



Viviane Rios Balbino currently serves as Minister Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations, in New York. She graduated in Psychology from the University of Brasília and joined the Brazilian Foreign Service in 2003. She holds a master’s degree in diplomacy from the Rio Branco Institute. Overseas, she previously served at the Brazilian Mission to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, DC and at the Embassy of Brazil in Doha, State of Qatar. In the capital, she worked at the Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality of the Presidency of the Republic, in the Division of Social Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the Office of the Ministry of Defense. More recently, she headed of the International Peace and Security Division (2018-22), as well as the United Nations Division (2022-23), at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 2018, she is the Brazilian representative in the Women, Peace, and Security Focal Points Network. She wrote “Diplomata: substantivo comum de dois gêneros”, also published by the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG).

The year 2020 marked the 20th anniversary of the adoption of United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1325, titled “Women, Peace and Security” – the first of the agenda bearing the same name, which includes 10 different resolutions. That same year, Brazil was preparing for the 11th mandate as a non-permanent member of the Council (2022-2023), without a record of meaningful engagement in the issue. In this context, the author decided to present the application of the agenda in the UN peace and security architecture. This book traces the history of women’s movements demand for participation in decisions on armed conflict, even prior to the creation of the United Nations – a demand that Brazilian delegate Bertha Lutz decisively advocated for at the San Francisco Conference. Having been part of the Interministerial Group that drafted the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in 2016 and revised the text in 2018/2019, the author maps relevant stakeholders and investigates the underlying motivations behind the text. Supported by interviews, she concludes that the Plan had little impact and that the text deserves an update. In assessing the implementation of Security Council’s resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, the book seeks to relate the difficulty of recognizing women’s views on war to the broader resistance to female participation in the public space. The book presents data on the situation of women in politics, with a focus on Brazil, including in foreign policy. By arguing that the WPS agenda aligns with Brazil’s diplomatic tradition of conflict prevention and promotion of development as the basis for lasting peace, the author supposes that the most recent mandate of the country in the UN Security Council could galvanize interest from different national actors on the topic. She suggests that a desirable outcome of this process would be the adoption of a new National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.



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Viviane Rios Balbino

THE WOMANLY FACE OF PEACE

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A BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY  
OF THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Viviane Rios Balbino



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BRAZIL

This work was originally composed as a dissertation for the Higher Studies Course of the Rio Branco Institute, the Brazilian diplomatic academy. Due to its relevance to the United Nations agenda on women, peace and security, it was published by the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), a government-affiliated think tank that promotes the dissemination of research about diplomatic history and contemporary foreign affairs.

The book immediately attracted the interest of readers from many countries. In order to meet this demand and to reach a wider readership worldwide, FUNAG is pleased to launch the current edition in the English language. This publication now joins a number of other titles available for free download at the Foundation’s digital library: <https://funag.gov.br/biblioteca>

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VIVIANE RIOS BALBINO

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E-mail: funag@funag.gov.br

**Publishing and Events General Coordination:**

Henrique da Silveira Sardinha Pinto Filho

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I dedicate this work to my son Theo, who, together with his brother Nuno, shows me that a more equitable future is possible. There is no greater joy or pride than being your mother, my loves.





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*“There will never be an unbreakable peace in the world until  
the women help to make it.”*

Bertha Lutz, plenipotentiary delegate of Brazil to the San  
Francisco Conference, during the 4<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the 1<sup>st</sup>  
Commission of the United Nations.



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>List of acronyms and abbreviations .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Preface.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Chapter 1. The United Nations’ peace and security architecture ..</b>	<b>35</b>
1.1. The United Nations Security Council .....	35
1.2. UN peacekeeping operations .....	38
1.3. Special political missions .....	45
1.4. Sanctions committees .....	47
1.5. The Peacebuilding Commission .....	48
<b>Chapter 2. Historical background: from the San Francisco Conference to the Security Council .....</b>	<b>53</b>
2.1. Women’s participation in the creation of the United Nations.....	54
2.2. World Conferences on Women .....	60
2.3. The outcome documents of the Fourth World Conference on Women .....	63
2.4. The path to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) .....	65
<b>Chapter 3. The regulatory framework of the Women, Peace and Security agenda .....</b>	<b>71</b>
3.1. Resolutions and other texts adopted by the Security Council .....	71
3.1.1. Resolutions.....	71
3.1.2. Presidential statements (PRSTs).....	77
3.1.3. Peacekeeping mandates .....	79

3.2. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) .....	84
3.3. Structures in the Secretariat and initiatives by the Secretary-General .....	85

<b>Chapter 4. The National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security .....</b>	<b>91</b>
4.1. Internal evolution (2000-2015).....	91
4.2. The drafting of the National Action Plan .....	93
4.3. Review and renewal of the National Action Plan .....	100

<b>Chapter 5. Analysis of the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda .....</b>	<b>105</b>
5.1. Increased participation of uniformed women in peacekeeping operations .....	109
5.1.1. The women pioneers in the Armed Forces .....	118
5.1.2. Current state .....	120
5.1.3. The future of women's participation in the Armed Forces .....	126
5.1.4. Police officers in peacekeeping operations .....	128
5.2. Civilian participation in peacekeeping missions, political missions and mediation .....	132
5.3. Political participation .....	140
5.3.1. Female representation in politics .....	143
5.3.2. The case of diplomacy .....	146
5.4. Prevention and protection .....	153
5.5. Peacebuilding .....	161
5.6. Awareness raising and international cooperation .....	165

<b>Chapter 6. 20 years of the agenda: current debate and Brazilian perspectives .....</b>	<b>171</b>
6.1. Activities to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325(2000) .....	173
6.2. Building a Brazilian perspective .....	179

<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>189</b>
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<b>References .....</b>	<b>199</b>
Higher Studies Course .....	209
Legislation and Public Acts .....	210
Media articles.....	212
Press releases .....	212
Speeches .....	213
Seminars.....	213
Databases .....	215
Audiovisual.....	216
United Nations Documents .....	216
United Nations Security Council resolutions.....	217
United Nations Security Council presidential statements .....	218
United Nations Security Council press releases.....	218
United Nations General Assembly resolutions .....	218
Reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations .....	218
Other documents.....	218
Diplomatic cables.....	218
Other official documents.....	219
Interviews .....	220
<b>Annexes .....</b>	<b>221</b>
Table 1 — Mandates given to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions on components of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, listed in alphabetical order by acronym.....	221
Table 2 — Brazilian military personnel selected for individual missions in UN peacekeeping operations, in chronological order.....	226
Table 3 — Women in the Brazilian Armed Forces in October 2020 .....	227
Table 4 — Women, Peace and Security priorities declared by countries elected to the Security Council between 2018 and 2020.....	228





## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>A4P</b>	Action for Peacekeeping
<b>ALCOPAZ</b>	Latin American Association of Training Centers for Peacekeeping Operations
<b>ATT</b>	Arms Trade Treaty
<b>BINUH</b>	United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti
<b>CAR</b>	Central African Republic
<b>CCOPAB</b>	Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center
<b>CIMIC</b>	Civil-Military Coordination
<b>COVID-19</b>	Coronavirus disease
<b>CSW</b>	United Nations Commission on the Status of Women
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
<b>DPO</b>	United Nations Department of Peace Operations
<b>DPPA</b>	United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>ECOSOC</b>	United Nations Economic and Social Council
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
<b>FARC</b>	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
<b>FET</b>	Female Engagement Team
<b>G4</b>	Group of Four
<b>GRULAC</b>	Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries

<b>IWG</b>	Interministerial Working Group in charge of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>MINUJUSTH</b>	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
<b>MINURSO</b>	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
<b>MINUSCA</b>	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
<b>MINUSMA</b>	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
<b>MINUSTAH</b>	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
<b>MONUSCO</b>	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>MPM</b>	Military Public Prosecutor's Office
<b>MRE</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>NAP</b>	National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NTP</b>	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
<b>OAS</b>	Organization of American States
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PCC</b>	Police contributing countries
<b>SEA</b>	Sexual exploitation and abuse
<b>SSR</b>	Security sector reform
<b>TCC</b>	Troop contributing countries
<b>UNAMA</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
<b>UNAMI</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

<b>UNAMID</b>	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
<b>UNAVEM II</b>	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
<b>UNCTAD</b>	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
<b>UNHCR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNIDIR</b>	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
<b>UNIFIL</b>	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
<b>UNIOGBIS</b>	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
<b>UNISFA</b>	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
<b>UNMIK</b>	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
<b>UNMIL</b>	United Nations Mission in Liberia
<b>UNMISET</b>	United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor
<b>UNMISS</b>	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
<b>UNMIT</b>	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
<b>UNPOL</b>	United Nations Police
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNSG</b>	Secretary-General of the United Nations
<b>UNSOM</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

<b>UNV</b>	United Nations Volunteers programme
<b>UNVMC</b>	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>WEOG</b>	Western European and Other States Group
<b>WILPF</b>	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
<b>WPS</b>	Women, Peace and Security
<b>ZOPACAS</b>	South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone

## Preface

This book is the English translation of research presented by the writer as part of the 66th Higher Studies Course (“Curso de Altos Estudos”) of the Brazilian diplomatic academy, Rio Branco Institute, in January 2021. The context for the paper, presented as a requirement for the writer’s career advancement, was the preparation for Brazil’s 11th mandate as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, which took place from January 1st, 2022 to December 31, 2023.

The Brazilian government’s decision to include the Women, Peace and Security agenda as one of seven priorities for the 2022-23 mandate had not yet been made at the time of submission. Yet, the inclusion did tint the book with new colors, since interest for Brazil’s views on the WPS agenda grew significantly in Brazil, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — or “Itamaraty” as it is known —, but also among partner countries.

Moreover, two major armed conflicts erupted after the book was written: the one between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 and the war in Gaza, in October 2023. The war in Europe was the first to bring military combat back to the center of international politics. Even in the case of peripheral countries that are not directly involved, the conflict allowed for a re-evaluation of simplistic interpretations, for example those that dismissed the dispute of the great powers for influence on the African continent as “ethnic conflicts.” In addition, the conflict in Gaza deepened distrust in the ability of the UN and its Security Council to protect world peace.

The UNSC’s inability to act upon the conflicts made it clear that the reform of the Council is urgently needed, something that Brazil had been advocating for decades, with a view to improving representation and legitimacy. At the very beginning of its 11th mandate, in light of the circumstances in Europe, Brazil was compelled to advocate for

basic principles of International Law that for many years were taken for granted. It once again became clear that, for a middle power that has renounced warlike use of nuclear energy such as Brazil, and with all legitimate criticism that can be levelled at the UN, the alternative of not having an international institution to resort to is certainly unfeasible.

In the area of Women, Peace and Security (WPS), the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan and the rollback in women's and girls' rights in that country in the second half of 2021 had already dealt a severe blow to the Council's credibility. In the case of Gaza, many countries that label their foreign policies as "feminist" have faced harsh criticism as their industries fuel atrocities with weapons and their governments fail to demand a ceasefire. As for the conflict in Ukraine, the call for the male population to take part in combat sparked protest on social media: "Who defends the men?" Actually, the WPS agenda sheds light on gender roles in the context of armed conflict. In the same way that their biological sex does not assign men to the role of combatants, neither should it impose on women the responsibility for providing and caring for the remainder of the population (children, the elderly, people with disabilities or the wounded), often forcing them to be displaced as refugees, with serious risks to their own physical safety.

As a result of these and other relevant discussions, Brazil's most recent term in the Security Council has taken on historic contours, unforeseen at the time of writing, in 2020. In this context, it is auspicious that the Brazilian government included the WPS agenda among its priorities in the Council. At a time when the world suddenly realizes that the nuclear threat remains, it becomes essential for the international community to take into account the perspective of the female half of the population on war and its consequences.

More than twenty years after the adoption of the resolution that inaugurated the agenda and introduced WPS as an item in the Council's work program — Resolution 1325 (2000) — the topic is now routine. At the same time, Brazil's decision to prioritize the agenda can indicate that the country considers it to be aligned with its stance on international peace and security, in particular the traditional promotion of the link between peace and development.

This hypothesis is supported by the fact that Brazil decided, in the first months of the last mandate, to join the Statement of Shared Commitments on Women, Peace and Security. The initiative, which aims to promote the participation of women briefers at different Council meetings and to foster analyses that include the perspective of women affected by conflict, as well as of those involved in negotiations and peacekeeping missions, was originally launched by Ireland, Mexico and Kenya during their respective monthly Council presidencies in the end of 2021.

During the Brazilian presidency in July 2022, on the occasion of the renewal of the mandate of the UN political mission in Haiti (BINUH), Brazil drafted a media stakeout on behalf of the signatories of the Shared Commitments, emphasizing the need to strengthen the fight against sexual violence and violence against women in that country. The experience informed Brazil's second presidency in October 2023, which coincided with the annual open debate on Women, Peace and Security, held on October 25, 2023, in honor of Dr. Bertha Lutz, a Brazilian pioneer of the WPS agenda.

To mark the occasion, Brazil drafted another media stakeout, this time bringing attention to civil society, especially women's movements, who find the strength to work for peace. Citing the context of exacerbated conflict, the signatories reaffirmed they are appalled by the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence around the world and ask for accountability as well as for survivors' access to justice. They also denounced systemic exclusion of women and girls in Afghanistan, which may amount to gender persecution.

For all of the reasons above, foreign policy operators in Brazil and beyond have grown more interested in the Women, Peace and Security agenda. The agenda also tends to attract more interest from researchers in the fields of gender equality, defense and security. In this context, Brazil's role, as a country of the Global South promoting WPS, may also be of interest for researchers and professionals outside of the country. Hopefully future publications will delve into aspects that this book, which intends to serve as an introduction Women, Peace and Security, only outlines.





# Introduction

The United Nations is committed to three interdependent pillars: peace and security, development and human rights. Each pillar is assigned a council with prerogatives over matters within its competence. Both the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Security Council are constituent bodies of the Organization, provided for in the 1945 United Nations Charter. The Human Rights Council, subordinate to the General Assembly, is the most recent, established in March 2006. Seventy-five years after the San Francisco Conference, the event that marked the foundation of the UN in 1945, the scourge of war still permeates the structure of the United Nations. From the phrase that captions the Organization's Charter<sup>1</sup> to the murals by Cândido Portinari decorating the main entrance to its Headquarters in New York, there is much to remember about its origins in the failure of its predecessor, the League of Nations, to prevent the recurrence of conflict between the major military powers. To this day, former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's 1945 response to criticism of the Organization is remembered as a summary of the primary function to which the United Nations is dedicated: "The UN was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell".

In accordance with the fundamental principle of gender equality enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the political process that led to the adoption of Resolution 1325 advocated that matters relating to women in armed conflict belong, as do all those concerning men and armed conflict, to the Security Council. Thus, although examples of encroachment by the Council in areas outside its remit, or whose conduct collides or competes with other bodies, are widely known (Garcia, 2016), this is not the case with the WPS agenda, which guarantees the application of gender equality to the pillar of peace and security and has in the Security Council its original locus and *raison d'être*. It can be said, then, that after

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1 "We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind [...]"

decades of action by the ECOSOC and the human rights bodies in favor of gender equality (see sections 2.2 and 3.2), the agenda represents the truly transversal assimilation of this principle throughout the work of the UN.

Resolution 1325, entitled “Women, Peace and Security,” adopted on October 31, 2000, was the first binding document adopted by the UNSC on the specific and disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women. On the same date, a corresponding item was included among the “Thematic Issues” on the UNSC’s working agenda. Since then, the Council has adopted ten other resolutions aimed at promoting the increased participation of women in conflict prevention and peace negotiations, as well as in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and protecting women and girls from violence, including sexual violence, in the context of armed conflict. On August 28, 2020, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2538, the most recent of what is known as the Women, Peace and Security agenda.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to the 11 resolutions, the WPS agenda is composed of presidential statements, annual reports of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) and strategies aimed at the fulfillment of the resolute texts. Components of the agenda have been incorporated into the mandates given by the Council to peacekeeping operations until they reach, with varying degrees of ambition, all of which are currently taking place. In addition, five sanctions regimes governed by the UNSC now include sexual offenses among the criteria for listing individuals and armed groups.<sup>3</sup>

Articulated around four axes — prevention, participation, protection and assistance/recovery — resolution 1325(2000) is considered a landmark in the history of the Security Council (Kirby and Sheperd 2016). Among all UNSC resolutions, it has been translated into the largest number of languages. The result of decades of international mobilization,

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2 While “women and peace and security” is also recorded, UN documents and the National Action Plan have consolidated “Women, Peace and Security” — a formula adopted in this paper. Resolution 2538, entitled “Women in peacekeeping,” was not adopted under the item, but its content allows for the interpretation that is part of the WPS agenda.

3 In chronological order of adoption, provisions to this effect have been incorporated into the sanctions regimes applicable to Mali (2017), Central African Republic (2017), Libya (2018), Somalia (2018) and South Sudan (2018). Source: Security Council Report 2020.

resolution 1325 recognizes, on the one hand, that restrictions imposed on women and the care work they provide for children, the elderly, the infirm and persons with disabilities make the female half of the population especially subject to the deleterious effects of armed conflict. On the other hand, it promotes the transformative potential of including women in decision-making regarding their countries' participation in armed conflicts, in negotiating the terms of a peace settlement and in national rebuilding after such conflicts.

Twenty years after its adoption, the pillars of resolution 1325 still serve as a parameter for assessing results in the field. In 2015, the United Nations published a Global Study on the implementation of the WPS agenda.<sup>4</sup> Among the results released, the positive effect of including women in peace negotiations gained repercussion, reducing the likelihood of agreements failing by 64 percent and increasing the likelihood of their lasting more than fifteen years by 35 percent.

As part of efforts to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda, the UN recommended the design of national strategies to member countries. A total of 88 have developed action plans or related strategies in the domestic sphere so far. National action plans constitute important tools for governments to prioritize, coordinate, and monitor the national realization of the WPS agenda.

On March 8, 2017, Brazil launched its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NAP), a result of consensus reached by the Interministerial Working Group coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and comprised of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice and Citizenship and the Special Secretariat of Policies for Women of the Presidency of the Republic. On March 29, 2019, the Brazilian government extended the validity of its National Plan for four additional years, until March 2023.

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4 Global Study on UNSC Resolution 1325: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, of 14 October 2015. Authored by a panel coordinated by Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka, composed mostly of experts from developing countries, the report is the product of responses submitted by 60 member countries, and research conducted by civil society coalitions with 317 organizations from 71 countries (Olsson and Gizelis in Davies and True (ed.), 2019, ch. 11).

The relevance of Brazil's knowledge of the WPS agenda is informed, among other elements, by the country's election to the 11th term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, 2022-2023, in June 2021.<sup>5</sup> Since the previous Brazilian mandate (2010-2011), eight resolutions on Women, Peace and Security have been adopted. The Uniformed Personnel Gender Parity Strategy 2018-2028<sup>6</sup> had not yet been envisioned, and the country had not developed a National Action Plan. In 2022 and 2023, Brazil was called to contribute to the conceptual debate and to initiatives that did not exist when it was last at the UNSC.

In this sense, it is worth emphasizing the need for adaptation in the Armed Forces in order to meet the targets for the participation of women in peacekeeping, bearing in mind the country's intention to maintain a high profile in the collective security system of the United Nations, with the deployment of military units (Figueirôa, 2018). To give an idea of the challenge, during the 13 years of uninterrupted command of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, from 2004 to 2017), more than 37,300 Brazilian military and police personnel were deployed. From the total, about 240 were women — or 0.64 percent (Hamann, Gianinni and Pereira, 2019). In 2020, in line with the aforementioned strategy, military units should have at least 6.5 percent of female representation.

The Women, Peace and Security agenda has gained recent visibility in Brazil after two military officers were awarded for their role as military gender advisers in the Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). In 2019 and 2020, frigate captain Marcia Braga and corvette captain Carla Araújo, respectively, received the UN Military Gender Advocate of the Year award for the methodology they developed to help combat sexual violence in that country. The UN's recognition of Brazilian military women was explicitly mentioned in the President of the Republic's speech at the opening of the General Debate of

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5 Press release no. 70, of 11 June 2021.

6 The Strategy, launched in 2018, provides for minimum levels of participation of women military and police personnel in peacekeeping operations by 2028 and will be presented in detail in section 3.3. Available at: <<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/uniformed-gender-parity-strategy-2018-2028-summary.pdf>>. Accessed on: 10 Aug. 2023.

the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 2020.

From the perspective of international law, the fulfillment of the WPS agenda is an obligation of UN Member States. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that signatory countries are bound by the decisions taken by its Security Council. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has established that UNSC resolutions are binding regardless of whether the body is acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>7</sup> Nowadays, UNSC resolutions or presidential statements are considered binding, but not other communications, such as press releases (Pontes, 2018). As a body of eleven resolutions, there is no doubt about the obligation of Member States.

Despite this obligation, internalized in Brazil via the National Plan in 2017, there are still few of Brazilian publications about the subject, which has been majorly overlooked in the literature produced on UNSC and the participation in peacekeeping operations. Particularly, there is a lack of records of the processes of development and extension of the Brazilian National Plan, of institutional interest to the four competent ministries. Thus, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the dissemination of knowledge to public servants, especially members of the Brazilian Foreign Service, as well as to offer proposals for lines of action so that Brazil can influence the international debate in favor of its interests. In doing so, it is hoped that interpretative misunderstandings that could jeopardize such action are avoided.

The study seeks to demonstrate that the WPS agenda is consolidated. Even in the face of severe crises at global and regional level, as well as within the UN, it has gained support to strengthen itself, as indicated by the 98 co-sponsorships, including Brazil's, received by Resolution 2538 (2020). Over the course of 20 years, it has survived enough political changes in the permanent and rotating member countries of the Council to attest to adherence from a broad political-ideological spectrum. In

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7 Advisory Opinion "Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)", 21 June 1971, paragraphs 112 to 115.

the USA, the only country to have internalized the WPS agenda by law,<sup>8</sup> the legislative process was initiated by a Democratic senator, but the action plan (one of the most comprehensive and ambitious on record) was formulated by a Republican government. In Brazil, the National Plan was launched during Michel Temer's administration, but the renewal was announced under Bolsonaro's government. Therefore, it is inadvisable to ignore the WPS agenda on the grounds that it is a fashionable topic or a diversionary strategy.

The year 2020 marked the 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 and the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Conference and Platform for Action on Women.<sup>9</sup> In recognition of the ephemerides, in February 2020 the Brazilian government appointed Ambassador Maria Luisa Escorel de Moraes as High Representative for Women's Affairs.<sup>10</sup> The moment seems favorable for the implementation of the commitments contained in the resolutions approved by the UNSC, bearing in mind, moreover, the impetus that the current Secretary-General, António Guterres, gives to the theme.

In light of the above, the paper analyzes the path that led to the adoption of Resolution 1325(2000) and subsequent resolutions, assesses Brazil's participation in this process, scrutinizes Brazil's decisions to adopt and renew the National Plan, examines the results to date, and finally suggests lines of action for Brazilian foreign policy. From an institutional point of view, the work fulfills the objective "Deepen and disseminate knowledge on the Women, Peace and Security agenda," more specifically the activity "Encourage and promote research on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, including facilitating the access to information and relevant primary documents, pursuant to the appropriate legislation," contained in the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (Brazil, 2017, 56).

Bearing in mind the myriad of topics currently debated under the rubric of WPS, those included in the Brazilian Plan have been prioritized.

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8 Public Law 115-68 (Women, Peace and Security Act) of 6 October 2017.

9 Available at: <<https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf>>. Accessed on: 10 Aug. 2023.

10 Cable 103 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in Geneva, dated 18 February 2020.

In light of the objective of subsidizing policymakers and government agents, and in order to meet the requested scope, the work is primarily informative and subsidiarily propositional. It seeks to provide up-to-date data and summarize theoretical reflections by way of introduction. Options for in-depth bibliographical references are offered throughout the text.

Before turning to the UN peace and security architecture, on which the Women, Peace and Security agenda is based, the theoretical framework, hypotheses, research method and organization of the work will be presented. To begin with, the bibliographical survey shows that the role of women in defense and security issues was initially the subject of a theoretical formulation of a supposed counter position, of a biological nature, of the female sex to war.

Still in this scenario, other authors pointed out that the position against war, rather than being intrinsic to female biology, derived from the subordination relegated to women in societies organized by men. Women's vulnerability and powerlessness were therefore exacerbated in wartime. Virginia Woolf's *Three Guineas* illustrates how her contemporaries were denied access to participation in deciding on the use of force.

After the Cold War, the topic gained attention from international relations academics, notably in the fields of Critical Theory and Critical Security Studies. In their view, mainstream scholarship on defense and security either ignores (in the case of realism) or romanticizes (in the case of idealism) the female face of armed conflicts, despite the fact that women have always participated in wars on various fronts — whether by sharing the economic burden of men's absence, assisting the wounded, displaced and refugees, or taking part in combat.<sup>11</sup>

Part of the Critical Theory of International Relations seeks to denaturalize the public vs. private dichotomy, as well as the attribution of social values to the differences between men and women (active men

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11 Women combatants include Ludmila Pavlichenko, known in the US as Lady Death, one of the most effective snipers employed by Russia in World War II, with more than 300 recorded kills, and the 588th Night Bombardment Regiment, suggestively nicknamed the "Night Witches" by the German side. Thousands of women helped decide the Vietnam War. Today, women fight in theaters like Syria, where large numbers of Kurdish women also fight in militias against Islamic State.

vs. passive women; rational men vs. emotional women; warrior men vs. pacifist women).<sup>12</sup> In addition to being inconsistent with the reality of post-Cold War intrastate conflicts, these divisions serve, among other purposes, to keep women away from the public space, and therefore from the exercise of power (Tickner, 2001). Once the physiological justification for women's interest in war and peace is removed, the duties and rights of the entire citizenry become the key criterion for validating the participation of the two halves of the population, on equal footing, in the discussion.<sup>13</sup>

At this point, it is worth explaining an important vocabulary choice. Academic authors who study Women, Peace and Security include an analysis of the different social roles assigned to women and men in a given historical context, as well as the power relations between the two groups, using the concept of gender. However, this professional paper was prepared in accordance with a call for proposals from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for which, at the time the paper was submitted, gender and sex were synonymous, referring only to the biological differences between men and women. Therefore, the study was limited to the binary categorization. Even so, preference was given to “women” and “men” in the plural, in order to emphasize that, within the same biological sex, there is relevant diversity, absorbed by the agenda (Aggestam and True, 2020, p. 148).

In light of the contemporary nature of the subject, some of the bibliographical sources fall within the critical theory of international relations. Nevertheless, the Women, Peace and Security agenda belongs, before academia, to the relationship between states in the only agency with international competence to authorize the use of force. Moreover, although it may be of interest to researchers, the work is intended to

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12 The incipient literature produced in the context of the Women, Peace and Security agenda recognizes that, in the complex power game between the sexes, women play an instrumental role, whether voluntary or forced, in intelligence actions and terrorist attacks, as they are less subject to scrutiny in checkpoints (Sjoberg, 2014). She admits that, in some cases, women can get away with war crimes, benefiting from stereotypes such as purity and benevolence (Stefja and Darden, 2020).

13 It is not uncommon to use military conscription, which in Brazil is compulsory and open only to males, as an argument against the validity of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Section 4.1.3 will examine how the legal prohibition on female conscription serves the dual purpose of keeping women out of the armed forces and perpetuating military service as a male-only credential in defense and security matters.



support public officials in the areas of foreign policy, defense and security. As such, it is also based on the diplomatic literature on the Security Council, which spreads across various theoretical currents.

In 2016, the book *The Unwomanly Face of War*, by Ukrainian journalist Svetlana Alexievich, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, was released in Brazil. Originally published in 1985 in Russian in a censored version, the book of interviews brings to light the point of view of some of the more than one million women employed by the Soviet army, as well as volunteers in the civil resistance, in World War II. In recovering these women's view of the war they helped win, including in physical combat, the author heard a different story from that told by the men — one in which the very notion of victory was nuanced. The author concludes that war does not have a woman's face both because the female contribution to this enterprise does not receive the same social valorization as the male one, and because women, alien to military comradeship, were unable to derive the same sense of glory from the carnage as their male colleagues. The title of this work dialogues with the title of the book and proposes that we at least recognize the female face of peace.

The work is based on the premise that the inclusion of the female half of society places sovereign states, and therefore the community of nations, in a better position to meet today's peace and security challenges, including non-military threats such as cyber-attacks, as well as enables them to act more effectively in contemporary scenarios of intrastate warfare. According to U.S. Naval War College Professor Joan Johnson-Freese, the Women, Peace and Security agenda is not just a matter of social justice, but of national and global security (Johnson-Freese, 2019, 8).

The second premise of this study is that the Women, Peace and Security agenda is fully in line with the interdependence between security and development, which guides Brazilian action in international peace and security (Fontoura, 2009; Neves, 2010; Uziel, 2015; Moraes, 2017; Figueirôa, 2018). Research indicates that political, economic and social inequality between women and men is related to a country's tendency to use force (Caprioli, 2000, 63; UN-World Bank, 2018, 116-118). Similar to material wealth, the achievement of lasting peace depends on the

contribution of the female half of the population.<sup>14</sup> In this sense, ensuring women's equal access to economic goods and politics is part of Brazil's goal of preventing the recurrence of conflicts by addressing their root causes.

In terms of structure, the work is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents the United Nations' peace and security architecture, to which the resolutions of the Women, Peace and Security agenda apply. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the historical process that led to the adoption of Resolution 1325(2000), from the creation of the UN, through the four world conferences held on women, to the UNSC. In this journey, the role of developing countries will be investigated, with emphasis on Brazil. Chapter 3 deals with the normative framework of the Women, Peace and Security agenda: the ten resolutions adopted between 2000 and 2020, the UNSC presidential statements on the subject, the mandates given to peacekeeping missions on WPS, Recommendation 30 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the programs and strategies put in place by the UN on the subject. Chapter 4 discusses the internal evolution leading to the development of the National Plan, published in 2017, and the government's decision to renew it in 2019.

Chapter 5 focuses on analyzing the results of the four axes of Resolution 1325 and the NAP: women's participation in international peace and security; conflict prevention and protection of the rights of girls and women; peacebuilding; and international advocacy and coordination, *vis-à-vis* the premises listed. It will assess the challenges of the global and national materialization of the agenda. Chapter 6 presents the international debate on the future of the WPS agenda. The link between the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the promotion of development as a driver of peace, a formula that Brazil holds dear, will be revisited in order to propose lines of action for the country to influence the debate and overcome the challenges identified in the previous chapter. In this vein, suggestions are made for a new National Action Plan.

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<sup>14</sup> The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that if women's participation in the labor market reached the same level as men's, the GDP of its member countries would increase by 12 percent over 20 years (source: OECD Recommendation of the Council on Gender Equality in Public Life, 2015).

In order to verify the hypotheses and to reach conclusions, and noting that this is not scientific research, a study was developed along the lines of an exploratory research, defined by Gil (2008) as that developed with the objective of providing an approximate overview of a given fact. The author adds that this type of research is preferably carried out when there are few references on the chosen theme and when the researcher aims at practical action. It also usually involves a bibliographic and documents review, non-standardized interviews and case studies (Gil, 2008, 27-28).

Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted between June and November 2020. The sample was defined based on three factors: a) subjects who participated in the IWG of the National Action Plan, either at the time of drafting or revising the text; b) Brazilian nationals serving the UN in field missions or in the Secretariat, on topics relevant to the agenda; and c) officials working in ministries that have activities included in the NAP. Although each interview followed individual dynamics, a basic script was developed for each of the three groups, available as Annexes.

In the case of group “b”, preference was given to female subjects, in accordance with the activity “Identify and share the experiences of Brazilian women formerly involved in peace processes, peacekeeping operations and special political missions,” contained in the National Plan.<sup>15</sup> We also sought to increase the sample of civilian women, bearing in mind that most of the Brazilian production on Women, Peace and Security still focuses on military women and, to a lesser extent, police officers.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, most of the interviews (18) were conducted by videoconference. The interviews lasted between 38 minutes and 1 hour and 27 minutes and were recorded on digital audio. Consent to share the results was obtained via electronic form. The subjects belonged to the following institutions: Foreign Affairs — 2; Ministry of Defense/ Armed Forces — 5; Military Police — 2; UN DPO (Headquarters and peacekeeping missions) — 4; DPPA (Headquarters and political missions)

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15 Brazil, 2017, 56. As for the subgroup of nine interviewees with field experience, it is worth mentioning that only two had children. Research by Giannini, Folly and Lima (2017) indicates a shared belief among military personnel of both sexes that it would be “impossible” for women with children to take part in peacekeeping missions. Children would not be an obstacle to the participation of men in these missions. This topic will be revisited in section 5.1.

— 2; independent researchers — 2; Chamber of Deputies — 1; Ministry of Citizenship — 1; Military Public Prosecutor's Office (MPM) — 1; UN Women — 1; and Igarapé Institute — 1.<sup>16</sup>

The primary source of information was unclassified communication exchanged between the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs and the network of diplomatic posts abroad, as well as minutes, documents and electronic messages.<sup>17</sup> Consultations were also held with the relevant areas of the four ministries responsible for the National Plan. Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH serves as a case study for two reasons: a) the first National Action Plan favors external action, especially peacekeeping operations; and b) the mission in Haiti, in which Brazil played a leading role, was developed in parallel with the growth of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, in terms of approved resolutions and UN initiatives. A comparative approach is adopted with the goals of the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy and with the results obtained by countries that have action plans and share security challenges and contributions to peacekeeping missions similar to those of Brazil.

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16 The selection of the sample is based on the methodology of elite interviews, which complement information available in documents and allow access to the culture and collective memory of the institutions (Blakeley in Shepherd (ed.), 2013, 158-168).

17 According to Itamaraty's Manual of Official and Diplomatic Writing (Revision of 13 May 2020): "Messages sent from one collective box to another in a Ministry unit are now a replacement for the use of the former paper minimemos. Thus, e-mail messages [...] should be used for all types of unclassified communication that do not require historical archiving [...]."

## Chapter 1

# The United Nations' peace and security architecture

Following the definition of the theme and objectives of the study, the UN's peace and security architecture shall be briefly presented, the structure for which the resolutions that make up the Women, Peace and Security agenda are aimed. In doing so, it is hoped to help understand the arguments presented throughout the book.

### 1.1. The United Nations Security Council

The UNSC is one of the six original organs of the United Nations. The other organs created in 1945 are: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the Trusteeship Council (whose works were suspended in 1994) and the Secretariat. From the point of view of International Law, the UNSC is the only body capable of authorizing the legitimate use of force in the event of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Garcia, 2013).

According to Article 29 of the Charter, the Security Council has the prerogative to set up subsidiary bodies. Since 2008, they have been divided into two groups: the first, made up of committees (including the sanctions, counter-terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation committees), working groups and panels of experts, international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and investigative committees, UNSG representatives and special envoys, regional coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, which also reports to the General Assembly. The second group of subsidiary bodies is made up of the 13 peacekeeping operations and 12 special political missions underway in 2020. In addition, the Council has several informal groups of experts reporting to it. The

Women, Peace and Security agenda applies both to the UNSC and its formal and informal subsidiary bodies and UN related departments.

Also worth mentioning in this context is the United Nations General Assembly's (UNGA) Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which has come to be known as C-34. Created in 1965 as part of the Fourth Committee of the UNGA, it is not strictly part of the peace and security architecture. Nevertheless, diplomats, military personnel and consultants from 147 countries work in political groupings<sup>18</sup> to produce an extensive report with practical recommendations on performance and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.

The C34 annual report is structured around the eight priorities of the UNSC's Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative for the performance of peacekeeping missions, including Women, Peace and Security. The C34 report is considered a relevant source, even by the UNSC, as it reflects the agreement of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs). For this reason, it has been evaluated by Brazil as "the most appropriate body to debate all aspects of UN peacekeeping operations."<sup>19</sup>

According to the United Nations Charter, the Council's primary function is to maintain international peace and security. In the event of a threat to the peace (Chapter VI), the UNSC must resort to: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means. The order in which the chapters are presented in the San Francisco Charter indicates that the use of force in cases of breach of peace or acts of aggression (Chapter VII) is a measure of last resort, preceded by sanctions and blockades. Article 51 of the Charter explicitly protects the right to "individual or collective" self-defense — provided that it is immediately communicated to the Council and without prejudice to its mandate.

The Security Council is made up of five permanent members, referred to by the acronym P5: the United States of America, the United Kingdom,

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18 Since 2012, Brazil has taken part in C-34 alongside Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay (ABUM). In October, 2020, Brazil took over the coordination of ABUM for one year.

19 Cable 642 of 16 October 2020 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York.

France, Russia and China, the only ones with veto power. In addition to them, the General Assembly elects ten rotating members, by regional group, for biannual terms, making a total of fifteen UNSC members. The Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure<sup>20</sup> establish that the UNGA elects five non-permanent members each year, in order to avoid replacing ten countries at once.

Since the creation of the Council, its asymmetrical composition and lack of representation of the full UN membership has been criticized. The retention of veto power by the five permanent members dates back to the post-World War II era and is linked to the perception among the victorious powers of their responsibility towards the rest of the "unprotected states."<sup>21</sup> In this sense, it is understood as a condition that enabled the creation of the UN. However, the permanence of this situation jeopardizes the recognition of the legitimacy of the UNSC's deliberations, which are mandatory, since almost all Member States have no direct involvement in drawing them up. Around 35 percent of UN members have never served on the Council (Pontes, 2018, 28).

In light of the above, Brazil is in favor of a reform that would grant the Security Council greater legitimacy and currency. Given its geographical, population and economic dimension, it believes it could occupy a permanent seat to be created.<sup>22</sup> In line with this original ambition, it is the second country that has held the most elected mandates on the Security Council (ten), behind only Japan, which has been on the UNSC eleven times. Brazil was on the UNSC in 1946-1947; 1951-1952; 1954-1955; 1963-1964; 1967-1968; 1988-1989; 1993-1994; 1998-1999; 2004-2005; and 2010-2011.<sup>23</sup> The last time it ran, Brazil received 182 out of possible 183 votes.<sup>24</sup>

20 The UNSC Rules of Procedure have remained provisional since 1946, as a sign of the permanent members' interest in keeping them flexible and not subjecting them to extensive revision (Pontes, 2018, 74).

21 According to Garcia (2013, 34-35), "Roosevelt was convinced that peace could only be maintained by force, preferably by overwhelming military power." China was included among the P-5 by Roosevelt as a strategic counterpoint to Japan in the Pacific (30) and France to reinforce "policing" in Europe.

22 Germany, Brazil, India and Japan support each other in their respective demands for permanent seats on the UNSC. Together they are known as the Group of Four (G4).

23 For a summary of Brazilian UNSC mandates, see Ziemath (2016).

24 Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: <[https://www.gov.br/mre/en/subjects/international-peace-and-security/maintenance-and-consolidation-of-peace/brazil-and-the-united-nations-security-council?set\\_language=en](https://www.gov.br/mre/en/subjects/international-peace-and-security/maintenance-and-consolidation-of-peace/brazil-and-the-united-nations-security-council?set_language=en)>. Accessed on: 26 Jun. 2024.

The Rules of Procedure stipulate that the presidency of the Council is held by one member each month, in alphabetical order in English. The country holding the presidency is responsible for presenting and approving the monthly program of work, as well as conducting meetings, organizing lists of speakers, drafting and approving press statements, negotiating resolutions, among other delicate protocol and substantive functions. The country holding the presidency also convenes a debate on a topic of its choice, usually open to non-UNSC members.<sup>25</sup>

The choice of topic for the open debate shows the priority given by a country — even more so in the case of elected members, given that they only hold the presidency once or maximum twice during a term and that each candidacy for the UNSC represents a huge political and diplomatic effort. In the coming chapters, we will acknowledge the importance of Namibia having chosen the topic of Women, Peace and Security for the first time for the open debate of its presidency in October 2000.

From this work's perspective, the Security Council's responsibilities for peacekeeping and peacebuilding are of particular importance. Peacekeeping operations, which are related to the first of these responsibilities, are presented below, followed by special political missions, which are usually carried out in support of the second.

## 1.2. UN peacekeeping operations<sup>26</sup>

Peacekeeping operations have become one of the main tools available to the community of nations in the area of peace and international security, hence the fact that increasing the participation of women in such missions is easily recognized as an objective of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. In November 2020, there were almost 95,000 individuals serving in 13 peacekeeping missions, of which 69,000 were military personnel (5.4 percent women), 9,000 were police officers (15.1 percent

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25 Despite Rule of Procedure n. 28 stipulating that the UNSC shall meet "in public", in actuality closed meetings happen much more often than open sessions.

26 In this work, the terms "peacekeeping operation" and "peacekeeping mission" will be used interchangeably.



women), and more than 16,000 were civilians (percentage unavailable), of 121 nationalities.<sup>27</sup>

However, peacekeeping missions were not created by the United Nations Charter. At the time of the UN's creation, the ambition was to establish an international army permanently at the disposal of the Organization, but this never came to pass. Instead, the missions are made up of personnel and military resources lent by Member States. Since the very first missions deployed by the UN to oversee peace agreements, the practice of selecting countries that are not permanent members of the UNSC has been established, in order to seek balance and impartiality in the action on the ground (Uziel, 2015). To date, countries without permanent representation on the UNSC have topped the list of the largest troop contributors, although China has been on the rise.<sup>28</sup>

Each peacekeeping operation receives a unique mandate from the Security Council, renewed every six months or annually. Since the adoption of Resolution 2086 (2013), it has been agreed to call the ambitions of current UN peacekeeping missions “multidimensional,” as they aim both to monitor peace agreements and to build domestic conditions for lasting peace (peacekeepers as early peacebuilders).

The peacekeeping missions being carried out by the UN in 2020 were: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO); United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan (UNDOF); United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Darfur (UNAMID); United Nations Disengagement Observer Force [Golan] (UNDOF); United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); United

27 Source: DPO/UN. Available at: <<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>>. Accessed on: 30 Aug. 2023.

28 In November 2020, China was 9th on the list, France 21st, the UK 46th, Russia 70th, and the US80th.

Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

The following missions, although subordinate to the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and mandated by the UNSC, do not fit the definition of multidimensional operations. These are United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP); and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [Middle East] (UNTSO).

The highest authority in a peacekeeping operation is the Special Representative appointed by the UNSG or the UNSC.<sup>29</sup> The missions have three components: military, police and civilian. The military component is usually led by a general-rank officer, called Force Commander. The police component has its own leadership (Commissioners/Chiefs of Police). The civilians who work in peacekeeping missions can be provided by Member States (judicial experts, electoral experts, prison officers who directly support the execution of mandates) or hired directly by the UN for technical activities (health, communications, administration) at Headquarters. Members of UN peacekeeping missions are called “blue helmets,” in reference to the color of the head covering worn on the ground.<sup>30</sup>

The contemporary mandates given by the UNSC to peacekeeping missions include some standard areas of action, such as: facilitation of the political process; rule of law and transitional justice; protection of civilians; disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants (known by the acronym DDR); support for the organization of elections; protection and promotion of human rights; security sector reform (SSR); protection of civilians; sexual and gender-based violence; the prison system; demining; administrative functions (budget, logistical support and training); communication and public information; and information analysis.

Various specialized UN agencies work around peacekeeping operations, as well as humanitarian aid organizations (Red Cross,

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29 In the case of UNAMID, as it is a joint mission with the African Union, the title is Joint Special Representative.

30 They are also called *peacekeepers*.

Doctors Without Borders). Peacekeeping mission personnel take part in various activities together with these agencies and organizations, in a collaboration known as civil-military coordination (CIMIC), through which the mission guarantees access to refugees, internally displaced people and the local population at risk of violence.<sup>31</sup>

Troop and police contributing countries can provide personnel in two ways: formed military and police units (contingents), or individual missions — observers and staff officers for the military, and Individual Police Officers for the police. In the case of formed units, prior negotiation of a bilateral memorandum of understanding is mandatory, which stipulates the administrative and logistical responsibilities of the Headquarters, the mission itself and the contributing country. The negotiation is based on the Statement of Unit Requirement, provided by the United Nations, which contains the desired size, organization and military resources.

The memorandum of understanding usually covers, among other points, the reimbursement due by the UN for the use and wear and tear of the country's military equipment; the jurisdiction applicable in the event of offenses committed by its agents on the host country's territory; and caveats — restrictions imposed by the country on the use of its human or material resources. Caveats have been considered an obstacle to the performance of peacekeeping missions, as they limit the authority of Force Commanders. On the other hand, these restrictions imposed by T/PCCs on the use of their personnel also express their intention to “prevent their troops from being [...] victims of interventions masquerading as peace operations.”<sup>32</sup>

In the case of individual missions, the selected soldiers and police officers sign a personal labour contract with the UN, subject to the governments proving conditions such as prior training and the absence of a criminal record, including sexual offenses. Whether in formed units or

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31 The mandates of peacekeeping missions do not usually include the direct provision of humanitarian assistance, but, in reality, the blue helmets take on tasks that could be classified as such, especially in emergencies. This was the case with the Brazilian battalion in MINUSTAH during the earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010 and when Hurricane Matthew hit the country in 2016.

32 Cable 573 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 19 March 2007 quoted in Neves, 2010, 19.

on individual missions, military and police personnel assigned by member countries to the UN continue to receive their national salary, plus per diems called Mission Subsistence Allowance, paid by the United Nations.

Negotiations on peacekeeping mission mandates at the UNSC and bilateral memoranda on the use of countries' military resources are lengthy processes. The delay led to criticism of the Organization during the genocides in Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia the following year, which resulted in the creation of the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) in 2015. This arrangement enables the Security Council to respond swiftly to humanitarian emergencies through pledges of military resources that member countries register on an electronic portal and make available to the UN.<sup>33</sup>

With regard to the current theaters of operation of UN peacekeeping missions, there is firstly a concentration of these forces in African countries: seven are located on the African continent. Secondly, the UN mostly operates on the outskirts of cities, which means that military personnel have direct and constant contact with the civilian population, a responsibility they generally do not have in their countries of origin.

A third characteristic of current peace mission scenarios is their expanding use in the context of ongoing conflicts. Defended under the international community's responsibility to protect the civilian population from massacres like those of the 1990s, military actions conducted in the absence of a peace agreement constitute peace enforcement — and greatly increase the risks to which the blue helmets are subjected (Figueirôa, 2018). In such scenarios, it becomes very difficult to avoid the perception among the local population that the United Nations is acting in favor of one of the parties to the conflict.

Historically, peacekeeping missions have been guided by the principles of impartiality, consent of the parties and the use of force limited to the self-defense of the troops and the defense of the mandate. The troops provided by member countries guarantee respect for the peace

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33 The PCRS is structured into four levels of readiness, according to the DPO's criteria and checks. At the last level (Rapid Deployment), the resources offered by member countries are available within 60 days of a request from the Secretary-General.

agreement (or ceasefire) and ensure that the measures agreed by the warring parties are implemented (Neves, 2010). However, UN practice in recent years has eroded these principles.

On August 23, 2018, the UNGA approved Resolution A/RES/72/262C, which reforms the peace and security architecture. According to the restructuring, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), created in 1993, was renamed the Department of Peace Operations.<sup>34</sup> The change in nomenclature denotes a shift in favor of the view that peace will not necessarily be maintained when UN troops are employed.

In this regard, Neves (2010) notes that the proposal had been submitted to the UNGA in 2007, when it was rejected. The author comments on the reasons for the change:

What at first glance could represent an evolution towards a more comprehensive and less militaristic vision, actually contains the opposite intention, of merging the concepts of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement and disguising the use of force, making the requirement for the consent of the parties less rigorous, as well as improving the image of military interventions for the consumption of domestic public opinion (media, parliaments).<sup>35</sup>

The growing number of attacks suffered by the UN in recent years, including fatal ones,<sup>36</sup> prompted the drafting of the Cruz Report on the security of peacekeeping missions in 2017.<sup>37</sup> Coordinated by Brazilian reserve general Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, former commander of the Brazilian Battalion in Haiti and former force commander of MONUSCO, the report lists a series of proposals aimed at strengthening the security

34 The DPO is responsible for drawing up guidelines and reports, negotiating agreements for the use of the armed forces of Member States in missions, accrediting specialized training centers, managing staff vacancies and rotations, and ensuring that the mandates of peacekeeping missions are fulfilled. Military and police personnel from member countries can be assigned, in addition to peacekeeping missions, to positions in the DPO or the Police Division (UNPOL) at UN Headquarters in New York.

35 Neves 2010, 19. Like other troop-contributing countries, Brazil's diplomatic practice is to use "peacekeeping" as a sign of its commitment to the basic principles of these operations and to the safety of its personnel.

36 Source: DPO/UN. Available at: <<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>>. Accessed on: 17 Aug. 2023.

37 DPO/UN. Available at: <[https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving\\_security\\_of\\_united\\_nations\\_peacekeepers\\_report.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf)>. Accessed on: 10 Dec. 2020.

of missions, with an emphasis on preparing troops and authorizing the use of force in response to attacks. It fails, however, to recognize the importance of impartiality and credibility for UN security on the ground, such as the attack on UN facilities in Baghdad in 2003 (Garcia, 2013, 93).

On the other hand, in 2015, the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (known by its acronym HIPPO)<sup>38</sup> issued recommendations that emphasized the primacy of politics. It recognized that peacekeeping operations are instruments available for primarily political, rather than military, solutions to international conflicts. It also advocated more “flexibility” for missions on the ground, suggested approving sequenced mandates in different “phases” of multidimensional missions,<sup>39</sup> advocated establishing partnerships with regional organizations and favored the adoption of a people-centered approach, in which women blue helmets could make a particular contribution.

Brazil has participated in UN peacekeeping missions since 1948 (Fontoura, 2011). From a pragmatic point of view, the decision to sustain the contribution of uniformed personnel<sup>40</sup> over the course of 70 years is consistent with Brazil’s ambition for a permanent seat on the UNSC and has contributed to the ten times the country has been elected a non-permanent member of the Council.<sup>41</sup> Brazil’s contribution is also aimed at continuously influencing conceptual debates and the development of doctrines on peace and international security (Uziel, 2006), in line with the country’s economic, geographical and population dimensions, which

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38 Available at: <[https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2015\\_446.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_446.pdf)>. Accessed on: 20 Jun. 2024.

39 For the Independent Panel, this would be a reason for the UN to adopt “peace operations” instead of peacekeeping operations, which ended up being reflected in the change of name of the respective department.

40 The term refers to military and police personnel. Brazilian civilians, selected directly by the UN, also take part in peacekeeping and political missions. However, the government’s knowledge of their contribution is very limited (see section 5.2).

41 Article 23 of the United Nations Charter establishes two criteria for the election of non-permanent members of the UNSC: the contribution of Member States to the maintenance of peace and the other purposes of the Organization, and equitable geographical distribution (from which the election by regional groups derives).

give it credentials as a middle power despite its relatively low military power.

One aspect worth mentioning in this context is the jurisdiction applicable to Brazilian military personnel serving in the UN. Firstly, it should be emphasized that the national legal system, in recognition of the Security Council's competence with regard to international peace and security (Article 24 of the Charter), conditions the participation of Brazilian military personnel in international operations on a mandate granted by the UNSC. Once this requirement is met, under the principle of extraterritoriality, Brazilian military personnel are subject to Brazilian military justice. This is a primary condition for negotiating memoranda of understanding when there is a deployment of Brazilian units, and is directly related to Brazil's response to sexual abuse and exploitation, which will be detailed in section 5.4.

It is also worth pointing out that, in the case of Brazil, the deployment of military contingents needs to be analyzed and approved by the National Congress, which makes the timeframe for meeting the UN's needs even longer. This is one of the reasons why Brazil joined the PCRS<sup>42</sup>. Brazil also supports the Light Coordination Mechanism initiative provided for in the A4P Declaration of Shared Commitments.

### 1.3. Special political missions

The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) manages the political missions developed by the UN for conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding. Similar to peacekeeping missions, political missions are led by Representatives or Envoys of the Secretary-General, but unlike the former, they do not have military components, although they can host military observers on individual missions. In their task of supporting political transitions, the staff of these missions work

42 In this respect, Fontoura (1999) records that in 1993, members of the DPKO made a technical visit to Brazil to introduce the Armed Forces to the model that had been conceived at the time for ready-to-use arrangements, structured in categories of mobilization times that were unfeasible for Brazil (7 days; 14 days; and up to 30 days). It was only in 1997, when the DKPO revised these categories (up to 30 days; between 30 and 60 days; and more than 90 days), that Brazil began to encourage the possibility of participating in these arrangements (242).

in coordination with national actors and humanitarian and development agencies.

The political missions as of December 2020 are as follows: United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH); United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS); United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA); United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (UNVMC); United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI); United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL); United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM); United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS); United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA); United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA); United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS); and United Nations Regional Center For Preventive Diplomacy For Central Asia (UNRCCA).<sup>43</sup>

In addition to these representations, the DPPA, in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has developed the “Joint UNDP-DPPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention,” through which it sends “peace and development advisors” to more than 60 member countries, with the aim of helping governments respond to the root causes of conflicts and prevent them. Since 2020, in fulfillment of Resolution 2493(2019), part of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, the DPPA has held high-level strategic meetings to promote inclusive peace processes.<sup>44</sup>

Brazil believes that the transition from peacekeeping operations to political missions and the closure of the latter must be well planned, i.e. carried out in such a way as to consolidate the gains made by the presence of UN troops. Withdrawals made without guaranteeing the safety of the local population can result in a recurrence of the conflict, with sometimes dramatic effects for the female population. This was the

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43 Also considered political missions are the offices of the UNSG Special Envoys and Regional Counsellors for: Bolivia, Burundi, Horn of Africa, Cyprus, Great Lakes region, Yemen, Myanmar, Mozambique, Western Sahara, Syria, African Union, and also for the mission for the implementation of Resolution 1559 (2004) on the elections in Lebanon, the Middle East Peace Process and the Geneva International Discussions on the situation in Georgia. Source: DPPA.

44 Document S/2020/946.



position defended by Brazil on the UNSC decision to end UNIOGBIS activities as of December 31, 2020.<sup>45</sup>

At the moment, there are no Brazilian civil servants on political missions. Civilians hired directly by the DPPA, without government intermediation, work at the Headquarters in New York and on missions in the field. The results of interviews with some of these officials will be reported in sections 5.2, 5.5 and 6.2.

#### **1.4. Sanctions committees**

Based on Chapter VII, Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter, the UNSC has the prerogative to adopt measures which, without involving the use of armed force, make its decisions effective. Called “sanctions,” these measures apply to states, groups and individuals, and are intended to support efforts to: i) resolve a conflict politically (Libya, among other examples); ii) nuclear non-proliferation (North Korea); and iii) combat terrorism (Da’esh, Al-Qaeda and associates, and the Taliban). The sanctions determined by the UNSC are mandatory for UN Member States, with the possibility of international liability in the event of disobedience.

Historically, sanctions have taken the form of complete or partial interruption of economic relations, and of communication by rail, sea, air, post, telegraph and radio. Nowadays, the most common type of sanction adopted against governments is the arms embargo. In some cases, there are also embargoes on trade in commodities, sensitive goods and luxury goods, among others. Against individuals, the most common sanctions are the freezing of financial assets and travel restrictions.

In order to manage the application of sanctions relating to a specific situation (what is known as a “regime”), the UNSC creates Sanctions Committees made up of the fifteen states with a seat on the UNSC and chaired by a non-permanent member. In 2020, there were 14 active sanctions committees, relating to the following situations (in order of seniority): Somalia; Da’esh, Al-Qaeda and associates; Iraq; Democratic

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<sup>45</sup> Cable 554 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 3 March 2020.

Republic of Congo (DRC); Sudan; Lebanon; Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Libya; Taliban; Guinea-Bissau; Central African Republic; Yemen; South Sudan; and Mali.

The regimes vary greatly in terms of the scope of sanctions measures, the existence and length of the list of individuals and entities subject to these measures, among other characteristics. As in the case of peacekeeping operations, the mandate and validity of sanctions regimes are periodically reviewed by the UNSC. In addition, 10 of the 14 committees are supported by Panels of Experts that monitor sanctions.

In principle, Brazil has reservations about the punitive role of sanctions committees because they do not offer listed individuals the broad opportunities for defense provided for in criminal law, and are subject to political conditioning (Baumbach, 2014; Ghisleni, 2011). This concern, shared by several countries, led to intergovernmental processes to reflect on the implementation challenges and results of UNSC sanctions (e.g. Stockholm Process — 2002 and Kimberly Process — 2003), in which Brazil participated.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, the country supports the inclusion of sexual offenses as a designation criterion for the listing of armed individuals and groups, a discussion that will be taken up in section 5.4.

### **1.5. The Peacebuilding Commission**

Created in 2005 with the active participation of Brazil, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is the only UNSC subsidiary body that also reports to the General Assembly. The Commission's Organizational Committee is made up of 24 countries, according to the following criteria: seven members elected by the Security Council and seven by ECOSOC for biannual terms, as well as the five largest troop contributors and the five countries with the largest contribution to the mandatory budget.

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<sup>46</sup> As a result of the debate on effectiveness and transparency in the imposition of sanctions, in 2006 the UNSC created the Focal Point for De-listing, which is responsible for evaluating requests for exclusion from the list of sanctioned parties directly from listed individuals and entities. In 2009, the Council also created the Office of the Ombudsperson, which works on the regime relating to Da'esh, Al-Qaeda and associates. The lists of sanctioned individuals and organizations are now amended by consensus decision of the fifteen Member States of each committee. Within the rules applicable to some committees, external actors can demand the inclusion or exclusion of an individual or entity, and update the data relating to the individual or entity listed.

The Committee sets the agenda for the Commission, which works in plenary meetings and in country-specific configurations, created each time the Commission identifies that a country is at risk of conflict. The country configurations are attended, in addition to the members of the Committee: the country under consideration; countries in the region involved in the efforts; the largest contributors of troops and police; financial donors, including international financial institutions; and representatives of UN agencies.

The advent of the PBC can be traced back to the need to respond to the recurrence of conflicts where the UN had been active (Angola, Somalia, Rwanda). Developing countries, including Brazil, argued that the resurgence of these conflicts was due to the neglect of the root causes of each one:

For Brazil, the Peacebuilding Commission represents confirmation of the principle of interdependence between development and peace; the realization that, in the absence of systemic action to build the social and economic foundations that lead to development, peace cannot be sustained in countries emerging from conflicts or tending to experience them. (Neves, 2010, 10)

Brazil has been elected for successive biannual terms since the creation of the PBC. In addition, it has chaired the Guinea-Bissau configuration since the country joined the body's agenda in December 2007. Brazil held the presidency of the PBC in 2014, when it promoted the participation of developing countries and African regional and sub-regional organizations in its activities, as well as a coordinated approach to conflict prevention and resolution. It believes that the Commission should advise the UNSC, particularly on mandate renewals and the closure of peacekeeping operations and political missions. The country also supports partnerships with international institutions, such as the World Bank, in order to guarantee adequate technical and financial support for peacebuilding in the countries of specific configurations and to contribute to the coherence of international support for these countries.

The Commission has a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), fueled by voluntary contributions. The term “peacebuilding architecture” has been used to describe these organizations. The Fund, created in 2006 to finance long-term support for political and development processes in countries in conflict or emerging from conflict, currently supports more than 200 projects in 34 countries.<sup>47</sup> From 2007 to 2015, Brazilian representatives were part of the PBF’s Independent Advisory Group, responsible for overseeing the Fund’s programs. Brazil’s participation influenced project modeling, countering the tendency of large financial donors to focus on the area of security, to the detriment of promoting socio-economic development, as well as limiting efforts to build the capacity of national actors and not involving local governments in project definition.

In 2015, in the context of the tenth anniversary of the creation of the PBC, twin UNGA resolutions 70/262 (2016) and 2282 (2016) of the UNSC were adopted, establishing the concept of “sustaining peace,” defined as a set of activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflicts. It involves, among other measures, the promotion of sustainable development; poverty eradication; national reconciliation and inclusive dialogue; access to justice; the promotion of equality between women and men; and coordination between UN bodies.

Brazil is a member of the Group of Friends of Sustaining Peace.<sup>48</sup> It argues that the concept, synonymous with lasting peace, should be applied across the board and enable complementarity between the three pillars of the United Nations (peace and security, sustainable development and human rights), without slipping into the subordination of one pillar to another, or into the securitization of development or human rights issues. In this context, it favors respect for national ownership and the strengthening of countries’ capacities.

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47 Countries on the PBC agenda are eligible to receive financing from the Fund. Countries that are not on the Commission’s agenda depend on authorization from the UN Secretary-General.

48 The “groups of friends” have emerged in the context of the specialization of the UNSC’s work agenda over the last 25 years. These groupings allow for the participation of countries that are not represented on the Council, with a particular interest in the topics they address, based on Articles 31 and 32 of the United Nations Charter. On this subject, see Pontes, 2018, 165-173, 250-253.

Sustaining peace is linked to the Women, Peace and Security agenda in that it recognizes the relevance of the female population in reconciliation, conflict prevention and economic revitalization. Based on the mandate of the twin resolutions and Resolution 2242(2015), in 2016 the PBC adopted a gender strategy, becoming the first UN intergovernmental body to do so. The document defines seven priority areas for action for the greater participation and leadership of women in peacebuilding, and recognizes the substantive link between the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and the efficiency and durability of these efforts.<sup>49</sup> The link between the WPS agenda and peacebuilding will be examined again in sections 5.5 and 6.2.

Having presented the organization of the work, its theoretical framework and the UN structures dealing with the subject, we move on to the historical process that gave rise to the UN Security Council's Women, Peace and Security agenda.

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49 Available at: <[https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/07092016-\\_pbc\\_gender\\_strategy\\_final\\_1.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/07092016-_pbc_gender_strategy_final_1.pdf)>. Accessed on: 14 June 2022.



## Chapter 2

# Historical background: from the San Francisco Conference to the Security Council

Prior to the creation of the UN and even of the League of Nations, women affected by wars denounced the irrationality of the military method of conflict resolution. Exhausted from caring for and supporting the wounded, orphaned children, disabled people and the elderly,<sup>50</sup> or from being raped and enslaved by enemy troops, women have served throughout history as a symbol of the disaster that comes from war, as exemplified by the establishment of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom in 1915 — an organization that is still active, best known under the acronym WILPF (Kirby and Sheperd, 2016).

The League, made up of women from both the defeated and victorious countries in World War I, even issued a manifesto against the Versailles agreement, warning against the risk of it precipitating further conflict. The manifesto, signed by more than a thousand European women, was ignored. By the mid-1920s, WILPF had more than 50,000 members in 40 countries. In the 1990s, it became one of the main civil society organizations advocating for UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) (Duncanson, 2018, 51).

However, while until the beginning of the last century women appeared purely as victims of wars fought by men, World War II changed this scenario. With the recruitment of women by various countries, the issues of direct interest to the female population regarding war and peace expanded markedly. Issues such as the recognition awarded to veterans of each sex, as well as the possibility that women's actions in the theater of operations might have different effects from those caused by their male

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50 Another striking effect of the great wars of the last century was the massive use of female labor in factories, including arms factories, in the absence of men. This economic plight, a direct result of the war, would have definitive consequences for the emancipation of women.

counterparts, whether on the local population or on fellow soldiers in the trenches, also came to be discussed.

The post-war period raised a new concern: the future of human existence, as it was now jeopardized by nuclear weapons. The destructive power of the bombs detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the arms race that followed gave women definitive reason to demand participation in decisions that impact the exercise of the right to life — their own and that of those to whom they give birth and serve as primary caregivers.<sup>51</sup>

The Security Council's Women, Peace and Security agenda therefore represents the culmination of a long process of social and political mobilization in favor of including the views of the female half of the population in decisions on peace and war. This chapter focuses on progress on the topic from the creation of the United Nations Organization to the Security Council in 2000.

## **2.1. Women's participation in the creation of the United Nations**

The text of the United Nations Charter, finalized during the 1945 San Francisco Conference, enshrines equality between women and men in its preamble, right after the reference to the scourge of war: "We the peoples of the United Nations determined [...] to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small". The story of how this language came to be included in the Charter is little known, with a Brazilian woman — Bertha Lutz — as its main character.

The San Francisco Conference was attended by six plenipotentiary delegates out of a total of 160 — 3.75 percent of the total. Virginia Gildersleeve, from the USA; Wu Yi-fang, from China; Minerva Bernardino, from the Dominican Republic; and Bertha Lutz were the only women to sign the text of the Charter. In her memoirs, Bertha Lutz noted that the delegates from Canada, Cora Caselman, and Uruguay, Senator Isabel de

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51 According to data collected by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 2018, women are responsible for more than 76 percent of unpaid domestic work in all regions of the world. Available at: <<https://www.ilo.org/media/415041/download>>. Accessed on: 18 Aug. 2023.



Vidal, had already left San Francisco by the time of the signing ceremony on June 26, 1945.

Out of the 50 countries represented in San Francisco, only 30 granted women the right to vote (Dietrichson and Sator, 2017). Her contact with England's suffragist movement during her education in Europe led Bertha Lutz, daughter of British Amy Fowler and Brazilian of Swiss descent researcher Adolfo Lutz, to begin her political career. Upon returning to Brazil in 1922, Bertha Lutz founded the Brazilian Federation for Women's Progress. In 1933, the year after women's suffrage was introduced in the country, she ran for a seat in the 1934 National Constituent Assembly. She obtained enough votes to be a first alternate representative and took office as a member of the Federal Chamber of Deputies in July 1936, succeeding the deceased incumbent. In Parliament, she worked in favor of changes to legislation regarding paid work for women and minors, equal pay and a three-month paid maternity leave, among others. She also proposed the creation of a national department for women.

In 1922, in Baltimore, Bertha Lutz participated in the 1st Pan-American Conference of Women, where she, together with other delegates, advocated for what is now the permanent Inter-American Commission of Women, best known under its Spanish/Portuguese acronym CIM. In 1933, she was nominated as a technical advisor to the Brazilian delegation to the Seventh International Conference of American States in Montevideo, at the request of scientist Carlos Chagas, a plenipotentiary delegate. Two of Bertha Lutz's resolutions were approved in Uruguay: a) the commitment that, at subsequent conferences, governments would appoint women plenipotentiary delegates; and b) the restructuring of the Inter-American Commission of Women's mandate to incorporate the inspection of women's working conditions in the Americas (Marques, 2013).

According to Marques, Bertha Lutz saw participation in international events as an opportunity to forge alliances with foreign partners, to gain visibility in the press and, at the same time, to establish a diplomatic discussion agenda through which she aimed to persuade the Brazilian political establishment to pass egalitarian laws. Bertha Lutz was, therefore, keenly aware of the role that women played in foreign policy, in line

with the agenda that would be adopted by the UN Security Council more than half a century later. Lutz expressed her disapproval of two reforms carried out by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1931 and 1938. In both cases, she felt that the decisions threatened the interests of the women in the institution.

In 1931, the career of Secretariat of State Officer was extinguished. The men in this career would be absorbed into the “diplomatic corps” or the “consular corps,” according to their seniority. The four women who belonged to the extinct career were obligatorily incorporated into the new, less prestigious “consular corps”. On behalf of the Federation she founded, Bertha Lutz wrote to President Getúlio Vargas to complain about the “discriminatory” treatment of these women (Friaça, 2018, 99).

In early 1938, there were rumors that a new reform would hamper women’s access to Itamaraty. The Brazilian Federation for Women’s Progress once again addressed the Ministry, this time in a preventive manner. Then Minister of Foreign Affairs Oswaldo Aranha wrote a six-page letter in response to the Federation chaired by Bertha Lutz. In his letter, dated July 11, 1938, he confirmed the plan to unite the diplomatic and consular corps. He went on to claim that the appointment of women to posts abroad had been causing embarrassment for both Brazil and the countries of representation (Friaça, 2018, 147-149). Sure enough, Decree-Law 791 of October 14, 1938, in its Article 30, prohibited Brazilian women from entering the newly created career of diplomat. This ban would only be definitively lifted in 1954.

In 1936, representative Bertha Lutz, accompanied by six other congress members, sent a request to the board of the Federal Chamber in favor of a congratulatory vote on the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, due to begin in Buenos Aires in the following days. In a long speech on November 6, 1936, in line with the women’s peace movement of the time,<sup>52</sup> Bertha Lutz announced:

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52 In Brazil, Lutz’s Federation espoused the thesis, championed in the US by Jane Addams, founder of the Women’s Peace Party, that women had a natural role in favor of peace. Tickner (2001) recognizes that the women’s peace movement at the beginning of the 20th century spurred debate on the differentiated impact of armed conflicts upon the two sexes, the association of men with war, and of women with peace. Tickner considers this to have contributed to artificial dichotomies and to the devaluing of both women and peace (59).

Mr. President, of all the beautiful ideas that guide contemporary thought, the one most dear to well-formed female hearts is Peace [...] I really believe, Mr. President, that when women are truly integrated into the government of peoples, war will be definitively placed outside the law.<sup>53</sup>

Bertha Lutz managed to be included in the Brazilian delegation to the San Francisco Conference largely due to the personal relationship she had forged with President Getúlio Vargas over the previous decade. During the 1934 Constituent Assembly, her Federation had acted strongly in favor of legal equality in that constitutional text (Marques, 2017). On the occasion of the adoption of the Constitution, on July 6, 1934, the Brazilian Federation for Women's Progress thanked the president for recognizing women's suffrage, for banning different wages on grounds of sex and for vetoing the incorporation of women into unhealthy industries (Friaça, 2018). In 1944, before being appointed to San Francisco, Bertha Lutz represented Brazil at the International Labor Conference in Philadelphia.

While in San Francisco, Bertha Lutz made use of all the experience she had amassed as a lobbyist, member of parliament and Brazilian delegate to previous international conferences. She negotiated the text of Article 8 of the United Nations Charter, on unhindered access for women and men to functions in the Secretariat and other UN bodies. In this endeavor, she had the support of the representatives of Australia and Mexico (alternate delegates), as well as the representatives of Uruguay and the Dominican Republic, with whom she also managed to include the "sex" factor among the forms of discrimination that the UN should combat. In her memoirs, written in English, now part of the collection of the Women's Library in London, Bertha Lutz recorded:

Article 8 is a Latin American contribution to the constitution of the world. It was written by the women of the Delegations of Uruguay, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and of Mexico, presented by Senator Isabel de Vidal of

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53 Source: Bertha Lutz Virtual Museum. Available at: <<http://lhs.unb.br/bertha/?p=1491>>. Accessed on: 18 Aug. 2023.

Uruguay [...]. It is not a mere indication of the rights of women, though I am a firm believer in such rights. It is more than this. The women Delegates to the Conference are the forerunners of women's contributions to world affairs. (Permanent Missions of Qatar and Colombia to the United Nations, 2018, 35)

The book *HERstory: Celebrating Women Leaders in the United Nations*, as well as Vargas (in Fontoura, Moraes and Uziel, 2015), also record that Bertha Lutz, on behalf of Brazil, presented a declaration to the committee negotiating the terms of UN's economic and social cooperation requesting the creation of a commission in charge of the situation of women. Among the topics to be studied were the deprivation of rights (political rights, for instance) and the collaboration of women in peace and security issues. The Brazilian proposal became a reality in 1946, with the creation of the Commission on the Status of Women — CSW — under UN's ECOSOC, in operation ever since.

Documentation retrieved by researchers Elise Dietrichson and Fatima Sator from the UN archives attests that, during her participation in the San Francisco Conference, Bertha Lutz was confronted by the US delegate, who advised against any “requests” for women in the negotiation of the text — which she considered “too vulgar”. In her response, Bertha Lutz informed her US colleague that the Brazilian government had included her in the delegation precisely to defend women's rights.<sup>54</sup>

Convinced that the “Constitution of the world” should unequivocally affirm the equality of women and men, Bertha Lutz fought resistance, even from representatives of developed countries, to insert the aforementioned paragraph in the Charter's preamble. In defense of this language, which was met with opposition, she argued that it was essential to include women in the pursuit of international peace.<sup>55</sup> It is noteworthy that during the creation of the UN, a Brazilian delegate sowed the seeds

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54 Available at: <<https://antigo.funag.gov.br/index.php/pt-br/2015-02-12-19-38-42/2303-funag-promove-palestra-about-bertha-lutz-and-women-s-rights-in-the-u-letter>>. Accessed on: 14 June 2022.

55 The sentence that captions this work is part of Bertha Lutz's speech during the 4th Meeting of the 1st Commission of the San Francisco Conference, on June 19, 1945, a week before the signing of the United Nations Charter. Source: United Nations Conference on International Organization 1945, vol. VI, 163-181.

of the underlying concept of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). It is thus clear that Brazil had a pioneering role in the historical process of building the current Women, Peace and Security agenda.

In 2020, on the 75th anniversary of the organization that Bertha Lutz helped structure, the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration<sup>56</sup> listing the very equality that those delegates who antagonized her in San Francisco considered a given as a priority for the future of the UN:

We will place women and girls at the center. Conflicts will not be resolved, and sustainable development will not occur, without the equal and active participation of women at all levels. [...] Persistent gender inequalities and abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence, have deprived us of a more just and better world.

In 2016, Bertha Lutz earned recognition from Brazil's Chamber of Deputies as the highlight of the exhibition "*Oh, Igualdade! Por que tardas? — Mulheres em busca da igualdade política no Brasil*" [Oh, Equality! Why are You Late? — Women in Search of Political Equality in Brazil]. At a side-event in the opening of the exhibition, on November 9, 2016, a book on her profile was launched, written by historian Teresa Cristina de Novaes Marques. In 2018, the documentary collection "*Feminismo, ciência e política — o legado Bertha Lutz 1881-1985*" [Feminism, Science and Politics — the Bertha Lutz Legacy 1881-1985], compiled by the Chamber of Deputies Archives, the National Archives, the Itamaraty Historical Archives, the Memory Center of Universidade Estadual de Campinas and the National Museum (partially destroyed by a fire that year), was included in the National Register of UNESCO's Memory of the World Programme.<sup>57</sup> In December 2021, the Brazilian government decided to submit the collection's application to UNESCO for inclusion in the Programme.<sup>58</sup> Finally, in 2023, Lutz's archives were included as a Memory of the World.<sup>59</sup>

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56 Document A/RES/75/1 (*The future we want, the United Nations we need*).

57 Cable 251 of 22 October 2018 to the Permanent Delegation to UNESCO.

58 Cable 361 of 02 December 2021 to the Permanent Delegation to UNESCO.

59 Available at: <<https://www.unesco.org/en/memory-world/register2023>>. Accessed on: 8 May 2024.

## 2.2. World Conferences on Women

Over the course of two decades, the UN organized four world conferences on women's rights, during which governments and civil society debated ways to achieve gender equality. Held in Mexico City in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985 and Beijing in 1995, the four World Conferences on Women included discussions on peace, disarmament, sexual violence as a weapon of war, political participation and other topics that now belong to the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

In 1969, shortly before the first of such conferences, the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) addressed the special protection for women and children during armed conflicts. This session of the CSW influenced the progress of the global debate on women and armed conflict and contributed to the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 of a declaration entitled "Protection of Women and Children in Emergencies and Armed Conflicts". It was the first high-level document issued by the UN focusing on the particular effect of armed conflicts on women.

The UN declared 1975 "International Women's Year." In this context, the First World Conference on Women was held in Mexico City. Although it did not specifically deal with the relation between women and armed conflicts, the Conference led to the drafting and adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The impact of the Convention and its committee on the Women, Peace and Security agenda will be examined in greater detail in section 3.2 below.

For her distinguished work at the San Francisco Conference, Bertha Lutz was once again invited to be part of the Brazilian delegation to the Women's Conference in Mexico. As for Brazilian civil society, Ferreira and Bonan (2005) report that the International Women's Year celebrations spurred a wave of women's activism across Brazil: "From all over the country, women's groups organized self-knowledge workshops, promoted debates, held street demonstrations, made complaints, published

alternative newspapers and carried out research” (Ferreira and Bonan, 2005, 29).

Held in 1980 in Copenhagen, the Second World Conference, officially entitled “World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace,” was marked by political discussion around the CEDAW Convention, the signing ceremony of which took place during the opening of the event. UN Women registered the participation of 145 Member States. The Brazilian delegation to the Copenhagen Conference was headed by Ambassador Maria de Lourdes Costa e Silva de Vincenzi, the third Brazilian woman to reach the top of the diplomatic career (Friaça, 2018). The outcome document of the Second Conference was an action plan on employment, property and inheritance rights, child custody and nationality.

The Third World Conference on Women, entitled “World Conference to review and appraise the achievements of the United Nations Decade,” took place in Nairobi in 1985, with 1,900 delegates from 157 countries, as well as 12,000 representatives of civil society. The outcome document, “Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women,”<sup>60</sup> includes a chapter on peace, with an analysis of obstacles and measures to make women’s participation in peace and security issues more effective.

The Fourth World Conference on Women, “Action for Equality, Development and Peace,” held in Beijing in December 1995, was the largest and most participatory event ever organized by the United Nations (Nicodemos 2005). It brought together around 17,000 attendees, including representatives from 189 Member States and UN observers, NGO members and journalists. The Brazilian delegation, headed by Dr Ruth Cardoso, was made up of diplomats, representatives from the Presidency of the Republic, the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministries of Justice, Health, Social Security and the Environment, as well as nine members of the National Council for Women’s Rights and thirteen observing members of parliament.<sup>61</sup>

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60 Document A/CONF.116/28/Rev. Available at: <<https://undocs.org/en/A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1>>. Accessed on: 22 Aug. 2023.

61 Cable es 830 of 11 August 1995 and 923 of 28 August 1995 to the Embassy in Beijing.

Brazilian civil society prepared in advance for Beijing. According to Ferreira and Bonan (2005), in June 1995, the Brazilian Women's Articulation held a preparatory meeting, "*Conferência Nacional de Mulheres Brasileiras Rumo a Beijing*" [National Conference of Brazilian Women Towards Beijing] which brought together 651 participants from 24 states. As a result, the "Brazilian Women's Document" contained a "diagnosis of the situation of women and proposals" that were shared with the government. According to the authors, almost 500 Brazilian women travelled to Beijing to take part in the NGO Forum. They also note that "a representative of the Articulation was part of the official Brazilian delegation to Beijing."<sup>62</sup> Diplomatic cables register the participation of "around 300 Brazilian women" in the NGO Forum, of which "40 to 45 would also be accredited to take part in the official Conference".<sup>63</sup>

The Beijing Conference, as it is known, is part of the "Decade of Conferences" (1990-1999), during which several global events were organized to debate the consolidation of human rights, especially those then considered "second generation" rights, which today is called the sustainable development agenda. These were: the World Summit for Children, in 1990; the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio-92), in 1992; the Vienna Conference on Human Rights, in 1993; the Cairo Conference on Population and Development, in 1994; the World Summit for Social Development, in 1995; the Fourth World Conference on Women, in 1995; the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat-II), in 1996; and the World Food Summit, in 1996.<sup>64</sup>

As Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro points out in the forewords to the first edition of *A década das conferências* (Lindgren-Alves, 2001), the importance of these events is such that: "The declarations and action programs that emerged from each of these conferences constitute today

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62 Ferreira and Bonan, 2005, 108. Cable 923 to the Embassy in Beijing identifies Wania Jesus de Sant'Anna as AMB's representative.

63 Cable 726, to the Embassy in Beijing, 15 July 1995.

64 In Lindgren-Alves' (2001) opinion, the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban in 2001, should be added to the list.



a complementary reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to all international human rights law treaties.”

Nevertheless, some women in social movements before the UN conferences saw the Organization’s events as limiting the potential of their original demands. To these activists, the United Nations bureaucratized and depoliticized the women’s movement by selectively promoting agendas and forming alliances with certain governments and multinational corporations that sponsored its events (Federeci, 2019). In this regard, Lindgren-Alves points out:

While it is true that the documents resulting from the major meetings [...] appear inconsistent with the observed practices and far removed from the lived reality, they are nonetheless a legitimate reference point, in force and available to all those who wish to act to change this reality. They can and should therefore be applied, *even serving as a means of conflict prevention* (2001, 23, emphasis added).

### **2.3. The outcome documents of the Fourth World Conference on Women**

The Beijing Conference examined the necessary steps for women’s full exercise of autonomy and political participation — rights that were already enshrined in the CEDAW Convention — in the 21st century. Despite mishaps during the negotiations, Lindgren-Alves (2018, 261) evaluates that: “[...] the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women are today the fundamental cornerstone on which the struggle of women for the realization of their rights will be based in the coming years.” Along with 103 other countries, Brazil co-sponsored resolution A/50/L.46, adopted by the Third Committee of the UNGA, endorsing the Beijing outcome documents.<sup>65</sup>

The outcome documents of the Beijing Conference include the participation of women as victims of armed conflicts and as agents of peacebuilding. The Declaration enunciates the role of women in peace

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65 Cable 2487 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 22 December 1995.

in the following terms: “18. Local, national, regional and global peace is attainable and is inextricably linked with the advancement of women, who are a fundamental force for leadership, conflict resolution and the promotion of lasting peace at all levels.” Through the Declaration, countries commit to:

28. Take positive steps to ensure peace for the advancement of women and, recognizing the leading role that women have played in the peace movement, work actively towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and support negotiations on the conclusion, without delay, of a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which contributes to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects; [...]

33. Ensure respect for international law, including humanitarian law, in order to protect women and girls in particular.

The Beijing Platform for Action, in turn, lists twelve critical areas of concern for women in order to achieve gender equality in the 21st century, including “Women and armed conflict,” which comes in 5th place. This area gives rise to six strategic objectives, accompanied by suggested actions for governments, international and regional organizations, civil society and others. They are:

E1. Increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and protect women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign occupation;

E2. Reduce excessive military expenditures and control the availability of armaments;

E3. Promote non-violent forms of conflict resolution and reduce the incidence of human rights abuse in conflict situations;

- E4. Promote women's contribution to fostering a culture of peace;
- E5. Provide protection, assistance and training to refugee women, other displaced women in need of international protection and internally displaced women;
- E6. Provide assistance to the women of the colonies and non-self-governing territories.

The language adopted in Beijing in relation to the critical area of “women and armed conflict” leaves no doubt that the main custodian of such concerns is the UN Security Council — and not ECOSOC, the body that until then had concentrated discussions on the social empowerment of women. The six strategic objectives listed above are reflected in the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

It is worth noting that, while recognizing the difficulty of translating the Decade of Conferences into concrete solutions for the problems they addressed (Lindgren-Alves, 2001), at least as far as the Beijing Conference is concerned, the outcome documents did prompt the Security Council to adopt a body of resolutions directly related to the recommendations contained in them. Therefore, the Women, Peace and Security agenda is testimony to the importance of the multilateral conferences of the 1990s — also consolidated in the indivisibility and universal applicability of human rights.

#### **2.4. The path to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)**

In March 2000, the UN Security Council, under the presidency of Bangladesh, issued a press release on the occasion of International Women's Day (March 8) stating that “peace is inextricably linked to equality between women and men.”<sup>66</sup> In commending Beijing results, the communiqué emphasizes women's equal access to power structures as essential for maintaining and promoting peace. It mentions that women make up the majority of victims of sexual violence during conflicts, as well as the majority of refugees and internally displaced people, while being

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66 Document SC/6816; Ghisleni (2011, 148).

underrepresented in decision-making processes. The text concludes with a recommendation for an “active and visible” policy of mainstreaming the gender perspective in all responses to armed conflicts.

Earlier, the Bangladesh presidency had tried to negotiate a draft resolution on women’s participation in peace, which was met with resistance, especially from the P5 (Security Council Report, 2010). Nevertheless, with the support of Canada, Mali, Jamaica and Namibia, also elected members of the UNSC, Bangladesh managed to include language to this effect, for the first time in the Council’s history, in two presidential statements: “Maintaining peace and security: Humanitarian aspects of issues before the Security Council,” which notes the special situation of women and children, and “Maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace-building,”<sup>67</sup> which draws attention to the needs of women former combatants and the role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

In April, during Canada’s presidency, the UNSG’s Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Angela King, was invited to brief the Security Council on the situation of women under Taliban rule in Afghanistan. In June of that same year, the 23rd Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly was held, entitled “Women 2000: Gender equality, development and peace for the 21st century.” The Political Declaration adopted during the Special Session takes up the outcome documents from Beijing and establishes a commitment among Member States to build a world where women and men can enjoy equality, development and peace in the 21st century.<sup>68</sup>

In July, Jamaica convened an open debate on the prevention of armed conflicts and adopted a presidential statement recognizing the important role of women and stressing the importance of their greater participation in all aspects of conflict prevention and resolution.<sup>69</sup> In August, the Report of the UN Panel on Peace Operations, known as the Brahimi Report, was released in recognition of Lakhdar Brahimi, who

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67 Documents S/PRST/2000/7 and S/PRST/2000/10.

68 Document A/RES/S-23/2.

69 Document S/PRST/2000/25.

chaired the panel. In its recommendations for improving the leadership of peace missions, the Report suggests that the UN Secretary-General selects potential Special Representatives and force commanders “representing a broad geographic and equitable gender distribution.”<sup>70</sup> These are all important steps in the way to the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000).

In 2000, Namibia was an elected member of the UNSC, celebrating ten years of its independence from South Africa and the conclusion of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in that country, which left a legacy of equality between women and men for Namibian society. The large female presence in civilian posts in the mission (40 percent of the total) is said to have influenced the formation of the new country’s institutions and facilitated societal shifts regarding the status of women. (Lahoud, 2020).

In May, Namibia organized, in partnership with the then DPKO, an event entitled “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations,” in the context of the elaboration of the Brahimi Report. The event resulted in the adoption of the Windhoek Declaration and Action Plan. The Windhoek Declaration states:

In order to ensure the effectiveness of peace support operations, the principles of gender equity and equality must permeate the entire mission, at all levels, thus ensuring the participation of women and men as equal partners and beneficiaries in all aspects of the peace process, from peacekeeping, reconciliation and peacebuilding, towards a situation of political stability in which women and men play an equal part in the political, economic and social development of their country.

The Windhoek Action Plan contains extensive recommendations regarding the incorporation of women in nine areas of peace missions, namely: negotiations of peace agreements; mandate; leadership; planning, structure and resources; recruitment; training; procedures; monitoring, evaluation and accountability; and public awareness. A major achievement

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70 Document S/2000/809.

of the organizers was to have the outcome documents of the event circulated as UNSC documents (document S/2000/693).

In October 2000, Namibia held the monthly presidency of the Security Council. Initially, the Namibian government intended to dedicate the debate to women in peace missions. However, a civil society coalition that had been working on a resolution on women and armed conflict reached out to the country's Foreign Minister and convinced him to broaden the scope of the draft resolution.<sup>71</sup> Finally, the text obtained the support of a permanent member, the United Kingdom, which became the penholder of the item "Women, Peace and Security" on the Council's agenda.<sup>72</sup>

With the issue having attracted a great deal of interest from members during two days of open debate, Resolution 1325 was unanimously adopted at the 4213th session of the UNSC on 31 October 2000.<sup>73</sup> As Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, then Namibia's Minister for Women and now the country's Foreign Minister, recalls, civil society organizations, especially women's organizations, were crucial in overcoming the initial resistance of some Council members to the adoption of a thematic resolution on women and conflict. The Permanent Mission of Brazil, which was not represented in the Council at the time, reported that, from the Latin American and Caribbean Group, Guatemala took part in the open debate "largely because of the role of Guatemalan women in the peace process in that country [...]."<sup>74</sup>

Once adopted, Resolution 1325 had few critics — "[...] or, at least, few who would openly dispute its headline ambition: to achieve global gender equality."<sup>75</sup> In fact, the Mission of Brazil reported that:

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71 "[...] one that combined peacekeeping with conflict prevention, peacemaking, and post-conflict recovery." Anderlini in Davies and True (ed.), 2019, chap. 4.

72 For an assessment of the UNSC's system of leading countries by theme, see Pontes, 2018, 164-173.

73 Press release SC/6942.

74 Cable 2291 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 28 October 2000.

75 Kirby and Sheperd, 2016, 373. It is worth mentioning that the draft resolution on the follow-up to the Beijing Conference, in the Third Committee of the UNGA, adopted only on the last day of the meeting, due to the difficulty to "[...] conciliate the wish of members of the WEOG (Western European and Other States Group) to retain a positive reference to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and the firm opposition to any mention of the UNSC's treatment of this issue, defended by

[...] although no delegation expressed opposition to the Security Council's handling of the issue, some countries (China, Egypt, Pakistan and Singapore) [...] emphasized the competence of other UN bodies — the General Assembly and ECOSOC — in examining the issue and that it was therefore important that their respective mandates be respected, not least as a way of avoiding duplication of effort.<sup>76</sup>

From the events in Beijing to the open debate at the UNSC that marked the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000), it is clear that developing countries, notably Namibia and Bangladesh, supported mainly by Jamaica and, to a lesser extent, Mali, were at the forefront of the process — and not permanent members (Basu, 2016). In this sense, the adoption of Resolution 1325 is reminiscent of the negotiation of the United Nations Charter, when women delegates from Brazil and the Dominican Republic had to insist on explicit reference to equality between men and women, against even other women delegates from the North.

As demonstrated, the Women, Peace and Security agenda was the result of decades of advocacy by women's organizations, the first allied governments being countries of the global South, directly affected by armed conflicts. Next, we assess how the item "Women, Peace and Security" has been incorporated into the daily work of the UNSC over the twenty years of the agenda, as well as the position of the permanent members and Brazil in the first two mandates held after WPS was included in the program of the Council.

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Iran, Sudan, Algeria and other Islamic delegations" (Cable 3019, from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 5 December 2001).

76 Cable 2291 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 28 October 2000.





## Chapter 3

# The regulatory framework of the Women, Peace and Security agenda

The mandates contained in each of the ten resolutions approved by the Security Council will be detailed below, with a focus on their practical consequences. The Council's presidential statements on the agenda item will also be identified, as will relevant mandates given to peacekeeping missions, the CEDAW Committee's recommendation on Women, Peace and Security, as well as initiatives taken by the UN Secretariat over the last 20 years to include women in international peace and security issues.

### 3.1. Resolutions and other texts adopted by the Security Council

#### 3.1.1. Resolutions

The first resolution approved by the Security Council on the role played by women in armed conflicts was Resolution 1325, on October 31, 2000. The document lays the foundation for all of the actions undertaken within the agenda, since it establishes the four pillars for achieving the goal of providing protection and full access for women, on an equal footing with men, to all aspects necessary for the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts, as well as for the recovery of countries after overcoming the most critical phase of each conflict and for building lasting peace. On the same date, the item "Women, Peace and Security" was included under "Thematic issues" on the UNSC's work agenda.<sup>77</sup>

After approving the landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security, it took eight years for the UN Security Council to adopt the second resolution on the disproportionate impact of armed conflicts

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<sup>77</sup> Source: Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (New York, United Nations: 2000-2003), 800. Available at: <[https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2000-2003/Chapter%208/Thematic/00-03\\_8\\_43%20Women%20and%20peace%20and%20security%20.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2000-2003/Chapter%208/Thematic/00-03_8_43%20Women%20and%20peace%20and%20security%20.pdf)>. Accessed on: 24 Aug. 2023.

on women. Resolution 1820, of June 2008, recognizes sexual violence as a tactic of war and mandates Member States to reinforce military disciplinary measures, including training their Armed Forces on the prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, especially women and girls. The text, drafted by the US, provides for the possibility of armed groups that commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls being included in sanctions regimes.

In October 2009, Resolution 1888, also presented by the US, then in the monthly presidency of the Council, followed on from Resolution 1820 of the previous year. The text mandates countries to protect women and girls from sexual violence during armed conflicts. In that same year, Resolution 1889, proposed by Vietnam, a non-permanent member of the UNSC, recognizes obstacles to women's participation in peace processes and provides for the adoption of indicators to monitor progress. In fulfillment of this mandate, the 2010 UNSG report proposes 26 universal indicators, based on the four WPS resolutions adopted until then.<sup>78</sup>

In December 2010, the US presented a new draft resolution dedicated to combating sexual violence in armed conflict. On December 16, the Security Council approved Resolution 1960, which prescribed the inclusion of judicial reparations for crimes of sexual violence as an integral part of peace processes. According to the mechanism set up in the Resolution, the UNSG will include, in his/her annual reports on sexual violence, a list of armed groups suspected of systematically committing rape or sexual violence in conflicts on the UNSC agenda. These groups are called upon to sign commitments to combat sexual violence, ensuring accountability for perpetrators.

Three years later, in 2013, the US once again presented a draft on sexual violence in armed conflicts. Through Resolution 2106, the Security Council strengthened reparations for sexual violence and called for an end to impunity for these crimes. The approved text makes it clear that men and boys are also victims of sexual violence during armed conflicts. According to the Permanent Mission of Brazil, the highlight of negotiations was the replacement of the expression "conflict-related

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78 Document S/2010/498. There is no record of the proposal having been incorporated into UN practice.

sexual violence” in the original draft with the more restrictive expression “sexual violence in armed conflict,” in order to limit the scope to conflicts on the Council’s agenda.<sup>79</sup>

In October of that same year, during an open debate organized by the presidency of Azerbaijan, Resolution 2122 was adopted. The text, drafted by the United Kingdom, emphasized the importance of women’s participation in all stages of armed conflict prevention, resolution and recovery. In its Operative Paragraph 16, the Resolution mandated a global study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000), in preparation of a high-level event in 2015. The Permanent Mission of Brazil noted that this was the first document on the agenda to focus on the issue of women’s political participation, while the previous resolutions had concentrated on sexual violence in conflicts. The cable sent to the capital also records that members of the Council changed the language of the original draft to reflect the need for situations that do not constitute a threat to peace and security not being subject to examination by the UNSC.<sup>80</sup>

In October 2015, in the context of the publication of the Global Study on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the High-Level Review on WPS, Spain and the United Kingdom presented a joint draft, which resulted in Resolution 2242. In terms of innovations, the text provides for the inclusion of sexual offenses among the criteria for listing individuals under UNSC sanctions regimes; establishes the UNSC Informal Group of Experts on WPS; and links the realization of the agenda to the fight against trafficking in small arms and light weapons. It also includes “non-United Nations forces” as possible perpetrators of sexual abuse and exploitation. During negotiations, France tried to eliminate this language, which alluded to allegations of sexual crimes related to Operation Sangaris, which France was conducting in the Central African Republic (CAR).<sup>81</sup>

A few months later, in March 2016, the UNSC approved Resolution 2272, centered on reinforcing measures to combat sexual abuse and

79 Cable 2156 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 28 June 2013.

80 Cable 3528 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 21 October 2013.

81 Cable 2913 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 13 October 2015.

exploitation perpetrated by UN personnel. The text, proposed by the US in the context of the credibility crisis involving troops operating in the CAR (Whalan, 2017), welcomes the UNSG's initiative to repatriate military or police units in the face of evidence of systematic violations, as well as to veto the incorporation of personnel with a background of misconduct. It repeats the explicit mention of "non-United Nations" troops, especially in the CAR. It also gives the UNSG a mandate to assess whether the national authorities of officials involved in sexual abuse and exploitation had taken appropriate measures to investigate and hold perpetrators accountable, and to use the responses offered by Member States as a criterion for future troop deployments.

After a three-year hiatus, in 2019 the Council adopted two resolutions dedicated to Women, Peace and Security. In April, Resolution 2467, proposed by Germany, was adopted. The document includes sexual violence in armed conflict as part of a broader continuum of violence against women and girls in times of peace. It gives States primary responsibility for overcoming the root causes of such violence, including structural inequality and discrimination against women. It proposes a survivors-centered approach (instead of "victims") in order to reduce the stigma associated with sexual violence. It also innovates by including men and boys as targets of this type of violence. During the open debate held on the occasion of the presentation of the draft resolution, the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize laureates — Iraqi refugee Nadia Murad and Congolese doctor Denis Mukwege — were invited, both recognized for their work in promoting the rights of survivors of sexual violence in armed conflicts.

A few months later, in October 2019, Resolution 2493 was adopted, reviving the call for the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in peace negotiations, peacekeeping and post-conflict situations. To this end, the text, presented by South Africa, calls for the UNSC to collaborate with the Peacebuilding Commission. It calls on Member States to make financial contributions to programs to support the economic empowerment of women living in countries in conflict or emerging from conflict. It requests the UNSG to continue with the Gender Parity Strategy in the UN Secretariat and agencies and requests information on the appointment of Gender Advisors in peacekeeping missions and the

participation of women peacekeepers in implementing mandates related to electoral processes, DDR and SSR in his/her report to the UNSC on the subject. It also asks for an assessment of the progress made in expert groups within the sanctions committees with regard to the mandates given by previous WPS resolutions.

On August 28, 2020, the Security Council approved Resolution 2538, drafted by Indonesia. Although it was not adopted under a “Women, Peace and Security” agenda item, it stands as the first resolution to be entirely dedicated to the participation of women military, police and civilian experts in peacekeeping missions and special political missions. This is a topic in which the proposing country has a lot of experience: Indonesia ranked 8th among the TCCs when it presented the draft to the UNSC. The text calls for the full incorporation of women into UN peace efforts at all levels, but especially in leadership positions, and innovates by including specific mention to sexual harassment, both inside and outside peacekeeping missions. It is the first UNSC resolution to deal with the issue. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi also remarked that Resolution 2538 (2020) was the first resolution her country had managed to pass in the entire history of its participation in the UN Security Council.<sup>82</sup>

In a vote held on 30 October 2020, for the first time the Security Council failed to approve a draft resolution on Women, Peace and Security. The text, circulated by the Russian presidency, was considered by most members, especially Europeans and the US, to be a selective reiteration of previous resolutions.<sup>83</sup> According to the press, these countries suggested that Russia turn the draft resolution into a presidential statement, which was not accepted. The document circulated under symbol S/2020/1054 was rejected with 5 votes in favor (South Africa, China, Vietnam, Indonesia and the proponent Russia) and 10 abstentions (Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom).

82 Source: Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: <<https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/1632/view/un-security-council-adopts-indonesias-resolution-on-female-peacekeepers>>. Accessed on: 24 August 2023.

83 Cable 2573 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 3 November 2020.

After having presented the resolutions that make up the Women, Peace and Security agenda, next comes an assessment of the thematic division, the geographical representation of the countries that proposed the texts and the level of support they received. In terms of main themes, there is a strong focus of WPS resolutions on sexual violence (five out of 10 documents, or 50 percent). This leads some to consider the agenda to be merely about the protection of civilians. This simplification is not supported by the set of documents approved, nor by the initiatives carried out by the UN and its Member States. Nevertheless, according to some authors: “In choosing to focus on sexual violence, the Security Council has reasserted its role as a protector of women, rather than as a supporter of women’s emancipation” (Otto, 2009, 15).

With regard to the penship of original drafts, non-permanent members of the Security Council played a fundamental role. While the US presented five draft resolutions, and the UK two (one of them together with Spain, an elected member), the remaining three texts were proposed by non-permanent members, in addition to the aforementioned Spain: Germany, South Africa, and Vietnam.

Regarding the support received by WPS resolutions, eight of the ten (80 percent) were approved by consensus of the 15 countries that were on the Security Council at the time of their adoption. Resolution 2272 (2016) was adopted with the abstention of Egypt, which held an elected seat that year. Resolution 2467 (2019), on the other hand, underwent a vote and was approved, with China and Russia abstaining. Compared to other issues on the body’s agenda, this represents an unusual degree of convergence.

Brazil was only present at the UNSC when Resolution 1690 (2010) was adopted, and the country supported it. However, it is not uncommon for proponents of drafts presented to the Security Council to seek support from the wider UN membership, in an effort to demonstrate that their texts reflect a view of the majority of the Organization. Outside of the Council, Brazil had the opportunity to co-sponsor Resolution 2538 (2020).<sup>84</sup>

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84 Cable 502 of 28 August 2020 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York.

### 3.1.2. *Presidential statements (PRSTs)*

The first presidential statements on the participation of women in peace and security issued by the United Nations Security Council precede the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000. As seen in section 2.4, two PRSTs adopted by Bangladesh in March of that year and one by Jamaica in July set a precedent for the UNSC to recognize the role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

From 2001 onwards, the Council started to issue annual presidential statements entitled “Women, Peace and Security,” usually in October. The first of them (S/PRST/2001/31) reiterates parts of Resolution 1325 and recognizes progress in mainstreaming a gender perspective. The following year, S/PRST/2002/32 condemned the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, a language that would be incorporated into Resolution 1820 (2008). The text calls on the UNSG to integrate WPS into training materials and to include gender specialists in teams visiting peacekeeping missions.

In October 2004, when Brazil was a non-permanent member at the UNSC, the Council adopted Presidential Statement S/PRST/2004/40, with the same title. The text welcomes the UNSG’s initiative to develop a strategy for the cross-cutting application of the women’s perspective in all stages of peacekeeping, as well as in all thematic and country reports issued by the body, and in post-conflict reconstruction projects. Finally, it mandates a report from the UNSG to be presented the following year.<sup>85</sup>

In October 2005, while Brazil was still in the Council, Presidential Statement S/PRST/2005/32 applauded the creation of the PBC and urged the participation of women in peacebuilding. The Statement also emphasizes the need for troop- and police-contributing countries to support measures to combat sexual abuse and exploitation. The text calls for annual reports from the UNSG to the Council on the issue, starting in 2006.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Cable 2950 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 29 October 2004.

<sup>86</sup> Cable 3106 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 1 November 2005. The 2004 and 2005 official letters merely transmit the texts of the Declarations, without commenting on the negotiations or the points of view defended by Brazil.

From 2006 to 2008, four presidential statements were adopted on issues related to WPS.<sup>87</sup> In 2006, a PRST asked the UNSG to compile good practices and identify gaps in implementing Resolution 1325. In 2007, two statements on WPS were released. The first one, in March, includes a reference to the outcome documents from Beijing and from the 23rd Special General Assembly in 2000 and asks the UNSG to create “gender components” in peacekeeping missions. In October, a second statement expressed concern about the low number of women serving as UNSG Representatives and Special Envoys and calls on Member States to present women candidates. It also calls for cooperation between Member states, the UN and regional organizations to promote regional approaches to the implementation of Resolution 1325(2000). The 2008 PRST reiterates the request for the UNSG to appoint more women as his/her Representatives and Special Envoys.

In 2010, the year that marked Brazil’s return to the UNSC, Presidential Statement S/PRST/2010/22 was adopted, aimed at monitoring indicators on WPS. There was polarization between France, the United Kingdom and Austria, on the one hand, who favored global, immediately applicable parameters, and Russia and China, on the other, who insisted that any criteria should only be applied to conflict situations on the UNSC agenda. Brazil and the United States helped overcome the stalemate by defending indicators to exclusively measure elements within the Security Council’s mandate, as provided for in Resolution 1325(2000).<sup>88</sup>

In 2011, the Council adopted S/PRST/2011/20, which commends the UNSG Special Representatives on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict and Children in Armed Conflict. The text announces the UN’s intention to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation of Resolution 1325(2000), to be published in 2015 — which then became the mandate of Resolution 2122(2013). It calls for the UNSG to focus on the role of women in conflict prevention in his next annual report to the Council.

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87 Documents S/PRST/2006/42; S/PRST/2007/5; S/PRST/2007/40; e S/PRST/2008/39.

88 Cable 4396 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 15 November 2010. Brazil’s position was also supported by the UNSG’s proposal for 26 universal indicators (S/2010/498).



With Brazil no longer on the Council, in October 2012 the UNSC adopted Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/23, which welcomes the contribution of gender advisors in peacekeeping missions and calls on Member States to deploy Women Protection Advisors. It calls for the gains made in the rights and social empowerment of women and girls to be preserved in peacekeeping withdrawals and transitions and encourages the adoption of national action plans on WPS. The 2014 Presidential Statement on WPS (S/PRST/2014/21) focuses on the risks to which internally displaced women and girls and refugees are subject during armed conflicts, particularly on sexual violence.

In June 2016, Presidential Statement S/PRST/2016/9 was adopted. The text emphasizes the increased effectiveness of peace efforts when women are included. It advocates for the economic and social empowerment of women, and values the role of women leaders in conflict prevention. It recognizes the specific vulnerabilities of women and girls to terrorist attacks, while calling for their rights to be safeguarded during counter-terrorism actions. Finally, in calling for more funding from Member States for the WPS agenda, the statement emphasizes the potential for the Peacebuilding Fund to finance projects in this area.<sup>89</sup>

### ***3.1.3. Peacekeeping mandates***

Since the adoption of Resolution 1325(2000), peacekeeping mandates have incorporated responsibilities relating to Women, Peace and Security. The current situation regarding the incorporation of the WPS agenda into the operative paragraphs of peacekeeping operations mandates, i.e. those that actually determine actions, is summarized in Table 1, attached.

The ten new peacekeeping operations approved since Resolution 1325(2000) are obliged to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda on the ground, with varying degrees of ambition. MINUSCA's mandate stands out as the one with the most agenda items (12), followed by UNMISS (11) and MINUSMA (9). It is worth noting that all three operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Use of Force). As for the

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<sup>89</sup> Cable 1611 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 16 June 2016.

components of the agenda that appear most frequently in mandates, there is an increase in the participation of women peacekeepers (all 10 missions considered) and the protection of local women and girls against sexual violence (six out of 10 missions). There are also mandates to reduce gender-responsive community violence and to support the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in the peacekeeping process overseen by the mission.

As Uziel (2015) points out, UN peacekeeping missions are historical tributaries of practices and innovations by the world's great military powers in their interventions, alone or in coalitions, outside the UN, in third countries. Of particular interest to this work are the military gender advisors — currently present in all UN multidimensional operations — the Gender Focal Points and the Female Engagement Teams, or FET.

Female Engagement Teams first appeared under this name in counterinsurgency forces deployed by the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2012.<sup>90</sup> Now replicated in UN missions, they were innovations created by the Armed Forces of these countries not for political correctness, but rather as a response to operational needs, contributing to the troops' situational awareness.<sup>91</sup> FETs also help in gathering intelligence from the local female population, knowing that terrorist groups recruit women in order to take advantage of the perception that they are less dangerous (Sjoberg, 2014, 41-42). FETs were then force multipliers in theaters of operation that required maximum military effectiveness. Since the role of national military organizations is to win wars, only incidentally did these units promote the rights of local women (Egnell, 2016).<sup>92</sup>

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90 A report by Australian General McLachlan adds Finland, Italy and Macedonia to the list of countries that have used FETs in Afghanistan (Australian Civil-Military Center, 2014). In the case of the US, the members of these teams, as well as those who took part in the predecessor initiative — Team Lioness in Iraq — escaped the restriction imposed on women in combat positions, which had been in force until 2013 (Wibben, 2016).

91 A concept used by the Armed Forces to designate the processes of attention, perception and decision-making, based on elements of the environment, the understanding of their meaning and the projection of their state in the near future (Marques, 2020).

92 The US Navy's FETs produced few results in the lives of Afghan women, some of whom did not even receive the compensation promised in exchange for inside information. They did, however, serve the narrative of "salvation" that justified the United States' presence in Afghanistan (Wibben, 2016).

In 2020, India, Ghana and Pakistan deployed FETs in MONUSCO, and the Zambia in MINUSCA, while Bangladesh kept a FET in MINUSMA.<sup>93</sup> According to the UN, these teams, made up of psychologists, doctors, nurses, as well as information, operations and logistics officers, are tasked with building trust and providing assistance to the local female population, such as psychological support, health support, economic empowerment, professional training, protection against violence and child abuse, as well as training for local police and military personnel.<sup>94</sup> This plurality of tasks to which the FETs are dedicated can, however, be assessed as a lack of definitive UN policy and guidance on FETs (Baldwin and Taylor, 2020).

Brazil was asked to set up a Female Engagement Team when DPO invited the country, in November 2017, to send 750 military personnel to MINUSCA.<sup>95</sup> According to an interviewee who accompanied the process, the Statement of Unit Requirement proposed by the UN for the Brazilian battalion included a 120-member support company to house the FET.<sup>96</sup> It was the first time in almost 70 years of contributing to the UN that the Brazilian State had seen its participation in a peacekeeping mission contingent upon the inclusion of women. In April 2018, Brazil informed the UN that it could not accept the invitation due to *budgetary* constraints (Hamann and Mir, 2019).

In addition to military units focused on relations with local women, in compliance with the Gender Responsive United Nations Peacekeeping Operations policy adopted by the then DPKO,<sup>97</sup> all UN peacekeeping missions must include Military Gender Advisors, Gender Units and Gender Focal Points. These structures, referred to by the DPO as the

93 In response to criticism, the UN began to set up *mixed engagement teams*, made up of 50 percent women and 50 percent men. They are "units trained to engage with all members of the community and designed to increase situational awareness of the battalion commander" (Baldwin and Taylor, 2020).

94 Source: DPO/UN. Available at: <<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/first-ever-female-pakistani-un-peacekeeping-team-receives-un-medals>>. Accessed on: 28 Aug. 2023.

95 Official Message No. 927 to the Ministry of Defense, 23 November 2017.

96 According to the UN request, the company would consist of a headquarters, a logistics/transport platoon, a maintenance platoon, two level 1 medical units, and a civil-military coordination platoon, a FET, mixed military capability and advanced air control units. The 120 military personnel would be divided between all these functions. In addition, the document provided for the possibility of the Brazilian battalion's FET being supplemented with female soldiers from other nationalities.

97 Available at: <[https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/english\\_gender\\_responsive\\_united\\_nations\\_peacekeeping\\_operations\\_policy.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/english_gender_responsive_united_nations_peacekeeping_operations_policy.pdf)>. Accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.

Gender Architecture, are responsible for encouraging collaboration between all the components in a peacekeeping mission. Their aim is to increase operational effectiveness and efficiency by responding to the differentiated needs, concerns and contributions of women and men in line with the principles of Women, Peace and Security.<sup>98</sup>

To this end, Gender Units work directly with the mission's leadership and support other units in developing strategies for implementing and monitoring equality between women and men, both among the local population and within the missions. MONUSCO's gender unit, for example, promotes the Gender Champions Award, given to mission staff who make "remarkable efforts to promote equality between women and men in implementing the Mission's mandate."<sup>99</sup> For their part, Gender Focal Points are responsible for providing day-to-day support to different units in terms of incorporating WPS mandates. As of September 2020, out of ten peacekeeping operations equipped with Gender Units, seven of them were located in the Office of the respective UNSG Special Representative.<sup>100</sup>

Brazil had an experience with embryonic Gender Units while in command of MINUSTAH's military component. In 2013, a unit made up of representatives from each troop- or police-contributing country was created, known as "Lady Point" or "Point of Contact as a Lady." It was responsible for training women in the mission to work on gender issues in conflict zones in Haiti (Lima, 2015). In 2017, the year the National Action Plan was launched, MINUSTAH was one of nine missions to have a Gender Unit (Moraes, 2017).

According to Costa (2018), there were two structures in MINUSTAH dealing with domestic and sexual violence, as well as with reports of sexual abuse and exploitation: the Gender Unit, made up of civilians and reporting directly to the Office of the Representative, in charge of the first set of problems; and the Gender Cell (which worked alongside the Child Protection Cell), made up of military advisors and reporting to the

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98 Source: "Gender Equality and Women, Peace and Security Resource Package." Available at: <[https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/gewps19\\_respack\\_v7\\_eng\\_digital.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/gewps19_respack_v7_eng_digital.pdf)>. Accessed on: 28 Aug. 2023.

99 *Echos de la MONUSCO X* (87), March-April 2019. Translated by the writer.

100 Document S/2020/946.

Brazilian Force Commander, in charge of the second set of issues. The Gender Unit created a network of Focal Points throughout MINUSTAH's area of operation, supporting women's increased participation in the country's decisions, as well as addressing complaints of sexual harassment and exploitation. To this end, these units held meetings and training sessions with the participation of local community's representatives and leaders, as well as the three components of the Mission.

The incorporation of the Gender Architecture is part of the Parity Strategies developed by the UN and has achieved positive results. However, recent research shows that the presence of women in the leadership of peacekeeping operations is more important than these structures. A mere increase in the number of women peacekeepers, without ensuring their representation in decision-making positions, hardly reduces sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA), for instance (Karim and Beardsley, 2017).

In addition, as a United Nations official interviewed pointed out, the inclusion of gender experts is not in itself capable of influencing host governments' decision-making on measures that could benefit the female population. For example, sensitizing defense and security authorities to adopt a gender perspective requires specialized technical knowledge, particularly on SSR. Without a budget that makes it possible for different teams in peacekeeping missions to work together on gender issues, mandates relating to Women, Peace and Security are compromised.<sup>101</sup>

Before moving on to the next point, it is important to note that in recent years China and, to a lesser extent, Russia have made it difficult to introduce language about women in peacekeeping mandate renewals. Experts familiar with the dynamics of the UNSC evaluate that these two permanent members have found in this position, which they also use in C-34's annual negotiations (see chapter 1), an efficient bargaining tool with the P3 (US, UK and France) on issues that their governments consider to be more strategic.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Interview conducted in November 2020.

<sup>102</sup> Cable 1393, from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, dated 21 May 2021.

### **3.2. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)**

In addition to the resolutions adopted by the Security Council, another source on Women, Peace and Security for all countries is the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Often referred to as the “women’s rights treaty,” it is a legally binding international convention with the specific aim of protecting and promoting women’s human rights in both the public and private spheres (Nicodemos, 2005, 77). The Convention has a permanent monitoring body, the CEDAW Committee, established in 1982, with 23 experts. Countries that are signatories to the Convention, including Brazil, must submit periodic reports to the Committee, that is also responsible for issuing general recommendations on issues affecting women, addressed to all States parties.

In October 2013, the Committee issued General Recommendation 30, concerning women in conflict prevention and post-conflict situations, referring to the resolutions of the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security. Known as GR30, the Recommendation contains suggestions for States to ensure that actions to implement the WPS agenda are consistent with the CEDAW Convention and that they promote the advancement of equality between women and men.<sup>103</sup> Following its publication, the CEDAW Committee expects States parties to include an assessment of the domestic implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in their periodic reports, so that it “can be used to mutually reinforce implementation of GR30 and the WPS agenda.”<sup>104</sup>

Some of the recommendations by the CEDAW Committee are: that violence against women be considered by countries in their implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT); attention to women and girls as potential targets of human trafficking in conflict and post-conflict contexts (an issue not previously included in UNSC resolutions); extension of the list of actors who may be involved in sexual abuse and

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103 UN Women. *Guidebook on CEDAW General Rec. no. 30 and UNSC resolutions on Women, Peace and Security*. Available at: <<https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2015/8/guidebook-cedawgeneralrecommendation30-womenpeacesecurity>>. Accessed on: 28 Aug. 2023.

104 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

exploitation, including national Armed Forces, border Police Forces and Immigration agents, as well as humanitarian assistance providers; measures to assist women subject to multiple discrimination (women with disabilities, elderly women and girls, indigenous people, members of ethnic, racial and religious minorities, women living with HIV/AIDS, among others) due to the specific risks they are exposed to during conflicts; and in the restructuring of the Rule of Law sector in post-conflict countries, protecting women's access to all the rights of the male portion of the population, including the right to nationality, property, documentation and political participation.

In December 2021, Brazil submitted the country's 8th and 9th Periodic Reports to the Committee in a simplified procedure.<sup>105</sup> In the report, there is no reference to GR30 or the WPS agenda.

### **3.3. Structures in the Secretariat and initiatives by the Secretary-General**

Over the last decade, the UN has sought to strengthen the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, either by implementing explicit mandates from UNSC resolutions, or by means of adopting initiatives in various areas related to WPS. The first of such initiatives stands out for its concrete impact. In 2009, the post of Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict was created, as mandated by operative paragraph 4 of Resolution 1888(2009).

The position is designed to:

provide coherent and strategic leadership, to work effectively to strengthen existing United Nations coordination mechanisms, and to engage in advocacy efforts, inter alia with governments, including military and judicial representatives, as well as with all parties to armed conflict and civil society, in order to address, at both Headquarters and country level, sexual violence in armed

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<sup>105</sup> Cable 954 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in Geneva, 29 December 2021.

conflict, while promoting cooperation and coordination of efforts among all relevant stakeholders.<sup>106</sup>

The first incumbent was Margot Wallström of Sweden, who went on to become Foreign Minister in her country.

Special Representative Pramilla Patten currently monitors cases in 19 countries or regions,<sup>107</sup> assisted by a Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, comprising officials from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the DPO and the UNDP. The team collaborates with peacekeeping missions, UN country offices and civil society and academia. At the regional level, it cooperates with the African Union, the League of Arab States and other organizations. At a global level, the team liaises with the International Criminal Court, among others. The discussion on strengthening the axis of protection against sexual violence will be further analyzed in section 5.1.

In 2015, then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the “Senior Women Talent Pipeline,” with the purpose to increase the participation of women in civilian leadership positions in UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions. The “Pipeline” registers women candidates with a master’s degree or equivalent, fifteen years’ experience in the areas determined in each of its calls, proficiency in English, and desirable knowledge of Arabic and French. In 2016, Ban Ki-moon created the Military Gender Advocate of the Year Award, which recognizes blue helmets who integrate the WPS agenda into all peacekeeping activities. Two Brazilian peacekeepers, Commanders Márcia Braga and Carla Araújo,<sup>108</sup> received the Award, in 2019 and 2020, respectively.

Pursuant to Resolution 2242(2015), the Security Council’s Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace and Security was set up in 2016. It aims at facilitating the adoption of a systematic approach and the coordination of efforts undertaken by the Council in this area. The IEG holds meetings

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106 Document S/RES/1888/2009.

107 Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, CAR, DRC, Syria, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, South Sudan (Darfur).

108 In 2020, the prize was also awarded to Major Suman Dawaini, from India, for her work at UNMISS.



to discuss the situation of countries on the UNSC agenda, with the participation of UN representatives in the field, Council members as well as local and WPS experts. Because of its informal nature, the Group is not listed as a UNSC subsidiary body. Nevertheless, most of the Council's members take part in IEG meetings.<sup>109</sup>

The Group has an annual rotating presidency, held jointly by two non-permanent members, observing geographical diversity, and supervised by the United Kingdom (penholder on WPS). UN Women acts as Secretariat. Regarding countries to be examined by the Group, the guidelines state that “diversity should be sought, both geographically and in terms of the phase of the conflict — whether at risk, active, in transition or in recovery.” By 2019, 12 countries and regions had been examined by the IEG.<sup>110</sup>

In September 2016, Portuguese national António Guterres took up the post of UN Secretary-General. At his swearing-in ceremony on September 12, he indicated that he would seek to deepen the measures taken internally by the Organization in favor of gender parity. He undertook to achieve full parity at the level of Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General, including Special Representatives and Special Envoys,<sup>111</sup> by the end of his term.

In January 2017, a task force was established to draw up a roadmap, including parameters and deadlines, towards full parity throughout the UN System.<sup>112</sup> As a result, the Systemwide Gender Parity Strategy was launched, valid for the Secretariat.<sup>113</sup>

In 2018, as part of the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, the UNSG established the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018-2028,<sup>114</sup>

109 Security Council Report 2020, 3.

110 Security Council Report 2020, 4.

111 Available at: <<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-12-12/secretary-general-designate-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-oath-office-speech>>. Accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.

112 In addition to the staff in departments and offices at Headquarters and regional offices, the UN System includes the UN's subsidiary bodies, its programs and funds, specialized agencies, research and training institutes, technical commissions and regional commissions.

113 Source: UN. Available at: <<https://www.un.org/gender>>. Accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.

114 Available at: <<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/uniformed-gender-parity-strategy-2018-2028-summary.pdf>>. Accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.

significantly reinforcing its predecessor's initiative to increase the engagement of women in peacekeeping operations. While A4P responds to the mandate to increase the efficiency of peacekeeping missions, the Strategy is based on the findings of the 2015 Global Study, which indicate that the participation of women in peace efforts increases efficiency, especially in the protection of civilians, and the longevity of peace agreements.

The Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy sets growing annual targets for the participation of women in all posts open to military and police personnel in peacekeeping operations over the course of 10 years, until 2028. The never-before seen enforcement of a minimum level of female participation is motivated, according to the UNSG himself, by the delay in achieving results in the realization of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

According to the Strategy, by 2020 each national military unit should have at least 6.5 percent of female military personnel. By 2028, this figure should increase to at least 15 percent. In individual missions (Military Observers and Staff Officers), in 2019, the minimum expected representation of women per country was 16 percent, and it should reach 25 percent in 2028. For Formed Police Units,<sup>115</sup> in 2019 the expected representation of women was 9 percent, aiming to reach 20 percent by 2028. The total of police officers sent by country on individual missions should include at least 21 percent women in 2019, surpassing 30 percent by 2028. Finally, among Justice and Corrections officers,<sup>116</sup> in 2019 countries should guarantee 26 percent of women, rising to over 30 percent in 2028.

On September 11, 2018, Brazil joined 150 countries endorsing the A4P Declaration of Shared Commitments.<sup>117</sup> A year later, on October 29, 2019, at the annual UNSC open debate on WPS, Brazil welcomed the adoption of the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy,<sup>118</sup> which reflected in changes to the working methods of the UN, particularly in the DPO and

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115 This modality has not yet been trialed in Brazil.

116 Brazil has sent prison officers to serve the UN only in East Timor. Current legislation makes it difficult to send Brazilians to this increasingly demanding segment of peacekeeping (see section 5.2).

117 Source: UN. Available at: <<https://www.un.org/en/A4P/>>. Accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.

118 Cable 1104 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 25 October 2019.

DPPA. Since 2019, Member States have been systematically informed by the DPO that women candidates will be given preference under the same qualification in selection processes for individual missions. Women-only positions for military and police personnel in peacekeeping missions and special political missions have also been created.

However, most of the vacancies offered by the UN for individual missions are intended for combat positions and require intermediate ranking. Given the historical restriction of women access to these positions, most troop- and police-contributing countries face challenges in meeting the Strategy's targets. In 2020, only five of the 17 TCCs with more than 1,000 troops in peacekeeping missions met the target of 6.5 percent women in formed units. According to the Strategy, countries that fail to reach the targets can face reduced vacancies for their military — which, to date, has not been put into practice (Sharland, 2020).

In order to overcome this situation, in 2018 the Canadian government launched the Elsie Initiative to accelerate the increase in the participation of uniformed women in peacekeeping operations. The Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations, or simply Elsie Fund, was launched to finance national projects to incorporate women in PKOs, in line with the targets set by the Strategy. The Elsie Fund has an initial mandate of five years, overseen by the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office and having UN Women as secretariat. The Fund intends to increase knowledge about the barriers faced by countries to deploy uniformed women to UN peacekeeping missions; to significantly increase this deployment at a global level; to expand the pool of military and policewomen eligible for UN vacancies; and to improve the working conditions of the women in the field.

The first call for projects from the Elsie Fund was launched in 2019, focusing on three areas: identifying barriers to the participation of uniformed women in peacekeeping missions; increasing participation through mentoring, investment in infrastructure, recruitment campaigns for women or specific pre-deployment training for military and/or police women; and finally paying premiums to military and police units at least

five percent above the targets of the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018-2028.<sup>119</sup>

According to a Secretariat official, the Brazilian Ministry of Justice and Public Security presented projects in the 2019 call for proposals. These projects were aimed at the participation of Brazilian women police officers in UN missions, but they were not selected. In the opinion of this interviewed official, Brazil would find it easier to get resources from the Elsie Fund in future calls by better coordinating the interested government agencies and by presenting more accurate projects.

Having learned about the international normative framework and the main UN political initiatives associated with the Women, Peace and Security agenda, we will now move on to the domestic panorama of the implementation of these commitments by the Brazilian State.

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119 The premium offered is approximately 20 percent above the reimbursement normally paid by the UN to T/PCCs, based on 20 percent of the total staff of the unit concerned. Payment is conditional on the fulfillment of the planned deployment period and can be extended for two additional periods.

## Chapter 4

# The National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security

The Brazilian National Action Plan represents the formal internalization of the international obligations examined in the previous chapter. Launched on March 8, 2017, for an initial period of two years, the Plan was renewed for an additional four years on March 29, 2019. The announcement was made by the Minister of Defense, General Fernando Azevedo, during the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference in New York.

The Plan's Introduction summarizes the drawing up of the document and will serve as a reference for the first two sections of this chapter, together with the survey of diplomatic files and the results of the interviews. In section 4.3, information gathered through interviews and documentation will be used.

### 4.1. Internal evolution (2000-2015)

In communications between the Secretariat of State in Brasília and the Permanent Mission in New York (the diplomatic post that monitors the activities of the UNSC and the Commission on the Status of Women — CSW), there are relatively few references to the Women, Peace and Security agenda between 2000 (the year Resolution 1325 was adopted) and 2015, when deliberations began on a possible national action plan. The presentation of the draft and the approval of Resolution 1325, on October 31, 2000, were reported in cables that do not include a Brazilian assessment of the merits of the initiative.<sup>120</sup> It should be recalled that Brazil was not a member of the Council at the time.

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<sup>120</sup> Cables 2291 of 28 October and 2325 of 2 November 2000, from the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations in New York.

During Brazil's mandate at the Council in 2004 and 2005, no resolution was adopted on Women, Peace and Security. However, Brazil participated in open debates and informal meetings held on the subject. In October 2004, at the initiative of Benin, an informal meeting (Arria Formula) was held to receive briefings from women participating in peace processes in the Mano River Basin (West Africa), Rwanda, Kosovo and Sudan. The Brazilian delegation emphasized the importance of collaboration between the Security Council and ECOSOC (under Article 65 of the Charter) in the implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000).<sup>121</sup>

A few days later, under the United Kingdom's chair, a WPS open debate was held "[...] with the participation of 50 speakers, revealing the interest of Member States in the matter." The Brazilian Mission also noted that "[...] the part reserved for the public in the Council Chamber was almost entirely occupied by representatives of NGOs and interested people, something unusual in the practice of thematic debates held by the UNSC and which makes clear the interest attributed by civil society to the subject." In its intervention, Brazil said it was committed to improving Resolution 1325 to make it "more effective and universal." The country defended that the Council recognizes the role of women not only as "vulnerable victims" of conflicts, but also as participants in peace processes, as agents of the reconstruction of societies and as blue helmets.<sup>122</sup>

In October 2005, Denmark convened an informal meeting on Women, Peace and Security. In the same month, another WPS open debate this time chaired by Romania, was held. Once again, the Brazilian mission reported a high number of speakers and of civil society as indicative of the interest raised by the topic. In its intervention, the Brazilian delegation once again supported collaboration between the UNSC and ECOSOC, adding the Peacebuilding Commission to the list of suggested partnerships. The country also suggested that the terms of Resolution 1325 (2000) be incorporated into the mandates of peace missions.<sup>123</sup>

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121 Cable 2899 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 25 October 2004.

122 Cable 2949, from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 29 October 2004. Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York.

123 Cable 3105 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 1 November 2005.

In the following mandate (2010-11), Brazil was present at the adoption of Resolution 1960 of 2010, as seen in section 3.1.1. In an open debate on Women, Peace and Security held on October 26, 2010, the Brazilian delegation stated: “National plans are important tools if they also include the participation of a broad spectrum of actors, including civil society. It is also important that action plans are supported by adequate funding” (Viotti, Dunlop and Fernandes, 2014, 371). There was no mention, however, of the possibility of Brazil having such an instrument.

A relevant finding of the survey is the fact that, until the end of Brazil’s 2010-2011 term, diplomatic communications on the Women, Peace and Security agenda made no mention of the Ministry of Defense or the Armed Forces. Although Brazil was at the peak of military deployment to the UN Mission in Haiti, reaching the top of the list of Troop-Contributing Countries (TCC), WPS resolutions adopted thus far did not emphasize the participation of women in peacekeeping missions. It can therefore be said that the connection between the WPS agenda and Brazil’s participation in MINUSTAH had not yet been made. The path leading to this link, which was crucial for the internalization, was first trodden by the Ministry of Defense, as we will see below.

#### **4.2. The drafting of the National Action Plan**

The process that led to the drafting of the Brazilian Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security began years earlier, in a military approach, in the context of the participation of Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH. In June 2010, the country opened the first peacekeeping training center, the “Sérgio Vieira de Mello” Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (known as CCOPAB). Simultaneously, the UN began to standardize content on the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases/HIV, sexual violence as a weapon of war and gender-based violence. These topics were deemed essential components of training TTCs must offer to their military personnel prior to deployment (Lima, 2015, 26).

In December 2011, the last month of Brazil’s term at the UNSC, the Ministry of Defense and UN Women signed a letter of intent in the area of “gender, peace and security” (Lima, 2015, 26). Referring verbatim to

Resolution 1960 (2010), co-sponsored by Brazil, as well as Resolution 1325(2000), the document provided for collaboration with CCOPAB with a view to “training peacekeeping troops on gender issues,” and mentioned “South-South cooperation activities with other peacekeeping troop training centers in Latin America and Africa.” The agreement also proposed “identifying actions, within the sphere of competence of the Ministry of Defense, which contribute to Brazil’s implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.” As a result, in 2011 UN Women introduced a presentation on gender at the military’s preparation for MINUSTAH, “with a difference in the field of discourse and sensitivity to gender issues” (Lima, 2015). Shortly afterwards, the foreign policy thematic program of Brazil’s 2012-2015 Multi-Year Plan included the intention to increase the participation of civilian and military women in peacekeeping operations in Haiti.<sup>124</sup>

The second document of interest in the chronology of the Brazilian Action Plan is the Protocol of Intent on Gender Policies for the Brazilian Armed Forces, signed in December 2013 between the Ministry of Defense and the then Special Secretariat of Policies for Women of the Presidency of the Republic. The text aimed to “establish a commitment” between the two government bodies to “join forces in the diagnosis, reflection and development of policies and actions that promote gender equality at all stages of the peacebuilding and security processes, through training and operation of the Brazilian Armed Forces.” In order to achieve these objectives, the Protocol stipulated five guidelines:

- a) to diagnose the duties carried out by peacekeeping troops and map the skills needed for women to carry out such duties; b) to contribute to the capacity building and training of peacekeeping troops from a gender perspective; c) to strengthen sporting practices as an instrument of peace where the Armed Forces operate; d) to establish partnerships in preventing sexually transmitted diseases/HIV and in fighting sexual violence as a weapon of war; and e) to

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124 Brazil, Law no. 12.593 of 18 January 2012.



build strategies to combat gender-based violence in humanitarian contexts.<sup>125</sup>

These guidelines were reproduced word by word in five actions contained in the National Plan on Policies for Women 2013-2015 (Lima, 2015, 21). Based on the Protocol, the Ministry of Defense agreed to take part in a study conducted in 2014 by the Latin American Security and Defense Network (known as RESDAL) on the situation of women in the Armed Forces in some countries in the region. It was the first time that a Brazilian government body participated in a survey related to Women, Peace and Security in the country. Although the study intended by RESDAL was not completed, the information gathered in Brazil resulted in the publication, on August 21, 2014, of the report “*Perspectivas de gênero em operações de paz: o caso brasileiro*” [Gender perspectives in peace operations: the Brazilian case], written by four members from Pandiá Calógeras Institute, a research institution affiliated with the Ministry of Defense (Pereira, Lima, Almeida and França, 2014).

The participation of the Ministry of Defense in the study led Igarapé Institute, a think tank that has dedicated researchers to the WPS agenda since 2012, to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Igarapé planned to organize an event, in partnership with the Ministry of Defense, to disseminate the results of the research and to promote the internalization of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.<sup>126</sup> On March 13, 2014, an international seminar entitled “Women, Peace and Security in Brazil: Building Bridges and Overcoming Challenges” was held at the Rio Branco Institute. Participants included the director of the Department of International Organizations and the head of Itamaraty’s International Peace and Security Division; the director of Pandiá Calógeras Institute; as well as representatives of Defense and the three Armed Forces, of the Military Public Prosecutor’s Office and the diplomatic corps in Brasilia. It was the first single collaboration between Itamaraty and the Ministry of Defense on the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

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125 Source: Ministry of Defense letter no. 15714/GM, dated 27 December 2013.

126 Interview conducted in August 2020.

One of the outcomes of the seminar was the possibility of “setting up an inter-agency discussion group that includes representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces and the police, as well as civil society, to identify and help promote relevant policies and initiatives in favor of gender equality.”<sup>127</sup> The WPS agenda was 14 years old, and Brazil had served two terms at the UNSC, when the first steps towards internalization by the Brazilian government were taken.<sup>128</sup>

In November 2014, CCOPAB organized the regional workshop “Women in Peacekeeping,” with the participation of member countries of the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (known as ALCOPAZ). The event provided an opportunity for women in field missions and women from local communities where these missions take place to share their vision of the agenda and their experiences in the field (Lima, 2015, 29).

The following year, the dialogue on the agenda between Foreign Affairs and Defense intensified. In May 2015, Pandiá Calógeras Institute, which had a line of research on the gender perspective in UN peacekeeping operations,<sup>129</sup> held an event entitled “O Brasil e a Resolução 1325 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas” [Brazil and UN Security Council Resolution 1325]. The event was attended by the Foreign Affairs, the Army, representatives of the University of Brasília (UnB) and UN Women, among others. The main topic of discussion was “the potential, opportunity and convenience of Brazil adopting a National Action Plan (NAP)” as a mechanism for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and other resolutions dealing with Women, Peace and Security.<sup>130</sup>

That same year, between June and July, informal discussions were instrumental in forming a favorable position for the two ministries

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127 Source: Igarapé Institute. Available at: <<https://www.resdal.org/assets/evento-igarape-mar2013-reporte.pdf>>. Accessed on: 30 Aug. 2023.

128 As Ambassador Maria Luisa Escorel recalls, at the first informal meeting of the GTI, the Secretariat for Women's Policies of the Presidency of the Republic identified several actions included in the 2012-2015 Multi-Year Plan and the National Plan on Policies for Women 2013-2015 relating to Women, Peace and Security. However, the agenda had not yet served as reference for these actions.

129 Source: Normative Ordinance no. 678 of 20 March 2015.

130 Source: MD. Available at: <<https://pandia.defesa.gov.br/pt/agenda-pandia/279-o-brasil-e-a-resolucao-1325-the-united-unions-security-council>> (page later taken down).

involved in the actions shaping up as the driving force behind the WPS agenda in Brazil. The wide repercussions of the Global Study produced on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of Resolution 1325 set the tone, in particular the greater durability of peace agreements with the participation of women. The external and internal context, mobilized by Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH, led to the conclusion that any Brazilian plan should be an instrument of foreign policy in the area of peace and security.

At this point, according to the interviews, the possibility of the Plan having its own budget was explored. However, government agencies did not consider themselves in a position to allocate a portion of their budget to the new initiative. At the same time, they felt that the economic crisis the country was facing made it unlikely to obtain additional budget. It was therefore agreed that the activities to be included in the future Plan would be carried out by means of adapting routines and procedures, making use of existing resources.

In August 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened an informal meeting with representatives of Defense, the three Armed Forces, the Ministry of Justice and the Secretariat for Women's Policies of the Presidency of the Republic, with the participation of UN Women and Igarapé Institute, to continue discussions on whether Brazil should have a national plan on WPS. The results of the Global Study were discussed. It was also noted that Chile had a National Plan and that the country was promoting a debate on the agenda within the South American Defense Council.

As a follow-up to the informal meeting, participants were asked to consult the leadership of their respective agencies to see if they would be interested in setting up an inter-ministerial working group, under the coordination of Itamaraty, in charge of drafting a text organized around the four axes of Resolution 1325. After deliberation by the group, the text would be submitted to the ministers for approval.

On October 13, 2015, the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations took part in an open debate at the UNSC on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of Resolution 1325. In his speech, he announced

that work had begun on elaborating a national plan to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda.<sup>131</sup> The Interministerial Working Group in charge of drafting the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security met for the first time on November 30, 2015. According to the Introduction to the Plan: “Starting in January 2016, the Working Group promoted monthly plenary meetings to discuss the elaboration of the Brazilian NAP. From June onward, the drafting committee began to meet between sessions (Brazil, 2017, 30).

There was no representation from the National Parliament in the Working Group. However, there was ad hoc participation of Vítor Hugo de Araújo Almeida, Chamber of Deputies’ Advisor on National Defense and Public Security. In 2018, the former officer in the Army’s Special Forces was elected to become a Federal Representative for the state of Goiás under the name Major Vítor Hugo. He went on to be the leader of Government in the Chamber between February 2019 and August 2020. In an interview with the writer, Representative Almeida clarified that his participation in the Group took place due to a study commissioned by another Representative while he was still an Advisor, in 2015.<sup>132</sup> The study was presented to the Gender Commission of the Ministry of Defense as part of internal discussions on the relevance of a national plan.

In February 2016, with the work of the Interministerial Group underway, the participation of women was included in an informal consultation held by Pandiá Calógeras Institute in preparation for the UN High-Level Thematic Debate on International Peace and Security.<sup>133</sup> In March of the same year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized, in partnership with Igarapé Institute and UN Women, a workshop entitled “Consolidating Brazil’s strategy on Women, Peace and Security: from the global agenda to the national context.” During the event, a Igarapé comparative study of national plans was presented, helping to guide

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131 Cable 2908 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 13 October 2015.

132 “Mulheres nas Forças Armadas Brasileiras: situação atual e perspectivas futuras” [Women in the Brazilian Armed Forces: current situation and future prospects]. Available at: <<https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/media/2015-291-estudo-sobre-mulheres-nas-forcas-armadas-vitor-hugo2vs.pdf>>. Accessed on: 30 Aug. 2023.

133 Available at: <<https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/noticias/ultimas-noticias/instituto-pandia-debate-a-revisao-das-operacoes-de-paz-da-onu>>. Accessed on: 10 Oct. 2022.

negotiations. Although the study suggested the adoption of indicators, with time-bound targets,<sup>134</sup> there is no record in the available minutes that the matter was deliberated by the Group that year. Nor was there any reference to the indicators recommended by the Security Council in 2010 (section 3.1.2).

The last meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group took place on October 19, 2016, after Parliament's decision to impeach former president Dilma Rousseff. In the view of the Group's members, the text, which had been finalized at the time, represented the fulfillment of an international obligation of the Brazilian State that should not be affected by the political situation. It was agreed that each of the four ministries represented would obtain the consent of their respective leadership, who would sign forewords to the National Action Plan. In light of the changes in ministry leadership after the impeachment, the process faced delays. The four texts were only completed in the beginning of 2017, which is why the symbolic date of March 8, International Women's Day, was awaited for the launch of the Plan.

With regard to the participation of civil society, encouraged by the UN, it should be noted that during the time the Interministerial Group was in operation, Itamaraty launched a web page dedicated to collecting inputs. However, the draft text was never shared on the web page, nor were proposals received. Thus, there is no parameter for assessing the mobilization of civil society or how suggestions were incorporated into the final version of the NAP (Drumond and Rebelo, 2018).

In parallel to the government's online consultation, Igarapé Institute maintained informal dialogue with civil society organizations while working in the text in 2016.<sup>135</sup> The dialogue with Amnesty International resulted in the suggestion of including activities aimed at refugee women. The suggestion was well received by the National Committee for Refugees, affiliated with the Ministry of Justice, and was incorporated into the Plan. The inclusion of actions aimed at refugees and asylum seekers in

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134 Summary available at: <<https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/media/2016-03-31-relato-oficina-mps-v-igarape.pdf>>. Accessed on: 30 Aug. 2023.

135 Interview conducted in September 2020.

the NAP was considered innovative (Drumond and Rebelo, 2018). It is also worth noting that it took place before the Venezuelan refugee crisis that led to the creation of Operation Welcome in 2018, a major turning point in Brazil's refugee policy and practice.

### 4.3. Review and renewal of the National Action Plan

According to the text of the Plan:

At the end of 2018, the WPS Working Group will meet again in order to evaluate the implementation of the Plan as a whole and proceed to any necessary adjustments for its improvement. The convenience of developing a new NAP for the subsequent time span will be discussed by the Working Group established for such purpose, which will report its recommendations to the concerned organs and institutions. (Brazil, 2017, 59)

In light of the above, the Interministerial Working Group met again, under the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in November 2018. This time, the Ministries of Defense, Justice and the Secretariat for Women's Policies, then under the Ministry of Human Rights, were invited. Once again, UN Women also followed the Group's meetings.

The resumption of the Group's work began with the international seminar "National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security: implementation and review," on November 1st, 2018, in the Paulo Nogueira Batista auditorium at Itamaraty. In addition to representatives from the four ministries, UN Women and Igarapé Institute, participants included Brazilian police officers and civilians with experience in peacekeeping missions, researchers, and diplomats and military personnel from Canada, a country with which Brazil had just established a bilateral dialogue on WPS,<sup>136</sup> and Argentina, a neighbor that shares similar defense challenges and contributions to peacekeeping missions as Brazil.<sup>137</sup> Both Canada and

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136 Cable 373 to the Embassy in Ottawa, 17 December 2018.

137 In November 2020, Argentina was 49th and Brazil 50th in the ranking of TCCs.

Argentina were invited to present their experience of implementing their respective national plans, a discussion that we will take up in Chapter 5.

Following the seminar, four in-person meetings were held between December 2018 and February 2019, in addition to e-mail exchange of information. At first, the Group's coordinators asked other ministries to share their results in implementing the NAP. According to the interviews, the Group agreed that a year and a half was too short a period to make it possible to assess implementation of the actions set out in the document. The Group also agreed that there was a lack of dissemination of knowledge about the Plan among relevant actors.

They then went on to discuss the future of the National Plan, in view of the imminent end of its initial mandate. The options put forward were: drawing up a new version of the document, updating parts of the text or renewing the original Plan for an additional period. Furthermore, at the suggestion of UN Women, ministries were asked to consider voluntary targets and indicators for monitoring, in order to facilitate future evaluation. Since the proposal was provided for in Security Council Resolution 1889(2009) and in the text of the NAP itself,<sup>138</sup> ministries were invited to consider the possibility of adopting targets and indicators.

The political context in Brazil was one of polarization, on the verge of a presidential election. There was an expectation that the teams, especially in the Ministries of Justice and Human Rights, would be replaced, whatever the outcome. In light of the circumstances, the Group unanimously decided that there would be little time, until March 2019, to draft a new text and to obtain the consent of new ministers who would take up their posts in January. The remaining option was to propose to the new ministers that they renew the mandate of the original text of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

The issue of budget allocation resurfaced when the Plan was being revised. Admitting that some of the activities could be carried out by making use of established resources, even greater progress may have been limited by the lack of a specific budget (Drumond and Rebelo 2018).

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138 Brazil, 2017, 59: "[...] The Ministries responsible for the execution of the present Plan, in their respective fields, will establish mechanisms to monitor its implementation."

However, the circumstances explained above did not encourage further debate in the Group. Thus, the decision on a possible budget for the Plan was postponed.

As for targets and indicators, Itamaraty and the Ministry of Justice both shared proposals for voluntary parameters by email. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose ten activities under its leadership and the Ministry of Justice another ten. However, in the end, the Ministry of Justice did not authorize the publication of its parameters on a dedicated website hosted by Itamaraty. As a result, Foreign Affairs is the only ministry so far to have adopted voluntary indicators and targets for implementation of the WPS NAP.<sup>139</sup>

The last aspect in the context of the 2018-19 NAP review was the length of the renewal that would be suggested to the elected government. Over the course of the meetings, the Group consolidated the view that ministries would benefit from a longer duration for planned activities. Thus, the agreed extension was of four years. On the other hand, the Ministry of Defense, in particular, requested that the Group met more frequently. Defense also asked for the second review to begin earlier in relation the end of the Plan's extended term, in 2023.

Two meetings of the Inter-Ministerial Group were held in February 2019, attended by the new teams from the ministries (Ministry of Justice and Public Security and Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights). Also in February, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed of the intention of the Minister of Defense, General Fernando Azevedo, to take part in the United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial, to be held in New York the following month. Itamaraty then consulted the Ministry of Defense about the possibility of leveraging this major event, coinciding precisely with the end of the Plan's term, for the minister to announce the renewal of the document. With Defense's agreement, at the following meeting the whole Group was informed of the intention to seize this opportunity to make the announcement, provided that the extension had the support of all ministers.

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<sup>139</sup> Available in Portuguese only at: <<https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/assuntos/paz-e-seguranca-internacionais/manutencao-e-consolidacao-da-paz/indicadores-e-metas-voluntarios-do-plano-nacional-de-acao-sobre-mulheres-paz-e-seguranca>>. Accessed on: 29 out. 2022.



According to the minutes of the last meeting, on February 28, 2019, it was agreed that the final text of the proposal to renew the NAP would be circulated by the Group's coordinators by March 8. Coordinators then asked to receive confirmation of the consent from the respective leaderships by email. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP) confirmed agreement to the terms of the renewal by means of a letter dated March 21, 2019. The Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights confirmed agreement on March 25, 2019.

On March 29, 2019, at UN Headquarters in New York, during his speech at the Ministerial Conference, General Fernando Azevedo announced the renewal of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in the following terms:

Brazil also reaffirms its commitment to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, demonstrated by the extension of its National Plan of Action validity for further four years, by the fulfillment of the established goals on women's participation by the United Nations and by the recent increase in training opportunities for women.<sup>140</sup>

This illustrates the continuing leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. The following chapters argue for the need to re-think the structure of the Brazilian NAP, which is very much geared towards the participation of Brazilian military personnel in UN peacekeeping operations, in light of changes in the internal and external scenario since the document was first drafted, in 2016.

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<sup>140</sup> Available at: <<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/brazilian-statement-english.pdf>>. Accessed on: 30 Aug. 2023. The renewal of the NAP was also included in Brazil's speech at the UNSC open debate on WPS on October 29, 2019.



## Chapter 5

# Analysis of the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda

The evaluation of progress on Women, Peace and Security in global terms comes primarily from the UNSG. The results are presented in annual reports to the UNSC, based on activities undertaken or monitored by the UN in peace processes and political transitions, peacekeeping missions and political missions, promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in conflict situations and humanitarian crises, disarmament and arms trade control, political participation and representation, economic recovery and access to resources, rule of law and access to justice, terrorism prevention and combating, among others.<sup>141</sup>

From the point of view of UN Member States, those that have NAPs on Women, Peace and Security typically use these documents as a reference for monitoring national progress. Although the axial structure of Resolution 1325 (2000) serves as inspiration for many NAPs, their content, the number of institutions involved and their legal status vary enormously depending on a range of factors, including foreign policy priorities. Countries recently emerging from conflict tend to focus their efforts on strengthening the role of women in their own societies, while developed countries usually address the actions of their plans to the women of the countries that receive their investments in peace and security (Drumond and Rebelo, 2018).

There are studies that outline what makes for a NAP to be likely more effective (Giannini, 2016; Folly and Giannini, 2017; Jacevic in Davies and True, 2019). Some of the key factors are: an inclusive drafting process, a plan for monitoring and evaluating results based on fixed periods,

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141 Document S/2020/946.

the presence of clear political leadership, and the provision of specific budget.<sup>142</sup>

Brazil occupies a unique position in this universe. Historically averse to direct involvement in armed conflict, having no unresolved border issues or significant terrorist threats, Brazil has devoted its first National Plan to external action, with a focus on engagement in United Nations peacekeeping and political missions. Regarding the characteristics of the NAP, a 2018 analysis found:

[...] gaps regarding implementation strategies, such as the lack of clarity on how these objectives will be achieved, the absence of budgetary allocation to carry out the actions [...] and evaluation and monitoring frameworks that include indicators, deadlines and other mechanisms capable of guiding institutional actions and mapping their progress. (Drumond and Rebelo, 2018, 16)

As seen on Chapter 4, during the drafting of the Plan, the ministries participating in the Working Group estimated that actions undertaken by the government in favor of equality between women and men, even before the document was drafted, would require no additional funding. This understanding remained when the Plan was revised two years later. Perhaps more relevant to the Brazilian case, however, is the fact that the National Action Plan is not linked to a legal act. The text was not submitted to Congress, nor was it officially published as a ministerial order. It was published by the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with introductory remarks signed by four ministers. In addition, the adoption and renewal of the NAP were formally announced through diplomatic channels to the United Nations. Even so, the NAP has not been backed by an act that makes its provisions enforceable.

At the end of 2018, when the Working Group resumed work, ministries claimed that one and a half year since the adoption of the NAP was not enough to evaluate implementation. Almost six years since

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<sup>142</sup> According to the UNSG Report, only 24 percent of the 85 national action plans adopted by July 2020 included a budget (Document S/2020/946, p. 3).

the adoption of the NAP, it has remained difficult to monitor. This leads us to believe that the lack of an accountability mechanism may be at the root of this difficulty, as predicted by the research mentioned above.

The National Action Plan lists 14 objectives, organized into four axes and 86 activities. Only 10 activities have indicators and targets — even then, they were only in place from 2019 on. Furthermore, some of the activities are written in the form of suggestions.<sup>143</sup> As a result of the writer's survey, there is a clear lack of dissemination of the document. In fact, the majority of the peacekeepers interviewed for this book admitted that they only learned about the NAP after returning to Brazil from their missions. Three officials working on issues included in the Plan who were interviewed by the writer said that they only learned about the existence of the document at the time of the interview.

Some countries in Brazil's immediate surroundings, notably Chile, Argentina and Paraguay, that also have national plans on WPS, share a similar security situation to Brazil and can serve as a relevant basis for comparison. In 2009, Chile became the first country in the Americas to adopt a NAP on Women, Peace and Security. In 2015, the country launched the second edition of the document, valid until 2018. In addition to the counterparts from the four ministries that signed the Brazilian NAP, the Chilean Ministry of Health also participates in the country's plan. The main innovation of the second version of the Chilean plan is the adoption of indicators and targets, which include an implementation deadline. Chile's 2nd NAP stipulates that each ministry must dedicate a portion of its budget to the activities under its responsibility.<sup>144</sup>

In relation to Argentina, we should mention the presentation by the country's representative at the seminar organized in Brasilia on November 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018. According to the diplomat, the Argentinian plan was enacted by a decree in 2015. In addition to the counterparts to the four ministries responsible for the Brazilian NAP, the following ministries are also involved in implementing the WPS agenda in Argentina: the Ministry of

143 Using language such as "Examine the possibility to", "Seek to", etc.

144 *Segundo Plan de Acción Nacional para la implementación de la Resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la organización de las Naciones Unidas 1325/2000*. Available at: <<https://gnwp.org/wp-content/uploads/segundo-plan-de-accion-nacional-1.pdf>>. Accessed on: 4 Sept. 2023.

the Interior; Production and Labor; the Ministries of Education, Culture, and Science and Technology; the Ministries of Health and Social Development; and the Ministry of Finance. By promoting an “integral vision of peace,” the Argentinian plan has an external scope (peacekeeping and humanitarian operations), but also an internal dimension, with a focus on the mainstreaming of a gender perspective and the empowerment of women in government organizations. Although Argentina’s NAP at the time did not have its own budget, it had monitoring indicators agreed between the ministries, drafted in partnership with UN Women. Focal points from each ministry must report periodically to Foreign Affairs, the ministry responsible for coordination.

Paraguay’s plan on WPS was launched in December 2015 for a five-year period. The long-term objective of the Paraguayan plan is to “contribute to the elimination of the cultural barriers that hinder the full participation of women in all spheres of human society.” Within five years, the main objective is to promote women’s participation in institutional decision-making, in peace processes, and in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. In addition to the ministries that signed the Brazilian NAP, Paraguay’s plan also includes the Ministries of Health and Social Welfare and Education. Each activity is linked to compliance indicators. Paraguay’s plan creates a Council of Ministries for the Implementation of Resolution 1325, with two focal points from each ministry, that is responsible for elaborating reports on implementation of the NAP.<sup>145</sup> The text does not address the budgetary issue.

On October 30, 2020, Uruguay announced in Press Release 112/20 that the government had finalized the procedures for launching a NAP on Women, Peace and Security. Among the countries in the region that have NAPs on WPS, Uruguay ranks the highest in the UN TCCs list.<sup>146</sup>

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145 *Plan Nacional de Acción — Implementación de la Resolución 1325 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas en la República del Paraguay*. Available at: <<https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/PARAGUAY-Action%20Plan.pdf>>. Accessed on: 4 September 2023.

146 In November 2020, Uruguay ranked 17th among the TCCs, Argentina 49th, Brazil 50th, Paraguay 79th and Chile 98th. With the departure of the Navy contingent from UNIFIL, Brazil’s position is expected to drop considerably.

We will now examine the implementation of the four axes that organize the WPS agenda and the Brazilian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. In doing so, we will look at both the implementation carried out by the United Nations at a global level and by the Brazilian government at the national level.

The Women, Peace and Security agenda has a substantively broader scope than simply peacekeeping, so much so that it has earned its own item on the work program of the UNSC. Ironically, however, the furthest aspect in relation to the original ambitions of the post-war women's peace movement is one of the most well-known applications of the WPS agenda: the incorporation of women into the Armed Forces and peacekeeping operations (Federeci, 2019).

As for the Brazilian NAP, there is a perception that it is primarily focused on the Armed Forces. In reality, only 25 of the 86 planned activities are the primary or exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. Itamaraty, for its part, has primary responsibility over 34 activities in the National Plan, sharing another 14 with other ministries.

Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the inclusion of women, both civilian and military, in UN efforts on the ground is a crucial, well-documented component of the agenda. It is no coincidence that it is the only one with universal benchmarks: the targets of the UN Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy.<sup>147</sup> Hence, we start our analysis of the Brazilian NAP results with the participation of uniformed women.

### 5.1. Increased participation of uniformed women in peacekeeping operations

*“When there’s nobody left, there’s the UN. I like to think that I have contributed, in homeopathic doses, to world peace.”*

Commander Mônica Thuler, former UNIFIL Legal Advisor, at an event celebrating 20 years of the WPS agenda and 40 years of Women in the Brazilian Navy.

<sup>147</sup> On the subject, Federeci (2019, 251, translation by the writer) sarcastically notices: “The Organization not only supported the call for war in the United States, but also, in the name of equality, enlisted women so that, like men, they could have the privilege of killing other human beings”.

The participation of uniformed women (military and police) in peacekeeping operations is one dimension of the WPS agenda that is most studied. Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000), positive effects have been identified. These include the deterrence of sexual abuse and exploitation; the promotion of awareness among the host country's population on cultural patterns of violence against women; and the collection of privileged information from local women, which contributes to the mission's security (Rehn and Sirleaf, 2002). It has also been found that peacekeepers serve as an incentive for the local female population to join the security forces (Karim in Davies and True, 2019, chap. 35). The Brazilian National Action Plan's Introduction also highlights that the presence of uniformed women helps to increase a sense of security in the local population, and facilitates the demobilization of female ex-combatants and their reintegration into society. It also encourages women to take part in elections, as the UN has observed in East Timor and Burundi (Brazil, 2017, 14-15).

Despite all the proven benefits, the inclusion of women in peacekeeping missions is still a challenge for the UN. In 2015, the participation of women seemed to have stagnated at three percent of the military components serving the UN (Kirby and Sheperd, 2016, 374). In 2020, women represented 5.1 percent of these contingents.

The United Nations have deployed peace support operations since the late 1940s. However, only in 1992 the Secretary-General chose a woman to head a peacekeeping mission. Margaret Anstee, a British national, was appointed Special Representative for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II). A decade later, in 2003, Kiran Bedi, an Indian citizen, was the first woman nominated UN Police Advisor and Head of DPO's Police Division, positions she held until 2005. Sandra Peisley, from Australia, was the first female commander of a police component in a peacekeeping mission, in the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISSET) between 2003 and 2005. In 2007, India deployed the first all-female uniformed unit to a UN mission, when the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) received 105 Indian women police officers.



It would still be some time before a woman took over as Force Commander of a UN peacekeeping operation. It was not until 2014 that General Kristin Lund from Norway became commander of the military component of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 2014-2016), where the Special Representative was also a woman, Lisa Buttenheim. In 2018, Major General Cheryl Pearce, from Australia, was appointed Force Commander of the same mission. Only one more female officer has ever commanded troops at the service of the UN: Brigadier General Maureen O'Brien from Ireland, who commanded the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan between October 2019 and July 2020.

Even as there are a few examples of leadership, more often than not uniformed women who serve the UN are not in positions of command. Professor Suzeley Mathias comments on this:

In the case of natural disasters or humanitarian operations, it is almost obvious that there is a space to be filled by female contingents, just as there is in all assistant and support tasks and in police jobs. However, just as in their countries of origin, the challenge is to fully integrate them into combat functions [...] where much remains to be done. (MATHIAS 2009, 10)

In fact, the participation of women police officers in peacekeeping missions has grown more than that of female military personnel. In 2015, when the Global Study was published, women represented 10.2 percent of formed police units. In 2020, this percentage reached 15.1 percent. As for justice and corrections units, to which Brazil does not yet contribute, the representation of women is even higher: 29 percent in 2019, above the target of the Uniformed Personnel Gender Parity Strategy for that year.<sup>148</sup>

As for military personnel, there is a shared difficulty in most of the TCCs with regard to the low numbers of women in the Armed Forces, discussed in section 3.3. On top of that is another issue that is crucial to understanding the challenge of increasing female participation in

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148 Document S/2020/96.

peacekeeping missions: the budget crisis affecting the UN. Since the first decade of the century, the UN has been reducing its presence on the ground in response to pressure from major donors for less expensive missions. Since 2016, this demand has been combined with a decrease in budget contributions from the United States, the single largest funder of the UN's collective security system.

The peacekeeping budget (approved in 2019 at US\$ 6.5 billion)<sup>149</sup> far exceeds the UN's regular budget (approved at US\$ 3 billion).<sup>150</sup> The mandatory annual dues owed to the UN by all Member States include contributions to the regular budget and to peacekeeping operations. The latter varies according to a complex calculation, called "capacity to pay," which takes into account factors such as population, economic performance and foreign debt. In the second budget, the P5 bear greater responsibility than other Member States.

For decades, the US had questioned the criteria for its assessment in the peacekeeping budget — the highest among all Member States. In this respect, Neves (2010) notes: "US quotas, already down from the real number, were further reduced in 2000 in order to resolve the financial crisis in the United Nations, due to the US Congress withholding payments owed to the UN" (Neves, 2010, 71). Even so, the US administration pressed for substantive cuts in peacekeeping missions (Figueirôa, 2018), and opposed the scale of assessment, which the country considered unfair. Contrastingly, the US government's own report affirms that the UN's collective security system is more cost-effective than operations conducted unilaterally.<sup>151</sup> Perception on the ground is also that, despite the official discourse, it was in Washington's interest, to maintain BINUH in Haiti, for example, since the special political mission was much cheaper than a possible military intervention.<sup>152</sup>

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149 Source: DPO/UN. Available at: <<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>>. Accessed on: 5 Sept. 2023.

150 Available at: <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/12/1054431#:~:text=The%20UN%20General%20Assembly%20on,by%20Secretary%2DGeneral%20Ant%C3%B3nio%20Guterres>>. Accessed on: 5 Sept. 2023.

151 UN Peacekeeping — Cost Estimate for Hypothetical U.S. Operation Exceeds Actual Costs for Comparable UN Operation. Report from the United States Government Accountability Office to the US Congress, February 2018. Available at: <<https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689900.pdf>>. Accessed on: 5 Sept. 2023.

152 Interview conducted in November 2020.

In any case, the official position by the US led to repeated cuts in the budgets approved for each peacekeeping mission, as well as in the numbers of troops authorized by the Security Council. Nowadays, peacekeeping missions face the challenge of implementing highly ambitious mandates, but with a smaller budget and less personnel each year. Considering the growing pressure on UN troops in the field, the contribution of women in the three main components of peacekeeping operations has been publicized as a solution to more efficient and effective peacekeeping missions, based on evidence.

The awards received by Brazilian Navy commanders Márcia Braga and Carla Araújo, mentioned in the Introduction, are due to the results obtained by them in their role as Military Gender Advisors in reducing reported cases of sexual violence within MINUSCA's area of operation. Commander Márcia Braga received the award on March 29, 2019 in New York, during the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference. Commander Carla Araújo, in turn, was awarded on May 29, 2020, International Peacekeepers Day, in an online ceremony.

Commander Márcia Braga developed an innovative methodology using mixed teams (men and women) in the Mission's patrols, resulting in qualified data collection from the local female population. This increased efficiency in the protection of civilians, including a significant reduction in cases of sexual violence. Recommendations made by the Commander in a briefing to the Peacebuilding Commission resulted in a paragraph included in the advice to the Security Council on the occasion of the renewal of MINUSCA's mandate in 2019.<sup>153</sup>

According to Commander Carla Araújo, the presence of African women who speak the local language makes a crucial difference in these patrols. During her tour of duty, Commander Araújo managed to expand the network of Gender Focal Points to all sectors where MINUSCA troops are based, extending the area covered by mixed patrols and leaving behind a replicable training methodology for new Focal Points. In her experience, she found it necessary to translate Resolution 1325 into terms that men can understand, since implementation requires their involvement also.

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153 Cable 2675 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 30 October 2019.

Despite the undeniable positive impact, widely proven and praised, of including uniformed women in peacekeeping operations, excessively concentrating on these results contributes to an instrumentalization, or one-dimensional conception, of the Women, Peace and Security agenda (Kirby and Sheperd 2016; Duncanson 2016). Without denying that the protection axis of Resolution 1325 is intrinsically important, we must not lose sight of the transformative ambition of the WPS agenda, which aims not only to remedy sexual violence, but to change its social and cultural roots, reducing its prevalence. In this sense, the necessary participation of women goes far beyond peacekeeping missions and peace negotiations, but must also take place in all decision-making instances — from the design of public policies in defense and security institutions, to the planning and monitoring of elections (Baldwin and Taylor, 2019b).

Even in their limited roles, women in the military and in police forces share the experience of having to overcome a condescending or protective attitude from the command of peacekeeping missions. Even those who serve in combat roles in their home countries are not immune to the male leadership's desire to “spare” them from patrols and other operational activities. Confined to headquarters, these women do not realize their full potential to contribute to the performance of the mission — which is a result of interaction with the local population (Rupesingue, Stamnes and Karlsrud in Davies and True, 2019, chap. 17).

In addition, a recent study of 142 female peacekeepers from 53 nationalities (including Brazil) reveals stigmas that surround these professionals,<sup>154</sup> many of which are related to their reputation and sexual behavior. There are also reports of their dedication to their children being questioned, as well as judgement of single women for not prioritizing marriage. The survey also reveals that they are frowned upon if they complain about ill-fitting equipment, even if it limits their professional performance.

The reported risk of harassment, in the form of “jokes” and “pranks,” and of sexual assault cause many to isolate themselves and avoid socializing, especially when the use of alcohol is permitted. Women of color say

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154 Addressing Taboos and Stigmas Military Women in UN Peace Operations Experience. Available at: <<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/10/addressing-taboos-stigmas-military-women-un-peace-operations-experience/>>. Accessed on: 5 Sept. 2023.

that they are exposed to cumulative discrimination. Yet the pressure to perform in a mostly male environment is enormous, and peacekeepers rarely report inappropriate behavior. The study recommends that female peacekeepers be consulted by the DPO regarding strategies developed for the inclusion of women (Vermeij, 2020).

From the Brazilian point of view, the participation of uniformed women in UN peacekeeping operations began in the 1990s. As of November 30, 2020, women accounted for 66.7 percent of Brazilian police officers in the field, 7.3 percent of Brazilian military personnel on individual missions and 2.3 percent of the Navy formed unit leaving Lebanon on December 2, 2020.<sup>155</sup> Brazilian Navy's decision to withdraw the only remaining Brazilian unit — which had been in UNIFIL since 2011 — was informed to the UN more than a year in advance.<sup>156</sup> It was justified by the need to reallocate naval assets in Brazil's immediate surroundings, with a view to revitalizing the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS).<sup>157</sup> Since then, Brazilian military contribution to UN peace operations is by means of individual missions.

Brazil's Armed Forces are faced with the challenge of finding peacekeeping missions capable of hosting large units, like the battalions deployed in Haiti from 2004 to 2017.<sup>158</sup> However, the absence of military units does not prevent Brazil from making a concrete contribution to UN operations. Among other means, the country does so by offering cooperation in capacity building. Brazil offers high-standard training to national and foreign military, police and civilian personnel in specialized training centers.

155 Source: DPO/UN. It is worth mentioning that the numbers of military and police personnel on individual missions fluctuate from month to month. In addition, Brazil's current contribution of police officers has been small, which makes assessing the fulfillment of the Gender Parity Strategy targets a complex task (see section 5.1.4).

156 Cable 1113 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 30 October 2019.

157 Brazilian Navy, "Note of clarification", of 27 July 2020. Available at: <[https://www.marinha.mil.br/sites/default/files/nota\\_de\\_esclarecimento\\_-\\_crusoe\\_27\\_jul.pdf](https://www.marinha.mil.br/sites/default/files/nota_de_esclarecimento_-_crusoe_27_jul.pdf)>. Accessed on: 5 Sept. 2023.

158 According to the DPO, in May 2019 only MINUSMA in Mali was short of trained military units: Current and Emerging Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping, executive summary. Available at: <[https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/uniformed-capability-requirements-un-peacekeeping\\_may-2019.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/uniformed-capability-requirements-un-peacekeeping_may-2019.pdf)>. Accessed on: 5 Sept. 2023.

Brazil has two specialized training centers accredited by the DPO: CCOPAB, mentioned above, and the Naval Peace Operations Training Center — Centro de Instrução Almirante Sylvio de Camargo (CIASC), both located in Rio de Janeiro. The two centers co-operate with third countries in preparing for UN peacekeeping missions. In addition, in July 2019, the Brazilian Army decided to deploy a mobile team specialized in jungle warfare training to MONUSCO, a mission that has been commanded by Brazilian generals since 2018. The team deployed by Brazil trains military personnel from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania who work in the Intervention Brigade of the Mission, which has a mandate to use force. It was the first time that a Member State was invited by the DPO to offer on-site training to military personnel from third countries as part of a UN peacekeeping mission.<sup>159</sup>

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborates with the two centers. Diplomats have participated both as trainees and instructors in the courses offered in Rio de Janeiro. This collaboration materializes most frequently in courses offered on civil-military coordination (CIMIC) and on preparation of civilians in unstable environments.<sup>160</sup> Itamaraty has also collaborated with CIASC's "Peace Operations Course for Women" — the only one in Brazil offered exclusively to women interested in taking part in peacekeeping operations.<sup>161</sup>

Nevertheless, female representation in Brazil's uniformed contribution to UN peacekeeping missions remains low. In this context, Brazilian female police officers would seem to be better placed to serve peacekeeping operations when compared to women military officers, since the women in the police force are used to working in complete parity in relation to men, including in repression and special operations. Women police officers have been appointed Chiefs of Police at the state level in Brazil,

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159 Source: MD. Available at: <<https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/noticias/ultimas-noticias/ccopab-auxilia-na-preparacao-de-instrutores-brasileiros-que-servirao-na-monusco>>. Accessed on: 15 June 2022.

160 Inspired by a course offered to journalists (Hamann, 2017), courses offered to civilians were created to meet the demands from researchers, missionaries, public servants in the penal and intelligence sectors, humanitarians, etc.

161 Sources: Naval Character Operations Center and Brazilian Navy. Available at: <<http://www.marinha.mil.br/ciasc/esoppazfem/>> and <<https://www.marinha.mil.br/noticias/marinha-forma-3a-turma-do-estagio-de-operacoes-de-paz-para-mulheres>>. Accessed on: 6 Sept. 2023.

including former chiefs in the Federal District, Colonel Sheyla Sampaio, and in the state of Paraná, Colonel Audilene Dias Rocha. In comparison, women in the Brazilian military so far remain excluded from combat and have hardly ever held leadership positions.

However, as keenly observed by one police officer who was interviewed, this comparison only applies to the post of Military Observer, as it might include operational duties. When it comes to Staff Officer posts, with responsibilities restricted to the administrative and planning areas, the women in the military should be in a position to compete on equal terms, since they carry out these tasks in their original military organizations. In fact, a civilian who was interviewed shared that, based on her experience in three different missions, few Brazilian military personnel deployed actually get involved in combat roles. Similarly, a military woman who was interviewed emphasized that Brazilian military women are not even assigned as military attachés abroad a function that bears no relation to combat.

Furthermore, despite the fact that they are represented in a slightly higher proportion in their corps than women in the Armed Forces (11.23 percent of all police officers in 2019 compared to 9.11 percent of the military in October 2020),<sup>162</sup> Brazilian law presents women police officers with an obstacle that does not exist in the case of the military. The selection of military personnel to serve the UN is a matter to be decided by the Federal Government. Police officers, on the other hand, depend on the appointment of State-level Government — one that is not easily convinced of the value of an international experience, when there are pressing public security problems to deal with at home.

We must therefore avoid blaming women in military and police forces for their difficulty to access vacancies in peacekeeping missions and special political missions. In order to be appointed to an individual mission, they depend on a decision that is made by the highest authorities of each institution and that follows criteria beyond their capability. As noted by Baldwin and Taylor: “This places all onus for change on individual women, locating them solely as disadvantaged actors in need of training while

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162 Sources: SENASP/MJSP and SG/MD, respectively. See sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.4 below.

ignoring the exclusionary power structures and individuals or groups that impede implementation [...]" (Baldwin and Taylor, 2019a, 4-5).

Analyzing the process of incorporation of women into the Armed Forces allows for a clearer idea of the hurdles TCCs face in meeting the targets set by the United Nations for the participation of women in peacekeeping operations.

### ***5.1.1. The women pioneers in the Armed Forces***

History is filled with examples of women who took part in decisive battles for their countries.<sup>163</sup> Yet, one can more easily find historical records of women who were assigned tasks socially regarded as feminine, such as caring for the sick (Ticker, 1992, 23). The most famous Brazilian women veterans in this category are probably the “Angels in White” — 73 volunteer nurses, 67 of whom were employed by the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and six by the Air Force, assigned to care for wounded Brazilian soldiers in Italy during World War II. These women acquired the rank of military officer (Second Lieutenant) in the field. Major Elza Cansanção Medeiros, in particular, was given roughly 200 decorations, and was elevated to the category of military hero (Nunes, 2020, 96-98).

But those who were willing to take up arms to defend their homeland, or to avenge their relatives killed in combat, still came forward. The first famous Brazilian fighter was Maria Quitéria de Jesus, who fought as “Private Medeiros” in the War of Independence in her home state of Bahia. In 1822, when her disguise was discovered, she was incorporated into the Volunteer Hunter Battalion and her skills earned her the right to carry a sword. So great was her success that the following year she received the Imperial Order of the Cross from the hands of the Emperor, Dom Pedro I, in Rio de Janeiro. By Decree/96 of June 28, 1996, Maria Quitéria was recognized as Patroness of the Army Staff Corps.<sup>164</sup> More recently, by

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163 For an analysis of historical participation of women in wars, see Sjoberg (2014) and Johnson-Freese (2019).

164 According to the Decree: “Considering that a tribute to Maria Quitéria de Jesus, a countrywoman from Bahia who fought for our Independence, is also a tribute to Brazilian women, today integrated into the Army as Commissioned Officers, as Health Corps and as students in military schools.” It is clear that, in 1996, there was no expectation that Brazilian women would be included, like Quitéria herself, in the Army’s combat ranks.



means of Law No. 13.697 of July 26, 2018, her name was inscribed in the Book of Heroes and Heroines of the Homeland, located in Brasília.

Four decades later, Ceará native Antônia (Jovita) Alves Feitosa, who volunteered in Piauí to fight in the Paraguayan War, was not so lucky. Accepted by the president of her province (now state) as a combatant in August 1865, Jovita Feitosa enjoyed a meagre 37 days of glory before having her rank of Second Sergeant revoked by the Secretary of State for War Affairs (Carvalho, 2019). In recognition of her “patriotic selflessness,” she was allowed to render “services compatible with her sex” (Carvalho, 2019, 28). Jovita Feitosa refused, stating in an interview with a local newspaper: “No, in that case, I would not have come. I could have stayed in my hometown, where I would have done all this [...]” (Carvalho, 2019, 27).

After her request for reconsideration to the Minister of War had been denied, and faced with her family’s rejection due to the embarrassment she had caused, the frustrated 18-year-old combatant was left with few options. Mired in speculation about romantic relationships and even about an alleged son she had left with her grandfather when she joined the Army Volunteers, Jovita Feitosa returned to Rio de Janeiro, where she eventually committed suicide on October 10, 1867, at the age of 19 (Carvalho, 2019). Jovita Alves Feitosa had her name inscribed in the Book of Heroes and Heroines of the Homeland, by means of Law No. 13,423, of March 27, 2017, at the same ceremony in which Maria Quitéria’s name was included.

Jovita Feitosa’s failed experience did not prevent another woman from taking part in the Paraguayan theater of war. Maria Francisca da Conceição, known as Maria Curupaiti, wanted to accompany her soldier husband in an attack on the Curuzu fort on September 1st, 1866. When her request was denied, she disguised herself as a man, took the weapons of a downed opponent and went into combat. Her husband was killed on this occasion, which only increased her willingness to fight. She continued in disguise until she was wounded during the defeat of the Brazilian troops in Curupaiti, when she was taken to a hospital, and had her identity revealed. Nevertheless, she was accepted as a combatant and fought in Tuiuti with the “honorable title” Maria Curupaiti (Carvalho, 2019, 47).

After the war, with the victory of the Triple Alliance, Maria Curupaiti moved to Rio de Janeiro, where she died “poor and unassisted” (Shumaher and Vital Brazil, 2000, 376).

The three cases above illustrate what the UNSG argues in his annual reports on Women, Peace and Security. That is, given the male structure of the Armed Forces throughout the world, women engaging in defense and security efforts out of assistant roles only rarely and recently are given credit for. That is why it is important to make this participation visible, so that women’s perspectives on these issues, whether as political leaders, military commanders or negotiators in peace processes, can be considered equally valid by the male majority.

### **5.1.2. Current state**

In 2014, military women accounted for more than 1/3 of the armed forces in Israel, Nepal and Eritrea. They could enlist in eight countries and take part in combat careers in more than thirty (Sjoberg, 2014). However, even in countries where restrictions on women’s military service were abolished recently (such as the USA), open or tacit resistance to the presence of women remains (Tickner, 2001; Johnson-Freese, 2019).

In Brazil, the incorporation of women into the Armed Forces is recent. In October 2020, women accounted for 9.11 percent of the forces: 18.73 percent in the Air Force, 10.61 percent in the Navy and 5.68 percent in the Army.<sup>165</sup> The total number of military female personnel is shown in Table 3. In comparison to the data considered in the 2017 NAP, there was an increase in the participation of women.

The figures above are consistent with the military conscription model adopted in Brazil — compulsory and exclusive to male citizens — which tends to maintain a low level of participation of women in military organizations. States that have adopted voluntary military service, as well as a civil-military model in their Armed Forces, have reached greater recruitment of women, with greater female representation in leadership positions (Carreiras, 2018).

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<sup>165</sup> Source: DEPEP/SEPESD/SG-MD, through electronic consultation.

Over the last three decades, Brazilian women in the military have carried out various roles in peacekeeping missions, albeit in relatively small numbers. The first one to serve on an UN individual mission was a Navy officer, in 2013. Military women from the Army have been deployed on individual missions in UNIMIL, MINURSO and MINUSCA (Costa, 2018). A survey carried out in September 2019 showed that, five Brazilian women were serving the UN on military individual missions at that time, (Hamann, Giannini and Pereira, 2019).

Based on the interviews, complemented by the survey, and on information provided by the Ministry of Defense, we came up with a list of Brazilian female military personnel deployed to UN peacekeeping operations on individual missions, shown in Table 2. Until January 2021, Brazil had deployed 18 female officers on individual missions (Staff Officers and Military Observers). Out of the 18 women, eight were Air Force officials (44.5 percent of the total), while six were in the Navy (33.3 percent) and four in the Army (22.2 percent). This distribution reflects the representation of women in the three branches of the Brazilian Armed Forces, as presented above. Still, it is striking that in November 2020 alone, there were 51 Brazilian military men on individual missions in the field — a figure almost three times higher than all the women deployed as Staff Officers or Military Observers throughout Brazil's history as a UN Troop Contributing Country.

In terms of Brazilian participation in formed military units, the case of MINUSTAH deserves to be highlighted, given the mission's duration (13 years), the fact that Brazil held the military command for this whole time, and the number of Brazilian military deployed to the Mission: around 37,300. Among them, 239 were uniformed women — or 0.64 percent of the total (Hamann, Gianinni and Pereira, 2019).<sup>166</sup> Although they were only present in small numbers, the participation of Brazilian uniformed women in Haiti was considered “extremely relevant” (Costa, 2018, 17).

At the time of the Brazilian unit's departure from Lebanon (UNIFIL) on December 2, 2020, women represented 2.3 percent of the total of the

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<sup>166</sup> Costa (2018) reports that 203 women were deployed by Brazil to MINUSTAH.

military personnel<sup>167</sup> — well below the target of 6.5 percent set in the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy. This serves as an illustration of the challenge to respond to the current demands for female representation in light of the Armed Forces' wish to resume contribution with formed military units.

As examined in section 4.2, policies aimed at increasing the participation of women in the Brazilian Armed Forces are recent. After signing a Letter of Intent in 2013, the Ministry of Defense was included in the National Plan of Policies for Women in force at the time, which recommended governmental bodies to create gender mechanisms. In this context, the Gender Commission of the Ministry of Defense was set up on April 14, 2014.

The Commission was a consultative body, with internal regulations and an action plan, published in the Federal Official Gazette in February 2015 and May 2015, respectively. According to the action plan, the Commission's aims were to:

- a. Guide the actions of the Ministry of Defense in 2015 with a view to making women's rights and gender equality a reality, taking into account the nature of the Armed Forces;
- b. Monitor and evaluate the fulfillment of the actions defined in the National Plan of Policies for Women, under the responsibility of Defense;
- c. Articulate the sectors of this Ministry in the implementation of the proposed actions;
- d. Contribute to the articulation of the actions of this Ministry in the institutional spaces that deal with women's and gender policies; and
- e. Raise awareness and train the Ministry's civil servants and managers on the subject.

The Commission was made up of representatives from the Office of the Minister of Defense, as well as from the areas in charge of Personnel, Education, Health and Sport and Institutional Organization of the Ministry, and representatives from the three Armed Forces' leadership,

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<sup>167</sup> Source: DPO, as of November 30, 2020.

as well as from Pandiá Calógeras Institute and the Brazilian War School, among others.<sup>168</sup> The first document listed in the Commission's action plan is Resolution 1325, explicitly linking it to the participation of the Ministry of Defense in the Interministerial Working Group set up to draft the text of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

In addition, the establishment of the Commission led to immediate changes in the participation of the Brazilian Army in MINUSTAH, even before the adoption of the National Plan. According to Costa (2018, 16):

The Land Operations Command, through its Division of Peacekeeping Missions, suggested changes to the ranks of the Brazilian Battalion and the Brazilian Peace Force Engineering Company in order to increase the participation of women in MINUSTAH. It also determined that training on sexual abuse and exploitation, child protection, gender balance and the WPS agenda should be included in the troops' preparation program, with the aim of widely disseminating the position of the UN on these issues and, in particular, disciplining the troops on the UN's zero-tolerance policy on sexual abuse and exploitation.

We now turn to the history of the incorporation of women into the officer ranks of the three Armed Forces in Brazil. The first of them to allow women to join was the Brazilian Navy, in 1980, as part of the now-defunct Women's Auxiliary Reserve Corps. The Introduction to the National Action Plan also recognizes that:

In 1996, the Air Force received its first women, who could join the Supply Corps. Since 2003, they have also been able to enter as aviators. The Air Force is currently the branch with the highest number of women in its ranks — including in front-line combat positions, such as fighter pilots. The Naval School received its first class of women in 2014, for the Supply Corps. As of 2017, the Army Military Academy

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<sup>168</sup> Although there is no formal record of its closing, the Gender Commission in the Ministry of Defense has not met since June 6, 2017. Source: Ministry of Defense, by e-mail.

of Agulhas Negras will also welcome women into the logistics ranks. (Brazil 2017, 33)

Since the integration of the “female element,” a term by which the (male) leadership refers to women, there has been a huge increase in interest among women, especially young women, in the military as a career option. The economic opportunity and social advancement represented by the Armed Forces attract women (Tickner, 2001). The interest of young Brazilian women is such that military preparatory schools established quotas to make sure that male candidates are enrolled in higher numbers.<sup>169</sup> In 2019, the Army Cadet Preparatory School announced 400 slots for men and 50 for women.

According to Representative Major Vítor Hugo, in his 2015 study mentioned above: “The military vocation is distributed among Brazilians, regardless of their gender” (Almeida, 2015, 42). In the same study, he recalls, however, that women officers joined the Brazilian Army in 2017 by force of law (Law 12.705, of August 12, 2012), restricted to the careers of logistics and war materials. In turn, the Air Force decided to accept women as aviators on its own initiative in 2003. The Brazilian Navy also responded to legal provisions — Law 12.216/2010 — by allowing 14 female candidates in the Naval Academy (Supply Corps) in 2014. Since 2019, female students at the Naval School are also able to choose between joining the Navy or the Marine Corps, both of which can lead to the top rank of four-star admiral.

In the second decade of the 21st century, the first Brazilian military women were promoted to the rank of general: Rear Admirals Dalva Maria Carvalho Mendes and Luciana Mascarenhas da Costa Marroni. Admiral Dalva worked as a Navy doctor and was promoted to the rank in November 2012. Admiral Luciana is an engineer, specializing in telecommunications, and became a flag officer in November 2018. On October 7, 2020, the Brazilian Air Force promoted Medical Colonel Carla Lyrio Martins to the rank of Medical Brigadier. The three military officers, widely known for

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<sup>169</sup> According to a policewoman interviewed, military police training contests also reserve a number of places for women. In the case of the police, the criterion has been the proportion of men and women in the incarcerated population of the respective federal unit.

being the only Brazilian women to have reached the top of their careers, belong to staff corps in their respective branches. As a result, they do not compete for the top rank. The Brazilian Army has yet to promote a woman general.

In this vein, it is worth noting two events promoted by the Brazilian Navy dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the presence of women, held in person on March 12, 2020, as part of the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325 (2000), and a videoconference on August 26, 2020, with a focus on the national context. On both occasions, it was shared that the integration of women contributed to a “healthy competition” with male colleagues for training and professional qualifications. Not only that, but also that women have a kind of “moderating function” on the (bad) behavior displayed by men in the barracks.

These assertions echo the results of a comparative study on female recruitment policies carried out with 25 Portuguese and Dutch male military personnel. Based on Battistelli’s typology of male reaction to the integration of women in the military, the sentences shared during the events fall into the *Carreiras*’ category of “gentlemen,” who accept the presence of women in idealized terms, or in the category of “macho,” who consider women to be suited to support functions, not combat roles (*Carreiras* in Mathias, 2009).

As for the National Action Plan on WPS, the activity “Train women to work on individual deployment in peacekeeping operations and special political missions” has been implemented. Between 2018 and 2020, the Naval Peace Operations Training Center offered four courses exclusively for women. In November 2019, CCOPAB offered specific PKO training to non-combat personnel. Although the course was not exclusively for women, it was the first time that a preparatory course for peacekeeping missions offered by the Center had a majority of women attendants (30 women and 2 men).<sup>170</sup> The course did not take place in 2020, but it is expected to continue in the future.

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170 Source: CCOPAB. Available at: <<https://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/en/center-news/148-2019/1135-ccopab-carries-out-the-trainingcourse-for-non-combatant-soldiers-for-peace-missions>>. Accessed on: 12 Sept. 2023.

Even before the NAP, UN’s “Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials” already contained training on “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse” (Lima, 2015). Also, since 2011, the training of the Brazilian battalion in Haiti has included gender equality (section 3.1.3). In 2020, the UN material continued to be the basis for CCOPAB’s Preparatory Training for Peacekeeping Missions. Based on the interviews, no additional training on the National Plan or the WPS agenda was being offered by the two centers at the time of writing.

With regard to the activity “Promote the Women, Peace and Security agenda in training and post-training courses of the Armed Forces,” a military officer who was interviewed said that opportunities for women in the military in peacekeeping missions became part of the curriculum at the Army Academy of Agulhas Negras after the integration of female cadets in 2018. However, it was not possible to confirm that the other two branches had done the same, nor that the content taught at the Army Academy mentions the WPS agenda or the NAP.

### **5.1.3. The future of women’s participation in the Armed Forces**

*“It should not be forgotten that, in Brazil, almost all of those who criticize the presence of women in the national Armed Forces have less experience in combat than the thousands of NATO women who are currently fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. The perceptions and opinions of these critics are mostly based on theoretical and sometimes patently discriminatory analyses.”*

Vítor Hugo de Araújo Almeida

The access of men — and only men — to military service is one of the historical pillars of the Armed Forces (Bourdieu 2018). Women’s participation in wars, from the oldest to the most recent, has often been treated as an undesirable side effect. The moment women are encouraged to compete for jobs and positions that were previously exclusively filled by men, a reaction is to be expected.



The debate about the presence of women in the Armed Forces has historically been based on the difference in physical strength compared to men. However, it is impossible to consider military combat today without taking into account the revolution represented by autonomous weapon systems such as combat drones and killer robots. With the introduction of these technologies into the theater of operation, illustrated, for example, in the conflict in Libya,<sup>171</sup> not only does the performance and interaction between human soldiers change, but also the very nature of combat.

The combination of optimizing soldiers' physical capabilities through the use of robots and lighter combat equipment tends to quickly make up for the gap in physical capabilities between the sexes. Furthermore, according to Letendre (2016), women have proven to be better controllers of some of this equipment than men. In current and future wars, armies will increasingly need creative teams capable of countering their opponents' technological innovations. In this scenario, diversity, including gender diversity, is beneficial (Letendre, 2016, 98-99).

There is a bill pending in the Federal Senate (PLS 213/2015) that would allow Brazilian women to be enlisted for optional military service in peacetime. Female candidates could express their desire to serve in the year they turn 18, just like men. The text reserves for women 30 percent of the total number of places on offer each year. There are also provisions allowing men to fill any remaining places in case they are not taken by women. In December 2020, the text awaited an opinion from the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense.

Acknowledging the difficulty that a large part of the women's movement has in supporting military efforts, the authors of the proposal stress that the bill aims at providing the female population, especially those on lower incomes and with less schooling, with additional opportunities in the labor market. In a more pragmatic interpretation, the bill would help equalize economic opportunities available to men and women in Brazil.

Another legislative initiative, this time from the Chamber of Deputies, is Nomination 1579 of 2019, on expanding women's access to the

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171 For more on this, see *Libya's Game of Drones*, August 2020. Available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DVE0tkGSaM>>. Accessed on: 12 Sept. 2023.

various careers in the Armed Forces. Received by the Directing Committee in November 2019, the proposal was submitted in December of that year to the Presidency of the Republic, where it remains under consideration. In an interview, the drafter, Representative Major Vítor Hugo, clarifies that it is a suggestion, given that the primary authority on the matter does not lie with Congress, but with the Executive. He adds that the main intention of the nomination is to spark debate on the issue.

Because of the cultural peculiarities surrounding military organizations, research shows that measures to integrate women need to be carefully planned. Without careful design, certain policies designed to promote formal integration (such as quotas) can be perceived as a source of inequality and thus create effects that are opposite to the full social integration of women in the armed forces — for example, less access to leadership positions (Carreiras, 2018).

#### ***5.1.4. Police officers in peacekeeping operations***

As we have seen, the military component of peacekeeping operations has its own leadership and employs police officers assigned by Member States in individual missions as well as in formed units. In individual missions, police officers are deployed for a period of up to two years in basic functions, such as patrolling, regardless of the hierarchical level they occupy in their country of origin. Once in the field, officers can go through internal selection processes to positions of coordination or command. This non-ranking system is significantly different from individual positions for military personnel in peacekeeping operations — which have distinct job descriptions and require a specific rank.

The effect of the presence of female police officers in UN missions is felt mainly in promoting local women's access to justice. In most host countries, women are socially prevented from approaching men outside their family circle — which is why the presence of a policewoman gives them a chance to report abuse and violence. Women peacekeepers also tend to encourage young local women to join security forces. According to the NAP:

[...] female officials react in a more efficient manner to violence against women, and are more likely to respond to domestic violence-related complaints. The female component also receives fewer complaints related to misconduct, inappropriate use of force and weapons, and authoritarian behavior in civilian and lower patent officials interactions. Finally, data collected from 40 countries demonstrate positive correlation between the proportion of female police officers and sexual assault reports (Brazil, 2017, 37).

The National Action Plan establishes as one of its objectives: “Increase the participation of women military police officers deployed in peacekeeping operations and special political missions, including in leading positions,” with three corresponding activities: “promote the deployment of women military police officers through coordination with the concerned federal units,” whose lead institution is the Ministry of Justice and Public Security; “assess the main practical challenges on the Women, Peace and Security agenda faced by women military police officers at the national level as well as on missions related to the matter;” and “promote the exchange of experience and best practices among countries regarding the participation of women military police officers in international peace and security activities,” both led by the Ministry of Defense. In Brazil’s practice, only military police officers have been deployed in the service of the UN. Peacekeeping missions more commonly require surveillance and overt security operations (which, in the Brazilian system, is in the purview of the Military Police), instead of investigation duties (which is in the purview of the Civil Police). The Brazilian Army General Inspectorate of Military Police is responsible for mediating consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which first receives UN offers through the Permanent Mission in New York) and the police forces of the 27 states in the federation.

Until 1993, the Ministry of Justice held this role. That year, in order to deal with the growing number of military personnel assigned to UN missions between 1989 and 1992, Itamaraty established the Interministerial Working Group on Peace Operations. Within the works

of this Group, the Ministry of Justice agreed that the Army had more resources and could establish more agile communication with the states than the Ministry. The decision was also influenced by the argument by the then Ministry of the Army that the military police are, according to article 144 of the Federal Constitution, auxiliary forces of the Army (Fontoura, 1999, 220-221).

Currently, the Army runs a preliminary evaluation of language proficiency, based on a list of interested candidates in the states. The process takes place in person. Police officers themselves must pay for their travel expenses to take the test. Those who pass the preliminary selection are registered on a roster and wait for an opening. When Foreign Affairs notifies Defense of a new opening in a mission, the Army notifies states' commands with candidates on the roster.

Once a police officer's interest has been confirmed, the challenging process of obtaining authorization for their deployment begins. With minor variations, authorization usually depends on the consent of their immediate superior, then the state General Commander of the Police, the State Secretary for Public Security and, finally, the Governor. Once state authorization is obtained, the Army forwards the officer's nomination to the Ministry of Defense, who in turn asks Itamaraty to send the name(s) to the UN for evaluation. This final step is identical to the one followed by military personnel deployed on individual missions.

Based on the interviews, there is little inclination among both police superiors and Governors to deploy women military police officers on peacekeeping missions. According to Hamann, Giannini and Pereira (2019), there is not always a clear understanding of the possible benefits that the participation of these professionals in UN missions can bring. As a result, the number of female police officers deployed by Brazil has historically been small. The first woman police officer to be deployed was in 1992, to the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM II). In almost 30 years, around 25 Brazilian women police officers have taken part in seven different missions (Hamann, Giannini and Pereira, 2019, 19).

In November 2020, out of three Brazilian police officers on peacekeeping missions, there were two women (66.7 percent).<sup>172</sup> In nominal terms, the percentage was above the target set in the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy. However, two aspects should be noted: a) in absolute terms, the figures are very low; and b) individual missions fluctuate significantly over a short period of time. A few months earlier, in August 2020, Brazil had four male police officers (zero percent of women) in the field.

As for the obstacles to the deployment of women police officers, interviewees believe they are similar to those faced by men. In some cases, it takes a very long time for an opening in a mission to be announced after pre-selection by the Army. When they receive a concrete offer, police officers have often already made other family or professional plans and end up declining. What is more, in the meantime, there has often been a change of a superior who looked favorably on the UN experience, and the replacement does not always share the same view. Interviewees conclude that the take-up rate is usually low for both women and men, which confirms the analysis by Calazans (2016).

When talking about their duties in the field, the women interviewed consider that women peacekeepers play an irreplaceable role in peacekeeping missions. One of them, with experience in Haiti, talks about the paradigm shift brought about by women in operational roles. Local police forces did not accept women when she first arrived in the country. She caused a stir when she was assigned to work alongside a Haitian Special Forces officer.

Another interviewee was particularly proud of her position in the UN International Network of Female Police Peacekeepers (UNPOL Women Network), a mechanism conceived by UNPOL in 2013, dismantled due to a lack of volunteers, and resumed in 2018 by a group in which she took part. Through her engagement with this Network, she became aware of the cultural barriers that led police officers from the host country to serve coffee or become secretaries in the barracks. These professionals were kept from assisting the female population, who cannot, within the social norms of that society, report an attack or a theft to a male police officer.

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172 Source: DPO, as of 30 November 2020.

This interviewee considers it unlikely that a male colleague would have taken the initiative she took to develop a special training course that ended up being offered to local women without the presence of men. The local secret service, which is 100 percent masculine, was not pleased when they could not access the event and to tried to intimidate the organizers, including the interviewee. Confident in speaking on behalf of the UN, the organizers, all women, did not back down.

When asked about the National Action Plan, interviewees said that they learned of the document after deployment, upon their return to Brazil. They consider that knowledge of the agenda in the Military Police is practically non-existent. Therefore, the adoption of the NAP would not have influenced the appointments of Brazilian women police officers to the UN. In fact, no data was found on the implementation of any of the three activities listed at the beginning of this section. Interviewees believe that sensitizing state General Commanders and the Ministry of Justice, through its National Secretariat of Public Security, could be helpful.

In order to increase the participation of Brazilian police officers of both sexes, it would be necessary to consolidate, among state-level leaders, the national interest behind engagement in United Nations peace efforts, especially in terms of international projection and doctrine updates, that can be multiplied in the corps when these professionals return to Brazil. Interviewees stressed that the Brazilian police are widely recognized in niches such as community policing and domestic violence — areas in which they can give a tangible contribution to the missions in which they operate. To this end, federal leadership seems essential, a role that could be filled, for example, by the Ministry of Justice. The lack of a driving force is probably the reason why Brazil has never deployed a formed police unit in 70 years contributing to peacekeeping missions.

## **5.2. Civilian participation in peacekeeping missions, political missions and mediation**

In today's multidimensional peace operations, where civilian components are significantly larger than in previous models, the UN employs specialists from various fields of expertise. In 2005, during a mandate at the UNSC, Brazil took part in discussions on the proposal

put forward by Sweden to include civilian professionals in peacekeeping missions. Files from the time, which coincided with the creation of the PBC, show that, despite concerns about legal issues related to the secondment of civil servants, Brazil considered that the proposal was: “[...] in line with the Brazilian vision of missions that cover aspects other than just those of a military nature.”<sup>173</sup> Brazil also felt that:

The presence of a civilian observer component could make relevant contributions to peacekeeping missions that take into account the interrelated aspects of security, political reconciliation, economic reconstruction and respect for human rights. The Swedish considerations on the issue of female representation are also justified, since [...] women, children and the elderly are the main victims of conflicts.<sup>174</sup>

Today’s civilian experts are career employees of the UN, or hired for positions in the field, through three main types of contract: Field Services; General Services; and Professionals and higher categories. Staff from all three careers can take part in peacekeeping missions, but the last is the most prestigious, as it operates in the Organization’s core area, i.e. political issues. Like the diplomatic career, the UN career of professionals is organized in hierarchical levels of increasing responsibility and compensation, up to director level.<sup>175</sup>

In 2010, the “Young Professionals Programme” was created to encourage youth from underrepresented countries, such as Brazil, to join the Secretariat.<sup>176</sup> Aimed at graduates up to the age of 32 who are proficient in English or French, the program selects professionals who join a list of pre-approved candidates, valid for two years, with no guarantee of employment.

Another way to join the UN is through the Volunteer Programme (UNV), which also recruits for specific positions by area and mission. Despite the name, these professionals receive an allowance to pay for

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173 Cable 1826 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 7 July 2005.

174 Cable 1180 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 19 October 2005.

175 Source: UN Careers.

176 Cable 266 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 31 January 2020.

room and board. They are not part of the UN's career plan, but with the experience they acquire, they are later well positioned to apply for a career job. According to the UN, between 2008 and 2018, 8,509 volunteers served in peacekeeping missions. In the organization's view, these professionals are particularly suited to supporting peacekeeping and special political missions to advance peacebuilding, bolster humanitarian assistance, support electoral processes and respond to health emergencies through administrative, logistical, technical and medical expertise.<sup>177</sup>

As an indication that representation on the ground and in the UN Secretariat matters, some countries make places available to their nationals through annual financial transfers to the UN. There is an exclusive UN entry program for donor countries — the Junior Professional Officer Programme, which, in October 2020, covered 39 countries.<sup>178</sup> The United for Gender Parity strategy, which aims to accelerate parity among UN employees, applies to all civilian jobs. According to DPO data from November 2016, women accounted for 22 percent of civilians working in peace missions.<sup>179</sup>

Although there is no frequent production of statistics on civilians, in contrast to the uniformed components, it is known that female representation among civilians is higher than among military personnel. For example: between 2008 and 2019, peacekeeping missions received 80 Brazilian UNVs — 36 were men (45 percent) and 44 women (55 percent) (Hamann, Giannini and Pereira, 2019, 23). As noted by Albernaz (in-press), although the sample is small, there is a much more significant representation of Brazilian women in this group than among the military and police.

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177 Source: UN. Available at: <<https://www.unv.org/Partners/unv-partnering-un-peacekeeping>>. Accessed on: 14 Sept. 2023.

178 Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Korea, Norway, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States of America. Fonte: ONU. Available at: <[www.un.org/development/desa/jpo/donor-countries](http://www.un.org/development/desa/jpo/donor-countries)>. Accessed on: 20 June 2022.

179 Available at: <<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/civilians>>. Accessed on: 14 Sept. 2023.



According to data obtained by the Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York from UN Human Resources in July 2020, nine Brazilians were working in the DPO and five in the DPPA at UN Headquarters. At the DPO, there were two women (22.2 percent), one civilian and one military. In the DPPA, four of the five Brazilians were women (80 percent). In the field, there were 11 Brazilian civilians in peacekeeping operations (4 women — 36.4 percent) and 11 in special political missions (5 women — 45.5 percent).<sup>180</sup> This confirms that civilian Brazilian women are much more represented in peace and security issues than uniformed women.

However, just like with uniformed women, the inclusion of civilian experts in UN missions is not without difficulties. One interviewee with experience in special political and peacekeeping missions believes that female UN employees are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment. In her view, when it takes place inside of missions, sexual harassment is less visible than sexual abuse and exploitation against the local population. It is also considered less harmful to UN's reputation. What is more, the channels for reporting sexual harassment lead to male managers, which creates a concern among women that speaking out against a superior will jeopardize their careers at the UN.<sup>181</sup> Another civilian interviewee admitted that she had been harassed on a previous mission, years ago, and that, at the time, she did not feel encouraged to report it to her superior, who had just employed his local mistress on the mission.<sup>182</sup>

Bearing in mind that women represent more than 50 percent of the population in Brazil, and that they are the majority graduating from national universities,<sup>183</sup> the inclusion of civilian women, experts or volunteers, in UN peacekeeping missions could compensate for the low representation of Brazilian women in uniform. Hence the objective of "Increase the participation of Brazilian civilian women in international

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180 The peacekeeping operations that employed Brazilian civilians were: MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNIFIL, UNMIK and UNMISS. The special political missions that employed Brazilians were: BINUH, UNAMA, UNAMI, UNIOGBIS, UNSOM, UNVMC and the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen. The presence of Brazilians in all these missions considerably expands the potential network of contacts available to the government, compared to the eight peacekeeping missions with military and police personnel.

181 Interviewed in November 2020.

182 Interviewed in August 2020.

183 Source: INEP 2019 Higher Education Census.

peace and security activities, including in leadership positions,” included in the National Action Plan (Brazil, 2017, 42).

One of the activities related to the above objective is “Analyze the relevant legislation with regards to the assignment of civil servants to the United Nations and other international organizations, in order to propose recommendations to increase the assignment of Brazilian women to perform roles related to international peace and security,” whose lead institution is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite high demand from peacekeeping missions and special political missions for specialists in the areas of justice (experts, clerks, among others), security (correctional officers) and elections, there are legal constraints for the secondment of Brazilian civil servants.<sup>184</sup>

Since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, various legal provisions have been approved regarding the possibility of public servants being seconded to international organizations. Article 96 of the “Public Service Law” (Law No. 8.112 of 1990) provides for assignment to an international organization in which Brazil participates or with which it cooperates, with total loss of remuneration. It so happens that the UN requires Member States to keep a link with the civil servant applying for the job and continue to pay her/his, salary.<sup>185</sup>

Law No. 10,539, regulated by Decree No. 4,501, both of 2002, allows for the secondment on a “temporary official mission” basis. The legislation applies to federal civil servants only, and it requires authorization from the President of the Republic, upon a proposal from the Minister of State to which the civil servant is subordinated, as well as the agreement of the Minister of Economy. It does not apply to municipal and state civil servants. Besides, the requirements discourage ministries and judicial bodies from circulating information on opportunities in the United Nations to their members. There is a great level of uncertainty about

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184 It is worth mentioning that members of the Foreign Service and military personnel, due to the nature of their duties, are subject to different legal regimes, and their secondment do not face the same difficulties.

185 According to Fontoura (1999, 224-227), 75 Brazilians, including four diplomats, were seconded as elections experts to five peacekeeping missions and one special political mission, between 1992 and 1999. These civil servants signed temporary contracts with the UN and were entitled to airfare and daily allowances, while their original institutions kept paying their salaries, health insurance and other costs.

whether authorizations will be granted, as well as about the progression and social security rights of civil servants on secondment, and the costs of health care and transport while on mission.

Between 2011 and 2013, as part of efforts to increase the participation of Brazilian civilians in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, Itamaraty held technical talks with various ministries and the President's Office in order to address inconsistencies found in the legislation on the secondment of civil servants. After that, there is no record of further attempts to change this legislation, which would allow Brazil to definitively expand the country's contribution to peacekeeping missions and political missions beyond uniformed personnel. Without that, the participation of Brazilian civilians in these missions is restricted to a small number of independent professionals, who are not supported by the State.

Seven civilian women were interviewed by the writer, none of whom were public servants. They recalled that they looked up information about working at the United Nations on their own. It is worth mentioning that only two said they were familiar with the NAP. When comparing their experience to that of colleagues of other nationalities, the interviewees recommended that the government make information on work opportunities in peacekeeping missions more available to Brazilians. Their suggestion resonates with the activity "Conduct incentive campaigns to disseminate information on jobs and positions in activities relating to international peace and security" (Brazil, 2017, 42) included in the NAP, under the leadership of Foreign Affairs. No information on the implementation of this activity was found.

The women who were interviewed suggested that the government pre-select interested candidates and keep a roster, along the lines of the pre-examination of military police officers by the Army. When an opening comes, the information could be shared with the previously selected professionals, increasing the chances of hiring. A roster that gives preference, on equal terms, to female civilians could be maintained at a relatively low cost and would fulfill the activity: "Encourage women who already have the necessary qualifications to volunteer for and participate in peacekeeping operations and special political missions

of the United Nations” (Brazil, 2017, 42) included in the NAP, under primary responsibility of Foreign Affairs, in relation to which no results were found.

In the interviewees’ experience, the integration of the Women, Peace and Security agenda into mission routines depends to a large extent on the leadership. According to most of the interviewees, however, few men are aware of the positive difference that women make on the field. Hence, having women in decision-making positions contributes to the agenda’s implementation. One interviewee mentions the difficulties faced by women in holding leadership positions in these environments, where men are not only the majority, but also a highly militarized and hierarchical one (in the case of peacekeeping missions). This requires extra willingness on the part of these women to impose their authority.

Male leaders, on the other hand, whether they are Special Representatives, Force Commanders or Police Commissioners, play an important role, according to the interviewees, if they set an example for the other members of the mission. According to their reports, men in a leadership position who practice or tolerate sexual abuse and exploitation end up sponsoring misconduct, whether intentionally or not. This jeopardizes the mission’s credibility among the local population.

In addition to participating in peacekeeping missions and special political missions, civilian women can also collaborate with peace efforts as mediators. Be they civil servants or self-employed professionals, women mediators have worked in preventive diplomacy, as well as in negotiating peace agreements and post-conflict political arrangements as part of the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. In the UNSG’s view:

Mediators are expected to promote the direct participation of women, clearly articulate it as a priority, rather than as something that can be addressed only after peace between warring parties has been achieved, and explore all possible strategies, including providing incentives and implementing temporary special measures.<sup>186</sup>

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186 Document S/2020/946.

Since 2006, the DPPA has a Mediation Support Unit dedicated to supporting good offices and mediation in the context of conflict prevention and resolution, with a mandate to “mainstream gender considerations in their advice and support.”<sup>187</sup> In 2008, the Standby Team of Mediation Experts was created, recently renamed the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisors, made up of professionals chosen by the DPPA for one-year contracts. Brazil has been a member of the Group of Friends of Mediation since its creation in 2010.

The participation of women in peace agreement negotiations contributes to the duration of armistices. However, ensuring such participation in conflict-affected countries is a huge challenge for the international community. In 2019, the DPPA launched guidelines to incorporate women into peace agreement negotiations and mediation efforts, after noticing systematic resistance from the parties involved. According to the new policy, the heads of special political missions and Special Envoys must periodically report on their initiatives to promote the direct participation of women in peace processes, giving them the ability to influence the results.<sup>188</sup> To help with this task, in 2019 there were 27 Gender Advisers in special political missions.<sup>189</sup>

At an event held on the sidelines of the opening of the 74th Session of the UNGA in September 2019, the Global Alliance of Regional Women Mediators Network was created, comprising the Nordic Women Mediators, The Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation — FemWise, the Arab Women Mediators Network, The Southeast Asian Network of Women Peace Negotiators and Mediators, the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network and the Women Mediators across the Commonwealth.<sup>190</sup> During the event, Argentina announced the intention to create a network of women mediators in the Southern Cone, based on the experience of the Federal Network of Mediators with

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187 Source: DPPA. Available at: <[https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/dppa\\_one-pager\\_msu.pdf](https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/dppa_one-pager_msu.pdf)>. Accessed on: 14 Sept. 2023.

188 Document S/2019/800, p. 7.

189 Document S/2020/946.

190 Available at: <<https://globalwomenmediators.org>>. Accessed on: 20 June 2022.

Gender Perspective — a group of experts linked to the Argentinian Judiciary, with professional experience in “peaceful conflict resolution.”<sup>191</sup>

In 2020, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325 (2000), Argentina consulted Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay about their interest in setting up a regional network of female mediators in the Southern Cone. According to the Argentinian proposal, the network would train women to take part in peace processes and elaborate a list of professionals qualified to meet UN demands.<sup>192</sup> The Southern Cone Regional Network of Women Mediators was created in 2021,<sup>193</sup> and it now presents Brazilian female civil servants with a unique opportunity to contribute to peace processes led by the United Nations without the need for secondment.

### 5.3. Political participation

*“You cannot easily fit women into a structure that is already coded as male; you have to change the structure. That means thinking about power differently. [...] It means, above all, thinking about power as an attribute or even a verb (‘to power’), not as a possession.”*

Mary Beard, “Women and Power”

The full, equal and meaningful participation of women in peace processes is one of the cornerstones of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, as it promotes lasting peace (UN Women, 2015). Despite normative progress in this area, the participation of women in peace negotiations led or monitored by the United Nations remains low: in 2019, women were 2.4 percent of all heads of delegation and nine percent of negotiators in formal peace processes. Between 1992 and 2019, women

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191 Available at: <<http://www.jus.gob.ar/media/3299911/bases.pdf>>. Accessed on: 14 Sept. 2023.

192 Cable 378, to the Embassy in Buenos Aires, 31 August 2020.

193 Available at: <<https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/es/actualidad/noticias/sola-lanzo-la-red-regional-de-mediadoras-del-cono-sur>>. Accessed on: 2 May 2024.

represented 13 percent of negotiators, six percent of mediators and six percent of signatories in the main peace processes.

In addition to numbers, another challenge is to ensure that the women who reach negotiating tables are able to influence their outcome. Recent research shows that the mere presence of one or more women cannot guarantee more agreements to be signed or implemented. It is necessary to make women count, not just count women (Paffenholz et al., 2016). On the difficulty of women's voices being heard in peace processes, the UNSG ponders:

Delegations to peace talks in wartime are a reflection of the conflict and societal power structures. When decision-making structures consistently exclude women from visible roles, parties to conflicts are more likely to see them as untested, given that they have not previously participated [...].<sup>194</sup>

Even in the United Nations' Secretariat, female representation in units that deal with international peace and security is particularly low. For that, the DPO and DPPA were given a longer deadline to implement the Gender Parity Strategy: until 2028, instead of 2026, which applies to the other departments.<sup>195</sup> According to the 2020 UNSG Report, women accounted for 41 percent of Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative posts in peacekeeping missions and special political missions.

In times of peace, when they can influence decisions on the preparation and deployment of Armed Forces, as well as support for peace initiatives in third countries, women's representation is universally low: an average of 24.3 percent in national parliaments. It may surprise some that Rwanda, which has undergone a recent democratic transition, today tops the list of parliaments with the highest female representation

<sup>194</sup> Document S/2020/946.

<sup>195</sup> Source: System-Wide Strategy on Gender Parity. Available at: <[https://www.un.org/gender/sites/www.un.org/gender/files/gender\\_parity\\_strategy\\_october\\_2017.pdf](https://www.un.org/gender/sites/www.un.org/gender/files/gender_parity_strategy_october_2017.pdf)>. Accessed on: 18 Sept. 2023.

— 61.3 percent in the lower house and 38.5 percent in the senate.<sup>196</sup> This is the result of implementing the Women, Peace and Security agenda on the ground, such as in the DRC, Syria, Afghanistan and Yemen — where cultural patterns restricting women’s participation in public life need to be overcome in order to help sustain peace.<sup>197</sup>

For Brazil, it is clear that Resolution 1325 (2000) is aimed at improving the situation of women after armed conflicts, as a result of the actions of the UN. In a speech to the Security Council on April 27, 2010, the Brazilian delegation argued:

In post-conflict scenarios, where institutions are being rebuilt and gradually consolidated, there is often a window of opportunity to overcome historical situations of insensitivity and gender inequality. It is precisely when the redistribution of power and roles within a society are being redrawn after the trauma of war that efforts must be made to ensure that women’s concerns and needs are properly addressed. (Viotti, Dunlop and Fernandes, 2014, 365)

Resolution 1325 (2000) consolidated the understanding that, if this is the case in wartime, the equal participation of women in politics should be the goal of all countries in peacetime. Research shows that the presence of women in parliaments reduces the risk of civil war and that a five percent increase in their representation reduces fivefold the chance that a country will use force when faced with an international crisis (Caprioli, 2000, 61).

Countries are different in terms of the history of women’s access to political office. While Finland has allowed its female population to vote since 1906, and Brazil since 1932, Saudi Arabia recognized female citizens’ right to vote in 2015 (Marques, 2018). The possibility for women to hold elected office in addition to voting has been linked with the maturity level of national democracies. Research shows that women participate in

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196 Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union. Consultation in August 2020. Available at: <<https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=6&year=2020>>. Accessed on: 18 Sept. 2023.

197 Document S/2019/800.



politics in a manner that is different from men, often prioritizing issues that do not attract their attention. Women tend to draft and support more bills on women and children, and to fight abuse (Johnson-Freese, 2019, 211).

In light of the challenges shared by the community of nations, we turn next to examining the situation of women's participation in Brazilian politics.

### *5.3.1. Female representation in politics*

In 2020, Brazil ranked 141st among 192 national parliaments in terms of female representation, with 14.6 percent of women representatives and 13.6 percent of women senators. In 2017, the year the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security was launched, the figures were very similar: 10.7 percent and 14.8 percent respectively.<sup>198</sup> In terms of state and municipal government, in 2020 there was one woman governor in the 27 states of the Federation. In the October municipal elections, only one woman was elected mayor of a capital city. The situation is identical to that of the year the Plan was launched: in 2017, there was one woman governor and one woman mayor of a capital city.

In reality, the increase in women's participation in national politics has been consistently slow. Political participation is the main reason for the country's low ranking (92nd place out of 153 countries) in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report 2020.<sup>199</sup> Despite having a law stipulating a minimum of 30 percent female candidates since 1997 (Law 9.504), in line with international best practice, Brazil has not achieved the expected results in terms of increasing the representation of women in elected office.

One of the aspects that seems to contribute to this situation is that the 1997 law stipulated that the percentage of vacancies for women be assessed based on the total number of candidacies that a party or coalition could launch, not on the number of candidates that were in fact presented.

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198 Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union. Available at: <<http://archive.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmmap17-en.pdf>>. Accessed on: 18 Sept. 2023.

199 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2020, 30.

In other words, the law allowed for candidacies that were supposedly reserved for women to never actually be launched. Once the flaw was noted, Law 12.034 of 2009 was enacted, requiring a minimum of 30 percent of women among candidates running for office.

Another factor cited as the cause of the inefficiency of quota laws in Brazil is that, over the last two decades, most female candidates have received little or no funding — which, in practice, makes it impossible for them to be elected. An action of unconstitutionality was filed on this. It was judged by the Federal Supreme Court on March 15, 2018. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that at least 30 percent of Party Funds should be allocated to women’s campaigns.

After a 2017 ban on party coalitions in proportional parliamentary elections, the 30 percent quota for female candidates — and the corresponding allocation of financial resources — now applies to each political party registered in Brazil. In addition, National Congress is currently considering a bill aimed at ensuring registration only of women candidates with a proven intention of running for and holding public office.<sup>200</sup> Hopefully these reforms will help to prevent fraud and bring the minimum 30 percent representation of women closer to the actual result at the polls.

While representation of women in elected office is important, one should also pay attention to the roles they fulfill. At state level, as of September 2020, all 27 legislative assemblies are chaired by men. In its entire history, Brazil has yet to have a woman chair one of the Federal Legislative Houses.<sup>201</sup>

Established by Article 58 of the Federal Constitution, National Congress committees have a legislative and oversight function. Their composition reflects the proportional representation of the parties in each House, and the choice of committee members and alternates depend on nomination by party leaders. There are also joint committees, such as the Joint Committee on Planning, Public Budgets and Oversight made

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200 Bill of Law 1.541/2019. Source: Agência Senado.

201 Women representatives and senators have been elected to chair committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate and have even chaired house sessions in the absence of incumbents.

up of representatives and senators, in charge of the bills that become the Budget Guidelines Law and the Annual Budget Law.

Standing committees discuss and vote on bills, hold public hearings, summon ministers to provide information, and can receive complaints against public authorities or institutions, as well as conduct audits in the Three Branches and the indirect administration. In general, the number of members in each committee is related to the scope of its work. As they consider legislative matters in the area of foreign policy and defense, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense of the Chamber of Deputies and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense of the Federal Senate are of particular interest to this work.

Normally, nominations for committees take place once a year. In 2020, however, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there were no nominations and the composition remained the same as in 2019. In the Chamber of Deputies, two women representatives were members of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, out of a total of 38 members (5 percent). There were no women among the Committee's board of directors. In the Federal Senate, three female senators were part of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense, out of a total of 19 (15.8 percent). The leadership of the Committee is also exclusively male.

In both houses, the Committees on Constitution, Justice and Citizenship and the Economic Affairs/Finance and Taxation Committees are the largest and most prestigious. In 2020, in the Chamber of Deputies, two female representatives occupied the 1st and 3rd vice-presidencies of the Committee on Constitution and Justice and Citizenship, which is made up of 64 members, including seven female deputies (11 percent). In the Committee on Finance and Taxation, three female representatives were among 36 members (eight percent), none of them as part of the board of directors. In the Senate, then senator Simone Tebet chaired the Committee on Constitution, Justice and Citizenship. She was the only woman among 27 members (3.7 percent). In addition, there were two female senators among the 27 members of the Committee on Economic Affairs of the Federal Senate (7.4 percent) as of 2020.

It is not possible to correlate the results described above with the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Although the Plan mentions women's participation in politics, it does not include objectives or activities aimed at women's representation in elected office. In addition, as mentioned in section 4.2, no parliamentarians were involved in drawing up the document. However, it should be noted that the discussions about increasing the presence of women in Brazilian politics and the effectiveness of the quota law open up an opportunity for the Interministerial Working Group to engage with parliament and electoral control bodies with a view to strengthening the issue in a future version of the National Action Plan.

### *5.3.2. The case of diplomacy*

In addition to political office, the participation of women in foreign policy is important, among other reasons, because diplomats are responsible for representing their countries in multilateral fora in charge of international peace and security. However, just as is the case of elected office and national defense, international politics and diplomacy have historically been carried out by men (Tickner, 1992). In many countries, legal barriers prevented women's access to diplomacy until recent decades.<sup>202</sup> Around the world, female diplomats find it more difficult to rise to positions of leadership than their male counterparts. In October 2020, there were 52 women among Permanent Representatives of 193 countries to the UN in New York (26.9 percent).<sup>203</sup> Worldwide, 15 percent of ambassadors were women (Aggestam and Towns, 2018).

Even today, the participation of female diplomats in defense issues and international peace and security is scarce (Ticker, 1992, 7-8; Mathias, 2009, 9; Aggestam in Davies and True, 2019, chap. 64; Myrntinen, 2020, 29-30). As a rule, posts that require characteristics associated with masculinity, such as political and military affairs, continue to be

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202 For a comparison of the history of the incorporation of women into the chancelleries of Brazil, the USA, Japan, Sweden and Türkiye, see Aggestam and Towns, 2018, 280-283.

203 Meeting of the President of the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly with female permanent representatives (16 October 2020). Available at: <<https://www.un.org/pga/75/2020/10/16/meeting-with-female-permanent-representatives-to-the-united-nations>>. Accessed on: 19 Sept. 2023.

occupied preferentially by men (Aggestam and Towns, 2018, 13). The representation of women diplomats in events on disarmament and arms control is consistently low, as opposed to the “room full of women” in meetings on the WPS agenda (Myrntinen, 2020).

Since Clausewitz’s proposition in 1832 that war is the continuation of politics by other means, diplomats and the military have often been compared in their attributions and have come to be considered the two faces of the external action of the State. In Brazil, the National Defense Policy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense White Paper, the so-called “basic defense documents,” have the objective of clarifying and disseminating defense activities in Brazil. These documents consolidate the view that defense and diplomacy are complementary.

The Strategy submitted to Congress in July 2020 states that: “Although diplomatic actions differ from those employed by Defense, both have the same objective in their essence.” It goes on to add: “In times of peace or crisis, the Defense Sector acts in a way that contributes to diplomacy efforts undertaken by the country.”<sup>204</sup> For its part, the White Paper proposes: “Defense and diplomacy are important drivers in preserving and strengthening national sovereignty, which requires close coordination between foreign and defense policies, insofar as the latter offers essential safeguards for Brazil’s actions on the international arena.”<sup>205</sup> None of the documents mention the National Action Plan on WPS.

In recognition of the role of women diplomats in peace and security issues, the NAP has two objectives and five activities aimed at increasing their representation in these teams, including in leadership positions (Brazil 2017, 45). In 2019, on the occasion of the Plan’s renewal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted voluntary targets for four activities:

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204 Available at: <[https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/copy\\_of\\_estado-e-defesa/pnd\\_end\\_congresso\\_.pdf](https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/copy_of_estado-e-defesa/pnd_end_congresso_.pdf)>. Accessed on: 19 Sept. 2023.

205 Available at: <[https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/copy\\_of\\_estado-e-defesa/livro\\_branco\\_congresso\\_nacional.pdf](https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/copy_of_estado-e-defesa/livro_branco_congresso_nacional.pdf)>. Accessed on: 19 Sept. 2023.

— “Promote the Women, Peace and Security agenda in diplomats’ training and post-training courses.” (goal = “At least 1 class per year”);

— “Promote the appointment of women diplomats to positions related to international peace and security, including leadership positions.” (goal = “Strive to ensure that 50 percent of the United Nations Department is staffed by women.”)

— “Promote gender balance in Brazilian delegations at international conferences and fora related to international peace and security.” (goal = “Aim to appoint delegations comprising at least 25 percent women within one year.”); and

— “Promote and protect women’s rights, in accordance with national and international norms for elimination of all forms of discrimination and violence, so women can fully perform their roles.” (goal = “Participation in 5 international meetings per year”).

Regarding the first activity, it was found that the United Nations Department taught a class on the Women, Peace and Security agenda as part of the Defense module of the Rio Branco Institute Diplomacy Training Course in 2019 and 2020. With regard to the latter, according to information available on the Ministry internal network (Intratec) in October 2020, there were 16 civil servants in the Department’s three divisions, eight of whom female (50 percent). Among diplomats, there were five women out of 13 (38.5 percent).

As far as the third activity is concerned, the COVID-19 pandemic rendered the assessment of the year 2020 useless. According to a diplomat interviewed, in 2019 the Department tried hard to comply with the established representation of women. As for international meetings, for the same reason 2020 will not be considered. In 2019, the Ministry met its target of participating in five international meetings on the subject.<sup>206</sup>

In terms of the representation of women in the Brazilian diplomatic career, according to the text of the Plan, in 2016 women represented 22.9 percent of all diplomats. In October 2020, women accounted for 22.99

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206 Consultations by email in October 2020.

percent, the exact same proportion.<sup>207</sup> Although the time frame considered here is only of four years, it is known that female representation in the diplomatic career remained low in recent decades. Farias and Carmo (2016) believe the situation to be one of stagnation. If we were to keep the same rate at which women joined the diplomatic corps between 1954 and 2010, the authors estimate that parity would be reached in Itamaraty by 2066. In order to speed up the process, some ministries around the globe have adopted measures. According to the researchers:

In the Finnish foreign service, quotas of 40 percent from top to bottom have been introduced. In others, the term ‘targets’ has been used. Denmark imposed a 40 percent target for women among ambassadors. In the British foreign service, in an initiative launched in 2008, a target of 50 percent was sought in the recruitment process and 28 percent in senior positions. In addition, if a woman and a man compete for the same position, the woman is given the opportunity until the gender gap closes. In France, Sauvadet Law mobilized its diplomacy to introduce targets for 40 percent occupancy at all career levels — with the ministry setting a target of 50 percent in recruitment.<sup>208</sup>

Like in other countries, there are fewer women at the highest hierarchical levels at Itamaraty (Farias and Carmo in Aggestam and True, 2018, chap. 6). In fact, in October 2020, women accounted for 26.71 percent of Third Secretaries and 15.75 percent of active Ambassadors. Women were 17.35 percent of Brazilian Chiefs of Mission abroad.

With the aim of motivating women candidates to take the Entrance Examination to the Diplomatic Career, in 2018 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the “More Women Diplomats” campaign. This is a series of 16 video testimonials by female diplomats from different classes, aired between June 2018 and February 2019 on the YouTube channel and on social media profiles maintained by the Ministry. Although the campaign can be considered a contribution to the implementation of the objective of

<sup>207</sup> Consultation by email in October 2020.

<sup>208</sup> Farias and Carmo, 2016.

increasing the participation of Brazilian women diplomats, the Ministry did not establish any link between the videos and the NAP.

However, before the Plan, and even before the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000), Brazilian women diplomats had held prominent positions in the area of international peace and security. Brazil was the first country to promote a career women diplomat to the post of ambassador — Odete de Carvalho e Souza, who held the position of Director of the Political Department when the “Suez Battalion,” Brazil’s first military formed unit, was sent to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in January 1957.<sup>209</sup>

Two women ambassadors, Vera Pedrosa and Vera Machado, occupied the post of Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, responsible for the United Nations at the Ministry, between 2003-2005 and 2009-2012, respectively. Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti was the first Brazilian to chair the UN Security Council in February 2011. Also, as Brazil’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, she became the coordinator of the Peacebuilding Strategy in Guinea-Bissau. Later, Ambassador Viotti was appointed “Chef de Cabinet” to the UN Secretary-General, a position she held from 2017 to 2022.

According to two women members of the Interministerial Working Group in charge of drafting the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security,<sup>210</sup> the entire process benefited from the presence of then Minister Maria Luisa Escorel, who was the Head of the International Peace and Security Division (2015-2016), and then director of Itamaraty’s Department of International Organizations (2016-2018). In this sense, the Brazilian case illustrates a phenomenon that is widespread in the literature produced on the WPS agenda: the commitment of officials who occupy key positions in government institutions makes a difference in the decision-making processes that lead to national plans (Kirby and Sheperd, 2016).

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209 Source: MRE. Available at: <<https://www.gov.br/mre/en/access-to-information/frequently-asked-questions/itamaraty-and-the-foreign-service-careers>>. Accessed on: 19 Sept. 2023.

210 Interviews conducted in June and August 2020.



Interviewees report that the now Ambassador Escorel felt that Brazil could use the positive experience of commanding MINUSTAH to join the group of almost 60 countries that at that time had action plans. Records and minutes of GTI meetings show that the Ambassador took part in preliminary discussions with the Ministry of Defense in mid-2015 and chaired practically all the meetings of the Working Group.<sup>211</sup> She also made sure that senior Itamaraty officials monitored the progress of the negotiations and made a personal effort to obtain the four presentation letters from participating ministries. In February 2020, the Ambassador, then Brazil's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, was appointed High Representative for Women's Affairs, including for the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325(2000).<sup>212</sup>

Still with regard to the role of women in diplomacy, it is worth mentioning the articulation of women in numerous ministries, such as the "Executive Women at State" affinity group in the USA, the "Femmes et diplomatie" association in France, "The Network" in Sweden, among others. In Brazil, the first steps towards an informal organization were taken prior to the National Action Plan on WPS. In 2013, a closed discussion group was created on the most popular social network at the time. Within a few weeks, more than 150 women diplomats were debating various topics of common interest. It was the first time, in almost a hundred years of women in the Brazilian diplomatic career, that such a contact was organized (Nogueira and Balbino in Friaça, 2018, Prologue).

At the beginning of 2014, with the support of the administration of Itamaraty, an institutional email account accessible to all female members of the diplomatic career was created. Around the same time, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado, launched an internal consultation, open to Brazilian Foreign Service employees, with a view to gathering suggestions for modernizing the Ministry. Women diplomats decided to respond collectively to the

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211 Among others: det. 1108 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, dated 30 September 2015; Cable 813 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, dated 28 March 2016; Cable 1464 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, dated 3 June 2016; det. 1101 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, dated 24 October 2016; det. 2937 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, dated 28 October 2016.

212 Cable 103 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in Geneva, dated 18 February 2020.

consultation, drawing up a document they entitled “Letter from the Women Diplomats.” The compilation of 14 suggestions was signed by 203 diplomats — “which makes it the largest political mobilization in the history of the Brazilian Foreign Service so far” (Farias and Carmo, 2016).

One of the suggestions that got to be implemented was the creation of an internal body responsible for gender issues. To this end, Itamaraty joined the Pro-Gender and Race Equality Programme, promoted by the Secretariat of Policies for Women, together with government bodies and private companies, between 2005 and 2018. Ordinance 491 of September 12, 2014, created the Management Committee for Gender and Race.<sup>213</sup> The Committee was restructured under the terms of Ordinances 554 and 555, both of September 21, 2015. Finally, Ordinance 336, of September 29, 2020, revoked the previous ones and shut down the Committee.<sup>214</sup>

The establishment of a body to monitor complaints of harassment was also suggested by women diplomats in their 2014 letter. The Commission for Preventing and Combatting Moral and Sexual Harassment and Discrimination was created by means of Ordinance No. 921 of November 10, 2017. Having detected a lack of knowledge about the potential administrative and judicial consequences of this type of behavior, in 2018 the Commission produced the booklet “Moral Harassment, Sexual Harassment and Discrimination in the Workplace.”

2018 marked 100 years since the first Brazilian woman joined the diplomatic career, in 1918. With the support of Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, women diplomats organized the event “Jornada Maria José de Castro Rebello: um século de mulheres diplomatas no Itamaraty” [Maria José de Castro Rebello Day: a century of women diplomats at Itamaraty], held on September 27, 2018 in the Paulo Nogueira Batista

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213 The text of the Plan provided for the participation of the Committee: “In the tasks of monitoring the fulfillment of the NAP, the contributions of the respective Gender Commissions and/or specific commissions related to the NAP will be taken into account, as appropriate” (Brazil, 2017, 63). However, according to the minutes and attendance lists consulted, Itamaraty’s Committee on Gender and Race did not participate in the drafting or revision of the National Plan, unlike the Ministry of Defense’s Gender Commission (see section 5.1.2).

214 The Committee on Gender would be reinstated by the Ministry in 2023. A separate committee on race was also established.

Auditorium.<sup>215</sup> Also on the occasion of the centenary, the documentary film “Exteriores — mulheres brasileiras na diplomacia” [Foreign: Brazilian Women in Diplomacy]<sup>216</sup> was produced. According to Café História (2019),<sup>217</sup> the film was the result of a crowdfunding campaign and the support of the Brazilian Diplomats’ Association (ADB). It was inspired by the documentary film “Par une porte entrouverte,” produced by the Quai D’Orsay the previous year.<sup>218</sup> According to social media posts by the Association, the documentary was launched on December 6, 2018 in Brasilia at the Renato Russo Cultural Center. On December 21, then Minister of State Aloysio Nunes unveiled a commemorative plaque naming Annex I of the Ministry’s building “Annex Maria José de Castro Rebello Mendes.”<sup>219</sup>

#### 5.4. Prevention and protection

This pillar of the WPS agenda deals with the prevention and protection of women and girls against two main sets of crimes: sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) of the local population by agents in the service of the UN; and sexual violence, notably that practiced as a tactic of war, and violence against women and girls in the context of conflict. In 2017, the UN created yet another structure to combat SEA: the Victims Rights Advocate.<sup>220</sup> Together with the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the zero-tolerance policy against sexual abuse and exploitation pursued by the UNSG (see section 3.3), the new structure represents UN maximum pressure against impunity.

With regard to the second set of crimes, it is worth noting the efforts of women’s movements in the 1990s to have sexual violence included among war crimes investigated by the International Criminal Tribunal

215 See: <<https://antigo.funag.gov.br/index.php/pt-br/2015-02-12-19-38-42/2820-seminario-jornada-maria-jose-de-castro-rebello-um-seculo-de-mulheres-diplomatas-no-itamaraty>>. Accessed on: 20 June 2022.

216 Available at: <<https://vimeo.com/303550770>>. Accessed on: 21 Sept. 2023.

217 Available at: <<https://www.cafehistoria.com.br/exteriores-mulheres-na-diplomacia/>>. Accessed on: 10 Oct. 2022.

218 Available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHzmQ3XxKnY>>. Accessed on: 21 Sept. 2023.

219 Available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWTekFKSI2A>>. Accessed on: 21 Sept. 2023.

220 In March 2024, the UN Secretary-General announced Brazilian Military Prosecutor Najla Nassif Palma as the new Victims Rights Advocate.

for the former Yugoslavia and later by the International Criminal Court (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2013). On the basis of this precedent, the inclusion of sexual offenses as a designation criterion for the listing individuals and entities in sanctions regimes managed by the Council was consolidated as good practice. In addition to the case of the DRC, provisions to this effect were subsequently incorporated into the sanctions regimes applicable to Mali (in 2017), the Central African Republic (2017), Libya (2018), Somalia (2018) and South Sudan (2018) (Security Council Report, 2020).

Even before the adoption of the NAP, during its 2010-2011 chairmanship of the DRC Sanctions Committee, Brazil accepted the request presented by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy (at a session on May 21, 2010), and on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, Margot Wallström (on December 6, 2011), in favor of more robust action against sexual violence and the recruitment of children in the DRC. Brazil's political support was complemented in 2010 by the donation of US\$ 1 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, towards access to justice and reparations for survivors of sexual violence in the DRC.<sup>221</sup>

The strengthening of measures against perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence, provided for in Resolution 1807(2008), is reflected in the Committee's two annual reports signed by Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti (S/2011/18 and S/2012/3), as well as in her final report to the UNSC on December 14, 2011, when she suggested:

We also need to reflect on ways to make the regime more efficient, considering alternative tools to better target individuals and entities prevented from travelling or having bank accounts. It is equally important to encourage the use of mass media, such as radio, by MONUSCO to help deter criminal activity and disseminate information about sanctioned individuals and entities (Viotti, Dunlop and Fernandes, 2014, 222-223).

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221 Cable 657 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in Geneva, 28 October 2010 and Cable 233 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 25 January 2011.

The toughening of multilateral measures against sex offenders in the DRC led to the conviction of Frédéric Batumike, a Congolese parliamentarian and militia leader, accused of crimes against humanity for the rape of 39 children in Kavumu province between 2013 and 2016. It also brought to trial Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, listed during the Brazilian presidency, on charges of the mass rape of 387 people in Walikale province in 2010, as recorded in the 2018 UNSG Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (S/2019/280). The same document indicates numerous remaining challenges: in 2018 alone, MONUSCO documented 1,049 cases of sexual violence against 605 women, 436 girls, 4 men and 4 boys, 741 of which were attributed to armed groups and 308 to the Congolese armed forces and police.<sup>222</sup>

Still on the subject of sexual violence in armed conflicts, two recent international initiatives to provide adequate care for survivors and hold perpetrators accountable deserve to be highlighted: the Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, promoted by Norway,<sup>223</sup> and the “Murad Code,” promoted by the United Kingdom in honor of survivor and activist Nadia Murad (see section 3.1.1). The latter stems from then G8 Declaration of April 11, 2013 on “Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict,” suggesting eradicating impunity through an “International Protocol on the Investigation and Documentation of sexual violence in conflict,” with a common approach to the investigation and documentation of sexual violence in conflict, in order to ensure that different actors preserve evidence and information, and that due consideration is given to the necessity of supporting victims during the investigative process.

A similar provision was included in the first draft that led to Resolution 2106 (2013). According to the Permanent Mission of Brazil at the time,<sup>224</sup> language encouraging the Secretary-General to use a roster of experts specialized in documenting crimes of sexual violence to support

222 For an analysis of international aid to rape survivors in the DRC, see “Researching wartime rape in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” by Baaz and Stern in Wibben (ed.), 2016.

223 Available at: <<https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020.08-UN-CRSV-Handbook.pdf>>. Accessed on: 21 Sept. 2023.

224 Cable 2156 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 28 June 2013.

national governments was removed before the resolution was adopted. At the time, the United Kingdom already had a “Team of Experts” specializing in documentation and investigation, available to support national governments.

With regard to the prevention and protection pillar of the National Action Plan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted indicators and goals for one activity: “Disseminate normative frameworks with regard to the protection of the rights of all women and girls” (goal = 1 informative text on the main international mechanisms in the area of promoting women’s rights and eliminating all forms of discrimination and violence per year). No data was obtained on the implementation of this goal.

As for the activity “Prioritize operations in areas in which gender-based violence is prevalent, as well as in situations in which women and girls are more vulnerable to this type of violence, taking into account the recommendations of the mission’s gender unit,” in an interview, Brazilian General Ricardo Augusto Costa Neves, former MONUSCO’s Force Commander, reported that he routinely promoted joint definition of operations with the participation of troops, police and civilians, including the Mission’s Gender Unit, as well as humanitarian agencies working in the field. In his opinion, this strategy not only favors the identification of critical areas and situations, based on extensive information, but also increases the feeling of ownership regarding the measures needed to carry out the agreed operation.<sup>225</sup>

The activity “Strengthen the implementation of the United Nations Zero-Tolerance Policy regarding Brazilian men and women deployed in peacekeeping operations and special political missions, by adopting strict measures to counter sexual exploitation and abuse in all its aspects (prevention, investigation, punishment of perpetrators and assistance to all women and girls in situations of violence)” was also assessed. The country’s political commitment is reiterated in all open debates held by the Security Council on the item. In a written contribution to the open debate on July 17, 2020, Brazil expressed support for the Murad Code initiative and reinforced the positive effect of including women in all

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225 Interviewed in October 2020.

aspects of peacekeeping in preventing such violence.<sup>226</sup> In addition, the two PKO training centers in Brazil reinforce the zero-tolerance policy in their preparatory training for peacekeeping missions, in accordance with DPO guidelines.

Brazilian troops have an exceptional disciplinary record over 70 years of participation in UN peacekeeping operations, as a result of the high standards of training and conduct demanded of the country's contingents. As a result of the need to manage an unprecedented volume of military personnel, Brazil has developed a doctrine of six-monthly rotation for the battalions deployed in Haiti — instead of the annual scheme recommended by the UN — as well as periodic leave and compulsory quartering at rest times, including on weekends (Martins, 2020).

In most cases, the investigation of sexual abuse and exploitation cases falls to the Judiciary of the country of origin. In order to avoid the inaction of Member States, in 2015 the UN adopted Special Measures on the protection from SEA.<sup>227</sup> These include the requirement that troop- and police-contributing countries appoint a National Investigation Officer (NIO) for each unit of 150 military personnel or more. It also recommends that Troop Contributing Countries send a justice team to peacekeeping missions (“Immediate Response Team”) to carry out criminal investigation on the spot.

In the Brazilian case, the clause of national jurisdiction applying to military personnel is indispensable in the negotiation of the MOUs signed with the UN prior to the deployment of formed units. According to military prosecutor Najla Nassif Palma,<sup>228</sup> once a case against a Brazilian military officer is received from the UN, an investigation begins, conducted by another military officer. Once in possession of the case file, the military prosecutor (a civilian career in Brazil) decides whether to file a complaint or not. The Military Criminal Code does not criminalize sexual abuse and exploitation. However, depending on the characteristics of the case, it is possible to report sexual exploitation as sexual harass-

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226 Cable 404 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, dated 16 July 2020.

227 Document A/69/779.

228 Interviewed in September 2020.

ment or corruption of minors, and sexual abuse by analogy with sexual harassment or rape.

Since the 2010s, the Military Public Prosecutor's Office has been working with Defense and the Armed Forces to strengthen prevention of SEA, including by participating in the training of military and police personnel for peacekeeping missions. The Office is in favor of an institutional military judicial police force, capable of adequately responding to the particular nature of the investigation of sexual crimes. The Office has also made itself available to send a team along the lines of the Immediate Response Team recommended by the UN Secretary-General, which has not yet materialized due to the discontinuity of the deployment of Brazilian formed units.

In line with the Special Measures of the UN, the Office seeks to sensitize the Armed Forces to the importance of an integrated database on criminal investigations. In compliance with the same Measures, the Office is working in partnership with the Military Justice system in favor of the approval of bills to update the Military Criminal Code (PL 9432/2017) and Military Criminal Procedure (PL 9436/2017). This is an example of a norm stemming from the WPS agenda that generates legal changes in T/PCCs, not only in countries experiencing or emerging from conflict.

As a contribution to the dissemination of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, the public competition notice for the position of Military Prosecutor in 2021 included, among the topics of examination “The international protection of women against discrimination. The United Nations Women, Peace and Security Agenda. The National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.”<sup>229</sup>

As mentioned in section 4.2, the National Action Plan contains the objective to “Foster a policy aimed at guaranteeing the rights of refugees and asylum seekers in Brazil that considers gender-specific needs,” associated with six activities, all assigned to the Ministry of Justice (Brazil 2017, 51). When the Plan was drafted, the number of refugees entering

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229 Available at: <<https://www.in.gov.br/web/dou/-/edital-de-13-de-janeiro-de-2020-12-concurso-publico-para-provimento-de-cargos-de-promotor-de-justica-militar-12-cpjm-238152882>>. Accessed on: 22 Sept. 2023.



national territory from Venezuela between 2019 and 2020 could not be foreseen. To manage this process, Operation Welcome was created in 2018 in the state of Roraima. Coordinated by the President's Office and logistically managed by the Armed Forces, in particular the Brazilian Army, Operation Welcome accounts for 889,859 border control cases and more than 260,000 requests for refuge.<sup>230</sup>

Brazil's Operation Welcome has set an example for other countries in terms of refugees' access to public services (the Unified Health System, the National Social Security Institute, among others) and respect for human rights. This is the result of coordination between various ministries, such as the Ministry of Citizenship, the Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. However, the Ministry of Citizenship did not participate in the drafting or renewal of the NAP. In the case of the Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights, the area of refugees was not involved either.

The organization of Operation Welcome resembles a peacekeeping operation, although it is strictly humanitarian in nature and national in character, with UN support only. The work is divided into thirteen "cells," headed by Army officers, responsible for different aspects of border management, shelter and internalization — the three main missions of the Operation. Military contingents, as is the practice in peacekeeping missions, rotate every four months, with one General remaining the longest. In 2020, there were almost 600 military employed in Operation Welcome. However, they had plans for a transition, with responsibilities gradually passing to civilian ministries and a reduction in this contingent by the end of 2021.

The main priority in 2020 was the internalization of the Venezuelan population arriving in Roraima, i.e. their resettlement in other states of the Federation. To this end, Operation Welcome uses four main strategies: interiorization through sheltering in another state; social reunion (supported by churches and NGOs networks); family reunion;

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<sup>230</sup> Source: Operação Acolhida. Available at: <<https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/exercicios-e-operacoes/acoes-humanitarias/operacao-acolhida>>. Accessed on: 21 Jun. 2024.

and job openings. According to an official from UN Women,<sup>231</sup> one of the UN agencies working with the Operation, such strategies have better served the male population: only 2 percent of Venezuelan women have been interiorized through job opening in other states.<sup>232</sup>

In order to plan specific strategies aimed at the interiorization of the female population, a working group was formed, made up of military personnel from the Civil Affairs cell, humanitarian agents, and coordinated by UN Women. The informal group operated between the last months of 2019 and March 2020, when travel restriction measures imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic affected the continuity of discussions.

Representatives of the ministries involved in Operation Welcome were consulted to identify actions in favor of Venezuelan women seeking refuge, and whether they have been done under the NAP.<sup>233</sup> Via email, a representative of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security clarified that their role was restricted to the area of documentation and migratory regulation. The Brazilian Army informed us that it runs professional training workshops for Venezuelan women in shelters. By the end of 2020, the “Empoderando Refugiadas” [Empowering Refugees] project was to have assisted 70 refugees and migrants. No connection was made between this initiative and the National Action Plan on WPS.

An employee of the Ministry of Citizenship,<sup>234</sup> in turn, listed a number of initiatives, many of which carried out in partnership with civil society organizations, in order to mitigate difficulties in the internalization of Venezuelan women.<sup>235</sup> Although she was not familiar with the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, which had not been taken into account in this context, she identified the possibility of articulation

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231 Interviewed in November 2020.

232 IOM, Internalization Report — November 2020.

233 Consultations with officials from MD, Ministry of Citizenship, MJSP and MMFDH in October and November 2020.

234 Interviewed in November 2020.

235 These actions constitute fulfillment of the activity: “Develop public actions and reception and shelter facilities that consider the specific protection needs of all women and girls” (Brazil, 2017, 51), albeit unintentionally.

between the NAP and a future national migration policy under discussion at the time.

An employee of the Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights indicated a similar situation. Although she reported no knowledge of the National Plan, which did not serve as a guideline for action in this scenario, the actions carried out by that Ministry in Operation Welcome could be interpreted as implementation of activities set out in the Plan, such as the construction of a shelter named “House of the Brazilian Woman” in Boa Vista, which serves many Venezuelan victims of violence.<sup>236</sup> In her view, there would be room to publicize the experience of protecting and promoting the rights of women refugees on Brazilian territory as a good practice in Women, Peace and Security.

## 5.5. Peacebuilding

*“I do not mind wearing this headscarf, which is a tradition in my country. Certain traditional values can be followed. But values that see me as a second- or third-class citizen, or that do not see me as a human being, I will not accept. I have full rights, like my male colleagues, to a job, to everything.”*

Nawal Hassan Osman, a member of the Darfur peace process, at a virtual event organized by UN Women to mark the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325

Interviews with members of two political missions in the Americas, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and BINUH in Haiti, illustrate the challenges in implementing the peacebuilding pillar of the WPS agenda. Colombia is often cited as a success story, both in terms of conflict resolution and the significant participation of women. The Final Peace Agreement and the National Policy on Reintegration contain several provisions on women and girls. Female ex-combatants

<sup>236</sup> In fact, this could be considered fulfillment of the activity: “Promote access to medical services and psychosocial support to asylum seekers and refugees who have suffered gender-based human rights violations.” (Brazil, 2017, 51), although it was also unrelated to the Plan.

and partners of ex-combatants have defined their own reintegration strategy. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known as FARC in their Spanish acronym) has women's committees and one of their ex-combatants was elected senator (Judith Simanca, known as Victoria Sandino). In addition, a unit for investigating sexual offenses was included in Colombia's transitional justice mechanism, which ruled out the possibility of amnesty for these crimes (Carvajal and Álvarez-Vanegas in Davies and True, 2019, chap. 36).

However, according to a female member of the UNVMC,<sup>237</sup> the majority of women (around 20 percent of the FARC) worked in the rear (communications, kitchen). Hence, Colombian institutions tended to disregard their opinions in the area of security. She also reports that domestic and sexual violence, perpetrated against both ex-combatants and the unarmed population, are topics that male leaders avoid. As a result, these crimes remain largely underreported and unpunished.

In the case of Haiti, in 2020 BINUH supported the country after the conclusion of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti<sup>238</sup> (MINUJUSTH, 2018-2019), which in turn succeeded the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004-2017, a peacekeeping operation with a mandate to use force). The extended presence of the UN in the country has generated a significant number of reports of sexual abuse and exploitation, which were dealt with by the Victim Care Unit at MINUJUSTH and then BINUH. In fulfillment of the zero-tolerance policy sponsored by the UNSG, the unit sought to help victims obtain reparations, as well as to hold those responsible accountable and prevent new cases (Martins 2020).

Regarding the contribution that Brazil could make to peacebuilding in Haiti, with a focus on the female population, the member of BINUH believes that an expression of support from the Brazilian Embassy in Port-au-Prince for the approval of a bill in the area of domestic violence, under consideration by in the Haitian parliament for years, would be very

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237 Interviewed in October 2020.

238 MINUJUSTH was a special political mission adopted by the UNSC in 2017, still under Chapter VII of the Charter, with a two-year mandate to strengthen the rule of law, develop the Haitian National Police, and monitor and promote human rights in a peacebuilding effort in that country.

positive.<sup>239</sup> In addition, according to the UN official, a statement in favor of integrating women into defense and security institutions would have great weight, given the participation of Brazil in MINUSTAH. A police officer with experience in Haiti also said that engagement with justice institutions could change the local pattern, very unfavorable to women and girls.

In this regard, in an open debate promoted by the Security Council on October 26, 2010, Brazil reported that it was working alongside the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and Oxfam to support Haiti's National Plan for Combating Violence Against Women (Viotti, Dunlop and Fernandes, 2014, 371). The website of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency reports that this cooperation, based on Brazilian experience, dates back to 2002. Only in 2011, when project was interrupted, 185 Haitian health and public security professionals were trained to deal with violence against women with the support of Brazil.<sup>240</sup> The suggestion put forward by the member of BINUH is therefore in line with initiatives taken by the Brazilian government even before the adoption of the NAP.

In 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted an indicator and target related to the activity "Strengthen gender mainstreaming into all the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission" (Brazil, 2017, 53). Results identified in fulfillment of this activity go beyond the indicators, which are limited to the Brazilian presidency of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the PBC.<sup>241</sup> In addition to organizing Commander Márcia Braga's briefing and mobilizing the inclusion of a paragraph based on her recommendations in the written advice of the PBC to the Security Council on the renewal of MINUSCA's mandate, seen in section 5.1, Brazil went so far as to identify the PBC, in the Security Council's open debate on WPS that year, as the preferred forum for examining lessons learned and good practices on Women, Peace and Security. Brazil suggested a "WPS

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239 Interviewed in November 2020.

240 Available at: <<http://www.abc.gov.br/Projetos/CooperacaoSulSul/FNUAP>>. Accessed on: 25 Sept. 2023.

241 Available at: <<https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/assuntos/paz-e-seguranca-internacionais/manutencao-e-consolidacao-da-paz/indicadores-e-metas-voluntarios-do-plano-nacional-de-acao-sobre-mulheres-paz-e-seguranca>>. Accessed on: 25 Sept. 2023.

Week” in that Commission to mark the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325.<sup>242</sup>

In 2020, during the review of the PBC Gender Strategy, Brazil suggested expanding opportunities for women working across the “peace continuum” to make their recommendations known to Member States. When dealing with peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau, Brazil stated that it “firmly believes that improving women’s access to public services helps to create a more inclusive society and more resilient peace.”<sup>243</sup> At the annual meeting of the PBC on the subject, on October 2, 2020, Brazil recommended that the Support Office (PBSO) be given the task of monitoring the implementation of the agenda. Finally, it was suggested that the PBC prepare advisory opinions on WPS for the UNSC at each peace mission mandate negotiation.<sup>244</sup>

During the work of the Interministerial Group in 2018, the results of the activity “Guarantee that humanitarian cooperation projects developed and/or financed directly or indirectly by Brazil adopt gender perspectives” (Brazil, 2017, 55) were circulated. In 2018, in partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Brazil developed disaster risk reduction projects for food and nutrition security in Bolivia and Colombia. In Bolivia, the aim was to provide female heads of household, women producers and women’s organizations with livelihood strategies. Cooperation in Colombia, focused on the Venezuelan returnee population, promoted women’s participation in decision-making about food production, diversity in the family diet, food safety, the custody of native seeds adapted to the context of drought and the processing and preservation of food in the absence of electrical power.

Interviews also revealed the implementation of the activity “Cooperate with local institutions for the drafting and implementation of specific laws on gender-based violence, including sexual violence, with a view to improving women’s access to justice and specialized care service, as well as to holding perpetrators accountable” (Brazil, 2017, 54).

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242 Cable 1104 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 25 October 2019.

243 Cable 250 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 30 April 2020.

244 Cable 2437 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 22 October 2020.

Between 1997 and 2018, Brazil cooperated with the restructuring of legal institutions and post-conflict legal reform in Angola, through the project “Intercâmbio Jurídico-Institucional Brasil e Angola” [Brazil and Angola Legal-Institutional Exchange], promoted by the Military Public Prosecutor’s Office in the context of Brazil’s military participation in the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM II). Over the course of more than two decades, the project included several bilateral visits by legal authorities from both countries, numerous events to disseminate knowledge and student exchanges, among others.

Although it began before Resolution 1325 (2000), the project took on a women’s protection bias as the Office became part of the efforts to internalize the WPS agenda, together with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2014. That year, the Angolan Supreme Military Court asked to learn more about the Brazilian military justice system, as a model for structuring the country’s system. The cooperation culminated in December 2018 with a draft text for Angola’s new Military Criminal Code, with the support of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Military Justice of Brazil. The text was based on the Common Angolan Penal Code and the Brazilian Military Penal Code, and includes the designation of military crimes of sexual exploitation and sexual and moral harassment.<sup>245</sup>

## 5.6. Awareness raising and international cooperation

In addition to nations, regional civilian and military organizations have also adopted their own regulations following UNSCR 1325. In 2007, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established a policy on Women, Peace and Security, followed by an action plan in 2010. Both documents were revised in 2018. In 2012, the position of NATO Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security was created. In January 2020, NATO launched its own policy to prevent and respond to sexual abuse and exploitation.<sup>246</sup> The European

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<sup>245</sup> Interviewed in September 2020.

<sup>246</sup> Source: NATO. Available at: <[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_91091.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm)>. Accessed on: 25 Sept. 2023.

Union, the African Union and the League of Arab States, to name but a few organizations, all have regional action plans on Women, Peace and Security.<sup>247</sup> The Organization of American States (OAS) does not have an action plan on Women, Peace and Security, a topic that has been debated by the Inter-American Commission of Women in the context of combating violence against women and femicide in member countries (Macaleese in Davis and True, 2019, chap. 32), and not by the Committee on Hemispheric Security — responsible for defense and security issues at the OAS. The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries has included the promotion of the implementation of Resolution 1325 as an objective of conflict prevention and the promotion of a culture of peace in its Action Plan for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2017-2020).

Also indicative of the development of the Women, Peace and Security agenda is the formation of coalitions of governments and civil society (Aggestam and True, 2020). Starting with civil society, the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders brings together more than 100 women's organizations in countries facing humanitarian crises or armed conflict. Active since 2010, the Network acts as an interest group with the UN in New York, where it is registered. Women Waging Peace, on the other hand, is an organization of around a thousand women who work in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in 56 countries. Launched in 1999 by former US ambassador Swanee Hunt, known for promoting the perspective of Bosnian women during the conflict with Serbia, WWP is based at the University of San Diego and is linked to the Inclusive Security think tank, also founded by Hunt.

In Brazil, the Women, Peace and Security Network was created in 2018, promoted by the Igarapé Institute. As part of this initiative, a training manual for facilitators<sup>248</sup> was launched, with the aim of providing basic information on the WPS agenda to community leaders. However, the funding lines that were to finance the Network were not maintained by the donors, making it currently inactive.

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247 Source: PeaceWomen. Available at: <<https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states>>. Accessed on: 25 Sept. 2023.

248 Available at: <<https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2018-03-29-v3-Manual-Treinamento-Mulheres-web-H.pdf>>. Accessed on: 25 Sept. 2023.



With regard to government coalitions around the agenda, in 2016, at the initiative of Spain and Namibia, with co-sponsorship from Canada, Chile, the United Arab Emirates and Japan, the Women, Peace and Security Focal Points Network was formed. According to the FPN's website, the initiative aims to set up an interregional forum for the exchange of experiences and best practices to advance the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and to improve the coordination of funding and program assistance.<sup>249</sup> Brazil joined the Focal Points Network the year it was created.

The objective of the proponents was to engage as many countries as possible in concrete efforts to implement the WPS agenda, by appointing national focal points responsible for publicizing the planning and launching of action plans. The Network holds annual meetings at ministerial level and, since 2018, also meets in parallel with the opening of the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Network's presidency rotates after a one-year term.

The first country to chair the Network was Spain, which held the first ministerial meeting in Alicante on April 26 and 27, 2017. The second was Germany, responsible for organizing a ministerial meeting in Berlin on April 9 and 10, 2018, entitled "Building Alliances to Advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda." The third country to chair the Focal Points Network was Namibia, holding a ministerial meeting in Windhoek on April 10 and 11, 2019, under the title "Women, Peace and Security: Towards Full Participation — Mainstreaming the WPS Agenda in the Regional Economic Communities." Since 2020, the Network has been chaired jointly. In 2020 Canada and Uruguay shared the presidency. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ministerial meeting that was to take place in Ottawa was held online.

In addition to the Focal Points Network, Brazil is a member of the Circle of Leadership on the Prevention of and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Operations — launched by the Secretary-General in 2017. Heads of state and government from

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<sup>249</sup> Available at: <<https://wpsfocalpointnetwork.org/about>>. Accessed on: 25 Sept. 2023.

71 countries participate in the Circle. Brazil has been represented at Presidential level since 2017.

In the international coordination for the agenda, the creation of academic centers in teaching and research institutions specially dedicated to the study of Women, Peace and Security is also relevant. The Georgetown University's Institute for Women, Peace and Security was founded in 2011. In 2015, the London School of Economics Centre for Women, Peace and Security was created. In Brazil, the Brazilian Research Network on Peace Operations (known as REBRAPAZ in its Portuguese acronym), created in 2016, brings together researchers from 12 institutions and has a working group dedicated to Women, Peace and Security.

With regard to the awareness-raising activities set out in the National Action Plan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted indicators and targets for four of them:

- “Manage the National Action Plan website, in order to promote active dialogue with society” (goal = 4 updates per year);
- “Promote the exchange of best practices with States that have relevant experience in the implementation of National Action Plans about Women, Peace and Security” (goal = 1 new dialogue per year);
- “Disseminate the National Action Plan within public organs, civil society organizations, feminist and women’s movements, the academy and the general public, as well as international and regional organisms, aiming to engage them in supporting its implementation” (goal = 2 exhibitions per year); and
- “Conduct incentive campaigns to disseminate information on jobs and positions in activities relating to international peace and security” (goal = create a tab on opportunities for civilians on the page dedicated to the WPS agenda on the MRE website).

When consulted, the area in charge reported that updates had been made to the content of the “National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security” page on the Itamaraty website in both 2019 and 2020.<sup>250</sup> A “tab”

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250 Available at: <<https://www.gov.br/mre/en/subjects/international-peace-and-security/maintenance-and-consolidation-of-peace/brazil-and-the-women-peace-and-security-agenda>>. Accessed on: 21 Jun. 2024.

has been created on the participation of civilian women in peacekeeping operations, although it does not contain information on openings for positions on the ground. Strictly speaking, the target has been met, although the activity (“disseminate information on jobs and positions”) has yet to be realized.

As for bilateral mechanisms on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, diplomatic cables register dialogues between Brazil and Canada in 2018 and Chile in 2019.<sup>251</sup> In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there were practically no bilateral visits. Nevertheless, during online meetings on the establishment of the Regional Network of Mediators of the Southern Cone, Brazil and Argentina envisaged the possibility of organizing periodic meetings to exchange experiences on their respective national plans.<sup>252</sup>

With regard to actions to disseminate the Plan, a seminar held on June 24, 2019, and classes on the agenda at the Rio Branco Institute have been identified. In 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took part in a seminar celebrating 40 years of women in the Navy and 20 years of the WPS agenda (see section 5.1). On August 21, 2020, as part of CCOPAB’s Training Course for Civilians in Unstable Environments, a representative of the United Nations Department gave a class on the NAP by videoconference. On October 25, 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was represented at a round table on the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325 (2000) at a REBRAPAZ online meeting. On November 10, 2020, the High Representative for Women Affairs represented the Ministry on a panel dedicated to NAP at the 6th Europe-South America Regional Security Symposium, held via videoconference.

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251 Cable 373, to the embassies in Ottawa, of 17 December 2018 and 502, in Santiago, of 7 August 2019.

252 Cable 378, to the embassy in Buenos Aires, of 31 August 2020.



## Chapter 6

### 20 years of the agenda: current debate and Brazilian perspectives

Over the last decade, the WPS agenda has been prioritized not only by the UN Secretariat, but by several governments. In 2010, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review of US Foreign Policy included the oppression of women as a threat to global and to US security, and affirmed that the situation of women in the world is not simply a moral issue, but one of national security.<sup>253</sup> In 2012, Australia's campaign for a seat as a non-permanent member of the Security Council (2013-14) was one of the first to include the WPS agenda among its priorities.<sup>254</sup> At the end of the mandate, Australia considered its contribution to advancing the agenda as one of the main achievements.<sup>255</sup>

Following Australia, several countries started to include the Women, Peace and Security agenda among the priorities for their mandates on the UN Security Council. By way of illustration, Table 4 is based on successful campaigns in the elections of non-permanent members of the Security Council between 2018 and 2020. We can see that 12 of the 15 countries elected in the three years (80 percent) included at least one component of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in their announced priorities. At the same time, six of them (40 percent) had women at high decision-making levels — which shows that the relevance of the agenda can be recognized both by male and female leaders.

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253 Leading Through Civilian Power — The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 23, 37, 57, 93, 151 and 152. Available at: <<https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/153142.pdf>>. Accessed on: 26 Sept. 2023.

254 Available at: <<http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australia-on-the-security-council-progressing-the-women-peace-and-security-agenda/>>. Accessed on: 26 Sept. 2023.

255 Available at: <<https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/international-relations/Pages/australias-term-on-the-united-nations-security-council-2013-14-achievements>>. Accessed on: 26 Sept. 2023.

Since the elected member seats follow geographical representation, it is difficult for single candidates (clean slate) — such as the Brazilian candidacy for the 2021 elections — to fail to reach the minimum of 2/3 of the votes (129, if all 193 Members are present). Sometimes, however, there are regional disputes: in 2019, two countries (St Vincent and the Grenadines, elected, and El Salvador) ran for a seat available to the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC). In 2020, two countries ran for one seat reserved for the African Group (Kenya beat Djibouti) and three countries from the Western European and Other States Group (WEOG) for two available seats (Ireland and Norway, elected, and Canada). In such cases, campaigns tend to make a difference.

Consequently, priority given to the Women, Peace and Security agenda, if not enough to guarantee a seat on the Security Council (as it proved not to be the case for Canada in 2020), has helped to elect the vast majority of non-permanent members in recent years. This is yet another reason that leads us to believe that the WPS agenda has been incorporated into the daily work of the Security Council, including electing non-permanent members — a decision taken by the full UN membership.

A recent phenomenon that deserves to be mentioned in the context of the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325 (2000) is the fact that some governments, in making a priority of the WPS agenda, have declared that they adopt a self-described “feminist” foreign policy.<sup>256</sup> The first country to make such an announcement was Sweden in 2014.<sup>257</sup> Subsequently, six other countries have called their foreign policies in the same way: Canada (2017), Luxembourg (2019), France (2019), Spain (2020), Malaysia (2020) and Mexico (2020).<sup>258</sup>

In 2019, Stockholm launched the “Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy” Handbook, which clarifies that the country systematically applies a gender perspective to its entire foreign policy, with a view to strengthening

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256 For possible definitions, see Hudson and Eason in Davies and True, 2019, chap. 61.

257 The Swedish chancellor who pushed for this decision, Margot Wallström, was the first woman to hold the post of Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, from 2010 to 2012.

258 In addition to these, the current governments of Norway and Finland have declared that they promote public policies aimed at gender equality in all areas. South Africa, Australia and the United Kingdom have included the Women, Peace and Security agenda among their foreign policy priorities (Aggestam and True, 2020, 144).

three areas: rights, representation and resources for women and girls. The relationship with the Women, Peace and Security agenda is explained in the Handbook's foreword.<sup>259</sup> Aggestam, Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell (2019) consider that foreign policies that place the promotion of gender equality at the top of their priorities derive their impetus from the WPS agenda, although the agenda does not cover the full range of what is expected from a feminist foreign policy (Aggestam, Bergman-Rosamond and Kronsell, 2019, 27-28).

In light of the above, there is a wide variety in the way different countries prioritize the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Indeed, Aggestam and True (2020) consider that the feminist objectives of Sweden and Canada have generated recognition, but also resistance. In contrast, middle powers such as South Africa, Australia and Norway have made use of consensus building and the cross-cutting application of a gender perspective to achieve broad foreign policy objectives.

In light of the above, 20 years after Resolution 1325(2000), there seems to be a broad consensus that the incorporation of women's views on international peace and security puts nations in a better position to respond to current security challenges, in line with the first premise presented in this book's Introduction. Furthermore, it seems that applying and disseminating Security Council's resolutions on Women, Peace and Security pay governments dividends, regardless of their specific political-ideological current.

The main discussions on the future of the Women, Peace and Security agenda will be identified next, providing context for the proposals for Brazilian action to be presented afterwards.

### **6.1. Activities to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325(2000)**

During the joint presidency of France and Germany at the UNSC in March and April 2019, an open debate was held on women in peacekeeping missions, plus another on Women, Peace and Security, and ground

<sup>259</sup> Handbook Sweden's feminist foreign policy. Available at: <[https://www.swedenabroad.se/globalassets/ambassader/zimbabwe-harare/documents/handbook\\_swedens-feminist-foreign-policy.pdf](https://www.swedenabroad.se/globalassets/ambassader/zimbabwe-harare/documents/handbook_swedens-feminist-foreign-policy.pdf)>. Accessed on: 2 May 2024.

Arria Formula meeting on women peacebuilders in the Sahel. In addition, on March 15, 2019, the governments of Namibia, Germany, Canada and Uruguay, together with UN Women, promoted the side event “The Road to 2020 — Accelerating Action on Women, Peace and Security,” in the context of the 63rd Session of the CSW. The need for updating the WPS agenda was repeatedly mentioned during these events.

Some of the frontiers of the debate on WPS in 2020 were: taking the needs of refugee women, internally displaced women, survivors of human trafficking and domestic violence into account; the situation of women deprived of liberty; women in communities vulnerable to terrorism; the issue of environmental protection in post-conflict contexts; the participation of girls and young women in peacebuilding and peacekeeping;<sup>260</sup> combating the increase in sexual violence in conflict; and reclaiming disarmament.

Unfortunately, plans for numerous in-person meetings around the world to mark the 20 years since the adoption of Resolution 1325(2000) were directly affected by the international measures imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic for practically the whole of 2020. UN activities were suspended from March 27 to October 1st, 2020. As a result, events to commemorate and evaluate the implementation of the agenda were transported to the digital space, clearly not with the same impact as the in-person events that would ideally bring world leaders together. In the same vein, studies on WPS carried out by Member States and research institutes on the implementation of the agenda during that year were circulated online.

Under these circumstances, discussions were centered on the consequences of COVID-19 on women around the world, including those experiencing the pandemic in the context of conflicts or humanitarian crises. In most of the online events, debates focused on the disproportionately negative impact of the pandemic on women’s living conditions, including job loss and a drop in their income, given

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260 Although there is talk of a youth, peace and security “agenda,” the topic is not included in the work program of the Council. Therefore, it is not equated with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. There are, however, three resolutions approved by the UNSC on the subject [S/RES/2250 (2015)], S/RES/2419 (2018) and S/RES/2535 (2020)].



that women were largely the ones responsible for caring for children and others during quarantine.<sup>261</sup> The exponential increase in domestic violence<sup>262</sup> and sexual abuse of children during isolation measures was also emphasized. On the occasion of the UNSC open debate on WPS, which in 2020 was held online, Brazil mentioned, among the impacts of COVID-19 on international peace and security, the situation of survivors of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations.<sup>263</sup>

In addition, there was widespread concern that the economic crisis magnified by the pandemic would lead to less funding available to promote the role of women peacekeepers and peacebuilders, and to a deterioration in the security situation in many countries, with serious damage to the implementation of the WPS agenda in a context of heightened risks for women and girls. The pandemic had a negative impact on the inclusion of women in ongoing peace processes. The negotiations between Afghanistan and the Taliban were cited as a test of credibility for the WPS agenda, due to the absence of women at the negotiating tables. The invisibility of women in the resurgence of the separatist conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was also cited.

Bearing in mind the role played by online communication during the pandemic, attacks on women political leaders, human rights defenders, among others, on social networks and other digital media deserved special attention. In addition to being included in two of the UNSG annual reports on WPS, the issue was raised during an online meeting of the Focal Points Network on July 15, 2020, as well as by the Minister of Defense

261 In Brazil, the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) recorded, between April and June 2020, the lowest rate of female participation in the labor market (46.3 percent) since 1990. [IPEA "Mercado de trabalho" 69, July 2020. Technical note "Mercado de Trabalho e Pandemia da COVID-19: ampliação de desigualdades já existentes?" (Labour Market and COVID-19 Pandemic: widening of already existing inequalities?), p. 55-63]. In November, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) released a report (Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Trade and Development: Transitioning to a New Normal) which states that, among the poorest, economic losses are felt most heavily by women worldwide.

262 UN Women, in a press release issued on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women (November 25), reported that for every three months of confinement, it is estimated that 15 million more women are affected by violence. Available at: <<https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/11/press-release-16-days-of-activism-against-gender-based-violence>>. Accessed on: 27 Sept. 2023.

263 Cable 689 to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 27 October 2020.

of North Macedonia, a woman, at a NATO event on October 15.<sup>264</sup> The attacks were largely seen as a contemporary challenge to the implementation of the WPS agenda.<sup>265</sup> These signs lead us to believe that online violence against women and girls is bound to become a new frontier in the international debate on Women, Peace and Security.

In the context of the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325, we also witnessed the return to an essential ambition that has so far received little attention: disarmament and arms control. It is worth mentioning that the Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was the first UN unit to develop an action plan on gender, in 2003.<sup>266</sup> The Brazilian National Action Plan includes an activity on DDR, led by Foreign Affairs, and one on humanitarian demining, led by the Ministry of Defense.<sup>267</sup> No information on the implementation of the two activities has been identified.

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Resolution 1325, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) published an article bringing the WPS agenda closer to forums dedicated to disarmament, such as the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to national plans on WPS in the areas of DDR, small arms and light weapons control, demining and cyber security (Myrtilinen, 2020). In 2019, Latvia hosted the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and took the unprecedented decision to choose gender-based violence as the event's thematic debate. In this regard, UNIDIR's publication evaluates the absence of female negotiators in forums dedicated to arms control

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264 Cable 160 to the Embassy in Brussels, dated 09 November 2020.

265 Hate speech against women on the internet is the subject of the 2017 book *Women & Power*, by Mary Beard, professor of classical studies at the University of Cambridge. In order to examine the contemporary reaction to women's voices in public spaces, including the web, Beard traces the history back to the foundational texts of Western civilization, which, since ancient Greece, have helped to establish a disdain for women's voices outside the home. In the absence of reflection, Beard argues, this contempt has been reproduced over the centuries, sometimes giving rise to violence.

266 Source: UNODA/UN. Available at: <<https://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/gender>>. Accessed on: 27 Sept. 2023.

267 Brazil 2017, 54: "Mainstream the gender perspective into the design and implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration processes, as well as of economic and social development programs in post-conflict and/or humanitarian cooperation situations" and "Contribute that humanitarian demining activities take into consideration the gender perspectives in the affected population."

and disarmament as an indication that national governments do not link the WPS agenda to this critical area of implementation.

In this context, we should also mention six resolutions adopted since 2010 by the General Assembly First Committee under the title “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control,”<sup>268</sup> which led to the item being included on the Committee’s agenda. As mandated by these resolutions, from 2013 to 2020 the UNSG presented five reports on the subject.<sup>269</sup>

The focus of the documents of the First Committee is the vulnerability of women to the use of arms, including domestic violence, in line with Article 7(4) of the ATT. A successful result of women’s international campaign, the article includes gender-based violence among risk factors in the assessment of arms exports required by the Treaty and was met with resistance from companies and governments (Enloe 2014, 23-28). Even so, the implementation of the article has proved challenging. Maintaining arms flow to countries in conflict has led to the questioning of exporters who claim to be supporters of the WPS agenda.<sup>270</sup>

Although they indicate synergy between the WPS agenda, which belongs to the UNSC, and the bodies responsible for disarmament in the General Assembly (which has the prerogative, according to Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, to deliberate on “the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security”), the resolutions of the First Commission do not create obligations for Member States. At the same time, Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security make few references to the issue.<sup>271</sup> In this respect, Otto (2009, 11) observes:

Perhaps Resolution 1325’s most instructive omission, when it comes to selectivity, is its failure to make any reference

268 Documents A/RES/65/69, A/RES/67/48, A/RES/68/33, A/RES/69/61, A/RES/71/56 and A/RES/73/46.

269 Documents A/68/166; A/69/114 e A/69/114/Add.1; A/71/137; A/73/115; and A/75/133.

270 According to Acheson and Butler in Davies and True, 2019, 698: “The same countries that discuss the implementation of the WPS in Yemen or protection against sexual violence in the Democratic People’s Republic of Congo, for example, fail to address how they fuel the conflict through their export of weapons.”

271 For a full list of mentions of DDR, demining and small arms and light weapons in the resolutions on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, see Myrntinen, 2020, 17.

to general disarmament, a long-standing goal of women's peace movements. This leaves the Security Council's 'hard' Chapter VII enforcement powers insulated from the (feminizing) influence of Resolution 1325. So, the price of the Council's endorsement of women's participation in peacemaking and peace-building [...] is the silencing of feminist critiques of militarism [...].

Updating the WPS agenda seem inevitable, such as we argued for the case of disarmament, returning to one of its original ambitions. However, there is also the risk of instrumentalization. A brief comment is proposed here on a current initiative that seeks to link the WPS agenda to climate change. Countries promoting this link at the Security Council, especially European countries, want to consolidate the view that a range of natural phenomena listed as "effects of climate change" are risk factors for the outbreak of armed conflicts, insofar as they contribute to food insecurity. In this context, they advocate the protection of women's livelihoods, recognizing the disproportionately negative economic impact of natural disasters on them.<sup>272</sup>

Taken at face value, the initiative might seem commendable. A more careful examination of the diplomatic actions of these countries within the international climate change regime, comprised of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, reveals, though, that they oppose concrete measures on an agreed reduction in emissions. Not only that, but European countries also resist the creation of financial mechanisms to compensate for losses and damages of small island countries — some of the most exposed to the risks of natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies related to climate change.<sup>273</sup>

The conclusion is that these governments are in fact seeking to brand their high defense and security spending as part of the fight against climate change (and as support for development, more broadly). The use

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272 See Gender, Climate and Security in Latin America and the Caribbean: From Diagnostics to Solutions, sponsored by the German government. Available at: <<https://www.climate-diplomacy.org/news/gender-climate-and-security-latin-america-and-caribbean-diagnostics-solutions>>. Accessed on: 27 Sept. 2023.

273 Cable 572, to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, of 24 September 2020.

of this type of strategy by developed countries has been mapped out for a few years.<sup>274</sup> From this work's perspective, the objective of these countries seems to be to maintain political support so that mandates along these lines continue to be embedded in peacekeeping and special political missions, as in the preambles of the current MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNSOM mandates. In doing so, they capitalize on the visibility achieved by the 20th anniversary of the WPS agenda.

## 6.2. Building a Brazilian perspective

Since 2004, the first time the country was present at the Security Council after the adoption of Resolution 1325(2000), Brazil has been moving towards, on the one hand, supporting the implementation of the WPS agenda at a global level and, on the other, internalizing it. Brazil's decisions to adopt and renew the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security are signs of this political commitment, as is the appointment of the High Representative of Itamaraty for the 20th anniversary of the Resolution.

In addition, Brazil's continued participation in all open debates promoted by the Security Council on the WPS agenda and the country's actions in favor of deepening discussions on the subject in the Peacebuilding Commission bear witness to the fact that Brazilian political support has been maintained. In this vein, Brazil's speech at the open debate on April 23, 2019, a month after the renewal of the NAP, deserves mention:

The WPS agenda seeks to ensure that all the conditions are created for lasting peace in the world. As research has repeatedly shown, there is no peace when half the population is excluded — from economic and social progress, from political participation and ultimately from peace processes.<sup>275</sup>

This book also sought to assess the implementation of the National Action Plan. Based on the research by the writer, with the exception of the activities that have indicators and targets, most of the Brazilian

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274 See Uziel, 2015, 93.

275 Cable 338, to Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, of 17 April 2019.

government's actions relating to the agenda are not the result of efforts to implement the Plan. Instead, they respond to UN requirements or other practical needs. The survey also reveals that the NAP is largely unknown, even in the four ministries directly responsible for it. Consequently, there is still no Brazilian perspective on Women, Peace and Security.

On the occasion of the next review of the Plan, some improvements could be discussed. The internalization of the Women, Peace and Security agenda would benefit from regular dialogue between the ministries in the Interministerial Working Group. In fact, among the countries in our region that have action plans on WPS, Brazil's is the only one that does not mention verifying or monitoring results.

The content of the NAP should also be updated. At the time the document was drafted, in 2016, Brazil had been in command of MINUSTAH for more than a decade. In 2011 and 2012, Brazil was among the top eleven UN troop contributing countries,<sup>276</sup> an unprecedented position in the country's long history of participation in peacekeeping missions. Since then, there have been significant changes both in the profile of Brazilian participation and in the capacity of the UN to sustain missions along the lines of those authorized by the UNSC in the first decade of the century. In November 2020, Brazil ranked 50th among the TCCs, a position similar to that recorded immediately before its engagement in MINUSTAH.<sup>277</sup> In addition, viable options for deploying large Brazilian units have diminished, following several missions drawdown.

Faced with current budgetary restrictions, the country cannot afford voluntary financial contributions or major humanitarian aid. As an example, during its thirteen-year presence in Haiti, Brazil incurred costs of R\$ 2.55 billion (approximately US\$ 490 million), of which the UN reimbursed R\$ 930 million (US\$ 182 million).<sup>278</sup> In addition to resolving the budgetary issues involved and identifying a suitable and safe environment for another engagement of this kind, Brazil would have

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276 Source: DPO/UN. Available at: <[https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/dec11\\_2.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/dec11_2.pdf)>. Accessed on: 28 Sept. 2023.

277 Neves, 2010, 176.

278 Source: EBC. Available at: <<https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/internacional/noticia/2017-05/apos-13-anos-missao-no-haiti-comandada-pelo-brasil-se-aproxima-do-fim>>. Accessed on: 28 Sept. 2023.

to take decisive steps to achieve the goals of female representation in its next formed unit. For all these reasons, Brazil is currently not a country whose peacekeeping profile justifies a national plan on Women, Peace and Security focused on external action.

However, this change has yet to be reflected in the National Plan. Internal and external transformations could offer Brazil the opportunity to revise the emphasis it has so far placed on the participation of uniformed women in peacekeeping operations and redirect it to political aspects of the agenda, such as the participation of civilian women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes, including mediation.<sup>279</sup>

Another possible update could include the security situation of the national female population. Even though Latin America has managed to avoid traditional inter-state conflicts for decades, at the same time the region has been weakened by high rates and malignancy of violence against the female population — figures comparable to those of a state of war. Thus, a future regional perspective on Women, Peace and Security could focus on combating violence against women (Giannini and Folly, 2017; Drumond and Rebelo, 2020b).

Although the legal and conceptual differences to separate public security (to which, in principle, crime and violence against women belong) from international security must be observed, it must also be recognized that the Women, Peace and Security agenda was conceived to cross these divides. So much so that the mandates of special political missions, that operate outside the context of a conflict outbreak, include promotion of legislation and programs aimed at tackling violence against women in the host countries.<sup>280</sup> Furthermore, Resolution 2467(2019) breaks new ground, from a normative point of view, by placing sexual violence in armed conflict in a continuum of violence against women also in peacetime.<sup>281</sup>

279 On the absence of civil society in the drafting of many of the national plans, Kirby and Sheperd 2016, 384, warn: "This can lead to a perception of national plans as elitist or irrelevant to the lives of the population, and, worse, allow for the increasing militarization of the WPS agenda, when its principles are reduced to the inclusion of women in the police and armed forces."

280 Cable 4396 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 15 November 2010.

281 The 13th preambular paragraph of the Resolution reads: "Recognizing that sexual violence in conflict occurs on a continuum of interrelated and recurring forms of violence against women and girls, and recognizing that conflict also exacerbates the frequency and brutality of other forms of gender-based violence."

A concern about a possible expansion of the WPS agenda into areas outside the law of war was present when Brazil was represented at the UNSC in 2010. In an open debate on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Resolution 1325 (2000), the Permanent Mission of Brazil noted that some speeches, centered on issues such as promoting gender equality and combating sexual violence outside of armed conflicts, ignored the boundaries of the Council's treatment of the issue. In its report to the capital, the Mission predicted: "This tendency to blur the line between women as a security issue and as a social and human rights issue may, in the future, encourage members of the Security Council to seek to extend their involvement in the issue beyond the scope of peace and security."<sup>282</sup>

It is interesting to note, in this context, that China and Russia have played the role of guardians of clear boundaries for the WPS agenda, as opposed to countries in the West, in particular the US. As the largest single proponent of resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, the United States was primarily responsible for extending the principles contained in Resolution 1325 (2000) beyond the scenario of inter-state armed conflict.

Would there be any risks for the population that is allegedly being protected in equating aggravated violence with an armed conflict? In this regard, Palma (2019, 159-160) points out:

In this sense, we believe that the political use of the term "war," including by public officials, to justify a militarized response to the issue of public security and to try to exempt military and police officers from criminal liability for any excessive and disproportionate use of lethal force is dangerous for society.

The three branches of Brazilian government have developed sufficient normative and institutional maturity in the field of combating domestic violence and femicide as to allow for the sharing of best practices with the community of nations, without imposing itself in a position of authority, but on the contrary, admitting to being an interested party. Particularly after enactment of Law No. 11.340/2006 (Maria da Penha Law), Brazil

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282 Cable 4396 from Permanent Mission of Brazil in New York, 15 November 2010.



has taken important steps in assisting victims and holding aggressors accountable, culminating in the designation, in 2015, of the crime of femicide — a specification of qualified homicide (article 121, item VI, § 2 and 2-A of the Penal Code).

Maria da Penha Law innovated by allowing for protective measures for women victims of domestic violence and by expediting procedural rules. The growth in the number of specialized police stations, the creation of “Call 180” hotline (which, in collaboration with consulates, assists Brazilian women living also in 15 countries abroad)<sup>283</sup> and the establishment of shelters in many states of the Federation were decisive initiatives in raising awareness among victims and offering them the conditions to break the cycle of violence. In addition, the Judiciary has also undergone significant update in this regard, embodied in the National Judicial Policy to Combat Violence against Women (Resolution 254/2018 of the National Council of Justice).

The situation in our region indicates ample room for cooperation. A study published in 2019 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) shows that Latin America is the deadliest area for women in the world, apart from those in full-fledged conflict.<sup>284</sup> Fourteen of the 25 countries with the highest rates of violent deaths of women are in Latin America.

The UN estimates that there is significant underreporting of violence against women by their partners, due to cultural factors. Eighteen countries in Latin America have criminalized femicide — which, according to the UN study, has not been enough to eradicate the scourge.

It would also be possible to think about violence and its effects on women and girls in a broader way. This is the opinion of Dr Renata Avelar Giannini, who believes that the issue to be incorporated into the analysis of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Latin America is organized crime and its consequences. Some examples are: the involvement of girls and women in territorial disputes between gang leaders,

283 Argentina, Belgium, England, France, French Guiana, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Uruguay, USA (only in San Francisco) and Venezuela.

284 Available at: <<https://oig.cepal.org/es/indicadores/feminicidio>>. Accessed on: 29 Sept. 2023.

forced marriages and sexual violence; the role of mothers in resisting recruitment of minors; the growth in the number of women imprisoned for drug trafficking.<sup>285</sup> In this case, the national element is inseparable from the transnational nature of the crime, and the value of international cooperation is indisputable.

It is worth reflecting, however, on the fact that the inclusion of domestic violence on the WPS agenda in countries in the region is stimulated by donor countries, which then take on the role of supervisors. The US national strategy for Women, Peace and Security, supported by the only WPS law in the world to date,<sup>286</sup> provides for each government body involved to formulate its own sectoral plan. The plan of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has the following line of action: “Promote the protection of women and girls’ human rights; access to humanitarian assistance; and safety from violence, abuse, and exploitation *around the world*.”<sup>287</sup> Similarly, the British government, through the Department for International Development, invests £67.5 million in the What Works to Prevent Violence: Impact at Scale program, which “[...] will help countries to scale up effective interventions to prevent Violence Against Women and Girls and expand the evidence base *as a global public good*.”<sup>288</sup>

The common denominator between the two examples above is that only violence perpetrated against women and girls in third countries, even outside the context of conflict, is taken into account. It is well known that no country is free from this type of violence, not even major international donors. Aggestam, Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell (2019) point out that Canada and Sweden, which also frame the protection pillar of the WPS agenda in foreign aid, could be criticized for failing to match the care given to women living in conflict zones or in poverty with that which they dedicate to their indigenous women or to refugee and marginalized women in their territory (Aggestam, Rosamond e Kronsell, 2019, 32).

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285 Interviewed in August 2020.

286 Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017.

287 USAID’s Women, Peace, and Security Implementation Plan, 7. Emphasis added.

288 UK’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018-2022: Annual Report to Parliament 2019, 3. Emphasis added.

If they were to be questioned, government officials from these countries would claim that there was no need to include local violence against women in their WPS plans because the issue is covered by other mechanisms. Well, this is exactly the case in Brazil. For more than a decade, Brazil has implemented well-established instruments for tackling violence against women, with their own budget and specific legislation — unlike, in fact, the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

There is no easy answer to global contradictions surrounding the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. The previous chapter mentioned the incoherence of the position of arms-exporting countries that give the agenda political support. This is also not to minimize the tragedy of the violence to which Brazilian women and girls, particularly black and indigenous ones, are subject. It is a question of admitting, as in the case of the use of force to protect civilians, the tensions between genuine good intentions and political (dis)interests that underlie human rights discussions in the Security Council (Fonseca Jr. and Belli, 2013; Ghisleni, 2011).

Given Brazil's unique position in the international community (economic, geographical and population dimensions, consistency in the defense of International Law and sustained contribution to peacekeeping missions, and a significant presence in the UNSC), the country is able to contribute to the debate on the future of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. In the construction of a Brazilian perspective, domestic violence in countries emerging from armed conflict where Brazil is or has been active seems to have a natural place.

The National Action Plan has two activities to support institutions in third countries in combating violence against women: “Support local institutions in security sector reform and rule of law for the promotion and protection of human rights of all women and girls”; and “Cooperate with local institutions for the drafting and implementation of specific laws on gender-based violence, including sexual violence, with a view to improving women's access to justice and specialized care service, as well as to holding perpetrators accountable” (Brazil, 2017, 54), of which no results were found. It was found, however, that Brazil had already made

efforts in this direction with Haiti, before the NAP (see section 4.5). During the drafting of the Plan, it was suggested that the Call 180 hotline could be “exported” to countries where Brazil is involved in peacekeeping missions (Lima, 2015).

Brazil could incorporate the two activities into its diplomatic action in countries hosting peacekeeping missions and special political missions where Brazilian military, police and civilian personnel are or have been active. The following come to mind: the DRC, where a Brazilian General is MONUSCO’s Force Commander; Guinea-Bissau, whose PBC country configuration Brazil chairs and where it has already directed UNIOGBIS; and CAR, which is home to MINUSCA, where two Brazilian women military officers have been awarded by the UN; as well as Haiti, as suggested by interviewees (section 4.2). Giannini et al (2018) argue that the integration of women into police forces and criminal justice, along with the inclusion of their views in public security policies, positively influences the situation of local women and girls.

A possible turn in this direction would tend to encourage the Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights and organized civil society, especially women’s movements, to engage with the Women, Peace and Security agenda — which, in turn, would contribute to consolidating the civilian dimension of the agenda — disproportionately identified with the military in Brazil. This would greatly strengthen national ownership of the agenda, potentially generating an original perspective.

With regard to the intersection between the Women, Peace and Security agenda and development, even before the adoption of the NAP, Brazil had already asserted that the economic empowerment of women is a crucial dimension of peacebuilding. In an open debate held by the UNSC on April 27, 2010, when it held a non-permanent seat, Brazil stated:

The participation of women in efforts to rehabilitate and reactivate the economy is of particular relevance. Given the fundamental role played by women in key economic sectors, particularly in agriculture, the impact of development projects can be enhanced if such projects are focused on women.

The country reiterated its position in an open debate on WPS on October 28, 2011:

The Council's support to empowering women in conflict and post-conflict situations is very important. However, it cannot stand on its own. The effective and sustainable political participation of women depends on social inclusion and economic opportunity. The work of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and UN Women in this regard requires our full support if we are to achieve the goals of the women and peace and security agenda. (Viotti, Dunlop and Fernandes, 2014, 377)

This position still holds to this day, as present in recent speeches. According to the research, the second premise of this book, regarding the full alignment of the Women, Peace and Security agenda to Brazil's defense of the interdependence between security and development, also proved to be valid. In light of the above, a future Brazilian perspective for the WPS agenda could include the economic and social empowerment of women and girls in countries emerging from conflict where Brazil is active.

In this context, resuming contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), interrupted in 2008, could have a multiplier effect on Brazil's troops, police and civilian personnel contribution to in peacekeeping missions and special political missions, to the direct benefit of local women and girls. The projects financed by the Fund are operated by specialized agencies (e.g. FAO, UNDP, UNFPA). According to its 2020-2024 Strategic Plan, the Fund seeks to ensure that all the initiatives it supports consider the situation of women as part of their conflict analysis, priority setting, budget allocation (minimum 25 percent for empowering women and youth), implementation and evaluation as well as results monitoring. In 2019, 40 percent of the US\$ 191 million invested by the Fund were directed to gender-responsive projects.

In 2007 and 2008, Brazil donated US\$ 20,000 and US\$ 570,000 respectively to the PBF. In 2010, the Brazilian government pledged to make an additional contribution of US\$ 1 million, which did not come into effect. In 2020, Brazil ranked 34th among contributors to the Fund.

Part of the resources already committed by Brazil in the form of trilateral cooperation with UN specialized agencies could be redirected to projects in countries emerging from conflict, coordinated by the PBF. This would help reinforce Brazil's commitment to lasting peace and the WPS agenda, both in countries that have yet to receive Brazilian cooperation, such as CAR, and in countries like the DRC, Guinea-Bissau and Lebanon, where Brazil holds strong credentials in terms of peace and security.

Finally, bearing in mind the discussion proposed in section 5.3, the National Congress is a key institution in the qualitative leap towards building a national perspective in the international debate on the future of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. A rapprochement between the Executive and Legislative branches would also open an opportunity to include the promotion of women's participation in politics as part of the internalization of the WPS agenda in Brazil. As seen in the Introduction and section 4.3, this ambition originated in Resolution 1325(2000) and is absent from Brazil's Action Plan.

There was not enough time for the construction of a national perspective on the Women, Peace and Security agenda in order for it to influence Brazil's 11th mandate at the UN Security Council in 2022 and 2023. On the contrary, Brazil's experience in the Council will ideally catalyze discussions at the highest decision-making levels. If this were to happen, the likelihood of Brazil having an updated, more participatory action plan, preferably with monitoring and perhaps a budget, would increase. As a result, the international contribution that Brazil would be able to make would be significantly more qualified, in line with its historic commitment to international peace and security.

## Conclusion

*“[...] men are prepared from childhood for the fact that they may have to shoot. Women are not taught that... They are not prepared to do that work... And they remember other things, and remember differently. They are capable of seeing what is closed to men.*

*[...]*

*Whatever women talk about, the thought is constantly present in them: war is first of all murder, and then hard work.”*

*Svetlana Alexievich, *The Unwomanly Face of War*.*

This book recalled that the Women, Peace and Security agenda, made up of 10 resolutions approved by the Security Council, is the result of almost a century of efforts by women’s organizations from different geographical regions to incorporate the perspectives of the female population on issues of international peace and security. The research by the writer revealed that Brazil played a pioneering role in building the agenda during the negotiation of the United Nations Charter, through Bertha Lutz’s defense of the role of women in peace.

We showed that the issue has been integrated not only into the work agenda of the UNSC in 2000, but also into actions on the ground, through the mandates of peacekeeping missions. We could also see that enforcing standards of conduct for military personnel and civilians serving the UN in the field has led to changes in national legislation, such as the updating of the Military Penal Code, currently being debated in Brazil. Support for the agenda has helped in the election of non-permanent members in recent years. These results indicate support from the international community for the first hypothesis of the study: that the inclusion of the female half of the population places States in a better position to respond to security challenges.

In this sense, we sought to assess two parallel dimensions of the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in its first 20 years: the first, the United Nations’ responsibility; the second, the

implementation of domestic actions by Member States. In the second aspect, the fact that Brazil has a National Action Plan since 2017 and maintains a historical commitment to the collective security system, was highlighted. In our conclusion, we will summarize some of the main successes observed and the lines of action suggested in order to improve the two dimensions of implementation of the 10 binding documents adopted by the Security Council on the subject.

Starting with the work of the UN and its members, the research concludes that, 20 years after the adoption of Resolution 1325, knowledge about the Women, Peace and Security agenda remains restricted to circles generally made up of women, while women (and the contents of the agenda) continue to be excluded from discussions on international peace and security, disarmament, arms control, etc. In order to overcome this mismatch, which jeopardizes the mainstreaming of the agenda, it is essential to seek collaboration of decision-makers, mostly men, especially through the production and dissemination of data, particularly on the effects of the inclusion of women in peace efforts.

When a Force Commander notices, for instance, that information gathered by women patrol officers from local women has prevented an attack on his troops, he will likely recognize the utility to have female officers in the Mission. Conversely, if the same Commander never learns that the crucial information would not have been passed on to male police officers due to cultural reasons, he may judge the inclusion of women to be a waste of increasingly scarce resources.

Nonetheless, we have tried to emphasize that the inclusion of uniformed women in peacekeeping operations should be considered above all as their right to equal access to professional opportunities in their field — not as a panacea. Difficulties faced by female officers in the field must be taken into account to ensure that they can collaborate with the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping missions while in full physical and psychological safety. In carrying out their duties, women blue helmets should respond to demands and expectations similar to those expected of their male counterparts (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004; Shepherd, 2011).



We argued that the inclusion of uniformed women and civilians in UN peacekeeping missions should translate into an improvement in the quality of life of the population of the countries that receive them, always in consultation with that population. Throughout the paper, data has been analyzed that proves that gender equality is a predictor of peace in a society. By contrast, UN peacekeeping missions operate where there is conflict, i.e. where there are severe restrictions on equality. It is the duty of the UN, as the generator of universal human rights norms and standards, to reinforce them on the ground. Unlike national armies, it cannot shirk its responsibility to consider women's views on cultural standards.

Hence, peace agreements and constitutional texts sponsored by the UN must guarantee unrestricted and explicit equality between the sexes in all spheres and prohibit discriminatory practices such as forced marriages and genital mutilation. Peacekeeping must include police combat and judicial accountability for crimes of sexual violence and domestic violence. SSR efforts must include the equal participation of women in public institutions. Peacebuilding must guarantee women's access to funding and to jobs. Without an integrated and cross-cutting implementation of WPS mandates by peacekeeping missions, the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy could become an instrumentalization, by the UN and contributing countries, of the Women, Peace and Security agenda for public relations purposes (Egnell, 2016; Otto, 2009; Simic, 2010).

Turning to the Brazilian point of view, less than a year separated the submission of this work from the beginning of Brazil's 11th elected term in the United Nations Security Council. As indicated in Chapter 3, the country had few opportunities to directly influence the documents adopted by the UNSC on Women, Peace and Security. The opportunity in 2022 and 2023 to influence possible new texts according to the Brazilian vision should therefore not be wasted.

It was shown that the national interest and the WPS agenda converge in the defense of peace and the peaceful resolution of disputes, and in the promotion of development as a response to the recurrence of conflicts and the importance of maintaining a peaceful geographical environment. Based on an analysis of Brazilian diplomatic discourse, it was found that

Brazil favors the Peacebuilding Commission as the preferred forum for discussing recommendations on Women, Peace and Security for the UNSC. The hypothesis that the agenda is in line with Brazilian support for the link between peace and development is accurate.

The survey on the implementation of the activities in the National Action Plan indicates that, like most UN Member States, Brazil has taken important but still initial steps towards internalizing the Women, Peace and Security agenda. On the one hand, it was found that in the ministries responsible for the largest number of activities (Foreign Affairs and Defense) hardly any official who is not directly involved in deployment to UN peacekeeping and special political missions is aware of the National Action Plan. On the other hand, it was possible to gauge interest on the part of actors that have not been included in this process so far, such as the Ministry of Citizenship and the Department of Migrants, Refugees and Stateless persons in the Ministry of Human Rights.

The successive political changes that have taken place in Brazilian government after the National Action Plan was drafted in 2016, with the following replacement of teams in ministries, may have contributed to this low level of knowledge. However, bearing in mind efforts made by Itamaraty and the Armed Forces to fulfill the objective of raising awareness and disseminating the NAP, the main reason for the lack of knowledge seems to be the lack of accountability. In the absence of monitoring mechanisms and a specific budget, there is, in practice, little incentive for government bodies involved to implement the Plan.

As explained in Chapter 3, even before the National Plan was launched, the Brazilian government already made use of concepts belonging to the resolutions that make up the Women, Peace and Security agenda. However, the adoption and renewal of the document do not seem to have generated, for the time being, greater knowledge about the normative framework underlying these concepts. It does not seem to have contributed to improved coordination of the initiatives carried out by the Brazilian government in matters pertaining to WPS. In this sense, there is a great deal of explored potential for deepening the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda by Brazil. This is especially true

when we consider the possibility of an original national perspective on the issue, which, to date, cannot be recognized.

The experience of countries whose national action plans led to concrete results indicates that it is crucial to involve the highest levels of government, in particular the ministers. According to the interviews, the drafting of the Brazilian NAP depended on champions in mid-level positions at the time. Also the execution of the Plan is subordinated to a small group of committed individuals, who have relatively little decision-making power.

We identified cost-free actions that could have a positive impact, provided there is high-level political commitment. In fact, greater commitment to the WPS agenda could give Brazil access to extra resources, such as those offered by the Elsie Fund. In addition, recalibrating the diplomatic discourse in favor of post-conflict initiatives that take into account the needs of local women, as provided for in the Plan, is an example of an immediate action that would depend solely on instructions to that effect. Redirecting resources from trilateral cooperation with UN agencies to projects under the purview of the Peacebuilding Fund, which allocates around 40 percent of its budget to benefit women and girls in countries emerging from conflict, was also highlighted as a possible foreign policy action in implementation the WPS agenda, without the need for additional budget.

We also found that there is room for better communication with interested institutions, such as military police commanders, which could result in an increased presence of female police officers in peacekeeping missions and political missions. We also identified demand for military personnel in the DPPA, at UN Headquarters, in areas such as planning of security sector reforms. The secondment of Brazilian women military to work in this area, not related to combat at all, could hopefully increase the representation of Brazilian women in uniform and would allow the country to strengthen its credentials as an agent invested in international peace and security at a time when the number of Brazilian military personnel on the ground is declining.

As for civilians, given the difficulties imposed by current legislation on the secondment of civil servants to the UN, the interviews confirmed that first-hand information provided by civilian personnel in special political missions and peacekeeping missions are of great value to calibrate countries' positions at the UNSC and other fora dedicated to international peace and security. To this end, the suggestion for the Brazilian government to come up with a gender-sensitive roster of eligible professionals could be instrumental and merits evaluation.

The expansion of issues under the Women, Peace and Security agenda was also explored. In some cases, expansion is moving towards issues that pertain to normative framework negotiated out of the UNSC (climate change, for example), that should not eat up the shrinking budget available for peacekeeping missions out of political interests of financial donors. At the same time, it was noted that the current debate also extends to problems such as violence against women outside conflict situations, and transnational crime. If, on the one hand, these challenges belong primarily to domestic law, on the other hand they in many cases pose a threat to the life and physical integrity of the female population as severe as armed conflict. In this context, the undesirable possibility of a militarized response was identified.

We also discussed that Brazil could make an important contribution to this debate by sharing the country's civilian experience of tackling violence against women and femicide, which extends to Brazilians living in 15 foreign countries. The civil-military construction of the protection of women and girls at Operation Welcome was also identified as good practice that could be shared internationally by Brazil. Still on the subject of the Operation, it was noted that coordinating existing actions around the National Plan and the WPS agenda could be very fruitful.

In its relations with countries emerging from conflict, Brazil could reinforce the fight to end violence against women as an integral part of the WPS agenda, in line with the country's best tradition to offer alternatives to the models proposed by permanent members, as was the case with concept of Responsibility While Protecting, in the context of response to humanitarian crises (Ghisleni, 2011; Fonseca Jr. and Belli, 2013).

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Such a step tends to generate interest for the agenda among civil society organizations, strengthening national ownership. In this prospective scenario, any inclusion of activities related to combating violence against women on national territory in a future NAP could complement, rather than detract from, the eminently external nature of the WPS agenda for Brazil.

It was noted that Brazil has accumulated political capital on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, manifested in the two awards granted by the UN to Brazilian female military officers in 2019 and 2020. For Ambassador Maria Luisa Escorel, it is in Brazil's interest to share the care taken in preparing our troops, which translates into excellence in deployment, as indicated by the awards. A similar view is shared by Commander Carla Araújo, for whom the two awards put Brazil in a favorable position in the international debate.

In addition, Brazil's achievements in the area of military doctrine (methodology for combating sexual violence, training third countries, etc.) could be shared with the international community. For Commander Márcia Braga, the innovative draft resolution on women peacekeepers presented by Indonesia in 2020, and approved with massive support, could serve as inspiration for Brazil in its mandate on the Security Council.

In order to optimize results in negotiations inside and outside the UNSC, the country can make use of overlapping geometries (Neves, 2010). In other words, depending on the issue and the body where it is discussed, Brazil could work with countries with a similar profile in the collective security system (T/PCCs); with usual partners in peace and security negotiations (ZOPACAS); with countries that share political affinities and neighboring countries, leading to regional perspectives (Chile, Colombia, Argentina and Uruguay).

These suggestions are based on the evidence gathered by the research and limited to the scope and length of this worked, produced in a professional context, not in academia. Still, some of them could enrich Brazil's engagement with the WPS agenda, in line with the national interest. Brazil could make a more qualified contribution as the internalization of the

agenda develops and involves various sectors, including National Congress and civil society organizations, which could lead broad consensus.

In March 2023, the first National Action Plan expired. Favorable context of Brazil's presence at the Security Council could spark a process of internal reflection leading to the improvement of the document and of Brazil's contribution to the international debate on the Women, Peace and Security agenda. The revision of the NAP could update Brazilian action, leaning to political aspects of the agenda, such as the participation of women in mediation and politics, and the implementation of international good practice.

In this sense, the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring progress, starting with the drafting of a text conducive to measurable actions, then including the adoption of indicators and targets and the allocation of a budget. It could prove useful in overcoming the assessment that: "As it stands, Brazil's NAP could end up being transformed into a merely rhetorical mechanism, endowed with good ideas and intentions [...]" (Drumond and Rebelo, 2018, 9).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as coordinator of the Interministerial Working Group, is in a privileged position to strengthen cooperation with other Executive bodies, notwithstanding collaboration with representatives from the Legislative and Judiciary branches, who could contribute a great deal in their respective spheres. As a result, the publication of a revised version of the Plan by means of a public act would represent meaningful progress.

A final word, inspired by article 4, subsection IX of the Federal Constitution, which determines, among the governing principles of Brazil's international relations, cooperation between peoples for the progress of humanity: the persistence in 2020 of separatist wars, serious intra-state conflicts and humanitarian crises affecting 2 billion people<sup>289</sup> is proof that keeping half the population away from the prevention and solution (whether political-diplomatic or military) of these conflicts has not served the good of the peoples.

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289 Source: Global Humanitarian Overview, 2019, 6.

Without pretending to exhaust the clashes between states — or between antagonistic interest groups within a country, as is more often the case — the Women, Peace and Security agenda urges the international community to bet on collaboration between women and men, on equal footing, in order to build more and better peace. After evaluating the twenty-year evolution of the agenda, the results compiled by the 2015 Global Study and others after that, as well as the path travelled in the implementation of the National Action Plan, it seems that responding to this call in transparent, balanced and predictable terms would be a fully justified option for Brazil.





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Camilla Corá, by e-mail, on November 5, 2020;

Carla Pessanha Loque, by videoconference, on November 1st, 2020;

Carla Marcolini Monteiro de Castro Araújo e Souza, by videoconference, on November 23, 2020;

Daniela Natália Teixeira Schermerhorn, by videoconference, on September 23, 2020;

Fernanda Santos Pereira da Silva, by videoconference, on September 12, 2020;

Germana Dalberto, by videoconference, on October 28, 2020;

Ivana Mara Ferreira Costa, by videoconference, on October 6, 2020;

Larissa Pereira de Almeida, by videoconference on October 23, 2020;

Márcia Andrade Braga, by videoconference, on November 2, 2020;

Márcio Carneiro Barbosa, by videoconference, on October 2, 2020;

Maria Luisa Escorel de Moraes, by videoconference, on November 13, 2020;

Najla Nassif Palma, by videoconference, on September 23, 2020;

Niusarete Margarida de Lima, by telephone, on November 5, 2020;

Pérola Mourão de Souza Sardo de Abreu Pereira, by videoconference, on June 2, 2020;

Renata Avelar Giannini, by videoconference, on August 4, 2020;

Ricardo Augusto Ferreira Costa Neves, by videoconference, on October 15, 2020;

Tamara Jurberg, by videoconference, on November 4, 2020;

Thâmara Monteiro de Arruda Fortes, by videoconference, on November 12, 2020;

Vitor Hugo de Araújo Almeida, in-person, on September 30, 2020.

## Annexes

**Table 1 — Mandates given to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions on components of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, listed in alphabetical order by acronym**

MISSION AND RESOLUTION	OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH NUMBERS AND SUMMARY OF THE MANDATE ON WPS
MINURSO S/RES/2548(2020)	<p>OP 11 — to the Secretary-General, to increase the number of women in the Mission and ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation in all aspects of operations;</p> <p>OP 13 — to the parties to the conflict and neighboring countries to include women in confidence-building measures.</p>
MINUSCA S/RES/2552(2020)	<p>OP 7 — to the CAR authorities to promote the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and in the broader political process;</p> <p>OP 9 — to the CAR authorities and other stakeholders to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women as voters and candidates in the 2020 and 2021 presidential, legislative and local elections;</p> <p>OP 12 — to the CAR authorities to include the recruitment of women in the implementation of the National Security Policy, the National Strategy on SSR and the National Defense Plan;</p> <p>OP 24 — to the CAR authorities and international partners to sustain adequate support to the Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children and to guarantee the swift prosecution of alleged perpetrators;</p> <p>OP 31 a (iii) — to the Mission, to provide specific protection to women and children affected by the conflict, including through gender counselors and the adoption of a gender-sensitive approach;</p> <p>OP 31 b (iii) — to the Mission, to assist the CAR authorities in including women in the peace process;</p> <p>OP 31 b (iv) — to the Mission to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, including survivors of sexual violence, in efforts to overcome the root causes of the conflict and achieve national reconciliation, in line with the CAR action plan on Women, Peace and Security;</p> <p>PO 31 b (v) — to the Mission to include women in transitional justice, including survivors of sexual violence;</p> <p>OP 32 b (iv) — to the Mission, to support the training of the CAR police, taking into account the need to recruit women at all levels;</p> <p>OP 32 d (ii) — to the Mission, to monitor, help investigate and ensure reporting of violations and abuses committed against children and women, including rape;</p> <p>PO 39 — to the Secretary-General, to increase the number of women in the Mission, including in senior leadership positions;</p> <p>OP 44 — to the Mission, to ensure the cross-cutting application of the gender mainstreaming perspective throughout the mandate.</p>

<p>MINUSMA S/RES/2531 (2020)</p>	<p>OP 3 — to the Malian parties, to increase the representation of women in the Committee for the Monitoring of the Agreement (<i>Comité de suivi de l'Accord</i>) and its subcommittees, and to establish a women-led observatory to oversee progress in their full, effective and meaningful participation;</p> <p>PO 4 — to the Malian parties, to observe the 30% quota for women in all political functions, stipulated by local legislation, as well as the targets for women's participation in the Agreement laid out in Mali's 3rd action plan on Women, Peace and Security;</p> <p>OP 28 a (iii) — to the Mission, to prioritize the needs of women and children in DDR actions;</p> <p>OP 28 a (v) — to the Mission, to ensure the participation of civil society, especially women's organizations and women peacebuilders in the implementation of the Agreement;</p> <p>OP 28 c (iii) — to the Mission, to provide specific protection to women and children affected by the conflict, including through gender counselors and the adoption of a gender-sensitive approach;</p> <p>OP 28 e (ii) — to the Mission, to monitor, document, help investigate and prevent all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and abuse committed against women and children;</p> <p>OP 45 — to the Secretary-General, to increase the number of women in the Mission and to ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation;</p> <p>PO 53 — to the Mission and all military forces operating in Mali, to comply with the resolutions of the Women, Peace and Security agenda;</p> <p>OP 54 — to the Mission, to assist the Malian authorities in ensuring the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of the Agreement, including in SSR, DDR, and in reconciliation and electoral processes. Calls on the Malian parties to provide extra protection for women and girls in vulnerable situations.</p>
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MONUSCO S/RES/2502 (2019)	<p>PO2 — to stakeholders to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women at all stages of local elections;</p> <p>PO 17 — to the government of the DRC to consider the needs and experiences of women and girls in DDR actions;</p> <p>PO 20 — to the government of the DRC to consider women’s full and effective participation and safety in SSR actions;</p> <p>OP 29 (ii) c — to the Mission, to ensure the participation of women in overcoming the root causes of the conflict and in national reconciliation;</p> <p>OP 29 (ii) f — to the Mission, to promote inclusive SSR, taking into account women’s participation and safety;</p> <p>OP 32 — to the Mission, in the fight against gender-based violence and sexual violence, to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women at all levels, including through partnerships with women’s networks in the protection of civilians and in support of DDR and SSR actions, as well as through the provision of civilian and uniformed gender and women protection advisers and focal points at Headquarters and field levels, participation of women civil society leaders and organization members with regards to conflict prevention and resolution, and to support the government in achieving the 30% constitutional quota for women in politics;</p> <p>PO 33 — to the Mission, to continue working with the government of the DRC to combat sexual violence in conflict;</p> <p>PO 41 — to the Secretary-General, to increase the number of women in the Mission and ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation.</p>
UNAMID S/RES/2525 (2020)	OP 9 — to the Secretary-General, to increase the number of women in the Mission and ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation.
UNDOF S/RES/2530 (2020)	OP 13 — to the Secretary-General, to increase the number of women in the Mission and ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation.
UNFICYP S/RES/2537 (2020)	<p>OP 5 (g) — to the parties to strengthen the participation of women’s organizations in peace efforts, including through the development of an action plan by the Technical Committee on Gender Equality for the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in the negotiations;</p> <p>OP 15 — to the Mission, to ensure the cross-cutting application of the gender perspective throughout the mandate; and to the Secretary-General and T/PCCs, to increase the number of women in the Mission and ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation in all operations.</p>
UNIFIL S/RES/2539 (2020)	<p>OP 25 — to the Secretary-General and T/PCCs to increase the number of women in the Mission and ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation in all operations;</p> <p>OP 26 — to the Mission, to ensure the cross-cutting application of the gender perspective throughout the mandate and to assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring women’s full, effective and meaningful participation, involvement and representation at all levels of decision-making and in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, as well as to support the implementation of the action plan on Women, Peace and Security, including to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence.</p>

<p>UNISFA S/RES/2519 (2020) and S/RES/2497 (2019)</p>	<p>Postpones the withdrawal of troops until the end of the COVID-19 pandemic and maintains the mandate given by Res. 2497 (2019):</p> <p>PO 18 — to the two governments to ensure that the full, effective and meaningful participation of women is included in confidence-building measures;</p> <p>PO 19 — expresses concern that women remain absent from the leadership of local peace committees, calls on the parties to promote the full, effective and equal participation of women, including in intercommunity dialogue, to ensure a credible and legitimate process, and encourages the Mission to integrate women into peace discussions;</p> <p>PO 26 — calls on the parties to cease all forms of violence against civilians, including women and children;</p> <p>OP 27 — to the Secretary-General, to effectively monitor sexual and gender-based violence and other violations and abuses committed against women and children; and to the two governments, to issue visas to UN staff in charge;</p> <p>OP 28 — to the Secretary-General, to increase the number of women in the Mission and ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation in all operations, to implement a gender mainstreaming plan in line with Resolution 1325, and to the Mission, to sustain adequate expertise on women and child protection.</p>
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<p>UNMISS S/RES/2514 (2020)</p>	<p>OP 5 — to the parties to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in all conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts;</p> <p>OP 8 a (i) — to the Mission, to protect civilians within its capacity and area of deployment, with specific protection for women and children, including through the continued use of the Mission’s Child Protection Advisers, Women Protection Advisers, and uniformed and civilian Gender Advisers, the positions for which should be filled expeditiously;</p> <p>OP 8 to (vi) — to the Mission, to develop and implement gender-sensitive community violence reduction programs, in cooperation with community partners and representatives, especially women and youth;</p> <p>OP 8 d (ii) — to the Mission, to monitor, investigate, verify and report on violations and abuses committed against children and women, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict, and to accelerate and strengthen the monitoring of such violations;</p> <p>PO 9 — stresses that the viability of the peace process is conditional on the inclusion of civil society, women and youth;</p> <p>OP 18 — to the Mission to strengthen its sexual and gender-based violence prevention and response activities, including through data collection, threat analysis and early warning systems by engaging with victims and women’s organizations, and to ensure the cross-cutting application of the gender perspective throughout the mandate and to reaffirm the importance of uniformed and civilian gender advisors and gender focal points in all components of the Mission;</p> <p>OP 19 — to the Mission, to intensify and extend its presence and active patrolling in areas of high risk of conflict, or where there are emerging protection risks such as high rates of sexual and gender-based violence, and in areas with a high concentration of internally displaced people and refugees, with particular attention to women and children;</p> <p>OP 21 — to the Secretary-General and the T/PCCs, in the context of improving mission performance, to increase the number of women in the Mission and ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation in all aspects of operations;</p> <p>OP 31 — to the Mission, to support the achievement of the minimum 35% women’s representation in the Revitalised Agreement and the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in all spheres and levels of political leadership, the peace process and the transitional government;</p> <p>PO 35 — to the government of South Sudan, to ensure that all victims of sexual violence have equal protection under the law and access to justice, and to protect the rights of women and girls in these processes;</p> <p>PO 41 — to the Secretary-General, to include in its report on the fulfillment of the Mission’s mandate the participation of women in peace processes and an analysis of the Mission’s political engagement on this issue.</p>
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Note: UNMIK [S/RES/1244 (1999)], UNMOGIP [S/RES/209 (1965)] and UNTSO [S/RES/50 (1948)] mandates were approved before the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000) and the other resolutions that make up the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

**Table 2 — Brazilian military personnel selected for individual missions in UN peacekeeping operations, in chronological order**

<b>RANK, NAME AND BRANCH</b>	<b>ROLE</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>YEAR</b>
Lieutenant Gisele dos Santos Alves (MB)	Military Observer	UNOCI	2013
Corvette Captain Carla Daniel (MB)	Staff Officer	UNIFIL	2014
Major Regina Schendel (EB)	Staff Officer	UNMIL	2016
Major Luanda dos Santos Bastos (FAB)	Staff Officer	UNAMID	2017
Lieutenant-Colonel Andréa Firmo (EB)	Military Observer	MINURSO	2018
Corvette Captain Márcia Braga (MB)	Staff* Officer	MINUSCA	2018
Captain Lieutenant Maria Aparecida Almeida (MB)	Military Observer	UNIFSA	2018
Major Laura Kazue Lopes Nakamura (FAB)	Military Observer	MINURSO	2018
Major Danielle Cristini Lara Espínola Nunes (FAB)	Staff Officer	UNMISS	2019
Frigate Captain Carla Araújo (MB)	Staff* Officer	MINUSCA	2019
Lieutenant-Colonel Joseane Xavier Guedes (EB)	Military Observer	MINURSO	2019
Lieutenant-Colonel Yamar Eiras Baptista (EB)	Military Observer	MINURSO	2019
Major Mônica Wainer (FAB)	Military Observer	MINURSO	2019
Major Jeanne de Aquino Araújo dos Santos (FAB)	Staff Officer	UNMISS	2020
Captain Nilza Barros (MB)	Staff Officer	MINUSCA	2020
Major Carla Oliveira de Souza (FAB)	Military Observer	MINURSO	2020
Major Karina Raquel Valentim Linhares (FAB)	Staff Officer	MINUSCA	2020
Major Luanda dos Santos Bastos (FAB)	Staff Officer	MONUSCO	2020

\* Gender adviser

Captions:

EB — Brazilian Army; FAB — Brazilian Air Force; MB — Brazilian Navy

MINURSO — United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSCA — United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

UNAMID — African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNIFIL — United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNISFA — United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

UNMIL — United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMISS — United Nations Mission in South Sudan

UNOCI — United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Sources: Hamann, Giannini and Pereira (2019), consultation with the Ministry of Defense in November 2020.

### **Table 3 — Women in the Brazilian Armed Forces in October 2020**

#### **Armed Forces**

Total female personnel: 33,187

Career personnel: 16,410

Temporary staff: 16,777

% Female/Total: 9.11%

#### **Navy**

Total female personnel: 8,381

Career staff: 5,121

Temporary staff: 3,260

% Female Staff/Total: 10.61%

#### **Army**

Total female personnel: 12,463 Career personnel: 3,074

Temporary staff: 9,389

% Female Staff/Total: 5.68%

#### **Air Force**

Total female staff: 12,343

Career staff: 8,215

Temporary staff: 4,128

% Female Staff/Total: 18.73%

Source: Ministry of Defense

**Table 4 — Women, Peace and Security priorities declared by countries elected to the Security Council between 2018 and 2020**

Seventy-Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly,  
mandate 2019-2020

Elected country	Prioritising WPS	Female leadership
South Africa	Yes	Yes (MFA)
Indonesia	Yes	Yes (MFA)
Dominican Republic	Yes	No
Belgium	Yes (performance)	No
Germany	Yes	Yes (MFA)

Seventy-Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,  
mandate 2020-2021

Elected country	Prioritising WPS	Female leadership
Tunisia	Yes (combating terrorism)	No
Niger	No	No
Vietnam	Yes	No
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	No	No
Estonia	Yes (protection)	Yes (PR)

Seventy-Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,  
mandate 2021-2022

Elected country	Prioritising WPS	Female leadership
Kenia	Yes	Yes (MFA)
India	No	No
Mexico	Yes	No
Ireland	Yes	No
Norway	Yes	Yes (MFA)

Caption: MFA — Minister of Foreign Affairs; PM — Prime Minister; PR — President of the Republic.

Sources: campaign materials, speeches at the launch of candidacies and/or elections.









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The year 2020 marked the 20th anniversary of the adoption of United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1325, titled “Women, Peace and Security” – the first of the agenda bearing the same name, which includes 10 different resolutions. That same year, Brazil was preparing for the 11th mandate as a non-permanent member of the Council (2022-2023), without a record of meaningful engagement in the issue. In this context, the author decided to present the application of the agenda in the UN peace and security architecture. This book traces the history of women’s movements demand for participation in decisions on armed conflict, even prior to the creation of the United Nations – a demand that Brazilian delegate Bertha Lutz decisively advocated for at the San Francisco Conference. Having been part of the Interministerial Group that drafted the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in 2016 and revised the text in 2018/2019, the author maps relevant stakeholders and investigates the underlying motivations behind the text. Supported by interviews, she concludes that the Plan had little impact and that the text deserves an update. In assessing the implementation of Security Council’s resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, the book seeks to relate the difficulty of recognizing women’s views on war to the broader resistance to female participation in the public space. The book presents data on the situation of women in politics, with a focus on Brazil, including in foreign policy. By arguing that the WPS agenda aligns with Brazil’s diplomatic tradition of conflict prevention and promotion of development as the basis for lasting peace, the author supposes that the most recent mandate of the country in the UN Security Council could galvanize interest from different national actors on the topic. She suggests that a desirable outcome of this process would be the adoption of a new National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

