

II CURSO PARA DIPLOMATAS AFRICANOS

MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES



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Apresentação

Por instrução do Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, a Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (Funag) organizou o II Curso para Diplomatas Africanos, em setembro de 2011, para o qual foram convidados diplomatas dos seguintes países anglófonos: África do Sul, Botsuana, Gana, Namíbia, Nigéria, Quênia, Sudão, Sudão do Sul, Tanzânia, Zâmbia e Zimbábue. Angola foi também convidada a participar.

O Curso foi inaugurado pelo então Presidente da Funag, Embaixador Gilberto Vergne Saboia, que deu as boas-vindas aos participantes. Em seguida, o Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto, Subsecretário-Geral de Política III, ministrou a palestra de abertura que versou sobre as semelhanças culturais entre os povos africano e brasileiro. O Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro enfatizou a importância da participação dos diplomatas do Sudão do Sul, cuja independência havia sido declarada em 9 de julho, dois meses antes do início do Curso.

No decorrer do evento, os diplomatas convidados tiveram oportunidade de interagir com especialistas brasileiros e africanos em matérias pertinentes à agenda do relacionamento afro-brasileiro. Para complementar as apresentações, foram promovidas visitas a importantes instituições brasileiras, tais como Petrobras, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Embrapa), Museu Histórico Nacional, Biblioteca Nacional, Senado Federal e Instituto Rio Branco.

Os textos redigidos pelos palestrantes encontram-se reunidos nesta coleção de artigos, importante fonte de reflexão e úteis subsídios para estudiosos e autoridades interessados nas questões africanas.

Dirceu Ricardo Lemos Ceccatto
Analista de Relações Internacionais

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Palestra de Abertura

*Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto**

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia – Bom dia, eu queria dar as boas-vindas à interpretação simultânea. Vou falar em português, pelo menos na sessão de abertura, inclusive porque espero que isso estimule a familiarização dos nossos amigos com a língua portuguesa.

Eu queria dar as boas-vindas a todos os participantes desse II Curso para Diplomatas Africanos. Aos que vêm participar do curso e aos que vêm dar palestra, esse curso é uma indicação palpável da importância e da prioridade das relações entre o Brasil e a África.

Estamos muito satisfeitos que possam ter aceitado o nosso convite para vir a este segundo Curso. Eu estava comentando com o Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro – Subsecretário-Geral de Política III encarregado, entre outras coisas, dos assuntos da África – que o que promovemos aqui é um encontro com distintos diplomatas e uma troca de impressões e de experiências sobre os planos, a conjuntura, as dificuldades e as boas práticas que cada país está desenvolvendo para melhorar o padrão e as condições de vida da sua população.

Eu queria fazer uma menção especial à presença do Doutor Lam Akol Ajawin, do Sudão do Sul, que fará uma palestra mais tarde, ainda durante a manhã. Aqui, na mesa, eu sou o Presidente da Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão; o Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro eu já apresentei; e o Embaixador Maurício Cortes é o Diretor do Centro de História e Documentação Diplomática, uma instituição da Fundação Alexandre de

* Diplomata brasileiro, Ministro de Primeira Classe e Subsecretário-Geral Político III.

Gusmão, localizada no Rio de Janeiro, que trata da documentação histórica, da facilitação do trabalho dos historiadores e das pesquisas históricas.

Queria agradecer especialmente ao Embaixador Valter Peçly, à minha direita, que é o Chefe do Escritório Regional do Ministério das Relações Exteriores no Rio de Janeiro, pela sua hospitalidade neste Salão Nobre da Biblioteca do Itamaraty no Rio de Janeiro.

Com isso, eu passo a palavra ao Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro, que dirá algumas palavras nesta sessão de abertura antes de passarmos a sua palestra, porque ele também será palestrante essa manhã. Muito obrigado.

Senhor Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro – Bom dia, Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia, Senhor Embaixador Valter Peçly, Senhor Embaixador Maurício Cortes Costa, Senhor Ministro Lam Akol Ajawin. É para mim uma honra estar presente na sessão de abertura deste II Curso para Diplomatas Africanos. A minha presença aqui é em representação do Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio Patriota, que lamenta profundamente não estar presente, porque ele dá um extremo valor às nossas relações com os países do continente africano. Neste momento, ele está entre Istambul e Ancara, na Turquia.

O Itamaraty, que é uma instituição, na minha opinião, basilar do Estado brasileiro, sente-se também honrado em receber esses grupos de jovens diplomatas africanos na sua casa mãe: o Palácio do Rio de Janeiro, onde eu diria que quase tudo começou. O Itamaraty vê-se como uma instituição extremamente profissional; neste momento é que quebrou um pouco do seu profissionalismo, porque eu tenho aqui, fora do que seria o normal da nossa tão louvada maneira hierárquica de trabalhar, à minha direita, o Embaixador Valter Peçly, que na verdade devia estar no meu lugar, porque foi o meu Conselheiro há muitos anos, quando eu era Secretário em Genebra. Mas isso é uma maneira um pouco jocosa de falar dessa instituição, uma instituição quase bicentenária (porque ela nasceu antes da nossa Independência), uma instituição que sempre teve como norte a defesa dos interesses do Brasil.

Ao fazer aqui, em volta dessa mesa, esse segundo Curso para Diplomatas Africanos, o interesse do Ministério das Relações Exteriores – transformado em realidade pelos esforços da Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão – é intercambiar experiências com povos muito antigos, mas que se organizaram em nações, em Estados nacionais muito jovens. Aliás, eu tive a honra de representar a Senhora Presidenta da República no Dia da Independência do mais jovem de todos, o Sudão do Sul, que mandou três representantes para esse evento. Desejamos, então, em duas semanas, trocarmos opiniões e experiências com os senhores.

O Brasil tem uma imensa e antiga relação com a África, embora sua sociedade conheça muito pouco aquele continente. Um dos objetivos da Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, do nosso Centro de História e Documentação Diplomática e do Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais é exatamente promover dentro da sociedade brasileira um conhecimento maior do mundo fora das nossas fronteiras; disseminar a história diplomática e o interesse pelas Relações Internacionais. É este, a meu ver, o grande interesse e objetivo deste curso, e agradeço desde já as contribuições que os senhores nos darão. Embaixador, muito obrigado.

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia - Muito obrigado, Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro. Com isso, creio que damos por aberto o II Curso para Diplomatas Africanos e passamos prontamente à primeira palestra, que será proferida pelo Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto, Subsecretário-Geral de Política III. Embaixador, o senhor tem a palavra.

Senhor Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro - Well, following a suggestion of Ambassador Saboia I will change from Portuguese to English. My task here is to speak about the Brazilian relationship with Africa.

The word "Africa" is a multi-meaning word for us. Africa, in a certain way, is a somewhat fabled land. At least for those that come from Bahia, like me, it is a place at the other side of the sea, from which many of our forebears came. In fact, by the last census more than 52% of the Brazilians identified themselves as people of African descent. At the same time, it is a land of conflicts. It is the Africa we see on TV, the Africa we read about in newspapers. Being a Portuguese-speaking country, contrary to our Spanish-speaking neighbors that consider Spain as their motherland (Pátria) - their mother/fatherland, mother/fatherland or mother/ father motherland, I do not know. We say that Portugal is our "avôzinho", a kind of little grandfather and, in a certain way, Africa is our mother. However, at the same time, Brazilians do not know Africa well. The Ministry of External Affairs knows that there are fifty-four countries (as we do not recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), but some of you say that the Africans count in the other side fifty-five countries that are of a great diversity. Africa is also for Brazil, in a certain way, a measure that started before our own existence.

I apologize in advance to Ambassador Cortes Costa, because I will tell a lot of heretical theories about diplomatic history. The first is that Brazil came into being after the Iberian powers started to think of its

existence, but before finding it. Spain and Portugal signed the Tordesillas Treaty that divided the world in two hemispheres. The lands of America – that did not have that name at the time – were to be split between the two Kingdoms by a meridian located a hundred leagues west of “Ilhas do Cabo Verde” – Cape Vert Islands (in front of Senegal there are some islands that are now the Republic of Cape Vert). The Portuguese did not accept such an agreement and required the division to be located at a meridian 370 miles west of “Cabo Verde”. That area was to be Portuguese. So before Brazil was found and discovered, our territorial area was determined by an African benchmark.

The second is a kind of historical accident. I usually tell the Moroccan Ambassador that we owe part of our 8.5 million square kilometers to the warlike prowess of the Moroccans. A Portuguese King called Don Sebastião went to Morocco to conquer and (forgive me, Mohammed Hamza here) to combat the infidels (well, the Muslims). In his attempt to grasp a part of Morocco he was killed and he did not have children. So Portugal passed on to the hands of the Spanish King. That historical accident, in a certain way, made that line of “Tordesilhas” useless, since the King of Spain and the King of Portugal were the same person. From 1580 to 1640, the Portuguese-speaking people living in Brazil (descendants of Portuguese, Indigenous people and Africans) went westwards. When Portugal regained its independence – and that was a fact in South America – we had in a certain way conquered half of this territory. Forgive me for the “we”, but it is the way we see Brazilian history. And, again, an event in Africa had a determinant impact in South America.

Coming back to diplomatic history, we had to – and our forefathers had to – rethink that. What was Brazil at that time? Brazil was a collection of Portuguese colonies that had a large production of sugar cane, most of it worked by Africans forcibly brought here to be enslaved. That attracted, in a certain way, the greed of many European powers. The first power to try to get part of that Portuguese slice of land was the then Republic of the Netherlands. There is a Brazilian author called Alencastro that has written a very important book called “O Trato dos Viventes” [The Trade of the Living], in which he defends the thesis that, in the 16th and the 17th centuries, Brazil and West Africa were part of a single colonial entity. In fact, he tries to describe the South Atlantic as something as a Polynesian Atoll – an island with a very thin piece of land around a very big lagoon. He defends the idea that during the colonial period Brazil and Angola were part of a system in which each region had a role: Angola provided workers, Brazil provided land and Portugal got the results of it. For two

hundred years we were a single entity across the South Atlantic and it still influences us today.

A lot of Brazilian authors criticized such a perception. They say it is a kind of edenic vision of the past, of these links between Brazil and Africa. In fact, for 350 years we had as linkage the institution of slavery.

The slave trade ended in 1850 in great part because of the action of the British Navy. The Great Britain had reconverted from a country that fought wars against the Netherlands to get the so-called “asiento”, the monopoly that Spain gave to other European traders to bring slaves to its colonies. They converted Brazil into a humanitarian country that fought slavery.

If you go back to the thoughts of Marx and if you go back to the history of economic development of capitalism, there is a change from the so-called slave “modo de produção” [mode of production] to the capitalist one. We do not want slaves any longer; we want wage labors – they are much more efficient. Then the British estranged because they were in effect in the most advanced form of capitalism and fought the slave trade. Brazil was a slave-operated plantation, but from our independence in 1822 until 1825 we were committed to a Treaty of independence with Portugal in which one clause said that Brazil would renounce forever any attempt of Angolan cities to join the new independent entity. We had here a “brassage” [miscegenation] and the creation of a new people.

The end of slave trade meant, in a certain way, the dissolution of slave institutions in Brazil. For example, when we got independent, one third of the population was enslaved; when we ended formal slavery in 1888, only 5% of the population was still slave. There was a huge number of free blacks in this country.

During those 50 years, there was also a new phenomenon: the trade between West Africa and South America was no longer based in the slave trade. That could have been – and I underline the expression “could have been” – a very promising thing. In West Africa, in what is now Benin and Togo, we have the so-called Agoudas, some families of black Brazilians that went back to Africa after emancipation and established communities there. Just to mention another historical curiosity, the first two sovereigns that recognized Brazilian independence were African: the Oba of Onin, now Lagos, and his suzerain, the Oba of the city of Benin. Brazilian independence was declared by a Portuguese Prince, and for most of the 19th century Brazil was an Empire.

I was struck last May when I went to Abuja to the Inauguration of President Goodluck Jonathan, because he distributed a book of his travels

within Nigeria. He is from a small people – I do not like to use the word “tribe” – in the Delta of the Niger. He visited every Nigerian King, and there are some beautiful pictures of him with the Oba of Lagos and with the Oba of the city of Benin. I could see the successors of the first two Monarchs that recognized Brazil as an independent country. The third was the United States of America in 1824; and then Portugal because of the influence of the British Empire, that did not want those two countries to fight and – according to some historians in Brazil – to create a situation that would harm trade relations. Brazil, the independent Brazil, was already one of the greatest clients of Britain.

1885 was a terrible year for Africa and also a terrible year for Brazil. The Berlin Conference took place that year and it formalized the scramble for Africa. It also prevented Botswana (there’s a diplomat from Botswana here!) from having a border with Angola, because it created the so-called Caprivi Strait – 50 kilometers running from the Kalahari to the Zambezi River – that allowed the Germans to have access to something that they did not know exactly what it was. That Conference divided your continent and created the majority of existing borders there. Those borders were contrary to the African costume by which a river is a place of gathering, and adopted a thought like the Rhine, where the river is a barrier between two warring neighbors. It also created a barrier in the South Atlantic that prevented the transit of ships from Bahia to Idah. By that time, the ships no longer carried slaves but tobacco, exported “eau de vie”, brought “panos da costa” and other textiles that were very prized in our side of the Atlantic. They brought also kola nuts, which were essential for divination. Those ships crossed this piece of water that a great Brazilian Ambassador, Alberto da Costa e Silva, one of our great African historians, called “the Atlantic River”. The last ship that went from Bahia to Africa did so in 1906 – Patacho Aliança, the schooner Aliança – and from then on people in Africa had to trade with Paris, with London, and no longer with Rio or Bahia or Recife.

Only after the Second World War – when the African independence movements began, when Kwame Nkruma and Houphouët-Boigny and Mwalimu Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta and Sédar Senghor were fighting to recover their independence and their freedom – we were able to see that fabled continent in the other side of the Atlantic as a matter of international relations. And the Conference of Bandung in Indonesia in the mid-50’s (1955) was the first moment in which we gathered with Asians, Africans and Latin Americans to discuss how the Third World could operate in the context of the Cold War between the blocks of the East and the West.

It is a part of our own diplomatic history that is not yet fully recovered. Every time in my new capacity that I travel to Africa, I get surprised. I went to Tunis after the revolution, and the Tunisian government came to thank Brazil for being one of the first countries at the UN to propose a resolution in favor of Tunisian independence. I was caught unaware. In this building we have a marvelous historical archive, a historical archive that sometimes I would like to boast to some European colleagues, because here we do have treaties by which Brazil established relations with European States that no longer exist.

Once in a while an Italian comes to us in Brasilia and says: "You should do this", "You should do that". I say we used to have Embassies in Naples and Turin and we had an agreement with the King of Bayern, whose capital was Munich. So, even if Brazil is a new nation, we have an old Foreign Ministry, older than those ones in Berlin or Rome.

This is another characteristic of this institution. When I was younger, as a Second Secretary, the Argentinians disembarked at the Falklands or Malvinas Islands, and the British came to the Foreign Ministry in Brasilia saying: "We were aggressed. Brazil has to be in our side because Argentinians took that decision of disembarking troops there".

I do not know if Ambassador Saboia remembers, but we always send a Third Secretary in the most humiliating role - going to the archives and finding a paper: "go there and dig!". On that occasion, the Third Secretary came back with a 1833 note by which the then Empire of Brazil protested to the British Minister in Rio against the occupation of the Malvinas Islands, that belonged not to the Argentinian Republic, but to the River Plate Confederation - a country with which Brazil had fought a war six years before and had lost our Cisplatine Province, which today is the Eastern Republic of Uruguay.

So this is to tell you about the richness of this institution in the sense that we are so proud of it that when we talk to our colleagues in the uniform - the Navy, the Air Force and the Army -, we boast that we were able to assure more land to this country than any of them, because Brazil was the inheritor of a weak metropolis and we have always given diplomacy a very important role in our international relations. Instead of sending the Navy, like the British liked to do (now they send their Royal Air Force), we used to send diplomats. I had a discussion with the British Ambassador in Brasilia when he came to talk to me: "Why Brazil is so conservative regarding Libya and Syria?". I replied: "Because we believe in diplomacy, we believe that we should talk and negotiate first". And this is what we have done to most of our neighbors in the negotiation of our borders.

You see here at the entrance of this compound (one Palace and these other buildings) the statue of the Baron of Rio Branco – a Brazilian diplomat that in the beginning of the century negotiated with our neighbors greater part of the definitive treaties of our borders. And the Foundation that is organizing this Seminar is named after Alexandre de Gusmão, a Brazilian that was born in Santos, like Ambassador Celso Amorim (that you know as our former Foreign Minister), was the Secretary of a Portuguese King from 1740 to 1750 and negotiated the Treaty of Madrid of 1750. That Treaty exchanged the Spanish territories west of the line of “Tordesilhas” occupied by the Portuguese with the Philippines, that was occupied by Spanish people from Mexico but was, from the Iberian point of view, Portuguese territory in the Asian Pacific part of this planet.

Forgive me to dwell so much in history, but I think the message that I wanted to convey to you, as diplomats, is that the use of our instruments – representation, negotiation and information – is what Brazil can share with you. It is what this Course is somewhat about.

One of my colleagues, the Chief of the African Department, is going to speak more about African-Brazilian relations later. However, what I wanted to talk to you was about the Brazilian view of diplomacy, the Brazilian interest in furthering and valuing all those instruments that we have developed in the 20th century. So I jump back to 1907, which was a very important year for Brazil, because we were invited to go to the II Hague Peace Conference, in the Netherlands. Baron of Rio Branco – that was the Foreign Minister then – sent one of the most important Brazilian politicians of the time, Rui Barbosa, who was from my State of Bahia and is still seen by some people from Rio and São Paulo as one of the most talkative lawyers of our history. When he went to The Hague, he had to defend something that nowadays we take for granted – the juridical equality of States. Brazil was no longer a monarchy but a Republic and was seen by the Europeans as one of those “turbulent” Latin American Republics. We share, with other Third World countries, the reputation of not being a very civilized country, full of coup d’Etats, where people did not behave according to democratic rules, and as such we did not merit the same treatment – we were perceived as an inferior country. We were so inferior that the big powers would not exchange Ambassadors with us, so we did not have Embassies in Europe – we had “legações”, legations. They were not headed by Ambassadors, but by Ministers Plenipotentiary.

One of the big objectives of the Brazilian diplomacy in the early 20th century was to open an Embassy to then elevate our Legation. We were able to convince the United States of America of that in 1906. One of the great

struggles of Brazil in the 1907 Conference was to instill in International Law this concept of the juridical equality of States. In the beginning we were abhorred by all those haughty European representatives – the Germans, the French, even the Americans. This was later enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. You know that in the League of Nations, the organization before the UN, only three African countries were members – the Empire of Ethiopia (and we had the beautiful speech by Haile Selassie in '35, saying that the world should not accept the invasion of Ethiopia by the Italians), we had Liberia and we had South Africa.

All the others were colonies or protectorates. That was in a certain way the struggle that happened in 1907. You did not have to face that after you got independent, because you could send Ambassadors abroad. And I say this, in part, to talk about a vision of the world that we still share with you, even if Brazil is the 7th or the 5th economy in the world today, depending on the exchange rate.

Funag is precious because it always publishes interesting books. One of the books I was reading yesterday was about the Brazil-Africa Forum that took place in Fortaleza in 2003, in the launching of Lula's policy for Africa. At the occasion a distinguished Angolan, Mr. Gonçalves, said: "Well, Brazil, where US\$ 1 is equivalent to R\$ 3, has a GDP of 700 billion". Now Brazil has US\$ 1.5 trillion GDP. It seems big, but the fact is that if you are in Rio, if you are in São Paulo, if you are in Bahia, if you look around, you will still see the shanty towns we have, you will see that we share with Africa this very uneven social environment, that we still have a lot of poverty.

What is the importance of this to Africa? The importance of this to Africa is that, and I quote an article by Minister Amorim – after he left the Office of Foreign Minister, he went to Harvard to have a two-month sabbatical and met a Nigerian intellectual who told him: "For every problem in Africa there is a solution in Brazil". The importance of the social and economic experience of Brazil is that we try indigenously and autonomously to find solutions to problems that are very similar to yours. And what's the importance of Africa to Brazil? In my historical discussion, I mentioned slavery many times and I also mentioned that 52% of Brazilians consider themselves of African descent. This is a cultural, political development by which those who were the descendants of slaves, that were once kept in the lower part of our demographic pyramid, they rose and they made movements claiming that this inheritance should be changed by public policies. For us to have a rich, a peaceful Africa, it is necessary also to give back to the African part of our population the pride they have to regain.

We have Brazilians of Italian descent, of German descent and of Japanese descent. They refer to one country. Those who descend from Africa link themselves to a continent that is always on the newspapers because of bad things – the media loves to publish bad news, because disasters just sell newspapers. But we also have to show them the Africa of the NEPAD; the Africa of the African Renaissance; the Africa that, like Brazil, is going out of poverty, is finding the remedies for development and finding in this side of the Atlantic experiences that can be shared.

We do not have the resources to solve all the problems of Africa. Brazil does not consider itself a donor country. I am from a small village in Bahia called Monte Santo, where we do not have universities. And I was Ambassador in Haiti, where I had to fight to establish undergraduate courses in Haitian universities. Then, when I went back to my small village, people said: “Hey man, are you mad? Are you creating universities in Haiti and none here?!” I said: “Well, this is foreign policy”. I do not represent Monte Santo, nor Bahia represents Brazil, and we have to use these instruments. It is just to tell you that, in a very uneven and unequal country, investing in external relations has to be balanced with our national development. But Lula – that’s a President I like – once said: “If you are a very rich man and someone knocks at your door, you might give him a glass of water and some bread and send him away. If you are not a very rich man and if you live in a neighborhood of middle and lower income, what normally happens if someone knocks at your door is that you open your door and say: ‘Sit here at my table and eat with me’”. It is what we call solidarity. This is one of the big tenets of our foreign policy. Even if we need here, even if you go in the outskirts of any Brazilian city, there is a need. You have to. More and more Brazilian society is convinced that we can share a bit with those that are still going through what we went through.

Being a developing country, we do not forget our brethren. And we remain a member of all those organizations that we helped to develop since the Second World War. In the G77, we were founding observers of the Non-Aligned Movement. We worked with you in the old G20: the G20 that in Cancun stopped Doha Round because it did not correspond to our needs. So these are, in a certain way, the foundations of an African policy that has opened thirty-five to thirty-seven embassies in your continent. Thirty-five because two are in the process of being implemented: Lilongwe and Freetown.

I heard today that a country represented here is considering opening an Embassy and might ask Brazil to reciprocate. This is good,

even if the budget of our Ministry does not allow us to have embassies like we would ideally like to have. Sometimes our Ambassadors are alone with an administrative officer. They do not and they cannot operate like the European and North American Ambassadors that have a certain amount of money to distribute to NGOs and so on.

I invited one of my sons, my oldest son, who works for one of the most important Brazilian institutions of health, Fiocruz. He is very critical of his father, and we discuss a lot about another remarkable institution – Embrapa. All these institutions were created to solve Brazilian problems. Embrapa is today a federation of research centers in agriculture. Research centers on cultures that you consume in Africa and we also consume here like cassava, manioc, yucca. We make thousands of products out of them. We have developed technologies by which cashews are not only used for nut producing – you can produce juice, you can produce sweets, even vegetarian hamburgers. Our sugar cane is much more productive than it used to be. Our cotton is sometimes four times more productive than what you find in South or North Sudan. So these are examples of what Brazil can share with you, and this was put very eloquently by the current Ambassador of Cameroon in Brasilia, Martin Mbeng. Brazil will not give money. We have some money, but not that enough. But we can share knowledge.

I could speak to you for one hour more, but Ambassador Saboia is telling me that my time is over. See, there is a joke among people from my state: when Brasilia was inaugurated, the National Assembly had to fly there, and the Congressmen (deputados) from Bahia are known for the length of their speeches. So one “deputado baiano” entered a plane for the first time (he used to come to Rio by boat), and then the Captain said: “I would like to welcome all of you onboard. Please take your seats and fasten your safety belts”. Then, to everyone’s astonishment, the representative from Bahia rose and said: “Mister Captain, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you”, and then he spoke for one hour and a half until they arrived in Brasilia. I will not do the same. Thank you very much.

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia – Thank you, Paulo, for this very enlightening presentation. I have a Bahian grandfather, so I might also start speaking, not for one hour, but for half an hour. Before I open the debate, I just want to tell you something about my own experience in dealing with black activists in Brazil (by the way, in Brazil I should say that word “negro” has no negative connotation; on the contrary, they prefer to be called “negro” than to be called “black”). But what I want to

say is that for a certain time I was Secretary of State for Human Rights and my task – one of my most important tasks – was to prepare Brazilian position to the Durban Conference on Racism, and I had a lot of contact with this movement and with other movements. One of the issues that we discussed at the time was their complain that this big part of the Brazilian population did not have the visibility and the presence they deserved. And they were fighting for affirmative actions and recognition on different levels, like being on TV and on the economic activities, on political levels. And I see a lot of change.

We adopted some affirmative actions – including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – to make these people advance faster, because as you make people advance in a peer to assume more prominent positions, they become role models for the new generations. They complained that young generations lacked role models and I think that the situation has improved a great deal. But what I want to tell you – and it is linked to Paulo's presentation – is about this separation that was imposed by slavery and by the decision to impose monopoly of Brazilian trade with Europe. That severed the links of the black people in Brazil with their forefathers and their cultures in Africa.

I think the Brazilian delegation to the Durban Conference was one of the biggest delegations there and the number of non-governmental representatives was enormous. I flied on the big plane with them, and it was very moving to see these people disembarking for the first time in the African continent. Many of them had never put their foot on African land, and they were emotional about it.

Well, I think that's more than I want to say and I would encourage very much... – now we have time for debate – ...and I would encourage our friends to pose questions and make comments about Ambassador Paulo Cordeiro's presentation or also about any other pertinent subject that they want to inquire about. Thank you.

The floor is open.

Well, I think we have to call. Yes.

You have the floor, Sir.

James Solomon – Thank you very much, your Excellency Ambassador Gilberto, and thank you other Ambassadors and my colleagues. The presentation made by Ambassador Paulo Cordeiro was really, very impressive, and it touched a lot about history of Brazil and what we can learn as African countries. There is something I would like to inquire more regarding this history. What is the way forward, as we

talk now, that Brazil wants to achieve about its foreign relations towards Africa? We have heard much of history, but what is coming in the future we would like to know, really. Thank you.

Senhor Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro – Well, we say in Portuguese “o futuro a Deus pertence” – the future belongs to God. If I can say, the future is of a much closer relation. When I said that it was important to recall and to be aware of the past, it is because we have many different visions of the past. The future is to be built together. And the first thing is to be aware of each other and see what we can do. We have here a representative from Namibia. I think I could tell you a story about Namibia. In 1983, I was charged to come to Rio to receive a group of SWAPO members (the Namibian South West and People Organization) that were fighting in Angola against the Apartheid regime. Few years later Namibia was independent, and one of the leaders of the group came here. The group came here because we wanted to do a Seminar, in this very room, on development of mineral rights policies. So Brazil is a country that exports iron ore, and we have important yacimientos, jazidas... how do you say it in English?

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia – Deposits.

Senhor Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro – ...deposits of whatever you wish. Only South Africa and the DRC might have more diversity of minerals than we do here. It was important to tell the Namibians how to develop those things. It was a request by the UN. The leader turned to be – when I was living in Geneva as a Brazilian diplomat to our mission to UNCTAD – the Minister of Trade and Industry, and a young man, Mr. Pohamba, that now is the president, was here for that.

We created, with those who came to be leaders of Namibia, a good real perception of Brazil. A Brazilian General was the Force Commander that oversaw the retreat of the Cubans from Angola. It was one of the conditions the South Africans imposed to leave Namibia. And then the Namibians, the independent Namibians, asked us something: “We see all those fishing fleets from the Asian countries, from Spain, straddling our waters, taking our tuna, and we cannot do anything”. So they asked Brazil to form what was then called the Naval Army of the Namibian Defense Force, and we had here an internal struggle.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Strategic Affairs and the Navy wanted to cooperate. But the Finance Ministry was reluctant

because of the high costs of the project. The staff of each body was then told to write opposite papers: for and against the cooperation.

By that time, I was out of the Foreign Ministry. I was the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies and I reported to Ambassador Sardenberg, who was the Minister for Strategic Affairs. And happily my paper and the papers of the Foreign Ministry won the battle for cooperation. We were able to bring four young Namibian Officials to spend four years of training in our Naval Academy every year. So we helped to form the core of the Namibian Naval Office, the core of the Namibian Navy. And we have in Walvis Bay a small, 30-people Brazilian mission that is still helping them. Now they asked us to form their Marine core.

This is an example of how we can work. We gave Namibia an old Brazilian corvette that, by European standards, is an armed tugboat, but it was classified in Brazil as a corvette. Then they got richer and bought a Brazilian petrol boat. Now they asked us to work with them on the delimitation of their continental shelf, so they can present the case to the UN, to have the continental shelf delimited outside the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. The good work with Namibia led Angola to ask us to do the same, but Angola will pay a bit, because Angola is richer than Brazil now. We are working with Angola on the refurbishment of the Guinea-Bissau armed forces.

We had a problem with the U.S. on cotton subsidies. Four countries of the Sahel, in West Africa, came to Brazil and said: "Let's work together on that". We did the Cotton-4 Project with Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. And we created, with the aid of Embrapa, what I called "experimental farm", which is now giving a lot of good results. The curious thing is that this experimental farm uses both the traditional way of controlling plagues with chemicals (what makes my ecologist son criticize me), but we are also using insects and trying to develop in Africa the same experiences we have here of planting cash crops with food crops. This is another possible field of cooperation.

In Brazil we have a public health problem that affects mostly the black population, the sickle-cell anemia (in Portuguese, we call it "anemia falciforme"). It was widely ignored for years, but thanks to the black social movement in the 80's and the 90's, the Brazilian government implemented specific policies to deal with it, which is a genetic disease. Many of the Brazilian forebears came from West Africa where sickle-cell anemia also exists. So now we are working with many countries of that region to find solutions to deal with that public health problem. Fiocruz is the main organization involved on the issue in Brazil.

During the Apartheid, we had a lot of pressure here in South America. We had dictatorships in Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, and showing an anti-communist face was always very efficient. So South Africa tried to draw us into something called OTAS (the NATO of the South). We here said no, we never allowed OTAS to happen. Then we created something with the African countries that have a littoral in the South Atlantic, the so-called Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), through which we are working on Ocean Sciences. But I have also gotten a lot for requests for cooperation in the naval control against piracy in Benin and Nigeria. We also have a problem whenever I go to Africa. When I try to call Brazil, it is very difficult. When I try to call our embassies in Africa, it is even more difficult. So, we are trying to work with South Africa and Angola in the establishment of new transoceanic cables that can facilitate communication among us.

We're working with Mozambique in University Courses at distance. It is something that Brazil, due to its size, had to develop. My home state is the size of France, with twelve, fourteen million inhabitants. The State of Amazon in Brazil has over 1 million square kilometers. Doctors in small villages have to rely on doctors on the capital by TV and computer technology to help them do certain, more complex interventions. We share that with some African countries. In São Tomé and Príncipe, the experience of Brazil in combating illiteracy is being very well implemented.

President Lula lost one finger because he was a lathe operator, and the only diploma he has is from Senai. Senai is a National Industry Service. It is another Brazilian experience in which we have private and governmental money. Most of it is private and consists of technical schools that agree to answer to the needs of specific clusters of manufactures. We are sharing that knowledge with Angola and Mozambique. I went to South Africa and doctor Malpani, one of the most important black South Africans, from Soweto, was asking us to work with him to replicate Senai in Soweto. Even if we do not have a lot of budget here, we were able to convince the government to maintain this project in Soweto.

So I heard that sentence that seems like a boasting sentence: "for every African problem, there is a solution in Brazil". It is true. And this is the future, James.

I admire James very much because he has already given his forebears a grandchild. James, you know Brazilians well. You were posted in Brasília¹, and you know that many Brazilians think that of Brazil as full

¹ Conselheiro James Solomon é de origem sul-sudanesa. Serviu como Conselheiro na Embaixada do Sudão em Brasília no período imediatamente anterior à secessão ocorrida em julho de 2011. Desde então, foi integrado à Chancelaria do Sudão do Sul.

of defects. That happens because people compare what they see here with what they see in the U.S., with what they see in France and so on. However, we must consider how far we came in terms of Education, for example. Brazil is a country that, during our colonial period, was forbidden to have universities. The Spanish-speaking countries had universities since the 1500's, but the Portuguese forbade universities here. The University of Brazil – that is now the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro – was founded in 1906. Then we had the University of São Paulo, in 1930. Today, each of the twenty-seven Brazilian States has a Federal University and a State University that are free, and at least one local private University. This is the kind of experience we can share with our colleagues from across the Atlantic.

I remember that when I was younger Brazil was criticized because we burned the forest, we destroyed our environment. According to Pedro, my son, we still do it. Nevertheless, we do it in a different way – we no longer destroy. We have all those young scientists working in Embrapa (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation) and in Inpa (National Institute for Research in the Amazon) to improve the management of our tropical and equatorial resources. I think this is the future of the relationship between Africa and Brazil.

We are developing technology to limit deforestation and at the same time increase productivity in our Savanna. Therefore we produce more soy beans and other grains and also feed herds that make us capable of investing in all that Science and change our economy. I underline that all those research institutes are financed by Brazilian own money and not by our brothers from the U.S. or wherever. They just cooperate with us sometimes.

Other thing that you should learn – and I underline should – is our experience with the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). The Brazilian Cooperation Agency was created in the 60's and 70's not to give assistance to other countries, but to discipline the assistance we used to receive from the Americans, the Germans, the Japanese, the Italians. Because everybody came here with a project and said: “do this”. And our Ministry of Planning and our Ministry of External Affairs said: “We do not want this, we want that”. For instance, we said: “we want to see how we can use the acidic soil of the Brazilian plateau – where during half of the year it rains and in the other half of the year it is drier than the Kalahari: 8% to 12% of humidity. How can we develop science to use those lands?” For over 30 years we tried to tailor the cooperation they offered to our needs.

We have tropical diseases like the Chagas disease, which attacks the human heart. Its vector is a mosquito very similar to the “tsetse” flies you have there. So these are areas, James, in which we can cooperate.

Minister Doctor Lam Akol Ajawin wrote in his paper that the Sudd, the big Pantanal they have in the middle of South Sudan, was a big barrier for the Europeans and the Egyptians to get to the south. We have our Sudd here – it is the Pantanal.

We have been working with the Argentinians, the Paraguayans and the Uruguayans to create what we call the Parana-Paraguay Riverway, in which all those problems of environmental protection have to be balanced with the need to have trains of barges carrying minerals and soy beans. How can we do that without taking the water out of one of the most beautiful and rich swamps in the world? South Sudan and Sudan will face that, and we can share that with you. Ethiopia wants to discuss with Egypt a reform on the management of the Nile Basin, and how they can build dams to produce much needed electricity.

I have here three Ambassadors that are double PhDs in negotiation with the Argentinians and that spent more than twelve years breaking their minds to convince our brothers from the South that building Itaipu would not harm Buenos Aires, nor would not destroy the Uruguay River. Even in International Law and diplomatic practices, I see pending situations in Africa that we have already experienced, so we do not have to reinvent the wheel – we have to adapt the wheel to the needs of our roads. So this is your job. You have to be clear in what you want, you have to be straightforward and we have instruments for that. We have IBSA, formed by India, Brazil and South Africa; we have the Africa South-America Forum (ASA Summit), that will hold a meeting in Malabo in November this year².

Moreover, we have to see how we work at the UN Security Council on the very sensitive issue of the use of force in international relations. We see the new situation in Libya and many countries in North Africa. In his speech in Malabo, the former President Lula said: “now, every time a President in Europe is facing low ratings for the next election, he starts bombing somewhere else”. These were his words I am just repeating them, not agreeing with him. However, we do have to defend democracy.

I was sent to Damascus last month. When I came back I was like a German bomber over London in 1941– the headlines in most newspapers said that I went there to talk to a dictator. So I opened the Charter of the United Nations and I read in Chapter VI that we have to exhaust all forms

² A 4ª Cúpula Anual da ASA ocorreu de 22-26 de novembro de 2011.

of dialogue and mediation before we consider the use of force. That is what Brazil believes. Before bombing we have to negotiate, we have to talk. And we are not really fond of bombing.

In my way down here today, I passed in front of “Praça XV” and I showed James the Old Imperial Palace, a very small Palace compared to the sprawling buildings of the Spanish Viceroy’s Palaces in Mexico or in Lima. However, in that small Palace, in 1863, our former Emperor – Peter the Second (Pedro II) – did something important. The British Navy had blocked Rio de Janeiro, because a British merchant ship wrecked in Southern Brazil and some “gauchos” stole the cargo. The British government wanted them arrested, hanged; it also required Brazil to pay a fine for what happened. And then, because the Brazilian government insisted on arbitration, they blockaded Rio and said: “If you do not pay the fine, we will bomb the city”. Then the Emperor paid it under protest and severed relations with the Great Britain, even though he was also a relative of Queen Victoria by some dynastic relations. The Brazilian people was so proud of him³!

So when British and French diplomats talk to me about intervention I tell them that I remember that historical event. We were blockaded, we also were, not very much, but slightly intervened and we now think twice before supporting those things.

We are very fond of International Law. We prize democracy, we fought for democracy, and we know what a dictatorship is, we suffered it in our skins. However, we look for a certain balance, and that is also something that Brazil and Africa have to share. When I go to the African Union meetings in Addis Abeba, I see you and I see your discipline, because the African group is one of the most disciplined diplomatic groups. You always have a candidate nobody fights, and this is also a lesson for us. We have to learn from you too, we have to send our academic missions there and be able to distinguish a “Nouer” from a “Dinka” as we want you to distinguish a “baiano” from a “pernambucano”. It is very important!

Well, I think I took too long to answer your question. Thank you, James.

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia – Thank you, Paulo, for this second lecture, which was very interesting. I must say that you touched very important issues and... yes, Sir, please, you have the floor.

³ O Embaixador refere-se à chamada “Questão Christie”, ocorrida entre os anos de 1861 e 1865.

Senhor Mohammed Hamza⁴ – Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I thank very much Mr. Paulo for his good presentation. We learnt a lot about the History of Brazil and I think if I had not come here I would not be able to know many things about Brazil. Even if it was for a short, very short period, it was a good presentation for us.

My question is actually three questions. My first question is: we know that Brazil is one of the emerging countries, so how you regard yourselves now? I mean, are you already a Western developed country, or do you now belong to another group, like G7 or G20, or are you still among the developing countries? This is my first question.

My second question is: you have mentioned that every problem of Africa has a solution in Brazil. One of the biggest problems of Africa is AIDS and our dependence on donation from Western countries to our development. So what is your solution? I hope that you had this problem before – dependence from a Western Block or from a Western country. In Africa, we rely very much on Western countries to combat AIDS. So what do you say? So what would be your solution for combating this kind of problem in Africa that for a long time has affected the economic development of Africa?

And my third question is that in Africa, agriculture is a major support of livelihood to a large population. So with your experience and knowledge, what can you share with us in terms of agriculture development? I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senhor Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro – Thank you Mr. Hamza. You propose very difficult questions.

First, Brazil is a developing country. It is not the least developed country, but it is a developing country. And we also have some regions in Brazil that are still among the least developed places in the world. I can mention for instance the State of Piauí that is probably the Brazilian State with the lowest per capita income. Other examples would be the State of Maranhão and even parts of Bahia, my home State. My native town has very low Human Development Index. I will tell you a history, I would like to tell you a history, forgive me about that.

Around 1942, Henry Ford visited Brazil. Brazil, at that time, was a big market for Ford cars. Brazil was the largest – and still is – producer of coffee. Ford gave this piece of advice to our president: “Brazilians should keep producing good coffee and buying our cars, because this is the nature of things. You have to pursue your natural economic advantages”. Well, we did quite otherwise.

⁴ Diplomata da Tanzânia.

A few years later, we sent a whole infantry division to Europe to fight against the Germans. We negotiated with the Americans so that they would allow us to import full steel work we could not buy anywhere else. That meant the beginning of the Brazilian steel industry – we did not have much coal, but we had a lot of iron. Then we decided to adopt an Import Substitution Policy, in order to foster industrialization and at the same time continue to promote agriculture.

Agriculture was the richest resource we had. Bahia was an important producer of cocoa, Maranhão of cotton, we had rubber in the Amazon and those traditional teas in the South. So we did not allow the industrialization to happen here like it did in Nigeria, that was one of the biggest producers of cocoa, but neglected it when the oil was discovered in Niger Delta.

The second was this struggle against dependency at the creation of ABC. We had to use aid as instrumental to development, and to use diplomacy also as an instrument for national development. So our embassies abroad were also intelligence centers to see what we could find there that would transform our economy, which are demarked here so that we allow the transformed economy to have an output abroad. And this is the struggle of a developing country, that was a big coffee farm, but was able to transform itself with a conservative upper class which was not convinced of that. That's important because it was not a consensual process in Brazil.

There were people that wanted just to keep exporting coffee, because if you want to produce cars – and now we produce 3 million, 4 million cars a year – you have to raise your tariffs, and we had something important that was a big internal market. This is fighting against dependency using external capital and using assistance as a tool for a nationally conceived policy.

So you have to think about what you want, because we want to avoid replicating what is happening in Haiti today. Haiti became a Republic of NGOs, each of them comes with a project that helps themselves to keep existing. Even though they help local people, they do not transform the reality. So what we can tell you is that you have to create policies to transform your reality. Now, for example, Petrobras is digging for gas in Tanzania. However it is up to Tanzania to discipline that process and to liquefy the gas, to add value, and to create wealth. And with the wealth created, reinvest in science that will by the next stage add even more value. Then the country will go out of poverty, go out of dependency. It was what the Chinese did, somewhat what we did, and I

think you are doing it somehow. I saw President Kikwete⁵ talking to Lula in Malabo and I was a diplomat in your country by the time of Mwalimu Nyerere⁶, who always prized education a lot.

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia - Well, thank you very much. You have the floor, Sir.

Não identificado - Thank you very much, Ambassador Gilberto. I have one question for Ambassador Paulo. A lot has been said about cooperation between Africa and Brazil, and so far it appears to be limited to the governmental level, whereby there is inter-governmental interaction. But unfortunately not a lot is known about Africa in this part of the world, and the reverse is also true: not a lot about Brazil is known in Africa. I mean, if you mention Ronaldinho everybody knows who we are talking about, but if you mention President Dilma Rouseff people scratch their heads. So maybe at the social level there should be attempts to create cultural programs whereby Brazilians could go to African countries to study for a year. Therefore there would be more knowledge at the social level - going beyond the governmental level - about Africa, and vice-versa? Africans could come to Brazil maybe beyond diplomatic and academic level as well. Thank you.

Senhor Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro - Well, we need to improve it very much. We have a program for African students; we have four thousand African students in Brazil. Now we believe that we have to send Brazilian students there. That happened once. One of my Professors in the Federal University of Bahia - we had a Center for Afro-oriental Studies - had a PhD from the University of Zaire (Université Nationale de Zaire), where she went to learn Kikongo, because Kikongo in Bahia is spoken as a sacred language in what we call Angola Candomblés, in the traditional African religions that survived here. And they speak to the gods as the Catholics used to speak in Latin. So Angola Candomblé speaks Kikongo, the Nagôs speak Yoruba, and the Jeje speak Fon.

These are things that happened at the beginning of the relationship, in the 60's, but were interrupted. Now that we have the African Renaissance we have to do that again. We also have to invest in civil society and we have some Brazilian NGOs in Africa. We also have something that

⁵ Presidente Jakaya Kikwete, Presidente da Tanzânia desde 2005.

⁶ Julius Kambarage Nyerere, primeiro Presidente da Tanzânia. Conhecido como Mwalimu Nyerere, governou o país de 1964 a 1985. Mwalimu é uma expressão em Swahili que significa "mestre" ou "professor".

is still not well studied here: Brazilian catholic missionaries and, more importantly, Brazilian evangelical missionaries. In downtown Vinduk there is an "Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus". I was surprised by that.

However, the most important thing is that the Brazilian government passed a law obliging all secondary courses here to teach African history. And this is something that happened ten years ago – we do not have enough teachers – but the issue is reaching university level too. So we have to learn more.

About the Brazilian projection abroad, It is difficult to compete with soccer, football or carnival, but Dilma Rouseff... – and I was told here that I did not mention her name, I mentioned Lula twice. Maybe it is part of my Bahia misogyny that I have to change. You rightly put that we see ourselves by the eyes of Hollywood, by the eyes of the New York Times, by the eyes of Le Monde.

There was, once upon a time, an attempt to create a new information order at Unesco, but it was defeated by the North. A great Senegalese was Director General at Unesco long time ago. That did not work. We have now to use the tools of capitalism and to educate our TVs. Now we have the instruments –Internet, social media, we have in this country here tens of TVs that are funded by local States and are open to create new informative programs. Commercial TVs, they still resist that, but now we have those not very expensive instruments through which we can show to each other our experiences.

Few Brazilians know what the Asantehene is, you know. When I was a young diplomat, he came to Brasilia and the glories of the Ashantis. There are many other things that we have to learn. And we have prominent Brazilians who were invited to come here that are interested in creating more links with Africa. And we can only respect what we know; we can only love what we know. And you very rightly put that, because we live in a world of stereotypes, and they have to be destroyed. Thank you.

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia – Thank you very much. If I see no other requests...yes Sir, you have the floor.

Não identificado – Ambassador Cordeiro, let me first appreciate the way you provide comprehensive answers as we question you. You gave a very comprehensive history of the relations between Brazil and Africa and I think that we not only find calamities and injustice in history, but we also find answers. But I have quite a different question here that I do not think you mentioned in history as you were giving your narration.

We have, nowadays, what you call climate change. The whole world is now facing this climate change, and they say we need to care about carbon footprint. But, as you might know, in Africa we are heavily reliant on the natural resources. In Botswana right now we just discovered that we have more coal and we have been importing electricity from South Africa – primarily from South Africa. Unfortunately for us the economy in South Africa is growing and therefore we buy less electricity. So we have been forced in a way to go underground and dig and produce more coal to burn, and in the process, of course, we do pollute the environment, it is obvious. I think this is the main issue in most African countries. And yet we have the desire to develop. We have the desire to be independent, we have the desire not to seek for donors, as you mentioned in the early hour. Now, my question is how do you strike the balance in this phenomenon? How do you strike that balance? As developing countries, we have this buried treasure in our countries and we would like to develop and reach a much more developed stage.

Of course Botswana has now been declared as a... Well, we do not really need donors, nowadays – we have been told that from the profits of diamonds, our State has not been declared otherwise. We do not rely on donors anymore, and so we are trying by all means to produce as much profit within the country as possible. How do you strike a balance, really, for Africa?

Senhor Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro – Well, we are going to have here Rio +20 next year, and one of the banners of Brazil is to convince our partners – the developed countries, specifically the U.S. and Canada – to abide to Kyoto Protocol, you know? Because if you see the amount of energy per capita that is consumed by someone from Botswana and someone from Canada, there is an abyssal difference. So, why Botswana should be forbidden of using its coal? Then we also have to look for the questions of science and technology. Another country that is normally accused of not following a strict discipline is China. China is huge, 1.2 billion people that use coal. Botswana has not even a million people. So countries like Botswana, that have no other choice, they are not endowed like Brazil is – we have rivers that we can harness to produce hydroelectricity – they will have to use the resources that nature or the Lord put there.

This is what we call diplomatic negotiation – sometimes the use of the old thing that Europeans discovered: the “Westphalian sovereignty” will do that, O.K.? That is, when necessary you have to resort to sovereignty, but you have to negotiate within your area, and if you are endowed with

that... The Chinese are developing much cleaner because they have to; they cannot suffocate the people of Shanghai with black power. The Turks around Ankara did the same. So there are solutions around that can help Botswana to use its natural resources, to answer to your needs and to prepare itself for a development that endow your population with those things that every human being in our century thinks are normal – turning electric lights and having a pump at the well.

These are things that we are also doing. We have here a coal producing area that we still have to mine, but we try to compensate them because you lose jobs. And in some areas of Brazil it is too expensive to use hydropower, so we are trying to use wind power.

So there are combinations of technologies that we try to apply research to solve the need, to find solutions to the needs that are more important to the people; and to tell our friends – that are already developed, that have depleted the ozone layer, that have started the increase of world temperature throughout 100 or 200 years of coal burning – that there are exceptions for countries that came later in this development race. Thank you.

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia – Thank you very much. If I see no other requests, I then... yes, Madam, you have the floor.

Não identificado – Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Gilberto and Ambassador Paulo. During your very good presentation, I heard you mentioning one of the Brazilian perceptions of the African continent, which is Africa as a land of conflict. You also assured Africa with a solution to every problem. I want to find out what you are doing to help solve the conflicts, the longstanding conflict situation in Africa right now. Thank You.

Senhor Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro – Well, we did that and we are open to do that. We worked closely with Mozambique and Angola in the resolution of their civil wars. We were present at the UN peacekeeping operations in both countries. In the case of Angola, we also worked very closely with Angolan diplomats in New York. I remember my good friend Josefa Coelho da Cunha because we were at the UN Security Council. She was an Angolan diplomat and we had General Higino Carneiro coming from Luanda to present Luanda's case, and we even worked in speech writing together. Not that they did not know how to write, but because we were inside the council and because we could – as we say in artillery, no?

- direct the fire to the most efficient. That time, for example, the UNITA of Savimbi had satellite telephones and if we cut his satellite telephones we knew that the civil war would go faster. And we talked about it with the Americans and they said: "No. Cutting the satellite telephones is against the freedom of communication. We will not accept that". It was mainly because the Republicans in Washington supported Savimbi. So we had to support Angola going in another direction, on cutting diamonds income, so we worked with the Canadians.

We are now in Guinea-Bissau, working with Angola on creating a new Army and establishing democratic institutions. So, as I said, we do not have resources to solve all problems of Africa, but we are working on conflict resolution in certain regions of Africa. We even worked to avoid a coup d'Etat in São Tomé, in a certain moment. We told the young officer there that he would not have much future if he continued down that path. And we worked also sideways in many New York and Geneva centered discussions. So working with you people is not strange to us.

I have here the Ambassador of South Sudan to South Africa. The Ambassador of Kenya to South Africa, Tom Amolo, is an old friend of mine. We worked together there at the Security Council drafting resolutions, because, as you know, the P5 (the Permanent 5), they come with sticks and do not always answer to the needs of those that I call "the intervened": the Africans, the Latin Americans. Then it is very common that we work together to direct the result to the needs that we have. So if you look at the history of cooperation between Africa and Latin America at the General Assembly, at the G-77 and at the Non-Aligned Movement, you have a long history of cooperation. And Brazil has always been in the forefront, since the beginning of the decolonization.

The only exception was the support that Brazil gave Portugal during the military regime. We were once scolded by Samora Machel when Mozambique got independent and he said: "You were not in our side, even if Brazilian society was". This is my answer to you. Thank you.

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia - Thank you very much. I think we... yes, yes... that will be the last question because we need to keep on time.

Não identificado - Thank you, Ambassador Gilberto, for the warm welcome. Thank you, Ambassador Paulo, for the informative lecture. My question is about the investment of Brazil in Africa. In fact, two years ago I attended a similar course like this in Vienna about European Union and

Africa. The whole question of that course was why Africa went East, to China? I think the answer is because China came to Africa not to exploit, not to give a conditional aid, but to invest in Africa and to cooperate with Africa. I am very glad that the answer to the first question about the future of the Brazilian policies towards Africa is promising. That accelerates the good relations between Brazil and Africa in order to get benefits for both of them. Thank you very much.

Senhor Embaixador Paulo Cordeiro - In your country, in the Sennar State (Sudan), we do have some investments in agriculture that are being so successful that the production of cotton and soy is being fourfold.

Going back to Angola, a Brazilian company, Odebrecht, is maybe the largest private sector employer there. Everything started when I was a Second Secretary, or Third Secretary, when the Angolan government asked us to work with Kapanda. Then Brazil built the dam, and the Soviets - still in the Soviet Union times - added the turbines.

The civil war took too long, but we never left. In those times, CPRM (a company that no longer exists) made a Brazilian federal geological survey and by request of Mozambique discovered the extent of the Moatize coal mines in Mozambique. Now that peace came to Mozambique we are starting to export through the railroad that goes from Tete to Beira. It is a small railroad operated by the Indians and is not sufficient to exports. So Mozambique asked us to build a new railway that goes from Nacala, crosses Malawi and soon, by the end of this year, Mozambique is going to export much more metallurgical coal. But it is the first time that they have money to invest nationally. They reduced their dependency on foreign aid, and they also asked us to develop agriculture along the railway.

We have in Brazil two ministries for agriculture. One was the Ministry of Agriculture itself (that has Embrapa). It was traditionally the Ministry that took care of the big land owners, so if you had a huge coffee farm, the government would give you money, credits, support. If you were poor, you would receive nothing. Then we created afterwards - in our quest for equality - a Ministry of Agrarian Development. That is the Ministry that takes care of the family farmers.

Brazil is a very successful producer of ethanol, and that is good for the big farmers, the ranchers. However, now we have also a biodiesel project that helps small land owners to plant some cash crop that is sold to the government. At the central government factories the castor oil and the palm oil - like Western African palm (we call here "dendê") - are transformed into biodiesel that, thanks to a Federal Law, represents 2% of

our national fuel consumption. That policy allows small farmers to have cash and supplement their subsistence farming.

We are repeating this process in Northern Mozambique and we might do that in Southern Tanzania. So this is part of our investment abroad, in cooperation with the Swedish in South Tanzania, because they have a long experience there.

We do not have the financial resources China has. China is sitting on a trillion-dollar reserve. We have one fiftieth of that. However, as I told you, we are ready to work with you in projects that are small at the beginning, but that form a basis for something bigger once we have learnt together and once you are comfortable with us. That is the way Brazil works.

We are not – as the economists say – in the scramble for Africa. We are going there invited and we are going in your conditions, as we have invited people to come here in our conditions. This is respect for sovereignty, respect for national legislation and respect for internally conceived economic schemes that will answer to the needs of the country.

Brazilian investments are growing a lot in Africa. They are growing so much that we do have good statistics about that. There is a new study by the World Bank with Ipea (Institute for Applied Economic Research) that will soon be published. I was correcting it last night. They wrote Eduardo “Mondlene” instead of Eduardo Mondlane. It is still to be corrected, but it will soon be published and you will have a good data on that. Thank you.

Senhor Embaixador Gilberto Saboia – Thank you very much. Well, with that we will have a short break for coffee or tea, and then we will have the opportunity to have the much awaited lecture by Doctor Lam Akol Ajawin.

Thank you. I invite all of you to go to the hall, where coffee and biscuits are being served. Thank you.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC): Goals, Programmes, Achievements and Challenges

*Ângelo Mondlane**

1. Introduction and Background

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established as SADCC¹ in 1980 by 9 countries and has since grown to 15 Member States, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. These are a diverse group of nations, ranging from least developed countries, small islands and land-locked states to countries with vast land masses and incredible mineral wealth making it a region with great potential.

SADC Member States are in different stages of development but predominately characterised by low income and underdeveloped economies. Economic performance varies across the different countries reflecting the level of resources endowment in the different countries, quality of governance and management of macroeconomic policies and environment.

The structure of production of SADC countries is characteristic of a developing region where large shares of GDP originate in primary sectors of production *viz.* agriculture and mining industry, whose total contribution is, on average, over 50% of total GDP. The region has a total

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¹ SADCC-Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

population of approximately 258 million people and GDP of US\$ 471.12 billion (2008). Despite having suffered negative impact from the Global economic crisis which slowed down the pace of growth experienced in the last decades (5% average), the SADC region economy is expected to grow by at least 3% in the current year if the global environment maintains the current recovery trend.

SADC is a recognized building bloc of the African Union and is working together with other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and continental bodies towards an integrated Africa.

This paper is intended to give an overview of the SADC region and integration agenda based on the current performance of its economy and on the regions efforts towards regional integration and development.

2. Overview of the Current Economic Performance of the SADC Economy

After many decades of political and military confrontations that characterised Southern Africa until the 1990s, the region has now embarked on important reforms both in the economic sphere and in the political domain. As a result of these reforms, SADC economies, in the last decade, have grown by an average real GDP of 5-7% with inflation rates below 10% (excluding 1-2 Member States affected by political strife).

This positive economic trend, however, was recently disturbed by the Global economic and financial crisis which started with the increase in food and oil prices experienced in 2007/8 and worsened with the financial crunch that pushed the major developed economies into recessions during 2008-2009.

The global crisis of 2007-2009 adversely affected the attainment of the targets of the macroeconomic indicators and rates of economic growth in most of the SADC Member States. It caused job losses across the region, especially in the mining sector; decreases in average savings and investment rates; decreases in government revenue and consequent increases in budget deficits; a decline in the average rate of inflation and an appreciation in the average real effective exchange rate; and a widening in the deficit on the current of the balance of payments. The medium term prospect is for an improvement in most of these economic indicators.

Member States that are overly dependent on oil, mineral, manufactured and tourist export products fared worse than those that depend on agricultural export products. A high degree of concentration

in export products and lack of diversification in export markets were also bad for Member States.

Economic Recovery

Following improvements in the major developed economies of USA, Europe and Japan, the regional economy began to recover from the global recession in 2010, with the rate of growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) increasing from 2.4% in 2009 to 4.9%. This rate of economic growth is smaller than the one achieved in 2008 which was 6.5%. In five Member States the rate of growth of real GDP was higher than the regional target of 7% required for attaining the objective of reducing poverty in the SADC region. These Member States are Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, per capita income in the SADC region is said to have increased by 4.3% in 2010 (SADC, 2011).

This rebound of the regional economy was propelled by economic recovery in developed countries which led to an increase in demand for export products from the SADC region, and consequent increases in prices of those products. In particular, the regional economy benefited from increases in prices of oil, minerals and agricultural products like coffee and tea. Owing to continued economic recovery in developed countries, real regional GDP is forecast to rise by 5% in 2011 and 5.6% in 2012. In Angola, Botswana, DRC, Mozambique and Zambia, the rate of economic growth is forecast to exceed 6% (SADC, 2011).

Changes in Employment

Reflecting the larger rate of growth of real GDP in 2010 compared to 2009, the level of formal sector employment in the SADC region is believed to have risen at a higher rate in that year than in 2009. Consequently, the level of unemployment is believed to have declined. The magnitudes of the increase in formal sector employment and reduction in unemployment are not known due to lack of data. Overall, data on employment are incomplete as they describe only formal sector employment. Data on unemployment are also incomplete as they describe only open unemployment. Recorded rates of open unemployment show only visible aspects of the unemployment problem in the region.

The actual under-utilisation of labour takes many other forms, including various forms of underemployment and hidden unemployment. Many of the so-called unemployed are self-employed in small-scale agriculture and non-agricultural informal sector activities, making the attainment of higher productivity in these sectors crucial for output growth, for the adequacy of household incomes to meet basic needs and for meaningful increases in self-employment.

Savings and Investment

As measured by national savings, the average rate of saving in the SADC increased from 13% of GDP in 2009 to 15.6% of GDP in 2010. The 2.6 percentage point increase between the two years is attributable to the accompanying increase in the rate of economic growth. The increase in the rate of saving was particularly marked in Botswana, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa. The average gross national savings rate is forecast to reach the 2006 and 2007 level of 18.2% by 2012. With the exception of Mozambique, Seychelles and Swaziland, all Member States are expected to achieve national savings rates in excess of 15% by 2012 (SADC, 2011).

On average, investment as a percentage of GDP increased from 22% in 2009 to 24.9% in 2010, which is less than the regional target of 30%. Only three Member States achieved investment rates above the regional target. These states are Lesotho (37.5% of GDP), Malawi (30.1% of GDP) and Seychelles (54% of GDP). In the medium term, the average investment rate is projected to decline slightly to 23.4% in 2011 and 23.7% in 2012. Only two Member States, DRC and Lesotho, are expected to register investment rates above the regional target of 30% of GDP (SADC, 2011).

Fiscal Developments

Government revenue on average increased from 29.2% of GDP in 2009 to 30.2% of GDP in 2010 due to improvement in economic performance. Angola, DRC, Malawi and Zimbabwe contributed significantly to this increase in revenue. As far as expenditure is concerned, most Member States maintained the 2010 expenditure at the 2009 level. On average, government expenditure was high at 33.3% of GDP in 2009 and 33.6% of GDP in 2010. The high level of government expenditure was designed to mitigate the

impact of the global economic crisis. The overall fiscal deficit averaged 4.9% of GDP in 2009 and 3.9% of GDP in 2010. General government debt declined from 49% of GDP in 2009 to 36.7% of GDP in 2010. With the exception of the Seychelles, all Member States registered general government debt below the regional target of 60% of GDP (SADC, 2011).

In the medium term, government revenues and expenditures are projected to be stable at their 2010 levels. The fiscal deficit will, as a result, deteriorate slightly to 5.2% of GDP in 2011, and general government debt will increase to 39.5% of GDP in 2011 and 40.4% of GDP in 2012 (SADC, 2011).

Inflation

In 2010, inflation averaged 7.5% compared to 12.4% in 2009 in the SADC region. This is said to be the lowest recorded average inflation rate in SADC in the past eight years. But, Angola, DRC, Mozambique and Tanzania experienced double-digit inflation rates of respectively 14.5%, 23.5%, 12.7% and 10.5%. The general downward trend in inflation in the region is due to adequate supplies of food, which helped to dampen pressures on prices, and moderate increases in fuel prices, which also helped to contain inflationary pressures, especially in the first half of 2010. In the medium term, the downward trend in inflation is expected to continue (SADC, 2011).

The External Sector

Largely as a result of an increase in demand for commodities following economic recovery, exports rebounded in 2010, with volumes rising by 10.2% compared to an increase of 0.8% in 2009. Owing to increases in prices of copper and sugar, DRC, Swaziland and Zambia registered substantial increases in export volumes of respectively 52.9%, 21.4% and 19.9%. The volume of regional exports is projected to rise by 9.8% in 2011 and 6.3% in 2012.

Compared to a decline of 1.1% in 2009, import volumes increased by 6.7% in 2010. A rise in commodity prices, particularly of fuel, contributed to the relatively low increase in import volumes in 2010. In value terms, imports increased by 26.9% in 2010 compared to a decline of 12.5% in 2009. Over the medium term, import volumes are projected to increase by 2.8% in 2011 and 5.1% in 2012.

As a result of the above developments, the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments improved marginally from 11.1% of GDP in 2009 to 10.9% of GDP in 2010. In Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles, Swaziland and Zimbabwe current account deficits of over 10% of GDP were recorded. Increasing commodity prices, especially of food and fuel, and low export demand are the main causes of the relatively high current account deficits. In the immediate future, the current account deficit is projected to improve slightly from 8.7% in 2011 to 7.0% in 2012 (SADC, 2011).

2.1. Medium - Term Prospects

Regional real GDP is forecast to be about 5% in 2011 and 5.6% in 2012, marginal increases from 4.9% in 2010. Contributing to this growth will be Angola, Botswana, DRC, Mozambique and Zambia who are expecting to record real GDP growth of above 6%. Similarly, per capita income is projected to increase by 4.5% in 2011 and 5.4% in 2012.

The downward trend in inflation is projected to continue with inflation averaging 7.6% in 2011 and 6.9% in 2012. Only two Member States – Angola and DRC – are expected to record inflation rates above 10% by 2012.

Gross national savings are projected to rebound to 2006 and 2007 levels at 18.2% by 2012. With the exception of Mozambique, Seychelles and Swaziland, all Member States are expected to register gross national savings above 15% by 2012. Nonetheless, investment as a percentage of GDP is projected to slow down modestly to 23.4% in 2011 and 23.7% in 2012. Only two Member States – DRC and Lesotho – are expected to record investment above the regional target of 30% of GDP.

In the fiscal sector, government revenues and expenditures are projected to be stable at 2010 levels. This will result in a slight deterioration in the fiscal deficit of 5.2% of GDP in 2011. Consequently, general government gross debt is projected to increase to 39.5% of GDP in 2011 and 40.4% of GDP in 2012.

On the external side, export volume of goods and services is projected to increase by 9.8% in 2011 and slow down to 6.3% in 2012. Import volume of goods and services is projected to increase by only 2.8% in 2011 compared to an increase of 6.7% in 2010. However, in 2012, import volumes are expected to increase by 5.1%. As a result, the current account deficit of the balance of payments is projected to improve modestly from 8.7% in 2011 to 7.0% in 2012.

3. SADC: Regional Cooperation and Integration

There is a general consensus that regional integration remains a critical strategy for achieving sustainable economic growth and development in Africa. The limited size of domestic markets, inadequate infrastructure and resource deficits as well as the increasing challenges of globalisation make regional integration an imperative for stimulating production, trade and investment necessary to raise living standards and reduce poverty in Africa. SADC is one of the most robust regional cooperation and integration Organizations in Africa.

Vision and Mission

The SADC vision is one of a common future, within a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice; peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa. This shared vision is anchored on the common values and principles and the historical and cultural affinities that exist amongst the peoples of Southern Africa.

The SADC mission is “to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socioeconomic development through efficient productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance and durable peace and security, so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective player in international relations and the world economy.”²

Principles and Goals

The SADC Common Agenda is based on the principles of equitable development, mutual benefits, subsidiarity, variable geometry. SADC goals include the following:

- promotion of sustainable and equitable economic growth and socioeconomic development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication;
- promotion of common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective;

² RISDP: Chapter 1.

- consolidation and maintenance of democracy, peace and security; and
- achievement of a sustainable pattern of growth and a meaningful position in the global economic system.

3.1. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO): The Main Areas of Regional Cooperation and Integration

3.1.1. Overview

In order to operationalise the SADC Programme of Action, Member States adopted the RISDP and the SIPO as the blueprints of the Organization, both in the areas of politics, defence and security cooperation and in the area of economic and social development. These are 15-year indicative plans and frameworks in place since 2005. They set up priorities, policies and strategies as well as indicative targets for achieving the long-term goals of the Southern African Development Community. RISDP and SIPO provide strategic direction to Member States and other key stakeholders with respect to SADC programmes and activities and have a direct bearing on improving the life of citizens in SADC. They are also intended to make effective use of the opportunities for development that globalization presents, while containing the adverse effects of global trends.

The RISDP sets out the regional targets and main milestones for deepening economic integration to include the establishment of a SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2008; the Customs Union (CU) by 2010; the Common Market by 2015; the Monetary Union by 2016; and a Regional Currency for the SADC Monetary Union by 2018.

3.1.2. Main Areas of Regional Cooperation and Integration

The main areas of regional cooperation and integration as per RISDP and SIPO are as follows:

- Peace, Defence and Security;
- Trade and Economic Liberalisation;
- Infrastructure and Services;

- Agriculture, Food Security, Joint Management of Transboundary Natural Resources and Environment;
- Social and human development;
- Cross-Cutting and special programmes such as HIV and AIDS, Gender, Science, Technology and Innovation.

3.1.3. Status of Regional Integration

Peace, Defence and Security Cooperation

In order to promote cooperation in the area of peace, defence and security as a key enabler for regional cooperation and integration, SADC created the Organ. The main objectives of the Organ are to promote peace and security, promote political cooperation amongst member states, protect the people of the region against instability, prevent and contain intra and extra-regional conflicts.

The main frameworks and instruments of regional cooperation in this area are the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) and the Protocol on Peace Defence and Security.

Trade and Economic Liberalisation

Since its establishment as a regional grouping, SADC adopted a developmental approach to regional integration. This approach is a combination of the project/functional approach with the market/trade oriented approach.

SADC has made progress in advancing towards a fully-fledged FTA, which was launched in 2008, when substantially all intra-SADC trade became duty-free. Maximum tariff liberalization will be attained in January 2012 when the tariff phase down for sensitive products is expected to be completed. For SACU countries³ this process was completed in January 2007, whilst for Mozambique it will be completed in 2015 in respect of imports from South Africa. However, this achievement notwithstanding, some Member States are still lagging behind in the implementation of some of their tariff phase down commitments and, as illustrated, are seeking further derogations:

³ Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.

- Zimbabwe has been granted derogation to suspend tariff phase downs for Category “C” products starting in 2010 until 2012. Annual reductions would resume in 2012 and finalise in 2014.
- Tanzania has also applied for derogation from implementing further tariff reductions under Category “C” in order to allow the levying of a 25% import duty on sugar and paper products until 2015 in order for the industries to take measures to adjust.
- Malawi has been falling behind in implementing its tariff phase down schedules and with the new tariff amendments of December 2010, Malawi’s compliance level is at the 2004/2005 levels.

Trade liberalisation in SADC is governed through a Trade Protocol which is in place since 2000. A 2011 Audit of the implementation of the Protocol on Trade has found that trade between SADC Member States that have acceded to the SADC FTA has risen sharply in the past decade. Using COMTRDE data the Audit indicates that in 2000, trade between these SADC Members amounted to only US\$ 6.67 billion. By 2009, intra-SADC trade had more than tripled to over US\$ 18 billion. However, exports from South Africa to non-SACU SADC countries played a significant role in this increase, with more than US\$ 5.2 billion exports going to non-SACU SADC Member states in 2009. Four broad sectors accounted for about 98% of intra-SADC trade namely: agricultural raw materials, food, manufactures and clothing and textiles. Primary products made up the bulk of the products traded. It is, therefore, important that targeted policies are developed to address productive capacity constraints in the manufacturing sector in the region.

Similar trends albeit based on different data obtained by the Secretariat’s Statistics Unit directly from Member States’ National Statistics Offices indicate that since 2000, when implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol commenced, intra-SADC trade has more than doubled. Intra-SADC trade is estimated to have grown in absolute terms from about US\$13.2 billion in 2000 to about US\$34 billion in 2009, representing an increase of about 155%. However, as a proportion of total SADC trade, intra-SADC trade has only grown from 15.7% to 18.5% in the same period. This analysis would be further informed by sectoral analysis which would be undertaken in the Mid-Term review. As the process to remove tariffs on sensitive products is still ongoing until 2012, there is still potential for further expansion of intra-SADC trade as most of the products on the sensitive list such as textiles and clothing, leather and leather products are highly tradable products.

It is important to note that the pace of implementing the SADC FTA can have implications on the framework for the establishment of the SADC Customs Union as proposed in the RISDP. However, efforts to consolidate the FTA and to move towards the establishment of a Customs Union are underway. A Protocol on Finance and Investment has been ratified and entered into force in 2010. Structures and mechanisms for financing development in SADC is now partially achieved in the form of the establishment of the Project Preparation and Development Facility (PPDF), which is now operational within the Development Bank of Southern Africa in South Africa; and a study on the Regional Development Fund has been completed and will soon be approved. A SADC Public-Private Partnership network has also been launched.

SADC has adopted a macro-economic convergence program and framework which are regularly reviewed and monitored. The first comprehensive review was undertaken in 2008 and reflected significant progress being made in convergence towards set targets of inflation, budget deficit and public debt.

A Model Central Bank Law was adopted by Ministers of Finance in 2009 with the objective to facilitate the operational independence of Central Banks, create clear standards of accountability and transparency as well as harmonization towards the monetary union and single currency. The payment, clearing and settlement system is now operational in 12 Member States.

The SADC investment promotion programme was launched in 2010 to raise awareness about SADC programmes and promote sustainable economic investment into the region, with a specific focus to support infrastructure development. The investment programme also focuses on the improvement of the regional investment climate.

Infrastructure and Services

In developing regions tariff barriers are not the only obstacle to intra-regional trade. The poor quality and underdeveloped network of infrastructure is one of the main barriers to trade and accelerated economic development.

In recognition of this reality, the SADC development integration approach prioritises also the development of infrastructure and services to complement market integration. Bridging the infrastructure gap has the

potential for deepening integration through the sharing of the production, management and operations of infrastructure facilities, hubs and development corridors. Strategic regional infrastructure interventions are crucial to attracting investment into the region, improving competitiveness and promoting trade.

Many SADC countries have been able to upgrade and expand their infrastructure assets and improve services through a combination of policy changes, institutional reforms and conducive investment climate. These policy reforms have paved the way for increased private sector involvement in the provision of infrastructure resulting in commercialization and cost recovery measures being put in place. To meet the challenges of infrastructure and services development, SADC has put in place policy and regulatory frameworks through instruments such as protocols and policy and strategy guidelines in the following sectors: energy; tourism; transport, communications and meteorology; and water.

Since 2005, significant progress on cooperation in the energy sector has been made. Nine (9) out of twelve (12) Member States on the mainland have been connected to the Regional Power Grid. The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) has been transformed from a co-operative to a competitive pool, thus creating an effective regional electricity market, with eight (8) Members having signed the Day Ahead Market governance documents. Projects for the sharing of power among countries have progressed significantly, including the Caprivi Link, the Zambia-Tanzania-Kenya Inter-connector and the Mozambique-Malawi Inter-connector. Tangible results have been recorded on the load management strategies and the demand side measures undertaken to curtail the energy deficit of the region. The regional regulatory framework for electricity has been strengthened significantly with a view to improve market conditions to attract investment in the energy sector.

In the area of transport, a Model Legislative Provisions (MLP) on Investment in Transport Act and on Road Network Financing and Management was developed to support reforms in Member States. Roads Funds Administrations were established in eight Member States. Eighty-six projects have been identified for investments in road networks and 36 for rehabilitating road bridges. Projects under development are Kazungula Bridge, Beira-Lobito Corridor, Trans-Kalahari Railway, Ponta Techobanine and Shire Zambezi Waterway. In recognition of the need for an integrated transport system and

an integrated transport policy framework to achieve regional integration, a Corridor Implementation Strategy has been developed. This entails the implementation of SADC Corridors infrastructure projects on the North South Tripartite Corridor, the Western Cluster, Eastern Cluster and Southern Cluster Corridors. The North South Corridor Programme was launched as a Model Aid for Trade Programme in 2009 under the aegis of the Tripartite RECs to showcase an economic corridor-based approach to reducing costs of cross-border trade in the region.

In the sphere of communications, telecom networks have been transformed to accommodate ICT requirements. The SADC Regional Information Infrastructure (SRII) – aimed at ensuring enhanced access on the terrestrial infrastructure, undersea cables and broadband connectivity, as well as the implementation of the missing links – is being developed. Guidelines on ICT Consumer rights and protection have been reviewed.

3.2. Food, Agriculture and Joint Management of Transboundary Natural Resources

In the area of Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources, SADC focus on achieving food security, reducing poverty, and promoting sustainable use of natural resources and the environment. Agriculture sector in the region remains critical as approximately 70% of the population depends on it for food, income, and employment. The sector also contributes between 4-27% of Member States GDPs and about 13% of the total export earnings in the region. The performance of this sector has strong influence on food security, economic growth and social and economic stability. SADC efforts in this area are guided by the RISDP and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, and Action Plan on Agriculture and Food Security by Member States.

Regional Cooperation in the area of Agriculture has contributed towards an increase in crops production in the region. For instance, the past 10 years there has been an increasing trend in the production of cereals. Total cereal availability for the year was estimated at 39.38 million tonnes, made up of 34.64 million tonnes of production and 4.73 million tonnes of carryover stocks, while total demand was estimated at 38.64 million.

Availability and access to inputs continue to be the main challenge to agricultural production in most SADC Member States. In answering this call, the Organisation has stepped up efforts to facilitate increased availability and accessibility of inputs.

Focus has been also directed in developing a harmonised system of labelling fertiliser in the region. The system is expected to facilitate trade in fertiliser among Member States. In addition, the Community is facilitating the establishment of a SADC Seed Centre which will implement the Harmonized Seed Regulatory System which is already in place.

In the area of Livestock production has also increased significantly in the region over the years despite its importance. Production of meat has increased by about 13% from 4.62 million tonnes in 2006 to 5.23 million tonnes in 2010. Milk and eggs production have also increased by 13% and 19% respectively from 4.40 million tonnes to 0.54 million tonnes and 4.98 million and 0.64 million tonnes respectively over the same period. However, the region still remains a net importer of these products.

In order to address this, the year under review focused on rehabilitation of veterinary services in the five Member States; improved capacity for diagnosis and surveillance of TADs; harmonisation of animal disease surveillance systems and establishing SADC Regional transboundary animal diseases (TADs) surveillance networks. The networks are meant to facilitate easy sharing of TADs information in the region. Moreover, plans are under way to establish the Southern African Commission for the Control of TADs (SACCT). The draft proposal for setting up the Commission is under consideration by the Member States. Capacity building in the area of disease surveillance has also been an area of focus.

In the area of crop protection, the Secretariat has facilitated development of guidelines for the registration of crop protection products. It is expected that trade as well as the use of these products will increase as a result.

For Agricultural Research, SADC has recently established the Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research and Development for Southern Africa (CCARDESA).

With regard to the joint management of transboundary natural resources, the Organisation continues to focus on Fisheries, Forestry, Wildlife and Transfrontier Conservation Areas. The focus has been to ensure that these resources are sustainably managed and that they benefit present and future local generations, as well as contribute to global well-being.

Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP) is expected to be a binding legal instrument for the implementation of the region's food, agriculture, natural resources and environmental strategies in the region. The RAP is intended to deal with challenges facing the region's agriculture value chain from the supply side (*production, productivity and competitiveness*), through *trade and markets* of agricultural products on the demand side.

Social and Human Development

SADC regional cooperation covers also important sectors in the area of social and human development such as education, health and pharmaceuticals, labour and employment, HIV and AIDs and other special programmes in this area. As in other areas, regional cooperation in human and social development is guided by a number of legal instruments most notably Regional Protocols.

Programmes in Social and Human Development are also based on the RISDP were the main objectives, focus areas, policies and strategies are clearly described for the medium and long terms.

Cross-Cutting Areas of Regional Cooperation and Integration

Besides the vertical clusters of regional programmes of regional cooperation and integration SADC is also pursuing a number of important cross-cutting programmes, such as Gender and Development, HIV and AIDS, Science, Innovation and Technology, Statistics, Sustainable environment. These programmes are also mainstreamed in the overall SADC Program of Action through the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan.

SADC Gender and Development Program aiming at promoting gender, in particular women's participation in development, is one of the most robust in the whole African continent and is guided by a regional Protocol on Gender and Development.

4. SADC, the African Union/New Partnership for Africa's Development and Continental Integration

Since its establishment, SADC has always aligned its programmes with the African Union ideals of African Integration under the framework of the Constitutive Act of the Union and the Abuja Treaty. In this context, the RISDP was conceived in the light of the Nepad main pillars of development and the Organisation has continuously played a very active role in shaping the dynamics of the Nepad framework.

More recently, through the Tripartite Arrangement, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), East African Community (EAC) and SADC are working towards harmonization of

policies and strategies, and implementation of programmes that will further leverage opportunities for trade in the three Regional Economic Communities. The three RECs are currently preparing to initiate the negotiations for the establishment of a grand FTA which will see the markets of the 26 Member States of the three Organizations transformed in one single market. This step will pave the way for expanding and deepening integration in the whole African Continent as foreseen in the Abuja Treaty.

5. Main Challenges Facing SADC Regional Cooperation and Integration

The Poverty Challenge

SADC recognises Poverty as the greatest challenge the region is facing in our times. The population living on USD 1 per day, on average in the SADC region, amounts to approximately 45% of the total population. Life expectancy has declined substantially in many countries in SADC from a previous average of about 60 years with the lowest now being 33 years and the highest 72 years. The poverty hardships in most SADC countries have been compounded and further complicated by the raging HIV and AIDS pandemic with around 25% of the population infected in the past decade. Southern Africa remains the epicentre of HIV and AIDS with high HIV prevalence. *HIV/AIDS contributes to a high mortality rate for women and children. Government expenditure on health continues to improve and programmes addressing HIV/AIDS are being supported. The 2006 Summit resolved that these interventions be up-scaled within the context of the Maseru Declaration on Combating HIV and AIDS.*⁴

In April 2008 the Heads of State and Government convened a Summit Conference on Poverty and Development and resolved to establish a Regional Poverty Observatory (RPO) to monitor poverty trends and track progress on Millennium Development Goals so as to inform regional and Member States policies and programmes. A draft proposal of the RPO is being finalised.

At the same Conference, Member States considered a draft Reduction Framework which is intended to augment the RISDP by operationalising the poverty eradication intervention area of the RISDP, in such a way that it clearly articulates key intervention areas, strategies

⁴ Aulline H. Mabika, 2006. "SADC and HIV/AIDS – Countries should utilise TRIPS Flexibilities", <<http://www.seatini.org/publications/articles/2006/Countries%20should%20utilise%20TRIPS%20Flexibilities.html>>.

and the activities that will have direct impact on poverty in the short, medium and long term.

Persisting economic challenges in SADC

The RISDP then summarises that *“the main challenge is clearly to overcome the underdeveloped structure of the regional economy, improve macroeconomic performance, political and corporate governance and thus, unlock the untapped potential that lies in both the region’s human and natural resources”*. It further states that *“if the region is to develop faster and take advantage of regional integration and globalisation, Member States will need to address the constraints facing the supply side of their economies, including those related to inadequate regional infrastructural linkages. A structural restructuring of SADC Member States should be orientated to more diversified economies and to significant reduction in the Member States’ over-dependence on primary commodities. This would also contribute to increases in the volume of intra-regional trade”*.

The RISDP emphasis on supply side constraints, non-diversified production and under-developed economic structures is perhaps most evident in the export composition of SADC countries to the world in general and also in their inability to grow intra-SADC exports as summarized below:

- Almost all SADC countries have upwards of 60% of their exports concentrated in no more than ten tariff headings.
- The top ten exports of a number of SADC countries are dominated by resource based non-value added products. Clothing products feature prominently for some countries, followed by agriculture and fish products mostly at the lower levels of processing.
- While a noticeable increase in intra-SADC trade has been recorded over recent years (since the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade), the region seems to have not yet significantly taken advantage of this market liberalisation. Exports from South Africa to non-SACU SADC countries played a significant role in this increase.
- Even though SADC countries’ imports from each other have increased, their imports from non-SADC parties have increased even faster. It therefore underlines that SADC countries are

losing competitiveness in each others' markets *vis-à-vis* third parties.

- Poor trade-related infrastructure (roads, rails, ports, border posts, etc.) increases the cost of trading in SADC to prohibitively high levels.

The wide differences in economic conditions and macroeconomic performance among SADC countries pose challenges to the SADC regional integration framework whose objective is to lead to equitable and balanced development of Member States rather than economic divergence. The RISDP has identified a number of priority intervention areas that are critical for the advancement of the regional economic integration agenda. In the priority intervention area of promoting trade, economic liberalisation and development, the strategies for achieving this goal include *“accelerate and complete the formation of a free trade area; begin negotiations for the establishment of a customs union, which will be followed by a common market; enhance competitiveness through industrial development and increased productivity in all sectors; harmonize policies, legal and regulatory frameworks for the free movement of factors of production; and implement policies to attain macroeconomic stability and build policy credibility”*.

6. Conclusions

SADC has been in existence for more than three decades and has over this time expanded both its membership and its program of action through a number of programmes and projects of regional cooperation and integration.

In spite of the adverse impact of the recent economic meltdown on the region, SADC remains committed to the implementation of the strategies put in place to accelerate poverty reduction and the attainment of regional economic integration. The Community's priorities and milestones are based on the fact that regional economic integration can only take place in an environment that recognises the importance of peace, security, democracy and good governance; social and human development; food security; infrastructure development and trade liberalisation.

The launch of Free Trade Area (FTA) in 2008, among other things, represents a major achievement and pacesetter in the regional integration agenda. Through its Protocol on Trade, SADC continues to implement policies and strategies that seek to eliminate obstacles to free trade and

encourage improvement of the region's economic performance and competitiveness. Member States are making significant progress towards reduction of barriers to trade and realisation of FTA in the near future.

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African Leadership in World Affairs

*Chris Landsberg**

Introduction

The years 1998-2008 were a crucial one for African leadership in world affairs. During this time, many states – including South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ghana – organised themselves as a “concert of powers”, playing innovative policy roles on the continent in pursuit of a continental and international agenda that for once was to be crafted and owned by Africans, not outsiders. They sought to put in place the building blocks of continental order, whilst articulating a clear African outlook that prioritised political, economic, social and developmental renewal, backed up by genuine partnership rather than the apparatus of patrimonial neo-colonialism that characterised its relations with the outside world, the industrialised powers in particular. These African states and many others demonstrated renewed agency and leadership as they sought to take responsibility for, and ownership of, the continent’s future.

South Africa and Nigeria, in particular, would co-ordinate their Africa strategies, and work towards winning the cooperation of others. Whereas former Libyan President Muammar Ghaddafi was pushing in his own inimitable style for a federated United States of Africa (USAf), South Africa and Nigeria favoured a Union of States, an international community or international society, whereby African members would cultivate and abide by common norms, rules and institutions. They helped

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to craft a continental inter-state architecture, which included governance, peace and security, development, and co-operation agendas. The result was the African Union, with executive and representative institutions negotiated, and the status of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) elevated to the status of “building blocks” for continental union. A new continental development plan, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) was articulated, with an emphasis on economic and political modernisation, including education, health, infrastructure development, strengthening governance, and promoting democratisation. The establishment in 2003 of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was an example of this new dynamism on the continent. Post-independence Africa has long had an ambivalent relationship with democracy and governance, primarily because the continent’s priorities during that period were to rid itself of the yokes of colonial rule and white minority domination. South Africa and some of its African partners assumed key roles in negotiating, and promoting a new political normative framework for the continent that included a governance and democratisation regime. The promotion of “good governance” in non-confrontational fashion, or in a quiet diplomatic manner, occupied a central position in the emerging African Agenda. Africa wished to engage the industrialised and other powers on the basis not of neo-colonialism or neo-patrimonialism, but genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual accountability and mutual responsibility.

The period 2006-2011 saw many of the leaders of these states leave office, to be replaced by a new crop of statesmen. In the immediate aftermath of the departure of these leaders the continent experienced something of a political vacuum, as fragmentation and diffusion crept into continental politics. Many of the new African leaders, acting on domestic calculations, seemed determined to show just how different they were from their predecessors, and distanced themselves from many of the continental strategies they inherited. The solidarity that had led to independence across Africa and seen the overthrow of the apartheid regime in South Africa crumbled, and combined with a lack of leadership was taken as an invitation by the West to initiate a new wave of interventionism in Africa. As a result, the continent appears to have returned to its traditional place at the feet of external powers, albeit this time not all were European.

We have witnessed how the UN Security Council and NATO have ignored the voice of the African Union (AU) during the Libya conflict, turning a “no-fly” zone mandate into a “no government transport at all” mandate, and a resolution to defend the Benghazi rebels into a resolute

form of belligerent regime change. Yet the AU was the first inter-state body to pronounce itself on the crisis in Libya, and took a position against Ghaddafi's brutal crackdown of a rebellion. Only later did the UN, the Arab League and others enter the fray, by which time the strategy for dealing with a state that had been foolish enough to welcome overtures from the West then use these to flex its military muscle against its own people would take an all too familiar direction.

Yet, Afro-pessimism – Afro-scepticism might be a kinder term – means that there is a common view held by many observers, inside and outside the continent, and inside and outside governments, which suggests that nothing new and nothing good can come out of Africa. A reluctance to take African leadership seriously has been used to abuse multilateral institutions for selfish interests by the Western powers. Nor is it only the old colonial powers of the West that have their eyes on once more carving up the resource-rich African cake. The past few months have witnessed great attention being placed on the new emerging constellation of states, the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) formation, which became BRICS, with South Africa joining in May this year. The BRIC agenda toward Africa is clear; they are not merely interested in friendship but they also harbour crude economic ambitions as they seek to quench their huge appetites for resources, which they look towards Africa to help satiate. However, lack of clarity from South Africa and other African countries on how they wished to engage these powers, and what they want from them in return, characterised Africa's response to the emergence of both BRIC and BRICS.

Bedevelled by fragmentation, Africa is struggling to come up with a formula that would help it speak with one voice, and act upon the basis of a common continental agenda. In practice, prevarication and dilly-dallying characterise African responses, and the African Agenda may very well be in jeopardy. This is mainly due to a lack of leadership and implementation of that Agenda on the part of Africans, and undermining of the continent by the international community in general, by the Western powers in particular. Drawing on my engagements of African inter-state bodies, and contacts with diplomats and politicians throughout the continent, and my reading of a wide range of literature on the subject, this paper will examine the fragmentation of Africa and argue that the latest failure to organise itself into a credible union, with a voice in its own dealings with the rest of the world, has largely been the result of poor leadership amongst Africans on the one hand, and concerted sabotage by the very powers who have claimed to have Africa's interests at heart, whereas it is actually only its resources.

The departure from office of most of the leaders who spearheaded these initiatives between 2006 and 2008, Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo, John Kufor, Joachim Chissano, Benjamin Mkapa, Meles Zenawi, and others, had left a void in leadership and implementation of what came to be known as the African Agenda. Their departure also showed that individual leaders matter in African agency and international relations. This void has not been filled by the new crop of leaders in Africa, and not even pivotal states like South Africa and Nigeria have stepped up to show the necessary continental leadership. The vacuum has been filled by the return of external powers, notably but not exclusively Western, to the African scene, resorting to typical realist power political, and Marxian exploitative tactics as they seek to reassert themselves in international affairs by using the African political theatre to fulfil their latest ambition. New kids on the capitalist block, China, Russia, India, Brazil and others, are now courting Africa, but nor is this merely for altruism and friendship; they too have huge appetites for the continent's vast mineral resources, and unless Africans organise themselves better as a community of states, able to speak with a common voice and to engage external powers with a greater degree of cohesion, we could once more see the continent becoming a battleground for new and different types of imperialism.

Africa in the global context

The African inter-state system is an evolving one, the past decade and a half or so having seen African states painstakingly invest in inter-state political processes and engage in diplomacy in an effort to construct a continental order that will take decades to consolidate. Since the end of formal apartheid in 1994, and especially since the assumption to power of Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki in South Africa in 1999, some African states had been at the forefront of African politics and diplomacy, and have played pivotal roles in mediating and constructing a new post-apartheid, post-Cold War continental order, a global order in which Western triumphalism reigns supreme, and new powers like China and Russia are emerging. Indeed, during the apartheid and post-colonial decades, the major preoccupation of African states was to rid the continent of apartheid, colonial rule and white minority domination. It is only in the post-Cold War, post-apartheid era that the continent's states and leaders could give their attention to the question of building a community or society by which the continent's 54 states could negotiate

common institutions, norms, principles and policies on which they could agree to subject themselves to and live by.

Their project, however, is often undermined by the tardiness and political gimmickry of some states within their own ranks, and by the overt and covert efforts of external powers who would like to see this project fail. This process of building a society of states, or a community of states could be referred to as *Continentalism*, which as a project would take the independence of African states as a reality and seek ways for them to co-operate more effectively and build common approaches to addressing problems.

The question they pursued was not so much “who should govern over Africans?”, but “how do Africans wish to be governed?” in their quest for economic emancipation.

The African Renaissance: The philosophical underpinnings of African Agency

Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo in particular, other continental strategic partners in general, showed a great deal of ideational leadership – the power of ideas – and demonstrated that with their brand of soft power and African diplomacy, under the banner of “African solutions for African problems”, they could help to influence international relations thinking. It was Thabo Mbeki who was instrumental in articulating a vision for the continent, in essence an attempt to put on the agenda a vision of African political, economic, social and cultural rejuvenation. Obasanjo in turn crafted the idea of the Conference for Stability, Security, Development, and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), based on a belief that Africa needed its own variant of the Helsinki Initiative.

In short, the African Renaissance was more than just a vision; it contained core priorities, as well as plans of action.

African internationalism through partnership, not neo-paternalism

The second generation of Africans wanted to end centuries of humiliation and colonial domination, in which they were treated as second class citizens; they wanted a relationship with former colonial masters and outside powers, not of paternalism, arrogance and neo-colonialism, but of genuine partnership. At least since 1998, African states, spearheaded

by Mbeki, engaged the G8 and other international actors in favour of a new paradigm and relationship, namely strategic partnership. Indeed, in 2000, during the annual G8 summit in Okinawa, Japan, history was made when African leaders first engaged the G8 leaders in search of this new post-Cold War development model. They showed real leadership when they proposed a move away from a historical paternalistic and dependency relationship to one of genuine partnership, based on the principles of mutual respect, equality, responsibility and accountability, responsiveness and an equitable world order, advocated under the AU/NEPAD framework. Accordingly, African expectations were that the new partnership would be, in the true sense of the word, a relationship based on equality, with both sides (Africa and the rest) having something to contribute, not a one-sided donor-recipient relationship that had characterized past interactions. No longer could agendas be imposed on Africa, but rather its own identified needs and priorities would be addressed.

The new partnership framework was supposed to draw on existing arrangements, while bringing strategic consolidation, coherence, expansion and result-oriented focus to the new architecture. It would, thus, need to forge relationships with strategic partners willing to engage in its development agenda. Imbibing the core partnership principles was considered vital as a result of a growing sense of realism amongst a new generation of Africans that development partners had to adhere to such evolving norms and standards, to redress the injustices of the past. In particular, given the need to underpin African ownership and leadership of Africa's development agenda and process, the G8 offered the possibility of establishing a political process that could translate political will into mutual accountability, as well as an effective monitoring of commitments, vital to translating them into effective strategy and policy.

This new partnership model was based on the theoretical framework of internationalism – African internationalism if you like – with the wish on the part of these African states to play a role, on behalf of the continent, to negotiate international power redistribution models and extract commitments from industrialised and former colonial powers in areas ranging from aid to market access. South Africa and other continental powers, like Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Ghana, and the African Union Commission, have been key voices in favour of new modalities for resource mobilisation, such as better and more effective levels of aid to be channelled to it. These states appropriated for themselves the role of partnership negotiator with the Western powers, notably the G8 countries

and European Union countries, and together with other African partners specifically campaigned for international support in five areas: more accelerated and predictable levels of aid; market access for African goods; debt relief; a free and fair global trade regime that would benefit Africa and the outside world; and resources to enhance the continent's peace support operations capabilities (Department of Foreign Affairs 2007a:7).

Where do we currently stand with this partnership model? There is a palpable sense in which African agency and leadership has been weakened since 2008. There is currently a real leadership vacuum playing itself out in the continent, and one demonstration of this lacuna is that they have failed to embrace the partnership paradigm as espoused by their predecessors. African politics are highly personality-driven affairs, and because the African Agenda of 1998-2008 was so closely associated with the personalities of Mbeki, Obasanjo, Wade, Chissano, Mkapa, Kufor, and others, their successors felt the need to distance themselves from these projects. The endresult was lack of ownership, and this gaping diplomatic lacuna. The Zuma government and its new African allies have allowed the important issue of Africa speaking with one voice to drift, and have not banded together with other pivotal African states, like Nigeria and Senegal. At present, there appear to be few signs of an African "concert of powers", through which key states come together and co-ordinate their efforts in favour of a single African voice and continental interests.

The G8-Africa Action plan, crafted from 1999 and coming to fruition in 2002, has been allowed to merely waver, and African states are currently doing little to hold the feet of the Western powers to the fire so as to ensure that they live up to commitments made to Africa. G8 powers made more than 120 commitments to Africa, and it is now up to them to try and ensure that these states live up to their side of the bargain in the areas of trade, aid, market access, debt relief, and resources for peace support operations. The G8 countries have conveniently pushed their Africa Action Plan off the table and onto the backburner; they would find all the excuses not to meet their obligations towards Africa, but would find the resources and will to engage in an illegal war against Libya. At present, Western powers are in breach of the principle of *pacta sunt servanda vis-à-vis* their compact with Africa.

Even within the context of the G20, where South Africa is currently Africa's own representative, it has not taken up the challenge of articulating this African Agenda, and another opportunity for African leadership and agency had been lost. South Africa has merely focussed on narrow issues of capital flows and fiscal issues. Expectations were now

that South Africa, as the sole African representative of Africa on the G20, would ensure that African interests were well-represented, and that the G8-Africa Action Plan would be pushed by South Africa. To date, this has not happened and African development concerns enjoy little attention.

Pivotal African states and the future of the African Union (AU)

Central to African states' African agenda and continentalist strategy was the idea that African states and continental institutions should not rush into a United States of Africa (USAf) project; instead, they would go about establishing order in a measured fashion by building and consolidating institutions on the basis of common norms and principles, cajoling states into living by commonly defined rules, and executing this project with the objective of "...strengthening of the AU and its structures" and "...in line with the Constitutive Act" (Department of Foreign Affairs 2007a:4). South Africa's African Agenda thus subscribes to a functionalist approach to African political development, placing as it does emphasis on norms creation, institution building, and building a community of society of African states. Indeed, since 1999, South Africa has been a key player in establishing the AU, and in 2002 became the first African state to chair the AU, the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU has made provision for the establishment of some 18 new organs entrusted with maintaining order in African politics. These key institutions include executive organs, accountability structures, and representative institutions. For Tshwane (formerly Pretoria), it is important to strengthen all these bodies (Landsberg & Mackay 2003). Tshwane places a huge emphasis on the need adequately to finance AU organs and institutions, and it supports the idea of the amendment of the Constitutive Act to achieve all the above reforms.

The AU as the premier continental integration institution, and embodiment of continentalism, faces major human and financial resource constraints as member states typically fail to meet their commitments to the body. At present, five member states are responsible for a whopping 75% of the budget of the AU, including South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, each of which pays 15% of its budget. In light of the serious effects of the so-called "Arab spring", or "Arab revolutions", and how they have weakened both Egypt and Libya, it is unclear whether these states will continue to meet their commitments to the continental body. Forty-nine other African countries together account for only 25% of

the AU's budget; yet many of them are in arrears with their continental commitments.

Of all the problems faced by the African Union, it is the policy-to-implementation gap, what we could call here the P2I crisis, that is of real concern. Many states simply disregard the importance of continental policies, and do not live by them. There is a pervasive culture in our continent of countries negotiating and signing up to policies without any real commitment to operationalise or live by them. The lack of political will to comply with continental principles, norms, values and purposes is a real challenge to the continental union project.

RECs as the building blocks: the SADC case

Given its commitment to ending Africa's international marginalisation, the "African agenda" built on a strong policy in defence of step-by-step regional integration and development. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are regarded as the building blocks and implementing agents of the AU; thus, there can be no Union of African States or African Community of States without strong sub-regional and regional integration blocks. Policy openly states sub-regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECASS), the Arab Maghreb Union and others should be strengthened to promote the goals of regional integration, democratisation, peace and security, and accelerated economic growth. As such, and as a REC, a commitment to achieve regional economic development and to build the Southern African Development Community (SADC) form key pillars of South Africa's "African agenda". The 2007 strategic foreign policy document referred to above states that "South Africa will aim to mobilise support for the harmonisation and rationalisation of Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as well as for the regional integration process" (Department of Foreign Affairs 2007a:4).

However, ambitious though this agenda appears to have been, the important point is that there was at least an agenda. African leaders showed a commitment, even at the rhetorical level, to regional integration and the strengthening of RECs. The problem lies in the serious challenges faced by the RECs, and by the idea of construction RECs as the anchors of an African union. First, the stated commitment to integration notwithstanding,

there is a real problem in Africa with the pooling of sovereignty and surrendering sovereignty for the sake of the regional good and regional integrating. There are also tensions between RECs and the AU, with many RECs believing that they should not be taking their cue from the AU as they are much older and more established than the supposed “mother” body. There is furthermore the problem of multiple and overlapping membership of many African states, with many belonging to several of these bodies at the same time. Just two of the adverse consequences of this overlapping membership problem are the drawing of scarce financial resources as well as often conflicting policies between RECs. Here should be added the lack of co-ordination and harmonisation of policies and processes amongst RECs.

Nepad as an African development blueprint

The African Agenda posited a pivotal role for South Africa in crafting a socio-economic development plan for the continent, and it was a particular developmental project at that: the modernisation of African states and regions. In 1999, South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria articulated the Millennium Development Recovery Programme (MAP), and later, together with Senegal, these countries developed the New African Initiative (NAI). In 2001, these countries developed the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). With MAP, NAI and Nepad, South Africa and its continental partners have viewed themselves as interlocutors with the industrialised powers, and the Republic took the lead role in negotiating a new “strategic partnership” between Africa and the outside world. Nepad hopes to spur Africa’s development after decades of failures as a result of the legacies of colonialism, the Cold War, bad governance, unsound economic policies and management and destructive conflicts (Bekoe and Landsberg 2002).

At the present juncture, Nepad’s future is somewhat uncertain. While rhetorically the Zuma-led government has stated its commitment to Nepad, in practice there has been little movement over Nepad’s direct commitment to Nepad and the programme appears to be in limbo. The much vaunted “African concert of power”, through which a few pivotal African states banded together and co-ordinated policies on governance, peace and security, development, and co-operation with the outside world, has started to fracture. These states even crafted common positions in relation to great powers and emerging powers, and how the AU and

Africans should speak to them. Over the course of the past three years, there is a palpable leadership crisis in Africa, one which is clearly being exploited not only by Western powers, but also other external powers, like China and India, as well as Russia and Brazil. The “new” South African government is ambivalent *vis-à-vis* Nepad, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and other continental initiatives and programmes, and few, if any, African states have shown signs of wanting to take leadership or ownership of them. The ambivalence and fiddling on the part of South Africa has been met by disengagement and uncertainty on the part of other African states, most notably Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Egypt, which has been severely derailed or distracted in the wake of the so-called “Arab Spring”. Prevarication on the part of South Africa has thus coincided with uncertainty on the part of other key African states, many of which, who had been founder members of Nepad, have become lukewarm about Nepad as a continental developmental body. The Western powers have been even more disinterested in Nepad, and this has been met with already great international scepticism about the plan’s future. Not only did many of these states show little interest in embracing Nepad as the affirmed development blueprint of the continent, they have also revealed disinterest in coming up with an alternative development plan for the continent. Again, this confusion about Nepad makes it easy for many donors to renege on their responsibilities towards the continent.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as a governance model

The promotion of “good governance” occupied a central position in Mbeki’s African Agenda, based on a view that there was need to develop “a common governance ethos within the AU” (Landsberg 2007:207). African Agenda policies promoted adherence to democratic benchmarks and governance indicators set up by Africans and for Africans in order to benefit from the renewed focus on African ownership. It had for example been instrumental in setting up an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to promote democratic conduct in Africa (Nepad 2002). Today, few African states, not even pivotal ones such as South Africa and Nigeria, take responsibility for the operationalisation and consolidation of the APRM and the programme is in real jeopardy. The APRM Secretariat in Midrand is weak; the High-level panel of Eminent Persons is not properly constituted. Plans of action as adopted by states that have undergone the

APRM are not being properly integrated in the political and budgetary plans of states. All the weaknesses associated with the APRM came about in part because of a lack of leadership and ownership for what continues to be Africa's most innovative governance promotion instrument. It was thus discouraging when the new South African government, which assumed office in April 2009, failed to embrace the APRM and was reluctant to demonstrate the necessary political leadership that would see it strengthened and consolidated. South Africa, for example, is yet to replace a former member serving on the High-level panel. Again, the onus should be on founding members like Nigeria and South Africa to lead by example. Their lack of leadership, coupled with scepticism on the part of donors, make the future of the APRM, and thus governance promotion, a highly uncertain proposition.

***Pax Africana* and peace diplomacy**

The illegal war by NATO against the tyrannical Muammar Ghaddafi's Libya, and the vote in favour of United Nations Security Council 1973 on 17 March 2011 to impose a "no fly zone" over Libya in apparent isolation of the African Union's position of 1973 has huge implications for African agency in world affairs. It has shown total disregard for, and marginalisation of the African voice by Western powers, at a time when the talk is of an apparent "partnership" with Africa. Indeed, it was an unprecedented move on the part of the Security Council as their "regime change" agenda under the banner of a "no fly zone", "democracy" and "freedom" was tantamount to the UN declaring war on a sovereign member state. Whatever the minutiae of the arguments for or against intervention – and they are likely to revolve around semantics rather than substance – the choice of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to ignore and marginalise the African voice rendered a telling blow to African agency. African and other developing countries, it should be remembered, place a high premium on multilateralism as a vehicle to address their concerns and interests.

This vote in favour of Resolution 1973 came in stark contradiction to the emerging continental doctrine of *Pax-Africana*, so circumspectly negotiated by African states during the course of the past decade-and-a-half. This *Pax Africana Agenda* adopted the mantra that "there can be no peace without development, and no development without peace" (Landsberg 2010:436-457). Many of these pivotal African states have for the past two

decades of post-Cold War, post-apartheid African rule supported ideas to bolster the peace-keeping and peace-support operational capacities of Africa at continental and sub-regional levels. The decision by South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon on 17 March 2011 to vote in favour of UNSC Resolution 1973 to impose a “no-fly zone” over Libya, which resulted in the contracting out of this mission to NATO, and in isolation from the AU, contradicted the continental peace and security tenet that denounces military solutions to political problems, as well as the notion of “African solutions for African problems”. Thus, in terms of peace diplomacy as well, some contradictions have emerged in the Africa policies of key African states, and tensions amongst them also arose.

A key goal of the African Agenda during the period 1997-2008 was that of achieving “sustained and sustainable peace in the Continent”. South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and others have therefore been active proponents of peaceful resolution of conflicts on the African continent and elsewhere. Tshwane has adopted the view that the Republic’s own experience of emerging from a seemingly intractable apartheid conflict, and out of that creating a progressive democratic state, makes it well placed to assist others in similar conflict situations; it has for some time been determined to apply the negotiation settlement solution as a means of addressing conflicts (Landsberg 2010:438).

A dominant mode of the African Agenda strategy has been to push for Negotiated Solutions and Inclusive Governments – read: the Government of National Unity (GNU) option (Landsberg 2010:438). So, for example, South Africa’s African Agenda is heavily influenced by the experience of its transition from apartheid to democracy, and its agenda remains predisposed towards quiet diplomacy and preventive diplomacy, notably the settlement of disputes through negotiations. It was a preferred strategy of African states to rule out the military option in international affairs and its preferred strategy continues to be that of brokering peace pacts amongst belligerents in conflict situations; military action is only to be taken under a multilateral umbrella, and only in very select instances, namely to engage in “responsibility to protect missions”, justified in instances of gross violations of human rights, genocide, instability in African states which threatens broader regional stability, and unconstitutional changes of government (read: *coups d’état*) (Landsberg 2010:437-438).

One cannot understand *Pax Africana* unless one appreciates the stress on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), or more specifically State-building (Department of Foreign Affairs 2007a:7).

In this post-conflict strategy, emphasis is particularly placed on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Burundi and the Comoros. State-building is in fact a key means of preventing deadly conflicts and war, and there exists a direct relationship between governance and state-building.

Here too, African states are highly dependent on the resources of external powers to secure peace and security on the continent. Indeed, part of the G8-Africa partnership agreements negotiated during the decade 1998-2008 was to set aside significant resources for the continent's peace-support operations. To be sure, Africa is too heavily dependent on the largesse of external powers for the continent's own security. This not only compromises the continent's security, but it makes the continent vulnerable. African states need to become more serious in investing in the continent's own security architecture by providing the necessary resources so as to strengthen sub-regional and continental entities to make and keep peace.

Conclusion

To conclude, at the present international juncture, as we enter the second decade of the 21st century, African agency and leadership in world affairs are being threatened by weaknesses and fractures continentally, and the marginalisation and disregard of Africa abroad.

During the past three years or so, we have seen a vacuum emerging in African leadership, and a lack of co-operation and strategising amongst African states appears palpable, to the extent that there is no real African concert of powers visible. Few African states embrace the African Union or its institutions, currently rendering the continental project weak and rudderless. Gaps in policy-making leadership, and poor policy management, typically result in poor policy outputs and outcomes. Lack of policy or bad policy makes for bad policy implementation. The absence of strategic leadership in African continental policy and ownership of policy is conspicuous. Whereas the breakthroughs of the early 1990s and first decade of the 21st Century came about in part because of leadership and a "concert approach" to African diplomacy, the lack of co-operation and co-ordination amongst African states at the current juncture, and the sense of fragmentation amongst them, means that the African Agenda is in jeopardy and the continent is both neglected and being undermined from abroad.

Indeed, there has been a high degree of policy discontinuity between the project as pursued by the second generation of African leaders, and

the crop of leaders who came to replace them. In practice we have seen deviations and uncertainty creeping into Africa's continental posture, even a lack of political leadership. Continental policy in many senses appears to have become victim of the fall-out between the crop of leaders who ushered in the turn of the millennium and those who came later. Many of the new leaders and their supporters try very hard to distance themselves from the domestic and foreign policy projects of their predecessors, but this has triggered confusion, timidity and diplomatic coyness on the part of South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique and others. Western powers have responded to this with a new aggressive interventionism, coupled with a new aggressive cultivation and penetration of Africa by emerging powers like China, India, Russia and others. Many events and initiatives have the potential to destabilise, and at the very least deepen the continent's fragmentation. What is needed is for pivotal states like South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Ghana, Senegal, and even Egypt, and Libya in the aftermath of the Arab revolution, to show confidence in its continentalism and African Agenda, and in concert and partnership with other African states, restore African agency and leadership in world affairs. This could be done in part by tackling the challenges of institutional consolidation, as well closing the huge gap between policy and implementation in Africa.

Linguagem Diplomática

*Felipe Fortuna**

Quando mencionamos a intenção de utilizar a “linguagem diplomática”, é bem possível que o nosso interlocutor desconfie que estamos prestes a mentir. No seu primeiro sentido, a ideia mesma de linguagem diplomática ocupa o espaço da verdade, substituindo-a por uma forma dissimulada e provavelmente enganadora, que tenta falsificar a tradução da realidade. Trata-se de uma operação radical e até mesmo violenta, em que se afirma algo para exibir o seu contrário. Acoplada às suas finalidades políticas, a linguagem diplomática passa mesmo a ser uma alteração relevante provocada pelas necessidades políticas, pela defesa de algum interesse, por um objetivo maior que precisa ser alcançado a todo custo. Há numerosos exemplos, de fato, em que o uso da linguagem diplomática escamoteou uma dada situação – que poderia relacionar-se tanto à crise pessoal de um mandatário, flagrado em atos da vida privada que repercutiram no seu desempenho de homem público, quanto a explicações e desmentidos de episódios de genocídio.

Existe também uma compreensão da linguagem diplomática que não corresponde propriamente a uma forma de contrariar o real, mas sim de suavizá-lo com vistas a transmitir de modo intencionalmente cifrado a mensagem desejada. É que a expressão “linguagem diplomática” parece comumente traduzida, em especial para o público leigo, à utilização do eufemismo, a uma forma de atenuação da mensagem. Desse modo, a mensagem perderia impacto, mas o teor a ser transmitido estaria ali, vigente. Aqui surge a noção mais popular de linguagem diplomática,

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exibida em sua plenitude: a que demonstra a força da ambiguidade, o poder forte da flexibilização da linguagem em nome da inflexibilidade de posições. Ou seja: a possibilidade de encontrar caminhos para a negociação e para a convergência de interesses quando, na maioria das vezes, o processo ainda se encontra inconcluso e em andamento.

O uso da linguagem diplomática muitas vezes se posiciona de modo dinâmico naquilo que Norman Scott denominou de uma oscilação entre a ambiguidade e a precisão. Essa oscilação – ou, melhor ainda, essa combinação – pode ser o elemento vital para o bom encaminhamento do processo negociador. Sobretudo em relação à ambiguidade, deve-se salientar o seu poder de atenuar as possíveis tensões existentes, assim como a possibilidade de ampliar a interpretação que se deseja dar a um assunto. A ambiguidade também permite que as gerações futuras, diante de novas realidades, possam encaminhar uma solução alcançada no passado de maneira mais segura, sem que uma visão estrita e, por assim dizer, fechada acabe impedindo maiores avanços. Na linguagem diplomática, a ambiguidade é antes uma possibilidade de encontrar solução do que uma fuga do enfrentamento – e isso nem sempre é compreendido por formadores de opinião e pelo público em geral, quase sempre na busca de conclusões que, caso fossem exigidas pelos diplomatas envolvidos em negociação, seguramente terminariam em fracasso.

As questões e os problemas que nos trazem a linguagem diplomática indicam que, para o seu melhor conhecimento, seria produtivo entender como se define a ideia mesma de linguagem. Pois, na tradição grega, a linguagem é uma expressão do ser humano: o *logos* consistia num instrumento a serviço da verdade. Não escapa a essa mesma tradição o fato de que a linguagem – toda linguagem – é uma expressão do poder. E, como tal, já Aristóteles na *Política* havia escrito que “a linguagem serve para declarar o que é vantajoso”. O uso da linguagem demonstra também um modo peculiar de pensar: embora humana e humanizada, a linguagem transmite muitos valores não compartilhados pelo interlocutor com que se quer negociar. Há expressões religiosas, conceitos e percepções que não são imediatamente captados em diversas situações, o que dificulta muito a pragmática da comunicação. Provavelmente os sermões religiosos devem representar um momento crucial do uso da linguagem, uma vez que neles está presente, entre outros aspectos, a intenção de convencer e de transmitir a palavra divina. Em muitas religiões, o pregador nada mais é do que um mensageiro da palavra suprema, um intermediário entre o ser superior e os fiéis, estes previamente convencidos, como por meio de um pacto, de que estão diante de um legítimo representante da mensagem aguardada. Ao pregador caberia apenas dar ênfase a este ou

àquele aspecto, sem se preocupar tanto em demonstrar e convencer, uma vez que mesmo a peroração tediosa e sem nuances poderia, afinal, chegar ao mesmo efeito: o de transmitir aquilo que já se sabe.

Para todos nós – que formamos um grupo essencialmente de diplomatas, ou de pessoas que se desempenham em atividades afins à diplomacia –, parece-me muito importante salientar a questão da *centralidade do texto*: não exagero quando afirmo que nós todos passamos uma parte considerável do nosso tempo de trabalhar a escrever telegramas, notas verbais, ofícios, cartas, guias de mensagem, notas à imprensa, entre algumas outras modalidades do texto oficial. Uma parte não menos considerável se destina a ler os mesmos tipos de texto, num *continuum* característico da tradição diplomática. O célebre tripé profissional – informar, representar e negociar – seria na prática impossível de ser realizado sem conhecimento e sem uso da linguagem.

Pelo terceiro ano consecutivo, coube-me ministrar o curso de “Linguagem Diplomática” no Instituto Rio Branco, em Brasília. Como sabemos todos, trata-se da academia diplomática, única a dar acesso ao Itamaraty. Os objetivos do curso são basicamente dois: o primeiro, trazer algumas questões gerais geralmente trazidas do domínio da linguística; e o segundo, imediatamente mais útil, de treinar o domínio das formas oficiais e do desempenho oral e escrito da comunicação diplomática. Um dos desafios que me cabe transmitir aos alunos-diplomatas é o de dominar aspectos do registro. Esse aspecto está longe de ser menosprezável – e, pelo contrário, constituiu mesmo tema de debate para os modernistas brasileiros. É assim que, ao iniciar o curso, apresento dois capítulos do clássico *Macunaíma*. O capítulo VII, intitulado “Macumba”, começa da seguinte maneira:

Macunaíma estava muito contrariado. Não conseguia reaver a muiraquitã e isso dava ódio. O melhor era matar Piaimã... Então saiu da cidade e foi no mato Fulano experimentar força. Campeou légua e meia e afinal enxergou uma peroba sem fim. Enfiou o braço na sapopemba e deu um puxão pra ver si arrancava o pau mas só o vento sacudia a folhagem na altura porém. “Inda não tenho bastante força não”, Macunaíma, refletiu. Agarrou num dente de ratinho chamado crô, fez uma bruta incisão na perna, de preceito pra quem é frouxo e voltou sangrando pra pensão. Estava desconsolado de não ter força ainda e vinha numa distração tamanha que deu uma topada.

Então de tanta dor o herói viu no alto as estrelas e entre elas enxergou Capei minguinha cercada de névoa. “Quando mingua a Luna não comeces coisa alguma” suspirou. E continuou consolado.

Nesse capítulo, o escritor modernista se vale de uma linguagem que tenta reproduzir o Português altamente coloquial e falado. Há construções que são inaceitáveis segundo os preceitos da norma culta. Esse registro de muita informalidade dá o tom de praticamente todo o livro, o que está de acordo com os objetivos do escritor: tratar de uma lenda nacional, utilizar o viés satírico e pouco solene para o tratamento de mitos, e afirmar a existência de religiosidade fora do enquadramento cristão e católico.

No mesmo livro, Mário de Andrade insere, no capítulo IX, a “Carta pras Icamiabas”:

Às mui queridas súbditas nossas, Senhoras Amazonas.
Trinta de Maio de Mil Novecentos e Vinte e Seis, São Paulo.

Senhoras:

Não pouco vos surpreenderá, por certo, o endereço e a literatura desta missiva. Cumpre-nos, entretanto, iniciar estas linhas de saudade e muito amor, com desagradável nova. É bem verdade que na boa cidade de São Paulo — a maior do universo, no dizer de seus prolixos habitantes — não sois conhecidas por “icamiabas”, voz espúria, sinão que pelo apelativo de Amazonas; e de vós, se afirma, cavalgades ginetes belígeros e virdes da Hélade clássica; e assim sois chamadas. Muito nos pesou a nós, Imperator vosso, tais dislates da erudição porémheis de convir conosco que, assim, ficais mais heróicas e mais conspícuas, tocadas por essa platina respeitável da tradição e da pureza antiga. Mas não devemos desperdiçarmos vosso tempo fero, e muito menos conturbarmos vosso entendimento, com notícias de mau calibre; passemos pois, imediato, ao relato dos nossos feitos por cá.

Nem cinco sóis eram passados que de vós nos partíramos, quando a mais temerosa desdita pesou sobre Nós. Por uma bela noite dos idos de maio do ano translato, perdíamos a muiraquitã; que outrem grafara muraquitã, e, alguns doutos, ciosos de etimologias esdrúxulas, ortografam muyrakitan e até mesmo muraquéitã, não sorriais! Haveis de saber que este vocábulo, tão familiar às vossas trompas de Eustáquio, é quase desconhecido por aqui. Por estas paragens mui civis, os guerreiros chamam-se polícias, grilos, guardas-cívicas, boxistas, legalistas, masorqueiros, etc; sendo que alguns desses termos são neologismos absurdos — bagaço nefando com que os desleixados e petimetres conspurcam o bom falar lusitano.

Na “Carta pras Icamiabas”, Mario de Andrade faz um pastiche da linguagem escrita e solene, com marcas da influência de Portugal. O tom

satírico, ainda que disfarçado pela linguagem, permanece – na descrição dos paulistas, da polícia e dos hábitos políticos brasileiros. O principal objetivo do autor, porém, é demonstrar a artificialidade, em muitos casos, da linguagem escrita, quando comparada à linguagem oral. Chega mesmo a escrever que “a sua riqueza de expressão intelectual é tão prodigiosa, que falam numa língua e escrevem noutra”.

Obviamente, o dilema de quem se vale da linguagem diplomática também se insere na questão de falar numa língua e escrever noutra. É sempre necessário encontrar o equilíbrio que torne o texto diplomático informativo, preferencialmente analítico e, se for o caso, propositivo.

Apesar da existência de línguas oficiais e de línguas de trabalho, a diplomacia parece ainda se debater no dilema da expressão linguística nacional, por um lado, e da utilização de uma *língua franca*, por outro. Esse debate, por sua vez, confunde-se ao de vários linguistas ao longo dos tempos. Seria de fato possível obter, entre milhões de falantes, um código afinal comum, que fosse igualmente dominado por cidadãos de diversos países e de diversas culturas? A possibilidade de uma comunicação escrita verdadeiramente global estimulou diversos estudiosos a conceberem línguas artificiais – cujo exemplo mais famoso é seguramente o Esperanto. No entanto, como bem nota o erudito professor Paulo Rónai – ele mesmo, húngaro de nascimento, um poliglota renomado – o trabalho incansável de especialistas acabou produzindo uma nova Babel, formada por línguas até então inexistentes. Em outras palavras, a busca por uma língua comum, que permitisse a comunicação rápida entre todos os habitantes deste planeta, revelou-se uma utopia.

Como sabemos, em épocas históricas distintas houve ao menos a tentativa de estabelecer línguas comuns para a melhor comunicação diplomática. Assim aconteceu com o latim e, mais recentemente, com o francês. Terminadas as duas Grandes Guerras, o inglês passou a ser tradicionalmente utilizado no comércio e nos contatos profissionais, o que influenciou de modo incontornável a atividade diplomática. Pouco a pouco, foi-se criando resistência à preeminência de uma só língua em ramos tão diversos – por exemplo, o cinema, a música popular –, bem como nas técnicas. Embora a língua franca não resulte de uma escolha, ela passa a ser, sem dúvida, uma expressão do poder.

Durante pouco mais de dois anos, chefiar a Divisão de Assuntos Multilaterais no Itamaraty. Entre os assuntos com os quais me envolvi, estava o de impulsionar o uso do português como língua de trabalho na Unesco. A questão da língua de trabalho tem sido defendida pelos países lusófonos desde a década de oitenta. Em 1982,

mais precisamente, a Conferência Mundial sobre Políticas Culturais (Mondiacult), organizada pela Unesco, no México, havia aprovado recomendação no sentido de favorecer a introdução do português como língua de trabalho. No ano seguinte, Portugal solicitou a inclusão de item intitulado “Estudo sobre a possibilidade da introdução do português como língua de trabalho da Organização” na agenda da XXII Conferência Geral. A Mesa da Conferência Geral deliberou, contudo, que o assunto deveria ser primeiramente examinado pelo Conselho Executivo, reformulando o título da proposta para “Estudo sobre a conveniência e implicações financeiras da introdução do português e de outras línguas como línguas de trabalho da Organização”. Como se depreende, a alteração do enunciado do item, por si só, refletia resistências.

Em 1985, o Conselho Executivo discutiu relatório a respeito, preparado pelo Diretor-Geral, que estimava em pelo menos 4,5 milhões de dólares no primeiro biênio os custos para a introdução de uma língua como o português, o alemão ou o italiano como língua de trabalho da Conferência Geral e do Conselho Executivo. Caso essa medida de introdução de uma dessas línguas fosse estendida a outras reuniões e conferências no âmbito da Unesco, o custo se elevaria ao menos a 14 milhões de dólares bienais. O relatório, apesar de não desestimar expressamente a proposta, levantou questionamentos sobre as vantagens dessa medida bem como sua compatibilidade com a clara diretriz, aprovada pela Conferência Geral, de redução do volume da documentação.

Na época, o Diretor-Geral acrescentou ao relatório inicial apresentado ao Conselho Executivo em 1985 informação no sentido de que a União Postal Universal havia aceitado, a partir de 1981, a tradução para o português das atas dos órgãos executivos daquela instituição, aproveitando-se dos serviços de tradução disponíveis nos Correios, em Brasília. A interpretação para o português nas reuniões do Congresso da UPU, do Conselho Executivo e do Conselho Consultivo sobre Estudos Postais já havia sido permitida desde 1975, à custa do Brasil.

Como se percebe, os argumentos então vigentes concentraram-se nas implicações financeiras dessa proposta. Em consequência, o Conselho Executivo, com o fim de evitar o aumento de despesas, decidiu encerrar o exame do assunto, embora tenha endossado a solicitação de que o português fosse adotado como língua oficial da Conferência Geral, o que foi aprovado pela 23ª Conferência Geral, em Sofia, em 1985. Logrou-se, assim, importante vitória, embora de alcance parcial, pois não se aplicou ao Conselho Executivo. O Regimento da Conferência Geral teve seu artigo 54.1 alterado para acrescentar o português às línguas oficiais definidas em 1948: árabe, chinês, francês, hindí, inglês, italiano, russo e espanhol.

Na longa trajetória a favor da introdução da língua portuguesa, os países lusófonos não conseguiram a aprovação, na Conferência Geral, de 1987, de proposta de resolução sobre a adoção gradual e seletiva do português, a partir de 1990, como língua de trabalho em certos tipos de reuniões, como os comitês intergovernamentais com participação de vários países lusófonos (Programa Hidrológico Internacional, Programa Internacional para o Desenvolvimento da Comunicação, Programa Intergovernamental de Informática, Programa MAB, etc.). Questionou-se, à época, se seria o caso de se dar preferência ao português em detrimento das línguas já reconhecidas como oficiais (árabe, chinês, espanhol e russo). Mesmo contando com a participação de representantes de países cujas línguas oficiais já são consideradas línguas de trabalho da Organização, esses comitês utilizam apenas o inglês e o francês como línguas de trabalho. No caso em que todas as seis línguas de trabalho viessem a ser utilizadas, levantou-se a dificuldade adicional de que poucas salas na sede teriam capacidade para acomodar cabine de interpretação para outra língua.

Apesar desses reveses, os países lusófonos retomaram a proposta dois anos depois, na Conferência Geral de 1989, a qual aprovou resolução que, embora solicitasse ao Diretor-Geral que continuasse a apoiar a introdução gradual do português como língua de trabalho da Organização, concentrava-se em providências para aumentar a difusão, em português, dos documentos publicados pela Unesco. Esse resultado, aquém do que seria desejado, mostrou claramente a dificuldade de se conseguir o reconhecimento do português como língua de trabalho, embora contivesse ressalva de que essas medidas de difusão eram aprovadas “sem prejuízo da possível utilização futura do português como língua de trabalho”. A persistência dessa resistência pode ser explicada, também, à luz do crescente desequilíbrio na utilização das demais línguas de trabalho que não sejam o inglês e o francês no âmbito da Organização, ditada por razões políticas e restrições financeiras, situação essa que gerou resolução sobre a promoção do uso dessas línguas já reconhecidas como línguas de trabalho na Conferência Geral de 1991.

Em 1994, o Diretor-Geral tentou tomar providências para que interpretação para o Português fosse oferecida aos membros lusófonos do Conselho Executivo. Essa medida, embora proposta em caráter experimental, causou reação extremamente negativa de parte de vários membros do Conselho, em particular dos representantes da Alemanha, Itália, Japão, Países Baixos, Rússia e, em menor medida, da Argélia, Dinamarca e Turquia. Essa mesma discussão já havia ocorrido em reunião informal da Mesa do Conselho, durante a qual argumentos jurídicos e

políticos haviam sido levantados para questionar a iniciativa do Diretor-Geral. No plenário, as atas da sessão registram a forte oposição desses países, os quais argumentaram que o Conselho não detinha competência sobre o estatuto das línguas de trabalho e que, caso houvesse os meios financeiros para incluir novas línguas de trabalho, o italiano e o híndi, por exemplo, deveriam ser igualmente beneficiados, pois também eram considerados línguas oficiais. Apesar da intervenção do Assessor Jurídico no sentido de que essa experiência não requeria alteração do Regimento do Conselho, o ponto de ordem acabou prevalecendo e a discussão foi suspensa e até hoje nunca retomada.

Desde aquela época, há dezessete anos, não houve nova tentativa de se voltar ao assunto. Acredito que seja necessário retomar essa meritória iniciativa, com base em nova articulação de posições com os demais países lusófonos. Estimo que, para aumentar as possibilidades de êxito, esse exercício de coordenação deve ser feito com vistas a reapresentar a proposta à Conferência Geral de 2011, foro em que todos os países lusófonos estão representados e no qual os obstáculos parecem menos importantes do que no Conselho Executivo. Para tanto, será necessária a mobilização da CPLP para angariar apoio junto ao maior número possível de países.

Para o agente diplomático, a linguagem na qual vão sendo redigidos os telegramas, os ofícios, as cartas, as notas verbais, os memorandos – e, enfim, toda a documentação oficial – tem um valor central para o trabalho: o diplomata é um produtor de símbolos, como se cada gesto seu – sobretudo a expressão oral e escrita – pudesse ser imediatamente interpretado como mensagens que um Estado pretende transmitir a outro Estado. Por isso mesmo, a linguagem diplomática está presente não apenas nos documentos, mas também nas ações do cerimonial e do protocolo, nas fórmulas de cortesia e nos encontros de caráter social. Em todos esses momentos, deve-se querer alcançar a melhor comunicação possível.

No contexto da informação global, a linguagem diplomática pode salientar-se como aquela que representa a percepção oficial dos fatos. Mas não há dúvidas de que ela compete com forças ainda mais intensas atualmente – por exemplo, pensemos nos interesses de empresas privadas de petróleo ou de companhias de produção de software. Todas essas novas estruturas de organização – o petróleo não tem mais do que setenta anos de extração industrial, e a informática não ultrapassa trinta anos de surgimento e expansão – possuem suas formas de comunicação, e a utilizam plenamente. Um exemplo muito próximo pode ser observado: o desaparecimento do *Jornal do Brasil*. Foi um dos mais tradicionais diários

do país, mais do que centenário, no qual trabalharam grandes expressões do jornalismo e do pensamento brasileiro. No momento em que seguidas crises financeiras fizeram com que o jornal perdesse competitividade e fosse até mesmo diminuindo fisicamente de tamanho, as informações editoriais preferiram salientar outros aspectos. Primeiramente, as vantagens do formato tabloide para os leitores (apesar de os jornais com tamanhos tradicionais continuarem demonstrando vendas crescentes). Em seguida, quando o jornal só podia ser lido pela internet, uma vez que sua circulação nas bancas fora suspensa, divulgou-se um editorial que enaltecia as vantagens ambientais de uma publicação que não agredia o meio ambiente... Não quero com isso insinuar que a linguagem diplomática deva servir a propósitos tão imediatistas de ocultar a realidade por meio de artifícios duvidosos de argumentação. Mas quero, sim, salientar a capacidade inventiva da comunicação que serve a interesses diversos, e o quanto a linguagem diplomática precisa estar preparada para, conforme o caso, responder às necessidades de um ambiente de múltiplos interesses.

Apenas o relacionamento da diplomacia com a imprensa teria a capacidade de gerar uma nova palestra. Para as finalidades deste Curso, quero ressaltar que, em contextos de normal funcionamento das democracias, a rapidez da informação se soma à transparência dos fatos. Até mesmo alguns graus de sigilo e de confidencialidade podem perder a sua intangibilidade – e, nesses casos, cabe ao agente diplomático enfrentar uma realidade organicamente distinta daquela que esteve vigente há cerca de cinquenta anos, quando uma classificação mais restritiva de documentos se associava à dificuldade de acesso e à quase impossibilidade de divulgá-lo com rapidez e para um público muito amplo.

Por fim, quero recordar que as questões de sigilo e segurança vieram à tona muito recentemente com o episódio conhecido como *Wikileaks*, que divulgou – e continua divulgando – uma quantidade extraordinária de informações produzidas pela diplomacia norte-americana. Eu mesmo tenho testemunhado diplomatas brasileiros que se envaidecem por terem sido mencionados nesses relatos telegráficos, como se tivessem saído, de forma surpreendente, do necessário anonimato. Ainda existe um debate sobre se o *Wikileaks* teria afetado de modo decisivo os contatos entre diplomatas – ou se, por outro lado, a diplomacia norte-americana terá sofrido sérios reveses por causa da divulgação de tantas opiniões, avaliações e percepções sobre países e interlocutores estrangeiros. Para o profissional da diplomacia, o *Wikileaks* não terá representado maior ameaça – uma vez que, de lado a lado, os juízos sobre algumas situações e pessoas não constituem, em si, o processo decisório.

Muitos se esquecem de que somente os relatos de caráter ostensivo chegaram ao público – portanto, permanecendo desconhecida a ampla gama de relatos reservados, confidenciais, secretos e ultrassecretos. Para o público leigo, o *Wikileaks* terá representando alguma sensação. Mas resta saber se, entre diplomatas, o que se revelou não passa do previsível trabalho de que se vale a diplomacia.

Na etapa em que estamos, o próximo desafio da linguagem diplomática deverá ser a *eDiplomacy*. Essa nova modalidade de comunicação, que envolve o uso de redes sociais, mídias eletrônicas e comunicações instantâneas por meio de instrumentos como *twitter*, ampliará o escopo e a responsabilidade da linguagem diplomática. É, como disse, o desafio que se coloca à frente, e para o qual precisaremos de mais contatos, de mais intercâmbios com representantes de países como os que estão neste momento nesta sala.

A Missão do Instituto Rio Branco

*Georges Lamazière**

É um grande prazer poder expor em linhas gerais o processo de seleção e formação para a carreira diplomática que incumbe desde 1946 ao Instituto Rio Branco – IRBr. A missão precípua do IRBr é, precisamente, “o recrutamento, a seleção, a formação e o treinamento do pessoal da Carreira de Diplomata”. A partir desse foco, o IRBr mantém, essencialmente, seis áreas de trabalho distintas: o Concurso de Admissão à Carreira de Diplomata (CACD); o Programa de Ação Afirmativa; o Curso de Formação; o Curso de Aperfeiçoamento de Diplomatas (CAD); e o Curso de Altos Estudos (CAE).

Cabe ainda mencionar duas áreas de trabalho que correm paralelas à vertente “formação e treinamento”, que são:

- a) atividades de cooperação internacional, inclusive na forma de intercâmbio de alunos e oferta de treinamento diplomático de funcionários de países que não possuem academia diplomática; e,
- b) fórum para a realização de palestras e seminários com autoridades nacionais e estrangeiras em visita ao Brasil.

I – O Concurso de Admissão à Carreira de Diplomata (CACD)

O Concurso de Admissão à Carreira de Diplomata (CACD) realiza-se anualmente desde a criação do IRBr, em 1945. Foi o primeiro concurso público de âmbito nacional instituído no Brasil. Até 1996, o

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candidato recrutado realizava o Curso de Formação na condição de bolsista. A partir de então, os candidatos passaram a tomar posse como diplomata previamente ao curso do Instituto.

O conjunto de disciplinas cobradas atualmente no CACD é essencialmente o mesmo que se exigia há trinta ou quarenta anos: Português, História do Brasil, História Mundial, Geografia, Política Internacional, Inglês, Noções de Economia, Noções de Direito, Espanhol e Francês. Apenas a primeira fase é objetiva. As provas seguintes são todas discursivas, no total de nove provas diferentes. O candidato aprovado escreve, em média, 44 páginas em provas discursivas e passa até 33 horas escrevendo suas respostas. Cada candidato é examinado por cerca de 32 especialistas, que formam nove diferentes Bancas Examinadoras.

Os conhecimentos e as habilidades que o CACD procura aferir são compatíveis com o nível acadêmico do Curso de Formação e com as futuras atribuições profissionais do diplomata. O CACD é realizado ao longo de cinco meses, tradicionalmente no primeiro semestre de cada ano.

No período de 2006 a 2010, o CACD ofereceu mais de cem vagas por ano, número expressivamente superior ao dos concursos anteriores, em razão da necessidade de implementar o aumento de cargos (de 998 para 1398) estabelecido pela Lei 11.292, de 26 de abril de 2006.

Desde 2011, todas as provas do CACD podem ser realizadas em todas as capitais brasileiras. O Itamaraty busca, dessa forma, a diversidade de origem de seus quadros, com vistas a ter uma representação diplomática que tenha, cada vez mais, “a cara do Brasil”. Nesse aspecto central da diversidade, insere-se também o Programa de Ação Afirmativa (PAA). Instituído em 2002, esse Programa oferece bolsas no valor de R\$ 25.000,00 (cerca de US\$ 15.000) para candidatos afrodescendentes se prepararem de forma adequada para prestar exame de ingresso na carreira de diplomata (CACD), com o objetivo de incentivar a diversidade étnica no âmbito do corpo diplomático brasileiro. Até o momento foram concedidas 372 bolsas. Dezssete candidatos do PAA foram aprovados no CACD. O processo seletivo do PAA é um concurso público constituído de prova objetiva e entrevista técnica.

Grosso modo, pode-se dizer que os cursos de Direito e Relações Internacionais são a origem de cerca de 60-70% dos novos diplomatas nos últimos anos, enquanto outros cursos da área de Humanas (Comunicação Social, Economia, Letras, História, etc.) concentram cerca de 20-30% dos novos diplomatas e os cursos de Exatas (Engenharias, Medicina, Matemática, etc.) são a origem de cerca de 10% dos novos diplomatas.

Naquilo que se refere à origem dos novos diplomatas, o Rio de Janeiro era, tradicionalmente, o Estado da Federação com a maior parcela de aprovação. Atualmente, há uma distribuição mais igualitária com relação ao peso demográfico de cada estado, porém, ainda com uma concentração no Centro-Sul. Nesse sentido, o Distrito Federal é atualmente a entidade da Federação com maior representação. Em termos absolutos, os Estados que mais aprovam são São Paulo, seguido por Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, Paraná e Distrito Federal.

Concurso de Admissão à Carreira de Diplomata (CACD)

Informações Estatísticas

	CACD 2006	CACD 2007	CACD 2008	CACD 2009	CACD 2010	CACD 2011
Vagas oferecidas	105	105	115	105	108	26
Resultado final (aprovados e nomeados) Homens/Mulheres	100 76/24	101 77/24	115 85/30	109 84/25	108 81/27	26 23/3
Inscrições	8.801	13.137	12.552	14.995	13.771	11.705
Inscrições pagas	6.308	8.667	8.228	9.190	8.570	7.180
Relação candidato/vaga	60,07	82,54	71,55	87,52	79,35	276,15
Média de idade dos aprovados	29,35	28,9	24,88	28,76	26,83	27,65

II - O Curso de Formação

O Curso de Formação representa a principal atribuição do IRBr na vertente “treinamento”. Todos os novos diplomatas, selecionados por meio de concurso, são obrigados a cursar o curso de três semestres, que compreende:

- a) disciplinas obrigatórias e eletivas;
- b) línguas estrangeiras; e
- c) módulos profissionalizantes.

No âmbito do Curso de Formação são oferecidas aulas de línguas estrangeiras, as quais são divididas entre obrigatórias (inglês, espanhol e francês) e eletivas (chinês, russo e árabe). As demais disciplinas obrigatórias da grade curricular são:

- a) Teoria das Relações Internacionais;
- b) Política Externa Brasileira;
- c) História das Relações Exteriores do Brasil;
- d) Linguagem Diplomática;
- e) Direito Internacional; e,
- f) Economia.

As disciplinas eletivas, por sua vez, compreendem temas como Direito da Integração, OMC e Contenciosos, Políticas Públicas, Globalização e Sistema Internacional, entre outros.

Cabe mencionar, ainda no âmbito do Curso de Formação, os módulos profissionalizantes, cada um com duração de uma ou duas semanas, concentrados no terceiro e último período letivo do Curso de Formação, e que tem por finalidade complementar o estudo de caráter acadêmico. Entre os Módulos Profissionalizantes correntemente oferecidos podemos destacar: 1) Imprensa, 2) Cerimonial, 3) Desarmamento e não Proliferação, 4) Assistência a Comunidades Brasileiras no Exterior, 5) Negociação e Solução de Conflitos Internacionais, 6) Promoção Comercial, 7) Direitos Humanos, 8) Sistema Multilateral de Comércio.

III - O Curso de Aperfeiçoamento de Diplomatas (CAD)

O CAD encontra-se em sua 61^a Edição e constitui-se de curso normalmente com duração de um mês, que ocorre duas vezes ao ano. O CAD é um ciclo de palestras divididas em módulos (econômico, social, político, etc.) feitas por autoridades, em sua maioria Ministros de Estado ou Secretários-Executivos. Após esse ciclo, é realizado exame de conteúdo, assim como visita a área de interesse especial, como usinas de energia, refinarias, etc.

A aprovação no Curso de Aperfeiçoamento de Diplomatas (CAD) constitui um pré-requisito para a promoção da classe de Segundo-Secretário para a classe de Primeiro-Secretário. Trata-se de curso de aperfeiçoamento e atualização, e seu público-alvo é, em geral, de funcionários diplomáticos que se encontram no exterior há vários anos.

IV – O Curso de Altos Estudos (CAE)

O Curso de Altos Estudos realiza-se ininterruptamente desde 1979, estando atualmente em sua 56ª Edição. É requisito obrigatório para a promoção à classe de Ministro de Segunda Classe. Consiste na elaboração de uma tese analítica e propositiva (150 a 200 páginas), com relevância funcional e utilidade para a diplomacia brasileira ou, ainda, que represente contribuição para a historiografia e o pensamento diplomático brasileiros.

A tese é avaliada por uma Banca Examinadora, composta por Ministros de Primeira Classe, subsidiada por pareceres elaborados por dois Relatores, um Diplomático – escolhido entre diplomatas da classe de Ministro – e outro Acadêmico, um professor ou especialista no tema de cada tese. A Banca Examinadora recomenda a publicação dos trabalhos que, a seu juízo, mereçam tal distinção. A publicação é feita, normalmente, pela Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (Funag), vinculada ao Itamaraty.

Até setembro de 2011, foram aprovadas 630 teses sobre diversos temas, constituindo rico acervo para a Diplomacia brasileira. Há, no momento, doze trabalhos em avaliação.

V – Outras Atividades

O Instituto Rio Branco mantém tradicional parceria com o argentino ISEN (Instituto Del Servicio Exterior de La Nación), que prevê intercâmbio anual de diplomatas-alunos. Ademais do acordo com o ISEN, o IRBr recebe regularmente diplomatas de outros países, em particular de países africano lusófonos como Angola, Moçambique, Guiné-Bissau, Cabo Verde. Esses diplomatas são indicados por suas respectivas Chancelarias para realizarem o Curso de Formação no IRBr.

Turma	2009-2011	2010-2012	2011-2013
Alunos estrangeiros	Argentina.....2	Argentina.....1	Argentina.....2
	São T. e Príncipe.....2	São T. e Príncipe.....2	São T. e Príncipe.....2
	Guiné-Bissau.....1	Guiné-Bissau.....1	Guiné-Bissau.....1
	Cabo Verde.....1	Cabo Verde.....1	Cabo Verde.....1
	Timor-Leste.....1	Timor-Leste.....1	Timor-Leste.....1
	Angola.....1	Guiné Equatorial.....2	Angola.....1
	Moçambique.....1	Palestina.....1	Moçambique.....1
			Tanzânia.....1
		East Caribbean.....1	
		Suriname.....1	
	Total.....9	Total.....9	Total.....12

Como se pôde ver no quadro anterior, a participação de alunos de países africanos é claramente majoritária entre os alunos estrangeiros do Curso de Formação.

Cabe, por fim, mencionar o papel do Instituto Rio Branco como fórum de discussões sobre de política externa. Nesse sentido, o auditório do IRBr é comumente utilizado para a realização de palestras e seminários proferidos por autoridades estrangeiras, ou acadêmicos de renome, em visita ao Brasil. Autoridades nacionais, incluindo o Ministro das Relações Exteriores, proferem com frequência palestras, algumas apenas para os alunos, sejam do Curso de Formação ou do CAD.

Dual Membership to Regional Economic Communities: Challenges for Zambia

*Griffin K. Nyirongo*¹

1. Introduction

Zambia's foreign relations were, after her independence in October 1964, influenced by her geopolitical position. Zambia found herself surrounded by countries still under colonial rule. Hence the country's foreign policy focused on supporting the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, namely in Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa. To this effect, Zambia hosted liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, South West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo) of Namibia, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) of Mozambique, and Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) and National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) of Angola, and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) of Zimbabwe.

The support for the liberation movement was not without consequences. Zambia was the target of military incursion from South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia which carried out military raids on targets inside Zambia. Zambia's support for the liberation struggle also had its toll on the Zambian economy. For example, Zambia, which was heavily dependent on electricity supply and transportation through South Africa

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and Rhodesia and Zambia, had to make costly alternative arrangements, which included constructing the Kariba North Bank power station and the Chinese supported Tanzania – Zambia Railway (Tazara).

As with most African states, Zambia was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, and is still today. Even after the end of the liberation struggle in the early nineties, Zambia has continued to play a role in mediating regional conflicts and providing troops to United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) peacekeeping initiatives. Zambia played a central role in fostering peace in Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and providing troops to Mozambique, Rwanda, Angola, Sierra Leone and Sudan.

Following the end of the liberation, struggle in Southern Africa, Zambia reviewed her foreign policy, shifting the focus on economic diplomacy. Thus, Zambia's interaction with the international community is founded on the need to obtain maximum economic benefits associated with global economic integration.² Among the policy measures to realise the policy objectives is the promotion of regional cooperation and integration. Zambia is a member of two regional bodies, namely the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

The regional bodies have their roots in the African vision for economic emancipation. The Lagos Plan of Action adopted in 1980 by African leaders set out the integration of African economies into sub-regional markets that would ultimately lead to the establishment of the formation of the African Economic Community (AEC). The Treaty establishing the AEC or Abuja Treaty, as it is commonly referred, was adopted in 1991.

The objectives of the AEC include promoting economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained development; and coordinate and harmonize policies among existing and future economic communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of the Community. More specifically, the Community would, among others, ensure:

- The strengthening of existing regional economic communities (RECs) and the establishment of other communities where they do not exist;
- The conclusion of agreements aimed at harmonising and coordinating policies among existing and future sub-regional and regional economic communities;

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zambia Foreign Policy, August 2009.

- The liberalisation of trade through the abolition, among Member States, of Customs Duties levied on imports and exports and the abolition, among Member States of Non-Tariff Barriers in order to establish a free trade area at the level of each regional economic community;
- The establishment and maintenance of a common external tariff; and,
- The establishment of a common market.

The Treaty, therefore, provided for the gradual formation of the AEC through the integration, harmonisation and coordination of the existing and future RECs in Africa. Both Comesa and SADC are building blocs towards the realisation of the African Economic Community. Other RECs designated as building blocs are the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC) and the Arab Maghreb Union.³ It was envisaged that the Community would be established gradually in 6 (six) stages over a period not exceeding 34 (thirty-four) years. This paper highlights some of the challenges Zambia faces as a result of her membership to two regional integration bodies.

2. Zambia's Membership to RECs

Zambia is, as it has been already stated above, member of two regional economic communities, namely SADC and Comesa.

2.1 Southern Africa Development Community

The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) has its genesis in the Frontline States, a grouping of Southern Africa states formed in 1975 to spearhead the liberation struggle through providing diplomatic and logistical support to the liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia.⁴ Following Zimbabwe's independence, the Frontline States transformed to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) on April 1 1980, with

³ Other regional integration institutions include the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the East Africa Community (EAC), Southern African Custom Union (SACU) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA).

⁴ These were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and, from 1980, Zimbabwe.

the primary objective of reducing economic dependence on South Africa and promoting the regions development. The economies of most of the frontline states were closely dependent on South Africa: for example, citizens of most of the Frontline States were working in South Africa, and for Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, their economies were heavily dependent on South Africa through membership of the Southern African Custom Union (SACU).

SADCC, unlike other regional integration organization in Africa, was established as a development organization and not as a regional trade arrangement. SADCC's agenda did not include regional integration or market integration. SADCC's main responsibility was the mobilisation of resources and implementation of projects that contributed to breaking the regions dependence on South Africa. SADDCC's focal areas included food security, agricultural research and the development of transport and communications infrastructure. At the time of establishment in 1980, SADDCC had nine members.⁵

The liberation of Namibia in 1990 and the agreement on a road map for the democratisation of South Africa brought to an end the liberation struggle, rendering the rationale behind the formation of SADCC no longer tenable. This led to the second transformation of the regional body to the Southern African Development Community (SADC).⁶ On August 17, 1992, at their Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia, the Heads of State and Government signed the SADC Treaty and Declaration that effectively transformed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The new SADC extended its agenda to include regional integration and trade liberalization as an area of focus. Consequently, the SADC Protocol on Trade was developed and entered into force on January 1 2000.

The main objectives of the Trade Protocol are to "*further liberalize intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually equitable and beneficial trade arrangements*" and "*to establish a free trade area for the SADC region.*" The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of the SADC, adopted in August 2003, extended the vision beyond the level of regional trade integration envisaged by the Protocol on Trade. The RISDP designates deeper trade and economic integration as one of its key catalytic intervention areas. It provides strategic direction

⁵ The nine countries are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

⁶ Currently SADC has a membership of 15 Member States, namely; Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Seychelles, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

with respect to SADC programmes, projects and activities towards the attainment of SADC's regional integration and development goals, which includes the formation of a customs union. The RISDP aligns the strategic objectives and priorities with the policies and strategies to be pursued towards achieving those goals over a period of fifteen years.

The launch of the Free Trade Area (FTA) was seen as an initial step towards trade integration, to move the Southern African region incrementally towards establishing a customs union – originally scheduled for 2010 – a common market by 2015, and a monetary union by 2016. Though the 2010 target for a customs union was not met, SADC is resolved to speed up preparations for establishing a customs union. The 31st SADC Summit held in August 2011 directed the Ministerial Task Force on Regional Economic Integration to expedite work leading to agreement and common understanding on the roadmap for the SADC Customs Union.⁷

2.2 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) with 19 members is the largest regional economic grouping in Africa.⁸ The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa traces its genesis to 1965 when the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) convened a ministerial meeting of the then newly independent states of Eastern and Southern Africa to consider proposals for the establishment of a mechanism for the promotion of sub-regional economic integration. The meeting recommended the creation of an Economic Community of Eastern and Central African states. In 1978, a meeting of Ministers of Trade, Finance and Planning adopted the "Lusaka Declaration of Intent and Commitment to the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa" (PTA). The Treaty establishing the PTA was signed in 1981 and came into force on 30 September 1982 after it had been ratified by more than seven signatory states as provided for in Treaty.

The PTA was established to take advantage of a larger market size, to share the region's common heritage and destiny and to allow greater social and economic co-operation, with the ultimate objective of creating an economic community. The PTA Treaty envisaged its transformation into a Common Market and, in conformity with this, the Treaty establishing the

⁷ Communiqué of the 31st SADC Heads of State and Government Summit held in Luanda, Republic of Angola from August 17 to 18, 2011.

⁸ The members of Comesa are Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Swaziland, Seychelles, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Comesa was signed on 5 November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda and was ratified a year later in Lilongwe, Malawi on 8 December 1994.

The programme of cooperation aims to achieve the removal of all physical, technical, fiscal and monetary barriers to intra-regional trade and commercial exchanges through the following stages of integration:

- i. A Preferential Trade Area (PTA) with lower tariffs applied to intra-regional trade originating in member countries than to extra-regional trade.
- ii. A Free Trade Area (FTA), in which no tariffs are levied on goods from other member States whilst each Member State applies its own regime of tariffs to goods imported from outside the region.
- iii. A Customs Union (CU) involving free trade amongst the member States but with a Common External Tariff (CET) according to which every Member State applies the same tariffs on goods from outside the region.
- iv. A Common Market (CM) with free movement of capital and labour, considerable harmonisation of trade, exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies, internal exchange rate stability and full internal convertibility.
- v. An Economic Community (EU) with a common currency and unified macroeconomic policy.

The Comesa Customs Union, originally planned to be established in 2004, is now scheduled to come to fruition by June 2012. Since the launch of the Customs Union in June 2009, nine Member States namely, Burundi, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, DRC, Rwanda, Swaziland and Uganda have submitted their provisional lists of Sensitive Products.⁹

3. Challenges of Regional Trade Agreements and Overlapping Membership

All members of Comesa and SADC with the exception of Mozambique have overlapping membership to economic groupings. The table below shows the extent of the problem of overlapping membership in the Comesa and SADC region.

⁹ Comesa, "Report of the Meeting of Member States that have Submitted Lists of Sensitive Products", 2 August 2011, Lusaka Zambia.

COMESA (20 members)	Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Swaziland, Seychelles, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
SADC (15 members)	Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
SOUTH AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION (SACU) (5 members)	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa.
EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY (5 members)	Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya.
INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION (5 members)	Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, Seychelles.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) (6 members)	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda.

As long as the process of regional integration was still in the infancy stages, the problem of overlapping membership to SADC and Comesa and indeed other regional bodies did not pose serious problems. It is only when the time came to deepen economic integration and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific states commenced that the problem of membership to multiple regional economic bodies was brought to the forefront.

3.1 Technical challenge to joining two custom unions

Technically, no country can belong to more than one customs union. It is not possible to belong to two customs unions with different CETs given the complexities of designing and administering different CETs.¹⁰ For example, if Zambia were to belong to Comesa and SADC customs unions, it would be impossible to implement two different tariff

¹⁰ Elago, P. and P. Kalenga, 2007, Whither the SADC Customs Union? In: Bösl, A. et al., 2008, *Monitoring Regional Integration Yearbook 2007*, Tralac, Konrad Adenauer Foundation and NEPRU, Cape Town.

schedules. This means that a country, member of more than one REC, aiming to establish a customs union will have to make a decision as to which REC's trade agenda it wants to follow, unless their different agendas can be harmonized and merged. This challenge does not only affect Zambia, as eight of the fifteen SADC member states are also members of Comesa.¹¹

Yet, both Comesa and SADC have in their plans the formation of customs union with a CET. With regard to Comesa, member states have agreed, under Article 47 of the Treaty, to *"the gradual establishment of a Common External Tariff in respect of all goods imported into the Member States from third countries within a period of ten years from the entry into force of the Treaty and in accordance with a schedule to be adopted by the Council"*. Article 45 of the Treaty expressly provides that, *"there shall be progressively established in the course of a transitional period of ten years from the entry into force of the Treaty, a Customs Union among the Member States."*

The objective of the SADC Trade Protocol, as extended by the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is *"to promote the eventual establishment of common market"*. Negotiations on the establishment of a SADC Customs Union were foreseen to commence in 2005 having fulfilled some prerequisites such as ensuring that the FTA is established, carrying out studies on the impact of a Customs Union and commence negotiations for a common external tariff.

The challenge of belonging to two more than one REC could have contributed to the delay in the implementation of both the SADC and Comesa Custom Unions. The Comesa Free Trade Area, which was launched in October 2000, was initially to be transformed into a common market in 2004 but this was shelved. The Comesa Customs Union was eventually launched in 2009. A three-year transition period was provided for to allow member states to implement the key instrument, namely migrating national tariff nomenclature to the Common Tariff Nomenclature (CTN), domesticating the Customs Union Management Regulations (CMR), and adjusting national tariff rates to the Customs External Tariff (CET). The SADC trade protocol, on the other hand, was ratified in 2002 with a view to establish a customs union in 2010. The 2010 target was also shelved.

¹¹ The eight countries are Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Namibia and Lesotho were members of PTA/COMESA and withdrew in due course.

3.2 *Weakening of regional integration efforts: Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) Negotiations and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)*

One of the cardinal objectives of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the EU is to deepen regional integration in the ACP countries. Article 35 (2) of the Cotonou Agreement stipulates that “*economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP States, bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the integration of ACP countries into the world economy*”. On the contrary, the EPA negotiations have created divisions in the regional integration bodies. Due to the overlaps in membership of the existing regional organizations, SADC and Comesa could not form the negotiating configurations. The result was a split in the regional bodies. Two negotiating configurations were formed among the SADC and Comesa states to negotiate an EPA with the EU.

The two configurations are the Eastern and Southern African grouping (ESA) comprising of 16 of the 20 Comesa member states¹², and the SADC EPA configuration comprising of Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania.¹³ Clearly, the EPA negotiations had the effect of undermining regional integration efforts rather than support existing RECs in the ACP.

This begs the question of how to reconcile the configurations to facilitate rather than undermine regional integration. According to Jakobeit et al, the problem of EPAs undermining regional integration need not arise if all SADC EPA and ESA countries sign the same agreement, albeit as bilateral FTAs between the individual states and the EU. Accordingly, this would ensure that all its members have the same trade commitments to the rest of the world with the exceptions made in that some countries, particularly Least Developed Countries (LDCs), would be allowed to back-load implementation of parts of the agreement, e.g. tariff reductions.¹⁴

¹² The Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) EPA configuration consists of Burundi, the Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

¹³ South Africa already has a free trade agreement with the EU, the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) which was concluded in 1999.

¹⁴ Jakobeit, C.; Hartzberg, T.; Charalambides, N., 2005, Overlapping Membership in Comesa, EAC, SACU and SADC Trade Policy Options for the Region and for EPA Negotiations, Trade Programme Div. GTZ.

3.3 Conflict among members of multiple regional economic communities

Overlapping membership between the groupings has the potential to cause conflict among the member countries. The South African Institute of International Affairs notes that the existence of numerous agreements within the region in itself is not a problem, though overlapping membership between the groupings has the potential to cause conflict.¹⁵ In the context of a free trade area, each member country has control of their external trade agreements as long as they do not extend better preferential treatment to any third party than they extend to the members of the FTA. Member countries, however, lose control of their external trade agreements within a customs union; each member of a customs union is obligated to adopt the group's common external tariff and apply this rate to all external trade with third parties.

This dilemma is a potential source of conflict in the regional economic communities, which are already a customs union or are in the process of deepening economic integration to the level of a customs union. It is precisely because of this dilemma that the various regional economic communities' treaties are at variance with each other. In terms of the SADC Protocol on Trade (Article XXVIII, paragraph 2), member states cannot enter into a preferential trade agreement with third countries that may "*impede or frustrate the objectives of [the] protocol and that any advantage, concession, privilege or power granted to a third country under such agreements is extended to other Member States.*"

Article 56 of the Comesa Treaty states that "*Member States are free to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements provided that such agreements are not, and would not be, in conflict and do not undermine the Comesa FTA and CU.*"

Suffice to mention that the experience of the SACU necessitated the SACU to amend the Protocol to ensure that an action by one member does not comprise the others. This was most probably introduced following South Africa's decision to negotiate to Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU without the participation of the other SACU countries. Although the agreement is only between the EU and South Africa, it applies *de facto* to the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) due to their membership of SACU. Hence, Article XXXI paragraph 3 of the new SACU agreement prohibits members from entering into new agreements with third parties without

¹⁵ South African institute of international affairs, "A Pending Crisis of Overlap", <<http://www.saiia.org.za/archive-eafrica/a-pending-crisis-of-overlap.html>>.

the consent of the remaining member states. Thus, for example, Swaziland cannot negotiate further with Comesa without the approval of the rest of SACU.

3.4 Administrative challenges of overlapping membership

The main administrative concerns relating to overlapping membership relate to the administration of tariffs, enforcement of the Rules of Origin (RoO) at the border (which may also breed corruption). Zambian traders have complained that the implementation of Rules of Origin in Comesa is extremely liberal putting Zambia at a disadvantage. Some countries are reported to be repackaging goods imported into their territories and re-exporting them as their domestic products.¹⁶

On the other hand, Zimbabwean cross border traders complained that the SADC certification process is complex and believe that the SADC Simplified Trade Regime (STR) should adopt the Comesa STR template.¹⁷ Under the Comesa STR template once the product is on the common list, the small trader can access the Simplified Certificate of Origin (SCOO) at the border. While under the SADC template, the small trader has to use the allotted certification number of the producer and obtain written permission from the producer for them to export the product and get the benefit emanating from the rules of origin; a long and complicated process for the small traders.

There is also the risk that different tariffs applied by SADC and Comesa could increase the scourge of smuggling and trade diversion of indirect EU imports in the SADC and Comesa region.¹⁸ Jakobeit et al. also raised similar concern pointing out that that poor articulation of tariff liberalisation under the different agreements may lead to infiltration of e.g. duty free EU goods from SACU into SADC and via Tanzania into the EAC (and Comesa).¹⁹

Overlapping membership also imposes greater transaction costs on the business communities and governments as countries with overlapping membership pay subscriptions towards sustaining two

¹⁶ N'gandu B, Zambia Business Forum Study on Zambia's Dual Membership of Comesa and SADC, Study was undertaken with the support from Market Access Trade and Enabling Policies (MATEP) and Zambia Threshold Project (ZTP).

¹⁷ DPC & Associates, Final Report on the Evaluation of the Comesa Simplified Trade Regime, October 2010.

¹⁸ Mareike Meyn, "The Progress of Economic Regionalisation in Southern Africa – Challenges for SADC and Comesa" Conference Paper prepared for the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU): "Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa", Windhoek, June 11-12, 2005.

¹⁹ Jakobeit, C.; Hartzenberg, T.; Charalambides, N, 2005, Overlapping Membership in Comesa, EAC, SACU and SADC Trade Policy Options for the Region and for EPA Negotiations, Trade Programme Div. GTZ.

parallel secretariats and sometimes programmes of a similar nature. It has been argued in some circles that Zambia would find it extremely difficult to pull out of Comesa since she hosts the Comesa headquarters.

4. Recent developments to address challenges of overlapping memberships

Notwithstanding the challenges of multiple memberships to RECs, efforts are underway to address these challenges. Overlapping multiple agreements would not be such a problem if there was an overall plan to synchronise the common external tariff of each group so that in the end they would all form one large trading bloc.²⁰

Clearly, a merger between the different RECs would greatly overcome the challenges posed by overlapping memberships. However, while it had often been suggested that these two organizations would be better off if they were to merge, the matter had proved to be very politically sensitive.²¹ Efforts have been made to coordinate the work of Comesa and SDAC to prevent duplication and conflict of their programs, projects and activities.

In 2005, the Comesa-EAC-SADC Tripartite was established with the main objective of strengthening and deepening economic integration of the southern and eastern Africa region. The Tripartite agenda is focused at harmonising policies and programmes of the three regional economic communities (RECs) in the areas of trade, customs and infrastructure development, and implementing these in a coordinated manner, through a wide-ranging work programme whose main pillars include:²²

- i. Harmonisation and improvement of functionality of regional trading arrangements and programmes, including establishing a Tripartite Free Trade Area encompassing its 26 member countries, which is a major step towards the realisation of the African Economic Community;
- ii. Enhancement of trade facilitation to improve the flow of goods along transport corridors by lowering transit times and the cost of trading. Significant progress is already being achieved on the

²⁰ South African institute of international affairs, "A Pending Crisis of Overlap", <<http://www.saiia.org.za/archive-eafrica/a-pending-crisis-of-overlap.html>>.

²¹ Jakobeit, C.; Hartzenberg, T.; Charalambides, N, 2005, Overlapping Membership in Comesa, EAC, SACU and SADC Trade Policy Options for the Region and for EPA Negotiations, Trade Programme Div. GTZ.

²² Comesa-EAC-SADC Tripartite, <<http://www.comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite.org/>>.

North South Corridor which has been implemented as a pilot since 2007;²³

- iii. Joint planning and implementation of infrastructure programmes, which mainly comprise of surface (road, rail, border posts, seaports) and air transport, ICT and energy. Enhancing physical interconnectivity through infrastructure development and improving operational efficiencies of border crossings and seaports are important factors in speeding up economic development and facilitating and expanding inter-regional trade, as well as trade with the rest of the world; and
- iv. Free movement of business persons within the Tripartite region to facilitate the conduct of business.

The main benefit of the Tripartite FTA is that it will be a much larger market, with a single economic space, than any one of the three regional economic communities and as such will be more attractive to investment and large-scale production. Estimates are that exports among the 26 Tripartite countries increased from USD 7 billion in 2000 to USD 27 billion in 2008, and imports grew from USD 9 billion in 2000 to USD 32 billion in 2008.²⁴ This phenomenal increase was in large measure spurred by the free trade area initiatives of the three organizations. Strong trade performance, when well designed, for instance by promoting small and medium scale enterprises that produce goods or services, can assist the achievement of the core objectives of eradicating poverty and hunger, promoting social justice and public health, and supporting all round human development.

The Tripartite is also addressing challenges of overlapping membership through harmonising programmes across the three RECs to achieve convergence of programs and activities, and in this way will greatly contribute to the continental integration process. By adopting this approach, leaders of the Comesa-EAC-SADC Tripartite have shown the political will to establish the single Free Trade Area (FTA) and eventually a customs union.

²³ The North-South Corridor is a transport corridor linking South Africa to countries to its north and is the busiest regional transit link in eastern and southern Africa. The North-South Corridor (also known as the Durban Corridor) is also the most extensive corridor in the region, linking the largest number of countries in eastern and southern Africa. It connects eight countries and interlinks to other corridors including the Trans-Kalahari, Beira, Lobito, Dar es Salaam and Nacala corridors.

²⁴ Comesa-EAC-SADC Tripartite Framework: state of play, <<http://www.eac.int/tripartite-summit/tripartite-overview.html?start=1>>.

5. Choices available to Zambia

In the event that current efforts by the Comesa-EAC-SADC Tripartite do not materialise and each bloc insists on forming their own customs unions, Zambia has the option of either leaving both Comesa and SADC or remaining in one of the two regional economic community.

5.1 *Zambia Leaving Comesa and SADC*

Zambia should leave both Comesa and SADC and adopt a unilateral protectionist stance. A study on Zambia's Dual Membership of Comesa and SADC recommended that this option should not be endorsed, as this would be the most costly policy option that can be taken.²⁵ Firstly, the implementation of the decision would involve unravelling both trade and non-trade relationships that Zambia has established both in Comesa and SADC. Secondly, Zambia would by this action undermine its position in international trade negotiations, as it is improbable that the country alone will attract the attention that countries in regional groupings will attract.

5.2 *Choice between Comesa Customs Union and SADC Customs Union*

Zambia can choose between the Comesa Customs Union and a SADC Customs Union. The study on Zambia's Dual Membership of Comesa and SADC showed that each choice would produce its own welfare losses apart from the accompanying difficulties of unravelling itself from relationships with the customs union not selected; and secondly, it is more important that the policy choice does not lead to significant trade diversion. What is required is therefore a strategy that reduces the trade diversion effects and other welfare losses.

The study recommended practical steps, which attempt to deepen integration based on already existing structures within the groupings and equally importantly involve a wholesome approach rather than uncoordinated decisions and actions by member states.²⁶ A practical approach that could be encouraged is one in which those members in Comesa who want to deepen integration in the form of a Customs Union

²⁵ N'gandu B, Zambia Business Forum Study on Zambia's Dual Membership of Comesa and SADC, undertaken with the support from Market Access Trade and Enabling Policies (MATEP) and Zambia Threshold Project (ZTP).

²⁶ N'gandu B, Zambia Business Forum Study on Zambia's Dual Membership of Comesa and SADC, undertaken with the support from Market Access Trade and Enabling Policies (MATEP) and Zambia Threshold Project (ZTP).

join the EAC as opposed to forming another set of CET within the Comesa FTA zone. For SADC, the parallel step that its members wanting to deepen integration can take is to join SACU as opposed to establishing a second CET within the SADC FTA Zone.

6. Conclusion

The problem of overlapping membership is not peculiar to Zambia alone. It is a problem faced by the majority of Comesa and SADC member countries. Only Mozambique does not face the challenges of belonging to multiple regional economic communities.

The problem of overlapping membership has its roots in the political dispensation of the Southern Africa region where, unlike other parts of Africa, many countries were still under colonial rule for a considerable period of the post-independence era. The end of the liberation struggle in the early nineties resulted in the transformation of what started as a political grouping into the regional economic community that SADC is today. This has had ramifications on the development of Comesa, which unlike SADC was established as a regional economic bloc.

Comesa and SADC have embarked on a programme to address the challenges of overlapping organisations. Comesa, SADC and the EAC have made progress on harmonisation and coordinating initiatives of the three organisations with a view to establishing a Tripartite Free Trade Area encompassing its 26 member countries. This will evidently advance the economic integration of the continent in which regional economic communities constitute building blocs for the creation of an African Economic Community.

From “Useless Territory” to Statehood

*Lam Akol Ajawin**

*“Large tracts of useless territory which it would
be difficult and costly to administer properly.”
Lord Cromer on Southern Sudan, 1898.*

South Sudan has recently gained its independence on the 9th of July 2011 becoming a member of the United Nations Organization, the African Union and other regional organizations. The South Sudanese people have every reason to celebrate their hard won independence for the road to independence was a difficult one. This presentation is an attempt to survey the past and suggest a way forward for the new nation.

From the 16th Century to the Turco-Egyptian Rule

The northern and southern parts of Sudan are distinct in historical and political development. The northern people of the riverain regions have been influenced by a series of major civilizations: ancient Egypt, Christianity, Meroe, and the Arab-Islamic. The north has therefore had long traditions of literacy, state-building and centralized administration.

By the seventeenth century the north had experienced the Arabisation and Islamisation that would prove a very important element of unity amongst its people. Unlike in some other parts of the Arab world, Arabism in northern Sudan was presented as a cultural rather than racial

* Líder do movimento sul-sudanês de transição democrática “*Sudan People’s Liberation*” e Ex-Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Sudão.

ideology, with the elasticity necessary to absorb the indigenous Sudanese. By the nineteenth century, the Sudanese peoples north of the thirteenth parallel, with a few exceptions, claimed to be Muslims and regarded Arabic as the language of civilization and religion. Arabism – more than religion or colour – separated the Northern from the Southern Sudanese¹.

In contrast, the peoples south of the tenth parallel remained diverse in ethnic and linguistic terms and lacked the political unity that would have enabled them take concerted action for mutual support against a common external enemy. They were more or less isolated from the world outside by a series of formidable geographical barriers, notably the Sudd². When the European technology of the mid-nineteenth century overcame these barriers, Southern peoples were ill-prepared to confront the depredation that followed: invasion, enslavement, and wholesale destruction, memories of which coloured Southern attitudes to the north ever afterwards.

From about the early sixteenth century to the early nineteenth, “the frontier of Islamisation” did not move below the thirteenth parallel³. During this period it was the Chollo and Abilang Dinka, not the Arabized Muslims, who were often the aggressors⁴. The only route to the interior of the South then was the White Nile, which was under Chollo domination up to the very frontier of Islamisation. Their raids reached the confluence of the White and Blue Niles (the site of present-day Khartoum). In the reign of Reth Yor Kudit (1772–1812), better known as Yor Nyakwaci, the Chollo established permanent control of the White Nile crossing at Alith (the present Kawa) and thus controlled communications between the two Arab and Muslim areas of the Gezira in the east and Kordofan in the west⁵. As late as the mid-nineteenth century the northern limit of the Chollo was Aba Island⁶; it was only the advent of modern firearms and river steamers that overthrew the balance of power⁷. The advantage in weaponry of the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist regimes was the determining factor in pushing the limit of Chollo control southward. Their tenacious resistance,

¹ Sanderson, L.M.P. and G.N. Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan, 1899-1964*, London: Ithaca Press, 1981, 8.

² Gray, Richard, *A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839 – 1889*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, 9.

³ Holt, P.M., “Modernization and Reaction in the Nineteenth-Century Sudan”, in Polk, W.R. and R.L. Chambers (eds), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, 402.

⁴ Sanderson, *op. cit.*, 8.

⁵ Mercer, P., “Shilluk Trade and Politics from the mid – seventeenth century to 1861”, *Journal of African History*, XII, 3 (1971), 407 – 26.

⁶ Holt, P.M., *A Modern History of the Sudan*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961, 5. An illustration (between pages 50 and 51) has the following caption: “Aba Island in 1852. In 1852 Aba was a Shilluk island at the extreme limit of Turco-Egyptian control : in 1881 it was to be the cradle of the Mahdia. This is how it was seen by Bayard Taylor, the first American tourist in the Sudan”. See also, Taylor, B., *Life and landscapes from Egypt to the Negro kingdoms of the White Nile*, 1854. According to some credible Chollo sources, Aba island was named after Aba, the son of Tugo Dhokoth (1682 – 1702) the tenth Reth of the Chollo.

⁷ Holt, *A Modern History...*, 5.

however, combined with the rapacity of the invaders, left little time or opportunity for the spread of Islam.

In 1839–40, Turco-Egyptian forces under Salim Qapudan were able to overcome Chollo and other local resistance. Coincidentally, in the 1840s the sudd was relatively penetrable⁸. Hence, both the human and natural barriers to invasion of the South were suddenly overcome and Salim's expedition reached Gondokoro in the Bari territory, some thousand miles south of Khartoum. This was the breakthrough to the outside world – whether slavers, gold prospectors, ivory traders, or seekers of the sources of the Nile – who had sought the source for centuries, and in the following years the Southern Sudan became a staging area for exploration and colonization of Africa south of the Sahara⁹. Muhammad Ali Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt and since the 1820s ruler of the Northern Sudan, had already abandoned his hopes of gold-mining (after a depressing visit in 1838), and his attention turned towards Central Africa's potential for ivory and slaves.

At about the same time as the Egyptian penetration of Southern Sudan, Muhammad Ali was forced by European diplomatic pressure to renounce his monopoly over trade there, and by 1850 private European and Levantine traders had taken over the ivory trade. Egyptians and Northern Sudanese followed soon after¹⁰. Administration of the South from Khartoum was out of the question for financial reasons, which were made more acute by the abandonment of the Government's monopoly on trade. In the absence of Government control, private traders resorted to violence, and by 1855 they were using private armies to raid for ivory and cattle, and to enslave Southerners¹¹. Southern slaves in the North became so numerous that the word *abid* (Arabic for "slave") became synonymous with Southern Sudanese.

The reign of Ismail Pasha as Viceroy of Egypt (1863–79, raised to Khedive in 1867)¹² involved a reversal of policy towards the South. Under European pressure, he demanded both establishment of an effective administration and suppression of the slave trade. This and Ismail's imperial ambitions required a big military force, which in turn could only be realized by forcible recruitment in Southern Sudan. Such "recruitment" was seen by the local population as identical to, if not worse than, enslavement by the private traders¹³.

⁸ Sanderson and Sanderson, *op. cit.*, 9.

⁹ Gray, *op. cit.*, 1, 6 – 7.

¹⁰ Sanderson and Sanderson, *op. cit.*, 9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹² Abdel Rahim, M., *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, 15.

¹³ Sanderson and Sanderson, *op. cit.*, 10.

Ismail embarked on implementing his new policy by establishing a provincial headquarters at Fashoda in 1865. But his own officials connived with Northern Sudanese slavers in the very trade they were supposed to suppress. In an attempt to solve this problem, Ismail turned to the employment of Europeans as administrators of the South from about 1870. They too alienated the local population by their constant use of violence against them, and likewise failed to win the support of the Muslims, who saw them as overlording infidels. The final outcome was not only the failure of the policy but the branding of the Government in local eyes as an institutionalization of violence¹⁴.

The Mahdiyya

The Mahdist revolution in the early 1880s had the effect of destroying all central authority in Southern Sudan, as Southern peoples seized the opportunity provided by the rising of the Mahdists to stage their own revolt. Many regions of the South experienced during the Mahdiyya a period of localized violence more destructive than the depredations of Northern slave traders and the Turco-Egyptians, as all semblance of law and order broke down¹⁵.

Despite the Mahdist penetration into some parts of Bahr El Ghazal and Equatoria, it was faced by a stiff resistance from the Chollo. Reth Kwikon Kwather himself, led Chollo fighters to Gadier to fight the Mahdi where he lost his life in combat. The relations between the Mahdiyya and Chollo had been uneasy, and Khalifa Abdalla, the successor of Al Mahdi, mounted a big campaign against Chollo under Amir El Zaki Tamal in 1896 that devastated the land and beheaded the Chollo sovereign, Reth Yor Akoch.

The Condominium Regime

The Anglo-Egyptian regime that was established after the defeat of the Mahdiyya in September 1898 was a novel form of government that placed the Sudan under a "condominium". The origin of this unique arrangement lay in Lord Salisbury's decision in June 1898 to assert a joint Anglo-Egyptian, as opposed to sole British, right of conquest over "the

¹⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵ Ibid., 12.

whole of the Mahdi State from Halfa to Wadelai"¹⁶. Lord Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt and its de facto ruler, was on grounds of parsimony opposed to any Egyptian re-occupation of Southern Sudan, which he considered "large tracts of useless territory which it would be difficult and costly to administer properly"¹⁷. It was the French challenge in the Upper Nile that necessitated a change of plans. The famous confrontation at Fashoda in September 1898 settled the matter in Britain's favour.

The southern Sudan administration in the early years of the Condominium was dictated more by the exigencies of the European scramble for Africa than by local considerations. It was predicated on establishing a military presence in areas claimed by the British and keeping open the lines of communications to these areas. Southern opposition to the advance of the British through their territory was met by force. So too was Southerners' resistance to undertaking the tasks demanded of them by British administrators (carrying heavy load, road-clearing, building resthouses, etc.)¹⁸. It is therefore hardly surprising that punitive expeditions, called "patrols", became the cornerstone of "administration" in the South in the first three decades of British colonialism.

Education in Southern Sudan was an obvious casualty of Cromer's - and his successors' - unwillingness to spend money on anything other than basic security¹⁹. A number of missionary societies were eager to proselytize in the Sudan, but Cromer, with strong support from Sir Reginald Wingate, the long-serving second Governor-General of the Sudan (1899-1916), believed that Christian activities would provoke the wrath of Sudanese Muslims and they tried to keep them out. Only under tremendous political pressure from the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in London, and others, did they relent and allow the missionary societies into the South only, under the close control and supervision of British administrators²⁰.

In the early years of the Condominium, the British adopted "Indirect Rule" as a system to run the country. Applied by Lord Lugard in Nigeria, the system gave authority to the chiefs to run their tribal affairs in coordination with the British administrators. In the Sudan, it served a dual purpose: to cut down on the expenses and to keep the detribalized local intellectuals away from being involved in the running of the country.

¹⁶ Ibid., 13. Cf Daly, M.W., *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934*, Cambridge, 1986, 11 - 18.

¹⁷ Sanderson and Sanderson, *op. cit.*, 14.

¹⁸ Ibid., 15.

¹⁹ Ibid., 17.

²⁰ Ibid., 18. See also pp. 440-4, "Missionary Regulations under the British Administration", 440-4.

Additionally for South Sudan, it was in the 1920s designated as a “Closed Districts” area and cut off from the North. The South continued to be run separately up to just after the Second World War. For instance, their British Administrators used to attend the annual meetings not in Khartoum but in East Africa.

After the Second World War, the British decided to unite South and North Sudan. The British might have had their reasons but the measure was prompted by pressure from two influential quarters: the Northern elite, especially the “Graduates’ Congress” formed in 1938, and the Egyptian Government which was working together with some Northerners for the unity of the Nile valley under the Egyptian crown. The Juba Conference in June 1947 was convened by the Civil Secretary, Sir James Robertson, to inform Southerners about the decision. Contrary to the current opinion in the North, the Juba Conference did not decide on the unity of the Sudan. Sir James Robertson admitted this fact in his memoirs²¹. The Juba Conference opened the way for the constitution of a Legislative Assembly with members from the whole Sudan.

The Legislative Assembly was formally opened on 15th December 1948²² and lapsed in October 1952 after having been extended twice by executive action²³. Southern members pressed for speedy development of the South, making their acceptance of self-government for Sudan conditional on progress in this direction, and for Southerners to be allowed to run their own affairs. By 1950 Southerners in the Legislative Assembly were already demanding federal status for the South within a United Sudan²⁴.

On 26th March 1951 the Legislative Assembly appointed a Constitution Commission to advise the Governor-General on steps to be taken towards realization of self-government. Both Diu represented the South. He called for a federal constitution, rejection of which by the Northern members of the Commission led finally to his withdrawal. British members, however, won for the Governor-General “wide legislative powers to afford protection over all the backward areas of the Sudan – including the South”²⁵. The Legislative Assembly approved the Commission’s recommendations.

²¹ Robertson, Sir J.W., *Transition in Africa*, London: Hurst, 1974,107.

²² Collins, *Shadows*, 436.

²³ Sanderson and Sanderson, 315.

²⁴ Albino, O., *The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint*, London: Oxford University Press (for IRR), 1970, 30.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 31.

Self-Government, 1953-1955

The "Free Officers" who assumed power in a coup d'état in Egypt on 23 July 1952 were prepared to concede the right of the Sudanese to self-determination. Thus, on their initiative, negotiations with the Umma Party and the Independence Front that had been broken off in June 1952 were resumed, and an agreement was signed on 12 October 1952. This stipulated, among other things, that the Sudanese would exercise their right of self-determination either to become independent from Egypt and Britain or to accept some form of association with Egypt. Self-determination would be preceded by a transitional period not exceeding three years, during which the Sudanese would have self-government and the Condominium administration be liquidated. This agreement was signed on 10 January 1953 by all the Northern Sudanese parties (the Umma, Socialist Republicans, and Unionists) in what became known as *Ittifaqiyat al-Ahzab*, or "Political Parties Agreement". A consensus had therefore been achieved between the Northern Sudanese parties and Egypt on self-determination for the Sudanese. Britain was disarmed and had to endorse the same, resulting in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Concerning Self-Government and Self-Determination for the Sudan²⁶ signed on 12 February 1953²⁷. South Sudan was not represented in the Cairo meeting on the excuse that it did not have political parties.

Elections for the new parliament were conducted in November 1953. The National Unionist Party (NUP) that campaigned for unity with Egypt emerged the winner, and formed the self-government in January 1954. Among the first tasks of the new government was to have government positions held by the Colonialists occupied by qualified Sudanese. A commission to work on that was formed. When it rendered its report, the South got only six out of the 800 positions to be Sudanized. This created a lot of dissatisfaction among Southerners. Not long after that, Southern politicians were facing a lot of harassment in the South meted out by the government. The situation was charged. It was under these conditions that a company of the Sudan Defence Force stationed in Torit, composed overwhelmingly of Southerners, was ordered to move to Khartoum to take part in the independence celebrations. The force mutinied on 18th August 1955. Many Northerners lost their lives. The reaction of the government was to subdue the mutineers and before the end of the year, the mutiny was over.

²⁶ Akol, L., *Southern Sudan: Colonialism, Resistance and Autonomy*, 2ndedn., Khartoum University Press, 2011, Appendix 3,251.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 212-15.

The attitude of the traditional parties towards the Prime Minister, Ismail Al Azhari, pushed him to force the issue of Sudan's independence as the only card that will guarantee his future as Prime Minister. Moves were immediately made to declare the independence of Sudan in the extant Parliament, as opposed to the self-determination being decided by the Constituent Assembly provided for in the Self-Government Agreement 1953. There was, however, a snag to this; Southerners were not yet convinced that the time has come for the British to leave. To this the Northern political parties initiated negotiations with the Southern MPs and agreement was reached that the demand of the South for a federal system will be given full consideration after independence. Consequently, Parliament voted unanimously on 19 December 1955 for immediate independence of the Sudan. The two condominiums acceded to the demand of the Sudanese. Thus, began the steps for the declaration and celebration of independence on 1st January 1956. The promise from the North to Southerners on federation was never respected.

Independent Sudan

Under pressure from the two Sayyids, a coalition government was formed on 5 July 1956 between the Umma party and the People's Democratic Party with Abdallah Khalil, leader of the Umma, as Prime Minister. Over the remaining two years of the first parliamentary period the NUP was out of power, and adopted a more secular stance in politics²⁸.

Elections for the Constituent Assembly took place at the end of 1957, and by early 1958 all the results had been announced. The South was allotted 46 seats out of 173. Of these, 43 were won by Southerners²⁹.

In May 1958 the Northern parties tabled their draft unitary constitution. On 16 June, the southern Federal Party members finally withdrew from the assembly after their spokesman, Fr. Saturnino Ohure, made a statement that while Southerners sought a federal union with the North, and not separation, they might ultimately be driven to support separation if the North persisted in a policy of "political, social and economic subjugation of the South"³⁰.

²⁸ Niblock, T., *Class and Power in Sudan*, London: Macmillan, 1987, 209.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 210.

³⁰ Sanderson and Sanderson, 354; Ga'le, 204-5. The oft-quoted statement of Rev. Fr Saturnino Lohure is: "The South has no intention of separating from the North, for had that been the case nothing on earth would have prevented the demand for separation. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so decides, directly or indirectly, through political, social and economic subjugation of the South."

By the summer of 1958 the Umma-PDP coalition faced disintegration, as differences over many issues came to a head especially over acceptance of American aid, which the Umma favoured and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) opposed. Contacts over formation of an alternative government had begun between the NUP and each of the coalition partners separately. Under either of the possibilities under discussion Abdallah Khalil would relinquish power³¹. On the evening of 16 November the Umma and NUP reached agreement on the formation of a coalition, which was to be announced at the reopening of parliament the following day. Instead, the military seized power, as prearranged with the prime minister³².

The military regime that assumed power on the 17 November 1958, looked at the Southern problem as a security issue and that the cultural differences between the South and North would be eliminated by spreading Arabism and Islam in the South. It therefore moved with speed and an iron fist to implement this policy. Pupils in schools and tribal chiefs were given Arab names and converted to Islam. The regime mounted a clamp down on the former Southern MPs driving many of them out of the country. By early 1960s many of them were in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) and formed in 1962 an organization to lead the Southern resistance which was given the rather unwieldy name "The Sudan African Closed Districts National Union", SACDNU, which was later changed to SANU. Simultaneous with the political resistance, the armed resistance was organized in the bushes of Southern Sudan in the name of Anya-nya.

The misguided policies and actions of the military regime resulted in the growth of armed resistance in South Sudan. Having failed to subdue the South, the political parties became restive about the military Junta and in October 1964 it was overthrown by a popular Uprising.

The transitional government that was formed after the October Revolution, under Prime Minister Sir El Khatim Al-Khalifa, was the first to acknowledge the Southern Problem as political in nature and required a political solution. It recognized the political and cultural differences between the North and the South. After a series of contacts it convened the Round Table Conference in March 1965. The conference brought together all the political parties in the country and was attended by observers from seven African countries³³. Although the conference did not issue resolutions, it nevertheless was able to identify points of agreement

³¹ Oduho, J. and W. Deng, *The Problem of the Southern Sudan*, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, 35-6, quoted in Sanderson and Sanderson, 354.

³² Niblock, 218.

³³ These countries were: Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and UAR (Egypt).

and difference. It formed a twelve-man committee from all the parties to continue discussions on the points of difference and produce a report that would be presented to another all-parties conference.

The transitional government did not last long as the Northern political parties rushed to hold general election in 1965. The elections were boycotted by the Southern Front on account of insecurity in the South. The new civilian government was a coalition between the Umma party and the NUP headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub. In relation to South Sudan, the government pursued policies not much different from that of the military regime. It clamped down on Southern government officials. This is the period that saw the massacres in Juba and Wau in July 1965 and in other places in the South in which Southern government officials were the victims. Nothing moved in relation to the peaceful resolution of the conflict as the government considered the Any-nya as "robbers" and "highway men"!

Subsequent governments were more occupied with their power struggle than solving the Southern Problem. The bickering went on until the military coup took place on 25 May 1969.

The new military regime was an amalgam of military officers, Communists and Arab nationalists. Their ideological differences were to have an impact on the approach towards resolving the Southern problem. In less than a month, the new regime issued on 9 June a declaration on the resolution of the conflict. Although it acknowledged the historical and cultural differences between the two parts of the country, it made the solution conditional on "a democratic socialist movement in the South to work hand in hand with the revolutionary movement in the North..."³⁴. This was understood by Southerners as turning them into Communists first before solving the problem! It was not until the abortive Communist-inspired and led coup in July 1971 that the regime changed its direction and took serious steps to achieve a political settlement. Contacts were started with the rebels through many organizations and church bodies; all these led to the Addis Ababa talks in February 1972 under the auspices of the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie. The talks culminated in the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement³⁵.

The Addis Ababa Agreement addressed the three demands of the South that caused the failure of the Round Table Conference: the South to be treated as one entity; the election, rather than appointment, of the leader of the South in any setup in the country; and the Southern

³⁴ Abel, A., *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 2nd reprint, Khartoum: Abel Alier, 2003, 363.

³⁵ Akol, *Southern...*, op. cit., 123-34.

government to have a say in the deployment of the army in the South. The Addis Ababa was a big breakthrough in that it ended a 17-year war that devastated the South, it enabled the Southerners for the first time to run their affairs by themselves and open up opportunities for education long denied to them or neglected. However, political bickering and power struggle between Southern politicians opened the way for Northern interference in their affairs causing resentment among a wide cross section of intellectuals. By early 1980s several underground movements were already active with the declared objective of waging a struggle in order to attain a separate South Sudan. Both the objective and subjective conditions were ripe for a revolution. The problems that arose regarding the redeployment of the integrated former Anya-nya units and their mutiny in Bor, Pibor and Ayod in 1983 provided the spark and the South was up in arms once more³⁶.

The newly formed liberation movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA) confounded both Southerners and Northerners alike by calling not for the separation of the South but for the unity of Sudan. Ethiopia was a willing host as it had an axe to grind with Khartoum which it accused of harbouring the rebels fighting the Ethiopian government, a tit-for-tat. The SPLM/SPLA also found considerable support in Libya which had earlier broken relations with Khartoum. South Yemen, the other member of the Aden Axis, came in support as well. Hence, the SPLM/SPLA kicked off with good military and other supplies. By 1984, it had gained the initiative forcing the Sudanese Armed Forces in the South to dig in in a number of garrisons while the SPLA was free to roam the countryside. The regime's unpopularity in the North coupled with the military reverses in the South made it look as if an SPLA's military victory over Khartoum was in sight. However, the March/April Uprising in 1985 took the SPLM/SPLA off guard and changed the equation altogether. The SPLM/SPLA refused to deal with the Transitional Military Council (TMC) which it dubbed as May-2 while accepting to deal with the civilian Council of Ministers and the forces of the Uprising (political parties and trade unions). How peace could be obtained without the involvement and consent of the TMC, which wields the sovereign power, remained unexplained. Since then the SPLM/SPLA has adopted the policy of negotiating with the political forces only and not with the government in Khartoum. The Koka Dam (1986) and the Mirghani-Garang (1988) agreements are cases in point. The only time the SPLM/SPLA met a government delegation was in June 1989 a few days

³⁶ Akol, L., SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution, 3rdedn, Khartoum University Press, 2011, 15.

before the democratically elected government in Khartoum that came to power in 1986 was ousted in a military coup.

The NIF-inspired and led military coup d'état took over power in June 1989. It made peace overtures to the SPLA right from the beginning but these were shunned by the SPLM/SPLA.

It was not until August 1989 that two delegations from the two sides met in Addis Ababa. This meeting and the second one in November/December the same years did not produce results.

In the SPLM/SPLA, the issues that were swept under the carpet during its formation and development came to the fore in 1991. In August three members of the Political-Military High Command issued the Nasir Declaration calling for the SPLM/SPLA to adopt the right of self-determination as the only objective of the struggle. It also called for the respect of human rights within the rank and file of the Movement and the establishment of administration in liberated areas³⁷. Thus, self-determination was back in the political discourse in Sudan. Although the SPLM-Torit prevaricated on the matter, it accepted it in Chukudum in 1994. The Government of Sudan agreed to it in Frankfurt, Germany, 1992, in the Khartoum and Fashoda Peace Agreements in 1997 and enshrined it in its 1998 Constitution. The Northern Opposition agreed in Asmara in 1995 to grant South Sudan the right of self-determination. Therefore, before the year 1995 came to a close, self-determination has been accepted by all the political parties in the country as the only way to solve the Southern Problem.

Peace Talks after the 1991 Split

Up till the split, the approach of the SPLM/SPLA to the peace talks has been consistent. The government of the day in Khartoum is required to fulfill the SPLM/SPLA's "pre-requisites" first before the SPLM/SPLA takes part in the National Constitutional Conference that would discuss and resolve on the problems of Sudan. The Conference was to include all the political parties and trade unions in the country. These pre-conditions included: the cancellation of Sharia law, the lifting of the state of emergency, abrogation of military pacts with other countries, a declaration that the problem is a national and not a "Southern Problem"³⁸. The talks never delved into discussing the resolution of

³⁷ Akol, L., SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration, 2ndedn, Khartoum University Press, 2011, 11.

³⁸ Akol, Inside ..., op. cit., 57.

the Southern problem; this has to wait for the National Constitutional Conference whenever it was to be held!

The Nasir move changed all this. The SPLM-Nasir wasted no time to table the right of self-determination to the people of South Sudan in the peace talks. This was the case in Frankfurt 1992 and Abuja Talks in May/June 1992. The other faction, SPLM-Torit, prevaricated as it attempted to satisfy two divergent constituencies: the Southerners on the one hand and their Northern friends on the other. One moment adopting self-determination as was the case for its delegation in Abuja 1992, and the next denying that and restatement of the SPLM/SPLA's position on a united Sudan³⁹.

Subsequent talks between the SPLM-Torit and the Government of Sudan from 1997 wasted valuable time (1998–2002) debating on "State and Religion", an issue every Southerner knew can never be solved outside the framework of self-determination. This reality was only acknowledged by the mediators in the Machakos Protocol which recognized the right of self-determination for the South and the North to be ruled by the precepts of Sharia⁴⁰. The Machakos Protocol set the stage for genuine negotiations on the resolution of the Southern Problem and led to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement⁴¹. The SPLM/SPLA negotiated for the South. However, it committed itself to working for a united Sudan and to make the "unity attractive" for the Southerners!

True, the SPLM later changed its position in 2010 to work for a separate South Sudan, however, the baggage of a "united new Sudan" continue to haunt the SPLM and is likely to impact negatively on the relations between the two new states of Sudan.

Evolution of Southerners' demands

The above historical survey shows the situation of the South as the Sudan developed into the modern state. Southerners started with simple demands limited to the civil service. They first asked for equal wages between the South and the North as Southerners received less wages than Northerners for the same jobs. That was during colonialism, especially in the 1940s and the early 1950s. They asked for a fair share in civil service during the Sudanization stage in 1955. When 800 jobs were

³⁹ See, for instance, John Garang's message No. 048/7/92 dated 8/7/1992 in: Akol, *The Nasir...*, op. cit., 118.

⁴⁰ The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA, 9 January, 2005, p.1.

⁴¹ Akol, *Inside...*, op. cit., 299-323.

Sudanized, Southerners asked for forty jobs but they were given only six. The common characteristic of these demands was that they were confined to civil service though in the 1950s, they were coupled with some political demands. Then came the demand for participation at the political level. This started with the talk about provision of guarantees that would ensure South Sudan would not be put at a disadvantage by the unity of the two parts of the country because education was hardly available in South Sudan. In the 1950s, Southern politicians came to call for the implementation of federation as the best solution to the problems of government. However, the call was met with fierce opposition and empty promises by the successive national governments as they equated federation with separation.

The first time the idea of self-determination was put forth was in late 1964, after the October Revolution, by the Southern Front, as the Anya-nya came to call for separation since 1963 whereas other Southerners, like Santino Deng and Philemon Majok, had been calling for centralized unity. The Southern Front believed that the only democratic way to reconcile all these views was through the exercise of self-determination so that the people of South Sudan could choose the system they deemed appropriate for themselves. The Southern Front expressed its demand for self-determination at the Round Table Conference in 1965 but it was totally rejected by the Northern parties who were acting as one bloc in that conference.

The period of autonomous rule (1972-1983) was the zenith of the Southerners commitment to the unity of the country, and it can be termed as the golden era of unity. It was the first time that the Southerners became associated with unity and were involved in its defense. This underscores the organic relationship between participation in government and defending that government. Southerners at that time were the most vocal in defending unity. They glorified unity at every public occasion to the extent that oilfields, banks and squares were named "unity". Even leaders of the Anya-nya maintained that Nimeiri was the best president they had ever got and that he was God-given. They were the same persons who before Addis Ababa Accord, stated publicly that "the best Arab is the dead one". The Sudanese opposition at that time (the National Front) was active against the ruling regime. However, despite all this, it did not hold a different view with regards to unity. Therefore, we can say that both the government and the opposition were congruent on the unity of Sudan.

From the aforementioned, we conclude that Southerners were calling for just representation which grew from equality of wages to

guarantees up to federation. The designation of war as being against Arabism and Islam was a mere reaction and not an original position as explained by Father Saturnino⁴² with regard to separation. The demand for the right of self-determination by Southerners emerged at a later stage in the 1960s as an inevitable result of the harsh policies of the central government at that time vis-à-vis the Southern demands.

A Crack in Southern Unity

The period of self-rule in South Sudan had proved wrong the theory that the Southern problem was against the Arabs and that Southerners represent a cohesive bloc united by one culture and one political orientation. It was proved wrong during that period by the demand of the Equatorians in 1982 for the expulsion from Equatoria of non-Equatorial Southerners, a process known as *Kokra* in the Bari language. Eventually, non-Equatorial Southerners were forced to relocate and some of them died en route due to adverse climatic conditions. However, the Arabs were not expelled, so the Arabs had become closer to the *Kokorists* than the other Southerners from the regions of Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile. Therefore, portraying the problem as only between the North and the South is grossly inaccurate as there are differences among Southerners themselves. So, with the emergence of the new state in South Sudan, we should tackle the relations between the South and the North as well as the relations among Southerners.

The rationale of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is the ending of the war and that any of the two options (unity or separation) should result in the sustainability of peace. It follows that if we revert to war, this means that the purpose of the agreement would have been defeated. Therefore, now that South Sudan has become an independent sovereign state, the question which deserves our profound thinking is to maintain peace, be it South-South peace or South-North peace. Therefore, when we speak of self-determination for South Sudan, it is important to know that it is the destination of the people and the unity of Southerners that exercise sought to guarantee.

The lesson to be learnt from the experience of self-rule is that Southerners must sit down to discuss their affairs and agree on the future of South Sudan, as banking on the theory of common foreign enemy is no longer useful. This theory, though effective in whipping up emotions for ephemeral support, cannot withstand the test of reality. Separation is not meant to get rid of the North which continues to be a neighbour; it is rather

⁴² See Note 30 above.

to get rid of the wrong practices which the experience of government in the South has proved can be made by Northerners and Southerners alike. During the six years of the interim period, the North has not intervened in the administration of the South.

Nations are not built by running away from reality, but rather by confronting it. There are the experiences of other nations we can draw lessons from. In May 1947, the Indian Subcontinent (Pakistan and India) was on the threshold of independence. Pakistan separated from India on the grounds that it was an Islamic country different from the Hindu India. However, religious homogeneity did not prevent the separation of Eastern Pakistan in 1971 in the wake of a fierce war to become the present Bangladesh. The same applies to Somalia which does not have any sort of diversity. Somalis hail from one tribe, with one religion and one language. Despite this homogeneity, Somalia has not known stability since the overthrow of Siad Barri's regime in early 1990s. From all that, it is evident that Southerners should develop their own roadmap for their future and avoid being driven by dictates from overseas. The roadmap is to address the reality in South Sudan, not the imaginations of "the friends".

Priorities for the New State

The new state, the Republic of South Sudan, is faced with a lot of challenges and should prioritize its interest areas. First and foremost, the ruling party must unify the ranks of Southern Sudan not by words but by deeds. This includes engaging in genuine peace talks with the rebels fighting the government at the moment and stamping out inter and intra-tribal fights. Second, the South must avoid by all means to be dragged into military conflict with any of its neighbours. In particular, it needs to have a peaceful border with northern Sudan. It cannot police that border which amounts to some 2,000 kilometres. Third, international relations are based on self-interest. The South should critically appraise its relation with other countries and organizations in light of this universal principle. Fourth, there must be an agreed clear programme for good governance in the South during the transitional period. Fifth, the transitional government must set as soon as possible a clear date for carrying out the general elections for the Constituent Assembly which will promulgate the Permanent Constitution for the country. Sixth, multi-party democracy is the only guarantee for a sustainable peace in South Sudan. Therefore, democratic space must be available for all the political parties. Registration or reregistration of

political parties in South Sudan should be for ease of organised political work and not for political exclusion as the SPLM has made clear on several occasions. Last but not least, the SPLM should reconsider its decision that recently established a huge government that will certainly eat away the meagre resources South Sudan can muster. The government must be lean and effective.

On a closing note, Lord Cromer's prediction might have missed the mark as South Sudan is today endowed with enormous human and natural resources, despite that however would it still prove "difficult and costly to administer properly"? Only time will tell.

Elections, Democracy & Political Parties in Nigeria

*Liasu Adele Jinadu**

1. Introduction

As Nigeria approaches the 2011 General Elections, it is important to begin to give serious thought to the critical connection between electoral reform, party reform and democracy in the country. In doing this it would be profitable to draw on the chequered history of the role of political parties as a factor in electoral governance in Nigeria in the broader context of the development of federalism and democracy in the country. What can one say about the role of party in the country's political history and electoral politics? What challenges have emerged from the role, and how might they be converted into opportunities to bring about positive changes in the country's governmental, including electoral governance processes? Put differently, is there any pressing need to undertake a reform of Nigeria's party system, in such a manner as to deepen positively federalism and democracy in the country, through improvement in the country's electoral governance? If so, what is the place of the Independent Electoral National Commission (INEC) in bringing about such an improvement? Is INEC, as presently constituted capable of playing such a role? Or does it need to be reformed and strengthened itself, the better and more effectively to play the role?

These questions are important given Nigeria's experience with party organization, competitive electoral politics, and the controversial role of the country's electoral commissions, given their historically deep-rooted embeddedness in our country's political process, since 1960.

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There is a general sentiment in the country that, in their organization, and in their posture towards competitive electoral politics, Nigeria's political parties constitute a major source of the problem of federalism and democracy in our country, and that a major cause of this grave situation must be attributed to either the failure of the country's electoral commissions to faithfully play their regulatory role or their incapacitation to do so owing to their resource and logistic deficits.

Adapting Epstein's [1967:14-43] illustrative framework for studying the development of political parties in western democracies to the development of Nigerian political parties, I shall try to answer the questions by focusing on the trajectories charted by the historical sociology, in other words, the "developmental circumstances" of competitive electoral politics in the country since independence, as my point of departure. For my purpose here, the politically salient development circumstances are (a) the colonial experience, particularly the anti-colonial movement and the progressive enlargement of the suffrage, since 1921; (b) changes in the country's social structure, reflected in the rise initially of an educated elite, and the challenge they posed to traditional chieftaincy authority, and later the emergence of a military/business elite in alliance with the political elite; (c) the interplay of ethnicity, as the most salient cross-cutting aspect of the country's social structure, and the political architecture of Nigerian federalism, giving rise to an ethnic-based competitive party and electoral politics, and its gradual federalization as a result of the dynamics and challenges of federal politics, during the First Republic and later under democratic transitions, brokered by the military; (d) Nigeria's general underdevelopment and the role of the state since independence as the site for corrupt enrichment or "nurture capitalism," and hegemonic contest for domination by ethnic groups; and (e) military rule.

That these developmental circumstances also impacted on electoral governance in the country in ways that have eroded general confidence in the non-partisan regulatory and oversight role of the country's electoral commissions in the electoral governance process can be seen from the following elaboration of these developmental circumstances.

2. The "developmental circumstances" of party in Nigeria

(i) The colonial experience:

The foundational "developmental circumstance" of party in Nigeria is what Georges Balandier [1970:32-39] calls the *colonial situation*,

in which a metropolitan power forcefully occupies a colonized territory, maintaining its occupation by force. Everywhere in colonial Africa, as Thomas Hodgkin [1961:21] has pointed out, "African parties are products of [this] 'colonial' situation," in that they emerged out of nationalist movements, which (a) asserted the rights of colonized peoples for self-determination and (b) demanded self-government or independence from colonial rule. In short, the origins of the party in Nigeria can be typically or generally traced to the transmutation of nationalist movements into political associations or groupings formed to contest legislative elections, as the country progressed between 1922 and 1960 from non-representative government (legislative council), through representative government and responsible and cabinet government to independence, with the consequent enlargement of the franchise on the basis of universal adult suffrage, and the introduction of an electoral system, and with it an embryonic electoral body, usually comprising expatriate civil servants, in each of the three regions. Each of these embryonic electoral bodies organized and conducted elections, under different regulations, for both regional legislative elections and central elections for electing their regional representatives to the federal legislature. It was not until 1959 that a separate federal electoral body was established to conduct federal elections.

The emergent party system in Nigeria under this progressive devolution and transfer of power to the inheritance political class in the country was a multiparty system, stimulated or encouraged in part by the colonial government, and by deep-seated split among the emergent political elite, reflecting its ethno-communal diversity.

Ngou [1989] estimates that "including the three [major] political parties, a total of fifteen others contested the 'critical' election of 1959." However, the more prominent of the parties in this emergent multiparty system between 1922 and 1960 were the Nigerian National Democratic Party (1923), the People's Union (1923), Union of Young Nigerians (1923), the Nigerian Youth Movement (1937), the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (1944), the Northern Elements Progressive Association (1945), the Northern Elements Progressive Union (1950), the Action Group (1951), the Northern Peoples' Congress (1951), the United National Independence Party (1953), the United Middle Belt Congress (1955), formed through the merger between the Middle Belt League (1950) and the Middle Belt People's Party (1953), Bornu Youth Movement (1956), the Dynamic Party (1955), and the National Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons (1958). [Azikiwe, 1961:301-334, Hodgkin, 1961:195-197]

(ii) Impact of social structure:

Another critical “developmental circumstance” is the country’s social structure, which can be disaggregated variously into class/elite, religious, linguistic, ethno-communal, rural/urban divide, ideological, and educational levels. A combination of petit bourgeois, middle class and sometimes-proletarian strata of the country’s social structure dominated the emergent party system in Nigeria. But this socio-economic foundational base or origins of the party in Nigeria reflected more fundamentally on the incipient tension between modernism and tradition, and the rise of the so-called modern elite and the corresponding decline of traditional chieftaincy authority in various parts of the country, and especially in the trajectory charted by the original three regions that emerged out of the 1946 Richards Constitution. Yet, this observation requires some qualification in view of the complex nature of Nigeria’s social structure and the resilience and flexibility of tradition in adapting to political and socio-economic changes. As Peter Lloyd [1967:105] has argued, “although the authority of the traditional rulers [was] being increasingly weakened, modern politics, in exploiting traditional conflicts, often [tended] to reinforce indigenous institutions.” In fact the logic of competitive electoral politics and the unfolding ethno-federal political structure in the country meant that the political parties had to cultivate the support of traditional rulers and traditional institutions, as part of their electoral strategy.

This comes out clearly in the close, sometimes symbiotic relationship between ethno-cultural associations or organizations and a number of political parties, which, like the Action Group and the Northern Peoples’ Congress grew out of or became the political wings of these cultural organizations. Although class and ideological divisions seemed not to have been significantly salient elements of the social structure of Nigeria, there is a sense in which the emergent party system in the 1950s and 1960s reflected class and ideological differences. While most of the Nigerian parties during this period were what might be characterized as elite parties, with the exception of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), a rough distinction can be drawn between conservative parties like the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) and centrist ones like the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG), based on their manifestoes and programmes, although as cracks within these two parties in the 1960s were to show, they, especially the Action Group, also had significant conservative elements. That class and ideological cleavages were insignificantly salient, in spite

of the sometime close alliance of some of the parties, like the NCNC, with the leadership of the trade union movement, might not be unrelated to the pervasive salience of ethnicity, which cuts across class and other social divisions in the country.

(iii) Ethnicity, federalism and party:

Ethnicity, therefore, is a major element of the country's social structure, which has had a profound impact on the origins and developmental trajectory of the party and of competitive electoral parties in Nigeria, and on the practice of federalism in the country. It is to this conjuncture of ethnicity, federalism and competitive party and electoral politics that I now want to turn briefly to illustrate another aspect of the "developmental circumstance" of the party in Nigeria.

I have already referred to the close symbiotic relationship between ethno-cultural associations and a number of political parties in the country. Indeed this accounts, by and large, for the substantial ethnic origin or power base of not only the three major parties—the AG, the NCNC and the NPC—but also of a number of parties like the Bornu Youth Movement (BYM), United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), and the United National Independence Party (UNIP). The impact of the process of the gradual regionalization or federalization of Nigerian politics set in motion by the 1946, 1951 and 1954 Constitutions no doubt encouraged and contributed to the emergence of ethnic based parties in the country.

This ethno-regionalist orientation of the parties, reflected in the fact that the national leaders of all the three major parties preferred to stay in the regions, becoming regional premiers, impacted in turn on the country's federal system between 1954 and 1960. The federal system's over-emphasis on regional autonomy, what might be characterized, following Riker as a "peripheralized" or "highly decentralized" federal system, resulted in strong unit level or regional governments, with the consequential weakening of the central government. As Watts [1966:340] puts it, "the main effect of the party system [between 1954 and 1959] was to provide three powerful organizations intent on maintaining regional rights."

Yet by 1960, there was going on a simultaneous process of the regionalization and federalization of party politics and of the party system in the country. Although the major parties retained their regional strength, they were forced by the logic of federal electoral politics to become national

and to look for alliances, particularly among minority ethnic group-based parties, outside of their regional bases or ethnic heartlands in order to strengthen their national electoral vote. The result of this federalization of the party system was a de facto two-party system, cutting across ethno-communal lines, at the federal level, and a single-dominant party system, reflecting majority ethnic group solidarity, at the regional or unit level, although the NCNC had substantial inroads and strong electoral support in such heavily populated Yoruba cities as Ibadan, Oyo, Ekiti and Ilesha.

It is the contradictions unleashed from 1962 onwards by this federalization of the party system – the declaration of emergency rule in the Western Region in 1962, the creation of the Mid-West Region in 1963, the 1962-63 census controversy, the party realignment before the 1964 regional elections and the 1965 federal elections, involving the alliance between the NCNC and the AG, on the one hand, and the NPC and the rump of the NCNC and AG in the new NNDP, on the other hand – that contributed significantly to the political and constitutional crisis and the civil unrest of October-December 1965, which precipitated the fall of the First Republic.

(iv) Impact of military rule on party:

It is in order to de-emphasize the dysfunctional or centrifugal salience of ethnicity in competitive party and electoral politics, based on the experience of the First Republic, which military-brokered transitions in the country between 1975-1979 and 1985-1999 tried to proscribe the formation of ethnic-based parties. This involved the attempt to engineer political parties with national outlook through a number of structural or organizational requirements, which political associations seeking recognition and registration as political parties had to satisfy, with the responsibility for ensuring this given to electoral commissions.

Other structural reforms of the post-military competitive party and electoral politics were intended to (a) facilitate internal democracy within the political parties, through requirements like party conventions and party nomination primaries, and the establishment of a party bureaucracy, involving a distinction between career politicians and party technocrats; (b) engender a new political culture through encouraging and nurturing the emergence of a “new-breed” of politicians, with a more positive and system-supporting orientation to politics; (c) emphasize issue-based or ideological *differentiae*, to distinguish one party from the other, and to

de-emphasize the personalization of party politics; and (d) bring about accountability and transparency in the sourcing and spending of party financing.

One can now look back and see that the objectives of these reforms of the post-military party system have neither diminished the ethnic factor in Nigerian competitive party and electoral politics, although they may have domesticated it within the parties, nor brought about internal democracy within the parties. If the 1975-1979 transition did not completely remove the old divide in party politics, as was clear in the composition of the major political parties that emerged as clones of the parties during the First Republic, it is arguable, nonetheless, that post-1987 as well as the post-1999 political parties reflected some break from the political parties of the First Republic. The link between this reform of the party system and the institutional reform of electoral commissions lies in the regulatory and oversight powers and functions vested in the post-1976 electoral commissions to ensure compliance by political parties with these dimensions of the reformed party system.

Yet, the country's electoral bodies have generally not been able to enforce compliance with these innovations of the reformed party system. It has been the case either that the parties have simply ignored or found ways to skirt around them; or that, the electoral commission has typically lacked the human, financial and logistical resource base to undertake its regulatory and oversight role in this respect. A more fundamental reason for the general lack of compliance by the political parties and the general failure of enforcement by electoral commissions lies in the combination of a political culture with a legal culture that encourages impunity in public political life, and which all political parties take advantage of. In his recent book, *Reflections of a Nigerian Electoral Umpire*, Dr. Abel Guobadia former Chairman of INEC recounts regretfully how the political parties consistently violated with crass abandon, the *Code of Conduct for Political Parties*, which INEC brokered among them in March 2003. The same pattern of breach of the Code of Conduct for political Parties brokered among Sierra Leone's political parties by that country's Political Parties Regulatory Commission has led to public outrage and demand for the Commission be vested with statutory powers of punishment and prosecution for parties which violate the Code.

Another fundamental reason is the fact that the country's electoral commissions are significantly dependent on politicians over whose behaviour they have regulatory and oversight responsibilities. This is one critical element in what Dr. Guobadia describes as "the hostile

environment” within which the electoral commission must operate, especially if the ruling party at the federal level is determined to make life difficult for it. If Nigeria’s electoral commissions are to be protected against this dependence, this “hostile environment,” the mode of appointment of their members, their tenure, in other words how they are enabled and disabled, and their sources of funding should be insulated from partisan politics, and made seriously independent of political officeholders. This may require imaginative institutional innovation, whereby their appointment is made, and their operations supervised by an institution similar to Plato’s *Nocturnal Council*, a small group made up largely distinguished, non-partisan personalities drawn from various spheres of the country’s national life. The function of this body would be to rescue the public interest, from the political elite. Additionally, these oversight institutions should be accountable and responsible to it, as indeed the Uwais Electoral Reform Committee has recommended.

3. Political parties, federalism and democracy in Nigeria

Let me now consider the relationship between competitive party and electoral politics, federalism and democracy in Nigeria, against the background of the two core or central functions of a political party, which are typically to help (a) structure electoral choice and (b) conduct the business of government, under a party label or banner. From these two defining functions of party flow their secondary functions or responsibilities, namely: (a) recruitment or reproduction of the political elite; (b) membership recruitment; (c) patronage disbursement; (d) organization-party bureaucracy; (e) involvement in policy formulation; (f) voter education and mobilization; and (g) protecting and defending the country’s constitution.

From this perspective, the significance of party for Nigeria’s federal and democratic politics is that under conditions of competitive electoral politics, whose outcome is expectedly *ex ante indeterminate*, the party (a) presents the electorate with a choice of candidates and programmes from which to choose, and in doing so (b) helps to decide which party or coalition of parties should govern for a fixed number of years. In other words, this functional definition of the party is predicated on the assumption of the competitiveness of the electoral process.

This assumption of competitiveness, which the electoral commission is expected to ensure through its fair and impartial management of the

electoral process and its conduct of credible elections, is what distinguishes the concept of party in a democratic political system, from the concept of the party in an authoritarian or one-party political system. In other words, ideally, in a democratic system, the party provides the medium through which the accountability of the executive and the legislators to the electorate is assured through periodic and credible elections conducted by the electoral commission under competitive multiparty electoral politics. By doing so, the party and the electoral commission under a competitive democratic system should work together to deepen the country's democratic process. This is of course the theory.

The reality is and can be much different, as various critics of the party and the theory of liberal politics from which this concept of the party derives have argued. For example, Herbert Marcuse has argued that elections in liberal democracies are routinized deceptions or myths, in that such elections do not remove the masters or the slaves. In Nigeria case, such critics, in advancing their arguments, point to the limiting or vitiating effect on the choice of the electorate of (a) contradictions, notably oligarchic and undemocratic tendencies in political party organization and (b) market imperfections and structural distortions in the economic organization of the democratic state, which make nonsense of the analogized perfectly competitive market place on which the theory of competitive party and electoral politics is based.

What then does party mean or has meant in Nigeria? How well has it performed its functions? Based on Nigeria's own circumstances, specifically the centrifugal consequences of the regionalization, as well as the personalization of party politics, particularly between 1951 and January 1966, the country has moved, beginning with the constitutional and political reform of 1975 to 1979, from a functional understanding of the meaning of party to a legal-constitutional one, which primarily defines party more in terms of structure than in terms of functions, e.g. national outlook and spread, internal organization or democracy, and registration by an electoral body, with the result that the country's Supreme Court has given a constitutional definition of what party means in Nigeria.

However, the constitutional-structural definition subsumes the functional one: whereas party, under the First Republic, was, rightly or wrongly, seen as functioning to advance parochial interests, the post-1979 reform of the party system offered instead a structural definition of party as advancing national not sectional interests. For example, the theory informing the party formation process during the ill-fated transition programme between 1987 and 1993 was one which located

party membership at the ward level; and which, starting from the ward structure, aggregated party structures and administrative machineries upward through the local to the state and the federal levels, with defined autonomous and countervailing powers, a kind of separation of powers, and quasi-federalized division of competences, for the structures and administrative machineries at each level. It is this structural-organizational notion of party that informs the constitutions of the parties, as well, providing the basis for their internal democracy, at least theoretically, and the regulatory/oversight roles of the courts and the electoral body in ensuring compliance by the parties with their constitutions.

How well this structural definition has achieved its objectives is altogether a different matter. But if the country's experience since the 1987 transition is anything to go by, there are limitations to both the social engineering and the functional assumptions of the structural definition of party. The theory of decentralized or polycentric party structures and administration, which has turned out to be a legacy of the transition programme of the Babangida administration, has been more often breached in practice than complied with. It is in this respect that political parties have contributed largely to the crisis of competitive party and electoral politics and consequentially to glaring deficits in the country's practice of federalism and democracy. What Nigerian political parties have turned out to be, when all is said and done, is a failure of leadership in consolidating federalism and democracy and in containing centrifugal trends and tendencies in the country's federal structure. But this has been largely the case because the country's electoral commissions since 1999 have been more or less deficient in undertaking their regulatory and oversight functions regarding party political activities and competitive party and electoral politics – especially in ensuring internal democracy within the political parties, monitoring party political activities, including electioneering and party finances, preventing abuse of the power of incumbency for unfair electoral advantage, and working closely with the political parties to compile credible voters register, even though they are empowered by statute to impose sanctions against or prosecute defaulting political parties and politicians.

Nigerian parties have neither risen above ethnic considerations nor exhibited internal democracy in their structure, organization and practice of politics. Rather, they have not only been ridden with internal crises but also turned out to be vehicles of corruption in material and ethical terms in the country, turning politics into a vocation not designed for the public interest. The following observations by Patrick Ollawa's [1989:161] about political parties under the Second Republic aptly illustrates the persistence

of some serious institutional and psycho-cultural weaknesses and distortions in the development and practice of the party and competitive electoral politics since the early 1960s:

The paradox of party politics in the Second Republic is that despite a well-intentioned constitutional attempt to evolve a party system, which would promote stable contest between parties, presumably characterized by different programmes manifested in issue-oriented ideologies... what emerged in practice was transactional politics based on opportunistic and informal networks of politicking replete with intra-party factionalism that constantly led to shifting alliances, a situation, which unavoidably supplanted the formal structures of party organization... the basic problem centered on the subversion and perversion of the intrinsic values and principles governing the operation of the system by politicians, whose party affiliations were rooted more in the pursuit of financial rewards, opportunities and linkages in dyadic relation to some party notables.

What this points to is the imperative of party reform, along the lines suggested by the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC), to strengthen their mechanisms for discipline and cohesion. There is also need to take another hard look at Nigeria's electoral commission, to determine whether it is not overburdened, as indeed the Hon. Justice Mohammed Lawal Uwais Electoral Reform Committee has done by wisely counseling and recommending, "unbundling" the current electoral commission into three election-related regulatory bodies—the Independent Electoral Commission, the Political Parties Regulatory Commission and the Constituency Delimitation Commission, to ensure stronger, more compact, more independent, and better resource endowed electoral bodies to undertake their regulatory functions. But, as the experience of Sierra Leone has shown, when it unbundled its own electoral commission and transferred some of its powers and functions to a new Political Parties Regulatory Commission, there will be unavoidable overlap of powers and functions, requiring coordination and cooperation between them on the one hand, and between them and the political parties on the other hand. Here again, the ERC has provided a useful framework for approaching and resolving this problem.

4. The imperative of party reform

I now offer some thoughts on how to reform Nigeria's political parties and the electoral commission as complementary vital forces in the country's

national public life, as part of broader constitutional and political, including electoral reforms to deepen federalism and democracy in the country. My starting point is the need, indeed the requirement for a new political and legal culture, which anchors politics on the demands and dictates of what I characterize as liberal morality: ethics, accountability, transparency, tolerance, participatory inclusiveness, and the rule of law, under a regime of constitutional government. Doing this will involve viewing the triadic relationship between politics, law, and morality as a seamless web. Chapter II, on *Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy*, and Chapter IV, on *Fundamental Rights*, of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution, provide the broad theoretical and jurisprudential elaboration of the country's core values and ideals, linking politics, law and morality seamlessly. The country's political parties must adhere to, and reflect faithfully these values and ideals, in their organizational structures, as well as in their policy statements and programmes. This means going back to the 1987-1993 reformed party system by anchoring party politics on the normative principles of a decentralized party structure and administration. It means the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances among the various administrative hierarchies of the party at local government, state and federal levels should structure and govern the constitutions, operations and party political activities of the parties, and should be applied as well to the conduct of their electoral processes for nominating candidates for public political offices. This is a basic component of what party discipline should mean in the reformed party system.

To this end, there is need to pursue a political reform agenda, including party reform, to rehabilitate the core ethical vocation of politics as the pursuit of the *res publica* and the *spirit of the law*, informed by and based on (a) a psycho-cultural reorientation of the outlook of the country's political elite, in particular, such that they begin to view, internalize, practice and defend politics as the vocation for cultivating and nurturing the core or intrinsic liberal democratic cultural values of tolerance, diversity, and respect for the *spirit* as well as the letter of the law – all of which is at one with the federal and democratic principle of limited government; and (b) the cultivation and internalization by the general public of what Machiavelli describes as *virtu*, by which he meant the republican spirit of good citizenship, in the form of the constructive engagement and participation of the ordinary people in public affairs. This, in effect, means in its application to political parties that party members have a constitutional obligation to insist on respect for their party's constitution by their party leadership and functionaries.

How can Nigeria's political parties advance and fit into such reform agenda? Let me answer this briefly at a highly generalized level. First, the parties must resolve contradictions, arising from their lack of internal democracy. They must faithfully subscribe to rules and regulations intended to ensure internal democracy within them; for their failure to do so continues to have gravely negative and destabilizing spillover effects on federalism and democracy in the country. Failure by the political parties generally to adhere to the letter and spirit of the provisions of their constitutions for the democratic, participatory and open conduct of their party primaries or similar nomination processes for elective public political offices and the creeping centralization of party political processes, located within their federal and state hierarchies and away from their autonomous local bases, have tended to undermine decentralized mechanisms and democratic structures enshrined in their constitutions to ensure the democratic outcomes of their primaries or similar nomination processes. This has become a general pattern. It is generating latent conflicts within the parties, transforming them into manifest ones, which have generally imploded to undermine or erode the long-term prospects for credible elections, federalism and democracy in the country.

It is only by, more or less, faithfully upholding internal democracy within their administrative and related organizational structures and administrative hierarchies, and engaging in and encouraging auto criticism that Nigeria's political parties can contain the antinomies of centralization and decentralization, and of the politics of exclusion and the politics of inclusion, which if not properly managed, as is now the case, has tended to result in indiscipline even at the highest party level, in ways that have also tended to undermine party cohesion, with grave destabilizing consequences for the polity. Doing this would require political will and the commitment of the political leadership of the parties to accept limits to their exercise of power within their parties. But it will also require the aggressive interposition of an extra-party but public interest by the electoral commission and the Political Parties Regulatory Commission, when created, to force the political party leadership to behave in the wider public interest.

Secondly, as experience, since May 1999, has shown, Nigeria's political parties must distinguish between the state or party-in-government, and the party itself. This can sometimes be a tricky or tenuous distinction to draw. Nevertheless, it is a distinction that is central to liberal democratic government, and the boundary of which the country's political parties

must find ways of establishing and respecting in their political practice and party political activities.

Related to this is the question of internal party discipline, and lines of accountability, especially in defining the relationship between the party-outside-the-legislature, and the party-within-the legislature, especially in a presidential system, where party discipline within the legislature tends to, or is expectedly weaker than in a parliamentary system.

Thirdly, and arising from the preceding two observations, Nigerian political parties must begin to create a sound technocratic and professional base, a permanent bureaucracy, including a research and policy unit at the national and state levels, to monitor and gauge voting trends, to obtain reliable data-based feedback on party programmes from the general public, and to provide ideas and policy scenarios on which party programmes are to be based. This is a point, which the ERC made quite strongly when it placed professionalization at the centre of the reformed party system.

Fourthly, the parties must begin to address seriously the noxious effect of money on discipline and cohesion within them. Party politics has become the politics of moneybags and godfathers, in flagrant deviation from the anchoring democratic impulses of a decentralized party structure and administration, its inclusiveness and openness. Nowhere is this more manifest than in prohibitive fees for entering the party primaries race, in the purchase of elective party offices, in the sponsoring of candidates for public political offices, in the cost of electioneering, in corporate funding of campaigns, and in the use of public or state resources by incumbents and political parties in control of the executive branch at all levels of the country's federal system to gain unfair electoral advantage. What more, much of this kind of funding goes unreported and unaudited. All of this runs counter to the relevant provisions on political parties and party financing in the country's Constitution and Electoral Act. But it also underscores the fact that regulatory and oversight bodies like the electoral commission, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission have generally turned a blind eye to the infractions or where they did not, have not applied sanctions or pursued prosecution. This is why the political parties continue with impunity to behave as if they are above the law.

Fifthly, let me link the fore-going focus on internal mechanisms and structures within the political parties to the broader political space. The linkage is that if, within their own internal political processes, the parties offered the wider national political society a mirror image of what federalism and democracy should mean, they would be forces for federalism and democratic consolidation in the country.

Let me now, going back to the party reform of the 1987-1993 transition programme, provide an outline of a framework for party reform along the lines I have enumerated above.

- (a) **Building party discipline and cohesion:** Party discipline based on due process is the foundation for party cohesion, both of which are vital for the sustainability of federalism and democracy in the country. Party discipline, as the foundation for party cohesion requires faithful compliance with the letter and spirit of party constitutions, which in turn must be informed by the broad democratic principles enshrined in Chapters II and IV of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
- (b) **Party Structure and Administration:** With party membership at the ward level, the party structure and administration should be aggregated upwards from the ward through the local government and state levels to the federal (national) level, with each subsidiary level integrated, through membership, into the party structure and administrative machinery at upper levels of the party's hierarchy. In this way autonomy at each level is complemented by shared rule at the proximate higher level of the party's governance structure, in what is essentially the application of the federal principle to party governance. The party structure and administration at each level must be autonomous within the spheres of competence assigned to it by the party's constitution, with provisions made for checks and balances by the other levels on the exercise of the autonomy.
- (c) **Party Congresses and Conventions:** Party congresses and conventions at local government, state and federal levels are mechanisms for diversity, accountability and inclusion in the governance of the political parties, including relevant party electoral processes for party and public political offices. Their membership should reflect diversity and be based primarily on the elective principle.

(d) Credible party primaries: The decentralized or federalized party structure already outlined implies that, while the national executive committees of the political parties should issue guidelines for the primaries of each party, to ensure uniformity nationwide within the party, the power to organize the primaries should reside in the relevant or appropriate party congresses, e.g. for gubernatorial elections, in the state congresses of the parties. The electorate for the primaries should be limited, of course, to registered and financially current members of each party. This places the onus of compiling credible and authentic voters' registers for their party primaries by the parties, in ways that will engender confidence in the conduct of free and fair primaries, in much the same way as such registers are critical to the conduct of free and fair general elections by INEC. A major issue is whether prospective candidates for party primaries should be charged levies, as a precondition for eligibility to contest in the primaries. There is perhaps a case to be made for the view that the imposition of such levies is against the spirit of the primaries and that it can be used to deliberately exclude or discourage some prospective candidates, and may in fact violate the rights and privileges of party members. For the organization of their primaries, the political parties should earmark a portion of their annual grant provided for under Section 228(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and embark on aggressive fund-raising activities, within limits imposed by statutory provisions and regulations on party financing, as another source from which to fund their primaries.

But stipulating this framework is not enough, as various fractions within the political parties would strive to find ways to subvert reform elements in the framework, unless there are external disincentives to discourage them. It is here that the constitutionally stipulated powers and functions of INEC to monitor and regulate "the organization and operation of the political parties, including their finances," and their "political campaigns," and to "provide rules and regulations which shall govern the political parties," become critical in interposing an external regulatory and oversight public interest into party political activities and their governance generally. [1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third Schedule, Part 1, Section F, 15(b)-(c)].

Perhaps, to reemphasize a point made earlier, INEC has been too reticent and unduly reactive in exercising these powers in the past several years. It now needs, together with the Political Parties Regulatory Commission, when created, to be more assertive, even more aggressive and proactive in this respect. No less important is the moral force of public opinion, directed towards defending the public interest, and acting as pressure driving the political parties towards it.

5. A concluding note

Let me conclude with the following reflections on the state of politics in Nigeria.

There are no short cuts on the way to democratic consolidation. It necessarily involves a long, exasperating journey, through difficult, treacherous, winding and in some respects, uncharted or unnavigated terrain. However, the country must persevere on the journey to it, because, as experience and statistical data show, countries where democratic consolidation has deepened are doing much better than others. Yet, as experience also shows, to strengthen democracy, Nigeria's political elite and political parties must show and demonstrate a firm commitment to the use of public resources to promote public welfare in an ethical, accountable and transparent manner. Unfortunately, moral suasion alone will not do. The country's regulatory and oversight institutions must determinedly and aggressively fish out, impose sanctions on, and prosecute violators of electoral laws. This point is what informed the ERC has recommendation for the establishment of the Electoral Offences Commission.

Additionally, there is need to turn the electoral reform searchlight on establishing an institutionalizing something analogous to the concept of the citizen Neighborhood Watch to protect the sanctity of electoral governance and the people's electoral mandate from predatory activities. This is one area, where as in places like Ghana and Zambia, INEC, the yet to be created Political Party Registration Commission (PPRC), the political parties, civil society organizations, faith-based and community-based groups can come together to establish non-partisan state and local electoral task forces, made up of distinguished state and local personalities, to organize and lead Neighborhood Watch groups at ward level, with their functions including on an on-going and continuous basis, voter education and monitoring party political activities in order to ensure credible voter registration exercises, tension and violence free electioneering, and the

conduct of free and fair elections on polling date. The tasks forces will also serve as an early warning system to douse or prevent impending electoral crisis, especially before and after polling day.

Nigeria is now at a critical crossroads – whether to advance and deepen federalism and democracy, or to continue with business as usual. The choice is clear, if difficult – to advance and deepen democracy. The challenge for the political parties is to constitute themselves into forces for advancing federalism and democracy in the country. The task for our election management bodies refreshingly empowered to assert their independence as critical elements in the country’s electoral governance is to act more proactively and aggressively to assure the *ex ante* indeterminacy of the substantive outcomes of our electoral process. For the Nigerian electorate and the citizenry generally, they must act to defend their vote and ensure that the voters’ electoral mandate is not stolen. Eternal vigilance, as is sometimes asserted, is the price of freedom and democracy.

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Peace and Political Stability in Tanzania

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Introduction

One of the most essential prerequisites for bringing socioeconomic development in a plural democracy, such as the one obtaining in Tanzania, is to inculcate a democratic culture that can sustain peace and political stability. Since independence, Tanzania has enjoyed relative peace and political stability to the extent of being considered an island of peace. This paper attempts to trace the evolution of Tanzania's peace and political stability, identify the real and potential conflicts which threaten the country's peace and political stability, and suggest the appropriate methods of and mechanisms for addressing the conflicts.

Country Profile

The name Tanzania is derived from the names of two sovereign entities, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which united in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania. The former Tanganyika obtained its independence from the British in 1961 and Zanzibar underwent a revolution in January 1964 which overthrew the Omani Arab dynasty.

The 1964 union produced complex political structures. Zanzibar maintained its autonomy and all the important institutions of a state – executive, legislative and judiciary. Its government, headed by an

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executive president, consists of all ministries except those of foreign affairs, home affairs and defense which are shared between the two entities that make up the union. The former Tanganyika, however, surrendered its autonomy to the union. Therefore, instead of having three governments (one for Tanganyika, one for Zanzibar and the other for the union), there are only two: one for Zanzibar and the other for the union.

The 1964 merger was not extended to the ruling parties - the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) for the mainland and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) for Zanzibar. Thus by 1965 Tanzania became a unique "one-party" state with one "sovereignty", two governments and two political parties. This unconventional structure made it difficult to determine whether the country was a unitary state, a federation or a confederation and whether the country was a one-party or multi-party state. This situation changed in 1977 when the two political parties (TANU and the ASP) merged to form *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM - literally translated as the Revolutionary Party). In the same year a permanent constitution replaced the 1965 interim constitution.

The mid 1980s witnessed more political changes. The 1977 constitution was amended in 1984, leading to the separation of the presidential post from the chairmanship of the ruling party and limiting the five-year presidential terms to two. In 1985 the presidency changed hands from the first president Julius Kambarage Nyerere to Ali Hassan Mwinyi following Nyerere's voluntary retirement. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi served the last ten years of the one-party political system. He was replaced by President Benjamin William Mkapa who was elected in 1995 through a re-introduced multi-party political system. President Mkapa was re-elected in 2000 to serve his last term. The 2005 general elections produced a new president, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, who has been re-elected in 2010 to serve his last term.

Conceptualizing Peace and Political Stability

While peace and political stability are closely related, they can nonetheless, be understood separately. Out of the two, peace is an all-encompassing concept. Peace is inclusive. It involves everybody in a society. Like an onion, peace has many layers. It begins at the level of an individual and expands outwardly to include the family, the local community, the district, the region and, ultimately, the nation. We therefore end up with a continuum of peace that ranges from

an individual to a national peace. Peace then becomes a collective responsibility. Its appropriate definition should go beyond the absence of war in a country. It should include political, economic, social and cultural aspects, which could threaten peace and political stability.

Like peace, political stability is also multidimensional in terms of both the actors and the issues involved. The state and its citizens are the key agents of political stability. Political stability depends more on the behavior and actions of the leaders and the led. Each could behave and act in a way that could undermine political stability. For instance, if the citizens do not respect the rule of law, this could definitely undermine a country's political stability. This is equally true for the state. There are instances that a government can use force to create political stability. But a political stability created by force is not a positive attribute of good leadership. It is an attribute of suppression and oppression. Hence, both the leaders and the led are capable of promoting or undermining political stability.

The Evolution of Tanzania's Peace and Political Stability

A number of factors have contributed to Tanzania's peace and political stability:

The first is the unity and political solidarity forged during the independence struggle. Unlike in other African countries, where struggles for decolonization were based on factional lines – racial, ethnic, religious and regional –, Tanzanians were unified under the solidarity of one nationalist movement, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).

The second is a strong national identity. Given the unity and solidarity emanating from the decolonization process, Tanzania emerged from colonialism as a homogeneous political entity regardless of racial, ethnic, religious and regional diversity. Tanzania is one of the very few African countries which attained a strong national identity immediately following their independence.

The third is a common language. Together with the fact that the Tanzanian population is composed of more than one hundred ethnic groups, each speaking its own local dialect, Kiswahili is the country's *lingua franca*. The common language has not only helped to forge a political solidarity during the independence struggle, but has also been instrumental in forging a strong national identity.

Yet another contributing factor has been a committed leadership. As early as during the independence struggle, the Tanzanian nationalist

leadership had a clear vision of what kind of society it envisioned to build. Its objectives were to build a nation free of all kind of social injustices, disrespect and inequality. In its first two decades, following the country's independence in 1961, its leadership was consistently committed in words and actions to this vision in its development efforts in serving the people. The first president Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, for example, had never been criticized for lack of accountability or kleptomania.

Educated population is another contributing factor to Tanzania's peace and political stability. Until the 1990s education in Tanzania was free from elementary to the university level. Primary education was both mandatory and universal. Complemented by a sound adult education program, Tanzania's education policy produced a mass of educated and well-informed population which was not gullible to political influences that could have threatened the stability and peace of the country.

Equally important has been the political consciousness of the population. Tanzanians are amongst the best politically conscious people in Africa. They have the capacity of making an independent political judgment free of other people's influences. This is an attribute of both mass education and the boldness of the post-independence nationalist leadership in explaining the problems encountered in the long journey towards development.

The last contributing factor to peace and political stability has been the contribution of the one-party political system and the policies of socialism and self-reliance. In whatever ways one evaluates the outcome of Tanzania's one-party political system and policies of socialism and self-reliance, one of their undeniable positive outcomes was their contribution to peace and political stability. Unlike in other African countries, Tanzania's one-party political system, coupled with the policies of socialism and self-reliance, injected in the Tanzania's masses a sense of national unity, solidarity, hope and purpose as well as human respect. All these factors were key in strengthening the country's peace and political stability.

Threats to Peace and Political Stability: Real and Potential Conflicts

Since the introduction of the multi-party political system in 1992, there have been real and potential political, economic, religious and socio-cultural conflicts that threaten Tanzania's peace and political stability. These real and potential conflicts are at the national and local levels. Their major source is the political openness associated with the political and economic liberalization.

National conflicts

At the political level, the political openness that is associated with the introduction of the multi-party political system has resulted into freedom of expression. Some of the freedoms of expression have taken a dangerous stance of racial, ethnic, religious and regional or geographical sentiments. Issues of economic control are played on racial lines whereby black Tanzanians are pitted against Tanzanians of Asian origin, who are perceived as dominating the economy of the country. This results into the prevalence of concepts such as “indigenization” or – in Kiswahili – “sera yauzawa”.

Issues of development disparities are played on ethnic and regional or geographical lines whereby the country is split between numerous ethnic development associations as well as between the north and the south. Disparities of control of political power are played on religious lines whereby there is a perception, real or imagined, of marginalization depending on whether the national leader is a Moslem or Christian.

Political Parties and the Electoral Process

A major threatening dimension of the national political conflict is the disparity between the political parties in terms of their strength. The most conspicuous disparity is that between the ruling party, CCM on one side and the remaining opposition parties on the other. The conflict emerges from the opposition parties’ perception that the ruling party’s strength emanates from the advantages associated with incumbency rather than from the popular support it commands resulting from its good organization, good leadership and sound policy programs.

According to the opposition parties’ perception, the ruling party has a hand in the political crises experienced within the opposition parties. It is considered to take deliberate steps to weaken the opposition for its own political advantage. This perception prevails even during elections. The opposition parties’ persistent complaints are that the elections are always not free and fair.

The hallmark of the national political conflict and the disparity between the ruling party and the opposition are the Zanzibar electoral experiences of the 1995, 2000 and 2005 general elections. The results of these elections were bitterly contested by the major opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF). In all these elections CUF accused CCM of rigging.

Hence, according to CUF, the elections were not free and fair. As such, it rejected the official results and boycotted the House of Representatives and refused to recognize the legitimacy of the government.

The political impasse, resulting from the political boycott, culminated in the events of 27 January 2001 when CUF decided to demonstrate in order to press, among other things, for a repeat of the elections. The demonstrations resulted in more than twenty deaths and first crop of Tanzanian political refugees to Kenya¹. These sad events not only tarnished Tanzania's positive political image and pride of being considered an island of peace but also threatened the country's peace and political stability.

Apart from the racial economic disparities between Tanzanians of African and Asian origins, there is now a big economic gap between the rich and the poor. This is one of the direct outcomes of the policies of economic liberalization. The most negative aspect of economic liberalization is that many of the social services that Tanzanians used to get for free – clean water, medical services, education – are no longer provided for free by the government. Taking into consideration that many Tanzanians are currently poorer than they were before the economic liberalization, very few can afford to pay for the social services.

Disputes over natural resources are another dimension of the national economic conflict. This is more pronounced in the mining sector. The dispute is between nationals and big foreign investors. It has been prominent in Mererani over rare *tanzanite* and in Bulyanhulu and Tarime over *gold*.

Local conflicts

In the recent past, Tanzania has been experiencing a number of isolated local conflicts. The conflicts have political, economic, religious and socio-cultural dimensions. Politically, the local conflicts are based on disputes over the control and leadership of political parties. Economically, they are disputes over land (farmers vs. pastoralists). Religiously, they are intra-denominational fights either over teachings (Wanamaombi vs. other Catholics) or over offices/areas of jurisdiction (Moslems over control of mosque and Lutherans over dioceses). Socio-culturally, there have been leadership crises in big football clubs particularly those with mass following (Simba Sports Club and Young Africans Football Club).

All these conflicts, both at the national and local levels, are potentially dangerous. If they are not appropriately addressed, they have

¹ Cawthra, Gavin et al., *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa*. Wits University Press (2007) p.194.

the potential of undermining Tanzania's peace and political stability. The fundamental question to be addressed is: what should the country do to reverse the trend that threatens its peace and political stability?

How to Address the Conflicts

As peace and political stability in the country benefits everybody, even the solutions to the problems that threaten peace and political stability are the responsibility of everybody. The responsibility of the sustenance of peace and political stability can be divided between the governors and the governed. While the governed have a duty to make sure that they do not take actions that could threaten peace and political stability, the governors have the responsibility of being accountable to the governed through good governance.

Improving good governance

Good governance is a function of managing conflicting demands of various social groups in a harmonious atmosphere. A responsible government should make sure that the governed enjoy peace, security and political stability through a system of law and order that is supported by the governed. Therefore, in order to sustain peace and political stability in the country, improved governance is one of the most important prerequisites.

Good governance should be a bag full of calabashes that contain different traditional medicines that could cure different threats to peace and political stability. There is no single solution to all the problems. As the threats to peace and political stability are multi-dimensional, the solutions to the threats of peace and political stability must be multi-dimensional as well. Political problems should be addressed by political solutions. This should be the same for economic, social and cultural problems. The country needs numerous calabashes full of traditional cure that address numerous domestic threats to peace and political stability.

Addressing the political conflicts

In solving the political problems associated with the political changes Tanzanians should never misuse the political openness emanating

from the current democratic political system. It is the responsibility of the citizens to refuse to play politics based on divisive ideologies. To consolidate democratic gains the country should make sure that political participation should be based on issues. Issue-oriented politics demand the mobilization of the citizens on specific agendas of gender, youth, community development, agriculture, business, social services and environment.

It is the responsibility of politicians, both in power and in opposition, to avoid divisive politics as well? Those in power should make sure that they are guided by the principles of equity and fairness in the distribution of political and socio-economic resources.

To address the disparity between the political parties in terms of their strength, the opposition parties need to accept the real causes of their weaknesses and their dismal performance in elections. One source of their weakness is their newness as compared to CCM. They have to realize and accept that it will take them quite a while before they become strong at all levels. Another source of their weakness is the difficult of recruiting new members and popularizing their Party policies.

The major source of the weakness of the opposition parties is their leadership. These parties are led by people who either have lost favour with CCM or people with little experience of leading political parties. They face big problems in sharing power, decision making and in using party resources. A lot of time and resources are wasted in dealing with administrative and leadership crises than in strengthening the parties.

The opposition parties will be able to fight their weaknesses only if they will make deliberate efforts to have convincing party policies that will attract more members and to have strong and committed leadership. The answer to the electoral problems is to develop and sustain a democratic culture that will be respected by all political parties and their members. The democratic culture should be based on the principles of free and fair elections.

Addressing the economic conflicts

In order to solve the economic problems associated with the economic changes, Tanzania needs to reduce the economic gap between the rich and the poor. Deliberate efforts must be taken to make sure that the poor, who are the majority, participate effectively in the productive

economic activities that could change their lives for the better. This should be done within the context of the Development Vision 2025 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy program. As far as the provision of social services – clean water, medical services, education – is concerned, efforts should be made to create special funds which could help the very poor to be accessible to these essential facilities.

Addressing the cultural conflicts

Good governance should also be the solution to local religious and cultural conflicts. The management of Churches, Mosques and Sport Clubs demands some elements of democracy, transparency and accountability. It is always the lack of these elements that ensures conflicts in religious and sports institutions. Like in the government, religious and sport leadership should make sure that their members enjoy peace and freedoms through a system of teachings, norms and rules that are not contradictory to the cherished ethics of those institutions.

Conclusion: Domestic capacity to resolve internal conflicts

Tanzania has demonstrated the ability of resolving its internal conflicts without the assistance of outside intermediaries. A good example to demonstrate this is the manner the country dealt with the Zanzibar electoral conflicts. It is obvious that Zanzibar's democratic transition started on a wrong footing. The results of its first multi-party elections of 1995 and those of 2000 and 2005 general elections were bitterly contested by the CUF.

The Commonwealth played an intermediary role in trying to address the political deadlock emanating from the contested 1995 election results. It succeeded in brokering an agreement which was signed in June 1999 by CCM and CUF². Unfortunately, the Commonwealth-brokered agreement was not fully implemented. The 2000 general election results were also contested by CUF and refused to recognize the government formed by the winner, CCM.

The political impasse reached its climax on 27 January 2001 when CUF decided to demonstrate peacefully in order to press for three principal demands: first a repeat of the whole general election in Zanzibar; second, the re-writing of the Union and Zanzibar constitutions with a

² Maundi, M.O. "Reconciliation and Democratic Consolidation in Zanzibar" in Political Handbook and NGO Calendar 2002. Dar-es-Salaam, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 2002, p. 142.

wider participation; and third, the reconstitution of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) in order to make them independent. The demonstrations turned violent in Zanzibar and Pemba, resulting in more than twenty deaths and the first political refugees from Tanzania to Kenya³.

The political impasse and the events of 27 January 2001 obviously hurt Tanzania's pride and tarnished its image as an island of peace. They threatened the country's political stability and peace. It was on this background that CCM and CUF initiated direct talks in February 2001 aimed at finding a lasting solution to the political crisis. The talks culminated in a reconciliation agreement that was officially signed on 10 October 2001 by the two political parties⁴.

To ensure the earnest implementation of the accord, the two parties agreed to form a Joint Presidential Supervisory Committee (JPC) that would be constituted by an Act of Law. The 2001 agreement raised a lot of expectations. A number of factors suggested that the agreement would have been implemented. The first was that both parties recognized that the political impasse was a threat to peace and political stability. Secondly, they both recognized that durable peace and political stability could only be guaranteed by sustained efforts to resolve their underlying political differences through peaceful and conciliatory politics rather than through political violence.

Thirdly, the accord, unlike the Commonwealth-brokered agreement of 1999, was negotiated not only in an atmosphere of confidence, trust and understanding, but it was also negotiated without the assistance of outside intermediaries. At the same time, unlike the 1999 accord, there was the understanding that the 2001 agreement would have a legal backing. Lastly, history would have condemned whoever would have been responsible for undermining the accord. It was expected that the fear of condemnation would have motivated both parties to play positive roles in implementing the accord.

Zanzibar went into the 2005 general elections without implementing fully the 2001 agreement. Like the ones in 1995 and 2000, the 2005 general elections did not bring peace and harmony in Zanzibar. This dangerous situation jeopardized not only peace and political stability but also seriously undermined its democracy. Like in 2000 the two rival parties were forced to take a compromising position. In early 2007 they

³ Bakari, M. and Mushi, S.S., "Prerequisites for Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania" in *Democratic Transition in East Africa*. REDET, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 2005, pg. 40.

⁴ Maundi, M.O. Op. cit. p. 142.

formed a joint inter-party committee, chaired by the Secretaries-General, to resolve their differences. After fourteen months of serious negotiations, a draft accord was agreed upon. The draft accord was supposed to be ratified by the high decision-making bodies of the two parties before its implementation. Unfortunately, due to intra-party disagreements, the draft accord was not ratified.

Going through the 2010 general election in the atmosphere a political acrimony would have been disastrous. Conciliatory measures were necessary to break the political impasse before the elections. Hence, informal secret contacts were initiated in the beginning of 2009, culminating in a meeting between the leader of CUF, Seif Shariff Hamad and the leader of CCM and president of Zanzibar, Amani Abeid Karume on 5 November 2009. The meeting paved the way for a constitutional change endorsed by a referendum that established a formula for a Government of National Unity (GNU). The 2010 general elections were therefore held in a peaceful atmosphere without any major problems. After the formation of the Government of National Unity, Zanzibar is now enjoying peace and political tranquility.

Sudan: the Heart of Africa

*Mohammed Seghairoon Elsheikh Alfaki**

Introduction

Sudan is located in north Africa with the River Nile as the most dominant feature of its geography, as the Nile basin constitutes 67.4% of the country's total area. Due to its unique geographical location, Sudan has always been a trading and cultural bridge between northern and southern Africa as well as between the Arabian Peninsula and Africa, particularly west and east Africa.

Sudan gained independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium on 1 January 1956. In 1955, a year before independence, a war broke out between the central government and different groups from southern Sudan, which continued to flare up and abate except for the period between 1972 to 1983. The south, which was subject to geographic and cultural isolation since the beginning of 1922, in addition to other factors of nature, assumed a relatively special status on the Sudanese state's map. This led to a development of a sense of not-belonging to the motherland among a wide sector of the southern Sudanese intelligentsia, and the rebellion against the central government. This war affected the state's social, economic and political stability and exhausted its human and material resources for more than half a century.

A series of talks were held between the government and rebel movement in a number of African capitals since November 1989. In 2002, difficult negotiations started aiming at ending the war and reaching

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a comprehensive and just peace between the central government and southern rebels. The negotiations culminated in the signing of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, which put an end to the war and granted southerners the right to self-determination at the end of an interim period as stipulated in the agreement. Accordingly, a free referendum was conducted on 9 January 2011 in which citizens of the south chose to break away from the rest of the country and create an independent country. On 9 July 2011, Sudan witnessed the born of a new country in its south named the Republic of South Sudan as it witnessed the beginning of the second republic in its north.

Sudan moves forward to new era in its great history, it is determined to make the end of the old entity a new start for the Sudanese state and the Sudanese people in accordance to a well-studied strategy and specific goals.

Sudan presents itself in the upcoming era as an element of regional and international stability, as a land of great opportunities and unlimited capabilities for producing food, as it has abundant fertile lands, water and human resources, with an under thirty age group that represents 61.7% of the population.

Basic Facts

Location	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • North Africa, bordering the Red Sea between Egypt and Eritrea.
Geographical Coordinates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Longitude: 2149E - 3834E • Latitude : 238N - 845 N
Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1,882.000 sq. Km - Country comparison to the world: 16 - 2nd in Africa and 3rd in the Arab World - Land area: 1,752,187 sq. Km - Water area: 129,813 sq. Km
Land Boundaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total: 6,780 Km - Egypt: 1,273 Km - Eritrea: 636 Km - Ethiopia: 727 Km - South Sudan: 1,973 Km - Central African Republic: 448 Km - Chad: 1,340 Km - Libya: 383 Km - Coastline: 875 Km

Climate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desert, semi-desert and dry in the utmost north (North State, North Kordofan and north Darfur). • Semi-desert to rainy in the central and southern regions and Mediterranean in the eastern areas.
Terrain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generally flat plains with highlands such as the mountain ranges of the Red Sea and Jabal Marra.
Elevation Extremes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highest point: JabalMarra, 3,024 m • Lowest point: Red Sea, 0m
Natural Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minerals: oil, iron, gold, cooper, chrome, zinc, silver, and tungsten. • Livestock: Camels, sheep, goats, wildlife (flora and fauna) • Water and Land
Population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 33,419,625 - Country's population in comparison to the world: 35th, 3rd in the Arab World and 9th in Africa - Population Increase (between the census of 1993-2008): 52%
Major Cities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Khartoum: national capital, located where the blue and White Nile Rivers meet. • Nyala: capital of South Darfur, located on the banks of Nyala creek in west Sudan. • Port Sudan: capital of Red Sea State, located on the Red Sea coast, eastern Sudan. • Wad Madani: capital of Gezira State, Located in central Sudan on the western banks of the Blue Nile River. • El-Obeid: capital of North Kordofan in the Mid-West.

Rooted History

Early history (3000 BC–543 AD)

Archaeological evidence has confirmed that the area in the east of Sudan, Nubia, was inhabited at least 70,000 years ago. A settled culture appeared around 8,000 B.C. They subsisted on hunting, fishing and grain foraging and kept cattle and sheep.

The area was known to the Egyptians as the Kush and had strong cultural and religious ties to Egypt. In the 8th century BC, however, Kush came under the rule of an aggressive line of monarchs – ruling from the capital city, Napata – who gradually extended their influence into Egypt. About 750 BC, a Kushite king called Kashta conquered Upper Egypt

and became ruler of Thebes until approximately 740 BC. His successor, Piankhy, subdued the delta, reunited Egypt under the Twenty-fifth Dynasty, and founded a line of kings who ruled Kush and Thebes for about a hundred years. The dynasty's intervention in the area of modern Syria caused a confrontation between Egypt and Assyria. When the Assyrians in retaliation invaded Egypt, Taharqa (688–663 BC), the last Kushite pharaoh, withdrew and returned the dynasty to Napata, where it continued to rule Kush and extended its dominions to the south and east.

In 590 BC, an Egyptian army sacked Napata, compelling the Kushite court to move to Meroe near the Sixth Cataract. The Meroitic kingdom subsequently developed independently of Egypt, and during the height of its power in the 2nd and 3rd centuries BC, Meroe extended over a region from the Third Cataract in the north to Sawba, near present-day Khartoum (the modern capital of Sudan).

The pharaonic tradition persisted among Meroe's rulers, who raised stelae to record the achievements of their reigns and erected pyramids to contain their tombs. These objects and the ruins at palaces, temples and baths at Meroe attest to a centralised political system that employed artisans' skills and commanded the labour of a large workforce. A well-managed irrigation system allowed the area to support a higher population density than was possible during later periods. By the 1st century BC, the use of hieroglyphs gave way to a Meroitic script that adapted the Egyptian writing system to an indigenous, Nubian-related language spoken later by the region's people.

In the 6th century AD, the people known as the Nobatae occupied the Nile's west bank in northern Kush. Eventually they intermarried and established themselves among the Meroitic people as a military aristocracy. Until nearly the 5th century, Rome subsidised the Nobatae and used Meroe as a buffer between Egypt and the Blemmyes. About AD 350, an Axumite army from Abyssinia captured and destroyed Meroe city, ending the kingdom's independent existence.

Christianity and Islam (543–1821)

By the 6th century, fifty states had emerged as the political and cultural heirs of the Meroitic Kingdom. Nubatia in the north, also known as Ballanah, had its capital at Faras, in what is now Egypt; the central kingdom, Muqurra (Makuria), was centred at Dunqulah, about 13 kilometres south of modern Dunqulah; and Alawa (Alodia), in the heartland of old Meroe,

which had its capital at Sawba (now a suburb of modern-day Khartoum). In all three kingdoms, warrior aristocracies ruled Meroitic populations from royal courts where functionaries bore Greek titles in emulation of the Byzantine court. A missionary sent by Byzantine empress Theodora arrived in Nobatia and started preaching Christianity about AD 540. The Nubian kings became Monophysite Christians. However, Makuria was of the Melkite Christian faith, unlike Nobatia and Alodia.

After many attempts at military conquest failed, the Arab commander in Egypt concluded the first in a series of regularly renewed treaties known as *Albaqut* (pactum) with the Nubians that governed relations between the two peoples for more than 678 years. Islam progressed in the area over a long period of time through intermarriage and contacts with Arab merchants and settlers, particularly the Sufi nobles of Arabia. In 1093, a Muslim prince of Nubian royal blood ascended the throne of Dunqulah as king. The two most important Arab tribes to emerge in Nubia were the Jaali and the Juhayna. Both showed physical continuity with the indigenous pre-Islamic population. Today's northern Sudanese culture combines Nubian and Arabic elements.

During the 16th century, a people called the Funj, under a leader named Amara Dunqus, appeared in southern Nubia and supplanted the remnants of the old Christian kingdom of Alwa, establishing *As-Saltanaaz-Zarqa* (the Blue Sultanate), also called the Sultanate of Sennar. The Blue Sultanate eventually became the keystone of the Funj Empire. By the mid-16th century, Sinnar controlled Al Jazirah and commanded the allegiance of vassal states and tribal districts north to the Third Cataract and south to the rainforests. The government was substantially weakened by a series of succession arguments and coups within the royal family. In 1820 Muhammad Ali of Egypt sent 4,000 troops to invade Sudan. The pasha's forces accepted Sinnar's surrender from the last Funj sultan, Badi VII.

Modern Egyptian Occupation (1821-1885)

In 1820, the Albanian-Ottoman ruler of Egypt Muhammad Ali Pasha invaded and conquered northern Sudan. Though technically the *Wāli* of Egypt under the Ottoman Sultan, Muhammad Ali styled himself as Khedive of a virtually independent Egypt. Seeking to add Sudan to his domains, he sent his third son Ismail (not to be confused with Ismail the Magnificent mentioned later) to conquer the country, and subsequently incorporate it into Egypt. This policy was expanded and intensified by

Ibrahim's son, Ismail I, under whose reign most of the remainder of modern-day Sudan was conquered. The Egyptian authorities made significant improvements to the Sudanese infrastructure (mainly in the north), especially with regard to irrigation and cotton production.

In 1879, the Great Powers forced the removal of Ismail and established his son Tewfik I in his place. Tewfik's corruption and mismanagement resulted in the Orabi Revolt, which threatened the Khedive's survival. Tewfik appealed for help to the British, who subsequently occupied Egypt in 1882. Sudan was left in the hands of the Khedivial government, and the mismanagement and corruption of its officials became notorious.

Eventually, a revolt broke out in Sudan, led by Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abd Allah, the Mahdi (Guided One), who sought to end foreign presence in Sudan. His revolt culminated in the winter of Khartoum and the death of the British governor General Gordon (Gordon of Khartoum) in 1885. Egypt and Britain subsequently withdrew forces from Sudan leaving the Mahdi to form a short-lived Islamic state.

The Mahdiyya, 1881-98

Discussion of the religious orders leads naturally on to the Mahdist movement, generally recognized as the origin of Sudanese nationalism, and the prelude to the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1898. Before turning to look at the movement, it would be well to examine the origins and basic elements of Mahdist belief. Ibn Khaldun writes in his *Muqqaddama*: "It is a universal belief amongst the Muslim masses throughout the ages that at the End of Time a man of the family of the Prophet must manifest himself to confirm the faith and proclaim justice. The Muslims will follow him and he will establish his rule over the Islamic Kingdoms, he will be called the Mahdi." Such messianic belief is popularly rooted in Sunni Islam, providing an ideology for the oppressed which has resulted in the frequent appearances of Mahdis throughout the history of Islam.

To many modern Sudanese Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi is the father of nationalism. The view of the Mahdist movement as being nationalist in origin has come about because it thrived upon the unity created by the oppression of the Turco-Egyptian regime; and also because the Mahdi managed to overcome, perhaps for the first time, the system of tribal and religious loyalties, to allow the Muslim Sudanese people to act as one with a common motivation and a common loyalty.

Initial success lent the movement impetus and credibility, and thereafter progress was swift. In January 1883 the Kordofan capital, El Obeid, fell to the Mahdi, precipitating the collapse of the decadent Turco-Egyptian regime, and obliging many reluctant Sudanese elements to join the revolt. Ottoman rule in the Sudan finally came to an end with the defeat of General Gordon and the capture of Khartoum on 26 January 1885. The system of government which the Mahdi and his followers, the Ansar, established was based on the principle of his absolute authority in both spiritual and temporal matters. Calling for a return to the pure and unadulterated Islam of the Prophet, he eschewed the ascetic principles of Sufism in his pursuit of justice in Dar al-Salam (the land of Islam) and followed a well-rooted Islamic principle in creating a government conducted, in the tradition of Prophet Mohammed, by four caliphs and involving judicial and financial institutions based upon the Qur'an and the Sunna.

The Jihad was a central pillar of the new state inherited by the Mahdi's chief disciple, Khalifa Abdullahi al Ta'aishi, upon the death of the former less than six months after that of Gordon. The Mahdist subjection of the Sudan was only ever intended as a first step in the holy war (something which clearly renders dubious the view of Mahdism as a movement with vocation). Abdullahi's position was not enviable. He lacked the Mahdi's charisma and profundity, and his succession had been challenged not least by the Mahdi's kith and kin led by Khalifa Sharif; they called themselves awlad al balad (the rightful sons of the land), as opposed to the Baqqara "upstarts" who descended on Omdurman from the west. The Khalifa was swift and ruthless in neutralizing them. Even so, whatever authority the Khalifa had exercised continued to rest upon brute force and reverence for the late Mahdi, something which obliged him to continue all the initiatives undertaken by his predecessor, including a campaign of Jihad against Egypt (since 1882 occupied by British forces) and against Ethiopia in order to bring its "infidel" people into Islam. He also sent dispatches to queen Victoria, the Ottoman Sultan Abd al Hamid and Kediye Tawfiq of Egypt enjoining them to submit to Mahdiyya. This obscurantist approach to international relations, with its concomitant adventurism, had contributed more than anything to the demise of the regime. Tribal feuds, internal dissension and famines compounded matters further for the Khalifa; the only surprise, thereafter, was that the Mahdist regime survived as long as 1898 when its fate was sealed by the victory of Kitchener's superior army at the battle of Karari.

The condominium (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1899-1956)

The battle of Karari, which took place on the 1 September 1899, effectively heralded the end of the Khalif's reign; Kitchener's superior forces were victorious, and his troops proceeded to a reckless pillage of Omdurman. Khalifa Abdullahi remained at large, but his fate was sealed, and it was merely a matter of time before the conquering armies caught up with him; he was finally overtaken and killed by forces under Wingate, in November 1899 at the battle of Umm Dibaykarat in southern Kordofan. Thereafter the conquering forces turned to the spoils, and to the future status of the Sudan.

The reconquest of the Sudan had been undertaken by a joint army, acting, in theory, on behalf of the Khedive of Egypt, but from the outset it was clear that the British were not going to let the territories of the Sudan return to a purely Egyptian sphere of control. This was facilitated by the British occupation of Egypt itself (which had occurred in 1882). British public opinion back home was against returning the area to the people who, it was felt, had stirred up the Mahdist rebellion in the first place by their "ill-advised" policies, and who had therefore to take some of the blame for the demise of General Gordon, by then a popular hero in the British Isles.

On the other hand, the annexation of the region as a British colony was at the time not in question either. International politics had effectively put a stop to any prospective British claims, with the Fashoda incident, in 1898. The arrival of French forces, under Captain Marchand at Fashoda on the Upper Nile on 10 July 1898 precipitated a rapid advance by Kitchener, and his subsequent announcement that the French were violating the rights of Egypt, as well as those of Britain, an argument designed to undermine the French position in a way which left British interests intact. This was the more surprising in view of the disinclination of the British sovereign, Queen Victoria, towards Fashoda; the Queen of England could hardly bring herself to consent to war "for so miserable and small an object", according to her message to Lord Salisbury on 30 October 1898.

The result of this dilemma was the "Agreement between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt relative to the future administration of the Sudan", which is known in general as the Condominium Agreement. Lord Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, was basically responsible for the drafting of this agreement, as he also had a great deal to do with the rationale behind the reconquest, and the British involvement in the

Sudan, anxious in the first instance to let the Egyptians shoulder the financial burdens that the governance of Sudan might demand.

The Condominium Agreement effectively shelved the question of sovereignty, but in practice the government of Sudan was a British affair. The Governor-General of Sudan was nominated by the British, and possessed supreme military and civilian authority in the land, with the power to rule by decree. His appointment was conditional on ratification by the Egyptians, but of course, since the latter were under British "protection" the result was that appointments were given a rubber stamp. All the governors-general were British, from the inception of the Condominium Government to Sudanese independence, though Sir Robert Howe, the penultimate British Governor-General, proposed on this resignation in 1955 that his successor should come from a neutral country in order to ensure impartiality during the self-government period; his advice was not heeded.

The subsequent history of the Condominium Government is usually dealt with in terms of a number of fairly clear-cut periods. From the reconquest to the outbreak of the First World War, the Sudan Government was concerned largely with establishing an administrative framework, and pacifying the various forms of resistance it encountered. The internal security of the country was probably the single most important "policy" pursued. The Great War itself saw some fundamental changes, including the annexation of Darfur in 1916, and the enlistment of Sudanese notables to support the war cause.

During World War II, Sudan was directly involved militarily in the East African Campaign. Formed in 1925, the Sudan Defence Force (SDF) played an active part in responding to the early incursions (occupation by Italian troops of Kassala and other border areas) into the Sudan from Italian East Africa during 1940. In 1942, the SDF also played a part in the invasion of the Italian colony by British and Commonwealth forces. From 1924 until independence in 1956, the British had a policy of running Sudan as two essentially separate territories, the north (Muslim) and south (Christian). The last British Governor-General was Sir Robert Howe.

The Independence

The continued British occupation of Sudan fuelled an increasingly strident nationalist backlash in Egypt, with Egyptian nationalist leaders determined to force Britain to recognise a single independent union of

Egypt and Sudan. With the formal end of Ottoman rule in 1914, Hussein Kamel was declared Sultan of Egypt and Sudan, as was his brother Fuad I who succeeded him. The insistence of a single Egyptian-Sudanese state persisted when the Sultanate was retitled the Kingdom of Egypt and Sudan, but the British continued to frustrate these efforts. The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 finally heralded the beginning of the march towards Sudanese independence. Having abolished the monarchy in 1953, Egypt's new leaders, Muhammad Naguib, whose mother was Sudanese, and later Gamal Abdel-Nasser, believed the only way to end British domination in Sudan was for Egypt to officially abandon its sovereignty over Sudan. The British on the other hand continued their political and financial support for the Mahdi successor Sayyid Abdel Rahman whom they believed could resist the Egyptian presence in Sudan. However the Egyptians realised his political inability and diminishing support in northern and central Sudan. Both Britain and Egypt had no option but to allow the Sudanese in the north and south to a joint self-determination and a free vote on independence. In 1954 the governments of Egypt and Britain signed a treaty guaranteeing Sudanese independence on 1 January 1956, in a special ceremony held at the People's Palace where the Egyptian and British flags were lowered and the new Sudanese flag was raised in their place. Afterwards, Ismail Al-Azhari was elected first Prime Minister and led the first modern Sudanese government.

Foreign Policy

Sudan believes in non-meddling into state's internal affairs, autonomy in world politics, the right of nations and people to relations based on mutual benefits and common interest. It also believes in an international order to realize justice, equality, human inter-dependence, sustainable development and strengthens and promotes neighbourly regional relations.

As part of its Africa, Arab and Moslem belonging and in view of its strategic geographical position and its situation midway between Africa and Arab region, Sudan strives to play an active role within the world community and regional groups in the framework of safeguarding its interest and principles and of commitment to world and regional agreement and conventions ratified by Khartoum.

Sudan's Geostrategic Position

Sudan commands an advantageous geographical position and:

- is bordered with seven states borders; also overlooks Saudi Arabia across the Red Sea;
- overlooks one of the world's most vital water lanes (the Red Sea). The world's longest river crosses Sudan from South to North;
- lies in the heart of Africa and touches the north, central, west and the east;
- it is the link between the Arab region and Africa.

World and Regional Organizations of which Sudan is a Member

Sudan is a member state of the United Nations (UN), the Arab League (AL), the African Union (AU), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Sahel and Sahara Alliance, the Inter-Governmental Association for Development and Desertification (IGADD), the Economic Commission for East and South Africa States (COMESA) and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area and others. Sudan maintains diplomatic relations with all world states to advance its interests, reassert its geographic and cultural identity and activity and contribute to regional and world peace and stability.

Foreign Ministry and Departments

The Sudanese Foreign Ministry is a key ministry that enables Sudan to play its role at the international stage through its embassies and consulates abroad that promote National goals and the well-being of Sudanese citizens in the Diaspora. The Foreign Ministry has evolved over the years and presently includes the following organs:

- Planning and Research;
- Consular and bilateral relations;
- International Cooperation;
- Administrative and Financial Affairs;
- Protocol Section;
- Media and International Law;
- National Centre for Diplomatic Studies;
- Specialized Administrations concerned with Sudan's relations with African, Arab, Asian, European and American States.

Sudan and World Organizations

Sudan is a committed member of the UN and its founding charter and strives to fulfil its role within the world organization. Following the development of certain events in modern history, including the emergence of a sole super power, Sudan has more than once found itself the frivolous subject of the Security Council. Yet, Sudan's allies have been steadfast in their defence.

The UN Security Council resolution 1706 that ordered the deployment of the international force in Darfur was rejected by Sudan precisely because it infringed on national sovereignty and delegates significant authority to these forces. Sudan fought this resolution through diplomacy at the international and regional arenas to express its concern on the matter. This led to a new round of talks with the UN and the African Union when the latter agreed to extend the mandate of its force in Darfur. Negotiations yielded an agreement that stipulated three support packages by the UN to AU forces in Darfur. The agreement created the hybrid force. This was included in UN resolution 1769 accepted by Sudan, which assured the world body of its cooperation. UN secretary Ban Ki Moon visited Sudan, praising the country's acceptance of the hybrid force and cooperation with the world organization.

Sudan is ultimately of the view that the UN, in order to be a more effective body, capable of truly representing all nations, must be re-structured and systematically reformed in a way that it reflects the global diversity. It also has to preclude domination by a few in order to meaningfully promote world peace, justice, interdependence and equality.

Sudan's African-Arab relations

Sudan maintains diplomatic relations with Arab and African states. It has bilateral conventions and agreements in economic, trade, cultural and security areas. Sudan has very much benefited from its Arab and African ties. We have together confronted many challenges and they have played indispensable role internationally in defense of Sudan.

Sudan resolutely supports Arab causes which include the just resolution of the plight of the Palestinians. Sudan was also active in settling inter-Arab differences, e.g. inter-Palestinian and inter-Lebanese disputes, particularly during its chairmanship of the Arab Summit.

Sudan also played a leading role in the process of African liberation when it co-founded the organization of African Unity (1963) and affiliated

bodies and later the African Union. In 1986, Sudan along with other countries founded the inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the COMESA in 1993 and the Sahel and Sahara states group in 1998 and chaired the latter following its third summit in Khartoum in February 2001. Thereafter, Sudan played host to the African Summit, African-Caribbean-Pacific Summit, including 79 states from various continents, where Sudan was elected to chair this group for two years. Today, Sudan cooperates with the African Union in Darfur.

Sudan's Multilateral Relations

Sudan did not settle for typical relations oriented towards the West, but instead opened its doors to the entire world. It fostered close and solid ties based on common interests with China, Korea, Russia, India, Malaysia, Indonesia and other Asian nations and benefited much from these relations. This is precisely why Sudan has been able to withstand the age-old aggression of and attempts at isolation by the West.

Challenges to the Sudanese Diplomacy

Sudan has certainly struggled with internal problems: South, Darfur and the East. The international media however has tended to embellish the facts, thus compounding the problems and making the search for peace elusive. The world has been divided between those who understand Sudan's situation fully and those who seek to exploit the situation and smear the country, a campaign led by several Human Rights Organizations.

Despite the overwhelming hysteria, Sudanese diplomacy has patiently and meticulously defended against this onslaught and has tried to set the record straight. One of the greatest challenges is the International Criminal Court (ICC) issue.

Sudan and The ICC

On 27 February 2007 ICC charged Ahmed Haroon, the Minister of State, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and the citizen Ali Kusheib for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during the period from 2003 to 2004, and issued two arrest warrants for them on 2 May 2007. The Government of Sudan refused these arrest warrants and admitted that it will not hand any Sudanese citizen over for trial outside, even he was against the regime.

On 14 July 2008, the Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has charged officially H.E. President Omar Al-Bashir for committing war crime and genocide in Darfur. This pursued by the request of AU from the Security Council to postpone the court procedures against the President for a year under Rome Statute, because this matter will effect negatively on peace process and negotiations on Darfur. However the ICC and the Security Council ignored these attempts and the ICC issued two arrest warrants to the President Al-Bashir on 4 March 2009. On 12 June 2010, ICC added a charge of genocide to the President Omar Al-Bashir to the prior charges.

The attitude of the Government of Sudan is not to be subjected to this court, for the following reasons:

- a. Sudan is not a member of the ICC, therefore the Court is not competent because Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute that established it.
- b. Deviation of the ICC of its targets (achievement of the international justice), and its transformation to a political tool from major countries to put pressure on small countries.
- c. Issuance of arrest warrant for President of the state, which is a member of the UN and he has a power, is contradicting to the principle of heads immunity, which International Law guarantees. In addition to encroachment on the sovereignty of States, it is considered as a serious legal precedent.
- d. Issuance of arrest against the President has specific legal and political consequences in the Sudan. He considered as a guarantor of the current agreements (CPA, DPA, Eastern-Sudan peace agreement).
- e. Accusations are false and did not support by any facts. International bodies, including the prosecutor of ICC and a large number of non-governmental organizations in Europe and America, are charging the Sudanese President for political reasons and reasons related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and its repercussions.

International and regional organizations have a significant role in supporting Sudan against the ICC Resolutions. So they issued statements stand for the government of the Sudan, and they reaffirm their positions on the Resolutions issued by ICC, the top of them are: Arab League, AU, OIC, Non-Aligned countries, Group of 77, China, Community of Sahel-Saharan States and Gulf Cooperation Council.

After Arab and African consensus to support the Arab League and the AU in the issue of Sudan against the ICC and not to interfere in its internal affairs, the Court tried to pursue a new method to break this consensus, especially after the rejection of AU to open a representative office to its commission in Addis Ababa. It decided recourse some European countries such as Britain, which sponsors the group of commonwealth and France, which sponsors *La Francophonie* countries to break the African consensus.

Peace in Sudan: (East-Darfur-South)

Problems Sudan faced concerning its stability and security were not exclusively because of internal factors. Foreign hands had greatly contributed thereto. The problem of the south, for example, was brainchild of British colonial rule, which, in 1932, issued the law of restricted areas whereby the three southern provinces were isolated from the north. The law encouraged expulsion of northern traders and Muslim villages from south Sudan and bars northern Arabs from traveling to southern provinces except by special permits and other such policies. Then came the Darfur crisis which erupted and rapidly expanded in an unprecedented manner to constitute material for the hostile media. This was followed by the problem in Eastern Sudan which was defused at the outset. The Sudanese government sought to settle these problems and was able to sign Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in respect of the southern question, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and the East Peace Agreement in Asmara.

East Peace Agreement and Implementation

The problem in east Sudan appeared recently where the area, like other areas in Sudan, suffered from lack of development. The area is populated by Beja, Beni Amer, Hadaandawa, Rashayda, Amarar and other eastern tribes. From within these tribes, Organizations assembled to address these problems and some set up armed militias stationed for some time in neighbouring Eritrea, under the signboard of the East Front. Some few clashes had taken place with government forces and that was enough to sound the alarm. Sudan government opened negotiations with the East Front, without the need for any foreign mediators, when the two sides met directly, hosted by Eritrea in the Eritrean capital of Asmara, and reached a peace agreement.

On 14 October 2006, the Asmara peace agreement was signed by Sudan government and the East Front. A presidential order lifting the state of emergency in the east was issued, followed by a series of resolutions appointing assemblies. Forces of the East Front redeployed in the agreed camps in each of Kassala and Red Sea states. Actual implementation of the agreement began by the return of East Front leaders from Asmara to Sudan where they were sworn in and assumed their constitutional posts. Ever since the agreement was signed, not a single shot was fired nor was any ceasefire violation reported. Resolutions were issued in the three states of the east appointing representatives of the Front on state governments and legislatures. As part of the security arrangements, the process of integrating some of the East Front fighters in national armed forces was started.

Chairman of the East Front Mousa Mohamed Ahmed underlined that the agreement is a step forward, included political gains to the individual of East Sudan and that sharing of wealth under the agreement secures justice and development for the welfare of the citizens. He asserted that the Beja Congress, which was founded in the early 50s, is not a racial movement nor an exclusive geographical bloc but a congregation of all ethnic origins in the east, aimed to advance the area and had resorted to armed struggle in the interest of the region. Mousa emphasized work with the national unity government in Khartoum, political parties and organizations to execute all peace accords concluded.

Darfur Problem and Abuja Agreement

Darfur region lies in extreme western Sudan and is inhabited by a mixture of Arab and African tribes which had managed to coexist for hundreds of years. However, recent famines in the area during the early 80s had led to spread of armed robberies. Besides, problems in neighbour states had spilled over the region in the form of illegal weapon trade. Some tribes sought to acquire arms to defend themselves against attacks in clash points on the border with rebel areas in the south. Under the circumstance, came the rebellion in Darfur in February 2003 to cause immense shock to the Sudanese people. This resultant negative impact on the area was badly wed by the antagonist media which tended to exaggerate and falsify facts.

The Sudanese government declared adoption of peaceful negotiation and settlement as sole means of finding a political solution for Darfur problem. It eventually advocated a settlement which addresses aspirations of people in the region, restores peace, returns refugees

and displaced persons to their original villages, leads to continued development of the area and reaches understanding on power and wealth-sharing. True to its promise, the government cooperated with the world community and the African Union to reach a final settlement to the crisis and, in the meantime, deliver human assistance and relief to those afflicted. It sat to negotiate with all rebel movements and signed, as start, the Abeshi (in Republic of Chad) accord of ceasefire. This was followed by the initiating of security and human protocols by the government and rebel movements. Then came the Abuja negotiations in Nigeria sponsored by the African Union. On 5 May 2006, Darfur peace agreement was signed in Abuja by Sudan Liberation Movement's faction led by Meni Arko Menawi and Sudan Government.

Since signing Abuja agreement on July 2006, the conflict in Darfur has come to an end and calm of situation return to this region, this was due to the tremendous efforts exerted by the Government of Sudan in coordination with local political and social forces in Darfur and in cooperation with international and regional partners. The top of them: Arab League, African Union (AU), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (Unamid). Other factors gathered to alleviate the crisis and to make transformation of violence pattern and insurgency activity lead to looting and banditry. These factors could express as follows:

- a. Significant role of Unamid to realize stability in Darfur with praise by the Government and relevant international parties. The mission assumed peace-keeping tasks from AU in January 2008 and cooperated with the government to implement such tasks. In July 2008, the head of Unamid, Rudolf Adada has announced an official end of war in Darfur, also General Martin Agwi, the Force commander of Unamid, as well as a number of relevant international and regional officials in the Sudan emphasized thereof.
- b. Suicide attack that took place by Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on Khartoum in 2008 had weakened the movement. While the other armed movements divided into approximately thirty factions after withdrawal of Abdul Wahid Mohammad Noor from peaceful process. Regional efforts have been exerted in Addis Ababa and Tripoli to unify these factions and resulted in forming the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), which is currently negotiated the government in Doha forum.

- c. The great improvement of the Sudanese-Chadian relations after stage of tension, due to Chad's great support to the Darfurian rebels, to the stage of normalization and cooperation, a matter that contributed in controlling the joint borders between the two countries by Unamid and through the commitment of the two countries to stop the rebel movement activities in its homeland, as well as restrict the JEM and Chadian movements.

Some areas are still insecure due to criminal acts and refusal of some rebel factions to commit to the declaration of ceasefire. May 2010 has witnessed increase violence as a result of collapse of the ceasefire situation between JEM and the government. In the light of such situation it obvious that the signing agreements with armed movements is not enough to solve the security problems, therefore it is important to create a new method that deals with the reasons of insecurity and through a new strategy.

Sudan new strategy for peace in Darfur

The Sudanese government steps are accelerating to close Darfur crisis file by the Referendum of Southerner for self-determination in January 2011. The Government is intensifying the internal potentials through a new strategy to achieve comprehensive peace, security and development in Darfur, which was declared by the Government in September 2010. These tasks are considered as part of its basic responsibility as a sovereignty government, therefore the Government has initiated its proposal to set-up and implement the required policy to realize objectives, after the improvement of situation in Darfur and regional atmosphere which affected on the crisis.

Darfur Strategy has consisted of five principal axes that cover all necessities requirements to resolve Darfur crisis from its roots and settlement and its negative effects, they are: security, development, reconciliation and justice, resettlement of displaced persons and refugees and negotiation. The strategy has included objectives and priorities, restoring peace process commitment with signed agreements, the role of partners and application through development of plans after consultation with them in the framework of government institutions.

The government will pursue the implementation and commitment with strategy at all federation authority levels, and provincial and local authority, taking into account the timetable of reaching a CPA and return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, as well as initiating

significant projects before the Referendum takes place in January 2011 on self-determination in Southern Sudan.

The Sudanese government encourages international and regional partners (countries and organizations) through this strategy to support the comprehensive political process made it possible by the centralization of Sudanese leadership for permanent solution in Darfur. The government considers that Unamid is a unique partner in determining and implementing its security, political, humanitarian and developmental initiatives and praise its role to achieve stability in Darfur. Also the government recognizes the AU great efforts in Darfur and its Supreme Executive Authority, both headed by Thabo Mbeki. So the government will continue to enhance its relations with them to reach a final solution of the conflict and to organize consultations in Darfur.

Other partners have a significant role. The government expects that AU, UN, Arab league, OIC and a number of countries will continue efforts, especially in the field of voluntary return and transformation from relief to development.

What is required from the international community in general to play a more positive role in the framework of new strategy and to transform from confrontation to cooperation, as well as, fulfil of the donors commitments to face spending on compensations, voluntary return and development in Darfur.

Positive signs began to appear from the application of this strategy, the top of them is the declaration of the Commissioner of Humanitarian Aid, that the government had approved (\$550 million) for all projects of strategy. This was during his meeting with the representative of Arab organizations in Darfur on 8 November 2010. This will be added to the projects initiated by the Government years ago and the continuing efforts of the Governments and state authorities in this regard. In addition to efforts of covering humanitarian needs, reconstruction and development undertaken by many countries and international, regional and civil organizations.

The international and regional parties and representatives of the partners have confirmed their support of strategy through consultations. The communiqué of the International Meeting on Sudan, which was held in New York on 24 September 2010 on the sidelines of the session of the UN General Assembly, had supported and praised this strategy. On his part, the Secretary-General of the UN prescribed due to one of his last reports to the Security Council on the Unamid that the strategy has shown encouraged precursors, and he declared that he has plans for supporting it with amount of \$109 billion dollars.

The first fruit of the new strategy is the signing of Geneina Peace Agreement between the government of west Darfur and Liberation\freemen and Reformation Movement in the presence of Presidential Adviser and the Official of Darfur file on 7 November 2010 in Jebel Moon with great Sudanese efforts.

The Doha Document

The Darfur peace negotiations, which were sponsored by the Arab League and AU, with the participation of the UN, were held in Doha. This state of Qatar hosted these negotiations and offered all logistic and administrative facilities. The Minister of State of Foreign Affairs Ahmed bin Abd-Allah Al Mahmoud and Gabriel Basoli, the Joint Mediator of AU & UN had adopted this process.

Delegation of the Government of the Sudan chaired by the Minister of State, Amin Hassan Omer and supervised by the Presidential Adviser and Official of Darfur file, Ghazi Salah Al-Deen expressed full readiness for negotiations with all armed movements. The delegation of government negotiated with the JEM, which refused other anti-government groups to sit on the negotiation-table and required to represent Darfurian. However this movement withdrew from the negotiation process. It sought lately to appeal the armed violence. Also it ignored the framework agreement, which has been signed with the Government in March 2010, providing a ceasefire.

The Government continued hardly negotiation process with a wide alliance of armed movements in name of LJM headed by Dr. Al-Tigani Al-Sisi. It signed an agreement with the exact elements of the framework agreement signed with JEM. Both parties (government and movement) going on negotiation according to joint commissions formed as follows:

- a. Power sharing;
- b. Wealth sharing;
- c. Return of displaced persons and refugees and compensations;
- d. Justice and reconciliations;
- e. Security arrangements.

The two parties reached agreement in the field mentioned above in October 2010 and timetable has been set until December 2010, ended by the final signature of the CPA which allows the other movements to involve in it as soon as possible.

At last, the parties reached an agreement and signed Doha document for Peace in Darfur on July 2011, paving the way towards the comprehensive peace in Darfur.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

One of the Sudan's greatest achievements is the peace reached by the CPA signed in Nevasha on 9 January 2005 to settle the problem of civil war in the south which started in 1955. Sudan's vice-president Ali Osman Mohamed Taha signed for the government and the late Dr. John Garang signed on behalf of Sudan People's Liberation Movement. The agreement was fruit of painstaking efforts and in accordance with the initiative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The International community has lent impetus to the initiative until its successful conclusion.

Under the agreement, a government for south Sudan was founded with all its legislative, executive and judicial institutions. The SPLM also participated in the national unity government according to the agreement and the items on sharing of wealth were as well implemented. Contracting parties of the agreement emphasized that, despite some problems which are on their way to settlement, there will be no recurrence to war.

The Referendum

A referendum took place in Southern Sudan from 9 to 15 January 2011, on whether the region should remain a part of Sudan or become independent. The referendum was one of the consequences of the 2005 Naivasha Agreement between the Khartoum central government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). A simultaneous referendum was supposed to be held in Abyei on whether to become part of Southern Sudan but it has been postponed due to conflict over demarcation and residency rights.

Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir said that the southern region had a right to choose to secede and that the referendum was helpful because unity "could not be forced by power." He also said he would respect the outcome of the vote and support the south. However, he also said that though secession was a right it may not resolve issues for the south: "The stability of the south is very important to us because any instability in the south will have an impact on the north. If there is a war in your neighbour's house, you will not be at peace. The south suffers from

many problems. It has been at war since 1959. The south does not have the ability to provide for its citizens or create a state or authority.”

Former American President Jimmy Carter, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and former Tanzanian Prime Minister Joseph Warioba led the Carter Center international observation delegation. US Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited Southern Sudan three times during the referendum period, also during polling. Several major regional organizations deployed international observers, including the African Union, the European Union, the League of Arab States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These organizations issued a joint press statement on the first day of polling, and also at the last day.

Domestic observation organizations also deployed Sudanese men and women to observe the process; these included the Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections (SuNDE), the Sudan Domestic Elections Monitoring Programme (SuDEMOP) and the Sudanese Group for Democracy and Elections (SuGDE). Other national civil society organizations were also accredited as observers.

Normally, the UN does not deploy electoral observers; however, in response to a request from the parties of the CPA, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Panel on the Referenda in the Sudan was established. The panel is composed of three senior officials, former Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal António Monteiro, and Bhojraj Pokharel, a former Chairman of the Election Commission of Nepal, who are appointed by and report to the UN Secretary-General. The panel made periodic visits to Sudan during the referendum period and is supported by field reporting officers and stakeholder-observer liaison officers.

Voting on the referendum began on 9 January 2011. On 12 January, after three days of voting, representatives of the SPLA/M announced that, according to their estimates, the 60% turnout threshold required for the referendum’s validity (corresponding to around 2.3 million voters) had been reached. Official confirmation came later the same day, when the referendum commission released a statement announcing that turnout would “exceed” the required 60% threshold. Jimmy Carter expressed his belief on 13 January that the referendum would likely meet international standards for both the conduct of the vote and freedom of voters.

On 7 February 2011, the referendum commission published the final results, with 98.83% voting in favour of independence. While the ballots are going to be suspended in 10 of the 79 counties for exceeding

100% of the voter turnout, the number of votes is still well over the requirement of 60% turnout, and the majority vote for secession is not in question. The predetermined date for the creation of an independent state was 9 July 2011.

Economy and Investment

Sudanese Economy

Since independence, Sudan's economy suffered from a contrast between the immense natural resources and the country's economic backwardness. The salvation revolution adopted economic plans and programs to change economic realities in the country and to stimulate production in all fields. The task was burdensome and fraught with many and complex problems.

Banking on support by the Sudanese broad masses, the revolution enlisted help from a select group of Sudanese scientists and experts to recommend remedy for the lopsided economy. The government was earnest in implementing the recommendations and the people patiently awaited economic resuscitation to exit the cycle of begging for aid to the limitless horizon of self-sufficiency and offering aid. Economic reformation was at the following levels:

- The Three - Stage Recovery Program 1990-1993.
- The National Comprehensive Strategic Plan 1992-2002.
- The Quarter-Century Strategic Plan 2006-2013.

Economic Liberalization

The policy of liberalizing export prices was the first step towards eventual liberalization of services and import prices. The policy made it incumbent upon the state to quit fields of agricultural and industrial production, economic services by sale or rent of faltering enterprise and denationalization. It also necessitated amendment of structures and laws. The liberalization policy led to recover the national economy and participation of the private sector in development.

Working on commercial basis, the privatized sector beefed up its potentials and became more competitive internally and externally. By cutting down red tape and lifting administrative shackles, the state capital to expand and diversify productive and service activities, thereby

increasing national income, creating new employment jobs and earning the country considerable hard currency.

Sudanese Exports

Sudan's exports include petroleum, whose export started in August 1999, followed by agricultural products, both plant and animal. In the animal sector, Sudan exports, cattle, sheep and camels either live or in the shape of meat apart from hides. As for plants, Sudan exports cotton, gum Arabic and oilseeds, topped by sesame. New commodities were added to the list of exports such as gold, fish, animals, organic fertilizers, sugar, molasses, oils, soap, animal fodder, starch and glucose. Besides, Sudanese exports found new outlets such as countries of southeast Asia, South Africa and Mexico.

Imports

In the past, Sudan used to import petroleum products, sugar and flour but now the country had reached self-sufficiency and Sudan's imports presently include capital goods, Intermediary and essential goods. These are: textile, transport means, equipment and machinery, chemicals, raw materials, wheat, tobacco and some other food commodities. The bulk of Sudanese imports comes from Saudi Arabia, Sudan's first trade partner, followed by China, Britain, India, Egypt, South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia.

Invest Laws, Opportunity in Sudan

Sudan provides ample chances and suitable climate for local and foreign investments. Given its vast resources, rich agricultural and animal wealth and underground mineral reserves as well as its abundant crude oil, Sudan is second African and third Arab attraction country for foreign investments. In 2002 a separate ministry was established to lure investments and a law to encourage investment was issued in 2002; the law offers varied guarantees and privileges to foreign investors.

To cut down red tape, the Ministry resolved simplification of license approval to one single unit, arranged seminars and meetings for interested investors, offered ready projects and investment chart to investors.

Privileges and Sureties Offered

Under the law of encouraging investments, no discrimination is allowed against capital investment either local, Arab or foreign, whether belonging to the public, private, cooperative or mixed sector.

- Discrimination may not be exercised against similar projects in respect of offering privileges or sureties.
- Strategic projects defined in the bylaws shall enjoy after due approval and registration exemption from business tax for a period of not less than 10 years starting date of commercial production or exercising the activity. The minister may prolong the said period as deemed necessary.
- Every strategic and non-strategic project shall enjoy customs privileges determined by the Council of Ministers.
- Customs privileges shall be offered in respect of Salon cars, cabin cars and station wagons according to rules.
- The minister may offer strategic and non-strategic projects according to bylaws:
 - a) Land plot necessary for the strategic project free of charge and at incentive price for non-strategic schemes in cooperation with concerned parties in areas planned by the competent side.
 - b) The privileges of accounting depreciation in accordance to the replacement value as determined by rules.
 - c) Considering any loss during the exemption period as happened during the last year of the said period.
- The minister may give preferential privileges to projects which:
 - a) Have investments directed towards least-developed areas.
 - b) Help promote the country export abilities.
 - c) Contribute to broad rural development.
 - d) Create great job opportunities.
 - e) Encourage philanthropic endowments.
 - f) Promote technical and scientific research.
 - g) Re-invest profits.

Investors enjoy the following sureties:

1. His/her project shall not be nationalized or sequestered, nor his/her real estate property be partially or wholly impounded or invested for public interest except by law and against a fair compensation.
2. His/her legal money shall not be seized, confiscated, frozen, withheld or put under custody except by judge.
3. Re-imburement of the capital invested in case the project is not executed in the first place, liquidated or disposed of in any way either partially or wholly in the currency it was originally imported. In the event of non-execution of the original project, relevant machinery, equipment, transport means and other requisites may be exported.
4. Transfer of profits and finance costs of foreign loans in the currency in which it was imported.
5. Import of raw materials required by the register of importers and exports. No administrative unit shall refuse to execute the privileges and sureties granted under this law provisions.

To conclude with the last decade is one of the most important decades in the history of Sudan. The beginning of this decade has witnessed the beginning of talks to end the civil war in Sudan that lasted for most than 60 years. Within this decade, Sudan has signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Also this decade witnessed the signing of Abuja agreement and Doha document to end the conflict in Darfur. This decade also saw the organization of general election, which is part of the CPA accords. This election was monitored by the entire international world. According to the international monitors the election went very crucial for Sudan because it was the first election after the signing of the CPA.

This decade also witnessed the conduct of South Sudan referendum which is one of the pillars of the CPA. The referendum was monitored by various international bodies and non-governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Sudan believes that time has come to face the challenges and go forward to build the country and impose the new strategy for development and economic recovery. And of course, the coming challenge is how to utilize the resources to overcome the difficulties that Sudan may face.

Formato	15,5 x 22,5 cm
Mancha gráfica	12 x 18,3cm
Papel	pólen soft 80g (miolo), cartão supremo 250g (capa)
Fontes	Verdana 13/17 (títulos), Book Antiqua 10,5/13 (textos)