BRAZIL, THE WORLD AND MAN TODAY VARIOUS STUDIES

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS



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Helio Jaguaribe

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Preface

As a sociologist and teacher, Helio Jaguaribe has dedicated his best efforts to the worthy task of thinking about Brazil. How can its development be advanced? In what ways can our potential be turned into reality? What kind of country can we be? Some of his answers to these challenges are contained in this valuable collection, in which the author himself has brought together important items from his wide-ranging academic production.

As well as being deeply rooted in a national point of view, Jaguaribe's work looks far beyond Brazil. His reflections run with equal competence and confidence over the historical development of human societies, philosophy, politics, culture and the great socio-economic dilemmas of the modern world. The national and the universal find a perfect synthesis in Jaguaribe.

With his critical, perceptive and judicious scrutiny that can predict the right path to take and follow it through the dust raised by the polemics of the day, Jaguaribe remains faithful to his convictions in defense of national autonomy and the influence of Brazil. As time passes, he expands, diversifies and improves his analyses with matchless intellectual honesty. His writings show on the one hand the continual development of his thinking and on the other the permanence of the humanist spirit he has always had.

In a short presentation such as this it is not possible to do justice to the marvelous body of his work without running the risk of simplifying it. Thus, I would simply like to make a very short comment on foreign policy, a subject

that affects me directly through my profession as a diplomat and my present duties as Foreign Minister.

Helio Jaguaribe has always been very interested in topics concerning international relations. As a young man, while head of the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (Higher Institute for Brazilian Studies - ISEB), his book *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira (Nationalism in Modern Brazil)* was published exactly 50 years ago, in 1958. His ideas had wide repercussions in the debate being carried on at that time concerning the opportunity for and suitability of an independent foreign policy for Brazil, which would begin to be explicitly put into practice from 1961 onward.

In that pioneering work, after analyzing theoretical problems linked to nationalism as a historical-social phenomenon, and critically evaluating more concrete questions such as exploration for oil in Brazil or how foreign capital should be dealt with, Jaguaribe dedicated a chapter to studying foreign policy. He suggested abandoning traditional policies of alignment in favor of a more neutral position. His argument was simple: far from formulating its actions according to the East-West ideological division imposed by the rigid logic of the Cold War, Brazil should seek its own way in world politics without xenophobia, being directed primarily by its developmental needs. In his words: "The future is definitely one in which we must make the best use of opportunities for international exchange without dependent commitments and valuing the strategic position of a country like Brazil in order to give it greater possibilities for action".

If today, with the advantage of hindsight, his proposals are seen as extremely lucid, it is essential to point out how certain ideas meet inexplicable resistance in being accepted before they are proved right by facts.


Thus, in his 2004 essay "The Argentina-Brazil Alliance", Jaguaribe talks of the need to establish a "solid, stable and trustworthy alliance" between Brazil and Argentina to create a dynamic axis for Mercosul and subsequently for South American integration. An "integrated and properly developed" South America, Jaguaribe predicts, can make our region "one of the great independent international voices" in the world of the 21st century. It is not improbable 50 years hence, a reader in the future will have a similar reaction of *déjà vu* when meeting an idea that was accepted in spite of obstacles placed in its way some unreal, others created - when their real scope was not perceived with the same clarity.

As Emeritus Dean of the Institute for Political and Social Studies (Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais), Jaguaribe continues to produce highly relevant work in the most diverse areas of social sciences. He applies the same energy he had as a young man to taking an active part in public debates on the directions Brazil should follow, presenting accurate diagnoses and suggesting alternatives, proposals and solutions.

It is a matter of great pride for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to sponsor the publication of this important book through the Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão and thus pay due homage to one of our greatest intellectuals, who is without a doubt a world figure and one to whom Brazil owes a great deal.

Celso Amorim Ministry of Foreign Affairs







Introduction

This book consists of reprinted studies that have been written over the last 25 years, starting from 1983. They are divided into four areas: (1) sociopolitical themes, (2) international relations, (3) descriptions of various personalities and (4) philosophical studies.

Given the variety of the themes tackled, the essays do not follow a common theme. However, I believe the general classification I have given them is valid since they deal with questions that are relevant to Brazil, the world and man in modern times.

Underlying all these studies are my basic convictions, which I call transcendental monism and transcendental humanism. They also have a common focus: looking at the world from the point of view of Brazil and at Brazil from the point of view of the world.







1. The Major Conflicts of our Time and the Position of Brazil (1984)

1. The Conflicts of our Time

A Dual Polarity

The modern world is affected by countless problems and conflicts arising out of the accumulated results of modernization in all the most important cultures - and the consequent loss of importance of the traditional patterns that used to govern them - and of the economic and technological unification of the planet that has created a marked imbalance in the 150 nominally sovereign states among which the world's population is distributed. Because the many factors involved are immensely varied, these conflicts are therefore governed by a double polarization: on the one hand, East-West and on the other, North-South.

Superimposed on the nominal equality of sovereignty of modern states there is in fact a strong polarization of countries between two blocs which oppose each other, under the respective hegemonies of Russia and the United States, at the same time as there exists in between these two powers an ill-defined group of nations, mainly from the Third World, that are seeking, with varying degrees of success, to place themselves outside an automatic alignment with either of the two blocs. This is the situation of the East-West conflict.

On the other hand, without affecting the economic and technological unification of the modern world - and indeed as one of the effects of this unification - modern nations, principally those not included in the Russian-dominated system, are divided between a small group of highly-developed countries now entering the post-industrial era, most of them in the Northern hemisphere, and a large number of insufficiently developed countries mainly in the pre-industrial stage, most of which are in the Southern hemisphere. This is the situation of the North-South conflict.

This dual polarization in the world results from causes with their own specific nature, although from time to time factors and effects arising from East-West conflicts do come into contact with each other. The specific nature of each of these two great conflicts, however, is clearly discernible in empirical and analytical terms and is widely recognized as such.

Nevertheless there are those who, basing their views on the global interests of the United States, maintain, along with President Bush and some of his supporters, that the East-West conflict is all-embracing. According to this point of view, problems linked to North-South polarization arise from the antagonism between the two great blocs and are generally produced by the subversive interference of Russia in the internal affairs of underdeveloped countries. On the other hand, there are also those who, starting from another system of interests, as President Fidel Castro and some of his supporters do, emphasize the all-embracing nature of the North-South conflict. In the final analysis we are dealing with a conflict between American imperialism and its international supporters (the North) and the efforts of oppressed peoples to achieve freedom (the South) under the supposedly liberating leadership of Russia.

Faced with the need to keep the present discussion within the strict limits I have given myself, it seems unnecessary to give more attention to the fallacious attempts to reduce the dual polarity affecting our age to either the one side or the other. As I have stated, some of the factors involved in some of the results of the East-West and North-South conflicts occasionally impinge upon each other without, however, reducing the intransigence of either with regard to the other.

The East-West Conflict

For a long time the basis of the East-West conflict was understood as being mainly a result of the ideological opposition between democratic Liberalism, mainly supported by American capitalism, and Marxist-Leninist Communism based on the self-proclaimed socialism of the old Soviet Union. This world view, which predominated until the end of the 1950s, is supported today only by the supporters of the superpowers. There exists now a basic consensus among experts in international relations and enlightened public opinion that there must be a recognition, independent of the positive or negative views concerning the ruling regimes in each of the superpowers, that the East-West conflict arises precisely out of the existence of both superpowers and from the fact that both have a tendency to work towards global domination. The superpowers are led by their very nature into a dispute for global domination as a supreme objective and towards an attempt, as a minimum immediate aim, to maintain the supremacy of their respective bloc of allies and satellites, as well as preserving their own strategic invulnerability, by which they a understand territorial invulnerability that cannot be affected except in terms of mutual annihilation.

Reducing the analysis of the main characteristics of the superpowers to its basic level, we find them presenting very different characteristics concerning their respective power systems, both internal and external and, on the other hand, quite similar aspects in terms of the relationship between the center of each bloc with its respective periphery. In the American system, both internal and external, power has a consensual basis founded on the unity of interests between the ruling elements and the community of values arising from a shared identity within Western culture. In the old Soviet system, both internally and externally, power was based on a closed circular relationship between a legitimizing ideology and the party that administered and expressed it. In the American system, power has the characteristics of a contractual agreement between major shareholders in a business, legitimized by decisions taken by shareholders' meetings that are effectively controlled by the former. In the old Soviet system, power had the characteristics of a pontifical mandate conferred by a College of Cardinals operating in the name of, and legitimized by, a religious system.

Looked at as a whole, therefore, the American and ex-Soviet blocs reveal a striking similarity in terms of relationships between the respective centers and their peripheries. In both cases the relationship is markedly asymmetrical and involves levels of greater or lesser dependence on the peripheries relative to the respective center.

Given this basic equivalence, however, it is important to point out two relevant differences. The first concerns the center of each bloc. In the

American bloc there is a strategic monocentrism (Washington) but an economic and cultural pluricentrism shared by the major European countries. In the old Soviet bloc, Moscow was the only center, but, and this is the second difference, in the Soviet case the center-periphery relationship was monolinear. It involved a monolithic set of decisions with consequent political implications, but left a wide margin on the periphery to embrace the particular economic and cultural characteristics of the societies that belonged to it. In contrast, in the American case, relations between center and periphery are flexible, allowing different levels of autonomy, but they have many different forms and are found in all areas of society, the economy and culture.

Today, both imperial systems show a marked contrast between the uninterrupted growth of their military and economic-technological power and the rapid and increasing decline in the legitimacy of each bloc and also, increasingly, in the private evaluation of their respective citizens. This increasing imbalance between power and legitimacy involves countless and serious consequences, the worst of which is increased instability in the international system and the risk of war. In the long term, history seems to be leading towards invalidating the hegemonic plan of each of the superpowers, increasing the autonomy of the periphery of both blocs and, in the American case, of alternative centers to Washington. In both cases we find, on the part of senior authorities, the idea of achieving this ephemeral global hegemony before the conditions that make it achievable disappear. At the end of the 20th century this has led to an increased risk of worldwide destabilization and war.

The North-South Conflict

In essence, the North-South conflict is the result of a self-privileging and self-perpetuating structural asymmetry between the developed countries of the North and the underdeveloped ones of the South. This asymmetry arises from conditions in the means of production of goods and services and relationships of exchange as well as, in a pattern of circular causation, the ways in which productivity *per capita* in the North tends to be, on average, 12 times higher than in the South. According to almost all analysts, the trend is towards an increase rather than a reduction in this difference in productivity.

The causes of this phenomenon, all of them eminently historical, are several. The difference in productivity between the main European countries and other societies with highly developed cultures, Western or not, such as the Islamic,

Buddhist or Chinese, was almost non-existent at the end of the Middle Ages. This difference arose and increased with the Industrial Revolution and has accelerated with the present scientific and technological revolution.

The case of Latin America, among underdeveloped countries of the Third World, is especially interesting. We find here, almost exclusively, a combination of societies adopting Western cultures, with social structures typical of the Third World. For the purposes of this discussion it is relatively unimportant to elucidate the historical causes of this situation. We shall mention only two important factors. The first concerns the origins of and the pattern given to colonization in Latin America. With rare exceptions, as in the case of Argentina, the colonization of Latin America was characterized by a structural dualism made up of a higher level consisting of the Spanish conquistador or the Portuguese colonizer, and a lower level comprising the indigenous native or the slave imported from Africa. Until the first third of the century this structural dualism held back the emergence of an independent and a larger middle class and even up to the present time it has delayed the effective inclusion of the great mass of the population in the civilizing process of their respective countries.

A second important factor in the relative backwardness of Latin America is found precisely in the extraordinary success that its primary-exporting economy enjoyed until the crisis of the 1930s. That economic pattern was so profitable that, in terms of the optimization of capital, all that needed to be done was to maintain it and keep it running while international and domestic conditions were in its favor. This led to the relative economic, social and cultural fossilization which has preserved the semi-colonial structures of Latin America until quite late into this century.

2. The Brazilian Interest

Basic Characteristics

Brazil is a Third World Western Latin American society. This duality of its nature in being both a Western country and a Third World one constitutes in general terms the most fundamental characteristic of Brazil. Linked to this situation are many of the most important and relevant characteristics of the country. So, on the one hand there is its European-style elite in which individuals with high-level international qualifications in areas of knowledge and technology stand out, contrasting with, on the other hand, the almost Asiatic

situation of the great unprotected masses who see only a fraction of the national income (12% going to the 50% of poorest people) and who enjoy practically no part of the benefits of Brazilian civilization.

Brazil is an extremely heterogeneous country presenting statistical data which, although quite accurate, do not really reflect the reality of the country because they merely show arithmetical averages behind which lie extraordinary contrasts. This means there is an urgent need for a new form of economic development arising out of a strict correlation with social development that can change the great masses on the margins of society as quickly as possible into a productive population participating at all levels of national life.

The great and urgent need for social and economic development contrasts dramatically with the recessions Brazil has been led into in recent years by the global system and by the policies laid down by the International Monetary Fund. The country needs to rapidly take a new path leading it towards new ways of development compatible with its demographic growth, the basic demands of the masses and the restoration and strengthening of its internal and external autonomy.

Faced with growing international pressures orchestrated by the agencies that unify the interests of the countries of the center, Brazil needs to immediately increase the scale of its internal and external autonomy and proportionally reduce its international vulnerability. In a world of one-handed liberalism in which internationally competent countries are protected either by their superpower status or by ingenious regional agreements, Brazil is defenseless, crushed by the weight of its external debt and domestically inhibited by the joint aims, from within its own society, of the imperialism and the neocolonialism of the central countries, from adopting the defensive policies it needs at present.

On the other hand, it is clear that the particular situation of Brazil as a country that is already widely industrialized although still not completely so, that carries within it immense imperfections of backwardness and poverty, makes the country something of a unique case on the international stage. We are being made to pay the price of a development we have still not completed and we are being deprived of the benefits of an underdevelopment we have still not overcome.

One of the most typical results of this ambiguous duality in the situation of Brazil is the fact that today we find ourselves the sustainers of universal interests that surpass domestic parochialism and even regional parochialism without, however, having sufficient resources for the universal defense of these interests.

Brazil and the East-West Conflict

Brazil is a country with a Western culture and way of life deeply and irreversibly linked to Greco-Christian tradition. We are and want to be an open society based on the principle of liberty and rationalism, aspiring to establish basic equality between all men and to organize ourselves politically on the basis of a social democracy that will preserve human rights and care for the protection of social interests.

Faced with the East-West conflict, we must above all proceed towards a judicious separation of the values and interests that preserve our commitment to Westernness (but without falling into satellite status) that will contribute to maintaining peace and a strategic balance that will in turn avoid the uncontrollable dominance of either of the superpowers, yet without dangerously weakening the Western camp.

Faced with huge external pressures arising from our excessive indebtedness and our continued dependence on imported oil, we must greatly reduce our international vulnerability if we wish to preserve and increase our internal and external autonomy. But we must exercise with clarity and determination the level of autonomy we already possess if we hope to increase it and reduce our international vulnerability.

Brazil and the North-South Conflict

As a Western Third World country, we have great solidarity with the group of countries belonging to this group, especially those in our own region of Latin America. This does not mean that our efforts to develop can only be undertaken through initiatives similar to those of other countries in the Third World or Latin America. Without prejudicing the advantages of a well-understood multilateralism as a defensive measure for the general interests of the Third World and, closer to hand, of Latin America, Brazil can and should have its own autonomous initiative promoting its development, and adopt policies appropriate to achieving that aim.

What emerges from the consciousness of being a Third World country is the understanding that our interests should be formulated and defended in terms that are in principle equally suited to other Third World and Latin American countries in a similar situation as ourselves, and this is not because of any abstract ethics, but motivated by a clear understanding of our own situation. On the other hand, it is not a case of waiting for other nations or depending on them. It is simply a case of not falling into the fallacy of making supposedly astute alliances with countries of the center at the price of betraying the general interests of the Third World or Latin America, as if we were not structurally members of those groups. Belonging to the Third World is definitely a condition and not a desired end. It is a condition which, although showing the positive characteristics of the societies it is composed of, is generally something to be overcome precisely by genuine forms of development. But these societies need to have a realistic view of their own situation and a full understanding of the fact that overcoming underdevelopment cannot be achieved by slick changes of direction or of appearances, but by structural modifications in the relationships of production, both domestically and internationally.

This situation of being a Third World country should lead us, among other outcomes, to make an active contribution to preserving and broadening our level of international autonomy and automatic non-alignment with either of the superpowers. To this end, it does not matter if, as a Western society, our evaluation of the two blocs facing each other is socially or culturally favorable to the Western one. For this purpose, our commitments to the values of the West or the way of life resulting from them are not in question. What is in question in this context is an international power mechanism in which, leaving aside our cultural preferences, we have to clearly understand that our level of autonomy depends on the extent to which a basic international balance exists between the superpowers and that it can only expand in those conditions.

Indeed, in a world characterized by the capacity for mutual annihilation on the part of the two superpowers, only the emergence and strengthening of a third group of countries genuinely interested in maintaining peace and bringing about a more equal world order can save the world from its self-destruction and lead it to a peaceful and consensual order for the benefit of all peoples.

3. The Position of Brazil

The Reduction of Vulnerability

As was pointed out earlier, the present international position of Brazil is characterized by a high and unacceptable measure of vulnerability. We depend, in a system of circular causation, on creditors for the recycling of a debt of about US\$100 billion which is suffocating our economy and our society but it

is through this recycling that we maintain our ability to import the large amounts of oil required for domestic consumption.

There is a clear need to change this state of affairs, both in renegotiating the debt to bring it in line with our basic economic and social needs, as well as in reducing our dependence on overseas oil paid for in hard currency.

The experience of Brazil and other countries in the recent past shows that the level of reduction of the burden of external debt achievable through conventional methods of negotiation, is extremely limited. This situation does not arise from any malevolence on the part of our creditors but simply from the fact that, as a result of its own particular situation, the United States has been led into the singular position of being at the same time the main creditor and the unilateral decider of interest rates. There certainly does not exist on the part of the American authorities any malicious intent to increase interest rates in order to boost bank profits at our expense. What does exist is a policy that is completely indifferent to international repercussions, intent on holding American inflation at extremely low levels and attracting a positive flow of liquid resources towards the dollar in order to compensate for deficits in the American balance of payments and the National Treasury. These aims have been successfully achieved by maintaining high interest rates and everything indicates they will be pursued in the foreseeable future.

From this point of view it is clear that in order to reduce its international vulnerability, Brazil needs to adopt measures other than those simply arising out of the goodwill of our creditors. The key to these measures is the formation in Latin America of a strategic polygon of resistance that will include, through appropriate agreements, countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, to name the most obvious, along with Brazil. We urgently need to study the possibility of an agreement for cooperation and reciprocal aid among a limited number of suitable countries in Latin America so that, by bringing a significant amount of exchanges to a system of agreements between such countries, we can achieve a significant level of regional substitution of industrial input and products that are being imported and paid for in dollars. This means increasing liquid assets for strategic imports and consequently reducing by the same amount dependence on new credits and orthodox debt recycling. The result of this will be that we shall significantly reduce our international vulnerability and therefore increase by the same measure our capacity for external negotiation.

Moreover as Baron Rio Branco clearly understood in his day, every effort to reduce international vulnerability should be accompanied, within a realistic evaluation of internal and external conditions, by a corresponding effort to modernize our armed forces. Indeed, one of the main results of the process of democratization which happily we are in the process of establishing will consist in returning the armed forces to their principal aim, the external defense of the country.

One of the disastrous effects of military dictatorships is, paradoxically, the weakening of the armed forces as agents of external defense. Interfering improperly in problems concerning the internal ordering of society, they acquire a sense of policing which discredits them and makes them lose their real military sense, thus weakening them. We must free ourselves for once and for all from the idea of military policing, but we have a great need for a really military sense in our armed forces. We need a modern army able to neutralize any threat of foreign invasion. We need a highly efficient air force and navy capable of dissuading foreign powers from repeating what recently happened in the Falkland Islands. At a time of hard bargaining, it is not enough to accumulate profits from foreign trade and have alternative sources of supply for industrial input and essential products. It is also necessary to neutralize the threat or practice of pirate operations which might make us, at little military cost or by the use of international mercenaries, lose by force what we were on the way to winning by negotiation.

Selective Universality

As has been mentioned earlier, Brazil finds itself in the final stage of its transition to full development, a situation which has led it, among other results, to having universal interests before having the appropriate resources to manage and defend them. This special situation in Brazil demands a proper solution which does not consist of a Malthusian restriction of our interests inhibiting our growth nor to an arrogant international omnipresence which would overstretch our means and exhaust our scarce resources.

Indeed, foreign policy, which is being so competently carried out by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, following the line of pragmatic clarity established by our much-missed teacher and friend San Tiago Dantas, has already outlined the direction to be given to this question. I would call this direction one of selective universality. We cannot maintain a very dynamic presence everywhere

in the world but, as we are already doing, we can opt for universal selective action. This selective universality will emphasize Latin America as a region and in this sense will lead us to an especially close approximation to Argentina and a certain number of other countries with which we shall form a strategic polygon of cooperation and mutual aid. This same policy of selective universality will lead us to have particularly close relations with Federal Germany and the Latin nations of Europe. It will lead us towards close collaboration with Nigeria and the Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa, to developing large-scale exchanges with the People's Republic of China and to have closer dialogues with nations in North Africa and in the Persian Gulf.

Pluralism with the United States

To conclude these considerations, I would like to point out that no valid illustration of how Brazilian national interests may be properly directed on the present international stage can be made without at least a brief reference to our relations with the United States. What gives this question special relevance is not only the obvious fact that the United States is the driving force in the Western system and, *a fortiori*, of the inter-American system. What gives particular relevance to our current relationship with the United States is the fact that the terms of this relationship have been rapidly and deeply modified in recent years without either party sufficiently taking new realities into consideration.

To explain briefly what seems to me to characterize Brazil's new kind of relationship with the United States at present, I would say it is the fact that our deeper interests have become more important and more effectively mutual, while the administration of our present interests has become less united and frequently conflicting, even though not structurally antagonistic.

Our deeper interests have become more important and more effectively mutual because Brazil has definitively established its socio-economic option within a Western model, following a form of capitalism run by an open society controlled and regulated by a social-democratic State. Like Spain two years ago, Brazil finds itself on the threshold of a Western modernity which is consensual but imbued with a profound sense of social equality. This makes Brazil not only a country with a Western culture but also one with Western ways of production and economic exchange. And this is where we find the deeper interests we share with the United States, apart from haphazard and

fleeting questions of government rhetoric which occasionally prevail in both countries.

On the other hand, Brazil is no longer an agrarian and merely reactive society on the world stage and has become - in spite of its wide-ranging and deplorable flaws of backwardness - an industrial society actively involved in world markets, expanding and diversifying its export capacity which is increasingly turning to high-technology goods and services. This situation makes Brazil a competitor with the United States in many products and in many markets, including the American market itself and, given the size of the country, makes its competition more deeply felt and resented than that of many European countries. The United States has still not adjusted its image of Brazil to the new reality of the country and thus its reactions tend to be frequently ruled by irritation or group interests. It is therefore important for the USA to realize the need to provide sufficient space for Brazil in order to allow for the intelligent mutual management of conflicts which will not affect the compatibility of deeper common interests.

In the face of these new and complex forms of relationship with the United States, Brazil for its part should take initiatives to make mutual disputes compatible with preserving deeper common interests. These initiatives will obviously involve a new diplomatic relationship prioritizing the previously mentioned realities, but in fact they will involve much more than a diplomatic relationship. This is because what is actually in question is the existence of multiple levels of relationship which cannot and should not be reduced to a simple diplomatic relationship, even though this will be the major one. This will be especially evident in relation to a society like America, which has an extremely high level of autonomy in its subsystems.

Without introducing details which will not be appropriate to the nature of the present analysis, I shall simply indicate the need to bear in mind three other important levels of relationship with the United States, in addition to the diplomatic one, that should be conducted by different Brazilian protagonists. The relationship with the business community, which places commercial and financial transactions within the depoliticized area of private contracts. The relationship with the scientific community, which places scientific and technological exchange within the depoliticized and non-commercialized area of inter-academic relations. And finally, the relationship with progressive forces in the United States, which are the bearers of the highest liberal traditions in the world and guarantee a broad area for dialogue and cooperation between

Brazilians and Americans, not in business nor through academic institutions, but through a social and humanist vision of global scope and on whose presence, in the final analysis, international peace and the salvation of the world depend.



2. The System of Power and Society (1987)

1. The Problem of the System of Government

The Typical Positions

Discussions about systems of government have historically followed two main positions: that of the ideal model and that of the historical example.

Discussion concerning systems of government following an ideal model shaped according to fixed values considered to be all-important, is the oldest form of analyzing this question. It is found in Greek thought from Herodotus to the speculations of Plato and Aristotle.

Plato's political work, in the three main dialogues he delegates to the subject (*The Republic*, *Politics* and *The Laws*) consists essentially in seeking the ideal characteristics the State should enjoy to ensure Justice among the *Polis* and a virtuous harmony in the souls of men. In his political work, Aristotle also seeks to determine the ideal characteristics of the State. In contrast to Plato, however, the *Estagirita* on the one hand subordinates its ideal model to considerations that are not exclusively ethical but which also take into account the conditions necessary to ensure social balance in the relationships between rich and poor, patricians and plebeians. On the other hand, Aristotle's research does not simply proceed like Plato's from a basis of speculating about the need to balance justice

among men with the virtuous conduct of everyone. As well as stating ethical considerations of an abstract kind, Aristotle takes into account the constitutional experiment of the Greek cities and compares them to each other. In this sense, it must be said that Aristotle, for the first time, indicates the formulation of another model, historical example, in an attempt to work with both models. Another exception of this kind in classical antiquity is the thinking of Polibius.

Discussions of systems of government in the Middle Ages by John of Salisbury, St Thomas Aquinas, Egidius Colonna or, in the 16th and 17th centuries, with Mariana, Suarez and Jean Bodin or finally in the 18th century with the *encyclopédistes* and Rousseau, also developed in a context of looking for an ideal model. One great exception is the functionalist view adopted by Machiavelli in the Renaissance and in the 17th century by Hobbes.

The historical example approach, the exploration of which was pioneered by Aristotle, achieved dominance from the 19th century onwards with studies by Savigny and the historical school. With the exactitude they gained from a dialectical view of social reality, they added to this way of thinking the ideas of Hegel and, along with other ingredients (historical materialism), from Marx.

Within the viewpoint of the ideal model, discussions of the system of government are conducted so as to give emphasis to one or another aspect according to whether it is considered, relative to the values pertaining, more or less democratic, more or less efficient, etc. From the point of view of historical example, discussion of regimes is linked to experiments considered to be paradigms or especially successful.

In the case of Brazil, the typical controversy between presidentialism and parliamentarism has been almost exclusively conducted according to one of these two viewpoints. Thus, from the ideal model point of view, it is customary to emphasize the superiority of parliamentarism because it is the regime of the most democratic and representative government. Presidentialism is championed because of its greater efficiency. In the same way, from the point of view of historical example, admirers of the European constitutional position - which influenced the 1824 Constitution - are inclined towards parliamentarism. Admirers of American constitutional practice - which influenced the 1891 Constitution - are inclined towards presidentialism.

The Functionalist Point of View

Without prejudicing the relative bearing of the two points of view discussed above, it is important to recognize that the choice of a system of government, for any given society at any given stage of its historical-social development, must deal mainly with considerations of a functional nature. These considerations optimize the adjustment of an egalitarian social order (where the presence of an ideal model is minimal), that is clearly viable (where the presence of a historical model is minimal) to the political and social demands that society faces. In his political thinking, Machiavelli tried to respond to the functional demands of Renaissance Italy. Hobbes responded realistically to the conditions pertaining in England in the mid-17th century.

Modern constitutional endeavors are clearly guided in this direction. The present French Constitution is based on a functional point of view (always bearing in mind the personality of de Gaulle). The current Spanish Constitution is based upon functionalism adapted to the restoration of the monarchy, and a functionalism free of personal or institutional commitments shaped the present Portuguese Constitution.

The Requirements of Brazil

Viewed in its general aspects, since Independence Brazilian society has gone through three main periods of unequal length. From the beginning of the 19th century to the first decades of the 20th, Brazil was an agrarian society controlled by a rural patrician class and a trading bourgeoisie, ruled by a democracy of notables. The country was governed in the name of the people but without the latter having a voice, and mainly not in their interests, by a landowning-trading oligarchy among whom and in favor of whose interests, the parliamentarism of the Empire and the presidentialism of the Old Republic operated. [The period of Brazilian history from 1889 to 1930 is commonly called the República Velha (Old Republic). It ended in 1930 with a military coup - translator's note].

After the 1930 Revolution and the short period of the 1934 Constitution, the 1946 Constitution allowed the establishment of a middle-class democracy that combined, under the protection of the bourgeoisie and the political weight of the middle class, the interests of the former with many of the aspirations of the latter. This was a period of transition in which the old agrarian society

became industrialized and urbanized. This led to the growing emergence of demands from the masses which were particularly felt during the second Vargas government and in the Goulart government, and which led in both cases, in 1954 and 1964, to conservative *coups* of a preventive nature. What it was hoped to avoid, in the name of moral principles - confronting atheist Communism - was the emergence of a mass social democracy.

During the 20 years of military authoritarianism, Brazil's socio-economic transformation was achieved despite what its rulers wanted. The country changed from being an agrarian, rural society to an industrial, urban one, although still carrying from both its distant and closer past huge blemishes of backwardness and poverty. This new Brazilian society could only be regulated by a mass social democracy, exactly the type of democracy that the *coups* of 1954 and 1964 – not to mention other aspects of the contexts of each of these events – had tried to avoid.

In contrast to what had happened in Europe and the United States, however, the emergence of Brazil into a mass social democracy occurred during an earlier stage of the country's economic development. When the American welfare state was founded by the second President Roosevelt and European social movements began with McDonald in England and the *Front Populaire* in France, those countries were already enjoying a very advanced stage of industrial development. When the welfare state was established in a definitive and stable state in Europe after the Second World War and in President Johnson's United States, the countries in question were enjoying extremely high levels of wealth and high economic productivity. In Brazil, social democracy took off almost at the same time as the country was changing, over the course of the last ten years, into a mainly industrial society and immediately afterwards the severe recession of the first half of the 1990s occurred which dramatically impoverished the country.

The conclusions to be drawn from present conditions in Brazil are mainly that Brazil has had to make a double attempt at compatibilization. On the one hand, a compatibilization between an essential institutional stability - on which a modern industrial society depends - with a no less essential acceleration of the processes of change - necessary for Brazil's socio-economic development to be completed. On the other hand, there has had to be a compatibilization between the expansion of wealth and the accelerated pursuit of technological modernization with a significant and rapid rise in living standards, training and the participation of the masses. And thus it is important for Brazil to ensure

that it has the most appropriate institutional conditions to achieve this double compatibilization: (1) stability together with change and (2) the growth and modernization of productive capacity with a much more equal social distribution of opportunities and of surpluses.

2. A Model for Brazil

A Double Prerequisite

The basic question, given the conditions in modern Brazil which will tend to prevail at the beginning of this century, is the need to achieve compatibility between stability and change on one hand, and economic and social development on the other.

Brazil's experience during the second half of the 20th century was particularly unfavorable in terms of this double prerequisite. What we actually see in terms of the government system is that the excessive presidentialism inherited from the First Republic showed itself unable to marry institutional stability to social change. Presidents like Vargas and Goulart who wanted change, were overthrown by coups d'état which caused immeasurable damage to the stability and respectability of institutions. In contrast, the military presidents from 1964 onward guaranteed institutional stability at the cost of the repressive freezing of social change, thus aggravating the crisis in Brazilian society in an extremely dangerous and socially unacceptable form. There is therefore a clear need to diversify responsibilities for stability and social change, placing each of them under a different authority. The authority charged with institutional stability cannot be involved in the process of social change, and the authority responsible for directing the process of social change cannot also ask to be responsible for institutional stability.

On the other hand, the economic and social regime in Brazil has shown itself to be equally inadequate to the demands made upon it. Economic development in Brazil, especially in the last 25 years, has been achieved at the cost of the country's social development, thus increasing the profound separation between the masses and the upper strata of society. It is vital to introduce a decisive change in this pattern but this should be done in a way that does not reduce, but rather encourages, the country's productive capacity and its process of technological modernization.

Congressional Presidentialism

The response to the first challenge, matching institutional stability to social change, is found in adopting a different regime from the exaggerated presidentialism of republican tradition without falling back into the familiar limitations of imperial presidentialism (personal power), nor leading the country into a futile imitation of British parliamentarism. It may simply be said of imperial parliamentarism that we are separated from it not only by a completely different society from the agrarian one of the time of Dom Pedro II, but also by the totality of the progress made by republicanism and federalism. Concerning British parliamentarism we can only say that we are separated from it by the profound differences in political culture between the two countries and their different social and economic situations.

The way in which, given the situation of Brazil, the need for institutional stability can be matched in a lasting and responsible way with the need for social change, is found in a congressional presidentialism.

Such a regime involves two main characteristics. On the one hand there is the figure of a President, elected by an absolute majority through universal suffrage and a secret vote, who is responsible for the stability of institutions and acts as a moderator of the functions of the State and has supreme command of the armed forces. On the other hand there is a Prime Minister, appointed by the President, but who relies on maintaining the confidence of the House of Deputies, who organizes a program of government as the basis of his or her mandate, appoints and dismisses ministers and works within a system that attends to the demands of the people in conditions of reasonable stability for the government.

This stability, according to the system adopted by the most recent constitutions, can be guaranteed by requiring an absolute majority for motions of lack of confidence, with the requirement for a corresponding appointment of a new Prime Minister. On the other hand, moreover, the President of the Republic, acting as a mediator for the government can, with the support of a report from the Council of State, oppose irresponsible maneuvers on the part of the Lower House when they do not conform to real demands on the part of public opinion, punishing such maneuvers with the dissolution of the House, naming an interim government and calling new elections.

We should point out, in a passing observation that it is not intended to develop here, the fact that in the present version of congressional presidentialism, the relationship of political confidence is restricted to the prime minister and the Lower House. The Senate, the element of Congress dealing with all legislative matters, has no say in the approval or disapproval of the Prime Minister and thus cannot be dismissed by the President. The Senate has the specific role of supervising the business of the Union in its function of being an institution representing the Federation.

The current regimes in France, Spain and particularly in Portugal, broadly fit into the pattern proposed here. It should also be mentioned, in respect of the federal nature of Brazil, that the kind of government suggested here would preserve the current administrative structure of states and municipalities, adding a clause requiring an absolute majority or a second round of voting for elections for governor and mayor.

The Socially Regulated Market Economy

The second requirement referred to previously, concerning the need to match economic and social development, requires the installation of a socially regulated market system to achieve suitable institutional management. In the final analysis, this system forms the nucleus of success in social-democratic experiments.

In the conditions prevailing in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, social regulation of the economy only seems to have been possible by socializing the means of production. However, as was shown during the long history of Eastern European countries, that socialist experiment was doubly disastrous. On the one hand, the concentration of all power in the State led to totalitarian regimes devoid of political and private freedom. On the other hand, the economic efficiency of state socialism was modest. To a certain extent it was clear that such a regime had - as in the classic case of the Soviet Union - a notable capacity to achieve the first stages of industrialization but subsequently a lesser capacity to administer a complex economy and keep it in the front line of technological progress.

In contrast, social-democratic experiments showed that it was perfectly possible for the modern State to regulate the market to the benefit of social and national interests, correcting, compensating for and avoiding the antisocial and anti-national distortions that tend to occur in a completely unregulated market, but preserving the suppleness and efficiency of private enterprise,

while making social and national regulation of the economy compatible with maintaining the greatest degree of public and private freedom.

It is therefore important, given the situation of Brazil, to subordinate the market economy to democratic planning with suitable public supervision in order to speed up economic development and complete the effort to modernize our society, along with a large-scale program of social development that will lead to eradicating misery and suppressing the most extreme forms of backwardness and poverty in the shortest possible time.

Studies being concluded at the Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais (Institute for Political and Social Studies) based on serious factual and analytical data, lead to the conclusion that by an appropriate combination of economic and social development, Brazil may be led to achieve social levels close to those currently existing in Southern Europe, but with a significantly more powerful economic structure. In this way Brazil would finally overcome its underdevelopment and at the same time become a country with a modern and egalitarian industrial society that could, in the first decades of this century, stand among the five most important countries in the world.

3. The Achievable Utopia (1990)

Classic Utopias such as those of Thomas More and Campanella, or Plato's *Republic*, were not written to be plans for a new society that could be realized, but to be illustrations of how the organization of society could be subjected to the dictates of reason. Marx, on the other hand, while avoiding drawing up plans for a socialist society, saw the transition to socialism as being historically inevitable and showed, though in a more negative than positive way, some of the characteristics of a society that would supersede private appropriation of the means of production and the subsequent alienation of social classes.

The experiments of the 20th century made a decisive contribution to clarifying the question of organizing society. In brief, two things became perfectly clear: (1) the vital economic necessity of a market based on free enterprise and (2) the vital necessity for prudent regulatory intervention on the part of the State guided by social democracy. Pure market economies did not last. The State had to intervene in the economy to avoid cyclical crises, to guarantee minimal levels of protection to poorer social classes and guarantee the survival of non-profit making cultural services. Neither did socialist experiments based on state control of the economy and the bureaucratization of society survive, as was shown in the collapse of Communism in Europe and the USSR. The example of Cuba is significant. The health and education systems work well but the economy does not.

The end of the 20th century showed the way to what we might call reasonable and achievable Utopias. In other words, a universal social democracy. An economic system with a socially regulated market. Scandinavia and Holland are examples of this achievable Utopia. The Federal Republic of Germany, even with a moderately conservative government, also points in the same direction.

What remains to be found in this vision of reasonable and achievable Utopias which the more advanced societies are approaching, is the destiny of man and his inherent transcendence in a period characterized by the decline in religious beliefs in precisely those societies.

4. Democracy and Periphery Countries (1991)

The Norm and the Process

The major political problem faced today by countries on the periphery of power is how to combine democratic legitimacy, through the effective operation of representative democracies and states of law, with rationality of action on the part of the public system.

Starting from the basic principle that the consent of the ruled is a fundamental precondition for legitimizing the rulers, there has been a universal development of awareness that democracy is an essential requirement for any legitimate system of power. This awareness, which is a legacy of Greek culture, gradually spread throughout Europe in the 18th century and became universal in the second half of the 20th.

The problem arising from the universalization of democratic awareness, however, lies in the fact that democracy *per se* does not necessarily lead to satisfactory levels of public rationality. This problem was anticipated theoretically by Aristotle in his *Politics* and was lived through in the experience of Athens itself. While leading the forces of the people, Pericles managed to combine in his own person greater representation of the people with the highest level of operational and ethical rationality. After the death of Pericles, Athenian democracy fell into the hands of leaders of the people – 'demagogues' in the etymological sense, the meaning of which carried other connotations – Greek

democracy lost the connection between the public and the rational. This led to successive crises in Athenian democracy – including the tragic episode of the death of Socrates – and to its final collapse.

The problem of a stable compatibility between democracy and public rationality has only been resolved very recently by European countries. Historically, this compatibility was only achieved, either occasionally, with the emergence of extraordinary personalities such as Pericles, or by means of institutional expedients. These expedients reduced public participation to restricted sectors of the population, creating democracies of elites in Europe and in the Americas of the 18th century, or middle-class democracies, up to the beginning of the 20th century.

Making universally inclusive mass democracies compatible with high levels of public rationality under structurally stable conditions has been a recent achievement on the part of European countries, dating from the Second World War. This situation became possible from the moment when the universalization of democratic consciousness at the level of political culture was accompanied in the social sphere by a high level of public education, an economy with an extremely high level of productivity the benefits of which were reasonably equally distributed among all levels of the population, and a broad and general recognition that the interests of all social classes and groups lay in national solidarity, together with rational and competent management of the economy and society.

Latin American countries, like other peripheral societies, find themselves at the present time imbued with the awareness that democracy is the only legitimate political regime, except that these societies do not have the concomitant social and economic conditions that, in Europe, guarantee a structurally stable compatibility between democracy and public rationality.

With some exceptions – notably in the cases of Argentina, Costa Rica and Uruguay – Latin American countries are trying to democratically regulate societies in which most of the population is extremely ignorant or poor. Even so, the exceptions to this situation cannot manage to gather the resources sufficient to create a stable compatibility between democracy and public rationality, basically because of shortcomings in their economic productivity.

Thus we find that in Latin American countries there is a wide gap between democracy as a norm and democracy as a process. As a norm, democracy is universally accepted. As a process, it has the most serious limitations. On the one hand, the contradictions between manifestations of popular will and

the minimal requirements of public rationality are tending to increase. On the other hand, and as a consequence of these contradictions, the very process of exercising democracy, in terms of the popular vote and the decisions of representatives, is affected by a high level of corruption.

Public Representation

Modern democracies are representative, even when they make available greater or lesser areas for manifestations of popular will, such as plebiscites, and preserve the rights of individuals and the legitimate interests of minorities. Thus they contrast in various ways with Greek democracy, which was exercised according to the direct manifestation of citizens gathered in the *Ecclesia* and which gave it totalitarian powers that could even be applied retroactively.

Political representation, the basis of modern democracy, involves three basic aspects referring to (1) its origin, (2) its aim and (3) the way in which it is carried out.

Concerning the origin of political representation, the democratic process developed in terms of achieving maximum scope and the most effective form of representation. Historically, all democracies began as democracies of notables limited to small circles of the male elite. As the democratic process consolidates, it tends, because of reforming readjustments and revolutionary breakaways, to broaden the bases of its representation to include middle-class sectors and finally all adult citizens, including women. In the same way, the representative regime tends to become more scrupulous, guaranteeing effective freedom to vote and a real chance for all the existing political parties in the country to dispute elections on an equal basis.

The problem of the aims of political representation is more complex. Rousseau, the first great theoretician of modern democracy, suggested the need to validate democracy for the institution to lead to the demonstration of the *volonté générale*. For Rousseau, the *volonté générale* is not the sum of individual wills, a result he felt to be factious and detrimental to the general good; the *volonté générale* is what comes out of individual manifestations, each of which are formulated from the point of view of collective interest.

This understanding of the general will, although theoretically correct, implies requirements that cannot easily exist in practice and which it would be impossible to prove. It is in the face of this difficulty that modern democracies work, according to another criterion that has been very well described by

Schumpeter: that of the dispute for public selection by personalities who have stood as candidates to represent certain trends or characteristics.

In spite of what the relevant legislation states and what protagonists or analysts of the electoral process declare, what happens in modern representative democracies is exactly what happens in the regime described by Schumpeter. This regime, which may be exercised in different electoral patterns, involves citizens choosing a ruling political class. The level of suitability and ability of this political class determines the third aspect of political representation referred to: the way it is exercised.

Representation may be exercised with greater or lesser degrees of rationality in terms of the problems a society faces. It may also be carried out with a greater or lesser degree of suitability in terms of the relationship between the personal interests of the representatives of the people and what the latter genuinely understand to be, on the one hand, the interests of their constituents and, on the other, as the collective interests of society.

The sociological and political analysis of the process of political representation in modern democracies shows two important correlations that appear between the level of development of a society's economic and cultural development, and the quality of the political class it generates. The higher the level of the former, the better will be the level of suitability and ability of the political representatives. The more primitive the economic and cultural level of a society, the less suitable and able the political class it creates will be. This is the basic reason why European democracies generate a political class significantly superior to that of the United States and even better in relation to the great majority of underdeveloped countries.

The second important correlation concerns the electoral system. Representative democracy may be exercised by means of different systems in order to choose its political representatives. These systems correspond, either solely or in combination, to three basic models: proportional representation, district voting and the party list vote.

In a proportional representation system, a country is divided into a certain number of relatively large electoral areas, each of which has the right to a certain number of legislative representatives. The candidates, who are generally named by political parties and, in some legislative systems, also depending upon a certain number of citizens, compete for the preference of electors, and those who receive most votes are elected within the numerical limits of the political representation of each electoral area.

In the district voting system, the country is divided into relatively small electoral areas and each area has the right to elect one legislative representative. The candidates then contest each vacancy and by a simple or absolute majority, the one with most votes wins.

In the party list system, parties organize their electoral lists, classifying their candidates in order of preference. Electors vote for just one list. The more votes a list obtains, the greater will be the number of candidates on it who, according to their order of preference, will be elected within the numerical limits of political representation of each electoral area.

There is much theoretical discussion concerning the merits and demerits of each of these electoral systems and in particular about certain combined forms, especially in the case of district voting combined with party list voting. For the purposes of this brief study we do not need to go into the merits of this discussion. What is important is to highlight its two main aspects.

The first concerns the fact that, the higher the economic and cultural level of a society, the less important is the electoral system it adopts. In a society with a very high economic and cultural level, any of the systems will lead to the formation of a highly suitable and capable political class. The electoral system, for this very reason, comes to be of fundamental importance for societies with low economic and cultural levels.

In terms of these societies, the problem which presents itself consists in the adoption of an electoral system which will be, at least potentially, the one best able to maximize, within a specific society, the suitability and capability of its political class. In short, we are talking about working in such a way that the public suitability and rationality of the political class are significantly above the average represented in the same society.

Comparative analysis of electoral results in modern countries shows that the pure proportional representation system such as that of a country like Brazil tends to form a political class with the same limitations as its own society. If the electorate consists of 90% of uneducated people, it will tend to have 90% of incompetent representatives. If the level of suitability among citizens is low, it will be equally low among its political representatives. In contrast, party list voting, especially when combined with district voting - in the so-called German system referred to - tends to create a political class whose suitability and capability are higher than the average in its society.

The Phenomenon of Populism

In countries with low economic and cultural levels, the social stratum of extreme poverty and misery combined with extremely modest levels of education, containing a huge number of illiterate adults and with only a small number of people who have finished primary education, is usually very broad. In a country like Brazil, to give a typical example, 65% of the population has a *per capita* income equal to or less than one minimum wage, that is, about US\$ 60.00 per month. More than 20% of adults are illiterate and less than 10% have completed the eight years of primary education.

In such countries these economic and social conditions create a strong tendency towards populism. In the conditions pertaining there, populism consists of a social and political proposal typically containing a plan to raise nominal salaries by government decision to levels significantly higher than those of productivity. At the same time, the populist proposal - emerging often from a genuine and honest concern for society - provides the widest range of social rights to all workers, paid for by their respective employers, whether public or private, with no regard for adjusting the number of jobs in companies to levels that would help them to be competitive. Finally, the populist proposal assumes various ways of distributing wealth independent of considerations concerning the preservation of a level of savings and investments to ensure the adequate reproduction and increase of capital. The effects of implementing these proposals are the destabilization of the economy, thus creating high levels of inflation, combined with economic stagnation caused by lack of investment, and the flight of capital, along with expertise in business, management and techniques which go in search of more favorable social and political environments.

Populism arises out of the impression, which predominates within the poorest and most ignorant sectors of those societies, that contain great majority of people, that their uncertain living conditions are basically caused by the ill-will of the educated and affluent majorities and that those conditions could be quickly improved if populist leaders were put into power to carry out the policies referred to above. As these sectors of society tend to form the majority in countries of low economic and cultural levels, the populist proposal wins easily within a regime that is actually democratic. The application of populist policies by leaders elected by these majorities greatly increases the level of poverty and ignorance of the population. Within these majority sectors, this

generates the belief that because of domestic and external obstruction, the populist remedy was not administered sufficiently strongly or widely, which leads them to support more radical forms of populism.

Within a democratic regime, if it is not abruptly interrupted by the formation of majority coalitions of the opposition - which rarely tends to happen - this vicious circle of causality finally makes the democratic regime itself nonviable. The frequent solution in countries with these characteristics - as happens in Latin America - is that of military intervention suspending procedures and democratic guarantees in order to install authoritarian regimes that claim to be committed to adopting rational forms of managing public affairs. Another type of solution found in countries with the same characteristics - as happens in various African countries - is the conversion of populism into centralizing and authoritarian state socialist systems that eliminate the market economy and replace it with a public economy of rationing and coupons, in conditions of increasing impoverishment.

Gradual Sedimentation and Accelerated Restructuring

The problems facing democracy in countries with very low economic and cultural levels are extremely difficult to solve. The question becomes almost insoluble within a foreseeable timescale in countries that do not have the internal conditions for development.

For those countries belonging to the group with low economic and cultural levels that do enjoy conditions for development, the problem of matching legitimate democracy with public rationality depends essentially on a specific correlation between timescales and models of achieving public rationality.

There are two typical models for increasing public rationality in selfdeveloping countries with low economic and cultural levels: the gradual sedimentation model and the accelerated restructuring model.

The gradual sedimentation model is implicit in processes of gradual development over a long period of time. Countries with low economic and cultural levels that have internal conditions for development tend, although not in a linear or automatic way, to raise their productivity and educational levels gradually. The crises that develop in populist regimes tend to be partly corrected by means of military interventions that seek to compensate for the lack of legitimacy of their power by a validation achieved through good performance. These regimes, however, through their inherent nature

commit the same kinds of mistakes of arbitrary and vicious behavior and are finally compelled to restore democracy. The latter, in turn, tends to be once more led into new populist experiments. And so the process continues, with its dialectical alternations leading however to a gradual rise in the economic and cultural levels of the society which, after a certain time, becomes capable of creating a sufficiently suitable and able political class to carry out the democratic and rational management of public affairs. Spain, during a long process which began in the 19th century succeeded, after its final authoritarian experiment under Franco, in achieving a level of self-sustainable maturity.

The problem of the gradual sedimentation model is the long period of time it needs to achieve reasonable results. Within this model, a country like Brazil, to give a significant example, would need a period of up to 50 years to achieve the structurally stable conditions suitable for making democracy compatible with public rationality.

Timescales as long as this create other types of problems. On the one hand, there is the unwillingness of the elites to submit to such a long process of maturation, which makes them susceptible to non-democratic solutions that impose rapid forms of development. On the other hand, in modern conditions typified by extraordinary rates of historical acceleration, these long timescales create intolerably wide chasms of backwardness and expose a country to dangerous forms of foreign intervention.

The accelerated restructuring model is that which, based on a reasonable chance of achieving democracy, seeks to bring together conditions which, through a broad and deep exercise of public rationality, will lead to the introduction of fundamental and irreversible changes in society and the state, permitting a higher level of development to be achieved in a relatively short period of time. The example of Brazil, typified by the Kubitschek government, which was justly proud of having carried out fifty years of development in five years, may be used here once again.

If in the case of the gradual sedimentation model, the main problem encountered is that of the excessively long timescales it needs, in the case of the accelerated restructuring model, the problem is that of the appearance of the democratic opportunity to allow it to be applied. The perverse relationship within the democratic regime between low economic and cultural levels and the formation of a political class with little suitability and competence, tends to work against the emergence of opportunities to make viable by electoral means

the constitution of a government with the will and ability to apply the accelerated restructuring model.

To illustrate this, we look again to Brazil and the election of President Fernando Collor in 1989, which surprisingly brought to power a candidate who had managed to achieve an absolute majority of votes against the populist candidate. Both as candidate and as President, Collor proposed in his public statements to move forward to an accelerated restructuring of the economy, the state and society.

The first 18 months of the Collor government, however, showed mainly negative results. The President began his mandate facing the immediate prospect, within an extreme short period, of explosive hyperinflation. By means of a set of extraordinarily drastic measures the focal point of which was the freezing of 80% of private assets, to the value of something in the order of US\$ 100 billion, for 18 months, he halted excess liquidity and eliminated the risk of hyperinflation. The strategy adopted by the Collor government was strongly criticized. Jurists pointed out the illegal aspects of the measure, while several economists argued against the soundness of the economic basis of the policy.

It is important to recognize, without entering into the merits of the question, that containing hyperinflation as it was about to explode made it vital, among other measures, to nullify the excess of liquidity in the hands of the public. The essential point, however, is not exactly a retrospective discussion of the Collor Plan but the fact that once the risk of hyperinflation had been contained in March 1990, the Collor government was not able to formulate and implement an economic policy to eliminate the primary factors leading to inflation and thus succeed in stabilizing the currency. Once the initial effects of the shock of freezing assets had passed, inflation returned to high levels, forcing the adoption at the beginning of 1991 of a new freeze measure, Collor Plan II, which had even less success. At the end of 1991 there are clear signs of a return to a new superinflationary set of conditions tending to re-establish the risk of another explosive period of hyperinflation.

Worn down by an ineffective economic policy and by the huge areas of incompetence that have been typical of his government and recently by extensive signs of corruption at the highest levels of the Executive, President Collor is trying to regain the ability to govern by proposing an agreement involving some constitutional changes and a consensual project for government. The prospect of success for these proposals seems rather modest and the

possibility that Brazil will plunge in a relatively short time into a huge economic, social and institutional crisis with unforeseeable consequences, has become dangerously real.

This picture of Brazil and the Collor government at the end of 1991 is in sharp contrast to the successful results being obtained by other Latin American countries and governments, as in the case of Mexico, Chile and Argentina.

Final Considerations

The great problem with modern democracy is that the demand for a democratic norm has penetrated irreversibly into the universal modern consciousness while the economic and cultural conditions needed to create suitable and capable social classes are still very limited and are found in a structurally stable form only in the countries of Western Europe or similar ones such as Canada and, on a larger scale, the United States and Japan.

On the other hand, as the present study has shown, only a relatively small number of countries enjoying the conditions for development can, within foreseeable - but generally long - timescales move in a stable manner towards imposing sufficient public rationality on the exercise of their democracies.

Within this picture there appears, in certain circumstances and relatively rarely, the possibility of the equivalent of a historical short-circuit by means of adopting and implementing the accelerated restructuring model in an underdeveloped democracy. This model allows very rapid progress towards a set of reforms in the state, the economy and society in general which within a democratic regime significantly increase the chances of effectively exercising public rationality. The positive effects arising from this tend to feed retroactively into the process of public rationality and lead the country to higher economic and cultural levels from which it can achieve structurally stable conditions for making democracy compatible with public rationality.

As has been already mentioned, if the problem of the gradual sedimentation model - which tends to be found in the case of countries with the ability to develop themselves - is that its results only appear after a long period, the problem of accelerated restructuring is that the opportunities for applying it in underdeveloped democracies are relatively rare. The exhausting delays of the gradual sedimentation model, with its marches and counter-marches, and the scarcity of opportunities for the democratic adoption of the accelerated

restructuring model, encourage the elites of countries with low economic and cultural levels to introduce the latter by authoritarian methods.

The introduction of the accelerated restructuring model by authoritarian methods - an experiment of which there are numerous historical examples: on the left with Lenin, on the right with Franco and Pinochet - brings us up against the problem of the contradiction between means and ends. In its most general terms, this question has been dealt with very clearly by Sartre when he stated that in effect, the ends justify the means. Sartre observes that all that happens is the means determine the ends to which we actually arrive. This implies that even if they are genuinely intended by their agent, the intended aims of a certain action do not necessarily correspond to the results produced by this action, because those results arise from the nature of the means that were used. The Russian Revolution is one of the most instructive examples of this contradiction.

Nevertheless, there are several historical examples of the successful establishment of the accelerated restructuring model by authoritarian methods that have led, even if almost always in a non-linear way, to stable means of making democracy compatible with public rationality.

The most interesting example of the authoritarian imposition of accelerated restructuring which led in a linear fashion to a stable match between democracy and public rationality is that of General de Gaulle in 1958. The Fourth Republic in France, undermined by party factionalism, by the demagogy of the left and finally by the military rebellion in Algeria, began to collapse after having contributed by its misgovernment to reducing France to a level of relative underdevelopment compared to other Western countries. Supported by military forces from Algeria, de Gaulle imposed his appointment as Prime Minister with full powers on President Coty and the National Assembly by authoritarian methods, ordering the recess of the Assembly for six months and subsequently re-establishing military discipline. Next, he obtained approval by plebiscite of a new Constitution and had himself elected President of the Republic by an electoral college instituted by that Constitution. The Fifth Republic thus installed would bring about under de Gaulle's direction an extraordinary economic and cultural development that created the conditions for a structurally stable matching of French democracy with a high level of public rationality.

It is also extremely interesting to see the imposition by Mustafa Kemal in Turkey in 1922, by authoritarian means, of an accelerated restructuring model.

Deposing Sultan Mahomet VI, Kemal instituted the Turkish Republic and brought about one of the most extraordinary feats of social and state reform known to history. Kemalism remained an authoritarian regime and it was only by means of a long process, involving various *coups d'etat*, that Turkey current democracy was established.

A similar situation would appear in the authoritarian experiments of Franco in Spain and Pinochet in Chile. Both took power by means of the military and instituted regimes of the extreme right on which they sought to impose institutional continuity. Both, after a long period of brutal repression, passed through an intermediate phase that led them, in the final years of their regimes, to rational and confident - though always authoritarian - methods of managing public affairs. In this way they imposed significant measures of development on their respective countries, creating involuntarily though effectively the conditions that would subsequently allow the return of democracy to make representation of the people compatible with public rationality in a stable manner.

What happens to authoritarian methods of setting up the accelerated restructuring model is that, as they contain within themselves a profound contradiction between stated ends and the means actually employed, authoritarian regimes are created whose direction cannot be predicted and which are generally liable to turn into vicious regimes giving priority to minorities. Thus, they actually join the long process of marches and countermarches which accurately characterize the gradual sedimentation model whose overthrow had allegedly produced the military intervention in the first place.

Two conclusions emerge from the analysis of these historical examples. The first is that the accelerated restructuring model can only be recommended universally when it is adopted by democratic means. Even if the chances for this model to be democratically adopted are relatively rare, in societies with low economic and educational levels is imperative that its establishment should occur through persuasion. Only thus can it be guaranteed that the result actually achieved will be the formation of a structurally stable match between democracy and public rationality.

The second conclusion is that sometimes authoritarian methods of establishing this model may be successful and lead - most often by dialectical rather than linear means - to democracies structurally imbued with public rationality. The success of these authoritarian methods, however, cannot be assumed, much less postulated *ex-ante*. The authoritarianism of its origin can only be validated *a posteriori* when the satisfactory orientation given to the

model has been indirectly confirmed, but always to the extent that, *ex-post*, the conditions of re-establishing a democracy compatible with public rationality have been ensured in a stable manner.



5. The Left as Project and as Machine (1995)

The left came to an end with the recognition of the theoretical fallacies of Marxism - with the exception of the permanent philosophical relevance of the thinking of the young Marx. The left came to an end when the Russians and Eastern Europeans themselves came to understand that Communism was a gigantic bureaucratic tyranny which, on its own terms of efficiency, had dramatically lost in its confrontation with the market economies. Did the left come to an end with the collapse of the Berlin Wall?

Norberto Bobbio is one of many enlightened voices that maintain, in my view completely correctly, that the Left-Right polarity is a constant in societies organized on a rational basis, in other words from classical Athens until today, with long intervals in between. This polarity takes different forms according to the historical period and characteristics of the society being examined. In Athens it created an opposition between those who called for patricians to keep the right of defining the law, and those who, like Solon, proposed that the law should be a written text, whatever form the ruling class might give it. It created an opposition between those those who wanted to restrict debate on public matters to the upper levels of society, and those who, like Pericles, wished to extend voting rights to all citizens.

During the course of a long sequence of theoretical debates and practical experiments, from the 18th century *Encyclopédistes* and 19th-century British reformism, until the post-Second World War welfare state and the improved

social democracy of the end of the 20 century, the concepts of Left and Right have undergone great changes. If it is true that we have not arrived, as some thought might happen, at the "end of ideologies", it is no less certain that the distance separating currently valid definitions of Left and Right has decreased dramatically. Both positions defend representative democracy, social justice and the idea of ensuring the well-being of the masses within a market economy. This implies a more social market economy for the Left and a more efficient one for the Right.

The theoretical and practical confrontation between the currently valid forms of Left and Right exists in a context that relates the demand for economic efficiency and international competitiveness on the one hand to the demand for social equality and well-being of the people on the other. The modern Right advocates, for the situation prevailing in any society, the optimization of efficiency and competitiveness within conditions of satisfactory levels of social equity and social well-being. The modern Left advocates the optimization of equity and the well-being of the people within conditions of satisfactory efficiency and competitiveness.

The modern world, however, in addition to this significant reduction of the distance separating current forms of Left and Right, has seen a new and important differentiation appear within both positions: the difference between the Left as project and the Left as machine. Something of the same nature, although in a different form, separates the racially resentful and xenophobic Right from the rational Right. This is the difference that separates Le Pen from Chirac in France.

In Brazil, the space between the Left as machine and the Left as project can be measured by the greater distance that separates the CUT [Central Única dos Trabalhadores - Single Workers' Centre - trans.] and unions like those of the oil workers from Força Sindical [a central trade union organization – trans.] and unions affiliated to it. This is the same distance separating the authoritarian and theoretically obsolete parts of the PT [Partido dos Trabalhadores – Brazilian Workers' Party – trans.] from the positions of other anti-dogmatic leaders in the party, such as Deputy José Genuino. It is the distance that separates the corporativism of the profitable public sector enterprises from the social-democratic ideas of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government and its proposals for constitutional reform as a necessary condition for creating a large-scale economic and social development program.

The Left as machine is an immense illusion manipulated by privileged groups from sectors which, invoking doctrines that were valid in the Brazil of the 1940s and 50s, seek to support public monopolies which are actually not led by representatives of the State, presidents and directors of state companies, but rather by the union leaders who control those companies. Should any doubts remain on the subject, the recent strike at Petrobras shows without a doubt who is running Petrobras, the directors or the union.

The Left as a machine, controlling the unions in activities which most closely and directly meet the needs of the people, such as the energy, transport, telecommunications sectors and others, hold the people themselves in general to ransom and in particular the large numbers of those in low-income groups who are completely dependent on public services. The Socialist nationalist banners these groups wave serve to disguise the motives that really inspire them, which are those of preserving the privileges granted by the public sector at the expense of taxpayers and public welfare.

As often happens in history, crises clarify the contradictions in society. The Brazilian people, suffering from the oil-workers' strike and in general terms from all strikes affecting public services, now recognize the gulf that separates the Left as Machine from the Left as Project. And it knows that a valid project of the Left, in the present situation in the world and in Brazil, basically conforms to that of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government program. This is the reason why 80% of Brazilians, when consulted recently, supported their government, with an even greater number no doubt condemning the recent oil-workers' strike.

Let us do away with deceptions and confusion and make Brazil, honestly and rationally into a great modern social democracy.



6. The Political System and Democratic Governability (1999)

Introduction

I have been asked to talk about the problem of the Political System and Governability. I would like to begin by observing, before embarking specifically on the topic, that in political terms societies are confronted with alternatives. At some points in the life of a society and in history the basic problem is how to limit the power of government. This guarantees that the citizen should have freedom in relation to public power, which has a tendency to despotism. However, the whole problem of certain periods in society - Brazil has already gone through these moments, all societies do – consists in finding forms of disciplining the government, regulating the government, etc.

Modern democracy - I do not wish to speak of ancient democracy because that has a rather different origin, and when I use the term 'ancient' I am obviously thinking of Athenian democracy, the democracy of Pericles, in a context different from ours. Modern democracy, which has developed steadily since the end of the 17th century and became established during the 18th, arose precisely out of the need felt by those European societies that had achieved a considerable level of economic and cultural development, to control the will of the Prince. And in order to control the will of the Prince the idea arose that the Prince should govern according to the law. The law should be formulated by representatives of the people. Out of this prior period, the

British idea of: "No taxation without representation" appeared, in other words, instead of the Prince saying: "The tax will be this" the response would be: "No, wait a moment, the tax will be the amount voted for by the representatives of the people". At the same time, a whole trend appeared which signified the start of the democracy we are still the heirs of today: that of restraining the Prince within legal norms by means of a mechanism allowing the people to appoint representatives to exercise this controlling power over the Prince and legislator on behalf of society as a whole.

On the other hand, there are other times when something different appears, in which several circumstances combine to make the exercise of authority extremely precarious. Public power comes to have power that is much more nominal than real. It cannot make things happen. It cannot formulate reasonable ways to regulate the activities of society. These are the times in which the problem ceases to be the control of the Prince and becomes one of controlling the exercise of governability, creating the conditions to make governability possible.

I propose that in my view - and later in the course of this lecture we shall look at this a little more closely - Brazil is passing through a time in which the main problem is not that of controlling the Prince, but of re-instituting a satisfactory state of governability. This may be understood if we bear in mind the natural oscillation of the pendulum of society and history between positions on the Left and Right, between anti-authoritarianism and authoritarianism. The fact that Brazil went through 20 years of authoritarian military government created in Brazilian society a reaction of conflict with that authority. This was natural, explicable and even desirable from a certain point of view. But as always, things go beyond what is desirable. I believe we are now passing through a moment of crisis of authority. A moment in which legitimate authority finds difficulty in legitimately carrying out, according to the law, the powers invested in it because of a decline in the conditions of governability. My lecture today will be an attempt to examine the conditions of governability, the extent to which this problem exists in Brazil and why the situation is as it is.

The Political System

Let us begin with a brief analysis of the political system. Political systems are given various labels, but in the modern world they exist within a certain area of common alternatives that appeal to the republican situation, the

democratic situation, the social situation and the situation of the people. Under these various titles, the people's republic of this, the democratic republic of that, etc., what is being referred to is a system of regulating society which, leaving aside names and titles, is conditioned by certain factors that are, abstractly speaking, of a permanent nature. In the first place, these factors constitute the system of stratification a particular society displays. Societies stratified according to oligarchies have oligarchic regimes. Societies stratified democratically have democratic regimes. Democracy operates on society, but society modulates the actions of the system. Thus, the way in which a society is stratified is extremely relevant in determining the type of regime that will prosper in it.

The second variable in the analysis of any political system is the political culture of a society. It has become a commonplace today, we might say perhaps since the 1960s and developments that began mainly with Gabriel Almond – set out in his famous book *Political Culture* - to recognize that culture in its widest, socio-anthropological sense, that embraces all the values, ideas, representations of the world and objects made by man and which surround human life, has certain variations, certain sectorizations, one of which is political culture. Political culture is that part of a society's general culture in which, following historical processes that emphasize certain values and dismiss others, people establish what society in general understands as what ought or ought not to be done in terms of the social regulation of society and in terms of the political regime. Institutionalized regimes can only manage to work against a society's political culture for brief periods, and then at their own peril. Societies that have good or bad democratic political cultures eventually have democratic regimes. Societies that have authoritarian political cultures, even though they adopt democratic forms, eventually work in an authoritarian way.

To illustrate this example, I would mention the extremely interesting case of Germany at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th. An extremely cultured society that achieved extraordinary development in the last decades of the 19th century, even overtaking great Britain's industrial capacity, having started from being a rural society at the beginning of the century - an absolutely spectacular development, it was a society led by an authoritarian political culture. This was a political culture that saw in the King the natural holder of power, the natural exerciser of power. When, after the crisis of the First World War, this society tried to form a democracy - the famous Weimar Republic - the authoritarianism implicit

in that society did not allow the Republic to work democratically and finally led to the catastrophe of Hitler. Clearly, many circumstances created the pathological phenomenon of Nazism, and it would be very unfair to German society and German culture to say it carried within itself a tendency to become Nazi. That is not true, but it is true to say that it carried within itself an authoritarian tendency in which Nazism found the conditions to prosper. Nazism would not have been possible in England, even if England had lost the war instead of Germany, because the political culture of England was not conducive to such a regime. There is no direct relationship between German political culture and Nazism, but there is a relationship of compatibility. German political culture made Nazism possible. Therefore political culture is extremely important.

Another fundamental aspect that determines political systems is the question of leaders. Leaders working to defend and maintain the positions of the power-holder or power-holders, or leaders who function as critics in opposition to power-holders. The forms of leadership that emerge in specific historical and social contexts have a strong influence on political systems. I will give an example. The American political system is without a doubt characterized by the idea of respect for individual freedoms, the rights of the citizen, etc. and the American Constitution is the same as it was at the Declaration of Independence. However, at a certain point, Senator McCarthy, exercising terrorist leadership and awakening certain phobias within North American society concerning Communism, created a situation of complete disrespect for individual freedom and the rights of individuals, persecuting people who were merely suspected of being Communists and in spite of the American system being completely opposed to this kind of practice, the public supported it. Therefore it is clear that systems suffer significant measures of twisting and distortion by virtue of the leaders who arise in them in certain circumstances.

So to sum up, a political system is or was the result of certain characteristics of the stratification of society, of the political culture that society supports at a specific period in its history, and of the leaders who appear, although naturally leaders are relatively less relevant because they are created within the ambience of social and political cultures. But from time to time they are able to distort the political scenario in a very significant way. The example of McCarthy, and several others could be mentioned, exist as evidence of this.

Governability

Having clarified what the political system is, let us now move towards the second point of our investigation, the problem of governability. When we use the expression 'governability' we generally wish to refer to the various conditions that determine the area of possibilities of exercising power and the conditions of greater or lesser efficiency in which power is exercised in that area. Therefore, governability pre-limits the area for exercising power and determines the level of efficiency with which power is exercised within this space.

What are the ingredients that determine the phenomenon of governability in a specific society? I would say that we can reduce these ingredients to four basic factors:

- the first factor is the relationship between the elite and the masses;
- the second is the political culture;
- the third are the public institutions, and
- the fourth is the greater or lesser ability to lead of those who are in power or of those who oppose power.

Let us examine very quickly what this means.

Elite-Masses

The type of relationship between the elite and the masses that exists within a specific society is fundamental in terms of everything concerning the exercise of power. This type of elite-masses relationship displays extraordinary variations which are found in certain extreme forms such as: on the part of the elites, what might be called the functional elites and the dysfunctional elites. On the part of the masses, are what might be called the adapted, acquiescent masses which might even be actively favorable to a certain social regime, or there are the rebellious masses. To simplify: rebellious or non-rebellious, to make the dichotomy easier. And the leaders, the elites, are either functional or dysfunctional.

What is a functional elite? Elite is a word, a term, we use to describe - taking into account the whole of society - those sectors or strata with greatest influence according to the kind of stratification the society has. In certain societies the elite corresponds strictly to a specific stratum: in traditional society the patricians are by

definition the elite. Every elite exists within the patrician class and every patrician belongs to the elite. In a multi-class, polyclass society without rigid class barriers such as modern societies, the elite is a much more complex thing. While, for example, in Victorian society, the elite always consisted of a small group of people who were the great landowners or merchants or great aristocrats, in England today, the same English society a century or so later, the elites are extremely diversified and so sectoral elites have emerged. Today we must speak of a political elite, an intellectual elite, an economic elite, a sporting elite and a media elite. There are many elites. Power is no longer concentrated in a single elite as occurs in rigidly stratified societies. Despite this, the multiple elites that exist in modern society have very different levels of ability to exercise or influence power. So we already find ourselves in a much more restricted environment. We find that if, in terms of the elite, we measure the level of elitism according to the level of its power or capacity to influence power, even in a very polyvalent, polyclass modern society, the elite is concentrated within that group which, in one way or another, exercises power or influences power through the press or other means.

These elites exercise a certain function. The elite is not there just because people want power. But when they exercise power, they are performing a certain social role and they charge a certain price. Every elite has a certain cost. So the question of the functionality or dysfunctionality of the elite, measured generally, may be understood as being: the functional elite is that whose service, when given to society, is worth more than the cost of maintaining it. What is the cost of maintaining an elite? This is a vague, generic expression but one which can be subjected to a certain measures. We can measure the cost of maintaining a specific elite by adding up the number of luxury homes the elite own, the standard of living this elite has, in other words a series of expenses directly or indirectly related to the elite condition.

It is not particularly relevant here, but in other studies I have been ableand I mention it because it seems interesting - to point out a fascinating phenomenon which in my view has not yet been properly studied: the fact that the cost of elites is relatively fixed. The cost of elites has been relatively fixed during all historical periods. All that happens is that this fixed cost, relative to a society's gross product, may be excessive or not. This is the whole problem with underdevelopment.

To give you an example, let us consider the more acute case of African societies. Why is it that African societies continue for years and years in the same state? It is very simple. The cost of sustaining the African elite absorbs

almost all the surplus produced in a rudimentary economy. And while the cost of maintaining the African elite absorbs almost all the surplus produced by that economy, there is no way to modify the structure of that society. It perpetuates its own underdevelopment. Is this because it is African? Not at all. This happened in the Western world until the end of the 18th century. While Versailles was being built the French peasant was dying of hunger. Then the same thing happened as is happening in Africa in different historical conditions. Until the 18th century, the European elite was absorbing so much of the surplus produced by agrarian societies that European societies made no significant social progress until the second half of the 19th century and much more recently. Therefore, returning to our starting point, functional elites are those whose value, when dedicated to the proper functioning of society, exceeds the cost of their maintenance. And how can we know if an elite is functional or not? The question clearly invites very analytical forms of response through a whole system of tables which set out criteria of values for this, that and the other, and costs etc. This is complicated. It is much better to take a general, gestalt view. A functional elite is one that makes the country work well. When the country works badly it is a sign that the elite is working badly.

Dysfunctional elites, which appear very often, more often than functional ones in history, are those that absorb a huge measure of social surplus and provide a relatively small return to their society. We may make some excuses for the elites of countries with a low capacity to create surpluses only because of the fact already mentioned, that the unavoidable fixed cost of maintaining the elite tends to be excessive. So societies in this situation can only resolve the impasse when a sector of the elite or a new elite, decides to somehow—we might say heroically—severely control its own consumption for the benefit of the development of society. For example, the Meiji turned medieval Japan into a modern state in 20 years by means of an extraordinary effort in controlling the costs of the elite and making huge investments to transform society. The Prussian elite turned an agrarian society into the greatest industrial society in Europe by means of a huge effort of concentrating on development and controlling its own profits. An example of a dysfunctional elite is 18th-century France, which paid the price of its dysfunctionality at the guillotine.

Thus we see an extremely important first element of governability. Governability depends on functional elites and is almost impossible to achieve when elites are dysfunctional; then governability is exercised by means of

arbitrary, coercive actions which for this reason are unstable. When elites are functional, governability is exercised with an increasing tendency towards the consent of the masses. On the other hand, we must also recognize that there are acquiescent masses and rebellious masses. If the rebellion of the masses, as almost always happens, is a result of the dysfunctionality of the elites, that is another matter. In my view, this is the main though not exclusive explanation for moments of rebellion by the masses. We only need to recognize that when a situation of systematic rebellion of the masses arises, elites no longer have the ability to govern even if they try to do so in a very proper way. They have lost the condition of *autoritas*, which is an invisible but decisive one. It is a condition that subjectively permeates the consciousness of society and leads to the granting or denial of consent. When there is a general denial of consent, the rebellion becomes structural and the elites no longer function. And what happens from the historical and social point of view? Usually a revolution occurs. This is what happened in the Russian Revolution, the French Revolution and in various other revolutions since that of Cromwell and others in the modern world.

Political Culture

Another aspect it is important to define in terms of governability is political culture. Political culture fixes the forms through which, in the general understanding of people, is felt to be what the government should or should not do. And when this political culture is too decentralized and feels the government cannot do anything, governability becomes more difficult. And this is what happens at those times when there is a collective awareness in a society of a crisis in the decision to hand authority over to those who can exercise it, even legally. I believe that Brazil is experiencing something of this phenomenon of a crisis in the conscious and deliberate handing over authority, no matter who holds it, which will obviously make governability difficult.

Institutions

Public institutions are extremely important insofar as they formally regulate the power relationships that emerge out of political culture and leadership. All these forms, stratification, political culture and leadership, are scattered, nonformalized processes. Institutions formalize. So, this society will be A, B or C

and will define who rules, who does not rule, how power is attained and who reaches it and what the rights and duties of the people will be. Institutions congeal, fix and solidify disparate social relations, but while they persist they represent a certain social relationship. Institutions do not last when there is too great a separation between the institutional and the real, and when that happens, the institution begins to fail. Institutions that work are those that have adjusted to the reality of the stratification, culture and the psychological aspects of society. The importance of institutions increases in relation to democratic regimes because in those regimes, without too many exceptions, the political culture is basically the same. There is a basic democratic political culture. There are differences according to the type of society and whether the political culture of these democracies is more directed towards personal success or towards social concerns, etc. For example, when we compare European to American democracy, the latter is seen to be individualistic while the European version concentrates more on social matters. There are differences, but there is a common basis underlying democratic culture.

Bearing this common basis in mind, the foundation of democratic culture, the way in which society is institutionalized is extremely important. And within it we find some distinct variations in political institutionalization that can be reduced to two kinds – leaving aside the monarchy-republic, which is a less relevant dichotomy at the present time, since the republic has become almost the predominant pattern in democratic life, with a few exceptions. The two great dichotomies are: the parliamentary-presidential dichotomy and the federal-unitary dichotomy. The parliamentary-presidential distinction, which from time to time has quite a significant presence in Brazilian public consciousness - is often distorted by the tendency of with less competence in the area to consider that one of these two alternatives is intrinsically better or worse than the other. This makes no sense. Parliamentarism is not intrinsically better or worse. Presidentialism is not intrinsically better or worse. So what determines the comparative advantages of these regimes and in what conditions can they be evaluated?

Parliamentarism

As we know, parliamentarism is a regime that developed out of the predominant practice of European democracy and regulates almost all the truly democratic European countries - there is not much parliamentarism in

Mr Milosevic's Yugoslavia - but parliamentarism definitely exists in the really democratic countries in Europe, even when they have monarchies, as in the case of the Nordic countries, Great Britain and Belgium. This parliamentarism reveals, regardless of other circumstances, an extremely serious dichotomy, that of viability or non-viability. There are viable forms of parliamentarism and nonviable forms, and this is an extremely serious dichotomy.

What is meant by viable parliamentarism? Viable parliamentarism is that which, by virtue of the social and cultural conditions of the society and the institutional conditions regulating political power, is able, or more than able, is likely, to create in each legislature a clear parliamentary majority with a clear political program, which members of Parliament consistently work to achieve and can therefore form clear majorities with clear programs consistently supported and followed by its followers. When this happens, parliamentarism is highly viable. And what gives high viability to parliamentary regimes that fulfill these three requisites: forming stable majorities, having meaningful programs and consistency in applying those programs, is the fact that they necessarily establish, by the very nature of the system, a compatibility between the Legislature and the Executive because the Executive is the extension of a Legislature in which this majority has already been defined. This majority appoints a Cabinet to direct it. As long as the stable, programmed majority is responsible, there has to be agreement between the Executive and the Legislature and the functioning of that society will be characterized by a high level of governability.

On the other hand, in parliamentary regimes that do not succeed in winning stable majorities or creating clear program commitments and which cannot make their members be faithful to the program of each party, parliamentarism works very badly. We have in our immediate experience of the modern world parliamentary systems that work very well, as in Great Britain; working extremely well in the case of Germany and working quite badly in the case of Italy where these forms of stable majorities and stable commitments to programs do not exist and party loyalty is dubious, as was recently seen in the crisis of the Oliva group and the substitution of Sr Prodi by Sr Alema.

Presidentialism

In the abstract, Presidentialism has the advantage of giving continuity to the Executive for the predetermined period of a mandate: four or five years,

re-electable or not according to the rules of the constitution. And this gives a certain security in continuity of command. On the other hand, it is the inherent cause of a problem which, depending on the nature of the society and its political culture, can become extremely serious, and that is the possibility, which occurs quite often, of there being a mismatch between the majority forming the parliament and the majority voting for the President of the Republic. The case of President Clinton is typical. He was elected with a significant majority while at the same time the American people voted in the opposite way to elect a mainly Republican Congress, thus creating a permanent conflict between President and Congress to the point of preventing the President from carrying out a series of extremely important measures. I do not wish to refer to the episode concerning thr young lady Monica Lewinsky because that is another type of problem. That is not the problem of governability that America has. The American problem of governability arises out of the fact that there was a significant mismatch between the tendencies, programs and projects of the Republican majority in Congress and the ideas and plans of the President of the Republic, representing the point of view of the Democratic Party.

The United States, which has recently experienced this contradiction rather frequently, did not suffer it in its early history and that is what validated the system for a long period, from the end of the 18th century until, I would say Roosevelt. Possibly Roosevelt (Franklin, not Theodore) was the dividing line. During this long period, American society was one in which the state was merely a general regulator of individual behavior. It oversaw the contract. The people had to respect the contracts and the state interfered as little as possible in society: a little in terms of roads, controlling water supplies - a light touch. Society ran itself by means of private enterprise and this allowed the incredible development of American private enterprise and the formation of major enterprises, all of which we are familiar with.

Based, however, on the increasing complexity typical of the modern world, in which the crisis of the Depression of the 1930s gave a brutal shakeup to modern societies, it became clear that private enterprise was not able to regulate problems as complex as those that emerge from crises, periods of high inflation, major deflation and social problems. All this went completely beyond the abilities of private enterprise. They are phenomena which can only be regulated by the government.

So the level of government intervention in administering society became incomparably higher than that exercised by American presidents in the 19th century. And it became clear at this time that there was a need to create a satisfactory working relationship between Congress and the president. A Congress radically opposed to the president inhibits him. The president begins to suffer a significant loss of governability.

So we must recognize that there is an inherent risk to governability in parliamentary regimes when institutional or social circumstances work in such a way that stable majorities, with clear programs and loyalty to these programs, are not formed. There is an inevitable crisis of governability in a parliamentarism that contains these defects. On the other hand, there is an inevitable crisis of governability in a presidentialism where there is a tendency to have significant differences between the direction of Congress and the direction of the President, thus handicapping the President's ability to govern according to his or her aims and, on the other hand preventing Congress from being able to regulate society in a suitable way.... Congress has the power to immobilize the President but not to administer; the President has the power to administer but cannot legislate because Congress is in opposition. These are the characteristics of ungovernability.

Federalism-Unitarism

A final and quick look at federalism and unitarism. Once again, there is no inherent advantage in the one or the other. The conditions of a society justify federative regimes. A society with a large population and large territory, with much regional diversity, clearly requires a federative regime to make this diversity compatible with national unity. On the other hand, very homogeneous societies with small territories are obviously better run by unitary regimes. No one would propose a federative regime for Uruguay or Denmark and obviously countries like Brazil, Germany and the United States, require federative regimes.

Once again, the whole question of this choice between a unitary or a federative system is based on the question of whether federative systems tend to optimize governability in more complex and diversified countries while at the same time preserving, relative to federal power - what is called in Brazil the Power of the Union - a satisfactory level of supervision and control over the national territory. One of the problems that in the Brazilian federative

regime today - I will discuss this later in the second part of this talk - is the fact that, since the new Constitution, the Brazilian Federation has been taken to such an extreme that today Brazil is almost a confederation. Each state thinks of itself as an independent country. So the State of Minas, for example, says: "I shall not pay the debt because things are different with us" and declares a moratorium as if it is possible to have a moratorium within one part of Brazilian society when dealing with debtors who necessarily see Brazil as a complete entity. When people lend money to Brazil, they are not lending to the states, they are lending to the Union. And so there is an obvious need for the Union to collect from the states the necessary means to service this debt. However, the confederative regime implicit in the Brazilian Constitution allows an imprudent governor to declare a moratorium, thus putting the country's international credibility at risk. It is obvious that the Brazilian federative regime is in need of revision.

Can abuse by the states be corrected? Yes. Federal intervention exists, but as this is a kind of atomic bomb, it is never used precisely because it is an extremely serious measure. So there are no middle-level ways of correcting and avoiding abuses and none for supervising states. And what happens is that there is a contradiction between this extremely fragmented structure in the Brazilian political system and the international view of the country, which is unitarian. When a gunman in Pará carries out a massacre which the Pará police do not punish because of their own involvement, the guilty party is the President of the Republic, who does not have the slightest chance of intervening in Pará unless it is by means of federal intervention. In other words, there is no middle way of correcting abuses, it is all or nothing. And when this happens, what really happens is that nothing.

The Case of Brazil

The problem of governability in Brazil seems to me to be an extremely serious one. In my view, one of the things to be seriously considered at this time and I confess that at this stage in my academic life I have more work than time, in a losing struggle against the clock, a struggle people always lose to the clock in the end because death is the last hour on it - I must say that I could not resist the gracious invitation I received because I think it is important to discuss the topic with a group so representative of Brazilians as those gathered here, is this question of governability. We live in a Brazil that is running a

serious, grave risk of a deficit in governability. What are the main factors eroding governability and restricting it so dangerously?

I would suggest five:

- 1. The electoral system;
- 2. The party system;
- 3. The federalism that has been turned into crypto-confederalism;
- 4. The excessive autonomy of certain agencies relative to central power;
- 5. The excessive autonomy of the Ministério Público [Public Prosecutor's Office an approximate translation trans.]

Let us briefly analyze these questions one at a time.

Congress

The first problem really concerns Congress. Unlike what the media tend to publish and what the greater part of public opinion accepts, Brazilian presidentialism is not characterized by an excess of power on the part of the president. In fact, Brazilian presidentialism is a form of congressionalism. It is the National Congress that runs Brazil and the president says "Amen". And if he does not say "Amen", he is dismissed. The president is completely subordinate to the actions of Congress. That is the truth of the matter. He has the ability to administer day-to-day affairs within parameters laid down by Congress, under the control of Congress and under the permanent threat of intervention by Congress. Congressionalism is not necessarily a bad thing. The problem occurs precisely when congressionalism is exercised in an irresponsible way. And I would suggest that Brazilian congressionalism is highly irresponsible. And why is it highly irresponsible?

First of all the Brazilian Congress is highly irresponsible because the composition of the main house of Congress, the Chamber of Deputies, is achieved in a completely arbitrary manner. And how do we know that the composition of the Chamber is brought about in a completely arbitrary way? Very simply. Ask anyone which deputy they voted for at the last election. No-one can answer. And if no-one can answer, it is because there was a free vote. They voted because they voted. And when they say: "I voted for Covas" or "I voted for Collor", everyone knows this. Everyone knows who

they voted for to be president, governor, mayor and, up to a certain point, senator.

No-one, or almost no-one, in Brazil knows who they voted for at the last election to be a deputy. What this shows is that the vote for deputy is a free vote. Therefore, the representation by people elected with a free vote is a non-representative representation. That is Point 1.

Point 2: The problem that affects the ability of Congress to properly carry out its functions, as well as the fact of there being an electoral system that creates non-representative representation, is that the party system creates parties that are equally non-representative. Brazil has 40 legitimate parties, half of which are represented in Congress and most have one or two deputies. There are some significant parties but also a number of parties called 'dwarf parties' which nevertheless also exist. They have time for electoral broadcasts, and enjoy a series of advantages simply by being formally constituted as parties. The idea that there is a fragmentation of public opinion because of a very large number of parties is well-founded. This idea of hyper-proportional representation as I have come to call it, has its origin in the perfectly legitimate and understandable desire to ensure the maximum representation of all important trends in public opinion. A trend having a certain importance should in principle have the opportunity of having a certain representation. Thus, maximizing the attention given to allowing any major part of public opinion to create corresponding political representation brings about an extraordinary level of party fragmentation.

This extraordinary fragmentation has its origin once more - to repeat what I have mentioned previously - in the fact that modern democracies arose as a means of controlling the will of the Prince. At that time it was a matter of, on the one hand, restraining the Prince and on the other of allowing the citizens to express whatever might be the various opinions of the people. This led therefore to a hyper-representativism. And this very hyper-representativism is a way of:

- 1. Maximizing all these small tendencies to give each a certain voice in proportion to the number of people within them and thus increase the limitations on the will of the Prince.
- 2. When the problem is not that of limiting the will of the Prince but of permitting the exercise of governability, the question changes completely.

- 3. Public power today is highly controlled by a number of agencies. In the Brazilian case, Legislative and Judiciary powers, like the citizen, are not threatened by the arbitrary power of the Executive. What is threatened, on the other hand, is governability. By increasing the number of demands to restrict the capacity for coherent government, we create a lack of government. There has to be a party reform to allow the formation of coherent and stable majorities that respect their own programs.
- 4. This clearly requires large-scale electoral reform and broad party reform.

Federation

In the final minutes of this talk I shall say two or three things about how it might be possible to bring this about. It is also necessary to launch a serious review of the Federation. The states of Brazil are not countries. Brazil indeed, does not have the federative origin that the United States, for example, had as it developed in the form of autonomous colonies that decided at a certain point, in order to free themselves definitively from British rule, to unite in what was to begin with a confederation and later became a federation. It is possible to understand a slightly confederative system such as that of Switzerland for example, where completely different communities, German, Italian and French, united to resist the pressure of the Habsburg Empire or that of the Duke of Burgundy, the two great forces that historically threatened those alpine peoples. So they united in order to have a united defense but preserved their differences in languages, cultures, etc., and today the confederation has become a federation, but one with quite a significantly confederative nature.

This does not make sense in Brazil, which is a culturally unified country, and thus it is artificial to create, through institutions which, while they last, are creating habits of considering the states to be the main focus of the citizens' view of the nation. State patriotism is something that makes no sense. There is only one Brazil, there is only one legitimate patriotism, which is the patriotism of the Brazilian nation and states and the administrative ways of dealing with regional differences. What we should aim for is that regional matters should be dealt with by those in the region and not by a distant federal authority. But this federal authority has to have the ability to monitor the whole of the country, the ability to foresee whatever problems may be starting to develop and which ones might become dangerous in due course. It has to have a certain power

of intervention that is not the atomic bomb of federal intervention. I shall take the opportunity to say something about this little later on.

Autonomy

I would also like to mention two other aspects concerning Brazil's governability that seem to me to be serious, that is the excessive autonomy that has been granted in terms of administrative, and not substantial, aspects of the Legislative and Judiciary powers. The Judiciary is not controlled by anyone. Who controls the Executive? The Executive is controlled by the Legislature in terms of adopting laws and the power to regulate by means of committees of enquiry, also the power to dismiss the president by means of impeachment. And it is controlled by the Judiciary where any infraction of legislation, should there be a suitable requirement on the part of the injured party, is the object of a judicial decision to correct abuses. Possible abuses of Executive power are strictly subject to parliamentary and judicial control.

What control is exercised on possible abuses by the Judiciary? Abuses of Judiciary power clearly fall into two very different types: the irresponsible decision and irresponsible administration. The irresponsible decision is a very complex matter and in my view has no other solution than internal criticism. I do not feel that any institution in a democratic state organized according to the rule of law can control the decision of the judge, other than the High Court. This is undoubtedly the solution that we have, the existence of regulatory courts. But even so, Brazil needs significant judicial reforms, as can be seen from the scandalous injunction industry which flourishes freely. Anything can be the object of an injunction, which holds up the progress of important matters for an indefinite time. And why? Because we have not yet adopted the norm that has been adopted by most modern countries, which is the universally applicable effect of a higher decision. If the Federal Supreme Court hands down a decision, this decision is binding on all judges. So it is illogical that when a ruling from the Supreme Court is broken, the Supreme Court should again have to be appealed to. This is obviously happening in Brazil but it is clearly a sign of ungovernability. Decisions of the Supreme Court have to be binding.

On the other hand, there has to be a way for the autonomy of the Judiciary to have its own expenses submitted to a certain control. At a time when the most basic budgets are being cut – for example my Institute has lost 80% of

its funding, however, at the same time I agree with this because strict discipline is needed to make the country come out of its crisis - at this time a court cannot decide to build a marble palace decorated with Bohemian crystal. It makes no sense. It is clear that there is a lack of correspondence between the controls being exercised on the Executive power, controls that are indispensable, but a complete lack of a certain kind of control concerning the economic abuses of the Legislature, which appoints whoever it wants to and of the Judiciary, that decides to approve expenses that bear no relation to the country's economic situation. All this clearly needs a reform which basically respects judicial and legislative independence, obviously. We are not talking of setting up any kind of dictatorship of the Executive, not at all, but of bringing about shared responsibility with harmonious control and not only of a single power.

Well, I am within five minutes of the end of my talk. So these five minutes will be dedicated to a short meditation I would like to share with you about how it is possible to increase the responsibility, representation and efficiency of the National Congress, which is the great problem. Once this is resolved, all other problems will be solved as a matter of course.

The problem of the National Congress concerns representation, a problem related to the formation of stable majorities, a problem of consistency in political programs and it is a problem of discipline on the part of members of the majority in executing the program they themselves have agreed to. None of these situations exists at the present. How can we find reasonable democratic solutions suited to Brazilian policy that can correct these vices? I believe the answer may be summarized in the following points.

First, something which today is agreed on by experts and the responsible political class itself: the adoption of the so-called mixed district vote in which each district votes for its representative, thus establishing a link between the representative and the represented. With the district vote it is no longer possible for the citizen to say: "I don't know who I voted for" because the vote is limited to a very small area. He must know who he voted for because he is voting for his neighbor. This link between the electorate and the elected becomes very close. On the other hand, the list allows, if it has been drawn up properly, certain great national leaders to come to power but who may not have a specific link with a certain constituency. So it allows greater political names to be empowered regardless of their local connection, while the majority representation will show a link to the district. And by definition the big name

is well-known, otherwise he would not get votes and the district candidate is known because it is a restricted vote, which is much closer to the elector than the dispersed vote we have today. This would significantly increase the representative nature of elected Brazilian politicians.

The second point, obviously, is one that is also agreed on today by political scientists and the global political class, which is that it is necessary to establish minimum conditions for a political party to have the right to exist as such.

Germany says that no party may exist if it does not have 5% of the national vote. That is a criterion. Other criteria may be adopted. There are perfectly manageable objective criteria that would eliminate this flood of parties which actually become electoral shops with dubious aims and reduce the party representation of those which really represent significant sectors of public opinion.

But something else is necessary and this something else is to follow the route I personally feel to be desirable, which is the two-party system. If we have a multi-party system, how can we avoid the risk of not having representative majorities in Congress? This is solved in the two-party system. In Great Britain is that the third party is decorative so that there is a clearly defined definition of a majority between Labour and the Tories. Equally, in Germany, the greens are decorative. There is a clear majority difference between social democrats and Christian democrats. What is to be done therefore if, as is the case in Brazil, there are several parties? I hope that in time, Brazil will turn, as occurred in the Empire - the good old Brazilian Empire was indeed, within the context of its time, better governed than the country is today - to a two-party system. But a two-party system cannot exist by decree, as the military government attempted to do. It has to come out of social reality. It has to come out of a polarization in which society chooses between A and B and tends to find in the alternatives offered by A and B suitable solutions for its political options. It has to come from society and not be imposed by law.

Until this happens, how can we guarantee conditions for a stable majority in the country? In my view, some mechanisms are already being used by certain countries. These mechanisms consist firstly of: in a presidential regime, giving the President of the Republic the right to dissolve Congress. There cannot be a completely irresponsible congressionalism concerning the President of the Republic. The president must have the right to dissolve Congress when it cannot form a stable majority government and to this end the legislation

should encourage the formation of coalitions. Are there many parties? Patience. We shall form a coalition in which one group of parties takes responsibility, during the course of one mandate, for acting together to administer a certain program and maintaining operational unity with a leader representing the coalition. These matters are perfectly controllable by legislation and perfectly adjustable to Brazilian political culture. Quite simply, if you can imagine a district vote, representative parties and the necessary formation of a coalition government and a stable majority with its own program, governability is guaranteed. Clearly, the system is much easier to install if we are dealing with a parliamentary regime in which the formation of this kind of majority is easier. But it is compatible with presidentialism since the president has the weapon of dissolution. Either you form a majority coalition within 30 days or Congress will be dissolved and new elections held. And at this point the coalition appears immediately and from then on it is possible to establish a presidential regime with majority is compatible with a specific program and in this way bring about a huge increase in government stability.

7. Drugs, Crime and Narcoimperialism (2000)

Not only in the world in general, but in the specific case of Brazil, the drug problem is taking on alarming proportions as a result of which this question cannot be restricted to routine police activities, but has become a national problem of the greatest importance.

In essence, the subject has three highly relevant aspects: (1) drugs have become one of the biggest businesses in the world, involving trillions of dollars per year; (2) drug consumption, especially in the United States, is completely out of control. At the moment, a huge and uncontrollable demand for drugs, from other countries as well, sustains a corresponding and equally uncontrollable supply; (3) countries surrounding Brazil, in particular Colombia and Paraguay, but also to a great extent Peru and Bolivia, have become areas in which the production and trafficking of drugs have taken on alarming proportions. Among other results, the proximity of these countries has caused significant penetration of drugs into Brazilian territory, either for re-export, or for local consumption, leading to, among other effects, criminal control by drug gangs of the slums of Rio and similar areas in São Paulo. The extreme seriousness of the situation demands from the Brazilian government an immediate and serious analysis and a corresponding adoption of appropriate measures.

The obvious antisocial effects of taking drugs, as well as their damaging consequences for the health of those who take them, have led civilized countries to criminalize the production and distribution of drugs. This action was based

on the supposition that it would be almost impossible to control drug consumption at individual level and this made it necessary to criminalize its production and distribution. The United States, the country where the greatest number of drug-takers is found, has constructed a huge system to fight the supply of drugs, granting large funds to the relevant specialized agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and allowing it to operate not only on American soil but with increasing frequency in the countries that produce and distribute drugs such as Colombia and Paraguay. This policy has produced the Colombia and Paraguay Plans.

These two countries are being submitted to an increasing process of direct intervention by the DEA, with corresponding financial and military support. Without doubting the sincere anti-drug motivation that has led to these interventions, it cannot escape a clearheaded observer that drugs, much more effectively than the old anti-Communism, are serving as a justification of what we might call narcoimperialism, putting countries surrounding Brazil under the control of the United States. The coincidence of the plan to set up a South American System of Economic and Political Cooperation, and the existence of the Colombia and Paraguay Plans also cannot escape our notice. It also cannot fail to become evident that the exercise of direct American control on these countries, possibly extending into Bolivia and Peru, makes an autonomous South American project impossible, torpedoes one of the four members of Mercosul and reduces South America to an ALCA under the control of the DEA.

What can Brazil do? This is clearly a question of the highest strategic relevance and urgency which the Brazilian government needs to place immediately on its agenda of priorities. In addition to the complex studies and discussions the matter requires, I believe it is possible first of all to formulate two proposals. The first concerns the policies Brazil must adopt in the face of the situation that the production and distribution of drugs involves at present the commission of serious crimes. The second concerns the evident impotence shown up to now - and which everything indicates will continue to be shown - of all the actions to fight against the production and distribution of drugs.

In the face of the seriousness of drug trafficking in countries like Colombia and Paraguay and the subsequent American intervention, it is up to Brazil, as a friendly neighboring country, to participate in efforts to support the governments of those countries and persuade Argentina and Uruguay, both members of Mercosul, and Chile, a near-member, to take part as well. These

countries would thus join American efforts in supporting the anti-drug activities of the Colombian and Paraguayan governments and at the same time give the USA the advantage on the world stage of not appearing to be narcoimperialist.

As well as making an effective and serious contribution to the governments of Colombia and Paraguay in combating drugs, Brazil should look for support in South America, Europe and the rest of the world, including the United States itself, to persuade the United Nations to promote wide-ranging scientific international discussion to analyze the question of drug trafficking and look for empirical elements to illustrate that the social ills arising from the decriminalization of drugs would be greater or lesser than those coming from the current attempts to control drug traffic by policing. Two excellent articles published some years ago by *The Economist* made a convincing case for the idea that criminalizing drugs, as in the case of Prohibition in the past, produces much worse effects than those arising out of legalizing them. We must urgently discuss this matter scientifically at an international level.



8. Social Democracy and Governability (2000)

I. Social Democracy

a) Origin

In 1869 in Germany August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht founded a party supporting the ideas of Karl Marx. In 1875, this party merged with the General German Workers' Union, which came to be called the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei-SPD) in the socialled "Gotha Program" that incorporated the ideas of Lassalle. This program was energetically attacked by Marx in a letter to Brake on May 5th, 1875 in a text that has come to be known as the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. At the Congress of Erfurt in 1881 the party reformulated its doctrine to remove the elements inspired by Lassalle and return to orthodox Marxism.

In 1889, Eduard Bernstein published *Premises of Socialism* which maintained that Marx's revolutionary proposals were baseless and unviable. Everything that Marx desires, that is, the socialization of the means of production and installation of a system of social justice to protect the poor and do away with capitalist alienation, can be obtained by parliamentary means through the use of the political and legal instruments of democracy by the proletarian majority in society.

Bernstein's ideas were violently attacked by Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg and the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, the SPD. When the latter suffered a great reversal in the 1907 elections, the SPD leadership realized that the workers had rejected the party's revolutionary ideas and were forced, even though not formally recognizing it, to adopt Bernstein's ideas. In doing so, they achieved a great victory in the 1912 elections.

The subsequent course of events, before and after the First World War, did not favor sufficient growth of the SPD in the face of the emergence and rapid expansion of Nazism and of the fact that German socialism was divided between the SPD's social democracy and the Communism of the Third International, the intransigent adversary of the former which preferred to indirectly favor Nazism than allow the SPD to succeed.

After the many vicissitudes Germany went through, Kurt Schumacher succeeded in reorganizing the SPD in 1945.

The 1959 Bad-Godesburg Conference was a decisive moment in the history of the SPD, when it renounced Marxism as the party's official doctrine and wholeheartedly adopted Bernstein's ideas in an updated form. It stated its aim as being the installation of a market-oriented social democracy.

Social Democratic ideas took their own course in Great Britain following the foundation in 1889 of the Fabian Society by Bernard Shaw, Sidney Webb, joined later by the latter's wife Beatrice, Annie Besant and others. In 1893, Keir Hardy and Ramsay MacDonald founded the Independent Labor Party, which in 1900 renamed itself the Labor Party. In 1924 and from 1929-31 there were brief periods in which MacDonald was Prime Minister. The Labor Party, however, only became a major party after the Second World War, when Clement Attlee was elected Prime Minister in 1945. The party has been in power at various times and has returned to power under Tony Blair.

Social Democratic parties have become standard in all European countries since the Second World War and are presently in power in Germany and France. It is worth pointing out the Roosevelt experiment of the New Deal in the United States in the 1930s and in South America, that of José Battle y Ordóñez in Uruguay from 1911-15.

b) Success and Problems

The Social Democratic experiment led to the setting up of the welfare state in Europe after the Second World War and a reduced version of it in the United States and Latin America.

Advantages: social order, workers guaranteed reasonable conditions, the protection of the underprivileged, the institution of reasonable conditions for all citizens, social security, medical and hospital care, education, mass housing and other social benefits.

Problems: Internal and External

Internal: excessive power obtained by unions to the detriment of public power and collective interests (continual strikes in public services) excessive taxation of the productive system. These results provoked conservative reactions - Thatcher, Reagan, etc.

External: loss of international competitiveness compared to countries with low social expenditure. The welfare state in crisis in Europe and forced to cut benefits.

II. The Case of Brazil

a) Origins

Without the disadvantage of previous isolated measures, Getúlio Vargas began a systematic attempt to introduce Social Democracy in the Estado Novo (New State)¹ between 1937 and 1945, and to a greater extent, and within a democratic regime, in the Second Vargas Government (1950-1954).

Vargas' PTB represented an attempt to set up a Social Democratic party that would link up with the State through the Ministry of Labor. This phase, however, was notable for the dependence of the unions on the government.

After the period of military authoritarianism, a formally Social Democratic party was formed, the PSDB.

Leonel Brizola, former leader of the PTB, having lost the mandate of that party, founded the PDT and claimed his party was Social Democratic and had it registered in the Socialist International ahead of the PSDB. The PDT today only represents a personalized form of populism.

¹ Between 1937 and 1945, Getúlio Vargas instituted the Estado Novo (New State) modeled on European Fascism. (Translator's note)

On the other hand, another socially inspired party, the PT, is consistent in its aims but preserves the aggressive characteristics of the pre-Social Democrat workers' socialism.

b) The PSDB

Founded after their secession from the PMDB (the anti-Quercia movement) by a senior group of leaders from the latter, it was originally significant for containing quite varied tendencies: a genuinely Social Democratic selection (Cardoso, Richa, Pimenta), a Christian Democratic section (Montoro) and a crypto-PT section (Sigmaringa).

It succeeded in mobilizing a significant number of votes in the attempt to elect Mario Covas President of the Republic, but he lost to Collor and Lula, with the final victory going to Collor. However, the PSDB still maintains its internal doctrinal ambiguity.

In the succession to Itamar Franco, Collor's Vice President, who had taken over the presidency after the latter's impeachment, the PSDB, in coalition with the PFL and other forces, elected Fernando Henrique Cardoso with an absolute majority for the period 1995-98 and re-elected him for 1999-2002.

c) The Cardoso Government

The Cardoso Government, after a reelection in which it won an absolute majority of votes in the first round, suffered a huge loss of popularity after the devaluation of the *real* in January, 1999, sinking to levels of popular approval of less than 30% in various public opinion surveys.

An objective analysis of the Cardoso government's loss of popularity leads to the conclusion that it was due to the conjunction of various factors, among which three in particular stand out: (1) a negative view of the government; (2) a rapid accumulation of old complaints that demanded an immediate and impossible solution and (3) too narrow a margin of governability available.

d) The Negative Image

The negative image of the Cardoso government is due to several factors. It is worth mentioning three of these as being particularly relevant. The first

concerns the fact that there is quite a considerable gap between the exceptional competence and qualifications of the President of the Republic and those of his ministers. To a great extent this gap is a result of the fact that most ministers are chosen by the President in return for the parliamentary support they promise to bring to the Government, apart from any other considerations. The second important factor concerning the weak public image of the government arose out of the reluctance on the part of the President to assert his authority firmly, together with the government's almost total lack of ability to spread the news of the positive aspects of its administration. The third factor that conspired against the government's image arose out of the previously mentioned lack of governability.

e) Explosions of Complaints

The second aspect referred to above, the sudden explosion of complaints accumulated during the course of Brazilian history, arose out of the fact that the advances in democracy being achieved by the country and the extreme liberality of the Cardoso Government, opened the way for a wide variety of complaints that had built up over the course of time to suddenly appear in an explosive manner. Typical of this situation is the fact that the claim of the Movimento dos Sem Terra (Landless People's Movement – trans.) took on an openly revolutionary aspect that aimed to bring about an insane form of rural socialism while allegedly calling for the implementation of agrarian reform just when the Cardoso Government had carried out the largest agrarian reform in Brazilian history with the appropriation of lands three times the size of Belgium and placing more than 300,000 families on them.

f) Lack of Governability

The lack of governability constitutes is the single most serious problem Brazil faces at the moment. This lack of governability also arises out of various factors, many of them institutional, others caused by insufficient levels of education and income on the part of huge sections of the Brazilian people and yet others being produced by the terrible pressures caused by the huge and recurring deficits in our balance of payments.

I had the opportunity, at a lecture given at the Escola Superior de Guerra (Higher War College - trans.) on 4th May, 1999 to discuss the institutional

aspects of the lack of governability Brazil suffers from and for this purpose I refer to the text, which is in the possession of the College.

I have only broadly mentioned, in this brief allusion, how the precarious nature of governability in Brazil arises out of the dangerous gap separating the political citizenship every Brazilian citizen enjoys, from the minimum levels of education and standard of living needed, sociologically speaking, for citizens to consistently exercise their political citizenship.

The third factor that is a powerful brake on our governability comes from the enormous international pressure we are subjected to concerning the large and continued deficits in our balance of payments. Obviously other circumstances contribute to this pressure, particularly the deficiencies in our system and the profound imbalances in the INSS (the Brazilian social security system – trans.). Nevertheless, balance of payments deficits in the order of US\$30-40 billion per year force the Brazilian government into a policy that has its hands completely tied by the need to attract every year foreign capital to meet these deficits. This causes countless consequences, among them policies of high interest rates to attract overseas capital and using about 40% of the Union's tax receipts to pay interest. In these conditions the government can do nothing more at the moment than administer external and internal debts. In this situation, although the public sector is earning significant income, amounting to about 30% of GDP, there are almost no minimally sufficient resources left over to carry out a large-scale program of integrated national development.

III. Final Considerations

A Social Democratic plan in the modern world needs a policy combining measures to ensure a satisfactory level of international economic competition with measures aimed at guaranteeing the highest level of attention given to the country's social needs and that are compatible with the aforementioned requirement regarding adequate international competitiveness.

Implementing a policy with the characteristics mentioned above becomes particularly difficult in the present advanced stage of the process of globalization. At this present stage, the requirements of international competitiveness are extremely demanding. To meet them without damaging a desirable social policy, it is necessary to have a modern productive system with sufficient international support to resist unacceptable outside pressures.

In the case of Brazil, this international support can be achieved by consolidating Mercosul. The modernization of our production system, however, is something that, generally speaking depends on a marked rise in our level of governability.

In the light of what has been explained, we may see how the question of carrying out a social-democratic project in the situation that currently exists in Brazil is much less a question of an ideological choice than one of operational viability. There is no lack of commitment to a social-democratic plan in Brazil in general, nor within the Cardoso Government in particular. The fact that the latter, in spite of its undeniable social-democratic commitment, has acquired in the minds of the people the reputation of being neoliberal, arises from precisely the problems resulting in a general way from the great and continuous balance of payments deficits.

The criticisms being leveled at the Government in terms of its being neoliberal are totally baseless from the point of view of what it is possible to achieve in the country's present position.

This is not a question of the social-democratic intentions of the Government and of the majority of the Brazilian people; it is a question of the conditions for making this plan viable. These conditions may be basically summarized as the need for a significant rise in the level of governability a country can enjoy and of overcoming the foreign strangulation coming from balance of payments deficits. We urgently need to adopt the institutional reforms that will bring back the country's governability. We need no less urgently to work out and put into practice a technically coherent and viable strategy to eliminate or minimize our balance of payments deficits and thus recover out decision-making autonomy in economic and financial affairs.



9. The 20th Century in the World and in Brazil (2002)

The Century in the World

The 20th century was an extraordinary period of socio-political experimentation and scientific and technological innovation. The First Great War of 1914-1918 was at the same time the last war of the 19th century – "Europe's Peloponnesian War" – the first of the 20th century, together with the Russian Revolution of 1917. The latter introduced a period of extraordinary socio-political experiments with Soviet Communism being followed by Italian Fascism, German Nazism, the Second World War and after it the great experiments of the Welfare State and finally the neoliberalism of the end of the century.

During the 20th century the scientific and technological world produced Einstein's physics of relativity, Max Plank's quantum physics, a new cosmology with Gamow, molecular biology, which became the cutting edge of science in the second half of the century and within this period, the remarkable development of the technology that applied the new science of the first half of the century, in the form of nuclear energy, cybernetics and space exploration.

In the field of the arts, the 20th century began with Impressionism, then it produced the Picasso's Cubism (1881-1973), Marrinetti's Modernism and Schemberg's Atonalism.

In general terms the Communist, Fascist and Nazi experiments ended in failure, serious failure in the case of the latter two. Nazism is one of the most shameful periods in human history, taking racist stupidity and state terrorism to extremes the like of which had not been seen since the Assyrians, with the difference that the most cultured society in Europe carried them out, using the most refined scientific and technological methods. Fascism, the first of the dictatorships of the right, was nationally a freedom-hating state bureaucracy and internationally a satellite of Nazism.

Soviet Communism is a much more complex case. Ideologically it consisted in a totalitarian distortion of Marx's social humanism. Trying to achieve a high level of social equality under Lenin by de-privatizing the means of production, it brought about general state control of society. Stalin's attempt to turn a backward agrarian society into a great industrial and military power by a sequence of three 5-year plans, came close to meeting its targets - and thus defeat Nazi Germany - by instituting an implacable and repressive totalitarianism that was characterized by an even more fantastic personality cult than that of Italian Fascism. In the long term, the fallacies inherent in its ideology, along with the limitations of totalitarianism and its system of production, led to the collapse of Soviet Communism.

Seen from the point of view of Marxist ideology - although betraying its basic social humanism - Soviet Communism became a lay religion which attracted enthusiastic followers practically all over the world and inspired the ideals of a whole generation of intellectuals and artists. In its name, Mao Zedong carried out the great Chinese revolution and built a regime which, after senseless experiments like The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, was led by the exceptional statesman Deng Xiaoping to become in a neo-Confucian way an enlightened authoritarian party-based autocracy. After more than 20 years of GDP growth of about 10% per year, modern China still maintains growth rates in the order of 7%, and is becoming one of the great world powers. How long the regime will last, however, is open to question. Also in the name of Communism, Fidel Castro has succeeded, within a zone of undoubted American domination, in building an independent and autonomous society despite it being politically a dictatorial and personalized regime which is economically ineffectual while socially successful and culturally creative, especially in medicine. Even more than China, it is an open question as to how long the Cuban regime were last and how capable it will be of adapting to the situation that will arise after Fidel Castro.

The most notable socio-political experiment of the 20th century was the welfare state, which was set up to a greater or lesser extent in Western European nations after the Second World War. The plan for a social welfare state arose, in the final analysis, from the fusion of Marxist social ideas with the market economy and the principles of political democracy. "The social market economy" was what the Germans called the sequence of reforms initiated by the Social-Democrat Party after the Bad-Godesberg Congress in 1956.

Social democracy has antecedents coming originally from Marx himself and more recently from the ideas of Eduard Bernstein and the book he published in 1899, *The Pre-requisites of Socialism*. Important contributions were made by the Fabian Society of Bernard Shaw and Sidney and Beatrice Webb and the *Fabian Essays* of 1889. There was also the "social thinking of the Church", promoted by Pope Leo XIII and social Catholic thinkers ranging from Von Kettler, the Bishop of Mainz to Fr. Fernando Bastos de Ávila, SJ.

The welfare state was very successful in Europe and arrived at a reasonable balance between capital and labor that led to a significant reduction of social inequality, especially in terms of pay scales, which were reduced to a difference no higher than 1 to 20 as well as conceding important social benefits funded by tax returns in the fields of health, education, mass housing and other areas.

In the final third of the 20th century, the welfare state faced growing problems, some internal, some external. The main ones were the abuse of union power working to the detriment of productivity and affecting the authority of parliamentary systems. Among external problems there was an increase in the economic difficulties felt by social democracies in the face of the extreme competitiveness of Japanese companies from the 1970s onwards and later, of the Americans.

The crisis of the welfare state inspired a reactionary movement from the Right, most notably those of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States, which led to an efficiency-seeking capitalism and the neoliberalism advocated by Hayek and the Chicago School.

Neoliberalism became the dominant way of thinking at the end of the 20th century and had a profound influence, on the basis of 'Washington Consensus', on economic thinking in Latin America, most markedly in Argentina and Chile and with wide repercussions in Brazil. Like Communism,

neoliberal ideology tended not to learn from experience. As its tax receipts fell, it claimed that the situation arose from insufficiently radical measures being taken. So countries in which it had been most radically adopted, like Argentina, which had been an exemplary disciple of Washington from Martinez de Hoz to Cavallo, were led into total disaster.

The 20th Century in Brazil

The changes that occurred in Brazil during the 20th century were relatively even greater than those seen in Europe and the United States. As might be supposed, the country felt the effects of dramatic events in the world. Its universities and scientific establishment absorbed the modern ideas of physics and biology and have shown themselves to be particularly fertile in social sciences. The new techniques in transport and communications introduced during the century were also adopted by Brazil, even though the gap between Brazilian technology and the most up-to-date technology remained the same, if not worse, especially in regard to the USA.

In the same way, intellectual and artistic movements from Europe influenced Brazil, with the Week of Modern Art in 1929, the poetry of Manoel Bandeira and Augusto Federico Schmidt, the music of Villa Lobos and Santoro, the painting of Portinari and Di Cavalcanti, the architecture of Niemayer and Sergio Bernardes, the sociology of Guerreiro Ramos and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the cultural philosophy of Miguel Reale, the existentialist philosophy of Vicente Ferreira da Silva, and the Neo-Hegelian Christian philosophy of Fr Henrique Vaz.

In the socio-political field, the great movements of the century had their counterparts in Brazil with Luiz Carlos Prestes' Communist Party, Fascism, especially in its Salazarist version with Plínio Salgado's Integralism and the welfare state with the initiatives of Getúlio Vargas, some of them instituted during the Estado Novo period and many others in his second government. The Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), founded by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Mário Covas, Franco Montoro, José Richa and others, was also an attempt to lead the country towards a Social Democratic regime.

The main changes that occurred in Brazil during the 20th century happened above all in the demographic and socio-economic and dimensions. From a population of around 17 million at the beginning of the century, Brazil entered the 21st century with a population of about 170 million. From being an agrarian

society until the mid-1960s, Brazil became an increasingly industrial society. The population, previously concentrated in the countryside, had become 75% urbanized by the end of the century. A society of notables led by an oligarchic democracy in the Old Republic became a middle-class democracy after the 1946 Constitution and a mass democracy after the collapse of the military government.

These changes on the political and institutional level occurred during the period of the Old Republic, from 1900 to 1930, the first Vargas period, from 1930 to 1937, the Estado Novo, from 1937 to 1945, the restoration of democracy, from 1945 to 1964, the military regime from 1964 to 1985 and the New Republic from that time to today.

To put it most succinctly, we may say that the Old Republic, inheriting from the Empire a democracy of notables that was moving towards democratic parliamentarism, instituted along the São Paulo-Minas Gerais axis, an oligarchic democracy based on a landowning-merchant system. A rather authoritarian regime developed which validated itself in the system of reciprocal support from state and federal power blocs, perpetuated by elections characterized by electoral fraud and subject to the recognition by those elected of the power divisions in Congress.

The regime of the Old Republic ran into a crisis in the 1920s which led to the 1930 Revolution. The urban middle class, totally excluded from the political process, formed a growing opposition to the regime and was joined by the younger elements of the military. The self-sustaining and self-validating political system of the Old Republic could only be overcome by revolution, the Revolution of 1930.

The broad picture of the first phase of Brazil's socio-political development from 1930 until today was that of the conversion of a society of notables into a middle-class society after the 1930 Revolution, passing through the authoritarian period of the Estado Novo, which consolidated the dominance of the middle class, and progressing to a middle-class democracy with the 1946 Constitution. In a second phase, corresponding to the advance of industrialization in Brazil, a middle-class society gradually turned into a mass society. Between 1964 and 1988, the military regime attempted, by authoritarian measures, to halt this process and maintain the dominance of the middle class. Social processes, however, have their own dynamic and cannot be obstructed by mere political will. The massification of Brazilian society continued beneath the militaristic shell and came to life with the collapse of the

regime, leading the country, with the Constitution of 1988, to become a mass democracy. This mass democracy was consolidated under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and will proceed towards a decisive moment from 2003 to 2006.

In the democracy of notables of the Second Reign and the Old Republic, Brazil achieved a satisfactory control of its needs and interests seen from the point of view of the time and of the ruling class. Even more successful, from the same point of view, was the middle-class democracy from 1946 until its final crisis in the 1960s. Mass democracy has successfully been consolidated with Cardoso but still cannot satisfy the two basic requirements for its sustainability. In terms of society, it has not been capable of bringing the poorest and least educated people in the country, about 30% of the population, into a state of full citizenship. In terms of the State, it has not been able to maintain a sufficiently representative and efficient political system. In addition, partly as a result of the low level of governability in the country, there is the financial crisis in terms of foreign and national currencies, which marked the transition from the last century to the present one. Brazil's historical achievements will be significantly affected by the measure in which, during the 2003-2006 mandate, it can achieve a satisfactory solution to the problems of reaching universal citizenship and raising levels of political representation and governability of the State.

10. Fundamentalism, Unilateralism and Historical Alternatives in the World (2003)

I. Introduction

The international terrorism which at the moment is described mainly, if not almost exclusively, as 'Islamic terrorism', is intimately related to religious fundamentalism. This fundamentalism, for its part, notwithstanding its purely religious dimension, goes far beyond this, showing its deep-seated links with questions such as underdevelopment, the existence of large sectors of humanity affected by profound poverty and total lack of education, and of communities submitted to intolerable forms of oppression and humiliation, such as that of Palestine.

In spite of this, the Bush government, reacting to the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, insists on considering terrorism to be a united conspiracy against the values of the United States undertaken by fanatical groups explicitly or implicitly supported by "rogue states", to control which the USA must unilaterally and militarily, and according to its own criteria, adopt preventive measures to exterminate the operational bases of this terrorism.

Terrorism is in fact a recurring historical phenomenon which was found in the form of state terrorism in the Eastern world of antiquity in Assyria, and appeared in the 19th century in the guise of anarcho-Marxism and was once more implemented as state terrorism by Stalin and Hitler, finally assuming today the characteristics it has in the Middle East. This question is part of a much broader problem which, on the one hand, certainly has something in common with the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism and with certain characteristics of the Bush government. On the other hand, it is linked to a much more complex problem concerning the difficulties Islamic culture has in modernizing itself and is intimately related, as mentioned previously, to the problems of underdevelopment in certain communities and the subjection of the latter to oppressive and humiliating forms of domination by other groups.

In the brief study that follows we shall seek to place Islamic terrorism and its fundamentalist roots within a wider perspective that takes into account, within its many aspects, some of the questions mentioned above, as well as the historical alternatives that are appearing at the beginning of this new century.

II. Fundamentalism

Religious fundamentalism, as Toynbee showed, is mainly a conservative attitude adopted in the face of modernization that leads to the radicalization of traditional beliefs. In his *Study of History*² Toynbee describes the reactions a traditional community feels when faced with the processes of modernization developed by another more dynamic community, as a dichotomy between herodianism and zealotism. Herodianism tries to save its culture by incorporating strategic elements from the dominant culture. Zealotism looks for a solution in fundamentalism, in the radicalization of its traditional beliefs.

Reducing the question of fundamentalism to its most typical examples, we may point out the cases of Christian fundamentalism that appeared mainly among certain Protestant groups in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries, or in the United States in 19th-century millenniarist movements the remains of which are with us today, and Islamic fundamentalism, which arises mainly from the failure of efforts to modernize the Islamic world.

The roots of American fundamentalism are found in the millenniarist movement of the 1830s and 40s. An important moment for this movement was the Niagara Bible Conference organized by James Inglis, a Baptist minister from New York. Although this movement was a minority one even within the Baptist Church, its repercussions are with us today and seen in the 'bornagain' group that has had so much influence on President George W. Bush.

² Cf. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. VIII, p. 610, Oxford University Press, London, 1954.

Protestant millenniarism is a reaction against the modernization of the ideas and way of life that has occurred in United States since the 19th century and is seen as violating biblical laws that the millenniarists feel should be observed to the letter. Thus, in their more radical manifestations, millenniarists reject the Darwinian theory of evolution and insist on accepting biblical Creationism. American millenniarism has never achieved wide acceptance socially or historically. What does, however, make it worthy of note is the fact that many of its beliefs and attitudes, especially in the missionary idea of the "crusade for good" have influenced President Bush and several of his closest aides.

Islamic fundamentalism is very different and much more relevant. Although it leads to radical and literal forms of interpreting Islamic principles, its origin, whatever its religious roots – as pointed out by contemporary fundamentalists such as Mawlana Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) - is not principally found in the realm of theology but rather in the military and political spheres. Reducing a complicated question to its basic elements, we can say that Islamic fundamentalism, regardless of its purely religious dimensions and aspects, arose in the 19th century, with repercussions lasting until today, from the unsuccessful experiments of *tanzimat*, modernizing reforms undertaken in the Islamic world from the time when Mahmut II (1808-1839) was responding to the conquest of Egypt by Napoleon.

Since the end of the 18th century, encounters between Islamic and western civilizations have been marked by successive defeats of the forces of Islam then led by the Ottoman Empire. Political leaders and Islamic intellectuals became increasingly aware of the fact that these defeats arose out of the clear technical superiority of the West and, behind that, of the mastery of modern science by the West. Successive Islamic leaders such as the already mentioned Mahmut II, Abdul Majid (1839-1861), Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), with the Young Ottomans and Mehmet V (1909-1918) and the Young Turks tried, by means of *tanzimat*, to absorb Western science and techniques at the same time as they struggled to maintain their religious beliefs and values. These efforts were supported by Islamic intellectuals such as Jamal al din al-Afghani (1839-1897) Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and later Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), with the journal al-Manar (The Lighthouse). None of these efforts, however, was capable of halting the continual defeats of Islam by Western forces. Thus it was that Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), after being an active supporter of tanzimat, renounced it, suspended the modernizing constitution of 1876 and banished the Young Ottomans. The army forced a return to the 1876 Constitution but Abdul Hamid II was deposed in 1909 by the Young Turks, who handed the throne to Mehmet V (1909-1918). The alignment of the Ottoman Empire with Germany and its defeat in the First World War initiated a period of crisis within which arose the figure of Mustapha Kemal (1881-1938) who proclaimed the Turkish Republic in 1923 and went on to impose the most radical westernization on the Turkish society and State.

At the centre of the question is the difficulty for Islam to differentiate within society between its social, cultural, economic and political subsystems. Islam is an all-embracing belief that leads to the concept of *Ummah*, the community of believers, of which Medina was the first. In *Ummah* the civil, economic and political systems are indissolubly united under the supremacy of religion. This was the difference in subsystems that became possible in the West, after the mutually neutralizing conflicts between the papacy and the Empire that deprived both of the opportunity to control society, and in turn allowed the separation of Church and State.

Various factors prevented *tanzimat* from being successful. The main one, however, was the fact that, in the attempt to bring together the religious beliefs of Islam and western science and techniques, the Islamic modernizers, because of the concept of *Ummah*, insisted on keeping education under religious control in the belief that scientific and technological training could be added on to traditional education, with understandably unsatisfactory results. It was on the basis of this finding that Mustapha Kemal came to understand that the modernization of Turkey could only be brought about by means of its complete westernization, with state, society and education removed from the control of religion and introducing into Turkey a clear distinction between the subsystems of society.

Mustapha Kemal's solution had considerable success in urban Turkey, but met stubborn resistance in rural areas and was not taken up in its entirety by any other Islamic society. Moderate forms of Islam rule in many Islamic countries in North Africa, Indonesia and, in the face of popular resistance, in General Pervez Musharraf's Pakistan. Algeria has been subject to a long and bloody conflict between the westernizing form of Islam advocated by the government and military, and the opposition of fundamentalists in their rural fastnesses. In other places, such as Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Palestine, fundamentalist movements have made their presence felt.

The situation of the Palestinian people has today become a central question related to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. The spiral of anti-Israel violence among Palestinian fundamentalists, who ignore the anti-terrorist urgings of the moderates, and the Sharon government which retaliates with state terrorism, thus giving indefinite continuity to this spiral of violence, keeps the region in a permanent state of conflict. The unconditional support given to Sharon by the Bush administration makes the USA particularly responsible, in the eyes of the Islamic world, for the calamitous situation in Palestine and in retaliation arouses the anti-American terrorist movement of Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East and also in other regions such as Pakistan and Indonesia.

It was in this context that the Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden was led to renounce the comforts his family situation afforded him to make the ascetic choice of the life of a terrorist, planning among other initiatives the attacks of 11th September, 2001. In contrast to a character like Saddam Hussein, who ruled Iraq tyrannically and confronted the USA but, faced with his (predictably inevitable) military defeat, chose to flee and was eventually captured in wretched conditions in his hideout, bin Laden, whose ascetic life allows him to live among the nomadic tribes of the frontiers of Afghanistan, continues to defy the United States, even though his operational capacity as a terrorist has obviously become restricted.

III. Unilateralism

Having become the only superpower after the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, the USA of Bush Sr and Clinton tried to make its new situation compatible with moderate international conduct within the norms of the United Nations while trying to maintain multilateral agreements with the international community, principally the EU and its members.

When he took over the presidency of the USA after controversial elections, George W. Bush, going against expectations that he would try to run a moderate government to reduce the internal divisions exacerbated by the doubts about his election, chose instead the path of radical conservatism and surrounded himself with a group of aides from the extreme Right, with the exception of his Secretary of State, Colin Powell.

The ideologues who make up Bush's intimate circle come from two groups: the religious conservatives or 'theocons' with millenarist tendencies and the

neo-Conservatives ('neocons') who favor an unrestricted affirmation of the American Empire. In addition to Bush himself, the first group consists, among others, of Attorney General Ashcroft, like the President a born-again Christian. The second group consists of right-wing radicals one of whose leaders, Robert Kagan, says the USA has to be the agency responsible for world order instead of the United Nations. Paul Wolfowitz, Under-Secretary of Defense and another of the intellectual leaders of the group, has been advocating since 1988 his "Plan for the New American Century" - a document he drew up probably with the help of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld - a role of clear world leadership assumed by the USA. This group also contains among its high-profile members, Vice President Dick Cheney, Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, William Kristol and Richard Perle. This group has for a long time aspired to take control of American politics, especially in the military-diplomatic area, in order to direct it according to its ideology.

During the Clinton presidency the group took refuge in the American Enterprise Institute a centre of ultraconservative ideology.

The election of Bush gave them the chance to assume the controlling positions they desired and to proceed to join the theocons with the neocons.

In the view of these ideologues the USA represents the essence of the West, a role it has taken over from an exhausted, agnostic and self-indulgent Europe. The mission of the USA is to universalize its Christian democratic values that originated in the West and set up a world order representing them, to this end openly adopting, unilaterally when convenient, the measures appropriate to achieve that objective. These measures include unilateral American military interventions where and when they may be necessary, not excluding the use of nuclear weapons. The new national security doctrine "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" announced in September, 2002 includes new sections dealing with various aspects of the question and basically maintaining the legitimacy of preventive unilateral military interventions aimed at preventing the US being attacked directly or through rogue states conniving with international terrorism.

The basis of this ideology is the double premise that the USA, on the one hand, because of its values and practices, is a "good nation" since there is a natural convergence between what is good for the USA and what is good for the world. On the other hand, there is the fact that, as well as having the most advanced economic and technological system in the world, its own individual military power is significantly superior to that of any other country or group of

countries. In this situation the USA has become a *de facto* world empire and *de jure* must exercise the functions arising from that situation.

The actions of the Bush government concerning the "axis of evil", in spite of the rhetoric that unites its alleged members under the same accusations, in practice, differentiated according to the vulnerability and the retaliatory capacity of each of them. It is this context that provided the basis for President Bush to take the decision to attack Iraq, spuriously presented as possessing terrible weapons of mass destruction - a decision effectively taken after September, 2002, as Bob Woodward states in an article published in *El País* under the title "Como se decidió la guerra" (30/3/03)³ - but only implemented on 21st March, 2003 in order to attempt, at the insistence of Colin Powell, to obtain the approval of the Security Council of the United Nations, an approval which was nevertheless formally denied. In contrast to the demonized Iraq of Saddam Hussein which was in fact extremely vulnerable and defenseless, Iran represents a more consolidated power and North Korea has a significant power of retaliation. These different situations account for the different American behavior in relation to each of them.

The Bush government's unilateralism is, on the one hand, turning out to be inefficient in terms of end results, as is shown by the continuity and even increase in acts of terrorism, and on the other hand creating an unsustainable impasse in the world. The inefficiency of this unilateralism in terms of end results arises from the fact that international terrorism, as previously pointed out, is not simply the result of a set of circumstances that can be eradicated by the military destruction of the bases that spread its ideology and the extermination of its fighters. Clearly, the international level this terrorism has achieved makes the military destruction of all its 'centers' practically impossible, much more so the extermination of terror groups that are being continually renewed. On the other hand, the fight against terrorism requires essentially the suppression of the factors and conditions that nourish them, without setting aside the necessary policing and military measures. The main elements among those is the existence of large numbers of human beings living in intolerable conditions of poverty, ignorance and humiliating oppression as well as lacking any chance of a better life. Terrorism is the product, although not exclusively, of the remarkable imbalances existing in the world and, especially, as pointed

³Cf. Luciano Martins, "O Fundamentalismo de Bush e a Ordem Mundial", p. 37, in *Política Externa*, Vol. 12, No 1, June, July, August, 2003.

out above, of the difficulties Islamic culture is facing in the process of modernization. In this sense, the position of the current president of Iran, Muhammad Khatami is particularly relevant as he is emphasizing the double imperative of a "dialogue between cultures" and that of bringing about an "Islamic democracy" via the moderate currents within Islam. Equally relevant is the statement by Mme. Suzanne Mubarak in her splendid speech at the inauguration of the New Library of Alexandria (3/5/2003) in which she pointed out how vital intercultural dialogue is.

More than any other country in the world, the United States has the ability to coordinate a great and decisive effort to eradicate poverty from the world in cooperation with the United Nations and working closely with the European Union. This would involve, and this is the essential task of the 21st century, bringing to a successful conclusion the absolutely necessary war being waged against the exclusion of a large part of humanity from minimally satisfactory living conditions. It is a war which, in economic terms, will require far fewer resources than those being spent today on arms. And it represents the only possible answer to the North-South dichotomy. But to achieve this, in contrast to the unilateralism of Bush and his ideologues, the USA needs to draw closer to other states and discuss the problems it has to confront.

On the other hand, this same unilateralism has placed the world in an untenable situation: the superpower which has the greatest power in the world is acting illegitimately and the centre of international legitimacy, the United Nations is powerless. The illegitimacy of power and the impotence of legitimacy are incompatible situations within a civilized world order. Among other things, civilization consists of a system and a process of ensuring the legitimacy of power and the power of legitimacy.

IV. Alternatives

Given the situation described above, the world is faced with alternatives of the greatest historical significance. In the short term, the alternative available arises from the fact that the conflict between power and legitimacy produced by the Bush government's unilateralism cannot continue and will necessarily have to be resolved in a relatively short time. Either the USA, as the single superpower, returns to international legitimacy by conforming to the precepts of International Law and the norms of the United Nations, or the latter will lose influence and the world, with the relative exception of certain countries,

will become a province of the American Empire. This question will depend to a great extent on the American people themselves. If Bush is re-elected, the Imperial option of the neocons will be reinforced. If a Democratic candidate is elected there will probably be a return to the regime adopted by Clinton, aimed at matching American supremacy, especially in the military area, to a more moderate pattern of international behavior which will work within the sphere of International Law and the norms of the United Nations.

We should point out in this context that the 'American Empire', in contrast to traditional empires such as that of Rome or Great Britain, does impose formal domination of the 'provinces' by the central imperial power through a proconsul or viceroy. It is something closer to the idea of a 'field' in the sense of a field of gravity or a magnetic field. It consists of a system of an extremely powerful financial, economic, technological, political and, when necessary, military system of pressures by which the rulers of the 'provinces' can maintain the formal aspects of independence and sovereignty but are forced by the combination of the power of the multinationals dominating their economies and pressure from Washington to deal appropriately with demands coming from these two sources.

In the long term, the world is facing three kinds of dilemmas: (1) that relating to the world order between, on the one hand, the universalization and consolidation of American power and, on the other, the formation during the first half of this century, of a new multipolar regime; (2) that relating to the North-South imbalance and, at each extreme, that concerning the included and the excluded and (3) that relating to the technology-humanism dichotomy.

In terms of the first dilemma, the absolute supremacy of American military power supported by an extremely powerful economic and technological system, gives the USA the opportunity to universalize and in the long term consolidate an unmatched global power. In this case, every country in the world will become *de facto* a province of this very special American Empire and will also become part of an international market controlled by the big multinationals - which are American by origin or orientation - and subject to the *Pax Americana* under the orders of Washington. Alternatively, countries which currently already enjoy a reasonable level of autonomy, such as China, India and Russia, will be able, if they follow their current rates of progress, to reach a level of equal power with the United States by the middle of the century, that will turn them into independent power centers, thus creating a multipolar system on an international level. And we should note in this context

the possibility of a country like Brazil, if the Mercosul group establishes itself in a stable manner, along with the recently constituted South American free-trade area, appearing by the middle of the century as another system possessing, if not militarily at least economically and politically, a high level of international autonomy.

The second kind of dilemma facing the world concerns the profound economic and social imbalance between the North and South and at each extreme, especially in the South, between rich and poor. If current trends continue, this imbalance will become worse. On the other hand, the imbalance is already showing signs of instability and of the long-term impossibility of the world or any country maintaining islands of affluence surrounded by oceans of misery. The analogy with Imperial Rome, which is always so rich in connotations, once again comes to mind. Rome was successful to the extent that, in its expansion, up to the time of Trajan (Emperor from 98-117 AD) it succeeded in incorporating peoples from the periphery into its civilization. When expansion stopped, after Hadrian (Emperor from 117-138 AD), Rome was finally swamped by non-incorporated peripheral peoples. Something of the same kind may already be seen in terms of the pressures of migration on Europe and the USA coming from the underdeveloped areas of the world.

The third kind of dilemma confronting modern civilization concerns the disjunction between technology and humanism. The extraordinary scientific surge of the first half of the 20th century created, during the rest of the century and increasingly so today, a no less extraordinary technological revolution, especially in the USA. This revolution is tending to shape a robotic world, both literally and above all, in the robotization of man, who is being turned into a de-personalized part of an automated system of production and distribution which is operated at the lowest and highest levels by shift workers who thus become disposable parts of the system. Nevertheless, sufficient remnants of humanism survive, especially among the peoples of Latin and notably Germanic origin⁴. To what extent can humanism come to terms with the growing and inevitable submission of the world to technology? It is becoming clear at the moment that the humanist remnants of the world will not survive and will not, without losing their

⁴It should be noted that Hitler's anti-humanism was a brutal break with the German humanist tradition from Goethe and Beethoven, to Karl Jaspers and the social-democratic philosophy of Willy Brandt.

humanist values, achieve a sufficiently competitive technological level. It is becoming equally clear that the submission of the world to technology will make man a disposable part of the productive system, with no identity of his own, if he cannot succeed in creating a suitable synthesis between humanism and technology. Faced with the three kinds of alternatives mentioned above, we must recognize, in terms of the first, the possibility of the present American unipolarity being replaced by new multipolarity by the middle of the century. This result will come about if China can maintain, although with the inevitable future fall in its current rates of economic progress, the extraordinary development it has displayed since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping (in power from 1978 until his death in 1996). A similar situation applies in India. Russia, on the other hand, is experiencing a significant resurgence under Vladimir Putin and, if it can continue in this way, will regain the situation of superpower the Soviet Union enjoyed. An important study undertaken by the Goldman Sachs group (Paper No. 99, 1/10/2003, by Dominic Wilson) shows comparative projections of growth in GDP in what is called the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group which are extremely interesting because they are based on very realistic estimates. According to these estimates, in 2040 the BRIC countries will overtake the combined GDP of the six richest countries in the world. China will overtake the USA in 2041. India will overtake Japan in 2032. Russia will overtake Germany in 2030 and Brazil will overtake it in 2040. In a comparative table below, three of the Goldman Sachs projections are reproduced.

Goldman Sachs

| Projected USSGDP | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|---------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| 2003\$US | BRICs | | | | G6 | | | | | | | | |
| on | Brazil | China | India | Russia | France | Germany | Italy | Japan | UK | US | BRICs | G6 | |
| 2000 | 762 | 1078 | 469 | 391 | 1,311 | 1,875 | 1,078 | 4,176 | 1,437 | 9,825 | 2.7 | 19.702 | |
| 2005 | 468 | 1724 | 604 | 534 | 1,489 | 2,011 | 1,236 | 4,427 | 1,688 | 11.697 | 3,33 | 22,548 | |
| 2010 | 668 | 2998 | 929 | 847 | 1,622 | 2,212 | 1,337 | 4,601 | 1,876 | 13,271 | 5,441 | 24,919 | |
| 2015 | 952 | 4754 | 1411 | 1232 | 1,767 | 2,386 | 1,447 | 4,858 | 2,089 | 14,786 | 8.349 | 27,332 | |
| 2020 | 1333 | 7070 | 2104 | 1741 | 1,93 | 2.524 | 1,553 | 5.221 | 2,285 | 16,415 | 12,248 | 29,928 | |
| 2025 | 1695 | 10213 | 3174 | 2264 | 2,095 | 2,604 | 1,625 | 5,567 | 2,456 | 18,34 | 17,345 | 32,687 | |
| 2030 | 2189 | 14312 | 4935 | 2980 | 2,267 | 2,697 | 1,671 | 5,81 | 2,649 | 20.833 | 24,415 | 35,927 | |
| 2035 | 2871 | 19605 | 7854 | 3734 | 2,445 | 2,903 | 1,708 | 5.882 | 2,901 | 23,828 | 34,064 | 39,668 | |
| 2040 | 3740 | 26439 | 12367 | 4467 | 2,668 | 3,147 | 1,788 | 6,039 | 3,201 | 27,229 | 47,013 | 44,072 | |
| 2045 | 4794 | 34799 | 18847 | 5156 | 2,898 | 3,381 | 1,912 | 6,297 | 3,496 | 30,956 | 63,596 | 48,94 | |
| 2050 | 6074 | 44453 | 27803 | 5870 | 3,148 | 3,603 | 2,061 | 6,673 | 3,782 | 35,165 | 84,201 | 54,433 | |

GS BRICs Model Projections See text for details and assumptions

HELIO JAGUARIBE

| Projected USSGDP Per Capita | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|------------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| 2003 | | BR | ICs | | G6 | | | | | | |
| US\$ | Brazil | China | India | Russia | France | Germany | Italy | Japan | UK | US | |
| 2000 | 4,338 | 854 | 468 | 2,675 | 22,078 | 22,814 | 18,677 | 32,96 | 24,142 | 34,797 | |
| 2005 | 2,512 | 1,324 | 559 | 3,718 | 24,547 | 24,402 | 21,277 | 34,744 | 27,92 | 39,552 | |
| 2010 | 3,417 | 2,233 | 804 | 5,948 | 26,314 | 26,877 | 23,018 | 36,172 | 30,611 | 42,926 | |
| 2015 | 4,66 | 3,428 | 1,149 | 8,736 | 28.338 | 29,111 | 25,086 | 38,626 | 33,594 | 45,835 | |
| 2020 | 6,302 | 4,965 | 1,622 | 12,527 | 30,723 | 31 | 27,239 | 42,359 | 36,234 | 48,849 | |
| 2025 | 7,78 | 7,051 | 2,331 | 16,652 | 33,203 | 32,299 | 28,894 | 46,391 | 38,479 | 52,45 | |
| 2030 | 9,823 | 9,809 | 3,473 | 22,427 | 35,876 | 33,898 | 30,177 | 49,944 | 41,194 | 57,263 | |
| 2035 | 12,68 | 13,434 | 5,327 | 28,749 | 38,779 | 37,087 | 31,402 | 52,313 | 44,385 | 63,017 | |
| 2040 | 16,37 | 18,209 | 8,124 | 35,314 | 42,601 | 40,966 | 33,583 | 55,721 | 49,658 | 69,431 | |
| 2045 | 20,92 | 24,192 | 12,046 | 42,081 | 46,795 | 44,94 | 36,859 | 60,454 | 54,386 | 76,228 | |
| 2050 | 26,5 | 31,357 | 17,366 | 49,646 | 51,594 | 48,952 | 40,901 | 66,805 | 59,122 | 83,71 | |

GS BRICs Model Projections See text for details and assumptions

| Projected US\$ GDP Per Capita Growth: 5-Year Averages | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|-------|------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|-------|-----|-----|--|--|
| Average | | BR | ICs | | G6 | | | | | | | |
| % yoy | Brazil | China | India | Russia | France | Germany | Italy | Japan | UK | US | | |
| 2000-2005 | -9,8 | 9,2 | 3,7 | 7 | 2,2 | 1,4 | 2,7 | 1,1 | 3 | 2,6 | | |
| 2005-2010 | 6,3 | 11,2 | 7,5 | 10,3 | 1,5 | 2 | 1,6 | 0,9 | 1,9 | 1,7 | | |
| 2010-1015 | 6,4 | 9,2 | 7,4 | 8,1 | 1,5 | 1,6 | 1,7 | 1,2 | 1,9 | 1,3 | | |
| 2015-2020 | 6,2 | 7,8 | 7,2 | 7,5 | 1,6 | 1,3 | 1,7 | 1,8 | 1,6 | 1,3 | | |
| 2020-2025 | 4,6 | 7,3 | 7,4 | 6,1 | 1,6 | 0,9 | 1,2 | 1,8 | 1,2 | 1,4 | | |
| 2025-2030 | 4,7 | 6,9 | 8,2 | 6,2 | 1,6 | 0,9 | 0,9 | 1,5 | 1,3 | 1,7 | | |
| 2030-2035 | 5,2 | 6,5 | 8,9 | 5,2 | 1,6 | 1,7 | 0,8 | 1 | 1,7 | 1,9 | | |
| 2035-2040 | 5,3 | 6,3 | 8,9 | 4,3 | 1,9 | 2 | 1,3 | 1,2 | 2 | 2 | | |
| 2040-2045 | 5 | 5,9 | 8,3 | 3,6 | 1,9 | 1,9 | 1,8 | 1,6 | 1,8 | 1,9 | | |
| 2045-2050 | 4,9 | 5,4 | 7,6 | 3,4 | 2 | 1,8 | 2,1 | 2 | 1,7 | 1,9 | | |

GS BRICs Model Projections See text for details and assumptions Global Paper No. 88, 1st October, 2003

The constitution of a new multipolar regime in the middle of the 21st century is a situation that carries the highest level of risk. As in the preceding American-Soviet bipolar period, a multipolar future, with major nuclear powers confronting each other, could lead to suicidal atomic conflict. This event has narrowly been avoided in the past during episodes such as the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba and some other critical moments. The extreme imbalance between technological power and equitable forms of rationalism in the modern world make it perfectly possible that humanity will finally destroy itself. We should not underestimate, on the other hand, the human instinct for survival, both individually and socially. We owe to this instinct the fact that the American-Soviet Cold War did not become a real one. This kind of conflict will tend to exist in the scenario of a possible future new multipolarity.

In the face of these considerations it is legitimate to suppose that a possible future multipolar system will lead, over a relatively long period, to a tense reciprocal military vigilance. Over an even longer period this reciprocal vigilance will tend to gradually turn into increasing forms of institutionalization that will lead, as Kant suggested, to a *Pax Universalis*.

We should recognize on the other hand that the alternative to a prolonged *Pax Americana* will also tend to lead in the long term to a *Pax Universalis*. The highly exploitative actions which will initially tend to characterize a possible future *Pax Americana* will tend to lead in the long-term, because of the inherent necessity for stable balance in this system, to a more egalitarian regime. This is what happened with the *Pax Romana* which initially looted the areas it conquered and then installed reasonably impartial forms of administration of the provinces under the system of *jus gentium* and the supervision of the *praetor peregrinus*. This was a process that culminated, with the Edict of Caracala in 212, in extending Roman citizenship to all provinces. Something similar occurred in the West with the increased inclusion of excluded classes that led to the post-Second World War welfare state.

The second great dichotomy the course of history is facing, that between North and South, and in each country between the affluent and the excluded, will tend in the long term, as has already happened with the European working class, to find a solution compatible with the systemic sustainability of the world and its various societies. The difficulty this dichotomy faces lies in the fact that the levels of consumption and well-being of currently developed countries are not, when we take into account the limitations of the planet, capable of being extended in material terms to the whole of humanity. The number of motor cars per inhabitant cannot in the future, in countries like China and India, approach the situation in the United States or even in Western Europe.

The *per capita* GDP projections made by Goldman Sachs shown above already show a considerable inequality between countries like China and India in 2050 compared to the United States and the Europeans. It is also clear that *per capita* indicators are a mathematical abstraction calculated by dividing global GDP by the number of people. This abstraction hides the great differences of real standards of living which will continue to exist among individuals in the relevant countries. In fact, the long-term requirements for systemic equilibrium between countries and in each country between its social classes will impose a significant relative reduction on the highest standards of living as a result of raising the lowest standards of living.

It is also important to take into account in terms of this great question of the North-South dichotomy and the gap between the affluent and the excluded in each country, that the long term, in the course of which as we have stated earlier, the demands of stable equilibrium in the world will tend to reduce current imbalances, will extend for a much longer period than the acceptability of the current social situation in the world. The international spread of terrorism and uncontrolled migratory movements will demand, as has been mentioned already, a much sooner end to this great war of our century which is the war against poverty and ignorance, by means of close cooperation with the United Nations on the part of the USA and other members of the G7.

To end this exercise in the long-term view, it is important to make a brief mention of the third great historical dichotomy mentioned previously, that of technology and humanism.

To simplify an extremely complex question, it may be seen that the broad and general application of technology to modern societies and individual life has led to increasingly automated systems in which, as we have seen, people at the highest and lowest levels of society become shiftworkers and as such disposable and able to be substituted by other shift workers. Humanism, on the other hand, forms a vision of the world and an individual and collective code of conduct based on the presupposition of the dignity of man and each individual as a human being, and seeks to preserve and increase it. Various historical versions of humanism - in our times characterized by the requirement for a profound social and environmental awareness - hold dignity and the search for human happiness as the ultimate aim. Technology, in contrast, although it emerges historically from the idea of improving human life and actually consists of a set of methods aimed in principle at achieving that objective, is carried forward by its inherent logic to increasing forms and levels of automation that turn it into an end in itself and, in the final analysis, into a supreme aim.

The conflict between technology and humanism that is implicit in its very origins, like the Stone Age arrow used for hunting and social domination, became more acute in the 20th century with its automated mechanisms and processes. It is interesting to see, in the modern Western world, the significant difference in this respect between the Anglo-Saxon peoples and the Latin and Germanic peoples. In this context the examples of the United States and Italy are illustrative. In those countries, 'know-how' is paramount, as are technical ability and a private life that concentrates on competing for the acquisition of

goods. In Italy, founded on a good basis of material conditions (GDP per capita of around US \$20,000) what we might call 'know-for' is paramount, that is, the tendency towards improving the quality of life. In the USA humanism is a specialty, an academic discipline. In Italy it is a way of life. Like Molière's M. Jourdain talking about prose, Italians are involved in the daily practice of humanism without realizing it.

Cultural evolution has led humanity to a situation in which technology has become a necessary condition for individual and collective survival. This same evolution, however, is leading towards the dehumanization of man unless there is a wide-ranging and effective restoration of humanism. This is a historically important contribution that the Latin and Germanic peoples, whose personal and collective life continues to be full of a significant dose of humanism, can give to the world. Latin America can play a relevant part in this because it is successfully increasing its technological capacity at the same time as preserving - and it is important that it preserves it ever more effectively - its humanistic legacy.



11. Decadence or Re-Emergence (2006)

Among other things, history consists of a sequence of periods. Periods which some countries take advantage of and which others miss. This happened with the period which began during the Renaissance with the Trade Revolution and the first move towards modernization, which Western European countries were able to use and which was missed by Eastern countries. The same thing happened with the Industrial Revolution which Latin America and once again, Eastern countries were not able to profit from.

Brazil is about to miss the period for aligning itself with the countries that are emerging today: China, India and South Korea. While China has been maintaining an extraordinary annual rate of economic growth of about 10% during the last 30 years, which has turned it from one of the most backward countries to the fifth economy in the world, ahead of that of France and Italy, India, a democracy with more than a billion inhabitants, has growth rates of about 6% and South Korea, from being further behind than Brazil, has now overtaken it. Brazil has been stagnant for the last 25 years with *trivial average growth rates of about 2%*. This stagnation remained under President Lula's first mandate. What can we think about the second presidential mandate which will begin in 2007?

Brazil in general, and its political class in particular, does not show any awareness of the terrible dilemma confronting the country: regaining the significant growth rates we enjoyed from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s

while we are still able to, or sinking into a process of decline leading to a prolonged period of decay.

The profile of the electoral process which is being drawn up has nothing to do with the country's urgent needs and requirements. What is happening is purely and simply a struggle for power. A power that Lula wants to keep in spite of having been unable to energize the national economy in his first mandate and proposing to recover it in a second one, and a power which the PSDB saw stolen in the 2002 elections and which it hopes to recover without any sign of having given up the sterilizing economic neoliberalism practiced by the Cardoso government, even though it denies it.

If the political process persists on its actual course we shall go through another four lost years, whoever wins. In this case, Brazil would miss the opportunities of first decade of the new century, making future recovery extremely difficult. In our case we are not talking only of an alarming loss of time in the race of history. We are talking of the fact that the most serious aspects of social deterioration, such as those resulting from huge and growing areas of marginality - with their related crime rates - surrounding main cities are leading the civilized centers of the country to shipwreck in the ocean of primitivism, ignorance and poverty that surrounds them. Brazil is rapidly taking the direction which will turn it into a gigantic version of Haiti.

Faced with this fearful picture of decay which is becoming imminent, Brazil possesses nevertheless the conditions to make a quick recovery. We are not talking only - although this is extremely relevant - of the fact that the country has a significant technical, industrial and agricultural base and has, among its 180 million inhabitants, a large minority with high levels of education. It is a question, in a historic moment that needs much social charisma on the part of its leader, of the fact that Brazil has in President Lula, the charismatic leader it needs, a man of great intelligence and good human qualities. It is a question also of the fact that we have sufficient technical and managerial competence - sadly lacking in the PT - but available in the PSDB and outside the party blocs.

Nothing is more tragic from the point of view of the interest - if not of the very survival - of Brazil than the fact - in spite of broad pragmatic agreements - of a simple power struggle placing the PSDB in conflict with President Lula. Lula's first mandate was wasted in spite of the President's qualities, because his well known managerial shortcomings were not adequately compensated for by the political framework of the PT. The extraordinary charismatic power

of Lula cannot help him on the administrative level where he can do nothing except rely on a good prime minister, but it does guarantee him the greatest visibility on the world stage and the essential support of the mass of the people, and leaves him unaffected by recent evidence of PT corruption in government and of the ongoing economic atrophy in the country, an achievement which no technocrat would be able to achieve.

This is the time to proceed is to a large-scale review of the Brazilian political body. It is a matter of urgency and absolute necessity to return to the national plan of consensus which was competently prepared in 2002 by what was then called the Parliamentary Committee on Consensus. It is essential that there should be an understanding between Lula's charisma and the competent sectors in the country in order for the government of the next four years to have Lula's ability to mobilize people and the PSDB's quality of competence. Lula as President and Serra as Prime Minister would be an *ideal situation which now seems to be out of reach*, but which seems to point in the general direction of a possible optimization of the future government. Eradicating poverty, urgently incorporating the millions of people marginalized in the big cities into acceptable levels of Brazilian citizenship and regaining annual growth rates above 6%, is the set of measures that the Brazilian people should demand from their political class. It depends upon allying social charisma with technical competence.



12. Democracy and Governance (2007)

1. Introduction

One of the problems facing the modern world is that of making the democratic system compatible with the requirements of good governance. It is widely agreed and understood that the democratic system - government of the people by the people and hopefully for the people - is the only way of guaranteeing the legitimacy of power and dignity to its citizens. It is equally undeniable that all countries need good governance. In this context, we find that the role of the State in society, which has always been important, has taken on immeasurably greater and more important proportions since the great crisis of the 1930s. After that time, the State added to its traditional attributes that of being a vital regulator of the economy and the market and of having a vital function in promoting social well-being by reducing inequality and protecting vulnerable sectors of society. In the presence of these vital functions of the modern State (the social welfare State) it is clear that the development of power by the democratic regime often fails to satisfy in a suitable way the needs that depend on good governance. It is also clear, on the other hand, that deficit in good government, while existing to a certain extent in all countries, is extremely unequal, varying from countries and cases in which it is hardly significant, to others in which it is alarmingly high.

We must obviously recognize the fact that deficiencies in governance tend on the whole to correspond to the level of underdevelopment in countries, but that fact in no way follows a rule of proportionality. Highly developed countries like the USA have seen low levels of governance in the course of President Bush's two governments, while an underdeveloped and extremely complex country such as India has shown good levels of governance within a democratic regime.

2. A Brief History

Democratic regimes are an exception in the general course of history. From the Bronze Age until today, oligarchies and monarchies have generally predominated, either under the control of royal families or frequently of dictatorships.

The origin of democracy is a Greek, specifically Athenian, phenomenon. It appears in the form of a democracy of notables like Solon (c.640-c.558 BC) who was the sole *archon* (Chief Magistrate) in 594. With Cleisthenes (second half of the 6th century BC), it acquires the characteristics of a middle-class democracy. It becomes a popular democracy with Pericles (c.492-429), the Athenian leader from 461, with a brief interruption, until his death in 443.

Athenian democracy was based on distributing public office by lot. This system was felt to be both the most indiscriminatingly democratic and also an expression of the will of the gods. An exception to this rule was the position of *strategos* (military leader), which was decided by election.

Socrates opposed this regime (a factor that would lead to his being condemned to death) claiming that leadership of the State could not be decided by chance. If a qualified pilot is required to navigate a ship, how could the Ship of State be entrusted to luck?

Roman emerged as a society controlled by a patrician class and gradually developed, during the 3rd century BC into a short-lived political democracy with the *Lex Hortensia* of 257 BC. After the conflicts involving Marius (157-86 BC) and Sulla (138-78 BC), which created the conditions for Caesar's (100-44 BC) dictatorship the Late Republic would be followed, for the rest of the history of Rome, by the Imperial regime instituted by Augustus (63 BC-14 AD).

In the Middle Ages, cities that succeeded in freeing themselves from feudal suzerainty, which occurred mainly in Flanders and in Italy, instituted autonomous government regimes mainly in the form of bourgeois democracies. Something similar would happen in the Italian Renaissance, with regimes alternating between democracies led or supported by Guild Masters or less frequently leaders supported by the *popolani* like Cosimo de Medici (1389-1464) who ruled Florence from 1429 to 1433 and again from 1434 until his death.

Modern democracies appeared with the Enlightenment as a result of the growth of the bourgeoisie and corresponding decline of the feudal nobility to the politically almost impotent situation of court nobility under an absolute monarchy, and the influence of the ideas of thinkers like Locke (1632-1704), Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Rousseau (1712-1778).

2. Mass Democracy

Contemporary democracy has become a mass democracy. The masses are not a modern phenomenon. The development of large cities in the ancient world, like Alexandria in Ptolemaic Egypt or Rome, from the end of the Republic, created large urban masses (obviously smaller than those of today), whose presence had a social and political great impact without, however, playing a decisive part in the power structure. The heterogeneous nature of the population of Alexandria, which contained Macedonian Greek, Jewish and native groups, did not enable it to exercise power although the Ptolemies did have to take its main demands into account. Equally, after the short period at the end of the Republic when the popular Assembly superseded the Senate, the Roman masses became a significant pressure group that had to be dealt with by the famous formula of "bread and circuses", but they were not able to exercise power, which depended essentially on the military factor.

If the bourgeoisies from the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th were the main factor in the power of western democracies, from the second third of the 20th century this power was transferred to the masses. The Western democratic tradition, its nature changed by the demand for legitimacy, led these democracies within modern mass societies to become mass democracies.

In this new situation of mass democracy, the question of the relationship between democracy and good governance became much more complex. Middle-class Western democracies were confronted with very different conditions from those which came to prevail in mass democracies. The former democracies, on the one hand, ruled States that interfered relatively little. Most of the interests of societies of that time were dealt with privately. The State guaranteed adherence to contracts through the system of justice, the safety of individuals through the police and, the defense of the country through the armed forces. Good governance required only the honest exercise of common sense. On the other hand, there was also the factor of the interests of the people, at that time understood as the interests of the middle-class, coinciding with the fact of political leaders being representatives of that same class.

What is happening in modern mass democracies is completely different. Social interests, without affecting the residual importance of the private sector, have come to depend on state management, even in societies such as the USA, which maintain a broad sector of collective interests under private management. On the other hand, there no longer exists common ground between middle-class political leaders and a population under the control of that class. The masses are the new people. Even if, from time to time, men who started life among the masses come to power, such as Lula in Brazil or Evo Morales in Bolivia, the political class is still mainly comprised of middle-class representatives.

In the new situation of mass democracy we observe then the fact that what carries a political leader to power is the approval of the masses, regardless of that leader's qualifications. Thus there is frequently an imbalance between the democratic choice of leaders and the inability of the latter to carry out good governance. What makes this imbalance particularly serious is the fact that modern societies depend, for almost all their important interests, on honest and competent governance.

4. Governance and the Masses

In what conditions does it become possible, in modern mass democracies, to guarantee that candidates who obtain the approval of the people may be reasonably qualified to exercise governance?

The answer to this question requires a brief examination of how mass democracies behave today. It is undeniable that modern democracies show marked differences from country to country. If we look comparatively at the cases of European, Asian, North American and Latin American democracies and at those of other, underdeveloped, countries we shall find, with the notable

exception of India, a high correlation between good governance and an adequate level of mass education. Western European democracies, with the relative exception of Italy, show a high level of governance that is noticeably superior to that of the rest. It is clear therefore that the higher average level of education in Europe, compared to other countries in the world, enables the European masses to evaluate their leaders better. The relative exception of Italy, where the average level of mass education is high, is mainly a result of the institutional failures of party and electoral systems which those same failures make it difficult to correct.

In terms of Eastern democracies, it is important to differentiate between a country with high levels of mass education comparable to that in Western Europe, like Japan, and the case of India. In the latter country the importance of religions based on the principle of compassion has a salutary effect on the choice of leaders based on their moral characteristics, even when the great mass of the people is unable to make a satisfactory evaluation of the candidates' practical abilities.

In the light of these considerations we must ask why a mass democracy such as that of the USA functions to a considerable extent less well than that of Western Europe. The question has many aspects, a particularly relevant one, as will be seen, being the question of a presidential regime in a mass society. We should, however, recognize that, as well as other factors, there is an important difference between American culture and that of Western Europe. The latter is a basically philosophical culture even though most of the population do not realize this. This foundation leads to a rational evaluation of public affairs. American culture, being mainly influenced by religious precepts of a Calvinist nature that emphasizes the character of candidates, leads to a psychological evaluation of the latter.

On the other hand, in underdeveloped countries, mass democracy leads to expectations of benefits and distribution of public wealth which favor populist candidates to the detriment of genuinely developmental proposals.

5. Good Governance

In relation to the foregoing observations, we must ask in what, if any, situation it would be possible to make mass democracy compatible with good governance. As has been mentioned already, there is a visible correlation in mass societies between the average level of mass education and good

governance, with the latter being better where average educational attainment is higher. Another visible correlation concerning societies with high average levels of education is the fact that good governance is more often seen in countries with small populations, as in the case of Scandinavia and Switzerland.

Without detrimentally affecting the factors and circumstances referred to above, an analysis of good governance in mass democracies leads to another conclusion: the marked superiority of parliamentary regimes compared to presidential ones. It is true that when exceptionally good presidents are elected, such as Franklin Roosevelt in the USA or Juscelino Kubitschek in Brazil, presidentialism can create excellent levels of governance. It is, however, undoubtedly true that examples such as those are extremely rare. Mass democracy in the presidential regime leads to the election of candidates who satisfy public taste regardless of their qualifications, which are often inadequate.

Why, in mass democracies, do parliamentary governments tend to be better than presidential ones? This question requires a preliminary consideration of the fact that parliamentarism *per se* is not necessarily a good regime because there can be good and bad parliamentary systems. Many factors come into this question, among them, as in all matters related to society and man, regardless of culture and society, specifically the way in which a parliament is constituted - something in which a society's culture is relevant - is decisive in determining its level of qualification and functionality. The multi-party system conspires against the formation of good parliaments, as the Italian example shows. What favors the formation of good parliaments, in addition to a country's suitable cultural conditions, is a two-party system and at most the existence of three parties that enjoy internal party stability and the consistency of party programs.

Thus we need to examine why well-constituted parliamentary systems are better than presidential ones. What is relevant in this question is actually knowing to what extent the regulatory institutions of a mass democracy lead to making the mass vote compatible with the satisfactory qualification of candidates to exercise power. This compatibility is achieved satisfactorily in parliamentary regimes by the fact that public figures standing for election to exercise power have been previously submitted to political education and selection within their respective parties. Presidential political parties are simply platforms that legitimize the receipt of the popular vote. In parliamentary regimes, candidates to public office first of all pass through a relatively long stage of preparation and training within the party. Thus, for better or worse,

according to the cultural characteristics of each country, a reasonably well-trained political class is created. When the party submits its members to an electoral campaign, they carry with them the benefits of their political education within the party. On the other hand, it is also within the party that the leaders are developed, with control of the new government going to the leader of the party that has won a majority in the election. Thus, parliamentarism combines this mixture of training political elite and the democratic methods of their selection, as recommended by Aristotle.



13. Nation and Nationalism in the 21st Century (2007)

Origins

The nation, in its social and anthropological sense, is a community with its own culture obeying a common leadership and, with rare exceptions, living in the same territory. In this sense, nations have existed since Neolithic times.

The medieval university gave the title *naca* to the linguistic divisions among their students, who formed the nations of France, Germany, etc.

In its modern sense the nation appeared in Europe, in its first form with the Italian Renaissance, which recognized divisions between Florentines, Milanese, Neapolitans, etc. In their full socio-political sense, the nations of Europe emerged after the 16th century with the formation or consolidation of nation states such as France, England, Castile and Portugal.

The nation state would have a long life. It took on its modern shape after the 18th century and achieved its full structure in the second half of the 19th century with the unification processes in Germany and Italy. This model of the State became common in the rest of the world at the end of that century.

Challenges

After the end of the Middle Ages, the nascent European nations were faced with a series of external challenges such as the Hundred Years War

between France and England or the independence struggles of Portugal against Castilian imperialism. After the 19th century and the end of France's expansionist adventure under Napoleon, the European countries were faced with British imperialism and its power to interfere in the affairs of other nations. On two occasions united Germany, first under Bismarck in the 19th century and Hitler in the 20th, became a serious threat to European countries, having on both occasions occupied a part of French territory.

More recently, the immense competitiveness of Japan became a great economic threat to other countries, including the already extremely powerful United States. Finally the latter, with the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, became the only superpower and came to enjoy insuperable global supremacy.

The current process of globalization is exerting on the great majority of nation states various kinds of pressure that combine economic factors with those related to culture and information. Multinational corporations have become the main powers in most world markets. International information is controlled by a small number of North American agencies. Something similar has occurred in television and the cinema. Globalization is uniting the world economically and culturally according to North American patterns and under the decisive influence of its culture and the English language.

Faced with these challenges, a great number of nation states have become merely formal structures that preserve their national anthems, flags and paradeground armies but are actually, especially in economic and cultural terms, mere provinces of the 'American Empire'. In contrast to previous empires in history, from the Roman to the British, this one does not exist by the direct exercise of political domination through the actions of a proconsul or viceroy supported by military and bureaucratic personnel from the dominating power. This empire is a 'field' in a sense analogous to magnetic or gravitational 'fields'. The dominance of the American Empire is exerted by means of irresistible forces in the areas of economics/finance, culture, information, politics and, in some cases, the military. These forces oblige local leaders to follow the direction of the USA in essential matters, even when they may not agree with it. There are two main factors that guide the 'provinces' of empires: the international financial market and everything concerning information, as well as the diffusion of images by television or in the cinema.

The entry of countries forming provinces of the American Empire into the international financial market, incorporating its procedures into domestic

practice and thus maintaining an open exchange in which the main principle is that of guaranteeing favorable conditions for foreign investment, makes these countries satellites of this market which, in turn, is dominated and led by the great North American corporations. What the legions were to Imperial Rome, financial capital is to the American equivalent, with the additional support of monopoly actions in the areas of information and imagery.

Reactions

This international scenario has aroused different reactions on the part of countries that are trying to preserve their authentic cultural, economic and political autonomy. These reactions vary according to two main situations: that of continental countries and that of successful regional groupings.

The most important case of successful autonomy in a continental country is that of China. During the last 30 years, since Deng Xiaoping, China has maintained an annual rate of growth of about 10% of GDP. Thus, a country that today has 1.3 billion inhabitants has gone from being one of the poorest economies in the world to third position in the world's economies, after the USA and Japan. Everything indicates that China will continue to maintain high annual rates of growth, probably no more than 10% of GDP but possibly no less than 6%, which will make it in the not too distant future the greatest economy in the world. At the same time, China is rapidly modernizing in all relevant areas which, in turn, will tend to make it a second superpower by the middle of the century. One of the effects of this probable state of affairs will be the establishment of a new bipolar situation with everything that this means in terms of danger for the world.

Russia, another semi-continental country, is making serious efforts under Vladimir Putin to regain its old position as a superpower, and has a chance, if it continues these efforts, of reaching that objective by the middle of the century. In the same way, India is rapidly modernizing and taking an increasing role on the world stage.

In contrast to what is happening in these countries, European Union countries have increased their number to 27. In the medium and short terms, this development will increase Europe's economic power but will delay, because of the greater differences that exist between its members, the possibility of it achieving satisfactory unity in foreign policy. The contrast between the economic giant and the political dwarf will continue for a relatively long period.

On a more modest scale, Mercosul, profiting from satisfactory results during the last 16 years, is becoming, in spite of many problems, the solid nucleus of a project for South American integration towards which the South American Community of Nations is a first step although still only at the proposal stage.

New Nationalism

What we are dealing with in the current American monopolarity and the probable Sino-American bipolarity which is still being shaped is the rate at which it will be possible in the rest of the world to create consistent areas of domestic and international autonomy.

Regardless of other factors, only the nation state is capable, by means of its regulatory actions and possible direct actions, of carrying out this role. The process of globalization, however, as has been pointed out, is in many ways significantly reducing the state's regulatory capacity. Monopoly practices on the part of American information and image production agencies is submitting all the world's cultures – and the more open and westernized these are, the more this is happening - to American influences working inside the frontiers of each country. The international financial market, which domestic markets form part of, impose these procedures on the latter in a way that nation states are unable to prevent. Finance ministers and presidents of central banks thus operate, whatever their own opinions may be, as agents of the internationalization of national economies, making them satellites of the international financial market. How can nation states oppose these trends?

The eminent Argentinean economist Aldo Ferrer has shown in several of his studies that the regulatory capacity of many nation states is much higher than that stated by theories of internationalization. In fact, the effective investment contribution of foreign capital is about 5% internationally while the development of nations continues to depend on national capital. Making domestic financial markets satellites of the international market can be significantly reduced by nation states as long as they free themselves from attitudes of dependence and adopt selective measures against merely speculative capital that tends to be the predominant kind. It is not policies of unrestricted access on the part of foreign capital that create opportunities for investment, but rather policies suitable for giving a powerful stimulus to domestic saving.

It is thus possible, as well as being necessary, to create a new nationalism that is not merely one of jingoism or narrow xenophobia, but rather an intelligent understanding of domestic and international realities. It is possible and necessary, on the other hand, to compensate for the uncontrolled actions of globalization by creating effective regional bodies. This was the successful solution adopted by Europe. This solution is available for Brazil and other South American countries by means of expanding and consolidating Mercosul in a process aimed at the general integration of South America. Changing the South American Committee of Nations from its current state of being merely a declaration into an effectively operational entity will give countries in the region an incredible increase in their economic and technological capacity and create a system with great international negotiating power and a high level of autonomy.

The answer to the negative aspects of globalization does not consist in passively accepting it but in adopting a new nationalism that conforms to the conditions of the 21st century. This is a protectively regulatory nationalism to create great new initiatives conceived, in the case of a country like Brazil, within an intelligent process of South American integration, to the advantage of all participants.



IV. STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



1. Autonomy and Hegemony in the American Imperial System (1987)

1. Introduction

The international scenario that emerged from the Second World War heralded the appearance of two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union - the latter becoming the Russian Republic - and both constructed as imperial systems. In contrast to previous imperial configurations, the two new empires show few of the outward signs of this state. Formally, they present themselves as independent nations like any other, although they have economic, technological, political and military power exceeding that of any other nation. On the other hand, at least nominally and sometimes to a considerably effective degree, the independence of other nations that continue to appear in international relations as speaking for themselves and being sovereign states, is preserved.

A more careful and realistic analysis of the international scenario shows that the two imperial systems have set up a new international structure which we may call inter-imperial. This is generally characterized by the division of the world into two areas of hegemonic influence and some geopolitical areas as yet undefined - notably in Africa – but still the object of intense dispute between the two superpowers.

The international stratification resulting from the new inter-imperial system is divided into four levels with decreasing capacity for self-determination. The

highest level corresponds to general supremacy. The level immediately beneath this corresponds to regional supremacy, followed by the level of autonomy. The lowest level is that of dependency.

During the 20 years following the Second World War, the level of general supremacy was occupied solely by the United States. This status combined the inviolability of the nation's territory with a general global power effectively contained only in the areas immediately controlled by the power enjoying regional supremacy. For its part, the inviolability of national territory is guaranteed by possession of a devastating capacity for nuclear counter-attack, the 'second strike ability' consisting of nuclear ballistic missiles and the superpower's command of automatic response mechanisms such that, even if it suffers a devastating nuclear attack, it will still have sufficient capacity to completely destroy any possible aggressor.

The technological and military development of the Soviet Union - continued by the Russian Republic from the 1960s on - has come close to that of the United States on the level of general supremacy. The decisive factor was the growth of the Soviet Navy and its ability to carry out preventive occupation of strategic positions, as the United States had done in Lebanon during the 1950s and the Soviet Union itself in Angola in the 1970s.

Regional supremacy is characterized by the inviolability of a nation's territory combined with exercising control over certain regions and having a powerful presence in others, even though this may be restricted to certain areas. The Soviet Union had such a role after the Second World War, keeping Eastern Europe under its control and exercising a powerful influence on various countries and sub-regions such as India and Indochina (until the fall of Sukarno), Cuba and certain African countries.

As has been mentioned already, the development of the Soviet Union has led it to share with the United States a situation of general supremacy although it still has a significantly inferior position to the United States on the global level.

On the other hand, the development of China, supported by a foreign policy of cooperation with the United States and of containment in relation to the Soviet Union, has allowed that country to achieve the condition of regional supremacy during the present decade. China was able to achieve this in spite of still not having achieved effective territorial inviolability, since Chinese nuclear power has still not reached the level of second-strike capability. China's immense conventional military power and the relative inviolability its relationship

of cooperation with the United States gives it, allows it to function as a great buffer state to restrain Soviet interests in Asia, a situation recently reinforced by the Sino-Japanese agreement which will lead to its reaching the level of regional supremacy.

The third level of modern global stratification is that of autonomy. Without guaranteeing the inviolability of national territory the situation of autonomy is one in which its holders are able to inflict severe material and moral penalties on any possible aggressor.

In addition, such nations have quite a broad measure of self-determination in conducting their internal affairs and a considerable capacity for independent action at international level. On this level we find the Western European countries, especially those belonging to the European Community, as well as Japan and China; the latter being at this level until it achieves a regional supremacy level.

During the 1970s, some more recent events are creating a distinction between 'regional' and 'sectoral' autonomies. Regional autonomy is still restricted to a region that has not yet achieved global status. Examples of this are Iran, in the Middle East and Brazil in South America. Sectoral autonomy is exercised at the economic level by reason of certain comparative advantages, such as that found in Saudi Arabia thanks to oil.

The great majority of countries in the world are found to be at the level of dependence. These are the countries which do not have the means to achieve higher levels. Except for some remnants of the colonial period these are nominally called sovereign states with their own government organizations and recognized as independent negotiators in relation to other states and international organizations. Despite this, these countries depend, by means of various forms of control, on decisions and factors outside their control coming from countries that have achieved general or regional supremacy and in some cases (and to a more limited degree) from medium-level autonomous powers.

In the modern world, preserving the nominal sovereignty of countries is linked to several factors. The main one is the interest on the part of the superpowers in not taking on commitments such as the problems of internal administration of these countries. Also in the interests of the great powers, through the legal fiction of sovereignty of independent countries, is keeping the citizens of those countries within their respective frontiers as if on a native reservation, to protect central countries from uncontrolled immigration.

In this brief description of the international situation, two kinds of relationship stand out: (1) the relationships of the superpowers between themselves, which make up the inter-imperial system and are characterized by complex relationships of cooperation and conflict; (2) the relationships between the center and the periphery within each imperial system. These relationships are very different for each of the empires, but in both we find great structural imbalance and corresponding intra-imperial tensions.

In the American Empire, intra-imperial relationships are extremely complex. The system is open and fluid. The relationships of hegemony or of power are not formally regulated but show themselves in an infinite number of variations of inter-relationship which are often, on an individual basis, of quite a consensual or spontaneous nature. These relationships encompass all ideas concerning social conditions, the economic and the cultural levels, from the social to the political; therefore, taken together, these relationships are shaped by great structural imbalance that favors the center to the detriment of the periphery. For this reason, it is within the American Empire that the various levels of international stratification and their respective characteristics are most clearly defined. At this level of autonomy we find the middle-level European powers, Canada, Australia and Japan, and at the level of regional autonomy countries like Iran and Brazil. The OPEC countries enjoy sectoral autonomy and the rest of the world is in a situation of dependence which is not forced upon them but is accepted by local elites in exchange for various benefits granted to their class.

The Soviet empire was monolithic in terms of the domination of the center over the periphery but much more accepting in the sense that many aspects of collective life in independent countries were to a greater or lesser extent influenced by the center.

The present study will restrict itself to an analysis of the problem of peripheral autonomy within the American Empire, with occasional side references to intra-imperial situations in the ex-Soviet system.

The Problem of Peripheral Autonomy

As has already been mentioned, the level of autonomy in the present system of international stratification is only clearly defined within the American Empire. This, also mentioned already, consists basically of a complex network of interrelated interests within a profoundly unbalanced framework that favors the center in relation to the periphery.

The structural imbalance of the intra-imperial system based on the absolute economic, technological, political and military superiority of the United States as a country and of its ruling elites as holders of multiple international roles, ensures in various ways the domination of public and private American interests in international relationships. This situation makes it possible for specific forms of these interrelationships, based on an already privileged position, to appear in most actual cases in the guise of an immediate or apparent consensual aspect. On the international stage this is in some way analogous to what would typically happen in the private sphere of the 19th-century capitalist system in the relationship established between owners of the means of production and individual workers who, thanks to the structural imbalance of the relationship, were obliged to accept highly exploitative working conditions.

For reasons already explained, relationships between the center and the periphery in the American intra-imperial system are influenced by a group of medium-level powers that enjoy general autonomy. This situation, described briefly above, is not absolute and is not definitive. On the one hand, it is enjoyed by countries which, having managed to satisfy certain demands, have risen above their previous dependence and, more directly or more often, have arrived at general autonomy after passing through a prior level of regional (or sectoral) autonomy. Iran and Brazil are two current examples of countries emerging from dependence that are on the way to regional autonomy, with good chances of achieving general autonomy. In different conditions, Bismarck's Germany managed to overcome its previous dependence on Great Britain and, in the last third of the 19th century, to achieve parity with the great European powers. The same happened in Meiji Japan and in the modern world with Japan's recovery after the catastrophe of the Second World War.

On the other hand, autonomy is not a stable and permanent achievement. Small European powers such as Belgium, Holland and others, have lost their individual autonomy and were only able to maintain their autonomy by joining the European Community. Spain and Portugal, leaders of European trade expansion in the 15th and 16th centuries, became dependent countries from the end of the 17th century and today their admission into the European Community has enabled them to emerge from that situation. In structural terms, achieving autonomy depends on two basic conditions: national viability and international permissibility. I have discussed these categories in other

studies. However, I would simply point out here that international viability is a relative status that varies according to historical circumstances and, within certain limits, the social and cultural circumstances of each country.

Basically the national viability of a country depends, at a certain time in history, on the extent to which it has a critical minimum mass of human and natural resources, including the capacity for international exchange. The more demanding the general conditions of an era, especially in terms of technology and the minimum levels of operationalism arising out of this technology, the greater will be the minimum mass of human and natural resources necessary, as well as their quality. This critical minimum mass of human and natural resources, as well as being controlled by the technological needs of each era, is also controlled by the level of socio-cultural integration in each country and by the moral and educational level of its people. High levels of socio-cultural integration and high ethical-educational patterns work as multipliers of the efficacy of resources. In contrast, during the same era and with the same technological demands, the minimum critical mass of resources for badly integrated societies with low general levels of education and modest patterns of collective ethics becomes appreciably greater.

The classification of international permissibility is abstract and more difficult to describe. It refers basically to the extent to which, given a country's geopolitical condition and its international relations, the country has the ability to neutralize risks coming from other countries that have sufficient ability to exercise effective patterns of force upon it. These conditions may be purely internal, such as the development of suitable economic and military capacity, or external with the establishment of suitable defensive alliances. The United States, for example, which did not have a very great military capacity until the second half of the 19th century, benefited from an extremely favorable geopolitical situation reinforced by the implicit protection of the British Navy which thus ensured its international permissibility in relation to the great powers of the time. Poland, located between Prussia and Russia, has suffered historically because of its adverse geopolitical situation.

As well as the requirements of a static and structural nature referred to earlier (national viability and international permissibility), the situation of autonomy also implies requirements of a dynamic and functional nature. These requirements are found in an alternative form in contemporary conditions and in the American intra-imperial framework. Either a country wishing to acquire autonomy manages to achieve it internally by means of a technical and business-

based autonomy with a corresponding minimal level of internal independence, or it succeeds in creating an effectively universal intra-imperial relationship with favorable terms of exchange.

The European Community countries and Japan have based their autonomy on a high level of technical and business-based independence that is the main indicator of their level of relative autonomy. It is interesting to observe how, in this respect, the comparative level of political and military power of these countries becomes less important. Thus, in the case of the European Community, it is clear that the level of comparative political and military independence of France is greater than that of the other countries in the group, compared to the United States. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the level of relative autonomy enjoyed by Western Germany is significantly higher than that of France, although the former currently enjoys less political and military independence. This is the case because Germany's level of technical and business-based autonomy and its level of relative internal independence are significantly higher compared to the rest of Europe.

On the other hand, the ex-British dominions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, existing in a much more modest phase of technical, managerial, political and military autonomy but enjoying a more universal acceptability in their intra-imperial relationships thanks to ethnic and cultural similarities with the United States, have a significantly high level of autonomy.

If we look at the world as a whole, there are few countries that enjoy the functional and structural requisites for autonomy. This is why the great majority of countries today find themselves in a situation of dependence.

Alternative Forms of Autonomy

The brief description given above shows that two types of situation must be taken into account for a country to reach the level of autonomy. The first is an enabling one that concerns the requirements for national viability and international permissibility. In order to exercise their autonomy, countries having these requisites need to enjoy a second condition, that of sufficient technical and business-based autonomy or a sufficiently universal intra-imperial relationship.

The enabling requirements are structural and constitute a precondition that is relatively easy to verify. They involve conditions which are basically independent of any measures adopted by the country. Without underestimating

the important degree of variation it contains, this is to a certain extent more controllable by national decisions determined by the country's level of socio-cultural integration and its ethical and educational level.

It is important to examine the second condition more closely because it consists of more executable requirements of a functional nature which can be changed by the internal efforts of peripheral countries or by modifications in the intra-imperial behavior of countries at the center. These latter requirements are technical and business-related autonomy or the availability of a universal intra-imperial relationship.

The problem for peripheral countries in creating autonomy in technical and business areas lies in the fact that, with the growing internationalization of the capitalist economy and its forms of consumption, and the corresponding economic interdependence of countries, especially within the American system, the costs of making the technical and business areas autonomous also become too great.

In the final third of the 19th century, the period of limited companies and the emergence of joint stock companies, Bismarck's Germany achieved parity with England in technical and business terms, even though it started from a scientific and cultural level that was not inferior to that of Britain. Before the First World War and the appearance of transnational companies, Meiji Japan succeeded in educating its young people in the West after making a collective decision in favor of self-emancipation. It also managed to reproduce internally technical and managerial patterns imported from abroad. In both cases, the efforts needed to achieve the desired technical and scientific autonomy were compatible with motivating the masses and the elites to put them into practice.

Without a clear idea of their sacrifice, the masses accepted customs restrictions and the practice of having lower-quality goods imposed on them at higher prices, practices that for a long time formed part of the developmental policies of Germany and Japan. In addition to this, for a long time these practices were to a greater or lesser extent identified with the symbolic benefits involved in creating an autonomous industrial structure. The social and trade union movements in Germany, which had been suppressed with the defeat of the Frankfurt Parliament and later controlled by the repressive legislation of the first Bismarck period, only took a more militant form with the creation of the Second International in 1880. In Japan, the situation of mass support associated with the *quantum-satis* of repression of social movements lasted until defeat in the Second World War.

This behavior on the part of the masses encouraged the elites to adopt an autonomous path of development. National businessmen were the heroes of progress and they also received the economic benefits and social and political prestige arising from their technical and business successes. This process had a highly multiplying and circular effect. Success in business encouraged the national intellectual elites to contribute scientifically and technically to industrial development, thus receiving the fruits of the latter in terms of university and research activities.

In the modern world of the periphery conditions are completely different. On the one hand, the universalization of and instant information about types of consumption in countries at the center produce uncontrollable forms of imitation in peripheral countries that reduce their investment capacity and encourage the use of products and processes that are directly or indirectly imported. On the other hand, the degree of international control by transnational companies over technological innovation and the markets makes it extremely difficult, in open societies not subject to authoritarian central planning, to develop national efforts to encourage autonomy in the technical and business worlds.

To these psychosomatic, political, technical and economic difficulties there has been added an extraordinary increase in minimum levels of critical mass needed to create successful technical and business freedom. The size of internal markets needed to compensate for the international control of manufacturers and the market exercised by transnational companies takes on semi-continental proportions or demands extraordinarily efficient methods of integration and a high degree of consensuality.

All these conditions are almost possible to gather together and maintain in an active state for a sufficiently long period. Also, in countries like Brazil and Mexico, whose size does allow such an effort to be made, social, economic and political conditions are not conducive to a suitable relationship between elites and masses to create the conditions that sustain sufficient motivation for technical and business autonomy. In order to maintain their expectations of consumption within the general poverty around them, elites and middle classes absorb disproportionate amounts of national income and force the masses to endure wretched conditions for survival. Thus the complementary relationships leading to the creation of technical and business autonomy are not created, and indeed the opposite occurs: internal conditions arise that increase technical and business dependence and as a result, international dependence.

Neither does the alternative pattern of an effective universalization of intra-imperial relationships present a more favorable picture. The most universal relationships that have been established between countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand with the United States are exceptions arising out of particular historical circumstances. Also, these countries have very small populations which, together with their ethnic and cultural homogeneity, make it possible for them to increase their relationship with the central power.

The general situation of inter-imperial relations is one of profound imbalance. To begin with, this imbalance is founded on the ethnic and cultural discrimination central nations have always shown in relation to peripheral peoples with a different racial and cultural makeup. This is the origin of the concept of the barbarian developed by classical civilization. It is true that, in the case of that civilization, there was a clear scientific and technical superiority on the part of the classical peoples compared to the barbarians (as there is today between the central and peripheral peoples). Historical and archaeological research is, however, revealing that the gap separating them was much narrower than classical man supposed, as is the present situation in the center-periphery relations of the Western world.

As well as showing quite a constant historical and anthropological tendency, the center-periphery imbalance in the modern world is based on selfish motivations that are extremely rational for their beneficiaries even though in the long term they often have counterproductive effects. From the point of view of the central elites, this imbalance provides a set of extra privileges which they are naturally interested in preserving. These elites, like the Roman optimata, as well as controlling the decision-making centers of the empire, administer the higher levels of transnational companies and enjoy the privileges and immunity of noble rulers in all the provinces of the empire. The forces that conspire to maintain the imbalance of center-periphery relations in the modern world are not only those of the elites of the center. The masses of the central countries, who are equally or more interested in preserving or increasing the benefits of the welfare state, exert pressure in favor of measures and conditions that require this imbalance. Thanks to this imbalance an enormously unequal level of productivity per hour of work at the center is preserved - and tends to increase - in relation to the periphery (in the order of 12 to 1) and in a more than proportional manner, in the remuneration of central labor in relation to that of the periphery.

Faced with these real interests, neither appeals to human solidarity nor considerations of universal equality and economic and political reasons, which show that in the long term the world can only be viable for central countries themselves if it is viable for all countries, carry sufficient weight to redress the structural imbalance of center-peripheral relations.

II. A Brief Comparative Historical Analysis

Historical Precedents

The inter-imperial system briefly discussed above constitutes a form of organizing power in the world which differs from its historical roots. For the first time in history, international relations are at the same time effectively global, including all those acting on the world stage, and are basically built around the two great empires. The effectively ecumenical nature of global relations is quite recent, arising out of the expansion of European influence since the mercantilism of the 15th to 18th centuries, and carried on through the vicissitudes of the internationalization of the Industrial Revolution until it culminates in modern times. This universalizing process of international relations, initially restricted to Spain and Portugal, only really achieved a more universal level when it came to be controlled by a group of great European powers after the Industrial Revolution.

On the other hand, the inter-imperial nature of the modern world is not new, as such, except in the sense of its actual ecumenism. The empires of the ancient East and the classical world could never manage to contain within themselves either the West or the Far East, much less the North and South. The unique nature of the situation today does not arise out of the synchronicity of the effective universalization of international relations with their inclusion in an inter-imperial system, but rather in the fact of technology, especially that of communications, having installed this great novelty in a world, which is the synchronicity of 'daily events'.

It is not actually a case of us living in a single world. In spite of small areas of isolation that remained in Asia and Africa, this universality existed in the 19th century. However, it was still an anthropocentric situation with Europe as the dominant expanding center. Today, the awareness and experience of universalization are equally shared by all the peripheral countries (although

not by all men), which have daily access to the same information and the same global interaction.

Despite its differences, the present inter-imperial system has many aspects in common with preceding historical processes of concurrent territorial expansion and concentration of political power. Current center-periphery relations are new in the sense that they actually and completely involve all individuals and are operated through a high level of technology, with the previously mentioned effects of 'instantization'. These relations, however, remain basically within the same paradigm of certain preceding intra-imperial relations. The previous intra-imperial systems that encapsulate a paradigm equally applicable to ours are those of the classical world: the empire of Alexander, the Hellenistic Realms and the Roman Empire. In addition, as we shall see below, the unification processes in certain European (as well as other) countries such as Great Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Italy and Russia itself, show similarities with those of today in their relationships between the center and the periphery. In order to understand current relations between the center and the periphery it is extreme important to make a comparative study of the relations pertaining within the scope of the empires and the processes of national expansion referred to earlier.

For the purposes of this study is not important to describe how classical empires formed, nor how certain European countries became unified. It is important to analyze how, during those processes, center-periphery relationships took shape and that is what we shall try to do briefly in the following paragraphs.

The Classical Example

Alexander's great adventure consisted not only of conquering the Persian Empire with its many dependent states, nor of the extent of this conquest, which stretched to the banks of the Indus. It consisted also, and in many ways mainly, in creating a relatively integrated system based upon components so profoundly different as the Greek and Persian, with Hindu additions. In addition, included in the Persian Empire were cultures as different as those of Media, Babylon, Syria and Egypt.

The short, restless life of Alexander (356-323 BC) did not allow him to make more than a sketch of the imperial system he hoped to found. His main idea was a union of Greeks and Persians since a union of Macedonians and

Greeks had already taken place. His premature death in Babylon interrupted these plans, to which he had devoted only the last years of his life. What is extraordinary in Alexander's actions is the extent to which, in spite of the breakup of his empire and the later great changes in terms of relationships between Greeks and barbarians, the link between the classical and the Eastern worlds was maintained for centuries in the form of the Hellenistic Realms and later, the Roman Empire.

The union of two worlds, imagined by Alexander and conceived as a basically egalitarian *homonia*, developed from the basis of an expanding Greek hegemony. In the process of conquering and shaping Alexander's empire, the Macedonian element predominates as the King's military and political advance guard. As the consolidation of Macedonian power in Greece showed more clearly the irreversible nature of the dependence of Greek cities on Macedonian power, the cultural union between Macedonians and Greeks took place. The *koine*, which began in Attica, became the universal language of the Hellenistic world, and the Hellenistic realms, especially the two largest realms outside Greece, the Seleucid and the Ptolemaic, eventually competed to receive Greek immigrants to run their administrations and military forces.

The relative level of integration achieved by the Hellenistic Realms was initially due to the Greek groups the kings looked to for support. The elite of the Hellenistic Realms was made up in part of members of the local aristocracy and mainly by high-ranking Greek dignitaries. The masses were composed of country people and local partisans who were used to working for the native elites in a servile, subsistence-level system, and they preserve these habits under their new Greek masters. However, it was the Greek groups that occupied the middle levels of the administration and the majority of the armed forces, thus ensuring the political and military internal stability of the Hellenistic Realms.

As a culture and way of life, however, Hellenism was extraordinarily varied. The common language, the *koine*, Greek literature, especially the theatre, daily customs such as clothing, accommodation and the practice of sports and gymnastics, were elements that were avidly absorbed by the higher and middle classes among all the cultures that came to belong to the political systems that inherited Alexander's empire. Also, cultures such as that of the Jews, whose individuality comes from its sacred nature, were affected in a devastating way by this philhellenism to the point where they ran the risk of losing their identity.

Greek imperialism, in contrast to what had gone before – and to what the 19th- and 20th-century European forms of imperialism would be – was not racist. It was based on an ethnic and cultural group that was already a composite, the Greco-Macedonian. Just as the interior union of this initial nucleus came about as a result of Hellenic culture – in its Attic form – so Hellenistic imperialism, as it expanded more widely, was defined as a cultural imperialism once the political and military domination of the Greeks had been effectively ensured.

This cultural characteristic of Hellenistic imperialism had a double and related result. On the one hand, from the point of view of the dominant center and its elites, there was no ethnic discrimination against members of populations that had been politically and militarily dominated; on the contrary, as they were Hellenized, they were selectively incorporated into the administration and the higher levels of life in the Hellenistic Realms. On the other hand, from the point of view of the periphery, the Empire exercised an irreversible fascination on all the peoples under its control and led the local elites and middle classes to imitate and absorb Greek customs.

The so-called Hellenism, however, was very selective from the point of view of social classes. The Eastern masses remained practically on the edge of the Hellenizing process. At the same time, they remained rooted in their traditional forms of agricultural production and traditional customs, including those concerning language. The elites became Hellenized almost without exception, although they sometimes retained a double cultural loyalty: a Hellenic one as a public culture and a local one as a private and often religious culture. The middle classes were mainly Hellenized. However, especially in the classes in which previous cultures had achieved a large degree of stability and high levels of success (such as the Egyptian and Jewish), religious-based movements and trends that had political influence still remained and resisted Hellenism, stubbornly holding on to their own cultural traditions.

Taking into account this dichotomy in the Hellenistic-Roman period, Toynbee developed the ideas of 'herodianism' and 'zealotism'. Herodianism, which is mainly and strictly connected to Hellenism, took for granted the superiority of Hellenism and the legitimacy of the cosmopolitan union of various peoples under the aegis of its culture. Zealotism, although it recognized the superiority of Hellenic culture, clung stubbornly to its local traditions – as Fichte did later in his *Addresses to the German Nation* – and denounced Hellenism for bringing about the loss of identity in Eastern cultures while a

trying to resist culturally, as well as politically and militarily, both Hellenization and later, Romanization.

The Roman Empire, the successor to the Hellenistic Realms, was the object of successive phases of Hellenization. This process made itself felt from the start of Roman civilization when, through the influence of Greek colonies in Italy as well as Greek influences on the Etruscans, the Roman Pantheon imitated that of Olympus. During this great process of continuous incorporation of Hellenism, the Greek language, which had only being cultivated in the elite circle of Scipio, became the common language of the Eastern part of the empire, where the use of Latin was restricted to administrative documents.

From the last phase of the Republic, and steadily throughout the imperial period, the Roman Empire followed the Greek precedent in becoming a multi-ethnic cultural empire under the political and military control of Rome. The elites and middle classes of the Empire, who were already Romanized and kept the Hellenic tradition in the Eastern regions, were incorporated into the administrative and upper levels of imperial life. The masses, who remained in their servile situation, or something close to it, kept their traditional systems of production and ways of life.

In contrast to what had happened in the Hellenic world, the unity of the Roman Empire (maintained until the division into the Western and Eastern Empires in 364 AD) and the basic stability of the system, in spite of frequent crises concerning the succession, led the Romans to adopt more gradual, though more profound, ways of absorbing the Romanized groups of the periphery.

This absorption, during the Republican period and the start of the Empire, was restricted to the provinces and, in a less restricted way, to the army. The Hellenistic kings, who had ruled conquered lands geopolitically separated from the Greek center, needed Hellenizing elements for their administrative bodies, but preferred to have Greek mercenaries in their armies. The Roman Empire, which kept its Roman-Italican base, easily absorbed Romanized groups for military service while taking care, until the fall of the Empire, to keep them well away from their countries of origin.

In terms of administering the Empire, the provincial elites were only incorporated into the higher echelons of the system in the second century. The classes of the *eqites*, who usually took the place of the senatorial groups in imperial administration, became increasingly populated by Romanized

citizens from the peripheral regions of Spain, Galicia, Syria, etc. and the imperial purple itself was conferred on non-Italicans such as Trajan and Hadrian, a situation that became common after the Antonines.

From this wide and interesting experience of the classical world we may draw the initial conclusion that, in terms of this broad experience of forming ecumenical empires, the systematic needs of the central powers, within the particular circumstances of the Hellenistic and Roman cases, led them to form a relationship with the periphery founded on the principle of incorporation by acculturation. The classical world exercised an irresistible fascination on the higher and middle classes of its periphery, both Eastern and Western.

These classes became deeply Hellenized and later Romanized, but preserved their Hellenistic tradition in the East. The rebellions of zealots, although not very frequent if we take into account the extent in space and time of the existence of the classical world, always failed. In the most typical case, that of Jewish zealotism, we must emphasize its important contribution to the historical preservation of the fundamental cultural identity of the Jews.

A definite and important conclusion to be drawn from this experience is the fact that the non-acculturation of peripheral masses finally brought disastrous results to the classical world. This non-acculturation, more than revealing a supposedly and the changing culture among the rural masses, was in fact brought about by the deliberate lack of interest of the upper classes, both metropolitan and peripheral, in spreading classical culture to the lower social strata on the periphery. The internal contradiction in the classical world between its universal humanist values and its dependence on slave labor, above all in agriculture, led to classical culture being excluded from the peripheral rural classes. The metropolitan masses which did belong to this culture ended up either imposing certain forms of democratic participation at the level of the *polis*, as occurred in many Greek cities, or acquiring for themselves subsidies from the State as compensation for being excluded from public life. This is what happened to the Roman plebeians during the final period of the Republic.

The preservation of local traditions among the peripheral masses provided the classical world with the corresponding ability to keep those masses in subjection and laboring at a merely subsistence level to produce the economic surpluses on which that world was based. Thus, an external proletariat was created on the periphery which, with the consolidation of the Hellenic realms, became firstly the Roman Empire and secondly an internal proletariat. This proletariat did not work together with the Hellenistic enterprise in times of

crisis and participate in the defense of its realms in the face of Roman aggression and neither could the Roman Empire in its decadence mobilize this same proletariat to preserve the classical world. The cultural servant class of the Persian Empire moved directly to being rural servants of the Hellenistic Realms, later of the Roman Empire and finally servants on the lands of the kingdoms that emerged out of the barbarian invasions. During all these great periods of transition, these agricultural masses, prisoners of their cultural and working traditions, constituted a passive element that could not be called upon or mobilized to preserve the civilizations that had fed on their surpluses but which had not given them the slightest chance to participate in determining their way of life or their culture.

The Unification of European Nations

The historical experience of the formation of various European countries constitutes, among other cases, an equally important illustration for studying center-periphery relations. From this point of view, center-peripheral relations are less illustrative because, among the expansionist-centralizing centers behind the formation of countries like Spain, England, France, Russia, Italy or Germany and the peoples who formed the periphery of this process, ethnic and cultural differences were incomparably less than those that existed during the formation of Alexander's empire and subsequent systems.

Although they existed in much less heterogeneous circumstances, the formation of the countries mentioned above took place by means of processes based mainly on force that led the leaders of a nucleus to expand it through incorporating adjacent territories, along with the subjection of the leaders and peoples of those territories to the jurisdiction of the central power.

It is not the purpose of this study to summarize these processes of expansion and centralization; we shall simply record for comparative analysis the main lines of these procedures.

In the case of Spain, the basic picture is provided by the situation of antagonistic coexistence between the Asturian remnants of the Visigothic kingdom and the Emirate of Cordoba. At the same time, the Reconquest was a long and interrupted process, lasting from the 10th to the 15th century, of recovering lands under Moorish control. There was an adjustment over the distribution of power in the broad area of land in Christian hands. The kingdom of Asturias gave rise to the kingdoms of Leon, Castile, Navarre, Aragon and

later, Portugal. Despite occasional difficulties, Portugal would keep its independence and extend as far as the Algarve by capturing Moorish lands. The other successor kingdoms to Asturias, under the increasingly powerful leadership of Castile, were eventually unified by the latter into a system that would lead to the union of Castile itself with Aragon that would in turn finally lead, under the predominance of the former, to create Philip II's Spain.

Great Britain would be created under the leadership of England, which would absorb Wales, Ireland and Scotland during a long process that would lead to the formation of the United Kingdom. France, under the leadership of the house of Valois and throughout the vicissitudes of the 100 Years War and later the conflict with Burgundy, would be unified from the base of the Ile-de-France and incorporate Bretons, Aquitanians, Gascons and Basques, the Dauphinate, the Burgundians and later the Franche-Comté, Lorraine and Alsace. Russia takes its shape from the eastward expansion of the principality of Moscow against the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan and to the west against Novgorod, the Baltic peoples, the Ukraine and Poland. Italy was unified on the basis of the house of Savoy and Piedmont absorbing Tuscany, the Papal States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In the case of Germany, after the initial expansion of Brandenburg to the east and the creation of Prussia, unification was achieved under Bismarck leading to the formation of the German Empire after the Franco-Prussian War.

In all these cases, we see that the expansion of the central core is initially based on political and military control which, on the one hand, leads to a clear imposition of the power of a historically well-constructed ruling group over others. On the other hand, though to a greater or lesser degree, this process also includes the acceptance of the superiority of one ethnic and cultural group or subgroup over the rest.

In all these cases, with a greater or lesser degree of acceptance or resistance on the part of peoples who are on the periphery of the process, the central core imposes the basic patterns of its cultural character on the system it is creating. The cultural pattern transmitted from the unifying center is frequently accepted by peripheral peoples, or by the majority of them, as a common legacy. This has happened in the more recent unifications, as in the Tuscan basis of the Italian language being imposed on the Italian kingdom and German on the German Empire. However this also happens in unifications that began in the Middle Ages where, in spite of the cultural characteristics of Scotland, as opposed to those of Ireland, English was imposed on Great

Britain. French also, notwithstanding the exceptions of Breton or Basque, easily achieved supremacy in the Kingdom of France at the end of the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance. But it was only after the effective generalization of the basic cultural characteristic of the central core being imposed on the rest of the country, whether it was native to the country or had been introduced, and to the extent to which the political power of that court was firmly implanted, that the obvious or subtle forms of discrimination that were mainly the privilege of the members of the central nucleus in relation to the periphery, began to disappear.

The second important observation concerning these procedures is the surprising extent to which today, after the consolidation of the resulting nations, cultural, political and other demands arise that are linked to older regional identities and come to represent a strong separatist impulse for certain regions or groups. This is the case of, among others, Scottish claims in Great Britain the claims of Bretons and Basques in France, of Basques and Catalans in Spain and, to a lesser extent, Bavarians in Germany or the South against the North in Italy.

When we compare the cases of these European nations with those of the classical world, we find that in both, although with a different level of intensity which seems to correspond to different levels of heterogeneity, the absorption of peripheral groups into the central system occurs through acculturation and depends on it. In contrast to what happened in antiquity, in the European countries acculturation was not restricted to the upper classes but permeated throughout the whole population. This produced the high level of political and cultural unity these countries achieved until modern times. On the other hand, to the extent that, because of many factors, this political and cultural unity has today come to have quite a minor meaning for inhabitants of these countries, their old regional loyalties and corresponding individuality have become more relevant and produced a noticeable demand for attention.

III. Nation and Empire in the Modern World

The Problem of the Nation

Modern nation states are a relatively new form of social organization which generally differs from all historical precedents. The basic nature of the modern nation state is the combination, based on a common historical

and cultural basis, often also on a common ethnic basis, of interrelationships between its members. This inter-relationship must be impersonal and direct, tends to be in fact privileged and almost exhaustive and, in terms of values, puts itself forward as deserving supreme loyalty and dedication.

The actually privileged and almost exhaustive nature of the interrelationship between members of the same nation state arises from the situation in which, for each member, the actual interlocutor is another member of the same state for almost all purposes of social life. For each member of the state, the axiologically supreme and all-embracing nature of the national condition arises out of the socialization of a civic and patriotic feeling between members that spreads the awareness of duty and dedication to the nation and loyalty towards it and its members because they belong to it. This inter-relationship is impersonal and indirect because of the great number and variety of the people who constitute a modern nation state, including smaller ones, in terms of the area for contact between individuals in which each member moves. When an anonymous and unknown member of the nation state appears, he or she is treated as a citizen by the rest, regardless of any other consideration.

The historical innovation introduced by the modern nation state is a result of the combination of its factual and axiological characteristics with an abstract form of inter-relationship between members and the all-embracing nature of that inter-relationship. For classical man, the *polis* was actually his main social environment and was valued more than the modern nation in terms of values. However, the inter-relationship between members was personal rather than indirect. Members of the state were known by their personalities, by their parents or their ancestors. Slaves did not take part in the social life of the *polis*. In the great societies of antiquity, as in the Eastern empires, solidarity between members was ethnic, with a family base of unilinear descent based on common loyalty to the monarch. In the Hellenistic Realms and the Roman Empire, solidarity was cultural and as such excluded the masses.

The characteristics of the nation state as set out above constitute a decisive political and cultural factor in describing society and its subsystems. Society, as is widely recognized and as I have shown in other works is, analytically speaking, a system made up of four subsystems: participatory,

cultural, economic and political. Each subsystem performs certain macrofunctions: the participatory system produces actors, roles and status; the cultural, beliefs and symbols; the economic, utility, and the political, orders. Analytically, the subsystems maintain between each other relationships similar to those of the materials required for industrial production. In exchange for these materials (actors, roles, status), the participatory subsystem receives integrative values of a cultural nature; the political subsystem receives internal order and external defense, and the economic one receives capacities for consumption. A similar exchange of products and materials is found in the relationships between the other systems. The following table shows this exchange in graphic form.

The characteristics of the nation state referred to above function as an intensifying factor in the raw materials-product exchange within the society they embrace. Thus they create, both in fact and as norms, conditions that partly supersede internal differences whether these are regional or local, or whether they are social in nature, and encourage an exchange of values between the subsystems in that society. For this reason, in societies belonging to a nation state, internal unity and solidarity increase, and so in a general way does the efficiency of intra-social exchanges. This produces a greater demand for legitimacy and reality in these societies which, along with other factors, helped turn the absolute monarchies of the 17th century into constitutional monarchies or republics in the 18th and 19th, at the same time leading these democratic states of law, by means of their inherent propensities, towards increasing levels of egalitarianism.

However, because of motives and circumstances mentioned in the first section of this essay, it so happens that the nation states belonging to the intra-imperial American system are in crisis (the same thing is happening in the ex-Soviet system). This crisis arises basically out of the growing difficulties these nation states face today, especially those on the periphery, in achieving their autonomy.

We have already had occasion to briefly analyze the problem of autonomy in the peripheral regions of the American imperial system and the requisites it depends on. The historical antecedents of the center-periphery relationships, both in the classical world and in the formation of certain European countries, have been analyzed. The rest of our study now requires a brief verification of the effects that loss of autonomy and other factors arising out of the current intra-imperial system have on the nation state.

| SUBSYSTEM PRODUCTS | SUBSYSTEM INPUT | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| CULTURAL | CULTURAL | PARTICIPATIONAL | POLITICAL | ECONOMIC |
| | | Formulators Communicators Believers | Sanctioning of values | Installation and operating facilities |
| | Beliefs and symbols | Integrative values↑ | Legitimacy 1 | Institutionalization; scientific/technological or magical/religious guidance |
| | Integrative values $\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$ | - Actors, roles, status | Internal defense External defense | Consumption facilities Ψ |
| PARTICIPATIONAL | Formulators Communicators Believers | Actors, fores, status | Decision-makers Executors Governed | Controllers Managers Workers |
| POLITICAL | Legitimacy ↓ | Decision-makers Executors Governed | Commands | Solvency ↓ |
| | Sanctioning of values ↑ | Internal order ↑ | Commands | Legal order ↑ Public services |
| ECONOMIC | Institutionalization; scientific/technological or magical/religious guidance | Controllers ↓ Managers Workers | Legal order ↓ Public services | Utilities |
| | Installation and operating facility | Consumption facilities | Solvency ↑ | |

Basically, this factor is related to the exchange of raw materials and products among the subsystems of a nation's society. Dependence on the imperial center is especially unbalanced for societies on the periphery of the system and affects the interaction of its subsystems because it substitutes for external raw materials and products some of the basic raw materials and products of the cultural and political subsystems of those societies. The most common form for this pathological system to appear in the American intraimperial system is in the growing importance the action of transnational businesses is taking on in dependent societies within the system.

The typical situation is for the most dynamic activities in those societies – in some cases extractive, in others commercial or industrial – to be taken over and exercised by branches of transnational companies under the central command of their respective headquarters and the local operational command of their subordinates. The most visible result of this process is the adoption of strategies, production methods, patents and trademarks

coming from central headquarters. At the same time we find directors and business teams from central countries operating in the economies of dependent countries. Alongside these more obvious aspects we often find at the periphery defensive arguments for the adoption of measures controlling foreign capital such as codes of conduct, the imposition on every company of local directors and teams, limits to the repatriation of profits, and other similar measures. Without here going into the possible benefits of those measures for dependent countries such as, in the final analysis, their effective economic or political viability, what is important is to highlight the superficial nature of this whole problem.

What we are really dealing with here is something very different, affecting a subsystem which is apparently not very much involved in the process: the cultural subsystem. The more the economic subsystem comes to be operated in its most dynamic sectors by branches of foreign companies, or is under the control of their central headquarters, the more its scientific and technological raw materials also start to come from the dominant countries. Thus, the main input the economic subsystem of a modern society receives from its cultural subsystem arrives by way of the cultural subsystem of another society, the central one. This situation profoundly affects the validity of the dependent country's cultural subsystem, in the same way as the tribal witch doctor's authority, together with local cultural values, is devalued and substituted in the medical field by a modern doctor.

When deprived of its dynamic function in directing science and technology in its own society, the functional devaluation of the cultural subsystem has a negative effect on its other functions and corresponding products. This is what happens when we draw up a list of the legitimizing values of the political subsystem and the values belonging to the participatory subsystem. Like a cell that loses some of its functions when invaded by a foreign virus, a society whose cultural subsystem is atrophied and devalued by the direct importation of a cultural subsystem from the central society loses some of its basic functions. Actually, with the atrophy of its cultural subsystem, this society also begins to lose the ability to regulate its social and political functions in terms of both values and norms.

Effects which are also pathological even though less virulent occur in societies belonging to the intra-imperial system that have kept their economic and cultural vitality, such as the European countries belonging to NATO. This happens when a basic product of their political subsystem such as external

defense comes to be underwritten by the political subsystem of the imperial center.

The national system of organizing society is, in practice and in terms of values, aimed at emphasizing the autonomy of the system and the interdependence of its subsystems. Atrophy in the cultural subsystem resulting from the loss of its function to direct science and technology, as happens in peripheral societies, and also atrophy of the political subsystem when it loses its external defense function (the case of NATO) or even its internal organization function (the case of many peripheral countries), creates an irremediable crisis in nation states. The national manner of organizing society is no longer compatible with the new situations that are typical of modern societies in the intra-imperial subsystem.

This crisis affects both peripheral and central societies, although to different degrees, the peripheral ones to the extent in which, with the growing and obvious non-viability of their autonomy in almost all national systems, lose their meaning and their society itself ceases to exist as a social project and is reduced to a territory and a market defined from the outside in. For their part, central societies, with the exception of the imperial center itself, are affected by the obsolescence of their respective political subsystems which maintain institutional command of their national systems while these, as in the Greek cities under the control of Macedonia or, more radically, the imperial provinces in relation to Rome, basically depend on political input coming from the imperial center.

Thus in the modern world there are two crises within the nation states that tend to run in parallel with those of the peripheral states. One of these dimensions affects the cultural subsystem - by means of the economic one - by depriving it of the ability to direct science and technology in the respective society. The present atrophy of the cultural subsystem in those societies also affects the validity of other products of this subsystem, which consists of basic input for the political subsystem (legitimacy) and the participatory one (integrative values).

The effect of this type of crisis is the gradual loss in these societies of their sense of a collective plan, turning them from a process for itself into a process in itself, in the form of a territorial market defined from the outside in. The corresponding effects of this deterioration in society are the importation from the metropolitan center of values of legitimacy and integration that take on a nontransferable utilitarian meaning in the service of the metropolitan elites and

their local agents. Governments in these countries, usually military dictatorships in the intra-American system, turn themselves into praetorian agents defending metropolitan interests and values. These countries, at least for the purposes of appearance and manipulation, preserve the symbols of their own nationality and independence and in effect turn themselves into a mix of provincial markets and concentration camps for the natives.

The other dimension of the crisis of nation states affecting central countries and, in a cumulative way, dependent countries on the periphery, concerns the political subsystem in its capacity to guarantee the external defense of the respective society. For developed societies that are members of the economic and cultural center of the American imperial system the effect of this crisis is to create a contradiction between the sovereign identity formerly preserved by the nation state and the real sense of a merely regional administration that such a state actually has. These societies preserve their collective viability in the form of a system of human interaction and have their own culture and economic self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, they are reduced to being nations only in a cultural sense and no longer in the sovereign political sense, as is the situation in the Helvetica Confederation, with its cantons and ethnic and cultural communities.

One of the results of the macro-political weakening of the nations described is precisely the reappearance of regionalist attitudes which once had their own historic existence until they were absorbed and stifled by processes of national unification. In these countries it is not simply a case of being guaranteed unfettered expansion of previously repressed regional attitudes as part of the wider development of their democratic feeling. It is above all a case of the disappearance of the nation's macro-political sense making regional subcultures and the loyalties linked to them important once again. At the same time, it no longer made sense to sacrifice those values in favor of the sovereignty of the nation state which in fact was no longer able to perform that function.

Limits and Alternatives

As we have seen, the intra-imperial system is not compatible with nation states as a way of organizing society in the form these states took in Europe from the 14th to the 19th centuries and at a later stage in the rest of the world under European influence. In fact and axiologically, the nation state requires an autonomy which the vast majority of peripheral countries have not managed

to achieve. Also, in relation to central countries which have been able to maintain the ability to exercise that autonomy, the intra-imperial system they belong to carries an insoluble contradiction between the functions of external defense inherent in the sovereignty of its states or the actual possibility of achieving it, and the tasks of those states, which are limited to internal administration.

The conflicts and contradictions between the imperial system and the nation states contain a certain number of models and solutions in terms of a system of alternatives that are more open or more closed for countries on the periphery, and are more or less rational for the system as a whole. We shall have occasion later to analyze the way in which these relationships currently tend to be structured. For a proper understanding of the problem it is important at this point to consider generally the main questions on the table and the main alternatives for solving them.

The questions revolve around two aspects of the system: the external and internal. In its external mode, the system is intra-imperial: when confronted with another superpower it manages to reach a level of general superiority although with less scope and capacity. In the same mode, the system also confronts the emergence of a new regional power (China) and the possibility of the formation of others such as a properly integrated European Community and, more remotely, other systems. In its internal mode, the system is intra-imperial and needs to build relationships between the center and the periphery in a stable manner.

These ideas, in each of the dimensions referred to, are subject to certain critical limits the system must respect to preserve its stability. The ideas that appear on the level of intra-imperial relations do not provide for the United States possible routes that involve the risk of losing its overall superiority and, as far as possible, its situation of *primus inter pares* on this level. In the same way, in the intra-imperial dimension, relationships between the center and the periphery cannot be constructed in a form that the United States feels is centrifugal.

The inter-imperial dimension of the system lies outside the aims of this study, although problems arising from this dimension do appear within other problems. We find here the existence of two kinds of limits, the first is the result of the inter-imperial problem and consists of the need for the United States to guarantee itself conditions that satisfy its imperative needs for external defense, not only in the strictly military sense but also in terms of the other

elements essential for maintaining an appropriate military capacity both in terms of economics and technology as well as geopolitics, sociopolitics and other areas. From this situation arises the need, in its intra-imperial relations, for the system to impose certain limits on the political sovereignty of states within its sphere of influence.

The second critical limit for the United States in the intra-imperial dimension concerns its productive needs. The imperatives for maintaining the American productive system have three main aspects. The first concerns preserving access to raw materials and other input essential for the American economy that are not found in sufficient quantity in the metropolitan territory. The second concerns foreign markets for American products, both in the sense of ensuring a demand matching domestic demand as well as and in particular to deal with the growing requirements of the balance of payments in creating sufficient capacity for foreign expenditure. The third aspect concerns the internal productive process itself which, for both economic as well as social and political reasons, has to maintain certain minimal rates of growth and preserve the dynamism of the economy, especially in terms of technological development and innovation. Like the first, this second critical limit in American intra-imperial relations imposes certain restrictions, today economic ones, on the sovereignty of the states belonging to the system.

Taking into account these two types of critical limits, the United States is confronting a certain range of options in terms of possible models for organizing its intra-imperial relations. This spectrum of options presents basically three main alternatives. The first of these also appears historically as the initial alternative and is ethnocentric in nature. The situation of being a superpower and the center of an empire has been achieved by the United States through its own national development. As a nation confronting others in the context of an international balance of power originally conducted by the great European powers, the emerging powers are led into a nationalistic and ethnocentric game of maximizing their advantages.

This model was spontaneously followed by the United States as it emerged from the status of a middle-range power in the second half of the 19th century when, following that model, it entered the First World War. President Wilson tried to depart from the model in pursuit of his idea of universal peace guaranteed by the League of Nations but public opinion did not support him. The isolationism of the inter-war years saw a restoration of an ethnocentric sense of American imperial expansion.

A historical analysis of American international relations is beyond the scope of this study. We shall merely mention that during the 20th century the ethnocentric alternative generally supported by Republican conservatism and Democratic populism alternated with other options proposed by liberals as a model of international relations.

As an alternative, ethnocentrism is a way of maximizing the interests of the center in the historical short-term. The ancient empires of the East were ethnocentric. So also were the ephemeral attempts of the Greek cities at gaining power over each other and also the European colonial empires. Ethnocentrism implies the permanent and clear domination and exploitation of the periphery by the center based only on superior force and a narrow ethnic conception of the center itself. Thus it does not create stable forms of cooperation between the periphery (or parts of it) and the center, exposing the latter to permanent hostile alliances. In addition, this situation has a negative effect on the quality of life of the central society, which must take the form of a pirate society (the Phoenicians, Carthaginians and European colonial empires) or a military barracks (the Syrians, Spartans and Ottomans).

The second alternative consists in overcoming ethnocentrism and replacing it with an all-embracing central cultural system incorporating peoples and groups who identify with the central culture. As we have already seen in this study, this was the solution adopted by the Hellenistic Realms and the Roman Empire. It signifies an option with an enormous potential for stability, as the extraordinary longevity of the Roman Empire proves. Because it is a relatively open alternative and one which selectively adopts the most capable elements of the periphery, it creates a self-renewing system that tends to maintain its power and efficiency based on a meritocracy. On the other hand, this model has an inherent, and therefore anti-popular, propensity to oligarchy. In its later stages it creates a large internal proletariat because it has absorbed an external one, which tends to exercise strongly negative pressures on the system and helps to create its final destabilization.

Under Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy the United States experienced periods when the country clearly showed its choice of this model. In addition to great political decisions, the expansion of transnational companies is gradually introducing this alternative into the intra-imperial relations of the United States. At the level of a large firm and not of a nation, international expansion begins in an ethnocentric form. After a certain moment, however, the interests of the company and its expansion are much better served if

management chooses the model of all-embracing central cultural patterns. This is what transnational companies have done since the 1960s. They have created a style and manner of acting of the 'international executive' based on the American East Coast model. This international executive is turning into the modern equivalent of the *equites* of the Roman Empire. The expansion of this group in public and private management tends to create an international unit equivalent to that which guaranteed the administration of the empire under the power of Rome for many centuries.

The third alternative is ecumenical. It consists basically of a considered self-limitation of the central situation in time and space. This is carried out by means of a planned and gradual abandoning of centralism in favor of universalization for all peoples and tends to bring all classes together within the benefits of social life in an ecumenical dimension. This is an ideal model which, in contrast to the others, has never been effectively applied in history. Alexander's plans were never concerned with the details of relationships between peoples, much less the idea - which would have conflicted with his experiences of conditions in the East - of the extent to which an ethnic-cultural homonia implies also a social homonia.

This is not the place to hypothesize on what might have happened if an intra-imperial system could have been converted into an ecumenical system, even in its social aspects. I have had occasion to study some of the questions involved in that process in a recent book to which I can refer those interested in the subject. I shall simply point out here the fact that a planned and gradual ecumenization of the imperial system, although it involves conditions that are empirically difficult to execute, does not need - like some projects for reforming the world - the prior conversion of men into saints. It involves something which, though conflicting with the short-term views of central interests and their peripheral consequences, actually creates long-term benefits both for the center and the periphery. It is essential to understand this process and evaluate its viability, to bear in mind its viability over the long term. It involves, in the final analysis, a democratic variation of the preceding alternative, the central cultural system.

The main difference consists in the consideration by the center itself and administered by it, of how to gradually advance to the creation of sub-centers in the various regions of the system and distribute increasing measures of responsibility to those sub-centers, increasing at the periphery the extent and level of consensus for supporting the system. This, which evolves gradually

from the intra-imperial system to ecumenical coexistence, will lead to the consensual organization of an international authority.

This process, like one of the previous conditions, requires a substantial increase in levels of income and education among peripheral populations which will lead to a relative leveling out of conditions and ways of life in the great regions of the world or of the areas included in the system. To achieve the ecumenization of an intra-imperial system, the other required condition is its inter-imperial dimension. While significant centers of power are maintained within the system but are potentially opposed to it, the requirements for defending the system will exert anti-democratic pressures within it that will be difficult to overcome, and they will tend to preserve internally their intra-imperial nature.

The Current Trend

The intra-imperial American system continues to be an open process. To begin with, an understanding of the inter- and intra-imperial characteristics of the system is something that escapes its rulers, and also most of the rulers of the countries in its orbit - although it did not escape the understanding of the Soviets. The sociology of empire continues to be, within an empire, a field of knowledge restricted to intellectuals or, in contrast, to those operating intelligence services.

What keeps this process open is not exactly the lack of understanding of it on the part of its leaders, but the fact that the process develops in a spontaneous way without any of the alternatives previously referred to having been taken up in an irreversible manner.

Having made this general observation, it is necessary to point out the fact that intra-imperial American relations tend mainly, although in an unplanned and not even irreversible way, to follow the path of the second of the alternatives already discussed: that of all-embracing central cultural values.

As mentioned above, and an important factor in this context, transnational companies have adopted this model over the last 15 years. No less important is the fact that, in economic and cultural plans, the 'center' appears to be wider than on the political level, including at the same time European and Japanese transnationals, as well as the cultural contributions coming from those sources. Added to this is the fact that this process of incorporation by acculturation (as in the classical world) is gradually opening up in the direction

of the periphery: Latin American and South-Asian executives appointed to the upper management levels of company branches, the exchange of visiting lecturers between universities in these and other areas, etc.

There is no doubt that within the United States powerful tendencies towards ethnocentric options still exist. As has been mentioned, the more traditional or extreme conservatives, as well as the populists, are in favor of it. The dominant trend in those groups today is a basis of isolationism that leans on the myth of Fortress America and which is incompatible with the effective exercise of imperialism. In addition, it is important to realise that the United States has experienced internally the social non-viability of racism and is gradually managing to overcome the obstacles implanted by that tradition. Internal self-rationalism, which tends to prevail pragmatically, is also helping to overcome international ethnocentrism.

In the preceding picture the American intra-imperial system tends to differentiate between two levels of centrality: the political and the economic-cultural. The political center continues to be exclusively occupied by the United States and its rulers. On the other hand, the economic-cultural center is partly shared with other countries that are incorporated into the higher levels of the system and enjoy an appreciable level of autonomy: the countries of the OECD.

This economic and cultural center, based on common interests, on international corporate capitalism and on the same basic universal Western culture, brings with it an appreciable level of external competence and cultural variations arising out of the origins of the countries that belong to it. This situation, within the implicit option for all-embracing cultural values, keeps this economic and cultural center open to the selective incorporation of new members, under certain conditions. These conditions are generally those which, starting from a basic compatibility of interests and culture between the members of the center and possible candidates for inclusion, exhibit on the part of the latter a level of economic-cultural ability of such a kind that it requires a significant level of consensus and active co-participation on the part of the candidates to achieve the suitable interrelationship between the candidates and the central countries. Based on the preliminary qualifying condition of fundamental compatibility of interests and culture, it is a case in the final analysis of certain countries within the intra-imperial system becoming at a certain point too important to be treated simply as peripheral by the central countries. In terms of the cost-benefit and techniques of procedure, is better in these cases to allow those peripheral countries to have a relatively high share of the advantages of centrality in exchange for their active participation in the economic and cultural processes of the system.

Today, candidates for inclusion in the center are countries like Brazil, Argentina, Iran and Nigeria, which have achieved a significant level of regional autonomy, and certain OPEC countries like Venezuela and Saudi Arabia because of their relatively high level of sectoral autonomy.

This type of structure, towards which the intra-imperial system is heading, provides the advantages consequent on the model of all-embracing central cultural values mentioned previously. On the other hand it shows a growing difference between the center (with its co-opted elements) and the masses at the periphery. As we have already seen, the model in question tends towards oligarchy and discriminates against external proletariats.

In the American Empire these consequences may be seen in the current relationships and tendencies between the center and on the periphery. Differences in income levels and discrimination in relationships of exchange and regulation, either formal or implicit, of the movement of people, are becoming more pronounced. The periphery is increasingly working at subsistence level for the masses and as a concentration camp for natives in which a kind of complementary workforce is occasionally recruited. This happens at peak moments in the central economies and when demand drops, these workers are returned to their countries of origin with no protection.

The negative effects of central cultural values to which we have made a brief abstract reference are increasingly felt in the intra-imperial system. These effects may be gathered into three main categories.

The most obvious negative effect of the model is the increase in intraimperial tensions together with their repercussions in the form of inter-imperial tensions. The systematic discrimination against the periphery and the continued worsening, especially in relative terms and with regard to the masses, of the imbalance between the conditions of the periphery and those of the central countries, paints a picture of increasing conflict in North-South relations. Central countries tend to exercise a repressive grip on peripheral ones while the potential for terrorist reprisals increases in the latter. The destabilizing effects produced by these intra-imperial tensions spread into inter-imperial relations, thus creating new conditions for the expansion of Soviet influence, if not direct or indirect Soviet military intervention, as has happened in various regions of Africa. As a result, opportunities for armed confrontations between forces of the two empires increase, with consequent and incalculable risks of the conflicts spreading out of control.

A second type of negative effect brought about by current intra-imperial tendencies and linked to the preceding one, is the non-viability of setting up a reliable world order to provide efficient and equitable solutions to the extremely serious problems it has to deal with. As well as the vital question of peace, the world is facing a huge range of very serious problems that cannot be solved by nation states, especially with the crises that are affecting them, nor even by isolated decisions of the superpowers. On the one hand these problems concerning the preservation of the biosphere and the planet's ecological system in general. On the other, they concern the many aspects that need coordinated international administration, whether it is the management of collective natural resources - such as the oceans, the atmosphere, etc. - or whether it concerns general human and population interests such as health, food and their equivalents.

In addition to these problems is the fact that, because of the exploitative nature of their international position and consequent lack of consensus surrounding them, the current course of intra-imperial relations is depriving central countries of the chance to properly manage these matters even in the narrower scope of the Western world.

The third kind of negative effect arising out of the present intra-imperial situation concerns the central countries themselves. This happens in two different ways. On the one hand, as happened in the ancient world, the external proletariat of the Western world has become an internal proletariat of the intra-imperial system as a whole. In this situation, the increasing destabilization of intra-imperial relations, while penalizing peripheral peoples in an immediate way, rebounds on the central powers in not only in the form of terrorism and other types of violence in general, but also through the economic and social effects of this destabilization.

The other way in which the increasing imbalance of intra-imperial relations is affecting the central powers concerns their ethical and ideological institutions and values. Thanks to having overcome many of the problems and conflicts of their initial phases of industrialization during their history, central powers find themselves constructing internally more consensual, egalitarian and free societies. For this reason, their high levels of income are a decisive precondition. In more immediate and apparent terms, the imbalance of intra-imperial relations which they benefit from is an important factor in their level

of prosperity. In fact, however, building egalitarian and non-repressive societies needs, in addition to adequate material bases, a serious social and humanistic plan as a factor in deciding the values of motivation and continuance of that type of society, and it is precisely at this point that the negative feedback of international imbalance makes itself felt.

No social and humanistic project today can maintain its validity and consequent capacity for social effectiveness if it restricts itself to selected minorities, either in terms of a class within a society, or in terms of countries at the international level. If the material advantages that central countries reap from the current unequal division of opportunities in the world gives them the necessary economic pre-requisites to build an egalitarian, free and non-repressive society, this same international inequality will correspondingly invalidate ethically and ideologically all attempts at social development.

The social development of central countries is inextricably linked to the general development of the world and its peripheral majorities. And once again, just as happened in the ancient world, imperial solutions, even if intelligently managed, will once more have a negative effect on the central societies themselves and their ruling classes.

Conclusions

The thematic complexity of the present study and the use of a double perspective in framing it, the historical and the systematic-analytical, makes it advisable to finish with an explanation of the main conclusions that the concept of peripheral autonomy within the intra-imperial American system has led to.

As we have seen, the intra-imperial system allows an appreciable level of autonomy to countries that satisfy certain requirements and are economically and culturally linked in terms compatible with the basic interests and values of the imperial center.

There are two types of requirement for autonomy: enabling and exercising. Enabling requirements contain two conditions: (1) national viability and (2) international permissibility. The dominant powers impose a choice: (a) countries aspiring to autonomy either achieve suitable technical and business autonomy internally or (b) in compensation they continue to enjoy favorable conditions in their relations with the imperial center, especially in ethnic and cultural terms.

Imperial systems generally tend to relate to their peripheries according to three main alternative models: (1) the ethnocentric, as in the case of the ancient Eastern empires; (2) all-embracing central cultural values as in the case of the Hellenistic Realms and the Roman empire; (3) universalizing and equalizing ecumenism, which is an ideal model that has not been empirically tested but towards which Alexander's imperial plans were working.

In the case of the intra-imperial American system, we see that at the start it was incompatible with the organization of society in the nation states as they had appeared in Europe after the 14th century, and later, through European influence, in other regions of the world. In terms of countries belonging to its economic and cultural center, such as those of the European Community and Japan, the intra-imperial system curtails one of the basic functions of nation states by taking over their external defense and imposing corresponding restrictions on their sovereignty. In addition, in peripheral countries, because of the dominance transnational businesses have acquired in their economies, the system deprives their cultural subsystems of the basic function of supplying technical and scientific input to their respective societies and, with the atrophying of the cultural and political subsystems of those countries, also deprives them of their own collective endeavors and turns them into mere territorial markets and concentration camps for their natives.

By means of these restrictions on the nation states that comprise it, the intra-imperial system is showing a tendency, which is neither deliberate nor irreversible, but clearly observable, of moving towards the alternative of all-embracing central cultural values. Within this tendency an important factor is that the transnational businesses that control the economy of the system have defined themselves during the last 15 years within the concept of the cultural-value model.

Within a center-periphery relationship that tends to be constructed in terms of the cultural-value model, autonomy for peripheral countries has become difficult to achieve, depriving almost all of them of the chance to reach that situation. In effect, only a very small number of peripheral countries manage to satisfy in principle and in a cumulative way, the enabling and energising requirements referred to previously. Neither can they relate to the imperial center in economic and cultural terms compatible with their basic interests and values.

Among the countries showing signs of being able to immediately achieve general autonomy we find those that have recently reached a significant level of regional autonomy such as Iran, Brazil and Argentina as well as, possibly, Nigeria. Some OPEC countries, especially Venezuela and Saudi Arabia,

which have also recently reached a high level of sectoral autonomy, seem to have a chance of achieving general autonomy.

Given this conclusion, it would be important to analyze more carefully, in relation to these countries, how much their possible rise to general autonomy would require an increase in their present technical and business autonomy as a prerequisite. Would it be a case of applying to these countries - as might be imagined in principle - the need to firstly achieve sufficient technical and business autonomy to reach general autonomy at an international level? Or, in this case, or in some cases, could there arise some form of compatibility of the economic power of transnational companies with the preservation of their social integrity and the consequent preservation of the validity of their sector? This problem would require a detailed analysis that would go beyond the scope of the present study, but it would be interesting to explore in a detailed way on another occasion.

To conclude, I shall state the final proof of the present study in that the American intra-imperial system, as occurred in the classical world, is internalizing its old external proletariats and thus creating two serious factors leading to its own destabilization. On the one hand, the system perpetuates and aggravates tensions, with their potential for terrorism and expandable conflicts, between the center and those parts of the periphery without authority, which are almost all the countries belonging to it.

On the other hand, by perpetuating unequal forms of relationship between the center and the peripheral countries and among the latter, especially in terms of the great exploited masses, in their attempt to build freer and more egalitarian societies at the center, the system suffers negative feedback to its ethical and ideological values because of these exploitative relationships which the center itself creates and on which it is based.

2. The Significance of Mercosul (1992)

1. Latin American Integration

Origins

Latin American integration is an old and historic aim in the region. For Spanish America, the idea of integration has its earliest roots in the ideals of Bolivar. In terms of the whole of Latin America, the proposal for regional integration originated in CEPAL [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean – trans] in the 1950s. This plan, which was well received in theory by all countries in the region, had an active supporter in Felipe Herrera when he was president of the IDB. He authorized studies to be made on the subject (the Aldhelio Project) and formally linked the Inter-American Development Bank to the idea of integration.

In spite of many efforts and continual declarations of support by almost all the region's governments, the idea of integration has made only modest progress in recent years. Institutions with more restricted regional scope such as the old ALALC and the present ALADI, like the Andes Pact and the Central-American Common Market or of a more specialist types such as SELA, have managed to be formally constituted and performed quite a useful role. But in all cases, results have been quite modest. ALADI, the most important of these institutions has not managed to account for more than 30%

of the volume of trade between its members and an even smaller share of their foreign trade. SELA, for its part, has been more useful because of the initiatives and contributions of its Secretariat than as an instrument to promote common projects between countries in the region.

Obstacles

Why does Latin America not integrate? Taken as a whole, Latin America consists of a far too heterogeneous and unbalanced collection of countries with extremely varying levels of potential and development. A horizontal and wide-ranging integration of this group of countries does not have any operational viability today. There is a considerable gulf separating Central America and the Caribbean from the great countries of South America such as Brazil and Argentina.

In contrast to the utopian idea of horizontal integration between such a disparate group of countries, the idea of selective agreement in the areas of the economy, science, technology and politics between Southern Cone countries based on Argentinean-Brazilian integration does, on the other hand, present itself as a fully viable possibility with a very high level of reciprocal suitability. It was precisely in this way that European integration developed, based on an initial agreement between France and Germany which gradually and carefully broadened to embrace the present-day 12-nation Europe.

Mercosul

As is generally known, the greatest potential for agreement among Latin American countries is that which exists between Brazil and Argentina. Because of their size and relatively high level of development, these two countries will form the axis of any integrationist process in Latin America. Uruguay is naturally an integral part of this axis, acting as a link between these two countries not only geographically but also in terms of economics, culture and politics. Paraguay, for its part, is an integral part both historically and currently, of the Southern Cone system. It remains for Chile, which also forms part of this system to opt rapidly to join Mercosul or to decide to continue not being a member.

Mercosul's relevance becomes particularly decisive when we consider on the one hand in economic terms, the restrictive effects on Latin America which will soon result from the activation after 1992 of the European Community, the American-Canadian-Mexican common market and the cooperative system between Japan and the newly industrialized countries of Asia. On the other hand, at the political level this relevance becomes strategically decisive when we consider the extreme vulnerability which Latin American countries will in isolation be subject to from a globally powerful *Pax Americana* in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

II. The Precedents

The EEC and ALALC

The need to open up markets to create economies of scale and increase economic space to support research and development efforts has been increasingly felt during the 20th century. It was in Europe, where a large productive and scientific-technological capacity was feeling the restrictions of national markets most acutely, that the plan for economic integration which Jean Monet encouraged so strongly was inspired.

In 1951 the Coal and Steel Community was the first stage of a large-scale integration project. The Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community in 1957, began a process of gradually incorporating most of the countries of Western Europe into that Community. The Single European Act of 1985 gave a decisive push to the Community, making 1st January 1993 the starting date of its full official existence.

Initially started by Western Germany, Belgium, France, Holland, Italy and Luxembourg, the European Community gradually expanded to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1972. Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986.

The example of the EEC had strong repercussions in Latin America, so much so that CEPAL and Prebisch began to recommend a project for integration in the 1950s. In 1958, the Central-American Common Market was formed. In 1960 Mexico and the countries of South America formed the Latin Associação Latino-Americana de Livre Comércio – ALALC (American Free Trade Association), which in 1980 became the Associação Latino-Americana de Integração -ALADI (Latin American Association for Integration).

The ALALC-ALADI experiment produced positive but relatively modest results. The countries of the region continued to trade with countries outside it—the United States and Europe—to a significantly higher level than within it, where

trade remained at about 30% of the total. The differences in relative levels of development, difficulties of transport and medications between the North and South of Latin America, the technological and financial superiority of the major countries and various other factors reduced the practical capacity of the system.

Within this context the differences in economic philosophies of ALADI members were accentuated. Mexico was becoming increasingly linked economically to the United States. The countries bordering the Andes tried by means of the Andean Pact to demonstrate their individuality and form a subsystem inside ALADI, although this did not achieve any practical results.

Brazil-Argentina

A new factor which introduced new possibilities for integration in South America was the change that occurred in 1979 in the relationship between Brazil and Argentina. Traditionally rivals since 19 century in the rhetorical dispute for regional supremacy which neither country had effective possibilities to exercise, the two countries were led to a higher level of confrontation by arguments concerning the hydroelectric use of the river Paraná then the conflicting demands of the Itaipu and Corpus power stations. Finally and opportunely, a rational position was taken by both countries over this problem which turned confrontation into regulated cooperation with the mediation of Paraguay with the 1979 Corpus-Itaipu Tripartite Agreement. After this change in Argentine-Brazilian relations, and after the re-democratization of both countries, these relations developed rapidly into a project for economic integration and broad-based political understanding. The 1986 Integration and Cooperation Act was followed by the Integration and Cooperation Treaty in 1989 which confirmed the integration between the two countries and included also Uruguay.

With the Treaty of Asunción (26th March, 1991), tripartite integration became quadripartite with the inclusion of Paraguay to form the Common Market of the South – Mercosul. Chile, which should be a natural member of this group, felt that the opening up of its economy had advanced significantly more in relation to the four other countries and thus preferred to delay its decision on whether or not to join the Common Market of the South.

Table 1 Mercosul - Basic Data

| Countries | Territory | 1989 Population in | GDP 1989 | | | |
|-----------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------|------------|---------------|------------|
| Countries | 1,000 km² | Millions | Total US | Industry % | Agriculture % | Per Capita |
| | | | \$million | | | US\$ |
| Argentina | 2,767 | 31.9 | 53.070 | 33 | 14 | 2,16 |
| Brazil | 8,512 | 147.3 | 375.100 | 43 | 9 | 2,54 |
| Paraguay | 407 | 4.2 | 4.130 | 22 | 29 | 1,03 |
| Uruguay | 177 | 3.1 | 7.170 | 28 | 11 | 2,62 |
| Total | 11,863 | 186.5 | 439.470 | | | 2,356 |
| Chile | 757 | 13.0 | 25.250 | 40(1) | 9(2) | 1,77 |

- (1) 1990 Data from *L'État du Monde*, 1992.
- (2) Data from 1965.

Source: World Development Report, World Bank.

III. The Treaty of Asunción

Details

The treaty was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in Asunción on 23rd March, 1991 and set out the basic lineaments and aims of a common market between the four countries to be operational by 31st December, 1994.

The general details of the Common Market of the South – Mercosul, may be summed up in the following main points: (1) free movement of goods, services and production factors without any tariff or non-tariff barriers; (2) the adoption of a common external tariff and an equally common foreign trade policy by coordinating positions in regional and international trade debates; (3) the coordination of micro-economic and sectoral policies in the areas of foreign trade, industrial, monetary, fiscal, exchange, capital market, customs, transport and communications; (4) harmonization of relevant internal legislation to guarantee and strengthen the integration process. To this end, the Treaty envisages the adoption of commonly agreed rules, a problem-solving system and, by December 1994, the right to adopt safety clauses restricting imports from fellow-signatories that might be causing severe damage to the economy of one of them.

For its members, Mercosul provides three main areas of integrative procedures: (1) the area of exchange of goods, services and production factors (2) the area of scientific and technological cooperation; (3) the area

of joint ventures; (4) the area of harmonizing relevant legislation; (5) the area of making macro-economic policies compatible, and (6) the area of operational measures – logistic, financial and administrative – related to the practical execution of the integration process.

Exchange

The importance of the first area related to exchange, is initially quite modest, especially for the two larger economies in the system. As can be seen in Table 2, in the period 1986-1989 Argentina's total exports were US\$32.2 billion; those of Brazil US\$ 116.7 billion; those of Paraguay US\$2.4 billion and Uruguay's were US\$5.3 billion. In contrast to these figures, as is seen in Table 3, the exports of each country to Mercosul partners in the same period came to no more than the following: Argentina, US\$2.5 billion; Brazil, US\$3.2 billion; Paraguay, US\$621 million; Uruguay, US\$1.1 billion. As a proportion of total exports for this period, these figures represent: for Argentina, 8%; for Brazil, 2.7%; for Paraguay, 25.8% and for Uruguay, 20.7%.

Table 2
World Exports and Imports of Mercosul Countries - in US\$ millions

| Brazil | Exports | Imports |
|-----------|---------|---------|
| 1986 | 22.249 | 15.557 |
| 1987 | 26.225 | 16.581 |
| 1988 | 33.783 | 16.055 |
| 1989 | 34.392 | 20.022 |
| Total | 116.749 | 68.215 |
| Argentina | | |
| 1986 | 6.851 | 4.724 |
| 1987 | 6.360 | 5.818 |
| 1988 | 9.136 | 5.319 |
| 1989 | 8.842 | 4.297 |
| Total | 22.189 | 20.148 |
| Paraguay | | |
| 1986 | 232 | 479 |
| 1987 | 409 | 675 |
| 1988 | 484 | 507 |
| 1989 | 1.281 | 677 |
| Total | 2.406 | 2.238 |

| Uruguay | | |
|---------|-------|-------|
| 1986 | 1.088 | 869 |
| 1987 | 1.189 | 1.142 |
| 1988 | 1.388 | 1.177 |
| 1989 | 1.637 | 1.271 |
| Total | 5.302 | 4.459 |

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics – IMF – 1990

Table prepared by: FUNCEX

Table 3 Import-export Exchange between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay – US\$ millions

| Imports | Brazil | Argentina | Uruguay | Paraguay |
|---------------|----------|-----------|---------|----------|
| Exports (fob) | | | | |
| Brazil | | | | |
| 1986 | X | 682 | 203 | 291 |
| 1987 | X | 832 | 268 | 288 |
| 1988 | X | 975 | 321 | 341 |
| 1989 | X | 710 | 334 | 323 |
| Total | X | 3,199 | 1,126 | 1,243 |
| Argentina | | | | |
| 1986 | 698.1 | X | 129.3 | 67.4 |
| 1987 | 539.4 | X | 168.4 | 60.9 |
| 1988 | 607.7 | X | 187.4 | 80 |
| 1989 | 702.6 | X | 210 | 91.3 |
| Total | 2,547.8 | X | 695.1 | 299.6 |
| Uruguay | | | | |
| 1986 | 286.3 | 88.1 | X | 4.6 |
| 1987 | 204.1 | 113.2 | X | 6.8 |
| 1988 | 229.1 | 100 | X | 7.5 |
| 1989 | 354.6 | 105.5 | X | 8.8 |
| Total | 1,084.10 | 407.4 | X | 27.7 |
| Paraguay | | | | |
| 1986 | 92.13 | 35.17 | 6.4 | X |
| 1987 | 63.1 | 53.87 | 15.02 | X |
| 1988 | 125.18 | 33.09 | 5.71 | X |
| 1989 | 340.54 | 46.04 | 9.28 | X |
| Total | 620.9 | 168.2 | 36.4 | X |

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics – IMF – 1990

Table prepared by: FUNCEX

Studies carried out by the Institute for Political and Social Studies (Projeto Alvorada, Rio de Janeiro, 1991) show there is a large margin of import substitution in favor of Mercosul. In a period of about three to five years these countries will be able to substitute a significant proportion of the imports they now receive from third countries for imports between each another, a proportion that should treble the value of imports within Mercosul. Thus, if we consider this same period of 1986-1989, trebling exports to Mercosul for a country like Brazil would raise the level of its exports to the Southern Cone, relative to total exports, from 2.7% to 8.2%.

This growth trend, however, has already been noticeable in the last two years. Trade between Mercosul countries, which came to a total of US\$ 2.7 billion in 1989, rose to US\$ 3.6 billion in 1990 and to US\$ 4.9 billion in 1991.

More significant than total export volume, especially when measured against overall trade within the Southern Cone in recent years, are the sectoral effects on the productive capacity of these countries as a result of the significant increase in potential markets that will accompany the Mercosul agreements. Given the characteristics of the countries in question, the demand for imports that will lead them towards each other will be concentrated mainly on a limited number of specific items. Wheat and temperate-climate crops on the one hand, and on the other, coffee, cacao, and tropical-climate crops. Light industrial products and certain consumer durables on the one hand, and on the other heavy industrial products and other types of consumer durables. Demand for products from the sectors will be greatly increased. The effects arising out of large increases in certain sectors, many of which are very important in the respective economies of these countries, will have a correspondingly dynamic effect on their economies.

Still in the area of commercial exchange, special reference should be made to the high level of economic activity that goes on between the frontier regions of the Southern Cone member countries, to which the integrative process provides a great stimulus. A large amount of trade is carried on across the Argentina-Brazil border between the provinces of Corrientes and Misiones and the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Rio Grande do Sul. The Uruguay-Brazil border is an extremely active area containing several towns whose metropolitan areas spread into both countries and are separated by a few streets frequented equally by completely bilingual people from both sides

of the border. The Paraguay-Brazil and Argentina-Paraguay borders are also areas that see a high level of exchange of goods, services and people.

Joint Ventures

The intense economic activity carried on between the frontier areas of Southern Cone countries, a significant part of which is not recorded in foreign trade statistics, is responsible for most of the joint ventures between neighboring countries. As well as frontier-based joint ventures such as bridges, electrical or telephone transmission lines, transport and storage services and inter-bank dealings, Mercosul is encouraging the formation of bi-national companies and multinational institutions to coordinate common interests. The model for these larger-scale joint ventures has been created by the integration process between Brazil and Argentina in areas of the latest technologies such as nuclear energy, bio-technology and aeronautics. Another result of this integrative experiment is the already well-advanced formulation of a legal system to suit the needs of bi-national companies. After some adjustments, these studies will help to build a suitable system for quadripartite companies in the Southern Cone.

Science and Technology

Scientific and technological cooperation, some of it carried out through joint venture businesses, are extremely relevant within Mercosul. Indeed, one of the main challenges facing countries coming late to the process of scientific and technological innovation is that of overcoming the increasing restrictions the leading countries are placing on access to up-to-date knowledge in order to perpetuate dependence on countries with greater ability in this area. Twenty years ago, a Third World student with qualifications could succeed on his or her own merit in entering the great universities in the leading countries and could master the most sophisticated levels of theoretical and applied knowledge. With the growing conversion of technology into the most important factor in production, the large transnational companies are beginning to confine as much as they can of scientific and technological innovation to their own laboratories which are protected by security and by intellectual property laws.

As has already been done in current experiments in the fields of nuclear energy, biotechnology and other areas, Mercosul provides member-countries with facilities for cooperation that will substantially strengthen the independent scientific and technological capacity of each of them. Merely reaching conditions of a critical mass in their scientific and technological ability will enable late-coming countries to overcome the barriers which a growing technological neocolonialism is putting in their way. As recent scientific and technological progress in Japan shows - and as we are beginning to see in Korea and China – restrictive measures for protecting knowledge do not prevent it spreading when a sufficient level of ability has been reached. Only by means of appropriate training however can progress be achieved in this crucial area since technological transfer agreements are useless if the receiving country does not have the suitable capacity to take advantage of it.

Macro-economic Policies

No less important are the benefits that Mercosul will bring to its members in the area of macro-economic policies and related legislation. What creates a common market is bringing together the macro-economic policies of its members, which is much more effective than suppressing customs and non-customs barriers.

When member countries of a common market achieve compatibility between their macro-economic policies and related legislation they produce an extraordinary benefit in restricting the margins for government decisions and impose on the latter rational agendas for conduct in the areas of monetary, exchange, fiscal, labor, industrial and commercial policies, as well as a necessary requisite for the common market to function. The example of the European Common market is extremely relevant in this respect. The adoption of appropriate common macro-economic agendas based mainly on the norms of good practice of the Bundesbank, imposed a vital discipline on the more lax governments of the European Community and reduced to tolerable measures in member countries the levels of inflation and factors controlling production costs.

Political Aspects

If the aims envisaged by the Treaty of Asunción become effective the formation of a Common Market of the South will provide a marked increase in the international negotiating capacity of member countries. A market of

almost 200 million inhabitants with a GDP of more than US\$ 400 billion represents an international body of considerable weight. This weight provides members of Mercosul with a vital counterbalance in a world in which major markets based on Western Europe, the USA-Canada-Mexico axis and Japan's links with Asian NICs, will dominate the international economy.

Although the relative weight of Mercosul (a GDP of US\$ 440 million) may be extremely modest (EEC with a GDP of US\$ 3.3 trillion, USA-Canada-Mexico with a GDP of US\$ 5.8 trillion) international coordination of the economic, scientific/technological and political interests of Southern Cone countries guarantees them an infinitely better position than they could have in isolation. The benefits of international coordination do not only come from uniting strengths and using them in a unified way. They also come from the fact that this coordination eliminates the disadvantages of a zero sum game arising out of mutually damaging forms of competition on the international stage between Mercosul countries.

Another important result of Mercosul if its results correspond satisfactorily to expectations is that the Common Market of the South will constitute a pole of attraction for other South American countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, South America is polarized between two trends. One, summarized in the Treaty of Asunción, will lead to a gathering of forces around the Brazil-Argentina axis. The other, which has a strong influence on Chile and to a lesser extent on Venezuela and Colombia, will tend to move, like Mexico, towards a broader openness to world markets and to closer links with the United States. The success of Mercosul will show other South American countries that their entry into the world market in general and especially into that of North America will be much more favorable if they belong to a regional system that can significantly raise their international negotiating ability.

Conclusions

As we draw near to the end of the century, Mercosul constitutes a vital solution to caring suitably for the interests of member countries on the international stage, to preserving their capacities for self-determination, expanding their markets and opening up to them alternatives for international exchange in the face of restrictions that might arise out of the restrictive policies of the mega-markets. It constitutes above all a necessary condition for achieving significant growth in their scientific and technological capacity and

increasing their chances of developing internally their chances of reaching higher levels of theoretical and applied knowledge and contributing to modern innovations.

For Mercosul to be an effective common market and not simply a rhetorical treaty it is, however, vital that even in 1992, member countries should succeed in controlling their chronic rates of inflation as much as possible and impose a rational and responsible regime on their public systems. Only when these pre-requisites have been dealt with will the Southern Cone countries enjoy the conditions that will make their macro-economic policies compatible with each other and mobilize their production systems to work competitively within Mercosul and the international market.

3. The State in Latin America (1994)

1. The State

General Aspects

As an institution and agent for regulating the public interests of self-governing societies, the State originated when the first civilizations formed in Mesopotamia, Egypt and certain other places, including pre-Columbian America. The distant origin of the State is found in the transition during the Neolithic period from family authority to territorial authority. The process of gathering together small groups of houses to create the city states, which happened first in Sumeria, led to the formation of States at the same time as religious authority, which controlled the temples and through them, collective life, was being subordinated to a political authority – the Mesopotamian *ensi* or *lugal* – even though this was initially exercised by a priest-chief.

From the sacred states of the ancient East to contemporary states, the idea of a State and the practice of its functions have obviously undergone immense changes, among which we note the gradual emergence of a private environment as opposed to a public one, the idea and practice of individual rights, the distinction between the sacred and profane, the differentiation between the State and government and the different ideas of what the attributes of the State should be. Nevertheless, the use of the same term, State, to

describe the kingdom of Uruk in 2850 BC and the United Kingdom today in 1994 AD is not arbitrary, but signifies the existence of basic common characteristics in spite of the temporal and cultural abyss separating these two kingdoms.

These common characteristics consist of the fact that, within the conditions that define every culture, at every time and in every society, the State is always, in sovereign societies, the instrument that regulates and administers public interests or those interests that are understood as deserving of public supervision.

The State, as conceived in the form mentioned above, is always subject to a fourfold set of obligations which we might label as (1) functional, (2) historical-cultural, (3) representational and (4) international.

The functional obligation is the result of what it is understood that has to be done for the sake of the public interest in a specific natural and cultural context. Opening canals with regulated flows of water and building temples in the Sumero-Akkadian civilization or promoting economic and social development in conditions of financial stability and social equity while maintaining a democratic and liberal legal order in the present situation in Latin America, are functional obligations of the State.

The historical and cultural obligations are those which, in every historical period and every society arise out of their respective culture in general and more specifically from their political culture, and determine what is understood as being the task of the State and the form of political organization best suited to it.

The representational obligation is that which, in the natural and cultural conditions of each society, arises out of the system of social interests and forces prevailing within it. No State is completely autocratic, even if it has that formal appearance, as in the Egypt of the Pharaohs and the Russia of the Czars, since the autocrat must necessarily take into account the major social forces – priests, the military, businessmen – and deal suitably with them. In the same way, no democracy is totally egalitarian since there is an inevitable predominance of those interests capable of exerting the most pressure.

Finally, international obligations are those that depend upon the position of a society within the international context. This obligation has made itself felt from the formation of the first states because of the relationships of cooperation or conflict they maintained between each other and with the

neighboring barbarian communities. This obligation still exists, in spite of the end of the Cold War.

The Latin-American State

Generally, the Latin American states were constituted in advance, following the shape of their respective societies, in contrast to what happened with modern European states or with the United States. In Europe, the states that emerged from the transformation of barbaric kingdoms into medieval monarchies were formed according to the characteristics inherent in their respective societies. The development of the latter through dramatic periods of history such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Counter-reformation, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution and more recent vicissitudes, caused corresponding changes to the European states until they took on the form they have today, of liberal-social parliamentary democracies.

In Latin America, the State was formed by the process of colonization, with a markedly less important contribution from local populations than occurred in the English colonies in North America. The states that emerged from the independence movements in Latin America developed as a result of the interests and ideas of a small group of notables and preserved the basis of those characteristics until the first third of the 20th century.

The transition of European societies from societies of notables – sometimes in the form of democracies of notables as in Great Britain and the Netherlands – into middle-class societies – sometimes middle-class democracies – took place from the end of the 18th century until the first half of the 19th. The middle-class societies turned into stable middle class democracies from the middle of the 19th century until the beginning of the 20th, some of them passing through authoritarian periods such as the French Second Empire or Bismarck's Prussia. Despite the events in these occasional periods of authoritarianism, middle-class societies in Europe achieved universal primary education by the beginning of the 20th century.

The transformation of many of these middle-class societies into mass societies between the two World Wars was a more turbulent process which gave rise to phenomena such as Western Fascism and Soviet Communism. After the Second World War, however, a stable form of social democracy spread over Western Europe which was characterized not only by universal primary education but also by a significant reduction in the distance between

social classes. The gap between the average lowest salaries and the highest was reduced to a ratio of not more than 1 to 20 and in some countries it was 1 to 5. In Eastern Europe the Soviet system, although it lasted much longer than Western Fascist regimes, did not survive the 1980s.

In Latin America, the transition from middle class democracies to mass democracies was only achieved in a few cases, such as Uruguay and Costa Rica. More recently, and in an even less satisfactorily stable way – given the extent of military power held by General Pinochet – it has happened in Chile. In Argentina the recent stabilization of its mass democracy still needs to pass the double test of bringing exchange-rate stability into line with price stability, and also the presidential succession.

Thus there persists in Latin America a great mismatch between its political culture and its economic and social reality. After having flirted with European Fascism and Communism, Latin American political culture has also been recently led, under the influence of the international situation, into a neoliberal trend of opening themselves up to the international market along with a greater or lesser degree of social commitment. In contrast to this political culture, Latin American societies show, with few exceptions, a marked tendency on the one hand for a very low level of education, productive capacity and standards of living among the masses, while on the other hand their production systems either depend too much on primary products that are subject to dramatically falling relationships of exchange, or their manufacturing capacity is not very competitive internationally.

This contrast makes it very difficult to adjust the production system to the demands of the international market and therefore it creates serious employment problems and risks large sections of local industry becoming obsolete.

The Crisis of the State

To a certain extent there is a crisis in the State in all Western countries. This crisis is basically the result of a notable lack of correspondence between democracy as a norm and as a process. In modern Western society it has become common to believe that a democratic regime is a necessary condition to confer legitimacy on any form of public power. Within this belief there is a general acceptance of a democratic model based on the representation of popular will through parliaments in a State

of Law that protects the rights of individuals and minorities and sets out the legal conditions for winning and exercising power. Despite this, in almost all Western societies the democratic process has shown itself to be notably unsatisfactory in comparison to the ideal model of democracy and to the expectations which emerge within this model on the part of the people.

The dissatisfaction which is being aroused by the democratic process in Western countries is based on the insufficient attention the political class pays to the expectations of citizens. The idea of the 'political class' and the social situation expressed by it has much to do with the frustrations of the electorate. Indeed, the democratic model that has been accepted by the West is a legacy of the ideas of the Enlightenment and especially of Rousseau. It implies setting up a system that allows the 'general will' to be identified and applied, in other words, more than the sum of individual desires, it is that which in the honest opinion of each citizen, expresses the collective interest. However, what happens is that the practice of the democratic process has departed significantly from Rousseau's model and made it inapplicable in the actual conditions of modern societies. The general will that appears at the ballot box is the expression of the collection of majority of private interests a specific time, and often has little to do with what each citizen, expressing his or her own convictions objectively, understands as being suitable for the whole of society. In practice, the general will is the expression of a group of private interests that are a majority when compared to other alternative groups.

As well as this central aspect, which has already been studied in depth by political science, most notably in Schumpeter's analysis, what has increased on the other hand, as the 'political class' has been effectively constituted as a corporate system of interests, almost as a social class, is the situation of the electorate, despite being given importance rhetorically, being subordinated to the corporate interests of this class.

And thus the electorate has a feeling of impotence since it is forced to choose between parties and personalities which basically look to their own interests as a political class in the name of and under the pretext of representing the interests of electors. This frustration has caused increasing absenteeism at the ballot box on the one hand, and on the other it is encouraging the appearance of political movements that are extra-parliamentary when they are not anti-

parliamentary: regional and sectoral leagues, trade union fronts and other groups that divert parliaments and governments from working properly.

Latin American states suffer like others from these kinds of problems, to which are added the problems typical of Latin American societies that often put the governability of those societies seriously at risk.

The problems that result from conditions particular to Latin American societies may be put into two groups: economic-financial and social-political. In the first group we find the problems that arise in part from the difficulties in adjusting Latin American economies to the competitive structures they find when they open themselves up to international competition and also, for reasons quite closely connected to the former, the problems arising out of a structural imbalance between public expenditure and income.

As has already been mentioned, since Latin American economies developed with greater or lesser degrees of success after the Second World War by means of import substitution, between the 1970s and 80s they exhausted the possibilities of this model and today are left with production systems that are either subject to falling terms of exchange in the case of most raw materials, or, in the high-technology industry and service sectors, lacking sufficient international competitiveness. If they do not open up to the international market they will increase their level of obsolescence and backwardness. If they do open up, they will lose their competitive capacity in their own country, creating growing unemployment and the gradual disappearance of their industrial infrastructure.

Since, in practice, all the countries in the region have significantly increased the amount by which they have opened up their economies to international competition, almost always through unilateral decisions, and since they have been forced at the same time to adopt severe anti-inflationary measures, they have been hit by a high level of recession that has created serious fiscal imbalances, with resulting problems for governability.

The second group of problems - the social-political ones - concerns the crisis of social transition these countries are passing through in changing from middle-class societies to mass societies or, in the case of Central American countries, from societies of notables into middle-class societies. This crisis of transition is frequently made worse by the type of international relationships that exist between certain countries.

Crises of Transition

The crisis of transition in Latin American societies occurs in six main forms. The first is found in the case of Central America, with the exception of Costa Rica, and to a large extent in the Caribbean, with the exception of Cuba.

These are societies based on monoculture agriculture – bananas or coffee – which until recently had been kept under the control of a landowning oligarchy associated with foreign capital and protected by Armed Forces that acted as custodians of the *status quo*. In this socio-economic framework the masses mainly remained in their position in the form of rural manpower. A small professional middle class had to choose between being acolytes of the oligarchy or being revolutionaries. While the romantic revolutionary option, clothed in legitimacy by Marxist-leaning ideologues, created movements that endangered the *status quo*, the job of the local Armed Forces became more relevant and they ceased being mere custodians of the oligarchy in order to share with it the status of a ruling class, autonomously taking political command of their respective countries. At the same time they became the only channel through which the emerging middle class might have access to the upper levels of power.

The international collapse of the Communist movement and of the validity of Marxism substantially weakened Central American guerrilla movements without, however, setting up a properly institutionalized and stable transition to a middle-class democracy. The main reason for this is the fact that the Central American oligarchies had lost control of their own armed forces, which had set themselves up in autonomous centers of power that were independent of civil control.

The second form of the transition crisis is found in countries where the transition from middle-class society to mass society is hindered by problems of ethnic integration as is seen most acutely in Bolivia and Peru and to a lesser extent in Ecuador and partly in Colombia, not to mention the effects of ethnic problems in Central American societies, particularly Guatemala. In these countries, the formation of a mass democracy confronts almost insuperable problems. The indigenous masses that are incorporated into the process of creating a national civilization exist at too low an educational and social-economic level to be able to practice their rights of citizenship in a manner compatible with the development and modernization of the country. On the other hand, in Peru large sectors of the indigenous masses, mobilized by an

anti-Western intelligentsia with a dubious theoretical background, coming mainly from the University of Arequipa, following aims equivalent to those of the Khmer Rouge, provide fighters or support for revolutionary terrorist movements with the greatest capacity for destabilization, possibly unable to take power but certainly able to deprive the country of the basic conditions for governability. The increasing evidence of the association between revolutionary terrorism with criminal drug-trafficking lends those movements quite terrifying proportions.

A third form of transition crisis which is quite closely related to the previous one, is found in countries where transition to mass democracy is obstructed by the excessive inability of the masses to achieve a reasonable performance in exercising political citizenship. This is most serious in Brazil and includes countries like Venezuela, Colombia, Paraguay and Argentina.

Paraguay is a relatively benign case and its problems arise from the fact that a long period of military authoritarianism artificially kept in power a society of notables, thus leading the country to a rapid change from that situation to a mass society without having passed to a significant extent through an intermediate stage. The imbalances arising out of this transition have made it difficult to create a mass democracy. There are, however, many indications that these imbalances can be put right over not too long period, especially if the Mercosul project succeeds.

The case of Argentina is also different from the rest because, in contrast to the situation in Brazil and Mexico, to quote the most typical cases, Argentina does not have serious problems of lack of general education, nor of intolerably high levels of social separation. Although in recent years, the levels of general education and of living standards of the masses may have fallen, more that 70% of the Argentinean adult population (15 years or older) have completed first grade (six years of schooling), in contrast to Brazil were less than 10% of the adult population have finished first grade even though this consists of eight years of school. On the other hand, although the social differences in Argentina grew worse in the 1980s, they are far less than those found in Brazil or Mexico.

The problem for Argentina in the transition from a middle-class democracy that has been formed under Yrigoyen, to a mass democracy instituted under Alfonsin and which is being consolidated under Menem, lies in overcoming once and for all the negative aspects of Peronism. Peron created a system to consolidate a mass society in Argentina but he invested it with antidemocratic features characterized by extremely illegitimate forms of verticalist

authoritarianism. Menem, who is showing a desire to restore Peronism and thus win the elections after the Social Democrat-leaning period under Alfonsin, was able to steer the party into a Democratic-Labor direction while adopting a Social-Liberal policy at government level. If it can politically consolidate a new direction for the Justicialista Party and achieve administratively a satisfactory harmony between domestic price levels and the exchange rate, Argentina will be assured of its conversion into a stable mass democracy. Depending in part on the success of the Mercosul project, this could happen in quite a short time.

The problem here is that the third form of transition crisis appears in a particularly serious form in the case of Brazil. After a turbulent period of transition that began with victory in the Revolution of 1930, Brazil succeeded in building and running a successful middle-class democracy under the protection of the 1946 Constitution. During this period Brazil created the most modern and efficient State in the Third World. In the same period, however, in spite of the accelerated process of industrialization, the country continued to be a mainly agrarian society until the 1960s with most of its people working in agriculture. The agrarian elite, whose economy depended on the availability of cheap and docile labor, kept the population in the countryside completely uneducated.

In the following years, there occurred a huge exodus from the country to the towns, which grew at a dramatic rate and today accounts for 75% of the population without, however, a large proportion of rural migrants being successful because of their lack of qualifications and opportunity, in joining the modern economy and thus they create a huge mass on the margins of society which today surrounds all of Brazil's large towns. In addition, the urban education system, designed to serve the middle classes, has proved unable to educate children of rural migrants properly, with large numbers of them repeating grades and absenting themselves from school.

So right up until today we still have a very low level of education among the masses, together with the wretched living conditions of the marginal populations and the extremely insecure situation of those earning up to three minimum wages (currently, a minimum wage is worth about US\$ 70.00), who make up more than 37% of the labor force.

So what happened with the restoration of democracy in Brazil in 1985 was that the country became a mass democracy before it had trained the majority of its population to have a reasonable ability to exercise political

citizenship. This immense lack of preparation has created on the one hand tendencies towards an irresponsible distributivist populism the inevitable effect of which is the creation of chronic forms of superinflation associated with the increased dilapidation of public systems. On the other hand, in spite of current international examples, the more organic sectors of this uneducated proletariat maintain their illusions concerning the nationalizing actions of socialism and making the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and important union bodies such as the CUT powerful agencies that sustain obsolete policies and create obstacles which may be difficult to overcome if the State is to achieve a rapid and socially equitable modernization of society.

A fourth type of transition crisis is found in countries like Uruguay and Chile which have much better chances of turning themselves into a solid mass democracy but whose resource base is insufficient to maintain the aspirations of providing a high level of consumption for the whole population, as happens in Western Europe and the United States. The problem in these countries consists in avoiding a mass democracy that will result in inflationary or populist effects arising out of a large-scale consumerism greater than national production can satisfy. In the mass democracy in these countries, it is a question of managing to speed up their development on a timescale and in terms that are compatible with an agreed maintenance of limits to consumption that will allow the nation to deal with the demands of this accelerated growth.

A fifth type of transition crisis is found in countries where adjusting to the international economy brings about an unbalanced relationship in its integration with the American economy. Typical cases of this are Mexico and Central America and, in more favorable terms, Venezuela and Colombia. The crucial problem these countries face is the mismatch in chronological terms and in certain other important aspects, between the positive effects of the liberalizing policy of opening up to the international market and the negative effects of the same policy.

In principle we might suppose that a policy of freely opening up one's economy should lead to attracting foreign capital and technologies that would raise the country's productivity and make it a competitive exporter of certain products, putting added value on products and creating new jobs, mainly at a higher level. These positive effects however tend to happen, when they actually do occur, over a significantly longer period and to a quantitatively lesser degree, than negative ones. An open economy allows the importation of better and

cheaper foreign products that wipe out large areas of pre-existing productive sectors, with the subsequent loss of jobs. In addition, in most cases simply opening up the economy when that action is not accompanied by adequate protective measures does not lead to a new and more competitive form of industrialization but rather to the country's entry into the international market as a producer of low-technology items whose value is falling in terms of exchange. This means an increase in unemployment in both the short and long terms and continued relative impoverishment of the country in international terms.

The sixth and final form of adjustment crisis to be considered in the case of Latin America concerns problems relating to reciprocal measures of macroeconomic compatibility among the signatories of the Treaty of Asunción. These problems will also occur in other countries in the region that join Mercosul or adapt the same kind of integration agreements between themselves.

Mercosul provides a decisive solution for increasing markets for Uruguay and Paraguay, who have their main buyers in Brazil and Argentina. For the two large countries of the Southern Cone the common market, although quite relevant in terms of commercial exchange (it represents more than 20% of foreign trade for Argentina and more than 10% for Brazil) is mainly important in terms of the scientific and technological opportunities it offers and the international implications of that situation. The increasing privatization in more advanced countries of cutting-edge knowledge resulting from their technological research makes it imperative in countries like Brazil and Argentina, which have their own scientific and technological establishments that are relatively important but second-rate in international terms, to join forces to develop the sector.

Mercosul does not only depend on good cooperation between the Foreign Ministries of its member countries - although this does exist - but essentially on a satisfactory reciprocal macro-economic compatibility. This compatibility, as well as involving complex problems in terms of law, labor relations and politics requires, especially on the part of Brazil and Argentina, a rapid solution to its main problems: defeating Brazilian super-inflation and in Argentina, matching its internal costs to its exchange rate. Both these problems, which in principle are perfectly soluble, are beset with great difficulties. In Brazil there are extraordinary political and institutional difficulties. In Argentina there are not inconsiderable difficulties in achieving in a short space of time a significant increase in industrial productivity - in a context which is shrinking internally

and externally - together with measures that will make the exchange system more flexible without feeding inflation.

II. Trends in Latin America

NAFTA and the Initiative for the Americas

In addition to other international gravitational forces, notably that of the EEC, Latin American countries feel the attraction of two other poles of very different strength: the pole of the United States through NAFTA and the Initiative for the Americas, and the Brazilian pole through Mercosul and the Amazon Pact. This latter pact will not be dealt with in the present study because it is of interest only to countries in the Amazon basin.

The United States, the greatest economy and the greatest scientific and technological complex in the world, exercises an extremely powerful attraction for all the countries in the region, especially those in the Caribbean and to the North of it. This attraction finds a space to function in quite well-structured terms, but with limited scope in the North American Free Trade Agreement -NAFTA. Another space that stretches throughout the Americas, in wideranging but still extremely vague terms, is the Initiative of the Americas which will henceforth be referred to simply as the Initiative; within this system NAFTA has an irresistible attraction for Canada and Mexico. In terms of these two countries, economic integration with the United States is already signed and sealed. The agreement has the merit of consolidating and institutionalizing this situation, making the participation of Canada and Mexico more equitable. As is well known, its ratification produced resistance in the United States from business sectors that fear the competition of cheap Mexican labor and to a certain extent the effects of the Canadian Welfare State on American social policy. The Clinton government has succeeded, however, in ratifying the agreement but is not insensitive to certain American fears. On the other hand, in Mexico the decisive support of the Salinas government and of broad sectors in the country did not prevent strong resistance to the agreement from the left wing which feared increase unemployment as well as the denationalizing effects that would tend to result from economic integration with the United States.

The attraction of the American economy for Latin American countries, which is particularly strong in Central America, the Caribbean and the North of South America, has led some to hope for possible ways of joining NAFTA

and many have hoped to achieve this result through the Initiative. This last point has led Venezuela and Colombia, who already have a special relationship with Mexico, to the idea of joining the Initiative and speeding up its establishment.

The attraction of the American economy and a more intimate relationship with it by means of the Initiative is felt more keenly in the Southern Cone countries of Uruguay and Chile and even in Argentina, where the traditional sphere of influence of Buenos Aires conflicts with the continental ambitions of other regions.

Chile, the country in the region that has gone furthest in opening up its economy and adopting neoliberal practices, has refused, although not definitively, to join Mercosul because it refers to be a member of the Initiative and linking its economy with that of the United States while at the same time maintaining a similar position in relation to the European Union.

In Uruguay, neoliberal ideology has a strong following which means it agrees with Chilean policies but realism makes the country remain a firm partner in Mercosul, which provides more than 50% of its foreign trade.

After being traditionally the Latin American country least connected to the United States, Argentina is currently giving the highest priority to its relationship with that country without prejudicing its links with Mercosul. Strong neoliberal feelings in Argentina and the Hanseatic tradition of the Buenos Aires economy work in favor of joining the Initiative. As in the case of Uruguay, however, political realism makes Argentina maintain its commitment to Mercosul even though it is carefully watching the development of the crisis in Brazil. There is a growing tendency in Argentina to feel that the viability of Mercosul will be damaged by Brazilian stagflation if this is not corrected relatively soon.

The Mercosul System

The 1991 Treaty of Asunción which constituted the Common Market of the South - Mercosul, represented an extension of the logic of the process of increasing cooperation between Argentina and Brazil that had begun with the Itaipu Agreement in 1979 and was definitively consolidated with the 1988 Treaty for Integration, Cooperation and Development. With the traditional rivalry between Argentina and Brazil transformed, and not before time, into a system of ever-closer cooperation which represented both political alliance

and economic integration, it was necessary and inevitable that Uruguay and soon afterwards Paraguay - the two countries on which the effects of that rivalry had the greatest effects - should become partners in this integrative process.

As has been mentioned, the benefits obtained directly from Mercosul are different in each member country. For Uruguay and Paraguay they consist above all of a large expansion of their markets, which gives them much better opportunities for development. For Argentina and Brazil, without adversely affecting the broader expansion of their foreign trade, the most relevant benefits of the Common Market of the Southern Cone are scientific and technological cooperation and a significant rise in their standing in international relations.

If they can overcome the main internal obstacles hindering their development relatively quickly, it will be necessary for both countries to rapidly increase their scientific and technological capacity in order to consolidate that development, to which end Mercosul gives them an appropriate means for cooperation. On the other hand, in a world of regional hypermarkets, Mercosul represents to its members a valuable reinforcement both in directly guaranteeing them a significant share of foreign trade, as well as in indirectly raising the international impact of each of them in terms of negotiation and dissuading third parties from unilateral acts of protectionism.

It is important to bear in mind the fact that the current division of international power between the United States, Japan and the European Community reveals the instability inherent in all tripartite systems. In these systems, whether they are Roman triumvirates or three-part divisions of power between nations, there arises a tendency for two of the elements of the system to unite against the third. In the present world situation there are signs that in spite of their reciprocal idiosyncrasies, the United States and Japan tend to resolve their interests in a way that is detrimental to Europe. In the resulting picture of market wars Mercosul will form a valuable tool to defend the interests of its members and encourage both the EU as well as the United States and Japan to give them much more favorable treatment than they would receive separately.

However, Mercosul depends basically on Brazil. Because of its semicontinental size, the level of development already reached and its extraordinary potential for growth in a relatively short time, Brazil forms within the American system, although in extremely unbalanced terms, an alternative pole to the United States. For countries in the South of South America, a close link with the Brazilian economy gives them preferential access to a large market with immense possibilities for expansion that can satisfy a significant part of the needs of its partners with the great advantage of guaranteeing them a system of actual equality in negotiation which the power structure of the United States makes it impossible for that nation to provide, even if we disregard its imperial pretensions.

The success of Mercosul and the very viability of this common market depend on the extent to which Brazil succeeds in overcoming in a relatively short time the deep crisis it has been struggling with since the 1980s and which has become extremely acute over the last two years. The main factors in this crisis are political and institutional and have been correctly dealt with by Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso in his Stabilization Plan or *Real* Plan. If the *Real* Plan has the hoped-for effect, Brazil will be able to overcome its great crisis and follow the path of a promising sustainable development. Alternatively, if inflation infects the new currency the Brazilian crisis, again in a relatively short time, will tend to lead to a major crisis with unforeseeable consequences.

External Influences

If we accept the hypothesis that the Brazilian crisis will be properly resolved, perhaps by the end of 1994, thus ensuring suitable conditions for the Common Market of the South to be firmly established, the countries of the region distributed between NAFTA, the Initiative and Mercosul will have to resolve complex internal problems and achieve an equally difficult macroeconomic reciprocal compatibility in order to adjust to these systems.

For countries that have linked their economies to that of the United States within NAFTA or the Initiative, these problems can be summarized into two major items: saving jobs and saving a satisfactory level of industrial capacity. These problems are appearing in a specific and immediate way in Mexico.

The acceptance of NAFTA by the United States has always carried the condition of free movement of economic factors among member countries, not only free migration of Mexican labor into the USA. Already suffering high levels of unemployment, the United States could not afford an influx of millions of Mexican workers into its territory. Realizing that this restriction is was a necessary condition for setting up NAFTA, the Mexicans accepted it on the grounds that the revitalizing effects of a common market with United States

and US investments in Mexico would help their development and create new sources of employment.

As has already been mentioned, this perfectly feasible hypothesis may not work. The timescale between losing jobs in Mexico because of the lack of competitiveness of various sectors of the economy and the revitalizing of employment as a result of new American investments may be too long for Mexico's social and economic capacity to sustain. On the other hand, the hoped-for American investments may not happen to the extent that is desired because of the need felt in the United States in the face of Japanese competition, to channel major resources into modernizing its own industrial infrastructure. It may also happen, as a result of the labor-saving characteristics of modern technologies, that new investments in Mexico will have a low capacity to create jobs.

These less than optimistic scenarios will create powerful contradictions in countries like Mexico between the preservation and administration of economic integration with the United States and the domestic demands of their masses. We recall that similar problems, created by European industrialization in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, were resolved by mass migrations to the Americans. People in America are, however, have nowhere to emigrate to on a large scale. A country like Mexico can therefore only solve the problem of accommodating its economic integrity in relation to the United States and, along with it, the process of modernization, if it is possible either through flexible attitudes of the United States in terms of resisting Mexican immigration, or through a reappearance of Mexican authoritarianism to force its masses to remain within their national territory.

In the case of Mercosul, the viability of which as has been pointed out, depends on Brazil overcoming its present crisis relatively quickly, the problems of reciprocal macro-economic compatibility between member countries, especially between Argentina and Brazil, are extremely complex.

If Brazil can reduce its inflation to tolerable levels, no more than 20% per year, and is able to rebuild its public services and give them a reasonable measure of efficiency and equality, its competitive capacity will become markedly superior to that which Argentina enjoys at the moment and will tend to raise Brazilian trade surpluses to excessive levels. Even in the current situation Argentina is facing increasing difficulties to export, both to Brazil and to the rest of the world because its internal costs have tended to increase by about 15% per year since the Cavallo Plan at the same time as, with the

current peso-dollar parity being rigidly held to, the American currency has in real terms suffered a devaluation of less than 3% per year.

While Brazil's basic problem lies in the rapid adoption of wide-ranging institutional reforms which, as we have seen, present major political difficulties, Argentina's basic problem, also not easily solved, is how to achieve a suitable match between internal costs and exchange rates. The official line, maintained by Minister Cavallo, is that it is up to Argentinean business leaders to raise their productivity and lower their costs to adjust the latter to the current parity of exchange. While this idea may be formally correct it may, for both technological and cultural reasons, run up against the inability of Argentina's productive system, if we leave out the exceptional case of wheat, to reduce its cost increases from about 15% to about 3% per year. If this reduction does not take place over a relatively short time, the Argentinean economy, as happened with the policies of Martínez de la Hoz, will feel the devastating destructive effects of rigidly holding to the current parity of exchange. It will also run the risk, if it adjusts its exchange policy to the present array of internal costs, of reopening the door to the inflation which was controlled by Cavallo at such cost.

As tends to happen in history, when favorable alternatives are feasible, they can be executed if there is sufficient confidence on the part of leaders and reasonableness on the part of social and economic agents. These favorable alternatives, both for countries in the NAFTA system as well as those in the Mercosul system, can be executed. If the United States and Mexico can arrive at an understanding concerning the question of employment in Mexico and create the appropriate mechanism to administer it, the negative effects mentioned above can be minimized. The subsequent speeding up of Mexican development will establish liberal-social policies in that country and the democratic regime will have extremely favorable results in the USA itself.

In the same way, overcoming the Brazilian crisis, which is perfectly possible within the policy drawn up by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, can be achieved by the end of 1994 bringing the country to a promising future of economic and social development and the stabilization of democratic institutions which in turn will probably lead to the election of Cardoso as President of the Republic.

Overcoming the Brazilian crisis is the main precondition for the success of Mercosul. It is important, however, as we have seen, for Argentina to balance its costs with its exchange rate. This also is perfectly possible and to

achieve it that country must create suitable conditions, ranging from the competence of its economic leadership to recognition by the major economic and social agents, that this result must be achieved.

The unfavorable alternatives, however, which in Brazil are found mainly in political obstacles and in Argentina in technical and managerial difficulties, are very large indeed. If these obstacles cannot be overcome both countries will suffer dire consequences that may hold up for quite a few years in the case of Argentina, and for very many years in the case of Brazil, a stable conversion of these countries into modern, egalitarian mass democracies.

4. Pax Americana or Pax Universalis (2000)

1. Introduction

A) The Legacy of the 20th Century

The 20th century was a century of great revolutions. It saw the establishment of mass society - the rebellion of the masses that Ortega y Gasset speaks of - that led to the appearance of universal mass democracies at the end of the century. It saw the overthrow of countless social taboos and created freedom movements in the areas of sexuality, family hierarchy, values and the arts. It was a century of great political revolutions that led to Communism, Fascism and Nazism. It is also the century of the great scientific revolution of Einstein, Heisenberg and molecular biology, cybernetics, nuclear energy, telecommunications, missiles and space exploration.

The legacy of the 20th century to the 21st therefore is an extremely complex and contradictory picture. Almost everything has become possible and executable. However, with historical rules having been broken, society has suffered a chaotic explosion of uncoordinated liberations together with an alarming loss of control and a subsequent increase in criminality. The century ended with an extraordinary increase in what could be done scientifically and technically and the serious reduction in society's capacity to sustain itself and the viability of the world.

B) The Reconstruction of Society and Culture

Many social conventions are arbitrary. However, many others are ways, although not necessarily exclusive ones, of establishing parameters and patterns to which regular attention must be paid if there is to be any possibility of having ordered customs in society. The regular workings of society require the most relevant of these necessities for its viability to be widely adopted by its respective members. This guarantees the self-regulation of his society. Notwithstanding the need all societies have for rules to control individuals established by public power or other authorities no society can be exclusively regulated by external norms, but the main need of all societies is for a satisfactory self-regulating regime. With the overthrow of so many social taboos and the uncontrolled explosion of countless freedoms, together with the Nietzschean disbelief in transcendent values (the death of God) and the postmodern discrediting of transcendental values (denial of objective criteria for discovering truth, beauty, justice and good) the 20th century has created a society and a culture which in the final analysis are tending to lose their selfsufficiency.

There are various possibilities concerning the way in which we might proceed, in ways that would be widely accepted, to recovering the self-sufficiency of society and the self-validation of modern culture. Sorokin (*Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1941), 1959), based on wide-ranging empirical examples, proposes a reformulation of Vico's theory. According to Sorokin cultures obey a circular process that leads from an original ideational phase based on divine myths to an idealistic one based on rational theologies, then to a sensory phase based on empirical and analytical criteria. This slides into a hyper-sensory phase in which the complete relativization of values leads to the loss of objective criteria to decide what is true, beautiful, just and good. This leads societies to lose their self-sufficiency. In the resulting crisis, according to Sorokin, there appears a new ideational phase.

In its final decades, the 20th century definitely entered a hyper-sensory phase with the characteristics described by Sorokin. It is open to discussion, however, as to whether the resulting crisis in self-sufficiency will lead society to a new ideational period, as Sorokin predicted. What does not seem to be open to discussion is the fact that the increasing crisis of self-sufficiency in modern society cannot go on indefinitely. Even if we do not recover a belief in God, the loss of transcendent values will have to be overcome by new

forms of social and ecological humanism. If we do not return to the philosophical convictions of the beginning of the 20th century the loss of transcendent values will have to be based on new criteria objectively founded on values the same as those used in the exact sciences.

In order to guarantee a civilized social life that can meet the psychological and physical needs of man, the 21st century will have to recognize the need to rebuild and absorb on a broad scale objective ways of recovering effective belief in transcendent (even if they are not religious ones) and transcendental values, even if they have a different foundation from those of the 20th century.

On the other hand, the world that has been unified by technology, the process of globalization and the intercommunicability of all general interests, will need to create an acceptably rational and egalitarian world order without which no stable balance will be possible. This world order, which we can call the *Pax Universalis*, brilliantly foreseen by Kant (*Perpetual Peace*) at the end of the 18th century, having become even more necessary in modern times which have made possible the nuclear implosion of the world, still seems to be a remote, if not utopian, dream at the beginning of the 21st century. What seems to be forming is a *Pax Americana* which, although arising out of the hegemony of a generally benign power, is leading to a non-consensual way of organizing the world that is not supported by the majority of the world's population and definitely lacks a satisfactory level of rationality and equality. Thus, the 20th century will face a problem not only of avoiding the world erupting in a suicidal conflict, but also the inescapable need to finally succeed in instituting a *Pax Universalis*.

II. A Prospective Scenario for the 21th Century

A) Phases of the Process

In relation to the century which is about to start, it is reasonable to suppose that it will go through three phases. This three-part view clearly belongs to a certain way of understanding reality that runs from classical to Hegelian thought and also through certain post-Hegelian ways of thinking. However, without disregarding this logical and ontological perspective, the idea that the coming century will be characterized by three main phases may be accepted here for empirical reasons as a result of observing how previous periods have

developed and acted upon the legacy they have received from a preceding one.

In reaction to the dogmatic sectarianism of the 17th century and its religious wars, the 18th century began, with Fontenelle, by proposing an enlightened, tolerant and rational view of the world. The second half of the century led to the plan, carried out in cases such as Louis XIV's France and Frederick II's Prussia (although within the limits of the State of Law) and various other kingdoms, of instituting absolute monarchies, an idea which the Stuarts in Britain failed to put into practice. The final part of the century was marked by a spirit of criticism inspired by Voltaire and Rousseau and led to the American and French revolutions. After the Napoleonic interlude, the 19th-century instituted in its first phase, with the Congress of Vienna, Metternich's authoritarian legitimization of monarchy. The second period was libertarian with the French Revolution of 1830, reform in Britain, the even more radical movements of the 1840s and reform in Russia in the 1860s. The end of the century sees a return to authoritarian conservatism under Napoleon III, Bismarck and the reactionary policies of Czar Alexander III.

The 20th century began with the socialist liberalism of the Front Populaire, of the Weimar Republic, of Giolitti's Italy and with the idea, in the Russian Revolution, of setting up a just and egalitarian society. The following phase was marked by the emergence of Fascism and Nazism and by Stalin's consolidation of power in Russia, with the dogmatic and totalitarian tendencies that had already been seen in Lenin. The century ended with the restoration of democratic ideology, the collapse of Soviet Communism and the postmodern spread of a nihilistic culture.

B) First Phase

As mentioned earlier, the 21st century will initially have to confront the need to regain the self-sufficiency of modern society that has been affected by the loss of self-regulation arising out of the overthrow of countless previous social prohibitions, of the uncontrolled explosion of a wide range of freedoms and at the cultural level of the loss of transcendent and transcendental values.

We cannot foresee what form the process of social and cultural reconstruction will take in the first phase of the coming century. It is difficult to see how this process will consist of simply going back to the patterns that prevailed in the first phase of the 20th century. The transcendent values that

originated basically in the transcendence of man's rational freedom can hardly return to being based on a new belief in God when modern thought leads precisely to the declaration that the idea of God is something that is a result of human transcendence. We must therefore presumed that a new concept of transcendence will be based on a new humanism, a humanism suited to the era of a mass technological society that will have to be different from the individualist humanism that existed from the Greeks until Goethe and Cassirer, and will become a social and ecological humanism.

It is equally difficult to assume that a new transcendentalism will return to the positions of neo-Kantism and the culturalism of the beginning of the 20th century, in spite of the permanent aspects contained in that line of thought. A new transcendentalism will have to develope from the criteria of objective testing of the truth employed by modern science, in a stochastic rather than an apodictic way. These are criteria that have nothing to do with the nihilistic post-modern hyper-relativism of the end of the 20th century.

As well as demanding a new cultural basis to overcome the nihilistic hyperrelativism of postmodern culture, the complex and globalized technological mass society of the beginning of the 21st century will demand values and ways of behavior to overcome a completely purposeless consumerism. What parameters and patterns of conduct will make it possible to trust the administration of this complex society is a question to which we cannot reply in advance. We can only think that these patterns will have to be of a nonfortuitous and highly predictable nature in order to give a long-lasting and universal stamp of trustworthiness to the system.

We may draw an analogy with the Greek and Roman world and the way in which that world saw purposeless consumerism on the part of broader sectors of the elite exist alongside the stoic harshness of the life of minorities who managed in those conditions to sustain classical civilization, that can show us the path towards similar ways of coexisting in the mass consumer society of the modern world.

As well as rebuilding self-sufficiency in modern society and culture, the 21st century will be faced with the need to build (or rather rebuild) a rational and egalitarian world order. The world has never been subject to rational and egalitarian order, although the classical *ecumene* enjoyed in the Roman Empire from Augustus to Marcus Aurelius (27 BC to 188 AD) two centuries of a rational and satisfactory and reasonably egalitarian system of ordering the cultural conditions of the time. Only in modern times, however, has the world

come to be unified, a process which today's globalization is taking to its logical conclusion. This economically and technically globalized world needs a corresponding institutionalized organization. During the second half of the 20th century the world was held in a precarious bipolar balance. When the collapse of the Soviet Union broke this balance in 1991 there remained only one superpower to exercise a growing global hegemony and create a system to organize the world that can be called the *Pax Americana*.

It is not the aim of the present study to analyze the Pax Americana. It is important merely to point out two of its aspects. The first is that the 'American Empire' now in the process of expansion and consolidation, is different from other empires in history from the Roman to the British because it is not trying to institutionalize itself or take on the shape of an empire and impose its sovereignty on territories under its control or influence by replacing or damaging the sovereignty of the States that govern them. The 'American Empire' is on the one hand a 'field', an area in which US actions are developed, and on the other hand it is a regime of conditioning. The power of this 'empire' is exerted precisely through the pre-existing institutions that ruled the territories included in the 'field', conditioning them to adjust to a certain objective parameters and patterns. These consist in an extrapolation of the US legal and cultural system and in imposing, although rarely openly and forcefully, norms that open up the Empire's territories to the operation of American companies and to free access to their goods and services.

The second aspect to emphasize in relation to the *Pax Americana* is the fact that, although it tends to be benign, it has met with varying degrees of rejection on the part of peoples in its 'provinces'. In contrast to the situation in the Roman Empire which, at its height - after the violence and confusion of the first period of conquest - imposed rational and egalitarian legal order by means of its *jus gentium* and the *praetor peregrinus*, that was well received (with the exception of Judaea) by the elites and middle classes of the provinces.

Pax Americana on the other hand encounters large areas in which it cannot impose itself. This is primarily the case in China, but also to a considerable extent in Russia, the key countries of the Islamic world such as Iran, and India. This 'bunker' which is either not subject to, or is insufficiently subject to, Pax Americana, does not at present have the ability to oppose it or even resist it. As will be observed below however, everything indicates that this situation will tend to change in the course of time and it seems that in

the middle of the 21st century it will consolidate into an anti-American system that will create a new bipolarity in the world.

All these circumstances and characteristics reveal the fact that at the beginning of the 21st century, the process of globalization has not succeeded in creating the corresponding institutional system that must in one way or another be achieved to ensure the very viability of the world.

C) Second Phase

If we assume that the first phase of the 21st century shows the basic characteristics described above, we may suppose that the second phase will present two main aspects. The first will tend to consist in the consolidation of a new form of society and culture created in the preceding phase. The second will tend to convert into opposition in the former resistance to *Pax Americana* found in China and possibly other countries.

As has been noted, the reconstruction of social and cultural conditions for self-sufficiency in the first phase of the coming century will not consist in a return to the patterns of the first half of the 20th. It is true that society and culture need objective bases for their self-sufficiency; it is no less true that the traditional bases of transcendence and transcendentalism were seriously damaged by the criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger, among others.

Recovering transcendent and transcendental values in a mass technological society will occur as a result of that society's requirements for survival. Only a new humanism with a powerful social and environmental orientation will be able to restore transcendent values in the immanentist ambience of modern culture. Only a new basis founded on the criteria of modern science will be able to restore the transcendental values of a globally technological world. It seems that the result of these reconstructions, however, will lead towards creating a social and environmental technological humanism.

As with everything concerning the future, it is impossible to predict what this new humanism will specifically consist of. We may imagine that it will establish a relationship of coexistence between the human and the technical equivalent of the way in which, in pre-technical humanism, man coexisted with nature. We may equally presume that a new social humanism will be incompatible with the forms of exclusion that have been tolerated and even justified by individualist humanism, such as slavery in the classical world, the

poverty of the proletariat in the bourgeois world and of peripheral groups and peoples in the modern world. If the relationship between individualist humanism and the excluded has been to some small extent mitigated by stoic compassion and Christian charity, in technological humanism of a social and economic nature, the relationship between peoples and groups will have to be a globally inclusive one dictated by its own need for balance within a much less egalitarian regime.

The other facet of the second phase of the coming century shows characteristics with a high level of probability. Indeed, if China and other members of the 'bunker' that is resistant to *Pax Americana* manage to preserve their autonomy and impressive rates of development, both of which are quite likely, a country like China will equally reach a level of sufficient equivalence with the United States by the middle of the 21st century.

China stands out from all other countries by reason of its population, basic homogeneity, the level of development it has reached at the beginning of the 21st century and other characteristics such as being the nucleus of a future bipolarity with the United States. Two further questions remain open. On the one hand, in terms of the middle of the 21st century, there is the question of whether, in addition to China, countries like Russia, India, Iran or others will also be able to achieve a relationship of opposition to *Pax Americana*. On the other hand, there is the question of knowing whether a future bipolarity will form around a coalition of one or more of these countries with China in the anti-American pole or if, especially because of the role of Russia, a multipolar system will form, similar to that of the beginning of the 20th century.

As has been repeated in this study, it is impossible to predict the outcome of this situation. We can only observe the fact that American power, far from stabilizing at the level it was at when the 20th century closed, will continue to grow, although probably at a slower rate than that of China. Among other consequences, this means that the situation of effective opposition to *Pax Americana*, even in the middle of the 21st century, only seems to be feasible if a stable coalition can be formed between powers resisting the *Pax Americana*.

D) Third Phase

Based on the presumed characteristics the second phase of the 20th century, the course and characteristics of the third phase will depend on how the preceding phase has turned out. History shows that new models of society and culture are subject to subsequent processes of consolidation or on the contrary, of crisis and conflict, to the extent to which they have or have not been successful. The religious and domestic dogmatism of the 17th century, with the horrors of the 30 Years War, created a strong rejection in the following period of all types of dogmatism that led to the tolerance and rational spirit of the Enlightenment. In contrast, the success of the enlightened society led to the 19th century preserving the basic characteristics of the preceding one.

If the social and environmental technological humanism forecast for the second phase of the 21st century should be successful, as in principle we may suppose it will be, the third phase will tend to consolidate and extend this model. Conversely, if the model is not successful, the end of the 21st century will submit it to a critical review if not a profound rejection - in favor of what, it is absolutely impossible to predict.

More predictably, although as with everything when thinking of the future, tentatively and merely speculatively, it is possible to prefigure how the new bipolarity will develop if it should take place. A bipolar system in the second half of this century will of necessity have more dangerous and serious characteristics than the American-Soviet polarity of the second half of the 20th century. It goes without saying that the level of lethality of the weapons of the second half of the coming century will be incomparably higher than that of the American-Soviet confrontation. The supposition of the formation of a new bipolarity implies the understanding that each opposing pole will have many times more power than is needed to exterminate not only each other, but all life on the planet.

The resulting impasse of a reciprocal, automatic and inevitable capacity for mutual destruction will lead a future new bipolarity to the same logic of antagonistic coexistence that characterized American-Soviet bipolarity. We cannot forget, as occurred in that first bipolarity, that the tensions of a prolonged antagonistic coexistence undermine the capacity of one of the opponents to sustain itself, leading to a world which will be subject to the definitive monopolarity of the remaining power.

Another, possibly more likely, scenario would be that of prolonged bipolarity. In that case it is probable, as also partly occurred in the American-Soviet case, that a culture of antagonistic coexistence would emerge that would develop towards a peaceful but vigilant co-existence.

The development of a future new process of bipolarity has many possible outcomes. In the final analysis however, we may accept the hypothesis that in the long term such a system will either end in a globally suicidal result, possibly even by accident, or it will end by leading to increasingly cooperative forms of organizing the world the final result of which will be the institution of a stable *Pax Universalis*.

E) Brief Reflections on the Theme

Future scenarios are always hypothetical and at best probabilistic. It is rarely possible, based on a particular existing situation, to see only one single scenario for development when looking into the future. In the case of this study, the only probable scenario attributable to the 21st century, especially in its first phase, arises out of the fact that the aim here was not to explore speculatively the main lines of possibility in passing from the 20th to the 21st century. The aim has been to start from, among the possible scenarios, the basis that was felt to be the most feasible one on which to construct the probable course of the coming century in order for a future study to make a brief analysis of the problem the world might face (and probably will face) in that scenario.

It is worth mentioning in terms of the hypothesis of the formation of a future new bipolarity in the middle of the 21st century, that this hypothesis (as well as being quite probable) was created in the light of its extraordinarily heuristic importance. In this respect, it is important to take into account two main aspects of the question that have not been dealt with in this text in order not to make it too complex. These are: (1) China's long-term maintenance of high rates of development, its national unity and its persistent desire to become a future superpower; (2) the unavailability of international conditions for the United States, from the time when Chinese development became a matter of concern, to be able to use internationally acceptable methods to prevent the progress of this development, as had previous happened when the United States was faced with the start of the Soviet nuclear program.

A third consideration in terms of the previously mentioned prospects for the 21st century, is to note the fact that they are based on a specific analysis of the characteristics that were presented by modern society and culture in the final decades of the 20th century, as was briefly mentioned in the introductory section of this study. This produced the analysis concerning the trend towards the loss of self-sufficiency on the part of postmodern culture and towards an intransitive consumer society. These characteristics will provide the elements to construct a corresponding scenario in the first phase of the 21st century and the future which this phase will provide for the following ones.

A final consideration refers to *Pax Universalis*. Firstly it is the same idea understood in our terms as the concept of Perpetual Peace represented for Kant in the 18th century. Secondly, the idea of the *Pax Universalis* contains the idea that, in a technologically globalized world, only a rationalized and equal organization of the whole world has a chance of guaranteeing its stable equilibrium which will be the best thing for all people and the only alternative to global self-annihilation.



5. Portugal-Brazil: Present and Future (2000)

I. Introduction

The actions of peoples during history, while containing many variations, consist in some cases in a single appearance during a period of greater or lesser expansion and in others in proceeding, though at different rates, through successive moments or phases that alternate between periods of success and decline. Greece, after its classical and Hellenistic phases, has not had a corresponding revival in the modern Greek state in spite of all the positive aspects the latter presents. Phoenician-Carthaginian civilization was not carried forward by the peoples who currently inhabit its former territory. Many other examples follow this model.

On the other hand, after the extraordinary Roman period, the people of the Italian Peninsula enjoyed a great Middle Ages, a wonderful Renaissance, a splendid Baroque period, a brilliant Enlightenment, a vigorous Rissorgimento and an excellent modern period. Portugal is a particularly successful example of the second model. It was important in the Middle Ages, enjoyed a magnificent Renaissance, a beautiful Baroque period, a splendid surge forward under Pombal and, after a socially and economically stagnant although literary brilliant 19th-century, is going through a new period of development and modernization.

II. Portugal-Brazil

Colonization of Brazil

What has Portugal done in the world? If we look at just three great achievements we can answer: (1) it discovered the greater part of the world or maritime routes unknown to the West at the time; (2) it created the conditions for Camoens to emerge and (3) it colonized Brazil.

I shall confine myself in this essay to this act of colonization. At the moment the colonization of Brazil is being given a negative interpretation by some Anglo-Saxon historians such as Leslie Bethell and writers influenced by him. This is not the time for a critical revision of that interpretation but I shall simply mention the fact that it displays the most deplorable lack of a historical and sociological sense. The consolation of Brazil is criticized for the lack of those aspects that are typical of Anglo-Saxon culture and the Protestant perspective, as if it were legitimate to evaluate an Iberian and Catholic culture according to the patterns of British Anglicanism. It is criticized for the lack of democracy understood in its contemporary meaning as if that criticism could not be applied to continental Europe from the 16th century to the beginning of the 20th. Also criticized are the social inequalities resulted from the fabulous economic success brought about by tropical agriculture and gold mining as if the lack of those resources are example in New England were a reason for condemning those who did enjoy them, or as if a Labor Party-style regime could have existed in the colonial period.

In fact, within the circumstances of the time and geophysical characteristics of the land, the Portuguese colonization of Brazil was an extraordinary feat. Looking at this colonization in terms of the relationship of the colonizers with the colony, no other colonization shows such a startling disproportion between the minimal demographic mass of the colonizers - Portugal had only one million inhabitants at the time of D. Manuel - and the immense area occupied and developed by Portugal in Brazil, the territorial extent of which was then almost equal to that of today. This territory was occupied and cultivated by colonizers from the Amazon to Rio Grande do Sul.

Looking at colonization from the point of view of the legacy it left to independent Brazil, we find among so many other positive aspects three that merit particular attention and which once again are not found together in any other colonial experience. These are: territorial integrity, contrasting with the

fragmentation of Spanish America and British America. Basic cultural unity, in spite of the immense regional differences in a country of semi-continental size, which means that a Brazilian Northeasterner is closer to a Gaucho than an Andalusian to a Castilian or a Sicilian to a Piedmontese. Finally, the humanism and tolerance that has allowed Brazil to exhibit the most successful experience in the world of ethnic miscegenation and bringing together different cultural traditions says we find incorporated in Brazilian culture: elements originating in Portuguese culture, important aspects of other European cultures such as the Italian, French and German, elements of American culture or those of the Middle East, Japan, Africa and the indigenous peoples. Ethnic miscegenation in Brazil compares very favorably with the formal or informal regime of apartheid that predominated in most of the other examples of European colonization, as well as the cultural parochialism of countries colonized by England, France or even Spain, which could only see the world through the eyes of the colonizing culture.

The Present Situation

Spain and Portugal are good illustrations of the historical model described in terms of phases of success and decline. They had a great Middle Ages and a great Renaissance but went through a sharp decline at different periods of the 17th century, while experiencing a new surge of vigor in the 18th century under Charles III and Pombal respectively, before experiencing once more—in spite their brilliant literature—serious economic and social decline from the 19th century until the first half of the 20th. In both countries, post-Francoism and post-Salazarism were periods of social and economic renovation. For both, entry into the European Union brought a new surge of development and modernization that provided them with favorable conditions to face the current phenomenon of globalization.

In the case of Brazil, considering only the most recent period, the country has experienced significant development since the crisis of the 1930s, an extraordinary surge from the 1950s to 70s, followed by a period of stagnation during the following 20 years. It is currently recovering from this stagnation. Also, the establishment of Mercosul is provising Brazil with the conditions it needs to face the challenges of globalization in a more satisfactory manner.

At the beginning of the 21st century Brazil and Portugal find themselves with serious problems that still need solutions but, as will be shown below,

they are also blessed with economic, political and cultural conditions favorable to meeting the challenges of the new era.

This is not the time to discuss the more serious deficiencies Brazil and Portugal currently suffer compared to advanced countries. Both need to significantly speed up their modernization. We might also mention in the case of Brazil, the extremely serious problem arising out of its great social differences that will require a huge effort, over a period that must not last longer than 20 years, to bring up to higher educational and income levels a vast contingent of people living on the margins of society and who account for more than 30% of the population today.

III. Facing the 21st Century

In spite of their remaining defects, Portugal and Brazil enjoy favorable conditions to face the challenges of the 21st century. It is true, as has already been noted, that these conditions require both countries to undertake successful and vigorous efforts to modernize in general and to reduce, in the case of Brazil, intolerable social inequalities. Notwithstanding this, both are favored by three national characteristics, economic, political and cultural to help them face the new century.

From the economic point of view, the condition that favors them is their entry into, respectively, the European Union and Mercosul. As has already mentioned, this gives them the ability to make up, in the short and medium terms, for their comparative backwardness in productivity and lets them develop within their respective regional systems, competitive sectors for a more open future on the international market. In this respect the importance of a close connection between Mercosul and the European Union becomes important.

From the political point of view, the two regional systems previously mentioned give these countries the opportunity to maintain satisfactory levels of internal and external autonomy in relation to the power of the United States. It also gives them the means to contribute in terms of increasing the level of multipolarity that exists today in the world, directing it towards building a *Pax Universalis* in the longer term. This would be a regime that could replace the possibility of an exclusively American hegemony, the *Pax Americana*, in favor of all countries, including the United States itself. In respect of these countries, this situation would avoid an all-powerful global hegemony leading, as

happened in all preceding global hegemonies, to a final suppression of democracy and its internal freedoms.

It is at the cultural level above all that the contribution of Portugal and Brazil is especially important as we enter the 21st century. This topic is extremely complex and its satisfactory description lies beyond the scope of this brief essay.

If we reduce the question to its simplest and essential elements, we find two main aspects. One concerns the conditions that will bring about the reassessment of our contemporary society of mass technology and consumerism that is blind to the needs for preserving that basic nucleus of higher values on which is based the very possibility for any society to subsist. No society can be exclusively or even mainly ruled by external norms imposed by government. If society does not contain among its members a proper level of internalization of higher values such as those of justice, integrity and a minimum level of commitment to the common good, no amount of external policing will be able to preserve that society's survival and the police will be the first to take advantage of their power to gain illicit advantages from that society.

The modern world is suffering in an alarmingly increasing way from the lack of higher values effectively shared between members of society. With the decline of religious convictions and traditional morality, these higher values can only be preserved by spreading a new humanism throughout society, a social and environmental humanism different from classical, individualistic humanism that was indifferent to the environment. Our mass technological and consumer society needs urgently and imperatively to spread this humanism.

The second basic aspect to consider is that of how to spread this indispensable environmental and social humanism. It is here that countries like Portugal and Brazil may be able to make a contribution.

Limiting myself to a brief reference restricted to the Western world, within such a broad and complex question - without forgetting the important potential contributions from other sources - I would like to point out the fact that, as history shows, the Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and Latin currents of this culture show different tendencies, although these are neither exclusive nor excluding. Once again, by making extreme simplifications we can see that in Anglo-Saxon culture pragmatic and operational tendencies predominate that have helped that culture to produce most of the technological innovations in the modern world. German culture has produced the greatest contributions to

scientific and philosophical thought. On the other hand the Latin culture has produced the greatest contributions towards an aesthetic view of the world, from the Renaissance to modern Italian design, and to an individual and collective style that makes the most of quality of life.

The variants of Latin culture found in Portugal and Brazil are characterized by a particularly happy combination, within a pragmatic sense of things, that tends more in the direction of the Italian with a great capacity to create and organize a good quality of life both individually and collectively.

Creating and spreading a new social and environmental humanism will not be the task of a single society or culture. We must recognize, however, that the Luso-Brazilian variants of Latin culture show a significant propensity to contributing here. Their sense of pragmatism leads them towards an operationalist and technological idea of the way in which things should be done in order to be useful. Their tendency to create and organize a good quality of life leads them towards the social and environmental humanism that is needed by the modern world.

Without denigrating other cultures and societies, Portugal and Brazil enjoy particularly favorable conditions to establish in their respective countries the social and environmental humanism that will help them bring together the technological and consumer society of the masses and the higher values that human survival depends on. In Portugal, the government presided over by Dr Mário Soares and the present Sampaio-Guterrez government, and in Brazil the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, both illustrate this tendency. If Portugal and Brazil can continue this trend they will make a decisive contribution to help the world confront the challenges of the 21st century.

6. A Brief Reflection on the Current Situation and the Possibilities for Latinness in the Modern World (2001)

Latinness

In its most immediate sense, Latinness is the basic and common cultural characteristic of the peoples of the Italian and Iberian peninsulas, France, parts of Belgium and Switzerland as well as Romania, and also the peoples of Latin America by reason of the expansion that occurred from the 16th century onward.

In the Europe form of Latinness, these peoples formed the core of the Roman Empire. Historically they are the result of a long process of evolution during which the peoples who made up the main body of the Western Roman Empire were culturally and ethnically influenced by the many different peoples occupying that geographic area from the 5th century onwards, mainly the Germanic peoples.

Seen from a historical perspective, the Latin peoples constituted one of the three main nuclei that influenced Western civilization, along with the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon groups. It would be rather arbitrary to try to measure the relative importance of each of these nuclei in the formation of the West. The Germanic element would predominate if we emphasized the importance of the Carolingian Empire in the organization of Europe. The Latin element would predominate if we felt that the Latin language and Roman culture were the basic ingredients of the development of European culture.

The Latin element would also come to the fore if we consider three of the most important periods in the construction of that culture: the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.

If we look at how the Modern World was formed in terms of more recent history, we shall see that it emerges out of the Italian Renaissance, acquires its basic shape with the German Reformation, passes through a period of Spanish hegemony from the 16th century to the beginning of the 17th, followed by French dominance from Richelieu to Louis XIV, culminating in English hegemony from the middle of the 18th century until the First World War.

The Current Situation

The Latin peoples in general did not have a successful 19th century, which to a great extent explains their current situation. If we take the case of France, the most developed Latin country during this period, we shall find that it recovered from the defeat of Napoleon and the mediocrity of the Restoration only with Napoleon III, but then proceeded to the disaster of Sedan.

In comparison to the German and Anglo-Saxon worlds of the time, the Third and Fourth French Republics were economically and politically unsatisfactory. A significant recovery relative to the rest of Europe was achieved under de Gaulle, but by then the world was already under the power of the Americans. The post-Second World War world is characterized by the powerful domination of the United States. This country became an almost hegemonic power (the status of 'unimultipolarity' that Huntington refers to) after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

American domination is found in all of the most relevant operational dimensions of modern times. It is an economic, technological, political, military and above all information-based domination. This last aspect stretches from the innumerable applications of computing to the cinema, music, newspapers, television and the international provision of all kinds of data.

American domination is also characterized, however, by a notable imbalance between its instrumental and substantive dimensions, between its dominance of information-spreading and its effective cultural relevance. In the face of the all-powerful American occupation of all the means of communication and the subsequent spread of an Americanized image of the world, the Germanic elements in Western culture have become the object of

special study and the domain of specialists, while the Latin elements of this same culture are increasingly taking on the aspects of folklore.

Historical Comparison

The Americanization of the world and the image of the world is only the latest manifestation of a cyclical process of cultural hegemonization, the first instance of which occurred in the Hellenic world. From Homer (8th century BC) to Alexander (4th century BC) and a little after him with the Hellenic Realms of the 3rd century, Hellenic culture was homogeneous and so was its view of the world. The Romanization of the world, from Scipio Africanus (c. 235-183 BC) to Theodosius the Great (c. 346-395) came about through the combination of the organizational and military capacity of the Romans with the Hellenic culture that became its cultural substratum. Latin was all-pervasive during the Middle Ages and Italian partly dominated during the Renaissance from the 14th-15th centuries. Spanish culture dominated from the 16th century to the beginning of the 17th with its Golden Age followed by the political and military domination of France and French culture in the age of Racine and Molière. English supremacy from the second half of the 18th century until the First World War was due to an economic, technical, political and military superiority sustained by a great culture containing writers from Shakespeare to Byron, Shelley and Keats, and from Dickens to Carlisle and Oscar Wilde.

The total American domination of today - not forgetting that country's important contributions to science and even in the arts - is the result of a decisive economic, technological and military superiority which is not, however, supported by a corresponding cultural wealth. It is rather like imagining the Roman Empire deprived of its Hellenic substratum.

Among the various signs of this mismatch, we find at the turn of this century in recent publications coming out of the United States concerning the century that is closing, the fact that they present many American personalities of the most modest standing as being particularly representative of the 20th century, while great Germanic and Latin thinkers and artists are omitted.

What can We Do?

Contemporary culture arises out of two basic facts, among others. In terms of the means of communication, it is a fact that English has become the international *lingua franca*, with Spanish as a second choice. In terms of substantive questions, there remains the fact that the future of the world depends on finding a suitable compatibility between mastering means, which depend on the spread of technology and mastering ends, which depend upon the spread of humanism.

Technology and humanism are unequally distributed in the world; the former is spreading vigorously in the United States and is insufficiently spread in the Latin world. The latter, which fills the world view and way of life of the Latin peoples - although without the power and self-awareness of preceding historical periods - is completely absent from daily life in the United States where it tends to be turned into a mere academic specialization.

There is a clear lesson to be learned from these two facts: use English as a universal language and Spanish as the main Latin language. In the Latin world, intensify and spread its humanist values together with making any vigorous effort to modernize technology and introduce a humanist view of the world into the United States and among the Anglo-Saxon peoples, while preserving their technological development. Maintaining civilization and its superior values, which depend on preserving man's rational freedom, requires a general acceptance of a modern humanism that is different from its classical counterpart by reason of the necessary emphasis on its social and ecological aspects.

Looking into Latinness

Without forgetting the extra-territorial areas of expansion of French and Italian culture, there have been above all two Western countries that have managed to make their respective cultures universal: the British and the Iberians. The former, together with the United States and the Commonwealth, the latter with Latin America and the Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa and Asia. It is a fact, however, that the Iberian world went into decline after the second half of the 17th century and the Anglo-Saxon world achieved increased levels of power after the second half of the 19th century.

However, the present recovery of the Latin world, with a vigorous postde Gaulle France, a prosperous Italy, a redemocratized Romania, an Iberian Peninsula modernized and integrated into Europe, a great surge of progress in key countries in Latin America such as Brazil and Mexico and with Argentina starting to recover, a new era is opening up for Latinness. This is an era in which Latin humanism will become indispensable for the world and in which Latinness is clearly rapidly overcoming its technological deficit.

The consolidation and expansion of social and environmental humanism within Latinness, as well as its own cultural identity in many national and linguistic components, and its accelerated technological modernization, depend on bringing together an effort of innovating thought with a broad and competent system of dissemination. The Latin world needs to be able to exercise its critical thinking at a profound level, a problem that universities and similar institutions by themselves are not at the moment responding to in a satisfactory way. On the other hand, there is a need for appropriate instruments for disseminating ideas, something which is even more lacking.

In the view of Candido Mendes, if Latin academia does not want to be merely a rhetorical institution in which intelligent people exchange intelligent discourse, it has to become an agency to promote social and environmental humanism and technological modernization in the service of this humanism, and it has to invent operational methods for this creative thinking to be practiced in an innovative way and achieve the necessary dissemination.

How to achieve these aims is something which will have to arise out of the critical thinking of Latin academia itself and goes beyond the limits of these brief comments. We must make mention of just two obvious considerations. Carrying out these objectives requires the coordinated setting up of networks of intellectual intercommunication between universities and similar institutions and demands the mobilization of significant resources on the part of public and private sectors in the Latin world, both to finance this endeavor to create critical thought as well as, and especially, its diffusion. If Latinness wishes to exist as an effective cultural and operational dimension in the world, it has to finance its reflective efforts and the dissemination of these efforts. We need a great Latin television network, a great Latin magazine and great Latin cinema. Either we achieve these resources or we become the folklore element in the Anglo-Saxon world.

The question of intensifying and spreading Latin culture also requires taking into account the diversity of Latin languages, in spite of their common roots. This question has to be approached in an extremely objective and non-parochial way. In order to achieve this result, it is important to recognize three basic facts. The first refers to the fact that Latin languages are mainly easily accessible one from the other. This fact is obvious in the connection between Spanish and Portuguese and the relationship between these two languages and Italian

is very close, although rather less so in the case of Romanian. French is a language apart. The second fact is that educated people in the Latin world should make an effort to learn related languages in order to broaden the area for communication and reduce the need for translating texts from French or into French. As a result, educated people in the Latin world should learn French and those of the French world should learn Spanish. The third fact to be taken into account is that Spanish, apart from any value judgments, is the international Latin language and must be accepted as such by all Latin peoples.

Looking out from Latinness

In order to preserve the actual global scope of Latin culture, it is not enough to adopt the measures mentioned above. Latin culture must be made universal, as the Anglo-Saxons made theirs. This universalization will become eminently practical if the measures referred to in the section "Latinness from the Inside" are effectively adopted. The existence of critical and innovative Latin thought widely spread throughout the Latin world is bound to spill over to the rest of the world.

Some operational measures, however, will still be necessary. On the one hand there must be suitable dissemination of the Spanish-language versions of Latin television, cinema, newspapers and magazines in the United States and the Anglo-Saxon world, as well as in other parts of the world. This leads to the need to adopt, in order to achieve this diffusion, an English version of those cultural elements, just as the Anglo-Saxon world creates its Spanish-language editions.

It is worth mentioning that, while in terms of its culture the Germanic world does not take measures equivalent to those discussed in these brief comments, the vehicles of Latinness also need to give news of important contributions of the Germanic world. If Greco-Roman culture is the root of Latin culture and the basis of its humanism, Germanic culture, from Luther to Goethe, from Kant and Hegel to the intellectuals of Weimar and the Frankfurt School, is one of the foundations of the West, a West that can no longer continue to manifest itself exclusively or mainly in its Anglo-Saxon current. Viva Shakespeare! But 'vivas' also for figures from Petrarch and Dante to Camoens and Cervantes, to Goethe and Hegel. Viva Witehead! But 'vivas' also for Ortega y Gasset, to Cassirer, to Raymond Aron and to Norberto Bobbio, to Octavio Paz, to Borges and to Manuel Bandeira.

7. Globalization, a New World Order and a Planetary Civilization (2001)

I. Introduction

As Daniel Halévy and others have observed, history has been gradually accelerating since the Middle Ages. Generally speaking, we can say that the period corresponding to a thousand years in the Egyptian Old Kingdom corresponds to less than a century in the Middle Ages and perhaps two decades today. This acceleration of history, however, does not proceed at the same rate at all levels and throughout all aspects of historical and social reality.

If we differentiate between three different levels: the socio-economic, the international system and the processes of civilization, we shall see that the deeper the level we examine, the slower is the rate of change. Things undergo extremely rapid changes in socio-economic affairs that are increasingly rapidly and more greatly affected by technological change. Things change more slowly if we look at the international system and the system of world order during each historical period. Finally, changes in the civilizing process and in the relations maintained between each other by different civilizations existing at the same time.

In this brief study we shall give a succinct analysis of three processes of increasing depth concerning social and historical reality: (1) the process of globalization which is affecting the reproductive system of modern societies and their ways of life; (2) the forming of a new international order after the

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the preceding bipolar regime, and (3) the development of Western Civilization which changed after the second half of the 19th century and more rapidly after the Second World War into what we might call Late Western Civilization. This evolutionary process has continued into our time since the Second World War by means of the influence being mutually exercised, among other cultures, by the Late Western, Chinese, Indian and Islamic Civilizations.

II. Globalization

The current process of globalization corresponds to the third wave of a process that began in the Renaissance with maritime discoveries and the Trade Revolution and continued in a second wave with the Industrial Revolution at the end of the 14th century until today and became in the final decades of the 20th century the current Technological Revolution.

This process of globalization has an incomparably wider scope than the preceding one which, in turn was far greater than the original Trade Revolution. We are in fact dealing with the fact that extraordinary technological progress in the area of computing, communications and transport has brought about on a world scale profound changes in the processes of production, management and trade that have allowed the spatial decentralization of the production of goods and provision of services, the setting up and proper management of multinational companies of huge proportions that have agencies in all the important world markets.

The internationalization of the system of production, combined with the alarming mobility of capital that allows the almost instantaneous transfer of many billions of dollars from one country to another, has significantly reduced the regulatory capacity of national governments. New conditions of production have provided the opportunity for the development of new economic concepts, creating a neoliberal ideology that has given them new life. The weakening of the state power has been greatly aggravated by a neoliberal ideology that preaches the reduction of the State to exercising minimal functions, like those of 19th-century liberalism, and proclaims the self-regulability of the market-controlled in practice by a small number of multinationals - and the supposed excellence of economies that adopt neoliberal practices.

Globalization was not invented by any country or economic group but resulted from the previous technological revolution mentioned above. For this reason it favors countries with high levels of technology, especially the United States, which has become the most competitive economy in the world. For this reason globalization means in practice an Americanization of world economies.

The three processes of globalization since the Trade Revolution are characterized by having formed a centre-periphery system. The countries and economic groups at the forefront of these three phases of globalization functioned as centers of the process, capitalizing on its advantages to the detriment of others that formed an underprivileged periphery. It has been estimated that the advantages of a central country relative to its respective periphery were 2 to 1 with the Trade Revolution, 10 to 1 with the Industrial Revolution and are now, in extreme cases (Africa) in the order of 60 to 1.

The current globalization process presents peripheral countries with a perverse dilemma. If they revert to the old strategy of protectionism to save their under-competitive industries they face on the one hand serious sanctions from international regulatory organizations (WTO, IMF, etc.) that are in the service of the great powers, and also directly from the latter. On the other hand, they have had to contend with the worsening of their technological deficit and the effects of slowing down progress that brings. If, however, they open their markets to international competition in line with neoliberal recommendations, this leads to the destruction of their industrial infrastructure and the internationalization of their economies, turning them into no more than sectors of the international market reduced to producing items of low added value.

Is there any way out for underdeveloped countries in the modern world? A more complete answer to this question would be beyond the scope of this brief study. Summarizing the question in its most essential aspects, we can say that for small countries with small populations that produce raw materials, joining the international market could be economically favorable even though that might happen at a cost of de-nationalizing those countries and might tend to make their relative underdevelopment a permanent condition. For underdeveloped countries with larger territories and populations the neoliberal model is extremely negative and socially destructive. Many such countries, however, may find a way out by means of regional or sub-regional partnerships such as Mercosul which make it possible for them to adopt suitable developmental policies and gradually overcome their underdevelopment.

III. The New World Order

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the bipolar system left United States as the only remaining superpower. Internal and external restraints have not yet allowed the United States to exercise unfettered world hegemony. In fact it is exercising a semi-hegemony which is quite extensive in certain areas of the world (parts of Latin America, Asia and Africa), a contained version in Europe, a relatively well-resisted one in countries like Russia and China and, to a lesser extent India, Iran and others. Samuel Huntington has given this situation the label 'unimultipolarity'.

In the present situation the world is subject to a three-part stratification. At the top of the system (controlling status) is United States together with, to a lesser degree, the European Union and Japan. At the base of the systems (dependent status) we find almost all the rest of the countries in the world. In an intermediate position that we can call resistance status we find countries like China and Russia. Countries like India, Iran and Brazil have risen out of the purely dependent status but have not yet properly achieved resistance status.

The resulting international order is far from stable. In the longer term either the United States will consolidate its hegemony and make it global, thus creating a unipolar world, or China and Russia will achieve an equipolar level with the United States to bring about a multipolar world. This situation will tend to become more acute if the 'Europeanizing' sectors of the European Union (France and Germany) somehow prevail over the 'Atlanticizing' sectors (Great Britain and the Nordic countries) to develop an independent foreign and defense policy.

The current situation is equally unstable in the long term for countries at the level of resistance status and for the larger underdeveloped countries. If China and Russia do not manage to reach the level of equi-polarity with United States by the middle of the century they will be affected by profound social crises and serious internal disruption. If, on the other hand, the larger underdeveloped countries like India, Indonesia, Brazil and Iran cannot reach a higher level of development and autonomy within a few decades in order to raise themselves to resistance status they will suffer equally profound social crises and internal disruption.

It is impossible to predict which of these two scenarios will occur. There are, however, significant indications that within a few decades Russia will

recover its superpower status and that by the middle of the century China will reach a level of equipolarity with United States. It is equally certain that there are important factors driving the European Union, in spite of British resistance, towards an independent foreign and defence policy. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that countries like India, Indonesia, Brazil and Iran, to quote the most important, will have much more to gain by adopting policies increasing development and autonomy than those which perpetuate their underdevelopment.

All these considerations lead, in the final analysis, to the conclusion that the most probable outcome for the second half of the century will be the multipolar world order. The type of multipolarity that will tend to result from this process will necessarily lead to a double effect. On the one hand, in an even more acute way than in the American-Soviet bipolar period, a military solution to polar rivalry for the world power will lead to the collective suicide of the planet. Although it is very improbable, this outcome is not impossible but it will mean the end of history.

The most probable outcome of this new multipolarity, on the other hand, will be that of a long period of great tension and mutual armed vigilance which in the long term will have to lead to coexistence between the great powers the gradual institutionalization of which will, as Kant foresaw as far back as the 18th century, lead to a *Pax Universalis*.

Among the various inferences to draw from this situation is the clear understanding that today's larger underdeveloped countries have a historically short period of about 20 years to overcome their underdevelopment and consolidate their conditions for achieving autonomy because if they do not do this they will be condemned, in either of the two world scenarios referred to above, to remain in their peripheral situation.

IV. A Planetary Civilization

In contrast to Samuel Huntington's predictions concerning a supposedly probable future conflict of civilizations, the civilizing processes currently underway are tending to lead to a fusion of civilizations and to create what we might call a Planetary Civilization.

Huntington's hypothesis, as well as its fallacies in identifying currently existing civilizations, confuses possible power conflicts with the conflicts inherent in developing civilizations. On the one hand, Huntington predicts a

hypothetical Sino-American conflict that he understands as a conflict between the "West" and Chinese Civilization and, on the other hand, a terrorist-type conflict between the "West" and "Islam".

These scenarios are based on two mistakes. The first and most serious consists in thinking of power conflicts as conflicts in the development of civilizations. If China were to enter into conflict with the United States, this would mean it had arrived a level of Westernization sufficient to reach a satisfactory level of equipolarity of power with United States. This would be a power conflict between a westernizing China and the United States, not a conflict in creating civilization. On the other hand, Huntington presumes that the United States identifies with the "West". In civilizing terms, however, the United States, although it has become technologically the most advanced society in the world, is only a successful periphery of the West just as Latin America is, although less successfully, another Western peripheral area and not, as Huntingdon supposes, a civilization in itself. The West is essentially Europe. Culturally the West is the product of the historical interaction, both cooperatively and in conflict, of four central peoples - Latin, Germanic, Anglo-Saxon and Nordic - and to a certain extent of a fifth power, the Slavs.

What has made the course of Western history different to that of other civilizations such as the Chinese, Indian and Islamic, is the development of an increasing technological capacity which implied an equally increasing operational superiority for the West for to achieve its productive and military aims.

Faced with this superiority, other civilizations that had survived until the 19th century had to embark, with a greater or lesser degree of success, on a huge effort to absorb Western science and technology. This effort allowed the peoples belonging to those civilizations to survive but it also brought profound modifications to their respective cultures. Basic concepts in Indian civilization such as *samsara*, in Islam such as *ummah* and the ancestor cult of the Chinese were deeply affected by efforts to adopt scientific and technological Western patterns. This Westernization must necessarily have effects on other areas of culture in each of these civilizations.

Western civilization, however, has not been unaffected by the course of the last hundred years. That same science and technology that has had such a strong impact on non-Western civilizations had the same effect no less strongly on Western civilization itself. This has led to the fact that we have to consider the West today as a Late Western Civilization just as happened with the transformation of Classical Antiquity into Late Antiquity. In the latter, the decisive fact was the Christianization of Roman society and the subsequent loss of old civic and religious values. So also, modern science has shifted the centre of gravity of Western beliefs, or the idea of God and of Jesus Christ as his incarnation, to a world view based on science and technology, no longer on religion and faith.

Late Western Civilization, on the other hand, as well as deeply influencing other civilizations, has also been profoundly affected by other cultures coming both from great civilizations as well as African and indigenous ones.

Everything therefore seems to indicate that the world is heading for a great cultural fusion which will lead, during the century which is beginning, to the gradual formation of a Planetary Civilization. We may foresee that the basis of beliefs for this new civilization will be science and technology. What we cannot yet predict is which superior values will come to be created. The intransitive consumerism of the technological West today is not sustainable. Indeed, non-Western civilizations such as the Chinese, Islamic and Indian, although going through a violent process of westernization, have kept a range of superior values that Late Western Civilization no longer has. These values, moreover, are a necessary condition to maintain any civilization in the long term. Planetary Civilization, in a way which we cannot yet predict, will necessarily be forced to create a new range of superior values and will be decisively influenced in this process by the remaining non-Western civilizations.



8. Superpower and Legitimacy (2002)

The most important historical characteristic of the United States is the fact that its development progressed, from Washington and Jefferson, Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, to Kennedy and Clinton, within the principles of democracy and legality both at home and to a reasonable extent abroad. The idea of creating the League of Nations was President Wilson's, and the United States was also the main supporter of the creation of the United Nations.

This consistent democratic direction and spirit of acting within the forms and in defense of the law enabled the United States go from being a regional power into a world power with the First World War, and with the Second World War from being a world power to a superpower, enjoying in the process the consent of the civilized and democratic world. The struggle against Prussian authoritarianism, later against Nazism and finally the containment of Soviet totalitarianism and eventual collapse of the latter had the support and active participation of all the democratic countries in the world, including Brazil with its modest but not merely symbolic military contribution to defeating the Axis powers.

It was against this background that President Bush, emerging from a hardfought election in which the majority of American citizens voted against him, and instead of adopting a moderate position with wide national support as was expected, formed (with the notable exception of Secretary of State Powell) a cabinet of ultras who represented the most reactionary thinking in the country and now hopes, in the name of the war against international terrorism and on the pretext of preventing Saddam Hussein from accumulating a dangerous stock of weapons of mass destruction, to carry out a military invasion of Iraq to depose its president and put an American puppet in his place.

International pressure and the judicious reflections of Secretary of State Powell have forced Bush to submit the question to the United Nations Security Council which he has asked to apply a short timescale for Saddam to accept the return of UN arms inspectors. Bush has declared, however, that he reserves the right to carry out unilateral military intervention if Iraq does not submit, and quickly, to an unrestricted inspection of its weapons.

The world today is openly faced with the unilateral affirmation by the sole superpower that its will may be superimposed on international law. The long historical tradition of the United States as an open and democratic society respecting the law is threatened with a frontal assault by the accidental President of that country.

At both national and international levels there are actual situations which create precedents in law. In a democratic country all citizens are equal but even in those countries the powerful enjoy conditions to which ordinary men do not have access. At the international level the situation of being a superpower creates rights that are not shared by smaller countries. A typical example of these prerogatives is the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Let us suppose that Iraq has secretly accumulated some of these weapons and for that reason there is international consensus that the United Nations should have the right to submit that country to unrestricted inspection in order to avoid their misuse. No country in the world, however, has a greater stock of weapons of mass destruction and the United States. The USA has nevertheless cultivated a global agreement that it should have them because (in actual fact) no other power has the ability to control it and because it is assumed (a legal situation) that as a democratic and lawful nation, the United States will not use them to ill effect.

And now suddenly President Bush has shown himself ready to use his warlike superpower, including nuclear weapons if he feels it convenient to do so, in an arbitrary and unilateral way. This challenge places the United Nations and the civilized and democratic world in an inescapable dilemma. If American unilateralism is tolerated, even implicitly, the world will no longer be free, democracy will no longer be universal and the law of the jungle will be supreme. This very situation would justify Saddam Hussein's position both in his possible

plan to gather lethal weapons as well as in his possible refusal to receive inspectors whose United Nations uniforms might be disguises replacing American uniforms.

In contrast, the United Nations and the civilized and democratic countries in the world will be able to denounce the illegitimacy of the position of America and its President if Bush should act arbitrarily and unilaterally. President Bush has the material conditions to ignore such a condemnation and attack Iraq, overthrowing Saddam Hussein even if at the cost of terrible destruction and catastrophic results in the Middle East. Nevertheless, his international illegitimacy will have domestic repercussions. In spite of the follies of its accidental president, the United States is still an open and democratic society which understands that international acceptance of its superpower position is subject to the conditions of responsible and legitimate conduct. It is still the same society that was against the slaughter of the Vietnam War and forced the American government to withdraw from that country. Bush's international illegitimacy will lead to his domestic illegitimacy. It is not the possible and irrelevant hidden weapons of Saddam Hussein that will force the United States to behave legitimately in the world, but rather the conscience and the democratic voice of American citizens.



9. The Argentina-Brazil Alliance (2004)

I. Introduction

The occupation of Brazilian territory by Portugal was characterized among other aspects by the continual ignoring of the line dividing the two empires that had been drawn up by the Treaty of Tordesillas. This blurring of the line became easier during the period of the unification of the two kingdoms from 1580 to 1640. At this point the frontier occupied by the two empires moved to the River Plate.

Portugal always wanted to occupy the eastern bank of the river, wishing to make it a natural frontier between the two colonies. The foundation of the Portuguese colony of Sacramento in the Banda Oriental occurred in 1680. This occupation, though tolerated by Madrid, was never accepted by the Spaniards in the region, who continually tried to dislodge the Portuguese and finally succeeded in doing so. From that time, relations between Brazil and what would come to be Argentina have always been extremely critical, veering between periods of rivalry and competition as in the case of the Sacramento colony, and other periods of cooperation and friendship in what would be the first example of joint action by the two kingdoms in opposition to Artigas who, from 1821, tried to separate Uruguay from Argentina and make it independent.

The arrival of D. João VI in Brazil in 1808 - in contrast to Fernando VII's mistake in remaining in Europe - had the most significant consequences.

Brazil became the seat of the Portuguese Empire, bringing together the resources of the kingdom, and at the beginning of the 19th century began to enjoy far better conditions to those of its neighbors, which were divided into various countries that suffered from frequent mutual hostilities. Dom João VI was concerned with increasing the size of Brazilian territory and giving it natural frontiers. For this reason he invaded the Banda Oriental and attempted, although unsuccessfully, to occupy the Guyanas.

The reaction of Artigas, who was supported in this case by Argentina, led in 1827 to war with Brazil, which was already the Empire of Brazil under Pedro I, who suffered a serious defeat in the battle of Ituzaigó. Mediation by the British led to a pause in the war and the formation between Argentina and Brazil of an independent buffer state, Uruguay, with the Treaty of 27th September, 1828.

In Argentina, the Rosas dictatorship that began in 1829 finally brought about the reaction of Urquiza who overthrew the dictator in 1852 with Brazilian help. There followed a long period of good relations between Brazil and Argentina under the presidencies in the latter country of Urquiza (1853-60), Mitre (1862-68), Sarmiento (1868-74) and Roca, from 1880-1886 and again from 1898-1904, by which time Brazil was a republic.

An important period of close cooperation between the two countries, together with Uruguay, would be the war with Paraguay from 1865-1870 against the dictator Solano Lopez who wished to annex parts of Argentinean and Brazilian territory. Another phase of cooperation arose from the action of Baron Rio Branco, the Brazilian Foreign Minister who skillfully manipulated the personal animosity of his counterpart Zeballos, leading the latter to resign in 1908; Rio Branco established a regime of proper cooperation with Argentina and in 1904 tried to bring about an ABC (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) agreement.

Perón's first government in Argentina (1946-1995) coincided with the second Vargas government in Brazil (1950-1954) and was once more a period of closer relations between the two countries in spite of the anti-Peronism that dominated the Brazilian Parliament.

The 1970s, however, were marked by controversy concerning the plan of Brazil, along with Paraguay, to build the great hydroelectric dam at Itaipu. Argentina considered this project as an unacceptable way of changing the course of waters flowing into the River Plate. The misunderstanding became a matter of concern but in time the two countries opted for the path of negotiation that led to the Itaipu Agreement on 19th October, 1979 between Presidents

Alfonsin and Sarney. According to this agreement levels of release of water considered adequate by Argentina were guaranteed.

The Itaipu Agreement marks the beginning of a process of increasing rapprochement between the two countries that would lead to the present situation of a 'strategic alliance'. Important stages in this process were the Itaipu Declaration (30/11/85), the Integration, Economic Cooperation and Development Act (29/11/88), the Nuclear Agreement (28/11/90) and finally, crowning these attempts at integration, the setting up of Mercosul with the Treaty of Asunción (26/03/91). Argentinean-Brazilian cooperation, which had already included the participation of Uruguay from 1987 to 1988, saw the additional inclusion of Paraguay within this treaty.

II. The Alliance and its Problems

Today most people agree that it is advantageous to have a strategic alliance between the two countries and the new governments of Lula in Brazil and Kirchner in Argentina are definitely in favor of consolidating this alliance.

Since Itaipu, the understanding between Brazil and Argentina has been based upon the recognition by both parties that there is nothing to gain from rivalry and much to gain from a system of cooperation. Three wars, the Franco-Prussian of 1870 and the two World Wars of 1914 and 1939, demanded from France and Germany terrible human and material sacrifices to achieve the ephemeral occupation of Alsace and Lorraine and the even more ephemeral occupation of the Saar, all of which came to nothing. In contrast, cooperation between the two countries after the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951-1967) led to the formation of the European Community and finally to the European Union and the adoption of a single currency, the euro, in almost all of its member countries.

In spite of a basic consensus in favor of an alliance between Argentina and Brazil, there have recently arisen specific problems arising out of Argentina's complaints concerning what it sees to be the excessive predominance of Brazilian industrial products in its own markets. The protectionist measures unilaterally adopted by Argentina, while they may be understandable from a national point of view, contravene Mercosul's regulations and are provoking a natural reaction in the corresponding sectors in Brazil. The Brazilian government, however, feeling that the alliance with Argentina is more important

than specific quarrels, has reacted with a great degree of tolerance and has tried to give the question and equally specific solution.

It is also clear that purely specific solutions are not enough. What is important here is the need to examine why the alliance is, more than being simply convenient, indispensable and what conditions are needed to make it work well.

III. A Vital Alliance

The relationship between Brazil and Argentina is a question not only of the fact that close cooperation between two countries is extremely convenient to both. It is a question of the fact that a solid, trustworthy and stable Argentina-Brazil alliance creates in present global conditions a *sine qua non* for the historic survival of both countries. At the moment, neither is capable of maintaining its effective sovereignty in isolation, guaranteeing its national identity and its historic destiny. This fact is one of the unavoidable consequences of the process of globalization.

Indeed, the globalization process, which is today exacerbated by the imperial unilateralism of the Bush government, is drastically and rapidly decreasing the area for international freedom of action for most countries. The purely formal aspects of sovereignty are maintained in these countries: flag, national anthem, parade armies and in the democracies, even the 'free' elections of their leaders. A set of extremely powerful financial, economic-technological, cultural, political and, when necessary, military constraints forces the leaders of these countries to follow, whether they want to or not, the direction of the international financial markets, the large multinationals and in the final analysis, Washington.

What is usually called the 'American Empire' is not an empire like the historic empires of Rome and Britain that exercised formal domination of the metropolitan country over provinces or colonies through a proconsul or viceroy with the support of military and bureaucratic personnel from the metropolis. The 'American Empire' is a 'field' in the sense that we use the word when talking of a magnetic or gravitational field. It is the area in which the constraints mentioned above are exercised without the possibility of effective resistance.

European countries saved themselves from turning into provinces of this Empire by joining the European Community, which was followed by the European Union. Semi-continental countries like China and India, and Russia

by reason of its nuclear arsenal, in spite of the severe loss of power caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, have managed to preserve their internal autonomy and a considerable degree of international maneuverability. A country like Brazil, if it can succeed in maintaining its national autonomy until it arrives at a satisfactory level of sustainable development, could also reach a reasonable level of internal autonomy and international influence. The problem for Brazil, however, as we shall see below, consists in the fact that in isolation it can only achieve this level at best in about 50 years, while the increasing restrictions on its international freedom of action it would experience in isolation would tend to turn it within 10 years into simply a sector of the international market and a 'province' of the Empire.

Why is the Argentina-Brazil alliance vital for both countries in the situation illustrated above? In the case of Argentina the problem it faces arises out of its lack of critical mass both in demographic terms, with less than 40 million people, and also in terms of its system of production. The latter has on the one hand been reduced to producing primary products such as oil, wheat and meat during a long and senseless neoliberal period of deliberate deindustrialization from Martínez de Hoz to Menem that has made the country dependent on the industry of developed countries. On the other hand, that same neoliberal policy led the country to transfer its major companies, with the relative exception of the agricultural area, to the big multinationals that control its economy and have a powerful influence on moving its policy towards that of being an international satellite.

Why is this alliance vital for a country like Brazil? Brazil has a sufficient demographic critical mass, with its 180 million people, has the biggest industrial infrastructure in the Third World, huge natural resources, principally the greatest supply of river water in the world, and should shortly achieve self-sufficiency in oil while having many other positive aspects. The answer to this question is found in the very low level of social integration in the country. Something like a third of the Brazilian population lives at a level of extreme poverty or wretchedness and is completely uneducated. Another third of the population is extremely poor with *per capita* income of a little over two dollars a day. Of the 40% of the population with reasonable incomes, only about 10% have fully satisfactory standards of living and education.

Until now Brazil has survived by reason of its extraordinary level of national integration, which is one of the highest in the world. This state of affairs, however, will not last if the country does not urgently start a large-scale social

program. Given its present social conditions, neither will Brazil manage to preserve its effective autonomy for more than ten years.

We should briefly clarify the question of poverty in Argentina and Brazil. During its history Argentina managed, due mainly to Sarmiento's educational policy, to create a balanced society consisting of a broad middle class that made up the most educated and civilized society in Latin America. An empirical study by the sociologist José Luis de Imaz (*Los Hundidos*) in the 1960s, showed that the level of poverty in Argentina, affecting about 10% of the population, was less than that of the United States. Today, after more than 20 years of neoliberalism, poverty affects 50% of the Argentinean population. We see, therefore, the effect of a terrible and prolonged stagnation that has created a corresponding level of unemployment. These Argentinean 'new poor' are basically middle-class people trained to perform paid jobs as soon as these return. Argentina's economic recovery, currently proceeding at full speed and accelerating, will be able to re-establish a satisfactory national level of employment within something like five years.

The Brazilian case is completely different. Here we are faced with a type of 'old poverty' similar to that of India. This poverty is a social result of the way in which the Brazilian economy has developed. Until the 1960s Brazil was an enormous tropical farm worked until 1888 by slaves and from that time onwards by a wretched and uneducated class of rural laborers. The rapid industrialization of Brazil that began spontaneously after the crisis of the 1930s and deliberately and systematically with Vargas and Kubitschek, drastically changed the country's economic system. In spite of this, Brazil continued to be a mainly rural economy until the 1960s. From the 1970s until today, massive urban migrations flooded Brazilian cities with a wretched and completely uneducated population, many of whom could not adapt to urban conditions of work and created huge rings of marginality that surround the big cities. The infiltration of drug traffickers into these marginal populations has created a level of criminality that is surpassing the capacity of the police to contain and suppress it. Thus a huge social problem has been created that demands an equally huge program to solve it. Such programs require resources which at the moment are not available and a timescale for solving the problem that is far beyond the estimate of no more than 10 years mentioned above.

IV. The Significance of the Alliance

The Argentina-Brazil alliance represents in the first instance a significant rise in the international status of both countries. Moreover, it represents the almost automatic factor of the consolidation of Mercosul and a South American system of cooperation and free trade.

The formation of a system closely linking the Argentinean and Brazilian economies within a common international movement to a great extent corrects the main weaknesses of each country. For Argentina this system means increasing its market from less than 40 million people to more than 220 million. It means raising the Argentinean GDP from US\$273 billion to US\$1000 billion, the equivalent of 1/6th of the GDP of Europe. It also implies overcoming its lack of critical mass.

The alliance gives Brazil a significant increase in the time available to reduce social inequalities and raise its level of social integration, thus speeding up its general development.

As well as the important positive results that will immediately occur for both countries from a closer linking of their economies and their international policies, this alliance, as has been previously mentioned, brings with it the almost automatic consolidation of Mercosul. Moreover, this system is extremely favorable to the economies of Paraguay and Uruguay and absorbs about 50% of their exports. Other important benefits will result from the extent to which, as we shall see below, a common industrial policy is adopted for Mercosul and, by extension, South America. It is possible, however, that without a solid, trustworthy and durable alliance between Argentina and Brazil, from time to time leaders of other countries, as happened in Uruguay in the Battle presidency, may be tempted to indulge in political adventures gambling on possible rivalries between Argentina and Brazil. The alliance between the two main members of Mercosul eliminates these risks and brings about in the two other members a healthy strengthening of their integration into Mercosul. As a result, the consolidation of Mercosul will tend to bring with it the consolidation of a South American system.

It is important in this respect to take into account two major alternative paths of action the world faces at the beginning of the 21st century. These involve consolidating and making the 'American Empire' universal in the coming years or, in a different way, seeing the emergence by the middle of the century of new, independent centers of power. The first hypothesis will tend to

materialize if, for various reasons, new independent power centers do not come into being during the first half of the century.

The formation of new power centers will occur if China can manage to sustain its high levels of development and is capable of adopting quickly and peacefully the institutional adjustments that will result from this development. This situation, supported by sufficient nuclear power, will lead it to a level equal with the United States within a few decades. The same may be said of Russia if it can continue the reforms Vladimir Putin is introducing which will enable that country to return within a few decades to the superpower status the Soviet Union enjoyed.

In this scenario of a new multipolarity, a three-level international system will come into being. At the top will be the superpowers: the USA, China and Russia. At the second level will be the countries or groups of countries able to act as significant international independent interlocutors. India will probably find itself at this level. We shall also find that at this level a South American system that can combine appropriate integration with a satisfactory rise in its level of development. Finally, we shall probably also see at this level a Latin-Germanic political subsystem. At a third level will be the dependent countries, reduced to being merely sectors of the international market.

The hypothesis of a Latin-Germanic subsystem needs a brief clarification. It refers to the fact that the European Union, which was already unable to create a minimum level of unity in foreign policy before the arrival of 10 new members, has definitely lost that ability with its enlargement. It has consolidated its position as an economic giant and a political dwarf. Within the EU, however, there are great countries like the United Kingdom, France and Germany which tend to have their own foreign policies. This creates the tendency for the EU, without damaging the preservation of its economic unity, to divide politically into two subsystems: the Atlanticist under the leadership of Britain and including the Nordic countries and possibly Holland, and the Europeanist under the leadership of France and Germany and including post-Aznar Spain and Post-Berlusconi Italy. Faced with these two subsystems, the Slavic countries will develop in a way which is difficult to predict. At the moment they are strongly Atlanticist but in the long term, when the current anti-Soviet generation has been replaced by a new one, it is probable that the influence of French culture some of them have felt, and that others have felt of the culture and economy of Germany, will take effect.

In the face of these alternatives, the formation of a South American system is a necessary condition for the region's countries to enjoy a satisfactory entry into the international system in the second half of the century. If the 'American Empire' should consolidate itself, a suitable South American system would become a part of it as a province of the first rank, in the manner of Europe. In isolation, these countries would enter it in the same way as African countries. If, on the contrary, as seems to be most probable, a new multipolar system is formed, an integrated and satisfactorily developed South America would be one of the great independent international participants in the new system.

If a new multipolar system should come into being, it is important to take into account that the preceding thoughts are based on the supposition that the level of safety measures contained in this new international system would prevent the superpowers, as happened in the Cold War, from attempting to impose military solutions that would tend to lead to mutual suicide, the celebrated 'Mutual Assured Destruction' – MAD.

V. What is Needed

The consolidation of a firm, stable and reliable strategic Argentina-Brazil alliance demands that several requirements should be suitably met, as well as the political will that has already revealed itself. More than simple political agreements, this alliance will depend on the extent to which its operation shows itself to be reciprocally advantageous. In this respect, many factors are operating, ranging from psycho-cultural aspects to economic and political ones.

Without giving this complex question more elaborate treatment, we shall merely mention that the essential element for achieving reciprocal benefits lies in adopting measures leading to a significant reduction in current imbalances. The success of the European Community arose out of the fact that Germany, and to a lesser extent England and France, contributed more than their share to developing more backward members such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland.

In the case of the Argentina-Brazil alliance, of Mercosul and South America in general, the essential aspect of compensatory treatment of imbalances consists in adopting a common industrial policy. This will mean on the one hand a rational and equal distribution of productive capacity on the part of each member so that all may have a satisfactory range of goods and services

to sell to the others, and that all of them should actually import those goods and services from their partners. Equally, this means that, especially at the beginning, there will be a significant imbalance in each member's contributions to achieving the success of the system. A country like Brazil will have to recognize the need to make a greater contribution than Argentina, and the latter will have to do the same in relation to the smaller countries.

Is beyond the scope of these thoughts to make any attempt to delineate the contributions each member of the system should make. We shall mention only the need for each nation to previously adopt measures that will allow significant public and private investments in the territories of other members. We should also mention the need to create a large-scale financial agency to operate on behalf of the system in a similar way to that in which the BNDES works in Brazil. We must also point out the incompatibility of the ALCA project with this system and the need for Mercosul to reject it.

Argentina and Brazil have the ability to escape the fate to which they would be condemned in isolation, of being turned into mere sectors of the international market and provinces of the American Empire. Based on the formation of a firm, stable and reliable alliance, they will create the basis for consolidating Mercosul and South American integration, thus guaranteeing themselves a great historic destiny. If they do not do this they will surrender their national identity and any historic role and become just geography.

10. Brazil and the United States (2004)

There are two main reasons why relations between Brazil and the United States urgently require a general reappraisal beyond the scope of diplomatic links. These reasons are, on the one hand, the need to make a clear difference between what emerges from structural interests and positions in each of the two countries, from that which emerges at the same time from the positions and policies of the current American President, George W. Bush. On the other hand, and arising broadly out of the previous topic, Brazilian-American relations require at the present time a more theoretical and not purely operational focus.

Itamaraty [the Brazilian Foreign Office – trans] cannot make distinctions between what Brazil cannot agree to because they happen to be Bush's present positions, and what represents broader areas of disagreement. It is compelled for diplomatic reasons either to include the first disagreements within the sphere of the second thus giving them greater importance than they really have, or to simply ignore them, to the detriment of national interests. On the other hand, understanding this problem requires a theoretical appreciation of the subject that goes beyond the operational level at which diplomatic activity is normally carried out.

The strict limits of this study do not allow an appropriate treatment of such a complex topic. The whole historical and sociological context of the question has to be taken into account to understand it properly. Given that it

is impossible to do that here, I shall limit myself to showing very simply and in a purely introductory way, the main aspects of the Brazil-USA relationship as 'state relations' and the Brazilian position regarding the positions and policies of the present American government.

In terms of the 'state relations' between Brazil and the United States, the essential point is that those relations are crucially determined by the different historic paths of the two countries. It is also a question whose roots have been sunk deep in the history of both countries since their respective colonial periods, but which has taken on particular relevance since the second half of the 20th century. Briefly, we are talking of the fact that the view the great power that became the single superpower, has of the world in general, and to a lesser extent of Latin America and in the case under discussion, Brazil, is characterized by a presumed stability that does not take into account the profound changes that are happening in the case of Brazil to a country which has moved rapidly from being a marginal and dependent agrarian society to that of the most important industrial complex in the Southern hemisphere, becoming on account of its base of natural resources, population and economic and cultural level, one of the seven most important independent centers in the world, the six others being the USA, the EU, China, India, Japan and Russia.

Like China and India, and to a great extent Russia, Brazil shows countless and serious symptoms of underdevelopment, especially at the social level. But its developed sector, maximized by its immediate potential for development, makes it not only a great power but one of the great international partners. In its 'state relations' with Brazil the USA does not take this situation into account and expects Brazil to react in a not very different way from how it expects a Central American state to react, instead of looking at the country in the same way as it looks at India.

The main result of this unbalanced point of view is that the USA tends to regard Brazil's increasingly independent and self-affirming attitudes as unfriendly, or even hostile, as a great American newspaper recently did.

Over the last 20 years Brazil has attempted to overcome its residual underdevelopment and become one of the great independent interlocutors in the international system by virtue of being a western country and by virtue of its values and institutions, but without automatically aligning itself with the USA or any other power. Brazil hopes to consolidate and strengthen Mercosul based on a stable and equitable strategic alliance with Argentina and make it the solid nucleus of a South American system of cooperation and free trade.

Brazilian objections to ALCA arise not only from the rejection of the unequal rules proposed by the Americans, but also from the fact that one of ALCA's implicit (but essential) aims is precisely to eliminate Mercosul and make South America a satellite.

The discrepancy between what Brazil already is and what it aspires to be and the view that the US continues to have of it is leading to increasing disagreements and occasionally takes on the appearance of a confrontation. Brazil does not seek these confrontations but accepts them when they are seen as such by the USA, maintaining the point of view, however, that they are autonomous and not antagonistic confrontations. Brazil does not see the USA as an enemy; it sees it as a partner in a cooperation that is desirable on equal terms, but also as a possible obstacle or competitor.

Brazil's disagreements with the Bush government are simpler though more sensitive. We are talking in the final analysis of the fact that Bush is trying to imprint on the almost global hegemony the USA has achieved the stamp of imperial leadership of the world, while ignoring the multilateral requirements of Law and the practice of international relations - which his predecessors, from Carter to Clinton, respected - in favor of a unilateral imposition of an American will. The unilateral invasion of Iraq on the false pretext that its secret arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (actually non-existent) represented an immediate danger to humanity was the most flagrant example. Brazil, faithful to its multilateral and pro-United Nations position, was one among many other countries that opposed this violation of International Law. The same militaristic unilateralism characterizes the Bush government's antiterrorist policy by confusing effects with causes - the latter are closely linked to questions such as the ignorance and misery of broad sectors of humanity and the oppression of peoples such as the Palestinians - a policy that, along with the violence of the American state, perpetuates the counter-violence of terrorism.

We must mention in addition to these linked themes what is fitting and not fitting in the recent Brazilian decision concerning the entry of Americans into this country. The principle of reciprocity is fitting. What is not fitting is the regrettable incompetence with which it was first put into practice. Not fitting also is the fact that this decision came from the Judiciary when it concerned a matter exclusively within the competence of the Federal Executive power.



11. Brazil-Argentina, the Vital Alliance (2006)

I. Introduction

International Permissibility

The process of globalization, exacerbated by the American Government's imperial unilateralism, is rapidly and drastically reducing the area of international permissibility of underdeveloped countries. This process preserves the formal aspects of sovereignty of these countries such as their national anthem, flag, ceremonial armies and, in democratic societies, elections. Despite this, irresistible constraints in the areas of economics, finance, technology, politics, culture and, when necessary the military, force the leaders of these countries, whether they want or not, to follow policies that suit the requirements of the international market, especially the financial one, and American guidelines. These constraints lead these countries to become in reality mere sectors of the international market endogenously controlled by large multinational companies and exogenously by Washington.

The great emerging countries like China and India, by reason of their critical mass and other circumstances, have managed to preserve their internal autonomy and an appreciable measure of external autonomy. A country like Brazil, in spite of its relative critical mass and high level of national unity, suffers from a lower level of social integration and is therefore vulnerable to disruptive

processes, especially when external pressures combine with domestic forces. Thus, to give one example, a project like ALCA, in spite of its serious negative aspects having been widely identified and discussed, is repeatedly defended by neoliberal currents of thought.

All the countries in Latin America are rapidly heading towards becoming, like so many others, mere segments of the international market. They have lost the ability to determine their own national identity in isolation. However, four countries in the region are preserving, even if not in the long term, the minimal conditions of national autonomy: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. In isolation they will lose what remains of their autonomy in the short term but they can still preserve their national identity and historic destiny if Mercosul (possibly without Chile) is consolidated and, based on this (with Chile), the South American Community of Nations.

The key to preserving this national identity and that of other South American countries is found in the formation of a solid and trustworthy strategic alliance between Argentina and Brazil, to which Venezuela should be added as quickly as possible. This A-B-V triad will surely lead to the consolidation of Mercosul and thereafter to the South American Community of Nations. Thus a new great independent interlocutor will appear in the world with an international weight close to that of the European Union and no less than that of India.

Macro-challenges

The course of history has led the beginning of the 21st century to become the most decisive moment in the history of humanity. Indeed, several processes and factors have been developing since the Industrial Revolution, and especially the Technological Revolution of the 20th century, which have peaked in the 21st century, achieving a potential level of deadliness which, if appropriate measures are not opportunely adopted, will lead to the extermination of the human race.

Among the most serious challenges the world will have to face during the 21st century, four stand out by reason of their catastrophic effects: (1) the loss of conditions to sustain life on the planet because of irreversible damage to the biosphere; (2) the failure to institute a properly rational international order during the first third of the century, which will lead the world to the undesirable alternatives of (i) the formation of a global American Empire that will subject all nations to the power of a single country or (ii) the formation of

a new bipolarity (USA-China) or multipolarity possibly including Russia that will bring back the risk of nuclear holocaust which, in these conditions, will be unavoidable; (3) worsening the inequality between North and South and, in many countries, both the immense differences between rich and poor that have created incurable social conflicts, and uncontrollable modes of terrorism; (4) the material unsustainability in the final third of the century of industrial civilization as it currently operates, when the participation of the huge populations of China, India, Brazil and other countries raises the number of consumers of industrial goods to about 10 billion, exceeding the supply of the various minerals and other scarce raw materials the industrial process depends on.

II. Challenges and Answers

The great challenges the world will face during the 21st century, mainly the four we have just mentioned, are amenable in principle to satisfactory solutions if appropriate measures are opportunely adopted.

The effects of water and air pollution, if they continue at the present rapid rate, will make the planet uninhabitable by the end of the century. Global warming will melt the ice-caps - as is already rapidly happening - raising the sea level by many meters, leading to uncontrolled flooding of low-lying lands. The toxic effects produced directly and indirectly by pollution will result, among other consequences, in making the air unbreathable and human skin defenseless against ultraviolet rays.

The only way of avoiding catastrophe is the immediate adoption of strict anti-pollution measures within the conditions (the Kyoto Protocol) that have been studied and which, for short-term political reasons are not being applied. Continual postponement of the adoption of these measures will inevitably lead missing the deadline for anti-pollution policies to be effective and will lead to irreversible damage to the biosphere.

Something similar is happening in terms of the international order. During the first third of this century, when American hegemony had not yet turned into an insuperable world empire but is still powerful enough to allow the USA to give the lead in creating a suitable international agreement and while China's development has not made it a superpower equal to the USA, it is still possible in these conditions for a proper global agreement to be adopted. In this respect, we have, among other examples, an interesting historical case in point, the Corinth Agreement

of 338 BC. After having achieved complete military supremacy in Greece, Philip of Macedonia called a pan-Hellenic Congress in Corinth and obtained from the other Greek states (with the exception of Sparta) an agreement on the constitution of the Hellenic League in which each Greek state would have a vote on the Main Council proportional to its respective power, while giving military leadership to Macedonia and its king. There are clear analogies between the present global position of USA and that of Philip's Macedonia in Greece. In the present state of the world, a large-scale international agreement would lead the USA to give up the idea of becoming a universal empire and emerging powers like China to give up the idea of becoming future superpowers and turn the world, within a *Pax Universalis*, into a great confederation of free states.

However, everything points to an agreement of this kind not happening. Since the end of the Second World War, the USA has been exerting a consistent domestic and international effort to become a great empire. The immense American military budget is greater than the total of the budgets of all the great powers. Just like the legions of Rome, the USA keeps military establishments in various strategic parts of the world, including recently Paraguay, in order to contain Argentina and Brazil. American military technology is without parallel in the world and allows the USA to destroy any objective anywhere on the planet with practically no risk.

Equally, since the time of Deng Xiaoping, over the last 30 years China has maintained an annual economic growth of about 10%, and has now become the third largest economy in the world. If it can sustain this effort of growth for a few more decades - which will, however, imply solving extremely difficult social and institutional problems - by the middle of the century China will achieve a situation of equality with the USA and in terms of competitiveness and will become another superpower. Aware of the risks that its nuclear installations are running, China has successfully developed a large-scale program of building transcontinental missiles while already having a sizeable arsenal of rockets capable of reaching American territory and which give it a significant power of deterrence.

Thus, at the beginning of the 21st century the world is faced with an undesirable set of alternatives: (1) a global American Empire subjecting all nations to the power of a single nation, or (2) returning to a bipolar regime (or

a multipolar one with Russia) and so subjecting the world once again to the risk of a nuclear hecatomb.

The inequality between North and South, and that which exists within many countries (notably Brazil) between rich and poor sectors of society is becoming worse and will tend to produce the most disastrous social effects. The world is cable of significantly reducing this inequality. However, the means of doing this imply significant costs for rich countries and social sectors and at the same time imply unpopular actions on the part of leaders of poor nations and social sectors. For this reason no effective action is being taken and the gap between wealth and poverty is continually increasing.

No less serious is the question concerning the non-viability of extending industrial civilization as it currently operates into the probable situation of the last third of this century. The success of industrial civilization has been because, among other factors, until the middle of a 20th-century only a small number of countries belonged to it: Western European countries, the United States and Japan. However, the fact is that on the one hand the world population, which amounted to about 2.5 billion people in 1950, will exceed 9 billion in 2050. On the other hand, the huge populations of countries like China, India, Brazil and others are industrializing at a rapid rate and will form part of industrial civilization in the second half of the century, thus raising to something like 10 billion the number of consumers in that similar station. Faced with this immense population, in addition to related problems of supplying them with food and drinking water (already pointed out by Malthus) there arises and even more serious question: the unavailability in corresponding measure, or even in absolute terms, of the various scarce minerals that are vital to the industrial process such as petroleum, natural oils, uranium, molybdenum, tungsten, cobalt, copper, lead and zinc that will become difficult to obtain after 2075. Even today we find that the rate of non-renewal of scarce resources is about 20%.

Given this situation, we shall either succeed in widely and profoundly reorganizing industrial civilization - something which is by no means happening or even being seriously thought about - or the world will be faced with a huge industrial crisis in the last third of this century. It is probable that in the face of this crisis the most powerful countries, notably the USA, will embark upon a fierce imperialism of supply, taking possession of the sources of scarce resources to the detriment of other countries.

III. A Strategic Alliance

Faced with the situation arising out of the considerations above, it is clear that countries like Argentina and Brazil - and the rest of South America, among others - have no chance of achieving their own destiny in isolation. In this situation the strategic alliance between Argentina and Brazil - to which Venezuela should be added as soon as possible - is the first and indispensable condition for preserving their respective national identities. If such an alliance can be made reliable and consistent it will give its participants an importance far higher than that arising out of the sum of its resources and therefore give them a significant increase in their respective areas of international permissibility. It is important to add Venezuela to this alliance as quickly as possible, a development which will result in an increased international weight for these countries significantly greater than the sum of their resources.

The A-B-V group will almost inevitably bring about the consolidation of Mercosul and, based on that system, the consolidation of the South American Community of Nations. As has already been mentioned, turning that Community from its current status of being merely a declaration into something really operational at the economic and political levels will make it an important and independent international interlocutor.

There will be several results of an effective South American Community of Nations. First of all, as in the case of countries belonging to the European Union, this Community will guarantee the preservation of national identities and their historic destiny. On the other hand it should be pointed out that this Community will enjoy favorable conditions in meeting the great challenges promised by the second half of this century. If an American Empire should be set up, the South American Community of Nations will become part of it in the same way as the European Union, as a first-class province and not as a res derelicta. If a bipolar or multipolar system should appear, this Community will perform an important role as an independent interlocutor instead of merely being a province of one of the superpowers. On the other hand, the Community will be able to perform a significant role in protecting the biosphere. Finally, faced with the probable future crisis of industrial civilization, since the Community has a wide range of energy, water and mineral resources it will to a great extent be able to survive thanks to those resources and conditions, which will help the member countries on the one hand protect themselves incomparably better than any of them would be able to do on their own, and on the other to negotiate the import of the resources they lack.

Given the foregoing considerations, the problem we face is not that of the obvious necessity of a South American Community of Nations for the countries of the region and the level to which the main axis of this should be the Argentina-Brazil Alliance. The problem lies in how to make this Community trustworthy and durable based on the trust and durability of the Argentina-Brazil Alliance.

If we reduce the question to its basics, we may say that three things are actually in play between the participants: (1) the adoption of a common point of view concerning the challenges of this century; (2) the creation of a subsequent political will not only at government level but also at the level of relevant social sectors and (3) the creation and implementation of a common program at the economic and diplomatic levels.

The Argentina-Brazil Alliance and on a broader scale the South American Community of Nations will only become effective if they are based on a shared view of the future of the world. We are talking about something that has not yet been achieved even at the individual level of countries like Argentina and Brazil but which, however, has to happen if we are to proceed to an objective analysis of the broader trends currently being revealed in the world. While the view of the world described above is being shaped by the responsible sectors in the countries in question, they will form in those countries a political will that will be consistent with this view. These positive probable situations are however relatively short-term events in historical terms. If this view and this common political will do not take shape while a minimum of international permissibility lasts in the region and in its key countries, the course of history will deny them any autonomous option.

The third requirement, concerning a suitable common economic and diplomatic program, is the most difficult to achieve. History shows, in processes of integration such as occurred in Europe, how long it takes and how difficult it is to achieve common programs. In terms of the South American Community of Nations it would be important to bear in mind the Argentina-Brazil Alliance both generally and in particular, since the promotion of an economic and diplomatic program that would be actually beneficial to the other participants will depend mainly on Brazil because of its power and influence in the region. Thus, as Germany paid the greater price to ally itself with France, and both countries pay a greater price in forming the European Community, so Brazil will have to pay a greater price to bring about its alliance

with Argentina and both countries will have to do the same to consolidate the South American Community of Nations.

The task ahead is extremely difficult but if it is not dealt with properly the countries in the group will become simply sectors of the international market.

12. Ibero-America a Historical-Cultural Process and a Political Project (2007)

1. Introduction

Certain great geographical areas such as Asia have no cultural unity. The various characteristics they possess are too vague to be gathered within the general denomination of 'oriental'. The great cultures of this area such as those of India, China and Japan have a clear identity. In the case of Ibero-America, which includes territories totaling 14 million km² and a population of about 400 million inhabitants distributed among Europe, Mexico, Central and South America, we note the existence of significant cultural characteristics that allow us to speak of an Ibero-American culture which is different from cultures such as the Anglo-Saxon or Slavic, for example.

This basic cultural community arises initially out of the fact of the Portuguese and to a lesser extent the Spanish cultures deriving from ancient Galician and both from Iberian Vulgar Latin. Subsequently, their basic cultural unity arises from the Portuguese colonization of Brazil and Spanish colonization of the rest of Latin America, not forgetting other significant cultural contributions from African and indigenous origins.

2. The Cultural Dimension

Culturally, when we speak of Ibero-America, we are referring to the two Iberian countries and that great cultural grouping that is Latin America.

The proportion of the population in Latin America which accounts for 77% of the whole of Ibero-America, means that when we use the term 'Ibero-American' we are in practice talking of Latin America. When we wish to allude to the cultures of Spain or Portugal we refer to them by those names or collectively by the term 'Iberian culture'.

As we have already seen there is, nevertheless, a basic common element that allows us to speak of 'Ibero-American culture', an element that derives firstly, given the common Galician ancestry or influence as well as the common root of Latin, and the fact that the Portuguese and Spanish languages are mutually understandable. On the other hand, with no disrespect to other specific links between Spanish and Portuguese, there are two integral elements of Ibero-American culture which, when compared to other cultures in the western world, show a remarkably similar quality - something which also happens with Italian culture - the ability to link humanism to technology.

There are undoubtedly significant differences between the Spanish and Portuguese branches of Ibero-American culture as well as differences between their respective languages. I believe we may identify the distinguishing mark of culture rooted in Spain, both in the Peninsula as well as in Spanish America by the 'tragic sense of life'. In the case of culture rooted in Portugal it would be important to point out the 'lyric sense of life'. The basic characteristic of Don Quixote is not the foolishness of his mistakes, mistaking windmills for giants, but his tragic heroism. The basic characteristic of Camoens, in spite of the heroic dimension of *The Lusiads*, is the intense lyricism magnificently he expresses in, among other episodes, that of Inês de Castro.

As we have seen above, the great legacy of Ibero-American culture is to link humanism to technology. In a country like United States, humanism has become an academic specialty. In Ibero-American countries - as well as in Italy - humanism is part of daily life. As in the case of prose for Molière's M. Jourdain, humanism is practiced without people realizing they are practicing it. It is part of the way of living life and living with other people. These humanist peoples, meanwhile, are rapidly taking possession of modern technology, a fact observable in all of them that is becoming a dominant characteristic among those nations with relatively higher levels of development. In my view this is the most important legacy of Ibero-American (as well as of Italian) culture to the present phase of world civilization.

Technology has indeed become the essential condition for survival of modern people. What nature meant for man until the mid-19th century,

technology means today. The utter importance of know-how has however become so dominant that many countries feel acquiring it has become the supreme aim of mankind. Technology has gone from being a condition of life to being now the very definition of life. We are, however, in this way losing sight of the ultimate meaning of life, which lies in its transcendental values. Much of the modern world is sinking into a deadly futility.

In contrast to this futility, Ibero-American humanism uses technology to guarantee material conditions favorable to enabling human beings to live together and enjoy good cultural and aesthetic values. In the successful Ibero-American cities quality of life is significantly higher to what we see in countries where technology reigns, in spite of their marked superiority of about 10 to 1 in *per capita* income. It is still important for the majority of Ibero-American countries to make an effort to achieve a high standard of living in conditions of stable progress. Everything indicates that they are approaching this level and will probably reach it in the first half of this century. Will countries suffering from the excessive domination of technological ability be able to satisfactorily incorporate the humanist values the Ibero-Americans have? Current trends are not encouraging.

3. The Political Dimension

What meaning does Ibero-America have politically? To analyze this question we need to separate political strategies from political realities. Broadly speaking the use of the term 'Ibero-American' is the result of a political strategy on the part of the Spanish leadership to spread the idea of an Ibero-American community that would gravitate around a Spanish pattern. Spreading this idea has increased Spain's influence in the European Union and in the world at large. From this point of view, however, the idea of Ibero-America creates only passive adherence on the part of the Spanish-American peoples and has no echo in the largest Latin American country, Brazil. The adherence of Portugal to this idea is also passive and reluctant. What Portugal tries to emphasize is the lusophone community, to which Brazil gives its full support.

To analyze the political aspects of the question we have to take into account the situation of Latin America and within it, South America. The idea of a Latin American community even with partial historical origins and within a more restricted Spanish-American context, was created and spread by CEPAL, with Raul Prebisch as its main creator, and continued enthusiastically

by Celso Furtado. CEPAL proposed a plan to integrate Latin America that was strongly supported by Felipe Herrera, the first president of the Inter-American Bank. Various attempts were begun to achieve this aim, but without significant results. The integration project for the whole of Latin America was given a definitive check when Mexico joined NAFTA.

Mexico's geographical situation, with its long land frontier with the United States and also its complete economic integration with that country, which accounts for about 80% of its foreign trade, together with the additional fact that American multinational companies have a dominant role in its domestic economy, have made Mexico economically part of the American system, with obvious political effects. NAFTA has in fact merely institutionalized a pre-existing situation with, in the final analysis, positive effects for Mexico.

Given Mexico's situation, an integration project for Latin America can no longer be put into operation in economic and political terms. Nevertheless Latin American culture still exists as an extremely important phenomenon. It is a culture that has one of its main foundations in Mexico, as well as Argentina and Brazil. It is thanks to its powerful popular culture and high level of erudite culture that Mexico has managed to keep its national identity. On the other hand, the preservation of Mexican culture is a fundamental condition for the strengthening of Latin American culture. This is why it is relevant for South American countries to maintain the closest possible relationships of cultural cooperation with Mexico.

In this context South America is particularly important. Indeed, mainly because of Brazil and Argentina, the group of countries on the South American continent preserves an important level of internal and external autonomy. If Latin America as a whole has lost a sense of autonomy in economic and political terms, South America has preserved it, even if it is in decline. This is the relevance of the South American integration project, especially Mercosul, a project whose success depends on the historic future of the countries in the region.

The South American integration project is becoming increasingly mature. Without going back too much to analyzing precedents, we must mention the relevance of the Sarney-Alfonsin Iguaçu Agreement (30/11/1985) and the subsequent Mercosul Agreement (29/3/1991). The Cardoso government formulated the South American integration project for the first time at heads of state level at the 2001 Brasilia Summit. The Lula government has given even more emphasis to the idea of South American integration and a decisive

contribution to this has been the strengthening of Mercosul with the entry of Venezuela.

There can be no doubt as to the fact that in isolation South American countries are not able to maintain their historic destiny and national identity. The process of globalization, exacerbated by the imperial unilateralism of the American government, is tending to turn the countries of the region into mere sectors of the international market and provinces of the American Empire. Brazil itself, despite its semi-continental size, large population and the significant level of development it has now achieved, will not be able to keep its national identity and historic destiny without South American integration or at least without Mercosul. This situation is responsible for the fact that, among other deficiencies, Brazil's low level of social integration, despite its high level of national integration, makes it vulnerable to the destructive effects of the demands of the international financial market and to American pressures. Only by integrating will the countries of South America be able to preserve their historic destiny.

In this context it is important to clarify the fact that the 'American Empire' is a 'field' in the same sense that the term is used when we speak of a 'gravitational field' or a 'magnetic field'. American power preserves the formal aspects of the sovereignty of its 'provinces', the flag, national anthem, armies on parade and even elections in democratic societies. Its domination is enforced by means of overwhelmig constraints in the areas of economics and finance, technology, politics, cultural and, when necessary armed force. These constraints have forced local leaders, whether they want to or not, to give in to the demands of the international financial market - which constitutes the body of the Empire - and to Washington's orders.

In this situation, only South American integration will be able to give the countries of the region the ability to preserve their national identities. Something similar has happened in the European countries which have managed to preserve their identities and historic destiny by forming the European Union.

4. Problems and Challenges

The procedures involved in integrating different national states, as various historical attempts have amply shown, are inevitably difficult and complicated. The procedures for integrating Mercosul and South America are no strangers to this rule and present countless problems and challenges

ranging from significant differences in population sizes, GDP and respective domestic levels of social and national integration, to the lack of a satisfactory system of physical communication between countries in the region. Bearing in mind all these difficulties and problems, we might point out the following five as the most relevant: (1) The greater level of inequality between countries with small populations and/or national GDP levels and large countries like Brazil and Argentina; (2) significant differences between countries that have managed to consolidate their respective nation states and countries where this task has still not been completed, such as the Andean states; (3) significant remnants of old rivalries arising from the colonial period, especially where Spanish and Portuguese colonies clashed; (4) the remnants of the dispute between Argentina and Brazil for regional superiority, and (5) the lack of a satisfactory system for physical communication between the countries in the region.

Simply listing the difficulties involved in the project for integrating South America shows the worrying amount of them. The huge gap separating the large countries of the region from those with very low incomes and small populations, like Bolivia and Ecuador, shows how much the effort to bring together this group of countries into an integrated system demands on the one hand large measures of compensation in favor of the small countries and on the other does not allow, at least at the beginning, very close types of integration such as exist in the European Union. The situation resulting from the existence in South America of countries with high levels of national integration such as Brazil and countries that have still not managed to construct a Nation State, as we find in the Andean states, is no less complex. In the latter, a majority of the population with roots in the high indigenous cultures that were smashed by the Spanish conquest has been kept for centuries in a situation of dependence and lack of effective citizenship. Evo Morales' Bolivia is an excellent example of how this situation is reverting to its original state and creating conflicts between a nascent indigenous nationalism and South American associationism. The two other resulting problems referred to - the remnants of colonial rivalries and rivalries for regional superiority - do not have the same importance even though they are obstacles that must be intelligently overcome.

The fifth great problem mentioned above, which arises from the lack of a satisfactory system of communication between the countries in the region, although it is not insurmountable - much the opposite, overcoming it is a natural objective within the integration process – concerns the question that must be

properly resolved, of requiring large amounts of capital which are still not yet available.

If, however, we shift our gaze from the difficulties to looking at the solutions they bring, we shall find a much more viable picture. In the final analysis, what is needed is a strong political will and intelligent measures to allow the accumulation of a satisfactory amount of resources for the gradual construction of a South American system of communication involving railways, energy and information.

Political will has already made itself felt at a significant level, as the repeated calls for integration made in the region have shown. In order for these to be raised from the level of talking to that of working it is vitally important that the strategic alliance being created between Argentina and Brazil should be consolidated as quickly as possible and should itself advance from the stage of declaration to operation. Much is already being done in this respect, as shown by the various agreements through which differences between the two countries are being amicably resolved. These differences arise mainly out of the deindustrialization to which Argentina was foolishly led by the neoliberalism that reigned in the country until the great crisis in 2001. Just in time, President Kirchner led the country back to a rapid program of development and is counting on help from Brazil to achieve this aim. What is important now is to take a decisive step forward and adopt a common program of industrialization by a proper linking of chains of production and undertaking common investment.

The consolidation of the strategic Argentina-Brazil Alliance, supported by a common industrial and foreign policy, will guarantee the consolidation of Mercosul as long as the bigger members provide appropriate compensation for the smaller ones. On the other hand, a trustworthy and reciprocally beneficial Argentina-Brazil Alliance will allow the inclusion of Venezuela in a tripartite leadership from the basis of which it will be possible to resolve the difficulties referred to above that confront the project to integrate South America.

One of the main tasks of this tripartite leadership will be to mobilize an adequate amount of financial resources to ensure the vigorous execution of a program of South American intercommunication. It is vital to create a South American Development Bank similar to the Brazilian BNDES and the Andean states' CAF. In accordance with ideas that have already been put forward by certain eminent economists from the region such as Aldo Ferrer, transferring

to this bank something like 5% of the strong currency reserves of the main countries in the region would guarantee it an initial financial level that would let it start a large-scale regional communication program. The integrating effects of such a program would be immense. Once again, everything will depend on a strong political will and this in turn will depend on a long-lasting and trustworthy strategic Argentina-Brazil alliance and the formation of the three-part leadership referred to previously. South American intellectuals should emphasize the vital importance of regional integration. The presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela must adopt the measures that will lead to putting it into practice.

V. BRAZIL



1. Eighty Years a Republic - 1901-1980 (1983)

I. Order an Progress - 1901-1910

For Brazil, the first ten years of the 20th century involved an effective effort to reform its finances, headed by Campos Sales and a wide-reaching process of modernization and development set in motion by Rodrigues Alves and Afonso Pena. Just ten years after its proclamation, the Republic could claim to be following its own motto ('Order and Progress' – trans.).

Although the installation of a Republic in Brazil was preceded by the introduction of new ideas and an effort to improve organization following the war with Paraguay, there was a sudden development resulting from a military *coup*. During the Empire, the democracy of notables under the control of the Moderating Power constituted a system representing rural landowners and the urban bourgeoisie based on the clientelist manipulation of the nascent middle-class and the socio-political passivity of the rural masses who were kept in servile conditions until 1888. With Deodoro Fonseca, a small circle of positivist-oriented soldiers and other long-time supporters of republicanism took power under the legitimizing agency of the new republican ideology, excluding the old political class without actually representing any important stratum in society. Left to itself, the personal power of Deodoro (15/11/89-23/11/91), an *ad hoc* expression of the old Moderating Power in a crisis situation, would tend to re-establish in a new and possibly less democratic,

form the influence of the notables, as could be foreseen in Baron Lucena's *coup d'etat* (3/11/91).

The originality of Floriano Peixoto's government (23/11/91-15/11/94) lay in its attempt to base itself on the incipient urban middle class in opposition to the notables and the interests they represented, imposing in the name of republican purity a civic and military jacobinism that would legitimize itself and stay in power through a policy of co-option. There was, however, a contradiction between the two wings of this republican jacobinism. If the republican principle were to prevail, it would not be possible to extend the mandate of the chief of state beyond its legal limit nor avoid the notables regaining power through the representative process if the electoral process were reopened. If the jacobin principle prevailed, the ideological dictatorship of positivism – with its minimal level of support within the urban middle class – would have to be imposed, thus anticipating by several decades models such as that of Kemal Pasha.

The situation in Brazil at that time excluded the second option in practical terms. With Prudente de Moraes the power of the notables was restored together with civil government and, thanks to the President's wisdom and firmness of purpose, political peace was allowed to permit the gradual reinclusion of the old political class into the Republican framework. Elected by Senator Glicério's Federal Republican Party, at the end of his mandate Prudente managed to take the political command of Congress away from Glicério and institute the beginnings of a presidential regime with the support of state governments.

With a base in the São Paulo state government, Campos Sales reorganized the Republican party and with Prudente's support, was elected to succeed the latter. The new government inherited from Prudente political peace and the beginning of a presidential regime supported by the dominant parties in the states, but also their financial situation of large external debt and major budgetary imbalances which were brought to light in the serious disturbances of the first years of the Republic. The Campos Sales government (15/11/98-15/11/1902) would make a very successful effort to clean up the external and internal financial situation through the direct action of the Finance Minister, Joaquim Murtinho. Before taking office, the President himself negotiated the terms of a funding loan with the House of Rothschild, thus ensuring the normalization of the external debt and stable exchange rates. A policy

of government austerity maintained a balanced budget and cleaned up domestic finances.

So when Rodrigues Alves succeeded Campos Sales he inherited a legacy of political peace and well-ordered administration and finances that gave the President the best opportunity to adopt a bold policy of modernization and development. Under the enlightened leadership of its Mayor, Pereira Passos and with the help of the engineer Paulo de Frontin, Rio de Janeiro was transformed into a beautiful modern capital city. Oswaldo Cruz, leading the campaign to eradicate yellow fever, created a successful sanitary system. The country's embryonic industrialization, which had been begun by the provisional government without a sufficient foundation, took on new energy with the efforts made by Rodrigues Alves to provide electricity. With the predicted results having been achieved, the Taubaté Agreement (26/11/1906) raised and stabilized the price of coffee, thus guaranteeing substantial foreign reserves for the country.

The government of Afonso Pena (15/11/1906-25/11/1908), although interrupted by the death of the President two years before the end of his term of office, involved a systematic extension of his predecessor's policy of modernization and progress. The nation's rail network was extended to connect regions and river basins. Modern new ports in Rio Grande do Sul, Vitória, Bahia and Belém were added to those of Rio and Santos, and under Marshal Rondon the telegraph penetrated the jungle and connected the towns of the Amazon with the capital.

During this period the Republic's political system was consolidated in the form of a presidential system that satisfied state-level government supporters and was widely supported by them, both directly and by means of supporters in the states and in Congress. The combination of the power of the state governments (the oligarchies) and the complementary support given to them by the federal government maintained a stable power base that was enlarged in the final instance by the power of the 'recognition' of mandates by the National Congress itself, which gave the President comfortable majorities in the Legislature that voted for all the measures proposed by the Executive. This system created, on the other hand, an opposition press led by Edmundo Bittencourt's *Correio da Manhã* (founded 1901) which gave a voice to political debate that could not flourish in the tame Congress. The growing distance between the political system and the press would over time create an urban middle-class public opinion increasingly opposed to the system and

which would finally contest it in the 1920s and overthrow it in the Revolution of 1930.

The first ten years of the century are also a time of great diplomacy inspired and later led by Baron Rio Branco. The general aim of this diplomacy was to guarantee external conditions that would strengthen the country's independence and was particularly applied to fixing and consolidating Brazil's frontiers. As it took shape during its history, Brazil continued to expand its territory far beyond the basic limit of the Treaty of Tordesillas and so had to face significant border conflicts with several other countries. After the first disagreement with Argentina over the Missions [Jesuit mission stations in the South of Brazil – trans.] (resolved in Brazil's favor by the arbitration of US President Grover Cleveland in 1895) Rio Branco introduced the principle of regulating such disputes by a policy of diplomacy and arbitration based on solid historical and geographical studies of the subject.

The same realism that led him to make exhaustive documentary preparations for frontier disputes provided Rio Branco with his policy for re-equipping the navy. With Admiral Noronha in the Rodriques Alves government this policy was correctly aimed at re-establishing as far as possible the shipbuilding program begun by Mauá. With Admiral Alexandrino in the Afonso Pena government the re-equipping of the navy took the form of acquiring from abroad two 20,000-ton battleships, the Minas and the São Paulo.

With the aid of his usual gifts of rational persuasion and effective use of power, Rio Branco tackled the serious question of the occupation of Bolivian Acre by Brazilian rubber-tappers both successfully and with a sense of equity. What made the situation especially dangerous was Bolivia's decision to give rights of use and occupation of the region to a powerful Anglo-American group, the "Bolivian Syndicate, in the form of a chartered company". By diplomatic and financial means, Rio Branco managed to dismantle the syndicate and, by taking military control of the region, negotiated its cession to Brazil by paying fair compensation (two million pounds sterling), with the Treaty of Petrópolis in 1903.

The systematic animosity of Estanislau Zebellos managed to put at risk Rio Branco's peacemaking efforts at times, as in the case of the famous secret Telegram No. 9 in 1909. The Baron, however, calmly defused the crisis, published the original version of the telegram and then carefully put back together the threads of good relations with the Southern Cone and with the

ABC Pact of 1909 achieved a closer approximation between Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

No comments on these fertile first ten years of the century in Brazil, however brief they may be, can be completed without referring to another peak in the Brazilian spirit at the time, which occurred in the area of culture and literature. The decade of the height of the Republic was also a decade of new heights in literature. Founded in 1897, the House of Machado de Assis [the Brazilian Literary Academy – trans.] produced its best fruits in the first years of the 20th century. In addition to Machado himself, Brazilian literature saw the realism and naturalism of Aluísio de Azevedo, Júlio Ribeiro, and Raul Pompéia; the epic prose of Euclides da Cunha; the Parnassianism of Bilac and Alberto de Oliveira; the Symbolism of Cruz and Souza; the philological and political oratory of Rui Barbosa; the historiography of Capistrano, Rodolfo Garcia and Oliveira Lima; the juridical science of Clóvis Bevilaqua and his plan for the Civil Code; the biomedical research of Carlos Chagas, and Visconti's Impressionist painting. It was a period of successful undertakings in which Brazil came to see its extraordinary potential and its ability to fulfill it, the patriotic attitude of which was symbolically anticipated in the book Afonso Celso de Assis Figueiredo published in 1900.

II. The Breakdown of Order - 1911-1920

For Brazil, the second decade of the century is characterized by a double breakdown in order, both national and international. At national level, the candidature and government of Marshal Hermes da Fonseca brought about a deep conflict between the civilian and military sectors of Brazil's nascent middle class. The breakdown in internal order would be seen mainly in political terms and led to the overthrow by violent federal military interventions – the 'salvations' – of the old state political factions, which would be replaced by new ruling military and civil groups that enjoyed the President's confidence. The breakdown in international order would come about with the beginning of the Great War from 1914 to 1918 in which Brazil would eventually have a small part from the end of 1917, but which would have important consequences for the country.

The political balance after the Floriano de Peixoto government was achieved from the Prudente de Moraes government onwards through a

combination of Presidentialism and the policy of rulers based on the São Paulo-Minas axis. Overcoming the control that Glicério held over Congress by means of the Party, Prudente and the presidents who followed him took direct control of the political leadership of the country and established a relationship of reciprocal support with the state political factions. Those state political factions, reinforced by the presidency, ensured their own succession and guaranteed the President their tame support in Congress. The backing of Congress helped the President support the perpetuation of ruling groups at state level, the so-called 'oligarchies'.

This state of affairs came to be criticized by increasing opposition from the urban middle class mobilized by the free press such as the *Correio da Manhã*, given form and leadership by Rui Barbosa. This opposition was, however, condemned to a state of complete impotence for a prolonged period. Pre-1930 Brazil was a mainly agrarian society in which the 'oligarchies', in the political sense of the term, represented the real oligarchies in the social sense of the term, and from that base exercised effective control of the electorate. The practices of adjusting electoral results to the convenience of the local power groups, from false registration to congressional 'recognition' of mandates, completed the picture and guaranteed the preservation of the system.

The arrival of a great independent leader in Congress, Pinheiro Machado, who had a solid base in the political bloc of the Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Julio de Castilhos, introduced a disturbing element into the system. Pinheiro's political ambitions were on the one hand favorable to restoring a unified party in the style of Glicério, with its leader in Congress and enjoying autonomy in relation to the President. On the other hand, it was a suitable instrument to replace the traditional state 'oligarchies' dating from the first years of the Republic with leaders who depended on the party leadership and would create power blocs faithful to it. As in the time of Glicério, this system could imply dividing powers between the party and its leader who would control Congress, and the President of the Republic who would lead the Executive.

The death of Afonso Pena before he completed his mandate brought forward thoughts about the succession and favored the emergence of Pinheiro's leadership. When Marshall Hermes da Fonseca, nephew of the founder of the Republic, announced his candidature, Pinheiro managed to avoid the possibility of a candidature coming from the traditional partnership of 'coffee

with milk' [the system of presidential candidates coming alternately from the states of Minas Gerais (milk) and São Paulo (coffee) – trans.]. The civilian candidature of Rui Barbosa which mobilized the opinion of the thinking public and raised the specter of political reform by means of the secret vote and other democratic measures, forced the state political factions to gather defensively around Hermes da Fonseca and ensure his election.

The Fonseca government did conform to a great extent to Pinheiro Machado's ambitions. Pinheiro certainly had less effective power than he seemed to have, with presidential decisions often going against him. In spite of this, the internal rupture of the system that Pinheiro hoped for began to happen. Violent intervention by federal government by means of its state garrisons overcame state power blocs in Rio, Bahia, Pernambuco, Sergipe, Alagoas, Ceará and Pará, replacing the old political 'oligarchies' with military and civil personnel trusted by the President—although not always by Pinheiro. This was, however, a breakdown within the system, not of relations between the system and civil society, which would only happen with the crisis of the 1920s and the Revolution of 1930.

The Fonseca government, which had began with the disturbance resulting from the sailors' revolt led by João Candido (22/11/1910) and carried on during the chaos of the state-level 'salvations', could not dismantle the core of the power of the old system, the São Paulo-Minas axis. This would produce, with the Ouro Fino Pact (21/04/14), the reaction to Pinheiro and Fonseca that would lead to the candidature and election of the President from Minas, Venceslau Braz. Pinheiro would be assassinated in 1915 when he was no longer at the head of Brazilian politics.

The government of Venceslau Braz would make an effort to bring about internal peace and restore the classic mechanisms of power while trying to confront the difficult state of affairs created by the First World War within the limitations of Brazil at that time.

Brazil's neutrality did not preserve its merchant Navy from the total submarine warfare with which Germany was trying to block Allied supplies. This fact was recognized early on by Rui Barbosa, whose political values and cultural background led him to identify with France and Britain. Brazil's participation in the war, defended by him – notably in his speech in Buenos Aires (14/07/16) – became an increasing demand on the part of the people after the successive sinking of three Brazilian ships. The torpedoing of a fourth steamer, the Macau, led Venceslau Braz to finally declare war on 3rd

May, 1917. The part played by Brazil would be marginal. As well as sending a small fleet, a team of about a hundred doctors was sent to help in French hospitals.

The effects of the Great War, however, although less than those that would arise out of the second global conflagration, were significant for Brazil. Internally, the country was aroused by a sense of patriotism and the idea of defending the nation which was shown in a civic movement that, among other consequences, helped to heal the wounds left by Hermes da Fonseca and the conflict between supporters of civil rule and the military. The interruption of normal foreign trade led the country – at that time purely an exporter of raw materials – to make the first effort at import substitution and instigated the increase of Brazilian industrial infrastructure. The 3,400 industrial establishments that existed in 1910 had grown to more than 13,600 by 1920. The working population had risen from 150,000 to 275,000 and the value of industrial production rose from 769,000 to 3 million *contos de reais*.

Industrial labor however still had no measures to protect workers, who were reduced to the most basic level of subsistence and whose working day could be as long as 14 hours. The end of the decade would be marked by social demands influenced by European anarcho-syndicalism.

Politically, the decade closed with the impasse created by the fact that when Rodriques Alves was elected President for the second time, succeeding Venceslau Braz, the Spanish influenza which began to devastate Brazil after the end of 1918 prevented the new President from taking office. Vice President Delfim Moreira became interim President until the death of Rodrigues Alves on 27th June, 1919. With the new elections, the unity of government supporters was more easily achieved in the prevailing conditions through the candidature of the famous figure of Epitácio Pessoa who had recently distinguished himself at the Peace Conference, a man who was distant from the centers of power but not controversial like Rui Barbosa.

Barbosa, knowing that his election victory was inevitable, stood one more time to take his last political message to the country. A noble figure at the beginning of the decade, at the moment of the internal crisis in the political system, of its regeneration through political reform based on the secret vote and voting urns, he foresaw clearly at the end of the decade the need for a spokesman for related social reform.

III. The Decline os the Notables - 1921-1930

The 1920s in Brazil saw the rapid decline of the capacity of the prevailing social and political system for running national life. The global economic crisis following the crash of the New York Stock Exchange on 24th October, 1929 was a decisive factor in worsening the crisis in the system that would contribute in great measure to the outbreak of the Revolution of 1930.

The crisis in the Old Republic system reached all the important areas of Brazilian public life. It was a case on the one hand of a crisis of ideas and values affecting the social and aesthetic sensibilities of the country. On the aesthetic level, the tired academicism of the 1920s came face-to-face with the vigorous creativity of the Modernist movement which was exhibited to a wider public at the Week of Modern Art in 1922. The Week, however, is only one striking moment in an esthetic movement that had been growing since the end of the previous decade and which, in tune with the trends of European art at the beginning of the century, had become the dominant style of the period, along with the writing of Mario de Andrade, Oswaldo de Andrade and Cassiano Ricardo, the poetry of Manuel Bandeira, the music of Vilalobos and the painting of Di Cavalcanti.

On the social level, the new sensibility became aware of the exploitation of the proletariat and the marked economic and social inequalities resulting from the unrestrained liberalism of the beginning of the century and produced movements for economic regulation and protection of the workforce ranging from the moderate measures adopted by the Liberal Alliance to the revolutionary radicalism of the Brazilian Communist Party, founded on 25th March, 1922.

It was also a case of a structural economic crisis that preceded the depression of the 1930s and was profoundly worsened by that situation. This crisis showed the impossibility for a country with the size and complexity that Brazil had attained in the 1920s, with more than 30 million inhabitants, depending entirely on a coffee monoculture. Given the difference between the country's increasing productive capacity and the moderate increase in global demand, the accumulation of unsellable stocks of coffee foreshadowed the exhaustion of that economic model before 1930.

Finally and principally, it was a case of a political crisis. The political system of the Old Republic completely marginalized the Brazilian middle-class and the emerging proletariat. From its beginnings in a social stratum of

civil and military administrators employed in trade and the liberal professions at the beginning of the century, by the 1920s the middle-class had become the main social stratum in the urban population. At its upper levels it mixed with the landowning-merchant elite but was separated from that class by its ideas and its way of life, which depended on earnings from work rather than from capital. At its lower levels it was closer to the proletariat and shared many of the latter's demands.

This class formed urban public opinion and was increasingly restless in beginning to confront a political system based on the clientelistic manipulation of rural masses and electoral fraud. The system's increasing lack of validity affected the legitimacy of the ruling power. It became obvious that the political powerbase was ultimately founded on the application of force and that this could only be corrected by alternative applications of force. The governments of the decade had to confront this increasing antagonism between the ruling system and civil society that was appearing in an increasingly critical form. Despite the disturbances it had to face, the government of Epitácio Pessoa can be considered as the last government of the Old Republic whose legitimacy was generally recognized by the country. It was a government based on a legalistic sense of authority – it brought into republican practice the new idea of appointing civilian ministers to military ministries – Calógeras to the Ministry of War, Raul Soares as Navy Minister – both of whom were very successful in their posts. It was also a government that achieved much, in the manner of Rodrigues Alves and Afonso Pena. Faced right from the start with a serious social crisis, it reacted in a legalistic manner, using with the law to suppress anarchy (17/01/21). In the same legalistic way it punished the abuses of Marshal Hermes Fonseca when he was elected president of the Military Club, and ordered the club to be closed by the police. The military rebellion linked to this episode (04/07/22) was finally aborted by the refusal to participate of the majority of the expected participants and finished with the heroic protest of the 18 soldiers of the Copacabana Fort.

Thus Epitácio, who had begun his government with the magnificent reception offered to King Albert I of Belgium, could close it in an equally festive way with the exhibition to celebrate the Centenary of Independence and give the country an impressive display of its successes a hundred years after becoming a sovereign nation.

In contrast, the two last governments of the Old Republic carry the mark of the decline of the regime. Artur Bernardes, whose candidature was deeply affected by the episode of the forged letters, had to rule the country in a continuing a state of siege. His government was seriously threatened by the revolution of Isidore Dias Lopes in São Paulo (05/0702) which, although defeated led to the incident of the column of Miguel Costa and Luiz Carlos Prestes that took revolutionary disturbance to the interior of the country until the middle of 1925. With its legitimacy contested from the very start by the urban middle class, mainly young men in the armed forces, Bernardes left his successor from São Paulo, Washington Luiz, political power that could only be maintained by repression.

The Presidency of Washington Luiz (15/11/26-24/10/30) was a frustrated attempt to restore normality. Enjoying a superficially more peaceful situation than his predecessor, Washington Luiz tried to re-launch the regime of achievements with his railway-building program. The system was however, exhausted. As well as opposition from the urban middle class and radicals, the regime had to confront the problems demonstrated in significant situations at state level: Minas under Antonio Carlos, Rio Grande do Sul under Getúlio Vargas and Paraíba under João Pessoa. Antonio Carlos, foreseeing the inevitability of change, suggested reforming the system: "Let us start the revolution before the people start it".

The forces of opposition joined together - moderates and radicals, gauchos, people from Minas and the Northeast – in the Liberal Alliance. Faced with this situation, Washington Luiz showed a total lack of political vision. Rejecting the moderate reform measures proposed by Antonio Carlos he opted, for petty reasons of parish politics, to support the candidature of Julio Prestes from São Paulo. Antonio Carlos reacted by launching the aggressive candidature of Getúlio Vargas with the support of the Borges de Medeiros group from Rio Grande do Sul. Thus the stage was set for a confrontation which could no longer be resolved by the usual expedient of ruling-power clientelism and electoral fraud.

Like all important historical movements, the Revolution of 1930 cannot be understood only in terms of its structural factors. The socio-political system of the Old Republic was effectively exhausted. Rejected by the urban middle class, especially young men in the armed forces, incapable of resolving the social problems arising out of the country's emerging industrialization, confronted by the collapse of an economy based on agricultural exports and a semi-colonial social structure, with no alternatives to offer, the system could nevertheless have possibly been saved by reform. This had been suggested

at the right time and at a high level by Rui Barbosa in his ceaseless democratic and social sermons. It might even have been achieved before the contrived election of Julio Prestes by means of understandings with Antonio Carlos and Getúlio Vargas concerning Antonio Carlos' candidature, or even that of a third party.

Like Bernardes, Washington Luiz opted for inflexibility but when he did so he enjoyed real levels of power far lower than those of his predecessor. Chance circumstances such as, on a more general level, the world economic crisis coinciding with the end of his mandate, and on a more restricted level, the assassination of Joao Pessoa, unleashed a revolution. By the middle of October the revolutionary forces had easily taken control of Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais and the Northeast. In numerical terms Washington Luiz still controlled the majority of the country's armed forces but there was no legitimacy in cause of the Old Republic nor social motivation to defend it. The military commanders in Rio de Janeiro, concerned to avoid a confrontation between the two wings of the army, preferred to take the initiative by deposing the President (24/10/30). They were encouraged by the great hope of coming to a compromise with the revolutionaries. They soon realized that the revolution was demanding total victory and that the generals did not possess the means to contain it. So, on 3rd November, 1930 the Military Junta of Generals Tasso Fragoso and Mena Barreto, and Admiral Isaias de Noronha, ingloriously handed over the provisional government of the Republic to Getúlio Vargas.

IV. The Emergence of the Middle-Class - 1931-1940

With the Revolution of 1930, the middle class achieved political supremacy in Brazil. As in 1889, it was the leaders of the middle-class who took power by means of revolution in the name of the interests and ideals of their class. In contrast to what had happened in 1889, in 1930 the middle class, although a minority – and still unable to defeat the clientelist policies of the landowning-merchant forces in elections – already had a critical mass sufficient to give its representatives stable control of the State machine. Another difference in terms of this revolution lies in the fact that the former was a military movement with a civilian ideology whereas the 1930 Revolution was a basically civilian movement that involved young men in uniform and used parts of the Army for its ends, with certain conditions.

The victory of the revolution was followed by a period of some bewilderment. The forces of insurrection coordinated by the Liberal Alliance actually consisted of a quite varied collection of groups and interests. The core of the revolutionary forces was the urban middle class and young military men. The revolution had also mobilized significant sectors of society from the old political class, like Antonio Carlos and Vargas himself who were opposed to the government power blocs and who had been led to the extreme measure of armed revolt by circumstances. There was however a wide ideological gap separating them from the radical young who aspired, in the conditions of the time, to the same intransigent transformation of society that the Jacobins at the start of the Republic had aimed to achieve.

Within this situation of different and contradictory aspirations, Getúlio Vargas would initially play the role of moderator, equally distant from conservatives and radicals, typified more by the ambiguity of his attitudes than by any positive claim to a central position. In fact he had dictatorial powers and exercised them widely although in such a way as to make compromises between the conflicting tendencies and personalities of the new regime.

The period between achieving power and the constitutional revolution in São Paulo in 1932 led the forces forming the new regime into an initial polarization between the conservative liberals who gathered under the banner of the Democratic Party in São Paulo on the one hand, and the radicalism of the lieutenants who organized their Club on 3rd October, 1931 with Pedro Ernesto as president, along with Góes Monteiro, Osvaldo Aranha, Juarez Távora, João Alberto and other leaders of the faction. Among the many differences separating the two wings of the new regime one of the most important was the position adopted about consulting the people. The conservative liberals wanted to do it as soon as possible and felt it vital to call for a Constituent Assembly to reform the institutions of the Republic based on authentic representation of the people. The radicals felt it was more vital to make further use of their power to change society and only later hold elections.

Faced with this alternative, Vargas behaved with the ambiguity that was his trademark at that time. On a formal level he supported the idea of consulting the people, finally making a decree for a new Electoral Code (23/02/32) which was clearly democratic and after some procrastinating fixed on 3rd May, 1933 for elections to the Constituent Assembly. In practice, however,

Vargas gave no sign of making an effective move to put an end to the discretionary powers of the provisional government.

The São Paulo revolution of 1932 played an important part in redirecting the course of events. The growing dissatisfaction in São Paulo with the direction of the provisional government dated from the beginning of the revolution when the intervention of João Alberto frustrated the hopes of the local antigovernment power bloc that had supported the movement and felt itself to be its natural successor in government. The weaknesses of the coffee policy - in an extremely difficult international situation - mobilized the powerful coffee interests against Vargas. The procrastination of the provisional government concerning elections finally convinced the Paulistas that only force could put an end to the discretionary regime.

Although they did not have the ability to overthrow the government when the hoped-for support from Rio Grande and Minas did not appear, the Paulista forces still represented a serious threat to Getúlio Vargas' power. The latter, having won revolution, exercised his customary skills in restoring good relations with those he had defeated. The São Paulo government was handed over to the Paulistas themselves in the person of the democratic leader Armando Sales de Oliveira and elections to the Constituent Assembly took place in 1933. When the Constitution was promulgated (16/07/34) Vargas was elected by the Assembly for a four-year mandate and a new stage of the revolution began.

The second phase of the regime installed in 1930 is notable for a new and more profound process of radicalization. The first phase set liberals and conservatives against radicals and was ideologically vague. Both wings considered themselves committed to democracy, some in terms of liberalism with a moderate social conscience, others in terms of a democracy that did not exclude free enterprise but was more definitely directed towards social aims and nationalist concepts. This new radicalization, which reflected the climate in Europe in the mid-1930s, was divided between a right wing represented by Integralism, founded by Plínio Salgado in 1933, and the National Liberating Alliance (1935) which had the characteristics of a popular front and included Luiz Carlos Prestes' Communists.

The radicalization of the middle class between the (mainly) Fascist-leaning right and a (smaller) socialist-leaning left with the participation of an increasingly well-organized and politicized proletariat, led Vargas to snap out of his previous ambiguity and take positions clearly congruent with the right, although preserving

his independence of the Integralists. The easily quashed Communist uprising of 1935 gave Vargas the opportunity to introduce legally constitutional reforms in the name of national security and, in practice, increasingly discretionary measures that were increasingly authoritarian.

The forces of democracy, who foresaw the risk of a new Getulian dictatorship, encouraged preparations for elections in 1938. São Paulo and the conservatives gathered around the President of their state, Armando Sales de Oliveira. After much maneuvering, Vargas nominally put forward José Américo de Almeida as the candidate of the revolutionary movement. The situation, however, allowed him to set up a plan to install a right-wing authoritarian state. To this end, he already had, both de jure and de facto, a considerable number of discretionary powers. General Dutra, the War Minister, guaranteed in the support of the Army. In a quick and successful mission to talk to state governors, Negrão de Lima brought news of the support of nearly all of them for the proposed *coup* (except for Bahia and Pernambuco). This was carried out suddenly on 10th November, 1937 under the pretext of avoiding dramatic Communist subversion based on the evidence of the fictitious Cohen plan. Francisco Campos, the Minister of Justice, had already prepared the text of the new Constitution. The police, surrounding the Chambers of Congress at dawn on 10th November, took care of the rest.

Begun under the banner of the purest of democratic spirit, the decade was ending under the aegis of a Fascist-leaning authoritarianism. In fact, rather than reneging on the ideas of the 1930 Revolution, Vargas always remained an interpreter of middle-class aspirations until the end of the New State. It is true that in those years as in later ones, there was always acting within him the desire to create a personalized form of power and to remain in power, but it is equally certain that in order to carry out his designs, Vargas always sought above all to understand and interpret the hopes of his time. He was a radical liberal when the middle class, dissatisfied with the power groups of the Old Republic, demanded that the system be made more democratic. He leaned towards Fascism when that same middle class, alarmed by a growing organization of the proletariat and by the specter of Communism, looked for protection in the authoritarianism of the right.

Through a disinterested alliance with the Integralists, Vargas abolished the 1934 Constitution and established the New State (*Estado Novo*). With the discretionary powers this gave him, he destroyed Integralism in the following year, along with the political pretensions of Plínio Salgado. When

the Second World War broke out he adopted a position of neutrality in spite of the affinities his regime had with the Axis Powers.

As well as these notable political vicissitudes, the 1930s were also a period of abrupt economic change. The semi-colonial Brazilian economy, based on coffee monoculture and importing almost all the goods it needed by exporting that product, suffered irreparable collapse in the depression of the 1930s. Stocks of unsellable coffee in the order of 30 million sacks piled up while foreign prices of the crop suffered catastrophic falls (US\$ 0.2425 per lb. in 1925 compared to US\$ 0.07 in 1930).

In this situation Brazil was spontaneously led into a policy of industrialization through import substitution. As would be pointed out later by Inácio Rangel, the idle resources of the Brazilian economy and its unused capacity were important in this regard. The impossibility of continuing to obtain from abroad the consumer goods it needed forced the country to produce them internally. The number of industrial plants, about 13,000 in 1920, rose to about 50,000 by the end of the 1930s and the value of industrial production in the same period rose from about 3.2 million *contos de reais* to 17.6 million.

V. The Transition - 1941-1950

The 1940s in Brazil would be a period of transition in significant areas of national life. In politics, the New State, affected by the course of international events, showed signs of increased lack of viability from 1943 onwards. Brazil's breaking off relations with the Axis Powers on 14th February, 1942, its declaration of war on 30th August, 1942 and the direct participation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force on the Italian Front with a contingent of more than 25,000 men were factors which, added to the internal circumstances of the country, led to unavoidable demands for re-democratization that would culminate in the deposition of Vargas in 1945 and the new Constitution in 1946.

The transition did not only happen on the political level, but affected the very social and economic structure of the country. By imposing the need for industrialization to achieve import substitution - a situation reinforced by the 1939-45 war - the crisis of the 1930s significantly changed the productive patterns of the country and led to an acceleration in industrial growth and, along with this, the appearance of a significant working class and the

emergence of industrial leaders under the enlightened leadership of Roberto Simonsen.

At the end of the decade these and other circumstances would bring no less important changes on the cultural level. There appeared on the one hand a new economic awareness encouraged after the war by the ideas of CEPAL [Economic Committee for Latin American and the Caribbean – trans.] and by the reawakening of interest in the problems of development. This new economic awareness would lead to the formation of a brilliant new generation of economists (Roberto Campos, Rômulo Almeida and Celso Furtado), who would play an important part in the following decade and later years. This new movement of ideas also made itself felt in the area of social sciences, philosophy and natural sciences. Leaving behind the mainly literary environment to which the Brazilian intelligentsia had traditionally belonged, the new intelligentsia that formed at the end of the decade (Page 5 of the *Jornal do* Commercio in Rio, Colégio magazine in São Paulo) would move on to making a social and political analysis of the situation of the country (Guerreiro Ramos, Florestan Fernandes and Helio Jaguaribe) and attempted in the area of philosophy (Vicente Ferreira da Silva, Mario Vieira de Mello, Roland Corbisier and Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez) to make innovative efforts at going beyond the patterns of positivism and Marxism. At the same time, modern theoretical physics was developing in Brazil with Cesar Lates, Leite Lopes, José Goldenberg and others.

Taken as a whole, the decade consisted of three phases in Brazil. The first corresponds to the continuation and consolidation of the New State that was set up in 1937. The second, from 1944 to 1945, is one of political transition in which interesting alternatives are formulated. With the deposition of Vargas at the end of 1945 and the elections, a third phase emerges characterized by the 1946 Constitution and the efforts of the Dutra government to achieve national unity.

The New State, invented by Francisco Campos to adjust Getúlio Vargas' desire for power to the Fascist-leaning tendencies of the middle class at the end of the 1930s, was essentially a bureaucratic and centralizing authoritarianism corporativist in inspiration, nationalist in direction and socialist in its tendencies. With his strong sense of pragmatism, Vargas tried to avoid making specific ideological commitments to Fascism, both in order to avoid creating guidelines restricting his own initiatives and also to avoid putting himself in a position of dangerous opposition to the United States. The regime,

however, had an air of Salazarism and had some similarities with the Portuguese model.

By means of the New State the middle class managed to avoid the return of the notables and the interests of the landowners and merchants who would continue, in the representative system, to be able to control the electorate until the middle of the 1940s. By means of the DASP [Departamento Administrativo do Servic'o Publico—Civil Service Administrative Department—trans.] (created in 1936) the new regime increased and rationalized the Brazilian civil service at a formal level and by means of public examinations opened it up to free competition within the middle class without the intervention of the notables. Its nationalist concerns led it to create the first great public companies: the National Motor Factory (1940), the National Steel Company (1941), the Alkali Company (1942) and the Rio Doce Valley Company (1942), among which National Steel and the Rio Doce Valley came to be extremely important enterprises in national development.

The Second World War would, however, have decisive effects on the course of events. When the war started Vargas maintained a position of prudent and equidistant neutrality. Opposing pressures were soon felt within the government with General Dutra favoring a pro-Axis position and Osvaldo Aranha arguing in favor of the Allies. Vargas tried on the one hand to maintain his good relations with the United States and also, from the end of 1939 until the beginning of 1941, when German victories in Europe seemed to be leading it to victory, he occasionally made criticisms of the "decadent old order" and showed empathy with the Reich. Vargas' caution, meanwhile, avoided major commitments to the Axis and allowed him, from the second half of 1941 following the pressure of public opinion - and the new directions the war was taking - to move closer to the Allies. At the consultative conference of American Foreign Ministers held in Rio in December 1941 the Brazilian government showed itself favorable to breaking off relations with the Axis and formalized that position on 14th February, 1942. The subsequent sinking by German submarines of five Brazilian coastal ships in August 1942 led Brazil to recognize a state of war with Germany in the same month (22/08/42) and then to make a formal declaration of war (30/08/42).

In contrast to the First World War, Brazil's participation in the Second was not simply symbolic. The country prepared and sent to the Italian theatre and expeditionary force of more than 25,000 men whose conduct there was exemplary. In a brilliant campaign led by General Mascarenhas de Morais,

the FEB [Força Expedicionária Brasileira – trans.] inflicted a series of significant defeats on Axis forces in which the victories at Monte Castelo, Montese and Fornovo stand out, the latter culminating in the capture and surrender of the whole of the 148th German Infantry Division, consisting of 20.000 men.

The active participation of Brazil in the war - against Fascism and defending democracy - clearly made it impossible to preserve at home a regime like the New State. This was understood by all sectors of public opinion in Brazil, starting with Vargas himself. As at the end of the regime of the 1934 Constitution, Vargas once more set in train an ambiguous and duplicitous plan. Formerly he recognized the need to modify the regime, for presidential elections and for a Constitution (Constitutional Amendment No. 9, 29/11/45). At the beginning of 1945, with the parties reconstituted, Vargas named his War Minister, Eurico Dutra as the official candidate to counterbalance the opposition candidate supported by the UDN, Brigadier Eduardo Gomes. At the same time, meanwhile, he strengthened his old connections with labor that he had been cultivating since 1944 with his radio program "Good evening, workers of Brazil".

The amnestied Luis Carlos Prestes began the "Constituent with Getúlio" campaign, supported by the regime's labor machine. The military *coup* of 29th October, 1945 caused by the nomination of Benjamin Vargas as Chief of Police, and the deposition of President Vargas, cut short the possible consolidation of an alternative to the "Constituent with Getúlio". Forced to retire to his farm at São Borja, Vargas realistically stood successfully for election as Senator recommending Dutra's candidature. It was the famous "He said" pronounced by Hugo Borghi and the PTB machine that was the decisive factor in electing General Dutra. The Dutra government (1946-50) was the third and final phase of this decade of transition and was notable for its prudent attempts at national conciliation. It was a government based on the PSD with the participation of the UDN but clearly conservative in nature and markedly anti-Communist. It began to make felt a new economic way of thinking that emerged in Brazil at the end of the 1940s under the powerful influence of CEPAL. The country awoke to an awareness of its underdevelopment. A first attempt at a program of public investment was carried out quite successfully with the SALTE Plan (covering health, food, transport and energy). At the same time an agreement with the Truman government was negotiated in 1950 with the support of the principles of "Point IV" that ensured a significant financial

contribution from the American public sector to develop infrastructure and basic industry services in Brazil that would be the basis of the future Mixed Commission.

VI. Populist Democracy - 1951-1960

The ten years from 1951 to 1960 were one of the most extraordinary periods in Brazilian history, characterized by previously unequalled feats in the economic and social areas and by political events of overwhelming importance. Compared to the conservative tendencies of the previous ten years, the 1950s were marked by a deep sense of progress in all areas of national life. This was the great decade of democracy, opening up politics to the masses, planned development, renewal of ideas and a nationalism whose ends were properly met in the selection of means (cf. Helio Jaguaribe, *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira*, Rio, ISEB, 1958).

Looking at its development in the long term, Brazilian democracy, which took the form of a democracy of notables in the Empire and the Old Republic and became a middle-class democracy with the Revolution of 1930, began to turn into a mass democracy in the 1950s. This process, meanwhile, took two serious backward steps with the *coups* of 1954 and 1964 and will therefore continue to be undefined for some years more.

An interesting characteristic of the 1950s in its two most representative periods, those of the second Vargas government and the Kubitschek government, was the happy correspondence between the emergence of a new intelligentsia, up-to-date and innovative in both the theory and application of social sciences, ready to rethink the understanding of conditions in Brazil and to draw up the specifications needed for the country's development. This new Brazilian social science, which had taken its first steps at the end of the previous decade, revealed itself academically, among other forms, through institutions such as IBESP and ISEB and in publications such as *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo (Notebooks for Our Time)*. It also provided the specialist teams that would produce in the Vargas era the Economic Advisory Service and Mixed Commission projects and under Kubitschek the Program of Targets and the SUDENE project.

The decade in question contained three successive periods. The first, from 1951 to 1954 is that of the second Vargas government. There followed an intermediate period of transition marked by the effects of the

coup of 1954 and given a new direction in 1955 by the counter-coup of General Lott in an attempt to restore democratic normality. The third period, starting in 1956, is that of the government of Juscelino Kubitschek. Returned to power for the first time by direct and free elections, Getúlio Vargas who had matured with age and with the experience of running the country, managed to create a great government although this time the conditions in which it would operate turned out to be particularly difficult. It brought with it the aim of reaching two great objectives: a significant increase in national autonomy, especially in the economic sphere and a serious effort to reduce social inequalities and bring the masses into Brazil's civilizing process.

To achieve his aims Vargas decided to divide his government into a political level, represented by the Ministry of Finance headed by Horácio Lefer, and a technical level represented by the Economic Advisory Service headed by Rômulo Almeida, a member of the new intelligentsia and the group responsible for *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo*. This structure was accompanied at the technical level by the creation of the Brazil-United States Mixed Commission led on the Brazilian side by the engineer Ary Torres (the founder of the São Paulo Institute of Technology), with the collaboration of Roberto Campos, another example of the new generation of economists.

The plans of the second Vargas government were directed in accordance with their basic aim towards a structural strengthening of the Brazilian economy and guaranteeing better conditions of life for the working masses, strengthening unions and raising real wages. The Economic Advisory Service of the President's Office produced great plans concerning energy supplies: Brazilian coal, oil (later incorporated into the Petrobras project) and electrification, later incorporated into the Eletrobras project) as well as basic projects such as that of CAPES [encouraging university research—trans.] and the Bank of the Northeast. The Commission produced major projects to re-equip ports and canals, the railways, the system for generating and distributing electricity, and basic industry.

At the same time, through the Ministry of Labor at first under Danton Coelho and later under João Goulart, Vargas tried to strengthen the structure of Brazilian unions and provide labor with effective protective measures. Wage policies on the other hand were constructed in order to recover workers' real earnings, which had lost more than 40% of their purchasing power during the previous government.

Vargas' grand plans, although they left a legacy of institutions and ideas that from a historical perspective and in a general way show themselves to be extremely fruitful and would form, in spite of all vicissitudes, the later course of events, did not at the time receive sufficient support from the majority and progressive sectors of society who received so much benefit from them. They were, however, clearly identified as running counter to the interests of the reactionary forces in the country. They created in those forces a conspiratorial attitude aimed at blocking this political orientation by bringing down the government. Various circumstances favored these plans and then showed President Vargas that he would inevitably be deposed by the Armed Forces.

Choosing to commit suicide in the early morning of 24th August, 1954, Vargas not only succeeded with this tragic decision in symbolically rescuing the authority of the constitutional President of the Republic, he actually managed to neutralize the more sinister aims of the *coup* which planned to achieve in 1954 what it only managed to do ten years later. The deep public disturbance that shook the country forced the government of Vice President Café Filho to take a moderate course of action. Subsequent events which led, with the apparent connivance of Café Filho, to the attempt at a new *coup* by Carlos Luz, were suitably neutralized by General Lott's counter-*coup*. Thus conditions for democratic normalization were re-established with the recognition and inauguration of the elected president, Juscelino Kubitschek.

With Kubitschek, the country saw one of the greatest governments in its history. Thanks in part to projects under way and the studies received from the second Vargas government, the Kubitschek government could take advantage of the experience accumulated previously in order to impose greater system and scope on its development policy embodied in the Programme of Targets, led by Lucas Lopes, together with the important SUDENE project directed by Celso Furtado. At the same time, his awareness of the dangerous resistance that Vargas' social program had aroused led Kubitschek to act more prudently in this area.

Within a climate of total freedom and democracy the Kubitschek government was a time of the greatest economic enterprises in the history of Brazil. His aim of carrying out fifty years of progress in five was actually achieved. The complete set of aims, including the construction of the new capital and its actual inauguration within the term of his mandate, embraced priority areas of energy, transport, food and basic industries. Global investments in the order of CR\$ 237 billion and US\$ 2.3 billion were applied by the

government through the public and private sectors by means of a gigantic mobilization of domestic and international factors. Kubitschek's government did not enjoy the comparative facility in obtaining the latter which (on a lesser scale) made possible the activities of the Mixed Commission under the Vargas government, nor at that time did it find in the international financial system the availability of long-term resources that would later favor the governments of Castelo Branco or Médici. It was for this reason that Kubitschek needed to accept a significant amount of external financing in the expensive form of 'suppliers' credits'.

The results of the Kubitschek administration justified its extraordinary effort. The country grew at an average real rate of over 8% per year. Kubitschek found an economy with all the characteristics of emerging industrialization and left the country with a great - although still incomplete - industrial system. It became the eighth largest economy in the Western world and achieved the basic conditions to ensure the self-reproduction of its development.

In spite of the extremely negative effects of the 1965 *coup*, the 10 years from 1951 to 1960 succeeded in bringing the country seriously close to the aim of overcoming its underdevelopment. There still remained significant tasks to be carried out. Indeed, Brazilian industrialization still needed extensive reinforcement in terms of its capital goods industry and up-to-date technologies with the corresponding know-how. On the other hand the imbalance between the urban, modern and prosperous Brazil and rural Brazil that remained backward and extremely poor, had increased. In this context the unresolved social question reared its head with increasing seriousness in a country with rich minorities and large indigent majorities.

VII. The Crisis of Populism - 1961-1970

The 1960s were for Brazil a return to the years of crisis, a crisis that involved the populist democracy and populist development that had guaranteed the country in the previous ten years an unequalled period of freedom and development.

The crisis of populism is found in two main and related areas, the economic and social. At the economic level populism was affected by what we might call the exhaustion of the Kubitschek model of development. Through the plan of targets and complementary measures, Kubitschek had mobilized all

the available resources in the country and abroad with an inevitable but moderate rate of inflation - that rose by about 20% per year - and with an inevitable - and also moderate - external debt that rose (against exports of about US\$ 2 billion per year) to about US\$ 3.7 billion, two thirds of which were repayable within a period of up to three years.

This immense undertaking needed continuity and supplementing. However, in the years after Kubitschek the conditions necessary for achieving this did not exist. Brazil's internal market, reduced because of the immense social marginalization to about a third of the population - the latter totaling about 60 million - could not create the demand to sustain industrial expansion. Also, at that time the country did not have access to external markets except in its traditional role of supplying raw materials. There only remained the State, which could use public resources to anticipate domestic demand and maintain the pace of industrialization, in this way contributing to a subsequent rise in demand. The State was also faced with its own absolute financial powerlessness since the various governments of the populist period had not been able to obtain from conservative Congresses the fiscal reform the country needed. The inevitable result of this impasse was the stagnation that affected the economy after 1961.

At the social level, the crisis of populism was determined by its inability, in view of economic stagnation, to continue to distribute portions of the profits of development. Populism was a weakened informal alliance, even if an efficient one, of the social strata linked to the process of modernization and development: the industrial bourgeoisie, the modern middle-class and the industrial proletariat. Beneath the leftist rhetoric typical of populism, the regime actually distributed the benefits of development very unequally, most of them going to the executive class and advantages for the technical and managerial groups of the middle-class, and only a modest though effective part to the proletariat. When economic growth came to a halt, it became impossible to satisfy the demands of the masses except by some form of redistribution of existing wealth. In the final analysis this was the meaning of the 'base-level reforms' that motivated the Goulart government but when it was directed towards distributing existing wealth, populism in its final days destabilized the class alliance on which its political power was based. The industrial bourgeoisie and the middle class, faced with the specter of increasingly socializing policies turned to positions on the right and realigned themselves with the old forces of landowners and merchants in opposition to the claims of the masses.

The Goulart government - after the brief and erratic episode of the Quadros government and the upheavals that followed his resignation, including the parliamentary period - found itself, on recovering full presidential powers after the plebiscite of January, 1963 faced with an extremely difficult situation. Celso Furtado's Three-year Plan was a lucid and courageous attempt to overcome these obstacles by means of re-energizing the economy through the public sector supported by new tax receipts. However, Goulart lacked the determination and consistency to ensure that the plan was carried out. The President allowed himself to become tied up with a set of short-term issues and exasperated social demands that grew out of them, together with the growing accumulation of fear and hostility on the part of the bourgeoisie and middle class.

There arose within populism a schism between the 'positive left' of San Tiago Dantas that was basically committed to carrying out the Three-year Plan and a 'negative left' led by Brizola that operated only at the day-to-day level and argued for the immediate adoption of radical measures, ignoring the decisions of Congress. Goulart committed the double error of choosing the line of the negative left and within it entering into competition with Brizola to gain the favor of the unions and the people. The inevitable result of this double choice would be the rapid political destabilization of the regime.

The 1964 *coup*, like all similar movements, expressed a particular formation of structural conditions that made populism inviable, together with circumstances that might have been different from what they were. Like Washington Luiz in the twilight of the Old Republic, Goulart, in the twilight of populism could have chosen measures that might possibly have avoided the *coup*, either by an enlightened policy along the lines advocated by San Tiago or even by a really audacious policy advocating, with sufficient preparation, more radical choices. The line he followed, radical in rhetoric and passive in deed, led fatally to the *dénouement* of April, 1964.

The military government installed in 1964 did not bring with it the plans for what would come to be called in later years the 'Brazilian system'. Basically, Castelo Branco supported the ideas of Carlos Lacerda in installing an 'emergency government' that, by repressing Communists and eliminating the corrupt figures in public life, would restore social health and make possible the re-establishment of representative democracy that would probably be led by the UDN, naturally under the leadership of Lacerda.

The facts rapidly worked to give the lie to this crude diagnosis of reality. The problems of Brazil were really profoundly structural, unconnected to any passing protagonists. Brazil was faced with the twin problems of how to relaunch its economy in the face of lack of demand in the market and the financial impotence of the State. How could a society so profoundly varied, in which a small minority with the culture and standard of living comparable to a European country lived alongside huge poverty-stricken masses with the characteristics of an Asiatic proletariat, be made compatible with democracy?

Gradually, from Castelo to Costa e Silva, the new regime was shaped within military circles, under the predominant influence of right-wing radicals with neo-Fascist tendencies and was characterized in the bourgeoisie and technocratic sectors that served the regime, by the ideology of dependent capitalism. This new regime, which reached its ideological and operational peak with the Médici government (1969-1974) consisted of military authoritarianism with Fascist tendencies based on a legitimizing ideology of national security using programs that worked according to the concepts of dependent capitalism.

Military authoritarianism eliminated any traces of effective political representation and manifestations of public opinion - using also the institutionalizing of torture - while maintaining for as long as possible the appearance of a Congress stripped of any power but carrying out the rituals of confirming laws dictated by the system. At the economic level, the regime opted for the active incorporation of transactional capitalism. This choice was found to carry consequences, many of which had not been foreseen by its advocates

The inevitable consequences were obviously those of multiplying by an extremely high factor the rate of dependency an emerging country like Brazil would have to pay in the modern historical situation, while at the same time reducing its ability to develop its own technological innovations. Another aspect of the inevitable consequences of the new regime was the increase instead of decrease - of the immense social inequalities in Brazil. More than 50% of wealth remained under the control of less than 10% of the population, while the 50% of the poorest people had access to little over 10% of total wealth. Reflecting this state of affairs, the Brazilian productive system concentrated on producing high-cost durable goods aimed at the affluent sectors of the population while the amount of goods and services aimed at the masses declined in relative terms.

An unforeseen result of the transnationalization of the Brazilian economy was a great surge in exports. For many years the country had maintained its export income at the modest level of about US\$ 2 billion per year. The dependent capitalist regime raised the value of the country's exports to levels that today are over US\$ 20 billion per year - an extraordinary increase even taking into account the devaluation of the dollar - also achieving an extraordinary diversification in types of goods exported.

The country entered the stage of manufactured exports, which became the main item on the list of exports. This qualitative and quantitative change in the nature of exports was basically due to the fact that with multinational companies on both sides of the transactions, in Brazil as producers of industrial goods using cheap labor, and abroad as the distributors of those products, they could easily dedicate themselves to this profitable business. It goes without saying that Brazil benefited from this surge in exports but as it was a case of a system that depended on external factors, the country would be equally led into an immense amount of debt when the international situation became unfavorable after the oil crisis of 1973.

VIII. The Peak and the Crisis of the System - 1971-1980

The beginning of the 1970s in Brazil saw a brief period of triumphal euphoria in the system installed after 1964, which was followed after 1974 by a period of increasing crisis and the inviability of the system.

After 1969 the particular combination of a military authoritarianism self-legitimized by the ideology of national security, with a dependent capitalism based on cooperation between the Brazilian State and the major transnational companies, led to an extremely favorable situation. Politically the system guaranteed its complete control of the country by an efficient mechanism of repression that had institutionalized torture and eliminated any effective form of opposition or criticism. The Federal Executive Power - which reproduced itself by choosing its successors - embraced all the powers of the Republic and exercised them under the orders of the President following guidelines approved by the high command of the Army. At the same time the system experienced periods of great economic success. After 1969 there were years of increased growth that led to the pinnacle of the 'Brazilian model' under General Médici

Outside the country an image was created of the 'Brazilian miracle' that seemed destined to carry the country on a final sprint towards development, comparable to the recovery of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. This economic success based on the authoritarian calming of social conflicts led the outside world to minimize the repressive aspects of the system and at home led broad sectors of the wealthy classes to justify it because of its technocratic success. As a general rule only the Church and the independent intelligentsia dared, at great risk, to oppose the system without their criticisms however managing to overcome the barrier of censorship imposed on the media.

The oil crisis at the end of 1973 quadrupled the price of oil, bringing fatal results to the system which nevertheless had difficulty in realizing this fact. These consequences were in the main directly and indirectly economic. Directly, to the extent that for a country like Brazil which depended almost exclusively on oil for internal transport and producing only about 25% of what it consumed, the quadrupling of the price of oil was an insupportable cost to its balance of trade. Indirectly - and this would become even more serious - because the oil crisis of 1973, aggravated by a new price hike in 1979, put an end to the long period of continuous expansion of the world economy. A recession developed that would become worse over the course of time until the 1980s saw a situation similar to that of the Great Depression of the 1930s. In these conditions, Brazil's efforts to pay its huge oil bills by increasing exports came face-to-face with the increased shrinkage of international markets. Thus the country entered a rapid and growing process of external indebtedness aggravated by the extraordinary rise in interest rates - that would lead it to the situation of international insolvency it found itself in by 1974.

As well as in the economic sphere, the crisis of the system was felt at the political level. While the 'Brazilian miracle' came to a halt and with it the internal benefits it provided for the higher reaches of society, public opinion, in spite of the severe controls it was subjected to, began to question the regime. The voice of the Church and the intelligentsia joined that of respectable institutions like the Order of Lawyers, various class associations and the Parliamentary opposition, which had gained a new lease of life. There arose in the country an increasing demand for a State of Law, for the end of absolute power and repression, especially the shameful systematic use of torture, which ultimately led to the demand for the restoration of democratic, representative and free government.

The Médici government (1969-1974) marks the pinnacle and the limits of viability of military authoritarianism and dependent capitalism. From 1968 to 1970, annual rates of economic growth of more than 9%, followed by even greater rates of 11.3% in 1971, 10.4% in 1972 and 11.4% in 1973, make this period one of extraordinary economic expansion. The situation led the then Minister of Finance, Delfim Neto, to assume that Brazil was able to maintain this accelerated rate of growth in spite of the international crisis that appeared at the end of 1973. 'The island of prosperity' was a myth that was created and spread by the following administration.

For this reason, the Geisel government (1974-1979) encountered an extremely unfavorable set of circumstances. President Geisel had the idea of creating a great government in the Gaullist style of his own personality. He hoped to overcome once and for all the restrictions of Brazilian underdevelopment and lead the country to rapidly becoming a great power. On the other hand, he brought with him a need to create ethical decency and respect for the law that inevitably led to an internal conflict between the President and the system of repression and torture which in turn led to the dismissal of the commander of the Second Army, General D'Avila after two infamous cases of death under official torture.

Thus the picture presented by the Geisel government is a complicated one. Refusing to draw conclusions from what the new international situation was imposing on him, he insisted for as long as possible on maintaining a policy of large-scale enterprises, in the nuclear energy field and in basic and infrastructure activities, thus raising Brazil's external debts to unacceptable levels. At the same time, meanwhile, he freed the country from the alienation of the policy of ideological frontiers and automatic alignment with the United States that previous military governments had been incredibly subjected to, creating an independent foreign policy pragmatically serving national interests. Internally the Geisel government restored the rule of law, suppressed the shameful practice of torture and proceeded to carry out a clearheaded critical review of the system.

The policy of relaxing the regime that was at first called 'distensão' will broadly be considered by history the high point of General Geisel's government. Geisel understood that the 'legitimacy of exception' that had allowed the construction of military authoritarianism and, with its support, the concentration of all the powers of the Republic in the hands of the President, was something that could no longer be accepted by a part of the country. If

the government insisted on maintaining the *status quo* it would not be able to avoid the great controversies that were beginning to stir up public opinion and were questioning all aspects of the system, if these spread to the barracks. There were already strong indications that disagreements between generals and senior officers about the policies being employed were serious and growing. Letting these become more serious would soon lead to the disintegration of military unity and generate (as in 1930) the conditions for a civil war. Geisel's solution was for the government itself to take the initiative in restoring democracy within conditions prepared and established by itself that would allow the process to develop gradually and control it until the end.

Consistent with this decision Geisel set in train at the same time the necessary preparations in the military field - which implied, among other measures, the dismissal of the then Minister of the Army, General Frota - and in the political sphere. In the latter he cautiously introduced the - legally and politically monstrous – measure of the indirect election of a third of the Senate, thus creating with the 'bionic senators' a guaranteed government majority in the Upper House. He then proceeded to choose the leaders who would succeed his government in the executive positions of the Union and the states, nominating General João Batista Figueiredo, ex-head of the Intelligence Service and the engineer Aureliano Chaves, from Minas Gerais as respectively President and Vice President of the Republic. Having completed these tasks at the end of 1978, the President decided to suppress the Institutional Acts and to restore the full observance of the Constitution in 1979.

When he came to power in March 1979, President Figueiredo inherited a totally different country from the one left to his predecessor. The latter received a legacy that was apparently resplendent in the economic field and ill-fated politically. Figueiredo received an economy crushed by the weight of external debt, internally unbalanced by uncontrollable inflation of about 100% a year, but on the other hand a country being returned to institutionalism and on the way to becoming a representative democracy once more.

The new President fully undertook to carry out the political duties that had been transferred to him and strove to complete the process of democratization. Like Geisel, he used a legally unacceptable trick to obtain approval for legislation to register parties that forced the breakup of the MDB as a way of avoiding a victory of the united opposition in the 1982 elections. On the other hand he announced a wide-reaching amnesty and guaranteed conditions of freedom for renewing legislative and state mandates. In

November 1982 these elections led to significant changes in the shape of the Congress and states, providing the opposition group with control of the major states in the Federation and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

In the economic area, however, the first years of the Figueiredo government were not so successful. The external debt was approaching US\$ 90 billion, the country was in a state of international insolvency and internal inflation was more than 100% a year. By insisting on maintaining economic policy under the command of the team that had created the 'Brazilian miracle' in the previous decade, the Figueiredo government discovered the bitter experimental proof of the complete non-viability of this model.

The willingness of the last two governments of the Republic to be self-critical of their political model, which led to the success of the movement for re-democratization, did not imply similar self-criticism to the economic model, as was shown in President Figueiredo's speech on 28th February, 1983. The 1980s were thus loaded with optimism in the political area and signs of catastrophe in the economy. The country retained the reasonable hope that if a successful economy does not necessarily lead to good politics (*vide* Médici), good politics can result in a suitable route for the economy.

IX. From the Notables to the Masses - Brazil, 1901-1980

At the end of a succinct effort to analyze each of the eight decades of the Republic during the present century, we must now try to take an overview of the period. At the end of the day, what did these 80 years of the 20th century mean for Brazil? I believe it is possible to approach this basic question in an equally succinct form by describing the nature of what happened in four fundamental dimensions of the country: its demographic, economic, cultural and socio-political dimensions.

Demographically the country experienced an extraordinary rate of growth. From a population of about 14 million inhabitants at the beginning of the century, in 1980 it had more than 120 million. Taking into account the other basic aspects of the country, this population constitutes its potential to become one of the greatest societies in the world by the beginning of the next century.

This same large population, meanwhile, is also the main challenge facing Brazil. On the one hand because, if the current rate of population growth of about 2.5% a year does not decrease, the country will experience excessive population growth that will double the population every 32 years and thus

place intolerable loads on it in terms of expanding the infrastructure required by such growth. On the other hand, what makes this problem extraordinarily more serious is the fact that this population is polarized between two extremes: on the one hand the excessive concentration of wealth in the hands of the 10% of highest earners and on the other, the poverty-stricken state of the 50% of the poorest, who make up the great mass of the population.

Economically, the first 18 years of the 20th century changed Brazil radically. Until the crisis of the 1930s a semi-colonial economy had been preserved based on the coffee monoculture, exporting raw materials and importing almost all the goods needed for consumption. The 1930s saw the beginning of a process of industrialization through import substitution the acceleration of which would be planned in the 1950s to turn the country into a society in an advanced stage of industrialization within a mainly autonomous model.

The exhaustion of Kubitschek's model of development and the crisis of populism in the mid-1960s as well as the choice of dependent capitalism by the military government led the country into the extremely complicated and difficult situation it would later encounter. The Brazilian industrial system had characteristics similar to those of an advanced European country. At the same time, however, the country suffered from a serious three-part limitation: the limitation of dependence, the chokehold on oil and the structural dualism of its society and economy.

Brazil's dependence, which definitely features among its characteristics the excessive predominance of transnational companies in the modern sector of the nation's productive system, consisted mainly however of dependence on external capital, techniques and markets to maintain its development, a situation that culminated in an external debt of about US\$ 90 billion, thus leading Brazil into a state of international insolvency.

The chokehold on oil supplies arose out of the fact that lacking suitable domestic sources of oil, before the 1973 oil crisis Brazil insisted on maintaining its dependence on this product, which was supposedly correctable by increased exports, instead of applying itself to a radical and rapid implementation of a wide-ranging program to replace this fuel with alcohol and vegetable oils, Brazilian coal and electrification. Although at the moment such a program is officially one of the government's aims, in fact it has still not managed to achieve a proper balance, much less put it into practice on the necessary scale and with the necessary speed.

The structural dualism of society and the economy arises out of the fact that the productive system adopted by Brazil, especially after 1964, does not correspond to the social situation. And guided by an economy that was directed, by means of highly capital-intensive production units, to produce consumer durable goods aimed at the wealthy sectors of the population and then for export, Brazil did not even have the ability to satisfy the basic requirements of its people nor create the number of jobs that would guarantee the productive occupation of its labor force and absorb into it the numbers of Brazilians, about 1.5 million each year, who were appearing and demanding new jobs.

Culturally, Brazil only succeeded in entering the 20th century 20 years late and it was only after the 1950s that the country would approach the levels of the vanguard of western thought through the emergence of a new intelligentsia in social sciences and modern physics. This cultural updating of Brazil nevertheless had to overcome serious problems. On the one hand, the effort to build and consolidate a valid university system, of which the University of São Paulo was the highest expression, was not sufficiently important in the government's list of priorities. At the time of the economic and financial crisis the education system was one of the first victims and there was no attempt to preserve intact certain centers of excellence for the future.

On the other hand, the low priority actually given to education led to a steep decline in standards at secondary and elementary level as well as a serious reduction in its social range. Increasingly broad areas of the population were badly educated or received no education at all. Neither was there an attempt to take advantage of methods to spread education among the working classes, specifically by means of television, which was vital at a period when the family and the church could no longer perform this task by themselves. Thus Brazilian society showed an alarming drop in the level of ethical and civic values absorbed by its people, who were becoming one of the least morally and civically educated peoples in the world.

Sociopolitically, the 20th century took Brazilian democracy on a long and important journey. In every society where it has been practiced consistently, the democratic experience has progressed in stages. In Classical Greece as in modern Europe, democracy began as a democracy of notables: Solon in Athens, constitutional monarchies in 18th- and early 19th-century Europe. There then follows a phase of middle-class democracy: Clisthenes in Athens and the bourgeois democracies of Europe in the 19th century and the beginning

of the 20th. This last phase, when the democratic process has been consolidated, is finally followed by a mass democracy or social democracy: Pericles in Athens and the European welfare state in the second half of the 20th century.

In the case of Brazil, the democracy of notables of the Empire and the Old Republic is followed, after the 1930 Revolution and subsequent vicissitudes, by a middle-class democracy: the Constitutions of 1934 and 1946. This starts to become, with the populism of 1950s, a mass democracy that will attempt to establish a Brazilian equivalent of the European welfare state. The crisis of populism in the Goulart government and the reactionary direction imposed on the country by the 1964 *coup* prevent this process being completed. As freedom returns to Brazilian society this process is slowly taken up again and is seen as both a possibility and a necessity. In the modern world no political democracy survives if it does not become a social democracy. At the same time, this century has given us clear examples, with the failure of Leninist experiments, that no social democracy can survive if it is not based on political democracy.

As at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 30s, but at an infinitely more complex stage of history, Brazil had to face alternatives that would have a decisive effect on its future. Unfortunately the country had not yet made certain of its conversion to a great, open and egalitarian modern democracy. If Brazilian society does not choose certain basic options it can become a system that is permanently dependent on central capitalism and socially, because of the insatiable dualism between a small modern, participating sector and the great marginal masses guarded like a native reserve by South Africanstyle neo-Fascism which, instead of racial apartheid - which is no longer viable in an ethnically hybrid society - will become a social apartheid discriminating against the masses. Alternatively, it can follow a Brazilian form of military Communism like that of Ethiopia, lining up the masses against the present elite under the command of left-wing colonels in a system of universal poverty, freezing culture and suppressing liberty.

There are however great possibilities for Brazil to be a success. Some of them, like re-democratization, are in an advanced stage. Nevertheless the consolidation of a democratic society must necessarily depend on Brazil agreeing a new social pact that will guarantee, as fast as our rate of economic development allows, a substantial redistribution of education, forms of labor and life chances for the masses, thus establishing a great social democracy in

Brazil based on a real political democracy. This model will require, as well as firm political decisions on the part of the ruling elite and an accepted and calculated sacrifice by the upper and middle classes, an economic model redirected towards national development. Given the present situation, this redirection will require a significant reformulation of the current ways in which Brazil participates in the international market.



2. The 1988 Constitution (1988)

A consensus is being formed among experts concerning the 1988 Constitution. The Constitution is the result of wide-ranging and prolonged negotiation which reveal the major ideological tendencies in the country and the pressures of corporate interests that exercise most influence on the State machine in a process that was not submitted to any leadership to give it a system, and has inevitably become a heterogeneous composition of all of those currents.

In the first place, it is an extremely detailed Charter, not so much, as has been said, because it has too many articles: 245 in the constitutional section and more than 70 Temporary Measures. Modern constitutions need to be wide-ranging compared to those of the Liberal period because the characteristics of the modern State and social relations that require constitutional regulation are incomparably more extensive. The detailed nature of the new Brazilian Constitution is shown in the frequency with which it refers to particular points that should be relegated to ordinary law or even to a merely regulatory level. This regulatory detail is especially noticeable in matters concerning the great corporations that control the state machine, such as the civil service and legal system. The major inconvenience in so much detail at the constitutional level is how rapidly these measures become outdated and require constant updating of the Charter.

As well as being detailed, the new constitution, being a product, as mentioned above, of wide-ranging and prolonged negotiation, makes concessions to each of the pressures that were brought to bear on the Constituent Assembly. Taking this interplay of tendencies into account, we may say in summary that the Constitution has been extremely successful in protecting individual rights, very well directed in terms of social concerns - although including certain utopian measures - and not very up to date in terms of regulating the economy.

In contrast to what is stated by Liberal and Conservative thinking, it is not true that peripheral capitalist countries like Brazil should have completely open economies subject to the pure laws of the international market. On the other hand, the ways of protecting national interests that were valid from the 1940s to the 1960s need to be radically revised because of the changes that have occurred in Brazil and in the world. During that period, the way of ensuring the sectors that were then strategic to the Brazilian economy adjusted to the national interest was to entrust their exploitation to public enterprises such as the National Steel Company, the Rio Doce Valley Company and Petrobras.

Based on the one hand on the impressive economic development Brazil has experienced and on the other, on the scientific and technological revolution that typifies the end of the century, the emphasis has shifted from control of property to control of know-how. Ownership of shares is now less important than the management of technology. This crucial element of the modern economy has not been sufficiently taken into account by the new Charter, which insists on a nationalist program that has become obsolete. What is important today is to create the conditions that will attract high-technology businesses to Brazil and guarantee that the country benefits from the effective transfer of technology. It is equally important to increase Brazil's economic competitiveness by means of a selective and gradual process of opening up to the international market.

In addition to its provisions for modernizing the economy, the Constitution has also failed to make the most of opportunities for modernizing the State and the party-political system. Pressures from the Executive, using all the power of the State machine, prevented the Constituent Assembly from holding the debate, which the majority wanted, about introducing a modern parliamentary system similar to that of France, in order to maintain the *status quo* of the presidential system. Also, the system of proportional representation for election to the Chamber of Deputies remains rather than a mixed district

system that would raise the quality of Parliament and give consistency to the Brazilian party system.

The reform of the State and the party political system is a matter of extreme urgency and relevance in Brazil. The Brazilian state, which was the most modern in the Third World, is now in a state of rapid decline. With the fall of gross tax revenue, from about 26% of GDP in the 1970s to about 22% today and worse, the fall in net revenue from 16% to about 9%, the State has become insolvent. Because of the avalanche of clientelist appointments and the most uninhibited policy based on political power groups that is typical of the New Republic, levels of competence and responsibility in the public sector have been seriously affected. The State has lost the ability to consistently plan and implement any public policy and is showing itself increasingly less able to properly manage the most routine public services.

The Constitution has certainly strengthened federalism, which was an urgent and pressing need, but on the other hand it has missed the chance to create conditions favorable to modernizing the State apparatus. Far from it, the Temporary Measures have granted all kinds of favors at the cost of the depleted state coffers and has also made indiscriminate promises of stability to all civil servants with five years of service.

As all commentators have pointed out, there has been a particularly unfortunate and incredible decision to include in the Constitution a measure defining interest rates. The inadvisability of imposing constitutional rulings on a matter subject to the widest set of variations and which can only be regulated by a specialist executive agency is completely obvious. On the other hand, fixing interest rates in a country like Brazil that faces the risk of sliding into hyperinflation, makes the latter situation almost inevitable if financial authorities are deprived of the necessary means to make use of national savings.

It is important however that the clear defects in the new Charter should not make us lose sight of its great virtue, which has been to institutionalize social democracy in Brazil. This basic aspect of the Constitution overrides all the rest and gives it a clearly favorable balance. Based on this solid institutional platform, as Brazil puts the new Constitution into practice it can identify its main faults and put them right, making use of the facilities the Constitution itself contains. It is also true that many of the more controversial aspects of the Constitution, including the ill-thought-out fixing of interest rates are subject to the enactment of complementary legislation which leaves the door open to avoiding their worst effects.



3. The Republic a Hundred Years On (1989)

1. The Ambiguities of the Republic

The Republican Model

Theoretically, the Republican model is instituted as the fully realized form of a democratic regime. There can be democratic dictatorships, as with the institution of an emergency dictatorship in Republican Rome and there can also be dictatorships in the strict sense of the term that nevertheless enjoy wide *de facto* acceptance by the people, such as that of Cromwell in the Puritan revolution or, at least at its beginning, Fidel Castro's revolution. The Roman dictatorship, however, because it emerged in an emergency and did not last long, actually consisted in the temporary handing over of supreme power to a leader appointed by the consuls. Also, dictatorships that enjoy wide *de facto* acceptance of the people are led by charismatic authorities and are by definition not susceptible to being institutionalized. Moreover, when these types of regime last for a long time they tend to turn into dictatorships pure and simple, maintained by force.

Constitutional monarchies, for their part, may be widely democratic if they grant leadership of the government to a Prime Minister who has the confidence of Parliament, thus leaving the Monarch to be the head of state in a mainly symbolic position, as in the case of Britain. So what justifies constitutional monarchies where Executive Power is not in the hands of the monarch, is their traditional ancestry. The gradual conversion of absolute monarchies into democratic monarchies over the course of history, as in those European countries that preserve the institution, has given traditional legitimacy to the symbolic or almost symbolic power kept by the monarch. If this traditional link does not exist, a republican regime is imposed theoretically as a necessary form of democracy.

Despite the axiomatic nature of the republican model in relation to the idea of democracy, historical practice after the French Revolution has made a point of contesting the thesis of the necessary legitimacy of republicanism. The First Republic in France slid into the Terror even though it preserved the forms of democracy. The republican experiments in Portugal and Spain before the Second World War were extremely controversial. Whether because of the revolutionary source of their power or because the electoral process did not reach far enough into society, the Iberian republics lacked sufficient popular support. We should also mention the case of the Weimar Republic, which gave power to Hitler legally in conditions that inevitably led to a dictatorial regime, as many people had foreseen.

It is to a great extent due to this relative de-sanctifying of the Republican model that the monarchy in Spain was restored by plebiscite after the death of Franco and a long interregnum that had broken traditional links with Spanish royalty. The relativization of republican legitimacy in the modern mind has helped to preserve the Swedish monarchy and to maintain its British counterpart.

The Case of Brazil

As well as in other situations, this relativization of republican legitimacy can be seen in Brazil in Article 2 of the Temporary Constitutional Measures of the present Constitution when it opted for a plebiscite scheduled on 7th September 1993, to decide on a republican or monarchical form of government, even though no one believed that the electorate would vote for the return of the monarchy – which they did not.

Although there is in Brazil an almost unanimous acceptance of the republican regime, the celebration of the centenary of its proclamation occurs at a time of broad critical review both of the way in which it was established

in 1889 and also in terms of the evaluation of the First Republic and more recently of the performance of the Fourth (current) Republic.

When carrying out a critical review of the process leading to the deposition of Pedro II, it is difficult to keep many of the protagonists of that process, even Marshall Deodoro da Fonseca, within the pantheon of national heroes. The conspiracy that led to the fall of the Brazilian monarchy is shot through with the highest degree of ambiguity.

It is not the aim of this brief study to examine this question, although it invites a wider analysis that certainly goes beyond the ideological prejudices that have typified our republican historiography. We should point out simply that republicanism - as Pedro II always maintained - was a position supported by a very small minority in what was then a limited number of citizens. The downfall of the monarchy was possible because it had the characteristics of a rapid military coup bringing together in its support, either actively or passively, the most reactionary conservatives who disagreed with the abolition of slavery, real republicans like Prudente de Moraes, officers like Benjamin Constant who firmly believed in positivism and wanted an enlightened dictatorship, and insubordinate military figures who were no longer prepared to accept civilian authority, such as Sena Madureira or Marshall Câmara, Viscount Pelotas.

Expressions of this ambiguity are found in the conduct of the two military chiefs at the time, Deodoro da Fonseca and Floriano Peixoto. The former, between the impulsiveness of his nature and his loyalty to the Emperor planned until the last moment to overthrow the ministry of Ouro Preto and prevent the inauguration of the ministry of Silveiro Martins. It was with the cry "Long live his Majesty the Emperor" that he proclaimed what he felt to be the fall of the Cabinet, as Marshall Rondon and other eye-witnesses later confirmed. And until the last moment, Floriano reassured Ouro Preto about the security of the government until the moment he made clear his refusal to use his troops to hold back the mutinous forces.

In order to face the well-armed and strengthened 80,000 men led by Solano Lopes the Empire, whose land forces had been reduced to 18,000 men, had made a huge effort to organize a large army that came to number 100,000 men. Victorious in war and unemployed in peacetime, this army revolted against civilian authority and overthrew the Empire.

After the initial period of military dictatorship the First Republic gave way to a phase of civilian normality with the inauguration of Prudente de Moraes as President on 15th November 1894. From Prudente to his successor,

Campos Sales the First Republic adopted the main characteristics it would maintain until its collapse in 1930.

There were three main features in the regime. Socially it saw the return to power of the forces that had previously made up the Conservative Party: the large landowners who had suffered financially from the abolition of slavery, and their allies in the urban bourgeoisie. Economically, it defended and perpetuated the agricultural exporting economy. Politically, through the socialled 'policy of the governors', it supported the militias and the alliance between the economic and political oligarchies through an electoral system controlled by those in power that used tactics ranging from the vote-buying and manipulating voting registers to the confirmation of mandates of party supporters that ensured the removal of the opposition.

Although it was legitimized in the name of greater democracy and the principle of federalism that was so dear to the heart of Rui Barbosa, the First Republic was both socially and politically a step backward in terms of the conditions prevailing at the end of the Empire.

By his prudent use of the Moderating Power, Pedro II was successful in gradually achieving two aims: the suppression of slavery and the spread of democracy. After the abolition of the slave trade by the Eusébio de Queiroz Law of 1850 the first aim was being gradually achieved by Viscount Rio Branco's 'Free Womb' Law of 1871 and finally by the Golden Law of 1888.

The second aim was also gradually achieved by the Emperor. During his reign he consolidated parliamentary practice even though this was not specifically laid down in the Constitution. During this process the Emperor, despite his personal preferences — which usually leaned towards the Conservative Party — always made an effort to enable parties to take turns at holding power, which allowed the Liberals greater participation than they would have had under the electoral system prior to the Saraiva Law. Also, Pedro II continually encouraged the government to liberalize electoral law with a view to eventually adopting direct elections instead of indirect ones, as was established with Law No. 387 in 1846 authorizing the choice of an electoral college which then elected parliamentary representatives. He achieved this aim with the Saraiva Law in 1881. Compared to the regime that existed in the final years of the Empire—just when the Republican opposition was taking shape—the First Republic was undoubtedly a backward step, both politically and socially.

From 1930 to 1964

The power system established in the First Republic showed an extreme capability for self-preservation. The close links between the controlling landowning oligarchy, at that time the oligarchy controlling political power in a regime that allowed the complete manipulation of elections, from the control of votes and vote counting to control of mandates through the system of congressional confirmations by party supporters, guaranteed the indefinite survival of the system. However, as the country expanded economically and demographically, and urban populations increased, there was growing dissatisfaction on the part of public opinion with the "regime of rigged votes".

Experience showed unequivocally how indestructible the system was while it continued to be regulated by its own rules. This produced a growing tendency in the new middle class, including young men in the military, who were ignored by the power structure, to find an answer in rebellion. The 1920s were marked by successive revolts and culminated in bringing about the victorious Revolution of 1930, encouraged by the crisis of 1929.

President Washington Luiz, who was preparing to hand over power to Julio Prestes, whom the system had elected to succeed him, was deposed by the military commanders of Rio de Janeiro in a futile attempt to prevent government being handed over to the revolutionaries. Getúlio Vargas refused to recognize the Junta and took power at the head of his forces.

In contrast to the *coup* of 1889, the Revolution of 1930 was a true revolution. With the First Republic the Army deposed the Emperor to take on in practice the functions of the Moderating Power and preserve in an even more conservative form the landowning oligarchy that controlled the economy and power in the State. With the Revolution of 1930 the middle class took part and having been affected by the crisis of the 1930s, Brazil was led into a growing industrial system as a result of import substitution. This unplanned industrialization became a consciously planned project for national development after the Second World War.

The great changes brought about by the Revolution of 1930 occurred in two main phases, politically and socially as well as economically, separated by the Second World War. In the first phase, the emerging middle class took political power, with the Lieutenants and Vargas, without an economic or social foundation. For more than a decade Brazil would continue to be a society controlled by a landowning oligarchy whose rural clienteles, even without

a rigged voting system, would put them in power by means of elections. Even though it originated in Vargas' desire to remain in power, the New State [O Estado Novo – Vargas' version of the dictatorships that had arisen in Europe – trans.] was the institutional expression of the divorce between the political superstructure and the economic and social infrastructure.

The middle class supported the New State – although its liberal members criticized it rhetorically – because this State, along with DASP [an organization formed in an attempt to professionalize the Civil Service – trans.], the system of public examinations for jobs and the increasing expansion of its bureaucracy run by the middle class, was an apparatus belonging to that class even though its main economic benefit was to the emerging industrial bourgeoisie. In the conditions of the 1930s and the beginning of the 40s, the democratic system would soon fall under the control of the rural bosses as would have happened with Armando Salles de Oliveira if the elections prevented by the 1937 *coup* had actually taken place.

The second phase in this period under discussion, which followed the Second World War and the fall of the New State, with the victorious return of the troops who had taken part in the fight against Nazi Fascism, saw the landowning patrician class lose its former hegemony. The expansion and strengthening of the middle class, developments speeded up by the New State, the emergence and consolidation of a new branch of the bourgeoisie, the industrial bourgeoisie, counterbalancing the old landowning-merchant bourgeoisie, and the gradual appearance of a working class as a result of the country's increased industrialization, created a different society. This society enjoyed favorable conditions for creating a middle-class democracy working to the advantage of the growing industrial business class and, providing marginal benefits for the working class, a planned process of industrialization. After the ephemeral Second Republic and the 1934 Constitution, the Third Republic was instituted with the 1946 Constitution.

The Third Republic founded a republican democracy with a considerable content of social measures which for the first time corresponded in a stable manner, in the mid-20th century, to Rui Barbosa's democratic ideas and to those of the liberal Republicans of 1889. Within this middle-class democracy and arising out of the developing process of industrialization, there appeared a mass society.

The transformation of Brazil from an agrarian and rural society into a society following a clear process of industrialization and urbanization from the

1930s to the 60s, created a power conflict between the emerging middle class and the rural oligarchy. This conflict was resolved in favor of the middle class in political terms by victory in the Revolution of 1930 and socially and economically by the subsequent changes that took place in the country's economy during the second Vargas government and the Kubitschek government. This process of transformations and conflicts led to another situation in the 1940s and 50s as during the latter decade, the middle-class society became a mass society.

In these two successive processes, the middle class appears in the former as an emerging power demanding greater space and participation in power and in the second as a resisting power trying to defend its prerogatives against the pressure of the masses who, in their turn, come to demand more space in the power system and a more equal share in the benefits of the industrial society.

At two points during this process the Armed Forces act as the shock troops of the middle class. The 1889 *coup* had already shown the characteristics of a middle-class commando raid. These characteristics were decisive in the rebellions of the 1920s, in the Revolution of 1930 and in the *coup* of 1937. In the second part of the process, middle-class resistance to the expectations of the masses took the outwardly coercive form of the half-frustrated *coup* of 1954 that led to Vargas' suicide and the more decisive form of the *coup* of 1964 that overthrew Goulart and led to the imposition of 20 years of military authoritarianism.

2. The Military Regime

The Context of 1964

The pressures of the masses to achieve a more equal share of the benefits of Brazilian development and in its leadership, demanding more influence on the power system, that were frustrated by the *coup* of 1954 and only partly satisfied by the Kubitschek government, made themselves felt with redoubled strength in the Goulart government.

Wishing to restore the presidential regime and recover the powers belonging to it, João Goulart applied himself skillfully to the initial task of preventing the consolidation of the parliamentary system the adoption of which had signaled the compromise that had allowed him to achieve power. The regime had started well with a good-quality Cabinet presided over by Tancredo Neves, with the illustrious figure of San Tiago Dantas as Foreign Minister. By officially proposing San Tiago as Prime Minister-designate to succeed Tancredo Neves in 1962 and at the same time privately persuading his friends in Parliament to vote against him, which they did, Goulart prevented the great planner of a new social program from assuming the presidency of the Council of Ministers and consolidating the system. The crisis in the parliamentary system at the time of the succession to Tancredo Neves, which was deliberately created by President Goulart, created the conditions that enabled the return of the presidential system with the plebiscite of January 1963.

On taking full powers as head of the government, however, Goulart had to face the huge social demands his populist leadership had encouraged, without the mediation of Parliament. The first year of Goulart's presidency consisted of an attempt to set in motion under the direct command of the President the reform projects conceived by San Tiago, who had accepted the post of Minister of Finance, within a project to make the country's economy and the State viable – the Three-Year Plan – conceived by the Minister of Planning, Celso Furtado.

The difficulties were obvious. As has frequently happened in recent years and frequently reoccurs, Brazil in the 1960s showed a marked contradiction between the necessary requirements to control inflation and restore the balance of public finances, and demands related to re-starting the development process – paralyzed since the end of the Kubitschek government – as well as those required to carry forward a large-scale social development plan.

San Tiago advocated a two-stage program within the parameters of the Three-Year Plan. In the first, planned for 1963, the government would make a great effort to improve its financial situation, including matters related to the external debt inherited from Kubitschek's Programme of Targets. At the same time plans would be drawn up for major reforms: agrarian reform, urban reform, banking reform and reform of the business system. In the second stage, after 1964, with the country's finances and public accounts stabilized, those reforms would be implemented.

Opposing these plans, Deputy Leonel Brizola, Goulart's brother-in-law and candidate to succeed him in spite of constitutional restrictions ("a brother-in-law is not a relative"), demanded immediate and radical reforms based on large-scale populist mobilization – with increased appeals to direct action – and with the support of union leaders. So a conflict was forming within party

supporters themselves between what San Tiago called the "positive left" referring to the rational and practical nature of his project and Brizola's "negative left" typified by a doubly inconsistent idea. It was inconsistent economically because it would unleash galloping inflation that would invalidate any public policy. It was also inconsistent socially and politically because it would destabilize the regime by reason of its radical nature.

Caught between these two pressures Goulart, who was more afraid of strengthening San Tiago's prestige than in competing with Brizola, invalidated his Minister of Finance's plan, which led the latter to resign, but the result was that he found himself in a senseless populist competition with Brizola and rhetorically adopted ever more radical positions. Thus he himself became the destabilizing element both of the regime and also of his own power bases.

As usually happens in these cases, the *coup* of 1964 was the result of a set of motivations and circumstances. An important group of officers, with Juarez Távora and Cordeiro de Faria, allied with Carlos Lacerda and the radical sectors of the UDN, all of them convinced of the electoral invincibility of the alliance between the PSD and the PTB – the latter party growing strongly in contrast to the weakness of the UDN – had opted for the path of insurrection since the first attempted *coup* of 1954. With the support of these conspirators Lacerda claimed the need for emergency intervention on the part of the Armed Forces in order to keep from power what he claimed to be a plot between subversive and corrupt elements. Another group of officers, which included some of these conspirators, was developing, together with general Golberi in the Escola Superior de Guerra [Higher War College - trans.] a national security doctrine aimed at a Conservative modernization program for the country that would eliminate the participation of leftists and which implicitly included technocratic authoritarianism. Finally, most officers in the three services looked apprehensively on Goulart's and Brizola's populism, seeing in it threats to subvert the regime and corrode military discipline.

The circumstances linked to the insubordination of the lower ranks of the Navy, to increasing the President's rhetorical radicalism, to the increasing power of union leaders and to the appeals for direct action through Brizola's "group of eleven", convinced General Castelo Branco, with the support of General Kruel and other commanders in March 1964, that the Armed Forces should carry out a preventive intervention to safeguard military discipline and that of the current social regime.

Military Authoritarianism

The regime that formed during the years that followed the *coup* of 1964 was not the result of a previously thought-out plan. When General Castelo Branco took command of the forces that overthrew Goulart he envisaged, in accordance with Carlos Lacerda's proposal, an intervention to save the State. Castelo Branco imagined that in a relatively short period of time he could carry out a financial, administrative and moral clean-up of the State and the country and make it possible to return to democracy. He also proposed, among his more personal intentions, as the Land Statute shows, to set up a centre-left regime as soon as the first phase of sanitizing the country had been completed.

The 1964 movement, however was swiftly taken over by extremely conservative forces and authoritarian sectors of the military who wanted to hold on to power for a longer period. From the combination of these elements and the characteristics and circumstances surrounding successive military presidents who took power after Castelo, starting with 'soft *coup*' of Costa e Silva—who placed himself in power as successor—there appeared the elements that gave shape to the military regime.

The regime's dominant theoretical line may be defined as one of conservative modernization. Castelo Branco's relatively social concerns were not passed on, except sometimes at a rhetorical level, to his successors. The period was dominated by a technocratic approach which did not detract from Costa e Silva's popular style and the populist style of Médici. On the political level the emphasis of the regime was anti-left and on the economic level to continue the effort to industrialize.

In contrast to other Latin American military regimes, the Brazilian one did not actually create a military government but rather a military power that maintained and preserved a civil government executed by civilian technocrats. Although Congress was deprived of any effective power of decision it was kept, along with the appearance of Legislative Power, in order to rubberstamp decisions of the Executive. The Judiciary, except in areas concerning the unquestionable right of the regime and its power bases to exist, was able, in spite of strong pressure, to decide against acts of the government or military authorities and in fact did so on certain occasions, although with a measure of prudence.

Like the Salazar government, the Brazilian military regime carried out no political mobilization. From Costa e Silva to Médici, especially the latter, it

remained strongly repressive, using torture widely as an instrument to obtain information and terrorize its adversaries. Nevertheless, it sought political approval in Congress through the combination of a general clientelist policy and coercive and manipulative ways of neutralizing effective opposition which allowed only a limited and shackled opposition to exist to maintain the appearance of democracy. On the other hand, it sought the support of landowners and the urban business world and to begin with, the middle class.

At the same time, however, as the military apparatus from Castelo to Geisel was being increasingly controlled by the security apparatus and the latter by the intelligence community, the regime was increasing its tendency to restrict its circle of leaders. During the Médici government the authoritarianism of the leadership and the level of excesses on the part of the agents of repression rose dramatically. At the same time the basis of power shrank. The repression of young people at universities alienated middle-class support. Political terrorism significantly reduced support for the regime by the more enlightened sectors of the bourgeoisie.

These were the circumstances that led President Geisel to realize that the regime had exhausted its own support. Thus, aware of being the last holder of totally authoritarian power (1974-79) he tried on the one hand to speed up the regime's modernizing function and on the other he planned to adopt on his own initiative, before the growing reaction to the regime could destabilize it, ways for the authoritarian regime to eliminate itself and be gradually replaced by a democratic one.

The Geisel Government

Geisel tried to achieve three main aims: (1) the restoration of a State of Law, (2) the modernization of Brazil both in terms of economic infrastructure and basic industries as well as science and technology and (3) the gradual restoration of democracy.

President Geisel's first aim collided head-on with the security system that had taken control of the State and the intelligence community, which had taken control of the security system. His predecessor, Médici, had left the country under the complete control of the security system and the intelligence community, concentrating only on preserving the populist style of his government by identifying it with national football – which won the World Cup during his government – and maintaining high levels of economic growth.

The security system, confident in its power, ignored the president's instructions and kept up its routine of outrage and torture. The conflicts created by this confrontation led Geisel to summarily dismiss General D'Avila, commander of the Second Army, and later to dismiss his War Minister, General Frota. The latter action gambled with the future of his government because it made Frota risk an attempt at a military *coup* or accept, as he eventually had to, his dismissal.

In the area of the economy and technology and in the face of the oil crisis of 1973, Geisel chose to maintain his plans for large-scale public investment and developing Brazil's scientific and technological capacity. To this end, he made wide use of funding from abroad – now made abundant and cheap by the recycling of petrodollars – and schemes for joint ventures – the so-called tripod – between public capital and national and foreign capital. This decision led to extraordinary developments in transport, energy and communications infrastructure, but on the other hand it created an enormous foreign debt.

Finally, in terms of gradually returning the country to democracy, at the end of his government Geisel himself abolished the exceptional powers that Additional Act No. 5 had given to the President of the Republic. By means of various maneuvers, including packing a third of the Senate with 'bionic senators' through indirect voting, he prepared the scenario he felt to be necessary for his chosen successor, General Joao Figueiredo, to complete the transition to democracy with a mandate extended to six years.

The Military Legacy

An analysis of the legacy left by the military regime at the point where General Figueiredo handed power to Vice President Sarney – during what appeared to be the temporary indisposition of the President-elect, Tancredo Neves – is complicated by the fact that the last period of military government, planned by Geisel as one of gradual transition to democracy, actually turned into a rapid process of decline for the State, the economy and the overall state of the nation.

It would have been one thing for Geisel to have made an immediate transfer of power in 1979 to an elected president – who would probably have been Tancredo Neves. It was quite another that actually happened with the passage of power over six long years of rapid deterioration of conditions in the State, the economy and society. At the end of the Geisel government Brazil had the

most modern State in the Third World, a very modern and dynamic economy and a people who were convinced that, with the promised return of democracy, they would quickly join the ranks of developed countries.

The great weakness of the military government – setting aside institutional aspects concerning human rights – was the total neglect of the social question. The conservatives leading the regime claimed during the twenty years they were in power that the country's economic growth and modernization would automatically bring about the elimination of poverty. Even if that might happen in countries with much less poverty, the in the case of Brazil, where 65% of the people have monthly incomes equal to or less than one minimum salary, this thesis is totally wrong, as the facts showed. At the end of the Geisel government – and even more with Figueiredo – the masses were relatively poorer than they were before military rule. On the other hand, because of the intense urbanization of the 1970s, 15 million new rural immigrants were concentrated in the towns, most of whom did not have access to the formal urban economy and were condemned to a wretched, third-rate marginal existence.

With the rapid decline in levels of public administration during the Figueiredo government the huge social shortcomings inherited from the military regime were augmented by growing inefficiency and insolvency in the State apparatus, the catastrophic increase in foreign debt resulting from the second oil crisis and the policy of quadrupling real interest rates adopted by the US Federal Reserve System from 1979 to 1983 and the disgrace of Public Power brought about by a vast array of abuses and scandals. These scandals multiplied, from the involvement of the SNI [intelligence service – trans.] in suspicious episodes such as that of the Rio Centro [bomb explosion – trans.] and the murder of the journalist Alexandre von Baumgarten, to the increase in acts of public impropriety practiced directly by those in high positions or in partnership with dishonest financiers whose immense frauds would immediately be covered up by the Central Bank.

3. The Turn of the Century

The New Republic

Hailed by all sections of democracy as the only leader capable of being elected in opposition to the military regime while it lasted, Tancredo Neves

prepared himself to face the most difficult and complicated challenge in his public life. He saw before him one huge initial obstacle, and if he succeeded in overcoming that, four huge problems to solve.

The initial and apparently insurmountable obstacle was how to make an Electoral College that had been expressly designed to perpetuate the military regime decide to elect an opposition candidate. The four huge problems to solve may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) controlling inflation and restoring public sector solvency; (2) dismantling the authoritarian regime and putting in its place a modern social democracy run by an efficient and responsible State; (3) restarting the country's economic development and modernization and (4) promoting large-scale social reforms and substantially raising the standards of living, training and participation of the masses.

What made the Electoral College obstacle apparently insurmountable was the fact that the opposition within it consisted of only one third of the votes, which made the victory of the establishment's candidate inevitable. Also, what made the future task of government extremely difficult was the fact that, in addition to a thousand other problems to be solved, the four major ones previously referred to demanded mutually incompatible remedies. Ending inflation, in itself an extremely difficult aim to achieve, would require a policy of great sacrifices at a time when, after years of suffering and frustration, the people would demand that immediate attention be given to their previously suppressed demands.

The way in which, by using all the opportunities open to him and taking advantage of all the contradictions and vacillations of the regime, Tancredo Neves managed to dismantle the government majority and win more than two thirds of the votes in the Electoral College, is one of the most extraordinary political feats on record. His unexpected death before taking office, however, makes it impossible to know how he would have tackled the great problems referred to above. We only know that he would have given absolute priority at first to controlling inflation, using his immense political credit to win over the patience of the masses and obtain a vote of confidence in the subsequent execution of a wide-ranging program of economic and social development.

Vice President Sarney, suddenly transformed into a strategic piece in Tancredo Neves' chess game when he took the latter's place, inherited a terrible problem of government that had to be solved. Unfortunately, as well as lacking the political genius of the deceased President, instead of bringing with him the latter's huge public credit, he brought the passive weight of

someone who had been, until a few months previously, the president of the party supporting the military regime.

Broadly speaking, the Sarney government can be divided into three periods. The first, covering the first months of the government, which took power in 1985, tried to show itself worthy to succeed Tancredo Neves by keeping the ministers (surprisingly mediocre ones) named by him and trying to carry out the guidelines the late President had left, either those he expressly stated, or which he was presumed to have wanted. The second phase corresponds to the period 1986-1987 and was characterized by attempts to control inflation with the Cruzado Plan and its adjustments and, in the following year with the Bresser Plan. The third phase corresponds to the final years of the government and contained the plans for living with extremely high rates of inflation and maintaining the presidential regime with a five-year mandate in spite of the promise made by Tancredo Neves to support a four-year mandate.

As is well known, all of the Sarney government's great plans failed except for, in addition to those concerning foreign policy, those of immediate interest to him: maintaining the presidential regime, the 1988 Constitution and the extension of his mandate to five years.

It is outside the limits of this brief study to attempt to interpret the great disaster of the Sarney government. How could an intelligent and well-intentioned man with a great capacity, except in the field of economics, to fully understand the problems he was dealing with, have such a disastrous period in power? How could a plan like the Cruzado Plan, so brilliantly formulated by a group of young economists, be so wretchedly put into practice? Why, from the very beginning, was support for the Bresser Plan withheld, thus depriving it of any chance of success? Such questions could be multiplied to make a long list.

As the Sarney government reached the end of its term, it led to the buildup of the worst crisis in the history of the Republic, if not of the country itself. Completely discredited, the President could no longer carry out any public policy and he no longer possessed the instruments to do so. The Brazilian State, which had been the most modern in the Third World, began to decline under the Figueiredo government and went into freefall with the Sarney government, becoming insolvent, incompetent and corrupt. At its pathetic close, the most that could be hoped for from the Sarney Government was that it could prepare for the election of a successor and pass on power are before the country slid into hyperinflation and complete ungovernability.

Alternatives for Brazil

The problems that would have confronted President Tancredo Neves if he had been able to take power were passed on in incomparably more serious conditions to the successor to President Sarney. Ungoverned since the end of the Geisel administration, the country was faced with three crises at the same time.

On a general level there was the crisis of inflation that reached about 36% per month in September 1989 and would begin to reach even higher rates as the new government was constituted.

On the structural level, the crisis arose out of four micro-problems: (1) the problem of the basic dualism in Brazilian society whose social stresses were about to depart from democratic ways of resolving conflicts; (2) the problem of the decomposition of the State which was on the way to losing the ability to carry out its most routine responsibilities; (3) the stagnation of an economy that had been paralyzed for 10 years; (4) the increasing seriousness of Brazil's scientific and technological backwardness at the time of dramatic innovations in the rest of the world.

Finally, on the organizational level, the country was in the hands of corporative interests entrenched in legal privileges and immunities controlled by a small industrial and trade union oligarchies that put their own interests first, demanding an unreasonable price from society while placing themselves above the ability of the authorities of the democratic state to control them.

The government that would be constituted as a result of the elections of 15th November 1989 would have to provide an immediate solution to this terrible tangle of problems. As had already occurred in the succession to Figueiredo, these problems demanded difficult solutions that were not mutually compatible. What needed to be done to decrease inflation conflicted with what needed to be done to restart economic development and bring about social reform. However, if the inflation problem were not dramatically resolved, no public policy could be carried out, just as no public policy could be carried out if a minimum of solvency and operational ability could not be recovered on the part of the State.

In the face of this terrible confusion the new government would have only a short time in which to show its ability to solve the main problems, to impose a an outline and timetable of priorities to overcome the contradiction is implicit in the problem and quickly adopt a drastic and effective policy to rein in inflation.

If it could deal with these demands it would gain the credibility that would far surpass the resistance of those interests that its policies would damage and this credibility would enable it to achieve its initial aims. Thus, there would be ample possibilities after 1991 to carry out a large-scale program of economic development, social reforms reform of the State machine, modernization of the country and opening up the country externally and internally, doing away with the domination of corporativist political interest groups.

Brazil is a country with exceptional possibilities. If its major problems had been properly and courageously solved at the start of the new government, favorable conditions would have been created for the country's social and economic development. The extremely serious social problems in Brazil could have been resolved in 12 to 15 years, bringing about a complete change in our social structure and raising the Brazilian people to levels equivalent to those currently prevailing in the South of Europe. As is shown in a study undertaken on this subject by the Institute of Political and Social Studies (Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais) and summarized in the book *Brazil: Reform or Chaos* (Rio, Paz e Terra, 1989), a reasonably well-managed effort involving the additional application of about 5% of GDP per year would have made a permanent change to the profile of our society by the beginning of the 20th century. Together with a reasonable program of economic development, the country could enter the 21st century as the fifth-largest economy in the West, as a modern and egalitarian social democracy.

On the contrary, however, the inability of the government constituted in 1990 to take adequate measures to solve the terrible problems the country faced would drag it rapidly towards the chaos of hyperinflation and ungovernability.



4. The Archaic Party System (1990)

The modernization of the Brazilian party political system is the basis for any successful public modernization. Assuming that a competent and capable government, endowed with great leadership and the corresponding support of public opinion, can bring about important reforms in the country's executive and judiciary systems, the permanence of such reforms – assuming the democratic regime is maintained – will only be possible if accompanied by the equivalent reform of the party-political system.

If the vices and the limitations of the present Brazilian party-political system are considered, it is vital to keep in sight the fact that, without minimizing the importance of the legal norms regulating party organization and the electoral system, the major determining factor in this system is Brazilian society itself, with all its characteristics. Behind the vices and the limitations of our party-political system lies the fact that Brazil is structurally a dual society in which only a minority of the population is effectively integrated into a modern industrial society, while something like 60% of Brazilians are excluded, living in a primitive agricultural economy or in a miserable, informal, urban economy.

One of the immediate signs of this immense marginalization is the extremely low level of the country's education. In a modern industrial society, the entire adult population has at least completed primary education. In Brazil, adults of 15 years old or more who have completed the eight stages of primary education represent less than 10% of the total population. Compare this with

data from Argentina, where the level of industrialization is rather inferior to that of Brazil but where 70% of the adult population has completed primary school.

Recent research by the Institute for Political and Social Studies (Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais) has demonstrated the possibility, in perfectly feasible terms, of correcting the most marked aspects of Brazil's structural duality by the end of the century, raising the standard of living of the masses to standards comparable with those that exist today in Southern Europe. Such an undertaking, within the self-improvement mechanisms which are typical of a democratic regime, would cause a corresponding improvement of our political and electoral system.

As it happens, however, the country cannot wait so long. The crisis of the relationship between the State-and-society and the State-and-party-political system is so great that, if corrective measures are not adopted effectively in the next two or three years, the modernization of the Brazilian State will not be sustainable within a democratic regime, and it will not be possible to maintain the modernity of society without modernizing the State.

Thus, the country is confronted with the urgent need to rapidly modernize its party-political system by anticipating a great social reform - but without preventing it from being carried out quickly. Obviously, it is a difficult task in which the representatives who benefit from the corrupt system will have to be asked to accept reform.

Despite the obvious opposition that will be shown to such a project, it must not necessarily be considered as infeasible. The Brazilian experience shows that the Executive Power displays, when it exercises competence and leadership, an extraordinary capacity for mobilization, both in the country in general and specifically in Congress. It is, therefore, for the President who will lead the government, in the 1990-95 administration – if he has the motivation and ability for this vitally urgent undertaking - to mobilize public opinion and Congress in such a way as to obtain the approval for an important reform of the Brazilian party political system.

There are two main aspects that will have to show evidence of such a reform: that which refers to the organization and the functioning of the parties and that which refers to the electoral system. As a result of what has been previously stated, it is essential to adopt a general regulation of the party system directing the parties to acquire and maintain their own political philosophy, as well as a certain vision of society which will lead them, in this

context, to formulate an appropriate government proposal, for every relevant instance of Brazilian life. It is equally necessary to legally discipline the running of the parties so as to persuade them to improve recruitment to their ranks and motivate them to a practice a form of public behavior consistent with the program of their respective party.

It is true, as was pointed out initially, that the political sociology of a country carries its own weight, imposing limits, in practice, on the effectiveness of legal norms that do not find support in society. In the final analysis, what will determine the consolidated modernization of our party-political system is the general modernization of our society, with the defeat of the widespread marginalization that currently affects it. But, without prejudice to the need to effectively implement a great social reform, the reform of the laws disciplining parties can produce in the shortest possible time relevant effects that will be consolidated with the reform of society.

In order for reforms arising from legislation to take effect as soon as possible, it is essential that, together with new legal regulation of the parties, a new electoral system be established. A clear majority of studies undertaken on this topic in Brazil have moved in the direction of recommending the adoption of the mixed district political system. Basically, this means dividing the seats of Congress into two groups: half the seats are filled with deputies elected by electoral districts, at the rate of one per district. The other half corresponds to a party list. The parties organize electoral lists in which they place their candidates in a descending order of preference. The voter votes twice: once for a district candidate and then for a party candidate. The more votes a party receives, the more candidates on its list will be appointed.

There are many merits to this system. In the opinion of experts, three of these are the most important. The first is to guarantee access to Congress of eminent personalities – distinguished jurists and economists, etc, who would otherwise not have put themselves forward – because they occupy a priority position on their party lists, thus raising the level of competence and ability of the Legislature. The second is to allow the common voter, who is less interested in wider issues, to be able to more directly influence the choice of his candidate within the limited scope of the district. Finally, the third is to avoid the insidious inter-party competition typical of simple proportional systems, which destroys party unity, and replace it by stimulating inter-party competition which consolidates the parties' political profile and internal unity. The increasing gap separating the Brazilian State, in a condition of alarming

and accelerating decline, from the modern sectors of our society, is extremely serious. If we do not rapidly modernize, the State will soon lose the level of modernity that we have so arduously gained in recent decades. More serious still is the distance that separates the relative residual modernity of the Brazilian State from the primitive condition that characterizes our party political system. As was previously indicated, if this is not modernized in the relatively short term, the State will face a fatal dilemma, as is already occurring. If it remains democratic, it will cease to be modern. If it wants to be modern, it will cease to be democratic.

Even though the modernization of the State and the party political system presents considerable and obvious difficulties, it is a feasible task for the next five-year presidential period, if the President of the Republic has the necessary motivation and capacity. This task requires to be carried out urgently from the start of the government which will be inaugurated in 1990.

If the State does not rapidly recover a minimum operating capacity, nothing will happen and the country will plunge into chaos over the course of the next five years. If there is a reasonable recovery of this operational capacity, the consolidation of the State and party political system reforms will depend on how far measures taken towards a large-scale program of social reform can be successfully completed by end of the century. Only by overcoming the fundamentally dual nature of Brazilian society and raising the masses to higher standards of living, training and participation, will it be possible to turn Brazil into a large, modern and equal democratic society.

5. The Suicide of President Vargas (1994)

The suicide of President Getúlio Vargas in the early hours of the 24th August, 1954, was both the tragic end of his human and public career and an act of personal greatness that rescued Brazilian democracy from a coup when everything seemed lost, guaranteeing it another 10 years of existence in the course of which the great Kubitschek government took place.

The process that led to the military deposition of the constitutional government of President Vargas found in the chance episode of the death of Major Rubens Vaz the spark that produced the explosion in the incendiary material that was being collected by the journalist Carlos Lacerda. Carried away by his primitive loyalty to the great chief, whom he saw as the victim of Lacerda's wicked and unfounded accusations, Gregório Fortunato, the exforeman of the Vargas' ranch in the South of Brazil, and at that time in charge of the President's personal security, felt himself morally obliged to kill the journalist and hired some gunmen to perform the deed. Because of the incompetence of one of these gunmen, the victim was Rubens Vaz, who had volunteered to act as bodyguard to Lacerda, who emerged from the incident only lightly wounded.

Lacerda mobilized his extraordinary rhetorical talent against the second Vargas government in an avalanche of writings and radio programmes, combining accusations of assumed corruption with bitter criticisms of supposed injuries to the national interest caused by government policies. Vargas and his

ministers never made any serious attempt to clarify the inaccuracy of these accusations and criticisms. They took them for what they really were: expressions of savage disagreement on the part of a talented loudmouth speaking in the name of a UDN that had no popular support and represented the old Brazil of the landowners and merchants that opposed the conversion of an agrarian society into an industrial one, and an oligarchic democracy into a mass of social democracy. Nevertheless, the underestimation of the power of these attacks by Lacerda to arouse public opinion, regardless of their inaccuracy, was a serious political mistake that can only be explained by the pessimistic disillusionment that Vargas increasingly felt as he grew older. This apathy allowed a conspiracy of powerful social forces to take shape, bringing together the traditional middle-class and its military representatives, with the most backward sectors of Brazilian society. The chance murder of an Air Force officer in what could be seen as an attack ordered from the Palace itself, in the climate of the 'sea of mud' created by Lacerda's rhetoric, unleashed the coup.

The second Vargas government, under the brilliant economic direction of Rômulo Almeida, acting as adviser to the Presidency, and the austere financial management of Horacio Lafer, as Finance Minister, was a decisive moment in changing Brazil from a primitive coffee-based economy into an emerging industrial society. It was also the sign of a redirection of the traditionally conservative tendency in the country towards a modern social democracy. The plans for a National Coal scheme, Petrobras, the nationwide electrification system, the renovation of ports and basic industries, with the support of the Mixed Brazil-United States Commission under the competent direction on the Brazilian side of the engineer Ary Torres and with the expert help of Roberto Campos and Lucas Lopes, together with the programme for training civil service cadres run by CAPES under the clear-headed direction of Anísio Teixeira, allowed Brazil for the first time in its recent history to carry out a consistent policy of economic and social development. Vargas was not able to personally reap the first fruits of his great government but he built the bases on which the Kubitschek government could set up its excellent Programme of Targets. As a young intellectual engaged in the project of Brazil's social and economic development, I had the opportunity to participate on the fringes of the last dramatic ministerial meeting at the Catete Palace on the night of 24th August. At the time I was acting, informally and unpaid, as adviser to the then Minister of Justice, Tancredo Neves, a situation that gave me access to the

anteroom of the ministerial meeting. Then I held a tense conversation with Tancredo before the meeting began, suggesting, with his full agreement, that we should remain in permanent meeting, defending the President with the resources left to us and leaving the military with the onus of attacking the Palace.

As Tancredo Neves later told me, and as could have been predicted, the long meeting was extremely dramatic. Tancred and Oswaldo Aranha, at that time Foreign Minister, favored the idea of resistance. The military ministers advised against it as it would cause sacrifices without any chance of success, and they were supported by the rest of the ministers. It was thus suggested, as an argument to save face, that the President should take a short leave of absence during which the falsehood of the accusations would be proved and at the end of which he would in theory return to lead the government. Vargas declared himself to be in favor of the solution.

While I was waiting for the end of the meeting, my heated defense in the anteroom of the idea of resistance annoyed General Caiato de Castro, then Chief of the General Staff and probably already contaminated by the rebelliousness of the rest of the military, who threatened to arrest me. I had a sharp exchange of words with the General, suggesting that he should arrest those who wanted to depose the President and not those who were there risking their lives to defend him.

When the meeting was over, Tancredo Neves, very depressed, informed me of the unfortunate decision concerning the Pesident's leave of absence. I returned home deeply despondent and burst out to my wife, who was anxiously waiting for me: "Again they've chosen to be smart instead of taking the bold decision the situation needs". It was two o'clock in the morning. At five o'clock I was told by telephone that Vargas had killed himself with a shot to the heart, leaving a devastating suicide note. The President had pretended to accept the idea of his leave of absence to save the lives of those who had remained faithful, choosing instead his lonely death.

The news instantly spread through the city and the country, with Vargas' suicide note being continually read out over the radio. Vargas' tragic decision and the extraordinary rallying power of his suicide note produced an immediate and complete reversal of the way things were going. Persecuted by the mob, Lacerda, who had thought himself near to gaining power, had to take refuge in the American Embassy. The soldiers who were preparing to attack the Catete Palace broke ranks to pay homage to the dead President. With his

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stoical decision, Vargas defeated the rebellion by sacrificing his life and saved Brazilian democracy, which had almost been lost. With his death he preserved the opportunity which a little later it would allow the great government of Kubitschek to appear, but the rebellion, contained for a while, had not died, and ten years later would return, this time with real effect.

6. Brazil and the World from a 21st-Century Perspective (2000)

I. Introduction

A) The Legacy of the 20th Century

The 20th century was one of great revolutions. It saw the establishment of the mass society - the rebellion of the masses that Ortega y Gasset talks of - which led, at the end of the century to the spread of mass democracies. The century saw countless social prohibitions being overthrown, thus creating movements in favor of freedom in the areas of sexuality, hierarchies, the family, values and the arts. It was the century of great political revolutions that led to the imposition of Communism, Fascism and Nazism. It was also the century of the great revolution in science and technology, with Einstein, Heisenberg, and molecular biology, cybernetics, nuclear energy, telematics, missiles and space exploration.

The legacy the 20th century left to the 21st is therefore an extremely complex and contradictory one. Almost everything has become possible and implementable. However, having broken with its former rules, society has been submitted to a chaotic explosion of uncoordinated freedoms accompanied by an alarming loss of control and subsequent rising crime. The century ended with an extraordinary expansion in the capacities of science and technology and a serious loss of self-sustainability in society and of viability

in the world. If the task of the 20th century was, in the final analysis, the deconstruction of the certainties of the 19th, the unavoidable task of the 21st century, if we are to preserve society, will be to reconstruct the capacity to regulate society and rebuild the viability of the world.

B) The Reconstruction of Society and Culture

Many social conventions are arbitrary; many others, however, are ways, and not necessarily the only ones, of establishing parameters and patterns which must be commonly followed if the well-ordered forms of social life to exist. The normal functioning of societies requires that the most important of these needs for its viability should be widely accepted by their respective members. This is what guarantees a society's capacity for self-regulation. Regardless of the need in all societies for rules that are more important than the individual, established by public power or by other authorities, no society can be completely ruled by external norms since they all have a dominant need for a system of self-regulation. With the overthrow of so many social prohibitions and the disorganized explosion of countless freedoms, together with Nietzsche's rejection of transcendent values (the death of God) and the postmodern rejection of transcendental values (the denial of objective criteria to ascertain what is true, beautiful, fair and good) the 20th century created a culture and society that has tended, at the end, to lose its power of self-sustainability.

There are many possibilities concerning the way to move forward, in terms of achieving a general agreement, towards the recovery of modern society's power to regulate itself and for modern culture to validate itself. Sorokin (*Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1941), 1959) uses wide-ranging empirical illustrations to advocate a reformulation of Vico's theory. According to Sorokin, cultures are subject to a circular process that goes from an original ideational period based on myths concerning the divine, through an idealist phase based on rational theologies, to a sensory phase based on empirical and analytical criteria. This develops into a hyper-sensory phase in which the complete relativization of all values leads to the loss of objective criteria in deciding what is true, beautiful, fair and good. This phase leads societies to lose their capacity for self-sustainability. According to Sorokin, the resulting crisis leads to a new ideational phase.

In its final decades, the 20th century definitely entered a hyper-sensory period that contained the characteristics described by Sorokin. However, it

may be disputed whether the resulting crisis in self-sustainability will lead modern society, as Sorokin predicted, into a new ideational period. What does not seem to be disputable is the fact that the growing crisis of self-sustainability in modern society cannot continue indefinitely. If we cannot rediscover a belief in God, the loss of transcendent values will have to be compensated for through new forms of social and environmental humanism. If we do not return to the philosophical beliefs of the first half of the 20th century, the loss of transcendental values will mean forming society on new criteria with an objective basis in those values, in the same way as they are applied to the exact sciences.

In order to guarantee a civilized social life that is able to answer man's psychological and physical needs, the 21st century will have to recognize the need to accept objective ways of reconstituting the real credibility of transcendent (even if not religious) and transcendental values, even if they have a different basis from those of the 20th century.

On the other hand, a world united by technology, globalization and the intercommunicability of all common interests will need an adequately rational and equitable world order without which no stable balance will be possible. This world order, which we may call a *Pax Universalis*, as brilliantly foreseen by Kant (Perpetual Peace) at the end of the 18th century, has become even more necessary in the conditions of the modern world that have made possible the nuclear immolation of the world, is still, at the beginning of the 20th century, a remote and even Utopian prospect. What appears to be consolidating itself is a *Pax Americana* which, although the product of the hegemony of an essentially benign power, is leading to a non-consensual way of organizing the world that definitely lacks a adequate level of rationality and equity. Thus, the 21st century will face the problem not only of avoiding the outbreak of a suicidal global conflict, but the inescapable need to finally manage to establish a *Pax Universalis*.

II. A Possible Scenario for the 21th Century

A) Phases of the Process

It is reasonable to suppose that the century that is about to begin will pass through three main phases. This three-part perspective has clearly been a certain way of looking at reality from classical thinking to Hegel, and in various kinds of post-Hegelian thinking. With no disrespect to that logical and ontological point of view, the idea that the coming century will be divided into three main phases is accepted here for empirical reasons, based on observations of how preceding periods have developed and handled the legacy they have received from the time before them.

In a reaction to the dogmatic sectarianism of the 17th century and its religious wars, the 18th-century proposed, based on Fontenelle, idea of an enlightened, tolerant and rational view of the world. The second half of the century led to this proposal, as seen in cases like that of Louis XIV's France, Frederick II's Prussia (although still contained within the State of Law) and various other kingdoms, to install absolute monarchies, something which the Stuarts in Britain did not succeed in doing. The final part of the century is characterized by the spirit of criticism inspired by Voltaire and Rousseau, and would lead to the American and French Revolutions.

After the Napoleonic interlude, the 19th-century began, with the Congress of Vienna, to legitimize Metternich's authoritarian monarchy. The second phase is libertarian, with the French Revolution of 1830, political reform in Britain, the even more radical movements of the 1840s and reform movements in Russia in the 1860s. The end of the century returns to authoritarian conservatism with Napoleon III, Bismarck and the reactionary regime of Czar Alexander III.

The 20th century began with the socializing liberalism of the Front Populaire, the Weimar Republic, Giolitti's Italy and the intention, with the Russian Revolution, of establishing an egalitarian and just society. The following period was marked by the emergence of Fascism and Nazism and by the consolidation in Stalin's Russia of the dogmatic and totalitarian tendency that had already been seen in Lenin. The century ended with the restoration of democratic ideology, the collapse of Soviet Communism and the postmodern spread of a nihilistic culture.

B) The First Phase

As has been mentioned above, the 21st century will first of all have confront the vital need to restore the self-sustainability of modern society that has been affected by the loss of self-regulation as a result of the overthrow of countless former social prohibitions and the disordered outbreak of a wide range of freedoms and, on the cultural level, of the loss of transcendent and transcendental values.

We cannot foresee what form will be taken by the process of social and cultural reconstruction the first period of the new century adopts. It will be difficult for this process to involve simply going back to the patterns that ruled during the first phase of the 20th century. The transcendent values that basically arose out of the transcendence of man's rational freedom can hardly return to the basis of a new belief in God when modern thinking has led precisely to the affirmation that the construction of the idea of God is produced by human transcendence. Thus we may suppose that a new idea of transcendence will be based upon a new humanism, a humanism of the time of mass technological society that will have to be different from the individualistic humanism that existed from the time of the Greeks to Goethe and Cassirer, and will need to become a social and environmental form of humanism.

It is equally difficult to assume that a new transcendentalism will return to neo-Kantian ideas and the culturalism of the beginning of the 20th century, in spite of the eternal elements contained in that way of thinking. A new transcendentalism will have to arise out of the criteria of an objective search for truth as used by modern science in a stochastic and not apodictic way. These criteria, however, have nothing to do with the nihilistic hyper-relativism of postmodern thinking of the end of the 20th century.

As well as needing a new cultural foundation to overcome the nihilist hyper-relativism of postmodern culture, the complex and globalized mass technology society of the beginning of the 20th century will require values and modes of behavior that will overcome a totally motiveless form of consumerism. What parameters and patterns of conduct will make the administration of this complex society possible and reliable is a question which we cannot answer in advance. We can only state that these patterns will have to be of a deliberate and highly predictable kind if they are to put a durable, universal and reliable stamp on the system.

An analogy with the Hellenistic and Roman world and the way in which, in that civilization, the futile consumerism of broad sectors of the elite coexisted with the stoic severity of the lives of the minority groups which, in those conditions, succeeded in maintaining classical civilization for many centuries, gives an indication of the possibility for similar parallel lives to be led in the mass consumer society of the modern world.

As well as rebuilding the self-sustainability of modern society and culture, the 21st century will be faced with the need to build (or rather rebuild) a rational and equitable world order. The world has never been subjected to a

rational and equitable order, even though the classical *ecumene* experienced in the Roman Empire, from Augustus to Marcus Aurelius (27 BC-180AD), two centuries of rational order that were reasonably equitable, given the cultural conditions of the time.

It is only in the modern age, however, that the world has become unified and that the current process of globalization is leading to its final consequences. This economically and technically globalized world requires a corresponding ordering of institutions. During the second half of the 20th century, a precarious bipolar balance ruled the world. Once this balance was broken with the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, there only remained one superpower, one that has been exercising an increasing global hegemony and creating a system of organizing the world that we may call the *Pax Americana*.

It is not the aim of the present study to analyze the *Pax Americana*; we need only to point out two of its qualities. The first is that the 'American Empire' which is currently in a process of expansion and consolidation, is different from the historical empires of Rome or Britain by virtue of not aiming to institutionalize itself or impose its sovereignty on territories under its control or influence by substituting or to the detriment of the sovereignty of the states they governed. The 'American Empire is', on the one hand a 'field', an environment in which United States can develop its activities. This 'empire' operates precisely by means of pre-existing regulatory institutions within the territories belonging to its 'field', making them adjust to certain parameters, patterns and aims. These are extrapolated from the US legal and cultural system and impose, rarely by openly coercive means, rules that open up the territories of the empire to the activities of American companies and to free access to their goods and services.

The second aspect of the *Pax Americana* worth emphasizing is that, although it is generally benign, it is met with varying degrees of rejection on the part of the inhabitants of its 'provinces'. This situation contrasts with that of the Roman Empire at its peak which - after the violence and chaos of the initial period of conquest - instituted a rational and equitable legal order with its *jus gentium* and the *praetor pregrinus* that was well received (except in the case of Judea) by the elites and middle classes of the provinces.

The *Pax Americana* on the other hand, finds that there are wide areas in which it cannot impose itself. This is mainly the case with China, but also to a considerable extent, with Russia, and the key countries of the Islamic world such as Iran, and also India. This 'bunker', which is not subject to, or is

insufficiently subject to, the *Pax Americana*, is not presently able to oppose it, but only to resist it. As has been observed earlier, however, everything points to this situation changing over the course of time and seems to be leading to a situation in the mid-21st-century, off the consolidation of an anti-American system that will create a new bipolarity in the world.

All these circumstances and characteristics reveal the fact that, at the start of the 21st century, globalization has not managed to create a corresponding institutional system which, in some way or another, will have to be achieved as a requirement for the very viability of the world.

C) Second Phase

Assuming that the first period of the 21st century displays the same basic characteristics described above, we must assume that the second phase will present two main facets. The first will be a tendency to consolidate the new form of society and culture that was created in the previous period. The second will tend to turn into opposition the resistance to the *Pax Americana* Anna shown by China and sometimes other countries.

As we have seen, creating the conditions for social and cultural self-sustainability in the first phase of the new century cannot really imply a return to the patterns of the first half of the 20th century. If it is true that society and culture need objective bases to sustain themselves, it is no less true that the traditional bases of transcendence and transcendentalism have been seriously affected by the criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger among others.

Recovering transcendent and transcendental values in a mass technological consumer society will tend to happen in terms of the survival needs of that society itself. Only by means of a new humanism with a strong social emphasis will it be possible to restore transcendent values in the immanentist environment of modern culture. Only a new foundation supported by the criteria of modern science will be able to restore the transcendental values of a globally technological world. The result of this reconstruction, however, seems to have do lead towards the creation of a technological humanism of a social-environmental kind.

As with everything concerning the future, it is impossible to anticipate what this new humanism will specifically consist of. We might imagine that it will succeed in establishing a way for the human and the technical to

live together in the same way that man and nature have lived together. We may equally assume that a new social humanism will be incompatible with patterns of exclusion that were tolerated, if not justified, by individualistic humanism, such as slavery in the classical world, proletarian wretchedness in the bourgeois world and the marginalized groups in the modern world. If the relationship between individualistic humanism and the excluded was to some extent mitigated by stoic compassion and Christian charity, the relationship between peoples and groups in socio-environmental technological humanism will have to involve a globally inclusive relationship dictated by its own homeostatic requirements within a much less non-egalitarian system.

The other facet of the second phase of the coming century shows characteristics that seem very likely to occur. Actually, as long as China and other members of the bunker resisting the *Pax Americana* succeed in preserving their autonomy and significant rates of development, both of which hypotheses seem to be quite probable, so a country like China will tend to reach a satisfactory level of equipolarity with the United States by the middle of the 21st century.

China stands out from all other countries by reason of the size of its population, its basic homogeneity, the level of development it has already reached by the beginning of 21st century, and other characteristics, as representing the nucleus of a future bipolarity with the United States. Two other questions remain to be answered: on the one hand weather, as well as China, countries like Russia, India, Iran or others will also be able to join in a relationship of opposition to *Pax Americana*. On the other hand, there is the question of knowing if the future new bipolarity will come about by means of a coalition within the anti-American pole made up of China and one or more of those countries or if, mainly because of Russia, a multipolar system emerges similar to that of the beginning of the 20th century.

As has been repeated in this study, it is impossible to anticipate what will happen. We may only observe the fact that American power, far from stabilizing at the level it had at the end of the 20th century, will continue to grow although probably at a slower rate than that of China. Among other consequences, this means that the conditions to create an effective opposition to *Pax Americana*, even by the middle of the 21st century, only seem to be possible if a stable coalition forms between powers that will resist *Pax Americana* in the future.

D) Third Phase

Starting from the characteristics we assume the second phase in the 21st century will have, the nature of the third phase will depend on how the previous one has developed. History shows that the success or failure of new models of society and culture depend upon subsequent consolidation or conversely, crisis and contestation. The religious and dynastic dogmatism of the 17th century, with the horrors of the 30 Years War, created in the following period a strong rejection of all forms of dogmatism that led to the tolerance and rational spirit of the Enlightenment. In contrast, the success of the enlightened society led 19th-century society to preserve the basic features of the previous one.

If the social and environmental technological humanism that we envisage for the second half of the 21st century is successful, as in principle we may suppose it to be, the third phase will tend to consolidate this model and increase its scope. Conversely, if the model is not successful, the end of the 21st century will submit it to a critical revision, if not profound rejection - in favor of what, it is absolutely impossible to predict.

More predictable, even if, as with everything concerning the future, in a tentative and merely speculative sense, is the idea that it will tend to be the development of a new bipolarity, if such a situation should emerge. A bipolar situation in the second half of the century will necessarily have infinitely more serious and dangerous characteristics than the American-Soviet polarity in the second half of the 20th century. It is superfluous to point out the fact that the level of lethality of military material in the second half of the coming century will be in comparably higher than that which existed during the American-Soviet conflict. Presupposing the formation of a new bipolarity implies admitting that each of the two opposing poles will have much more power than is necessary to exterminate not only each other, but all life on the planet.

The impasse resulting from a reciprocal, automatic and inevitable capacity for mutual destruction will lead a future new bipolarity into the same logic of antagonistic coexistence that typified the American-Soviet bipolarity. Neither can we ignore the fact, as occurred in the first bipolarity, that the tensions of a prolonged antagonistic coexistence undermine the capacity for one of the contenders to sustain itself, thus leading the world into what would be a definitive monopolarity of the remaining power.

Another, perhaps more likely possibility, is that of a prolonged bipolarity. In this case, it is probable, as also partly occurred in the American-Soviet

case, that a culture of antagonistic coexistence would develop that would tend to evolve into a peaceful, vigilant coexistence.

There are many possibilities for the development of a future new bipolar process. In the final analysis, however, we may assume the hypothesis that in the long term, such a system will either end in global suicide, perhaps even by accident, or it will lead to increasingly cooperative forms of ordering the world, the final result of which will be the institution of a stable *Pax Universalis*.

E) Brief Reflections on the Topic

Scenarios of the future are always hypothetical, and at the best of times depend on probabilities. Starting from a certain pre-existing situation, it is rarely possible, speculatively, to foresee a single scenario for the future development of that situation. In the case of the present study, the only probable scenario assumed for the 21st century, notably in relation to its first phase, arises out of the fact that the aim has not been to explore speculatively the main possibilities surrounding the transition from the 20th to the 21st century. The aim has been, starting from various possible scenarios, to choose the most probable and from it construct an idea of the rest of the course of the coming century in order to create in the third and last part of the study a brief analysis of the problems which, in that scenario, a country like Brazil might meet (and in all probability will meet).

It is worth mentioning, in terms of the hypothesis of the formation of a new future bipolarity in the mid-21st-century, that this hypothesis (as well as being quite probable) has been formed by reason of its extraordinary heuristic importance. In this respect, it is important to take into account to main aspects of the question that have not been dealt with in the text in order not to make it too complex. These are: (1) China's long-term maintenance of high levels of development, its national unity and its persistence in becoming a future superpower; (2) the impossibility of there being an international situation in which the United States, from the point when Chinese development becomes a concern, can use internationally acceptable means to prevent the pursuit of that development, as previously happened when the United States was faced with the beginning of Soviet nuclear armament.

A third consideration to make in terms of the formerly mentioned prospects for the 21st century, is to note that it is based on a certain analysis of the characteristics shown in the final decades of the 20th century by modern

society and culture, as was briefly mentioned in the introductory section. This produced the analysis related to the gradual loss of the capacity for self-sustainability on the part of post-modern society and the society of intransitive consumerism. These are the characteristics that produce the construction of a scenario for the first phase in the 21st century and the results which that phase will have for the following ones.

One final consideration concerns the *Pax Universalis*. This is what is understood on the one hand as the form that corresponds in our time to that which Kant understood in the 18th century as the idea of Perpetual Peace. On the other hand, the idea of the *Pax Universalis* contains the idea that, in the conditions of a technologically globalized world, only a rational and equitable ordering of the world will be able to guarantee it a stable balance acceptable to all and the only alternative to the self-immolation of the world.

III. The Requirements for Brazil

A) The Pre-requisite

At the end of the 20th century, Brazil finds itself extremely unprepared to face the challenges of the new century. This is not a case only, but also, of the fact of the country – contrary to the expectations of the 1950s and 60s entering the 21st century without having been able to overcome its lingering underdevelopment. Although serious, this limitation is not fatal. The country has already achieved a sufficient level, even if after a delay, to reach this long-standing aim within 20 years if it consistently adopts the measures required to do so. If it is correct that the historical period for Third World countries to overcome their development autonomously and independently will tend to become increasingly shorter in the new century, a period of about 20 years will probably still remain, on the one hand within the limits that are still internationally permissible, and on the other, for a country like Brazil, within what it is domestically possible to do.

In this respect we must mention the fact that what is actually at stake in this question is the possibility of a country overcoming its underdevelopment in a basically autonomous way in domestically and internationally exercising the level of sovereignty permissible within the international situation pertaining at the beginning of the 21st century. The process of globalization previously referred to, as well as the probable consolidation and extension of the *Pax*

Americana during the first half of the coming century, will tend to significantly, if not decisively, limit the chances of autonomous national development. The internationalization of development processes which, to an overwhelming extent during the period referred to, mean Americanization, will tend to convert those processes into a territorial adjustment of local economies to suit the convenience of the hegemonic economy and turn the corresponding territories into sectors of the international market. Meaningful margins of internal autonomy will be preserved only by those countries that enter the first half of the 21st century having already reached a high level of development and self-regulability with regard to their economies, such as the countries of Western Europe. And they can do this only if they preserve a satisfactory level of external - as well as internal - autonomy as, once again, the countries of Western Europe have managed to achieve with the European Union.

This is what creates such an urgent need for the quickest possible development of national development at the beginning of the 21st century. There is a risk that the estimate of 20 years at the beginning of the century as a time-limit for the international permissibility for such an initiative is too optimistic. It can be stated with certainty that the possibility of national development occurring within this time limit depends on the one hand on beginning the process as quickly and as energetically as possible. It depends on the other hand on the level to which the country that tries to carry it out has a sufficient critical mass of the elements of power and suitable international connections. This seems to be true in the case of Brazil, both domestically and internationally within Mercosul and other satisfactory international links. This last point will be briefly touched on in a further section of this study.

As well as the persistent underdevelopment that has left Brazil unprepared to face the challenges of the 21st century, is the fact that the country as a whole, including its ruling elites, is not even aware of the basic requirements to face the new century, nor of the extreme urgency for attending to the initial requirements needed to do so, thus risking losing the short time still available to reach the desired target.

The most important pre-requisite for Brazil's national viability at the beginning of the 21st century consists in being aware of the basic conditions necessary to do so and in forming a broad national consensus concerning this situation and the proposal to deal with those conditions.

The most important difference between nationally viable countries and those lacking sufficient national viability is usually not found in their different

levels of development, but in the extent to which they have become aware of the requirements their viability depends on and, when they have acquired a satisfactory critical mass, they have formed a basic national consensus concerning the decision to give consistent attention to those requirements. China shows an extraordinary inequality in terms of its average general development relative to the United States, to European countries like Italy and even, when everything is taken into account, in relation to Brazil. Nevertheless, China is fully aware of what it has to do during the coming decades to bring about both domestically and internationally its viability as a nation and marshals a solid national consensus to achieve that, which has been competently generated by the state and the ruling Chinese cadres. China possesses the initial conditions of viability to face the 21st century and Brazil, with an average general level of development even higher than that of China, does not currently enjoy the same conditions.

It is alarming to note, as this the study is being written, that the national political debate in Congress and in the media is limited to short-term questions such as the bizarre proposal to link the minimum wage to the dollar or the speculations concerning the profile of the candidate to succeed President Cardoso whom the latter might support.

In radically different terms from those which the national political debate is concentrating on, is the question of knowing if the government that succeeds that of President Cardoso will or will not enjoy the conditions to advance the internal and external national viability of Brazil by 2020, give or take a couple of years. Whoever is the leader of the next government, whether or not the presidential system survives or is replaced by a parliamentary one, the chance of a future government taking Brazil in the direction of its national viability depends dramatically on the extent to which the Cardoso government in its final years is successful or not in competently creating the set of basic measures required for that purpose and succeeds at the same time in creating a broad national consensus on this matter.

What is important in the succession to President Cardoso is not which party provides the candidate he chooses to support, but the extent to which the succession to Cardoso consists in a project to give a consistent beginning to the implementation of a basic national plan. Elaboration of this plan must be the main priority of the final years of Cardoso's administration, together with understandings aimed at creating a broad national consensus around this plan.

B) Basic Requirements

In order to direct Brazil in the direction of the desired target, within a time limit that falls inside the limits of what is still internationally possible and still nationally capable of being implemented - a limit which is estimated to be extendable at most until 2020 - the country needs to acknowledge two types of main requirement: on the one hand, conceptual requirements, on the other, operational ones. The conceptual requirements to ensure the historical viability of the country concern the kind of understanding of external reality and general internal conditions based on which it is possible to decide on targets to be achieved and the operational conditions needed to achieve them satisfactorily.

The basic conceptual requirements may be divided into four large groups. The first of these groups concerns the understanding of the current international system and the ways in which it will tend to develop. Section II of this study makes a brief consideration of the main aspects of external conditions Brazil will have to deal with during the 21st century based on the most likely probabilities, but recognizing the hypothetical nature of these.

The second type of basic conceptual requirement concerns the kind of the country we wish to create within what we might define as being desirably achievable. Some basic characteristics can be stated immediately. They concern reaching a level of social development at least as high as that in the countries of Southern Europe, together with the most demanding level of economic and technological development. It is also a question of achieving an internal and external situation that will preserve the highest level of national autonomy and political sovereignty that international conditions allow. Within these parameters there are specific options to take in the relationship between quality of life and national power, as well as in the relationship between the public and the private domains.

To give a typical example, a country like China has placed the emphasis of its future development on maximizing national power, either because it feels threatened from abroad, or because it nourishes the ambition of achieving future parity of power with the United States. For a country like Brazil, whose people do not aspire to superpower status and for which external threats are not as great as those which the Chinese see, the priority of a good quality of life (based on sufficient national power) seems to be an aim on which there is general agreement.

The question of the relationship between the private and the public is more complex because it has been mistakenly approached from an ideological point of view, contrasting in the extreme case the neoliberal with the socializing. It is in fact important to decide very clearly the extent to which a compensatory or corrective intervention by the public sector in society is necessary or suitable for the aims in view, given the situation of Brazil as an emerging country with the social and cultural characteristics it enjoys.

The third type of basic conceptual requirements, linked to the compromise between the private and public, concerns the institutional system required to ensure the carrying out, in the Brazilian situation, of a large-scale program of integral development and of maximizing its autonomy at home and abroad. It is indisputable that the current public and political institutions in Brazil are totally inadequate. The country does not have a minimally satisfactory electoral and party system. The Brazilian state, on the other hand, suffers from a most serious crisis of governability both institutionally and in terms of its resources. What is needed therefore is to redesign the details of a political system to ensure that it provides an effectively representative democracy and also to redesign a state system that will be able, while guaranteeing full protection of individual rights and the legitimate interests of minorities, to make the maximum possible level of governability compatible with effective administration.

The fourth type of basic conceptual requirement is also linked with the private-public compromise and concerns the kinds and types of public policies best suited to achieving the aims in view. On the one hand, the neoliberals, pointing to the inefficiency of state, the failed attempts at planning and the success of countries with free-market economies like the United States, recommend that Brazil adopts a similar policy: a minimal state and a completely open and free market. On the other hand, the *dirigistes*, indicating the inability of the market to guarantee the required attention to non-mercantile social demands, pointing out the need in underdeveloped countries to support market forces by public action and the requirement for emerging countries that are trying to preserve their autonomy to avoid a dangerous denationalization of their economies by means of appropriate state intervention, recommend this path and give South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore as examples of its success. Which options should we adopt?

In this as in other cases, what is important is to take a non-ideological approach to the question based on a pragmatic and operationalist point of view. If the aim in view is to ensure, within the shortest time possible, the

conversion of Brazil into a fully and integrally developed country with the maximum domestic and external national autonomy that international conditions allow, there is a clear need to combine the efficiency of a market economy with a prudent but effective intervention on the part of the state to promote, correct and preserve national autonomy. It is worth pointing out, in terms of this last point, that the only kind of nationalism that makes sense in the current situation of Brazil and the rest of the world is a nationalism of ends rather than means. We find, however, that a nationalism of ends does not come about in practice as a result of declared intentions, but rather by virtue of specific policies and as a result of specific instruments.

This situation implies, among other results, that a minimum nationalism of means is necessary as a condition, among other requirements, to achieve an effective nationalism of ends, in other words, a high level of internal national self-determination on which, among other factors, external autonomy depends.

C) Basic Measures

A national consensus concerning the four basic requirements listed above requires at the same time the acceptance of the adoption of basic measures that are essential to meeting those requirements. These measures may be enumerated in the following way:

- (i) Adopting a major program framework for national integral development that will set out the economic, social, cultural and political macro-targets that have to be reached by 2020, give or take a couple of years, that have been formulated in order to achieve a level of social development not lower than that of the Iberian Peninsula, and economic and technological level not lower than that of Italy, and aimed at leading to the consolidation of Mercosul, preferably including other important countries in South America in close collaboration with the rest of the countries of Latin America, leading also to a balanced system of cooperation with the United States, the European Union and Japan and a close relationship with semi-continental countries such as China, India and Russia;
- (ii) Instituting a party and electoral system that will significantly increase the representation of the people by the representatives of the people and will ensure in each legislature, the formation of stable parliamentary majorities with their own programs, party discipline and single leadership;

(iii) Adopting a fiscal and public management system that will guarantee the balancing of public accounts while creating sufficient surpluses to guarantee the implantation of the macro-targets of the program for integral development.

D) Operational Requirements

Operational requirements consist in the enumeration in a quantified way of the aims and objectives required to achieve the integral development program's macro-targets. It concerns a subject that involves on the one hand, technical requirements and on the other, political requirements related to regional and local demands and to the ideas of political parties. For this reason, these requirements cannot be included in the larger national consensus which it is important to form around the conceptual requirements and the resulting program of integral national development. The forces that gather around this latter program must arrive at agreement about the material, an agreement which, in contrast to the basic consensus, cannot be seen as a single founding act but as something to be renovated with each government administration.

E) International Permissibility

The question of international permissibility during the 21st century, but especially at the beginning of that period, is extremely important for the theme of national development among emerging countries like Brazil. Of course, this question affects the time a country like Brazil still has, which this study estimates as being at most until 2020, to achieve a satisfactory national victory over its underdevelopment.

As has been discussed previously, globalization and the predictable consolation and spread of the *Pax Americana* during the first half of the century, will bring in their wake difficulties which it will be difficult to overcome in order to achieve national development under the aegis of the sovereignty of the respective state. The areas of the world that remain underdeveloped during the probable course of the first half of the 20th century will tend to turn into territories whose economies will perform according to the convenience of the hegemonic economy and will thus become, regardless of the formal survival of their previous sovereignty, mere sectors of the world market.

In the probable course of the first half of the 20th century the question of the sovereignty of states will be radically modified. Only the hegemonic power will be fully sovereign. A partial sovereignty will be preserved, on the one hand, by the developed countries of the West, notably the members of the European Union, a situation they have achieved at the cost of surrendering increasingly large elements of their former sovereignty to that Union. Relative sovereignty will also be preserved by some semi-continental countries that have already shown signs of the ability to satisfactorily resist the hegemonic power, as in the case of china and, in various lesser ways, Russia and some Islamic countries like Iran, as well as the special case (under the protection of China) of North Korea. Countries like Brazil and India will also, to a lesser extent maintain a relative degree of sovereignty inasmuch as they maintain and improve autonomous national development policies. For these latter countries there will tend to emerge a process of circular causality by which internal autonomous development overseas will maintain their levels of external autonomy and the latter in turn will allow a satisfactory measure of internal autonomy.

This system of circular causality between internal and external autonomy will only be available to countries that have a sufficient critical mass of national power and suitable international relations. Reducing the analysis of the situation to the Brazilian case, we may say that Brazil will succeed in achieving the level of international permissibility necessary to create a satisfactory system of reciprocal conditions between internal and external autonomy in the same measure that it speeds up the national impetus of its development and controls its internal autonomy in such a way that the internal coefficient of the nationalism of ends and its respective instruments are balanced by its attractiveness to the open capital market.

It is important, however, that internal autonomy be reinforced by a suitable level of external autonomy. The latter in turn will depend upon the following conditions: (1) the consolidation and extension of Mercosul by bringing into it the most important countries in South America; (2) the maintenance of a balanced regime of cooperation with the United States, the European Union and Japan; (3) the formation of a group enjoying strict economic and technological cooperation with the main sub-continental countries: China, India and Russia; (4) the preservation of a pacifist international position and the renunciation of nuclear weapons.

In the case of Brazil, we must emphasize the extent to which the consolidation and extension of Mercosul - which is essential for the external autonomy of Brazil and the other members - will be powerfully reinforced by

the parallel formation of a system of close cooperation with the semi-continental countries, China, India and Russia. The existence of this new bloc which, along the lines of the G-7, might be called the C-4 (the Cluster of 4) will be an important factor to dissuade those who wish to weaken Brazil by contributing to the destruction of Mercosul, including even some members of this market.

Given the characteristics of the *Pax Americana* already described, the latter is compatible with maintaining moderate levels of national sovereignty, as could be the case of Brazil, within the conditions previously referred to assuming that the restrictions arising out of a policy of nationalism of ends is balanced by attractive opportunities for investment and, on the other hand, that external autonomy does not lead to anti-American coalitions, nor towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The question of nuclear weapons would require special treatment that goes beyond the scope of the present study. We shall simply mention that the American prohibition on third parties acquiring weapons contains quite wide ranges of conditions and quite diverse circumstances, as the cases of France, India, Pakistan and China show, as well as the unique situation of North Korea. It is also, of course the case that 'going nuclear' (except for producing energy) holds no interest for a country in the historical period in which Brazil finds itself, as well as being of no interest to countries that have not previously developed efficient missiles.

The question of international permissibility requires one final observation concerning the probable final phases of the 21st century. The preceding considerations have discussed this problem from the point of view of the consolidation and expansion of the *Pax Americana*, taken in this study as necessarily characterizing the first phase of the coming century. Conditions are international permissibility will become substantially modified, as this study predicts, when China's development, possibly with the support of other powers, leads it to occupy a situation of suitable equipolarity with the United States in the second half of the 21st century.

Speculations concerning the international situation that suggest the hypothesis of China assuming the situation of a second superpower at the end of the coming century cannot be formed in advance. A new division of the world into two antagonistic poles will tend to force a corresponding alignment of the remaining countries, as occurred with the American-Soviet bipolarity, although non-alignment was a possibility in that case. Whatever situation develops, two suppositions seem to be very probable. The first is that the

level of external autonomy emerging from that situation for countries like Brazil will tend to be proportional to the level of autonomous development they have reached. The greater and more 'national' the level of development Brazil has achieved, the greater will be its external autonomy. On the other hand, as occurred in the case of American-Soviet bipolarity, the courting of third countries by the opposing powers in order to gain their support, will tend to increase their margins of international permissibility. The greater the margin of autonomy a country has managed to preserve by that time, the greater the degree of international permissibility it will be able to achieve.

F) Cardoso's Last Years

In the three years from 2000 to 2002, the Cardoso government will be faced with a double responsibility: the appropriate implementation of its Pluriannual Plan and preparing the country to confront the 21st century. These two aspects are interrelated: the execution of the Pluriannual Plan, topped up by a significant amount of funding for scientific research of about R\$60 billion for the period 2001-2005, is an important step towards national development. The macro-targets mentioned previously, however, will have an effect on far more wide-reaching and deeper objectives than the emergency measures included in the Pluriannual Plan. Just as important as numbering and quantifying the objectives that the National Basic Program mentioned previously should consist of, is the creation of a national consensus concerning it. It is absolutely vital to call the country together to establish some serious rules of the game. The various political currents opposed to the Cardoso government, for whatever reasons, have the democratic right to continue to oppose it. It is not, however, legitimate for them to oppose a project that is nationally agreed upon concerning a Basic Program to guarantee the country's historical viability during the coming century.

It is therefore important that the Cardoso government, with the support of the country's centers of competence, should draw up a major plan for a Basic National Program and submit it for public debate. This is a project which, to deserve national consensus and have long-term validity, must be restricted to the exposition and corresponding quantification of its macrotargets, leaving the details of this Program to later government administrations, starting with the one that will begin in 2003. There is nothing, however, to prevent the Cardoso government as it now is from submitting to the country

its own proposal for the details of the Basic Program - which will be the proposal of the official candidate to succeed Cardoso - among other proposals which opposing political movements may formulate. It is around these alternative programs for the details of the Basic Program - not about the Basic Program itself, which must be consensual - that political discussion in Brazil concerning the succession to Present Cardoso should develop.

The Cardoso government, the profile of which as it reaches the end of its eight-year mandate can already be traced in general terms has had, like all governments its hits and misses. It is beyond the aims of this study to attempt to evaluate this government, but one fundamental aspect should be pointed out. More than the many successes it has had, what will establish the historical importance of the Cardoso government will be the extent to which, during the final years of its mandate, it had on the one hand, the ability to formulate a major national Basic National Program for the historical viability of Brazil during the 21st century and, on the other, had the ability to generate a national consensus concerning this Program, regardless of any alternative that might have been proposed for it at the level of details.



7. Brazil, 500 Years On (2000)

As Brazil celebrates the 500 years since its discovery by Europeans, it has reason to look at its past with a mixture of euphoria and frustration. Indeed, no country can celebrate everything in its history, nor can it contemplate it in a completely pessimistic way even if there are not many countries that can boast a historical account that is very much in credit.

The 'discovery' of Brazil has been questioned by various people. Some because they insist that this land already had its own culture, to which was afforded, by the arrival of Cabral, the opportunity of discovering the Portuguese. Others, because they imagine that Portuguese colonization interrupted a possible development of native cultures or directed our own civilization in the less happy directions which have resulted in our persistent underdevelopment. Concerning these allegations, we may say that those that have a basis are irrelevant and those that are relevant have no basis.

It is obvious that the discovery of one people by another implies a certain reciprocal revelation, although we should make a distinction between those living passively in one place and those making a great human and technological effort such as crossing the Atlantic at the end of the 15th century, to arrive on a continent the existence of which they were previously unaware of.

What is important, as we celebrate 500 years of the post-Cabralian existence of Brazil, is to reflect broadly and objectively on our successes and failures. It does not fall within the narrow limits of this article to attempt to

make a balanced criticism of our past. I propose therefore to simply highlight, from among the most important aspects of our history, some which seem to me to be especially happy or unhappy ones.

Among the positive aspects that initially stand out is what made Brazil a Western society, and that was Portuguese colonization. From the end of the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, Portugal and Spain were leading nations. During the 17th century both went into decline, Portugal after the senseless Moroccan adventure of D. Sebastião, Spain after the reign of Philip II. Both had a brief renaissance during the 18th century, Portugal under Pombal, Spain under Charles III, and then sank once more into stagnant backwardness until the middle of this century.

To attribute Brazil's underdevelopment to the decadence of Portugal from the 19th century to the middle of the one which is now closing, is to forget that Brazil has ruled itself, not only since Independence in 1822, but in fact since the arrival of D. João VI in 1808. In Brazil's 300 years as a colony, Portugal - then a small but vigorous country - left an inheritance which even today is the country's main asset. This inheritance has three parts: (1) territorial unity, in contrast to the fragmentation of Hispanic America; (2) cultural unity which, in spite of the immense area of the country and its regional differences, means that the differences between a gaucho and a Northeasterner are less than those separating a Piemontese from a Calabrian, or a Castilian from an Andalusian; (3) the sense of tolerance which the most diverse level of ethnic miscegenation has given us, has instilled in us a generalized humanism and made us open to variety in the world, in contrast to the segregating and parochial attitudes of almost all other countries with a colonial past.

Within this context, Brazil has succeeded in doing some great things. It has created a specific variant of Western society and culture that has its roots in a Greco-Roman past as well as in the Christian tradition, and shares in all the important contributions to the West, to which Brazil has made its own contribution. If the decadence of post-Pombalian Portugal at the end of the colonial period deprived us, when it would have been possible to establish universities, of scientific knowledge which took much time and effort to consolidate, with the consequent delaying effects on development, in compensation that same decadence freed us to have direct access to, among other sources, French culture, British institutions and American ways of doing things. As well as the ethnic miscegenation gathered from the widest range of peoples and races, we benefit from cultural miscegenation.

We have also made a considerable contribution to Western culture. This is the country of music and musicians, from José Américo Lobo de Mesquita and Father Maurício to Villalobos; a country of the plastic arts from the great colonial baroque tradition to Pedro Américo, Portinari and Di Cavalcante; a lyrical country, from the poets of the *Inconfidência* to Castro Alves, Gonçalves Dias, Manuel Bandeira and Carlos Drummond; a country of businessmen, from Mauá to Roberto Simonsen; a country of statesmen, from José Bonifácio, Pedro II, the Marquis of Paraná and Rodrigues Alves, to Vargas and Kubitschek.

Although we have so many aspects and facts to celebrate, our past carries the immense burden of slavery, which we tolerated until the end of the 19th century, of underdevelopment, which continues to slow us down and which derives to a great extent from slavery. We are entering the 21st century with our sovereignty and highest values intact but without having resolved our persistent underdevelopment. Thus it is that, in this 21st century that is beginning and which will be extremely difficult, we only have - if that - 20 years to finally overcome this underdevelopment, because if we do not, we shall lose, probably irreversibly, that sovereignty and those high values which until now we have managed to preserve.

Together with the well-deserved celebrations of the discovery and our 500 years, we must rapidly develop and begin to put into action a major national project. The Pluriannual Plan and the funds for scientific research that have recently been established are an excellent first step, but they need to be complemented by a long-term approach to our main problems. This does not only mean finally overcoming our underdevelopment by 2020 at the latest, but also of teaching Brazil to face the immense challenges the 21st century will bring. This is the task which the Cardoso government has to undertake in its final three years.



8. Towards a New National Defense Policy (2000)

I. Introduction

This brief study is a first approach to an extremely complex topic and has been conceived as forming the basis of a broader discussion on the subject being dealt with here. The problem concerning Brazil's national defense is treated here extremely briefly and on a purely conceptual level. Only after a proper conceptual clarification of the topic can its operational aspects be addressed.

II. The Problem

A) General Aspect

A country's national defense should show the result of a balance between a realistic estimate of its external risks and the resources it actually has to respond to them. In the case of a country like Brazil, this equation is especially difficult to calculate because of its level of economic development (the 10th-largest economy in the world), its great territorial size and population numbers, its national and international characteristics, the risks it is exposed to in the medium and long terms far outstrip not only its present defensive resources but also those which it can realistically see itself having, on its own account, in the foreseeable future.

B) Risks, Rated by Origin

In general terms, the risks Brazil is exposed to, considered in the short term (currently existing), medium-term (2001-2005) and longer term (up to 2020) may be classified according to their origin, in four groups in increasing order of generality, thus:

- (1) Risks arising out of large-scale operations linked to the drug trade;
- (2) Risks arising out of threats and/or acts of aggression launched from bases in territories bordering those of our neighbors;
- (3) Risks arising out of conflicts with great powers that may create threats and/or acts of aggression;
- (4) Risks arising out of conflicts with the superpower, the United States of America, that may create threats and/or acts of aggression.

A perfunctory evaluation of the risks described above gives the following results:

- (a) The risks listed in item (1) are current and imminent and mainly affect the Amazonian frontier, but are also capable of appearing on the Western frontier and more distantly, on the Southwestern frontier.
- (b) The risks referred to in item (2) are extremely remote in terms of our neighboring countries, but rather less remote if we consider the possibilities of adjoining territories being used by forces and interests in conflict with those territories and which are operating in them in various ways;
- (c) The risks mentioned in item (3) are also quite remote. However, the case of the 'lobster war' illustrates the possibility, however remote, that economic or other interests may arouse hostility on the part of a great European or Asian power or Canada, creating threats and/or acts of aggression;
- (d) The risks related to hostile positions taken by the United States, although remote, are more likely to occur than the rest, with the exception of the drug trade. This is due to the fact that at the moment, the United States believes that in its position as the only superpower, it must carry out international policing in defense of democracy, human rights and its own interests, acting unilaterally when it is not taking the place of the United Nations. It should be noted, however, that possible hostile acts

on the part of the United States will tend to be, at least at first, of an economic nature, with only the most distant possibility of threat and/or carrying out acts of aggression.

C) Risks, Rated by their Nature

The nature of external risks to which Brazil is exposed may also be classified into four main groups, thus:

- (i) risks related to national goods and values in which foreign powers assume the right to interfere, such as protecting tropical forests, notably the Amazon, protection of indians, protection of human rights in the case of those supposedly lacking them, like the Landless Movement, and others;
- (ii) risks arising out of conflicts over patents that are either not recognized by Brazil or supposedly broken by the country, especially in relation to Brazilian biodiversity;
- (iii) risks arising out of economic conflicts such as accusations of dumping, undercharging of exports, illegal subsidies and others of this kind;
- (iv) risks generated by ideological conflicts such as those created by Brazilian policies that are considered to be violations of free trade, illegitimately anti-neoliberal, or nationalist.

III. National Defense

A) General Aspect

Brazil's current system of national defense is recognizably very inadequate and compares unfavorably with national defense systems of countries with GDP levels and patterns of civilization significantly lower than those of Brazil, such as Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam and others.

A significant rise in the level of Brazil's national defense in the short and medium terms would face a double difficulty. In general terms, the extreme shortage of resources available, both in the current budget as well as what may be predicted for the coming years, invalidates the possibility of Brazil having a national defense system that meets its minimum needs. On the other hand, if we take into account external risks coming from the great powers, Brazil does not have in the short or medium terms the economic or technological

capacity to meet them. If, finally, we consider risks linked to threats and/or acts of aggression from the United States, Brazil's chances of successful resistance, using its own resources, are simply non-existent.

To give a satisfactory solution to the question of Brazilian national defense, we have to consider separately, on the one hand, the short and medium terms, and on the other, the period up to 2020. It is equally important to consider as an essential element of our national defense the possibilities of using appropriate Brazilian foreign policy to minimize external risks.

In the long term, Brazil will not have viability as a nation if it does not manage to overcome its underdeveloped status for once and for all by the year 2020 and adopt measures that will enable it to meet the challenges of the first decades of the 21st century. This basic question must, as a question of urgency, be the subject of a broad and intense effort to raise awareness within the country, because our survival as an autonomous nation depends on it. In domestic terms this means achieving by 2020 at the latest, a social level no lower than that pertaining today in Iberia and an economic and technical level no lower than that of modern Italy. This also applies to the need to gather for that purpose new resources on a large scale, which will imply a corresponding reduction in the resources available for national defense.

In international terms, the National defense policy will require the following objectives to be dealt with:

- (i) The consolidation of Mercosul, extending it to include Chile, Bolivia and Venezuela and setting up a South American system for political and economic cooperation within the system of free trade;
- (ii) The establishment of close economic and technological cooperation with other semi-Continental countries: China, India and Russia;
- (iii) The establishment of close economic and political cooperation with the European Union;
- (iv) Adopting a system of balanced economic and technological cooperation with the United States, Canada, Mexico and Japan;
 - (v) Close cooperation with the whole of Central America and Mexico.

In the short term, Brazil needs to realistically develop a policy of national defense which will deal separately in the medium and long terms with the risks it faces. As well as its military aspects and those linked to it, this policy must take into account the economic and technological requirements of each period

and, most particularly, the diplomatic requirements. On the other hand, the viability of such a policy, as has been mentioned already, depends totally on the extent to which the country quickly and successfully makes an effort to overcome its state of underdevelopment. In the medium term (2001-2005) the national defense policy - along with measures aimed at speeding up the country's development - will have to include a military re-equipment initiative compatible with the financial and technological resources available and the adoption of measures to prepare an effective system of national defense for the conditions foreseeable up to 2020.

B) Medium-term Requirements (2001-2005)

Starting in 2000, plans should be made concerning the needs to be dealt with in the period 2001-2005. The most important aspects of these needs are divided into four main groups:

- (i) adopting institutional reforms that will significantly raise the level of governability in the country (currently very low) and in addition to the requirements for national development, will create the financial possibilities to bring about on the one hand satisfactory re-equipment of conventional military materiel and on the other, the development of appropriate technological research;⁵
- (ii) carrying out within the financial limits available, and using as many items as possible produced in Brazil, a minimally satisfactory re-equipment of the national arms industry and conventional military materiel sufficient to carry out large-scale operations against the international drug trade;
- (iii) carrying out intensive research related to the production and launching of long-range rockets designed for meteorological satellites, and research in the building of nuclear submarines;
- (iv) actively executing a foreign policy aimed at the consolidation and extension of Mercosul, including close economic and technological cooperation with China, India and Russia, close economic and political cooperation with the European Union, a system of balanced economic and technological cooperation with the United States, Canada, Mexico and Japan, and at achieving general cultural cooperation with Latin America in general.

⁵Concerning this, see the brochure published by IEPES following a conference at the ESG [Higher War College – trans.] (04/05/99) on "The Political System and Bureaucratic Governability".

C) Long-term Requirements (By 2020 at the Latest)

Two precepts must be taken into account in any long-term national policy. Internally, the realization that Brazil will not be viable as a nation if it does not achieve by 2020 at the latest, the development targets mentioned in the final paragraph of section (A) of item III. Externally, it is important to take into account the fact that, during the first 20 to 30 years of the 21st century, the United States will exercise broad hegemony over the hemisphere and will enjoy an international status that Samuel Huntington has labeled "unimultipolarity". In brief, this system gives the USA a general power of veto over any international initiative and makes that country an indispensable partner for achieving the viability of any international decision and gives it a high level of power to act unilaterally, always being able to count upon a minimum amount of European support. Given this situation, Brazil's national autonomy will depend upon a significant increase in its general development, adequate control over its own economy and an effective and appropriate foreign policy. Concerning the latter, particular relevance attaches to the consolidation of Mercosul and closer relations with semi-continental countries, as well as a close economic and political cooperation with the EU.

We cannot predict what will be the specific requirements that will have to be satisfied to achieve a suitable policy for national defense by 2020. What we can predict is the absolute need, on the one hand, for the country to preserve, in the face of American hegemony, satisfactory levels of development, and internal as well as external national autonomy, with the latter depending decisively on an effective and appropriate foreign policy.

On the other hand, there is a predictable need for the country to have successfully undertaken a great effort to carry out technological research concerning long-distance rockets, nucleus submarines and cybernetic techniques. When possessed of the corresponding know-how by 2020, the country will be able to put it to use in the most suitable way in the conditions of the time.

D) Final Thoughts

In relation to national defense, it is vital that Brazil urgently carry out the institutional reforms necessary to significantly raise its level of governability

(which is currently insignificant) and consequently, its ability to make available the budgetary resources necessary in the medium term for a satisfactory program of reequipping its Armed Forces, mainly the Air Force and Navy, with conventional weapons, and to carry out an effective international policy which requires, in addition to competent diplomacy, a suitable availability of resources.

It is equally vital that, by 2020, as well as having achieved a satisfactory level of general development, Brazil has achieved significant technological development in terms of long-distance space-launching devices, nuclear submarines and cybernetic technology.

Given the present situation of the world, it is important to point out that a preparatory policy to optimize Brazil's domestic and international position by 2020 has to be undertaken within a scheme of peaceful international cooperation, not possessing nuclear weapons and not being aligned to powers hostile to the United States, if it wishes to avoid preventive intervention on the part of the USA that will be unstoppable in practical terms. We should not forget, far from it, peaceful ways of economic and technological cooperation with semi-continental countries and with the European Union.

As has been mentioned previously, preserving Brazil's national autonomy during this crucial period (up to 2020) will depend on the extent to which the country can keep satisfactory control over its own economy, can achieve an active form of development while developing a broad foreign policy of consolidating and expanding Mercosul, and of selective international cooperation.

Faced with the requirements mentioned above, we should point out the particular difficulty country will face, up to 2020, in gathering on a broad scale the new resources needed for a rapid and vigorous policy of national development, at the same time as collecting the new resources needed for a minimally satisfactory policy of national defense.

In this respect, we must mention the need for an economic and financial policy that will maximize non-budget sources for the national development program because the resources for national defense will necessarily have to come out of the budget.



9. The Kubitscheck Government (2001)

I. Introduction

As we celebrate the centenary of the birth of Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (12/09/1902-22/8/1976), we find that a little over 40 years after the end of his government, he stands out in the memory of Brazilians as the President who ran the greatest and most important administration in the history of the Republic. The Brazilian people have little public memory - in contrast to Argentineans, whose historic figures are part of civic day-to-day life - and only remember a few names of the heroes of their past such as Cabral, José Bonifácio, the two Dom Pedros, Vargas and Kubitschek. Of all of these, JK is the best remembered and has become an emblematic example of a great and good president.

Among all the interesting aspects of the Kubitschek government, one of those that stands out is the relative disproportion between the person of Juscelino Kubitschek, a pleasant, friendly, normal individual who did not show extraordinary abilities, and the extraordinary long-lasting impact his government had. How did he achieve such success?

Questions such as this have no conclusive answers and belong in the measureless depths of the world of human nature. However, we can point to some qualities that contributed to JK's success. First of all, we would have to recognize the excellent diagnosis Juscelino made of the situation Brazil was in during his time. On the one hand, he understood that, as the country was

emerging from the major crisis that had ended in the suicide of President Vargas on 24th of August, 1954, followed by the attempted coup of Café Filho and Carlos Luz which was prevented by General Lott's counter-coup on 11th November, 1955, the situation imposed on the government Kubitschek was inaugurating in 1956 a high level of prudence that did not favor the approach of certain subjects and thus narrowed the room for maneuver open to him.

On the other hand, he understood that Brazil was basically faced with two serious problems. In the short term there was a financial problem that took the form at home of a significant inflationary trend and abroad of a lack of funds. In the long term, it was impossible for the country to be able to develop because of its lack of electrical power and means of transport, combined with its still rather modest level of industrialization that did not provide sufficient capacity to satisfy domestic demand. Faced with this double challenge, Kubitschek opted for a developmental energy policy although this was combined with a serious policy of fiscal austerity.

The second element favoring JK's success was his contagious enthusiasm, his goodwill and his genuinely democratic spirit, both qualities reinforced by his extraordinary persistence. His generous response to the frustrated coup at Jacareacanga and later, Aragarça, won him public sympathy even from his political adversaries. It should also be added that JK's contagious optimism became part of the attitude of mind of the Brazilian people as the Program of Targets and the ambitious plan to build Brasilia (not to mention the opportunities offered by the project and its respectable origins) filled Brazilians with confidence in their future and their ability to achieve things. As a country, Brazil was mobilized by a great national project and a powerful belief in its ability to achieve a great destiny. Meanwhile, Juscelino's persistence caused him to continue carrying out the Program of Targets even when the financial difficulties of 1958 made the IMF and conservative elements of the government persuaded him to suspend investments that were still in the pipeline.

II. Domestic Politics

When we analyze the excellent administration of the second Vargas Government (1950-1954) we find that the major difficulty it faced was insufficient support by the organized elements of society. In brief, Vargas tried to carry out simultaneously a large-scale program of economic development (Petrobras, Eletrobras, the National Coal Plan and a general industrialization) as well as a

large-scale program of social development (land and basic social reforms). His economic development project was supported by the industrial bourgeoisie, but his social projects aroused hostility on the part of the landowning and merchant classes to whom projects such as land reform and other similar initiatives were directly opposed to their interests. They also aroused the hostility of the privilege-seeking middle-class, who saw in the plans for social reform a mobilization of working-class forces that threatened those privileges.

The social groups that benefited from workers' projects, although they were the great majority in statistical terms, were not sufficiently organized to have a proper understanding of their own interests and even less so to demand them. The UDN, the party of the urban middle class and of the ideology of the legal profession, systematically opposed Vargas and cleverly used the image of the Vargas of the New State to counter the democratic and developmental Vargas. The forces of the landowners and merchants joined this party although they had been traditionally represented by the PSD.

This disparate set of social forces found in the highly talented but somewhat possessed Carlos Lacerda, a leader capable of holding them together and inspire them into a conspiracy to launch a *coup*. Purely chance events like the accidental assassination of an Air Force officer acting as Lacerda's bodyguard mobilized the Air Force against Vargas and, subsequently, a significant section of the armed forces. Faced with his imminent removal from power, Vargas opted for the heroic solution of suicide, a suicide that profoundly moved Brazil and obliged Lacerda, hounded by the people, to seek refuge in the American Embassy and turned the soldiers surrounding the Catete Palace into a guard of honor for Vargas' coffin. His wonderful last letter electrified the country. In that situation, the Café Filho government, that had originally been created to be an extremely reactionary one, initially had to take a more moderate position. Its immanent tendency to suffer coups, however, soon came to the surface. On a modest level, Jacareacanga and Aragarça were examples of UDN-Lacerda *coups*. Ten years later, in 1964, this tendency to carry out coups would triumph.

Faced with this situation, Kubitschek came to the conclusion that the vital social reforms Vargas had wanted to complete would have to be postponed to avoid a return to a series of *coups*. For this reason he tried to secure the ground for the social and political viability of his government. To do this, he developed a supporting tripod that consisted of (1) the PSD-PTB alliance in Congress as a way of preserving a parliamentary majority that would ensure

that his government could govern; (2) the support of the military, meeting their main complaints head-on and keeping on the anti-*coup* General Lott as War Minister; (3) mobilizing support from the progressive sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie, the modern middle-class and the industrial proletariat, as a protection against *coups* orchestrated by the UDN.

III. Foreign Policy

In terms of foreign policy, Kubitschek noted in Brazi's traditional diplomacy the continual emphasis on the country's position with regard to the United States, which mainly tended towards giving automatic support and in other cases causing a prudent but potentially hostile separation.

Kubitschek tried to take a different direction. On the one hand, he changed the country's traditional passive alignment with the United States into an affirmative and dynamic one that consisted in moving that country, in exchange for the support of Brazil and other Latin American countries through the Pan-American operation, in the direction of something like a 'Marshall Plan for Latin America'. On the other hand, he saw this new policy as a regional agreement that actively mobilized the other Latin American countries. In drawing up and adoption this policy, an important role was played by an extraordinary figure in the Brazilian literary world, the poet, businessman and statesman Augusto Frederico Schmidt.

JK's foreign policy, although it brought about quite significant concrete effects like the setting up of the Inter-American Development Bank, which was placed under the control of an eminent Chilean economist, Felipe Herrera, was mainly important in showing the existence of a different international position on the part of Brazil. The country abandoned automatic alignments with or positions of potential hostility to the United States in favor of an individual and independent position directed towards the collective interests of the hemisphere, putting pressure on the United States to give it material support. This launched the germ of the idea that would later become Brazil's independent foreign policy. The new foreign policy also ended Brazil's isolation in Latin America and led to the formation of a Latin American cooperation system along the lines conceived by CEPAL.

IV. Development

In spite of the importance of JK's domestic and internal policies, the former aimed at ensuring the stable maintenance of the government in social

and political terms, the latter leading the country autonomously towards a Pan-American position, the decisive trademark of the Kubitschek government, which gave it the effective ability to achieve its campaign slogan of carrying out the work of 50 years in 5, was the Program of Targets.

Various factors and circumstances contributed to the formulation and execution of the Program of Targets. Obviously we have to mention JK's own view of Brazil's problems and the way to solve them as being decisive. It is also important to refer to the important initiatives inherited from the second Vargas government, including the set of studies and projects carried out by the Economic Advisory Service of the President's Office under the direction of that eminent technocrat and patriot, Rômulo Almeida. We should also note the significant contribution made by a group of intellectuals comprising Romulo Almeida himself and, among others, Ewaldo Correia Lima, Cândido Mendes, Guerreiro Ramos, Ignácio Rangel, Israel Klabin, José Ribeiro de Lira, Moacir Félix, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez and Roland Corbisier, as well as the author of these lines, working in institutions such as the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais – IBESP (Brazilian Institute for Political and Social Studies), as editor of the magazine Cadernos do Nosso Tempo (Notebooks of Our Time) and director of the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros – ISEB (Higher Institute for Brazilian Studies), the latter contribution being an attempt to undertake a serious economic, social and political analysis of conditions in Brazil as they existed in the 1950s, and to show that the only possible solution was to move the progressive sectors of the country in a national-developmental direction, and to demonstrate the main characteristics of what that policy should be. To this end, IBESP presented in Edition No. 5 of *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo* a wide-ranging study entitled "Towards a National Development Policy" (CNT, January/March, 1956, pp. 47-188) which, without taking anything away from the decisive contribution Lucas Lopes and his team would make, was a significant contribution to the Program of Targets.

Basically, the Program of Targets consisted in a comprehensive and quantified study of the economic and social problems of Brazil with a view to identifying the choke points of the national economy and make a realistic projection of the country's main requirements on the brink of the 1960s and as a result, to decide on the physical targets to be reached in vital sectors in order to attend to these probable future demands.

Based on this exercise, the Program of Targets drew up a list of 30 main targets that had to be met to respond to national needs and proceeded to estimate the resources and means necessary to achieve them, basically by 1960-61, as

well as the special target of Brasilia. At the same time, it made a realistic estimate of the sources of finance that could be mobilized to meet these ends within a policy of avoiding serious inflationary consequences. We should mention in this respect the difficulties Brazil faced in obtaining long-term financing from the international banks. In an attempt to make Brazil give up its policy of monopolizing oil production through Petrobras, the USA used that policy as proof that Brazil did not need foreign capital. This forced Kubitschek to make use of short-term suppliers' credits with higher interest rates.

One important aspect of the Program of Targets concerns the realistic conclusion that JK came to in that the conventional State machine, choked by an obdurate bureaucracy, institutional obstacles and delaying tactics of all kinds, would not be able to carry out this vast program. On the other hand, Kubitschek proposed to work within the norms and conditions of the State of Law and to be subject to the proper legal controls. The solution he found was to set up, by an act of the Executive Power, Working Groups to which would be legally assigned the power to carry out the tasks attributed to them. They would operate under the control of and supervision of a National Development Council made up of Ministers of State presided over by the President of the Republic and the executive coordination of the President of the National Economic Development Bank which, as it was a public bank, would be the main financing agent of the Program.

The targets were grouped in five main categories: energy, transport, food, basic industries and education. The costings for the program produced the following general estimate.

Investments Required for the Program (1967-1961)

| Sector | Estimated Cost of Domestic Products and Services | Imported Products in Services | | Total Expenditure in Cr\$ | Percentage of Total |
|------------------|---|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| | Cr\$ | US\$ | US\$ | Cr\$ | % |
| | Billions | Millions | Billions | Billions | |
| Energy | 110 | 862.2 | 44.3 | 154.3 | 43.4 |
| Transport | 75.3 | 582.6 | 30 | 105.3 | 29.6 |
| Food | 4.8 | 130.9 | 6.7 | 11.5 | 3.2 |
| Basic Industries | 34.6 | 742.8 | 38.1 | 72.7 | 20.4 |
| Education | 12 | =1 | - | 12 | 3.4 |
| TOTAL | 236.7 | 2,318.50 | 119.1 | 355.8 | 100 |

Source: BNDE, VI, Statement on the Program for Re-equipping the Economy

Note: The CR\$/US\$ exchange at the time varied from CR\$53/US\$1 in August, 1957, to CR\$80/US\$1 in October, 1958 and CR\$100/US\$1 from January, 1959.

Distribution of resourses by percentage to finance the program, the following resources were earmarked:

| SOURCE | % |
|---|------|
| Federal budget | 39.7 |
| State budgets | 10.4 |
| Federal agencies (BNDE, Bank of Brazil | 14.5 |
| Private or ex-economy enterprises | 35.4 |
| TOTAL | 100 |

The execution of the Program of Targets was extraordinarily successful although certain secondary targets achieved only a modest level of implementation in the time available.

Targets, Prediction and Results (1957-1961)

| Targets | Prediction | Result | % |
|--------------------------------|------------|--------|-----|
| Electrical energy (1000 kW) | 2 | 1,65 | 82 |
| Coal (1,000t) | 1 | 230 | 23 |
| Oil - production (1000b/d) | 96 | 75 | 76 |
| Oil – refining (1000b/d) | 200 | 52 | 26 |
| Railways - (1000 km) | 3 | 1 | 32 |
| Roads - construction (1000 km) | 13 | 17 | 138 |
| Roads - paved (1000 km) | 5 | - | - |
| Steel - (1000t) | 1,1 | 650 | 60 |
| Cement (1000t) | 1,4 | 870 | 62 |
| Cars and trucks (1000 units) | 170 | 133 | 78 |
| Nationalization – cars % | 90 | 77 | 83 |
| Nationalization – trucks % | 95 | 74 | 78 |

Source: Bank of Brazil, Report, 1961.

Brasilia

If the Program of Targets, excluding irresponsible or purely party-based criticisms, had the unanimous support of the country, the special target of Brasilia was quite controversial. Opposing the project was the argument that the determination of successive Brazilian Constitutions to move the capital to the centre of the country for reasons of defense no longer made sense in an age of airplanes and missiles. It was felt that the huge investment necessary to build a new capital - CR\$300 billion in 1961 prices - in a place like Brasilia which had no means of transport or communication with the civilized areas of the country, was a whimsical choice that would deviate an enormous sum of money from Brazil's modest investment capacity which could be better directed to investments in priority economic and social areas. It was also said that JK's real aim in developing the interior of the country should not nor could not be achieved by building a capital that looked backwards to a plan from the past, but rather by concentrating on urban centers of the future, including the idea of developing Goiânia.

Nevertheless, Juscelino firmly held to his plan of building Brasilia supported by the constitutional requirement to move the capital inland, and convinced that it would be a good thing to distance the Presidency of the Republic from the local conflicts and crises that inevitably sprang up in a large city like Rio de Janeiro.

Regardless of the good or bad opportunities thrown up by this project and its origins, the fact that the Kubitschek government managed to build from scratch a city with an initial capacity to hold 100,000 people in the incredible time span of three years, was in itself a spectacular achievement. In a deserted region, completely isolated from the rest of the country, JK built, with Niemeyer's beautiful architecture and Lucio Costa's urban planning, the perfect city to be the new capital of Brazil, connected to the rest of the country by an impressive array of new roads, as described below.

| New. | Road | ls for I | Brasıl | lıa |
|------|------|----------|--------|-----|
|------|------|----------|--------|-----|

| STRETCH | KILOMETRES | |
|---------------------------|------------|--|
| Belo Horizonte – Brasília | 700 | |
| Goiânia – Brasília | 200 | |
| Belém – Brasília | 2,000 | |
| Fortaleza – Brasília | 1,500 | |
| Acre – Brasília | 2,500 | |

Giving the lie to rumors spread by the opposition, the road journey from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia on the day the city was inaugurated, 21st April, 1960, was perfectly and comfortably passable, with gas stations suitably placed along the route.

The inauguration of Brasilia, which the author of these lines had the pleasure to take part in, was an unforgettable moment of euphoria and pride for the nation. In three years, the time it often takes to put up a large building, JK had built a new capital completely equipped and ready to work. Brazilians from all corners of the country embraced emotionally in the streets, possessed of a new confidence in a country that had performed that prodigious achievement and, leaving party differences to one side, were proud of the President who had succeeded in undertaking such an extraordinary feat. At that moment, Brasilia represented for Brazil what the Marseillaise was to the French Revolution, a symbol of national greatness.

V. Final Points

In addition to the spectacular construction of Brasilia - regardless of opinions concerning the suitability or not of the project - and the felicitous plan to create SUDENE, with its Program of Targets the Kubitschek government succeeded in turning a mainly agrarian country into a mainly industrial one. In fact, when we look at the history of Brazil as it moved from the status of colony to today, the two most important events in that process were, first of all, the arrival of D. João VI and the conversion of the former colony into the central territory of the Portuguese empire with a modern State relative to the conditions of the time. With D. João VI, Brazil achieved its *de facto* independence, which would later be proclaimed *de jure* by his son, Pedro I. The second most important moment in our history was the Kubitschek government, which took Brazil into the essential phase of the 20th century, becoming an industrialized country.

This exceptional government was administered in completely democratic conditions with absolute public freedom, unrestrained opportunities for criticism and political differences, allied to a generous tolerance of opponents. At the same time, inflation was satisfactorily controlled; the rate of inflation in 1956 was 12.5% and at the end of the Kubitschek government it was 30.5%. In compensation, the country enjoyed an average growth over that period of 8.1% per year. Internal gross product in constant 1949 prices, which was

215.2 billion cruzeiros in 1949, was 297.8 billion in 1955 and 455 billion in 1961. Resisting the pressures of the IMF and the more conservative sections of his government, JK held firm to the decision to achieve the Program of Targets by the end of his mandate and in that way, with a relatively moderate rate of inflation, as pointed out above, succeeded in raising Brazilian GDP by about 143%, with industrial production from 1958-1961 reaching successive annual rates of 16.8%, 12.9%, 10.6% and 11.1%.

The success of JK's government, his exuberant optimism and great generosity helped to neutralize the latent tendency to *coups d'état* of the UDN-Lacerda faction during his administration, but could not eradicate it. His successor, Jânio Quadros – who Afonso Arinos said was the UDN on a bender – tried to carry out a tame kind of *coup* by which he tried, using a hopeless strategy, to gather for himself dictatorial powers. The rebels of 1954, however, remained united and 10 years later achieved the success that Vargas' heroic suicide had denied them.

More than 20 years of darkness descended on the country. Among the many deplorable acts that occurred during that time, one of the most terrible was depriving Juscelino Kubitschek of his political rights. This was an attempt to eliminate from the history of Brazil one of the two men who had contributed most to it. If the return of democracy to Brazil, imposed by the mobilization of the people in the "diretas já" [the demand for direct presidential elections, without delay—trans.] and orchestrated extremely intelligently by Tancredo Neves, gave the country back its civic dignity, the unanimous homage paid to the figure of Juscelino Kubitschek poured deserved opprobrium on those who had denied him his rights, and restored to the national pantheon the extraordinary example of the public man that was Juscelino, the centenary of whose birth Brazil is now celebrating with pride.

10. Brazil, the Years to Come (2002)

Basic Objectives

Brazil is entering the 21st century without seeing a satisfactory result of its continued efforts to overcome its stubborn underdevelopment during the course of the preceding half-century. It is clear that there is a great difference between the Brazil of the 1950s, when it was still an agrarian society, and the Brazil of 2002, which is the most developed country in the Third World.

The most important factors in this process of change were the second Vargas government and the extraordinary Kubitschek government, with its successful implementation of a program of targets, the contributions to consolidating Brazilian infrastructure that came from the military presidents Castelo Branco and Geisel and the important contributions of the Cardoso government, which guaranteed the long-term financial and institutional stability of the country even while leading it to an excessive dependency on foreign capital. The adjustment agreed with the IMF at the beginning of August, 2002 gave short-term relief to the pressures being applied, but did not correct the situation in the medium and long terms.

In spite of the profound changes that have happened in recent decades, Brazil is still an underdeveloped country. The main aspect of this underdevelopment is social in nature. Brazilian society has one of the highest rates of heterogeneity in the world, characterized by the formation of upper and middle social strata with high levels of education and income comparable with those of Southern Europe, and of lower strata that exist in the depths of poverty and with a lack of education comparable to the least happy examples in Africa and Asia.

Faced with this situation, it is clear that Brazil has to consistently and rapidly seek to achieve two major objectives: (1) overcome its underdevelopment once and for all, quickly removing the 'non-Western' levels of ignorance and poverty and (2) within 20 years, reach a self-sustainable and autonomous level of economic and technological development comparable to that of countries like Italy.

Difficulties

The great problem which emerging countries like Brazil are facing today is the fact that the process of globalization, the almost global hegemony of the United States and the pressures imposed by the great powers, both directly but mainly through international agencies like the IMF and WTO among others, are drastically reducing the level of international freedom of action for these countries. In these conditions, a country like Brazil has no more than 20 years to overcome its underdevelopment, create a satisfactory level of national autonomy and guarantee stable conditions for economic and technological development. If it does not do this, Brazil will become a mere sector of the international market, led at one remove by multinationals and great powers, while preserving a façade of sovereignty.

In order to reach its desired level of satisfactory national and autonomous development, Brazil will have to overcome three main obstacles. Externally, the obstacle is its almost complete dependence on the international financial system. Internally, the obstacle is the immobilization of the resources of the Union and the stagnation of the national economy, factors arising mainly from dependence on overseas resources, and also the purely domestic obstacle of the extremely low level of governability the Federal Government can command.

The terrible level of external dependence Brazil is experiencing is a general result of the passive way in which the entry of Brazil into the international market has come about since the Collor administration. The result was an

explosion of imports in contrast to the very modest growth in exports and the resulting trade balance, which increased even more the pre-existing deficits in current transactions. This dependence becomes especially serious in terms of the way in which Brazil participates in the international financial system. To compensate for deficits in current transactions, which are now about US\$ 20 billion per year, Brazil depends on the inflow of an equivalent amount of foreign capital. This then leads to the annual rolling over of Brazil's external debt by sums amounting to about US\$ 30 billion. In these conditions, Brazilian economic policy is forced to adjust itself to the convenience of the international financial system and to become completely dependent upon it. It is also the case that in the present conditions, the international attractiveness of emerging countries has notably declined, reducing injections of foreign capital and making it a less safe measure to adopt.

One of the main negative effects of this dependency is the need to adopt a high level of interest rates at home in order to attract foreign capital. These interest rates, however, paralyze the national economy and have devastating effects on the Union's resources. Indeed, although the Union's revenues are about 16% of GDP, the equivalent of more than US\$ 80 billion, it does not even have one cent to spare because interest rates account 35% of its revenues, to which we may add the welfare deficit of about 1% of GDP. The paralysis of Union resources and the stagnation of the national economy prevent the country achieving a rate of GDP growth compatible with the aims previously mentioned, a rate that should be 7% *per annum*, but is only a modest 2% at the moment.

In contrast, the problem of the low level of governability is purely domestic in origin. Also, it is a result of other factors, from the fact that at the moment, the electoral system and the system for regulating political parties are totally inadequate. As a result, a political class is formed with a very low level of competence and actual commitment to the national interest. This produces the lamentable situation in which the country finds itself today. Projects of the highest national interest have to be negotiated one by one with each politician, whose support is obtained by an exchange of favors at the expense of public interest and not as part of the commitments of a party program and being directed to the benefit of the national interest. For this reason, as well as infinite delays, it is impossible to carry out proper reforms in the area of social security, the tax system and so many other vital questions.

What can be done?

Brazil is faced with two kinds of important needs: those concerning long-term questions and those concerning short-term decisions.

In order for Brazil to achieve a satisfactory level of social development and autonomous economic and technological development, it needs to build a basic consensus in society and in the main political movements in the country in terms of the macro-targets that need to be achieved in the course of the next 20 years and, also of the minimum conditions necessary to reach those targets.

All successful countries enjoy, either formally or informally, a basic consensus concerning their major national objectives. Thus, in countries like Britain, Germany, France, the United States and others, although the rotation of parties and leaders in power reveals different characteristics, it does not invalidate the pursuit of the same basic aims, a factor which ensures the continuing success of those countries.

In order for Brazil, during the next five 4-year terms, assuming the indispensable electoral processes are maintained, to consistently follow a path leading to victory over its underdevelopment and to a sustainable level of satisfactory economic and technological development, it is vital that the major targets leading to that outcome should be the object of a basic national consensus.

It is an optimistic sign that a group of politicians who are highly representative of the main political currents in the country has met to create a Committee of Consensus that has been trying, since the end of last year, to discuss major national problems and design the macro-targets are that will help the country to reach the desired results over the next 20 years. During the months of June, a reporting subcommittee, part of the main Committee and coordinated by Deputy Aloízio Mercadante, consisting of Senator Jefferson Peres, Deputy Rita Camata and Deputy Yeda Crusius, drew up a proposal for the National Project for Consensus that was approved by the Committee and will be submitted for wider public discussion. This proposal is a remarkable step forward in the direction the country should be taking. If, as a result of the public discussion that will begin, a consensus can be created that will be accepted by the main political forces in Brazil, it will significantly increase the chances of Brazil reaching a satisfactory level of autonomous and sustainable economic and technological development while it is still able to do so.

The chances of achieving this desirable development depend, however, not only on consistently moving in the right direction during the next five 4-year terms, but in the short term on adopting measures to make it viable to carry out this project.

The points made above are the basic indicators in terms of the subject. In concluding these brief thoughts, I will limit myself to pointing out the fact that the main obstacle that must first be removed is overcoming Brazil's excessive dependency on the international financial system.

As has been pointed out, the agreement signed with the MFI in August, 2002 did stabilize the country's exchange position in the short term, that did not solve the medium- and long-term problems. Indeed, various studies indicate that Brazil's current position within the international financial system is not viable even in the medium term. Brazil cannot continue to depend indefinitely on the influx of foreign capital to compensate for its deficits in current transactions. What happens is that, on the one hand, this dependence sterilizes the national economy and perpetuates the country's underdevelopment. It is also the case that various circumstances, especially the growing realization that the present system is continually aggravating the 'Brazil risk', is leading to a growing reluctance on the part of the international financial system to invest in Brazil, a situation which, if the current system persists, will necessarily lead to a 'default situation'.

It is, however, possible to adopt an alternative model for Brazil to join the international market in general terms and in particular the international financial system. This model has different forms which include different ways of dealing with a set of variables, among which the most important concern exports, imports, the tax system, finance and the exchange system. It is beyond the limits of this essay to try to make an attempt to give a technical description of this new model. The important thing to point out is that adopting it is at the same time absolutely vital and extremely urgent and can be done in a satisfactory manner both technically and politically.



11. Prospects for Brazil in the International System (2002)

A) The USA as the Single Superpower

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the United States as the only world superpower. The first move of the American government, then under the presidency of George Bush Sr., was to declare that this event was opening a period of universal peace. According to the American dream and the fundamentalist propensity of the culture of that country to see the world in terms of positions of good (implicitly American ones) and positions of evil (implicitly those of its enemies), international Communism represented evil. Its dismemberment represented therefore an opportunity for the 'free world' to achieve its peaceful aims and for a period of universal liberty and prosperity to begin.

This euphoria was short-lived, being soon overturned by the explosion of various conflicts in Bosnia, Africa and the always disturbed Middle East. Once more it became obvious that the international system could not regulate itself spontaneously. During the Cold War, each of the superpowers explicitly or implicitly exercized a certain amount of regulation in its respective area, maintaining a reciprocal armed vigilance in the field of conflict. Once this bipolar system came to an end, the USA was forced to take on the main responsibility for keeping international order. Under the command of Bush Sr., and later even more explicitly under the command of Clinton, this American

contribution to world order was carried out in a multilateral way in cooperation with the European Union and with the mediation of the United Nations.

It is, however, the case that the American power elite, by which we mean in general what Eisenhower called the "industrial-military complex" aspires to the unilateral exercise of this regulatory function, implicitly applying it in terms of an American Empire. The American people are not yet ready to make the personal and economic sacrifices necessary to create and maintain an empire and do not sustain imperial aspirations as the Roman people did from Caesar to Trajan. They wish to preserve their economic, technological and military supremacy in such a way, however, that they are not called to man the trenches.

Faced with these circumstances, after the disastrous experience of Vietnam - which reinforced popular revulsion to military recruitment - the American power elite formulated the strategy of aerospace attacks supported by the Navy which made it possible to inflict on any country devastating and unsupportable damage with practically no loss of American lives. After being successfully applied in the Gulf War, in which more than 100,000 Iraqis were exterminated as opposed to a few dozen American casualties, many caused by accidents, this strategy was perfected even further in succeeding years.

It is, however, the case that carrying out imperial actions demands authoritarian regimes even when loss of life has been brought to a minimum, as is the case in the current US aerospace-naval strategy. Empires, from the Roman to the British, were created and maintained by authoritarian regimes. In the case of the British Empire, which was created in the 18th century when Britain was an authoritarian aristocratic democracy, it is interesting to observe how, as the British government became a middle-class democracy under Gladstone and later with the Labour Party and the Welfare State, a mass democracy, the British Empire could no longer be sustained and its cornerstone, India, became an independent country.

In the case of the United States, internal and external constraints prevent the country from openly becoming an imperial system. The internal constraints arise from the democratic culture and institutions of the United States. Even after the new military strategy had been elaborated that extraordinarily reduced the risk to life on the part of Americans, the people opposed unilateral US acts of aggression if they were not presented to them as being 'legitimate'. In this respect, American public opinion understands situations in which, on the one hand, they can see the 'evil' of the enemy being attacked and, on the

other, where American aggression is approved by the United Nations or at least by the respectable European countries.

External constraints derive from the resistance of the United Nations and countries like France and Germany, as well as China, Russia and the Islamic world in general. These constraints create international public opinions that oppose unilateral US acts of aggression and encourage American public opinion to take similar positions.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, however, clearly changed the position of American public opinion. For the first time since the war against Great Britain in 1812, the American people saw themselves attacked at home and lost their sense of territorial invulnerability. Threats of new attacks, repeatedly emphasized by the government, gave President Bush Jr. a chance to create a new doctrine of national defense. The basis of this doctrine is to adopt the principle of preventive defense by which the USA feels itself to have the legitimate right to attack unilaterally and on its own initiative any target, group or country which, in the view of the President, sometimes with the support of Congress, may be felt to present an imminent danger of aggression against the United States, its people, important personalities or American institutions.

Within this new concept of defense, President Bush seeks to identify Iraq and its President Saddam Hussein (felt to be the nucleus of the 'axis of evil') as presenting an imminent threat to American security and thus deserving to be the object of a decisive preventive attack. European diplomacy, coordinated by France and supported by Germany, managed to persuade Bush to make his attack on Iraq conditional on the prior verification by United Nations inspectors with unlimited powers of inspection that Iraq was concealing weapons of mass destruction.

B) The American Empire

The 'American Empire' is different from the older empires of Rome and Britain both in the way it dominates and in the aims it seeks to achieve. Traditional empires are characterized by the formal and overt exercise of the domination by the metropolis over the 'provinces' or 'colonies'. The Roman proconsul and the British viceroy were the supreme authority in the provinces or colonies of the Empire, supported by an appropriate body of civil auxiliaries and military elites.

In contrast, the 'American Empire' does not exist by virtue of the open and formal subordination of the areas under its control to the USA. The 'American Empire' is a 'field' in the same way that we speak of a 'gravitational field', or a 'magnetic field'. It is a field within which powerful economic-financial and technological effects are exercised which oblige the authorities in areas subject to its authority to act according to American interests and in the final analysis, on Washington's orders. It is only as a last resort that the USA calls for military intervention, as in the cases of Nobrega in Panama and Maurice Bishop in Grenada (1979) or, in a clandestine way, using the CIA, in the overthrow of Arbenz Guzman (1954) by Castillo Armas, in Guatemala.

On the other hand, the aims of the 'American Empire' are completely different from the aims of a typical empire such as that of Rome. Rome won its empire by force of arms, initially for defensive reasons linked to the Punic Wars then, after Sulla and especially after Caesar, the motive was conquest. The first period conquest was for loot. Roman generals did not receive salaries but had the right to generous amounts of the 'spoils of war' which were ruthlessly taken from those they conquered, including the enslavement of vast numbers of people. However, after this period of looting, the conquered lands and peoples became provinces of the empire and as such were subject to the rationality and equality of Roman law. They benefited from the jus gentium administered by the praetor peregrinus, who charged them a moderate tribute and contributions for maintaining the Roman army. In exchange, Rome provided them with important services from road-building and other facilities, to defense against barbarians and the provision of good public services. While the *Pax Romana* lasted, the provinces, with the single exception of Judaea, after Augustus, were loyal to Rome and participated in the life of the empire, with various emperors coming from the provinces. After the Edict of Caracalla (212 BC) all those living in the provinces became Roman citizens.

In contrast, the 'American Empire' is not concerned with administering the 'provinces', nor with their well-being, but aims to guarantee basically two main aims: (1) the preservation of its unparalleled military dominance and (2) free access of American companies and individuals to local markets under the same conditions as national companies, together with measures to protect American patents and investments.

In other to achieve its first aim, the USA forbids the possession of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction which are presumed to exist in

countries like Iraq and North Korea. To achieve its second aim, the USA adopts a policy of free trade and of presumed reciprocal concessions of facilities in terms of intellectual property rights, financial and security services and government services. This is in fact a system in which *de jure* reciprocity is eliminated by the inability on the part of the 'provinces' to take advantage of these facilities while American companies can make wide use of them.

The current process of globalization, although it has not occurred as a result of the initiative of any single country or economic group, but rather from the effects of the technological revolution of the last third of the 20th century, is in practice one aspect of the Americanization of the world in general and in particular of the underdeveloped countries that belonged to the American 'field'. In the same way, the neoliberal ideology that has spread throughout American universities and the mass media directly or indirectly controlled by the USA, are another decisive factor in conditioning the economic and political elites of emerging countries in favor of American interests.

C) Evolutionary Tendencies

The present international system is characterized by its instability. The global semi-hegemony of the USA will, over time, tend to turn into an unsurpassed global hegemony unless (among other conditions) the rapid development China has seen since Deng Xiaoping and carried on by his successors, as well as Russia's swift return to its previous position as a superpower by the middle of the century, will bring these countries into an equipolar position with the USA and create a multipolar regime. Many factors are working in favor of the global consolidation of American hegemony. The military superiority the USA has already achieved, which is significantly greater than the combined power of all the other powers, supported by an extraordinary economic and technological capacity, provide an acquired advantage which other powers will equal only with the greatest difficulty. We must also take into account the fact that, in contrast to what occurred in the Roman Empire, the 'American Empire' is not a stable system that is happily accepted by the 'provinces'. This circumstance introduces an important destabilising factor into the area of American influence, encouraging in it centrifugal tendencies that could achieve dangerous proportions. On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind the fact that in the long term, imperial processes are forced to internalise their peripheral possessions, as occurred with Rome or, in a different way, with the British Commonwealth, thus neutralising or reversing the centrifugal tendencies. We are therefore faced, as usually happens in history, with an open-ended process that may develop in different directions.

On the other hand, there are real possibility is that, by the middle of the century, the international system will move in a multipolar direction. This could come to pass if China can maintain over a period of several decades the extraordinary rate of development and modernization it has seen during the last 30 years. Another contributing factor will emerge if the efforts to modernize and consolidate the State and regime that Vladimir Putin is successfully carrying out in Russia can be continued for a sufficient length of time. We must also consider in this context the achievements of countries like India and Brazil, especially the case of the latter in terms of Mercosul, of reaching a high level of development that will guarantee them in the future a significant level of international autonomy. It is also important to take into account within this line of thinking, and the growing trend within the European Union as a result of French and German initiatives that at least one group of nations within the organization should adopt an independent foreign and defense policy.

The possibility of a multipolar regime appearing in the middle of the century represents serious risks that it will lead to the formation of antagonistic coalitions with their respective bases in the United States and China. This scenario will recreate conditions similar to those that occurred during the Cold War, along with the resulting risks of an apocalyptic nuclear confrontation. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that a feeling of self-preservation will lead to a system of guarded peace, as happened in the American-Soviet confrontation.

It is interesting to observe in this respect the fact that, in the very long term, if we avoid an apocalyptic confrontation that would probably mean the end of the human race, the world, either in the situation of a consolidated American hegemony or under a new multipolarism, will tend to move towards a *Pax Universalis*, as predicted by Kant at the end of the 18th century. This is because, in the long term, only a suitably rational and equitable international system will be able to maintain a balance in the world.

II. Prospects for Brazil

A) The Basic Alternative

During the last two or three decades the world's nations have been faced, with the emergence of the American superpower, the alternative of being

autonomous or being satellites. The first choice is only accessible to a limited number of countries among which at the moment only China is sufficiently capable of maintaining itself in this situation. Countries like Russia, India and Brazil, the latter especially insofar as Mercosul becomes consolidated, will be able, along with a few other countries, to achieve a satisfactory margin of autonomy. The countries belonging to the European Union also enjoy sustainable autonomy in the sense that the organization maintains its internal autonomy and increases its external autonomy. The autonomy alternative therefore will not be possible as long as the *Pax Americana* consolidates itself universally.

The alternative of becoming a satellite is understood in the terms of this study as being the result of many forms of dependent membership on the part of a nominally sovereign country, of the American 'field'. The position of being a satellite has many forms, both in terms of the level of conditioning the country is subjected to, for example in terms of the economic, social and cultural results of being dependent. In this respect, we should pay particular attention to the case of underdeveloped countries with large populations such as Nigeria, Indonesia or, if it does not succeed in reaching a sufficient level of autonomy, Brazil. In these countries the state of dependency, usually accompanied and maintained by the imposition of a neoliberal regime, produces the most serious social problems such as large-scale unemployment, the formation of great pockets of ignorance and wretchedness, and immense social inequality, creating deeply unbalanced societies where these conditions have a tendency to produce explosive or destructive outcomes. In contrast, small countries like Costa Rica that have a good level of education may adopt advantageous methods of joining the American 'camp'.

For the large emerging countries such as India and Brazil, the possibility of reaching satisfactory levels of autonomy depends on how, while they enjoy (at most during the next 20 years) a suitable level of international freedom, they are capable of overcoming their high levels of underdevelopment, especially at the social level, and achieving a level of economic and technological development similar to that of countries like modern Italy.

B) Brazil in the Short Term

The possibility for a country like Brazil to reach a sustainable level of autonomy is hampered by short-term problems and others on a longer scale that should not be more than 20 years.

The level of autonomy it is still possible for certain countries to reach during the first decades of this century - if this period does not see the consolidation of an insuperable American global hegemony - depends on two types of condition. The first is substantive and depends on a country preserving its self-determination. The second is more peripheral and depends on how far a country can sustainably reach, while it is still possible to do so, a social, economic and technological level of development above a critical level.

In the present state of the international system, the loss of a country's self-determination is a result of the extent to which it gives in to pressures, supported by the satellitized sectors of its own elite, to hand over to the superpower privileges prejudicial to its sovereignty, such as the concession of military or similar bases, or the acceptance of agreements which, although often touted in terms of apparent reciprocity, give the superpower advantages that are actually unilateral.

In the short term, Brazil faces two serious threats to its self-determination: the Alcântara Agreement and ALCA. The Alcântara Agreement is mainly symbolic because its harmful effects are restricted to Brazilian sovereignty. In any event, under the pretext of safeguarding US technological secrets, when the Brazilian government ceded the territory for the base to the USA, it unfortunately agreed to conditions that gave the American authorities exclusive use of parts of that base. This unacceptable agreement is still awaiting its ratification by Congress, which we must hope will be refused, and will be subject to revision by the future Lula government, which we hope will be carried out.

C) ALCA

The case of ALCA is much more serious. It involves an understanding that is fully under way that was skillfully designed by the USA in terms of successive steps so that adhesion to the agreement of countries involved in it would gradually become irreversible. In the short term, the participants, including Brazil, will have to show which services will join a list of 'reciprocal' concessions such as financial services, opened bidding for government purchases, intellectual property rights, and others. It should be noted that this list of concessions is the most detrimental of all those contained in the ALCA project. Given this situation, it is absolutely imperative and urgent that, before taking any other measures, Brazil decides whether it wants to join ALCA or not, and if it does, under what conditions.

I have repeatedly written and spoken in support of the idea that for Brazil, joining ALCA under the conditions proposed by the USA, would simply mean, as President Lula has stated, accepting being annexed by that country. I would claim moreover that, even in the completely unrealistic scenario of the USA agreeing to suppress all the protectionist clauses, including the non-tariff ones, and also all the clauses relating to purely formal systems of reciprocity in which a country like Brazil would actually only experienced as advantages, even in this case it would not suit us to join ALCA because this would mean extinguishing Mercosul. It is therefore important, at this decisive point in the process, to clarify with the maximum clarity and objectivity, the two following questions: (1) why Brazil should refuse to join ALCA and (2) what measures it should adopt to protect itself when it does refuse to join ALCA.

The reasons why Brazil should not join ALCA may be resumed in three points: (1) the preservation by the USA within the ALCA agreement of unacceptable non-tariff barriers; (2) the adoption of systems of false reciprocity in which formally reciprocal concessions refer to topics in which only the USA can actually enjoy advantages; (3) the extinguishing of Mercosul as a consequence of suppressing customs tariffs between all countries in the three Americas, thus doing away with Mercosul's *raison d'être*, its common external tariff.

The question of the suppression of non-tariff barriers by the USA has been presented by the defenders of ALCA is something that should be the object of negotiation. This form of union is deceptive. In fact, the non-tariff barriers the USA intends to maintain were imposed by congressional laws and cannot be suppressed by a mere agreement between representatives of the American Executive and for example the Brazilian Executive. Only the President of the United States can obtain permission from Congress to suppress such barriers. The fact is, however, that President Bush does not even want this to happen. The barriers in question are the result of the actions of powerful lobbies each of which has representatives in Congress who were elected by them and to depend totally on them. Nothing can shift these representatives from their loyalty to the lobbies their political careers depend on, as do, in the case of President Bush, his chances of reelection.

The second negative aspect of ALCA, which is even worse than that arising out of non-tariff protectionism, is the adoption of a system of false reciprocity in the area of services. These false reciprocities include protection of intellectual property rights (patents and others), deregulation of investments,

free access on the part of all members to bid for purchases by the governments of other members, and similar measures. However, in the areas in question, only the USA will enjoy any advantages. For every patents Brazil tries to protect, the USA will present hundreds. Deregulating investments within member countries is only in the interests of the USA, which will be the investor, while a country like Brazil will be forced to accept any investment the USA wishes to make in it, without having any regulatory power. Government purchases, for their part are something which only American companies will be able to take advantage of. Purchases by the Brazilian government will be supplied in great measure by American companies while no significant American government purchase will be successfully bid for by Brazilian companies.

The third negative aspect of ALCA concerns the extinguishing of Mercosul. There is almost no probability that the USA will accept the suppression of all non-tariff barriers and the exclusion, in the ALCA agreement, of systems of presumed reciprocity in the service area. In fact, this latter is the most important of the aims envisaged by the USA. If we admit however for the sake of argument that all of Brazil's demands were accepted, the ALCA project would still be detrimental to Brazil by eliminating Mercosul. The thesis defended by some that ALCA would not do away with Mercosul because the latter is a common market agreement and ALCA simply a free market, is fallacious. In fact, the basic requirement of Mercosul is the adoption of a common external tariff to create an area of economic advantage for its members within which they can develop businesses that will gradually achieve international levels of competitiveness. With ALCA, Mercosul's common external tariff would disappear to the USA, which is precisely the most competitive economy in the world and therefore that which Mercosul should protect itself against.

Brazil's refusal to join ALCA requires as a preventive measure, the adoption of appropriate protective measures which can be perfectly properly and opportunely put into practice. In descending level of importance, these measures can be summarized under the four following points: (1) the strengthening and irreversible consolidation of Mercosul; (2) the adoption of a free trade agreement between Mercosul and the Andean Community; (3) a cooperation agreement between Mercosul and the European Union; (4) a cooperation agreement between Brazil and the other emerging countries of semi-continental size: China, India and Russia.

D) Mercosul

The current crisis in Mercosul is to a great extent the result of the serious crisis Argentina is currently passing through, which has affected the two other members of the system, and is also the result of serious deficiencies in the current Mercosul system. Brazil has given much support to Argentina and will be able to gives significantly more support when it can provide greater net resources, that is, presumably in the second half of 2003. As well as a purely bilateral action, however, Brazil can make a decisive contribution to Argentinian recovery by means of a suitable reworking of the Mercosul system. In this way it would at the same time speed up the recovery of Argentina and carry out an irreversible consolidation of Mercosul.

Mercosul was originally conceived as a system aimed at the economic, political, social and cultural improvement of its members. The disastrous influence of the neoliberal ideology in Latin American countries in recent years has meant that in recent years Mercosul has become almost exclusively a system for commercial exchange. Although the balance of trade between Brazil and Argentina has been favoring the latter, what it needs, along with the other Mercosul members, is a system to stimulate its economic development and industrial and technological capacity. To achieve this result requires a general restructuring of Mercosul. Among the various measures to be taken, the most important is to adopt a common industrial policy, one which provides the appropriate conditions for each member country to develop along industrial and technological lines which, within their respective situations, will make the most of their productive capacity. A rational and equitable agreement between member states will give each of them favorable opportunities to achieve the aim in view. The Andean Community is certainly trying to achieve the same and has not been successful because the industrial provisions of the plan have not been respected, with each country wanting to produce everything. In the case of Mercosul, however, there is a large purchasing market in the form of Brazil which could therefore, if the necessary political will existed, guarantee satisfactory progress in the understandings which are being adjusted in this area.

A Mercosul with these and other characteristics which should be properly considered will be an extremely advantageous system for all its members, because of which it will be extremely disadvantageous not to belong. This is how it will be possible to arrive at an irreversible consolidation of Mercosul.

If Brazil has the necessary political will to do it - for it corresponds to the country's most basic interests - it has the ability to ensure the success of a new Mercosul.

The restructuring of Mercosul along the lines indicated above is an extremely urgent and priority task for Brazil. In sofaras it carries out this project successfully, Brazil will stamp an irreversible identity on this new Mercosul and at the same time will ensure that in order to remain in the organization, members of Mercosul will have to go along with Brazil and reject the ALCA project.

The second protective measure Brazil should adopt before formally refusing to join ALCA is to promote a free trade agreement between Mercosul and the Andean Community, offering benefits to members of the latter to ensure their agreement. We are talking in the final analysis of adopting a system which will allow the Andean countries that wish to belong to ALCA to do so, as long as the advantages they offer to the USA are matched by the same advantages offered to Mercosul.

In this respect it should be noted that Brazil currently exports a large amount of industrial products to the USA at the expense of Mexico, even though it does not have the customs benefits the latter country enjoys as a member of NAFTA. These products will continue to be exported even if Brazil does not join ALCA. If the USA should try to retaliate by raising its tariffs on Brazilian goods, Brazil would be able to reciprocate in such a way as to make American reprisals counterproductive. On the other hand, while Mercosul enjoys the same benefits in the Andean countries as these have given to the USA, Brazil will be in a competitive position in terms of selling its products to those countries. For the Andean states, even if they join ALCA, a free trade agreement with Mercosul will be extremely favorable because it will give them alternative access to products from the sub-region and free them from the American oligopoly as well as providing a market for their exports in Mercosul.

E) The EU and the Semi-continental Countries

Mercosul's understandings with the European Union have suffered by the insistence on the part of the sub-region that the Europeans suppress their agricultural subsidies and, on the European side, especially at the insistence of France, on maintaining these subsidies. It is obvious that there is no short-term solution to this question. However, it is the case that Mercosul and the EU, apart from question of agriculture, have important common interests to defend. The most important of these is for both parties to contain current American unilateralism and increase the international influence of a multilateral system. This important common interest provides a satisfactory basis for a cooperation agreement between Mercosul and the EU. It is also true that the European doctrine of protecting its rural culture, while basically legitimate when applied in a purely domestic sense, loses validity when agricultural subsidies are applied to exports in unfair competition with non-subsidized agricultural products, in direct contravention of WTO principles. Understandings on this subject by means of offering reasonable advantages in compensation, could be the subject of an agreement with a country like Brazil and a serious attempt should be made to achieve this.

In the same way, it should be noted that the situation of being an emerging country of semi-continental size, which Brazil shares with China, India and Russia, means that these countries share important interests in spite of their differences in terms of political regimes and economic systems. Once again, it is up to Brazil to take the initiative in trying to shape the appropriate forms of international cooperation with these countries.

The fact of Brazil not joining ALCA, a basic condition for preserving its chances of achieving its own historic destiny, but it can formally take up membership as soon as at least the two protective conditions mentioned above are put into place and even, in the most extreme situation, from the moment that Mercosul is irreversibly consolidated.

The fact must also be borne in mind that the timetables of ALCA and the understandings related to Mercosul and the Andean Community, are not synchronous. Because of this, and given Brazil's need, especially after it becomes one of the two co-presidents of the ALCA project, to follow the stages that have been set down for that project to continue, and it is important that Brazil rapidly makes a formal declaration within ALCA, that its possible future signing of the agreement, regardless of what may happen in the intermediate stages, is strictly conditional on the suppression of all non-tariff barriers and the exclusion of clauses concerning topics such as intellectual property, financial services, deregulation of investments and other similar topics.

III. Long-term Prospects

A) The Two Conditions

As was stated above, the preservation and enlargement of the degree of autonomy Brazil already enjoys depends on two basic conditions: (1) not surrendering national sovereignty by means of one-sided agreements with the superpower and (2) rapid development over the next 20 years in order to achieve a social level equivalent to that of modern Spain and an economic and technological level equivalent to that of Italy.

The previous section of this study briefly discussed questions related to preserving and enlarging the degree of autonomy Brazil still has. It is now important to make a short survey of the complex question of how to achieve a satisfactory level of social, economic and technological development within 20 years.

The question contains two main aspects. The first concerns the starting point. The second, the conditions controlling the efficient long-term implementation of a social, economic and technological development project. The starting point is especially relevant in view of the fact that, for reasons which need not be enlarged on here, Brazil has remained stagnant in recent years and does not currently enjoy the conditions for creating a level of economic growth that is minimally compatible with the growth rates it must achieve to reach the targets referred to above.

B) The Starting Point

In a book published recently (*Brasil: Alternativas e Saída*, Paz e Terra, 2002 - *Brazil: Alternatives and a Solution*), I had the opportunity to discuss this matter at more length. The question here is how to break out of the financial straitjacket the country has been led into, without increasing taxes. Although the Union has been collecting 16% of GDP, interest on internal debt accounts for 35% of resources and the welfare deficit consumes the equivalent of 1% of GDP. For this reason the Union's coffers are completely bare of resources available for priority projects.

The Gordian knot of the question is based in exchange rates. The extremely high interest rates in Brazil - quite apart from questions concerning inflation - aim to attract foreign capital in order to pay off the country's

deficits in current transactions. As this deficit is reduced, there is also a reduction in the demand for foreign capital to cover it and as a result, assuming that the inflationary surge at the end of 2002 does not continue, so does the need for high interest rates to attract that capital. The solution proposed in the book referred to consists in creating, if possible, an orthodox alternative involving a significant rise in the balance of trade surplus thus doing away with the need for compensatory foreign capital and leading to the possibility of lowering interest rates. If the orthodox solution is not possible, a heterodox solution is recommended which has been used in emergencies by countries like Britain and France. This consists in exchange controls by the Central Bank that allocates the available funds according to an appropriately defined agenda of national priorities. This significantly reduces funds for purchasing non-essential imports that can be replaced by national substitutes and the transfer of corresponding funds to deal with the deficit in current transactions, thus leading to the reduction or elimination of the need for compensatory foreign capital and making it possible to reduce interest rates. This measure could make available to the State sums in the order of R\$30 billion every year. A strict review of the welfare system, including appropriate legislative reform, will enable the benefits of the welfare system to be restricted to the net funds available within the system and thus eliminate a Federal deficit of about R\$ 20 billion and make this money available for priority projects.

Any attempt at achieving national autonomy for Brazil depends on the country overcoming its situation of dependence on the international financial system. Also, making significant financial resources available to the Union will allow it to return to carrying out a dynamic role in the process of national development. At the same time, a significant reduction in domestic interest rates will have a dynamic effect on development in the private sector. Thus the requirements for initiating the process of gaining autonomy can be met. It will also be important to adopt within the legislative and administrative spheres the measures necessary to replace the current economic model that has brought about stagnation, with a model which will energise the economy and society. The new model will have to lead - whenever possible by inducements but for necessary measures by compulsion - to a significant rise in the rate of national savings, which are now about 19% of GDP and which must be raized to at least 25%.

C) Long-term Requirements

For Brazil to overcome its underdevelopment once and for all will mainly mean eradicating pockets of ignorance and extreme poverty and a significant rise in the population's average levels of education, culture and living conditions within a set of conditions aimed at ensuring full employment. Also, the possibility of Brazil reaching during the next 20 years the level of social development equivalent to that of modern-day Spain and economic and technological development equal to that of modern-day Italy, will need a consistent and continuous effort that will imply in economic terms an annual growth in GDP of about 7%, as opposed to the current rate of less than 2%.

Long-term development programmes in democratic countries, as is happily the case in Brazil, do not however allow, as they do in China specific long-term projects which imply uninterrupted continuity of direction and, implicitly, authoritarian regimes. In the course of the 20 years suggested for the consolidation of Brazilian development, there will be five four-year presidential terms, each with its own way of looking at things. No long-term project will be realistically compatible with this succession of four-year periods. In this situation, the only hope of coherently achieving significant long-term results consists in gaining broad national consensus in terms of both political and public opinion concerning the major targets the country must reach in order to achieve its desired level of social, economic and technological development.

In the case of Brazil, it is interesting to note that, on initiative of the Institute for Political and Social Studies (Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais-IEPES), an eminent group of public figures made up of 11 parliamentarians from different parties and one independent figure, agreed to join a Committee of Consensus that was set up at the end of 2001. This Committee met periodically during 2002 and arrived at a unanimous consensus concerning the main problems of Brazil, the level of development it had to reach during the next 20 years and, as a result, the major targets it had to reach to do so, as well as the minimum conditions needed to meet these objectives. The document containing the results of the Committee's work, entitled "Brazil: Towards a Plan for Consensus", was widely distributed at the end of

⁶PT: Sen. José Eduardo Dutra, Dep. Aloizio Mercadante, Sen. Roberto Saturnino Braga; PFL: Dep. José Carlos Aleluia, Dep. Eliseu Resende; PMDB: Dep. Michel Temer, Dep. Rita Camata; PSDB: Sen. Lucio Alcântara, Dep. Yeda Crusius; PDT: Sen. Jefferson Peres; PPS: Sen. Roberto Freire; Indep: Prof. Celso Furtado.

2002 and during the first four months of 2003 will be submitted as the basis of a large-scale national debate on the basis of which the Committee hopes to be able to draw up a plan for consensus that will be an important expression of basic consensus within the nation. If future Brazilian governments maintain this consensus, each one seeking in its way to meet the desired targets, there is a reasonable chance of meeting them and thus enabling the country to maintain itself at a satisfactory level of development by the end of the second decade of the century and the beginning of the third.

D) External Resistance

If Brazil carries out the long-term and consistent project to achieve autonomy, it will run the risk of arousing significant external resistance that will find support at home among the 'satellitized' sections of the Brazilian elite. As has been previously mentioned, the process of globalization and the interests of the superpower and the multinationals are working radically and rapidly to reduce the area of permitted international action of emerging countries. A project to achieve Brazilian autonomy will take the country in the opposite direction to these interests, which will exert the strongest pressure to force Brazil to return to neoliberal policies and a system of dependence.

Brazil's chances of resisting these pressures and to maintain its autonomy plans in the long-term will depend on the one hand on the extent to which it has managed to create the set of protective measures referred to above. On the other hand it will depend on the country's political will over time in terms of the determination of its governments and the maintenance of broad popular support. In this respect, we note that the gradual carrying out of a project of autonomy that leads to a higher rate of social, economic and technological development, will produce a corresponding internal and external strength for the country and an increased positive feedback from its development and level of autonomy.

At the start of the Lula government, Brazil still has, if it has the necessary political will, the conditions to preserve its national identity and historic destiny within the current international system. To do this, the new government must accept the starting-point conditions for take-off referred to in this study. To do this, however, it is necessary to create, also in the short term, a broad national consensus concerning the major targets the country must meet in the coming decades and which is the indispensable condition for achieving the eventual success of an autonomous project for national development.



12. Towards a Brazilian National and Social Neo-developmentalism (2003)

I. Introduction

The direct and indirect effects of neoliberal ideology influencing even first-rate individuals who sincerely do not believe themselves to be neoliberal, like Pedro Malan in the previous government and Antonio Palocci in the present one, have led to the idea that financial fiscal and exchange balances a necessary condition and *sine qua non* of any rational economic policy and should be a priority target to be achieved at any cost.

This conceptt dominated Brazilian economic policy - and to a certain extent Latin American policy - during the 1990s. Its results, however, were doubly unsatisfactory. On the one hand they lead to stagnation, with the *per capita* GDP of a country like Brazil remaining almost stable (at around US\$ 2,000/2,500), with a resulting disastrous level of unemployment and creating a tendency in recent times for the economy to shrink. On the other hand, the balance itself could not be maintained in a stable and sustainable manner. In the case of Brazil the policy of static equilibrium led to an extraordinary level of internal debt, creating a situation in which more than 30% of the Unions tax revenue was absorbed by interest on the public debt. This situation owes much to the need to maintain extremely high rates of interest, at the moment more than 24% either, until

recently in order to attract foreign capital (balance of exchange) or as at present, to maintain monetary and fiscal balances and fight inflation.

The situation of an alarming picture of stagnation and of economic and social progress going into reverse, as could be seen during the second three months of 2003, led many members of the Lula government, including Vice President Alencar, to protest against the continued policy of very high interest rates which Palocci and Meirelles, supported by President Lula, saw as being an indispensable method for controlling inflation.

A careful examination of the question starting from the widest possible sociological perspective, leads however to a more complex view of the problem. It is clear that the balances in question are necessary parameters for any rational economic policy. In the final analysis we cannot spend more than we have. However, what is important to take into account is the difference between the abstract validity of these three balances and the way in which they are adopted. They are social and economic conditions within which the static adoption of these balances may be effective. Nevertheless, there are other conditions in which this balance is revealed as a target to be reached with a rapidity which allows circumstances to dictate that the acceleration in economic growth be made a prior condition for achieving that target. An economy with a satisfactory level of growth allows the balances in question to be maintained on the basis of an equally satisfactory balance of supply in relation to demand. In a shrinking economy, the rigid fixing of the balances in question leads it, on the contrary, to feed on its own decline. The analogy in this case would be treating anemia by bleeding the patient.

It is important to point out that something similar is happening concerning extremely high rates of interest as an instrument to control inflation in an economy which is stagnating or shrinking. In these conditions, as we see in Brazil today, inflation becomes inertial and begins to reflect a perverse combination of increased production costs because of high interest rates and companies raising their prices because of previous inflation and reduce sales resulting from the population's loss of purchasing power. In this situation, lowering interest rates stimulates production and guarantees demand that will absorb increased supply. Nevertheless, it is important to draw a distinction in this case between demand for non-essential goods and essential ones, something that can be done by physical methods, placing additional taxes on superfluous goods.

II. A New Model

General Characteristics

In place of the static balance model which is now in place, a dynamic balance model should be adopted which is not measured at each moment but planned, with the proper rigor, to create in the long term a significant increase in production and provision of goods and services. In a society like that of Brazil, this dynamic balance model should become a decisive element in society and restrain the marked trend to raise the margin of national control on the country's production system and its input, both physical and technological.

The objectives to be reached basically amount to a significant rise in the rate of National savings, today at around 18% of GDP, to no less than 25% of GDP. In the same way, they imply a significant rise in the annual rate of economic growth, which has lately been equal to or less than 2%, to no less than 7%.

The new model should be actively export-oriented and capable of creating considerable commercial balances. To achieve this is important to guarantee the conditions to stimulate production for exports and minimize the costs of this process. Stimulation should also be given to competitive import substitution. Also, in addition to creating favorable fiscal, credit and logistical conditions for exports and competitive import substitution, the State must intervene to encourage the formation of large export trading companies. These trading companies should have access to the necessary financial resources to absorb an initial period without making profits which will probably last more than one year in the course of which they will need to create distribution and sales networks for their products, and also create a system within Brazil to bring their products into line with the quality required for international competition and to help domestic producers to work together.

To set up the new model it will be necessary to adopt, a technically rigorous and highly practical transition strategy that will lead in the proper way and with the desired timescale, to replacing the current model. This strategy will involve creating, without raising taxes, significant resources to be available from the Union and applied in priority projects. This will involve, partly as a result of the previously mentioned provisions, the creation of stimuli for the private sector. It will involve significant improvements in the Brazilian infrastructure and logistical system. Finally, it will involve adopting internal

measures to ensure the efficient and honest administration of the country's resources and of external measures that will substantially raise the level of Brazil's international economy. To these measures must be added those of a social nature directed to changing the current social profile of the country, and those of a national nature that aimed to raise our capacity to control events domestically.

Resources Available from the Union

In 2002, the total tax receipts for the Union were around R\$ 331 billion, (25% of GDP). Despite this, the Union has not a single cent freely available to spend. As well as waste and other factors, the main reasons for the Union's financial paralysis are the high interest rates on public debt and deficits in the welfare system. The former account for 30% of the Union's tax receipts, the latter represent 4% of GDP. A monetary and fiscal policy that substitutes the principle of static balance for a dynamic one, while at the same time adopting measures to restrain superfluous consumption, will allow a gradual reduction of interest rates to half the present amount. This means liberating every year more than R\$ 13 billion of resources which the Union already has. If the welfare deficits were reduced by 10%, this would free up the equivalent of more than R\$ 5 billion. This considerable level of annual funding will allow Brazil to carry out a vigorous policy to improve and expand the countries road and energy infrastructure and also provide significant amounts of money (to which specific budgetary resources should be added) for priority social costs such as the 'Zero Hunger' project and measures aimed at rapidly reducing the worst aspects of poverty in the country.

Raising National Savings and the Rate of Economic Growth

The measures referred to above would bring with them a significant rise in the level of savings in Brazil and as a result, its investment capacity. It is, however, the case that such a rise in savings and the ability of the Union to invest, given the present circumstances, together with concurrent energizing of the private sector economy will have difficulty in reaching the desirable minimal level of 25% of GDP. It is therefore important to adopt at the same time measures that will lead to this kind of increase

Among the various measures that can achieve these results are the adoption for as long as is necessary, of a system of compulsory savings designed to create additional national savings of about 5% of GDP. This requires taking into account one basic social fact: the excessive rate of consumption of the upper sectors in Brazilian society. If we compare the lifestyles of these classes with their equivalents in Europe, we find that in Brazil - and in Latin America in general - the higher sectors of our societies have significantly higher standards of living than their equivalents in Europe. This fact, which is empirically verifiable, justifies the adoption for as long as necessary, of the compulsory savings system. This is not a case of creating new taxes. It is a case of adopting a system by which those who have higher incomes and a certain standard of living should be legally obliged to purchase savings certificates related to priority investments, the profits of which will be suitably beneficial. Among the various forms of creating this system, that which stands out by virtue of its simplicity is adopting a free choice system in which the compulsory savers may acquire certificates of their own preference that can be emitted by banks and special companies under proper public control. The resulting resources would be applied to priority economic projects under proper public control and the control of interested parties, creating future profits that can be distributed to the certificate-holders.

National Control

The question of keeping a satisfactory level of national control of the country's production system and its economy in general has mainly been discussed in ideological terms, with socialist arguments opposed to those of the private sector. However, the question requires a purely pragmatic approach. There is no point in feeling that foreign capital is necessarily good or bad, what matters is making a broad objective estimate of the situation pertaining in a certain country, concerning the positive and negative effects of foreign capital, bearing in mind its position relative to all the capital in the country.

First of all it is important to demystify the excessive importance given by some to the role of foreign capital in promoting national development. As the eminent Argentinean economist Aldo Ferrer⁷ has pointed out, development in

⁷Cf. Aldo Ferrer, *Hechos y Ficciones de la Globalización*, p. 20, Buenos Aires, Academia Nacional de Ciencias Económicas, 1997.

any country is a result of domestic capital, with foreign capital in tooting no more than 5%. On the other hand we must point out the fact that Brazil's lack of savings capacity in the last 20 years has led it to depend excessively on foreign capital. The amount of foreign capital, which was US\$ 41.7 billion in 1995, had risen to US\$ 103 billion by 2002. This huge influx of foreign capital, therefore, confirmed Aldo Ferrer's idea and prevented the country from overcoming its long period of stagnation.

The question which presents itself pragmatically in terms of foreign capital is that of discovering how much the benefits resulting from a certain investment are higher than its costs when considered in terms of its effects on the economy in general. In principle, investments are always beneficial if they increase the supply of goods or services, whatever country the invested capital comes from. The differences between investments of domestic and foreign capital are mainly of three kinds.

The first concerns the relationship between the foreign currency which is directly or indirectly produced by the investment and that which is consumed by the repatriation of profits. Foreign capital that creates profits from exports or import substitution greater than those which they consume by transferring profits has a positive effect on the trade balance. Foreign capital that operates in *reais*, makes its profits in *reais* and then turns these into dollars to transfer profits have a negative effect. In this case, we should also consider to what extent this capital contributes to meaningful technological innovation, something which might compensate for its negative effects. In the case of Brazil we find that this technological contribution is not found in the case of most foreign investment, but we also find that multinationals have helped to increase Brazilian exports, accounting for 60.4% of the value of exports in 2000. Nevertheless, the relationship between exports and imports in terms of multinationals is extremely unbalanced. If they export on average 70% more than national companies, they import 290% more.⁸

The second aspect of the question to be looked at concerns the system of physical and technological input presented by foreign investments with negative effects on the trade balance. One of the main motives for foreign investment is to provide their national bases with increased demand for goods and services. To this end, their overseas branches import input that could partly be acquired locally and not only look for a higher rate of profit abroad

⁸Cf. Luciano Coutinho, "Política Industrial", in Rumos, No. 208, p. 15, May, 2003.

than they would receive at home, but also favor exports from their home base. The result is an even greater increase in foreign exchange costs related to that capital, not to mention increased technological dependency.

A third negative aspect concerning foreign investment, which also includes that which has a positive effect on the balance of trade, is the introduction into the country of agents whose publicly stated interests are different from those of the country. This is found in the way in which these companies employ their advertising budgets both in terms of companies and the products the publicity announces, as well as, most importantly, the destination of resources for political ends, as regularly happens in every election.

It is by taking these circumstances into account that a country like the USA, although it is the most powerful nation in the world, adopts a policy of not allowing foreign capital to amount to more than 30% of total capital and not allowing it to have an important position in strategic sectors by forbidding foreign investment in the most sensitive of those. In the case of a country like Brazil, we are presently faced with the fact that among the 500 most important firms in the country, 47% depend on foreign capital, which is mainly found in the most strategic areas. There is a vital need to correct this situation.

Once again, this question requires a strictly pragmatic approach. It is not a case of compulsory nationalization of certain amounts of foreign capital, nor of giving the same treatment to investments with positive or negative results in the balance of trade, nor investments in high technology as opposed to those that are not in that area. It is a case of adopting a policy which will initially discriminate between foreign investments as a function of their cost-benefit relationships. It is also a case of in terms of foreign investments with a negative cost-benefit relationship, of preventing further investments of this kind and encouraging, in a non-compulsory way, the gradual nationalization of those investments.

The public banks should play a decisive role in this process. In general terms there is no sense in public banks giving long-term loans for foreign investments that do not have a clear positive effect either in terms of the balance of trade war of technology. On the contrary, the acquisition by national capital, with the support of public banks, of foreign companies with a negative cost-benefit relationship, should be encouraged at the same rate at which the country's capacity for giving credit develops. The gradual reduction of the relative amount of foreign capital to proportions similar to those in the USA should be a long-term national objective.

The Social Dimension

One of the most complicated questions to be faced by an alternative neo-developmentalist national and social model is changing Brazil's perverse social profile. The most recent estimates have raised the estimates of the number of Brazilians living in the greatest quality and misery to about 80 million of the 170 million inhabitants of the country. Solving this problem is the greatest challenge Brazil faces. If we do not solve it, in addition to the unacceptable ethical aspects of the question, the country will not be able to achieve a stable level of satisfactory development. Nevertheless this problem requires, in the broadest sense, a period of time much longer than the two decades Brazil has, according to the premises adopted by this brief study, to achieve its development. The question therefore requires a realistic distinction to be made between what is possible to achieve at different stages.

In this respect it is important to differentiate between the relatively short term, which in practice corresponds to the present mandate of President Lula, and the relatively long-term, of about 20 years and an even longer term of about 40 years. Given the current situation in Brazilian society and its economy, the country will only be able to have finally overcome its levels of poverty and educational deficit by the middle of this century. On the other hand, something must necessarily and urgently be done to eliminate the most serious forms of misery and make a rapid start to eradicating the factors and conditions contributing to poverty and misery.

Brazil's social problem takes on an especially serious aspect in the broad areas of urban marginality that surround all of Brazil's big cities and involve, especially in the case of Rio de Janeiro, alarming connections with the drug trade and organized crime. In Rio, public authority has lost control of a significant part of the metropolitan territory and has shown itself to be incapable of guaranteeing a minimum level of public safety to the population, especially in the poorest classes.

It would be beyond the brief of this short study to make any attempt to describe a new social policy in detail. The topic involves a wide range of measures, from those concerning education, health and employment to those concerning housing and public transport. It is sufficient to mention that studies by the Institute for Political and Social Studies (Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais – IEPES; see, among others, *Brasil, Reforma ou Caos*, São Paulo, Paz e Terra, 1989) state that an effort to bring about the effective elimination

of large-scale poverty would require every year the application of resources equivalent to 5% of GDP.

Given those demands, the basic conditions for a serious social program would involve, starting now, rigorous planning, including the prediction of resources needed and deciding where they would be obtained. Brazil urgently needs a second Program of Targets, this time directed towards social development as a priority.



13. National Defense – Challenges and Possible Responses from Brazil (2004)

1. Introduction

The problems of the country's national defense always have two aspects, internal and external⁹. The latter contains the sum of risks and challenges the country faces on the international stage. The first concerns the resources the country has or which it may obtain in order to face those challenges. It also refers to questions linked to the country's social structure and its levels of national and social integration. In the case of Brazil, we note that, in spite of an uncommonly high level of social inequality – with a corresponding lower level of social integration—there is an extremely high level of national integration.

In order to make a brief survey of the question under discussion, it is important first of all to identify the risks and challenges our national defense is facing. It is also necessary to analyze, even if briefly, the conditions controlling the possibility of these risks being satisfactorily dealt with. In the case of Brazil, the external risks the country is exposed to of three different types: (1) military; (2) economic and technological, and (3) the release or aggravation

⁹In this brief study I refer to the third chapter of my book *Brasil: Alternativas e Saída (Brazil: Alternatives and a Solution)* São Paulo, Paz e Terra, 2002, in which I discuss the problem of national defense. The present study, on the other hand was published as pp. 61-83, in the book *Reflexões sobre Defesa e Segurança: uma Estratégia para o Brasil (Reflections on Defense and Security: a Strategy for Brazil)* Brasília, Ministério da Defesa, 2004.

of destabilizing domestic movements, as a result of powerful external interference.

As explained in a preceding work, military risks may be listed as follows: (1) military aggression by the superpower or by great powers; (2) idem, by neighboring countries; (3) through the development of military border conflicts; (4) through the action of drug traffickers and (5) as a result of internal rebellion.

Economic and technological risks are connected to the high level of dependence the country suffers both in terms of external financial resources and in terms of technological procedures. The risks linked to powerful interventions from abroad which might release or exaggerate destabilizing processes or movements within the country concern the possibility of creating operational and strong links between foreign interests from right or left and their Brazilian counterparts, which would have severe effects within Brazil that would conflict with the current regime or with national interests. A concise discussion of these risks needs a clarification of the conditions, both general and specific, governing the possibility of having to face them.

Given the current situation of the country it is first of all necessary to state that it does not at the moment enjoy sufficient potential to successfully face serious challenges, be they military, economic and technological or even coming from powerful destabilizing movements. This is an extremely serious observation that is prompted in the final analysis by two main factors. Firstly, the fact that the means Brazil has to guarantee its national defense against the very serious challenges of the three types outlined above, are far too modest, both militarily and economically and technically, or in terms of containing powerful destabilizing interventions. What makes this situation especially serious is the fact that the complete freeze on resources by the Union does not provide any slack in order to use more significant amounts of money to supplement our means of defense in case of emergency. Secondly, Brazil's current impotence in terms of national defence arises out of the lack of sufficient awareness on the part of the Brazilian population, together with the main social and territorial elements into which it is divided, of the absolute importance of preserving national autonomy.

Any discussion concerning national events must therefore start from the basis of the current state of extreme impotence in which the country finds itself. Our Armed Forces are not prepared to face serious military aggression. The question of how much Brazil is exposed to such a risk, although relevant,

does not exclude consideration of the weakness of our military system and the need to pay attention to it.

Our economic system and the technological resources under our control are not enough to guarantee a satisfactory level of autonomy in relation to the international financial system and the set of conditions and measures, both *de jure* (patents) and *de facto* (effective control) that control the use of the technologies we need.

Our very low level of social integration – notwithstanding the salutary corrective influence of a high level of national integration – makes us susceptible to destabilizing effects that can become very dangerous, without having the appropriate ability to react. These effects may arise from collisions between powerful foreign and domestic economic interests compelling us to accept directions or agreements contrary to our national interests as for example in questions of exchange rates, patents, perverse international regulations (like several of those of the WTO), or agreements like those of Alcântara or ALCA. Or, in another context, concerning the possibility of conspiracies between protesting social movements and their counterparts in other countries (e.g. FARC) that our contrary to national interests.

It is clear then, from the situation described above, that at the moment our national defense situation is precarious and that the fate of the country depends much more on the non-occurrence of serious international challenges than on its capacity to successfully oppose these.

This affirmation of significant weakness leads us to recognizing that no serious national defense policy can be effected in Brazil if we do not give prior attention to two enabling requirements. The first concerns the adoption of a new macro-economic model and a proper strategy, with satisfactory conditions, for changing the current model of static balance for a neo-developmentalist one of dynamic balance that also contains a deep social and environmental commitment. The second requirement, which actually creates the conditions for public support of the first, consists in promoting a large-scale movement to make the Brazilian people aware of the importance of preserving and significantly broadening the already narrow margins of internal and external autonomy the country enjoys, and of the need to integrate our national defense with that of the Mercosul countries.

It is outside the limits of this brief study to make any attempt to discuss, however succinctly, the macro-economic questions referred to above. The

subject is covered briefly in Chapters I and II of this book, as well as in my text referred to above, *Brazil: Alternatives and a Solution*.

Neither will it be possible here to deal with the question of autonomy. It is sufficient to make two short comments. The first concerns the fact that it is completely illogical to suggest that the process of globalization leads irresistibly and irreversibly to the practical elimination of the Nation State and its substitution by the market, there being nothing else to do than accept the rules and procedures dictated by the latter¹⁰. The second, which corroborates the first, consists in showing how various countries, some of them large ones like China and India, other smaller ones, like Malaysia, and yet others with advanced economies and civilizations, like the social democratic countries in Europe, can successfully maintain policies to maximize their national and social interests.

A country like Brazil has the critical mass in terms of its economy, its scientific and technological level, its population and the amount and variety of its natural resources, to preserve and significantly increase its level of internal and external autonomy, needing only an effective national desire to do so. These positive conditions will become exponentially greater if the national defense of Brazil is properly linked to that of the other countries in Mercosul.

Nevertheless it is important to emphasize the absolute and urgent need to proceed to adopt an appropriate alternative model that will release as quickly as possible significant financial resources from the Union that are now tied up in paying interest or social security deficits and that will encourage a strong increase in National savings and our ability for investment.

I had the opportunity to make a brief reference, in an interview published in the *Folha de São Paulo* (03/08/03) on the main aspects of this question. Referring those interested in the topic to this article, I shall limit myself here to repeating that a major reduction in the extremely high current interest rates, carried out before the end of the present four-year presidential term, together with a significant reduction in the deficit of the welfare system, which has been partially attempted by the welfare reforms proposed by the Lula government which takes up 4% of GDP, would result in the release of annual resources of about R\$ 50 billion for priority projects that would include national defense. By adopting measures of this kind alone, together with others supported by

¹ºCf. on this topic the excellent analysis by Aldo Ferrer in Hechos y Ficciones de la Globalización, Buenos Aires, Academia Nacional de Ciências Económicas, 1997.

general awareness on the part of the people of the vital need for a national autonomy, it will be possible to effect a serious national defense program.

2. The Military Aspect

In purely military terms, it is almost impossible for countries like Brazil to create an effective solution to the risk/defense problem. This is because, at the most general level of the question, as happens in almost all countries, the unparalleled military and technological supremacy of the USA compared to any other country gives the superpower the military ability to inflict intolerable penalties on third countries while at the same time preserving its military invulnerability. The technology of high-level air attacks and the use of high-precision long-range missiles can cause the most devastating effects without the superpower suffering almost any casualties. As I have already pointed out in another context, it is more dangerous for an American citizen to be a member of the New York Police Department than of the Armed Forces.

In this context, in military terms the problem of national defense for a country like Brazil reveals a very restricted framework. Brazil is capable of effective deterrence and, in case of necessity, a successful reaction to the eventuality of military aggression from a neighboring country. The fact is however that in the present state of international relations within South America or even Latin America, military risks of this kind are practically non-existent and would the practically eliminated if there could be created a vital link between the Armed Forces of the Mercosul countries. However, the situation would be rather different if irregular forces (e.g. the Colombian FARC) were to invade our national territory. There is a certain relevance in the possibility of dangerous incursions by groups working for drug traffickers invading Brazilian territory.

Without going further into this question, we can draw some main conclusions concerning military risk. Among these, we need to point out in particular that these risks are mainly of two kinds: (1) typically military risks that tend to concern mainly air and sea forces and (2) other types of risks that tend to be located in the Amazon Basin and to a lesser extent in the less-inhabited areas of the Midwest.

Based on an alternative economic model, Brazil enjoys the conditions to guarantee, in contrast to the present situation, significantly greater protection in terms of air and naval defense. It is basically a case of concentrating naval

defense in submarines, giving the highest priority to completing the construction of nuclear submarines. At the same time, it is important to install a mobile system of coastal defense missiles and to equip the Air Force with better facilities to protect our airspace. As a complementary measure a Mercosul joint defense system should be instituted. Brazil cannot, however, either now or in the future, be certain of being able to defend itself adequately against all invaders, but it can achieve a satisfactory level of defense against what might be called 'faceable military risks'. It can also achieve the situation of inflicting a not inconsiderable cost on militarily superior aggression.

In terms of the second group of risks mentioned above, Brazil already has a basic program to protect Amazonia and the Midwest. What is important is to implement and broaden it in a satisfactory way, which needs a significant increase in financial as well as military resources.

Seen as a whole, the military aspect of the question of national defense needs four types of measures. First, as has been pointed out, we need to unfreeze the Union's finances to allow significant amounts of money that are now tied up in paying interest and the deficits of the welfare system to be redirected to priority projects, among which are those concerning national defense.

Secondly, it is important to carry out a large-scale review of our military system, especially the Army, applying a system which, maintaining and broadening compulsory military service for reasons of civic and other types of education, will lead to the development of professional Armed Forces with a high level of technical training, as in the more advanced countries in the world

Principally, it is a question of the highest priority to adopt a consistent domestic and foreign policy aimed at optimizing the country's level of autonomy and maximizing its international support. Finally, it is important to combine with the other countries in Mercosul to create an appropriate joint defense system for the region.

If the budgetary question can be solved satisfactorily, it is extremely relevant, in terms of national defense to emphasize the question of autonomy. Our national defense will always be proportional to our level of autonomy, whether domestic or external. Among the main requirements of autonomy we find the absolute and urgent need for the country to renew and significantly increase its military equipment and material industry. Companies like EMBRAER – although it is not specifically a military one – are among most

important in Brazil and need complete public support, which must be given nevertheless with the necessary care taken to avoid its competitors applying the restrictive measures laid down by the WTO. The same can be said of tanks and military vehicles, of rockets and missiles and of military electronics. On the other hand, these resources must be understood as soon as possible in terms of regional defense within Mercosul.

In respect of the international aspects of the question, two types of consideration require particular attention. The first refers to the difficult and complex question about Brazil's relationship with the United States. The second concerns the system of international support Brazil must obtain based on the consolidation of Mercosul.

Concerning our relations with the United States, it is fundamental that Brazil should adopt and stamp its credibility on a policy characterized by linked concepts of cooperation and autonomy. Cooperative relations with the United States are not purely rhetorical although in practice they sometimes exist at the cost, on the part of Brazil (e.g. the Alcântara Agreement)¹¹, of a significant amount of autonomy. Again, it would go beyond the limits of this brief study to make any attempt to develop this topic further. I shall only point out, on the one hand, the fact that our trade with the USA represents about 25% of the total, including, after Mercosul, the highest rage of manufactured goods of all our exports. On the other hand, the importance of the Brazilian market for the USA – faced with strong competition from Europe and Japan – can be measured by the pressure exerted by that country to make Brazil join ALCA. There is, however, a satisfactory level of bilateralness in our system of cooperation with the USA, within which it should be possible to preserve our autonomy.

The other side of the question, autonomy, depends domestically on the extent to which Brazil is able to raise its technological capacity and adopt appropriate macro-economic policies. This last question will be looked at in the following section of this study and is more widely discussed in Chapters I and II of this book. What should be noted here are, once again, our relations with the USA. While the Bush government maintains its unilateralist direction, there will be a tendency for that country to interpret as confrontational any signs of autonomy that go against its interests or even its aims. In this context

¹¹We note the auspicious fact that the Lula government is carrying out a general review of this agreement to exclude the clauses concerning extra-territoriality.

a country like Brazil will be frequently led into situations where it will either have to submit itself to the care of America and renounce its autonomy (as with ALCA), or it will affirm its autonomy and lead the USA to interpret that position as confrontational.

Brazilian foreign policy should make all possible efforts to make the USA understand that autonomous positions, within the context of a broad system of cooperation, are not confrontational. If, however, as often tends to happen, the USA should unilaterally come to see those positions as confrontational, it will be up to Brazil to show the difference between confrontations of autonomy which it may well adopt, and antagonistic confrontations. It will be for Brazil to make a firm claim when necessary for its rights to have a level of autonomous confrontation similar to that which allies of the USA such as France and others sometimes adopt. It is worth pointing out that the credibility of autonomous and not antagonistic confrontation demands, on the part of the country like Brazil, the effective renunciation of possessing weapons of mass destruction.

The second line of considerations to be taken into account in a discussion, however brief, of the international aspects of the question of autonomy for a country like Brazil, concerns its relationship with Argentina and Mercosul, with South America, with Europe, with other emerging countries of semicontinental proportions like China, India, Russia and South Africa, and with the rest of the world.

I have always maintained that a strategic alliance between Brazil and Argentina is the cornerstone of the foreign policy of both countries. In the situation of accelerated globalization we are currently experiencing, an Argentina reduced to itself becomes an irrelevant country on the international scene, less important in the eyes of the USA than the Ukraine or, in the eyes of Europe, than Morocco. From a separate point of view, in the context of a strategic alliance with Brazil and within Mercosul, Argentina has, for the United States, and importance that is relatively comparable to that of Canada and, for Europe, that of the whole of the Maghreb. Although Brazil, on account of its larger size, is more able to claim its position on the international stage, in isolation it too will tend to be reduced to the condition of as sector of the international market and a peripheral member of the 'American Empire'.

In terms of the military aspects of Brazilian national defense, it is important to emphasize the extent to which, in present world conditions and those that can be predicted for the next decades, Brazil's national defense cannot be effectively undertaken without the strictest cooperation of the Armed Forces

with those of Argentina and, for obvious reasons, with those of the two other members of Mercosul. This question refers us back to the second point referred to above, the international dimension of our national defense requirements.

The question is clearly a complex one. Once again, it is outside the scope of this brief study to make any attempt to expand upon it. What is basically important is the affirmation of the need for a very close military articulation between Mercosul countries based on the Argentina-Brazil Alliance. To this end, it is necessary for Brazil, if Argentina does not do so first, to make a rapid start to creating understandings with that country directed towards planning the construction of a common defense system including the whole of Mercosul in an attempt to draw up the first stages to be covered by this essential military cooperation, as well as the conditions within it felt to be reasonable and which it should attend to.

Nevertheless, in spite of its great importance, the development of a joint defense system within Mercosul is not enough to guarantee satisfactory conditions for Brazil's national defense, as is also the case, in their respective situations, for the other participants, not for the related protection of our level of autonomy. The impossibility of guaranteeing the national defense of a country like Brazil, in purely military terms both now and in the foreseeable future, against the risk of serious aggression on the part of the superpower or even one of the great powers – notwithstanding, as has already been mentioned, the low possibility of such a risk occurring – requires the adoption of complementary measures on the international level. In the final analysis it is a case within the international environment of the need to maximize the conditions and factors that will inhibit the possibility of aggression by great powers and at the same time of mobilizing significant support for Brazil to pursue its national interests in that same international environment.

In the particular conditions relative to the internal workings of the superpower and of the influence on those workings of factors and behavior coming from abroad, the main inhibiting factor that makes itself felt comes from specific countries and institutions. First of all Great Britain, but to a great extent countries like France and Germany, and the European powers together, have a significant influence on American public opinion by reason of their opinions and positions. The same can be said of institutions like the United Nations, the Arab League or the Vatican and other great religious authorities. For Brazil, a suitable link with these countries and bodies aimed

at emphasizing the need for ethical behavior on the part of all members of the international community and for acting within the rule of law, will have a significant inhibiting effect on the possible practice of acts of violence by the USA.

At the same time, Brazil's strengthening of relations of cooperation with European countries and also with emerging countries that, like Brazil, have semi-continental proportions, like China, India and Russia, constitutes a decisive strengthening of Brazil's capacity in international negotiation. It was mainly by diplomatic means that the Portuguese Empire survived from the Restoration of 1640 until the independence of Brazil. It was also through diplomacy that the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in decline since its defeat by Prussia in 1866 and the subsequent formation of a pan-Germanic system that excluded Austria, survived until the First World War. It should be pointed out tomorrow whether this war, that led to the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was caused by the diplomatic incompetence of Austria after the assassination at Sarajevo.

3. The Economic and Technological Aspect

If the military risks in relation to Brazilian national defense are quite remote – even though they require the proper preparation to be made as soon as possible – the risks presented in economic and technological terms frequently occur and can have fatal effects on our autonomy and independence.

On the financial level, these risks are present in the form of dependence on foreign capital to preserve Brazil's international solvency or, on another level, to maintain the viability of our exports. Brazil tended to experience significant deficits in current business because it was not accumulating surpluses in its international trade sufficient to cover the deficits in other current transactions. Until recently these deficits amounted annually to about US \$20 billion and required, in recompense, either an equivalent influx of foreign capital or loans from the IMF. After 2004, the accumulated trade surpluses came to about US \$30 billion. On the other hand, Brazil depends too much – because of its insufficient domestic financing capacity – on foreign financing for its exports. This dependency subjects the country to the variations of the international financial market behind which operate the large multinationals, the big foreign banks, the IMF, and in the ultimate instance, the US Department of the Treasury.

On the technological level, Brazilian dependence has a less dramatic but for all that a no less detrimental aspect. The question has two facets: that of patents and that of real-life situations. Countries like the USA and the states of continental Europe evolved rapidly from the second half of the 19th century until the first third of the 20th in a context where the technological restraints (coming from Britain) they suffered were irrelevant. On the contrary, it was they who quickly accumulated international protection for their technological processes. Today, almost anything one wishes to do is internationally protected by patents, significantly holding back technological process in emerging countries and, in certain cases, blocking it. To the immense universe of patents – whose scope and periods of validity the USA is trying to increase – are added real-life situations arising in practice out of the monopoly or oligopoly of the great multinationals which are able to provide the widest possible range of goods and services.

Economic and technological dependence is a formidable barrier to the development of a country like Brazil and increasingly and more rapidly is tending to reduce its level of autonomy. If the negative effects of this dependence cannot be suitably restrained, a country like Brazil will become relatively quickly a mere sector of the international market, domestically subject to the control of foreign multinationals and externally to that of Washington. In this sense, this dependence is the most serious challenge to our national defense because, quite simply, within a few years it will lead the country to lose its capacity for self-determination.

This double risk requires two corresponding and different types of solution. In terms of financial dependence – the more pressing in the short term – the basic solution is to adopt measures that will maximize exports and maintain imports at levels that will ensure a satisfactory trade surplus. These measures are basically well known and have been put into practice in recent years, especially during 2004. Maintaining the level of imports, on the other hand, has resulted in lowering the demand because of our economic stagnation and not from a vigorous and well-directed effort of competitive import-substitution.

With regard to the technological question, we almost had to start from scratch. During the Sardenberg administration [of the Ministry of Science and Technology – trans.] In the Cardoso government, there was a significant increase in the amount of resources to finance Brazilian technological development. It is still the case that the model of static balance that prevailed in the Cardoso government and is still being maintained by the Lula government

as these lines are written, is freezing these resources as a result of programs to achieve fiscal surpluses. Even more serious is the fact that the excessive presence of foreign capital controlling the Brazilian business world¹² is having a de-stimulating effect on the use of Brazilian technology and, even worse, on its development, in favor of technology coming from the centers of the multinationals operating in Brazil.

The situation resulting from our current economic and technological dependence is much more serious from the point of view of defending the Brazilian nation than that arising out of our military unpreparedness and to a great extent deprives us of the ability to correct it. Either we change radically the parameters ruling our economy and our technological activity or Brazil will cease to be an autonomous and independent nation in less than 10 years.

Once again, it would go beyond the limits of this short study to explore this question further. Let us simply note the six following measures, the adoption of which as quickly as possible is indispensable to our national survival.

- (i) Domestic savings: Raising the annual rate from about 18% of GDP to no less than 25%;
- (ii) Annual rate of economic growth: Raising the current rate, which is negative or modest, to at least 7%;
- (iii) Annual trade surplus: Maintaining the trade surplus at a minimum of US \$30 billion, by a combination of increased exports and new means to bring this about, with an increased rate of competitive import-substitution;
- (iv) Patents: Moving towards a rigorous review of patent registration policy, eliminating abuses and subjecting new policies to conditions compatible with national development and the social protection of the health of the people. At the same time encouraging the patenting of Brazilian technological innovations;
- (v) The productive process: directing the productive process towards increased nationalization by means of a corresponding increase in the rate of domestic savings and reducing stimulus for or blocking foreign investment which, without providing compensatory technological advantages in any way consume directly or indirectly, more resources than they produce. Vigorously stimulating the production and use of Brazilian technology and de-stimulating by taxes and other legitimate methods, the import of supplies and technologies that have competitively priced local alternatives.

¹²Of the 500 largest companies based in Brazil, more than 47% are foreign.

(vi) WTO: Adopting within the appropriate forms, the necessary measures to avoid hindering Brazilian development by restrictions imposed by the WTO, working on the one hand towards modifying them and on the other, towards taking locally the proper precautions and measures to avoid sanctions.

4. Dangerous acts of foreign interference

One of Brazil's most worrying limitations in terms of protecting its national interests is its high level of vulnerability to the interventions of powerful foreign interests working together with domestic agents. Such interference tends to be more visible - provoking at the same time more internal resistance - when it concerns processes or movements of a subversive tendency. This happens for example in the case of the financing of the Movimento dos Sem Terra (Landless People's Movement) from abroad, or in terms of those working with the Colombian FARC.

Less noticeable, but potentially more dangerous, are the partnerships not always malicious ones - with foreign economic and political interests working to influence public opinion and the government in favor of initiatives and positions which, when properly examined, are detrimental to Brazil. The case of the Alcântara Agreement, the extra-territoriality clauses of which grant to the United States, under the guise of protecting technological secrets, exclusive access to parts of the national territory, is a recent example of how unacceptable concessions can be extracted from Brazilian authorities even though the latter in this case were people of the highest personal and public qualities. The explanation of why this kind of thing happens lies in the long and persuasive indoctrination that Brazilian public opinion has been subjected to by the media and other methods, to present the strategic interests of the USA as being the same as those of Brazil.

A similar case, but one which is extraordinarily serious, is that of the ALCA project in the form proposed by the USA. This is an initiative of the United States which is openly claimed to be intended for the formation of a pan-American free trade area from Alaska to Patagonia. This initiative is presented as being extremely favorable to Latin American countries because it would supposedly give them free access to the great North-American market and would channel to them a significant flow of capital and technology. In Latin America this plan has the support of the mass media, the multinationals and various pressure groups.

Brazil has been the Latin American country least willing to accept ALCA. Despite this, President Bush, in his meeting with President Lula in July 2003, managed to obtain from him enthusiastic agreement with the ALCA project, qualified only by a prudent safeguard that Brazil would reserve the right to make its acceptance conditional on the USA canceling the clauses that are unfairly protective of American interests.

When properly examined, the ALCA project as presented by the USA is an extremely unilateral proposal favoring American interests to the detriment of those in Latin America. There are two main aspects of this imbalance. The first consists in excluding from the ALCA system and the non-tariff forms of protection for less competitive sectors of the American economy, from orange juice (the Florida lobby) to leather or steel goods. Thus, as the protective system in Latin American countries is purely tariff-based, their markets would be completely open while those of the USA would continue to enjoy the protection of non-tariff barriers. The second way in which American unilateralism appears in this project is in the institution of false reciprocities, as in the question of protection of intellectual property (TRIP), the non-regulation of foreign investment or of government purchases. The extension of these rights to all participants in the ALCA project conceals the fact that only American companies will be able to take advantage of these facilities. No Latin American company will be able to succeed in competing for sales with the American government, while many American companies will be able to successfully compete for sales to Latin American governments. The prevention of national regulation of foreign capital will bring no advantage to Latin American companies, which have no significant investments in the USA, but at the same time it will deprive them of the possibility of regulating foreign capital invested in their respective companies.

We also have to take into account, in the case of ALCA, the fact that even in the unlikely case of the USA should accepting the corrective proposals formulated by Brazil, ALCA would still be unacceptable to Brazil because the suppression of all customs tariffs in the pan-American region would lead to the abolition of Mercosul's common external tariff, which is the cornerstone of the Mercosul system. For a country like Brazil, giving up Mercosul to become just one among tens of other members of ALCA - even if the latter is cleansed of its unacceptably asymmetrical characteristics - would lead to the abandonment of its most important instrument of international protection, Mercosul, to become a country dependent on the USA.

In spite of the very serious inconveniences that membership of ALCA would bring to Brazil - in the form proposed by the USA - this membership is supported by significant groups in Brazil. This state of affairs shows the extent to which Brazil continues to be vulnerable to the pressure of important foreign interests supported, maliciously or naively, by domestic partners. Only a general mobilization of public awareness to arouse in the Brazilian people a vigorous conviction that preserving the country's economy is the basic condition for its historical survival, will be able to create the conditions for an effective defense of the country's national interests.

In the case of the discussion of a project such as ALCA, there is a growing need for a preventive advance towards great effort to strengthen Brazil's international position, as has been previously mentioned. In the first place, consolidating Mercosul, based on a serious strategic alliance between Brazil and Argentina, also, rejecting membership of ALCA on the terms proposed by the USA, should be presented as a decision arising from the fact that the United States refuses to abolish all the unfair clauses. In addition to the strengthening of Mercosul, it is vitally important to finalize as quickly as possible the agreements that are already well underway for an agreement between Mercosul and the Community of the Andes, to bring about a wide-ranging system of free trade and economic cooperation between the countries of the two blocs. From the point of view of Mercosul there is nothing stopping the Andean countries that want to do so from joining ALCA under the conditions proposed by the USA, as long as they grant the Mercosul countries the same advantages they offer to the USA. In general, the Mercosul countries are not competitive with the USA on American territory, but they are in South America.

Without going further into this question it is important to repeat that an effort to strengthen Brazil's international position - and the same is true for the other members of Mercosul - requires appropriate agreements with Europe, Japan and semi-continental countries such as China, India, Russia and South Africa. With the help of the conditions previously mentioned, Brazil and the other members of Mercosul will be able to turn down membership of ALCA if the USA does not give up the unbalanced clauses that preserve its autonomy and economic interests, in such a way as to be satisfactorily sustainable.



14. ISEB and National Development (2004)

I. The Origins of ISEB

Formally, ISEB was set up in 1955 following studies made at the end of the Vargas government, but in my view the thinking that led to the creation of ISEB came from the experiences of a group of young intellectuals who, under my direction at the end of 1940s, had access, thanks to Augusto Frederico Schmidt, to Page 5 of the *Jornal do Comércio*. Elmano Cardim, at that time the paper's director and owner, gave the space to the group to create a cultural page. The members of this group were, among others, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez, whose main concern at that time was above all philosophical, Israel Klabin, at that time concerned with poetry, Jorge Serpa Filho, Cândido Mendes and me.

This was a very interesting experience because it was dominated above all else by the concern to overcome the positivism-Marxism dilemma. Our aim was to find an epistemological formula - guided principally by the social sciences - that would allow the incorporation of some of the basic elements of the Marxist legacy, without however accepting the theory of historical materialism, and which would also accept some of the rules that legitimized positivism, especially the principle of verifiability, without accepting the system in its entirety. The project also saw the beginning of what would become one of ISEB's guiding principles: the desire to understand the relationship between

a general view of universal culture and specifically the problems of Brazil. The Brazilian intellectual could not avoid the specific problems of his country nor, as a result of those problems, could he think he would be able to understand matters if he disregarded or was unaware of the areas of universal culture.

Page 5 of the *Jornal do Comércio* movement was in my view successful and had a certain effect on intellectual groups in São Paulo who shared many concerns with the group in Rio. Our contact, our point-man in this respect was Roland Corbisier, then editor of the *Estado de São Paulo* newspaper. Gathered around Roland was a group of intellectuals from São Paulo, also young like those from Rio, and whose concerns were mainly philosophical. The most important of these was Vicente Ferreira da Silva, a person who I feel was extremely important but is, unfortunately very much forgotten today. There was also Renato Czerna, who did much important work later with Miguel Reale, in the Philosophical Institute in São Paulo. We also had Almeida Salles, Paulo Edmur de Souza Queirós and Ângelo Arruda, who remained very committed to an Integralist position.

We were in contact - by this time it was during the second Vargas government - with the Minister of Agriculture João Cleofas, who offered us the chance to meet for regular discussions in the Itatiaia National Park. As well as being very beautiful and being reasonably well-equipped, this place had the advantage of being half-way between Rio and São Paulo. Thus was formed to the 'Itatiaia Group' that would meet on the last weekend of each month to hold themed conversations, with speakers appointed to talk on various topics.

However, differences arising out of the ideologies and interests of the two groups made themselves apparent. These São Paulo group was almost entirely philosophical while those from Rio, while sharing this interest, was much more interested in the social sciences and applying the categories of those sciences to analyzing the situation in Brazil as a response to the challenge of Brazilian underdevelopment.

The São Paulo group was made up almost completely of ex-Integralists like Roland Corbisier and Ângelo Arruda. Vicente Ferreira da Silva never had any militant political convictions but was very much under the influence of German thinking, especially that of Heidegger, at a time when he was flirting with National-socialism. For this reason, insofar as he adopted political positions, he felt himself to be a man of the right.

Many of those belonging to the Rio group had passed through a Trotskyist phase. I was a Trotskyist in my youth as a way of being a non-Stalinist Marxist. I was a disciple of Mário Pedrosa at that time and a member of the Socialist Party experiment along with him.

This conflict of differing ideological backgrounds on the one hand and of philosophical focus versus sociological focus on the other, led the Itatiaia Group to split up, since the position of the Rio group became predominant. The Paulistas left, with the exception of Roland Corbisier, who changed his position completely. He became critical of Integralism, turning first towards a left-wing Catholic position and later drawing closer to Marxism. He also took a growing interest in Brazilian affairs. He finally joined the Rio group when, for personal reasons, he moved to Rio. The Itatiaia Group, now without competition from the Paulistas, became an institution with the creation under my direction of the Brazilian Institute for Economics, Sociology and Politics (Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Política—IBESP).

This Institute lived off small contributions from its own members. IBESP had a journal, *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo (Notebooks of Our Time)* edited by me, of which we managed to print five numbers, but there came a point when it was no longer possible to keep up this financial effort, which depended almost completely on part of my earnings as a lawyer and we decided that the only way to continue with the initiative was to turn IBESP into a public institution.

While the second Vargas government was still in power, my friend Gilson Amado persuaded Antônio Balbino, then Minister of Education and whose Head of Cabinet he was, of the need to set up in Brazil and institution dedicated to political studies and asked me to prepare a plan. The plan I submitted took into account two things: first, something like the Collège de France or, in a form more suited to the situation in Brazil, the Colégio de México. Second, to form something along the lines of the Presses Universitaires de France, a major publishing house that would give the Brazilian intellectual a suitable instrument to spread ideas and have access to major cultural works translated into Portuguese.

The suicide of President Vargas in 1954 brought everything to a halt but we were fortunate in that the Minister of Education in the government of Café Filho - who would normally have been hostile to this sort of thing - was the enlightened Cândido Motta Filho, an intellectual interested in these problems and decided, persuaded by me with the support of Helio Cabral, to continue the project. He was fascinated with the idea but, given the conditions of the

time, understood that it had to be carried out in a more modest way, that is, as just one institution - and not two as initially proposed - that would be a research institute for developing a publishing initiative supported by the Ministry of Education. And so I was given the chance to set up ISEB.

ISEB went through three periods from its foundation in 1955 until it was wound up in 1964. The first phase, up to the end of 1958, developed mainly under my guidance. Roland Corbisier, chosen by me to be director of the Institute, at that time agreed with my ideas and positions. The same may be said of Ewaldo Correia Lima, the director of economic studies, Guerreiro Ramos, in sociological studies and Cândido Mendes in history.

This phase might be described as the problem-setting one. It was an attempt to identify and solve Brazilian problems, taking into account the development of ideas and socio-political advances in Western Europe. The motto of Cadernos de Nosso Tempo, "Brazil from the point of view of our time and seeing our time from the point of view of Brazil", would very probably sum up the direction of ISEB in its first phase.

ISEB was given a modest grant by the Ministry of Education to cover its basic needs: the rent of the headquarters in the Rua das Palmeiras, honoraria to the Director, salaries to a small number of staff, running costs and a fund for publications. The academics worked for nothing.

ISEB's activities at that time consisted in running annual courses in Political Science which will my responsibility, economics (Ewaldo), Sociology (Guerreiro) and History (Cândido). At the same time we ran an annual cycle of lectures on Brazilian problems and continued to publish books written by ISEB members. The ISEB courses were basically made up of two parts. The first was a brief outline of the basic aspects of the subjects taught, the second an analysis in the light of one of these disciplines, of the main Brazilian problems and a discussion of how to overcome them. Students had to write a short dissertation on a problem of their choice chosen from among the course subjects, in order to earn a certificate showing they had passed the course.

The ISEB students were mainly seconded from public and academic institutions although individual enrolments were allowed. During the first phase of ISEB, the then Colonel Nelson Werneck Sodré, the famous military historian, a Marxist by conviction and an outstanding representative of the nationalist current within the Army, then led by General Estilac Leal, joined ISEB as a point of mediation between ISEB's nationalism and that of the

military. Nelson taught courses in Brazilian history. Also in that first phase, Álvaro Vieira Pinto, the eminent professor of philosophy of the then University of Brazil, joined ISEB to run an annual course in philosophy.

In its first phase, ISEB rapidly made a great impact in intellectual and political circles in Brazil and even in Latin America. It was the outward sign of a new kind of thinking that critically related Brazilian problems to universal ones. It was the open expression of an nationalism ready to accept all the great ideas of Western thought without xenophobia but also without colonial dependency.

The exceptional success of ISEB caused however, certain negative effects internally. It greatly affected to the thinking of Álvaro Vieira Pinto in a mainly personal way. At 50-something years of age, he was considerably older than the other members of ISEB who were in their 30s. Also, Álvaro hadf spent his whole life teaching Plato to small numbers of students. Now in ISEB he was faced with very large numbers of young people who were ready to adopt radical positions. This audience deeply influenced his mind and rapidly led him to abandon Platonism for Marxism.

Another damaging effect of this broader scope of the institution was that concerning Guerreiro Ramos. In a process I have always had difficulty in understanding, Guerreiro, who was an extremely competent and clear-thinking sociologist, was led to believe that under the Kubitschek government, Brazil was heading for large-scale social disruption that would lead it towards something like the 'February Revolution' in Russia. Faced with this prospect, Guerreiro was persuaded to believe that ISEB could be the agency to mobilise the energy of the people and lead the country to the equivalent of an 'October Revolution'.

Starting from these extremely baseless suppositions, Guerreiro felt that ISEB would only be ready to undertake this mission if it was led by him, which implied removing me from the leadership and substituting me with Roland Corbisier, who was then my representative, as Director of the Institute. During 1958, Guerreiro's motto was "Enough of understanding Brazil, let's change it". To this end, Guerreiro contrived a plan to discredit me. This plan consisted in publicly presenting one of the sections of a book I had just written, *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira* (*Nationalism in Contemporary Brazilian Life*) as if it represented the thesis of the whole book.

I had planned book as an attempt to express the idea of Brazilian nationalism in objective and well-founded terms, critically contrasting the nationalist and 'surrenderist' (which I called 'cosmopolitan' in the book, so as not to give it a pejorative sense) positions. Thus the book was planned in three parts. In the first I set out the cosmopolitan positions; in the second the nationalist ones and in the third the two positions were compared and an attempt was made to draw basic conclusions, which comprise a rational and critical form of nationalism.

According to the practice adopted within ISEB, members submitted their manuscripts to the criticism of other members before publishing them. Guerreiro distributed copies of the first part of my work to the heads of the National Union of Students (UNE), claiming that part was the complete book. This caused an immense disturbance which was reflected in the press and I was accused of having sold out to Standard Oil! At the end of 1958 the matter was discussed within ISEB, where Guerreiro Ramos' position was condemned, which caused him to resign immediately from ISEB.

During the holiday period of 1959 Roland Corbisier, who had voted in favour of Guerreiro - without realising what was behind his maneuvers - was afraid that the Council would remove him from the directorship of ISEB when the new academic year began. So he persuaded President Kubitschek, with whom he was personally connected, to change the ISEB statutes, turning the Council into a consultative organ and its Director appointable by the Minister of Education. This change in the statutes led me to resign when ISEB's activities recommenced.

II. The New Phase in ISEB

After I left ISEB in March 1959, the second phase lasted from that date until 1962, under Roland Corbisier's personal leadership until he was elected to Congress. This was an intermediate stage; Roland had inherited a whole tradition of students and academic seriousness, so that these aspects had not been very much affected. The only problem was that ISEB had begun to be used as a propaganda instrument for Roland as he stood as a candidate to be the Deputy for Guanabara. He did this with a certain amount of discretion, without corrupting the institution, following the policy that ISEB should create new members of the political class and not the merely an area to discuss Brazilian problems. Also, he was successful since he won the election. This obliged him to give up the direction of ISEB according to the legal requirements of that time.

The Third Phase

The third phase of ISEB lasted from 1962 to 1964 when it was closed down by the military. Alvaro Vieira Pinto took over the leadership of ISEB, which became a mouthpiece for the more radical demands of the Goulart government. There is no doubt ISEB by then shared a large number of positions with the Communist Party (PC) of the time, although not everyone in the Institute belonged to the PC and vice versa. I believe that Alvaro Vieira Pinto, who was always very resistant to formal militant movements, was never directly involved with the PC. He simply felt that if we were doing through a viable revolutionary process then as a result certain positions had to be radicalized and that ISEB was the instrument to achieve that. This of course was the ISEB that irritated the military during the 1964 *coup*. I have the impression that one of the first things that was done in Rio was to invade the ISEB headquarters, occupy it and arrest those who were found there, including Alvaro Vieira Pinto and to confiscate his library, which was felt to be subversive. Fortunately, as I have been informed, it is now to be found in the Higher War College (Escola Superior de Guerra), which is a good thing because that is what kept it safe.

III. The Ideas OF ISEB

The ideological movement ISEB was connected to tried, with only limited success, to discuss the models of society and epistemological questions within the Social Sciences. This theme is mainly found in the publications appeared on Page 5 of the *Jornal do Commércio* and in some other studies that appeared in *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo* during the time of IBESP. When ISEB was set up, discussion on Brazilian problems became so important that theoretical concerns had to be put to one side as all the effort and energy of the group was directed towards the debate on how to overcome underdevelopment. The basic concern eventually came to be the answer to the question: how is it possible to arouse an effort for national development?

The first attempt to answer this question was to formulate a deliberately utopian model. This document, published in Issue No. 5 of *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo*, illustrates a kind of 'Platonic Republic' for Brazil, proposing an entirely socialist solution. Next, based on this document, a critical analysis took place within ISEB of the socio-political obstacles that made this solution

inviable. Then there was a discussion about how it might be possible to go from that socialist-nationalist model to a project that would preserve the greater part of its national and social intentions but would at the same time compatible with the actual situation in the country, that of dominant forces and indeed of the prevalent conditions of the 1950s. The solution that seemed viable to us at the time was the national developmental plan that gave the nation's bourgeoisie, in conjunction with the working class and the modern middle class, a decisive role in making an effort to achieve industrial development, working towards a plan for the nation.

At the time this thesis was very widely accepted. In fact it was almost formally incorporated by the Kubitschek government and obviously received the support of the power groups in Brazilian industry. It was a very popular thesis in the São Paulo Federation of Industries and a little less so at Federal level; it also had the support of the Brazilian left. It seemed to be a way to lead the Brazilian bourgeoisie towards a commitment to the idea of development securely linked to a national plan, that is, a nationalist one in the sense of claiming a national autonomy on the world stage that would at the same time be concerned with mobilizing the masses and raising their standards of living.

IV. The Brazilian Bourgeoisie

Later, this thesis was widely discussed. I believe that the first empirical attempt to discuss it was made in a study by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. He carried out research on the São Paulo business world – and I do not believe that the business community of that state had previously been studied in a meaningful way – and claimed that his work disapproved the thesis that a Brazilian bourgeoisie existed. In fact, he said, Brazil had a completely internationalized bourgeoisie that felt it belonged to a large international bourgeois club. Nationalism was only used rhetorically when it could justify certain advantages or protection that could not be defended using any other argument.

This is an interesting question to discuss. Could it be that ISEB was right when it said there was no Brazilian bourgeoisie during the 1950s? What is the result of this thesis when confronted with empirical studies carried out during the 1960s that seem to disprove it? How much of it remains at the beginning of the 21st century? In my view, in order to clarify this problem a far greater empirical effort has to be made than has so far been made and this

would consist of new research, in today's conditions, for example, in how the conflicts between the national sectors of the bourgeoisie and those linked to multinational companies are now making themselves felt again. I believe that it would then be possible to detect positions different from those found by Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1965.

My own suggestion, without a sufficient empirical basis to support it, but working only from my own interpretations, is that today Brazil is fully – and was relatively so in the 1950s – a sufficiently significant country in terms of resources and demographic density to create a national bourgeoisie. On the other hand, we are still, although to a far lesser extent, a dependent country. Thus the Brazilian bourgeoisie finds itself historically in a fluctuating position. There have been periods when it felt comfortable with the support and direction of the State; there have been others when it felt that the State was not giving it sufficient support in terms of financial guarantees, the protection of certain advantages, etc. and that therefore it needed to align itself with all-powerful external partners. This fluctuation within the nation's bourgeoisie reflected the fluctuation of the State itself. I believe that the experience and analysis of history will show clearly how the successive fluctuations of the Brazilian State - between economic protectionism or the opposite, financial squeezes to control inflation – led the Brazilian bourgeoisie after 1964 to distrust the possibility of a stable link with the State and in consequence led it to the conclusion that such a stable link could only exist with major international partners.

From the end of the last century until today, the development and consolidation of the bourgeoisie have to a great extent changed this picture. Today the dividing line is found between the bourgeoisie of the multinationals and the national bourgeoisie, and not between the protectionist State and the fiscalist State.

This dividing line is still not being properly administered. This has become very clear after almost two years of the Lula government. Because of its origin is and the positions of the president himself, this government hopes to institute a social democracy based on a solid national bourgeoisie but aimed at eradicating poverty and ignorance and at guaranteeing minimum a satisfactory living conditions for all Brazilians. On the other hand, the neoliberalism that dominates the most influential groups of Brazilian economists maintains within Lula's economic team the same orthodoxy it maintained in Cardoso's team. The resulting strangling of the bourgeoisie both in terms of taxes and credit in

Brazil, as well as the effects of globalization, favor the predominance of multinationals over the national bourgeoisie. The latter will tend to disappear within not too long a period if a new national model – a developmental one adapted to the conditions of our time – cannot be very quickly adopted. It should be pointed out in this context that in the current conditions in the national-developmental project is only viable if it is based on the policy of regional integration. This basis is the strategic alliance between Argentina and Brazil, one of the conditions for consolidating Mercosul and, based on that, the institution of a South American system of cooperation and free trade.

15. Vargas, the Permanent and the Tactical (2004)

Vargas stands out as the most important public figure in Brazil during his long career, which lasted from the Revolution of 1930 to his second government, from 1950 to 1954. It is important to differentiate within the public persona of Vargas between what we might call his basic and permanent characteristics and those that can be considered as tactical actions to adjust to different historical and social circumstances. A permanent characteristic in Vargas was, on the one hand, his desire for power and his exceptional ability to achieve it and hold on to it. On the other hand there was his public message, characterized by developmental nationalism, by a concern with the rationality of State, by great social sensitivity and by the project to make Brazil a great nation.

Vargas' tactical side is shown by his ability to interpret the predominant social expectations in each of the historical stages Brazil passed through from the end of the 1920s to the mid-1950s. Thus Vargas was liberal-democratic towards and with the Revolution of 1930, proto-Fascist, more precisely proto-Salazarist, with the Estado Novo and social-democratic at the end of the Estado Novo and in his second government. As he was above all a man of power, Vargas' ideological commitments in each of his three periods were, in my view, relatively sincere but mainly operational. It was a case of him assuming an ideological direction in each of these historical-social stages that was best suited to the exercise of power and, by means of this, to achieve his permanent

aims: nationalism, economic development and a rational public system to deal with the most urgent social demands and help to build a great nation.

As happens with men like Vargas who are basically interested in power, we may construct an image of him that is mainly negative or equally the opposite. We may quote as a supreme example, the personality of Julius Caesar. Caesar was a tyrant for Brutus. Vargas was a dictator for the UDN. But Caesar was also the reformer of the Roman system and gave it the direction that would ensure its existence for about 500 years. Vargas was the rationaliser of the Brazilian State who gave it the economic and social development that began the process which would culminate, with Juscelino Kubitschek, in changing an agrarian society into an industrial one that became the most important in the Third World.

It was due to this sensitivity to the demands of society and ideological direction that the profound change introduced by Vargas into the meaning of the Estado Novo came about. Vargas understood that the Second World War would finally close the period of the Fascist states and in their place would create new social demands. This new direction begins to make itself felt after 1943 with the radio program directed at "the workers of Brazil" and the tactical alliance with Prestes. The labor-oriented Vargas was appearing, and this would lead to the PTB-PSD alliance and the social-democratic trend that would characterize his second government.

This Vargas profoundly alarmed the Conservative factions in Brazil which were then clearly predominant, politically grouped within the UDN and were the majority within the military. The 'anti-dictatorial' line that was used to justify the UDN-military *coup*. What they saw was this dangerous new Vargas who was emerging from the mists of the Estado Novo, with its demands supported by the Communists.

Brazil's subsequent history confirmed the early view of the new Vargas that the conservative forces had of him. With democracy restored, the most beneficial result of the defeat of the Estado Novo, the new social forces arising out of the industrialization begun by Vargas carried him to power again in the free elections of 1950. These forces would also lead, after the new conservative *coup* in 1954 – frustrated by the Roman-style suicide of Vargas – to the extraordinary government of Juscelino Kubitschek.

Vargas' suicide delayed for 10 years the UDN-military takeover that would return to dominate the country in 1964 but the developmentalism of Vargas and Kubitschek changed Brazil irreversibly. The UDN-military

takeover and had to give way to another restoration of democracy, this time a stable one that would culminate in the election of Lula in 2002. This type of *coup*-based thinking no longer has a place in Brazil.



16. The Loss of the Amazon (2007)

In a country like Brazil which suffers from large-scale and unfortunate negligence on the part of its public powers, nothing is comparable to the absolute abandonment being suffered by the region of Amazonia. What is happening in this area, which represents 59% of Brazilian territory, is simply incredible. By means of a great number of different actions, the Amazon is being submitted to a rapid process of denationalization in which the threatening projects on the part of the great powers to internationalize it formally by working in conjunction with senseless and uncontrolled concessions of huge areas which together amount to about 13% of national territory, nominally to a very small population of something like 200,000 indians, and in practice to foreign invasion. In addition to this there are countless acts of intrusion, in the guise of scientific research (although there are cases of serious examples of this) and the action of more than 100 NGOs completely or partly dedicated to utilitarian proposals with denationalizing effects. A recent report published in a special supplement of the *Jornal do Brasil* on 28th January of this year contains the most alarming data on the subject.

Brazilian Amazonia, representing 85% of total Amazonia, constitutes the largest tropical forest and largest river basin in the world, containing 1/5th of the planet's fresh water while at the same time it is the greatest area of biodiversity in the world and has one of the greatest concentrations of valuable minerals, including a potential diamond field in the Roosevelt Reserve that is

15 times bigger than the largest mine in Africa, huge reserves of iron and other minerals in the Carajás region of Pará, bauxite in the Trombeta River as well as in Pará and cassiterite, uranium and niobium in Roraima.

The *dendê*, which is native to Amazonia and easily grown there, is one of the greatest potential reserves of biodiesel. In only 7,000,000 hectares, in a region of 5 million km², it is possible to produce 8 million barrels of biodiesel per day, the equivalent of the whole of Saudi Arabia's oil production.

It is totally obvious that Brazil is losing control of Amazonia. In the not too distant future American and European penetration will control strategic sectors of the region and as a result, they will justify the internationalization of Amazonia, or this will in fact happen. Faced with this situation, appropriate federal intervention is a matter of maximum urgency.

Considered seriously though, the question initially demands an appropriate survey of all the problems of Amazonia. In substance the main aspects to be considered concern the most effective ways of surveilling the region and equally effective ways of rationally exploiting it and colonising it. The Amazonia Working Group, coordinated by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), already has a large database of reports that the country's leaders however are not giving the slightest attention to. It is vital to give the proper attention to these reports. Without prejudice to the measures suggested in them and to similar reports, there is a pressing need to make a broad review of the policy of making gigantic territorial concessions to very small populations of Indians in which, mainly on the pretext of religion, foreign penetration is taking place. While the Catholic Church is acting as a naive protector of Indians, indirectly helping undesirable foreign penetration, Protestant churches, in which so-called pastors are at the same time businessmen working for themselves or for big companies, are working directly in trading enterprises or in alienating projects such as teaching English to Brazilian forest-dwellers. Their aim is to create the conditions for the formation of 'indigenous nations' and then to proclaim their independence with American support.

Among the major questions involved in the problem of the Amazon, none is in such need of a wide-ranging review as that concerning these immense concessions on land to minute Indian populations in an implicit alienation of national sovereignty. At first sight the question presents an important point relating to a proper approach to the Indian question. In the final analysis (if we exclude the simple policy of eliminating Indians adopted in the 19th century by the United States) there are two possible approaches: that of General

Rondon at the beginning of the 20th century, and the present one of the indigenists.

Rondon, who himself had indian roots, worked from the supposition that the indian was the legitimate owner of the land he lived in. In a civilized country like Brazil, it was necessary to peacefully persuade the Indian to incorporate himself as a citizen and give him all the help possible, from education and health to facilities for proper employment. The indigenists, on the other hand wish to institute a 'zoo' for Indians under the fallacious pretext of helping them preserve their culture, rather like an attempt to create a preservation area for Palaeolithic or Mesolithic cultures within a modern country. The final result - as well as facilitating foreign penetration - is to turn the condition of the Indian into a lucrative profession with bank accounts in New York and cellphones used by people suitably dressed in feathers.

If the indigenist theory merits any serious critical discussion, there is not the slightest doubt that there is an urgent need for a broad review of the immense areas given to the Indians, submit them to efficient federal control, having reduced them to an incomparably smaller size, and instituting a suitable buffer zone owned by the Union and properly controlled, on the frontier between indigenous territories and other countries.



17. Brazil: What can be Done? (2007)

I. Introduction

Probably no other country in the world presents a more extraordinary gap between it is immediate potential and actual level of performance than Brazil does. With more than 8.5 million km², almost all of which is usable land, Brazil has the fifth largest national territory in the world and the fifth largest population, but economically it occupies 15th place in the world, below China, Mexico, South Korea and India, to quote only examples of underdeveloped countries. Why does a country with such a huge amount of natural and human resources show such a modest performance?

The lines that follow are an attempt to explain the causes for this great imbalance. It is of course important to state the working hypothesis of this study, which suggests that the low pattern of ethics and the huge lack of education that are typical of Brazil are the cause of this extraordinary failure to take advantage of its wealth.

The most perfunctory analysis of the situation in education and in the life of the Brazilian people shows that only one third of the latter have educational levels compared to a country in Southern Europe. The lowest third of this population have the same levels of education as that existing in the most modest countries in Africa and Asia. The remaining third show levels significantly close to the lowest third.

The fact of Brazil having a large population means that its upper third is represented by more than 60 million people. This is already half the size of the population of Argentina and, if this section of the population were independent, they would represent a country the size of France. It is to this third that Brazil owes the economic, technological and cultural level that it has reached.

However, the fact of two thirds of the Brazilian population living in a state of complete or very elementary levels of education and living conditions is an alarming historical sign of the low ethical pattern in the country. In order to make use of a cheap and tame workforce after the abolition of slavery, the Brazilian elites did not pay the slightest attention to educating the rural masses in a country that remained mainly agrarian until the 1960s. The migration of these masses to the large urban centers in the following years, creating a population that became 85% urban, flooded those cities with people who were unable to do any kind of work other than the most rudimentary manual labor. The concentration of this population in the big cities created huge rings of marginal societies around them. The penetration of the drug traffic into these rings of marginality led to the formation of a huge reserve army of crime. State policies, charged with ensuring public safety, revealed themselves to be completely unable to provide minimally acceptable levels of safety and were also accused of being highly corrupt as a result of the juxtaposition of easy money from the drug traffickers and the very low salaries of the police.

The 'historic lack' of ethical patterns exemplified by the abandonment of education for the great masses on the part of the Brazilian elites is added, at the level of those elites, to a broad level of morally uninhibited opportunism. At the other extreme of the social pyramid, the champagne socialism of intellectuals with half-formed theoretical backgrounds helped to spread among the masses the principle according to which, in compensation for the social injustice they suffer, illegitimate methods of getting ahead are justified. These methods included the widespread expansion of a culture of petty crime and moral indifference to crime. In Brazil, ethical awareness became practically reduced to the educated sectors of the middle-class, mainly in the interior of the country.

Brazil's present problem therefore, is not limited only to the need to return to the path of development that we have lost, but also to the path of rediscovering suitable patterns of reasonable ethical behavior throughout the country.

II. The Collapse of Ethics

It is an indisputable fact that modern society, mainly in the West, is in a state of some confusion concerning ethics. The "death of God" announced by Nietzsche and supported by most modern philosophers, from the French postmodernists to Bertrand Russell, has eroded the credibility of traditional religious values and has still not arrived at a satisfactory consensus for the adoption as an acceptable theoretical level - if it is possible to arrive at one - of an ethical alternative which would probably appear in a social-humanist form.

However, basic ethical principles survive in the practices of a great number of societies. Allowing for different modes of appearance, we may speak of European, American, Japanese or Chinese ethics. The same cannot currently be said of Brazil as a whole. As we have previously seen, in practice the Brazilian elites create ample opportunities for unequivocally amoral opportunist acts. Examples of these practices are plentiful in the worlds of business and politics. Among the great masses, the practice of amoral forms of opportunism has created, as was stated above, a widespread culture of petty crime and corresponding moral insensitivity. It is however the case, as history shows unequivocally, that successful peoples in all times have been those who were guided by consistent ethical patterns.

Notwithstanding the relevance of other factors such as average levels of education, the existence of a culture conducive to the spirit of entrepreneurism and the availability of material resources, what has made the difference between successful and failed peoples both today and in history, have been their respective ethical patterns. This was the case in Greece, with the higher levels of development of Sparta, Athens and Thebes. In Roman history, consistent patterns of ethics were maintained, with tolerable breaks, from the beginning of the Republic (510 BC) to Marcus Aurelius (Emperor from 161-180). The same can be said of the Iberian peoples from the 14th to the first half of the 18th century is, and their remarkable recovery in modern times. France maintained a high level of ethics from Henry IV to the beginning of the 20th century, and later with de Gaulle, Great Britain since the 18th century, the USA from the Pilgrim Fathers to Kennedy, Japan since the Meiji Revolution and modern China since Deng Xiaoping.

In the history of Brazil since Independence, consistent patterns of ethics prevailed from the Second Reign until the 1960s, when public morality began

to weaken in the final decades of the 20th century. There will be no hope for Brazil unless it restores reliable patterns of ethics for its entire people. This restoration will depend, on the one hand, on the appearance of contagious manifestations of exemplary ethics, starting from the top and, on the other hand on efficient efforts to radically correct our excessive social imbalances.

III. The Collapse of Growth

The collapse of ethics is the root cause of all of Brazil's defects. The immediate cause of stagnation, however, arises out of the inability of our leaders and the teams of economists who advise them, to create a fiscally balanced development plan. This leads to the stubborn neoliberalism that has been suffocating Brazil in recent years.

When properly examined, the factors that are paralyzing the country may be summarized under three headings: (1) exorbitant interest rates, overloaded with a suffocating tax burden; (2) the artificial overvaluing of the exchange rate of the *real*, and (3) excessive public expenditure, mainly by the Union, with an estimate of more than 20% of this being parasite costs.

If it is correct to say that balancing the main macro-variables - monetary, fiscal and exchange - is an important requirement for sustainable development, it is no less correct to say that making this balance an absolute target to the detriment of conditions leading to economic development, as is the case with neoliberal ideology, brings with it the effects that inevitably create stagnation. Brazil has stopped growing since the 1980s and since then has been showing pitiful annual rates of growth of about 2%, while the rest of the world is growing at rates of above 3%. In spite of their immense populations, dynamic countries such as China and India are maintaining annual growth rates of about 10-8% and Kirchner's Argentina has rates of over 7%.

If it is necessary to maintain an anti-inflationary policy, particularly in regard to rates of monetary devaluation which are more than 20% a year, it is no less correct to say that controlling inflation cannot be made to the supreme objective of the economy if it means condemning the latter to stagnation, as has been happening in Brazil.

The idea that low rates of inflation necessarily lead to uncontrolled forms of inflation is purely an ideological one. Accepting it implies rejection of the mechanisms capable of controlling inflation which leaves, as has happened in Brazil, to a preventive anti-inflation policy that has inevitably resulted in

stagnation. The extraordinary development of Brazil that occurred under the Kubitschek government was achieved at a price of an average annual rate of inflation of about 20%. Thanks to this policy, an agricultural country was turned into an industrial one in the extremely short period of five years. We must also point out the existence today of resources that allow rapid forms of development with minimal rates of inflation, as happens in China and India. What is important is to adopt and implement a competent development plan, and this could and should be done in Brazil, although it is not being done.

If the prevailing monetary neoliberalism were replaced by an enlightened development plan, interest rates could be reduced to levels compatible with the current rate of inflation of less than 4% per year, reducing interest rates to less than 8% per year and by this means alone, saving the Union about half the annual expenditure which today is equivalent to something like 8% of GDP, and channeling towards priority projects the huge amount of resources thus produced. A radical reduction in interest rates, combined with a strict review of public expenditure would allow a corresponding reduction of the tax burden, which is about 40% of GDP, and in this way a game, huge amounts of resources would be released for priority projects and at the same time relief would be granted to the private sector that would give it significant opportunities for savings and investment.

As is generally known, inflation is the result of excessive demand relative to the available supply of goods and services. By drastically suppressing demand, as neoliberalism does, it is very possible to avoid inflation, but this happens at the price of stagnation, which Brazil has been paying in recent decades. On the other hand, by making the economy and its supply of goods and services more dynamic, inflation on the supply side is avoided, thus ensuring high rates of economic growth. National development depends on this not only economically but also socially, with increased employment and wages and in attending to the needs of an urgent and vital urban reform.

We find in the current situation in Brazil that, as well as being a victim of neoliberalism, the country suffers from a serious ethical crisis to which the same neoliberalism has made a significant contribution. The drastic curtailing of opportunities resulting from stagnation and unemployment encourages the elites to resort to amoral forms of opportunism and on the part of the masses, adopting a culture of petty crime.

We should bear in mind in this respect, the significant margin of autonomy that always typifies the ethical universe. Poverty does not automatically create illicit forms of acquiring goods as many examples show, for example the behavior of the great majority of poor people in India. Neither does the restriction of opportunities automatically produce illicit forms of opportunism among the elites, as defined in the austerity cultures that flourished in countries as different as Japan and Great Britain. However, it is undeniable that there is a relationship of circular causality between high levels of ethics and social prosperity.

IV. The Collapse of Safety

Today, Brazil has become one of the most unsafe countries in the world and definitely the most unsafe among modern Western societies. Among the conditions nourished by a long period of stagnation, which we have seen since the 1980s and the collapse of ethical standards referred to previously, the formation of huge rings of marginal society surrounding our main metropolitan centers and their unrestricted occupation by the drug trade have provided for the criminal world a huge reserve army which supplies the dealers who have tens of substitutes available for every bandit arrested or killed. Widespread police corruption, especially among prison guards, has turned 'maximum security' prisons into resorts were criminals enjoy the shelter and protection from which they freely and without punishment, control the world of crime through cellphones and other methods.

We must point out with absolute objectivity, the total failure of our current system of public safety. In the face of this failure, insisting on preserving the present system under the illusion that it can improve if given more resources, is simply to prolong and aggravate the present situation. Given this situation, as with so many others that Brazil is currently facing, we must put the question: "What can we do?".

It is important generally to recognize that in this case, as in others approached in this study, that the main problem is the collapse of ethical standards in Brazil. In a country that needs many important reforms, ethical reform is necessarily the most important and the one on which all the rest depend. I shall tackle later in this study the complex question of ethical reform, the success of which will definitely not be produced by moral exhortations. While recognizing that it depends on a far-reaching ethical reform, the question of lack of safety, like others discussed in this study, also depends upon a set of circumstances and measures that require specific consideration.

In the final analysis, this is a question of the absolute social non-viability of the continued existence around our much what centers of huge rings of marginal settlements that are freely used by the drug trade. This question contains many implications, among them the relationship between the rural and urban population and the extent to which the desperate conditions of the former lead to uncontrollable migrations to the towns. Here we see the complex problem on which a balanced system for urban living depends and, as a result, the question of social housing. At the same time, we come up against the complex questions of employment, education and health. Finally, there is the question of crime, its prevention and suppression and the way in which reasonable penal and prison systems may be created.

A satisfactory approach to these questions would go beyond the limits of this brief study. We must therefore point out very briefly their most important aspects. To do this, we would have to begin with making an exhaustive study of the whole problem, which has not yet been done. I approached it in a preparatory and perfunctory way in Chapter 4 of a recent book *Urgências e Perspectivas do Brasil* (*Urgent Questions and Prospects for Brazil*. Brasília, Coleção Rio Branco, 2005).

We find, of course, that to make a serious attempt at giving them a satisfactory answer, the extraordinary complexity of the questions being dealt with needs a joint mobilization of the efforts of the Union, states and municipalities in a broad-ranging program that will need over a period of years an application of significant resources amounting to, at a first estimate, about 5% of GDP per year. This is something which goes far beyond the simplistic policing approach being given to it at the moment, but which also exceeds the annual shareout of public expenditure and the resources available.

Two initial questions appear: the first concerns the extent to which, if serious measures are not adopted to substantially improve the quality of life of the rural population, we shall not be able to avoid, unless by authoritarian methods, continued migrations to the towns which will in turn lead to uncontrolled urban population density. If this basic problem cannot be solved, all efforts to creating a reasonable mode of reorganization in Brazil will be in vain because an uncontrollable flow of people towards the towns will continue to happen.

Once rural migration to the towns has been halted by making conditions in the countryside more attractive for people to stay there, the reorganization of the urban system still presents a large number of questions, beginning with coming to an agreement about what a reasonable level of urban density is for each town. This question has been satisfactorily solved in Europe, which has been helped by its current demographic stability. Nevertheless, because of the large number of foreigners who wish to settle there, a country like Switzerland has imposed limits of growth on its towns, making new inhabitants obtain prior permission to live in them.

Once the current mass migrations from the country to the towns have stopped, a reurbanization program will have to identify the conditions in which it can give public assistance to a large mass of an educated city-dwellers concentrated in the rings of marginality. Among other complications are questions of employment, education and health. Building social housing for all those who want it would lead to the double impasse of creating an almost unlimited demand and an investment effort far greater than Brazil can afford.

And finally, in terms of the problem of marginal settlements in metropolitan areas, there is the question of crime. This took on dramatic proportions at the beginning of February, 2007 with the murder of a six-year-old boy who was trapped by his seatbelt in a car stolen by criminals and, hanging half out of the car, was mercilessly dragged along the road for several kilometers because the criminals preferred to barbarously sacrifice his life in order to guarantee their getaway. Among the shockingly frequent cases of a brutal lack of moral sensitivity we can point in this very month to the rape and murder of Thavane, a little girl four years old in the greater São Paulo area.

The level of moral and social insensitivity of a large proportion of inhabitants, mainly completely uneducated young men from the margins of metropolitan areas, has become almost unlimited. These are the people who form the reserve army of the drug trade. Without discussing here the complete inadequacy of the penal and prison systems currently in operation, it must be stated that what is even more urgent than a profound reform of that system is the recognition by the authorities and by society as a whole and that the civilized world has lost the war against drugs. Just as happened with America's Prohibition of alcohol, which created terrible gangs like that of Al Capone, so the criminalization of drugs is creating even worse and more powerful criminal gangs.

The decriminalization of drugs is made more difficult by the fact that simplistic moral considerations lead many people to feel that liberalizing drugs, even in a controlled way, is unthinkable. To avoid it, an alliance is formed between the efforts of the drug dealers, who do not want to lose their extremely

profitable business, and the agents of the fight against drugs, who do not want to lose their jobs and, in many cases, the bribes they receive from the dealers.

The start of a wide and profound review of the penal system concerning drugs requires the holding of a large-scale scientific conference in which all aspects of the question studied, from the medical and health points of view to the psychological, sociological and legal, subjecting the material to an objective cost-benefit analysis in relation to maintaining the current system of criminalizing drugs or the alternative of a controlled freedom such as exists for alcoholic drinks. I am personally convinced that the evils arising from the existence of uncontrollable drug dealing mafias are incomparably greater than those that might result from a controlled liberation of use of drugs along with an intensive program telling of the ill effects of taking them. The examples, on the one hand, of the eventual liberation of alcoholic drinks in the United States and on the other, of the extent to which educational campaigns about the ill-effects of nicotine have led to a marked fall in the consumption of tobacco argue unequivocally in favor of a policy of controlled freedom. We must, however, take into account the unsuitability of a purely localized freedom of drug use, as in the case of Amsterdam. For a country like Brazil, as well as the scientific approval referred to above, it would be important to include the legalization of drugs in a multinational system in which at least, the Mercosul countries would take part.

V. The Recovery of Ethics

Is it possible for society as a whole to recover its ethics? In fact there are many historical examples of the ethical recovery of a society. Without trying to make an exhaustive catalogue of cases, we may mention as being among the most interesting, the recovery of Roman morality which had dissolved significantly at the end of the Republic, through the actions of Augustus. In the case of France we may mention, after the end of the Renaissance and the abuses carried out in the name of religion, the recovery brought about by Henry IV. Centuries later, after the corrupt years of the third Republic, recovery was achieved by de Gaulle. In Britain, after the dynasty of the Stuarts, at the beginning of the 17th century, there came, Cromwell's strict puritanism. Centuries later, the loose frivolity of the 18th century was followed by Victorian (1837-1901) austerity. We may also mention the moral recovery of Germany

with Adenauer after the abuses of Nazism and in Italy after Fascism, with de Gasperi.

The processes of moral recovery of a society tend to occur more frequently, as previous examples show, as a result of the enlightened connections carried out with a high level of ethics by a leader who re-establishes the spirit of self-confidence and a national plan in a society that is demoralized or has lost the sense of its own destiny. Cases of moral recovery due to great religious or ethical leadership are also socially relevant. This happened with Mohammed (c. 570-632) in the Arab world, and the same happened with the impact of Luther (c. 1483-1546) in the Germanic world. The same happened with great Popes such as Gregory I (590-604) or great saints such as St Francis of Assisi (1181-1226).

In the case of Brazil, solving the problem of ethical recovery depends on the one hand, as we have seen in the cases quoted, on Brazilians recovering their self-confidence and on a new mobilization of society towards a national program with powerful collective appeal coming from a public leadership possessing a clear ethical respectability. It depends also on the extent to which this new plan effectively meets the needs of the great powerless masses and opens up opportunities for them to be gathered into the nation's citizenship.

Under an austere and wise Emperor, the second reign in Brazil, following the temperamental turbulence of Pedro I, instilled in the country's elites a great confidence in the destiny of Brazil, as well as high average standards of ethical conduct. During the Old Republic, Brazil experienced extremely positive periods with Campos Salles and, in particular, Rodrigues Alves. After the 1930 Revolution, once the revolutionary confusion had died down, Getúlio Vargas' first period in power produced the New State which led to the good and innovative administration of the country, carried out with high standards of ethics, which established, with DASP a rational organization of public service and, with the extraordinary mandate of Gustavo Capanema in the Education Ministry, created an extremely creative cultural atmosphere that brought together the best talents, whatever their ideological convictions. However, the effect of that government being based on the 1937 *coup d'état* and being, even though in an enlightened way, a dictatorial presidency, prevented it from having a greater influence on society.

The second, democratically elected, Vargas government, distinguished by having excellent economic and social direction, was not able to exercise the influence it promised because of the rebellious confusion that finally led Vargas in 1954 to prefer suicide to being deposed by a military *coup*.

The succeeding years, however, were extremely productive. During that time the Higher Institute for Brazilian Studies (ISEB) exercised innovative influence with its national-developmental plan and, based on these ideas, there occurred the extraordinary government of Juscelino Kubitschek. As he himself correctly stated, within the space of only five years, his government succeeded in turning an agrarian society into a predominantly industrial one. The social impact of this government was extraordinary and has tended to increase as the passage of time has caused the country to forget the small problems of the period, and the shipwreck of Brazil in the military dictatorship that followed the deposition of João Goulart in 1964 made the great merits of the Kubitschek period stand out, revealing it as a period which left a decisive mark on Brazilian society, but was not continued in the governments that followed.

In the long period of stagnation into which the country sank from the 1980s onward has contributed to the loss of self-confidence by individuals and society and, among other effects, has caused a serious deterioration in average standards of ethics in the country. As has already been mentioned, only a new national plan that can rally broad support from Brazilians and restore their self-confidence will be able to re-establish satisfactory standards of ethics.

The election of an ex-lathe operator as President of the Republic in 2002 had an extremely favorable impact and showed an unexpected level of social mobility in Brazil that significantly strengthened its democratic institutions. However, if Lula's first mandate showed his extraordinary attitude to create good international relations for the country, its performance was extremely modest on the domestic front. Although it social policy was dynamic, it was purely assistential in nature. It made significant inroads into the most immediate effects of poverty with the Bolsa Família, [family cash transfer program – trans.] but did nothing to eradicate them by starting to correct the factors that cause poverty. The Lula government's fatal choice was its timid option of a neoliberal monetarism which, in exchange for the peaceful existence resulting from control inflation and the corresponding support from the financial sector – which achieved unheard of levels of profitability – that perpetuated the stagnation the country found itself suffering.

At the start of Lula's second mandate he unfortunately no longer enjoyed the conditions for a favorable prognosis. Maintaining as head of the Central Bank the same President who was responsible for the monetary neoliberalism of the first mandate indicated that this stagnating policy would be adhered to. The modest measures predicted in the PAC [accelerated growth program – trans.] for the supposed energizing of the Brazilian economy will have very modest effects when seen within the stagnating context of the neoliberalism it plans to preserve. Can the country put up with four more years of stagnation and the concomitant deterioration of its already fragile social and cultural situation?

Actually, countries have an extraordinary resilience which causes many, like China and India to go through long periods of stagnation and decline until they suddenly show a surprising rebirth. Brazil must not be an exception to this persistent state of resilience that so many countries show. However, things will tend to become even worse, especially in terms of the average patterns of ethics in Brazilian society. For a start, the author of these lines is convinced that Brazil's extraordinary social and economic vigor will lead it to tolerating yet another unfortunate extension of the stagnation in which it has been vegetating since the 1980s. It is to be hoped that this vigor will cause a powerful reaction that will probably happen after the second decade of the century. Finally, we must note in addition the possibility, even if it seems to be a remote one, that this reaction might even happen during President Lula's second term of office.





1. The Problem of Ethics in Contemporary Mass Technological Society (1988)

The Problem of Ethics

Like everything concerned with the theory and practice of human activities, ethics, like theoretical discipline and praxis, has appeared in different forms since the ideas of the Greeks. Nevertheless, we may note that these different forms share a common recognition that, in theory and in practice, ethics refers to the norm is that ordinary human behavior, based on an inherent and non-arbitrary requirement of validity.¹³

Analyzing the various forms of ethics that have been considered important, leads us to the realization that they are divided into two main types. Based on the nature of their precept, ethics are formal, as in Kant's ethical duty, or material, as in the ethics of good or of values. Based on the authority exercised by the norm, ethics are:

- (1) transcendent, based on divine commandment;
- (2) transcendental, based on the requirements of duty or a supreme being, and
 - (3) immanent, based on the search for happiness.

¹³Cf. The entry "Ética" no *Diccionário de Filosofia* de José Ferrater Mora, Buenos Aires, Ed. Sudamericana, 1951.

Ethics are the axiological dimension of all cultures. Regardless of the basis of their requirement and the nature of their precepts, all types of ethics respond, based on the psycho-physical and social situation of man, to the need to guarantee the internalization of reliable principles of order and conduct by all members of society. The preservation of the individual in terms of his psycho-physical needs, the possibility of his participation in society and the preservation of society itself as a whole, demand non-arbitrary patterns of behavior. This is what is responsible for the fact that in spite of the different forms of ethics laid down in different historical and social situations and different philosophical systems, there is a regulatory substratum common to all forms of ethics. All relevant types of ethics forbid unjust ways of killing. All condemn the improper acquisition of the goods of others. All of them are regulated by a certain notion of justice, loyalty and keeping promises.

Ethical Variations

In spite of sharing a common regulatory subsystem, the many different forms of ethics obey the discernible influences of history and society and a limited range of philosophical alternatives.

In his monumental treaties on the dynamics of cultures, Sorokin shows how, in the course of history and in all cultures, three basic ways of looking at the world have emerged: the ideational, the idealistic and the sensitive. ¹⁵ The ideational, typical among emerging cultures and based on a theocentric view of the world and on faith, preaches certainties concerning the divine, the human and the worldly. The sensitive, typical of cultures that are either very mature or in decline, are based on reason, is skeptical, relativist and immanentizing. The idealist position comes between these two and is typical of cultures that are approaching their greatest point of creativity and seeks a harmonious balance between faith and reason, maintaining the basic beliefs of its theodicy and submitting them to the discipline of rationality. In an alternative approach to the socio-cultural variations found in history and based on the evolutionary process of societies, we can differentiate between four periods as ideal models:

¹⁴Cf. Max Scheler, *Ética*, 2 vols. Especially Sections 5 and 6, Spanish translation Hilario Rodrigues Sanz, Buenos Aires, Revista de Occidente Argentina, 1948 and Henrique C. de Lima Vaz, *Escritos de Filosofia II*—*Ética e Cultura*, São Paulo, Ed. Loyola, 1988.

¹⁵Cf. Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, Boston, Poster Sargent Publ. 1957.

- (1) the archaic, creating founding myths;
- (2) the classical, rationalizing those myths;
- (3) the modern, reconstructing the world based on critical and rational experience, and
- (4) the postmodern, deconstructing systems, based on hypercriticism and radical immanentization of the human condition.

Hesiod, Homer and the Fathers of the Church, spokesmen of an archaic past, consolidated the myths. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Greek culture and, in Western civilization, the Renaissance thinkers and representative figures in the 17th and 18th centuries, constructed the classical period. Epicurus and Xenon in Greece, and in Marx, Nietzsche and Freud in modern Europe, created Western modernity. Roman sybaritism and modern permissiveness are expressions of the postmodern world.

Each of these four type-phases in their respective historical contexts, tends to set out the philosophical alternatives that can attract a following in the human spirit. The archaic phases created myths and beliefs and encourage ethical systems linked to the divine, either in the heroic manner of classical ancient culture or in the transcendent manner of Christianity. The classical phases that rationalize myths and beliefs, encourage transcendental ethical systems either in the form of the Supreme Good as in Plato and Aristotle, or of the requirements of duty, as in Kant. The modern experimentalist and critical phases encourage immanent ethical systems such is that of Epicurus in the classical world and stoicism, when it is based on conformity with nature. In the Western world, the modern phase encourages utilitarian or pragmatic ethical systems or those devoted to revolutionary action aimed at changing the world. The postmodern phase, which deconstructs systems, is sensualist and hypercritical and encourages ethical systems aimed at enjoying life, such as Roman sybaritism or modern permissiveness that are dialectically moderated by a tragic sense of life.

Postmodern Society

The term 'postmodern' has recently begun to circulate widely. In most cases, however, the implicit concept of modernity on which postmodernism is based, is used without a comparative awareness of its historicity. It presupposes a unilinear

¹⁶Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, 13 vols., London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1934 54.

development of history in which the ancient world is confusingly understood as everything preceding Western modernity, and that the postmodern world is what follows that.

We do not need to prove the fallacy of that view of postmodernism. The history of human societies is not unilinear, but includes synchronically and diachronically, many cultures or civilizations. ¹⁷ Each of these civilizations has identifiable phases of development that are very different in historical terms and in general correspond to the four type-phases previously mentioned, although for endogenous or exogenous reasons not all cultures go through all of these phases. Thus, if we concentrate, for the purposes of making a simpler form of comparative analysis, only on classical and Western cultures, we shall find, as was pointed out earlier, that the concept of postmodernism only has meaning - as Sorokin understood with his theory of the "late sensate" - when it is understood as the generalization and intensification of sensualism and criticism typical of modern times.

Alexander brought the classical world into the modern one by doing away with the socio-political structures of the *polis* and establishing a political, social and cultural cosmopolitanism. This modernity, which would be carried on into the Roman Empire, led to the postmodernism of the classical world with Petronius' sybaritism and Julian's tragic awareness. The fusion of Christianity with barbarism would create a new archaic phase in history and bring about the emergence of Western culture.¹⁸

Today, Western culture is in its postmodern phase.¹⁹ In common with postmodern phases in other historical periods, it is typified by an agnosticatheist sensualism and hypercriticism that lead to the deconstruction of all systems and at the same time to the dialectic of a tragic opposition. In itself, in relation to all the previous periods of history, is characterised by an extraordinary level of technological development which is still increasing and is the main factor in production and in creating the conditions of life.²⁰

¹⁷Vide A.L. Kroeber, *An Anthropologist Looks at History*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963 and *A Roster of Civilizations and Cultures*, Chicago, Aldine Publ., 1962; see also Alfred Weber, *História de la Cultura*, Spanish translation, Luis Recaséns Siches, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1941.

¹⁸Cf. Arnold Toynbee, op. cit. Vols. 1 e VII and Christopher Dawson, *The Making of Europe*, New York, Meridian Books, 1956.

¹⁹See Alain Touraine, *La Société Post-Insdustrielle*, Paris, Denoël, 1969 and Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, New York, Basic Books, 1973.

²⁰Cf. Hans Freyer, *Teoria de la Época Actual*, Spanish translation, Luis Villoro, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1958 and Radovan Richta, *La Civilization au Carrefour*, French translation, L. Klimara and J.B. Glory, Paris, Anthropos, 1972 and also, Jean-François Lyotard, *La Condition Post-Moderne*, Paris, Ed. Minuit, 1970.

As in the classical world, the Western postmodern world is a typical phase of mass societies. Contrary to what happened in the ancient world, however, these societies are not materially decadent. In classical postmodernity, the concomitant situation of lack of belief in a principle of moral ordering of a world seen as being absurd and unjust, with increasingly efficient and exploitative forms of organizing society and its material preservation, led to the dismantling of collective life. The disenchantment with the world that was typical of classical postmodernity created on the one hand conditions favorable to the spread of Christianity and on the other, irreparable breaches in the structure and workings of the State, which allowed itself to be reduced to barbarism from inside and out.²¹

In Western postmodernity, the loss of belief in a moral principle for ordering the world and an awareness of its intransitivity find definitive compensations that the classical world did not have. In brief, there are two types of compensations: on the one hand, the extraordinary development of technology created ever more efficient ways of dominating nature, thus guaranteeing postmodern societies - from which underdeveloped societies are materially excluded - levels of comfort and plenty never before achieved. On the other hand, supported by its progressive abundance, Western culture developed incomparably more equitable ways of ordering society. The amount of public and private freedom and the level of basic equality modern man enjoys, are incomparably greater than in any preceding historical period, even in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where recent trends under the leadership of Gorbachev have led to increasing levels of freedom.²²

Postmodern Ethics

As in the postmodern periods in history, modern ethics, without affecting the remaining forms of transcendent and transcendental ethics, is predominantly immanent and typified by its increasing permissiveness. The limiting factor to this permissiveness is still the principle of what is harmful to society. Everything

²¹Vide Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, London, Thames & Hudson, 1971 e Tom B. Jone, In the Twilight of Antiquity, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1978.

²²Cf. Benedetto Croce, *La Storia como Pensiero e como Azione*, Bari, Ed. Laterza, 1970 and Erich Kahler, *Man, the Measure*, New York, George Braziler, 1961 and *The Meaning of History*, New York, Braziler, 1964.

is allowed that is compatible with preserving society, and this is what produces the general rejection of terrorism and typically delinquent forms of behavior.

Postmodernist permissiveness leads to styles of life which for most people are directed towards achieving compatibility between a legally remunerative activity increasingly linked to joining a bureaucratic system and protected by social guarantees, and an enjoyable private life with the maximum degree of leisure, supported in material comfort increasingly based on electronic features within the context of an agreeable social relationship that accepts uncommitted sexual freedom.²³

For certain groups, both private and public, in sectors and levels of society that demand high levels of training, there is a powerful motivation that can be generically termed as professional success in the widest sense of the term. For some people this motivation can become an almost exclusive form of activity opening the way to dedication to work, science and art, or to public affairs that are comparable with activities in other periods. These groups, however, are a small minority in terms of the general rule which is typified by the characteristics described above.

In this situation, transcendent forms of ethics such as the ethics of duty and the revolutionary ethics of 'what ought to be', are in marked decline. Current postmodern culture, as opposed to the modern, tends to return to the concept of transcendence, but does so within an immanent view of the world.²⁴ This immanent tendency may be observed in the work of Teilhard de Chardin in spite of his theocentric aims. In the same way, the ethics of duty are confronted with a growing awareness of man's psycho-social conditioning and the unsustainability of a categorical imperative that does not arise from a finalist-moral ordering of the world that is hardly compatible with contemporary cosmology. Finally, the revolutionary ethics of 'what should be', as well as suffering from the restrictions affecting the ethics of duty, are affected by the loss of meaning of their proposals to change society. Marxist-inspired revolutions have not led to man's disalienation, nor even to a classless society and they have revealed the terrible abyss separating the revolutionary ideal from the results it has actually led to.

²³Cf. Henri Lefevbre, *La Vie Quotidienne dans le Monde Moderne*, Paris, Gallimard, 1968. ²⁴Vide Theodosius Dobzhansky, *The Biology of Ultimate Concern*. New York, The New American Library, 1967; four a wider philosophical treatment, see Edgar Morin, *La Methode*, 2 vols., Paris, Seuil, 1977 e 1980.

The ethics of permissiveness of modern technological mass societies that leads in its most sophisticated forms to a social sybaritism - different from the sybaritism *erga omnes* of classical postmodernism - suffers from a double limitation. The first is external to it and arises from the fact that making the affluence of Western societies universal has not been achieved and does not seem likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future. The second, which is internal, arises out of the inability for consumerist permissiveness to sustain itself at a social or personal level.

Consumerist permissiveness is eroded from inside and out by the fact that affluent western societies constitute a minority of the world's population whose social conditions are in stark contrast to those existing in the rest of the world. What is certain is that the economic and technological and military potential of the First World and in its own way, of the Second World, made them relatively autonomous in terms of self-support in relation to the Third World. That autonomy, however, does not prevent many and inevitable forms of intercommunication both on the level of ideas, practices and customs, as well as inter-human and inter-social relationships, including terrorist acts. This inevitable intercommunication between such unbalanced worlds has the negative effect of a growing trend for affluent societies, either by undermining within their own self-awareness, the validity of their way of life, or by causing them material problems.

Internally, consumerist permissiveness is affected by its inability for self-sustainment both socially and personally. At the social level this is seen in the fact of the increasing cost of maintaining current social structures. The creation of surpluses sufficient for the proper maintenance and development of the production system is hampered by increasing social demands that divert surpluses from investment to consumption. At the same time, the disappearance of the work ethic leads to a drop in the efficiency of systems and in the quality of their products, thus affecting in relative terms the creation of surpluses.²⁵

On a personal level, consumerist permissiveness also shows itself to be unsustainable except by a minority of 'bon-vivant' artists who are themselves dependent on highly privileged economic and cultural conditions. For the ordinary man in the affluent society, consumerist permissiveness represents a

²⁵Cf. Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, London, Heinemann, 1976 and Jost Herbig, *El final de la Civilization Burguesa*, Spanish translation, A. Domenech, Barcelona, Ed. Critica, 1983.

repertoire of pleasurable practices that make life agreeable but do not leave any impression on him.

At the same time as habits stabilize themselves at a comfortable level of consumerist permissiveness, a growing hiatus is created between the demand for a meaning to life and a simple sequence of pleasant daily events. We should add that these daily events are not always so pleasant: loneliness, long-term illness, old age and death, erode the validity of consumerist permissiveness.²⁶

The Postmodern Crisis

There are two great differences among those separating western culture at its postmodern stage from the postmodernism of other previous cultures such as, among the most successful, that of classical culture. These two great differences are, on the one hand, the lack of material decadence in post-industrial societies compared to those at the end of the classical world. On the other hand, there is the fact that the classical world was surrounded by an external proletariat the domination of which depended on maintaining the internal consistency of classical world whereas, in the case of the modern world, its proletariat is internal, even in the decentralized internalization of the Third World.

The first difference arises out of the combination of post-industrial society's high technology and its extremely rational socialization of equality, guaranteeing it, in spite of problems such as those previously mentioned, a comfortable level of self-sustainability. The classical world, in its postmodern phase, lost its economic and social viability and this loss caused it to surrender power to the barbarian world. The second difference, coming from the internalization of the proletariat, means that in the final analysis there are no alternative societies to the Western world, as understood in its widest form, that can include the Second and Third Worlds. All modern societies, despite their different cultural characteristics and economic and technological levels, belong to the Western world in its broadest sense, which is what its operational rationality gives it. The Western world will either develop the conditions that will guarantee the self-sustainability of its culture or it will have to generate within itself the formation of a substitute culture.

²⁶Vide José Ferrater Mora, Las Crisis Humanas, Madrid, Alianza Edit. 1943.

In quite a short period of time, this question will become relevant to the ethics of consumerist permissiveness and will either impose new conditions to overcome the factors undermining it, or it will make postmodern society create another form of ethics with subsequent implications concerning the characteristics of postmodernity. A broader discussion of this theme would require further examination of the postmodern condition. Will the postmodern stage necessarily be the end of a culture, as was notably true of the classical world, or can the postmodern stage be a critical one in the modern phase of a culture, and one that can create a new phase?²⁷

I believe that we are not currently in a situation where we can give a definite answer to this question. Western postmodernism may be the final stage of Western culture.

This was precisely the case of classical culture, the postmodernism of which created at the same time the deconstruction of its cultural, social and political system, the spread of Christianity and, by the endogenous and exogenous creation of barbarism, the final collapse of the Western Empire that led to a long period of barbarism during which Western culture was formed.

Another hypothesis is that of the self-transformation of the postmodern world, creating a new cultural phase within Western culture which will not only be critical-sensualist but would contain in an affirmative way, new beliefs and faith in its values. There are, moreover, significant indications of this trend. Consumerist permissiveness has not eradicated humanism in the universe of values and human plans within Western culture. In contrast to the numerous signs of neo-barbarism in the modern world, we can see the permanence of the basic values of humanism and the manifestation, both socially and politically, of a new humanism we might call social-humanism as opposed to the individualistic humanism of the classical and Renaissance traditions.

The basic element in social-humanism that may be taken as providing the possibility for an ethical alternative for our times, it is a return to the view of Protagoras in seeing man as the measure of all things and with the decisive additional qualification of seeing man in social, and not only individual terms and doing this from an ecumenical standpoint that is not confined to national parochialism or ethnic tribalism. The new humanism, which can embody many of the anti-dogmatizing achievements of postmodern permissiveness, will be

²⁷Cf. Arnold Toybee, op. cit. vol. IX, Cap. XII, "The Prospect of the Western Civilization"; see also Erich Kahler, *Man the Measure*, op. cit., p.603 et sec., "The Kingdon of Man".

different from the latter for the basic reason of containing the philanthropic dimension in terms of love for humankind and a humanist model of the human that will lead to the transcendence of individual sensualism, without denying its valid elements but replacing the ethic of everyday comfort with an ethic of a transcendent meaning of life. This will be something like an ethical synthesis (based on completely different ontological positions) of neo-stoicism understood as a tragic assumption of freedom, with a neo-epicureanism that will replace the search for *ataraxia* with a search for *eudemonia*.²⁸

²⁸Vide, in Karl Jaspers, *Balance y Perspectiva*, Spanish translation, Fernando Vela, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1951, pp. 187-210, "Condiciones y Posibilidades para un Nuevo Humanismo"; concerning the new humanism, see Ortega y Gasset's positions on racial-vitalist humanism, Sartre's existentialist humanism and the social humanism of Adam Schaff.

2. Environmental Rationality and its Institutional Prerequisites (1992)

1. The Environmental Problem

General Characteristics

There was an idea that lasted for a long time, indeed well into the 20th century, that nature, a universal blessing for humanity, was something inexhaustible that was freely available for the sake of human convenience and possessed inherent processes that would automatically ensure its renewal. It was supposed that the complex relationships between the natural resources of the air, the waters and the earth, partly activated by no less associated relationships between inanimate matter and the multiple forms of life, comprised a dynamic self-balancing system even though until recently it was not known how the system worked and even though many of its aspects are badly understood today.

One of the results of the development of industrial civilization after the 18th century was a corresponding increase in man's aggression towards nature. For a long time the effects of this aggression, which lasted for most of the 19th century, appeared not to contradict the supposition of nature's ability to sustain and renew itself. Gradually however, it could be seen that certain local disturbances in the air and water were the result of the accumulation of industrial effluents that were not capable of spontaneous elimination, such as the London

fog caused by burning coal and the pollution of certain rivers used for dumping waste.

From the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the present one, the ability of nature to spontaneously rebalance became less than the industrial civilization's ability to contaminate it, initially in the form of local disturbances as mentioned above. More recently it can be seen that these disturbances are affecting the whole of the biosphere and irreversibly reducing certain resources, leading to the exhaustion of non-renewable ones.

The aggression towards nature caused by industrial civilization takes many forms. These different forms of aggression can be grouped into three main categories. On the one hand there is the exhaustion of non-renewable resources of fossil fuels such as oil. Although the most alarmist predictions of the 1960s have been contradicted by the discovery of significant new deposits in Mexico, Venezuela or on the coasts of various other countries, the planet's oil reserves are limited and if present *per capita* rates of consumption are maintained or rise, they will be exhausted during the 21st century.

A second and more dangerous set of aggressions on the environment is that which concerns multiple forms of pollution of the atmosphere, the stratosphere and the Earth's waters caused by industrial effluent such as CO₂ and chlorofluoride and by the discharging into rivers and seas of all sorts of waste, including untreated sewage, the greenhouse effect that is leading to a gradual but continuous heating of the Earth²⁹, the destruction of the protective ozone layer, which has already reached considerable proportions, acid rain caused by sulfur dioxide emissions and other pollutants, the biological and destruction large masses of water, constitute damage that cannot be spontaneously reversed and which will end by making the planet unable to support human life.

A third group of aggressive acts against the environment is caused by the deforestation and desertification of increasingly large areas, with their impacts on climate and the water system as well as the production of agricultural land by urbanization and other uses or by the exhaustion of soil caused by overuse.

These aggressive acts against nature are committed by all countries at all levels of development. The industrialized countries are responsible for the

²⁹In the last 100 years the average temperature of the planet (15° C) has risen by 0.5° C and the sea level by 10 to 20cm because of the greenhouse effect. Continuing the present rate of air pollution will raise the average temperature by 5° C by the year 2100, with the most serious environmental consequences.

majority of this aggression (for about 64% of CO₂ emissions, including the EU, the USA, Japan and the ex-USSR) especially in terms of industrial air pollution. The more backward countries are mainly responsible for continued deforestation (which is responsible for 15% of greenhouse gas emissions) and from the effects of not dealing with urban air pollution.

The Population and Nature

Industrial civilization, which is continually increasing man's capacity for action, is making demographic growth a virtual factor of environmental destruction which becomes greater the more industrial development is spread. Thus, two important variables appear in terms of aggression towards the environment: growth of world population and the increase within society of productive capacity and *per capita* consumption.

As is well known, the global population remained at a low level for thousands of years until rising exponentially from the end of the 19th century. Demographic growth in the world remained below 0.1% per year until the end of the Middle Ages, rose to about 0.3% in the 18th century and was something like 0.6% at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1900, the world population was a little more than 1.5 billion. By 1960 it was 2.5 billion and reached 5.2 billion in 1989. According to United Nations estimates, by the year 2000 the world population should be about 6.2 billion and 8.5 billion in 2025.

Demographic growth will not be continuous. From 1950 to 1985 the population grew at an annual average rate of 1.9%; it is estimated that from 1985 to 2000 this rate will drop to 1.6% and from 2060 2025 to 1.2% until it achieves a state of demographic stability with a world population of about 12 billion in the second third of the 21st century. This population may be smaller, about 10.2 billion, if it stabilizes in 2035 or bigger, about 14.2 billion if stabilization only happens in 2065.

Demographic growth has linear consequences in terms of consumption of food and variables, in terms of the level of the increase of industrial civilization and in terms of the goods produced by the latter. In order to deal with foreseeable demographic growth, food supplies most increased by an annual rate of 3% to 4% by the year 2000. Energy consumption, which indicates the effects of the spread of industrial civilization, was about 10,billion kW per year in 1980 and if current rates are maintained in developed and

underdeveloped countries, will reach 14 billion in 2025. If the *per capita* rate of consumption becomes uniform, this will rise to 55 billion kW per year.

The effects of demographic growth, magnified by the spread of industrial civilization created corresponding increase in aggression towards the environment. Increased food supply brings a growing cost in terms of the use of existing agricultural lands and the expansion of these lands at a cost of deforestation which also brings desertification. In 1980, agricultural subsidies came to about US\$ 2.7 billion in the United States and in 1976, US\$ 6.2 billion in the European Community. In 1986, the EU figures were US\$ 21.5 billion and US\$ 25.8 billion in the United States.

After 1970, erosion overtook soil formation in about one third of the agricultural area of the United States, a figure that rose to about 25%-30% in India. Low-level desertification currently affects 29% of the surface of the Earth and is increasing at an annual rate of about 6 million hectares.

Environmental Awareness

The second half of the 20th century has seen the emergence of environmental awareness. The Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, *Man and his Environment* (26/05/69), revealed publicly for the first time the need for a rational international administration of the environment. Dennis and Donella Meadows' report for the Club of Rome, *The Limits to Growth* in 1972, demonstrated with the use of accurate mathematical models the inviability in the relatively short term of a continued exponential population growth and of the use of natural resources. The report showed that nature is finite and that the ability to maintain human life on the planet has very strict limits.

These pioneering documents inspired an increasing number of studies concerning the environment that culminated in the United Nations Stockholm Conference in 1972. It became clear then that present ways and rates of industrial civilization assaulting nature, if maintained during the following decades, would lead relatively soon, in about 40 years, to catastrophic effects on the capacity of the planet to sustain life.

It was in the face of this prospect of environmental catastrophe that at the end of 1972 the United Nations adopted Resolutions 2995 and 2997/XXVII, creating the United Nations Environmental Program — UNEP, and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development — UNCED, with a

Permanent Secretariat in Nairobi and an annual operating fund of US\$ 30 million.

The new environmental awareness in the world led to systematic studies on the effects of pollution, deforestation, excessive exploitation of soil and the exhaustion of non-renewable resources. A relatively broad-reaching agreement was arrived at and quantified concerning the impact of these factors on global warming (greenhouse effect), on the reduction of the protective ozone layer, on the disappearance of thousands of species with the subsequent impoverishment of the planet's genetic data bank and the negative effects on marine life and on the agricultural sustainability of soil.

The 1987 Brundtland *Report Our Common Future* presented in condensed form an excellent analysis of the environmental problem and proposed measures needed for rational management of the environment. The study, commissioned by the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany and produced by the Research Committee of the 11th Legislature of that parliament led by Deputy Bernd Schmidbauer, published in 1991 by the University of Bonn with a version in English, stands out by reason of the scope and accuracy of the information contained in it.

Environmental Rationality

The points referred to above created a policy to carry out environmental rationality in managing all human activities that have measurable impact on the environment. We know today from scientific evidence that nature is not inexhaustible nor does it have sufficient self-renewing capacity to absorb the current aggression of industrial society without the most serious negative effects.

Recent environmental awareness in the world has led to the recognition that developmental processes cannot carry on as they have in the past, but need a radical adjustment in line with the environment. Thus the concept of 'sustainable development' was created, implying development compatible with preserving the environment. This need for adjusting to preserving ecological balance was broadened, as a result of the great differences in the level of productivity and life that exist between different regions in the world, to include also the social aspects, both intra- and international of development. Environmental rationality imposes on us a new concept of development: environmentally and socially sustainable development. A globally sustainable

development needs to deal with three types of basic conditions, technical, economic and institutional.

From a technical point of view, environmental rationality demands the universal adoption of measures to decrease the use of non-renewable goods and energy consumption, based on the general substitution of those goods by other, renewable kinds, together with measures to minimize adverse industrial impact on the environment and to restore environmental balance, locally and globally.

From the economic point of view, it has become imperative to adopt a system to ensure the appropriate financing of the costs of protecting the environment and to carry out development in universally equitable terms within rigorous conditions of environmental and social sustainability.

At the institutional level the requirements indicated above require the adoption of a normative and operational system that will guarantee internationally, nationally and locally, the adoption of appropriate rules to defend the environment, their effective implementation and the proper supervision of the latter by means of rigorous sanctions on those who contravene the rules, all within a universally equitable and demographically responsible perspective working towards the promotion of ecologically and socially sustainable development.

II. The Institutional Requirements

The Nature of the Problem

The need for environmentally and socially sustainable development leads to the need to establish some basic and universal principles of environmental equality. It is self-evident that the first principle of environmental equality must be that of giving those who pollute or destroy the responsibility, including financial responsibility, for putting right and compensating for the damage they have caused.

This basic principle needs a double qualification: on the one hand it is important to recognize that the ability to avoid or reduce the effects of pollution or destruction is proportional to the level of development of those who produce these effects and of the country they belong to. Big companies and highly developed countries can easily include in their production system procedures and equipment that will avoid or minimize their capacity for pollution. The

same big companies and the same highly developed countries have no justification – nor in fact long-term economic interest – in carrying out environmentally destructive activities³⁰. A typical example of this are the advanced methods of exploiting timber resources that always involve a level of reforestation above the level of the damage caused. In contrast, primitive populations in backward countries confront great economic and technical difficulties in controlling the polluting effects of certain production processes and above all the devastation caused by primitive forms of using natural resources like the example of timber extraction quoted above.

The mitigating factor of relative backwardness on the part of devastatingly polluting agents and their respective countries cannot overlook the basic principle of the responsibility of the polluting/devastating agent and country for the damage they have caused. For this reason there should be a reasonable solution in terms of equality and in pragmatic terms in providing a suitable international system of sharing the costs of repairing damage war preventing polluting/devastating effects caused by more primitive agents and more backward countries, without reducing a reasonable level of responsibility to be accepted by polluting/devastating agents in countries.

The second mitigating factor to be introduced in the general principle of environmental equality concerns the polluting effects that are now common in the atmosphere, in the stratosphere or in international waters. These effects must be overcome to avoid the continuation, or the non-aggravation, of the environmental deterioration they cause. Nevertheless, it will be difficult to establish a direct relationship between these effects and the agents and countries which might have caused them, since they are so widespread. In principle it is clear that the origin of the polluting effects that have become widespread in the atmosphere and the seas have a proportional relationship to the rate of pollution each country is responsible for. This means that about 80% of these effects come from a limited number of highly industrialized countries. Within this context there is a clear need for internationalizing the responsibility for overcoming the general effects of pollution and distributing the corresponding responsibilities between member countries of the United Nations in accordance with a calculation that combines the level of development of each country with the extent to which it has polluted air and water.

³⁰ Those countries which, like Japan, devastate tropical forests, do this in underdeveloped countries.

The preservation of the environment at international, national and local level, in an equitable way demands a combination of a normative system with an effective system of implementing those norms that is subject to a suitable system of supervision and operating within a system of real sanctions.

The problems arising from the four requisites previously mentioned consist on the one hand of the difficulty in achieving a reasonable compatibility between the necessairily international nature of norms for protecting the environment and the sovereignty of different nations, and on the other, adopting a system that is equally reasonable and realistic, for financing environmental protection.

Concerning the question of national sovereignty, this must definitely not provide a pretext for impunity for serious environmental violations. On the other hand, neither should the internationalization of environmental protection be a pretext for the great powers, in ways which may already be observed, imposing environmental colonialism on countries with relatively low levels of development.

The basic norms for protecting the environment must definitely be international with national and local application within each country. The internationalization of norms requires equally an internationalization of the system of supervising them and the system of sanctions against those who violate them. The system for implementing the norms does not need to be international and could not be so in the present conditions pertaining in the world. It would therefore be far more suitable for each country, with no detrimental effect to the international supervision or sanctions concerning these norms, to have its own system of supervision and sanctions.

In this respect, difficulties arise in the way in which the international aspects of the question are compatible with national sovereignty. It is beyond the scope of this brief study to attempt to suggest specific solutions to this question. It is sufficient to mention that the way of making these two aspects compatible has to be equivalent to that which makes the supremacy of federal rule compatible with the autonomy of member states in federally organized countries.

In technical terms, the internationalization of the basic norms for environmental protection requires the establishment of targets to be reached within specific times and conditions and, in the legal sphere, the adoption of an international code of environmental sanctions within the responsibility of an international court, together with a decision concerning the way in which the sanctions of such a court should be applied.

The Costs of Environmental Protection

As has been shown above, the costs of direct environmental protection have to be covered by polluting/destroying agents and countries, taking into account realistically the ability of those agents and countries to pay. The mitigating factor in the underdeveloped world of this ability to pay cannot be seen as the concession of impunity. What is in question here, therefore, is something similar to what happens when the relationship is established in tax law between the level of an income tax and the level of the contributor's earnings.

These costs for protecting the environment could be divided broadly into two groups: direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are those related to the measures needed to eliminate or minimize the polluting effects of certain production processes or the effects arising from hosting extractive mining activities. Indirect costs are related to overcoming general forms of pollution as in the case of renewing polluted rivers or lakes or those involved in the international community supplementing the financial abilities of underdeveloped countries with contributions from more developed ones.

It is estimated that the average direct cost to the polluting agents for controlling pollution in the processes that produce it, is about 1-2% of the cost of production.

There are no reliable estimates concerning the indirect cost of overcoming pollution and the devastation of natural resources. These costs will obviously vary greatly according to the greater or lesser share of the international contribution to be adopted, in favor of underdeveloped countries.

In fact, given the absolute need for achieving an extremely effective form of international protection for the environment, we must recognize realistically that meaningful results will not be achieved if equally meaningful resources cannot be directed towards this end. As an initial working hypothesis, until the subject is better understood, it could be said that global protection of the planet's environment, in addition to direct measures for controlling pollution and the devastation of natural resources, is no less than 1% of global GDP which at the moment is the equivalent annually of US\$ 100 billion, coming almost exclusively from contributions from developed countries.

The question of the costs of environmental protection, as well as the disciplinary measures for the area, is linked to a certain concept that there can be a reasonable former development that is both environmentally and socially

sustainable. The specific treatment of this question requires a broad scale of physical targets to be put in place, mainly in terms of acceptable rates of industrial emissions per year in order to keep the environmental aggression of industrial civilization within the limits of natural restoration of environmental balance. The exhaustive work of the Research Committee of the 11th Legislature of the German Parliament mentioned above is a good example of what a list of such targets could consist of.

Basically, it is important to separate the problem of pollution from that of the destruction of natural resources. The former requires, in the final analysis, two types of provision: on the one hand, those concerning the filtering of noxious emissions, on the other those concerning the substitution of polluting materials and processes with others that do not pollute or are far less polluting. The toxicity of industrial effluents should be compulsorily reduced to about 10% of current volume. The possibilities for substituting materials and processes are quite promising. Means of transport using oil derivatives, especially road tgransport, can be replaced in the not too distant future by non-polluting fuels like hydrogen, first for cars and trucks, and possibly by airplanes, and nuclear energy for ships. In this way about 50% of the present production of CO₂ could be eliminated.

The destruction of natural resources such as oil, which in any case will be restricted by the eventual exhaustion of deposits, could be reduced to a fraction of its current figure by the introduction of the new fuels mentioned above.

The destruction of forests can only be contained by measures leading to their rational exploitation. This question, which is extremely simple in theory, is very complicated in practice because merely prohibiting infractions by law will be ineffective if there is no effective offer of suitable alternatives for those primitive populations which are at the moment, either themselves or through third parties, the main agents of deforestation.

Institutional Control

International discussions on protecting the environment, like the United Nations meeting scheduled to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, can no longer be restricted to diagnoses and recommendations. There is an urgent need to work towards establishing an international system for the obligatory regulation of the area, setting up organizations, regulatory norms, physical

targets and procedures for the promulgation, supervision and sanctions for those norms and the reaching of the targets.

The United Nations is the only international agency that can accommodate the system referred to above. Previous resolutions have already led to setting up the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the Permanent Secretariat in Nairobi. Now it is a question of adopting measures that will lead to the international regulation of environmental protection, the establishment of specific targets to be achieved, creating an international system for supervising the norms and targets and establishing a system of penalties for failure to comply with the norms and an international judicial mechanism to apply sanctions. It is also a case of the need to set up an International Environmental Protection Fund, without which effective practical measures cannot be taken, especially in the Third World.

The basic problem in creating an effective and equitable system for protecting the environment consists, on the part of the developed nations, in recognizing that theirs is a double responsibility. On the one hand the responsibility for currently being responsible for about 80% of global pollution, having been in the past the destroyers of the temperate forests, the destruction with which to a great extent they financed their own development at the end of the 18th century until the middle of the present century, and on the other hand the responsibility of being almost the only realistic source of financing environmental protection in the coming decades.

An effective and equitable system of environmental protection requires on the part of underdeveloped nations requires them to recognize their joint obligation to achieve this aim, on the satisfactory achievement of which depends the future of all humanity. For these countries it is a case of implementing effectively and honestly the environmental norms and targets internationally adopted in their various territories, within a previously calculated equitable system of international cost-sharing. It is also a case of putting into practice suitable programs for controlling population growth since these countries are responsible for almost 80% of total world population and more than 300% of its future growth.

For the sake of their own development, the developed and underdeveloped worlds are united and inextricably committed to the environmental salvation of the planet. This is a task that has to be carried forward seriously and with maximum urgency if we are not to produce

irreversible effects that will compromise our ability to live on earth within a short period of about 40 years.

This joint cooperation is realistically and reasonably possible if developed countries can understand that, as well as their technical leadership in diagnosing problems and creating solutions, they should be responsible for almost all the costs of protecting the world's environment. This is the environmental tax on rich countries, but this united cooperation can also only be realistically and reasonably applied if the underdeveloped countries that will receive money to preserve and export environmental goods to the rest of the world, make an effective and honest commitment to that part of the task for which they are responsible. This task involves a lesser but no less important part of pollution control, but it involves above all the obligation to impose environmentally sustainable patterns on exploiting their natural resources and adopting all the appropriate procedures to lead their people towards responsible forms of parenthood and thus significantly reduce the world's population explosion.

Tables

- 1. Population
- 2. Food supply (1960-80)
- 3. Greenhouse-effect-forming industrial waste gases
- 4. The 20 main emitters of CO₂
- 5. Percentage of forests in various regions
- 6. Industrialization of timber and its use by main countries

Table 1

Population

Sharp increase in demographic growth caused by the Industrial Revolution and medical-sanitary progress, especially since 1950

1900-1950 average annual rate 0.8%

1950-1980 average annual rate 1.9%

Word Population (Billions)

| REGIONS | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| The world | 2.5 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 4.8 |
| Developed regions | 0.83 | 0.94 | 1.05 | 1.14 | 1.17 |
| Underdeveloped regions | 1.68 | 2.07 | 2.65 | 3.31 | 3.66 |
| Annual increase (%) | | 1.8 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| World developed regions | | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.6 |
| Underdeveloped | | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.0 |

Source: Brundtland Report, tables 4.1 and 4.2

Projected Growth (billions)

| REGIONS | 1985 | 2000 | 2025 | Rate of increase % | | | |
|---------------|------|------|------|--------------------|---------|---------|--|
| | | | | 50-85 | 85-2000 | 2000-25 | |
| World | 4.8 | 6.1 | 8.2 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.2 | |
| Africa | 0.56 | 0.87 | 1.62 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 2.5 | |
| Latin America | 0.41 | 0.55 | 0.78 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 1.4 | |
| Asia | 2.82 | 3.55 | 4.54 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 1.0 | |
| North America | 0.26 | 0.3 | 0.35 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 0.6 | |
| Europe | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.1 | |
| USSR | 0.28 | 0.31 | 0.37 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 0.6 | |
| Oceania | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 0.9 | |

Table 2 Food Supplies (1960-1980)

| | Per capita food production in 1961-64 = 100 | | Gross pe plante (hect | d area | Use of fertilizers per capita (kilos) | | |
|-----------------------|---|-------|-----------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|-------|--|
| REGIONS | 1961-64 | 81-84 | 1964 | 1984 | 1964 | 1984 | |
| World | 100 | 112 | 0.44 | 0.31 | 29.3 | 85.3 | |
| North America | 100 | 121 | 1.05 | 0.9 | 47.3 | 93.2 | |
| Western Europe | 100 | 131 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 124.4 | 224.3 | |
| Eastern Europe & USSR | 100 128 | | 0.84 | 0.71 | 30.4 | 122.1 | |
| Africa | 100 | 88 | 0.74 | 0.35 | 1.8 | 9.7 | |
| Near East (1) | 100 | 107 | 0.53 | 0.35 | 6.9 | 53.6 | |
| Far East (2) | 100 | 116 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 6.4 | 45.8 | |
| Latin America | 100 | 108 | 0.49 | 0.45 | 11.6 | 32.4 | |
| Socialist Asia(3) | 100 | 135 | 0.17 | 0.1 | 15.8 | 170.3 | |

Source: Brundtland Report, Tables 5 and 1

Table 3
Greenhouse-Effect-Forming Industrial Waste Gases

| GAS | Cumulative for the period 1860-1960 % | Current contribution for 1980-1990 | Emission Source | % | | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----|--|----|--|
| Carbon dioxide (CQ) | 60 | 50 | | 50 | | 50 | |
| Carbochluorofluorides (CFCs) | 9 | 22 | Energy and transport | 50 | | | |
| Ozone (C ₃) | 10 | 7 | Chemical products | 20 | | | |
| Methane (CH) | 14 | 13 | Chemical products | 20 | | | |
| Nitric oxide (N ₂ 0 ₃) | 3 | 5 | Tropical deforestation | 15 | | | |
| Stratospheric water vapour (H ₂ O) | 4 | 3 | Agriculture and other sources | 15 | | | |

Source: Protecting the Earth, vol. 4, p. 50

Table 4 The 20 main emitters of $CO_2(1986)$

| | Country | CO2 coming from energy | Share of total | Per capita emission from |
|-----|-------------------|---------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|
| | | production (million tons) | (%) | energy production (t) |
| 1. | United States | 4766 | 23.8 | 19.2 |
| 2. | USSR | 3737 | 18.6 | 13.2 |
| 3. | P.R. China | 2030 | 10.1 | 1.9 |
| 4. | Germany (unified) | 1067 | 5.3 | 13.7 |
| 5. | Japan | 914 | 4.6 | 7.5 |
| 6. | United Kingdom | 676 | 3.4 | 11.9 |
| 7. | India | 539 | 2.7 | 0.7 |
| 8. | Poland | 478 | 2.4 | 12.7 |
| 9. | Canada | 436 | 2.2 | 17 |
| 10. | France | 384 | 1.9 | 6.9 |
| 11. | Italy | 365 | 1.8 | 6.4 |
| 12. | South Africa | 293 | 1.5 | 7.7 |
| 13. | Mexico | 266 | 1.3 | 3.3 |
| 14. | Australia | 245 | 1.2 | 15.2 |
| 15. | Czechoslovakia | 244 | 1.2 | 15.7 |
| 16. | Romania | 212 | 1.1 | 9.2 |
| 17. | Holland | 203 | 1.0 | 13.9 |
| 18. | Spain | 189 | 0.9 | 4.9 |
| 19. | Brazil | 175 | 0.9 | 1.3 |
| 20. | South Korea | 162 | 0.8 | 3.9 |

Source: Protecting the Earth, vol. 1, p. 294.

Table 5 Percentage of forests in various regions

| REGION | % Land Area | %Total Forest Area |
|------------------------|-------------|--------------------|
| Industrialized Nations | 33.3 | 44.7 |
| North America | 33.3 | 14.8 |
| Western Europe | 33.8 | 3.1 |
| Eastern Europe | 29 | 0.7 |
| Soviet Union | 41.3 | 22.5 |
| Japan | 67.6 | 0.6 |
| Others | 12.9 | 2.9 |
| Developing Nations | 29.8 | 55.3 |
| Africa | 27.5 | 15.7 |
| Middle East | 8.2 | 2.4 |
| China | 12.5 | 2.8 |
| Rest of the Pacific | 34.6 | 8.7 |
| Latin America | 50.2 | 24.8 |
| Others | 42.2 | 0.9 |
| World | 31.3 | 100 |

Source: Protecting the Earth, vol. 1, p. 296.

Table 6 Industrialization of timber and its use as fuel

| | Trees Paper | | | | | | per | Fuel | | |
|------------|-------------|------|-------|------|----------|------|-------|------|---------|------|
| Countries | Softwood | | Other | | Softwood | | Other | | | |
| | -1 | -2 | -1 | -2 | -1 | -2 | -1 | -2 | -1 | -2 |
| USA | 153 | 25.3 | 39.2 | 13.8 | 134.9 | 34.9 | 64.4 | 27.3 | 16.2 | 1.2 |
| USSR | 131.8 | 21.8 | 19.9 | 7.0 | 32.1 | 7.0 | 7.9 | 11.7 | 78.4 | 5.8 |
| Canada | 107.4 | 17.1 | 3.4 | 1.2 | 67.7 | 19.6 | 16.9 | 15.3 | - | - |
| -W. Europe | 47.8 | 7.9 | 20.2 | 7.1 | 36.7 | 9.5 | 22.1 | - | 27.4 | 2.0 |
| E. Europe | 33.3 | 5.5 | 21.9 | 7.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| China | 22.4 | 3.7 | 13.9 | - | 18.9 | 4.9 | 7.9 | 5.5 | - | - |
| Sweden | 22.4 | 3.7 | 4.9 | - | 8.1 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 160.8 | 11.9 |
| Finland | 21.2 | 3.5 | - | - | 25.9 | 6.7 | 4.9 | 3.4 | - | - |
| Japan | 17.5 | 2.9 | 4.8 | 1.7 | 22 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 3.8 | - | - |
| | | | | | 4.3 | 1.1 | 16.9 | 11.7 | - | - |
| Brazil | 8.7 | 1.6 | 23.3 | 8.2 | 6.2 | 1.6 | 10.1 | 7.0 | 40.5 | 9.5 |
| World | 674.7 | - | 284.2 | - | 366.7 | - | 144.3 | - | 1350.90 | - |

- (1) million cubic metres
- (2) percentage of global use

Source: "Perspecting the Earth", Vol. 1, pg. 296.

3. Can we Create a New Humanism? (1999)*

The great ethical and cultural problem that led to modern nihilism after Nietzsche, Heidegger and the post-modernists, lies in the fact that only a new humanism will allow us to recover a sense of the value of human life.

The question of a historical and social possibility of creating a new humanism in mass technological society that does not imply the mere residual survival of the tradition of classical humanism, is basically linked, in terms of its empirical requirements, to the four questions posed above.

As well as the necessary attention given to the four great problems already mentioned as empirical prerequisites, a new social-humanism cannot be simply a repetition of classical humanism, even if it identifies itself with that. Neither can it be merely a new edition of democratic socialism, which failed to deal with the problem of modern competitiveness.

To have influence and ability, a new humanism will have to rise out of a view of the world that is not harmonious, that realizes that the Cosmos has no meaning and that universal harmony does not exist. It must be aware of the instinctive nature of man and of the elements that control his reason. A new humanism will have to be intrinsically compatible with modern science and the current technological demands of mass society.

^{*} The present article is a summary of the conclusions of a lecture delivered at the Eva Klabin Rapaport Foundation on 19/07/99.

For a new humanism to arise, the basic question lies in modern man's decision to redefine with full scientific awareness, the dignity of man and the fact that he has a rational freedom that transcends the very factors and circumstances of his creation. Instead of being formed, as occurred in the 18th century, as the result of a universal harmony which we know does not exist, it will have to be formed as a free choice on the part of man to rationally and equitably rebuild the human world. The cosmos is paralyzed, but over an extremely long period in human terms – although very short in cosmic terms – man will be able to exercise his rational freedom over the Earth which, thanks to man's free will, can turn itself, through human action, into an intelligent and equitable planet. Within a short astronomical period and a long historical one, man is a demigod. The Demiurge of his own habitat, he is able to convert it into an extremely civilized and decent home for all men.

History shows us the cycle of constructive and destructive periods. The Hellenic period saw the ancient world reconstructed according to its ideas based on its awareness and affirmation of the *logos*. Christianity rebuilt the Hellenic-Roman world as well as the Barbarian one, giving it a new dimension of solidarity. The Renaissance created a world led by *virtu* and the desire for beauty. The Enlightenment overcame despotisms and obscurantist beliefs to build an illuminated world.

The deconstruction of the world that has been characteristic of the cultural cycle that arose at the end of the 19th century and has dominated our own period, can be exchanged for a humanism made up of a new plan for humanity guided towards building an intelligent and equitable world. The construction of this world has become a vital condition for the survival of civilized life on the planet. Nothing allows us to forecast that this new humanism will be built and prevail. Very much the opposite, current trends are moving in the opposite direction. The possible new humanism will not come out of the dominant tendencies noticeable in our time but precisely out of a rational and voluntary rejection of those tendencies. This rejection is necessary and possible in spite of being statistically a less probable one.

History is still a sequence of interrupted probabilities that occur when new macro-circumstances appear, such as natural disasters (the explosion of the island of Santorini) or human disasters (barbarian invasions) or worldchanging technological innovations (the invention of gunpowder) as well as the appearance of extraordinary personalities such as Moses, Confucius, the Buddha, Alexander, St Paul and Mohammed who changed the predominant patterns of life. Neo-humanism, in the form of a social humanism that is scientifically clear and technologically effective, is as improbable as it is indispensable and perfectly executable. Being aware of these aspects is taking a step towards creating it.



4. Time and History (2000)

I. Introduction

Human Time and Cosmic Time

What is time? St Augustine had already noted that he knew what time was but, when asked, felt unable to explain it. The difficulty in explaining what time is arises from the fact that all possible explanations are necessarily circular, in other words, they define time according to references to time itself. In the same way, definitions of space are subject to the constraint of circularity. The reason for this is the fact that space and time are irreducible primary dimensions. Time is the irreversible succession of moments, but moments are units of time.

For Plato, time was the "movable image of eternity". Aristotle understood time as "the number of movement related to before and after". Plotinus saw time as "the life of the soul in movement, as it passes from one state or act of experience to another". Although Augustine said he had difficulties in defining the time, he felt it was "the presence of past things as memory, the present of present things as vision and the presence of future things as expectations".

There is a double polarity in the various attempts to define time. The first concerns the distinction between time as the object of human existence and time as the object of physical science. A second polarity concerns, in each of

the previous reference modes of time, another group of alternatives. Time as human existence is understood by some - like Plotinus and St Augustine - as a subjective process, a spiritual state. For others - like Aristotle - it is an objective flow to which man is subject, either because time flows through him like a river, or because like a boat, he sails on it.

In a physical sense time is also understood in two different ways. For Newton and in a Euclidean view of the universe, time is a process of irreversible successions. There is an absolute time which runs irreversibly through successive instance. For the non-Euclidean physics of the Theory of Relativity, it is necessary to abandon structurally independent ideas of simultaneity and duration. For each pair of events, A and B, that are related in space, there is an inertial framework in which these events are simultaneous, but there is also another framework in which event A comes before event B, and yet another in which event B comes before A. The theory of relativity suggests that simultaneity is relative to a framework of axes. If one framework of axes moves relative to another, in that case events that are simultaneous relative to the first, are not so in relation to the second, and vice versa.

Time as human existence is presented as the continuous and irreversible flow of successive instants. This flow marks the biological rhythm of man (one heartbeat after another, so many heartbeats per minute, etc.) And the rhythm of his states of mind: the successive nature of life experiences.

Faced with this flow, the present appears in two different ways. One of them concerns the present as the immediate experience of the living being. In this sense, time is the period man spends in the world. From another point of view, the present as a concept, it refers to the process of continuous conversion by man of the immediate future into the immediate past. Everything happens as if, within the framework of duration, man continues and irreversibly passes from an immediate now to another now immediately following it.

II. A History of Time

Cosmological civilizations

Time has been understood during the course of history in a circular or a linear way. The cosmological and Hellenic civilizations had a circular concept of time. This concept was taken up again by Nietzsche with his theory of the eternal return. In contrast, the eschatological civilizations like the Persian,

Judean and Christian, had a linear concept in which time was understood as something that had an absolute beginning with the creation of the world, and would have an absolute end with the end of the world.

Cosmological civilizations like those of Babylon and Egypt, understood that everything that exists is part of the cosmos and is ruled by an eternal circularity, as happens with the orbits of the stars. For the Babylonians the Cosmos, of which man is an integral part, is seen as a system regulated by the gods, who form an assembly of immortal beings conceived in an anthropomorphic way, but with exceptional powers and led by a trinity. This trinity consists of the president of the gods, Anu, god of heaven, Entil, god of the air and the actual manager of the universe and Enki, god of the waters who has supreme intelligence and is a friend of humankind.

The Babylonian year was lunar, with 12 months. A 13th month was periodically inserted to make up for solar difference. After the 5th century AD, seven months were inserted into each cycle of 19 solar years, following the view that this period corresponded basically to 235 lunar months. The seven lunar days ended in a malignant day. The seven-day-week originates in Babylon.

Babylon also provided the concept of the zodiac, a heavenly zone in which the Moon, Sun and planets are found. In the 5th century AD the 12 signs of the zodiac, of 30 days each, were formulated. As a result of the zodiac, the invention of astrology dates from this time.

The King represents gods on earth and, like them, guarantees the prevalence of cosmic order over chaos. The main rite of propitiation is the New Year festival by which the continuity of cosmic order is insured. This reproduces the original victory of the world of Marduk over Tiamat, or chaos.

In Egypt, the circular concept of time takes on a particular aspect, that of a concomitant understanding of the world as being unchangeable. The world was created once, in a permanent form, including Egypt's, which has had the same unchanging aspect since the creation. Those changes are seen as merely irrelevant appearances, or as being cyclical and always returning to the same place.

The Egyptian year contained 12 months of 30 days each, with five days added after the end of the year to make 365 days. The Egyptian calendar was based on the observations of the rise in the waters of the Nile. The high waters occur when the last visible star before dawn is Sirius. It is estimated by means of regressive astronomical calculations, that this calendar was

adopted in 2,773 C. at the time of the Minister Inhope in the reign of Djoser, in the Third Dynasty.

The civil year was divided into three seasons of four months each, which correspond respectively to the periods of flooding, sowing of seeds and the harvest. The Egyptian calendar was lunar. The Egyptians discovered that 309 lunar months are almost equivalent to 25 civil years, that is, one solar month is the same as 1.03 lunar months.

The Egyptian day had two parts, each with 12 solar hours, but hours of unequal length because one part was day and the other night. The hours were measured by sundials which are only accurate at the equinox. For another kind of control of time, the Egyptians invented de clepsydra, which had two inverted cones joined at the two points, with a small hole between them, that measured the time for mortar or fine sand to run from the upper come to the lower and allowing for the subsequent inversion of the cones.

Greece

In Greece, the circular concept of time acquires a rational meaning which is completely different from the cosmological meaning. Both Plato and Aristotle saw time as coexisting with the world and the latter being subject to a cyclical process. For Plato, the world was created by a divine artificer, the Demiurge, who tried to mould material in the shape of an absolute model, the eternal idea of the world, and created time based on the idea of eternity. Time is therefore the movable image of eternity in the ambit of which the world moves. The world and time follow a cyclical trajectory characterized by a positive period regulated by the gods, and a period of decline when the world is guided by its own forces, which leads in each cycle to a period when the gods restore the world to a new and positive phase.

For Aristotle the world is finite but eternal; time is the measure of the movement of the world. Like each of the stars, the world, taken all together, follows an eternal cyclical trajectory which had no beginning and will have no end.

The Linear Concept of Time

With the exception of the evolutionism of Epicurus and Lucretius, the linear conception of time was introduced by the eschatological religions. The world, created by God and with it time, follows a course that will end with the

end of the world and of time. This linear concept of time is common in Mazdean Persia, among the Hebrews and in Christianity and, through the influence of the latter two, in Islam and its own version of the Final Judgment.

According to Zarathustra, Ahura Mazda, the Wise Lord, creator of heaven, earth and men, also created at the beginning of time, two twin spirits, later identified as Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu, who opted respectively for Good and Evil. Ahura Mazda, the omniscient, knew in advance that the spirits would become the spirits of good and evil, but deliberately made them like that to give men then free choice between good and evil. The struggle between the two principles will characterize the whole of history but will end, at the end of time, with the victory of Good.

This same linear nature characterizes the Judaic and Christian concepts of the world and time. God created man as a free being. By choosing the part of sin, the man lost his original innocence. In the Christian way of thinking, a second opportunity for salvation has been given to man with the incarnation of Christ. Those who follow him will be saved. The world and time will end at the end of history with the consuming of the world at the Final Judgment, the resurrection of the dead, the eternal salvation of the good and damnation of the bad.

The linear concept of history and time has lasted until our own time, passing through a profoundly religious stage from the Middle Ages until the 17th century when it arrived at an increasingly profane view in the 18th century. Darwin's evolutionism and in a general way, the scientific thinking of the 19th century, including its Marxist version, would imprint a purely immanentist meaning on the linear concept of history.

Anew circular understanding of time, however, arises initially with Nietzsche and his idea of the death of God and the eternal return of the latter. At the same time, the cosmological theories of George Gamov and W. R. Bonner support the thesis of an infinitely circular process of explosion ("big bang"), expansion ("inflation") reconcentration ("big crunch") and a new explosion of the Cosmos

III. The Time of History

History as a Process and a Discipline

The word 'history' has a double meaning in all Western languages. One concerns the historical process, the *res gesta*, the other the discipline which

studies this process, the *historia rerum gestarum*. History as a process began with the emergence of culture when man became able to pass on ways of behavior that were not biologically inherited. The historical process also only became the part the object of history as a discipline when it transmitted to a historian information concerning its events.

In a recently concluded work entitled *A Critical Study of History*, which has been translated into an excellent Portuguese version by Ambassador Sergio Bath, and should be published next year by the Editora Paz e Terra, I had the opportunity of discussing these two meanings of the word 'history' more broadly. I shall refer those interested in the matter to this book and restrict myself here to making some brief comments.

After a long tradition, from the chronologies of Mesopotamia and Egypt to Greek and Roman historiography, history has passed through various stages in Western culture, culminating in the present day in the understanding that the historian is the person who, using the appropriate methodology, reinterprets the past in terms of the indicators he gleans from it. The task of the historian to discover and identify these indicators, choosing those he feels to be reliable, and interpreting them.

What is this past that the historian seeks to interpret? This past is the *res gesta*, it is that which, according to specific criteria of relevance, we suppose to have happened at certain places and times. Not everything which we suppose to have happened is interesting to the historian. Human biological processes are not usually relevant. The importance of certain people, however, gives relevance to their birth or their death. The customs of daily life on their own are not relevant, but the type of daily life of a certain people or a certain time, if not of a certain personality, may become a relevant object of study for the historian.

Thus it is fundamental for historical research to discover what it feels to be relevant in a certain era in the past. Until the first decades of the 20th century the understanding of relevance in terms of historical evidence was basically confined to events understood as being sufficiently important to influence the subsequent course of history. This sense of relevance was, until the mid-19th century, mainly understood in political terms. Economic and cultural aspects of the past were gradually recognized being relevant in the historiography of Burkhardt (1818-1897) for culture, and for economy, the paradigmatic case of Marx (1818-1883). With the school of the "Annals" begun by Marc Bloch (1886-1944) and Lucien Febvre (1878-1956), the

criterion of historical relevance expanded to include everything and all facts, however insignificant they might have been, since in the eye of the historian, they must be understood as having had influence on the event that the historian proposes to study.

Broadening the criterion of historical reference to include the most varied events and facts, however insignificant they might seem to be, and concentrating on the effects that may justifiably be attributed to them, does not mean that everything which happens is historically relevant. It simply means that what is historically relevant may arise out of the most varied facts and circumstances, even if they seem to be insignificant. The job of the historian has become more demanding. What makes something historically relevant, however, although it may be independent of the apparent relevance of the factors that led to their happening, is not arbitrary, but depends on how much the event in question may be validly understood as having noticeably influenced the subsequent course of history.

The Acceleration of History

One of the most interesting phenomena in the historical process is its acceleration. This acceleration makes itself felt in relation to the macro-stages of the process. The Paleolithic period lasted more than a million years, and the Neolithic for only about 10,000 and the civilizations we recognize for 5,000 years.

This acceleration continues to be felt in the history of civilizations. The Mesopotamian civilization, that of the Sumerian cities which emerged around 3,200 BC, until Babylon fell into the hands of Alexander in 332 BC, lasted for 2,868 years. The Old Kingdom of Egypt, which began in about 2,615 BC until its conquest by Alexander in 332 BC, lasted for 2,283 years. In contrast with these long civilizations, Greek civilization, from Homer to the Roman conquest of Greece, lasted for only about six centuries. If we compare and the length of the Egyptian civilization with the length of time of the modern world, we may calculate that an Egyptian century roughly corresponds to one modern year.

The acceleration of history is basically determined by scientific and technological progress. Humanity took a thousand years to go from the state of gathering food provided by nature to being food producers by means of agriculture and animal breeding. It took 10,000 years to replace the Neolithic

village with urban civilization. It took about 2,400 years to overcome the magic view of the world held in Mesopotamia and Egypt and replace it with a rational view of the Greeks.

Until the 19th century, human locomotion on land depended on the horse and at sea, on the wind. After the Industrial Revolution, scientific and technological progress developed increasingly rapidly. Technical applications of scientific innovations required many years, until the beginning of the 20th century, to take place. Today, the speed with which scientific discoveries are turned into technological processes is such that high technology companies are carrying out scientific research in their own laboratories to keep their discoveries secret in order to quickly patent the resulting technical applications.

This extraordinary acceleration in history has brought about two separate results. The first is that, in its initial phase, the acceleration of history means the acceleration of relevant facts. The speed with which news circulates, with which people move and with which events are produced correspondingly speeds up historically relevant events. However, after a certain rate in the aforementioned sense of speed in the circulation of news, movement of people and production of events, the events thus produced become increasingly irrelevant.

In as Heidegger and others have observed, the increasing acceleration of technological progress has led to a profound change in its meaning. Technological progress occurs in terms of the use of scientific discoveries to improve the condition of man in the world: the railway was an excellent substitute for the horse, the telegraph replaced unreliable transmissions by semaphore and medicine has freed men from an infinite number of illnesses and substantially prolonged the length of life and improved its quality. After a certain moment, however, although certain relevant innovations remain, as continues to happen in our time, technological innovations become increasingly cosmetic, as in the case of new models of cars. Changes are made so that things can stay the same.

The Collapse of the Future

The acceleration of history that has been brought about by the acceleration of technological progress has led initially to an increase in the 'technologization' of life. The relationship between man and nature is turning mainly into the relationship between man and technology. The continuous acceleration of

this process, however, leads to a progressive emptying of history. Things change in order to remain the same. This is a result of the fact that the phenomenon of relevance is not arbitrary, and for this reason cannot be arbitrarily produced. What is relevant is what significantly affects, positively or negatively, the human condition in general and the life of man in particular. The chance of something significantly affecting the condition of the life of man is limited by the psychological and physical nature of the human being.

In it is important for men to determine with sufficient precision, the course of time. The mechanical clock was a big improvement on the sundial and the clepsydra. The modern precision clock allows us to measure situations in which minutes are important, to the nearest second. It is useless, in daily life, to improve the precision of clocks to indicate fractions of a second. The same can be said of all technologies of space and time. It is important to have fast cars. It is however useless to give ordinary cars the capacity to achieve extraordinary speeds because the requirements of traffic impose speed restrictions on streets and highways.

Given the technological conditions currently available, the marginal use of almost all technical innovations is greatly decreasing. Modern developed societies have increasingly less to gain from merely space-time innovations. What societies need more and more are social and philosophical innovations that will do away with the immense inequalities existing between rich and poor nations and, in all parts of the world, between privileged and needy sectors of society. What modern man needs increasingly is to recover is the meaning of his life and save it from the shipwreck of an intransitive technological consumerism in which he loses personal substance to become a mere function and thus, becomes replaceable by another equivalent function. From the highest to the most modest functions, the man-function has become a disposable man.

On the path we are following, the continued acceleration of history and of a progress that consists of continual changes to keep things the same, the modern world is faced with the emptying of its present and the prospect of the collapse of its future. The irrelevance of today as the future of yesterday announces the irrelevance of the future tomorrows.

Human history, as the adventure of a late-flowering species in the evolution of life, will end before the extinction of more resilient species like insects and bacteria. The last animal to appear on the earth, man, will be one of the first to make himself extinct, long before the cosmic extinction of the planet. History

however as *res gesta*, will tend to end far earlier than the zoological extinction of man if and when, as everything seems to indicate, the shipwreck of the disposable man within technological intransitivism leads to the collapse of the future. History will continue while the human species exists, as a sequence of generations and of human actions. History as *res gesta* will finish if and when everything turns into an irrelevant process of the disposable man. This is what the collapse of the future means.

A New Humanism?

Faced with this process and this prospect, the question arises: what can we do? The answer requires two especially relevant clarifications. The first concerns the measure in which historical and social processes that have a high probability of following a certain course can come to take a different direction. The second clarification concerns the extent to which specific scientific and technological innovations which are already under way or which may occur, might significantly change the human condition or the very nature of man.

In terms of the probable course of a specific historical and social process, we find both diachronically and synchronically, that no process follows its initial course indefinitely. In the long term, modifications of parameters will inevitably occur, changing the initial course and characteristics of a process. It on the other hand, it is found, although rarely, that highly improbable or unpredictable events may occur. The way in which history accelerates as discussed above, creating an increasing alienation in man, who is converted by that process of intransitive technological consumerism into a disposal man, will tend to raise resistance on the part of the people and groups who may possibly be able to modify the course of things. Man who, because of his rational freedom is a transcendent being, will show a nature that is in conflict with that of the disposable man. The probability is that reactions directed towards reaffirming human dignity will make themselves felt is no less likely than that of the alienating process referred to previously taking its course. What cannot be predicted is what will happen.

The hypothesis that relevant improbable or unpredictable things will happen, even if infrequently, cannot be ignored. When Alexander, with fewer than 40,000 men, attacked the Persian Empire which was able to mobilize

armies of up to a million men, it was highly improbable that he would succeed but he managed to conquer Persia. The saga of Mohammed is no less improbable and unpredictable. Expelled from Mecca with a tiny group of followers, he managed to reorganize his forces in Medina and during his lifetime created a new religion and a new political and military force which, over a period of a few decades, conquered half the inhabited world and created a new civilization.

However worrying the present economic and technological tendencies and the increased scope of their alienating effects may be, disposable man may be rescued by a new humanism. If the human basis of this possibility is man's transcendent condition, specific cultural and geopolitical conditions will be necessary to reverse the alienating process. Two of these conditions seem to be essential. One consists in the creation, consolidation and expansion of a new humanism which will necessarily be of a social and environmental nature. And if, as happened during the emergence of all the great religions and all great cultural movements, an emerging social and environmental humanism manages to establish itself and spread on a large scale, the cultural conditions will be created to control man's alienation and create a compatibility between the individual and collective dignity of man with technological civilization, even if significant consumerist aspects remain within it.

On the other hand, for this new humanism to establish itself and expand, it will become necessary for it to prevail in certain geopolitical areas. The conversion of Constantine and the official adoption of Christianity in Imperial Rome was the necessary condition for its establishment and expansion. For a new humanism inspired in society and ecology to prevail, the emergence of this movement will have to be assured of having an adequate territorial basis.

It is important to point out in this respect that the ruling neoliberal doctrine in the United States and in various other parts of the world is one of the cultural foundations of the current process of consumerist-technological alienation. An emerging socio-environmental humanism will only prosper if it can erode the neoliberal beliefs and interests in the United States itself or succeed in restraining neoliberalism in other regions of the world such as Europe, Latin America or in different conditions, countries like China and Russia. As a view of the world and as a practice, neoliberalism is incompatible with a new humanism and has definitely led to the current process of consumerist-technological alienation in man.

A New Human Nature:

The recent development of molecular biology, the identification of the human genome and the improvement of cloning techniques, among other innovations in the field of biology, are creating the possibility of genetic engineering that will lead to the introduction of substantial modifications in human nature. It has become possible to modify the structural profile of the human genome and possibly the very molecular composition of human genes.

Experiments currently being carried out are being directed towards enabling the substitution of defective cells, and even tissues and organs, thus opening up an extraordinary new area of medicine. Everything indicates, however, that this type of experiment will lead to the possibility of introducing substantial modifications in the human genome, with the corresponding modification of human nature. The slow evolutionary process that led to the emergence of *homo habilis*, his transition to *homo erectus* and the final appearance of *homo sapiens* will, through an evolution that has been deliberately brought about by genetic engineering, create a new type of human nature. Moreover we shall not be able to escape the supposition that it is quite probable that this genetic leap will happen. What consequences will come from it?

Those involved in these experiments will certainly argue with great conviction that this genetic engineering will lead to an improvement of human nature, making man more immune to dysfunctional or contagious illnesses, significantly prolonging his useful and healthy life and improving his intellectual and moral qualities. This optimism seems to require a decisive distinction to be made between what biological improvements of the human machine may mean and what is meant by a moral improvement in human nature. If the first hypothesis seems very probable, the second is the least highly debatable.

The moral characteristics of human nature as they appeared from the evolutionary process of hominids are conditioned by a complicated and dialectical balance between basic impulses: egoism, which is necessary to preserve human individuality and the individual's reproductive capacity, and altruism, which is necessary for the social preservation of man and the development of culture.

Like everything which results from the evolutionary process, understood in its widest and most cosmic dimension, the final characteristics of this process, which may be observed in the case of man, have led to an extraordinary psycho-physical and rational-volitional system which only shows the characteristics it does because the evolutionary process strictly followed the directions which, partly by chance, it actually came to take. Insignificant modifications which may have occurred in this long process have provoked completely different results, notably in terms of human life and nature.

The exceptional singularity of the dialectical balance that came to exist, as the final result of this evolutionary process, between the basic impulses of human nature have necessarily led to the supposition that small substantial modifications in the egoism-altruism equation will either produce an individual superman (already identified in science fiction as the "exterminator of the future") who is incompatible with the preservation of society and culture (a situation in which the process would have no continuation), or a sub-individual completely conditioned, like social insects, to guarantee the optimal functioning of society, which is what will probably happen.

Final Thoughts

The ideas outlined above lead on the one hand to alarming prospects concerning the future of man and, on the other, they open the way, although it seems to be very unlikely to occur, to the emergence of a new humanism inspired in society and ecology.

An initial supposition is currently inescapable: that the alienating tendencies that have arisen from the current union of the economic-technological process with an intransitive consumerism have led to the creation of the disposable man, and with him, to the collapse of the future. A second supposition is also currently inescapable: that the emerging genetic engineering will lead to the development of modifications in human nature which will suppress or significantly reduce its transcendent characteristics and create the conditions to perpetuate intransitive technological consumerism of a type of human the disposability of whom will come to form part of his nature.

Regardless of all this, modern man, however disposable he may be becoming, is still a transcendent being by nature. As long as human nature is not adulterated, the option will remain open for man to react against his own disposability.

At this moment of transition from the 20th century to the next, nothing is more important than to recognize that the human condition is being seriously threatened to the point of putting human nature itself at risk. A social-

environmental humanism can save human dignity and adjust the economic and technological world to the transcendence of man. The great religions that changed the world began from a basis of recognizing the crisis surrounding them that was far less adequate than our capacity today to understand the crisis of modern society. The emergence of a social-environmental humanism, although not a highly probable event, could happen if we wished it to. It will happen quite simply if a sufficient critical mass in modern humanity have the courage and consistency to demand that this humanism is actually created.

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5. Humanism in a Mass-Technological Society (2002)

Introduction

Dealing with the question of humanism in a mass technological society, even at a perfunctory level, requires a brief clarification of what is understood by the two terms in the proposition and the extent to which their respective essential characteristics are reciprocally compatible.

Understood in its widest and most basic form, as a set of attitudes and ideas that make men and the human element man's preferred object of attention has a long tradition during the course of history from its most remote and initial manifestations until its problematic situation in our day.

In its broadest sense, humanism is contemporary with the emergence of *homo sapiens*. Becoming aware of the mortality of his condition, creating tombs for the dead and rites for their burial is something that man has done since he became fully human about 40,000 years ago. The cave paintings of Lascaux and Altamira, probably expressing propitiatory exorcisms for hunting, are a first manifestation of humanism, through which elements of Nature are subordinated to human designs.

In a sense nearer to its current one, there are signs of humanism in ancient Oriental civilizations by which man expresses his existential anguish, as in the Babylonian poem about the Good Man Suffering - a prototype of what would come to be the biblical narrative of Job. The Code of Hammurabi contains a

humanist sense of justice and protection for the unprotected. There is a profound sense of humanism in ancient Egypt, in its art, in the narration of the lively debate between the man who wants to commit suicide and his own soul, or in the Book of the Dead.

Mass society, for its part, also has traces of antiquity. The old Eastern empires were mass organizations, although with large servile or semi-servile sectors. The Hellenic Realms and, in an even clearer sense, the Roman Empire, contained masses similar to those of today administered by a combination of coercion, clientilistic relationships and popular strategies, such as *panem et circenses*. What is new in our time is the technological mass society, that is, a mass society which, as Jaspers observed, consists of a technological system the masses use without understanding it as an integral part of a second nature.

This mass technological society which emerged with the Industrial Revolution, increased greatly in terms of numbers after the last third of the 19th century and has reached colossal proportions in our time. Based on the technological innovations of recent decades, the masses have been led into an inherent consumerism ever further away from the humanist values that developed from ancient Greece until the mid-19th century. How can the humanist tradition from Socrates and Plato, from Cicero and Seneca, from the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, Goethe and Tolstoy be compatible with modern mass of society?

The humanist tradition

In spite of its initial manifestations in Paleolithic times and in the ancient Eastern civilizations, humanism as a conscious reflection of man concerning his own condition and a conscious priority that man gives to everything that is human, is a product of Greek civilization. It appeared with Homer in the form of heroic humanism and the cult of *areté*. It developed with the Sophists, especially Protagoras, who saw man as the measure of all things. It reached its classic height with the reflections of Socrates and Plato on virtue as being the knowledge and practice of good. As Heidegger observed, it was the Roman Republic that gave humanism its name: the *homo humanus* as opposed to the *homo barbarus*, incorporating the Greek *paidéia*. *Paidéia* may be translated as *humanitas*. The *romanitas* of the *homo romanus* consists in this *humanitas*.

This humanism impregnated all the manifestations of classical culture after that of Greece: the architecture of Ichthinos, sculpture from Phidias to Praxiteles, the painting of Polygnotus, the poetry of Sappho, the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, the comedy of Aristophanes, the politics of Pericles or Alexander's *homonoia*. This humanism would be continued by the circle of the Scipios, by Cicero and Lucretius and by the Stoics from Seneca to Marcus Aurelius.

Classical humanism oscillates between the poles of relativism and categorism. The relativist, with a tendency to agnosticism or atheism – from Protagora to Aristotle and Lucretius – makes man the center of himself, while the categorist – from Socrates to Plato and the Stoics – leans towards a metaphysical monotheism, measuring man by his dedication to virtue and the supreme good, justice. The tradition of classical humanism was incorporated into Christianity from its Hellenization until St Albert the Great (1200-1280) and St Thomas, via its platonic aspect. The reconstruction of Christian philosophy on Aristotelian bases by St Thomas (1215-1274) gave new value to the concept of virtue as a means to an end.

Medieval humanism, under the influence of the profound theocentrism of the time, shows significant differences which mainly arose out of the developments that took place within the Church, and the development of the medieval city. In general terms, we can see that the ecclesiastical structure inherited from ancient Christianity based on the network of the parish, Bishop and Archbishop follows the expansion of the Independent Benedictine abbeys after the foundation of Cluny in 910, followed by that of Citeaux in 1098 and Clairvaux in 1115. Benedictine humanism, the highest expression of which is found in St Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), was mystical and rational in its nature but was also responsible for the preservation and study of the great manuscripts of antiquity and led to the construction of Romanesque abbeys, the paintings of illuminated manuscripts and great pictures in an art form that sought to show the Divine by means of the human as in the fresco *Christ in Majesty* in Berze la Ville, dating from 1180.

From the beginning of the 13th century, the Benedictine period is followed by that of the mendicant orders at the same time as medieval cities expanded. The militant humanism of absolute charity of the Franciscans (founded in 1209) and the humanism of rational faith of the Dominicans (founded in 1215) reflects the spirit of these two orders. Franciscan humanism is also intellectualized by St Boaventura (1265-1321), Duns Scotus (1265-1308) and William of

Ockham (c. 1220-1349), that led to a nominalist-leaning voluntarism. The rational faith of the Dominicans would lead to St Thomas and to Christian Aristotelianism.

The Franciscan-Dominican dichotomy would continue in the representative arts. The 'Franciscan' or 'illusionist' style praised by Roger Bacon (c.1220-c.1292) emphasise the need to create the illusion of volume by means of perspective and found in Giotto (1266/7-1377) its brilliant practitioner. His picturzs of St Francis emphasized at the same time the humanity and goodness of the Saint. The anti-illusionist 'Dominican style' makes a deliberate return to two-dimensional painting in order to emphasise the sense of the divine, as in Duccio de Buonisegna's (c. 1235-c. 1318) *Maestá* (1308-11).

The development of cities after the 11th century led to the emergence of humanism either in the universities as in Paris (1150 or 1170) and Bologna (the end of the 10th century) which created an academic humanism as in the brilliant Abelard (1079-1142) or that of independent intellectuals like Gandhi (1265-1321) and also with the Italian Renaissance and, after it, the spread of the Renaissance view of the universe into Northern Europe and the Iberian peninsula, in which classical humanism is recreated in an even more powerful form. Italian humanism began at the end of the 13th century and at its height, with Petrarch (1304-1374), rediscovered Roman culture with a later addition of Greek culture.

As we know, there was a great controversy about whether the Renaissance was qualitatively different from the Middle Ages. The idea of a deep hiatus between medieval and Renaissance thinking, as defended by Erwin Panofsky and others, conflicts with the idea of continuity. Since the patristic period, Latin writers had been read by medieval scholars but now this controversy has been overcome, as Alan Bullock has demonstrated. Although it is true that Burkhardt, in his classic book on the Renaissance in Italy, exaggerated this break, it is undeniable that since Petrarch the appropriation of the classical world has occurred in a different way to that of the Middle Ages. For the Middle Ages, the Latin classics were useful as a support for Christian thought. For the Renaissance they were the door to the world of classicism itself, which was felt to be superior to the medieval world with the single exception of the preservation of the Christian Revelation.

Thus humanism begins as a rediscovery of Rome and the unsurpassed excellence of the classical world. From Rome, thus humanism will move on to increasingly incorporate Greece after the second third of the 14th century.

The Byzantine scholar Manuel Chrysolaras, appointed by Salutari to teach Greek in Florence in 1337, began to teach Hellenic language and culture, which soon formed part of humanist studies. In its initial stage Italian humanism was philological and literary. Latin texts began to be read for their own sakes and their merit as the expression of a superior culture and as literary models. The humanists wrote in Latin - as well as improving the vernacular - and made great efforts to achieve standards in language comparable to those of Cicero at the same time as they undertook a laborious search for new original works and made an extraordinary increase to the available stock of Latin manuscripts.

In its second stage, in the second half of the 15th century, when Florence was the centre and the group surrounding the Medicis was its magnetic and energising nucleus, humanism created a new view of the universe. Like Protagoras, man felt that he was the measure of all things. Exercising his rational freedom in a decisive and intelligent way, man enjoyed the *virtu* necessary to impose himself on fate. Life is seen as being an opportunity for men to show his excellence as well as a chance to show unlimited production of beauty and the taste for beauty. The generation of humanists like Salutati (1330-1406), Leonardo Bruni (1369-1444), and Luiz Battista Alberti (1404-1472), painters like Giotto (1266-1276), Simone Martini (1284-1344) and Masaccio (1401-1428), of sculptors like Brunelleschi (1377-1446) and Donatello (1386-1466), is followed, especially in the courts of Cósimo (1389-1464) and then Lorenzo de Medici (1440-92), by the generation of humanists like Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), at the head of the Platonic Academy of Florence and Pico della Mirándola (1463-1494), of political thinkers like Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Guicciardini (1483-1540), of painters like Boticelli (1445-1510) and Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), of architects like Vasari (1511-1574), and of sculptors like Michangelo (1475-1564).

The cult of beauty in the human being and finds its typical expression in the Florence of the Medicis, with the inspiring beauty and grace of Simonetta Vespucci. Giuliano de Medici loved her and dedicated his tournament victory to her in 1475, which Poliziano, who also loved her, celebrated in his *Stanze della Giostra de Giuliano de Médici*, and Boticelli immortalized her in *The Birth of Venus* and *Spring*.

From its centre in Florence, humanism spreads throughout Italy, with important developments in Venice and Rome. In Venice, the influence of Aldus Mauntius (1450-1515) who began the editing of Greek texts that would

bring fame to the Aldine Press and which Erasmus visited in 1506, joined forces with pictorial developments centred around the Bellinis, Jacopo (1400-1470) and his sons Gentile (1429-1507) and Giovanni (1430-15 six).

In Rome the Renaissance and humanism were promoted by a series of Popes from Nicholas V (1445-55) who built the Vatican Library, followed by Calixtus III, Paul II and Sixtus IV with the Sistine Chapel. Alexander VI and mainly Julius II (1503-13), who began work on St Peter's and Leo X, Giovanni de Medici (1513-21) the moving spirit behind the construction of the Basilica and built the church of St John the Baptist on Via Giulia. The semi-paganization introduced by the Renaissance popes and the abuse of indulgences to finance work on St Peter's, together with papal luxury, created increasing ill-feeling in Northern Europe that culminated in Luther nailing his 95 theses to the doors of the church in Wittenberg in 1517, which unleashed the Protestant Reformation.

The Italian Renaissance was closely followed by that of Flanders and frequent contact was established between Flemish and Italian artists. Nevertheless, we must differentiate between the Renaissance style in the case of Flanders in Northern Europe, especially in painting, and the later wave of humanism. Jan van Eyck (1385-1432), with his unsurpassed *Adoration of the Lamb* in de Ghent (1427-1432), or Rogier van der Weyden (1400-64), with his *Descent from the Cross*, are excellent Renaissance artists but they belong to the culture of medieval Christianity as did Giotto a century before. Northern European humanism began a century later with Erasmus (1466-1536), Thomas More (1477-1535) and Guillaume Budé (1468-1540).

In Iberia, Renaissance art also preceded humanism. In the 15th century an important Catalan school of painting developed under Flemish influence and in Portugal, also influenced by Flanders, a master of extraordinary talent, Nuno Gonçalves appeared, his Saint Vincent Triptych (1460) containing a portrait of Prince Henry the Navigator. The late-arriving Iberian humanism encouraged by Cardinal Ximenes (1436-1517), reached its highest level of expression in Spain with Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) and Luiz Vaz de Camoens (1524-1580), in Portugal.

The invasions of Italy in the 16th century, which became the seat of conflict between the France of Louis XII and Francis I, and the German Empire, the crisis of the Reformation, religious wars and the Counter-Reformation, destroyed the optimism of the Renaissance and introduced an element of pessimism into the humanist tradition. Montaigne (1533-92) in his essays

and Shakespeare (1564-1616), speaking through Hamlet, express the tragic sense of the world in the Baroque age and find the answer to the challenges of their time in a new stoicism. From the end of the 17th century, the waste of religious controversies, the horrors of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and the development of a new rationalism beginning with Descartes (1596-1650), continued with Spinoza (1632-1677) reached its peak in the rational optimism of Leibnitz (1646-1716), opened the way for a new world view that would lead to the Enlightenment. Newton's (1642-1727) physics and astronomy, which went beyond Descartes' theories about vortices, ushered in a new mentality that restored confidence in the harmony of the world based on harmony in the universe. The scientific and social writings of Bernard de Fontenelle (1657-1757) at the end of the 17th century brought about the view of the universe enjoyed by the century of the Enlightenment.

The rationalist humanism of the 18th century re-awoke the Renaissance passion for classical antiquity – which had lasted during the Baroque period – searching within a new idealized view of the Roman Republic for a model of society and the State. Enlightened humanism like that of the Renaissance was mainly aimed at action but with the difference that it was less attractive to individual action and more to the reform of society. The Enlightenment had an all-embracing view of the world and found a general harmony in nature, from the cosmic harmony discovered by Newton to the harmony of living nature explained by Buffon (1707-1788) in his Natural History. This harmony could be produced in human societies, demonstrating a harmony to which man is naturally inclined – as Rousseau (1712-1778) would claim – but which loses its strength when faced with the association between despotism and religious superstitions.

The task proposed by the *philosophes* from Montesquieu (1689-1755) to Rousseau was the establishment of a rational and egalitarian society, eliminating the absolute power of the Church and replacing traditional authority with the authority of reason. The enlightened humanists were mainly deists, with rare exceptions such as the materialism of Baron Holbach but they confronted revealed religion and showed themselves to be deeply critical of Christianity as it was preached by the Church. Voltaire (1694-1778) made in the demystification of ecclesiastical power his main mission in life ("écrasez l'infame"), contrasting religious myths with the "natural religion" found written in the heart of man and showing itself in the harmony of the universe. The *encyclopédistes*, through Diderot (1713-1784) and d'Alembert (1717-73)

worked to achieve the immense task of gathering and ordering existing knowledge for the education and enlightenment of humanity, promoting science and culture in place of religious myths and obscurantist traditions in order to establish a good society.

Locke (1632-1704), Montesquieu, Rousseau and Jefferson (1743-1826) saw a good society as being the product of the free association between freeborn men who preserved their freedom by means of the law and freely elected government systems. These ideas would attract a following of all educated minds in Europe and will become the main engine of the French Revolution as well as British parliamentarianism and the democratic reform movements of the first half of the 19th century.

Although it was less intense than Renaissance humanism, the humanism of the Enlightenment was broader in its individual forms of expression. As well as its manifestations in the writings of the *philosophes* and the encyclopédistes, who lent a modern dimension to historiography, it reached its highest intellectual peak with Kant (1724-1804) and achieved an extraordinary expression in art. If Rococo painting is in general inferior to the great Baroque painting, Watteau (1684-1721) and Chardin (1600-1779) in France, Gainsborough (1727-1788) and Lawrence (1769-1830) in England, Canaletto (1697-1768), Tiépolo (1696-1770) and Guardi (1712-93) in Venice and above all, Goya (1746-1828), in his enlightened period, symbolize a splendid period in the history of art. Nevertheless, it was in music that artistic humanism came to technical maturity in the 18th century, its highest forms of expression reaching levels never before achieved, with Vivaldi (1675-1741), Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750), Gluck (1714-1787), Haydn (1732-1809), the divine Mozart (1756-1791) and the first period of the genius of Beethoven (1770-1827).

The humanist tradition remained alive during the first half of the 19th century with the incorporation of Romantic feeling. Goethe (1749-1832), Schiller (1759-1805), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), the founder of the University of Berlin, Hegel (1770-1831) and Marx (1818-1883) represent high points in 19th-century humanism. As in the previous century, music was an incomparable expression of human feeling. It culminated with the towering figure of Beethoven's work, which had its supreme expression in the composer's mature years, Schubert (1797-1838), Mendelssohn (1807-1847), Schumann (1810-1856) and Chopin (1810-1849) marked the high point of musical Romanticism. The second half of the century, during which the crisis

of modern humanism began, still maintained the high level of musical humanism with the heroic expression of Wagner (1813-1883) and Brahms (1833-1897) in the final manifestation of Classical-Romantic harmony.

Humanism and its Crisis

From Greece to Goethe, from Phydias to Cánova, from Polygnotus to Goya, from Greek chant to Beethoven, humanism in all its changing historical expressions, as Pico della Mirándola said, was an affirmation of the dignity of man. In its many forms, according to historical period or means of expression – word, marble, color, music – man was celebrated for his rational freedom, his transcendence of circumstances and his very psycho-physical structure.

Explicitly or implicitly, the humanist tradition was based on a general feeling of harmony that stretched from the cosmic harmony of the spheres to the harmony of the human body and the possible harmony of human life and society. Even in its most utopian expressions and periods, humanism – from Pericles' view of Athens to proposals for the ideal city, because in accordance with Christianity with Augustine and the Church Fathers, or in accordance with reason with Thomas More or the *philosophes* – there was always full awareness of the distance separating current reality from society and the human life within it from the humanist ideal of society and its way of life. This distance is not, however, understood as an expression or product of a lack of natural or innate harmony, but rather as the result of distortions caused by evil and unjust institutions. These distortions may be overcome at the individual level by areté, by the virtu that overcomes fate, and by the stoic resistance that overcomes all vicissitudes. It may be collectively defeated by demystifying obscurantist beliefs and despotic practices through the imposition of the principles of reason.

While confidence in universal harmony and the strength of reason endured, the classical forms of humanism also endured. This confidence in reason and universal harmony ran into a crisis after the first third of the 19th century. Nietzsche (1844-1900) argued against Socratic humanism and Christian humanism in the name of the power of the will and a change in values that overcame moral pieties, establishing an ethic of excellence in superior men, the Superman. Freud (1856-1939) demystified the autonomy of reason by showing how much man is guided by his instinct, his erotic impulses and his fear of death. With the expansion of the Industrial Revolution, international

trade and colonialism, European societies in the final third of the 19th century enjoyed increased prosperity which, however, was concentrated in the hands of a minority of businessmen and capitalists. The vast majority of people either continued to receive very small incomes from agricultural work or was subjected, in return for subsistence wages, to exhausting manufacturing labor that mercilessly exploited women and children.

This savage capitalism brought about a reaction on the part of liberals with social consciences such as John Stuart Mill (1806-73), moral socialists such as Proudhon (1809-1865) and above all, Karl Marx (1818-1883). Marx dedicated his life to criticizing bourgeois society, from his brilliant sociophilosophical teachings in the Paris Manuscripts (1844), in *German Ideology* (1845-46) and in the *Communist Manifesto* (1848) up to his extended an unfinished study *Das Kapital*, the first volume of which was published in 1867 and in which he defends an interpretation of economics that would not be borne out by the subsequent development of that discipline.

Marx's criticism of bourgeois society only produced practical results many years after his death. Nevertheless, important social movements began to have an increasing impact, from trade unionism to the various branches of socialism that culminated, as a result of the First World War, in the Russian Revolution in 1917. Before that date, Lloyd George had begun, with the 1911 Insurance Act and with the radical wing of liberalism, to construct what would later become the British welfare state. The revisionist socialism developed by Bernstein at the beginning of the 20th century (*Evolutionary Socialism*, 1909) would gradually become the great social democratic movement that would dominate the European political scene after the Second World War. Criticisms of brutal capitalism and the proposal for an egalitarian society went beyond the borders of the various forms of socialism and became a common position in political movements inspired by Christian democrat and socio-liberal ideals.

The humanist tradition arising out of the Enlightenment was deeply affected by the intellectual and social movements of the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. These were the first light of a historical period marked by a crisis in the belief in universal harmony. The ethics of solidarity, the fundamental basis of humanism, were attacked by Nietzsche and the theorists of violence, a movement that would produce Nazism-Fascism. The supreme value of rational liberty, the basis of humanism itself, suffered devastating attacks by Freud and later by behaviorist psychology.

Newton's harmonious universe became Einstein's universe of relativity and of Max Planck's quantum mechanics, later turning into the chaotic cosmos produced by the Big Bang.

In the context of this situation of crisis, Western culture, as analyzed by Sorokin in his theory on the "late sensate" reversed the constructive trend of humanist tradition and was carried forward into a process of increasing deconstruction. The world view deconstructed itself and was reconstructed as an infinite range of particularist scientific disciplines that made it inconceivable to try to make a new synthesis such as those of the *encyclopédistes* or by Kant and Hegel. Art deconstructive itself, music, with Schoenberg's atonalism (*Pierrot Lunaire*, 1912 and Alban Berg (*Wozzek*, 1925). Painting, with the Expressionism of Munch, Kirchner, Emil Nolde and Kokoschka, Picasso's Cubism, Mondrian's abstract work, the Surrealism of Jean Arp, Tanguy and Miró, and the ultimate conversion of painting into action through the 'action painting' of Mathieu, and finally in literature, with Joyce and the dissolution of the narrative into the stream of consciousness.

Faced with this process of deconstruction of men in the world, the reaction of humanism was basically to abandon any new attempt to achieve a synthetic understanding of reality—with the exception of the efforts of Whitehead (1860-1947)—and to concentrate instead on the area of human social disciplines. Humanism at the end of the 19th century and first half of the 20th, turned into social-humanism. Some thinkers, like Sartre (1905-1980), believed that it was possible to express this social-humanism in Marxist terms and for a long time persisted in their belief that Stalinism was a distortion of Leninism and that after Stalin the Soviet Union would move on to a humanist form of socialism. The repression of the Prague Spring gave the light of these hopes. Other thinkers leaned towards Willy Brandt's style of social democracy and others, like Ortega y Gasset (1833-1955) or Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) towards a form of social-liberalism that would allow the combination of expressions of personal excellence with social protection for low-income sectors of society.

Contemporary humanism from Cassirer (1874-1945) and Schweitzer (1875-1965) to Habermas (1934), in the form of social-humanism or in different forms, in spite of remaining faithful to the fundamental basis of all forms of humanism, that is, belief in the dignity of man and a stubborn defence of man, did not succeed in holding back the process of deconstructing the world view nor in overcoming the contradictions arising out of this view.

The Mass Technological Society

If mass technological society is a modern phenomenon that came fully into being after the Second World War, the presence of the masses, as has already been mentioned, has made itself felt since the time of the ancient Eastern empires. The rise of the masses is a social phenomenon that appeared after the consolidation of a wide-ranging process of civilization. The concentration of people in towns, supported by large-scale food production based on well-organized agriculture, like that of ancient Mesopotamia, was the basis of the creation of the masses. This happened in Babylon and, under different conditions, in the Hellenistic Realms and Imperial Rome. In stark contrast, the masses do not exist in civilizations without large urban centers, as in Greece, nor in civilization processes that are not yet complete and have low levels of urbanization, as was the case in Europe from the fall of the Western Roman Empire until the mid-19th century.

Modern mass technological society is typified by a high level of urbanization that can reach 95% of total population, frequently concentrated in megacities with millions of inhabitants like Mexico City, São Paulo, Shanghai and New York. It is also characterized, in contrast to the situation of masses in antiquity, by a support system totally dependent on complex technology that guarantees the supply of energy, almost instantaneous communications and an extremely rapid mass transport system.

This mass of society is constructed in a bureaucratic and corporativist way with a small and decreasing autonomous professional class. Major companies and the public sector work in a bureaucratic way, following a model which Max Weber identified in its initial form. The small firm that is still responsible for a major share of employment works in the same way as in the last century although it often uses modern management methods. Its employees, except in countries with weak legal systems, are still union members and work according to their corporative interests, no longer having the old links of loyalty with their employers.

Modern mass technological society is the result of the development of a process that has been deeply affected by the decisive influence of three main factors: urban concentration, the social domestication of capitalism and the ongoing progress of technology. Urban concentration increased after the mid-19th century. The social domestication of capital began, after pressure from unions and socialist-inspired movements, with the social measures of

late Bismarckism, becoming more marked with Lloyd George's reforms and the pressure of the *fronts populaires* in the first third of the century, to become complete with the welfare state that appeared after the Second World War. Technological progress speeded up after the end of the 19th century, especially after the Second World War.

As we have mentioned earlier, the Industrial Revolution established a brutal capitalist system which in turn provoked a socialist reaction. The history of socialism, from Marx until the collapse of the Soviet Empire, basically followed two currents: the authoritarian, following the principle of efficiency and the need to defend the Fatherland of real socialism from the aggression of the capitalist world, and the humanist, inspired by Marx himself inspired of his 1880s scientifism, which led to post-Second World War social democracy. Soviet Communism, while it confronted social democracy in a totally hostile way—causing among other results the ruin of the Weimar Republic—benefited, at least until its collapse, from the humanist idealism that usually inspired socialist thinking. For its part, although social democracy and its social-humanist philosophy confronted Soviet socialism, it also benefited until the latter collapsed, from its actual achievements, from the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany to the space epic begun by Sputnik.

Among the effects of the crisis of Soviet socialism at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 90s was a profound influence on socialist ideology, including its democratic version. Socialism was the last lay religion in the world, incorporating in its social-humanist form the ideas of the Enlightenment including its progressive and perfectionist version of history, combining the idea and the practice of technological development which was only being glimpsed in its initial stages during the century of Enlightenment. During the period when socialist ideology held sway, the Western world – or those countries under the influence of the West – offered man two main choices. For those who enjoyed favorable conditions in the *status quo* of capitalist society it still held out the possibility of achieving economic success through which the benefits of consumerism combined with the prestige of success and the 'thymotic' manifestation of personal excellence. For those who did not enjoy such favorable conditions socialism appeared as an immediate ethical and practical means of improving the world with the promise of a presumed historical inevitability in the longer term.

The dismantling of socialist beliefs has deprived modern society of its final collective project for man. Consumerism and bureaucratic careerism

continue to offer immediate satisfaction and an institutionalized space to exercise their desire for power, to a minority of men. Nevertheless, consumerism suffers from too irremediable limitations: at the individual level, is empty and it is unable to satisfy the deepest human desires, revealing itself to be completely useless in the face of the tragic situations which man inevitably has to face. At the collective level it is a false idea that has been to a great extent demystified now that current levels of consumption among the prosperous minorities in comfortable societies have not been able to be spread more widely.

The dismantling of the world view that began in the last third of the 19th century has deprived man of a mission and of meaning with the final demolition of the socialist ideal in the context of the mass technological society. Man has become a spare part in the existential mass apparatus without any intrinsic value in himself. From President to worker, man has become no more than a function. Man has become disposable. The seriousness of this situation does not exactly lie in the fact that it describes the current moment in history but rather in the fact that it is not the product of circumstantial events but rather of man's cultural development itself. As Sorokin pointed out in his *Dynamics of* Civilizations, the cultural development of man was, historically speaking, a process of continuous demystification of the world. The magical Cosmos of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt gave way to the Greek *logos* whose sense of eidetic transcendence became, with Christianity, the ontological transcendence that led to the demystification of Nature. Desanctifying Nature allowed the development of science and technology. The final product of scientific and technological development that culminated in the process of demystifying the world, led to a Cosmos deprived of meaning, where the man of the mass technological society exists deprived of a mission, losing his own meaning and turning into the disposable man.

The Problem

The modern world is facing five basic problems. One is ethical and cultural and arises out of the loss of all transcendent and transcendental values – truth, justice and beauty – and four that are socio-empirical: (1) the problem of a stable and reliable manner of making democratic legitimacy compatible with public rationality; (2) of the rational and equitable ordering of the environment; (3) of bringing backward societies and social classes into the world of modernity

and development, and (4) of an effective international administration of the general interests of humanity, leading to a global improvement in the quality of life.

In the most developed societies mass technological society has organized itself into a mass democracy. The idea that democracy is a necessary condition to achieve political legitimacy has become general. We see in history how societies of notables in the Western world became democracies of notables from the mid-18th century to the mid 19th century. Then these societies became middle-class societies and slowly, from the mid-19th century to the beginning of the 20th, middle-class democracies. Finally, these societies have become mass societies and in the Western world between the two post-war periods, the formation of mass democracies has become universal.

Usually the problem of democracies, especially mass democracies, lies in the fact that legitimacy of power, the result of a democratic system, does not in itself lead to public rationality. This problem had already been identified by Aristotle in his *Politics* and is still with us today. Authoritarianism, however, as well as being inherently illegitimate, also does not in itself lead to public rationality. Today, the need for public rationality which is extremely important for any society, has become a vital condition for survival in mass technological societies. While the good administration of the irrigation system was a necessary condition for mass survival in Mesopotamia, the good administration of the technological system modern masses depend on is even more vitally an essential condition for their survival. However, to a certain extent the ancient masses could migrate to regions that provided more food and also, as actually happened, store grain during the fertile years to compensate for bad harvests. We can add to this fact that the good administration of irrigation was a simple task that only depended on preserving royal power. In modern mass societies this good administration is an extremely complicated task that demands at the same time a proper functioning of the hardware of a whole network of interdependent technical subsystems and the competent management of software, be it technical, economic or socio-political.

Today, some democratic mass societies have managed to achieve stable and reliable conditions for making the democratic system compatible with a satisfactory level of public rationality. This is the case of various European countries, of some countries in the British Commonwealth and to a lesser extent in the United States and Japan; other examples, China apart, are rare. Countries that have not managed to reach this level of compatibility, the great

majority, make up the ranks of the underdeveloped in our time and they are underdeveloped precisely because of their lack of public rationality.

If we examine the factors that lead to making democratic legitimacy compatible with satisfactory levels of public rationality we find that, in addition to other conditions, this fact is founded on two main points. The first, that usually first appeared in the last century, is making education universal. In almost all these countries, all adults have finished primary education and most of them secondary school as well, along with technical training, not to mention an adequate proportion of people with a university education. The second point, which to all intents and purposes crystallized after the Second World War as a result of the welfare state, was the considerable reduction in the gap between social classes. In these countries the highest salary is on average no more than 20 times greater than the lowest, and frequently this proportion is 1 to 10 and even 1 to 5, while in underdeveloped countries these proportions can be 1 to 200 or even 1 to 1,000.

Reducing the distance between social classes to acceptable levels, with suitable protection for low-income groups creates a society in which everyone works towards good administration. Universal education gives people a proper understanding of the collective problems they face and helps them make rational decisions. This guarantees a reasonable and stable compatibility between democratic legitimacy and public rationality.

The second socio-empirical macro-problem we face today may be approached in an extremely simple way. It concerns the fact that in recent years industrial society has began to inflict a level of aggression on the biosphere that is increasingly greater than the latter's automatic ability for self-adjustment. The polluting effluents discharged every year in two the waters and into the air as well as the effects on the protective ozone layer are seriously affecting the ecology of the planet. It has been calculated that this will very rapidly cause irreparable damage in the very short space, historically speaking, of about 40 years if we do not immediately adopt a series of measures to preserve the biosphere. There is a global theoretical consensus concerning this which was arrived at during the first important discussion that took place during the Rio-92 conference, but almost nothing is being done about it. The planet is running the risk of becoming uninhabitable during the 21st century.

The third macro-problem is also socio-empirical and may be approached in a synthetic way. It concerns the fact that because of a deficit in public rationality - as well as other factors – most of the world remains in a state of

great backwardness and underdevelopment. Nevertheless, the world will become nonviable if the North-South divide and the situation of large sectors of people being excluded from human progress, continue to exist. The pressures of migration from the South to the North will become as irresistible as the migratory pressures of the barbarians against the Roman Empire. The North – and the affluent sectors of it – face the dilemma of not being able to preserve their civilized values and high level of prosperity if they continue to be surrounded by a vast and growing population of the wretched and ignorant. To slow the migratory pressures and criminality they will be forced to take extremely hard measures that will directly or indirectly mean it using forms of genocide that will affect their internal values. To preserve these values, in addition to their domestic problems, they will need to accept the entry of migrants from the South in numbers that will destabilize them.

The problem has become clearly visible in the wealthier European countries and to a great extent also in the United States. The only solution on the international level consists in the North making a systematic effort, along with the greatest possible support from the educated sectors of society in the South, to modernize and develop underdeveloped societies. In practice, this implies a huge combination of mass education together with large-scale creation of jobs by transferring capital and technology as well as causing a serious problem of birth control in the South. Equivalent measures will be required domestically to incorporate marginalized groups into society.

The fourth socio-empirical micro-problem mentioned above in general terms is quite simple. In brief it concerns the fact that the globalization of economic and social relationships in the modern world, which has the advantages of instantaneous communications and rapid transport systems, no longer allows humanitys common problems such as those concerning health, education and the regulation of exchange, as well as environmental ones, to be subject to a great number of sovereign national decisions. The countries in the modern world have become, whether they want to or not, municipalities of global civilization and have to delegate the regulation and administration of the major collective interests of humanity to an effective and equitable International system. The United Nations was created with this aim in mind and can perform this task if it can achieve the necessary international agreement that will give it the means to carry out the actions required. Failure to do this will subject the world to growing levels of chaos and conflict that will affect the quality of life in all countries. On the other hand, doing it together with

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establishing a policy of modernization and development in the South, will lead to a good quality of life for everyone in a timescale that is reasonably short in historic terms.

6. Transcendence, Man and the World (2002)

I. Introduction

Transcendence

According to José Ferrater Mora, in his classic *Diccionario de Filosofia*, transcendence refers to a being passing beyond itself. Aristotle and the Scholastics drew a distinction between the *actio immanens*, which remains within the subject itself and the *actio transiens*, that passes beyond the subject and has an effect upon something else. St Augustine defined transcendence is that which causes a being to move outside itself while remaining what it is.

The phenomenon of transcendence is usually related to human freedom and the absolute transcendent, God. However, transcendence is a phenomenon or process of a general kind. It is something that is seen when, in certain circumstances that contain, among other aspects, a homeostatic balance among causal factors, the direction of a process surpasses the level of the factors controlling it to reach a more complex level in a series of events that ends in substituting the controlling factors with a motivating plan.

Transcendence is the conversion of a process into a plan both consciously and purely objectively. When the process is conscious, transcendence concerns human freedom. When it is purely objective, it is a macro-immanent phenomenon inherent in all vital processes and which constitutes the

phenomenon of transimmanence. This is a process that, in certain conditions, leads certain molecules to turn into cells, certain cells into organisms, certain organisms into vegetables and animals, and finally into man.

Divinity

Since the beginning of *homo sapiens*, there has been a belief in spirits that lived in the surrounding world some of which had powers for good and some for evil. Paleolithic man tried to seek the favor of the beneficent spirits and to magically exorcise the malevolent ones.

In the transition from the Paleolithic to the Neolithic, the main beneficent spirits were concentrated into fertility goddesses and other divinities. As civilizations advanced, divine pantheons were formed which, in Hellenic civilization, led to the circle of the Olympian gods with Zeus at the centre, as well as other levels of divinities.

The transition from polytheist to monotheist religions was characterized by the 'de-immanentization' of the Divinity which acquired, with Moses' Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the quality of absolute transcendence. The monotheist religions created the idea of a unique, eternal, absolute, omnipotent, omniscient, merciful but judging, divine being, the creator of heaven and earth, angels and men. From the point of view of the monotheist religions, human transcendence was the way to raise the spirit of man in search of God.

For polytheist cultures, the existence of gods was not questioned. Philosophers like Socrates, probably and certainly Plato and Aristotle, relegated the traditional gods to the level of myth and adopted a metaphysical concept of the divine as the Supreme Good or Prime Mover. Western Christian civilization created the demand for rational proof of the existence of God. A characteristic of medieval Christianity was the conviction that theological truth should necessarily correspond to rational truth. This produced the various attempts to provide rational proof of the existence of God.

Without developing this point further, the fact should also be mentioned that attempts to rationally prove the existence of God were of two types, the *a priori* proofs of St Anselm and Descartes, and the *a posteriori* proofs of St Thomas and the Scholastics.

St Anselm's arguments consisted in stating that, if we have the idea that God is the most perfect and greatest of possible beings, then God must necessarily exist because, if He did not, our idea of God would lack the

perfection of existence and supremacy, which would not be analytically compatible with it.

The validity of the *a priori* proof of the existence of God was denied by St Thomas, who said that to prove this thesis, *a posteriori* proofs were necessary. Hume, and later Kant, who differentiated between analytical and synthetic judgments, showed how only the latter are applicable to stating the existence of something, while analytical judgments are restricted to showing attributes contained in their object.

In place of the *a priori* arguments, St Thomas formulated five *a posteriori* arguments to prove the existence of God. Two were apodictic and three founded on the principle of reasonability. The apodictic arguments are based on the need for a primary cause to understand the causal connections of the world. They also recognize the need to admit a necessary and absolute factor to understand the connections and events of the world. The arguments based on the principle of reasonability are those founded on the idea that the world is finalistically arranged, which presupposes a divine arranger. These arguments take into account moral order and deduce from it the need for a divine legislator. They are, in sum, the multiple experiences of the presence of the divine in miracles and the mystical contemplation of God.

I have discussed more widely the question of the existence of God in a study entitled "Transcendência e Mundo, na Virada do Século", published in my book Brasil, Homem e Mundo – Reflexão na Virada do Século (Brazil, Man and The world - Reflections on the Turn of the Century, Rio, Topbooks, 2000). Referring those interested to that study, I shall restrict myself here to pointing out the fact that St Thomas' apodictic arguments rely on the assumption that the world was created by a deliberate act that preceded the world and transcended the world and which was only possible by being a work of God. Modern cosmology however, with George Gamow (1904-1968) has suggested, with the convincing empirical proof of primordial radiation, that the world is the result of the now famous Big Bang that occurred about 15 billion years ago. This process leads to an expansion of the universe until the point of balance between the force of expansion and that of gravity, as a result of which there is a reconcentration of the universe leading to a new explosion, in an infinite process during which the entropy of the expansive phase is compensated for by the disentropy of the concentrating phase. Subsequently, quantum cosmology introduced, with Hawking and others, the idea of a process of conversion, based on the radiation of a 'false vacuum', of virtual articles into real ones which then cause a phase of spinning 'inflation', or Gamow's Big Bang, to create one or several universes which renew itself or themselves, based on a new 'false vacuum'.

II. Transimmanence

A General View

As has been mentioned above, the process of transcendence in purely objective terms, consists of the phenomenon of transimmanence, which is characteristic of life. This is a process through which, about 3 billion years ago, in the primitive ocean and atmosphere, under specific conditions, certain molecules turned into heterotrophic cells in a long evolutionary chain that led to the development of plants, animals and man. This process is still ongoing in the long term although in the present situation, environmental forces are less important than those deriving from technological progress.

Research on the process of evolution began by Lamarque and Darwin have been brilliantly updated in modern times by Jacques Monod (1910-1976) in his *Le Hasard et la Nécéssité* (1970). This work was received with the usual criticisms of writers who persist in maintaining a teleological view of the world and the inconsistencies characteristic of that position. More serious, however, are the statistical and mathematical criticisms made of it. According to those criticisms, the most reasonable statistical and mathematical estimates for the process, by means of random combinations, of converting molecules into heterotrophic cells and from that stage to the various subsequent ones, would need far longer than the 3 million years commonly taken as being the point when life began.

I am not capable of evaluating the arguments for the longer time-scale claimed by those critics. It is, however, important to point out that those critics do not take into account the phenomenon of transimmanence. This is an empirically observable phenomenon, not only paleontologically, but also in mutations produced in laboratories. As a result of this, the primordial random combinations leading to the formation of heterotrophic cells became far less random after this stage, which led to a shortening of the evolutionary intervals as the level of the process was developed.

It is interesting to observe that the slow conversion of the process of purely objective transcendence, as it is seen in the course of the evolutionary process, into a subjective transcendence related to creation of a motivating plan, such as is found in the gratuitous exercise of human freedom, is seen in its prior stages in the animal world. In the animal world, manifestations of subjective transcendence are found in the cases that have been observed of dogs who follow their dead owner to the graveside and remain there for a long time or until they die. Even more impressive, because it concerns a bird, is the case that Darwin observed of a blind bird that was fed by other members of its flock.

The Transcendence of Man

It is in that higher primate, man, that is subjective transcendence, which has already been detectable in the animal world, reaches its highest forms. It is because of this that man deserves, rather than because of his specific nature as a rational animal - which he shares, although at a higher level, with other animals - to be called a transcendent animal. The primary forms of transcendence, that can be found in the animal world as previously mentioned, affect man at such a higher and more complex level that only in his case can we speak of an actual subjective transcendence. The synchronic and diachronic observation of human transcendence, regardless of religious beliefs, leads to the situation in which, whether God exists as the monotheist religions state, or if He does not exist, or is even impossible, as I personally believe has been proved by modern science, human transcendence leads all men, however trivial and common they may be, and some men who are exceptional, to having the ability to carry out acts which overcome and sometimes contradict, their instincts and selfish interests. A Christian or Muslim would say that human transcendence consists in wanting or doing what God orders. I would allow myself to say that human transcendence, in its highest manifestations, consists in wanting or doing something that leads to producing the divine in a man.

The concept of the divine has a double meaning. Divinity is an attribute of what God is or does. Also, Divinity is the quality of the act or work that shows the highest expression of human excellence. Beatrice and Laura are divine women in the eyes of Dante and Petrarch. *The Divine Comedy* or the *Sonnets to the Lady Laura* are divine works of those two great poets. Camoens, Shakespeare and Goethe are also divine. Divine also are the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Hegel's *Phenomenology* and *Lectures on the*

Philosophy of History, Mozart's concerto in D minor No. 20 KV 466, or his Requiem, almost all the works of Beethoven, Botticelli's Birth of Venus, the frescoes in the Sistine Chapel and many other works of human genius. But equally divine are the cool rationality of Pericles, the indomitable energy and homonoia of Alexander, the clear-sighted audacity of Caesar, the boundless charity of St Francis or of Mother Teresa and the ecumenical goodness of John XXIII.

Human Divinity is the practice or construction, based on that supreme attribute of *homo sapiens* which is his rational freedom, of acts and works that surpass the circumstances of the environment from which they emerge and become patterns of human excellence. God may not exist, but the divine, the supreme attribute of human transcendence, has existed and will continue to exist as long as man preserves his rational freedom and exercises it at the highest level.

Disposability and Neo-humanism

I believe it would be opportune to close these reflections on transcendence in its objective and subjective forms with some brief comments on the state of man and on the intransitively consumerist modern mass technological society.

The recent development of Western society and the growing and rapid universalization of this model have created an intransitively consumerist modern mass technological society. As Karl Jaspers has observed, modern mass society has turned technology into its second nature and depends on it without realizing the fact, in the same way that ancient man depended on his natural surroundings without biological or physical knowledge.

Modern mass technological society, which gradually began developing during the Industrial Revolution and acquired its present form with the Technological Revolution of the second half of the 20th century, has turned into an intransitively consumerist society. Mediaeval man, who aspired to be a good Christian, Renaissance man, who tried to maximize his *virtú* and dominate his fate, the enlightened man of the 18th century, the *honnête homme* of the 19th century, have been succeeded by the mass-man of the second half of the 20th century. The mass man is on the one hand the servant of a production or administrative

system in which he occupies positions which, from top to bottom, from the President of the Republic or of a large company, to soldier or worker, are becoming increasingly typified by their disposability. For the system, individual people no longer exist. There are functions to be performed and these functions are parts of the system which have no personality of their own and as such are disposable. The shift president is disposable as is the shift sentinel or the shift worker. All that exists are functions.

This disposable man, who does not have his own plan in the social context has become at the same time an intransitive consumer. The idea is to have the ability, even if at a minimal level, to consume, which drives him to perform the functions he has access to in spite of his individual disposability. Various public or private pension schemes in modern countries provide man, even though he is disposable, with the ability to maintain his consumption while he is alive. Alive for what purpose? To consume.

The problems that the modern intransitive consumer faces apart from his disposability - against which pension schemes tend to provide a minimum amount of protection – lie in the fact that this consumerism does not adequately fulfill major human requirements. Intransitive consumerism confers on those who practice it a state similar to that which we might call a kind of drunkenness that is not specific to the senses. The intransitive consumer moves throughout the world, carries out his functions, takes advantage of the benefits of his pension, but cannot fill the deep emptiness in his life. It is not merely because this consumerism evaporates when faced with the tragedies that inevitably occur in life. It is also and above all because life itself loses all sense, loses that for which the drunkenness of consumerism only provides an unsatisfactory and superficial compensation. Thus we have the growing demand for the deeper types of drunkenness that drugs provide.

What will tend to happen to the intransitive consumerism of mass technological society? History shows on the one hand that modern consumerism is not the first or the only manifestation of that trend. It shows various periods of widespread consumerism from the First Intermediate Period in Ancient Egypt from 2200-2050 BC to the crisis in Babylonian society after Nebuchadnezzar II (604-562 BC) or to the crisis in Roman society in the 3rd century AD. On the other hand history also shows that generalized intransitive consumerism does not last indefinitely. As Sorokin

showed in *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1957), hypersensitive periods tend to lead a society either to annihilation as in the case of Babylon under Nabonidus (555-539 BC) or to a new idealistic or ideational phase. The decadent Babylonian culture was absorbed by the Hellenic *logos*, the Roman by Christianity.

The intransitive consumerism of mass technological society is showing growing signs of its unsustainability. Exogenous unsustainability in the sense that European and American consumerism cannot be extended to the great masses of the Third World. Endogenous unsustainability in the sense that growing signs of irresponsibility and delinquency, from those affecting big American companies, down to the level of common criminals that puts one American adult in every 30 in prison, show how the sustainability of such a society is being eroded.

Shall we see, as Sorokin proposed modern intransitive consumerism leading to a new religious culture? There are signs of a new religiosity in the modern world which is not yet being found in the West, in the resurgence of higher levels of Christianity. In this case the new religiosity is shown in the expansion of radical sects such as the Evangelicals typified by appeals to mass psychology and devoid of a rational basis. At a different level, fundamentalism is increasing in the Islamic world as well as more modest rational forms of neo-Mohammedanism.

Bearing in mind the historical experience and various characteristics of the modern world, what seems to be most probable, as happened in 4th century Rome, is the emergence of a power elite that will not allow itself to be dominated by pure consumerism and also the eruption of a new socially and environmentally oriented humanism as we are seeing in the 'green' movements and other manifestations, especially among the young.

Planetary Civilization, which is being formed and shows signs of gradually taking shape after the second half of the century now beginning, will bring together the characteristics of the various civilizations that have joined to form it. Based on Late Western Civilization, it will incorporate significant elements of the Chinese, Islamic and Indian civilizations as well as African and indigenous ones. This civilization will require the formation of a new system of ethics that will have to be compatible firstly with technological progress and the preservation of the biosphere and secondly with the higher values that will restore meaning to human life and respond

to the inherent transcendence of man. Instead of a re-emergence of higher forms of monotheism, it seems to be more probable that there will be an explosion of a new social and environmental humanism that will make it possible for multiple societies to live peacefully together on a planet which, in the second half of the century will be home to 12 billion inhabitants and will either commit nuclear suicide or construct a *Pax Universalis* based on a world system that will be at least satisfactory for the great majority of men.



7. Brief Reflections on Christianity (2004)

I. Introduction

Christianity is one of the most incredible events in history. Based on a set of absurd theological and philosophically premises, there emerged this extraordinary religion which is Christianity and this extraordinary civilization which is the West. How was this possible?

For the purposes of this brief essay we shall leave to one side the important preliminary point - the existence or not of God. My ideas on this subject have been set out in other writings, specifically in Chapter 5 of my book *Brazil, Man and the World* (Rio, Topbooks, 2000).

What is important for this brief study is to show the absurdity contained in the theological and philosophical premises of Christianity. This absurdity is first of all reflected in the concept of the Holy Trinity. Secondly in Christ, both in terms of his nature and also in terms of the mission attributed to him. These absurdities had already been detected since the 2nd century AD by means of various alternatives to the dogma relating to the Trinity and Christ that had been condemned as heretical by the Church.³¹ Among these heresies, the most significant are the denial of the three persons of the Trinity, Arianism,

³¹Cf. Marcello Craveri, *L'Eresia*, Milano, Arnaldo Mondatori, 1996; see also Jean Danieleou, *L'Eglise des Premiers Temps*, Paris, Ed. du Seuil (1963), 1985.

Macedonianism, Monarchism and Sabelism. As for the non-divinity of Christ, we have Adoptionism, Apollinarianism, Decetism, Monophysitism and Nestorianism.

The concept of the Holy Trinity contains a first absurdity which consists in the Father and Son having the same age. It is no use trying to nullify this absurdity by attributing eternity and therefore timelessness to the Persons of the Trinity. The Son is necessarily created by the Father, and is therefore in terms of a concrete being, is subsequent to him.

The second absurdity concerning the Holy Trinity consists in seeing the Third Person, the Holy Spirit as a product of the loving relationship between the preceding two. This involves turning a relationship into substance, which is absurd.

The third absurdity concerning the Holy Trinity consists in assuming the existence of three people in the one God. Admitting the divinity of each one of these three people implies necessarily having three gods. If only one divine person exists, this person cannot be three distinct 'egos', since that which characterizes a person is his unique ego.

The absurdity contained in the concept of the Holy Trinity is the historical result of needing to attribute the condition of the God the Son to Jesus, which would of necessity lead to a binary conception of God. The introduction of the Third Person, as the Holy Spirit, arose out of the necessity of giving a personality to the divine agent who impregnated the Virgin Mary. The final result is the irredeemable set of absurdities referred to above.

This same group of absurdities is found in the nature of Christ and his mission. Jesus is conceived as having a double human nature. Human, as he deliberately incarnated himself through the Holy Spirit in the Virgin Mary. Divine, because he continued to be God. This latter characteristic is shown in his capacity to perform miracles and finally in the Resurrection. Human nature is revealed through the body of Christ and his sufferings. These two natures are mutually incompatible. God cannot suffer or die. Given the existential unity of man, Jesus would not be able to make use of his divine nature in order to deliberately test the limits of the human condition, since such an option would be that of a God and as such, could only consist in a succession of miracles, in each of which human suffering would appear, which could not be felt by the divine ego.

A second absurdity in Christology consists in the declared mission of Christ. He took human form in order to redeem the sins of men. Now sin is

no more than a violation of the divine order by man. The forgiveness of sins by God can only be an act of grace which gives absolution to sinners. Supposing that a divine-human being like Jesus were capable of really feeling suffering (an absurdity previously pointed out), that suffering, as such, without the grace of God, would not absolve any sin. Therefore it is clear that the mission of Jesus is absurd because he did not even need to be incarnated to absolve sins. What is extraordinary, however, is the fact that, based on this set of absurd premises, Christianity and this extraordinary Western civilization, it should have emerged.

It is interesting to note that in the three other monotheistic religions, the Persian, of Zarathustra, the Judaic of Moses and the Islamic of Mohammed, do not contain inherently absurd premises. Ahura Mazda, the Zoroastrian god, created heaven and earth through his own omnipotence and created two spirits, Ormazd and Ahriman, representing good and evil, to give human judgment concrete options. Jehovah, appearing through Moses, following previous immanentist concepts, like the mountain god El, appears as a pure spirit, creator of heaven and earth. In the same way, the God of Mohammed, Allah, is a pure, omnipotent, omniscient and infinitely good spirit. The only absurdity that these other three great monotheistic religions share with Christianity is in attributing to their respective god characteristics of omnipotence, honesty and infinite goodness, which are incompatible with the decision to create the world. How could a being with these characteristics gratuitously create a fortuitous entity like the world when, through its absolute nature, it would of necessity be looking at itself? The world, for God, is in the final analysis a game and God cannot play, in other words, cannot amuse Himself with Himself. On the other hand, being omniscient, God would know that in creating the world he would be creating an environment of suffering and death and, for many, eternal damnation, something that is incompatible with His absolute goodness.

II. The Historical Aspect

In contrast to the development of the three other great monotheistic religions, Christianity is not an immediately revealed religion. It is a religion that gradually formed during the 1st century AD. Jesus never said he was the Son of God, but that he was the Son of Man, nor did he say that he was setting up a religion, but rather an ethical way of life. According to the Gospels,

the only time when his divinity was questioned is when Pilate asked him: "Are you God?" Jesus' reply, "You say so", does not assume his divinity but shifts this statement to Pilate.

In contrast, all of Jesus' declarations, in his preachings or on Calvary, especially his final complaints of being abandoned³² are in the sense of feeling himself to be a human messenger of God whose message he, as a prophet, is trying to pass on in his preachings and his acts. It was after the Resurrection that Peter and the apostles were convinced that Jesus was the Son of God. The Resurrection, nevertheless, in relation to a person like Jesus, whose historical reality is extremely tenuous and is only now being clarified to a certain extent³³ has no element of proof, as it could not have. The Resurrection is a result of the desire to believe in it on the part of Peter and the apostles. who had not had the courage to defend Jesus and were profoundly sorry for that.³⁴ It is extremely interesting to accompany the gradual development of Christianity as a religion. It is recognized that the decisive step was taken by St Paul, whose conversion represents the peak of a psychological phenomenon concerning which we have no information, and led a man of genius and excellent cultural background to construct the doctrine of the new religion based on his personal conviction concerning the truth of the Resurrection, and imposing it on the apostles who were still thinking in a Judaic way. With St Paul, Christianity emerges with a new religious proposal.

The new religion develops as a sect which attracts mainly Hellenized Jews. Analyzing primitive Christianity is an extremely complex task that is only recently acquiring a satisfactory level of scholarship.³⁵ Among other requirements it demands the study of the early Fathers of the Church, St Jerome and St Augustine. It demands a psycho-socio-cultural analysis of primitive Christianity and the way in which, in the face of a Roman culture that accepted all religions and was completely tolerant of the other great monotheistic religion, Judaism, Christianity suffered discrimination. There can be no doubt in this respect that the persecution of Christians was not in the

 $^{^{32}}$ Cf. Matthew, 26 – 38, 39, 42, Mark 14 – 20, Luke 22 - 42.

³³Cf. John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus, New York, Harper (1991), 1992.

³⁴Cf. on this point, Thomas Sheehan, *The First Coming*, New York, Dosser Press (1965), 1990. ³⁵Cf. R. Bultmann, *Le Christianisme Primitif* trans. from German, Paris, Petite Bibliotheque Payot, 1969, and Michel Meslin and Jean-Rémy Palanque, eds., *Le Christianisme Antique*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1967, Henri-Iréné Marrou, *L'Eglise de L'Antiquité Tardive*, Ed. du Seuil, (1963), 1985, Pierre Geoltrain, ed.. *Aux Origines du Christianisme*, Paris, Gallimard, 2000.

least religious, nor was it directed at their theological and philosophical convictions, but was entirely directed at their denial of the civic cult of the emperors, which at that time was the equivalent of treason against Roman order. The primitive Christians were politically the equivalent of fundamentalist Moslems in the modern world as seen by the West and, like them, were suspected of antisocial acts.

On the other hand, the heroism of the Christian martyrs is impressive politically similar to the suicide bombers of today - a fact that shows the profound belief of those Christians, as well as their modern counterparts. In to understand this phenomenon it is necessary to have a deep understanding of the psycho-social-cultural situation in Late Antiquity. The most striking characteristic of this Antiquity, with the disappearance of the *polis* and the discrediting of traditional paganism, was the search for individual salvation, either through Orphic beliefs and cults and Neoplatonism, or through Eastern religions like the Judaic, Egyptian and Persian.

Christianity, Hellenized by St Paul and the great Fathers of the Church, offered the Greco-Roman world a set of conditions for salvation that was more in line with that culture and with Eastern beliefs, and was more concrete than platonic philosophy. The Hellenization of Christianity gave it increasing acceptability and the heroism of the martyrs gave the new religion an aura of seriousness and for many, a sign of the divine.

The decisive moment for the success of Christianity as a religion was its adoption by Constantine (the Edict of Milan in 313), which was the equivalent of granting it the status of a religion of the Empire.³⁶ Christianity was then a belief with many followers that had surpassed the characteristics of primitive Christianity and now had the wide support of the middle classes of the Empire and even of some people from the senatorial class. It was therefore a sect comparable to those that spread Eastern beliefs. What would have happened to Christianity if it had not become a state religion? Like all 'what if?' speculations, this one contains various possibilities. What is important to bear in mind in this respect, however, is the reverse of the question. What would have happened to the Empire if it had not adopted Christianity? Everything indicates that Constantine's opting for Christianity, which began in 312 with his victory over Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge in Rome, was a

³⁶The formal institution of Christianity as the sole religion of the Empire only happened with the edict of Theodosius I, the Great, in 380AD.

historical act of understanding the needs of the Empire. Just as his opting for Constantinople, inaugurated in 330, arose from his understanding that this new capital, because of its topographical and geographical position, if properly fortified would ensure almost complete impregnability - as the subsequent thousand-year history of Byzantium would prove - so Constantine understood that the Empire needed the support of a religion like Christianity to overcome its internal differences and instill a new spirit in its defenders, an act of foresight which events would also justify.

In spite of having been converted into a state religion in which the voice of the Emperor was all-powerful, Christianity maintained its reticular construction, being composed of a group of units that enjoyed great operational autonomy, the parishes and the bishoprics, something which gave them a great degree of religious autonomy. This situation, among other characteristics, would become decisive in converting barbarians to Christianity after they occupied the Empire.

III. From Christian Society to Western Society

As I have had occasion to consider in *Um Estudo Crítico da História* (Vol. II, Chap. 15), Western civilization did not appear suddenly, nor even directly, from the ruins of the Ancient World and the Roman Empire. What followed these periods, after many vicissitudes, was a Christian Society that was composed mainly of Ostrogoths in the old centre of the Visigothic Empire in Iberia.

The process of creating Western civilization has its origins in the expansion of the Franks throughout Europe and the unification of their two branches, the Salians and Ripuarians, by Clovis. The latter, like Constantine before him, understood that the recent unification of the two branches of the Franks would need a common religion to guarantee its stability and continuity and so he converted to Christianity, which was already his wife Clotilde's religion. The vicissitudes of the Frankish kingdom reached their peak with Charlemagne (742-814) who, after the death of his brother Carloman in 771, became sole leader of the Frankish kingdom. Going against the advice of his late brother's pro-Lombardians, Charlemagne allied himself with the Pope and inflicted a decisive defeat on the Lombardian advisers who were attacking the latter, deposing their king Desiderio in 774 and taking the crown of Lombardy.

After many vicissitudes, Charlemagne became the great protector of the papacy and Pope Leo III (795-816) considered transferring his loyalty from the Byzantine Empire to Charlemagne and consecrated him Roman Emperor of the West in 800.

Charlemagne's successors could not preserve the unity of the Empire. His three grandsons, the children of Louis the Pious, divided the Empire among themselves with the Treaty of Verdun in 843; Francia Occidentalis went to Charles the Bald, Francia Media, which came to be called Lotharingia, to Lothaire and Francia Orientalis went to Louis the German.

At this point there was no longer the unity provided by the lingua franca, which in the West had become an early form of archaic French and in the East and archaic form of German. This moment marks the start of the transition of Christian Society, until then unified in Charlemagne's Empire, into what would become Western Society. Fundamentally important in the process of forming Western Society after the subdivision of Charlemagne's Empire was the interaction between the Church, feudalism and the emerging medieval cities. By means of the papacy and the extraordinary institution of the Benedictine monasteries, the Church stamped on a crude and violent society the idea of duty, the highest expression of which in the feudal world came to be the institution of chivalry. By means of the Church's action, the members of a turbulent and violent mobility were persuaded to adopt the role of knights, defenders of the Church and the poor who made honor and faith the main rules of their lives.

Another equally important factor was the re-urbanization of Europe after the 11th century, which was mainly the result of the work of merchants and with them, the formation of an urban bourgeoisie. The emerging cities in their turn, made possible the appearance of two great new institutions: the mendicant orders of the Franciscans and Dominicans, and the universities.

Western civilization developed as a result of this set of factors and circumstances. It gradually took shape as a new culture after the Christian Society that had been contained in Charlemagne's Empire, with Christianity as its central and basic belief, the Church as its mentor and increasingly the cities in their respective linguistic areas which took over the power previously enjoyed by feudal lords, replacing the authority of the latter, locally by mayors and town councils, and nationally by kings.

IV. A Great Religion

The conversion of a set of beliefs based on absurd premises into this extraordinary religion that came to be Christianity is an extremely complex historical and cultural phenomenon. Those who belong to this religion explain it by its divine origin. A historical and sociological approach to this phenomenon requires that a multiplicity of factors and circumstances be taken into account. Simplifying this complex question, we may point out the relevance of three main factors: (1) the huge and very widespread demand in Late Antiquity for a means to personal salvation, (2) the reconstruction of Christian dogma by the Church Fathers and (3) external circumstances that favored the religion.

The disappearance of the *polis* after Alexander, the formation of the Hellenic Kingdoms and, the culmination of the process in the formation of The Roman Empire, totally extinguished a whole psychic and cultural system that gave meaning to the life of the Hellenic citizen and, in his time, the Roman, until the crisis of the Republic in the second half of the 2nd century AD.

For its part, Greek philosophy after the Ionians and especially with Socrates and Plato, was developing a monotheistic view of the world based on the dualism of matter and spirit, strengthened by neoplatonism, a tendency that led to a concept of man as consisting of a perishable body inhabited by an immortal soul. At the same time, the Orphic mysteries, which combined secret rites with salvationist ideas, gave hope of a destiny after the death of man.

These and other circumstances typical of Late Antiquity created during that period a profound and widespread demand for personal salvation that neither the magical forms of Late Paganism, nor Orphism, nor Eastern beliefs, nor neoplatonism itself could satisfy. Christianity gave a complete and satisfactory answer to this demand. As Christ had said: "I am the way and the life". With Christianity there opened up on the one hand an ethical system that made human life worthy and on the other, the way to eternal personal salvation opened up by means of combining good works and the merciful Grace of God.

A second important factor in helping Christianity become a great religion was the restructuring of its dogma by the Fathers of the Church, among whom the figure of St Augustine stands out. This restructuring consisted in general terms, with the qualification of less room given to the mysteries, in framing Christian beliefs within the requirements of rational validity postulated by Greek philosophy. In this process Christian monotheism became consolidated, its

religious devotion focused on Jesus Christ and moving the two other Persons of the Trinity into a distant background. The Trinity was relegated to the rarefied territory of theological speculation. The real God of Christianity was Christ.

A third important factor, this time an external one, was the conversion of Christianity into the religion of the Empire, together with a structure of the Christian priesthood that on the one hand allowed great operational autonomy to units of the system, the parishes and their episcopal organization. On the other hand, by means of councils and other forms of authoritarian statements of dogma, it was possible to maintain the theoretical unity of this religion and reject the many heresies that arose after the 2nd century.

As a religious idea, Christianity revealed an exceptional strength over the course of time and was able, like no other religion, to make the preservation of its central dogma compatible with an extraordinary level of adaptation to changing historical and cultural situations. Thus this great religion built itself on a system within which huge opportunities for the exercise of human excellence opened up. Intellectual excellence from the Fathers of the church to St Thomas and innumerable other Christian philosophers, culminating in our time with Teilhard de Chardin or in Brazil, figures like Father Fernando Bastos de Ávila and Father Henrique de Lima Vaz. Excellence in the exercise of the highest forms of human goodness, from St Francis to Mother Teresa of Calcutta. The excellence of wise and holy kings such as St Louis of France, of paladins like St Ignatius, of great popes like Leo I (440-461), Gregory the Great (590-604) or more recently, Leo XIII, with his *Rerum Novarum*, John XXII, Vatican II and the great statesman John Paul II.

Analyzing the success of Christianity requires a brief consideration of the history of the Church. In its double function are being both the carrier of dogma and of the instruments of Grace, the sacraments, and also being the temporal agent of Christianity, the Church presents during its history, striking differences according to circumstances of place and time. Without going further into this extremely broad question, we must mention, as well as the initial phase of the Church from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages, which was significant for the important role of the Benedictine Abbeys, six significant later phases. The first, marked by the conflict between the Empire and the papacy with Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (1194-1250) and Popes Gregory IX (1227-1241) and Innocent IV (1243-1254), ended in the defeat of the Emperor but nevertheless with much discredit to the papacy which, in Avignon fell under the control of the kings of France.

This event proved to be decisive for the history of the West because it made it impossible for secular or ecclesiastic powers to have a monopoly on society and created the possibility of an open society. A second important period in the Church would be the Renaissance of the 15th century when the Popes took over and expanded the Renaissance inheritance of Florence under Alexander VI, Julius II and Leo X to the point when they actually became semi-pagan. A third crucial moment for the church was the Reformation, which in general terms was a reaction of Christian purism to the extravagances of the Popes. With Luther (1483-1546) there appeared an extraordinary reformulation of Christianity which opposed the thesis of freedom of conscience to ecclesiastical authoritarianism with the principles of sola fide and sola scriptura. Lutheranism would form a parallel branch of the Christian church which would have its greatest impact in Germanic Europe and Britain and would be that part of Christianity which would first become compatible with modern science. Mention should also be made of a fourth period in the church, the 17th and 18th centuries, characterized by adhesion to monarchical absolutism, of which it made itself the legitimizing agency: Alter and Throne. A subsequent phase, in the 19th century will be characterized, above all in the Roman Church, by an obscurantist and anti-scientific anti-modernism. A sixth phase, in modern times is characterized by the opening up of the Church to the demands of the modern world, both in its Catholic and Protestant forms, leading to Vatican II, to John XXIII and to that great Pope-statesman, John Paul II.

Modern Christianity finds itself divided into three major branches: the Orthodox, the Protestant and the Catholic. The Orthodox arose out of a power struggle between the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Bishop of Rome as Pope, creating the schism of 1054. The differences in dogma are insignificant, but nevertheless various attempts to join these two branches since ancient times have been unsuccessful. The Orthodox branch became the Christianity of Byzantium and Byzantine missionaries took it to Russia and converted the Slavic peoples to this branch of Christianity.

The Protestant branch, born out of Luther's Reformation, subdivided into many sects and became the major form of Christianity in the Germanic and British worlds and by extension, the United States. British Protestantism shows few differences from Catholicism, the main one being the replacement of the authority of the Pope by that of the King of England, since Henry VIII.

The Catholic branch is still significant in the Germanic world and the Southern Low Countries, modern Belgium, and is massively predominant in all the Latin countries while also having a significant presence in Africa.

The historical development of the three branches of Christianity is characterized by a tendency on the part of the Orthodox and Protestant branches to take on an important political and national role. In Byzantium, the Orthodox religion was intimately linked to Byzantine patriotism and was its main driving force. A similar phenomenon, although a less intense one, was Russian orthodoxy.

Anglicanism, the British form of Protestantism, performed a similar role until the 18th century. In modern days there is a tendency on the part of Anglicanism to distance itself from the Crown and turn back to its own ecclesiastical authorities. In American Protestantism, which is spread throughout many different sects, we find the growing influence of the activists and their Evangelical branch. We also find a growing tendency to a fusion between religion and patriotism rather similar to that which happened in Byzantium.

Catholicism, the predominant church in Latin countries, still performs a less strictly religious role but we find in it a growing concern with social questions. In some cases, such as Liberation Theology in Latin America, the influence of Marxism is noticeable, as well as a certain fusion with that ideology. In Catholicism, a humanist concern is equally important and this does not play a significant part in the other two branches of Christianity.

V. A Great Civilization

Western civilization, in its most general aspects, is the historical result of the fusion of Latin and Germanic elements. The Latin elements were, on the one hand, the peoples who were Latinized by Rome in Great Britain, Gaul, Iberia and large areas of the Germanic territories. On the other hand, and to an even greater extent, it was Roman culture, with its Hellenic ingredients, that spread throughout Europe, by means of the Church with its ecclesiastical Latin as a universal language of culture, the writings of Antiquity preserved in the Benedictine monasteries and with them, the humanist legacy. In addition to this general transfusion, it is important to add three important resulting factors: (1) the ideal of chivalry, (2) the linking of all European Community is by the Church through the double network of bishoprics and the religious

orders, first of all the Benedictines and then the mendicant orders, and finally (3) the development of cities and with them, in the post-Carolingian world, merchants and universities. The Germanic world, for its part, after experiencing the diversity of peoples occupying its territories in the Roman Empire, mainly Ostrogoths and Visigoths, was mainly populated by the Franks, who dominated the broad area going from modern-day France to modern-day Germany.

As has been mentioned already, the first stable formation that succeeded the Western Empire was the Christian Society that came to be organized within the Carolingian Empire. It was in this society that the process of fusing Latin and German elements began. The conversion from a Christian Society to a Western Society was a process that lasted many centuries, from the dissolution of the Carolingian Empire to the feudalization of Europe, and begins to take on the characteristics of what would become Western Civilization after the 11th century, with the appearance of new cities.

During this process and in its initial phase, with the feudalization of Europe, the successful implantation by the Church of the ideal of chivalry would play an extremely important part. It was on the one hand, the way in which a turbulent lower nobility that lived in a predatory fashion off the spoils it took from the peasantry, was turned into a nobility consisting of nights in the service of noble ideas. These ideas spread throughout the higher ranks of the nobility and created the principle of *noblesse oblige*. Also, the ideals of chivalry became over time the ideals of 'gentlemanliness' which shaped the patterns of behavior of the European elite.

A decisive factor in the formation of Western society and with it Western civilization, was the result of the process of urbanization after the 11th century. At that point the archaic forms of European languages were already becoming different from each other. Within the various linguistic areas the cities, with their merchants, clerics and universities, and exerting greater or lesser degrees of administrative authority but being basically independent of the feudal lord and linked to a higher authority, the emperor, King, Count or Pope, were a manifestation of what might be called universalist particularism. They were particularist both because of their own characteristics, each city being the sum of more than their respective languages and cultural content. But they were universalist because of Christianity and their erudite and ecclesiastical culture, which was expressed through Latin. The common space-language and urban network complex gradually created the kingdoms that emerged out of the feudal world. These were kingdoms that shared between themselves

the great languages that formed from the 7th to the 11th centuries. In this way Western society and its civilization appeared.

Any attempt to analyze the historical development of this initial nucleus of Western civilization that was forming from the 11th century onward would be beyond the limits of this short essay. We shall mention simply the major phases this civilization will pass through, such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Baroque Age and the 18th-century Enlightenment. We shall also mention that after the 17th century the universalism that typified this culture led it to increasing levels of scientific progress that went from Copernicus and Galileo to Newton, from 19th-century chemistry to 20th-century electricity and to modern science. We shall finally mention that with the First World War, the "European Peloponnesian War", the fragmentation and weakening of the European powers moved the dynamic centre of Western civilization to the United States. This would culminate in the current situation of the USA being the only superpower and having unsurpassed world supremacy.

VI. The Late West

Just as modern historiology identifies Late Antiquity as the last period of the classical world, usually understood as beginning with Constantine and the Christianization of the Roman world, so also we must identify the modern West as the Late West.

What is the Late West? We could say that it could be understood as Western civilization after the period when it stopped being egocentric and began to base itself on its scientific and technological ideas. This is the period that followed the criticism of religion in the 18th century and went from the emergence of positivism in the 19th century and finally the consolidation of a new scientific view of the world after the First World War and more decisively after the Second. This period is also marked by a broad and profound crisis in Christianity. The explanation of the world by means of Christian dogma became increasingly incompatible with scientific knowledge and its consistent empirical and analytical proofs. The whole concept of Christianity concerning the beginning of the world and man became inconsistent in the face of evolutionist theory and modern cosmology. Molecular biology in turn, which proves empirically the purely molecular origin of life and based on that, the continuum from the molecular to the cellular and together with experimental psychology, from the physiological to the psychological and from the latter to

intellection and volition, made the body-soul dualism unacceptable and the idea of spiritual substance inconsistent.

The Thomist thesis of the strict compatibility between faith and reason became unsubstantial. What happens now to religions, including Christianity? The effects of the "death of God" are extremely conjugated. Of course, in purely statistical terms the number of people who definitely understand the scientific insubstantiality of religious dogma is superficially small. A for greater number of people, however, are aware of this insubstantiality as a result of inferences arising out of the culture of our time.

Faced with this situation, these people have different reactions. Some understand that the tenets of Christian faith, to quote the case of that religion, are so existentially necessary that we must assume the existence of two worlds which cannot share their truths, that of science and other religion. Other people, in contrast, give up their religious beliefs. Yet there is a third position that statistically shows a tendency to predominate. For some, this position consists in maintaining religion as a code of ethics, regardless of whether God and the soul exist or not. For others, as we see mainly in the United States, religion has become a form, albeit an implicit one, of patriotism, 'the American way of life' and an affirmation of US global supremacy. It does not matter if we discuss the existence of not of God and the compatibility or not of religious dogma with science. At the heart of the matter, God is not in question within this attitude. What is important is to understand that religion – in this case its Protestant, mainly evangelical version – is one of the foundations of the United States and as such must be preserved. Going to church the right number of times is paying homage to the national flag and restating America's international superiority.

VII. The Preservation of Transcendence

There is growing agreement today about the spiritual emptiness experienced by modern man, especially in the West. In the whole of the history of mankind, man has never had better facilities to attend his demands. Never, however, have we seen as we do today, such a lack of meaning in his life. This loss of meaning leads to an intransitive consumerism which has still not provided a viable and valid solution for man. Given the physical limitations of the planet, it will not be possible to replicate the patterns of consumption in American society which societies as populous as those of China and India

will never be able to achieve by reason of physical limitations, regardless of the level of their respective GDPs. On the other hand, intransitive consumerism is a kind of drunkenness that does not free man from the inevitable tragic moments in life and does not give life any meaning beyond the immediate. Neither does the conversion of religion into patriotism and into the feeling of international superiority give a meaning to life, as is shown in the disenchanted state of mind of American soldiers in Iraq or American women who have lost husbands or children in a war that the United States provoked on its own.

Man is a transcendent animal. This is perhaps his most unique qualification. From the Paleolithic period until the modern age man's demand for transcendence has been met more than in any other way by the multiple manifestations of his religious nature. Now the moment has come when religions have lost their validity, how can the human need for transcendence be met? A significant beginning to answering this fundamental question can be found in the Hellenist philosopher's from Zeno to Epicurus. Man's transcendence is achieved through rational and equitable forms of exercising freedom. Taken together, these forms of exercising freedom have, since ancient times, found their expression in humanism, the humanism of Epicurus and Zeno, Cicero, Seneca, Lucretius, Epitectus, Marcus Aurelius, Montaigne and many other important representatives of the superior forms of rational and equitable exercise of freedom. The fact is though that in modern times this humanism needs to be clothed in a profound social meaning and not simply be individualistic, like classical humanism. It must also take responsibility for the environment if we wish to avoid planetary suicide.

Faced with the need to create a new humanism, I understand that Christianity, leaving aside its dogma are keeping its ethics, is one of the best starting points for propagating this indispensable and urgent neo-humanism. I would add in this context the extraordinary importance of the Catholic Church, of Lutheranism and those churches that represent the superior forms of Protestantism, and the Orthodox Church. All of these churches have gone through periods of disgrace, of which the Inquisition and the religious wars in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries are terrible witnesses. At the moment however these churches, with natural exceptions, are performing in an extremely positive way. They are agents of hope, of help and consolation in human suffering, and of the preservation of the dignity of the underprivileged.

May those who hold sincerely to their religious convictions maintain them while they really believe in them. The nonexistence of God does not negatively

affect the qualities inherent in Christianity. Indeed, for those who have been led, for scientific and philosophical reasons, to invalidate religious dogmas, Christianity, regardless of the existence of God and without prejudice to other alternatives, is an excellent support for a new social and environmental humanism. In the long term, I believe that the historic destiny of Christianity lies in turning itself into this neo-humanism.

8. Culture, Language and Excellence (2005)

Among many other things, history consists in a series of dominant languages that corresponded to a greater or lesser extent to dominant cultures. In antiquity, Aramaic was that the *lingua franca* of the Middle East. With Alexander, Greek became the dominant language of a large Part of the world, from the Mediterranean to the frontiers of India. The Roman Empire made Latin a universal language and it remained as the language of culture until the 17th century. In 1511, Erasmus wrote his *Moriae Encomiumin* in that language, but the world of Philip II spoke Spanish. French dominated the 18th century and remained an international language until the middle of the 20th century. Since then, English has succeeded it as the universal language.

The total dominance of English today makes it the world's general language, so that non-Anglophone Europeans, Orientals, Latin Americans and other peoples use it internationally. This absolute dominance brings with it many consequences and raises countless questions. Among the most important consequences of the universalization of English is the corresponding universalization of Anglo-Saxon culture, specifically in its American version. What then, measured in terms of its actual meaning within Western culture, is the real importance of Anglo-Saxon culture? Also, to what extent can we avoid this universal use of English leading to the world becoming a series of cultural satellites of the USA? Today in Brazil these questions have achieved a certain relevance with the decision of Foreign Minister Amorim to do away

with the eliminatory status of the English test in the entrance examinations to the Rio Branco Institute, the training institution for Brazilian diplomats.

It is important in this context to make an initial attempt at an objective evaluation of Anglo-Saxon culture within Western culture in general. What, in the final analysis, is Western culture? I believe that experts in this area broadly agree in recognizing that this culture basically originates in Latin and Germanic sources. Christian society, which succeeded the Roman Empire in the West and achieved its institutional shape with the Carolingian Empire, was the result of an interaction between its leading Germanic groups, mainly the Franks, and the Latinized peoples of Europe. The resulting Western culture that took shape during the Middle Ages is a Latin-Germanic one to which would be added, with the Elizabethan Renaissance, the English influence of Shakespeare, the influence of whose language spread during the 19th century, in the course of which Russian influence also made its presence felt by reason of its extraordinary literature. Seen in terms of its significance during the 19th and 20th centuries, Western culture is mainly the result of the philosophical, historical, sociological and musical contribution of Germany, the contribution in physical science and literature of Great Britain and the scientific, literary and artistic contribution of France. In these terms is undeniable how much the current dominance of Anglo-Saxon culture by far exceeds its actual artistic and eidetic importance and is a result of the international dominance of the English language, which is sustained by the economic and military dominance of the USA.

What conclusions can we draw from this situation? From the many that should be taken into account, two stand out, though with different meanings: the pragmatic and the identitary. Emphasizing the fact that even today, the Latin and Germanic contribution to Western culture is more important than the Anglo-Saxon in no way changes the fact that the English language is undeniably the *lingua franca* of the world and performs a role that was performed by Latin and French at other periods in history. In the same way, however, that after the First World War diplomats discussed the Treaty of Versailles in French, so today we must pragmatically use English as the international language. In this sense, Foreign Minister Amorim's decision to no longer take the English test into account as an eliminatory factor in the entrance examinations to Rio Branco can only be justified if the English language is taught as one of the most important subjects in that Institute's curriculum and if a future diplomat can only receive his or her final qualification after

demonstrating a suitable command of that language. Making access to Rio Branco more democratic will be a socially correct policy only as long as the final pass marks are not 'democratized'. After all, since Pericles democracy has been a system which, with other things, has led to meritocratic forms of elitism. Brazilian diplomacy has meritocratically won a reputation for being one of the best in the world, and must not lose it.

A different set of considerations, however, must be brought to bear on the theme in question when the discussion turns to national identity. While the Portuguese language has not gained the international status that Spanish enjoys – something which will happen as a result of the historic success that Brazil will achieve – as a Latin American country we must accept that internationally, Spanish is the language that expresses our identity.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the vital emphasis on our identity must start at home. It is unacceptable that there is a wide use of languages other than Portuguese—as is increasingly happening—in labeling institutions and Brazilian things in our cities. The government should take urgent steps to control such abuses. However, more than a question of language, what is currently needed is a vigorous affirmation of Latin culture that will continue to have a high profile in Europe and Latin America, and to which Brazilians should make a significant contribution. This is not a question of playing down Anglo-Saxon culture but rather one of achieving levels of excellence in our own culture.



9. A Brief Essay on Man (2006)

1. What is Man?

In his *Man and History*, published posthumously together with *Ways of Knowing and Culture* (*Philosophische Weltanschaung*, Cohen, Bonn, 1929), Max Scheler states that there have been five main human concepts in the course of history: (1) that of religious faith, as in the Bible, (2) that invented by the Greeks, *homo sapiens*, (3) that of *homo faber* of the naturalists and positivists like the ancient atomists and writers such as Bacon, Hume, Mill, Comte, Spencer, Lamarck and Darwin, (4) of that of man as a decadent being as suggested by Theodor Lessing and (5) later purposeful atheism that claims that the freedom of man depends on the non-existence of God, as proposed by Nietzsche, D. H. Kerler and Nicolai Hartmann, in his *Ethics*.

It is important to study a little further the role of the concepts of man based on Greek and Roman atomism. Leucipo de Abdera (fl. 440 BC) and Democritus (c.460-370), followed by Epicurus (341-271) and Lucretius (94-55), claimed that the whole of reality is made up of atoms that have their own movements and move within the universe. These atoms are extremely small and therefore invisible corpuscles of matter with different shapes and volumes, a combination of which makes up all bodies and the separation of which causes them to disintegrate. The human soul is also made up of extremely small atoms distributed throughout the whole body and motivate it; they also disintegrate when we die.

According to Socrates, Plato, on the other hand, proposed a dualist concept of man made up of a mortal body and an immortal soul that was subject to a process of metempsychosis. The soul has three dimensions: the rational (tó logislikón), which produces knowledge, the irascible or volitional (tó thymoeidés), from which we derive courage, and the concupiscent (to epithymeticón), from which we derive moderation. This trichotomy of the soul leads Plato to an equally trichotomic concept of the Republic which has an upper level of the philosophical leaders, a middle level of the warriors and a lower level of the producers.

Aristotle also sees men as being made up of a body and a psyche. He differs from Plato however in seeing the soul as a form of the body and essentially linked to it and dying with it. For Aristotle, man is the rational animal (zoon logikón), but also the social animal (zoon politikón).

Although the currents of thought referred to above still exist in Hellenic thinking, the latter is distributed mainly into four great schools: the Epicurean, the Stoic, the Skeptic and in its Roman period, the Neo-platonic. Generally, and in particular in terms of Epicureanism and Stoicism, its aim is ethical and practical: insuring the tranquility of the spirit - eudaimonia. Epicureanism is atomist and its aim is to achieve tranquility of the spirit through a life of moderation led in a publicly discreet way in the company of friends and in the enjoyment of companionship. Stoicism sees reality as a collection of factors possessing a soul. In this view, eudaimonia consists of living in harmony with nature and in the strict performance of personal and public duties. The wise man is self-sufficient and cultivates autarkeia. He is a universal man who understands that good consists of virtue and the practice of carrying out his duties (tó kathekón).

According to Pyrrhon of Elis (c.360-272), Skepticism aims to achieve spiritual peace by abstaining from commitment to any particular view. It seeks *epoché*, or the suspension of judgment by means of systematically opposing different types of knowledge. Skepticism benefited from the important contribution of Sextus Empiricus (3rd to 2nd century BC), who argued against the pretensions of dogmatic philosophy to know more than what was apparent. Man should strive to achieve *ataraxia*, the liberating suspension of predictive judgments and to live without dogma, in accordance with the appearance of things such as customs and natural inclinations.

With Plotinus (205-270 and Porphyrius (232/3-304), Neo-platonism returns to Plato's dualism. It proposes a three-part concept of reality: the

One, the Intelligence and the Soul. Neo-platonic dualism is teleological, with the soul turned towards the inner man (*éndon anthropos*). Man is individually unique. Human freedom stems from the transcendence of the *psyché* over the *physis*. It attributes communication at a lower level with our equals and other higher level with God.

Medieval thought is ruled by three influences: the biblical, and the classical tradition and the patristic. With St Augustine, it acquires Neo-platonic, Pauline and biblical roots. Man is a wanderer in the world as he is a being for God. With Saint Thomas and Scholasticism the decisive influence is that of Aristotle. While it lasted, Medieval thought began with a patristic phase (the construction of a rational Christian dogmatism) followed by three great periods of Scholasticism - the Initial, until the 12th century, the High (13th century) and the Low 14th century. St Augustine dominates the 12th century and St Thomas dominates from the 13th (1225-1274).

St Thomas' anthropology contains three main streams: (1) the classical concept of man as a rational animal, (2) the Neo-platonic influence, man as a living frontier between the spiritual and the material and (3) the biblical concept of man as the image and reflection of God.

With the Renaissance we see the development of a new humanism that maintains religious faith and the doctrinal and sacramental acceptance of the Church, but proposes a new individualism outside the care of the Church. It is reason that determines the dignity of man, as Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) points out in his *De Dignitate Hominis* (1486). Man has *virtú* with which to confront his destiny. Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) in his main work, *De Docta Ignorancia* (1440) tries to reconcile the two contradictions and finds in God the maximum and minimum. To come to know God, man must free himself of all his positive conclusions and assume a learned ignorance.

After the Renaissance, philosophical thought takes two opposite directions which will lead it to the spiritual dualism of Descartes (1536-1650) and Pascal (1623-1662) and the monism of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). For Descartes, reality is dual: *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. The methodical doubt allows him to state his own existence as an irrevocable truth and, based on his conviction concerning the goodness of God, leads to his certainty of the reality of the image of the world provided by the senses. For Pascal, within the opposition between nature and the spirit, man is by nature an unimportant being who rises to greatness through thought. Hobbes, on the

other hand, claims that man is his body. He is a being in nature which, as his own creation, consists of a transition from a state of nature to the civil state.

In this context, John Locke (1632-1704) argues in favor of a moderate dualism in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* of 1690. Man is a rational and free being. All ideas therefore come from the apprehension of reality through the senses and, based on these, ideas are created by abstract mental processes. There are no innate ideas.

With the Enlightenment, all dogmas, be they religious or political, are subjected to rational criticism. This position leads to a criticism of the Church and the Throne, leading most thinkers - with the exceptions of materialists such as Baron Holbach and de la Metrie - to a philosophical deism that sees God as the watchmaker of the world. On the other hand, Rousseau's social contract maintains that it is through the deliberation of men that we pass from the state of nature to the civil state. The 18th century had unlimited faith in reason, seeing it as man's essential characteristic. This position leads to progressism by means of expanding knowledge and found its highest level of expression in the *Encyclopédie Française* with Diderot (1713-1784) and Condorcet (1743-1794) in his *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*, an expression of historical optimism written while he was being persecuted by the Terror, and published in 1795, after his death.

The philosophical thought of the Enlightenment reaches its high point with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kantian thought develops in three phases: the pre-critical up to 1789, the critical from the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781 to the *Critique of Judgment* in 1790, and the post-critical until his death in 1804.

Kant's anthropology, which was mainly formulated in his *Anthropology* from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), proposes that pragmatic knowledge is what man does, can and should make of himself. Kant's idea of man follows three basic lines: (1) the sensitive-rational, (2) the physical-pragmatic and (3) the structural, religious, pedagogical and political.

An important point in the idea of man and the world arrived with Hegel (1770-1831) who created an idea of man in which nature, the subject of spirit (the individual), the object of spirit (history) and the absolute spirit (self-knowledge) were dialectically linked to nature.

For Hegel, the 'spirit' is partly man described by his essential attribute, but it is also a spiritual substance that generates an increased knowledge of

itself during the course of history and is the equivalent of humanity. During the progress of the spirit, four different levels are found: (1) man in the natural world, in a dialectical opposition between immediacy (nature) and the human (the subject of spirit), (2) man in the cultural world - the humanization that occurs in the objective spirit and leads to awareness; history as the progress of awareness of liberty, (3) man as a being-in-time, a dialectical time that controls the rhythm of history and (4) man confronted with the absolute spirit. The absolute spirit as process is Art, Religion and Philosophy. As absolute knowledge it is knowledge of oneself. For Hegel, the objective spirit develops in the following way:

| | Anthropology | Corporality |
|--------|-----------------------------|---|
| | (Natural Being) | Psychism |
| | | Consequence |
| Spirit | Phenomenology | Awareness of self |
| | (active relationship) | Reason |
| | Psychology (Affectivity) | Theoretical spirit Practical spirit Free spirit |

Hegel's absolute idealism led the most important branch of his followers, the Hegelian left, to an adjustment which basically consisted in re-positioning the awareness-existence relationship within an existence-awareness relationship. The first point in this re-positioning was Feuerbach's (1804-1872) criticism of religion, mainly in his *The Essence of Christianity* of 1841. In this work he claimed that it was the demand for a sense of the absolute that led man to create God.

Influenced by the atheism of Bruno Bauer, the intellectual leader of the 'Doctors Club' of his youth and holding to Feuerbach's ideas, Karl Marx attempted to make a general reformulation of Hegel's thinking, "turning it

upside down" and at the same time incorporating into it the views of French socialism. For Marx, man is Aristotle's rational and political animal, but also and basically, the, *homo faber*. His view of the world is based on the means of production and corresponding forces of production.

For the purposes of this study there would be no point in continuing to make individual references to the individual thinkers who followed, from Marx until today. What interests us is understanding how we have moved from a Hegelian-Marxist concept of man to current ideas on the subject. For this reason that I shall restrict myself, though with an inevitable measure of arbitrariness, to make a brief mention of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud, followed by Scheler, Cassirer, Ortega and Heidegger.

In the view of the author of *The World as Will and Representation* (1819), man faces a reality which he is aware of by means of its representations, that is, simply phenomenologically (Kant) and on the other hand is faced with the impulses of his psycho-physical nature that lead him into countless types of desires that can never be properly satisfied and in which only a nirvanic overcoming of will can bring him peace.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) saw the world on the one hand as a cyclic system controlled by the principle of "eternal recurrence". On the other hand in this world we find a man who is ruled by the desire for power. If properly exercised (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 1883), this can lead to overcoming what is vulgar in man and create a Superman (Übermensch).

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) attempts on the one hand to make an analysis of the structure of the 'I' that is characterized by three levels of depth: the unconscious and deep 'id', the active 'ego' and the normative 'super-ego'. Men's actions are carried out within the sphere of possibilities that their unconscious allows them as a function of the norms of behavior prescribed by the super-ego. Based on this analysis of the structure of the 'I', Freud suggests a type of therapy for psychological disturbances, psychoanalysis, involving a procedure by which psychoanalysis leads the patient to identify the dramas that provoked his or her disturbances, and thus becomes free of them.

Max Scheler (1874-1928) sees man as a natural being that has a spirit. For Scheler the spirit is not a substance as it was for the Scholastics. There are no spiritual substances but spiritual functions exist that are an exclusively human property by virtue of which the forces of the soul can rise above themselves and control themselves. On the one hand this property makes it possible to exercise free will and free reason, on the other, the construction of

culture and the practice of the sublime. These ideas run through all of Scheler's work, but most specifically discussed in his last book, *The Human Place in the Cosmos* (1928).

Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), who represents the second generation of neo-Kantism, was the most important representative of this line of thought, which he enriched with a great sense of historicism. Among his various contributions to philosophical anthropology, the most important is his *Essay on Man* (1944). In this work, following the line of ideas developed in his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1923-29), Cassirer considers that man's essential attribute, the one that characterizes him as a man, is his ability to create symbols. Man is the symbolic animal. The word is man's great symbol and culture is a system of symbols. It is through the act of symbolizing that man appropriates things and their characteristics.

In his untiring questioning concerning the world, Jose Ortega y Gasset (83-1955), one of the greatest philosophers of our times, was not led to elaborate a systematic philosophy. Nevertheless he was a systematic thinker, as is shown in his many studies. Man in many forms was the permanent object of his enquiry. For Ortega, man has no nature; he is a construction made by himself. Man is his project. Ortega's 'racio-vitalism' consists of reason based in life, individual life of each man and the historical life of each society. Reality is shown in perspective.

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) is the most influential philosopher of our time. We find in him unequivocal signs of genius with a debatable eidetic derivationism by means of which he draws ontic conclusions based on semantic analyses: to exist, ex-sistere, to be outside. Heidegger's central concern is to go back to understanding being, based on the presupposition that philosophy has lost the sense of being and has lost its way by analyzing the entity. For this reason Heidegger proposes studying the being and non-being of man, which he calls the *dasein*, i.e., the being-there, or being-now, that which is thrown (ex-sistere) into the world and time. With Hegel, he understands that pure being and nothing are the same. Philosophy should be a return, a *Kehre*, that travels along all the paths mapped out by the being. According to Being and Time (1927) man, with the eclipse of the nothing, becomes the guardian of being. The nothing is what is radically the other in the face of every entity. The nothing is the veil of being. This means that the being, by means of the nothing, partly shows itself and partly hides. The being cannot be objectively known thus for Heidegger thinking consists in the question which gives thinking

a meaning. Philosophy is a discovery of the being which hides and shows itself.

2. The Transcendent Primate

Where are we taken by the brief outline given above of the way in which some important philosophers have seen man? Based on the concepts presented, I believe it is important to recognize and agree on the acceptance of Aristotle's concept of the 'rational animal' and the 'social animal'. This concept however is not enough for modern thought. Sociability is common to many animals and is more developed in certain insects than it is in man. For its part, rationality is shared by many animals, even though at extremely low levels, like mammals in general and like that strange invertebrate the octopus and notably the anthropoid simians. On the other hand, the dualist idea of man that sees him as having a bodily substance and another spiritual one, although it is still recognized by monotheist religions, it has no scientific support based on molecular biology and experimental psychology.

Would the idea Ortega shared with the existentialists be correct in saying that man has no nature but only a project? Examined carefully, the question can only recognize that this formula is primarily an exercise in verbal brilliance. It would be the equivalent of saying that the horse has no nature, only a gallop. This is a question, as will be better shown at a later point in this study, in order to distinguish between human nature and the human condition. Man's humanity is to a great extent produced by himself. What distinguishes modern man from the men of other historical periods, as obviously happens in relation to the Upper Paleolithic period, are differences between their respective humanities, that is, differences in the human condition. This results in the countless ways in which man participates in the world and relates with other men and with himself. This bearer of different human conditions is nevertheless a being who possesses essential permanent characteristics: human nature. What is human nature? It is the set of attributes common to all men in all times that have been passed down as an inheritance from Cro-Magnon man.

These basic common characteristics correspond to the Aristotelian concept of man that contained elements Aristotle did not consider. Cassirer identify this differentiating element as the ability to produce and understand symbols. Once again it is important to recognize that there are signs of symbols being made by other animals. These are symbolic behaviors and bodily manifestations

of hostility or love common to mammals and identifiable in other species. What those animals that most closely approximate man, the anthropoid simians, cannot produce outside their bodies are abstract symbols such as the word, or painting or music. This gives relevance to Cassirer's definition of man as a symbolic animal.

Without taking anything away from the relevance of this definition it is important to recognize that it identifies a product that is specific to man does not refer to the attribute by which man is able to produce symbols. It is clear that this attribute resides in something that is characteristic of man's rational-volitional system, something that concerns his rationality and free will. I understand that this something, which Scheler calls the spirit, is better described as transcendence. Man is the transcendent animal, more precisely the transcendent primate.

Transcendence is the phenomenon by means of which an entity or an act raises its level of complexity when there is a relationship of homoeostatic balance between the factors that shape it. Thus it is that a psychological process turns into a project.

The spirit, as Max Scheler understands it, contains a concept derived from a substantially dualist view of man. Although Scheler insists that the spirit of man is not a substance but a higher function, the inherently substantialist meaning contained in this concept is inevitably reflected in the revelation of Schelerian thinking. This does not happen with the concept of transcendence.

It is correct to say, as with everything concerning the human animal, that something similar, although on a different scale, is also found in animals. It happens, however, that there are two levels of transcendence, the primary and the transcendental. The primary is continually found in nature and in animals in the conversion of molecular processes into cellular ones and cellular processes into physiological and psychological ones, and from these into volitional processes.

Transcendental transcendence, or pure transcendence, only occurs in man and acts volitionally as an act of freedom and intellectually as a conceptualization. Within their respective environments, animals act by operationally taking into account of either the properties of the objects they deal with, like stones and water, or the properties of predator and prey, but they form no abstract concept of things independent of their presence. It is for this reason that animals have no language. As Reichholf pointed out, it is clear that human language depends phonetically on the favorable position of

the glottis, the lack of which prevented Neanderthal man from having an articulated language. The same is true of the simian anthropoids but the phonetic aspect is only one dimension of language, even though it is the decisive one in terms of speech. The pre-requisite of language is the abstract conceptualization of the object and the predication of its attributes. The essential requisite for language is the capacity for abstraction. In other words, intellectual transcendence.

As I propose in a previous essay (*The Place of Man in the Cosmos*), the modern understanding of reality sees in it a continuum going from the subatomic to the atomic and to the molecular, from the molecular to the cellular, from there to complex organisms and finally to man. This process should be understood as one of primary transcendence arising out of a particular property of the cosmos which is its trans-immanence. Here, beyond a certain level quantitative differences become qualitative ones. The primary transcendence observable in nature and notably in animals, in man becomes transcendental. This is what makes it relevant to see man as a transcendent animal and specifically as a transcendent primate.

Nature and the Human Condition

As mentioned previously, man, like all species, has a nature that is fixed and passed down to him through heredity, but he also has a condition, the human condition, consisting of the many ways in which man belongs to the world and relates with other men and with himself. It is by linking unvarying human nature with its extremely variable human condition that philosophers like Ortega or Sartre understand that man has no nature but only a project.

It becomes clear therefore how much this construction shows itself to be fallacious because attributing to man the property of projection means granting him this property as part of his nature. In fact, the projective ability is essential part of human nature. The latter, however, contains other characteristics. Without spending too much time developing this point, we may begin by recognizing that human nature, as a group of properties that may be transmitted through inheritance, necessarily contains the attributes that are characteristic of the order of primates. There are various species in this order. In its biological sense the species, as defined by A.E. Emerson: "is a natural population, genetically distinct, reproductively isolated and with its own evolution". The human species, even at the purely biological level, has physical

characteristics particular to itself which distinguish it from other primates. More than physical characteristics, however, the distinctive mark of man is his rational-volitional system that gives him transcendence. These characteristics in human nature, transmitted by heredity since the Cro-Magnon stage of mankind, have been of a permanent and invariable kind from prehistory until today.

As stated earlier, the human condition presents itself in the most diverse forms. Tackling this question in an extremely brief way we must recognize three different levels of relationship that man has: (1) with the world, (2) with other men and (3) with himself.

The various ways in which, during the course of history, man has related to the world may be divided into two major groups according to how on the one hand man sees himself as an object in the world and on the other, how he sees the world as an object. The first way corresponds to the cosmological cultures such as those of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and in a general way, the pre-philosophical cultures. In these the world is seen as an omnicomprehensive system ruled by great cosmic laws to which the gods themselves are subject. Human freedom is limited and fixed in one place and the course of events, including human ones, follows the direction predetermined in the cosmic system.

In the second group, which we could call that of cultures enjoying philosophical reflection, as in the exceptional case of Hellenic culture, the world is seen as an object that is susceptible to intellectual understanding and to a great extent to premeditated human intervention. In the case of Greece, it was Ionic thinking of the 7th and 6th centuries that moved the understanding of the world from mythological formulations to the rational search for basic principles.

In terms of man's relationship with other men, the various forms of the human condition differ according to how the family relationship, the social relationship and the historical relationship are dealt with. The primary human relationship is familial and takes shape with the very emergence of man. In it, there are different relationships between sexual partners, between parents and children, brothers etc. After the Neolithic period and the territorially limited forms of sociability which take on their stable configuration with the urban revolution, society adopts a vertical structure in which three basic levels may be distinguished: (1) that of the formulators-managers, priests and their successors, (2) the intermediate level of executives who were originally warriors and (3) the level of the producers, slaves, serfs or workers.

Seen from the historical point of view, the human condition presents in its broadest sense a differentiation resulting from the types of concepts of the world that are divided into three types: (1) the magical concept of the world, (2) the rational-qualitative concept and (3) the rational-quantitative concept.

Cosmological cultures are magic ones. Hellenic culture was revolutionary in introducing a rational concept of the world. Hellenic rationality, from the Ionic thinkers to Aristotle and his successors, is qualitative. Things have inherent properties which the philosopher identifies. This concept of the world prevailed until the Renaissance. After Copernicus, Galileo and others, the world was analyzed quantitatively. The laws of nature are written in mathematics. This view, with the wider aspects that have come from improving calculation, has lasted until today.

The same human history seen more specifically in terms of the relationships between societies and between them and the world, involves a more complex diversification. Among other possible forms of classification, that which I believe to be especially relevant is the one which takes into account the basic situation of a civilization relative to other societies and to the understanding of the world.

Based on this criterion, five major types of civilization may be classified historically: (1) predatory civilizations such as the Assyrian, Mongol, Tartar and Viking, (2) cosmological civilizations such as the Egyptian, Babylonian, pre-Columbian and others, (3) aesthetic-rational civilizations like the Hellenic, Etruscan and others, (4) particularistically regulatory civilizations like the Hebraic, Phoenician, Chinese, Hindu and Persian and (5) universally regulatory civilizations like the Roman, Western and Islamic.

Bearing in mind the third level of human relationship previously referred to, that of man with himself, we shall find that the human condition is different on the one hand in the sense that man has no clear awareness of himself, like primitive men and members of cosmological civilizations, or is fully aware of himself, like Hellenic man. On the other hand, in the man-world and mangods relationship, the place of man varies if he places himself in the centre of this relationship like classical man and post-medieval Western man, or if he sees himself as a slave of the divine, like those living in cosmological or unconditionally monotheistic societies.

The different generic categories shown above into which the human condition fits, accumulates an infinite number of specific ways to suit each human grouping and reach individual. In this specific sense the human condition is different for each moment and situation in life.

4. Man's Destiny

In a previous study (*The Place of Man in the Cosmos*, São Paulo, Paz e Terra, 2006) I had the chance to observe that the strange fact that life in general and man's life in particular had appeared on the planet Earth as beings having their own ends emerging from a Cosmos with no end whatsoever. Man is a teleological being. What end does he give himself and what end, if any, does he have as an individual and as a species?

The first question contains generically an empirically confirmable answer. During the short period of his life, man seeks his own happiness. This question becomes more complex and discussable when we try to determine what constitutes human happiness. There is one dimension of human happiness that is generally agreed upon, the psychophysical kind. Man has psychophysical needs which are, on the one hand, structural as he is an animal, and on the other are psychosocial in nature, being much more complex but, in the final analysis, also capable of being identified.

What makes this question extremely difficult is the transcendent dimension of man. Socrates did not properly differentiate between psychophysical happiness and transcendent happiness. This is what led to his idea that evil is only done by mistake, through intellectual ignorance of what is good. Aristotle, on the other hand, understood perfectly the fact that psychophysical happiness does not necessarily coincide with 'spiritual' happiness. The former can lead man into antisocial and anti-ethical behavior whenever he tries to optimize the satisfaction of all his psychophysical demands, regardless of any other considerations.

The extent to which psychophysical demands should be subordinated to ethical principles depends, on one hand on the belief in divine judgment on human conduct and the existence of an immortal soul which, after death, will have the destiny that comes from this judgment. On the other hand, what happens when we deny the existence of God and of an internal soul, a situation towards which, according to some, including the present writer, modern scientific and philosophical thought leads us?

According to Dostoevsky, everything is allowed to man if God does not exist. Within this line of thinking, the radical monist will be given the chance to

do everything he wants to do that is within his capabilities, always assuming he can avoid retribution in the course of his life. It is undoubtedly true that this course of conduct is followed with greater or lesser degrees of prudence or radicalism, by many people, which has given our time many of its characteristics. Can this be the final response from the point of a consistently monistic atheism?

To properly understand this question it is important to recognize that man, as well as having the psychophysical nature of his species, is a transcendent being. Human transcendence, which was for a long time understood as a function of divine transcendence, in fact does not depend on the latter but arises out of human nature itself. As has already been pointed out in this study, man is a transcendent primate. This transcendence imposes on man the need to have meaning, giving meaning to his life, even if the world as a whole has no meaning. Giving meaning to life consists in transcending the purely psychophysical dimension and accomplishing in a meaningful way—and not only by chance—something that has its own worth. This worth can be cultural, social or simply ethical.

As Max Scheler earlier stated with his "material ethic of values", values have an inherent substratum that is universal in nature at the same time as they always appear in a historical perspective. Beauty can be seen in as much in a Greek statue as in a Chinese or African one, in spite of them all expressing different aesthetic patterns. Acts of knowledge are produced both in the Ionic cosmology as in that of Einstein. Heroism is found in Epaminondas as well as in Joan of Arc, charity from the Good Samaritan to Mother Teresa of Calcutta.

No man escapes the emptiness of his life (regardless of the ultimate irrelevance of the world) if it is confined to the merely psychophysical dimension. Successful forms of anti-ethical happiness do not escape this emptiness and simply exist on a level similar to that of drunkenness, a drunkenness that cannot however manage to hide the emptiness of life.

This way of thinking leads to a social, environmental and transcendent ethic that arises out of human nature and by means of which the imperative of transcendent feeling imposes itself on the mere individual satisfaction of psychophysical demands. This is not something that depends on divine judgment and is guided by a destiny after death; it is something directly and immediately related to each man's sense of life.

During his brief life, man is given the chance, above all else, to make that life significant or insignificant. Based on that choice, ever since ancient times

ethics of austerity have appeared that demand a behavior devoid of any search for pleasure and directed exclusively towards the accomplishing of duty, like the cynicism of old (which has nothing in common with the modern meaning of cynicism), stoicism and, within the theist concepts, the ascetic forms of Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism.

The ascetic ethics, when considered separately from the (illusory) belief in divine rewards after death, are simply the opposite of pure hedonism. Just as pure hedonism disregards the transcendent demand for meaning, asceticism ignores the effective and real psychophysical demands of man in the name of illusory rewards. It is doubtless worth practicing a reasonable amount of asceticism as an exercise of will-power over instinct, what we might call 'the gymnastics of freedom'. In this sense, like all good gymnastic exercises, asceticism should be practiced in moderation. Making it the main object of life is the same as suffering gratuitous mutilation.

The conclusion we may draw from the foregoing considerations, taking into account the Delphic prescription of 'nothing to excess', is in the sense that the meaning of life consists of its orientation towards transcendental (cultural, social and ethical) values while reasonably enjoying psychophysical pleasures as far as possible and taking into account the society one lives in and the environmental preservation of the planet. I would give this way of life the name 'environmentally aware and socially transcendent hedonism'. Environmental and transcendent hedonism needs to have a strong social dimension in order to give social justification to those who practice it and making the world more tolerable for all men and possibly excellent for many.

If, in terms of the preceding considerations, a moderate environmental and socially transcendent hedonism is the subjectively reasonable objective for the life of each man, we must ask does man as a species have, objectively, his own rationally identifiable end in view? In this respect, the rational answer is exclusively biological. Animal species, including the human one, transcendent objectives. This transcendence is of the individual human being, not of his species. As a species, his only aim is self-preservation, a self-preservation that can be achieved as long as the general conditions last allowing man to exist on Earth (environmental awareness) and something that has predictable limits – beyond the statistics of cosmic or human disasters – in terms of the limited duration, not only of the present cosmos in general, but specifically of the 10 to 15 billion years of the possible duration of the solar system.

An environmental and socially-transcendent hedonism is essentially the proper response to man's life in the world, regardless of the fact that the world may have no meaning and that man may have no other meaning than that which he gives himself, bearing in mind his transcendent and social nature.

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10. Christ, Allah and Agnosticism (2006)

Religion is the oldest and most basic dimension of human culture. Neanderthal man, the first species of *homo sapiens* to appear in the evolutionary process about 160,000 years ago, showed signs of religiosity in his burial rites. Palaeolithic animism saw evil or benign spirits in all aspects of nature and this animism continued until civilizations developed. This occurred in Italian-Mediterranean animism with its *numina*, which are found from the origins of Roman religion until it became Hellenized. The crisis in the classical world which intensified during the 3rd century BC led to the discrediting of polytheism and increasing demands for a religion of personal salvation, opening the way for the spread of Christianity. After becoming the official religion of the Roman Empire after Constantine (reigned 324-357), Christianity became the nucleus that shaped Western civilization.

The origin of the other great universal monotheistic religion in the world today, Islam, founded by Mohammed (c. 570-652) is different. After the revelations which unexpectedly changed his life as a merchant, from about 600, until his death, Mohammed dedicated himself to spreading the new religion. The essence of this new religion is that there is only one God, Allah, and Muhammad is his prophet. The new religion spread at a dizzying pace. With Mohammed begins the political and religious unification of the Arab tribes which, in the course of just one century, went on to conquer the Persian Empire, most of the Byzantine Empire and the Iberian peninsula (where it

would remain for seven centuries), at the same time spreading through Egypt and North Africa.

Relations between these two great religions have been full of conflicts throughout history, though with some periods, especially in Iberia, of peaceful coexistence. As proselytizing religions, both considered followers of the other to be infidels. It is particularly interesting to see how each of these religions came to terms with the process of modernization in the world and the resulting secularization after the Renaissance and especially after the Enlightenment.

To understand how these religions reacted in profoundly different ways to the process of modernization, we have to bear in mind the effects on Western Civilization of the long conflict between the Papacy and the Germanic Holy Roman Empire which opposed the Hohenstauffen, notably the extraordinary Frederick the second, *stupor mundi* (b. 1194, Emperor from 1220 to his death in 1250) to the Papacy, from Gregory IX to Innocent IV (1243-1254). This conflict ended firstly with the final defeat of Conradin, the last Hohenstauffen in 1268 and secondly with the corruption of the Papacy which had become dependent on the French king while it was at Avignon (1309-1373). This reciprocal neutralization of the Empire and the Papacy allowed Western Civilization to escape from both an imperial and a Papal monocracy and create a system of autonomous subsystems that were cultural, political, economic and social. This led to creating the conditions for individual freedom and freedom of thought that have characterized Western culture from the Renaissance on and above all, the Enlightenment.

Islamic culture combined, within the *Umma*, its religious, cultural, political and economic dimensions, and resisted the process of secularization, preserving until today significant medieval characteristics. Islam never had a Renaissance nor an Enlightenment, in spite of attempts at modernizing at various times and in various areas, and which were only successful with Mustapha Kemal in Turkey. The result we see today is that Islam has kept its religious vigor at the cost of its lack of modernization and in contrast, Christianity has become a modern scientific and technological culture which is no longer theocentric.

The Western world today sees itself belonging to a cosmos without any purpose, purely consequential in nature but which encompasses everything that exists in space. It is in this context that the Pope-philosopher Benedict XVI, demonstrating the profound influence of Hegel, is trying to save the world from complete secularization by seeking to gather together those who continue to believe in Christ and those who maintain firm Moslem beliefs.

This endeavor was symbolically represented by the Pope praying together with the Grand Mufti of Istanbul, Mustapha Cagraci, in the Blue Mosque in Istanbul on 30th November, 2006. Bento XVI recognized (in his reference to Manuel II Palaiologos) the deep ambivalence within Islam, which spread by the sword but survived by belief. Leaving behind those aspects, the Pope advocates, in the environment of modern agnosticism (which the author of these lines shares) the religious imperative of loving the same God while using different names and rites.



11. The Sacred and the Rational (2006)

The violent protest demonstrations in Islamic countries against the publication of cartoons making fun of the Prophet Muhammad in European newspapers is encouraging a new reflection on the limits - if any limit should exist - of the freedom of the press. For the purposes of debate it matters little that those demonstrations have been proved to be not spontaneous, but happened months after the cartoons were published, following the coordinated mobilization of a group of religious leaders. This is primarily a case of deciding if, among the limits the freedom of the press must submit to, respect for the sacred is one. On a deeper level is the complex relationship between the sacred and rational. Can the sacred be the legitimate object of rational criticism?

Today, the question of freedom of the press is the object of a great double standard. A double standard on one hand on the part of societies subjected to intolerant regimes imposed for political reasons such as that of North Korea, or for religious reasons such as those in Islamic countries. In such societies the press is subjected to far stricter controls, but they also witness frequent demands for freedom of the press to proclaim their ideologies in Western countries, as is constantly happening with Islamic groups based in Europe.

Another, and in many ways more serious double standard concerning the freedom of the press is found in Western countries. Thus, in the USA, self-censorship is practiced by almost all newspapers concerning topics or questions affecting the national interest of America or if, broadly speaking, they are felt

to be disrespectful to the President of the Republic and the country's more important institutions. In Brazil we see a completely opposite attitude, where the most outrageous criticisms of the country coming from abroad are given space in our newspapers.

In the Western world, a similar double standard can be seen concerning the sacred. The same freedom to caricature Mohammed will not exercise the same freedom to print offensive cartoons of the Virgin Mary or Christ. This has no doubt something to do with the fact that, in contrast to Islamic societies, Western ones are mainly agnostic - almost completely so in Denmark and the other Nordic countries. This requires, even if very briefly, a reflection on what the sacred consists of and to what extent the criticisms it may be submitted to are legitimate.

The sense of the sacred is among man's most ancient feelings. In the upper Paleolithic period this feeling is expressed in cave paintings or in rituals that have been re-enacted. In the Neolithic period this feeling would lead to the worship of fertility goddesses and in the Bronze Age to various forms of polytheism, of which we still see remains today, especially the Hellenic. What should we think about the sacred in the cultural situation of today?

In a subject that is so complex, in which the Western world differentiates between agnostics and believers, we must recognize that in a broadly consensual way, there is a prevailing awareness that respect should be given to the feeling for the sacred on the part of those who follow the great religions. This attitude of respect ceases to be consensual and general in relation to 'primitive religions' that are felt to be a part of folklore even when, as in the case of Brazil, a significant part of the population shares such beliefs.

It is from a basis of these ideas that in the Western world we see that, in terms of the sacred, what is in question is the extent to which the beliefs implied in a feeling for the sacred may be considered sufficiently 'rational'. Judeo-Christian beliefs have benefited from this presumption. Thus, the less rational religious beliefs have been felt to be, the less respect their feelings for the sacred have aroused.

In the face of the countless aspects contained within this subject, I shall simply point out two, which are found at different levels. The first is that of the absolute legitimacy of all rational criticisms of the sacred. Reason is man's supreme attribute and everything man deals with should be subject to it. Rational criticism, however, has nothing to do with mockery or insult, but

rather with objective types of scientific and philosophical analysis, and it is these same analyses that legitimately lead many people to agnosticism.

Another separate aspect of the relationship with the sacred arises from a double consideration: the first concerns the intrinsic respectability that manifestations of the sacred present within every culture. The Western world bestows this cultural respectability on the Judeo-Christian idea of the sacred. The second consideration is social. The aspects of the sacred that are shared by large sections of humanity demand respect within their respective areas of cultural dominance, or by reason of that dominance. It is in this sense that publication in the press of cartoons and other items offensive to a great religion like Islam deserve criticism and if necessary, public prohibition. In Brazil, equal consideration should be given to primitive beliefs and rites in which large sections of the population take part, from the 'evangelicals' to *candomblé*, without taking anything away from the rational criticism they may be subject to.



12. Reflections on the Two Truths (2006)

1. Introduction

The theme of the two truths, as will be seen in this short study, arises from the occurrence of monotheistic religions like Islam and Christianity. Classical antiquity knew the difference between the sensory representation of reality and its intellectual representation. For Plato, that was an illusion. For Aristotle, on the contrary, it was the first effective representation of reality based on which the intellect, by abstraction, conceived ideas. The distinction between sensory representation and intellectual representation did not, however, imply the concept of two truths. The idea of truth was unitary. For Plato, it was intellectual truth. For Aristotle it was sensory truth and, through abstraction, propositional truth.

A discussion, although a brief one, on the theme of the two truths requires firstly a clarification of the concept of truth. What is truth? The concept contains two different meanings: (1) that concerning the truth of a proposition and (2) that concerning the truth of things. The latter refers to the extent to which an attribute is predicated to something which corresponds to it (truth) or does not correspond to it (falsehood). The second meaning concerns the truth of being.

In this second meaning the concept of truth is understood as in a different way by different cultures. In Hebrew, truth means trust or fidelity; in Greek,

alatéia means revelation, the truth about being; in Latin, *veritas* means veracity. The Western meaning of truth about being basically corresponds to the Latin one.

The Scholastics saw a difference between ontological and logical truth. In the ontological sense truth meant reality, the reality of being. In the logical sense truth consisted in any correspondence between the idea and the thing: *adequatio rei et intellectus*.

For modern philosophers propositional truth consists in the analytical or empirical verifiability of the origin of a predication.

2. In his *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Nicola Abbagnano makes a distinction between five fundamental concepts of truth: (1) as correspondence, (2) as revelation, (3) as conformity, (4) as occurrence and (5) as utility.

(1) Truth as Correspondence

The concept of truth as correspondence is the oldest and most used. It was expressly formulated for the first time by Plato in *Cratylus*. "Truth is the discourse that describes things as they are; falsehood is that which describes things as they are not". In the same vein, Aristotle declares: "denying that which is and stating that which is not, is false, while affirming that which denies what is not, is true".

Aristotle states that truth is in thinking or in language, not being or a thing. On the other hand, that state of being or a thing is a measure of truth, and not a thought or discourse. A thing is white because it is, and not because it is said to be white.

Until the Hellenistic philosophers, the concept of truth and criterion of truth implied the same thing. With the Stoics and Epicureans, the concept and criterion of truth become different things. Truth is still understood as a correspondence between judgment and the thing. For the Stoics, however, the criterion of truth is the "cataleptic representation", i.e. obvious representation. For the Epicureans, the criterion of truth is sensation.

(2) Truth as Revelation

The concept of truth as revelation or manifestation involves two modes, the empirical and the physical. Empirically, truth is what it is immediately shown to man. It is, therefore, intuition or phenomenon. Metaphysically, truth is revealed as a way of knowing, by means of which the essence of a thing, or its being or its principle, become clear. In this interpretation, evidence is at the same time a definition of truth and the criterion of truth.

The criterion of truth as revelation led to the recognition of eternal truths based on the criteria of evidence. This is where we find Descartes' *cogito* and where we find Romanticism. For Hegel the idea is truth because it is objectivity responding to the concept, not in the sense that external things respond to my representations: in this sense, these are exact representations that I have as an individual. But in the sense that everything that is real, while it is true, is the Idea and has its truth by means of the Idea and the forms of the latter (Enc. § 213). In other words: "the Idea is the objectivity of the concept, that is, the rationality of the real, but insofar as it shows itself to the consciousness in its need, that is as knowledge or science" (System of Philosophy, ed. Glockner, I, p. 423).

For phenomenology, truth is the evidence of phenomenological objects as they present themselves when *epoche* is achieved.

For Heidegger, truth is revelation or discovery. The truth can only reveal itself to man. On the other hand Heidegger states that truth is not judgment. Truth is not a revelation of a predicative nature but consists in being discovered in the being of things and not being the discoverer of man (*Being and Time*, § 44). On the other hand, each discovery of being, as it is a partial discovery, is also a concealment of being. "The being hides while the entity reveals itself. Thus, the being, while illuminating the entity, at the same time leads it into error.

(3) Truth as Conformity to a Rule or Concept

Formally, truth as conformity consists in conforming to the general rules necessary to the intellect. This theme was tackled by Baden's neo-Kantism. Windelband felt that the object of knowledge, that which measures and determines the truth of knowledge itself, is not an external reality which, as such, is unreachable and unknowable, but the intrinsic rule of knowledge itself (*Preludien*, 1884, 4th edition, 1911, passim). Rickert identified the object of knowledge as the norm that knowledge must obey in order to be true (*Der Gegenstad der Erkennis*, 1892). For these neo-Kanteans, conforming to the rules, which for Kant was simply the formal criterion of truth, became the definition of truth itself (Abbagnano, op. cit., p. 960).

(4) Truth as Coherence

This concept of truth appears with the Anglo-Saxon idealist movement: B. Bosanquet (*Lógica na Metafísica do Conhecimento (Logic in the Metaphysics of Knowledge*), 1888) and F. H. Bradley (*Appearance and Reality*, 1897).

According to this line of thought, anything that is contradictory cannot be real. The truth therefore consists in perfect coherence.

(5) Truth as Utility

This concept belongs to pragmatism, although Nietzsche was the first to formulate it although in a different context. For Nietzsche, truth does not generally mean anything that is not relevant to the preservation of humanity (The Will to Power, ed. Kremer, 78, 507).

For William James, truth as utility is applied to beliefs that are non-verifiable or non-demonstrable, such as morals and religion (*The Will to Believe*, 1897). For F.C.S. Schiller (*Humanism*, 1963) "a proposition is true what ever field it belongs to, simply by reason of its effective utility, that is, because it is useful to extend man's dominion over nature by means of knowledge or to achieve solidarity for the better order of the human world. An alternative version of this concept is found in the instrumentalism of all of Dewey's cognitive processes.

3. The Double Truth

Antecedents

The emergence of the concept of two truths is linked, as was mentioned earlier, to two monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam. Nevertheless the roots of the problem lie in the Aristotelian distinction between the active intellect and the passive intellect and, after Aristotle, in commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c.200 AD).

Within his general concept differentiating between matter and form, potentiality and act, Aristotle understood that there existed in the soul of man a passive intellect that consisted in the potential for understanding, and an active intellect consisting in the actual exercise of that capacity (*On the Soul*, III, 5).

Alexander of Aphrodisias, a noted commentator on Aristotle, maintains a conceptualist position, but on a broader level. Several specific elements may belong to a single common nature. This nature, however, does not exist as a universal unless it is abstracted from its particular characteristics by thought.

In terms of the Aristotelian distinction between passive and active intellect, Alexander identifies the active intellect with God. God, as the most intelligible entity, makes everything more intelligible. As its own self-sustaining agent, only the active intellect is imperishable. On the other hand, the human intellect as such (passive intellect) perishes with death.

This thesis of Alexander of Aphrodisias would have an important impact on Renaissance thinking, where it would be confronted by the position taken by Averroes, which opposed Alexander's affirmation of the mortality of the soul with the idea of a universal and imperishable active understanding.

Single Truth

The classic idea of a single truth is taken up again by medieval High Scholasticism, but already at this point based on the understanding that Reason and Faith are one. Revelation tells us directly through the word of God the truths on which Christian faith will be based. On the other hand, human reason was created by God and destined by Him to arrive at the truth. Thus it is possible to confirm the truths about faith through philosophy. Based on these suppositions, the philosophical and theological work of St Albert the Great (Alberto Magno) and St Thomas Aquinas were developed. The five proofs of the existence of God presented by Thomas Aquinas are typical of this conviction concerning the unity of philosophical and theological truth.

Typical also of this unitary concept of truth is the ontological proof of the existence of God formulated by St Anselm. It is unimportant in this case that Anselm was a Platonic realist and Thomas an Aristotelian conceptualist. In both we find the same conviction concerning a single truth that is attainable both by philosophy and by revelation.

The development of medieval thought from the High to Low Scholasticism of the 14th century was marked by the belief that, contrary to what Thomas Aquinas thought, several revealed truths are not susceptible to confirmation by reason. The discrepancy between reason and faith appears in many cases, from those concerning mysteries such as the Holy Trinity or the divine and

human double nature of Christ, to questions concerning the relationship between the body and soul.

Nicholas of Kues

Nicholas Kryfts, who was born in Kues in 1401 and died in 1464, became known by the latinized form of his name, Nicolau de Cusa, and represents the highest point of Renaissance philosophy. Having initially supported the conciliatory positions concerning the papacy (the Catholic Concorde of 1432), in 1435 he became convinced that only the Pope could preserve the unity of the church, and gave him his support. Appointed cardinal in 1448 and Bishop of Brixen in 1450 he carried out two activities throughout his life, that of thinker and representative of the Pope on various missions, notably his efforts to reunite the Orthodox churches with Rome and to establish a deeper understanding between Christianity and Islam.

The main theoretical contribution of Nicolau de Cusa is his idea on the uniting of contradictions in the infinite and in God, which he proposes mainly in his famous book *De Docta Ignorantia* of 1440.

Nicholas' thesis concerning learned ignorance consists on the one hand of an affirmation of the *coincidentia oppositorum* in the infinite and in God, and on the other, based on the idea of the immense limits of intellectual knowledge, in the affirmation that it is through ecstasy that the human spirit can reach God.

The thesis concerning the union of opposites in the infinite and in God marks an important moment in the historical progress of the theme of the two truths. Denying the unrestricted validity of the principle of contradiction, Nicholas of Kues opens the way for the validity of sustaining opposing truths.

The Two Truths

The thesis of the two truths is first expressly formulated by two thinkers, the Muslim Averroes and the Christian Piero Pomponazzi. In both cases the question concerned the idea that there are many conflicts between reason and faith and between philosophical and religious thought.

Historically, the first of these thinkers was Averroes (Abu'l-Walid Mohammed Ibn Ahmad Ibn Mohammed Hafid Ibn Rusd) who was born in Cordoba in 1126 and died in Morocco in 1198. He was a disciple of

Abubaker, one of the most eminent Arab philosophers, and a judge (Gâdi) in Seville and in Cordoba. For almost the whole of his life he had an excellent relationship with the ruling Almohad of Cordoba. The successor to the latter, al-Mansur (1184-99), adopted extremely rigid orthodox positions and the philosopher fell out of favor, was exiled from 1195 to 1198 and restored to favor shortly before his death in Morocco. He was buried in Cordoba.

A prolific writer of works on medicine, law and philosophy, Averroes was the most important Arab commentator on Aristotle and the source of much contemporary knowledge about the Greek philosopher in the West. Central to the thinking of Averroes is his interpretation of Aristotle's theory concerning the active intellect and subsequent denial of the mortality of the soul along, with the affirmation of the eternal nature of matter, opposing any concept of creation out of nothing (*ex nihilo*).

His main works are the *Decisive Treatise* and *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*. The latter argues against al-Ghazali and in it Averroes defends naturalism and its corollary, the eternity of the world. The former study is that which has particular importance to the theme under discussion here, because in it Averroes establishes a distinction between religious truth, which has to be shared by all men, and philosophical truth, which is accessible only to those who are able to understand it.

There is controversy concerning the extent to which Averroes, with his theory of the two truths, is able to defend their compatibility at a higher level, or admits margins of mutual incompatibility between them. His exile by the Orthodox al-Mansur gives strength to the latter supposition.

Piero Pomponazzi

With Pomponazzi (1462-1525), who was born in Mantua and taught in Padua and Bologna, we meet one of the most important thinkers in the Renaissance and an outstanding commentator on Aristotle who interpreted the latter's work within the same framework as Alexander of Aphrodisias. He opposes both Averroes and Thomas Aquinas, defending, in relation to the latter, the theory of the two truths.

In his treatise *De Immortalitate Animae* (1516) Pomponazzi states that the immortality of the soul is a religious truth, with which he contrasts, philosophically, the awareness of its mortality. For the sake of prudence, given the power of the Inquisition, Pomponazzi claims to personally support

religious truth. However it is unequivocally the case that his own thought supports the incompatibility between the two truths and believes that philosophical truth is the superior one.

Pomponazzi's naturalist position (*De Naturalium Effectum Admirandorum Causis Sive*, de 1556) leads him to consider that events claimed to be miraculous have their origin in nature, although this may not be realized at the time. In *De Fato*, *Libero Arbitrio*, *raedestinacione*, *Providencie Dei Liber Quinque*, of 1520, he proposes the nonexistence of predestined actions given the existence of human free will.

Subsequent Historical Development

Historically, the thesis of the two truths had no significant theoretical continuity. The 17th century, reacting against the semi-paganism of the Renaissance, was at the same time strictly religious (within the Reformation and the Counter-reformation) and strictly scientific. Although philosophers such as Descartes, Pascal and Leibniz, or scientists like Newton, did not expressly tackle the topic of the compatibility between reason and faith, they took it as understood in their work. The question acquired a different complexion with the Enlightenment.

With its radical rationalism, its direct opposition to mere arguments based on authority and on the supposed authority of the Church (Voltaire's "écrasez l'infâme"), the Enlightenment denied the validity of dogmatic forms of religion like those passed on through the Christian tradition. In their place it advocated the superiority of a natural religion written in the human heart and leading to a non-dogmatic theism.

The philosophical and historical-sociological rationalism of the Enlightenment takes us to a theory of the two truths. This consisted simply in denying that the tenets of revelation were true and accepting scientific-philosophical truth as the only valid one.

As was mentioned earlier, from the 18th century until today there has been no theoretical attempt to support the idea of the two truths. Thinkers like Chesterton (1874-1936) or Maritain (1882-1973), or even Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) continued to maintain, along with Thomas Aquinas, the compatibility between reason and faith, scientific and religious truth. What may be observed the period in question, however, is a

continuous development in agnostic positions that leads to the acceptance of a single truth, the scientific-philosophical.

Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind concerning our modern period, the significant number of educated people who are aware of scientific progress, especially in areas such as molecular biology and who can maintain their religious convictions alongside their scientific and philosophical culture. How does this compatibility come about?

Everything leads us to believe, both through logical considerations as well as the declarations of some of these individuals, that compatibility between reason and faith today, as maintained by those who do not support philosophical positions like those of Maritain or Teilhard de Chardin (although these positions still have their adherents), is due to an implicit acceptance of the thesis of the two truths. For this significant group of people who have kept their religion in spite of the ample measure to which that religion is contradicted by their own scientific convictions, what happens is a differentiation between 'scientific truth' and 'existential truth'. For such people, the world is not explainable without God, not so much from the cosmological and biological point of view, but rather from the existential point of view, of the meaning of life. God is existentially necessary. It is therefore important to protect this conviction which explains the meaning of life to those who share it, from any scientific-philosophical criticisms. Science is trusted to explain causalist systems. Existential intuition is trusted to justify the belief in God. As a result, the non-communicability between these two convictions is accepted.

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13. Transcendental Atheism (2007)

Introduction

Atheism consists in denying the existence of God. It is common to distinguish between theoretical atheism, which is philosophical in nature, and practical atheism which consists in generally ignoring the existence of God. This brief study is located within the philosophical area of atheism. Its rather unusual title of 'transcendent atheism' arises from the fact that the affirmation of God's nonexistence used here is concomitant with a support of the idea of the transcendent state of man. In this essay it is understood that the supposition of the existence of a transcendent God arose out of man's need, as a transcendent being, to attribute that quality to the image he had made of God.

Theoretical atheism is a recent historical position that only became fully apparent with the Enlightenment. Greek philosophers, with the exception of Carneades of Cyrene (214-129 BC), including the atomists, maintained their belief in the gods or, more rarely, took a monotheistic view of divinity as being the Supreme Good of Plato or Aristotle's Prime Mover.

In the modern tradition of atheist positions, we should mention especially Thomas Hobbes (1588-1670), Paul Henri, Baron Holbach (1725-1770), Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709-1751), in the 18th century. The main figures of the 19th century are Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Karl Marx (1818-

1883), Ernst Haeckel (1881-1919) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). In the 20th century we have Bertrand Russell (1872-1970).

Proofs of the Existence of God

Ever since ancient times, there have been many attempts to prove the existence of God. It was mainly in the Middle Ages that the best arguments for this were put together. In my book *Brasil, Homem e Mundo – Reflexão na Virada do Século (Brazil, Man and the World - Reflections at the Turn of the Century* Rio de Janeiro, Topbooks, 2000), I discuss in depth the main proofs of the existence of God (pp. 89-98).

I shall refer readers interested in this topic to the book and in this brief study shall give only a short survey of the nature of these proofs. They can be summarized in three distinct types: (1) the *a priori* arguments of St Anselm, (2) the *a posteriori* arguments of St Thomas and (3) empirical manifestations of divinity in the form of miracles, apparitions and mystical experiences. St Anselm's (1033-1109) argument, contained in his *Proslogion* (1078), basically consists in claiming that if the idea of the most perfect and most absolute being we can conceive does not involve the affirmation of its existence, this cannot be the greatest possible conception of that being because if it were, it would contain that affirmation. From this argument there follows the *a priori* need to conceive of a God if we recognize His existence.

This argument was challenged by St Thomas and later by David Hume and others. The challenge consists in showing that the affirmation of the existence of a being is not an analytical but a synthetic predication based on experiental data.

St Thomas' arguments are *a posteriori*. Two of them, the second and third ways, are apodictic. The others are contingent. Among the apodictic arguments are that of the necessary first cause and that of the non-contingent factor. The first argument shows how, as everything in the world is caused by something, it is necessary for the series of causality to have a prime cause, which is God. The contingency argument demonstrates that as everything that exists in Nature is contingent and depends on something else to exist, it has to be admitted that there is a necessary being – God – following the principle of the contingent sequence.

The non-apodictic arguments are based on the teleology of the world, on moral order and religious experience. The finalistic links we see in the world cannot be the result of mere chance, resulting from the infinity and precision of existing finalistic processes (the mouth for eating, eye for seeing and legs for walking), but only from a higher finalistic plan coming from God. Neither can moral order, which controls man's natural acts, be at the same time natural and have divine origin. So the multiple experiences of God's presence through miracles, apparitions and mystical events, show empirically that God exists.

Without going into a detailed discussion of St Thomas' arguments, it is sufficient to note that, apart from the empirical references, everything depends on an idea of the world as something created from nothing. If the world had always existed, as the cyclical theory of Wheeler and Linde claims, as well as other theories, the world is necessarily a result of itself and, in so far as it exists, necessary. On the other hand, the finalism of the world is a human extrapolation. Legs were not planned for the purpose of walking, but we walk because we have legs. As for miracles, apparitions and mystical events, the point is that there are no empirical proofs of these happenings. This deficiency is decisive in the case of miracles. Indeed, if they could be definitely proved, miracles would be irrefutable empirical proof of supernatural power. However, it must be noted in relation to miracles that most reports referred to ancient events that took place in cultures and in situations where there was a belief in the supernatural. This same belief in the supernatural occurs in relation to relatively recent apparitions of the Virgin in Lourdes or at Fatima, both witnessed by shepherd girls with a deep belief in the Virgin as being the mother of Christ.

On the other hand, it is important to note that the most recent miracles, some of them confirmed by medical evidence, all refer to the cure of psychosomatic illnesses like certain forms of blindness, deafness, muteness and paralysis. No medically documented miracle concerns the creation of a finger or a leg by people who had lost them. All psychosomatic miracles can be explained by the powerful somatic effects resulting from a profound psychological impact.

As a teenager, the present writer had the opportunity to witness one of these phenomena in the Church of St Maria Margarida in the Lagoa district of Rio de Janeiro. A paralyzed lady was brought in a wheelchair to a priest who was famous for his miraculous gifts. The church was absolutely packed and the priest, dressed in his full set of robes, began his procedure with a declaration that no man, however holy, performs miracles or can ask God to perform them. Only God, in his infinite and omniscient goodness, can perform miracles

when He wants to. Then the priest invited those present to accompany him in fervent prayer. Then, with an astonishing boldness he turned to the paralyzed woman and in a strong voice commanded her: "Sister, get up and walk!" At that moment the paralyzed lady rose shakily from the chair and with equally shaky steps, approached the priest and kissed his hand. It is impossible to describe the emotions that swept over all those present and even today, 50 years later, I have an indelible memory of it. Something absolutely extraordinary had just happened. I do not know what became of that lady later although I fear that, once the exceptional impact of that voice saying "get up and walk" had passed, the problems that afflicted her may well have returned.

We may observe something similar in mystical revelations of the divine. How can we separate the psychological phenomenon of mystical ecstasy from the supposed revelations it brings about?

Do the foregoing considerations invalidate the capacity of arguments to prove the existence of God? The question presents itself - which leads many people to adopt a simple position of agnosticism - that the lack of evidence for the existence of God does not prove His nonexistence. Can it be validly stated that the existence of God is empirically or analytically impossible?

The Empirical Impossibility of God

The existence of God understood as a supreme being, creator of Heaven and Earth, having infinite goodness, omnipotence and omniscience, who will judge men after death by the acts they have performed, rewarding the just and punishing the bad, it is an ideal that has been proclaimed by many cultures. God is the ideal supreme object of all men of goodwill. The present author, modesty aside, allows himself the luxury of considering himself a man of goodwill and as such, a legitimate candidate for these divine rewards. It is therefore unfortunate that not only can the existence of God not be proved, but that his inexistence is the result of irrefutable synthetic and analytic reasons.

Why, in terms of *a posteriori* synthetic judgments can we state that God does not exist? The reasons are of two kinds: psycho-anthropological and cosmological. On the psycho-anthropological level, the basic reason for man consists in the fact that the expectations of life after death based on the idea that man is composed of two substances one perishable, the body, the other immortal, the soul, are totally unjustified. Socrates was the first to develop

this dualist concept of man and Plato developed it more fully. According to the beliefs in the existence of God, this immortal soul will be rewarded or punished after death according to its behavior in life. Belief in the immortality of the soul is based on the presumption that man's intellectual and volitional acts cannot be explained without reference to a spiritual substance, the soul, which is necessarily immortal and is that which allows human free will. The controversial existence of the soul has met its incontrovertible response partly in molecular biology and partly in experimental psychology.

Molecular biology has indeed shown how certain proteic molecules are able to duplicate themselves and also capable of producing embryonic forms of a genetic code. The linking together, about 3.5 billion years ago, of self-duplicating molecules with those that formed an embryonic genetic code, created the protobacteria on which the whole of biological evolution, right up to man himself, depends. Also, experimental psychology has irrefutably shown the extent to which physiological processes become psychological ones and how these become rational-volitional acts. The human nervous system, commanded by the brain, determines all of man's 'spiritual' deeds. Cerebral lesions in specific areas produce corresponding limitations of intellectual-volitional activity. The soul is the central nervous system, controlled by the brain.

On the cosmological level, the creation of the world from nothing, which had already been validly challenged by the Greek atomists, has met an irrefutable explanation in modern cosmology. The current universe appeared about 13.7 billion years ago as the result of a Big Bang, the origin of everything that exists in space-time. This primordial explosion, the creator of space and time and also the radiation-matter system that constitutes the universe, felt the initial effect, according to Alan Guth, of a powerful process of expansion, which in the first 10^{-36} seconds of the existence of the universe, led to its doubling in size every 10^{-34} seconds, producing an expansion of about 3 x 10^{43} . Added to these original forces was 'dark energy', which represents 71% of everything that exists in the Cosmos and exerts a strong repelling force which produces the continuously accelerating expansion of the universe.

How did the original Big Bang occur in a universe that did not yet exist? This question has received various hypothetical answers, the most consistent of which is the cyclical theory of Archibald Wheeler at Princeton University and of Andrei Linde. According to this theory, the universe exists in an eternal process of Big Bang, expansion, reconcentration and Big Crunch, in which

the previous cycle is extinguished and its respective entropy creates a new Big Bang. In this eternal universe, each cycle, while keeping the same mass of energy-matter as the preceding one, has specific, never strictly identical, properties resulting from the manner in which each new Big Bang is produced. We are about 13.7 billion years into the latest of these eternal cycles which should last about 15 billion years, after which a new cycle will occur. This eternal universe is self-sustainable in its successive cycles and since it has always existed it never had a creator.

The Analytical Impossibility of God

A proper analysis of the concepts of 'soul' and 'God' leads to the discovery that their presumed attributes are analytically incompatible with each other and with the functions attributed to them.

The incompatibility between the concept of a spiritual soul and the functions related to it were first noted by the Greeks, with the exception of Plato. Indeed, the problem for the Platonic-Christian concept of a spiritual and incorporeal soul is how an incorporeal being can act upon a corporeal one like the body. If we admit the possibility that thought can be produced by an incorporeal being (which is debatable), how do we explain its relationship with the body, from which thoughts receive sensorial data that allow them to abstract ideas and how, once ideas have been formulated, can these be communicated to the body to be turned into speech or the practice of actions arising from those ideas? How can an incorporeal being execute or receive bodily communications?

It was the clear impossibility of imagining a meeting-point between the incorporeal and the corporeal, with the non-measurable with the measurable, that made Greek culture, with the exception of Plato, always conceive of the soul (*psyche*) as something corporeal. For most Greek thinkers, the *psyche* was the same as a warm breeze that nourished itself by breathing the air and, when it died, was dissolved into that element. For the atomists, the soul was composed, like all bodies, of atoms, although smaller ones than those of the body. The idea that the soul is an incorporeal substance is analytically incompatible with the attributes claimed for it.

What happens with God? Of course, the concept of God as being on the one hand an eternal, omnipotent and omniscient immaterial spirit encounters difficulties, when it comes to the idea that He created the world, similar to

those that negate the operational relationship between the human soul as an incorporeal being, and the body. In the case of God, however, it could be said that His omnipotence could, under conditions that cannot be described, act operationally on measurable material even though He is a non-measurable being. Implicit in this possibility is the acceptance that, within the realm of his omnipotence, God auto-materialized in order to create the world as part of his auto-materialization.

In addition to the incommunicability between the non-measurable immaterial and the measurable material referred to above, there are other analytical contradictions. Three of these deserve particular attention. On the one hand they concern the contradiction between the non-temporality of eternity and the temporality of the creation of the world. On the other hand, they concern the contradiction between the situation of an absolute being and His acting in something which is not the contemplation of himself. Finally, they concern the contradiction on the part of an omniscient and infinitely good being in arbitrarily creating human creatures who are all destined to inevitable suffering in life, which includes death and in many cases, to eternal damnation.

In creating the world, God made Himself temporal, contradicting the non-temporality of His eternity, because there arises a difference between the moment that preceded the creation of the world and the moment when that actually happened. There was one time for God before the creation of the world, and another afterwards.

The second contradiction concerns the fact that an absolute being can only act by contemplating Himself. For God, creating an accidental world is the same as making a toy for His own amusement, something that is incompatible with His condition of being absolute.

Finally, creating men as a result of a casual decision contradicts the absolute nature of God and also to a certain extent contradicts the idea of omniscient divine goodness because it involves arbitrarily creating beings who will suffer, even if they will later be rewarded, and individuals who in some cases – and God will have prior knowledge of these - are going to fall, even if as a result of their own actions - into eternal damnation. The attributes of God are analytically incompatible with the creation of the world and of man. Why does this incompatibility exist? Because, as Feuerbach very aptly put it, God was created by man in his continual search for the absolute. Being unable to achieve the condition of being absolute, man invented an absolute being, God, to whom he attributed an absolute level the best qualities of man. The problem

is that the superior qualities of man, such as understanding, goodness and practical ability, when taken to an absolute level, become reciprocally incompatible, as the foregoing reflections have clearly shown.

So far we have shown the fallacies in the proofs for the existence of God but also, and more importantly, how the attributes attributed to God are mutually incompatible. God is empirically and analytically impossible. The radical nature of this conclusion and the way it is revealed here is something terrible, as Dostoevsky and others have observed. According to Dostoevsky, if God did not exist, man would be allowed total freedom. Is this supposition logical?

Ethics

There have been many suggestions for ethical systems since ancient times. Based on Socrates' intellectualism and Plato's idealism, Aristotle's balanced realism, the stoic and epicurean ethical systems and Aristipo's theory of pleasure, Western thought has created various great ethical systems. If we take all of these systems together, from St Thomas to Bertrand Russell, we find that two main concepts stand out in terms of their objectives: the ethics of Goodness and those of the Hedonists.

There is a general agreement amongst almost all philosophers that man seeks happiness and his ethics, as a discipline, consist in studying what happiness, the Hellenic *eudaimonia*, consists of and how he can achieve it. For Aristotle and in general terms philosophers who understand happiness as something arising from the search for and practice of Goodness, happiness is a state reached by practicing virtues. The classical world recognized for main virtues: Prudence, Temperance, Strength and Justice. Christianity added to these the virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity.

Aristipo of Cirene (435-350 BC) and with him, hedonist ethical systems, with important variations ranging from Epicurus' quietest hedonism to Bentham's utilitarian form, feel that happiness consists in a rational and therefore balanced enjoyment of pleasure and the suppression as far as possible, of all forms of suffering. Understood rationally, pleasure is not only physical, but includes all its psychological and spiritual forms, which range from aesthetic pleasure to enjoying friendship and, according to Epicurus, the absence of suffering.

Looking at the question of ethics from another angle, systems ruled by the search for happiness appaer. Historically, three systems are shown as being necessary or appropriate to achieve this aim (1) the principlist, (2) the religious and (3) that of freedom of choice.

For the Greek thinkers and those influenced by them in the course of history, achieving happiness results from adopting proper principles. According to Aristotle, these principles consist in the prudent use of rational freedom, leading one's life so as to bring together the practice of the basic virtues with a satisfactory fulfillment of psychological and physical needs.

The religious system introduced by the monotheist regions, prescribes the strict keeping of divine commandments such as those revealed by Moses, Christ or Mohammed. In religious ethics, finalism takes second place; basically, it is an ethic requiring that behaviour conforms to divine commandments. The freedom of choice system ignores divine commandments and also puts aside rational and social principles for deciding on forms of human behaviour. The starting point of the system of freedom of choice is the nonexistence of God and the possibility of discarding rational and social considerations in favor of self-interest. Anyone can do what seems convenient to him, depending on his ability to do it. There is no other principal than personal interest.

Dostoevsky, mentioned above, suggested that if God did not exist, the only system conceivable for men would be that of freedom of choice, in which everyone did what was in their interest. The facts of history do not support Dostoevsky. In spite of religious prescription, hedonist ethics have never been predominant even in the classical world - where religion was not prescriptive - nor in the Western, Islamic, Indian, Japanese or Chinese worlds. We must take into consideration, however, from a different perspective, what is happening today in excessively consumerist societies. In these societies there is no religious direction and almost nothing of classical principlism. How does a man behave in the super-consumerist modern mass society?

The question has two main aspects, the descriptive and the normative. At the descriptive level, excessive consumerism leads to uninhibited hedonistic ethics that are mainly sensible and limited only by personal and social questions of prudence that involve avoiding dangerous psychological and physical pleasures (drugs) or those that are illegal, the latter involving practical forms of avoiding legal consequences.

Looking at another aspect of the subject, the question is normative and asks how happy medically and socially prudent uninhibited hedonism makes those who practise it? This is where the question of human transcendence comes in.

Values and Transcendence

The futile and excessive consumerism that is found in the wealthy sectors of Western society with which to a greater or lesser extent contaminates other modern societies, does not have a long-lasting social viability and is deeply frustrating for those who practise it. We find also that this excessive consumerism, for purely physical reasons, cannot be transferred to the whole of the world.

It is important to bear in mind that if it is right that all societies need regulating public norms, it is no less correct to say that the viability of a society depends on the extent to which values that are compatible with it are properly internalized by its members. No society can survive if its rules of conduct are purely public. On the contrary, societies that mainly depend on internalized values for its members show the greatest levels of vitality.

If we make a comparison at any point in history between successful and failed societies, we shall find that the former had high levels of socially suitable internalized values. This was the case with the successful city states in Greece such as Sparta, Athens or Thebes, with Rome until the 3rd century AD, with Spain from the 16th century to the mid-17th, with Richelieu's France and more recently, that of de Gaulle, 19th-century Britain and that of Churchill, and the United States from Independence to Abolition and more recently with Franklin Roosevelt and Kennedy. If modern societies that practise intransitive excessive consumerism do not create sufficient sectors with socially suitable values during the coming decades, they will inevitably go into rapid decline, even if they are a superpower like the USA.

In the case of individuals, intransitive consumerism is a form of inebriation that cannot hide the emptiness of people's existence nor can it deal with the inevitable tragic moments in life that culminate in death. This hollowness in life is not the result of a lack of religious convictions - although, in spite of the nonexistence of God, these have a greatly palliative effect - nor of any other reason except the ultimate irrelevance of pure consumerism. Why does this happen?

In earlier works such as *O Posto do Homem no Cosmos* (*The Place of Man in the Cosmos* S. Paulo, Paz e Terra, 2006), I approached the question of transcendence. Religions like Christianity created confusion between the divine and the transcendent. In fact, the phenomenon of transcendence is independent of the existence of God and even of the possible relevance of the

world. In the final analysis, everything is irrelevant in the long term. Humanity will disappear long before the end of the Earth and the Earth will end long before the collapse of the current cosmic cycle. In the short term of human life, therefore, what is irrelevant is the ultimate irrelevance of things.

Man is a transcendent animal. In its basic form, transcendence is immanent in the Cosmos, constituting within it what I have called 'transimmanence'. Transcendence consists in the phenomenon of a being or act rising to a higher level of complexity as a result of the occurrence of a homeostatic balancing system of the factors that control it. And it is by virtue of this basic transcendence that self-duplicating macromolecules become living cells, physiological processes become psychological ones and these become rational-volitional acts.

These rational-volitional acts give man a higher form of transcendence, a transcendental or pure transcendence that is his freedom, and it is in terms of this transcendence that the meaning of life is defined. This may be irrelevant, as in the case of intransitive consumerism, or meaningful, according to how it is guided towards achieving higher values of an ethical, and cultural or social nature, as well as other conditions. Regardless of the ultimate irrelevance of the world, the relevance of each person's life is constituted, for that person – and in general for society - according to how well it transcends its purely psycho-physical level and rises to a level of achieving transcendental values.

In the final analysis, the nonexistence of God does not have a decisive influence on the meaning of human life. What does have an influence is man's exercise of his transcendence, giving to his life a corresponding meaning based both on religious convictions as well as on atheism. In the exercise of human transcendence, what is relevant is that its meaning for each individual should not depend to a great extent on the objective relevance of the transcendental acts one practices, but rather on how much those acts are the result of a deliberate system of transcendence. The good work of a manual laborer is not a consequence of higher pay or external control, but arises from the simple desire to do a good job, an act of transcendence which, while taking nothing away from other reference points in life, gives meaning to life.

As Max Scheler (*Le Saint, le Génie, Le Héros*, French translation, Paris, Egloff, 1944) pointed out, superior acts of transcendence by the hero, genius and saint, raise the human condition to the level of the divine. The divine Alexander, divine Beethoven, divine Mother Teresa of Calcutta.



14. Universality and Western Reason (2007)

Introduction

The term 'Western reason' is usually understood to mean the kind of thinking that originated in Classical Greece, that continued during the Hellenic-Roman period and developed within Western culture from the Middle Ages until today. If it is correct to say that the term 'Western' in its strictest sense refers specifically to Western culture, as opposed to referring to the Greek or Roman worlds, it is no less certain that the idea of the *logos* arose with the Ionic thinkers of the 7th and 6th centuries BC, and that this idea was basically transferred to Western culture. Western reason is therefore no more than a continuation of the Hellenic *logos*, although it incorporates countless advances in various sectors, from the logical and mathematical level of Pierre de la Ramée (1515-1572) to Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and Kurt Goedel (1906-1978), with his incomplete theorem of 1931. For its part, the term 'universality' concerns the quality of what is universal. The concept of the universal contains two distinct meanings: ontological and logical. In an ontological sense, the universal refers to the scope, in a specific area, of all types and modes belonging to that area. In its broadest sense, this area is the universe itself, that is, the group of astral bodies or, more generically, everything which exists in space-time.

In a more restricted sense, as when we speak of universal history, we are talking about the set of events that has happened to the human species since Paleolithic times.

In its logical sense, the universal, more properly used in its plural form, the 'universals', are the generic ideas: man, animal, stone. All men are contained in the idea of man, all animals and all stones in the ideas, respectively, of animal and stone.

Since Plato, with his theory of ideas understood as non-corporeal substances, and the criticism Aristotle made of him, seeing ideas as mental abstractions, a controversy was generated that would mark medieval thinking until the 13th century and was known as the controversy of the universals.

Three main concepts were pitted against each other in an attempt to explain the universals: the realist, and the nominalist and the conceptualist. According to Plato, the realists understood the universals as being non-corporeal substances which the understanding learned to accept as such. Among the realists are Johannes Scotus Eriugena (810-877), St Anselm (1033-1109), William of Champeaux (1070-1121). Ranged against them are the nominalists, who saw the universals as simply generic terms or mere words (*flatus voci*). Among them are Roscelin of Compiegne (1050-1120) and William of Ockham (1300-1347), continuing a line of thought that had already been proposed by Boethius (480-524) and Martianus Capella (end of 4th and beginning of 5th century AD).

This controversy was resolved by Peter Abelard (1079-1143), who said that the universals should be understood in terms he called conceptual, based on High Scholasticism. Abelard showed that the word (*vox*) is a group of sounds that only acquire meaning when they become a predicate (*sermon*) by means of conceptual thinking (*conceptus*).

Without developing further the logical aspect of the question, we must simply mention that for Kant, as he shows in his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, the necessary universality of any position depends on its objective validity.

In ontological terms, it is possible to conceive of several universals, from the Universe itself, to the universes of the four kingdoms (animal, vegetable, mineral and human) and in terms of the human, its two main divisions, the anthropological and the historical. We shall now move on, in this brief discussion of universality based on Western reason, to a short analysis of the cosmic, anthropological and historical universes.

The Cosmic Universe

Human understanding of the Cosmos has developed over a long period, from the geocentric ideas of the Greeks to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus (1473-1543), passing through the universe of Newton and Laplace to that of Einstein and Gamow.

Modern cosmology makes a distinction between the complete universe, whether there is one single universe or several, and the visible and therefore knowable universe, which is that from which light reaches us. As I have pointed out in my recent book *O Posto do Homem no Cosmos* (*The Place of Man in the Cosmos* - S. Paulo, Paz e Terra, 2006), the universes has a horizon of more than 30 billion light-years. It contains about 10 billion galaxies, each of which has about 100 billion stars. The density of this universe is about 10⁻¹¹ g/cm³, in other words, extremely empty. It is about 10²⁶m wide and has a mass of about 10⁵³kg. The universe includes all the subatomic, atomic and molecular components of the matter-energy complex, ruled by four basic forces: gravitational, electromagnetic, weak nuclear energy and strong nuclear energy.

The universe is subject to three main constants: (1) the speed of light in a vacuum, 300,000km/second; (2) the Hubble Constant and (3) the Einstein constant in its modified form. The speed of light is constant regardless of the speed of the source of emission. This speed is the maximum limit of any speed possible in the Cosmos. The Hubble Constant, indicated by the letter H, is the ratio between the velocity (V) at which to galaxies increase the distance (D) between them. This is expressed by the equation H.D=V. it is estimated that it is about 73km/Mpc, where Mpc stands for megaparsec; 1 Mpc being equal to about 3 million light-years.

The cosmological constant has been interpreted in various ways since it was suggested by Einstein, who uses it to explain why the stars do not crash into each other. When Hubble's discoveries showed the universe was in a state of accelerated expansion Einstein discarded his theory of a constant. It was, however, found that the expansion of the universe requires the additional existence of a repelling force, which is considered to be dark energy.

The finding concerning this energy, together with other observations, has led to the recognition that the proportion of normal, non-luminous material in the universe is insignificant. The composition of the latter at the moment is as follows:

Components of the Universe

| Dark energy | 71% |
|---------------------|--------|
| Dark matter | 23% |
| Non-luminous matter | 3% |
| Luminous matter | 0.995% |
| Radiation | 0.005% |
| TOTAL | 100% |

How did the universe appear? Today, there is a broad consensus agreeing with the Big Bang hypothesis proposed by George Gamow at the end of the 1940s. According to this theory, about 13.7 billion years ago a primordial explosion launched into space the universe we see today, although in an initial form of immense radiation. According to Alan Guth, the expansion caused by the explosion was greatly accelerated by an initial process of inflation that doubled the size of the universe every 10^{-33} seconds, causing a rate of expansion of about 3×10^{41} .

The question that arises as a result of big Bang theory is how and why this explosion happened. To say that space and time only existed after it had happened does not answer the question of how the Big Bang could have happened from nothing. Among the various theories advanced on this topic, the one that seems to be most consistent is the cyclical theory proposed in 1953 by John Archibald Wheeler and Andrei Linde. According to this theory, the universe consists of an eternal process of explosion, expansion and reconcentration, leading to a Big Crunch followed by a new Big Bang, with each Big Crunch eliminating the entropy of the previous cycle. Thus we return to the view of Democritus in the 5th century BC.

The Anthropological Universe

The anthropological universe is that of man in time and space. As I have shown in previous works (*Um Estudo Crítico da História*, 2 vols., (*A Critical Study of History* - Paz e Terra, 2001) and *O Posto do Homem no Cosmos*, (*The Place of Man in the Cosmos* - Paz e Terra, 2006), "human evolution began about 4 million years ago with the Australopithecines. After this intermediate stage between man and the anthropoid primates, four species emerge one after the other: *Homo Habilis*, about 2 million years ago, *Homo Erectus*, about a million years ago, *Neanderthal Man*, about 200,000 years ago and, finally modern man, *Cro-Magnon Man*, about 70,000 years ago" (*O Posto do Homem no Cosmos*, pp. 95-96).

The process of 'hominization' has its distant origin as Yves Coppens³⁷ demonstrated, in a great geological accident that happened about 8 million years ago when a huge fault extending

³⁷ Yves Coppens, Pré-ambules, Paris, Poches Edile Jacob, 2001, p. 172.

for thousands of kilometres from North to South, separated a large stretch of East Africa from the rest of the continent. This separation brought about a profound change in the system of rainfall, which remained the same in the Western part of Africa but became much less frequent in the Eastern strip. As a result of this drop in rainfall, the forests in the Eastern region began to disappear and were replaced by broad savannahs. Both parts were inhabited by anthropoid primates and those who lived in the Western region remained living in their forest habitats. Those living in the East had to gradually adapt to the conditions of the savannah in which the survival of the species depended upon an erect posture which gave wide panoramic vision that was necessary to avoid predators and to find food. Bipedalism, in turn, brought with it extremely important consequences: increased brain size, freeing the arms and hands for useful purposes, and becoming increasingly omnivorous. Thus began the process of 'hominization'. (The Place of Man in the Cosmos p. 97).

From its original enclave in a tiny region in Eastern Africa to the South of the Red Sea, human evolution developed over time through the successive micro-stages of the Paleolithic, Neolithic, and Bronze Age, with the attendant urban revolution and the emergence of the great cultures of antiquity, until the Iron Age. Geographically, since *homo erectus* the territorial frontiers of man were greatly extended over a long period until they came to reach all the continents. This geo-climatic diversification would bring about, by adaptation, the development of the different human races starting from the black pigmentation of the original man. It would also lead, within each of the macro-stages, to the huge diversification in cultures.

Until the end of the 14th century humanity was geo-culturally dispersed into the great groups formed by Africa, Europe, Asia, Oceania and the Americans. The maritime routes rounding Africa led, with Vasco da Gama to India on the one hand and on the other, Columbus to North America and Cabral to South America in the Trade Revolution of the 16th-18th centuries, to the first unification of the world. From this time on we see the first differentiation in income at global level, favoring those peoples engaged in navigation and long-distance trade like, to begin with, the Spaniards in

Portuguese and later, the French, British and Dutch, to the detriment of Asian nations.

The second great wave of globalization emerged from Great Britain with the Industrial Revolution from the end of the 18th century until the 20th. If the Trade Revolution doubled the level of income of the peoples involved in it compared to the income levels of the great Asian civilizations, the Industrial Revolution brought about a difference of more than 10 times between the industrialised countries and those which remained agrarian. It is at this time that the great difference between central and peripheral peoples. This difference experienced a huge exponential growth with the Technological Revolution of the 20th century.

These successive stages of technology have led to a current situation of great disparity in the social, economic and cultural levels of humanity, which is now divided into four large groups: (1) the developed peoples, Europeans, North Americans, members of the British Commonwealth, the Japanese and increasingly, the Chinese; (2) the underdeveloped peoples including those in Southeast Asia, Latin America, India and South Africa; (3) the backward countries, including most of those in Africa and (4) the primitive peoples, including those tribes which remain in various parts of the world.

The insufficient differentiation between human nature the human condition have led several thinkers, in particular the existentialists, to the idea that man does not have a nature but only a plan for being a man, as Ortega y Gasset, Sartre and others claim. In fact, like other species, man has a fixed and permanent nature that has been reproduced by heredity since the Cro-Magnon period. What varies hugely is the human condition, that is, the different ways in which man relates to the world, with other men and with himself.

As I showed in my recent study, "A Brief Essay on Man", there are various ways in which the human condition is created. Thus, in terms of the relationship of man with the world, it is important to distinguish between two large groups, according to whether man sees himself as an object in the world (cosmological civilization is) or sees the world as an object (rational civilizations. In terms of the relationship of man with other men, we have to make a distinction between the family relationship, the social and historical. As for the relationship of man with himself, there is a difference between cultures without a clear self-awareness such as the cosmological ones, and those that are self-aware, such as the Hellenic.

The process of globalization has led to an increasing homogeneity in the human condition that is tending to create a planetary man. In the very long term (if history should allow humanity to have one) the new conditions of life in the mass technological society will make human nature adaptive, just as happened many centuries ago during the process of 'hominization'.

In an incomparably shorter term, man has been confronted with two major restrictions to his current way of life. One, concerning technological civilization, concerns the impossibility of making available to all the people in the world the very high levels of consumption in highly developed societies, by reason of physical limitations. The other, which is even more serious, concerns the impossibility of maintaining the current patterns of industrial civilization until the end of the century, because of the exhaustion of stocks of various minerals required by current production processes.³⁸ Without dramatic technological innovations that that have not yet even been imagined, that might lead to substituting relatively rare, non-renewable materials with other materials or processes, today's industrial civilization will become unviable by the last third of the century.

The Historical Universe

In the first decade of the 21st century, the world is faced with a choosing between two basic alternatives: either consolidating the present supremacy of the United States in a Universal Empire or creating a new global bipolarity based on the consolidation of Chinese development.

The facts seem to favor the second alternative. The United States, mainly because of the leadership of Bush, but for much deeper reasons, cannot formulate an international plan that satisfies the other countries in the world and thus arouses strong resistance in its 'provinces'. China, on the other hand, although it does not offer the world any alternative to the universal nature of American dominance, has a high level of self-sustainability and an amazing ability for development, having maintained annual growth rates of about 10% over the last 30 years that have made it the fourth biggest economy in the world and in the long term will put it into first place. The main difference between China and the USA lies in the fact that the validation of the international predominance of the latter depends upon the validation by other nations of its

³⁸Oil, uranium, molybdenum, tungsten, cobalt, copper, lead and zinc.

worldview, and this is not happening, while in the case of China, its international importance depends only on its domestic and international self-sustainability, which shows signs of being long-lasting. Strictly speaking, China is not an alternative to the USA, but an alternative to the latter's consolidation as a global empire.

The likely consolidation of Chinese power will take the world into a new and dangerous bipolarity, as occurred during the period of American-Soviet confrontation. This new bipolarization may perhaps take on the characteristics of an East-West antagonism that will create a long period of impasse through the failure of the Asian model to achieve international characteristics and validity. If, however, as appears to be most probable, the effect of a Chinese-American bipolarity is a significant neutralization of the international power and influence of the USA, in spite of its inherent risks, the results of this new bipolarization will be to open up areas susceptible to new international influences coming out of Europe and Latin America. A strategic bipolarity between China and the USA may lead the world to a fertile cultural and economic multipolarity.

We should not, however, underestimate the extremely serious risks contained in the creation of a new strategic bipolarity when the level of lethality the two superpowers have at their disposal is exponentially comparable to that which existed during the American-Soviet period of bipolarity. Nevertheless, we have to take into account, when referring to the deliberate use of this super-lethality, the same mutually restricting effect that existed during the late Cold War. The great risk for the future, as was the case in the past, is that unforeseen circumstances will accidentally unleash a nuclear hecatomb.

Given the rationally more probable hypothesis of mutual deterrence in the likely event of a new global bipolarity being formed, the resulting scenario will tend to b the long-term creation of a guarded peace within which the different ways of suspicious cohabitation will gradually develop and become increasingly institutionalized. If the hecatomb is avoided, in the long term, either one of the superpowers will finally dominate the other, or the world will move towards increasingly institutionalized forms of a *Pax Universalis*, as Kant foresaw at the end of the 18th century.

The great problem within this new bipolarity and one which will probably become a reality is that of the kind of society in which both poles will develop. Without going further into this important question, it is worth mentioning the fact that the hyper-consumerism of modern society is not sustainable in the long term. The sustainability of a society depends upon a high level of

internalization of values compatible with civilized ways of living together. This is not happening in present-day hyper-consumerism. What can correct this pointless hyper-consumerism? It is unlikely that there will be a return to traditional religions. Among other possibilities, the one that seems to be most viable, is the emergence of a new humanism which is socially guided and environmentally aware. This new humanism exists in the ideas of great modern thinkers from Karl Jaspers and Cassirer to Habermas. Will the plan for a new humanism become the mobilizing force of future society? Within this framework or others, the question of a new transcendental substratum to maintain society is something that depends on this as much as it does of the future creation of a *Pax Universalis*.







1. Merquior and Liberalism (1992)

The Engaged Intellectual

José Guilherme Merquior (1941-91), died before he was 50 years old at the height of his creative powers and was recognized at home and abroad as one of the most gifted essayists of our time. Combining a sharp and quick mind with exceptional erudition, he covered the broadest aspects of culture with the greatest competence, clarity and a fine critical spirit. His production ranged from literary criticism to the critical history of ideas, from philosophy to sociology and to political science, not to mention international relations, theoretically as an essayist and in practical terms as an excellent diplomat. His last posts were as head of the Brazilian Embassy in Mexico and of the Brazilian delegation to UNESCO.

Merquior was a multifaceted, polyglot intellectual who was extraordinarily successful in achieving the rare feat of combining immense erudition with an exceptional agility of mind, and was also a politically engaged intellectual. This was not in the sense of being a party militant, but being a militant in the field of ideas and public concerns. Having been attracted in his youth to the ideas of social democracy in the style of San Tiago Dantas, he experienced, like Roberto Campos, a profound disillusionment with the machine of state, a feeling which led him into the field of liberalism. This was first of all a conservative type of liberalism which close to that of von Mises and Hayek,

but it was a liberalism that evolved in his later years towards a social-liberalism in the tradition of Thomas Green and John Hobson, closer to the ideas of Raymond Aron and Ralf Dahrendorf.

I had the opportunity of participating in a conference with him on Brazil in Paris in December, 1990. He was already irremediably affected by the cancer which would kill him in the following month. Even so, he was able, through a heroic effort of mind and overcoming his fragile physical condition, to give an extraordinary speech in impeccable French on the success of national planning projects in Brazil since Independence, from José Bonofacio until modern times. The experience was doubly striking. First of all there was this fine critical intelligence analyzing the meaning and scope of the great plans that followed each other, with the parliamentarism of the second kingdom, republican positivism, the ideology of the lieutenants, the New State, the democratic liberalism of the 1946 Constitution, the Saint-Simonism of the 20 years of military rule and the frustrated social democracy of the New Republic. There was also the striking victory of the mind over the weaknesses of the body that allowed this frail man to deliver what was to be his swansong.

As well as that speech - the publication of which by Ignacy Sachs is eagerly awaited - the other late work by Merquior, the final proofs of which he was able to correct but the publication of which he did not live to see, was *Liberalism*, *Old and New*" (Boston, Twayne's Studies in Intellectual and Cultural History. N.I, 1991; Brazilian translation by Nova Fronteira - Rio, 1991). In a certain way this book is an intellectual test of the engaged essayist and in the following lines I shall give a brief critical commentary of this work.

General View

Liberalism, Ancient and Modern is the most wide-ranging although selective descriptive and critical study of liberal thought during the last three centuries. The book is organized in five long chapters: (1) Definitions and Points of Departure (2) The Roots of Liberalism (3) Classical Liberalism, 1780-1860 (4) Conservative Liberalism and (5) From New Liberalism to Neoliberalism. These chapters are followed by a brief general Conclusion and copious notes and references.

Merquior's study has the characteristics of a critical and expository encyclopedia of liberal thought and movements. Two notes especially stand out in this *magnum opus*. On one hand he covers the terrain that is usually

avoided by works on liberalism that concentrate excessively on Anglo-Saxon thinking. In addition to covering this ground, Merquior studies French, German, Italian and Spanish contributions as well as others and includes Argentinean thinkers such as Sarmiento and Alberdi. The second distinctive point about this book is the capacity revealed in all its pages to combine an admirable synthesis of the thinking of each of the important figures in the various currents of liberal thought, starting from medieval and Renaissance proto-liberalism, with a clear critique of the meaning of the contribution of each one in the context of its place in time.

Faithful to its promise to be an objective critical explanation of the many currents and personalities within liberal thinking during the last three centuries, the book deliberately avoids presenting the author's own ideas.

We feel however the keynotes of Merquior's convictions and predilections in the affection with which he deals with the social liberalism of the New Liberalism from the end of the 19th century until today, in the respect with which he approaches the liberist neoliberalism of von Mises and von Hayek and in the esteem in which he holds Raymond Aron and Ralf Dahrendorf.

What is Liberalism?

What is liberalism? How far is it possible to find constant characteristics in a movement of ideas and practical initiatives that has developed over the course of three centuries and often presents quite different tendencies during the same period?

Merquior asks himself this initial question and gives it an positive reply. Liberalism is not a hollow form of expression but has remained, in the various periods and schools it has gone through, although to different degrees, faithful to maintaining four basic freedoms. These are: (1) the (negative) freedom to not suffer violent acts of interference; (2) the (positive) freedom to take part in public affairs; (3) the (interior) freedom of conscience and beliefs and (4) the (personal) freedom for each individual to develop himself or herself. These four freedoms will always appear, even if at different levels and sometimes more implicitly than explicitly, in the historical cast-list of liberal thinking. Taken as a whole, from the 18th century until today, this thinking takes different forms, basically according to the characteristics of each period, in terms of the greater or lesser emphasis given to each of those four freedoms and in terms of the relationship between the individual, society and State. On the

other hand, liberal thinking, again taken as a whole, reflects the main trends in the cultures of the countries in which it develops.

In terms of the historical development of liberalism, Merquior initially identifies a proto-liberalism of which the most primitive roots are found in the defense of rights in the Middle Ages and in the humanism of the Renaissance. He could have referred to the emergence of internal freedom with Socrates and Plato and to the universal rights of man with the Stoics. Next, Merquior distinguishes between the main currents in liberalism: classical, conservative and new liberalism, neoliberaism, neocontractualism, and sociological liberalism.

Referring to the schools of liberal thought that were influenced by the characteristics of the main national cultures in which they developed, Merquior identifies three lines: the English school of Hobbes and Locke, Bentham and Mill, for which freedom is mainly personal independence; the French school, after Rousseau, for which liberty is basically self government, and the German school which, based in the thinking of Humboldt, finds the essence of freedom in personal self-realisation.

The Roots of Liberalism

According to Merquior, in the final analysis Christianity in general and the Reformation and French Revolution in particular, are the basic points of departure from which liberalism developed.

The most distant roots of liberalism may be found in medieval thought with Marcilius de Padua and his *Defensor Pacis* (1324) which introduced the idea of the need for the consent of the governed as a pre-requisite for the legitimacy of government. Ockham (1300-49), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Johannes Althusius (d. 1638) are important precursors of many of the aspects of liberalism. In later times we owe to John Locke, with his *Second Treatise on Government* (1659) the creation of the foundations of liberal thought. Among the more distant antecedents, Merquior recognized the influence of ecclesiastical conciliarism in shaping constitutionalist thinking. As mentioned previously, he might have referred to the Greek legacy on the subject of an internal freedom, one of the bases of liberal thinking, and also the same Greek legacy in the construction of democracy as a political regime. We would have to add the important contribution of the Stoics who preceded Christianity in understanding the universal dignity of man regardless of his status as a citizen and in society.

Notwithstanding its distant roots, liberalism as a movement of ideas and societal practices is a result of the Enlightenment. In the final analysis, the latter movement drew attention to the basic problem of the relationship between man, society and the State which is, on the one hand, the demand for liberty, both negative in the sense of non-coercion and positive in the sense of public participation. On the other hand, the demand for public rationality is in opposition to the populist and clientelist forms of democracy. For this reason, the 18th century wavered between the public rights of the citizen, emphasized in the French Revolution, and the demands for public rationality, emphasized in the so-called 'enlightened despotism' - of Frederick the Great or the Marquis of Pombal - which, by reason of not being actually despotic, should be called enlightened authoritarianism.

Classical Liberalism - 1780-1860

Classical liberalism is a reflection of the way in which State legitimacy was formed and a defense of negative and positive freedoms in relation to the government and within the ambit of the State. Hobbes maintains that preserving the security of people and their basic rights leads to delegating all power to the prince, the administrator of those values. Locke counters this with a basic social contract requiring the consent of the governed as a condition for the legitimacy of power.

The Whigs, the first organized party with a liberal tendency, absorbed Locke's demands for consent, moderating them with some ideas taken from Hobbes in terms of preserving the authority of the prince. Classical liberalism produced a brilliant cast of thinkers: Benjamin Constant and Aléxis de Tocqueville in France, J.S.Mill in England, Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy and Alexander Herzen in Russia.

Locke, who was moderately influential in the Glorious Revolution, would have a decisive influence in the development of liberal thinking in the American Independence movement.

Conservative Liberalism

The excesses of the French Revolution, both the populism of Marat and Danton, and Robespierre's jacobinism, culminating in the authoritarian imperialism of Napoleon, led liberal thinking at the end of the 18th century

and the beginning of the 19th, towards a conservative reaction. It was felt necessary to protect society from veering between the extremes of irresponsible populism and repressive dogmatism.

Edmund Burke (1729-97), with his criticism of the French Revolution, sets the tone for liberal conservatism. He would be followed in Britain by Thomas Macaulay (1800-59), John Dalberg, Baron Acton (1834-1902), Walter Bagehot (1826-77), the great editor of *The Economist* from 1861 until his death and the Darwinist social evolutionism of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).

In France, conservative liberalism was introduced François-René de Chateaubriand (1768-1848). French liberalism of the Conservative kind would have its positive moment in the great Revolution in 1789, and its negative one in 1793. With variations linked to the political vicissitudes in France, conservative liberalism in close figures such as Michelet (1798-1874), who would support the Second Empire, Remusat (1797-1875), who would support Thiers while still maintaining his preference for a constitutional monarchy, Edgar Quinet (1803-75) who would advocate a liberalism without the claims of the various classes and Ernest Renan (1823-92), who would defend a non-democratic type of liberalism.

The fourth chapter of *Liberalism, Ancient and Modern*, which studies conservative liberalism, includes a section dealing with a particular branch of this liberalism known as liberalism for national construction, and analyzes the public activities of two eminent Argentinean thinkers: Domingo Sarmiento (1811-88) and Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-84).

Sarmiento, who inherited the concerns of the Enlightenment concerning the compatibility of the positive and negative the freedoms of the citizen and the need for public rationality, shows how the precondition for this compatibility is universal mass education through state schooling. In his classic work, Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism (1845) he states himself to be firmly in favor of the latter course of action, in contrast to a rural patrician society.

Alberdi sees an Argentina invaded by vast waves of immigrants and is concerned with preserving the sense of nationality and denying political rights to immigrants. Merquior quotes Natalio Botana's definition of Alberdi as the Edmund Burke of European immigration. His plan is for a form of conservative modernization that would favor industrialization and progress under conditions that would protect the Republic from the irrationality of the masses and the denationalizing effects of the immigrants.

It was a valuable innovation on the part of Merquior to have overcome the prejudice of limiting discussion of great public ideas to the European and North American sphere, and introducing in his great work a minute analysis of Sarmiento and Alberdi. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that this lucid and unprejudiced entry into a new area did not include basic references to the Mexican liberalism of Juárez and the Conservative-progressive liberalism of Porfirio Díaz, Brazilian liberalism from Antonio Carlos de Andrade and Ruy Barbosa, nor the thinking and actions that took place in Chile during the extraordinary effort at nation-building by Diego Portales.

Merquior's study of conservative liberalism closes with an analysis of German thinking, linked to the idea of the *Rechtsstaat* and including a penetrating discussion of Max Weber. This analysis is followed by two others which study the thinking of Benedetto Croce in Italy and of Ortega y Gasset, in Spain. German thinking moves along two broad lines: the concept of Wilhelm von Humboldt on the limits of the State, which is seen as a 'night watchman' of civic liberties and Kant's concept of self-improvement as the supreme aim of the individual, needing the appropriate care of the State.

Within this line of thinking, the figure of Max Weber (1864-1920) stands out, a figure who admirably combined the German historicist tradition with the positivist-tinted demands for a scientific sociology. Within this point of view, Weber realizes that the process of modernization consists of expanding instrumental rationality, the social agent of which is bureaucracy. Thus, modern societies confront a double danger: the despotism of bureaucracy and, in reaction to this, the despotism of charismatic authoritarianism. To overcome this double risk, Weber emphasizes the need for parliamentarism as a democratic and rational form of choosing political leaders.

Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) is another figure carefully examined by Merquior. Based on a profound historicism that would rescue the reputation of Giambattista Vico, Croce advocates liberalism as a moral demand in opposition to the economic liberalism of utilitarianism. Croce's great contribution was to identify within the historical process a cumulative increase in liberty, although it is neither linear nor interrupted. This commitment to freedom as a moral requirement but also as an evolutional trend in history led Croce into a consistently anti-Fascist position.

The analysis of the thinking of Ortega (1883-1955) closes Merquior's discussion on the great personalities within conservative liberalism. Ortega is faced with contradictory demands. On the one hand, there is his profound

liberalism, which arises out of his wide-ranging humanism. On the other, there is his criticism of mass-man, who is not seen as a member of the proletariat but as a psycho-cultural type found in all social classes, usually a man with no superior ideas who wastes his energies in a search for well-being. Ortega's liberalism leads him to support the first efforts of the Republic and at the same time to oppose Franco and Communism. In my view, Ortega's psychocultural elitism leads him to form his own type of conservative liberalism which we could define as a universal support of the negative freedoms and a selectively meritocratic approach to the positive ones. Merquior does not examine this aspect of Ortega's thought, which for me is extremely important.

Concluding his magisterial study of liberalism from its classic to its conservative periods, Merquior distinguishes between five main forms of expression:

- (1) natural rights, with, with Locke and Paine,
- (2) the civic humanism of Jefferson and Mazzini,
- (3) that of historical stages, with Smith and Constant,
- (4) utilitariansm, with Bentham and Mill, and
- (5) historical sociologism, with de Tocqueville.

Liberalism is a process that starts with Whiggism as a simple demand for religious freedom and constitutional government in order to achieve democracy. The excesses of the latter worry conservative liberals, who wish to moderate democracy and become neo-Whigs.

As a result, three types of liberalism appear: (1) the Burkean language of Macauley, Maine, Alberdi, Renan, and Acton; (2) the Darwinist language of Spencer; (3) the historicism of Weber and Ortega with its elitist implications.

New Liberalism

Merquior quotes Albert Dicey as observing that law reform in Britain had two phases in the 19th century; the first was from 1825 to 1870 and aimed to defend and expand individual independence, the second, from 1870 onwards, aimed to achieve social justice.

New liberalism, from the end of the last century onwards, had a strong social orientation which turned it into social-liberalism. The great British figure within this line of thought was, is Thomas Hill Green (1836-82). Based on a

Kantean Hegelism, Green proclaimed the need, while maintaining the principle of liberty, to be free from any form of coercion, to move towards positive freedom, and to guarantee all men their full measure of self-development — the *Bildung* of the Germans. The aim of public action should be social improvement. This means, in addition to defending individual rights, demanding equal opportunities and a community ethic.

John Hobson (1854-1840) and Leonard Hobhouse (1864-1929) followed Green's line of thinking. Hobhouse insists on the demand for positive freedom. Hobson became famous with his *Imperialism* (1902), attributing the existence of the latter to the excessive accumulation of wealth and savings that eventually required the coercive conquest of new markets.

Green's ideas were maintained and put into practice by William Beveridge (1879-1963). Based in the Reform Club, in 1942, Beveridge created the initial statutes of the British welfare state.

In France, social liberalism took the form of republicanism. What was at stake was the reconstruction of institutions after the fall of the second Empire without inciting either the populism of the Commune or a return to conservative monarchy. The basic ideas of the movement were launched by Claude Nicolet in *L'Idée Républicaine en France*, in 1870. In France, social liberalism is subdivided into several forms: neo-girondines, with Quinet, neo-dantonists, with Michelet and Victor Hugo, positivist republicans, like Jules Ferry and Gambetta and spiritualist republicans, like Charles Renouvier. French social liberalism sprang to the defense of Dreyfus. Its more recent exponents were Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Leon Duguit (1859-1925). The final form of this tendency takes on a super-individualist sense, bordering on anarchy, with Alain (Emile Chartier, 1868-1951). Alain would be extremely influential in shaping the thinking of Sartre, Simon Weil and Raymond Aron. This tendency, with a more social coloring, would be continued by Albert Camus (1913-60) in his novels.

Social liberalism has significant defenders in Italy, with Piero Gobetti (1901-26), an anti-Fascist, who maintained an idealistic social-liberal position based in the masses, and Carlo Roselli (1899-1937) who sought a democratic socialism free from Marxism. In Spain, this trend appeared with Salvador de Madariaga (1886-1978), who took a position within an organicist view of democracy.

In Germany, social liberalism is identified with support for the Weimar Republic. Its most eminent exponent would be Hans Kelsen (1881-1973).

In his *On the Essence and Value of Democracy* (1920), the eminent jurist maintains that the essence of the latter consists in autonomy in creating norms within a situation of political pluralism.

The United States makes an important contribution to social liberalism with Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) and his New Freedom program and John Dewey (1859-1952), with his emphasis on education.

More recently, the British have made an important new contribution to social liberalism with Keynes (1883-1945) and the novelist George Orwell (1903-50). Karl Popper, within a conservative tendency and taking a neopositivist point of view, develops a concern with overcoming poverty in anti-state terms which may be summed up in his famous phrase: "minimize avoidable suffering instead of maximizing happiness". Prominent within this branch is the intellectual importance of Sir Isaiah Berlin, whose *Two Concepts of Liberty* in 1958 differentiated between negative and positive liberty and emphasized the need for following rational objectives while avoiding all forms of authoritarianism.

Neoliberalism

While that which Merquior calls "new liberalism" is characterized by being impregnated with the social concerns in liberal thinking, neoliberalism goes in the opposite direction and makes a strong criticism of state paternalism. Von Mises (1881-1933) with his critique *Socialism*, in 1922, denouncing the abuses of social regulation, von Hayek (1899-1992) supporting a free market in a situation of minimum government, together with Milton Friedman (1912-2006) and his total defense of the market, personified the extreme conservative line of neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism returns to the individualist theme of classical liberalism within the conservative liberal position of Burke, Macauley and Bagehot. The great influence exercised by this line of thinking on modern politics is well known, from Thatcher in Great Britain and Reagan in the United States, spreading through the rest of the world, especially in the Third World. The fact that economically neoliberal governments, although often founded on political authoritarianism, have had significant economic success in Southeast Asia and in some Latin American countries such as Pinochet's Chile (with policies that were continued by Aylwin's democratic government) and Mexico, have given neoliberal ideology a wide audience.

Merquior analyzes with great skill the main personalities in neoliberal thought. It is a pity that he did not mention the necessary qualifications concerning the differentiation that must be made between the proved validity of a market economy driven by private enterprise as a condition for the proper allocation and management of resources, of the purely ideological aspects of neoliberalism, demonizing the State and by dismantling it, establishing the law of the jungle in societies whose stabilization has been due to the healthy effects of the welfare state.

Sociological Liberalism

The fifth and last chapter in Merquior's book contains two final sections. The first, dealing with what we might call 'sociological liberalism', which consists basically in a critical analysis of the thinking of Raymond Aron and Ralf Dahrendorf. The second deals with the neocontractualism of Rawls, Nozick and Bobbio.

Strictly speaking, we cannot speak of sociological liberalism in terms of Aron and Dahrendorf. The term is only meaningful when applied to the liberalism of Spencer and Durkheim, the former by reason of his evolutionist determinism, the latter by reason of his social determinism. Aron and Dahrendorf eminent sociologists and confirmed liberals. In both, liberalism does not originate in sociological premises even though the fact of them being eminent sociologists clearly leads them to go beyond the merely ideological aspects of the various forms of liberalism, both from the left and right.

Aron (1905-93), who is as multifaceted as Merquior – and famously said of the latter: "Ce garçon a tout lu" – maintains a moderately conservative liberalism in terms of the individual-society-State, emphasizing the negative liberties and the relevance of the marketplace. On the other hand, he is aware of the need for prudent regulation by the State of economic (anticyclical measures) and social (equality of opportunity and protection for underprivileged social sectors) relations. His fierce denunciation of the fallacies of Communism and types of left-wing populism for many years earned him the hostility of most of the intelligentsia. His extraordinary intellectual honesty, his immense ability and exceptional clarity finally won the general admiration of all serious intellectuals even before the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union gave historical confirmation to the basis of his criticisms.

Merquior's analysis of Aron concentrates mainly on his historical and sociological work and less on his ideas concerning liberalism, which are mainly found in his great contribution to journalism.

Born in 1929, Rolf Dahrendorf shares his conclusions concerning modern industrial life with Aron and studies the conflicts found in it. Particularly important in this respect is his recent (1988) book The Modern Social Conflict. Dahrendorf shows how, in modern industrial society (which is becoming postindustrial) 19th-century-type class conflicts have been overtaken by another type of conflict. Class differences have been greatly reduced by universal education that has given a middle-class lifestyle to almost the whole population. And thus there has been created a broad social stratum of both blue- and white-collar salaried workers. The entrepreneurial class, in spite of the income and decision-making power it derives from capital, belongs to this social stratum in the form of the company executive. In advanced modern societies, social conflict takes the form of conflict between 'guaranteeing provisions' and 'having rights'. Social legislation and union agreements give 'rights' without considering the specific 'provisions' necessary to support them, thus causing frequent conflicts between the rights gained and the means to support them. The current debate in Brazil concerning pension rights is a good illustration of this point. This kind of discussion brings to light two opposing socio-political movements. On the one hand there is a majority class (the broad-based salaried class), demanding its rights. On the other there are the Thatcherites, anxious to protect the provision available to them, imposing discipline on those rights.

In this context, Dahrendorf, like Aron, supports a radical liberalism that ensures a healthy balance between making provision and having rights.

The Neocontractualists

John Rawls (1921-2002) achieved fame late in life with his book A *Theory of Justice* (1971). Returning to the idea of a social contract, Rawls shows that what is really in question is not the legitimacy of power but the rules of justice. For Rawls, the social contract is absolutely hypothetical. It is a case of knowing what rational people would agree to if, not knowing the resources of each individual and the what place they would be given to occupy in society, they had to establish the rules of justice. According to Rawls, this situation would lead to the adoption of two principles: (1) everyone should have an equal right to the greatest degree of freedom compatible with the freedom of others; (2) social

inequalities could be permitted as long as they benefit the less fortunate members of society. These positions lead Rawls to social liberalism.

In *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974), Robert Nozick (1938-2002) takes different positions although they are based on neocontractualist premises, when he advocates the need to minimize the role of the State, which puts him among the neoliberals.

Noberto Bobbio (1909-2004), one of the major intellectual figures of our time, is concerned with the future of democracy and the kind of good society and good government that can realistically be achieved. His book *State, Government and Society* (1955) is possibly the best modern compendium of political theory. According to Bobbio the good State should have five basic characteristics: (1) it should exist within a polyarchic context; (2) it should place limitations on power; (3) it should guarantee the participation of citizens in the adoption of laws; (4) it should use democratic procedures to elect leaders, and (5) it should respect civil and civic rights. Like Rawls, Bobbio is both a social and democratic liberal.

Conclusions

In a brief final commentary, José Guilherme Merquior gives a summary of his own book. Liberalism is a process of ideas and practices that has developed over the past 300 years. For a better understanding of this long and varied process it is important to highlight six main points:

(1) Proto-liberalism

The concept of rights and the formation of a constitution begin in the Middle Ages. The Renaissance contributes with the ideology of humanism and citizenship while the culmination of the process of shaping liberalism occurs with the Enlightenment in the 18th century. The latter develops a secular and progressive understanding of history and from these twin bases Romanticism emphasizes the importance of the individual.

(2) Classical Liberalism

Classical liberalism contributes the theory of modern liberty (Constant) and the modern political system (the Founding Fathers of the United States).

The classic economy is formulated (Smith, Ricardo) along with the idea of economic freedom. At the same time the theory of democracy are constructed with Bentham and de Tocqueville, and the theory of individual liberalism with John Mill

(3) Conservative Liberalism

After the mid-19th century, with the excesses of the French Revolution and the phenomenon of Napoleon, there was an attempt to seek protection from the negative aspects of democracy. Bagehot, Spencer, the Germans of the *Rechtsstaat*, Croce and Ortega, advocate an elitist form of liberalism.

(4) New Liberalism

After the end of the 19th century there arises a form of liberalism loaded with social concerns. Green, Hobhouse, Kelsen, Keynes and Dewey formulate the positions of social liberalism. Communist and Fascist totalitarianism, on the other hand bring about a liberal counteroffensive from Popper, Orwell, Camus and Berlin. The neocontractualists, Rawls and Bobbio, advocate a new kind of social liberalism.

(5) Neoliberalism

Taking a contrary position to social liberalism, neoliberalism returns to conservative positions and advocates the free market and shrinking the role of the State.

(6) Sociological Liberalism

The great contemporary thinkers in modern society, Aron and Dahrendorf, point to the need for a balanced liberalism, a balance between having rights and ensuring provision and between the growth of freedom and greater social equity. *Liberalism, and Ancient and Modern*, the last work of the great essayist José Guilherme Merquior is also the most representative publication of his immense erudition, his exceptional sharpness of mind, his intellectual clarity and, although implicitly, his political convictions.

This book is the most wide-ranging modern study on the development of liberalism over the last 300 years and represents a veritable critical and explanatory encyclopedia of the subject. As has been noted above, it might have been desirable if the work could have included the unprejudiced inclusion of important Latin American thinkers such as Sarmiento and Alberdi, which would have given it more breadth by including important representatives of liberal ideas and practices in countries like Brazil, Chile and Mexico.

In his personal beliefs, José Guilherme Merquior went from an initial position of a social-democratic tendency along the lines of San Tiago Dantas, to a more severe criticism of the limitations of the State that led him to a position of conservative liberalism and, in his later years, to social liberalism. In my view, the high regard he maintained for the great representatives of conservative liberalism, mainly Hayek, means he does not include in *Liberalism, Old and New* an adequate criticism of the ideological elements contained in neoliberalism.

In my long conversations with José Guilherme Merquior I had a chance to note how much his exceptional clarity and intellectual honesty led him to a critical recognition of the heavy ideological load carried by neoliberalism. Like Aron and Dahrendorf, Merquior supported a liberalism of balances between achieving maximum freedom and a wide ranging demand for social equity. His criticism of neoliberal ideologism, although not openly expressed in *Liberalism, Ancient and Modern*, as well as being present in Merquior's thinking, is clearly implied in his commentaries on new liberalism and the work of Aron and Dahrendorf.

The episodes concerning the publication of a series of articles by president Collor from a social-liberal point of view, starting on 5th January, 1992 and based on a text on the subject he had been given by Merquior at the end of 1990, are an irrefutable illustration of the social-liberal position of the final stage of Merquior's thinking.



2. A Brief Word About my Own Work (1998)

1. Introduction

Work

I believe it is generally recognized that it is extremely difficult to speak about one's own work. The descriptive aspect of this exercise is obviously easy and no one is better fitted for it than the author himself. The difficulty consists in analyzing and evaluating one's own work objectively. Without laboring this point further I shall say that in my view it is not for the author to try and make a critical evaluation of his work because nobody can separate their critical function from their conceptual background. The author's ideas about the world coincide with the author's world of ideas.

So I feel that an exercise such as the one I have been asked to carry out, to speak about my own work, should first of all consist in taking account of everything I have done in an attempt to choose what seems to me to be most relevant. Secondly, with regard to this limited list of most relevant topics, the author's task is to highlight the central aspects and basic meaning of what he has tried to say or do, without any attempt at judging it.

Looking back at all of my work from my present 75 years of age, I shall divide it into three main parts: intellectual life, business life and public life.

My intellectual output consists of 41 published books, 15 of which are solely mine and 26 written with other authors, a large number of essays, papers and lectures, most of them unpublished and several hundred articles in newspapers and magazines.

My business life consisted mainly in carrying out two ambitious projects: a large steelworks - Companhia Ferro e Aço de Vitória - and a large Latin American company trading in capital goods from the region - Latinequip.

My public activities have consisted mainly in funding and directing three cultural institutes, IBESP, ISEB and IEPES, and in my contribution to the formation and launch of the PSDB and from April to September 1992, running the Ministry of Science and Technology, at that time a Secretariat of the Government of the Presidency of the Republic.

Intellectual Career

This is perhaps the point, at this introductory stage, before trying to present the central elements of my main writings, to give a very brief description of my intellectual career.

As a teenager I was interested in literature and read avidly the great writers in Portuguese, French, English and Spanish and in translation, the Greeks and Romans, Russians and Italians. At that time I thought I might become a writer. I wrote (classical) poetry and juvenile novels.

As a student in the classical section of what was called the complementary course, I became interested in philosophy, influenced by Aristotle and Scholastic philosophy taught to me at that time by the Jesuits of the Colégio Santo Inácio, an interest that became permanent. At the same time - and with a certain amount of conflict - I became interested in Marxism and even now I have the greatest respect for the work of the young Marx, from the *Paris Manuscripts* to *Grundrisse*.

As a law student in the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro from 1939 to 1943, I became interested in Political Science, influenced by the brilliant course of Antonio Gallotti, Professor of Theory of State, and thought about dedicating myself to studying it without giving up my continued interest in philosophy. Even at that time I was able to notice the problematic state of the University in Brazil and this led me to think about organizing myself so that my intellectual activity should suit my intellectual interests without the bureaucratic

problems and restrictions of university life, entrusting the care of my economic needs to working as a lawyer and consultant.

In my university undergraduate course I came under two important influences. The first began with reading Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* followed by reading many more texts - among which I would highlight Jacques Monod's *Le Hasard et la Nécessité* - and long reflections on the subject which led me, against the very religious education of my youth, to the conviction that (unfortunately) God does not exist. The other great influence that opened the doors to the great culture of our time was that of Ortega y Gasset. I read almost all of Ortega's work and later had the pleasure of a long conversation with him in Madrid. Fascinated by Ortega, with whose ideas I still have a great affinity, I was led by him to become familiar with German thinking in that great period lasting from the last decades of the 19th century to the 1930s and the tragedy of Nazism.

Ortega and German culturalism made me abandon the economic ideas of Marx and historical materialism although I still have, as a mentioned, the greatest appreciation for Marx's work as a young man.

The great influences that contributed to my intellectual development were, after Ortega, those of Dilthey, Rickert and Windelband, Ernst Cassirer, Max and Alfred Weber, of the phenomenological school of Husserl, Jaspers - with whom I had an excellent meeting in Basle in Switzerland - and Max Scheler. Other influences were those of Bertrand Russell, Whitehead, and Collingwood, Gurvitch, Mannheim, Talcott Parsons, Sorokin and Raymond Aron as well as the Frankfurt School, notably Horckheimer. Werner Jaeger and Erich Kahler were further influences

2. Business Activities

I trained as a lawyer in the office of San Tiago Dantas, my teacher of Roman Law whom I admired and who became for me, as well as a great friend, a model of intellectual and public life. I opened a law office with my dear friend and classmate Reynaldo Reis, and we were very successful.

Law and consultancy opened up opportunities for business projects. In the two major business projects I ran and managed successfully - Ferro e Aço e Latinequip—the financial incentive, while important, was not the decisive factor. What led me to have the audacity to carry out these two undertakings was, in the case of Ferro e Aço, the desire to make a contribution to Brazilian development that was not simply intellectual. I was also moved by the desire to show myself that I was able to do something practical, outside the sphere of the unworldly and verbal. In the case of Latinequip my old obsession with economic integration in Latin America had caused me to feel such a growing irritation with the fact that the integrationist rhetoric of governments was not leading to concrete results. So I decided to make an effective contribution to the process of integration by founding a large Latin American trading company to market capital goods produced in the region.

The Companhia Ferro e Aço de Vitória project ran from 1959 to 1963. A small 40-ton furnace to produce pig-iron, founded in Vitória by relatives on my mother's side of the family, lacking working capital, had seen its unsteady profits swallowed up by bank charges. Either it had to be turned into a large steelworks or it would have to close down. At that time we were in the second Vargas government, which was showing the first serious attempts at a deliberate promotion of development. I was invited by my relatives to look at the situation of the company and suggested that they entrust me with a major expansion project. To this end, I succeeded in persuading a large German trading company, Ferrostal AG, to undertake this project with support from the BNDE, supplying the equipment and investing the profit from the sale in the company, investing it in increasing the capital of the old firm. The 1954 coup caused a substantial delay to this project but it was vigorously reactivated under the Kubitschek government. In 1963 the succeeding president, João Goulart, opened our major steelworks which had the capacity to produce 500,000 tons of steel per year.

Next I prepared a second plan to expansion to be carried out in the region of Ponta do Tubarão, also in Vitória, to raise the production of the factory to 2 million tons. By then a solid relationship of trust had been formed between the directors of Ferrostal and me. Baron Vollrat Von Watzdorff, the company's representative in Brazil, Theodor Müller, one of his senior directors, and Werner Devendahl, the Managing Director of Ferrosral, became personal friends of mine. With their support I formed a large European consortium, Eurosid, which put together a financial package equivalent in today's money to more than US\$ 2 billion to set up a large steel works in Ponta do Tubarão, Vitória, that would work together with the existing one to produce 2 million tons of steel a year. When the technical plans and the new financial structure were ready, the 1964 *coup* took place which caused me to resign as Managing Director of the company and accept a previous invitation from Harvard to be

a visiting professor of Political Science there. Unfortunately my successors on the board of Ferro e Aço were not able to carry out the plans that had been prepared and a large steel works was built at Ponta do Tubarão on the initiative of other individualsm, without the participation of Ferro e Aço.

I ran the Latinequip project from 1971 to 1976. The aim was to use the resources of public Latin American banks to form a large trading company dealing in equipment produced in Latin America, to be sold within the region and abroad. To this end, I entered into agreements with the IDB, The President of which at that time was Ortiz Mena with Eduardo Figueiroa, an eminent Chilean economist as his main adviser who, in fact ran the affairs of the IDB presidency.

Figueiroa thought the idea was excellent. In order to carriy it out we first of all planned to form a consultancy, Latinexpert, which would be staffed by experts from Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil. The IDB would finance the cost of the Latinequip project in the form of a contingent recovery loan of US\$ 150,000 that would be repaid by Latinequip if and when it should be formed. Having settled these details I proceeded to organize Latinexpert, which was made up of Manuel de la Fuente, from México, Diego Castellanos, from Venezuela, Gaston Valente, from Argentina by me from Brazil.

Once the team was formed we began the preparatory work to set up Latinequip. At this point there was a radical and unexpected change in Eduardo Figueiroa's position. This was revealed in a dramatic conversation I had with him in Washington when the promised financial agreement with IDB was about to be signed. In this extraordinary conversation, after several whiskies, Figueiroa led me to understand that under the bureaucratic pretexts he then put forward, he had succumbed to a crisis of envy. Why was he, Figueiroa, going to lend me US \$150,000 to carry out a major project the completion of which would depend on him, while in fact he would remain in the shadows and I would appear as the Latin American hero who had founded the first major regional transnational company?

Faced with the refusal of finance when Latinexpert had already been founded and studies had begun to set up Latinequip, I then decided, after consulting the other members of the team, that we would carry out the project anyway. To achieve this, the consultants worked without pay and only incurred unavoidable expenses such as salaries for assistants, rent for the Latinequip office in Rio and similar items that would be paid for by me. To pay these expenses I used money I had earned from the Ferro e

Aço project. Thus Latinexpert was able to put together the Latinequip project properly. However, starting up this company suffered a great setback because of various political problems, mainly those arising from the military government in Brazil, which I had publicly repudiated and which was naturally very hostile to me.

Nevertheless, favorable circumstances finally arrived in 1976 with the inauguration in Mexico of President Echeverria, a friend of mine, the election of another friend, Franco Montoro as governor of the state of São Paulo and of a third friend, Aldo Ferrer, as President of the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. So it was possible to put Latinequip together quickly with shareholders including the Nacional Financiera, representing México, the Banco do Estado de São Paulo, then under the presidency of Bresser Pereira, representing Brazil and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, representing Argentina.

With its headquarters in Buenos Aires, Latinequip was organized quite quickly and began to work very successfully selling Latin American equipment. The company was also able to reimburse me (without interest) for the money I had advanced for Latinexpert, and the year after start-up it had on its books deals totaling more than a million dollars. As I pointed out to my wife, who had not approved of me advancing money to Latinequip, it is sometimes necessary to finance history.

Unfortunately, because of internal politics, Aldo Ferrer's successor at the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires refused to support Latinequip which, in spite of its success, had not yet become completely self-supporting. As has often happened in Latin America, petty politics and the lack of continuity in public-sector guidelines frustrated a very proper initiative for integration that had already shown signs of great potential for success. Nevertheless, Latinequip was a practical demonstration of the huge potential for regional integration and opened a path that, a few years later, would lead to the triumph of the of the Mercosul experiment.

3. Public Activities

To make things simpler, I think I can divide my public life into two areas: founding and directing public interest institutions, and participating in party politics or government operations.

The Institutes

Since childhood I have had a permanent concern with Brazilian development and Latin American integration. In addition to specific measures, promoting Brazilian development requires a great increase in public rationality. In the final analysis, underdevelopment is a result of the lack of public rationality. Latin American, especially South American, integration, which is easier to achieve, basically depends on a broad and intimate cooperation between Brazil and Argentina. This double and closely related aim has led me to found successively three institutions.

The first, the Brazilian Institute for Economics, Sociology and Politics (Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Política-IBESP), began in 1950. From 1953 the Institute began to publish a journal, *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo* (*Notebooks of Our Time*) that was well-received throughout Latin America. The motto of the journal, which summed up the aims of IBESP, was: "The problems of our time from the Brazilian point of view—The problems of Brazil from the point of view of our time". The members of IBESP, in addition to me as its General Secretary, were, Ewaldo Correia Lima, Guerreiro Ramos, Roland Corbisier, Romulo Almeida, Carlos Luiz de Andrade, Ottolmy Strauch, Candido Mendes, Fabio Breves, Ignacio Rangel, Israel Klabin, J. P. de Almeida Magalhães, José Ribeiro de Lira, Heitor Lima Rocha, Moacir Felix de Oliveira and Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez.

Because IBESP was a non-profit-making company its costs, which were basically those of publishing *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo*, were mostly paid out of my own pocket from my earnings as a lawyer. After a time it was no longer possible for me to continue to do this so we decided, with the firm support of Anisio Teixeira, whose work in the Ministry of Education was linked to ours, to turn IBESP into a public institution that would become the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Superiores-ISEB (Brazilian Institute of Advanced Studies).

The foundation of ISEB was supported by Lourival Fontes but suffered a setback with the *coup* that led to the suicide of President Vargas. When that critical period had passed it became possible, with Cândido Motta as Minister of Education, and through the mediation of Helio Cabal, a friend of the Minister, to set up ISEB with a small grant that would be sufficient to meet essential expenses and pay its Director, a post for which we chose Roland Corbisier. The latter, who had resigned as president of the newspaper he

was working on, the *Estado de São Paulo*, agreed to move to Rio and take over the running of ISEB. ISEB was created by decree as a form of special activity of the Ministry of Education and was in fact an Institute administratively and financially autonomous, run by a Board of Trustees appointed by the Minister, which in turn appointed the Director of the Institute.

ISEB played an important role in identifying and describing the problems Brazilian development, having provided important information for Juscelino Kubitschek's Plan of Targets, coordinated by Lucas Lopes (material which was published in Issue No. 5 of *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo* in 1956) and advised his government. At the end of 1959, internal disagreements between Guerreiro Ramos and me caused a serious crisis in the Institution. I have described this affair elsewhere and shall not return to it here. It is sufficient to say that, defeated in the internal discussion question, Guerreiro resigned from ISEB in December 1959. Surviving a new crisis at the beginning of 1960, I left the Institute in March of that year. Succeeding Roland Corbisier, who was elected to Congress in 1962, Álvaro Vieira Pinto sent ISEB along a rigidly Marxist path, turning the Institute into an instrument of the Brazilian Communist Party. This led the military forces to abolish ISEB after the 1964 coup and send its excellent library to the Escola Superior de Guerra (Higher War College).

Having publicly criticized the 1964 *coup*, and in spite of my friendship and family relationship with Castelo Branco, I left Brazil at that point to take up a longstanding invitation to be a visiting professor at Harvard. I remained in the United States until 1969, having taught not only at Harvard but also at Stanford and MIT. It was while I was visiting professor at MIT in 1969 that the University offered me a permanent post. In spite of the temptation to take advantage of this privileged position to further my studies, my obsession with the question of Brazilian development led me to turn down the invitation, saying that I needed to return to Brazil. So I lost the chance to renew my contract as a visiting professor and had to return to Brazil during the military regime, then led by Médici. The military did not directly persecute me but made me a 'non-person' and deprived me of the chance of performing any public activity.

It was at this point that Cândido Mendes bravely and a generously welcomed me into his university, where I worked in international relations. After a while, strongly supported by Antonio Gallotti, I tried to set up a new Institute to be called the Max Weber Institute. To this end, Gallotti mobilized

the support of a large number of business figures who were prepared to finance the new institution. One of the businessmen Gallotti approached, Azevedo Antunes, who was extremely reactionary, foolishly and maliciously felt that I was a Communist agent taking advantage of Gallotti's good faith and denounced the new initiative to the Naval Secret Service as being dangerously subversive. There are those who feel that the names suggested for the incipient Institute seemed to some of the less enlightened security agents to imply some kind of relationship with Karl Marx. The business figures on the list supplied by Antunes were then ordered by that Service not to participate in the project, which caused it to fail.

Years later, with the initial support of Rafael Almeida Magalhães, I began to set up a new Institute that would be called the Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais-IEPES (Institute for Political and Social Studies) thanks to the action of a group of intellectuals and liberal professionals and later the support of certain businesses. Founded in July 1979, IEPES rented a pleasant house in Rua Barão de Oliveira Castro, in the Jardim Botânico district, where it began its operations in January 1980 and has continued its work until the present time, prolifically and without interruption, under my academic direction. IEPES was founded, in accordance with my continual concern with the topic, as an important agency in promoting public rationality. During its 19 years of existence the Institute has undertaken important research related to Brazilian development, social reform, the structure of the State and its parties and the analysis of the international system as it concerns Brazilian foreign policy. These studies have generated several books published by commercial publishing houses, mainly Paz e Terra, and some of them have been very well received at home and abroad, running into several editions.

The PSDB

At the instigation of my friend André Franco Montoro and with the support of José Richa and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, I was an active participant in the foundation and initial organization of the PSDB. The party's social-democratic ideas coincided completely with my own convictions, which since my youth had gravitated to the centre-left area. The German phrase "a social market economy" corresponds to my view concerning the model that modern societies, and definitely Brazil, should adopt. Thus I was a member of the National Executive and Directorate of the party from its foundation until 1992,

when I gave up those posts to become Minister of Science and Technology after Collor's reshuffle of ministers.

My work with the leaders of the PSDB, along with Richa, Montoro and Fernando Henrique was to try to consolidate the party's social-democratic direction. This actually divided into three different tendencies: the socialdemocratic embodied by Fernando Henrique, Montoro's Christian Socialist liberalism and Sigmaringa's PT-leaning socialism. This latter tendency, represented by a minority group at the head of the party, nevertheless had links with militant groups at the base of the party. In general terms the party had two types of followers: a majority with social democratic convictions that was middle-class but rather averse to street protests, which had separated it from the old PMDB, and a small but extremely vocal group of militants coming from the PT and other radical groups on the left. Although this radical left was a minority, it had a strong influence on the PSDB, trying to draw it closer to the positions of the PT. I belonged to a small group at the head of the party led by Richa that felt it was vital to make the party line absolutely clear and to exclude anyone who did not agree with it. We felt it would be better to have a smaller but more coherent and cohesive party rather than keep in the party a group whose ideological orientation was completely in line with that of the PT simply in order to swell the ranks.

For a time it was very interesting for me to have this experience of party life in the attempt to form a party with a coherent program. On the other hand, the experience revealed to me that an independent intellectual does not fit in well with the political struggles of a party and indeed this only has a meaning for those who aspire to elected office. It was this realization that led me to the conviction at the end of 1991 that I should no longer carry on as a member of the National Executive and Directorate of the PSDB.

Government

I was a militant propagandist for the presidential campaign of Mario Covas in the 1990 elections. I had a very friendly relationship with him and had the highest opinion of his moral qualities. Having voted for him in the first round, I cancelled my vote in the second round because I disagreed as much with having Lula for President as having Collor.

I was extremely critical of the Collor government that began with an incompetent and inadequate administration that allowed the events to occur

which were later the subject of a Parliamentary Committee of Investigation. At the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, as a result of articles I had published in the *Jornal do Brasil*, Collor invited me twice to explain to him what I found wrong with his government. At the second of these meetings, and without concealing the fact that I voted against him, I took along a short text setting out in summary my main criticisms and summarizing also the corrective measures I felt were needed.

After this second meeting I noticed that in a curious way Collor was slowly adopting the measures I had suggested. Then, at the end of March 1992, with my friend Marcilio Moreira, then Minister of Finance, as intermediary Collor called me to the Palace and told me that, as I would have observed, he was scrupulously following all the recommendations I had drawn up, which was why I now had to accept a post in the new ministry he was going to form, composed of the most highly qualified people, to put my proposals into practice.

In the circumstances I could not refuse the invitation. I told him that for the aim he had in mind, the best thing would be to create a Secretariat of Planning and put me in charge of it. Collor spoke of the huge operational difficulties that would accompany the creation of a new ministerial post and suggested that I take charge of Science and Technology on the understanding that I would prepare a plan of action for the government as well as directing the affairs of the Ministry. He said that I would have to accept the post quickly because for political reasons he needed to make an immediate announcement about the new ministry. I therefore accepted his invitation and quickly told my colleagues on the Executive of the PSDB and I was accepting the post and for this reason I was giving up my work with the party.

It would be difficult to summarize in a few lines my experience in the then Government Secretariat for Science and Technology, later turned into a Ministry, in the period between April and September, 1992. From a political point of view of this period had two faces, before and after Pedro Collor's [the President's brother – trans.] accusations and the findings of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry that was then set up. During the first three months of my office it was possible to take several worthwhile initiatives. In the second phase the Ministry personnel decided not to resign in order to avoid leaving dangerous power vacuum, but to restrict itself to carrying out those measures necessary to defend the public interest.

Among the initiatives it was possible to take, three stand out as being most important: promoting the Brazilian space program, setting up a study concerning the action of the states in the field of science and technology, and the formulation of the government program: 'Brasil 2000'.

I found a space program in an advanced stage of development aiming at building a meteorological satellite in Brazil and also plans for a major Brazilian space policy. Unfortunately, the resources available in the Ministry represented a third of the minimum funding required because of budget cuts imposed to reduce the fiscal deficit. I decided therefore to prioritize the space program and by means of extra funding obtained by President Collor, a loan from the bank of Brazil, to finalize the measures necessary to launch a meteorological satellite completely designed and built in Brazil. This was launched after I had left the government.

A second initiative I was able to complete before I left the Ministry and which I left for my successor who now occupies the position, my friend the eminent physicist José Israel Vargas, was a wide-ranging study on how the State should act in the area of Science and Technology, showing basically its strategic aims in order that this might be carried out, and the resources needed to do so.

A third important contribution was drawing up a plan for the 'Brasil 2000' project. To this end, Collor brought together under my coordination a working group consisting of Marcilio Marques Moreira, then Minister of Finance and Eliezer Baptista, then Government Secretary for Strategic Affairs. In close cooperation with those two colleagues, I prepared a detailed plan for a project that would enable Brazil to achieve a situation of self-sustainable development by the year 2000. Eliezer Baptista's contribution was extremely important and consisted of a set of strategic maps showing the geographical location, together with indications for timescales, of axes for transport, energy and telecommunications.

When this work was finished, the problems of the Collor government were so irreversible that they were leading to either the impeachment or the resignation of the President. We understood at that point that it would be against the national interest to reveal this project to a dying government and that it would be better to save it for use at a more opportune moment in the future.

When Vice President Itamar Franco took Collor's place he refused to accept any contributions from the previous government, regardless of its intrinsic merit. After consulting with my successor at Science and Technology,

José Israel Vargas and Eliezer's successor, Admiral Flores in the ministry of Strategic Affairs, I received their permission to use the elements of that project for research and activities in my Institute, IEPES, which is what happened.

4. Intellectual Activities

My intellectual activities are spread over six main areas: (1) theoretical work in the field of Political Science and Sociology; (2) studies in the area of International Relations; (3) works concerning Latin America; (4) philosophical studies; (5) works related to Brazilian Development, and (6) historical and sociological studies.

Political Science and Sociology

The following books belong to the area of Political Science and Sociology: (1958) Condições Institucionais do Desenvolvimento (Institutional Conditions for Development); (1972) Desenvolvimento Econômico e Desenvolvimento Político (Economic Development and Political Development); (1973) Political Development; (1978) Introdução ao Desenvolvimento Social (Introduction to Social Development), (1985) Sociedade e Política (Society and Politics); (1986) Sociedade e Cultura (Society and Culture); (1989) (with other authors) A Proposta Social-Democrata (The Social-democratic Proposal).

Among my books concerning political and sociological problems, I feel the most important is *Desenvolvimento Econômico e Desenvolvimento Politico (Economic Development and Political Development)* (1972), the ideas in which were greatly enlarged and developed in *Political Development* (1973) and *Introdução ao Desenvolvimento Social (Introduction to Social Development*, 1978). The first was translated into English and published by the Harvard University Press in 1973. The second was translated into Portuguese by the Editora Perspectiva, published in three volumes in 1976, and translated into Spanish by Editorial Paidos, in Buenos Aires and published, also in three volumes in 1972. The third book mentioned was translated into Spanish by the Fondo de Cultura Económica in México and published under the title *Hacia la Sociedad no Represiva*, in 1980. In Annexes I, II and III, I give a brief description of the main ideas contained in *Political Development* and in *Introdução ao Desenvolvimento Social*.

In contrast to the two main models of the time, the functionalist (Parsons) and the dialectical (Marx), my view of society is characterized by a functional-dialectical concept. Early societies, both familial and primitive society, are correctly represented by the functionalist model. They arise out of the two pairings of man-woman and mother-child. As societies become more complex, both in the course of human evolution from the Paleolithic to the Neolithic and then to urban society, and also in the environment of a complex society when primary groups become institutionalized, the dialectical model is better able to explain and detect aspects and relationships that functionalism cannot embrace. The purely dialectical model, however, ignores the characteristics of primary society both analytically in the sense that those characteristics endure in all kinds of society, and also empirically when it deals with specifically primary societies.

The functional-dialectical model, as well as providing the correct representation of society, allows us to identify these subsystems that make up the social system: participatory, cultural, economic and political. It allows us to discover the values produced by each subsystem: actors, roles and status, by the participatory; beliefs by the cultural; uses by the economic; commands by the political. Finally, it allows us to measure the means available to each subsystem (prestige, culture, money and power) and the consumption-product relationships between them.

This kind of analysis of society also allows us to understand and explain the processes of change, either structural or circumstantial and also reveals the principle of congruence that regulates social subsystems. Structural changes in one of the subsystems either produce congruent changes in the rest, or they do not last, or they lead to the breakdown of the regime and an intra-systemic exchange with a consequently destructive effect on the society in question.

Based on this view of society we can understand and explain the processes of social, cultural, economic, political and global development. In *Political Development* the process of political development is studied both closely and broadly. The conclusion of this study is that political development arises out of a process of modernization with a subsequent increase in the instrumental rationality of the system and the cumulatively from a process of institutionalization that raises levels of participation, representation and legitimacy in society.

Social development, the theme of *Introdução ao Desenvolvimento Social*, consists of a significant rise in the rate of integration in a society, raising its internal relationships of cooperation and solidarity, significantly reducing its rate of inequality and minimizing forms of coercion, which are restricted to neutralizing possible, and in principle rare, antisocial acts.

The ideal model of the socially developed society is the non-repressive society. This model is characterized by the concurrent response to three main demands:

- 1. Indifference to accumulating goods because of the generous provision of the latter in a system of egalitarian consumption;
- 2. Indifference to regulation of power because of the existence of an egalitarian democracy that is extremely legitimate and representative, and strictly observes legal norms;
- 3. The powerful social and humanist motivation of members of society based on an effectively shared conviction that a good quality of life for the individual depends upon a good quality of life for everyone.

The model of the non-repressive society is an ideal one that requires a substantial change in the social system of remuneration. Within basically egalitarian strata of society, greater material remuneration is given to those who carry out unattractive activities (e.g. dustman) and less to those who carry out socially or personally attractive activities (e.g. teacher, director) because in compensation they have higher symbolic and social remuneration in the form of respect and prestige.

Empirically, forming non-repressive societies will also depend, in addition to conditions that will be difficult to bring about to change current societies into this model, on an international context that will permit this social model to exist, in complete contrast to historical and current situations. The totally non-repressive society is an analytically viable utopia but depends empirically on internal and international conditions which, if they are in principle (analytically) capable of happening, are completely different from those that exist at the moment. We are dealing therefore with an ideal model that can act as a reference point which extremely egalitarian democratic societies, like the Scandinavian ones, tend to approximate to and which constitutes a target for democratic societies to aim at.

International Relations

In the field of International studies, the following works appear: (1977) "The New International System" in Karl Deutsch et al. *Problems of World Modeling*; (1982) (with other authors) *La Politica Internacional de los*

Años 80: Una Perspectiva Latinoamericana; (with other authors) Reflexões sobre o Atlântico Sul (Reflections on the South Atlantic); (1986) Novo Cenário Internacional (The New International Scenario).

The studies on international relations deal with the profound change in the international system caused by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and international Communism. My work on this subject reflects this decisive change. Works prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, which are those mentioned previously and also an approach to the theme in the last chapter of *Political Development*, develop the thesis of an inter-imperial international system. Later writings analyze the current process of creating a new world order that is faced with the alternative of increasing and consolidating a *Pax Americana* or of forming and consolidating, under the influence of the European Union, China, Russia, India and Mercosul, a multipolar world order under the aegis of the United Nations.

Works written during the bipolar American-Soviet system comprise on the one hand an objective and non-ideological description of the meaning of an American 'Empire' with its special characteristic of being an informal and deliberately non-institutionalized hegemony—the 'free world', and a Soviet 'Empire' that combines the characteristics of an egalitarian welfare state with the totalitarian control of society and the secret privileging of the *nomenklatura*. In this context, these studies try to analyze the areas of relative autonomy that non-aligned countries could occupy and the conditions necessary for them to do that.

My work after the collapse of the Soviet Union³⁹ consists of essays prepared for various seminars that had not yet been published in book form, although some had appeared in specialized journals. These studies try to analyze the institutional conditions resulting from the existence of a single superpower and the factors that are preventing the insuperable American superiority from being turned into a consolidated world power. At the same time, these studies attempt to analyze the tendencies in 'Euro-Europe', Russia, China, India and Mercosul to create a new multipolar word order, and discuss the conditions such a process depends on.

The central thesis of these studies is that the difficulties for the United States in consolidating a *Pax Americana* are both internal and external.

³⁹ The most relevant among these are the essays (1) "Mercosul e as Alternativas para a Ordem Mundial" ("Mercosul and the Alternatives to World Order") and (2) "El Proceso de Globalización y el Rol de Mercosur" ("The Globalization Process and the Role of Mercosur").

The American power elite aspires to creating a consolidated global hegemony and knows that it controls the decisive instruments to achieve it. Economically there is the fact that the present process of globalization, although it was not deliberately created by the United States, objectively signifies control of the world economy because of American supercompetitiveness. Militarily there is the fact that, supported by its nuclear invulnerability, the United States can inflict intolerable penalties on any country based on its own decision and bymeans of attacks from the air and from space. However, the hegemonic aims of the American power elite run up against significant internal and external limitations. Domestically, the American people do not aspire to an imperial destiny and refuse to pay the price for it either financially or in terms of human life. Internationally, 'Euro Europe' and the other countries previously mentioned are opposed to a world order unilaterally ruled by the United States and are working to form and consolidate a multipolar system under the aegis of the United Nations.

The fact that the 'American Empire', in contrast to the Roman Empire, offers few attractive choices to its 'provinces', significantly diminishes a *Pax Americana* that is not purely coercive and therefore is limited and transitory. The secret of the Roman Empire's survival in spite of its origins in military conquests, lay in the fact that it went on to institute, with the *jus gentium* and the *praetor peregrinus*, a legal system in the provinces that favored their respective ruling classes and received the active support of the latter. The Roman Empire fell when, because of the deterioration of its internal power system, it was no longer beneficial to the provinces and instead began to oppress them. It was not the barbarians who defeated Rome, it was Rome that broke itself up.

Latin America

Works on Latin America include the following studies: (1967) Problemas do Desenvolvimento Latino-Americano (Problems other Latin American Development); (1971) Ciência y Tecnologia en el Contexto Socio-Económico de America Latina (Science and Technology in the Socio-economic Context of Latin America); (1991) O Brasil e o Plano Busch: Oportunidades e Riscos numa Futura Integração das Américas (Brazil and the Busch Plan: Opportunities and Risks in a Future Integration of

the Americas); (1995) El Estado en America Latina (The State in Latin America).

My many works about Latin America are guided by two main aims: to understand the reasons for Latin American underdevelopment and to help overcome it, especially through the consolidation and expansion of Mercosul.

There exists generally in Latin America what has happened in the particular case of Brazil: based on the colonial legacy, a dual society has formed in which optimizing the interests of the elite has blocked the incorporation of the masses into higher levels of participation, thus prolonging underdevelopment.

The geographical and economic characteristics of Mexico and Central America have led these regions into a close economic relationship with the United States, a situation institutionalized in Mexico by means of NAFTA. The ALCA project aims to extend throughout the whole of Latin America a free trade system that will guarantee absolute economic supremacy for the United States in the region. Mercosul is opposed to these aims and proposes the alternative of incorporating the rest of South America into Mercosul and make this the great South American common market which will preserve the autonomy of countries in the region.

My recent studies on Latin America have highlighted the necessity for a multidimensional entry of the region's countries into the world. It is important to differentiate the cultural area of this policy from the economic. Latin America as a whole exists only as a cultural entity. The Iberian legacy, fed by other European, African and American Indian contributions, has created a culture of exceptional potential conditions which are favorable for it to make an important contribution to the main cultural demand of our time: making mass technological society compatible with the legacy of humanism.

In another area, the economic one, Latin America will divide itself between two poles: that of NAFTA and that of an enlarged Mercosul. Mexico already belongs to NAFTA and Central America and the Caribbean are inclining towards it. The countries of the Southern Cone already belong to Mercosul and Bolivia, Chile and Venezuela are inclining towards it. Mercosul must attract the remaining South American countries. Also, especially in terms of international policy, it must work towards creating close links with the European Union and will thus be able to make an important contribution to shaping a new world order which will be multipolar and will accept the authority of the United Nations.

Philosophical Studies

The area of philosophical studies contains the following works: (1957) *A Filosofia no Brasil (Philosophy in Brazil)*; (1993) (with other authors) *Transcendência e Mundo na Virada do Século (Transcendence and the World at the Turn of Century)*.

Philosophy has always been my greatest interest. Various circumstances have led me to concentrate my studies on Political Science, Sociology and History without affecting my constant concern with philosophical problems. If I have the time and disposition I hope, after finishing my current work, *A Critical Study of History*, to carry out a study on the place of man in the cosmos, to use the happy phrase taken from a book by Max Scheler. Preliminary work on this subject can be found in the (1993) book *Transcendência e Mundo na Virada do Século*.

The central thesis of this study, which has the same title as the book, is that the cosmos, which has always existed subject to an internal process of expansion and reconcentration (a thesis that suggests inversion of the second law of thermodynamics in the process of reconcentration), lacks meaning and finality. In this meaningless cosmos there has occurred, during two periods of expansion, on a secondary planet of a secondary star in a secondary galaxy, the emergence of life as a process that is ideologically guided towards its self-perpetuation and possible evolution. This evolution resulted in the emergence of man possessing rational freedom. On this man has imposed the need to give meaning to his life in a universe that has no meaning. The need has been imposed upon him to understand his absolute mortality which he does so that the possible meaning of life consists in an exercise of increasing rational liberty in the short period of time each man has on earth. God (lamentably) does not exist, but transcendence exists, potentially contained in the cosmos and able to be effectively exercised by man. In its superior forms, transcendence leads to the construction of the divine within the environment of man, the divine in the goodness of St Frances and Mother Teresa of Calcutta, the divine in Mozart and Beethoven and the divine in Plato, Kant and Hegel, the divine in the anonymous carrying out of duty and in anonymous acts of compassion.

The Development of Brazil

Works on the development of Brazil include the following: (1958) *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira (Nationalism in Contemporary*

Brazilian Life) (summarized in Annex IV); (1974) Brasil: Crise e Alternativas (Brazil: Crisis and Alternatives); (1985) (With other authors) Brasil Sociedade Democrática (Brazil: a Democratic Society); (1986) (with other authors) 'Brasil 2000' Para um Novo Pacto Social ('Brasil 2000: Towardsa New Social Contract); (1987) (with other authors) O Estruturalismo Brasileiro (Brazilian Structuralism); (1989) (with other authors) Brasil, Reforma ou Caos (Brazil, Reform or Chãos); (1989) Alternativas do Brasil (Alternatives for Brazil); (1989) (with other authors) A Proposta Social-Democrata (The Social-Democratic Proposal); (1990) As Perspectivas do Brasil e o Novo Governo (The Prospects for Brazil and the New Government); (1991) (with other authors) Condições para a Retomada do Desenvolvimento (The Conditions for Restarting Development); (1992) (with other authors) Sociedade, Estado e Partidos na Atualidade Brasileira (Society, State and Parties in Contemporary Brazilian Life); (1993) Crise na República (Crisis in the Republic); (1994) (with other authors) Brazil, Social and Economic Survey; (1994) (with other authors) Brasil, Proposta de Reforma: Subsídios para a Revisão Constitucional e Planejamento Estratégico (Brazil, the Proposal for Reform: Aids to Constitutional Review and Strategic Planning); (1994) (with other authors) Desenvolvimento, Tecnologia e Governabilidade (Development, Technology and Governability); (1994) Brasil Hoy; Perspectivas Sociales y Políticas e Implicaciones para Mercosur (Brazil Today: Social and Political Prospects and the Implications for Mercosul).

The problems of Brazilian development have been the object of the greatest number of works within the six fields of research to which I have dedicated myself. Written at different times, responding to different demands, focusing on different aspects of the same problem, these works contain a specific idea of development and underdevelopment as well as the causes of the latter and the conditions necessary to overcome it.

Development is a relative concept through which, in a specific cultural system at a specific moment in history, when compared to other societies in the same cultural system, it is found that a certain society has achieved conditions for meeting its social needs that demand, relative to its available resources, the proper use of the technical and managerial methods available at that point in history in that cultural system. The relationship of the concept of development to a specific cultural system is vital since different cultural systems – in practice different civilizations – have very different ideas about

the objectives of man and society, as becomes clear when we compare Buddhist societies with Western ones. Development consists, for societies in a certain culture, in the proper use, ideally the best possible use, of the means available at a specific moment in the history of that culture to provide what that society needs in terms of the human and material resources available to it. Therefore underdevelopment is a condition of those societies that have not succeeded in applying the means available in their cultural system at a specific time in history, to attend to their needs. Underdevelopment is a condition of an insufficient use of rationality in society.

The scarcity of human or material resources available to a society interferes in its development process, but does not prevent it. Societies without natural resources like Japan have achieved a high level of development. Societies with small populations, like Switzerland, have also achieved a high level of development. Underdevelopment always arises out of a lack of public rationality. Why does this happen? Why has it happened in the case of Brazil? My works on this topic are an attempt to answer this question and describe the conditions necessary to overcome our underdevelopment.

Within the ambit of Western civilization the many causes of underdevelopment can be reduced to a single basic cause: the dysfunctional nature of the relationship between the elite and the masses. In most cases, both historically and today, including the case of Brazil, this dysfunctionality is due to the elites. Dysfunctional elites are those which, on the one hand, do not direct their own interests in directions that will improve life for the whole of society and, on the other hand, have too high a cost of self-sustainability relative to the surplus produced by their respective societies, depriving the latter of the possibility of reproductive investment, and thus perpetuating its stagnation.

Brazil was an agrarian society from colonial times until the end of the 1960s. An agrarian society principally based on tropical agriculture such as coffee-growing creates a surplus equivalent to the difference between the cost of tropical agriculture and the external price of the raw materials as exports. Aware of this fact, the Brazilian agrarian elites always tried to reduce the costs of production which were mainly labor costs. Thus the rural population of Brazil – who were slaves until the end of the 19th century – were kept uneducated and living at a strictly subsistence level in order to be a cheap, docile labor force in order to maximize agricultural profits, since the price of the product did not depend on the producers and was fixed abroad. The

situation changed with the nation's industrialization under Kubitschek. The backwardness accumulated during the previous period, especially in terms of the people's lack of education, prolonged the country's underdevelopment. New socio-political contradictions linked to the emergence of populism, with the mistakes arising out of distributive policies imposed by decree and made worse by the attempt of the middle class to suffocate populism by means of military repression, continued to hold back the development of the country.

My latest works on the problem of Brazilian development concentrate firstly on the social problem and the resulting need to substantially change the profile of society, especially by means of an educational revolution, secondly on the problem of the State and the political system in order to overcome clientelist politics and the bureaucratic/authoritarian State, to provide the country with a public system that is capable of promoting the social change it needed to administer a modern and democratic industrial society. After the second Vargas government and the Kubitschek administration it was only after 1994, under the Cardoso government, that Brazil managed to move properly towards overcoming its underdevelopment.

Sociology of History

With regard to historical-sociological studies, two works should be mentioned: (1985) (with other authors) (*A Democracia Grega*) *Greek Democracy* and (1994-99) (still being worked on) *A Critical Study of History*.

My work in Social Sciences has always been directed by an acute sense of history. In certain conditions attempts to apply mathematics to the field of Social Sciences are legitimate. In the same way as economic mathematics (the 'economics' of the Anglo-Saxons) differs from political economics there is an equally valid area for sociometrics and politicometrics. Machiavelli had the brilliant idea of introducing formalism into political science, but he was the political thinker who was most aware of the historicity of the social sciences.

For many years this profound concern with history has made me want to dedicate a sociological analysis to the historical process when I felt I had the maturity to do so. The circumstances of my life delayed the moment when I could apply myself to this aim, which I finally succeeded in doing in the middle of 1993. An agreement between UNESCO and my Institute made me director of a large-scale research project entitled "A Critical Study of History" in which

16 of the most important civilizations would be studied, starting from prehistoric times, to discover the main conditions that influenced their emergence, their development and eventual decline. A comparative analysis will then be made to find out – and this has never been properly done to date – if civilizations form parts of unique and unrepeatable contexts or if, conversely, similar factors produce similar effects in different civilizations in different historical periods.

This study began in January 1994, is now nearing completion and should be finished in August 1999. As well as texts on the prehistoric period, papers have also been prepared concerning Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Aegean, Ancient Israel, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, Islam, India, China, Pre-Colombian Civilizations (Inca, Mayas and Aztec), Africa and, in relation to Western Civilization, the chapters on the Formation of Europe and on the Renaissance. The chapters still in preparation are those on the "Development of the West" (from the 17th century to the start of the 20th), "Reflections on the 20th Century", "Conclusions" and the General Introduction. We still have to complete the final revision the texts and the language. Written directly by me in fluent but not impeccable English, the texts are submitted to the revision of an expert in that language, who turns what I call "UN English" into "Oxford English".

The working method adopted consists in me preparing⁴⁰ a basic text that is then submitted for critical revision by a small group of sociologists with long experience in dealing with the problems of development (Professors Torcuato Di Tella and Manfred Mols, and Ambassador Ludovico Incisa Di Camerana) and next for revision by an eminent historian who is a specialist in the civilization being dealt with in the relevant text. Based on these critical contributions, I write the final text, which I am responsible for, but the reports of the historians, whether or not accepted by me, will be published in the same book.

To allow comparative criticisms to be made, each civilization is studied in six sections. The first gives a brief presentation of the people or peoples who developed a certain civilization and the geographic and historical context in which it arose. The second section gives a short historical summary of that civilization. The third gives a brief outline of the main aspects of its cultural evolution. These three initial sections are based on the reputable literature available on the topic and on my part involve only the work of coordinating

⁴⁰Except for the chapters on the Pro-Columbians (Heraclio Bonilla) and Africa (Joseph Ki-Zerbo).

and summarizing information that already exists. The three following sections involve a personal attempt, using modern social science categories, to decide what were the main conditions that influenced the appearance, development and sometimes the decline of each of the civilizations studied. This is followed by a critical comparison of these findings in order to discover if the civilizations belong to a unique and unrepeatable context or if similar factors produce similar effects in different civilizations and historical periods. The work will end with an attempt to find out to what extent its conclusions help to achieve a better understanding of our own time and its place in relation to the current of universal history.

This study is different from the vast amount of previous literature on Philosophy of History, from St Augustine to Toynbee, because in contrast to that literature, which adopted *a priori* concepts concerning the historical process that was understood as Divine Providence (by Augustine and Toynbee), as the immanent realization of human progress (by Condorcet), as the self-realization of the Absolute Spirit (by Hegel), or as the product of the class struggle (by Marx), in this case the approach is strictly empirical. Each civilization is studied *per se*, independent of any religious, metaphysical or ideological presupposition. In accordance with the basic information concerning each civilization, summarized in the three first sections of the respective chapter, the work proceeds empirically to identify and analyze the factors that influenced its appearance, development and possibly its decadence, and form conclusions based on these data.

Only after the analysis of all the civilizations studied has been completed is it intended to draw comparative conclusions based on the data available. In the present phase, in which the research has almost been completed, everything indicates that similar factors produce equivalent and similar effects in different civilizations and periods.

The central finding this study is arriving at is that civilizations are systems of beliefs and practices adopted by one or more societies and which survive as long as they keep their capacity for self-operation or self-regulation, both of which together determine how self-sustaining a civilization is.

Various internal and external circumstances tend to erode this capacity for self-sustainability. In civilizations where a single society shows the patterns adopted, catastrophic military defeats can overwhelm their capacity for self-operation, in other words, the ability to use the technical means necessary to guarantee their material and social survival based on their own resources.

This is what happened, for example, when the combined forces of Cyaxeres and Nabopolassar destroyed Assyria in 612-609 BC.

Alternatively, the exposure of a civilization to a superior culture in the sense that it has a higher level of operational rationality and a more confirmable representation of the world, as in the case of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations in contact with the Hellenic, erodes the basic beliefs of the civilization with less rationality, depriving it of its capacity for self-regulation based on its own normative system and thus depriving it also of self-sustainability.

There are strong indications that the Islamic and Indian civilizations that have survived until today are suffering a significant loss of their self-regulatory ability because of their contact with Western Civilization. For its part, after the First World War and more rapidly in recent years, Western Civilization has experienced a process of modernization and laicization that has affected its basic beliefs and turned it into something quite different, which we might call, in an allusion to Late Classical Civilization, Late Western Civilization, whose basic belief system has abandoned Christianity for a belief in Science and Technology. There are also signs that Late Western Civilization, while absorbing the Islamic and Indian Civilizations—which have become Islamic and Indian versions of Late Western Civilization—is itself under the reciprocal influence of those civilizations and of other factors, thus becoming a Planetary Civilization. Chinese Civilization, that has resisted being eroded by the Western variety even though it has absorbed its science and technology, is also showing signs of belonging to this emerging Planetary Civilization.

The situation outlined above, which is still subject to final confirmation with the completion of the comparative analysis of all the civilizations studied, comes to different conclusions about the future conflict between civilizations from Samuel Huntington's prediction. Huntington's ideas have been partly strongly influenced by Islamic Fundamentalism, which he says will last a long time. The recent development of Iran seems to point in a different direction. On the other hand, Huntington is equally influenced by the idea that a possible future power struggle between the United States and China, in terms of a new world order, will be the expression of a conflict of civilizations rather than a conflict of power.

With the same reservations that such considerations require before concluding analyses that are still under way, I believe it is possible to make the point, separately from Huntington's theories, that their possible future power struggles concerning the shape of a new world order during the 21st century will not prevent the continuation of a process that will last incomparably longer, the formation of a Planetary Civilization. This will be a civilization characterized

by the science and technology developed by the West but also characterized by the cultural input of other civilizations. Amid this input an updated version of Confucianism – as it deals with a social-humanist ethic that is independent of religious or metaphysical presuppositions – could become the blueprint that will control the future Planetary Civilization.

Annexes

These Annexes contain a brief summary of the main contributions contained in the works referred to in them.

Annex I

Economic Development and Political Development

The book consists of two parts. The first is theoretical and discusses the problem of economic and political development. The second is historical and analyzes the economic and political evolution of Brazil from colonial administration to the current situation in the country, along with the alternatives within it.

The second part of the book gives a summary of the material dealt with. The conclusion, concerning the present time, is that Brazil needs a developmentalist nationalism that will use foreign capital but keep the process under Brazilian control.

The first part of the book is the more important as it discusses the various forms the development process might take, both spontaneous and deliberate. The core of development lies in increasing public rationality.

For planned development, the study advocates the suitability, within the situation of each society, of three models: (1) national or neo-Bismarckian capitalism, for societies in more advanced stages of development; (2) State capitalism, or Nasserism, suitable for societies that are still quite underdeveloped and (3) developmental socialism for very backward societies.

Annex II

Political Development

The book contains three parts, the first, Book I, deals with Society, Structural Change and Political System. The second, Book II, discusses the problem of political development and Book III is a Latin American case study. The work is an attempt to consider the current state of political science in relation to major themes corresponding to each of the three parts of the book and, starting from this basis, to construct a well founded and broad-reaching explanation of these topics and, founded on that, to create operational models which, in certain conditions, might be able to promote the political and global development of a particular society. The assertions and theories produced in the first two parts of the book are applied in the third to analyzing the case of Latin America.

Of all my work, this book is the most important attempt to create a general theory of society and of the processes of its political and global development. It provides the theoretical basis for my subsequent studies that will culminate with the still unfinished *A Critical Study of History*.

Political Development is to a certain extent a long dialogue with Parsons and Marx that leads to a dialectical functionalism.

The work also represents an attempt to make a conceptual and taxonomic clarification of the most important elements contained in an idea of society, the political system and the processes of structural change. Based on the analysis of the first part of the book, the second part presents a theory of political development, a theory of operational models to promote development, and a theory of the process of development.

After reviewing the principal contemporary theories on political development, the book maintains that political development is the result of the combination of a modernization process that leads to an increase in public rationality, together with a process of institutionalization that leads to increased mobilization, integration and representation in politics.

The study of political models that shows the difference between representational and operational models leads, in terms of the latter, to identifying ten models that emerge out of different types of political system and which are appropriate for different types of societies. These ten models are: (1) liberal democracy, (2) neo-liberalism, (3) national capitalism, (4) welfare statism, (5)

welfare socialism, (6) modernizing autocracy, (7) modernizing elitocracy, (8) state capitalism, (9) Communism, and (10) developmental socialism. This typology of models contains the three basic models described in *Economic and Political Development*, with the addition of intermediate models.

The study of the process of political development leads initially to an assertion of the existence of stages of development and of their progressive nature. It then goes on to analyze the operational conditions of this process. This analysis leads to the finding that in order for this process to be successful, six conditions must be cumulatively satisfied. These are: (1) national viability, determined by the amount of human and material resources available, (2) political mobilization, that requires sectors of society to be actively engaged in the process, (3) proper leadership, that implies the need for the process to be led with a satisfactory level of competence capable of bringing about mobilization, (5) a suitable political model for the type of society in question, and (6) the absence of insurmountable external obstacles, be they powerful enemies or uncontrollable natural conditions.

Chapter 18, the last one in Section C ("The Process of Political Development") in the second part of the book, proceeds to analyze the current international situation and the extent to which it allows successful efforts of development, paying particular attention to the case of Latin America. It concludes that the imperial systems built by the United States and the Soviet Union have a significant effect on the present ability for development in the world and practically eliminates it for certain countries. Nevertheless, given certain conditions, a large number of countries will be able to develop if they can satisfy the necessary requirements that have been detailed in the previous section of the book.

The third part of the book, Book III, contains a study of the case of Latin America. It consists of three sections: Section A, consisting of two chapters, deals with the main structural characteristics of modern Latin America. Chapter 19 presents a general typology of the region; Latin American countries are classified within a matrix that defines in particular three basic levels of national viability: (1) relative individual viability, (2) collective viability, and (3) low or zero national viability. Horizontally, it differentiates between more and less developed societies. Chapter 20 offers a structural analysis of Latin American societies. This chapter proceeds to develop a study of the characteristics of underdevelopment and the problems of stagnation, marginality and denationalization.

The second section of Book III also studies in two chapters the causes of underdevelopment in Latin America. Chapter 21 concerns the dualist society and formulates and tests the first hypothesis to explain Latin American underdevelopment. This hypothesis is the following:

Latin American societies remained underdeveloped from their independence until the early decades of the 20th century because they became dualist societies in which the satisfaction of the aims of the elite was not compatible with the basic interests of the masses and thus prevented the social integration of those societies and established in them a social system (i.e. a combination of a system of values, participation, power and property) that was not conducive to their national development.

Chapter 22 deals with the obstacles arising out of this dualist legacy. This chapter formulates and provides the basis for the second explanatory hypothesis:

Latin America's efforts to promote its national development over the last 30 years have not achieved a level of self-sustainability because: (1) when the process was spontaneously induced by domestic demand, national markets revealed themselves to be too small; (2) when the process was pushed forward by deliberate efforts on the part of national governments, the cost of incorporating the masses into the centers of participation and greater consumption showed themselves to be substantially beyond the limits consensually accepted by the new establishment, which used the Armed Forces to interrupt the process of change and preserve or re-establish the dualist society.

It is worth noting that this hypothesis was formulated during the period of the military dictatorships in Latin America, when the writer was self-exiled in Harvard.

The third section of Book III, consisting of three chapters, discusses the alternatives and possibilities for Latin America. Chapter 23 presents the basic alternatives: dependence or autonomy. It also discusses the question of the timescales possible for an autonomous option and for one of its major conditions, regional integration.

Chapter 24 studies the dependence alternatives that consist of four typical types: colonial, neo-colonial, satellite and provincial. In this context the book discusses the 'Canadian model' and its implications of 'Menshevist capitalism' and 'colonial Fascism' as a regime that tends to take shape within a dependence model, as well as the extent to which colonial Fascism cannot sustain itself, but depends on continual input coming from the central power.

The autonomy alternative is discussed in two chapters. Chapter 25 studies the imposition of autonomy by revolutionary means and the conditions needed for the viability of that model. Chapter 26 discusses the reformist path and shows how, in the case of Latin America, it is the viable model. To this end, a comparative study is made of various attempts at reform as in the cases of Chile (Frei), Venezuela (Betancourt), Bolivia (MNR) and Peru (CAEM).

The last chapter of Book III, and the last in the book, Chapter 27, starts by studying the prevailing conditions in Latin America and the factors that control its options. Then it looks at conditions in the United States and finds that socially and politically the United States is faced with the alternative of trying to build a world empire or moving towards forming a community of nations. Socially and culturally it is faced with the alternative of an ethic of duty (from the Protestant tradition) or an ethic of freedom (from the tradition of the Enlightenment). According to which one prevails, these alternatives will dominate the relationship between the United States and Latin America and this will have repercussions in the sense of favoring more liberal or more radical models of development or of dependence.

The book concludes on a note of moderate optimism, predicting that it is more probable for enlightened internationalism to prevail in the United States, and liberal reformism in Latin America.

Annex III

Introduction to Social Development

The book consists of three parts; the first deals with the theoretical presuppositions: (1) General structure of society, (2) Social subsystems and (3) General meaning of social development. The second part discusses the central theses of liberalism and Marxism, while the third and final part proceeds to a critical analysis of the Liberal and Marxist models and proposes the alternative of a non-repressive model of society.

After reviewing the historical and theoretical evolution of concepts of society and discussing the functional (Parsons) and dialectical (Marx) models of society, the first part proposes a functional-dialectical model. Based on this model, it proceeds to an analysis of social subsystems and arrives at a four-part view that leads to the following framework:

Means Valuable Subsystem and macro-functions Primary Secondary

1. Cultural

Production and

allocation Phatic Beliefs Culture Influence of

Symbols of: Value beliefs

Normative beliefs Symbols of expression

2. Participational

Creation and Actors Prestige Affective influence,

evaluative Roles and ludic Status

allocation of:

3. Political

Production and Commands Power Influence

allocation of:

4. Economic

Production and Utilities Money Influence allocation of:

The second part of the book consists of an analysis and exposition of the ideas central to the liberal and Marxist projects. It shows how liberal capitalism, without prejudice to the preservation of neo-liberal positions, evolved theoretically and practically into social welfare capitalism. It also shows how theoretical Marxism (with its humanist context) was turned by Lenin and Stalin into operational Marxism dominated by the pragmatism of results.

The third part of the book is a critical analysis of the liberal and Marxist models and goes on to propose an alternative model of a non-repressive society.

The conditions and possibilities for achieving a non-repressive society are widely discussed in the eighth chapter of the book. This analysis concludes that there are three basic requirements for a non-repressive society that require simultaneous attention. They are:

- 1. Indifference to the accumulation of goods given the superabundance of availability of these and the existence of a system of egalitarian consumption;
- 2. Indifference to the accumulation of power given the effective control of a socio-political system of stable democracy with a high degree of legitimacy and legality in an egalitarian state of law that guarantees those features;
- 3. A powerful collective motivation in that society to preserve this model based on a social-humanist ethos and a stable and broadly supported interest in preserving the system of equal affluence.

The study analyzes the conditions necessary to move towards such a model of society that is attainable through a form of democratic socialism based on the search for an affluent egalitarianism or a radicalizing reformism within the conditions of affluent egalitarianism of the social welfare state.

The empirical conditions for the viability of this society require internally a new relationship between material and symbolic-moral incentives. Unattractive activities should be appreciably more materially remunerated than attractive once. Attractive activities should be submitted to rigorous tests of excellence and receive socially significant symbolic-moral

remuneration. The basic egalitarianism of this social model requires therefore, within reasonable limits, a certain amount of material inequality in favor of unattractive activities (e.g. dustmen) and inequality in terms of deference and social prestige for the materially less well remunerated attractive activities (e.g. teacher or director).

The study points out, on the other hand, that the empirical possibilities that make up this type of society depend on an international context that is compatible with it and which is totally different from the one existing at present.

Annex IV

Nationalism in Modern Brazilian Life

This study attempted to introduce a comparative, objective and rational analysis into the controversy between Nationalists and 'Surrenderists' that unfolded in the 1950s. To this end it presented the main 'cosmopolitan' and 'nationalist' theories and attempted to make an objective critical judgment of them. The conclusions of the book are that, in order to be valid, the nationalist positions should be of the 'nationalism of ends' type and not a 'nationalism of means'.



3. Candido Mendes – Personality and Thought (1998)

Initial Considerations

Biobibliographical studies are always difficult. The aim of the objective critical evaluation of the work of an intellectual starts with the inevitable distortions that are the result of the analyst's own ideas, which shape in many different ways the appreciation he makes of the ideas of the person being analyzed. It is even more difficult to make objective analyses of a human personality whose outward characteristics often differ from his deeper personality. The latter, for its part, insofar as it is less transparent, can only be approached by making an effort at interpretation that is subject to the problems inherent in all subjectivist constructions.

In the case of the person and the work of Candido Mendes these difficulties are of an extremely high order, both because of the extraordinary uniqueness of the person as well as the fact that the deeper reality of Candido Mendes is covered by the multiple personalities he has built, some of them relatively permanent, others according to circumstances and the boundless creativity of the 'numenic' Candido.

We should also note that one of the most long-lasting personalities he created is that of Candido Mendes the Sphinx. It was not by chance that his first important work, when he was a young man at the end of the 1940s, was called *A Linguagem da Esfinge* (*The Language of the Sphinx*). And it

would be as a Sphinx that, in the course of the 50 fruitful years of his intellectual activity, Candido Mendes would produce most of his written work.

In the choice of the deeper Candido Mendes to become Candido Mendes the Sphinx is only one, although the most prominent, of the characteristics that make him one of the most individual people one could meet. His uniqueness derives essentially from is self- construction of multiple personalities that was the way in which the deeper Candido Mendes related with the world. There are multifaceted persons who manifest extremely varied and even contradictory aspects, interests and behavior but these multiple aspects are usually facets of the same personality. In the case of Candido Mendes, it is as if Fernando Pessoa's aliases, instead of being pseudonyms used for different kinds of writing, were four different people according to the roles they performed. In fact, as a writer, Candido Mendes only has two aliases: Candido Mendes the Sphinx and Candido Mendes the Colloquial. His multiple self-constructed personalities are always expressed in colloquial or Sphinx form.

Candido Mendes constructed many more than two personalities for himself, and they constitute a broad range of possible human types. Candido Mendes changes personality where ordinary people change their position. There is Candido Mendes the Catholic leader and Candido Mendes the Philosopher. There is Candido Mendes the Businessman and Candido Mendes the Politician. The Candido Mendes with family and friends and Candido Mendes the Sociologist. As I mentioned above, these many forms of Candido Mendes expressed through two types of language: the colloquial and that of the Sphinx, according to circumstances but mainly according to the nature of each of these various personalities.

Added to these characteristics, which make Candido Mendes a unique person, is the fact that the deeper Candido Mendes has the gift of extraordinary intelligence, extraordinary clarity, extraordinary talent, an extraordinary sense of humour and a rare level of culture - as well as extraordinary generosity - attributes which permeate the many personalities he adopts.

I should also mention in these introductory remarks, the fact that I have had a continuous and brotherly friendship with Candido Mendes since he was students at the Catholic University. When I returned from self-imposed exile after the 1964 *coup*, it was Candido Mendes who gave me a place as lecturer at his University, a post I held until I took over the directorship of IEPES in 1980. For this reason I can give my warmest support to the publication celebrating his 70th birthday of a collection of writings concerning

his personality and his work. My knowledge of Candido Mendes' personality comes from having been close to him for more than half a century. This relationship, characterized by a continuous exchange of ideas, has made it possible for me to evaluate his thinking separately from his written work.

In this brief analysis of the personality and work of Candido Mendes, I intend to discuss them as objectively as possible with an independence that can overcome the effects of friendship. I fear that the latter differentiation is especially prejudicial and deprives me of the ability to decode the language of the Sphinx and appreciate the literary significance that its symbolic constructivism may have.

Personality and Roles

The various personalities Candido Mendes shows to the world can be grouped into two main types: that of the language they use and the role they exercise. I have already referred to the first aspect, pointing out that it has two branches: colloquial language and the language of the Sphinx. I shall make a brief attempt to interpret this double language but for the moment I would like to look at the multiple personalities and their respective roles.

As I have mentioned previously, Candido Mendes' various personalities can be classified according to the roles they perform. Among these I believe that the most important are: (1) those concerning the relationships of family and friendship, (2) those of the Catholic leader, (3) those of the intellectual, (4) those of the businessman and (5) those of the public figure.

There is an admirable intimate Candido Mendes to be found in his relationships with family and friends. I believe the intimate Candido Mendes is the closest one to the deeper Candido Mendes. This characteristic shows an extremely affectionate man, a solicitous husband, a most dedicated father and a most generous friend.

In the role of friend, Candido Mendes combines the quality of peerless conversationalist with being the most helpful of companions. The presence within him of different forms of intelligence of the highest level in rich with a broad culture, wide knowledge of the world, enormous generosity and a great sense of humour mean that he can speak on a surprisingly varied number of topics and levels in conversation. With the exception perhaps of classical music, Candido Mendes is a rich conversationalist in the most varied areas of knowledge and different levels of subject. He is friends with less intellectual

scope do not feel uncomfortable in the face of his superior intelligence and culture because without showing it he adopts the same level as the person he is speaking to, as if it were his own level. For extremely sophisticated people, conversations with Candido are a unique example of understanding, clarity, information and humor, and in all cases, one of his constant characteristics is a genuine and generous helpfulness.

As a Catholic leader, Candido Mendes is a militant defender of the ideas and interests of the Church. He is connected to it by old and current family links. He inherited the title of Papal Count by reason of services rendered by his great-grandfather in defence of the bishops in the reign of Don Pedro II and is the brother of D. Luciano, the holy and eminent Jesuit bishop who for a long time was head of the CNBB [National Conference of Brazilian Bishops – trans.]. For Candido Mendes, commitment to the Church is an *a priori* situation, a situation he belongs to and to which he gives militant service, wrapped in the impenetrable protective cape of an air of deliberation that cannot be criticized.

Of the five main roles carried out by Candido Mendes' various personalities, the most interesting and singular is that of the intellectual, and this is also one of the roles in which Candido Mendes' public image is most affected by the language of the Sphinx. For those who feel able to interpret it or who see in it a modern expression of literary construction, the language of the Sphinx confirms their belief in the talent and culture of Candido Mendes. At the opposite extreme there are those who feel that this language is a deliberate attempt to confuse the foolish or a clever way to conceal ambiguities and this leads them to form a negative opinion.

I shall leave until later a brief discussion of the language of the Sphinx because I would now like to look at Candido Mendes' thinking apart from his Sphinx-like writings and only in terms of what, thanks to our long intellectual relationship, I understand to be the main characteristics of his worldview. There is no need for me to repeat what I have already said about his high level of understanding and culture, so while simply referring to the essential elements of what I feel to be his view of the world, I would say that ontologically speaking he takes it to quite a structured concept of global reality while epistemologically and semiotically he takes it to a position of relativism that denies the possibility of validly arriving at that concept.

In this sense, I believe that there is in Candido Mendes an unresolved conflict between his methodological relativism, which leads to skepticism,

and his feelings concerning the world, which leads to a cosmological immanence at the level of global reality and a psycho-sociological historicism in terms of his understanding of civilizations and societies. Methodologically, Candido Mendes holds positions similar to the French and Italian founders of postmodernism - Derrida, Deleuse, Baudrillard, Lyotard and Vattino, to mention a few of the authors who have had most influence on it - and shares the idea of the symbol not simply as an instrument for communicating a feeling, but as an object which is a constituent part of reality. In this respect, access to the real is hindered by the fact that the instrument of communication, the symbol, is not a clear representation of the meaning it is supposed to transmit, but is an object in itself. Nevertheless, Candido Mendes also recognizes the cosmos as an ultimate reality from which all other realities developed, including human history as a process, without an inherent teleology and subject to five controlling factors: (1) material factors, (2) cultural factors, (3) the dialectic of the symbol as an autonomous object of interlocution, (4) human freedom and (5) chance.

Another of Candido Mendes' important roles and one of his most significant personalities is that of an extraordinary businessman rather like Schumpeter in terms of creating possibilities and generous manager of existing enterprises. His Schumpeterian talent enabled him, when his businesses were close to going on the rocks, to find innovative solutions that would save them and then, giving in to a desire to do more than he could and to do it to a higher level than the means at his disposal, they would return to a critical situation.

The most extraordinary example of Candido Mendes' Schumpeterian talent happened a few months after the death of his father, when in 1962 he took over from the latter as president of the Sociedade Brasileira de Instrução (Brazilian Education Society) which was responsible for what was then called the Conjunto Universitário, and is now the Universidade Candido Mendes. Hardly had he mastered the system of the institution he had taken over when he received an eviction order from the Bank of Brazil, which at that time owned the building at No. 101, Praça 25 de Novembre, where the University operated. The Bank of Brazil wanted to knock down the building of the old Convento do Carmo to build a huge tower block on the site. Losing the building would mean the end of the University, which had no money to build another suitable center. When everything seemed lost, Candido Mendes put an amazing plan into practice. First of all, he managed to obtain, obviously having a good case, a preservation order for that historic building, making its demolition impossible. This meant that the Bank of Brazil abandoned the

eviction order. Secondly, Candido Mendes obtained, with funds from the wheat harvest, a federal donation that enabled him to buy the deeds of the building for the University. He then developed a project by which the same tower block planned by the Bank of Brazil could be built behind the old convent building on land belonging to it but without affecting it. Finally, he came to an understanding with a large construction company which built the planned tower on that site and gave various floors to the University as payment for the land. And so he built the splendid centre where the Universidade Candido Mendes stands today.

The public man is another important personality worn by Candido Mendes and which has various facets. I would like to begin by emphasizing the courageous generosity with which Candido Mendes saved countless intellectuals from the claws of repression during the military regime, either by negotiating with General Golbery, with whom he maintained friendly relations, or using lawyers hired by him, like the valiant Heleno Fragoso, who defended persecuted individuals. It was in this sphere of his activities that Candido Mendes offered me a post in his University when I was *persona non grata* with the military government.

Among the many important public posts held by Candido Mendes, I would like to emphasize the important role he played on the Afonso Arinos Committee in 1986, where he was one of the major contributors to developing the great project for the new Constitution prepared under the direction of that eminent and much-missed master.

Candido Mendes supports a social democratic political position and, as these lines are being written, is federal deputy for that party and for the State of Rio de Janeiro. He also tries to make his party position compatible with supporting the candidature of Lula, which provokes understandable resistance, both on the part of the government because he supports Lula, and on the part of the PT [Workers' Party – trans.], because he is not a member of the party in government.

The Language of the Sphinx

The most singular aspect of Candido Mendes' multiple personalities is his general use of the language of the Sphinx. Almost all his academic work is written in this language, as well as many of his articles, particularly the political ones. Writing concerning his business activities, however, he

does not use this style, nor is it used in his relationships with family and friends. The language of the Sphinx, which began in his youthful writings, and from then on remained in most of his work, does not easily fit into a brief definition. I believe, therefore that it is necessary to identify two different versions of the Sphinx-like texts. In one, which I would call the coded version, the phrases carry, or seem to be carrying, a sealed meaning rather like that of the late James Joyce. This meaning is revealed in symbolic words that obey (although in a rather random way) a certain code. When the symbols are decoded, intelligible communication tends to appear. This is how the young Candido Mendes wrote the text *A Linguagem da Esfinge (The Language of the Sphinx)* and later, the essay *América*, *Mito e Violência (America, Myth and Violence)*. The difficulty of these texts lies in the fact that the implicit code is not easily discernible and is certainly not unambiguous.

The second version of the language of the Sphinx, and one which appears more often, consists in using words as objects of art and not as carriers of meaning. This version is linked to the idea of the symbol as a thing in itself, a concentrated object from the social world and not as a transparent carrier of meanings in the way we would like. In fact it is a kind of concrete poetry. In my view, the aim of this language seems to be that of verbally constructing the equivalent of an abstract painting in which shapes that correspond to nothing that transcend them are produced to create a certain effect, at times aesthetic at other, more frequent, times as a subjective representation of ideas or emotions.

It is an undeniable fact that Candido Mendes pays a high price for choosing the language of the Sphinx: the price of the unintelligibility of the meaning of much of what he writes. In the final analysis it is the price of projecting a public image in which a significant amount of the recognition he has achieved - member of the Brazilian Academia de Letras, of the Pontifical Committee for Justice and Peace and its Secretary-General in Brazil, UNESCO's International Council for Social Sciences and its president in 1992 and Federal Deputy as these lines are being written, among many other high-level posts is a result of factors other than his work written in the language of the Sphinx. At its best, the latter is appreciated at the level of intellectual juggling, an acrobatics of symbol and engineering of metaphor.

This is the high price paid by a man of the greatest talent, excellent human qualities, enviable level of culture and, as I have briefly tried to show above,

by an intellectual whose thinking is serious and sophisticated and whose ideas can objectively be captured in conversation.

Personally, I have no satisfactory explanation why Candido Mendes chose this option of writing in the language of the Sphinx. I find elements pointing towards it when I see the relevance there is for him on the methodological and semiotic level, of certain immanent concretist ideas in specific currents of postmodernism. I find other explanatory elements in his boundless imagination, his love for the symbol as such when envisaged intransitively, and sometimes in his desire to be everywhere, wanting to be at the same time in all places and in all positions.

Perhaps other analysts contributing to this book commemorating Candido Mendes' 70th birthday will have different views of the language of the Sphinx and perhaps do not even recognize it as such. Personally, I feel it necessary to take this occasion to join those who are celebrating Candido Mendes' intellectual and human excellence, making a distinction between his thinking and his Sphinx-like language and for that reason point out how the intransitive nature of the latter is no bar to recognizing the importance of his thinking through the conversations that he is always holding and through the writings he publishes in more current forms of language.

4. A Portrait of Afonso Arinos (2000)

Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, along with his great friend San Tiago Dantas, was one of the two most universal men in the Brazil of his day. Like San Tiago's, Afonso Arinos' life divides into two different periods, not only because they correspond, respectively to his youth and maturity, but because in the lives of both men the passing of time led them to a significant reworking of their views of the world.

San Tiago was an Integralist [member of the Brazilian Fascist party - trans] at the beginning of his public life, and had been a member of the 'Chamber of 40' [an elite group within the party – trans.]. As Integralism moved away from its original positions which were those of a 'green-and-yellow' nationalism and grew closer to Italian Fascism, San Tiago's humanism drove him away from it until he formally broke with the movement. After a period of intense and fruitful legal practice, San Tiago bought the *Jornal do Commercio* from Elmano Cardim and returned to public life supporting social-democratic ideas.

Afonso Arinos, a signatory of the 'miners manifesto' and a fierce adversary of the New State, maintained his hostility to Vargas during the latter's second government, but produced a broad review of his ideas in the post-Vargas period, adopting, like San Tiago, a social-democratic position. He was Foreign Minister in the Jânio Quadros government and in that post ended Brazil's automatic alignment with the

USA and ushered in a period of independent foreign policy. San Tiago, who followed him in the parliamentary government, continued this line, making it state policy and one which, with brief interruptions, Brazil has maintained.

I had the chance to know Afonso Arinos personally when I was a member of the Afonso Arinos Committee tasked with developing a proposal for a new Constitution. On that occasion, being in constant contact with him, I was able to observe his great confidence, his extremely high level of public-spiritedness and the extremely competent way in which he performed the tasks of the commission, encouraging positive contributions and discouraging irrelevant ones. The result was a good proposal for a parliamentary constitution which, although it was not used, had a significant influence on the future Constitution. The latter, however included, along with the parliamentary aspect of the Arinos Committee's proposals, a presidential solution that created unexpected consequences that are still felt in the application of the new Constitution today. As I pointed out earlier, Afonso Arinos had a great universal mind, and was at the forefront of every field he entered, as a humanist, jurist, historian, essayist and public figure. As he matured, his youthful impetuousness turned into a broad and wise public energy. He became extremely tolerant of legitimate divergences of political ideas and positions within an intransigent framework of rules concerning all matters of morality and conduct in public affairs.

I was in frequent contact with him in the last years of his life. His conversation, like that of Goethe, covered all areas of the humanities with ability and great clarity. He had a great sense of the history and sociology of national and international events, as was revealed in his essays and writings but more particularly his conversation; it needed an Eckerman to record it.

Among the many things we talked about, I was able, once our friendship had established itself, to discuss with him the figure of Vargas and his career, stretching from the liberalism of the 20s and 30s to the Salazarism of the New State and the social-democratic positions of his second government. In spite of some lingering disagreements, we mainly agreed in our opinions on Vargas. I remember that I once said to him on the subject: "Afonso, you've changed a lot". With his generous cordiality, he replied: "Helio, you've changed as well".

I had the pleasure of helping Afonso Arinos in his later years in his candidature to a seat as senator for Rio de Janeiro, and he was elected comfortably. He took to the Senate that culmination of energy, serenity, great competence and clarity that were typical of him. I have the best memories of him and miss him greatly.



5. Araujo Castro and Foreign Policy (2003)

The happy initiative of the University of Brasilia Press in publishing a representative collection, entitled *Araújo Castro*, of the texts of that muchmissed and illustrious diplomat and the unfortunate comments on the matter published by Ambassador J. O. de Meira Penna in the *O Estado de São Paulo* newspaper of the 31st May and 7th June this year, seem to me to require a rapid critical clarification. As well as being an ex-career diplomat, Meira Penna is a cultured person, frequently represented in the organs of the national press. The circumstances in which, at a particularly difficult moment for Brazilian diplomacy, he is joining forces with powerful pressures that are trying to make the nation's foreign policy return to the senseless 'policy of ideological frontiers' - from which the Geisel government happily rescued itneeds a clarification of the elements that are in play.

Basically, Meria Penna's criticisms consist of stating that Araújo Castro invented the policy of "automatic non-alignment" and had a 'Third-Worldist" tendency with pro-Soviet and pro-Marxist implications for Brazilian foreign policy, turning it away from its classical and unbreakable alignment with the USA. This tendency is supposedly being implemented today in Itamarati by a group of his disciples, "Araújo Castro's widows", with the support of others who spread his ideas, such as Celso Lafer and myself.

In this brief discussion of the topic I shall not detain myself with the anecdotal aspects of Meira Penna's comments. With regard to myself,

having maintained the most cordial friendship with Araújo Castro in life, I hold his memory in great respect in terms of international relations, a field in which I broadly agreed with him and have no problem in accepting the accusation that Meira Penna aims at me of doing no more than reproducing Araújo Castro's arguments, if it were not for the fact that my first writings on the topic (cf. *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira (Nationalism in Modern Brazilian Life)*, Rio, ISEB, 1958) preceded those of Araújo Castro by some years (cf. *O Congelamento do Poder Mundial (The Freezing of World Power)*, Washington, 1971). What is important, however that is not the anecdotal aspect, but the merits of the material. In fact, on reducing the question to its basic aspects, it will be seen that Meira Penna's criticisms are founded on the three mistakes: (1) a mistake in his view of the world, (2) a mistake in his view of what Brazilian foreign policy should be and finally (3) a mistake as to what the country's current foreign policy actually is.

For Meira Penna, as for the other ex-ideologues of the Cold War, the world is divided into two irreconcilable camps, the Western democracies and Marxist totalitarianism, which represent respectively good and evil. Brazil, a Western country is 'good' and must necessarily support the camp of the Western democracies. Araújo Castro and his followers, with their theories of automatic non-alignment and claims that Brazil does not belong to either of these two camps, but to a third, the Third World, have introduced a dangerous division into the Western camp and, deliberately or innocently, brought Brazil closer to the Soviet camp, thus favoring the interests of the latter.

The fallacy of this view of the world begins with its crude acceptance of the propaganda of the superpowers as being a realistic description of themselves. Today, apart from Meira Penna and the official propagandists of the Soviet Union, only some rare remaining supporters of the theological view of the international system of the 1950s would dare to claim that bureaucratic Soviet despotism can be considered as Marxist. In the same way, few friends of the United States would be brave enough to claim that its system of strategic alliances is compatible with the interests of democratic and free countries.

It is true that in the final analysis, and regardless of the fact that the main international motivation of the United States, like that of the Soviet Union, is world supremacy, internally American society has incomparably more space and better conditions for preserving humanist freedman values. This does not mean that international relations do not become entangled in causes involving

ideals whatever the validity of those ideals and the amount of influence they exercise, but rather in political and economic interests.

Meira Penna's second serious error is a result of the first, when he prescribes for Brazil a foreign policy formulated according to the country's support for and loyalty to the values of freedom and democracy, as they are personified in the American bloc. It is curious to observe that this idealism is firstly characterized by total indifference to the actual nature of freedom and democracy that prevails within his own country. The military dictatorship, the systematic use of torture and a range of other factors that made life miserable in Brazil from 1964 until the Geisel government was never, for Meira Pennawhen the principle of ideological frontiers was in force - a matter of great concern, nor did those factors seem to him to be an impediment to their supposedly deciding our foreign policy in the name of values that were not being applied in Brazil. Secondly, for Meira Penna, morality in foreign policy is considered to be a given in terms of our systematic adhesion to the American camp, but not one which should dictate the foreign policy of the United States itself, which may use all necessary means to preserve its own interests.

I shall finish these brief comments by pointing out that Meira Penna's view is no less mistaken in terms of our current foreign policy, currently led by an extremely competent team. It is precisely because, after Geisel, Brazil succeeded in returning to a decent but realistic foreign policy, as Araújo Castro and before him, San Tiago Dantas advocated, that our present Third-Worldism takes a non-ideological and extremely pragmatic position. This is not a case of demystifying the determining desire for power in the conduct of the superpowers, but to celebrate the Third World and make our links to it a moral imperative.

What our current foreign policy is doing is purely and simply recognizing the Third World nature of a country like Brazil and the actual level of common interests we have with the other countries in the group, endeavouring to maximize our comparative advantages by ensuring the satisfaction of those interests. This awareness exists, however, alongside an equal awareness that Brazil, as well as being a Third World country, is also a Western country with another range of interests in common with the countries in that group, which also seeks to satisfy.

Automatic non-alignment means precisely the recognition of these complexities. What is surprising is that, after an entire career dedicated to foreign relations, Ambassador Meira Penna has not taken this into account.



6. San Tiago (2004)

I knew San Tiago Dantas in 1941, when I was taking the first year of the Law Course at the Catholic University. Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas was professor of Roman Law, a subject that was part of the first-year curriculum. I went to San Tiago's first-class certain that I would be taking an extremely boring subject and I gathered my patience in anticipation. To my surprise, I listened to the subject being explained in a way that was fascinating not only because of the unsurpassed brilliance and clarity of San Tiago's words, but mainly because of the focus he gave to the subject. His class actually consisted of a description of what Romanness was and how the culture and society it shaped with structured according to a set of institutions that formed Roman Law.

At that time San Tiago was a little over 20 years old, although his serious manner made him appear older. His classes were so interesting that they attracted people from various other courses. For me, it was an unforgettable first moment of an admiration that lasted a lifetime and which became a great friendship. As a young lawyer, I had the privilege of being allowed to join San Tiago's firm where other partners were the eminent jurist Carlos Medeiros and the dynamic defense lawyer Jayme Bastian Pinto. I had this relationship of admiration and friendship for San Tiago for as long as he lived. When he was dying of the cancer which Piquet Carneiro pretended was "collagen sickness" he took his recommended walks in the Botanic

Gardens and I usually accompanied him, enjoying the most fascinating conversations. San Tiago was an extremely cultivated man with an extremely broad command of humanist disciplines, especially history, and was immensely interested in, and had a vast knowledge of, everything concerning classical antiquity or the Renaissance. He had an exceptional memory and ability to make clear verbal statements.

San Tiago had a photographic memory that enabled him to recall with incredible precision details of everything he had seen or read. I remember an episode I witnessed in the house of Paulo Bittencourt. At that time I was writing editorials for the *Correio da Manhã* newspaper and one of the duties involved - which led to a great friendship - was to visit the editor every morning when he still lived in Copacabana. On one of these occasions, San Tiago was also going to visit him. Paulo told me that he was going to give him a test. It was said that San Tiago knew the *Divine Comedy* by heart. Paulo received San Tiago with the text in his hands and began to read from the middle of it a text concerning Purgatory. When he stopped reading, San Tiago continued in his excellent Italian without hesitation or error to recite the poem for as long as we allowed him to speak.

I will quote an interesting example of his extraordinary capacity for public speaking. When he was Foreign Minister, San Tiago received the title of Doctor *honoris causa* from the University of Krakow. He was told that, in accordance with the ancient rules of that University, that his speech of thanks should be in written form. Because of his many duties in the Foreign Ministry, San Tiago had no time to write his speech. He took with him his then First Secretary Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez, who was provided with a tape recorder. At the ceremony, San Tiago held in his hand a sheaf of blank sheets of paper and pretended to read them in impeccable French, giving a magnificent speech that was received with a standing ovation by the University. When they asked him to provide the text of publication, San Tiago said that he would like to make some small changes and would send it as soon as possible. When the tape of San Tiago's speech had been played back and transcribed it was then sent to the Rector of the University.

The extraordinary and multifaceted figure of San Tiago did not have the same opportunity to become familiar to the public. On the one hand, as an intellectual he was a man who communicated orally and did not have an Eckerman to preserve his words. His written work was confined to an excellent legal text on neighbourhood law and some published lectures, notably the

extraordinary "D. Quixote, um Apólogo da Alma Ocidente" ("Don Quixote, a Parable of the Western Soul"). Also, as a public figure, his premature death at the start of the military government allowed him to hold only two ministerial posts in the government of João Goulart, and he did not survive to see the period that followed.

In spite of this, San Tiago's public service was extremely important during the time in question. It has been mentioned previously that as a young man, San Tiago played an important part in the first stage of Integralism when this movement still took the form of a new nationalism, the green-yellow movement. As Integralism slowly allied itself with Italian Fascism, San Tiago felt the party was incompatible with his humanist beliefs and ideas and cut himself off from it entirely. He then dedicated himself to an active and extremely successful career as a lawyer with the aim of gathering sufficient funds to allow him a satisfactory level of personal independence in the future. This is what he was doing when at a certain point he bought the *Jornal do Commércio* newspaper from Elmano Cardim, and by this means launched himself into public life, taking a social-democratic political position. This initiative made it possible for him to be elected as Federal Deputy by the Minas Gerais branch of the PTB [Partido Trabalhista Brasileira - Brazilian Labor Party – trans.].

When Jânio Quadros resigned, which took Vice-president Goulart, on a visit to China at the time, by surprise, San Tiago played a decisive role in preserving Brazilian democracy. He convinced the military, who wished to depose Jango [Goulart] to accept a compromise formula: adopting a parliamentary regime in which Tancredo Neves would be Prime Minister.

San Tiago was appointed Foreign Minister in the first Parliamentary Cabinet and formulated what would become the cornerstone of Brazil's international operations, the 'independent foreign policy'. San Tiago turned this position, which had already been taken by Afonso Arinos in Jânio Quadros' government, into an officially accepted one, a political directive, which would become the main guideline of Brazilian diplomacy in all the governments that followed the military regime and which, even during that period, was followed by Mario Gibson when he was Foreign Minister.

The cancer that affected San Tiago when he was Finance Minister allowed him neither the ability nor the time to stamp his own mark on that post. He

died at the beginning of the 20 dark years of the military regime but left an indelible mark on the direction of Brazilian foreign policy and left also in the small group of people who had the privilege of enjoying his friendship and his company, the memory of his multifaceted uniqueness and extraordinary quality as a decent human being.

7. Celso Furtado - Theory and Practice of Development (2005)

Introduction

I received with the greatest pleasure the invitation from our Academy to give a lecture about Celso Furtado today. A few days ago I took over Chair No. 11, which had been Celso's. I was a close friend of his for more than half a century, sharing his ideas and views of Brazil and the world, holding him in the greatest esteem and having the greatest admiration for him.

In a brief talk I propose to give, I would like to highlight three aspects of this great man's life and work. First, I shall attempt to give a brief description of the most important periods of his life and of the work he did in them. Then I shall try to analyse Celso's important contribution as a theoretician development and a planner of development for Brazil and the Northeast. Finally, I will emphasize the great importance Celso's thinking and projects continue to have in modern-day Brazil and Latin America.

Celso's Life and Work

As I pointed out to the Academy in my recent inaugural speech as the successor to Celso Furtado in Chair No. 11, his life was divided into five successive periods characterized by the different chances and circumstances that came his way. The first period, his education, begins with his birth in

Pombal in the *sertão* area of Paraíba, on 26th July, 1920, to his joining CEPAL [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean - trans.] in 1949. The second period consists of his work in that United Nations agency until he left it in 1958. The third period encompasses his activity in Brazil, from CEPAL until the military *coup* in 1964. This brought about a new phase in Celso's life, exile, which he spent mainly in the Sorbonne in Paris, until returning to Brazil with the amnesty and restoration of democracy in 1985. He spent the last period in Brazil until his death on 20th November, 2004.

Celso's formative period consists of his first studies in the capital city of Paraíba and his entry into the Law Faculty of the University of Brazil, in Rio in 1940, as well as his joining DASP [Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público – Administrative Department of the Civil Service – trans.] in 1943, after passing the public entrance examination. He interrupted his studies in 1944 to accompany the Brazilian Expeditionary Force to Italy as an Officer Cadet and his experiences in the war produced the book *Contos da vida Expedicionária* (*Tales of Expeditionary Life*), published in 1946.

Returning to Brazil in 1945, he finished his law studies and in 1946 started his doctoral studies under the supervision of Prof. Maurice Byé, gaining his degree in 1948 with his thesis entitled "L'Économie Brésilienne". He returned to Brazil that same year and joined the team of economists at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation.

Celso's CEPAL period began in 1949 and he remained in the agency until 1958. His ten years at CEPAL were extremely important in completing his intellectual development. He was able to achieve a broad and serious knowledge of Latin American countries, have contact with some of its most representative personalities and above all, work closely with that admirable founder of Latin American economic thought, Raul Prebisch, under whose direction from 1950, CEPAL became one of the main innovative centers for modern economic theory.

In 1953 Celso spent some time in Rio de Janeiro running the mixed CEPAL-BNDE [National Development Bank – trans.] group, the work of which would provide support for the future Program of Targets. During this period Celso published *A Economia Brasileira* in 1954 and in 1955 wrote for CEPAL the study entitled "Uma Introdução à Técnica de Programação" ("An Introduction to the Technique of Programming"), which is one of the first important works on CEPAL's method of economic programming, and would have the greatest impact in Latin America and the Third World in general.

In 1956 he published *Uma Economia Dependente* (A Dependent Economy) and in 1958 gave an important lecture at ISEB on "Perspectivas da Economia Brasileira" ("Prospects for the Brazilian Economy"), which would become a book.

His Brazilian period, from 1958 to the military *coup*, saw his active participation in the country's public affairs. His first important contribution was, after being appointed by President Kubitschek as his official representative in the Grupo de Estudos do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (Study Group for Development in the Northeast), in which he wrote the report entitled "Uma Política de Desenvolvimento para o Nordeste" ("A Development Policy for the Northeast"). In 1959, during a sabbatical at the University of Cambridge, he wrote his classic *Formação Econômica do Brasil (Economic Growth in Brazil)*. In 1960 Congress approved a law to set up SUDENE [development program for the Northeast – trans.] and Celso was appointed as superintendent of the new agency based in Recife.

Celso Furtado's work leading SUDENE, marked a profound change in the involvement of the State in that region. The many attempts at regional development since the time of the Empire had been crippled by the connection of political clientelism with the interests of the big landowners which gave the latter the right to irrigation services from systems built by central government. Under Celso SUDENE became an effective regional development agency based on a strictly technical and social administrative programme which, during his period in charge, gave the Northeast a development rate higher than the national average. During this period, in 1961, he published his important book Desenvolvimento e Subdesenvolvimento (Development and *Underdevelopment*), developing a rational view of the problem. The intervention of San Tiago Dantas persuaded the military that extremely negative effects would result from a coup and convinced them to accept a parliamentary solution that would give control of the government to a prime minister, a post for which Tancredo Neves was selected. Appointed Foreign Minister, San Tiago headed one of the most brilliant administrations in our diplomatic history, creating the doctrine of an 'independent foreign policy'.

Tancredo Neves was succeeded by Hermes Lima as prime minister and in the latter's Cabinet, Celso was named Minister for Planning. Supported by San Tiago, who was to become Finance Minister, he prepared an important project, the Three-year Plan for 1963-65. This plan contained programs for the measures necessary, in the difficult times that prevailed, to give a new

development boost to the country within the situation of a satisfactory macroeconomic balance. The military *coup* of 1964 prevented the plan from being put into action. Once the Plan had been prepared, however, Celso had chosen to return to SUDENE and it was there that he was taken by surprise by the *coup* which deprived him of his political rights and drove him into exile.

Celso spent the 20 years of his exile mainly in the Sorbonne in Paris. His classes and lectures attracted such large audiences that in order to accommodate them the University had to give him a special area, Amphitheatre VIII, one of the biggest in the Faculty, in the Place du Panthéon.

Intellectually, his period of exile was an extremely fertile one in Celso's life. The undisturbed working conditions provided by his university life but also the pain he felt concerning the situation in Brazil, under a repressive military dictatorship, combined to facilitate and stimulate his studies. During this period, in 1966, he wrote Subdesenvolvimento e Estagnação na América Latina (Underdevelopment and Stagnation in Latin America), and in 1967, Teoria e política do Desenvolvimento (Theory and Politics of Development). In 1969 he published Formação Econômica da América Latina (Economic Growth in Latin America), a counterpart to his previous classic work Formação Econômica do Brasil, this time with reference to the whole region. In 1972 he published Análise do Modelo Brasileiro (Analysis of the Brazilian Model). In the following year, A Hegemonia dos Estados Unidos e o Subdesenvolvimento da América Latina (The Hegemony of the United States and the Underdevelopment of Latin America). In 1974 appeared O Mito do Desenvolvimento Econômico (The Myth of Economic Development). A Economia Latino-Americana (The Latin American Economy) and Prefácio a uma Nova Economia (Preface to a New Economy) appeared in 1976. In 1978 came Criatividade e Dependência na Civilização Industrial (Creativity and Dependence in Industrial Civilization, and Pequena Introdução ao Desenvolvimento (A Short Introduction to Development) in 1980. Em 1982 he published Brasil, a Construção Interrompida (Brazil, Interrupted Construction) and the following year, Não à Recessão e ao Desemprego (No to Recession and *Unemployment). Cultura e Desenvolvimento em Época de Crise (Culture* and Development in a Time of Crisis) appeared in 1984.

The last period in Celso's life corresponds to his return to Brazil in 1985 with the amnesty and the restoration of democracy, and lasted until his death in 2004. The beginning of this final phase in Brazil, like the

period 1958-1964, would be one of active participation in public affairs. In 1986 he was appointed Ambassador to the European Community in Brussels and from 1986-1988 was Minister of Culture in the Sarney government. Following this period Celso returned to private and intellectual life. In 1997 he was elected to the Brazilian Academy of Letters, and in 2003 to the Brazilian Academy of Sciences. During this period he published, in 1985, A Fantasia Organizada (The Organized Fantasy) and in 1987 appeared Transformação e Crise na Economia Mundial (Transformation Crisis in the World Economy). Two years later, he published A Fantasia Desfeita (The Shattered Fantasy) and ABC da Divida Externa (The ABC of Foreign Debt). There followed in 1991, Os ares do Mundo (The Winds of Change), in 2000, Introdução ao Desenvolvimento (Introduction to Development) and in 2002, Em Busca de um Novo Modelo (In Search of a New Model). His second wife, Rosa Freire d'Aguiar Furtado, a brilliant journalist and writer, gathered Celso's autobiographical work in three volumes entitled *The* Autobiographical Work of Celso Furtado, published in 1997. Celso died suddenly on 20th November, 2004.

The Theory and Practice of Development

Celso Furtado had an extremely rich and varied personality. Psychologically, he embodied many of the characteristics of the Northeastern sertão such as sober behavior, austere habits, firmly-held positions, resistance to misfortune and a conviction in his own ability. On the other hand, he was a man of the world, open to many different cultures and ideas, with a broad sense of being Latin American, which he developed even more in his years at CEPAL, together with a deep but very balanced sense of nationalism. His intellectual interests were extremely wide-ranging. His main interest was history and, following Max Weber and the German culturalists, he combined a sociological view of the historical process with a historical view of social processes. He was passionate about music, both popular and above all classical, and this was a constant accompaniment to his life. As well as music, he loved literature and the breadth of his literary knowledge was surprising, stretching from classical antiquity to the great literature of the 19th century and contemporary writers, from Proust to Joyce and, among Brazilian writers, from Alencar and Machado to Jorge Amado. He also had a great appreciation for the plastic arts, showing an equally surprising knowledge in this field, from Praxiteles to Rodin and from Giotto to Picasso and Portinari.

As well as this breadth and diversity of interests, Celso was above all a great theoretician and an excellent development programmer. We should emphasize the fact that with regard to the development process he had, as well as extremely original theoretical concepts, a deeply social and critically environmental understanding. Celso Furtado's developmentalism was eminently humanist without diminishing its theoretical rigour.

Celso's great theoretical contribution to the study of development arose out of his deep sense of history and his historical and sociological view of economics and all social processes. Based on this point of view, Celso reacted against the algebraic and statistical limitations of economics, from classical to neoliberal. He did not argue against the validity of econometrics as long as it was applied in the proper place, which was business and at a general level, micro-economics. When it was necessary and convenient, he used this method. In the domain of macro-economics, however, Celso Furtado always pointed out the need for a diachronic, historical and sociological approach to the larger-scale processes within which economic activity takes place, since it is only then that synchronic and quantitative economic analysis are valid and necessary.

This historical and sociological view of macro-economics enabled Celso to have a completely original focus on the problem of development, which he conceived in terms of a complex system of development-underdevelopment which led him to leave behind definitively previous theories of economic growth, from Ricardo to Keynes. This same diachronic-synchronic focus let Celso to give a much wider meaning to the centre-periphery concept elaborated by Prebisch. Prebisch's analysis, although extremely acute and original, made the centre-periphery the basis for understanding the present imbalance found in exchange relations between central countries which have all the advantages from those relations, as compared to peripheral countries which remain underdeveloped.

Celso's great innovation consisted in showing, in contrast to what had previously been supposed, that development is not a 'mature' phase of underdevelopment, neither is the latter a 'primitive' phase of development. Development and underdevelopment are historically interrelated situations, the former having expanded to a considerable extent at the expense of the latter. This is where Celso Furtado's re-thinking of Prebisch's 'center-

periphery' idea comes in. This idea is not simply an unfavorable system of exchange occurring in our time; it is the manifestation of a historical phenomenon that has been taking shape since the maritime discoveries of the 14th and 15th centuries and the subsequent Trade Revolution. It is the result of the way in which historically social surpluses have been accumulated. Central countries were those - in Western Europe - which were able to accumulate surpluses in the form of capital and apply this to a further push to increase productivity. This occurred initially in the form of trade and, after the end of the 18th century and intensively during the 19th, now with the participation of the USA, in the form of industrialization based on increasing numbers of technological innovations.

The peripheral countries were those - as in Latin America, Asia and Africa - whose economies were based on exporting primary products, both mineral and agricultural, while importing from central countries manufactured goods to satisfy the demand of local elites. The imbalance we see today in exchange relations between central and peripheral countries is the result of this historical process. It was thanks to the growing 'technification' of their means of production that the central countries managed to maintain over time sufficient rates of economic growth and profitability for their businesses in spite of the continuous rise in salaries they had to face as a result of the actions of social movements starting in the 19th century. As Celso Furtado shows us, social demands were, contrary to what we might suppose, an energizing factor in development because they encouraged the development of technical innovations to compensate for them. On the other hand, it was because of the unbalanced exchange relationship they had with the periphery that central countries managed to maintain satisfactory levels of demand for their products.

The crisis of 1929-30 destroyed this balance. The central countries lost a significant part of their GDP and the peripheral countries no longer had exchange surpluses that allowed them to import the manufactured goods demanded by their ruling elites. Thus there arose the process of import substitution which was spontaneously created because of the impossibility of continuing the old system of importing manufactured goods and thus opened up the possibility to try to produce them locally. Subsequently, this process became a deliberate policy on the part of various peripheral states, as occurred in Latin America, notably in Brazil, after the 1940s.

In the final part of his analysis of the import substitution process, Celso Furtado shows how increased demand for capital generated by peripheral

industrialization, reproducing the patterns of much wealthier countries, led the former, sooner or later, according to the size of their respective markets, to a "foreign currency crisis". The cost in foreign currency of the equipment that needed to be imported to sustain import substitution, to which was added the cost of raw materials that also had to be imported, as often happened in the case of oil, came to be more, in foreign currency, than that earned by exporting raw materials.

This new process of strangulation caused a crisis that Latin American countries are still suffering from. Some, like Brazil, have succeeded, in a second phase of import substitution, to reach the stage of local production of capital goods. In the case of Brazil, the continued success of Petrobras has reduced the level of dependence on oil imports. This second phase of the industrialization process, however, has finally led to a demand for capital greater than local capacity to accumulate it. This has produced the stagnation-inflation dilemma, when it is not actually stagflation. Some Asian countries, like South Korea, have succeeded in overcoming this problem through a very high level of national savings, about 30% of GDP. Latin American countries, however, have not been able to achieve this and have even, like Brazil, tended to reduce the rate of savings. Inflation, for its part, has not been able to sustain the industrialization process and has led it into stagnation. In its place, there has arisen a neoliberal ideology that has led to a new and supposedly competitive opening up of the international market, and has created new forms of dependence. This same neoliberalism has led, through the so-called 'Washington consensus', to an extremely rigid fiscal and monetary policy in the name of maintaining a severe macro-economic balance but producing as a result continued economic and social stagnation.

Celso, the Development Programmer

As well as he is theoretical and technical contribution to programming with his 1955 work for CEPAL already referred to, *Uma Introdução à Técnica de Programação*, Celso Furtado had two opportunities to put his programming into practice as Minister of Planning, creating the Three-year Plan in 1962 and as the creator of the SUDENE project which he himself ran from 1960 until the 1964 military *coup*.

The 1963-65 Three-year Plan was never carried out because of interruption of the military *coup*. In it, Celso had planned to adopt policies

and measures that would create a suitable compatibility between the balance of macro-economic variables and giving a significant re-start to development. The fact of the plan not being put into practice meant that it was not possible to measure how much these two aims could be reciprocally compatible. What can be said concerning the aim of Celso Furtado's programming is that its final aims were directed towards transferring efforts to brining about an actual increase in efficiency from product to process. Celso understood that peripheral countries like Brazil had never undertaken a real development process, but simply a modernising one typified by an increased quality of products and not by increased efficiency in production. On the other hand, to achieve this aim, Celso favored methods that would lead, rather than impose themselves in an authoritarian or compulsory way, and which would be effective ways to introduce programming, as occurs in France.

Celso Furatdo's experience in SUDENE was extremely successful, even if short. As has been previously mentioned, after SUDENE the rate of development in the Northeast went from being insignificant to above the average of national development.

It may be noted that, after Celso's departure, SUDENE began the process of gradual decline which culminated in the organization being wound up and the Northeast returning to be ruled once more by the dubious combination of clientelist politics and big local landowners.

The Relevance of Celso Furtado Today

Celso Furtado's national-development is impregnated with a deep sense of social commitment as well as a critical environmental awareness. Celso realized, and was very worried about, how much current methods of economic development advance at the expense of a dangerous level of degradation of the biosphere. For that reason he emphasized the urgent need for technological progress to be directed towards a substantial level of protection of the biosphere. One of his concerns in terms of industrial civilization was the substitution of polluting fuels for others such as hydrogen that have no damaging effects.

On the other hand, for Celso, development should consist of a balanced process of economic expansion together with raising the living conditions of the population and a significant reduction in social differences. This social-developmentalism led him to support the governments of Juscelino Kubitschek

and João Goulart and later, of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. He hoped that the latter President would produce a great economic and social renewal that would lead Brazil back to rapid economic development, but that he would do it while prioritising social development.

Like many who shared his position, Celso was extremely understanding about the line taken by the Lula government during the first year of its mandate. He recognized the need to calm the markets at home and abroad and put the country's economy into good order. He also understood that it was important at the same time to prepare an alternative model similar to that which, although in different historical and social conditions, he had proposed in his Three-year Plan. This alternative model ought to have been prepared in practical and political terms during the first year of the Lula government so that it could have been put into practice in the second year.

The fact that the Government did none of these things, that in the second and third years it followed the same line as in 2003, caused Celso to become increasingly apprehensive. However, until he died, he held on to the hope that the Lula government would still take the route of social developmentalism that he wanted. He privately criticized the direction the government was taking but refrained from doing so publicly in order not to give ammunition to the forces of conservatism.

What now? After the death of Celso Furtado, how can we use his ideas and his social-developmental projects?

The question Brazil is currently facing, like many other emerging countries, is how to balance the main macro-economic variables with the need to speed up economic and social development. The Cardoso government, like the current Lula government, ran up against the fact that, within the premises of the situation in which both imprisoned themselves, the imperative of achieving macro-economic balance prevented the formation of a sufficient margin of surplus to make priority investments in the economy and society. This problem was duly analyzed by Celso Furtado when he showed the extent to which, in peripheral countries with their modest rates of savings, industrialization for import substitution sooner or later collided with the country's inability to regulate sufficient amounts of capital. To avoid this collision, Celso proposed to mobilize public opinion in order to enable a significant increase in the rate of national savings in the manner of the Asian countries.

A significant rise in the rate of national savings, when it does not happen spontaneously, is something which could be deliberately achieved by indirect or direct methods. Indirectly, it could be done through measures which would give a people strong incentive to saving, and what stands out in this respect is the adoption of powerful fiscal incentives together with fiscal penalties applying to what could be defined as excessive consumption. This could happen in a direct way through adopting a system of compulsory saving.

Compulsory saving could be achieved in various ways using greater or lesser levels of authoritarianism. The least authoritarian way is to create a public agency to invest compulsorily collected savings in priority projects. This would use savings certificates held by the compulsory savers which would return to the saver the profits resulting from the projects their savings had been invested in.

Celso Furtado never expressly addressed this question. I believe, nevertheless, that we may deduce from his thinking that he would be favorable to indirect measures to increase savings while at the same time allowing, if it were strictly necessary, reasonable forms of compulsory saving. In Celso's thinking is clear that he gives absolute priority to economic and social development, with an emphasis on the social.

We may also add the supposition that for Celso, national developmentalism in the current conditions created by globalization would become regional developmentalism. This is a situation which, based on a solid, reliable and mutually beneficial alliance of Brazil with Argentina, would lead to the consolidation of Mercosul and the South American Community of Nations, turning the latter into a major system of regional development. I would like to finish by pointing out that Celso expressly subordinated, within reasonable limits, macro-economic balance - supposedly something which would not allow variations higher than 20% of GDP - to promoting economic and social development, emphasizing the latter.

Today, Celso Furtado's ideas and projects are more relevant and urgent than ever. Nothing would be more desirable than President Lula's acceptance of the absolute need to discuss in practical and political terms the practicality of executing an alternative model to the current neoliberal one that would lead to rapid economic and social development. If this does not happen, as unfortunately seems most likely, Brazil will have to suffer four more years of the stagnation it has suffered since the 1980s. It is beyond the scope of this

lecture to discuss even briefly effects of being held back in this way. However we must not fail to take into account the fact that those effects will be extremely grave and could seriously compromise Brazil's chances of preserving its own historic destiny and national identity in the current world climate.

It is vital and urgent to return to Celso Furtado's ideas and projects.

8. Statement by Helio Jaguaribe - Rômulo Almeida (2005)

The first thing we have to point out when talking about Rômulo are the basic traits of his personality. Rômulo is one of the most extraordinary cases I know of dedication to the civil service. I used to say: "Rômulo, you are a Saint Francis of the civil service. What Saint Francis did for Christianity, you do for the Brazilian civil service".

And it is typical of the unlimited, total, enlightened, competent and active dedication he had for the civil service that he worked anonymously. He made things happen in such a way that no one knew who was behind them.

The second Vargas government was the high point of Getúlio's periods in office. Vargas was a man who, in my view, passed through three very different periods, helped by his enormous ability to sense the direction of the winds of the time, the meaning of each moment in history and to adapt himself like a chameleon to the situation of the moment, constantly motivated of course by his huge desire for power. Nevertheless, in his three periods as a statesman, he maintained the same constant concern for national development and for an autonomous national path to development. This was without a doubt the great period of Brazilian development.

In this situation, the personality of Rômulo fitted perfectly with that of the Vargas in the latter's second government. When Vargas took office for the second time, democratically elected, he was concerned about not being too dependent on the guidance of his Finance Minister. In order to be able to

carry on a critical dialogue with the latter, he decided to create an Economic Advisory Office alongside the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, which would be able to hold a dialogue on his behalf with the Minister. So on the recommendation of Evaldo Lodi, President of the Confederation of Industry, he chose Rômulo , whom he did not know. Very soon, however, a close fellow-feeling developed between the two.

What Vargas must have appreciated was the fact that Rômulo was not only extraordinarily competent and hard-working but also made a permanent effort to be anonymous. No one knew that those projects Vargas was presenting as coming from the President's Office had been developed by Rômulo and his team. Among the many ideas that Rômulo developed and which were definite successes in the second Vargas government were: the Eletrobras, Petrobras, National Coal, the Bank of the Northeast and CAPES projects. These are the five that I have knowledge of; there may be more which I do not know about.

Let us begin with what we might call the most original of these projects, CAPES, an educational and cultural one. Rômulo understood the need for the Federal Government to have a body with enough resources to enable the training of qualified people for the civil service and for Brazil in general. So the idea behind CAPES - the Campanha de Aperfeiçoamento do Servidor Público t (Campaign for Training the Civil Servan) - was to recruit people who had been trained but could still benefit from more training, and provide them with this opportunity both at home and abroad by means of bursaries, study projects, etc., which worked extremely well and became one of the most important agencies for cultural and educational development in Brazil.

The Bank of the Northeast was a local affair. Coming from Bahia, Rômulo understood the need for the Northeast to have the equivalent of the BNDES [National Development Bank – trans.] for regional purposes that could provide financing locally and so he drew up a project for the bank that was approved by the President and by Congress and of which he was the first president.

The purpose of the National Coal Plan was to make proper use of the major coal deposits in Santa Catarina. These, however, contained certain impurities that made it difficult to use them for steelmaking. The National Coal Plan consisted of a project to make use of this coal by removing the elements that made it unsuitable for steelmaking and thus creating economically usable coal. Rômulo showed that the cost-benefit of coal in Santa Catarina was vastly less than importing good-quality foreign coal. Thus intelligent use

was made of a national raw material which made it competitive with its foreign equivalent at less cost and using national resources, an extremely interesting scheme which is still working today.

As for the two great projects, Eletrobras and Petrobras, it has to be said that in both cases Rômulo understood that these producers of essential input for the economy, oil and electricity, had to be national and preferably public so that the profit motive in producing these commodities would not raise their prices. By means of these initiatives it was possible to provide the country with basic resources such as electrical and oil-based energy at reasonable prices which could therefore make Brazilian industry competitive. This was Rômulo's basic idea.

Within this overall concept he planned an electricity generating industry that would use Brazil's immense water resources, which has made Brazil the country with probably the cheapest energy in the world, since 90% of its energy comes from making extremely intelligent use of the rivers that are available in the country. The other initiative, which was audacious and much more controversial than Eletrobras, was to set up a public body that would be able to prospect, extract and refine oil in order to try to make Brazil autonomous in this resource. We should note that at that time, oil prices were far lower than the astronomical figures they have reached since (today, about US\$ 70 a barrel). It was already a very expensive item and one which weighed heavily on Brazil's foreign exchange budget and meant that the country depended greatly on foreign supplies. The idea of an agency that could create within a relatively short period of time the oil derivatives the country needed was absolutely correct. Obviously, it was strongly opposed by the defenders of foreign capital but after a long period of discussion throughout the country, the Petrobras project was finally approved by Congress.

It is interesting to note that, of all of Rômulo's initiatives, the one that has perhaps been most successful historically is Petrobras. It is such an important institution that even with the ideological mania for privatization which has unfortunately swept the country, Petrobras has remained untouched because it has been the company whose international success has been greater than that of its foreign competitors. What other company is looking for oil 3,000m under the sea? Neither Shell nor any other competitor has developed the technological capacity Petrobras has, based on Brazilian know-how and the gradual specialization of Brazilian geologists in developing appropriate technology. Petrobras has been a complete success, to the extent that

privatization has not been able to spoil this great project. And today, thanks to it, Brazil is not suffering from the devastating shock of oil prices which could have seriously affected the country's economy. On the contrary, Brazil is almost self-sufficient and I believe that in no more than a couple of years we shall begin to export surplus soil.

All of this was the topic of research carried out by Rômulo Almeida at the Economic Advisory Office he set up anonymously and with total discretion. He handed the results of his work to President Vargas, who made political use of them as he had every right to do. In a country as a whole, is not realized that Petrobras, from alpha to omega, is Rômulo Almeida. After this period, this great man naturally carried out various other activities such as being one of the 'seven wise men' of the Alliance for Progress. He was extremely well respected and recognized in spite of his 'Franciscan' self-effacement, that deliberate anonymity with which he served his country for love of it and not for personal advancement.

Rômulo's team consisted of individuals of the highest quality, all characterized by a profound sense of public service and disinterested devotion to the State. They were, however, very badly paid. I remember that at one point Jesus Soares Pereira (I cannot remember if he was from Alagoas or Sergipe), a member of Rômulo's team needed to return to his home state but, like the others, earned a ridiculously low salary and worked for the love of his country. So he asked Admiral Lúcio Meira to give him free passage in a cargo ship so that he could go to the Northeast; Lucio was shocked and told him: "What do you mean? A person like you has the right to a first-class ticket on a Lloyd Brasileiro ship". He gave Soares Pereira the ticket he could not afford to buy because he was working for nothing. This is the Rômulo I am talking about. An extraordinary person, he was also a cheerful and excellent companion. I felt the greatest friendship and admiration for him.

There is an interesting anecdote concerning his wife Francisquinha, a charming woman who has unfortunately passed away, where she tells of being invited to attend the unveiling of a statue to Rômulo. When the speaker said: "This is the statue of Rômulo Almeida, an exemplary father, an extraordinary husband, a family man, etc., etc." She said: "I don't know this man". When the speaker went on to say: "This is Rômulo Almeida, a national hero, a great public servant…", she said: "Ah, that's the man I know".

9. Ortega y Gassett – Life and Work (2005)

I. Circumstances and Life

Introduction

It was a source of particular pleasure to me to take part in this Round Table on Ortega, and in the company of such eminent colleagues, that the Brazilian Academy of Letters organized on the 15th September 2005, on the 50th anniversary of his death.

Ortega was the greatest teacher of my younger days and I owe him my introduction to the world of modern culture and ideas. From the mid-940s to the beginning of the 50s I read everything he had published up to then and had the good fortune to spend an afternoon with him in Madrid in 1952.

As soon as I had arrived in Madrid I telephoned Ortega saying that I was a young Brazilian intellectual who had read all his published work and had the greatest admiration for him. I hoped therefore that if he had a free moment, I might have the pleasure of meeting him. Ortega replied in the friendliest way and invited me to meet him "ahorita". It was an extraordinary meeting. I wanted to talk about his work and Ortega said to me: "Forget what I've written. What is important is what I'm saying now". And so we spent the whole afternoon, with him giving me a wonderful account of his ideas on the world and on life.

Life, however, had taken him in different directions. He commented that he was happy with the fact that "el filósofo es un torero de ideas".

Life and Work

I feel it necessary, when speaking of the philosopher of circumstance and vital reason, to begin these comments by pointing out the most important aspects of the conditions in which his thinking developed.

Ortega used to say of himself that he had been born on a printing press.⁴¹ Teacher, lecturer and essayist, he was always a man who concentrated on his time and the analysis of his circumstances. He was *El Espectador*, the analyst of everything that happened, sometimes committed, sometimes simply an interpreter of the meaning of things. The son of a director of *El Imparcial*, José Ortega Munila (1856-1922) and grandson of the founder of that newspaper, Eduardo Gasset y Artime, he dedicated a considerable portion of his writings to the press. In addition, moved by what he felt to be a tactical requirement into communicating ideas in the Spain of his time - but above all, in my view, this was an expression of his personality - Ortega was always engaged in dialogue with his circumstances. And thus, on the one hand we find the feeling of relevance his work conveys which never allows itself to be diverted by what is abstractly formal or by timeless inactivity. This situation is also responsible for the fact that even his most systematically considered works always seem to convey an urgent sense of reflection created between two hurried moments in life where he shows, as if they were notes to be worked up in the future, his great perceptions and his view of the world.

Born on 9th May 1883, Ortega's immediate predecessors in Spain where the famous Generation of 1898, the generation that was brutally confronted in that fatal year with humiliating defeat in war against the United States, the loss of Empire and the realization that the myths of grandeur they were still being fed had for many centuries reflected less and less the truth about Spain and the world.⁴² This realization of Spain's underdevelopment and its terrible backwardness both materially and culturally, caused the appearance of the

⁴¹For biographical details on Ortega, see Julian Marias, *Ortega*, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1960 and Fernando Salmerón, *Las Mocedades de Ortega y Gasset*, México, El Colégio de México, 1959. See also, Lorenzo Luzuriaga, "Lãs Fundaciones de Ortega y Gasset", in *Homenaje a Ortega y Gasset*, Caracas, Univ. Central de Venezuela, 1958.

⁴²On the Generation of 1898, see Pedro Lain Entralgo, *La Generacion del Noventa y Ocho*, Madrid, Estanislao Masiá Alonso, 1945.

two models of reacting to national decline that Toynbee calls zealotism and herodianism.⁴³ The one reacts to the awareness of cultural inferiority by falling back on its own traditions, the other tries to overcome it by incorporating elements of the dominating culture. These two models, both fatal in their primitive or common forms, can be found in more powerful versions: enlightened zealotism, whose traditionalism is practiced on a higher level of understanding the world, and critical herodianism whose incorporation of foreign values is done in a selectively autonomous way by being clearly aware of its own situation.

In post-1898 Spain these two superior forms of zealotism and herodianism were embodied respectively by Unamuno and Ortega. Unamuno seeks the redemption of Spain by the racially pure restoration of the tragic sense of life. Ortega feels that Spanishness is not an aim, but a view. The aim is to build a modern Western European society not merely, nor even mainly, in a technical sense, but in the sense of a superior understanding of the world and the creation of those conditions that would lead to a genuine national mission.

This double commitment, first to Spain and then to the universal nature of European culture, would figure in the whole of Ortega's life and work. Sometimes the sense of absolute urgency to do something carries him into the area of actual political commitment but more as a militant than a party member, as in 1914 with the Liga de Educación Política de Espana in the pre-war crisis of the Spanish monarchy. Or again in 1930 with the Agrupación al Servicio de la República, when the monarchy was turned on its head and the plan for a republic emerged like a dream and a utopia. More often, however, Ortega worked in the long term as an educator of his people based on his deep conviction that what was more important than anything else was to clearly understand the world in order to have an effect on it. This alternation between party commitment and critical distance would shape the main periods of Ortega's life.

The years 1898-1910 were his formative period. He studied for his bachelor's degree in philosophy at the University of Madrid from 1898-1902. Then he took his doctorate in 1904, writing his thesis on "The Terrors of the Year 1000". He later studied, with some interruptions, in Germany from 1905-1910, in the universities of Leipzig, Berlin and mainly in Marburg under Hermann Cohen.

⁴³Cf. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. VIII, pp. 580 et seq., London, Oxford Univ. Press., 12 Vols., 1934/1961.

This immersion in German culture, especially Cohen's neo-Kantianism, was vitally important to Ortega. On the one hand, as he would say, because it gave him solid intellectual discipline and rigorous analytical instruments, also because "in order to overcome Kantianism, you have to pass through it" and it was through his studies with Cohen and his dialogue with Kant that, having to transcend the barriers of idealism without falling back into ingenuous realism, Ortega was guided towards his ideas of vital reason and perspectivism.

Living permanently in Madrid after 1910, Ortega began a period of initiation and initial commitment. Teaching metaphysics in the University of Madrid from 1910, he soon earned a growing reputation for competence, originality and brilliance. *Adán en el Paraíso*, containing a version of his ideas appeared in 1914. That same year saw his *Meditaciones del Quijote*. Also in this year he made his first political commitment, founding the Liga de Educación Política de Espana, the ideological platform of which is found in his study on *Vieja y Nueva Política*. The periodical *España*, founded in 1915, expresses the same ideas of engagement.

Ortega soon felt however that the limitations of the groups and tactics involved in all actual political engagement were barriers to his real desire for a clear and general understanding of things. With the foundation in 1916 of *El Espectador* - a publication that appeared sporadically and so spared him the demands of regular publication - Ortega returns to his objective position as an interested but critical observer of the course of events. And he returns to his philosophical dialogue with Western universalism. The publication of *España Invertebrada* in 1921 and the founding in 1923 of the *Revista de Occidente*, delineate these positions.

The collapse of the monarchy in 1930 and the opportunity to plan a great republic led Ortega back to militancy. The Agrupación al Servicio de la República was founded in 1930 and as a parliamentary deputy he worked with a group of intellectuals in the Cortes.

Again, the limitations of actual politics were unacceptable to him and he left Parliament to return to writing. *La Rebelión de las Masas* and *La Misiõn de la Universidad* appeared in 1930. *Goethe desde Dentro* and *Guillermo Dilthey y la Idea de Vida* in 1932, and *En Torno a Galileo* in the following year.

The radicalization of Spanish politics between a right wing that became Fascist and a left wing that fragmented led to Ortega's worst fears being realised. A man of words for whom life is liberty and understanding, he feels

that after a certain degree of intolerance, silence is the only response available to the intellectual. Thus he prefers to exile himself from Spain during the turbulent years of 1936-1945. During this period he understands that the situation does not allow valid political reflection but he remains philosophically active, writing some of his most important works. *Ensimasmiento y Alteración* in 1939, *Ideas y Creencias* in 1940 and in the following year, *Estudios sobre el Amor* and *Historia como Sistema*.

On returning to Spain, he succeeds in 1948 in his final attempt to set up a more stable centre for innovation and propagating ideas, the Instituto de Humanidades, where he brings together like-minded thinkers, disciples and a wide public interested in his ideas. There he produces his final work until his death in 1955.

Ortega's Influence

Many years before his death, Ortega had already established his reputation as the most important Spanish philosopher since Suárez (1548-1617), and as one of the most important modern thinkers.

It is true that some of the elements of his work, which I have referred to and which have the appearance of being a preliminary treatment - which Ortega's circumstances and personality did not induce him to rework - have led some critics to underestimate the importance of his contribution. 44 Contradicting this superficial understanding of Ortega's works, however, is the fact that as well as creating a school of thought in which the best modern Spanish philosophers could be found, Ortega left a lasting and universal influence which is felt in many areas of the humanist disciplines.

It is a question open to debate and is a typically Ortegan theme of the philosophy of philosophy as to what extent it is possible in modern conditions to create a really universal and permanent school of philosophy as has happened in the history of Western thought from Socrates to Hegel and Marx. It may be that the perspectivism Ortega speaks of implies the discontinuity

⁴⁴See, among others, Joaquim Iriarte, *Ortega y Gasset – Su Persona y su Doctrina*, Editora Razon y Fé, Madrid, 1942, José Sánchez Villaseñor, *José Ortega y Gasset, Pensamiento y Trayectoria*, Editora Jus, México, 1943, Juan Roig Gironella, *Filosofia y vida – Cuatro Ensayos sobre Actitudes*, Barcelona, Editora Barna, 1946, Juan Saiz Barbera, *Ortega y Gasset ante la Crítica*, Ediciones Iberoamericanas, Madrid, 1950. See also, in response to the first three critics, Julian Maias, "Ortega y Tres Antípodas", Buenos Aires, *Revista de Occidente*, 1950.

and segmentation of all current views of the world in order to form one of the essential characteristics of the culture of our time. On the other hand we may see, for reasons explained by the sociology of knowledge and which correspond to Ortega's circumstantialism, that the intellectual impact of ideas is conditioned by the cultural status of the people and media from which those ideas emerge.

For a philosopher coming from a country like Spain, where intellectual responsibility was exclusively linked to a Golden Age 300 years ago and who, instead of moving to one of the great universities in the world which would have received him with open arms, made his choice of Spain one of the basic elements of his very way of being and seeing things, Ortega's impact and the permanence of his influence are really extraordinary.

This influence, as well as being complete and direct with regard to his closest disciples such as Julian Marias or Joaquim Xirau, makes itself felt in a much wider sense, as more than just a systemic group of theses, but as an influence on perspective and as a way of seeing things. ⁴⁵ And it is due in great part to this influence, without underestimating other contributions, that modern Spain drew close once more to the central core of Europe years before its recent economic and political development enabled it to join the EEC. I shall return to this question at the end of this essay.

II. Central Themes

System and Scheme

Ortega's work appears in quite a fragmentary form. Magazine articles and short studies for lectures and magazines accompany each other and even his longer books are short and have the air of essays. Nevertheless, taken together it is a large body of work. The rather selective editing of his *Obras Completas* by the *Revista do Occidente* in 1946-47 contains six large

⁴⁵On Ortega's influence, see Julian Marias, Ortega, op. Cit. and *La Escuela de Madrid*, Buenos Aires, Emécé Editora, 1959. See also: Manuel Garcia Morente, "El lema de Nuestro Tiempo", Madrid, *Revista de Occidente*, 1923; Ernst Robert Curtius, "José Ortega y Gasset" in *Europäische Revue*, 1926 and "Ortega", in *Merkur*, May, 1949; Walter Starkie, "A Philopher of Modern Spain" in *Contemporary Review*, 1936; J. Esteirich, "Le Scnema des Crises in *Nouvelle Revue Française*, —, 1943, Luis Diez del Corrai, "Ortega ante el Estado", in *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, Madrid, May-June, 1953, Marcel Batallón, "José Ortega y Gasset", in *Bulletin Hispanique*, March, 1956 and Charles Cháscales, *L'Humanisme d'Ortega y Gasset*, Paris, PUF, 1957.

volumes. Following Ortega's death there came seven more (smaller) volumes of posthumous works.

In fact the fragmentary nature of Ortega's work has more to do with the way they are presented them with their substance or their thinking. "System is the thinker's honesty", says Ortega (*Obras Completas*, I, p. 115) when speaking about Hegel and about himself. Ortega rightly felt that his thought was systematic because, like Hegel, although in different ways, he had a global view of reality and felt that he could only understand a part of his total environment. This systematic view of reality led him to concentrate on a certain number of basic themes around which is whole work revolves. Ortega's systematic method, however, is found in his view of the world and not in his way of expressing it. Neither does it lead to rigid dogmatic positions, but rather to examining the same central problem in different aspects and from different viewpoints.

A systematic thinker, Ortega is a schematic author. This schematic nature however does not apply to his language. A writer of sensitive but fluid prose, he never sacrifices style to speed even while living under intense pressure, because life is his absolute and knowing it is ephemeral he wants to see everything and understand everything. This is what produces his intellectual schematicism. He always expresses himself with an elegant clarity but he does not have within himself the time to completely explain his ideas or give them a finished treatment. What matters to him is understanding things and achieving an understanding of them within a rapid intellectual schema. What is systematic is his understanding of reality, not the way he explains it. This produces in Ortega that unique combination of intellectual schematicism, all of it poured out in prose in which we can feeling of urgency of the man and his ideas, and always expressed fluidly and gracefully.

The systematic nature of his world view leads Ortega, as he says, to work around a limited number of themes. *Tema de Nuestro Tiempo*, the title of one of his most important books, is also the central theme of Ortega himself, the theme of vital reason. This vital reason leads on the one hand to perspectivism as a precondition of man's relationship with the world. On the other, there is historical reason, which is vital reason seen through the passage of time and in terms of men as a whole. Vital reason moreover is what gives reason to life and explains how one can and should live: a noble life or a vulgar one, a directed life ordered by the power of transcendence in loving and serving, or a passive, intransitive life reduced to its own physiology.

The psychological and ethical opposition between the noble and the vulgar, the transcendent and the intransitive, the personal and the anonymous collective, leads Ortega to oppose, in the words of the title of one of his posthumous works, "El Hombre y la Gente" in his sociological studies. It also leads him, in one of his incursions into political action, to see in the real politician - like Mirabeau, for example - not only a man who has a valid collective plan to propose to his society and who shapes it in terms appropriate to circumstances, but also and very specially, the man who has a great soul, a forceful vital impulse and who is able to move himself and others.

Vital Reason

Ortega's central theme is vital reason. Vital reason is the concrete *logos* introduced into life in a pure and abstract form as in mathematical and physical reason. Vital reason is the reason for life in the dual sense of guiding our life and our world - knowing what to bind ourselves to and guiding us to an understanding of the world by means of our lives, which is radical reality, the reality in which all others are rooted.

Ortega's vital-rationalism represents an attempt to overcome the barriers of Kantean idealism without falling back into naive realism. For Ortega, realism is based on the arbitrary prejudice of supposing that things constitute reality and use it up, and that the spirit faithfully captures the essence of things. The truth, however, is that the spirit - as idealists understand it - is not merely a neutral and passive mirror that limits itself to reflecting things. On the other hand, idealism confuses the parts with the whole. If it is correct that the external world can only be understood by an operation of a knowing subject who constructs the thing as an object of knowledge things, for their part, are not produced by the subject and the latter cannot exist independently of them. Reality is neither the world nor me, but the coexistence of me with the world, the subject facing the world and the world working on his consciousness.

This reciprocity that is a part of man's relationship with the world throughout his life leads Ortega to integrate the subject with his circumstance. In his deathless phrase: "I am me and my circumstance". Circumstances are things - as well as other men and the products of men. But man is not a thing, nor is life a thing. Life happens between things and things happen in life. "All things, whatever they are, are mere interpretations that (man) tries to give to what he meets. As soon as man encounters things, he only supposes that he puts them

where he wishes. What the 'I' meets are the pure difficulties and abilities in existing. (*Historia como Sistema - Obras Completas* VI, p.32).

In contrast to things, which exist in circumstances and appear in life as difficult or easy affairs for men, this is nothing but a project or a drama. "The drama is its project". It is man who makes himself. His life is a drama. "Man is not his body, which is a thing, nor his soul, psyche, conscience or spirit, which is also a thing. Man is not a thing at all but a drama - his life is a pure and universal event that happens to everyone and in which everyone in his turn is nothing but an event". (*Historia como Sistema - Obras Completas* VI, p.32) For this reason, says Ortega, since life is a drama its substance is its plot, and man, while creating himself from a script that he himself writes, "is the novelist of himself, either original or copied" (idem., p. 34).

This state of being inconclusive, of making oneself, is basic to human freedom. The freedom to which man is condemned because he has no other solution than to be constantly choosing and shaping himself in the process. "Freedom is not an activity practiced by a being which, by itself and before practicing it, already had a fixed being. Being free means lacking a formal identity, not constituting part of a specific being, being able to be someone different from what one is, and not being able to fix oneself once and for all within a specific being. The only thing that must be fixed and unstable in the free being is his formal instability" (*Historia como Sistema - Obras Completas* VI, p. 34).

Perspectivism

As life is radical reality, the reality in which all other realities are rooted, in other words it is at the same time the world being in us and our being in the world, things – which immediately present themselves as being difficult or easy factors in life – take shape within the realm of that life. Because of this, things are events in life and always appear from the perspective of the living subject within that subject's circumstance.

For Ortega the theory of perspective is a fundamental dimension of his view of the world. It is precisely the world that is always seen in perspective, in its entirety and constitutes the totality of all perspectives in space and time. This perspectivism embraces all the forms of understanding of the world, from the spontaneous forms of daily life to the erudite forms of physics or history. In Einstein's reality Ortega hailed the more scientifically sophisticated

expression of physical and cosmological perspectivism. In Dilthey, as a theoretical historian and in the great historians such as Mommsem, Burckhardt or Rostovtzeff, he found the highest manifestations of historical perspectivism.

Perspectivism, or point of view theory, means for Ortega that all reality is based on a vital root system. Strictly speaking, this is found in a man's individual life at a given moment and in a given circumstance. In a broader sense, is found in the perspective of a society, a culture or a civilization. "Every life gives a point of view on the universe. Indeed what it sees can be nothing else. Each individual - person, people, time - is an irreplaceable organ for achieving truth. That is how the truth, which in itself is immune from historical variations, acquires a vital dimension. Without development, constant change and the unceasing adventure that constitute life, the universe, the multiform truth would be ignored" (*El Tema de Nuestro Tiempo, Obras Completas* III, 2000).

In a further section of the work referred to above Ortega observes: "The inveterate error consisted in assuming that reality contained its own shape within itself, regardless of the point of view from which it was viewed. Following that line of thought it is clear that any vision of it based on a certain point of view would not coincide with its absolute aspect and would therefore be false. The fact is, however, that reality, like landscape, has an infinite number of perspectives, each of them equally true and authentic. The only false perspective is the one that claims to be unique. To put it another way: what is false is utopia, the unlocalized truth seen from nowhere. The utopianist - and this has basically been a result of rationalism - is wrong because he is the man who does not remain true to his point of view, he deserts his point of view" (Idem, p. 200).

For Ortega, perspectivism does not lead to skepticism but to a critical realism. Perspective is not an illusion; it is its own reality. Based on each man's perspective within his own life and his own circumstance, perspectivism gives him his proper relationship with the world. Within this primary basic perspective various valid forms of knowledge - scientific, philosophical or pragmatic - provide men, in the conditions of their time, with the criteria to make a suitable choice of secondary perspectives according to the aims they have: scientific-technological, aesthetic or pragmatic.

Historical Reason

Historical reason for Ortega is vital reason conceived in time or relative to human groups. It is different from physical-mathematical reason because it embraces reality in a narrative form, as it happens. "To understand something personal or collective you had to tell a story. This man, this nation, did such and such a thing and did so because previously something else had been done differently. Life only becomes a little transparent in the face of historical reason" (*Historia como Sistema*, *Obras Completas* VII, p.35).

"Man is what has happened to him, what he has done." "Man does not have a nature, he has history." "Because we cannot explain yesterday without the day before yesterday and so on, history is a system (hence the title of the book) - the system of human experiences that form an inexorable and unique chain" (*Historia como Sistema Obras Completas* VI, p. 43).

Ortega's discovery of historical reason and the historicity of reason were for him his most important contribution and culminated in the theoretical and methodological constructions of vital reason and perspectivism. He shared the credit for this with Dilthey, whose work he said he was unaware of when he was developing his own ideas on the subject. With historical reason, Ortega felt he had solved the dilemma of reason and history which had existed since the time of the Greeks. In his own words:

Until now, what was rational was not historical and what was historical was not rational. Historical reason is therefore ratio, logos and rigorous concept. We may agree that there is not the slightest doubt on this point. Opposing physical to mathematical reason does not mean giving rein to irrationalism. On the contrary, historical reason is even more rational, more rigorous and more demanding than physical reason. Physics gives up understanding what it is talking about. Furthermore, it creates its formal method from this ascetic renunciation and for this reason comes to lend the term 'understand' a paradoxical meaning against which Socrates had already protested when he refers us to his intellectual education in Phaedo, and after Socrates every philosopher until the end of the 18th century, at which point empirical rationalism was established. From physics we understand the operation of analysis which works by reducing complex facts to a set of simpler ones. But these elementary and basic facts of physics are incomprehensible and it is inevitable that they should be since they deal with a fact. Historical reason on the other hand accepts nothing as a mere fact but dissolves the whole fact in the origins from which it comes: it sees how the facts are made. It does not believe in explaining human phenomena by reducing them to a set of instincts and 'faculties' that would in fact be brute facts like shock and attraction - but shows what man does with these instincts and faculties and even tells us the origin of these 'facts' - instincts and faculties - which of course are no more than ideas – interpretations - that man has created at a certain point in his life. (Historia como Sistema Obras Completas VI, pp. 49-50).

Components of Man

Ortega's philosophy leads to a specific philosophical anthropology on which in turn he bases his understanding of human conduct and, along with other elements, his Ethics and theory of values. Philosophical anthropology dealt with explicitly does not reappear frequently in Ortega's work, as do his other central themes. Although it often involves the problem of the strata that make up human reality, Ortega systematically occupies himself with the question - after having approached it in a course of lectures - in his 1924 essay on "Validity, Soul and Spirit" published in Vol. V of *El Espectador* and reprinted in Vol. II of his Complete Works.

In brief, Ortega understands man as a teleological process, a mixture of thing and non-thing that consists in the fusion of a bodily delimited individual and characterized incorporeally by a three-level personality consisting of: vitality, soul (or *pneuma*) and spirit (or *nous*).

Vitality, which forms the part of the organism that expresses its fusion with the psyche, is a universal dimension that takes on its own characteristics in each individual while participating in the general process of life. Vitality shapes the intra-body, the body inside. "Each of us is, more than anything else, a vital force: to a greater or lesser extent, abundant or missing, healthy or ill. The rest of our character will depend on what our vitality is" (*Obras Completas* II, pp. 447-8). Further on he will say: "This fund of vitality nourishes the whole of our person and rises like an animating sap to the heights of being". It is impossible to have in any sense a vigorous personality of any kind - moral, scientific, political, artistic or erotic - without an abundant stock of this vital energy that has accumulated in the foundations of our intimate being and which I have called the "bodily soul" (*Obras Completas* II, p. 452).

If vitality constitutes the basis of the person, the spirit is the highest point. The spirit is the pure 'I', as reason and as will. Like vitality, the spirit is also a

universal dimension that assumes its own nature in each individual but has a role in the general process of rationality. The spiritual is the most personal part of man, his rational and volitional center, his pure 'I', but it does not contain anything more individual because the principles of rationality and will are universal while choice is rational.

Between these two levels comes the third, which is the most individual and individualizing element in every man: the soul or *pneuma*. "Indeed, between vitality, which is to a certain extent subconscious, obscure and latent and stretches into the depths of our person like a landscape in the background of a painting, and the spirit in which it lives up to its instantaneous acts of thinking and wanting, there is a middle area that is lighter than validity but less illuminated than the spirit and which has a strange atmospheric nature. It is the region of feelings and emotions, desires, impulses and appetites: what we may call, strictly speaking, the soul". (*Obras Completas* II, p. 454).

Later he will state: "The spirit, the 'I', is not the soul: it could be said the former has disappeared like a shipwreck survivor into the latter, which contains and feeds it. The will, for example, does nothing but decide and choose between one or another inclination; it prefers the better choice but would want nothing for itself if there not exist outside it this keyboard of inclinations on which the will puts its imperative finger, as the judge would not exist if there were not people interested in the case" (*Obras Completas* II, p. 454). And later he clarifies the point: "I repeat that my impulses, inclinations, loves, hates and desires are mine, but they are not the 'I' that watches them like a spectator, intervenes in them like a chief of police, sentences them like a judge or disciplines them like a captain" (*Obras Completas* II, p. 455).

Ortega draws many conclusions from this trichotomy of the human person, at the psychological and ethical level as well as the social and historical. Charactereologically, he maintains that the proportions of vitality, spirit and soul vary from person to person, change with age and also tend to differ according to sex, women being predisposed to having more soul than men.

Something of the same kind is found in societies, in historical periods and in culture. "The Greek lives from within his body and without passing through the soul, rises to his spirit. Thus we can understand this double and contradictory impression that art, books and the whole existence of Greece produce in us. On the one hand we feel a strange innocence and animal nakedness, and on the other, a surprising clarity and purity that reaches the superhuman" (*Obras Completas* II, p. 466). In contrast, medieval man is

pure soul. "If Greek art is plasticity - pure presence - medieval art is expressivity, an allusion to something missing. But made us come the soul be expressed. Where there is expression, the soul dominates" (*Obras Completas* II, p. 468).

Values and Life

For Ortega, perspectivism does not lead either to scepticism in the field of knowledge, nor to moral relativism in ethics. Like the world, values exist objectively, although their reality is rooted in our lives and shows itself to us within a personal as well as historic-social perspective.

In his essay on values (*Obras Completas* VI, p. 317) Ortega takes a position similar to that of Scheler and supports the objective nature of values. The value is an unreal quality of things but it does not depend on us to attribute it, rather the contrary, value is a quality that imposes itself independently whether we want it or not, when we are faced with that quality, whether it be utility or beauty. For this reason Ortega objects to the arbitrary nature that is presumed to control value judgements. "The phrase *de gustibus non disputandum* is a crass mistake. It presupposes that in the area of taste, in other words values, clearly objective values do not exist to which we may refer our disagreements in the final analysis. The opposite is true: all our 'taste' likes a value (pure things do not offer the chance of liking or not liking) and every value is an object which is independent of our whims" (*Obras Completas* VI, p. 333).

Values have three dimensions: (1) quality: positive or negative, (2) hierarchy: more important-less important, and (3) matter, referring to what deals with and constitutes the support of different kinds of values. With regard to this last aspect, Ortega differentiates between four major types: useful values, vital values, spiritual values (intellectual, moral and esthetic) and religious values.

In the context of the general value theory Ortega places the problem of quality of life in terms of two different criteria, that of life referring to itself and that of life referring to values. Above all, life is the life of someone and has its own shape which implies, with greater or lesser clarity and with wider or more limited conditions and autonomous response, a certain vocational tendency to which each man gives a more or less authentic answer. Authentic life and non-authentic life constitute the polarity that presents itself to every man, whatever his life project maybe. Man is his own project. This reference

to values may be noble or vulgar but referred to itself it will be more or less authentic. Authenticity is the first prerequisite of any full life.

In terms of values, life is noble or vulgar. This dichotomy explains in a general way, in terms of the object, the dominance of vital values over useful ones, and of spiritual values over the latter. But above all it expresses the dominance of the transcendent over the intransitive. A vulgar life is a futile life turned back upon its own being and, in the final analysis, is merely physiological.

Man and People

The man-people polarity that opposes the personal to the impersonal in the human universe is one of the major themes that reappear in Ortega's thought. He hoped to dedicate an important work to this theme in which he would systematize his concepts of society. Ortega touched on the topic on several occasions in courses and lectures, leaving behind his notes on the subject.

Based on material he prepared for his last course on the subject at the Instituto de Humanidades in 1949-50, he wrote a longer text which, still in the form of a course, was the first version of his book *El Hombre y la Gente*. However, he died before revising the text, which the *Revista de Occidente* published as it was, in 1957, among his posthumous works.

Ortega's central idea about society is that it is a system for living together based on including people and their specifically personal activities in a group of norms that anonymously discipline conduct that the collective group, 'people', consider to be appropriate for certain circumstances or for certain types of people.

Society inherits a certain cultural nucleus from its remote origins that is expressed through a language and contains a basic repertoire of beliefs that are reflected in that language and in various customs. This cultural nucleus, like everything social, has something historical in it which changes over the course of time but does so within a basic continuity imposed by tradition. This, however, is sometime subject to more abrupt and profound changes because of certain events such as religious or socio-political revolutions, major scientific and technological innovations, aesthetic fashions and other factors that quicken the pace of social change.

Among the elements making up the tradition of a society at a given moment in history are its customs, some of them formalized into norms and precepts which comprise that society's legal system and others, more informal but no less relevant, that make up the repertoire 'of what ought to be done'. Thus we have norms that control dress to establish differences based on sex, age and social class. Thus we have customs that regulate rituals such as greetings, condolences on death, congratulations on births, etc.

The essence of what is 'social', with the expression of the beliefs or hopes of 'people' as opposed to the opinions and decisions of specific persons is, for Ortega, the fact that what is social has its own field of influence regardless of the consensus of individuals, whether this refers to institutionalized social factors in the form of a norm or a public agent, or whether it refers to informal social factors such as the elements of a culture, customs and behavior.

As well as representing his contribution to a theory of society, Ortega's sociological ideas constituted an important parameter for his historical and ethical thinking. A philosopher of vital reason and historical reason, Ortega is mainly concerned with understanding men's progress through history and to identify the requirements of authentic forms of life. His interests are divided basically between these two propositions: they attempt to understand how modern man, especially the European man of his time - and his fellow-Spaniards - came to be what they were, and also his zeal to delineate the conditions on which superior forms of life depend, both in general and in the circumstances of his time. Both these proposals seemed to him to depend on the proper understanding of the relationships between men and people in order to clearly distinguish between areas in which this can automatically be done from those in which the human personality can and should operate, and in which the choices that determine the selection of a life plan are shaped.

The Politician

To close this brief account of Ortega's central theses, I should mention his thoughts about political man. Although this theme appears at various times, such as in his references to Caesar or Napoleon, Ortega develops them specifically in relation to Mirabeau.

The particular point about Ortega's view of political man is his emphasis on vitality. As we have seen above, based certainly on his own experience as possessing extraordinary vitality, Ortega sees in that quality the basic energy resources for all kinds of human excellence. To be great in science, art and in carrying out any activity, man needs to have abundant vitality above any other quality.

Among all forms of human greatness, however, in Ortega's view none is as dependent on vitality as political greatness. Political man is not only - nor even mainly - the one who, in reality or in appearance, creates the best collective projects for his society or who knows, or seems to know, how best to implement and administer such projects. Political man is one who has the greatest reserves of energy available for the task of politically mobilizing others and is able to move himself and others with an irresistible force. The politician is the collective translator not only of shared ideas or interests, but also of motivation and dynamism based on his own abundant vitality. And this is why Ortega finds in Mirabeau the illustration par excellence of political man. The importance of Mirabeau in the French Revolution and his stature as a political figure have long been recognized. The originality of Ortega's view of Mirabeau is partly a result of seeing in him, more than in any other influential politician, at a crucial time in Western history, the very paradigm of his situation: Mirabeau or the Politician. On the other hand it also consists in attributing this prototypical quality not so much to Mirabeau's ideas and proposals - the idea the following century would embrace, of constitutional monarchy - but above all to the super-vitality of that turbulent, protean man blessed, according Ortega's charactereology, with the most fabulous bodily soul, who did not know what to do with his life while circumstances limited him to a private existence and who, with the Revolution, suddenly found a stage to fit his outsize vitality.

III. A Brief Evaluation

Ortega's Thought

Ortega was a man with universal interests and concerns. As well as philosophy, he was deeply interested in history, art, human and natural sciences, literature, politics and current affairs and also, in other areas of his life, in bullfighting, hunting, women and love. This man of universal interests was naturally led by his own way of life to be the definition of the "interesting man as the interested man". 46

⁴⁶See also the study on Ortega, "Para una Psicología del Hombre Interesante", originally published in the *Revista de Occidente*, July, 1925 and later in Vol. IV, pp. 46 et seq. of the Obras Completas.

Ortega's general interest in the world, be it real or ideal, synchronic or diachronic, operated in two dimensions: seeing and acting. His representation of the world is essentially visual and his fascination for the world, which was not interested in the appropriative dimension, is extremely pragmatic in the ethical and psychological sense of a permanent search for authentic and noble ways of life.

His vision and sense of commitment determine how he tries to understand reality. His research method is phenomenological and hermeneutic. It starts from immediate data deriving from the conscious and semantic-linguistic analysis of data coming from culture. When he asks himself what something is, he tries to relate his immediate intuition of that reality to the explanatory and interpretive elements implicit in language and culture. On the other hand, as a committed man consciously embedded in his circumstance and consumed by plans, he always tries to take guidance for real life from knowledge, about what to do and how to do it. Thus Ortega's thinking constantly concentrates on identifying meanings understood as belonging to the realm of eidetic images and at the same time seen in their relationships with the praxis of individual and collective life. This is something which, without comparing respective statures, makes us think of a Goya of ideas, universal and very concrete, transcendent and pragmatically oriented.

Intuition and Metaphor

This plasticity in understanding things based on a huge vital impulse of interest in the world and his continued commitment to projects, leads Ortega to explore his intuitions in a mainly metaphorical way. "Man is his own project". "I am me and my circumstance". "Man is the novelist of himself, either original or a plagiarist". "Man does not have nature, he has history".

There could be many more examples. Ortega's synthetic formulae, expressed in memorable phrases, define the basic concept in response to some reality - mainly man - but they do it within a certain circumstantial or qualifying context. Metaphor is an image of ideas and is originally the idea in the form of an intuitive addition before being critically and scientifically treated, the deliberately contextualized idea linked to qualifications of manner, circumstance or time.

As was stated earlier in this study, Ortega is a systematic thinker but a schematic writer. He is a man in a great hurry who gives his view of the world

a quick, preliminary treatment, just enough to be immediately intelligible, and leaves the final elaboration of his ideas for another occasion which he never, or very rarely, finds the time for. This is at least in part the origin of the explicitly or implicitly metaphorical nature of so many of his ideas. This metaphorical treatment allows him to gather his intuitions rapidly and insert them into his way of interpreting the world without needing the prolonged effort of elaborating the finished product. This schematic-metaphorical nature of Ortega's work provides its broad scope and also its immense interpretive richness. On the other hand, it deprives many of his main contributions of the conceptual rigor that would have been required by the critical and scientific reworking that Ortega never managed to give them.

Philosophical Position

After his immersion in the universe of Kantean idealism in the final period of his formative years, Ortega emerged thirsty for reality and wanting to deal directly with things themselves. On the other hand, Kantism and neo-Kantism set him permanently apart from any form of naive realism. Ortega therefore had to find a new path towards reality and the things that would overcome the limitations of the ideal without falling back into the mistakes of classical realism. He found this path in rational-vitalism as an epistemological and ontological view of the world that discovers radical reality in life and, based on life and its perspectives, the chance of knowing what reality is.

His points of departure, in negative terms, are Kant's critique of realism and his own critique of Kantism as being a subjectivist prison. His distant point of reference is Aristotle and for certain purposes, Leibnitz, because they had taken precautions to overcome naive realism and rationalism. Along this path he shared many of the views of Nietzsche and certain insights of Bergson. He also cultivates, first by coincidence, then by critical acceptance, Dilthey's historicism. His vitalist feeling, which was more Nietzschean than Bergsonian, leads him directly to certain affinities with Hans Driech's vitalism and most of all to that of Huesküll. His phenomenological and hermeneutical research method is closer to that of Husserl (while rejecting transcendental idealism) and for this reason closer still to that of Max Scheler.

These points of departure and theoretical references lead Ortega's rational-vitalism to anticipate phenomenological existentialism in general terms, but more according to Sartre's version than that of Heidegger. As Charles

Cascales points out, Ortega anticipates by several years much of Heidegger's thinking. ⁴⁷ More than his thinking, Ortega anticipates Sartre's main theses concerning man as freedom and as a project.

Rational-vitalism, however, is a variation of the central current of the philosophy of existence with its own particular characteristics differentiated from existentialism. The latter tends to see existence as a project of pure freedom in the face of the absurdity of the world and of nothing. Ortega, on the other hand, sees life as something formally inserted into the circumstance and burden of historicity. Rational-vitalism is a philosophy of reason within circumstance and history.

Epistemology and Ontology

In the final analysis, Ortega's philosophy is an epistemology that goes beyond the alternative of realism-idealism, and an ontology that goes beyond positivism and rationalism. Ortega feels this result has been reached by maintaining that life is radical reality because all other realities are rooted in it. Things do not exist outside us but happen in our life. Reality is not even the 'I' but the relationship with the other. On the other hand, when things happen in our life they are always seen in perspective.

Perspective is an integral part of the reality of things mediated by life and total reality is no more than the sum of all possible perspectives.

Did Ortega achieve the results he hoped for? Actually, in my view rational-vitalism, rather than a means of overcoming idealism and realism, is a juxtaposition of them. It begins with an idealism of life - instead of an idealism of pure mind - and turns life into the environment in which all realities belong. Then, through perspectivism and based on the idea that reality when seen in perspective is actually seen as such - total reality as a sum of all possible perspectives - rational-vitalism presupposes neo-realism.

I believe there are two main faults within the central nucleus of Ortega's thought, in spite of the richness of his intuitions and the attractiveness of his metaphors. The first arises precisely out of his metaphorical treatment of life. What, finally, is this life in which all realities are rooted? It is not life in a biological sense, but existence as drama. But a drama without actors, purely as plot, because Ortega's man is nothing, he is purely his own happening.

⁴⁷Cf. Charles Cascales, L'Humanisme d'Ortega y Gasset, op.cit., p. 17.

This pure happening of a man, which constitutes man himself in his own progress, thus creates an event without a subject in relation to which, however, it is not proper to make any predication. This life cannot be just a pure event without a subject that happens and is independent of what happens, giving that subject, who does not exist in himself, any kind of experience of things.

The second difficulty I find in Ortega's central theses is the passage from the idealism of life to the critical realism of reality, through perspectivism. If things happen in my life - and leaving out the prior difficulty of my life being a life without a subject that is independent of it - there is still the problem of knowing what the nature is of the reality of these things outside my life. The fact of them being seen from a perspective within my life does not give external legitimacy to my life; they only add a divisive note to my vital subjectivism.

Historical Reason

If the epistemological and metaphysical bases of rational-vitalism seem questionable to me because Ortega failed to submit his insights and brilliant metaphors to rigorous critical and scientific analysis, I nevertheless believe his contribution to historical reason and in general to theory of history, has the greatest relevance and pertinence.

We should pay no attention to the criticism aimed at it by Eduardo Nichol - an Ortegan *malgré lui-même* – who says that the importance of Ortega's contribution to historiology was already to be found in Dilthey and that either Ortega owed him more than he admitted or had the unhappy fate of rediscovering by himself what someone else had already discovered.⁴⁸

In fact Ortega, in spite of Dilthey coming before him, is not merely repeating Biebrich's philosophy, but is an original elaborator of a theory of history as a process and a form of knowledge that shares with its own characteristics a historicist view of which Dilthey represents a relevant moment, but does so neither as the founder of this view nor as the person who explains it most comprehensively. There is a whole tradition, from Vico to the historiology of the Enlightenment and then to Hegel, that leads to the historiology of Dilthey and Ortega. And Ortega, who follows Dilthey and also Rickert and Cassirier, goes further in his historical thought than his

⁴⁸Cf. Nicol., *Historicismo y Existencialismo*, p. 308 et seq., México, El Colégio de México, 1950.

predecessors by developing a theory of historical reason and a systematicity that Dilthey always sadly lacked.

In his writings on history, notably *Historia como Sistema*, Ortega emphasizes the fact that human experience constitutes a system transmitted by tradition in a preserved form and in an altered form by gradual or sudden historical changes. In the context of this systematic process, Ortega requires an equally systematic historical knowledge which must not be devoured by the topical nature of events or by conjuncturalism. He demands historical reason with categories. In this context historical reason has a double meaning for Ortega. As *ratio humana* it expresses the essential historicity of life. Vital reason, within time, is historical reason. And thus man is given a genuine understanding of historicity. On the other hand, as the *logos* of the historical, it has its own categories in the same way as physical and mathematical reason is the *logos* of nature.

In this latter sense, in several of his writings, but especially in his notes for a prologue to Hegel's *History of Philosophy* (*Obras Completas* IV, p. 521 *et seq.*), he maintains the need for a new theory of history that will use a system of hypothetical ordering of data. Historiology is not a mere methodological reflection on the history *rerum gestarum* or historiography, but also an immediate analysis of the *res gesta* of historical reality that determines its ontological texture, the basic ingredients it is composed of and its primary dimensions.

Ortega finds this ontological texture of history, based on a spiritual view of human action, in the three-part connection between man and circumstance, man and people and the cycle of generations. The great engine of history is the combination of vital impulse - that primary human force that leads men to assert themselves in the world and transcend themselves - and the development of culture as an instrument for controlling the world and as an expression of the humanization of man and his creative excesses. The previously mentioned three-part connection operates from the basis of this spiritual-cultural impulsiveness. Having already referred to Ortega's ideas concerning mancircumstance and man-people relationships, I shall make a brief mention of his theory of generations.

Ortega's innovation in terms of this question consists in substituting the biological idea of generation as a father-to-son succession for a socio-cultural idea that corresponds to the connection, by age groups in 15-year intervals, of men in society. At any given moment three generations are always important:

(1) the dominant one which includes a range of people aged between 40 and 60 or more years, (2) the emerging one, consisting of those between about 30 to over 40 years of age who, having completed their cultural and professional training, are seeking to establish themselves in various strata of society and (3) the declining one, which includes those over 60, men who until recently controlled the main social roles and who, with the exception of certain long-lasting eminent figures, are being displaced from their previous preeminence by the new ruling generation, and finally by death.

Ortega states that the generations tend to have their own characteristics; some of these, the formal ones, arise out of the respective condition of emergence, dominance or decline and lead to certain kinds of intergenerational conflicts. Other, more concrete ones depend on the historical process that each generation, because of its circumstances, was specifically made to adopt. As well as being a philosopher and historical theoretician, Ortega was an excellent practitioner of the discipline in his various contributions to historical studies and also in his analyses of the Roman Empire (*Obras Completas* VI), of the emergence of the new physics in *En Torno a Galileo* (*Obras Completas* V) or the new historiology in *Guillerno Dilthey, la Idea de Vida* (*Obras Completas* VI). In these studies we meet a brilliant application of his historical theories based on solid factual information and backed up *ad atera* by his incisive philosophical commentaries.

Ortega's Sociology

Ortega was very interested in sociology itself as distinct from the sociology found in any historical study. For many years his work on *La Rebelión de las Masas (Obras Completas* IV) was considered to be his most important book and Ortega himself gave particular importance to the study he planned to write on *El Hombre y la Gente*, of which he left only the first version in manuscript form.

Ortega's sociology, the style and brilliant insights of which are reminiscent of Simmel's work, naturally reflects all his ideas on human life and, in a subconscious way, his own attitude towards society. Given the emphasis Ortega placed on everything concerning the authentic and personal forms of life, on the noble life and on transcendent projects, he was naturally led towards a psychological approach to the social phenomenon and treated it more in terms

of social psychology than sociology in its strictest sense. It is also true that the version arising out of his sense of values towards the anonymous, the automatic, that which comes from people and not from man, did not predispose him to a cool and dispassionate study of what is specifically social in society.

We should also recall that Ortega's greatest contribution in this area is what he wrote concerning inter-subjectivity, the ego and the alter-ego in the social context. In strictly sociological terms, Ortega's vision is not broad. His sociology concentrates on the study of customs and behavior. He pays no attention to the links between social classes nor the origin and consequences of this stratification. The phenomena of power, on the other hand, are seen as simple expressions of human aggressiveness or as a necessary way of sanctioning social norms. He does not understand the details of the political process, the relationships of creating and exercising power, nor its interrelationships with the economy and culture.

What does show through in Ortega's sociological writings, however, are his own class prejudices. Intellectually, Ortega differentiated between select minorities as the functional expression of certain forms of excellence, and the masses as an expression of rigid forms of life, both expressions of the fortuitous social status of the former and the latter. In his actual treatment of the subject he confused the aristocracy of excellence with the excellence of the aristocracy. And Ortega's masses, although theoretically defined as the homogenous grouping of masses of men, are actually in the end confused with the proletariat and the great working masses.

Feeling himself to be an aristocrat in the public square, ready to serve public interests, in spite of his proposals Ortega did not only allow his class values to subconsciously permeate his understanding of social reality, but also transferred the implications of those values to some of his philosophical concepts. So his ideas of noble and vulgar life, of authentic and unauthentic life, as well as his notion of vocation presuppose, on the part of the choosing subject, finding himself in objective conditions that allow him the free exercise of those choices, which in practical terms restricts those chances to those occupying the middle or upper strata of society.

Ortega's Importance

Every work containing a writer's thinking presents controversial aspects, however widely and highly readers agree on its importance. Thus, to quote

the most classic examples, with Plato and Aristotle, those two cornerstones of human thought, a permanent argument still continues about whether one is better than the other in terms of their central ideas. On the other hand, it is inevitable, when dealing with less outstanding figures who have approached a wide range of questions, that they do not show the same level of excellence in all their writings.

These general considerations seem appropriate at the conclusion of this brief study on Ortega, in order to try to make a brief general appreciation of his significance. Ortega was a man of genius and broad culture surrounded by the most brilliant minds of our time, even though he cannot be included in that narrow group of supreme thinkers who trace the basic trajectory of philosophy and science from classical antiquity to the present day. For this reason, as well as the inevitably controversial nature of any work of ideas, his work is undeniably variable in quality.

Of course, his personal propensity to write occasional works such as his countless articles for newspapers and magazines, many lectures and short essays, led him to deliberately work at a more impressionistic than rigorous level of communication. Also, as we have seen repeatedly in this study, even in terms of his central ideas, his schematic treatment of the subject and associated inclination towards a metaphorical approach to his insights only rarely led him to make a final elaboration of his theories.

The metaphorical schematicism that has just been alluded to, and which is so typical of Ortega's work, has advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages, we must emphasize the fact that it allowed him to create a breadth and diversity of writing which a more perfectionist or concentrated writer could not have achieved. In addition, and much more important, is the fact that this metaphorical schematicism, for a man of Ortega's genius and universality, led him to create ideas of extraordinary seminal richness which he produced in a preliminary form, as was his custom. For that reason it is certain that his thinking often lacked an appropriate foundation - and this is where we find one of the main drawbacks in his character. It is equally certain that on other occasions a rigorous critical and scientific revision of some of his ideas would have led him to abandon them because of their lack of basis in analytical or factual terms and this is the root of another of the disadvantages of those characteristics. But it is also true that in many cases Ortega's metaphorical schematicism opens up immense possibilities, which his thoughts return to, of giving them their finishing touches or using them as points of departure for a new explorations of reality.

As may be understood from my foregoing comments on Ortega's central themes, I believe - to illustrate my thinking with three of his main themes: vital reason, historiology and his sociological ideas – that a critical revision of them would lead to quite different appraisals. On this subject I would say that the theme of vital reason as set out by Ortega suffers from epistemological and ontological fallacies that require them to be reformulated. I think that in this case Ortega had an insight and contribution of the greatest relevance with its emphasis on human life as an arena for man's experiences and also as something linked to circumstances marked by historicity and representing the plot of a drama and not a biological process. Nevertheless, the epistemological fallacies I have referred to in this study seem to me to require a significant re-working of the theme.

From another point of view, Ortega's ideas concerning historiology and history, his notion of historical reason as a rationale for narrative and the flux of life, and of historical science as a form of knowledge requiring categories to organise historical data, are contributions of the greatest importance and create a critical and scientific platform from which fertile progress may be made.

I feel there are fewer elements worth retaining from Ortega's sociological contributions. His ideas concerning inter-subject relationships and society are important. Of greater interest and brilliance are many of his insights in the style of Simmel concerning situations and social roles. The general structure of his sociology, however, is idealistic and some way distant from the mainstream of scientific and critical understanding of the society of the social system.

This variation of results and quality in Ortega's work seems to me something he shares with most writers who try to cover a wider range of questions. His importance is in no way diminished by this shortfall. Indeed, in spite of the wide recognition his name receives today, I feel his real importance and relative position among thinkers in the first half of the 20th century are rather underestimated.

This is basically due to the circumstance I mentioned at the start of the study: the terrible dependence of a thinker's prestige on the cultural environment he belongs to. The lack of prestige of Spain in the areas of philosophy and science has had a negative effect on Ortega's image. What has happened to him is the opposite of what happens to thinkers in countries with better cultural images such as France, England or Germany where the reputation of the

respective national cultures adds to the acceptance and respectability of their writers. In contrast, Ortega had the task of raising his country's cultural image. A more important thinker in my view than Paul Ricoueur, Gabriel Marcel or Jean-Paul Sartre, to quote figures from similar groups and of similar stature, Ortega is rarely recognized as such outside the Hispanic world and is definitely not yet recognized as such in France itself or the Anglo-Saxon world, which are particularly averse to anything coming out of Iberia.



10. Concerning ISEB (2006)

I think I can begin these brief reflections on ISEB (Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros - Advanced Institute for Brazilian Studies), by recognizing that it was an important experience for me at a certain period in my life. I have always felt myself to be an intellectual committed to the conditions pertaining in Brazil and in our times. Thus I have tried, during the course of my relatively long life, to maintain the same commitment and effort to think critically about Brazil, using the categories of contemporary culture for this purpose. It was important to place Brazil in its domestic and international contexts. One precept that has directed my view of things for a long time has been that of seeing Brazil from the point of view of our time and seeing our time from the point of view of Brazil.

I believe that all universality must start from a concrete, existential and even personal situation. For this reason it is important to use universal and personal categories in a reversible way.

ISEB was the result of the efforts of a group of people I brought together in Rio de Janeiro. For this reason I should give a little previous history, which contained various episodes. The first stage happened in the 1940s thanks to the mediation of my friend the poet Augusto Frederico Schmit, who had a great deal of influence in the 1940s and 50s, a complex man, a man of thought, action and business, in short, a universal man. He was a friend of Hermano Cardim, editor-in-chief and owner of the *Jornal do Commercio*, who offered

us space on page five of the publication where from time to time the group I was coordinating could express its ideas on Brazil and the world. This was the first stage that preceded the creation of ISEB. The second occurred when this group in Rio began to work together with a group in São Paulo of which the most important member was Roland Corbisier. He had been a member of the Integralist Party but had moved on to a more advanced position. It was at this time that the idea arose of holding regular meetings of the Rio and São Paulo groups on the last weekend of each month in Itaiaia, half-way between the two cities. The then Minister of Agriculture, Cleophas, gave us accommodation in the National Park and there we began to have serious discussions on Brazilian and world problems. Out of these discussions came an awareness within the group of a need to make these discussions more systematic and so IBESP (Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Política – the Brazilian Institute of Economics, Sociology and Politics) was formed. Among those belonging to IBESP, of which I was General Secretary, were Ewaldo Correia Lima, Candido Mendes, Guerreiro Ramos, Ignácio Rangel, Israel Klabin, João Paulo de Almeida Magalhães, José Ribeiro de Lira, Moacir Felix de Oliveira, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez, Roland Corbisier and Rômulo Almeida.

The Institute began to publish a journal called *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo*, edited by me. It had an extraordinary success and great impact on society, but there was a problem of the kind that cultural journals created in this way always suffer: it did not have its own funding and finally ended up being financed by me. At that time I was beginning my career as a lawyer and was still only receiving modest fees.... As the experiment was becoming ever more expensive as a result of rising costs, so it became difficult to finance the publication from my own earnings. Therefore our group examined the problem and found a solution, which was to abandon private enterprise and turn this cultural activity into a public undertaking. This was the correct decision because only with state help could a cultural undertaking such as that make progress. We started moves to create an institute under the Vargas government with the support of the team that was advising it, notably Rômulo Almeida, to set up a major centre for Brazilian studies. When the Vargas government fell it was very difficult to launch this project. Those who replaced the Vargas team were completely opposed to the ideas of the Itaiaia group.

The Minister of Education at that time, Candido de Oliveira, however, was in sympathy with our ideas and helped to create the new Institute. So

ISEB was created by decree. For this to be possible, the intervention of Anísio Teixeira, at that time a senior figure in the Ministry of Education was decisive. The Institute was created by a decree signed by President Café Filho who in fact did not know what he was creating with ISEB - the Advanced Institute for Brazilian Studies.

Once the institution had been founded we had to look for a place to accommodate it with the basic conditions for intellectuals to carry out their activities. We found this pleasant house at No. 55, Rua das Palmeiras, in the Botafogo district of Rio de Janeiro. It was here that ISEB was set up with the support of a modest grant from the Ministry of Education.

The success of ISEB is due to the group that worked there for no pay. In addition to me, a political scientist, Roland Corbisier participated as Director, Ewaldo Correia Lima as an economist, Cândido Mendes, a historian, Guerreiro Ramos, a sociologist. We were joined later by Álvaro Vieira Pinto, a philosopher and Nelson Werneck Sodré, who wrote a history of Brazil.

The money from the small grant was earmarked to pay the rent and the fees of the full-time Executive Director and the small group of staff necessary for the Institute's operations. When there was some money left over it was spent on starting a library. This system worked well with Roland Corbisier as Director. He was already a member of the Itaiaia group. At a certain point, however, he suffered a crisis at the *Estado de São Paulo* newspaper of which he was editor. So he left the newspaper and was able to accept our invitation to move to Rio de Janeiro and become Executive Director of ISEB.

ISEB was set up as a parliamentary system. There was a General Council that appointed the Executive Director and had the power to direct the Institute. At that time I was head of this Council.

So began the ISEB adventure. It had a plan for Brazil. This was not a vague proposal but arose out of a critical analysis of the conditions pertaining in Brazil and the world. What is the nature of the country? What are the conditions of our time? What is the nature of the international scenario? Within this perspective, looking at the national and international situations, what is best for Brazil in this context? Based on this double analysis of the state of Brazil and the world, the idea we formed was that Brazil had the opportunity and absolute necessity to overcome its underdevelopment by means of an immense effort to industrialize.

The initial group that comprised ISEB fully shared the ideas of CEPAL [Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe - Economic Committee

for Latin America and the Caribbean – trans.]. This consisted of making a planned effort to bring about industrialization and a guided effort to achieve Latin American integration. It was decided not to wait for this integration in order to start industrialization, but on the contrary, it was felt that the basis of a well-directed national effort would facilitate and stimulate this integration. Integration was seen as an objective and not as an initial condition.

From then on the ISEB group worked together to formulate the national development plan that would lead to a great push to create a solid infrastructure and the development of the main sectors of the economy. On the foundation of this major infrastructure system, basic industries and capital goods industries would be constructed.

At the same time, we advocated the idea that a project of this scope could only be carried out by a large-scale national mobilization the strength of which would be based on an alliance of classes. We were convinced that no single class would be able to meet the challenge of this project. Our analysis of that time was that Brazil was still dominated by what we called the landowning-merchant group. On the one hand, the large landowners and on the other, great merchants who exported raw materials and imported finished products, including consumer durables to which only the landowning-merchant class had access. We maintained that this was a perverse alliance because it perpetuated the semi-colonial economy. We were not opposed to exporting raw materials but rather to the excessive importing of finished goods. The great effort referred to could be brought about by activating an alliance between the state, the country's bourgeoisie and industrial workers in opposition to the landowning-merchant system and the archaic and parasitic middle-class. Our idea was to create a new middle class with an industrial mentality in opposition to the merchant middle class. We also wished to create an industrial working class in opposition to the rural world that was manipulated by coroneis ['colonels' - political bosses among the landowning class – trans.]. In short, to create an industrial bourgeoisie in opposition to landowning-merchant classes who were perpetuating a semi-colonial system. An industrialization process similar to what we were proposing could not be brought about by a mere project developed by intellectuals or simply because the President of the Republic might have decided to create it by decree. This plan could only succeed if it were based upon large-scale mobilization at national level.

ISEB was also not in favor of conventional Marxism, which places the bourgeoisie and proletariat in a state of inevitable opposition. We maintained

that in the situation which Brazil found itself in as a country on the road to development, social capitalism based on an alliance between the state, the industrial bourgeoisie, the technical middle-class and the working class was both necessary and possible.

Based on this set of analyses of Brazil and the world, and with this proposal for an anti-landowning-merchant alliance of the industrial bourgeoisie associated with the proletariat and the modern middle-class, we thought these ideas could be implemented by means of a set of basic methods. Among these were: (a) forming elites motivated by these ideas through courses and other forms of information; (b) planning conferences throughout the country to discuss these ideas and (c) the combined influence of the legislative and executive sectors of central government in Brasilia. This is what we tried to do by means of ISEB and we succeeded to a certain extent in meeting our aim because once the reactionary period of the Café Filho phase had passed there followed the government of Juscelino Kubitschek, which agreed completely with these ideas and put into practice what would come to be called national-developmentalism.

ISEB and the Present

It would be interesting to put today's Brazil face-to-face with the ISEB period. This is a very important point because Brazil is in fact caught in a trap created by one-track thinking, by neoliberalism and by a static economic model which is correct in certain limited aspects but profoundly wrong to the extent that it is based on self-stagnating premises. I believe that it is time to establish a new developmentalism adapted to the conditions of globalization without ignoring it, but on the other hand not taking globalization as a process that completely ties the hands of the national state. The first thing I feel it important to emphasize is that these are the conditions essential to a country like Brazil which, as it enters the 21st century, now has good infrastructure, both industrial and technological, and an intellectual critical mass that can form a national state sufficiently capable of administering the process of globalization instead of being administered by it.

The basic point is the following: it is not a case of everything being resolved by the market but a case of disciplining, regulating and directing the market; not suppressing it but rather transferring its supremacy to the Brazilian people by means of the State. This does not necessarily mean returning to the entrepreneurial State. We are not against the market but this cannot mean that the public company should be abolished. It is possible to make the State work with the support of private enterprise, but in certain cases the public sector is necessary. One of the great mistakes of the privatization that has characterized recent times was the idea that everything that public services did was wrong. In fact, there is no sense in privatizing monopoly activities. This is completely absurd because, instead of having controllable public monopolies working for the common good, private monopolies are created to be driven only by the desire for profit.

On the other hand, it makes no sense to abandon public services to the benefit of foreign companies. The foreign company is only seeking to make a profit in our internal market and has no interest in economic emancipation. In this sense, my proposal is for a neodevelopmentalism consisting in returning to the ideas of developmentalism while taking into account the constraints and circumstances arising out of globalization, but rejecting the thesis that globalization demands the subordination of the State to its workings. There are certain states, although relatively few, that are controlling the process of globalization. China and India are having great success in this area. Brazil, although with a smaller critical mass, can also do this.

To make up for our inadequate rate of social integration we need to establish a solid alliance with Argentina, leading to the consolidation of Mercosul, until we arrive at a solid South American system of development. Based on this, we can control the system of globalization and direct it towards emancipating Brazil and South America. Neo-developmentalism implies that when certain countries have a critical mass the process of globalization can be administered by the State instead of being administered by it, until the State practically disappears under the justification that the market is all-powerful. Our position is exactly the opposite. The State disciplines, regulates and directs the process of globalization without suppressing the market, which is absolutely necessary but which needs to be disciplined by the supremacy of the State. What should be condemned is the dictatorship of the market over society.

Álvaro Vieira Pinto

The work of Álvaro Vieira Pinto in the second phase of ISEB deserves a brief commentary. The point about Álvaro the intellectual is complicated

because first of all he came late to ISEB. Secondly, ISEB was the initiative of a group of young intellectuals in their 30s while Vieira Pinto, when he joined ISEB, was about 50 years old. He had had a long career as a teacher of History of Philosophy in the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Brazil, now the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. He was a specialist in Plato studies and therefore had a background in philosophy and almost no background in sociology. So his contribution to ISEB was in philosophy. This made him important within ISEB on account of his profound competence, but his experience was quite special because it had previously consisted in discussing Plato with three or four enthusiasts before now coming face-toface with a young and highly active audience. His incorporation into the group began to be influenced by this audience, causing him to re-direct his thinking. One constant worry I had in ISEB, one which was shared by other colleagues, was the need to enthuse and mobilize young people without following the passions of the young because this inevitably leads to extremism of various forms. This is true of young people all over the world and not only in Brazil.

In my view, Alvaro Vieira Pinto allowed himself to be recruited by the audience, that is, to do what the audience asked him to do and so the 'platonizer' became the 'marxizer'. Thus Álvaro came to have a role in ISEB during the period when I was no longer there. This was when ISEB went through a great crisis in 1959, created by Guerreiro Ramos, a great friend of mine and a person with whom I had enjoyed much contact and great intellectual cooperation for long time. Guerreiro was a man of humble birth, a mulatto whose mother was a cook, but he had a great talent for sociology developed through much effort and so was unquestionably a man with a broad vision of the country.

A very rare phenomenon occurred in 1959. I do not understand how a man like Guerreiro, with his sociological competence and clarity of analysis, could have adopted the false position that Brazil was heading for a profound social revolution and that ISEB could be the means of guiding this revolution. At that point Guerreiro began to use the expression: "Enough of understanding Brazil, let's change it". Thus he wanted to turn ISEB into an agent of activism, that is, a political, practical and militant agent. ... I said to him: "Don't do this, because you're being naive!" Why did the Institute have such a large audience in progressive circles in Brazil? Because, among other things, it was recognized that none of us (in ISEB) wanted to fight elections or try to be ministers. ... Finally, I tried to make some of our colleagues see that as committed

intellectuals, our function was to guide analysis and debate on the situation in Brazil and not enter into political competition. Guerreiro formed a Machiavellian plan against my leadership, involving Roland Corbisier as well, without the latter realizing it. He was convinced that if he could remove Roland Corbusier and me from the leadership he could take over ISEB and make it what he wanted to be; he would turn it into an agent of activism and militancy. Guerreiro's idea that we were on the verge of a great social movement and that ISEB could be the great orchestrator of this movement, was completely wrong.... He saw himself as a kind of future Lenin based on very mistaken ideas of the situation in Brazil and the world.

This was when a regrettable episode happened. It was our custom in ISEB to show each other what we were writing.... At that time I was preparing a book that would have the title O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira (Nationalism in Modern Brazil). This book consisted of a discussion attempting to give nationalism a strictly rational orientation without prejudicing the emotional associations it should preserve. Why is nationalism rationally suitable? The book analyzed the *entreguista* [surrenderist - trans.] position, which for reasons of style I called cosmopolitista (cosmopolitanist - trans.), and also examined the nationalist position. I compared the two and drew conclusions from the comparison. This produced Guerreiro's regrettable response. What did he do? He interpreted the text from the *cosmopolitista* point of view and told everyone this was how Helio Jaguaribe was thinking! Based on what had been dialectically organized as thesis, antithesis and synthesis, he claimed I was defending the *entreguista* position, thus causing major rumors in the press. This had immense repercussions in ISEB and led to a great deal of internal discussion in which all ISEB's authorities met to discuss the question. Guerreiro lost this debate. In the same debate, Professor Alvaro Viera Pinto, who shared Guerreiro's ideological positions by reason of his own ideological tendencies, was also defeated. There was a decidedly heated and fierce discussion because questions were discussed concerning honesty, ethics and integrity between colleagues working together there. After his defeat, Guerreiro resigned and left ISEB. As a side effect, another regrettable event occurred. Roland did not realise that Guerreiro wanted to displace him and so decided to support him. After reviewing my book he claimed regrettably that he "had reviewed it but not read it". Because of this, Roland voted in favor of Guerreiro and lost. With Guerreiro's resignation, the meeting closed and the Institute's staff went on holiday until March because we were already into December.

During the holiday period Roland, having lost the debate because he had voted in favor of his defeated colleague, had the impression that when we returned to work in ISEB the following year, the Council would dismiss him, although that was not our intention. So what did he do? He was connected to a lady who was very friendly with President Juscelino Kubitschek and through her had privileged access to the President's office. Roland took advantage of the situation and in an audience with the President, who had no idea about what was happening at ISEB, argued that Brazil had a presidential regime, but that ISEB was a parliamentary organ. The Director of ISEB was elected by the Council instead of being appointed by the President of the Republic or by the Minister of Education. The President agreed with Roland, who created a new regime for ISEB that was approved without opposition and made the Council merely a consultative one. This occurred during the vacation and when we returned to our normal activities in March the following year, we found a completely changed ISEB. Realizing that Roland had carried out a *coup*, I finally resigned from ISEB and a good number of people left along with me, among them Anísio Teixeira and Roberto Campos. From then on, Roland remained as Director, but was appointed by order of the Minister of Education.

In fact, during the period when Roland was in charge without my presence, which was a total of two years until the 1962 election, he ran ISEB quite well and did not change its basic lines of action. He simply made ISEB an instrument to support his election as Deputy, in other words he used ISEB for his electoral campaign and succeeded in being elected. As a result he had to resign the post of Executive Director of ISEB. After his departure, Álvaro Vieira Pinto was named as the new Executive Director. As the head of the Institute, Álvaro imposed a completely Marxist line on ISEB. Thus it assumed the role of mouthpiece for the Communist Party of Brazil. It should be made clear that from its beginning ISEB had maintained an independent and culturalist position which Alvaro's appointment totally altered. Thus, when the 1964 coup occurred, the military forces viewed Alvaro's ISEB as a clearly Communist institution. Without knowing what ISEB had previously been, they invaded the premises armed with machine guns. Álvaro had a very weak and delicate personality and faced with this shock of a violent invasion of ISEB and subsequent persecution, he began to suffer a syndrome of fearing the police.

He later went into voluntary exile. Some years later, in 1968, on the eve of the political persecution brought about by AI-5 [Institutional Act No. 5, which hardened military oppression in Brazil – trans.] he returned to Brazil and locked himself in his apartment, where he lived in complete isolation for the rest of his life. He had suffered an irrecoverable trauma.

Stages of ISEB's Development

We can say that ISEB's development was characterized by three different stages of thinking: the first was when I headed the Institute, from its foundation, as coordinator of its actions and decision-making, although I did not hold any executive post apart from that of researcher. At this point the intellectual direction was mine, with the valuable collaboration of my colleagues; the second stage was under Roland Corbisier, at the beginning of the 1960s. Finally, ISEB was dominated by the ideas of Álvaro Vieira Pinto from 1962 onward, when Roland left to take his seat in the Assembly. It is important to comment on certain important aspects of this historical process of the Institute.

I would point out first of all that we overestimated the capacity of industrialization to create jobs. The Brazilian industrialization process was really extraordinary and changed the country. The great achievement of President Kubitschek was to carry out 50 years of progress in five. He came to the presidency of an agrarian society and five years later, when he left government, he left an industrial society. Not even Japan achieved this transformation so quickly. This was the most astonishing social change that I know of in the modern world.

The ability for industrial Brazil to provide jobs, however, was modest. As is well known, modern industry's ability to provide jobs is decreasing. In this context, two phenomena occurred: first, the capacity of industry to absorb labor was too small for the number of workers who had left the countryside for the towns. After the 1960s there was a huge wave of immigration from the country to the towns. Millions of Brazilians left the fields, with their utter poverty and lack of education, for urban areas in search of work within the industrialization process. In the towns, this demand by migrant labor encountered an industrial system that was unable to absorb that number of people. Second: the requirements of the system for absorbing labor exceeded the level of education of the masses coming from the countryside. Thus these masses came to form a huge peripheral society surrounding our cities which it

was difficult to employ because they did not have any qualification to participate in modern society. ISEB was not aware of the situation at that time. We felt that industrialization would absorb the Brazilian masses, which was a mistake.

It should also be stated, secondly, that we did not realize that the process of industrialization promoted by the Brazilian state had led it to make efforts that surpassed the resources available. Because of this the subsequent problem came about, which has still not been solved, of a deficit of State resources. The state's resources fell short of the task it had set itself and began to operate in an increasingly inadequate way, which provided a pretext for the rise of a neoliberalism that preached the near extinction of the state. What we could have done was review the duties of the State and match them to the State's ability to create resources. To this end, the main problem that has not been corrected, from the post-Kubitschek period until today, is that of readjusting the State. Neoliberalism tried to abolish the state and almost succeeded. Bearing in mind that the modern State is minuscule compared to what it once was, one of the urgent tasks today is to rebuild the State. But for this we need a different economic model than the one we inherited from recent decades. And there is even more need for a broad and deep reform of legislation regulating elections and political parties.

Where my analyses and thinking in ISEB were correct was in helping to build the national-developmental project which stimulated a process of industrialization in Brazil that led it to overcome its underdevelopment. I still believe that there were no alternatives or solutions for the problem of Brazil other than this national-developmental approach. To be viable, the nationalism of yesterday needs to be integrationist today, which was not really the case in Brazil during 1960s when the country was able to go its own way to a considerable extent. Today it can no longer do this. Therefore, today the Argentine-Brazil alliance is a precondition for the survival of both countries. There is no future for an Argentina or a Brazil in isolation. This alliance has to be the keystone of the opportunity for countries like Brazil and Argentina and the rest of South America to confront the negative aspects of the wave of globalization.

The 1964 Coup

After the military *coup* ISEB really had no chance of survival, especially with the line of thinking imposed by the then Executive Director Álvaro

Vieira Pinto, who had linked ISEB to the Brazilian Communist Party. We can only imagine what would have happened if there had been a different Director during this period. Perhaps ISEB would not have been closed because it would not have linked itself to any party or militant activities. It would have continued to be an organ of intellectual activity intellectually committed to the critical analysis and discussion of Brazilian problems. Most probably, however, the military would not have tolerated independent thinking.

40 Years after ISEB

To celebrate 40 years of ISEB, a conference was organized central aim of which was to pay tribute to Guerreiro Ramos. I was invited to make this tribute and accepted the invitation. Actually, the sociologist Guerreiro must be separated from the regrettable period in which he made an intellectual mistake and did something ethically unacceptable. I cannot understand how a sociologist as able as he could have made such an incorrect evaluation of the social conditions in Brazil at that time, but a man, an intellectual, should not be judged on just one mistake. Guerreiro's contribution to Brazilian sociology is a very important one and his contribution to ISEB was also extremely important. Thus it was that I was very happy to be a part of this tribute.

After ISEB

The basis of my thinking at that time is still valid today. I have, however, no regrets about ISEB as it was while I was a member of it. I feel that what we did, in the conditions of the time, was correct. I recognize now, as Bresser points out in an excellent article about ISEB, that we overestimated the capacity of industrialization to provide jobs. This was a mistake we were not aware of at the time. The truth, however, is that was not the time to discuss the effects of industrialization but rather to promote it. Before that time it was better to have industrialization even if it did not provide many jobs, than not to have it. There was no alternative. Moreover, it was not for us, at that point, to measure the future limitations of the industrialization process because it was only just beginning. The second thing I would like to point out is that it was difficult then to predict the future lack of resources

on the part of the State. The industrialization process only showed its true colors when I was no longer with ISEB. President Kubitschek ran his spectacular government, leaving of course a State that had done an admirable job but which had exhausted itself in doing so. So we must ask: where did Brazil go wrong in the post-Kubitschek era? I believe it went wrong in two ways: first, later governments should have recognized that the State had exceeded its ability to sustain itself and should thus have prudently retreated in various areas. I would have favored the privatization of certain sectors, such as State enterprises operating in competitive areas but not in monopoly areas. I would not have privatized the Vale do Rio Doce company, Petrobras, Eletrobras or Embratel and others like them.... All these enterprises should have been kept as they were. On the other hand, I would have adopted much stronger measures to significantly raise the public sector's ability for investment, thus reducing its costs. That task is a difficult one because cutting costs is like recommending a fat person to lose weight.... It is the most difficult thing in the world to cut the fat off the state, but it is possible to a certain extent. In such a case, we would increase the state's capacity in terms of real investment.

The Roots of Thinking

The ISEB militants had in common a culturalist position. The strongest influence was German thinking from the creative period of the Weimar Republic, of Max Scheler, Max Weber and Cassirer. These were the thinkers who guided us, in contrast to other sectors of the Brazilian intelligentsia who were more influenced by French ideas. In its initial phase ISEB was influenced by German thought.

ISEB was obviously interested in reaching the masses. This was done through the courses it offered. Every year, a large number of people, both young people as well as those already working in the Brazilian administrative and productive system and who had a certain influence in their respective areas, were recruited. In this way we hoped to create a new mentality in these middle-level workers in Brazil. Ideas were transmitted to the masses by means of the books, magazines and publications best suited for spreading them at that time. The young people recruited to take ISEB courses spread these ideas through the influence they had in the workplace. ISEB had an extraordinary success but a relatively short life.

Other Trends

ISEB thinking had its counterpart during its historical period in the thinking of the Escola Superior de Guerra (Higher War College) which presents itself as being anti-ISEB. At that time, the idea of National Security predominated in everything that sustained the military governments after the *coup*. In Rio, which was still the nation's capital, anti-ISEB thinking was a defense of the principles of the right maintained by a certain part of Rio's elite. On the other hand, in a different way, with no right-wing connotations but with different positions, there was the thinking of the University of São Paulo (USP) containing ideas of academic sociology of French origin which ran counter to the sociological thinking of engagement in the service of national projects. In other words, USP maintained that the sociology of engagement was ideological and lacked scientific seriousness. This academic attitude implied an anti-ISEB position, not in terms of orientation, but in terms of intellectual work which supposedly had to be done at academic level. The great source of influence on USP thinking was French, while the great source of thinking at ISEB was the German thinking of the 1920s.

The Legacy of ISEB

I do not believe there has been an institution comparable to ISEB. It left a stubborn man, me, wanting to do what I had done within ISEB in a different situation. At the end of my time at ISEB I became very active in a project that greatly attracted me, that of Ferro e Aço de Vitória (Vitória Iron and Steel). At that point in my life I was motivated by the desire to contribute to Brazilian development not only through ideas but through actions, and also to prove to myself that I was not only a man of ideas and words but one who was capable of doing practical things. Among the practical things that seemed most stimulating to me, I chose that of creating a major steelworks. With the Ferro e Aço de Vitória project I actually managed to do something important. With no capital and starting from the mobilizing ability I could exercise at the time, I manage to build a large steelworks which was opened by João Goulart in 1963. It initially produced 500,000 tons of steel laminate per year. I gave the company the opportunity for major expansion through a system which, with funds already available and the technical plan drawn up by McKee in the United States, would be

able to produce two million tons of steel within the following five years. At that point, when I had this amazing project completely planned, the military coup of 1964 occurred. I realized then that a project like that could only be carried out with maximum support from the state. As I was opposed to the military coup I had no way to execute that project so I decided to resign the presidency of Ferro e Aço. Castelo Branco, who took over the presidency, was actually a personal friend of mine. He wanted to invite me to join his government and made me a very attractive offer.... I said I had to refuse because I was convinced that, in spite of his moderate position, his government was condemned by the forces supporting it to belong to the right, even against its own will. That is what indeed happened. He was not a man of the right, he was a moderate man, even of the centre-left, but he could not do what he wanted to because he was compromised by the radical right. This was what led me to refuse his invitation and resign from Ferro e Aço. Soon afterwards I accepted an invitation to be visiting professor at Harvard University. I spent several years as a visiting professor in the United States. Under the pretext of teaching, I learned a great deal.

IEPES

Rio de Janeiro, which was the centre of Brazilian thought, containing a sophisticated group of intellectuals committed to social change, suffered a great hiatus in its intellectual activity, which was left disarticulated by the 1964 *coup*. Rio lost influence when the national capital was transferred to Brasilia and what weakened it more was the regrettable misfortune of joining the State of Guanabara, which had promise, to the State of Rio, which was a state with no real shape. This greatly impoverished Rio de Janeiro, which became a deprived city. The decline of Rio was the result of this. After I returned from exile, I tried to set up a centre where I might continue my activity in the area of Social Sciences and contribute to discussing areas of public interest in Brazil. This Institute is IEPES (Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais - Institute for Political and Social Studies).

I am greatly in favor of universities but also of a great reform of the Brazilian University system. It is supremely important that centers of excellence in various sciences should be set up within the universities, at the same time as universities are opened up to a wider public. This is what gives importance to research such as that done by IEPES.

IEPES is a private institute. It is a limited company in civil law with partners who make up its General Assembly, which meets once or twice a year. This assembly elects the Board of Trustees which meets more often and this Board of Trustees elects directors who meet even more often. They also appoint a Dean who runs the Institute on a full-time basis. I was Dean of Institute from its foundation until 2003. On reaching the age of 80, I felt it was time to look for a younger person to run the Institute. My successor, Professor Francisco Weffort, ex-Minister of Culture in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government, is carrying out his duties extremely well. I remained as Emeritus Dean, freed from administrative and bureaucratic duties and able to dedicate myself completely to my own studies.







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