillor in Moscow and it had been written upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, who wanted explanations about the behavior of the Soviet government in relation to the IMF and the World Bank.

313 Saraiva Guerreiro was Vice-Chancellor (Secretary-General of the Itamaraty) when Geisel was the President (1974-79) when Brazil, despite the pressures of the American government, signed the Nuclear Agreement with Germany and made several initiatives in the diplomatic sphere, such as recognition of the Independence of Angola and the establishment of relations with several countries whose governments were notably leftist. Saraiva Guerreiro was Chancellor of the Figueiredo government (1979-85). See Saraiva Guerreiro in Lembranças de um Empregado do Itamaraty (1992).

314 I am thankful to the Barbosa da Silva family for the kindness of the interviews and to the Minister Paulo Roberto de Almeida, to Ambassador Raul Fernando Leite Ribeiro, to the Secretary Marianne Martins Guimarães, to Marcílio Marques Moreira and to Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago for the valuable comments.

315 Several observers point out that, already in the 1930’s, it was common to use the term “secos & molhados” to designate the economic area of the organ. About Fonseca Filho see: Palavras de Saudade a Dois Cônsules Brasileiros. Jornal do Brazil. March 1st, 1934.

316 Um Tema Para Debate. O Imparcial. June 20th, 1928.

317 Diplomacia dá as mãos à Economia. O Observador Econômico e Financeiro. N. 287. Year XXIV. January 1960, p. 7.

318 The five volumes of the Cadernos do Nosso Tempo were republished in Volume 4 of the magazine Revista Estudos Políticos, accessible at <http://revistaestudospoliticos.com/numero-4/>.

319 Various such organs were created in the second government of Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954), including, at the top of the list, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico – BNDE (National Bank of Economic Development), and Petrobrás (the national oil company). In addition, there were the Assessoria Econômica da Presidência da República (Economic Advisory Body of the President of the Republic), the Comissão de Desenvolvimento Industrial (Commission of Industrial Development), Superintendência do Plano de Valorização Econômica da Amazônia (Superintendency of the Plan of Economic Valuation of the Amazon), the Banco do Nordeste (Bank of the Northeast), the Banco Nacional de Crédito Cooperativo (National Bank of Cooperative Credit), the Instituto Nacional de Imigração e Colonizção Nacional de Política Agrária (National Institute of Policies for Agricultural Immigration and Colonization), and the Serviço Social Rural (Rural Social Service). Plus, in higher education, there were the Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas – CNPq (National Research Council), and the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – CAPES (Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Level Staff), which are also from the same period (D ‘ARAÚJO, 2004).

320 IBAM was created as a private, non-profit organization without political purposes or affiliations. The federal government recognized it as a public entity in November 1953. Its proposed activities included studies and research; the promotion and dissemination of practical ideas that would contribute to the development of municipal administration; the provision of technical assistance to municipalities, including educational courses aimed at improving municipal administration; and the publication of the Revista Brasileira de Administração Municipal (Nascimento, p. 54). IBAM still exists, with these same goals. It is headquartered in Rio de Janeiro.

321 The IBRI worked in Rio de Janeiro until 1992, publishing the RBPI continuously, albeit with much difficulty. Both the organization and the journal moved to Brasília in 1993, and they are still inspired by a group made up of diplomats and academics.

322 The Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI) can be accessed at <http://www.scielo.br/ rbpi>. The issues published between 1958 and 1993 were digitalized and published in Mundorama– Iniciativa de Divulgação Científica em Relações Internacionais, at the University of Brasilia. They are accessible at <http://www.mundorama.net>.

323 The RBPI has seen three major phases to date: From its inception in 1958 until 1993, the periodical published Brazilian thought on international relations as expressed by intellectuals, diplomats and a few academics. The majority of the academic community was not yet involved, however, and the management of the periodical was outside the university environment. In 1993, the Brazilian Institute of International Relations was transferred to Brasilia, and the RBPI was placed in the hands of a group of researchers at the University of Brasilia, where it has maintained its operating base ever since. In its new headquarters the process of consolidation of the scientific aspects of the periodical began, exactly when the study of international relations was expanding in Brazil with the growth and sophistication of a specialized academic community and an exponential increase in the number of undergraduate courses offered in the subject area. The RBPI became an eminently scientific magazine, similar to those published in first-line study centers around the world. In addition, the growing international insertion of Brazil made Brazilian foreign relations a subject of interest to new and diverse segments of society, and the editors of the publication responded with an expansion and diversification of objective analyses. And finally, in phase three, the current time, information technology and a modification of traditional models of scientific communication have equipped the publishers of the periodical with the same quality standards existing in countries of great tradition in the area. The publication has, therefore, extended its international visibility, increased its circulation, and met the increasingly demanding criteria of national development agencies, both for its own economic viability and its ascent in the rating scales of national and international indexing.

324 “Caiada” means the basic white painting applied to the external walls. According to the author, it represents the elite directed towards the whitening of the nation, the horizon of which was always Europe and the United States.

325 See DANTAS, 2011, p. 351. Marcílio lists all the documents and the activities of San Tiago Dantas that, since the 1930’s, and are relevant to the international process.

326 “Trechos da Audiência do Ministro Afonso Arinos na Comissão de Relações Exteriores da Câmara de Deputados”, FRANCO, 2007, p. 77.

327 During the Quadros administration, Brazil restored relations with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Restoration with the USSR, however, did not immediately follow. That proposal had generated controversy because of its more complex political connotations, as it was the USSR that led the socialist bloc. In addition, the break had taken place in a dramatic manner, together with domestic measures, such as the prohibition of the Brazilian Communist Party and the suspension of its members’ political rights. As for the Cuban problem, the grounds of the Brazilian position were brilliantly outlined in a memorandum signed by Secretary Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, Chief of the Political Division of Itamaraty, on May 8, 1961 (as transcribed in FRANCO, 2007, p. 64). San Tiago Dantas incorporated many of this memo’s arguments into his proposal.

328 In a meeting of the political planning commission that took place on December 27, 1961, Ambassador Araújo Castro, said: “Something that had to be said very carefully concerns the issue of foreign policy. In fact, the problems are much more serious than they were one year ago. At that time we were at the stage of the enunciation of principles and now it is all about the application of those principles. The Jânio Quadros administration actually did not have any foreign policy problem, except the case of the Santa Maria.” (Cited in FRANCO, 2007, p. 232).

329 The Cold War admits several relationship standards between both blocs, from the antagonism that characterizes the diplomacy of Foster Dulles to the proposals of Kissinger about détente in the 1970’s. In the USSR, the variations oppose Stalin and Gorbachev.

330 The best theoretical discussion of the problem is that of the constructivists.

331 It could be added that, for San Tiago Dantas, controversy is natural. As he said in his farewell speech at the Foreign Ministry: “All human personalities bring with them an indelible mark that they take to the offices they occupy or to the place where they live... It was natural that I brought to this office a mark that could not be separated from my public life and my destiny, which has been controversial. Being controversial and enjoying it, not believing in the pacifications imposed by artifice, but, on the contrary, being certain that it is through the fight and the antagonism that the stages of stagnation are overcome and new development stages are reached, I never renounced entering a fight in order to find through it the paths of truth and peace” (Lessa; Hollanda, 2009, p. 254).

332 As stated in the program of the Parliamentary Government, “The goals that we pursue – and according to which we make our decisions – are the following: first, to preserve world peace, which is currently a common and supreme purpose of the international action of all peoples, but in relation to which our political calling rose early, inspired since the beginning of the nationality by the pacifist ideas and the formal repudiation to war as a means of international action [...]” (Lessa; Hollanda, 2009, p. 22).

333 It is worth recalling that, unlike San Tiago Dantas, those who argue against the decision to restore relations with the USSR state that dialogue with Moscow will always be tainted because the USSR intended to transform Brazil into a center of espionage and subversive propaganda of a “poisonous doctrine” – as Father Vidigal said when he interrupted the Foreign Minister during his statement (Lessa; Hollanda, 2009, p. 70)

334 It should be noted that the dissolution of the threat is not absolute and the restoration allows for both diplomatic missions, in Moscow and in Rio de Janeiro, a statute of limitations for the displacement of their employees, as, in fact, San Tiago Dantas himself explained in his statement in the Chamber of Deputies. Many years later, when the relations with Cuba were restored, a similar statute was negotiated, in both cases, by inspiration of the security division of João Goulart administration and later that of Jose Sarney.

335 The criticism is not public. It was made during a closed meeting with the summit of Itamaraty in a house in the Gávea Pequena neighborhood, the Casa das Pedras that belonged to Drault Hernany, a theme that we will return to the theme. “In that line, there was a slight touch of ideological sympathy and a systematic refusal [...] sometimes having avoided talking about the democratic character of Fidel Castro’s government [...] our idea was the opposite. We started by recognizing that the Cuban regime was not democratic. [...] That eliminated the problem of ideological sympathy. The Brazilian government has no ideological sympathy for the regime of Fidel Castro. Even though some political groups within the government might have it, the government has sympathy for what is written in the Constitution and the treaties” (Fonseca, 2007)

336 According to Lafer: “The development of nuclear weapons led war to no longer be an alternative instrument of politics. Given the inadmissibility of warlike solutions, the world is confronted with the need to adjust, through negotiations, differences between nations. Therefore, the single path in search of solving problems of our time is through permanent negotiation, the idea to always negotiate. The United Nations is not a super state, but the affirmation is that the world has to live in a continuous state of stubborn, patient negotiations. They are the mechanisms that provide the maximum opportunities for encounters and lines of commitment. If it is true that this negotiation process involves the permanent risk of deadlock, it is no less true that it is the only way in which solutions that ensure the survival of mankind can still be found.” (Cited in Dantas, 2011, p. 147).

337 Another mention of the theme of continuity is made in the chapter on foreign policy of the parliamentary style of government: “Not only in this one, but in any other regime, continuity is the indispensable requirement of all foreign policy, since, in relation to the administrative problems of the country, the drawbacks are minor resulting from the quick liquidation of an experience of change of an adopted path. In relation to the foreign policy, it is key that the protection of the State behavior within the international society ensures credit to the commitments made. Brazilian foreign policy has responded to that need for consistency in time. Although the immediate goals are transformed under the action of the historical evolution of which we participated, the Brazilian international behavior has been that of a State conscious of its own purposes, thanks to the administrative tradition of which the Brazilian Foreign Ministry became a trustee, a tradition that has provided us a fair concept in international circles.” Celso Lafer pointed that reference to me from his book, A Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a Política Externa, p. 26.

338 The accusations of Cuban interference in other countries were common and started right after the Revolution.

339 In August 1959, San Tiago Dantas submitted to the Chamber of Deputies a report on the Meeting, which was motivated by institutional instability in the Caribbean and friction between the Dominican Republic and Cuba (Lessa; Hollanda, 2009, p. 41-58).

340 In Guerreiro’s memorandum, the problem was clearly presented: “Although the other American republics may verify that Cuba hasn’t organized itself as a representative democracy, and it cannot be said that the regime currently installed there should be respected because of the principle of self-determination, they will have to respect it because of the principle of the sovereignty and the independence of States. They may only intervene if they consider that such a regime is a threat to the peace and security of the continent” (GUERREIRO, 2010, p. 67).

341 Victory in a forum is part of the legitimation process, but it is not the only one. In the Consultation Meeting, in 1962, the lack of support from Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Chile, turned fragile the legitimacy obtained by the U.S.’ policy.

342 The position of Arinos is interesting because it goes beyond conceptual terms, when it characterized “the contrast between what we could call the national sovereignty and the international organization, the contrast in what the national sovereignty ensures to the subsistence and the survival of the State and what the international organization, at least in its most current, deeper, and more moral meaning, claims as being the statement of the human rights” (Cited in FRANCO, 2007, p. 79). Thus, Arinos anticipated what became one of the axes of the problem of the modern international legitimacy, i.e., Limits to sovereignty for the values tied to human rights.

343 The diplomacy was more of a bilateral sense, with Brazil dealing, for example, with refugees in its Embassy in Havana, besides gestures, such as an award given to Che Guevara, etc.

344 At Casa das Pedras, the meeting about Cuba started from the idea that “Brasil hopes to see Cuba recovered to continental friendship status, by persuasive means”. See “Colóquios da Casa das Pedras”, in: Dantas, 2011, p. 343.

345 Earlier, Guerreiro had talked about a“Yugoslavization” of Cuba (FRANCO, 2007, p. 72).

346 Maria Regina Soares de Lima observed that, “the most current and innovative element of San Tiago Dantas’ idea of foreign policy was the suggestion to create a special statute for Cuba that preserved the non-intervention principle, so important to the powerless countries and, simultaneously, allowing for the coexistence in the hemispheric scope with a socialist country [...]. If it had been accepted, it would have been victory of the principle of universalism in the region and a powerful antidote with relation to the penetration of the Cold War and all its harmful effects on the stability of domestic political institutions and the very destiny of democracy in the region”. See Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “Independent Foreign Policy”. In: Moreira; Niskier; Reis, 2007, p. 70.

347 In his testimony to CPDOC, former Minister Saraiva Guerreiro recalled a conversation with the head of the Caribbean Desk of the State Department in which, in personal terms, he suggested that the United States could avoid the deepening of the revolution if they made low-interest loans available to Cuba, to make up for the nationalizations. To Guerreiro’s surprise, the reaction was strongly negative.

348 The first one was the “Exposição aos Chefes de Missão dos Estados Americanos,” of January 12, 1962, the “Declaração Sobre a Nota dos Ex-Ministros das Relações Exteriores”, of January 17, the statements made during the Consultation Meeting and, later, the “Exposição feita em Cadeia Nacional de Rádio e Televisão”, of February 5 and, finally, the debate at the Chamber of Deputies, on May 29, when the censorship motion was discussed with the minister in Punta Del Este (Dantas, 2011).

349 It is good to recall that the phrase was said in a closed meeting and in speculative terms, but it clarified that San Tiago Dantas himself knew Limits of his argument and tested them.

350 Marcílio Marques Moreira, who accompanied the Foreign Minister in the final stage of his life, indicated that one of the constant concerns of San Tiago Dantas was the perspective of radicalization that the Cuban Revolution brought to the Latin American politics, and in the case of Brazil, with divisions that could lead, as they did, to the collapse of democratic institutions in March 1964.

351 “Wherever an alternative, an open door, has been left for the democratic system, that system will have the sufficient attractive force to impose itself, sooner or later, and to eliminate any competing system” (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 130).

352 In fact, San Tiago Dantas complained precisely about the lack of support from the President and the Prime Minister. He said in one of the meetings at the Casa das Pedras: “Today, foreign policy lacks an interpreter with a very affirmative reputation in the country. President João Goulart is not in charge of foreign policy; Tancredo Neves has been very neglectful in terms of foreign policy. As for me, since the position of Foreign Minister is very limited, and because I am not so much that kind of public man, I am considered more as a man of ability in my role rather than a man of extreme roles” (Fonseca, 2007, p. 317).

353 If we look at the history of Brazilian speeches at the UN, between 1946 and 1963, we rarely used a partisan or engaged language concerning the East-West conflict and, when the political practice is analyzed, except for Dutra’s administration, the alignment with the United States always had some kind of nuance.

354 “The Cuban socialist dictatorship, regardless of how efficient and ideologically more solid it is, does not provide perspectives of change or suppression in the future, by action of the domestic oppositions.” (GUERREIRO, op. cit., p 66).

355 Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “Política Externa Independente”, in: Moreira; Niskier; Reis, 2007, p. 72.

356 Pan-American Operation, created under the instruction of Augusto Frederico Schmidt, was conceived after the trip of the US Vice-President Richard Nixon to South America in May 1958, in which he faced demonstrations and protests in Peru and Venezuela. Its launching took place by means of a letter from Kubitschek to the US President Dwight Eisenhower, dated May 28, in which he proposed investments in economically backward areas of the continent by means of technical assistance programs, the protection of commodities, and resources from international financial institutions to the benefit of development. The negotiations took place in the OAS, mainly in its Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES), and culminated in the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), in 1959, in whose headquarters a bust of Juscelino was inaugurated in 2006.

357 The Marshall Plan (Mar 12, 1947), elaborated by the then US Secretary of State, General George Marshall, was the program of economic aid of the United States to Europe, which was targeted to the economic recovery of the European countries that had suffered with the War. Washington’s determination to fight communism and the amount of resources directed towards Europe have made Latin American rulers of the time, and even of the following decades, to nurture a hope that Latin America would also receive a similar plan. In that context, the overvaluation of the presence of Communism in Brazil became trite.

358 The break of the relationship of the Brazilian government with the IMF took place on June 9, 1959, and was accompanied by the perception that the institution, as well as the “enemies of the independent Brazil”, were trying to force a “national capitulation”, so that the industry started to be controlled by the foreign capital (Speech by Juscelino Kubitschek, Correio da Manhã, Rio de Janeiro, 06/18/1959 and 06/27/1959, apud BANDEIRA, 2011, p. 77).

359 The opinions expressed in this chapter are of exclusive responsibility of its author, except when mentioned otherwise.

360 Lecture delivered to the trainees of the Higher War Course, Washington, D.C., on June 11, 1971. In: AMADO, 1982, p. 200.

361 At the end of this chapter, see a brief note on Araújo Castro’s ironic view of life.

362 About that, see the opening chapter of “Araújo Castro”, by Ronaldo M. Sardenberg, published by the Universidade de Brasília Publishing House, 1982, which includes the texts of the lecture at ESG and of the inauguration speech, as well as translations into Portuguese of speeches made in English.

363 OPAS does not seem to be a symptom of political weakening of Itamaraty in relation to the Presidency of the Republic. Although the Chancellors at the time, Macedo Soares and Negrão de Lima, were overcome by the events, important diplomats moved ahead its process of formulation and execution, starting by Araújo Castro himself.

364 He mentioned, for example, the entire lineage of authors devoted to the theme of the universal government, since Dante and his De Monarchia until the draft of the World Constitution, organized by Professor Robert Hutchins, of the University of Chicago. He recalled Weber and Manheim. He quoted major geopoliticians, such as Mackinder and Haushoffer, Ratzel and Mahan. He did not forget Spengler and Toynbee, Bertrand Russell and Harold Laski. He mentioned George Kennan, the great theoretician of containment and the Cold War. He did not leave out the Brazilians, such as the sociologist Guerreiro Ramos, the scholar San Tiago Dantas, the politician Juarez Távora and the jurist Themístocles Brandão Cavalcanti, among others.

365 Nowadays, the mitigation of the powers of the State can be seen in the incidents of breach of secrecy, in the USA, in the sphere of information, and in the diplomatic documentation.

366 His appointment to be Chancellor broke, in a decisive manner, the taboo of not appointing career diplomats for that position. The Itamaraty modernized itself. In the following decades, the Government may benefit from the diplomatic experience of that professional staff.