In a world of rapid shifts and unsettling changes, the relationship between the United States and Brazil stands out as a unique and enduring testament to the complexities of international diplomacy. These two vast and diverse nations find themselves at a crucial crossroads, their paths mirroring each other in revealing and transformative ways. This reflection extends beyond cultural parallels into the contemporary political arena, where shared dilemmas and common goals resonate with increasing depth.

The United States and Brazil are grappling with the dual challenge of upholding democracy, resisting the allure of populism, and combating climate change. They are also seeking innovative solutions to foster resilience without sacrificing economic growth. How these nations confront these challenges shapes their bilateral relationship and serves as a model for global leadership. This dynamic is set against a backdrop where traditional alliances are reevaluated, and new partnerships emerge, driven by the realities of the 21st century.

At this historic juncture, the United States and Brazil have a unique opportunity to deepen their ties, recognizing the synergies that arise from their parallel journeys. From sustainable development to the battle against misinformation and a dedication to upholding democratic values, a vast landscape for cooperative endeavors emerges. A Bicentennial Partnership: Past, Present and Future of Brazil-United States Relations invites readers to envision the future paths of an enriched alliance between the United States and Brazil, exploring the foundations laid by two centuries of diplomatic engagement and the potential they might jointly tread.

Bruna Santos (Director of the Wilson Center Brazil Institute)

The bicentennial of the establishment of bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States is a significant occasion in our diplomatic history. One of the first countries to recognize Brazil's independence on May 26, 1824, the United States has established itself throughout this period as an indispensable partner for Brazil in the international community.

In the multipolar order that is taking shape today, the Brazil-US relationship can play an important role in addressing the major global issues: climate change, the fight against global warming and the promotion of sustainable development; the reduction of socioeconomic asymmetries between and within countries, including the fight against hunger and poverty; the reform of global governance decision-making bodies; the maintenance of international peace and security; nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; the protection of human rights and the defense of democracy.

Mauro Vieira Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil









Fernanda Petená Magnotta (Editor)

A BICENTENNIAL PARTNERSHIP:

Past, Present and Future of Brazil-United States Relations



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A BICENTENNIAL PARTNERSHIP:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF
BRAZIL-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão Brasil Fernanda Petená Magnotta (Editor)

A Bicentennial Partnership:

Past, Present and Future of Brazil-United States Relations

Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão Brasil

A BICENTENNIAL PARTNERSHIP: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF BRAZIL-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

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FERNANDA PETENÁ MAGNOTTA (EDITOR)

A BICENTENNIAL PARTNERSHIP: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF BRAZIL-UNITED STATES RELATIONS



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Foreword

Mauro Vieira¹

The bicentennial of the establishment of bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States is a significant occasion in our diplomatic history. One of the first countries to recognize Brazil's independence on May 26, 1824, the United States has established itself throughout this period as an indispensable partner for Brazil in the international community.

Relations with the United States have occupied a special place in my career. My first diplomatic post was the Embassy in Washington, where I served from 1978 to 1982 as Third, Second and then First Secretary. Years later, I had the honor of being appointed Ambassador of Brazil to the United States by President Lula.

As head of our Embassy between 2010 and 2015, I also had the privilege of accompanying President Obama on his visit to Brazil in March 2011, as well as the visits of then Vice-President Joe Biden in May 2013 and June 2014 respectively (already in the context of the World Cup in Brazil), and of President Dilma Rousseff to the US in August 2012. As President Dilma's Foreign Minister, we returned to Washington in August 2015 for an important working visit. In Brasilia, in October 2012, I had also attended the last meeting of the Global Partnership Dialogue (GPD), the main and highest-lead mechanism for bilateral political dialogue.

Our shared diplomatic history is marked by alternating cycles of rapprochement, recomposition, major convergences and occasional divergences. From the "unwritten alliance" of the Baron of Rio Branco's

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time — to use historian Bradford Burns's famous expression — to the current moment, characterized by evident mutual sympathy and a high degree of political intelligence between the two countries, we have covered a wide historical arc.

The two largest countries in the Western Hemisphere — multiracial and multicultural mass democracies that have many similarities but also clear differences between them — Brazil and the US are bound by a bicentennial friendship built upon important complementarities and synergies, in spite of distinct points of view that naturally arise. It is, after all, a complex, multifaceted and nuanced relationship. It should always be in Brazil's interest to maintain a mature, balanced relationship, rooted in mutual respect and on an equal footing, in which we will seek to understand US positions on global issues, while also reserving the right to present our differing perspectives.

In the multipolar order that is taking shape today, the Brazil-US relationship can play an important role in addressing the major global issues: climate change, the fight against global warming and the promotion of sustainable development; the reduction of socioeconomic asymmetries between and within countries, including the fight against hunger and poverty; the reform of global governance decision-making bodies; the maintenance of international peace and security; nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; the protection of human rights and the defense of democracy. Brazil maintains bridges with the entire international community and a universal capacity for dialogue, which can help to bring together different positions, build consensus and present solutions to shared challenges.

In a conversation I had with my colleague, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, at the very beginning of the current administration, when he called me to express his solidarity after the terrorist acts of January 8 in Brasilia — with the similar attacks on the Capitol two years earlier in his rearview mirror — , we noted that the commemoration of the bicentennial coincided with the resumption of bilateral relations in their best form, made possible by the election of President Lula and by the renewed

willingness of the Biden administration to revitalize dialogue with Brazil in the wake of difficult years in both countries.

In our subsequent meetings, usually on the sidelines of multilateral summits — and also in our frequent phone calls — , we have always reiterated that the anniversary offers a unique opportunity in terms of the potential for concrete achievements in the bilateral field. With this in mind, we believe that the celebrations of the bicentenary of the establishment of diplomatic relations should transcend the merely festive tone, taking on a political and diplomatic character, strengthening our ties in all fields and increasing coordination on global issues.

President Lula's visit to Washington in February 2023, when President Biden received him at the White House after just over 40 days in office, is part of this context. The large number of visits by US government officials to Brazil throughout 2023 is also testimony to this drive to strengthen ties between our governments. The launch of the Lula-Biden initiative on labor rights, on the margins of the opening of the General Debate of the 78th United Nations General Assembly, also offers a good example of what we can continue to do together for the benefit of our societies. On the occasion of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023, President Lula launched, alongside President Biden and the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, the Global Biofuels Alliance, designed to stimulate the global production of renewable fuels, especially ethanol, in the context of efforts to promote the energy transition. There are many opportunities opening up for us to strengthen diplomatic, political, economic and commercial, scientific and technological, cultural and human ties between our peoples and countries.

The book A Bicentennial Partnership: Past, Present and Future of Brasil-United States Relations, edited by Professor Fernanda Magnotta, could not come at a better time. More than a necessary retrospective, it is part of a cycle of events and achievements designed to commemorate history and to project what lies ahead. Structured around the past, present and future axes of the bilateral relationship, the book aims to be a living element of the virtuous cycle we are going through.

From our long diplomatic history, we can learn from the chapters contained here and draw lessons for navigating the present of the Brasilia-Washington relationship; from the various perspectives on the current state of our relations — and from the countless programs, issues and agendas we share — we can begin to build the future together; and by projecting the issues that will affect the future of both countries and of humanity as a whole, we can anticipate the problems and challenges and offer a reliable navigational chart for future generations of Brazilian and American citizens, politicians, diplomats, businesspeople, scholars, scientists, researchers, intellectuals, journalists, artists, and activists.

Introduction

Fernanda Petená Magnotta

Diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States are historic and important. They are anchored by identity traits that describe the two countries, each individually, as "exceptional," deserving of playing a unique role in the world. They also reflect the weight of the two largest democracies in the Western Hemisphere, whose material and ideational resources make it impossible to ignore the convergences and divergences between them.

If, on the one hand, we have reasons to celebrate shared values and common agendas, on the other, we also need to recognize that our history is full of mutual suspicions and ambiguities. In Joseph Smith's terms, in the classic *Unequal Giants*, it is first and foremost a profoundly asymmetrical relationship.

With that in mind, it is essential for Brazil and the United States not only to maintain close communication, but also to strive to understand each other. What drives us? How do we see ourselves? How do we frame the world? We don't always have the same answers to these questions. However, even more important than thinking alike is being willing to listen, understand and legitimize the other's rationale, built according to their capacities and based on their own historical experience.

On the verge of the 200th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, this book intends to serve this very purpose: to help build new bridges of mutual understanding. Thus, A Bicentennial Partnership offers not only a detailed analysis of the relationship between the two countries over two centuries, but — in the segments "Past," "Present" and "Future" — the book addresses the transformation and challenges of this complex bilateral interaction with its sights also set on what lies ahead.

In the "Past" section, firstly, we present comprehensive reflections that take stock of the 200 years of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States, exploring their various phases over the years. This is followed by a discussion of cases selected for being particularly emblematic: the role of US diplomacy during Brazil's independence; the influence of Brazilian businessmen in defining bilateral policy during the Second World War; Brazilian participation in the US intervention in the Dominican Republic during the Cold War; the tensions and opportunities during Brazil's re-democratization process. Reflections are also made on specific periods, such as the bilateral relationship during the two Lula administrations and the rise of "Trumpism" in the United States and the new right in both countries during the Bolsonaro administration. Finally, there is a panoramic assessment of economic relations in that period and an analysis of the partnership in terms of the defense of democracy and peace.

The "Present" section discusses current relations, questioning the interdependence between the two countries, analyzing the development of studies about the United States in Brazil, the perception of Brazilian public opinion about the United States, the logic of "Americanism" and "anti-Americanism" in Brazil, the role of business interest groups in this relationship, and cooperation towards the construction of common antiracist policies.

The "Future" segment explores the potential directions of this partnership. It takes a "state of play" overview of promising agendas. It discusses issues of potential cooperation — such as the transition to a low-carbon economy — and ponders the challenges and opportunities of the bilateral relationship in a polarized global context. A brief look at the history of economic results also allows us to think about next steps for trade and investment. Finally, political trends in the United States and their possible impacts on Brazil are addressed, underlining the need to adapt to a new moment for the international system.

A Bicentennial Partnership is notable not only for the quality of its content, but also for its editorial characteristics. Firstly, because the choice to publish the book in both Portuguese and English broadens its audience,

allowing Brazilian voices to be heard globally, promoting a more inclusive and comprehensive dialog on a topic of great importance to us.


Compiling a book with these characteristics rests on the commitment to promote perspectives that reflect our own interpretations and subtleties about a history that has us as protagonists. It also aims to contribute to the appreciation and strengthening of the academic and intellectual production of the country, helping to balance a debate that is often dominated by North American or European authors in the field of foreign policy in general and bilateral relations in particular.

This book also serves as a celebration of Americanists and Brazilianists, now and in the past, who have dedicated their efforts to building a detailed record of relations between Brazil and the United States. It is a tribute to their ongoing commitment to shed light on the intersecting paths that have shaped the course of relations and, by doing so, to encourage critical thinking about them.

In this sense, the diversity of the authors, including academics and diplomats from many generations, with vast experience and direct knowledge of relations between Brazil and the United States, ensures a many-sided and in-depth analysis. It also reflects a concern with the diversity of perspectives in this work. The contribution of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mauro Vieira, through the Foreword, adds a layer of great value to the work, underlining not only the importance of diplomatic relations at the highest governmental level, but also bringing to light the experience of a privileged interlocutor.

Finally, it is symbolic and important that the publication of this work takes place under the auspices of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), a well-respected institution that for over 50 years has dedicated itself to promoting knowledge in international relations in Brazil within our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Public policies are usually better when they are conceived in a pluralistic way. Thus, giving a voice to specialized epistemic communities in the process of "thinking Brazil" and reflecting about its role in the world is not only laudable, but also an important step towards building the country we want to live in.

We hope that this material will become an essential reference in studies of bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States. The aim is for the book to help promote understanding, qualified and intellectually honest debate on a complex and nuanced relationship that needs to be continually revisited.



200 years of a Gradual but Decisive Partnership: Revisiting the History of Brazil-US Relations, their Challenges, Maturity and Potential

Introduction

The timely publication of this book comes close to the 200th anniversary of the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, on December 2, 1823. Conceived at the time, ironically, not by the US president, whose surname has become enshrined, but by his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, this formulation had a minimalist character and was more prospective than effective, since that country was still in the formative stages of what would later become the North American power. Even so, by affirming the exceptional nature of the Western Hemisphere, which should no longer be the object of greed on the part of the European imperial powers, which were experiencing a process of conservative restoration, this postulate began a long reflection on the real intentions of the United States, which we are still dealing with today (Morgenfeld, 2023).

In Hispanic America, where geographical fragmentation and intestinal revolts were spreading, this doctrine generated greater concern, especially at the turn of the 20th century, when US imperialist interests were more clearly manifested. Brazil was more receptive to the Monroe postulate, and even to its most bellicose addendum, the so-called Roosevelt Corollary, a veritable self-proclamation of the US *right* to intervene in the region. In a continent that has long been perceived as being under the influence of Yankee imperialism, this is a clear indication

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of the good historical relations experienced by the two countries. But even though they are the two largest democracies and societies in the Western Hemisphere, and have maintained a good diplomatic relationship, as well as an intense economic relationship, for almost two centuries, there has never really been a strategic partnership established on a lasting basis between Brazil and the United States, beyond occasional, sometimes even unsuccessful, rapprochements (Ricupero, 1996).

Given the unrealized potential for rapprochement between the two countries, it is not surprising that their historical lines of interaction have sometimes been characterized as an "informal alliance" or, alternatively, as an "emerging rivalry" (Burns, 1966; Moniz Bandeira, 2011). The point here is not to reiterate the notion of a certain long-term exceptionality of Brazil-US relations, countries whose historiography has already been defined too much by this conceptualization; but rather to try to reflect, in a text of an essayistic and eminently synthetic nature, the evolution of a bilateral relationship that was guided both by constancy and good terms, and by the absence of a clear formalization of interaction. In this sense, even though structural asymmetry is, in fact, a constitutive element of the relationship (Hirst, 2004), I seek here to better understand how the two largest nations in the hemisphere, which share a feeling of being unique on the continent, could or could not have forged closer cooperation ties, as well as the potential, limits and risks of such a framework.

From the end of colonial rule, the rise of the American giant to the crisis of the South American empire

In the first three centuries after the invasion of the American continent by European empires, which began at the turn of the 16th century, in a dynamic typical of colonial logic, there was little interaction between regions controlled by different metropoles, since commercial and socio-cultural exchange relations took place more between America and Europe than between different colonies. In this sense, it is not surprising that there wasn't much interaction between the Portuguese and English territories in the New World until the beginning of the 19th century. In fact, with different socio-economic organization and administrative

models, these possessions were not in a position, or even interested, in establishing more intense levels of relationship until at least when new socio-economic, political and even ideological dynamics began to redefine the parameters of the colonial rule, culminating in a turbulent, mostly emancipation process for almost the entire continent (Griffin, 2023).

Given this background, it is not at all surprising that the relationship between the new Brazilian and American nations went through a slow start. In fact, although they had experienced quite different emancipation processes, one marked by negotiation between metropolis and colony, and the other by a much more dramatic rupture, in the first years after their respective independences, they continued to be socio-economic realities destined to maintain a transatlantic orientation in their respective diplomatic relations. And although there was a request from the new North American nation for help with the failed attempts to emancipate parts of Portuguese territory in the New World in the last years of the 18th century, the so-called "founding fathers" of the USA shied away from committing themselves to any concrete material support, and the role that the former Thirteen Colonies played in Brazil's emancipatory process was restricted to the level of historical example.

Two material reasons helped define the cautious initial course of the bilateral relationship. On the one hand, Portugal had offered the status of "most favored nation" to the US as early as the 1780s (Moniz Bandeira, 1978, 19); on the other, the fact that Brazil adopted the monarchical model of government throughout most of the 19th century, and even suppressed attempts to implement a republican government in various rebellions around the country, before and after independence, meant that US leaders, as well as those from neighboring countries, maintained a certain distrust of the interests of the imperial government in Rio de Janeiro. And even the recognition of Brazil's independence by the US government, which took place on May 26, 1824, the 200th anniversary of which we are celebrating this year, derived more from practical interests than from a deep communion of values between the parties, and even led to few immediate concrete results in terms of intensifying the relationship.

Brazil-US relations would increasingly assume a degree of reciprocal relevance, albeit not proportional, over the following decades, with trade at the heart of the relationship. The two countries signed their first formal agreement, called the Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce, in 1828, and on this basis, slowly and gradually, they would follow a long process of mutual recognition of the rich potential for interaction. Let's remember that England, the patron saint of the Orleans and Bragança crown on both sides of the Atlantic, would continue to be the Brazilian empire's largest trading partner, as well as exerting the greatest influence in terms of government models and economic ideologies. Even so, the US did well to deepen new forms of interaction, including as a partner of the empire in the expansion of the slave trade in the South Atlantic in the first half of the century, also strengthening, through the growing availability of the emerging US merchant fleet, trade between north and south in the Western Atlantic (Moniz Bandeira, 1978, 64).

In the second half of the century, more marked differences began to manifest themselves in the domestic realities between the two nations. The US was dramatically deepening its industrial process, while Brazil's agro-exporting and slave-owning nature was being consolidated. In fact, while US society expanded its white middle classes, at the cost of territorial expansion over native populations and the forcible seizure of territories under Mexican control, Brazil remained a coastal nation, with legal distinctions between its ethnic groups, thus limiting the growth of the domestic consumer market. And while the bellicosity characteristic of a nation born out of the war of independence was established in the American imagination as a "manifest destiny," in Brazil, the founding myth of a multiracial and peaceful national exceptionality was consolidated in the country's self-image. The Civil War in the USA, as well as the Paraguayan War, both in the 1860s, generated new points of contention, since the government of Rio de Janeiro recognized the belligerent status of the USA, which allowed direct commercial relations with the southern states, and private US merchant ships helped both Uruguay, before the war in the Plata, and Solano Lopez's own government, during the greatest conflict in the history of South America.

In addition to formal relations between governments, through treaties and agreements, non-state relations, especially based on economic interests, through private actors, have also helped to shape the Brazil-US relationship since the beginning of the 19th century. In fact, as early as the mid-1820s, an American corporation, the New York American Steamboat Association, sailed up the Amazon River in search of business opportunities, albeit without authorization from the government of the Brazilian empire. These mercantile interests centered on the idea of expanding navigation services in that vast, clearly unexplored territory, but also included the geopolitically based notion that the Amazon Valley represented an excellent area for the expansion of slave-based agriculture, an idea that aroused interest among elites in the southern states of the USA, forcing imperial elites to take a greater level of interest in that significant part of their immense territory. And although some Brazilian leaders understood that a greater US presence in the Amazon region could be beneficial to the country's development, diplomatic friction over the issue ensued, although there was no formal rupture. The greatest fear in Rio de Janeiro was not that there would be an invasion sponsored directly by the government in Washington, but that something similar to what happened in the Mexican province of Texas — where American families settled in large numbers, later seeking annexation to the US — could also happen in Brazil (Martin, 1918).

But even though friction and mutual distrust influenced relations between Brazil and the United States throughout the first decades of the 19th century, bilateral trade remained the central pillar of the relationship, with a strong surplus for the Brazilian empire. Throughout the second half of the century, coffee production was consolidated as the flagship of the empire's economy, and the vertiginous demographic growth of the USA in the period meant that the country became the preferred market for around two thirds of Brazil's black gold exports, which represented, by the 1870s, more than half of everything that was exported. Non-state interactions also increased, mainly through traders from the USA who settled in Brazil to intermediate coffee exports. Another element was the migration of around 3,000 Americans from the southern states after the Civil War, which helped in the process of transferring new agricultural

production techniques, as well as expanding the teaching of English and the Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian religions, especially in the southeast of the country (Moniz Bandeira, 1978, 119).

And so, in the last quarter of the 19th century, a relationship that had begun tentatively had been consolidated, including through tariff exemptions on the import of Brazilian coffee by the USA and greater American investments in Brazil and cultural exchanges, including the trip of Pedro II to Lincoln's country in 1876, during the events commemorating the 100th anniversary of that nation's independence. The United States was consolidating its position as an industrial, technological and even military economic power on a hemispheric scale. And the proclamation of the Republic in Brazil, at the end of the following decade, would allow the relationship to deepen on an even larger scale, expanding beyond the commercial field to include the military, cultural, legal and even ideological areas. In fact, with the seizure of power by forces agglutinated around the Republican agenda, the US came to represent the societal model to be followed. From the country's new name (United States of Brazil), through the new constitution, largely inspired by the equivalent US document, the new high degree of administrative federalism, to the new developmentalist intentions, largely frustrated, promoted by Rui Barbosa, Brazil sought, in an accelerated manner, to emulate the US experience.

Unsurprisingly, reactions against such a move would soon follow, including from groups closer to European commercial interests (Moniz Bandeira, 1978, 146). Even so, the Brazil-US relationship would deepen, albeit at a slower pace, including through military aid to defend the new regime against emerging Thermidorian attempts. Brazil was even the only country in Latin America that did not oppose the new hemispheric designs of the Monroe Doctrine at the turn of the century, and the consolidation of coffee interests in the new civilian governments in Rio de Janeiro would further deepen bilateral trade in the same period, even leading to the most dramatic diplomatic reorientation in Brazilian history towards the "colossus of the North" in the first decade of the new century.

The 20th century, Rio Branco and the persistence of the American turn

The arrival of the Baron of Rio Branco at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1902, and his long control of the chancellery over the following decade, made it possible for the most important change to take place in the direction of Brazilian diplomacy, which from then on was directed, to a greater extent, towards the American continent. It may come as a surprise that these developments were led by someone who had served as a diplomat almost exclusively in Europe. It would be more useful, however, to think that Rio Branco, even though he implemented the most consequent redefinition of directions in the focus of Brazilian foreign relations, did not do so by disregarding relations with European countries, thus creating another constitutive element of our diplomacy, its universalist character and the constant search for new partners, without this implying the renunciation of good relations with traditional partners. This is also a striking feature of current Brazilian diplomacy, which has allowed Brazil to emerge in the world over the last few years, as will be discussed later.

The new directions taken by Rio Branco did not go unanswered by the US, which welcomed the change of regime in Brazil and supported the new Republican government, with which it deepened trade relations through new customs agreements that were very favorable to the new government of South America's largest republic. In fact, even before Rio Branco's ascension to the head of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, the Brazilian chargé d'affaires in Washington, Salvador de Mendonça, was already trying to outline the future deepening of relations between the two countries, going so far as to defend the notion that the Monroe Doctrine not only posed no threat to Brazilian interests, but was even potentially useful to his country in the territorial disputes that still existed, and whose final resolution, under Rio Branco's command, would make him a national celebrity (Burns, 1966, 146).

In general terms, Rio Branco understood well the great potential the relationship US and Brazil had for the two largest nations on the continent, and he sought to deepen the relationship with the largest trading partner, not only in coffee, but also in rubber and cocoa. He also elevated the Brazilian representation in Washington to the rank of Embassy, where he assigned one of his best diplomatic staff, when Joaquim Nabuco took over as the first ambassador in that city. But while the Brazilian Chancellor was motivated by pragmatic reasons, particularly commercial ones, from a country whose agro-export-based economic matrix he faithfully supported, his actions also reflected a larger vision that perceived that the world was changing, where the American continent, and the USA in particular, would increasingly take on greater weight.

And so the 20th century began for Brazilian diplomacy, and for the relationship between the country and the United States, under the aegis of Rio Branco's American or Pan-American turn; a reorientation that would come to define the general lines of the South American giant's international behavior from then on. However, even though he set the new central focus for his country's foreign relations, the Brazilian super chancellor did not see the relationship between Brazil and the United States as one of subservience, as he sought closer ties on an equal footing or, at least, with some degree of autonomy to pursue his own interests.

In fact, by supporting, or at least accepting, US plans for growing hemispheric relevance, with aspirations of a perhaps even global nature, Rio Branco sought to guarantee room for maneuver so that his country would be free to exercise a certain degree of hegemony within the contours of South America — a hallmark of Brazilian international action to this day, proving once again the durability of the Baron's diplomatic reorientation. But even though the Brazil-US relationship was almost unique in terms of functionality in the hemisphere during the period, there was no formal alliance between their governments (Burns, 1966). This situation reflected structural characteristics linked to US ambitions for autonomy in international affairs, and indicated the existence of a reality that would continue over time, leading to new iterations where the sharing of interests was not enough to consolidate a closer relationship.

And so the 1920s were marked by US economic and cultural expansion around the world, as well as in Brazil, something that had in fact been happening since the outbreak of World War I and the associated European

decadence. US investments were expanding throughout Brazilian territory and dependence on these funds, as well as on the US consumer market, was key to the exclusionary prosperity of the period in Brazil. And so it would be in the following decade, within a broad process of administrative reorganizations, cultural reorientations and economic redefinitions of new blocs in power, both in Brazil and in the US, that the relationship between the two countries would acquire new contours, not linear or subservient, but more mature and profound.

The coming to power of Getúlio Vargas in the south and Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the north of the continent represented the possibility that their respective nations could finally revisit the role of the state in the economy and society in general, thus becoming a key player in the pursuit of new national development projects in each nation. If this process initially sought to deal with domestic structural challenges, at the end of the decade, with the threshold of a new world conflict that promised to be even more intense, the new paths pursued by the Estado Novo and the New Deal took on even greater relevance for each country, as well as for their mutual relations. Especially with the actions of Oswaldo Aranha, one of the initial leaders of the so-called Revolution of the 1930s, first as ambassador to Washington and then as chancellor during the Estado Novo (1937-1945), in defense of a closer relationship with the US within a government that was clearly ambiguous on the subject, the bilateral relationship took on new, deeper, more complex and transformative dimensions. In particular, the economic axis of the interaction would expand beyond the commercial sphere, to also encompass the interstate coordination of a late industrialization project, but which would become one of the most constitutive elements, as well as, later, a complicating factor, of Brazil-US relations in the second half of the century.

But although the deepening of common projects — such as the various Brazilian economic planning missions promoted by the US government throughout the 1940s and 1950s (Cooke Mission, Abbink Mission, Joint Commission, etc.) (Ioris, 2014) — helped define the intensification of the bilateral relationship, new frictions, generated largely by a lack of understanding of the reality and logic at work on each side of the equation, also became increasingly apparent. The Cold

War would decisively change the dynamics of Brazil-US relations in the second half of the 20th century, which, although they did not culminate in a formal structural break, deserve their own analysis.

The post-war period, the Cold War and the complexification of the relationship

Brazil's support for the US in the fight against European fascism during the Second World War generated expectations on the part of Brazilian elites, as well as Latin America as a whole, of a deepening of the partnership established during the so-called Good Neighbor Policy, defined by better North-South trade terms, greater dialogue and respect for the right of non-intervention, as well as the search for common cooperation projects. This vision was quickly frustrated by the US government. In fact, even in the midst of the conflicts, it was already clear that the US would seek new directions, no longer hemispheric, but global, for its foreign policy, which would thus have to live up to its new status as a world superpower.

Thus, although in the 1950s, while the Cold War had not yet assumed all its violence in Latin America — which would happen effectively, with the exception of the sad case of Guatemala in 1954, only after the conquest of Havana by the bearded men of the Sierra Maestra in January 1959 — it was more or less possible to maintain a certain degree of good bilateral relations, by the end of the decade, and especially in the early 1960s, it was clear that there was growing mutual frustration with the terms of the interaction. In fact, the US under the Republican Dwight Eisenhower already had a certain difficulty in understanding the developmentalist paths aspired to by Brazil's presidential administrations in the period. And although President Juscelino Kubitschek made the most assertive attempt to connect the hegemonic hemispheric country with the aspirations of regional economic growth and transformation, through his proposal for a Pan-American Operation in favor of Latin American development, such efforts had a largely formal reception in Washington, and JK would even diversify his options, with the surprising re-establishment of trade relations with the Soviet Union at the end of the decade (Ioris, 2014).

If the young and ambitious Kennedy symbolized a new air in the US domestic context, and his proposal for a regional Alliance for Progress seemed to finally respond to Latin American yearnings for development cooperation, the historic Punta del Este Conference of August 1961, in turn, revealed the deepening ideological polarization on the continent, where more radical options for change were being consolidated and the reformism proposed by the US would end up being refuted by the acceleration of events in the mid-1960s. In the context of the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, the US did not accept Brazil's attempt to diversify its spectrum of international relationships at the beginning of the decade, increasingly coming to understand the reformist measures of a moderate nationalist government under João Goulart as excessively close to the international communist agenda, thus increasingly imposing binary options typical of the Cold War on national elites (Loureiro, 2017). And so, even though the 1964 business-military coup in Brazil was largely the result of domestic events, including the inability of the ongoing regime to respond to the intensification of demands coming from opposing ideological camps, the forced collapse of Brazilian democracy was also reflected in US foreign policy, which, despite its grandiloquent rhetoric in defense of liberal democratic values, would in fact come to play a nefarious role in supporting regimes of exception in Brazil, as well as around the continent.

After the 1964 coup, Brazil-US relations took on an increasingly complex character. If, in the early years of the new regime, it was an attempt at an almost automatic alignment ("what's good for the US is good for Brazil"), from the end of the decade onwards, new dynamics within the regime, which ironically took on a more developmentalist bias, implied an attempt to redefine the terms of the relationship in order to allow greater levels of autonomy that could allow the country, whose economy was undergoing enormous transformations, to seek to promote its interests in a broader way. In the midst of such transformations, complex and sometimes even contradictory and when Brazilian foreign policy was not always aligned with US foreign policy, the path of internationalizing the Brazilian economy continued, mainly through the growing penetration

of the Brazilian producer and consumer markets by US capital and technologies (Evans, 1979).

There was certainly no shortage of attempts to curb this trend, whether by promoting a greater role for the state in the Brazilian economy, or by diversifying trade partners, including in the socialist sphere, as well as in technological cooperation, for example with the formalization of a nuclear agreement with West Germany (Patti and Spektor, 2020). But although these efforts played their part, and the growing weight of the Brazilian economy in the global economy made the US government recognize Brazil's growing relevance in the region (Spektor, 2009), by the end of the military regime, Brazil had assumed a greater degree of insertion in the global capitalist market, within a process of conservative modernization depending, to a large extent, on the designs of the largest global capitalist power.

In fact, the debt crisis of the 1980s forced the last autonomist projects of the Brazilian government and industrialists to be retracted, as the country became more dependent on financial support from international organizations led by the US, whose support implied the liberalization of the domestic market (Moniz Bandeira, 2011; Vigevani, 1995). Brazil was thus once again becoming more economically dependent on the US, a country that was acting assertively in the international sphere at the time to promote an agenda of neoliberal, pro-market and anti-social reforms. But if until the end of the process of re-democratization in Brazil, at the end of the decade, such a rapprochement derived more from necessity than choice, at the turn of the century, there was an enthusiastic broadening of the lines of alignment.

The post-Cold War era, the 21st century and the possible maturing of relations in a changing world

The 1990s in Brazil were largely defined by successive attempts to implement a path of liberal modernization of the economy. And while at the beginning of the period, under the presidency of Fernando Collor de Mello, this process took place in an almost militant, if not propagandistic way, where everything that was supposedly American meant modernity

to be followed, with the arrival of Fernando Henrique Cardoso as President, and the corresponding presence of Bill Clinton, the President who promoted liberal globalization, in the White House, the Brazil-US relationship took on a more mature and diverse character, even if this did not mean a close linear alignment. Let's remember that this was the time of a reality that was defined as a unipolar world, when US global supremacy was taken for granted. But although FHC had good results in bringing the two countries closer together, largely through presidential diplomacy, and had also continued the process of economic liberalization, national economic modernization also involved strengthening domestic players capable of acting in global markets — a process that had already begun under the military government and would be deepened under the Lula government in the early 2000s.

In fact, although he represented an ideological and partisan pole opposite to Cardoso's, there was a lot of continuity in Lula's foreign policy, especially in the consolidation of Brazilian leadership in South America and in the even greater diversification of trade partners and geopolitical allies around the world. Interestingly, even as he expanded relationships with countries in the Global South, Lula maintained a very good relationship with Republican George W. Bush, who, however, did not maintain his promised initial focus on Latin America — which ironically allowed more room for action for Brazil's leadership in the region (Ioris, 2011).

These dynamics continued throughout the second decade of the 21st century, as Obama, although symbolizing a historic change in the domestic context, maintained the long course of cordial but largely formal relations, or without any more assertive interest in deepening them with the region's largest neighbor. Trump, with his active disinterest in Latin America, in addition to using the image of Latinos for domestic political use, would further consolidate the picture, although Bolsonaro has tried to promote a close alliance with the world's greatest far-right leader (Ioris and Moll Neto, 2023).

It is therefore comforting that, as we celebrate the 200th anniversary of the US government's recognition of the Brazilian nation, its respective

leaders, Lula and Biden, defended the inherent value of democracy in a meeting at the beginning of 2023, and sought to advance projects in common, albeit still timidly, as they usually do, especially in the environmental sphere (Ioris, 2023a). At the same time, Brazil's structural dependence on the US is significantly less today, that the Brazilian economy has several new trading partners and that its diplomacy is much more complex and multilateral (Ioris, 2023b). In fact, within the changing context of the world in which we live, it is certain that, in the early years of the 21st century, Brazil has increasingly sought its own space for action, moving beyond a historical policy of accommodation with the US to assume a more autonomous stance in the international sphere (Espósito Neto, 2023).

The results of such efforts, if conducted in a mutually respectful and beneficial manner, could certainly be of great value to both countries, as they would represent a maturing of the relationship. But it is undeniable that over the last few years we have moved from a largely unipolar world, under the economic, diplomatic and technological leadership of the US, to an increasingly complex world that is on course to experience not only a bipolar structure, but perhaps even a new cold war (Abrams, 2022).

A new hemispheric reality is on the horizon, and it is to be expected that such movements will create risks and concerns. None of this should necessarily imply friction or disagreement, as long as these dynamics can develop with maturity, dialog and mutual understanding. But given that, as we pointed out above, the relationship between the US and Brazil has been guided as much by the sharing of common interests and projects as by the recurrence of a hierarchical, if not paternalistic logic, it is to be hoped that both sides have the ability, maturity, as well as the courage and boldness, to realize the great common potential that they have as the two largest nations, economies and democracies in the hemisphere.

Greater knowledge, as well as a greater degree of mutual recognition of each other's interests, needs, logic and even fears, would be very useful in this process. I hope that this piece can serve towards achieving these important goals.

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200 Years of Diplomatic Relations between Brazil and the USA: Ups and Downs

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The history of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the USA begins with a controversy. It is well established that the US recognized Brazil in 1824, under the Monroe Administration. Even reiterated that the US was the first State to recognize Brazil's independence. The reason for this historical error may lie in the fact that the accreditation of Brazil's first chargé d'affaires in Washington, José Silvestre Rebello, is considered to be the recognition of independence. Arriving in the US capital in April 1824, he sought to fulfill his instructions to obtain recognition of independence from the US government. After negotiations with Secretary of State Adams, the US placed as a condition for Rebello's meeting with President Monroe the Emperor's consent to Portugal's agreement with the United Kingdom on the suppression of the slave trade. Although Rabello's verbal and written manifestation never fully committed the Empire to the end of the slave trade, the response was considered satisfactory and President Monroe received the chargé d'affaires of an independent Brazil on May 26,

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1824, a date that came to be interpreted as tacit recognition of Brazil's independence by the government in Washington.

The Brazilian government welcomed the meeting as recognition of independence, although the US government had made no statement to that effect and continued to deal with all matters directly with Lisbon and not with Rio de Janeiro. Brazilian and American historical sources (in this case, including the diaries of the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams) characterize this act as the beginning of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In his State of the Union speech, on December 7, 1824, President James Monroe mentioned, without alluding to the recognition, that

A chargé d'affaires has been received from the independent Government of Brazil. That country, heretofore a colonial possession of Portugal, had some years since been proclaimed by the Sovereign of Portugal himself an independent Kingdom. Since his return to Lisbon a revolution in Brazil has established a new Government there with an imperial title, at the head of which is placed a prince, in whom the regency had been vested by the King at the time of his departure. There is reason to expect that by amicable negotiation the independence of Brazil will ere long be recognized by Portugal herself.

The official record, both in Brasilia and in Washington, is mistaken regarding the date of establishment of diplomatic relations with the US. There is a double mistake. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the US only took place by an agreement between the two countries signed in October 29, 1825, after Portugal and Great Britain recognized Brazil's independence. The US didn't want any friction with Portugal. The first country to recognize independence was neither the US nor Great Britain, it was Argentina in 1823, for reasons related to the dispute over the Cisplatina Province, present-day Uruguay.

Main episodes of bilateral relations during the Empire period

Historically, relations between Brazil and the US over the last 200 years can be characterized as a process marked by mutual mistrust and suspicion, most of the time.

The historical roots of the mistrust and suspicion between the two countries can be traced back to the Empire period. The relationship between the US and Brazil grew in an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, explained by the difference in the regimes and structure of the two societies. The US considered the monarchical regime in Brazil an "anomaly" and Brazil perceived the US as a hotbed of subversion. Relations between Brazil and the US were therefore not as smooth as is generally presumed. The independence of the Kingdom of Brazil on September 7th, 1822, was not immediately recognized.

The US considered Brazil as the representative of Europe in America and viewed with concern the emergence in the South of the continent of an independent country that could rival Washington.

In 1823, President James Monroe, taking into account the Holy Alliance's desire to subordinate the former Iberian colonies by taking away their autonomy, drafted what became known as the Monroe Doctrine, by which any invasion of any part of America, particularly nations whose independence had already been recognized by Washington, would be seen as an attack on the peace, power and sovereignty of the US. Brazil approved the US government's decision as a way to protect itself from any threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The influence exerted by the US was not just ideological in promoting the republican form of government. Commercial and political interests led the US to become involved in almost every domestic uprising in Brazil, such as the *Sabinada*, *Cabanagem*, *Balaiada* and *Farroupilha* revolts that took place in the first half of the 19th century.

In that century, the Brazilian government suspended diplomatic relations with the US on three occasions (1827, 1847, and 1869), even though, since 1848, most of its exports, especially coffee, had been destined for the US market. Relations between the two countries only

improved from 1870 onwards, when Brazil became dependent on the American market for supplying coffee.

In 1860 and 1865, the US Civil War and the Paraguayan War were responsible for a great deal of diplomatic activity in Brazil. The US had always opposed the Empire's policy in the Río de la Plata Basin and helped José Artigas' resistance against Brazil in the Banda Oriental, with several incidents between the two countries being recorded during the Cisplatina War. During the War of Secession in 1860, Brazil declared itself neutral, although the emperor expressed his sympathy for the Southerners. Successive frictions and estrangements were derived from the rather undiplomatic attitudes of US representatives related to the authorization of the use of Brazilian ports by Southern ships and the recognition of the belligerence of the Confederates. The Brazilian government allowed Southern ships to enter Brazilian ports. In 1863, the ship Alabama was allowed to dock in Salvador. The Alabama was later seized and sunk by the United Kingdom, an act that provoked a strong reaction from Washington, almost to the point of declaring war against London. The US claim for compensation was settled by arbitration and one of the arbitrators chosen by London was Brazil. Despite the restrictions on the slave trade that still existed in Brazil, Dom Pedro II was invited to be one of the arbitrators (he was represented by the Baron of Itajubá), due to the good results of his visit to the UK and the USA, inaugurating Imperial Diplomacy.

The War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay in 1865 was also an important part in Brazil's relationship with the USA. The US was also involved in the war, encouraging the Asuncion government, supplying arms to the Paraguayan side, and even offering mediation, which was refused by Brazil. The successive frictions that occurred during the Paraguayan War originated from the US interest in avoiding a stronger Brazilian presence in the region and a response to the Empire's ambiguous position in the War of Succession. The Foreign Ministry's reaction to the US intervention (the US briefly suspended relations with Brazil) was vehement and at a certain point even threatened to break off relations between the two countries. As well as having to defend Brazil's interest in the US alliance with Paraguay, Brazilian diplomacy had to break ties with

Peru, another supporter of Solano Lopez and had to deal harshly with Bolivia, which had been supporting Paraguay, to achieve its neutrality.

Relations with Washington became tense as a result of the US government's efforts to colonize the Amazon, with Abraham Lincoln's proposal to transfer part of the black population to the north of the Amazon River and the eventual creation of the Republic of Amazonas, as repeatedly mentioned in the US. Associated with the manifest destiny of expanding US borders, the initiative faced a reaction from the Brazilian government. There was a perception within the Brazilian government that the US had the intention of conquering that region. Diplomatic action and Dom Pedro II's silence were responsible for the end of this idea, which would imply the cession of territory, as occurred with the implementation of this initiative in Liberia. The suspicion was reinforced by pressure from Washington to open up the Amazon River peacefully, if possible, by force if necessary. The pressure to open the Amazon River to free navigation raised suspicions that the Amazon could be lost to the US. Brazil did not give in, and the Amazon River remained closed, pushing aside the prospect of the creation of US colonies.

These facts may be in the national subconscious regarding the concern with the occupation of the Amazon, which continues to this day.

Another external episode with the US was the immigration of Confederates to the states of Pará (Santarém) and São Paulo (Santa Bárbara and Americana) in mid-1865. Sponsored by Dom Pedro II, around 3,000 Southerners decided to abandon their lands in the USA, discouraged by the defeat of the Southern states that defended slavery. In 1867, after long discussions about the freedom of navigation of the Amazon River, the Brazilian government allowed foreign merchant ships to transit.

From 1870 onwards, diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States improved, but the mistrust did not disappear. In 1876, in the context of the centenary of the US Independence, Pedro II made a successful visit to that country. In 1887, President Grover Cleveland proposed the creation of a *Zollverein*, that is, a customs union, with the exchange of products free of all duties. Emperor Dom Pedro II expressed

some sympathy for the idea, but the Brazilian government did not go ahead with the proposal.

Relations with the US, as indicated, experienced moments of tension, but became more important towards the end of the imperial period due to the growth of bilateral trade, especially coffee exports, and the emergence of the US as a global power.

Main episodes of bilateral relations during the Republic period

The 20th century began with major changes for both countries. Brazil became a republic and reorganized its economy with the end of slave labor. For the United States, a movement of commercial and military expansion began, leading first to disputes with Spain over political and military control of its maritime surroundings, in the Antilles and Central America, and then in the Philippine archipelago. On the other hand, it began to compete with the British Empire for commercial and then financial control of the continent's economies, formerly dependent on the European power.

Brazil was the first to notice the British decline and the rise of the new power, with which it began to develop a promising commercial relationship. The Baron of Rio Branco played a relevant role in this process. Sharing the American suspicion of the European powers and his vision regarding the risks of political and military instability in Spanish America, Rio Branco guided Brazilian actions on the continent to avoid conflicts and strengthen convergence between the interests of the two countries.

Shortly after the Proclamation of the Republic, two events involving the US took place. The first one was the Issue of Palmas in 1890, related to the territorial dispute with Argentina, where the decision to divide in half the disputed area generated a strong reaction in Brazilian public opinion, preventing its ratification by the Parliament. The dispute was only resolved in Brazil's favor, with the defense made by the Baron of Rio Branco, based on the theory of *Uti Possidetis*, in 1895, by the arbitration of US President Cleveland. In the civil war against Floriano Peixoto, led by sectors of the Navy, commanded by Serzedelo Correa and Custodio de Melo, known as the Revolt of the Navy, in 1893, Brazilian diplomacy

worked with the Washington government due to US naval intervention in support of the rebels and foreign navies.

Before implementing the policy of rapprochement with the US, Rio Branco had to overcome mutual suspicions regarding the territorial issue with Bolivia. The situation was complicated by the presence, since 1899, of US investors through a company, Bolivian Syndicate, whose creation had been negotiated with La Paz and had the support of the Washington government.

After a series of incidents, such as the unauthorized sailing of a warship with an American consul on board, support for the negotiation of an agreement between the Bolivian government granting Acre to the Bolivian Syndicate company and the threat of US intervention, Rio Branco, out of strict national interest, ordered the closure of the Amazon River, making it difficult for company officials to access the disputed territory and forcing the capitulation of investors. In 1903, the issue was settled with a compensation payment to the Bolivian Syndicate and the negotiation of a border treaty with Bolivia.

Once this episode was over, the bilateral relationship blossomed and began to be seen as a true unwritten alliance between the two countries: Brazil sought to mobilize support for American initiatives, or at least not to openly resist them while receiving tacit backing from the United States to obtain the most favorable results possible in its boundary agreements with its South American neighbors. Brazil and the US converged both on the application of the Monroe Doctrine (Brazil had its understanding of its meaning, different from that of the US) and on the issue of Pan-Americanism.

The Great War (1914-1918) did not alter the relationship between the two countries, which initially remained neutral. However, the conflict drastically affected the normality of trade with Europe. From 1927 onwards, the United States became Brazil's largest trading partner, surpassing Britain in national imports. In October 1917, Brazil broke its neutrality and partially participated in the war effort alongside the United States, which had declared war in April of the same year. Brazil supported President Wilson's initiatives to hold the Paris Peace Conference, as well

as the creation of the League of Nations, and Wilson tried unsuccessfully to get Brazil a seat as a non-permanent member of its Council.

Between the wars, the New York stock market crisis in 1929 and the 1930 Revolution in Brazil shook the growing convergence between the two countries. The United States once again isolated itself and remained so for several years without adopting an effective participation in world affairs. Brazil focused its international activities on negotiating its foreign debt, obtaining new credits, and guaranteeing minimum prices for Brazilian commodities. Seeking alternatives to its dependence on American trade and investment, Brazil adopted a policy of friendship and cooperation that oscillated between Paris, London, Berlin, and Rome, powers that lined up in an increasingly conflicting manner in the European scenario.

With the approach of World War II, two perceptions of the Brazilian elite decisively affected relations with the United States. On the one hand, there was an opportunity to explore the rivalries born from the need for the two blocs to have secure political allies and reliable suppliers of food and strategic materials – which was done successfully by Getúlio Vargas. On the other hand, the arms race in Europe and Asia highlighted the great fragility of Brazilian society and economy and its military vulnerability.

Starting in 1941, the two countries adopted several agreements that allowed Brazil to acquire arms and supply strategic goods, financing agreements for the installation of the first major Brazilian industrial complex, in Volta Redonda, and a secret agreement providing bases for military installations in the Northeast Region of Brazil.

The military, whose leaders had European professional backgrounds — French or German — realized that, in the absence of a rapid and effective process of industrializing the productive sector and modernizing the state, the country would find itself on the verge of possible military action, should war break out. After the United States entered the war (December 1941), the pressure on Brazil to side with the allies against the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis became irresistible and prevailed, leading to diplomatic rupture (January 1942), to the declaration of war (August) and finally to direct participation in the conflict, with the creation of the

Brazilian Expeditionary Force (November 1943) and the landing of troops in Italy in July 1944.

After the political and economic rapprochement with Germany, Brazil decided to support the Allied Forces and strongly expanded its relationship with the US. A military base in northeastern Brazil and the purchase of Amazonian rubber were strategic priorities for Washington. The Pentagon even drafted an emergency plan for the occupation of part of Brazilian territory (the Northeast) in case the Vargas government didn't join the Allies. In January 1942, the Third Hemispheric Meeting of Foreign Ministers was held in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil — via its Chancellor Oswaldo Aranha, who chaired the meeting — played a crucial role, in particular because of the reluctance of some countries to join the Allies, especially Argentina and Chile. The purpose of the meeting was to confirm continental solidarity towards the US and to offer Washington's protection for products and goods produced in the region that could be used in the war effort. Two weeks after the Conference, Brazil and the US signed a cooperation agreement involving the production of rubber in the Amazon Region, worth US\$100 million, and how it would be sold to the US. Brazil, at the time, was a major world producer of rubber — synthetic products did not exist — and Malaysia and other countries that were beginning to become relevant in the global market were in the sphere of influence of Japan, which was also at war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's visit in January 1943 was the political moment in which the influence of traditional relations with the USA led Itamaraty to become involved in a series of negotiations, including support for the United Nations Declaration with the endorsement of the Atlantic Charter, which defined the objectives of the allied countries, culminating in Brazil's declaration of war against Germany. Franklin Roosevelt's visit to the Northeast to meet Getúlio Vargas in January 1943, after a meeting in Casablanca with Winston Churchill, is related to the negotiations to send troops to the war, the use of the military base in Natal, the setting up of a broad cooperation program to export rubber to the US and the supply of war material to Brazil. As a result of the talks with Roosevelt, the construction of an air base in Natal was authorized, in order to transport military forces and war equipment to the North African theater. During this visit, the

foreign minister, Oswaldo Aranha — who Vargas failed to include in his delegation for the meeting with Roosevelt – prepared detailed information, listing the compensations that Vargas should ask for Brazil to join the war effort ("giving in war to gain in peace"), including the creation of a steel industry, which would stimulate the country's industrialization and economic development. After the attack on Brazilian ships, Brazil declared war on Germany and sent an expeditionary force to fight in Italy – the only Latin American country to do so. Aranha defined Brazil's foreign policy at that time as "support for the US in the world, in exchange for its support in South America."

In a highly symbolic decision, Brazil was admitted to sign the Declaration of the United Nations that led to the creation of the UN. The alliance with Brazil in World War II also brought the United States political advantages, given Brazil's mobilization of Latin American countries in favor of the war effort, which resulted, for example, in the strengthening of the Inter-American Security System.

In the immediate post-war period, expectations on the Brazilian side were very high. The United States was expected to fulfill its commitments to support the modernization of the Brazilian economy, armed forces, and state machinery, and to transfer the scientific and technological knowledge necessary for sustained development. From a political point of view, Brazil played a role out of proportion to its real power resources in the negotiations of the new post-war institutional framework, such as the creation of the UN, the Bretton Woods Conference, which created the international financial system — with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund —, the creation of GATT (which preceded the WTO), and was a candidate of the Americans to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, being passed over by France, due to the veto of England and Russia.

With the end of the war in 1945, tensions between the US and the Soviet Union intensified, triggering the Cold War which, for several decades, divided the world into two fields: ideological and military. The golden period of relations between Brazil and the United States lasted only through World War II and the immediate post-war period, beeing

soon followed by an ambivalent attitude from both sides, especially from 1949 onwards. The outbreak of the Cold War and the need to contain the feared Soviet expansion in the second half of the 1940s put the United States' regional objectives in the background, relegating Brazil to a minor role in the country's global commitments. In contrast, Europe, especially Germany, came to define the fundamental axis of American foreign policy. Unlike other peripheral areas, such as the Middle East and the Far East, Latin America, including Brazil, lost much of its strategic significance for the US.

The national elite, in particular the state bureaucracies, especially diplomats and the military, deeply resented the persistence of the country's fundamental problems, despite having made the right choice in World War II, fulfilling all its commitments. Despite breaking off trade and diplomatic relations with the countries in the Soviet orbit, opening trade and liberalizing the exchange rate, and giving political support to the United States in all forums, Brazil still lacked the resources to deal with the deficit in its external accounts, the foreign debt and mediocre industrial growth.

Despite the frustration regarding the lack of military and social aid from the US, the alignment with Washington and anti-communism led to Brazil breaking off relations with the USSR in October 1947. At the Petrópolis Conference in August 1947, the text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was approved, the first in a series of defense agreements negotiated by the US. In the UN and later in the Organization of American States (OAS), created in 1948, Brazil's foreign policy strictly followed the positions of the US, but not without reproaches from sectors of Itamaraty. There was a long impasse over issues such as the renegotiation of foreign debt, new investments, support for the development and modernization of the Armed Forces, and the transfer of science and technology, particularly strategic technology and nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Nevertheless, the whole period between the Eurico Gaspar Dutra government and the Jânio Quadros government — when the so-called independent foreign policy was introduced — became known as Brazil's "automatic alignment" with US foreign policy.

In 1950, during the second Vargas administration, foreign policy continued to be influenced by the US. The Brazilian government wanted to expand economic development through closer ties and collaboration from Washington, as it felt it was owed for the support in World War II. The Korean War favored another act of Brazilian support to the US aspirations to prolong the war and to sign the TIAR at the Fourth Meeting of the OAS in 1951, creating a hemispheric defense bloc. Inspired by Vargas, diplomacy sought US support for measures aimed at economic development, the expansion of programs to reduce social inequalities, which resulted in the creation of the Brazil-US Joint Commission for Economic Development. With Washington's support, the Joint Commission approved projects that were to be financed by Eximbank and the World Bank, but that never came to life because the Joint Commission was abolished in 1953. Brazil was no longer as strategically important to the US as it had been before the war. Brazil still signed agreements with the US in 1952 and 1954 for the sale of minerals such as uranium and thorium. Those agreements were not fulfilled after Vargas committed suicide.

The period that encompasses the Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (Jango) governments and the military regime, marked by disputes and frustrated cooperation attempts, was in a way foreshadowed by the intense foreign activism of the Juscelino Kubitschek government, with a direct impact on relations with the US, combining political and military alignment with constant friction in the areas of trade, non-proliferation, disarmament and official direct investment.

Between 1955 and 1960, foreign policy was dominated by the planning and launch of the Pan-American Operation (OPA). After 1958, faced with growing debt, stagnation of national exports and rising inflation, Juscelino's foreign policy was based on a nationalist rhetoric and a liberal economic diplomacy. At the same time, it was very active in attracting alternative foreign investment and opening new markets, including among socialist countries.

The OPA began in 1958 with a letter from President Juscelino to President Eisenhower, requesting US support for a hemispheric Marshall Plan, in the context of a visit to Latin America by Vice President Nixon, which was met with a great deal of popular hostility. The Brazilian argument focused on the fact that the lack of industrial development condemned Latin America to poverty and backwardness — and this argument was later extended to underdeveloped countries in general — which would pose an insurmountable barrier to convergence with American objectives in the Cold War. The OPA aimed to adopt an economic development program for Latin America, involving external debt relief, special trade regimes with protection against fluctuating commodity prices, official investment in a broad industrial development program, and the transfer of science and technology. The main objectives of the Operation were to invest private capital in the poorest areas, increase international credit, and organize the commodities markets. The initiative did not have any major practical consequences due to the lack of support from Washington. The US preferred to launch its Alliance for Progress, which had some of the OPA's proposals as by-products, such as the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), to stimulate intra-regional trade. In 1957, Brazil signed an agreement with the US for the civilian use of atomic energy. While the United States observed these initiatives with caution, Brazil was dissatisfied with the OPA results, which were far less than expected, and received Washington's initiative for the region with skepticism.

The so-called Independent Foreign Policy, which began with Jânio Quadros and continued with João Goulart, especially with Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas, was a milestone in the history of Brazil's external relations, being still remembered today as a relevant reference, especially at times of automatic alignment with ideologies or with the US. Contrary to US policy, after the revolution led by Fidel Castro, Brazil maintained a positive attitude towards Cuba, expressed at the meeting in Punta del Este in 1961, condemning the US invasion of the Bay of Pigs and decorating Che Guevara.

The new disappointment with the indifference of the United States towards its supposed political debt to Brazil, due to the intense convergence during World War II, continued to affect the bilateral relationship from then on. With the independent foreign policy, initiated under the Jânio administration and consolidated under the Jango administration,

the expectation of economic and political rewards for "good behavior," in other words, in return for a close convergence with the interests and ambitions of the United States, came to an end. The central argument was that the Cold War, with its corollary nuclear race, would lead, if not to destruction, to misery and insecurity. Peace could only be achieved through disarmament, and prosperity through technical and financial aid to underdeveloped countries.

The US played an important role in the preparation and deposition of João Goulart, with the direct involvement of President Johnson and the prospect of military support, if necessary to assist the military insurgents. Under the military government — from 1964 to 1985 — foreign policy underwent major changes and evolved from a so-called independent policy to one of automatic alignment with the US. Only for a brief interval, during the first military government of General Castelo Branco, did the so-called "ideological frontiers" prevail, with the assumption that the interests and objectives of the countries in the American bloc were subordinate to those of the Cold War. But the idea that Brazil's commercial, financial, and scientific policy interests would be pursued wherever necessary and feasible prevailed as the central axis of bilateral relations, setting the limits for collaboration and the foundations for tensions between the two partners.

The conflictual background continued for the most part throughout the military period, despite a degree of alignment, especially on issues that affected the "ideological frontiers."

During the military period, suspicions grew about foreign interests in the occupation of the Amazon region. Studies by the Hudson Institute of Washington on the creation of a large lake in that area and the perception of an external threat to the control of mineral resources increased suspicions about US ambitions in that regard.

The doctrine of concentric circles placed relations with the US at a special level, due to its support to the insurrectionary movement against the João Goulart government. Geopolitical concerns related to the Cold War with the Soviet Union took precedence. That was the moment when the then Ambassador to Washington and future Foreign Minister

declared that what was good for the US was also good for Brazil. Brazil ended relations with Cuba, participated and led the military intervention to overthrow a democratically elected government in the Dominican Republic, in 1965, interrupting the traditional line of non-intervention. That stance continued in the internal political interventions for the destabilization of Salvador Allende's socialist government in Chile (1973) and in Operation Condor in other countries in the region, especially Uruguay and Argentina. From the time of the Costa e Silva government onwards, foreign policy, reflecting domestic economic policies with a strong developmentalist and nationalist emphasis, gradually became more balanced and more independent of geopolitical considerations, more concerned with national interests. The issue of democracy and human rights gradually undermined the relationship with the US. The reaction to criticism from the US regarding the lack of respect for human rights due to allegations of torture of political prisoners came to light during the Geisel administration with the breaking of the military agreement with the US. Nuclear policy took on a special dimension with the nuclear agreement with Germany, with the intention of developing a nuclear device and the refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, contrary to US policy.

After 1974, when General Ernesto Geisel took office, the domestic conditions in both countries underwent significant changes that would have an impact on bilateral relations. In the United States, opposition to political and military interventions abroad grew sharply, especially in support of corrupt and authoritarian governments such as those in Southeast Asia, causing a retreat in American activism, including in Latin America. The Jimmy Carter administration took this policy to the other extreme, as the dirty war waged by the continent's military, with the support of US security agencies, until then a virtuous action, began to be seen as a sin, to be punished and corrected.

In Brazil, the "economic miracle" was interrupted by the first oil crisis, which started an international recession and triggered a significant reduction in our industrial growth. In his inaugural speech, Geisel defined his external priorities in terms of serving national interests, international trade, vital inputs for industry and consumption, and access to the most up-to-date technologies. In different pronouncements, Brazilian

diplomacy made it clear that bilateral relations with the United States and Brazil's multilateral orientations would aim at practical purposes rather than speculating on convergences or divergences. The independent foreign policy was therefore continued, then under the label of "Responsible Pragmatism."

As expected, disagreements soon emerged. In the case of energy policy, there was an urgent need to diversify oil supplies and look for alternative energy sources, one of Brazil's options being the construction of nuclear power plants to produce electricity. The Carter administration, for its part, was committed to fighting against nuclear proliferation and adopted restrictive measures on the supply of nuclear inputs and equipment, frustrating the completion of the Angra dos Reis plant project, under contract with an American company, Westinghouse.

Like Juscelino in the face of American reticence to invest in the establishment of an automotive industrial park, seen as a strategic step towards Brazilian industrial autonomy, Geisel also turned to possible European partners. Successfully, the country concluded an agreement with what was then Federal Germany — allied with the US — to jointly develop an alternative uranium enrichment process. The Carter administration put all the pressure it could to get the contract rescinded, frustrating both Brazil's and Germany's ambitions.

The activism of the Carter era on issues such as the rights of indigenous populations, non-proliferation, the defense of democracy, and human rights, almost led to a rupture in diplomatic relations, when a congressional report on human rights violations, with severe criticism of Brazil, was met with the denunciation of the Brazil-United States Military Assistance Treaty, inoperative in practice, but symbolic of the years of special relations between the two countries in the immediate post-war period.

This period marked the greatest friction between Brazil and the United States. Initiatives and measures taken by Brazil on sensitive issues for both countries contributed to it, such as the diplomatic recognition given by Brazil to the Movement for the Liberation of Angola, one of the groups fighting in that country, precipitating international recognition

of its independence (1975); the vote in the UN General Assembly in favor of condemning Zionism as a form of racism (1975); the Amazon Cooperation Treaty (1978) between Brazil and the other countries in the region – which, although it had no practical results, worked as a kind of Monroe Doctrine, to keep extra-regional players, such as the United States and the other industrialized countries, away from any attempt to interfere in any problems in the region; or even a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iraq (Figueiredo government, 1980), among others.

The effort to open and modernize the economy had as its strategic element a policy of regional economic integration, with the creation of MERCOSUR (1991), the first initiative to establish a free trade area in South America and the initiative to physically integrate the subcontinent's infrastructure. In contrast, American initiatives for the economic integration of the American continent, including the George H. W. Bush administration's initiative for the Americas and the Clinton administration's negotiation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, were received with reticence by Brazil.

As a result, the areas of least convergence between the two countries have shifted from the political and investment dimensions to the regional dimension, especially when it comes to trade. As for the Initiative for the Americas, an external debt relief project, accompanied by modest investments and a still unclear proposal for free trade, aimed at Latin American countries, although greeted with enthusiasm by the majority of countries in the region, was received with a lot of reticence by Brazil, which, at the same time, announced the establishment of a common market with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay — MERCOSUR. Without support from Brazil, the initiative never got off the ground.

The Clinton administration's proposal to create free trade throughout the continent (the FTAA) was received with double suspicion in Brazil. Sectors of the government and society believed that an FTAA would interrupt the previously successful development of MERCOSUR, which had significantly increased not only the volume but also our balance of trade with the region, fueled by industrial exports, improving the quality of our exports. There was also a fear that the agenda of opening the economy would target areas that were only relevant — and sensitive — to the

Brazilian economy, such as industrial products and services, but which posed no threat to the vast majority of countries on the continent, a situation that would leave Brazil isolated in defending its interests. Brazil remained the United States' main interlocutor throughout the FTAA negotiation process, assuming the role of co-chair of the final phase of negotiations, when the agenda in question, as a result of our diplomacy's capacity for articulation, became more negotiable for Brazil. However, with the changes in the domestic contexts of both countries and in the international negotiations under the Doha Round, the FTAA negotiations could be aborted by tacit agreement between the main interlocutors, already in the Lula administration (2003).

With re-democratization, starting in 1985, under the successive governments of José Sarney, Fernando Collor, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), relations with the US and the countries of the region continued to be a priority for foreign policy, but China became a strategic partner, as defined by both countries, and became Brazil's main trading partner.

The autonomous attitude of the Brazilian government towards the United States was maintained but with a reduced degree of friction. On the one hand, it was important to banish the ghosts of foreign debt, which was being negotiated mainly with American creditors, and mediated by the International Monetary Fund. In addition, hyperinflation kept new investors away, hindering the resumption of growth, while a closed economy, with price and exchange controls and discrimination against foreign companies, made it difficult for Brazil to be accepted as a partner in the international community.

The efforts of democratic governments to overcome suspicions in terms of human rights, the rights of indigenous populations and minorities, the resolution of social conflicts, especially in the rural areas and the Amazon region, as well as Brazil's positive performance in some relevant international regimes, such as GATT and the IMF, have contributed to feeding a positive agenda with the United States. The FHC government requested the convening of TIAR, as a significant gesture of support for the US, during the terrorist attack on the towers in New York in 2001. In the Lula and Dilma Rousseff administrations, Brazil opposed

the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), supported the Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela and spoke out against the war in Iraq, causing tension with the government in Washington. At the beginning of the first Lula administration, bilateral relations became more formal with the creation of permanent coordination mechanisms and the official establishment of the Strategic Dialogue. In 2010, with Barack Obama, the US National Security Strategy defined Brazil as one of the new centers of global power. Disagreements continued to occur, such as the serious diplomatic incident between the two countries during Dilma's administration, when the US National Security Agency's spying on the Brazilian government and companies was made public, leading to the postponement of President Dilma Rousseff's presidential state visit to Washington.

The Jair Bolsonaro administration disrupted the traditional stances of Brazilian foreign policy and Itamaraty's working methods. In the first two years, a negative ideological attitude prevailed, condemning multilateralism (anti-globalism) and the left in international relations (China), prioritizing bilateral relations. Automatic alignment with the US, or rather with the attitudes and policies of President Donald Trump, inaugurated an ultra-ideological presidential policy that included other conservative countries such as Hungary and Poland. The presidential policy made Brazil closely associated with the US (automatic alignment) in foreign trade and on the agendas of multilateral institutions. It also favored Israel (through the influence of evagenlical groups, with the declared intention of moving the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem) and Chile, with a conservative bias as well. The few positive advances with the US include the signing in 2019 of the Technological Safeguards Agreement, which made the use of the Alcântara Launch Center viable. Under ideological influence, the Bolsonaro government distanced itself from Argentina, radicalized its activism against Venezuela, to the point of closing all the Brazilian Consulates in that country, in a move that went against Brazilian interests, and abandoned the priority of regional integration. On a global level, many problems were created with China, Brazil's main foreign partner, at a time when a decision was to be taken on the new 5G technology, and action in multilateral institutions was limited to following the US, especially in the conservative agenda.

Currently, relations between Brazil and the US are going through one of their most challenging moments, due to the transformations that the economy and the new international order are undergoing, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and their impact on the domestic and foreign policies of the US and Brazil. The global transformations, with the new economy and the new international order, have created major geopolitical challenges.

The first year of the Lula administration, in 2023, brought Brazil back to the international scenario, with its voice present in all multilateral organizations. Environmental and Latin American issues became foreign policy priorities. The Brazilian government reasserted its position of equidistance concerning tensions between the US and China, Russia's war in Ukraine and Israel's against Hamas.

Statements on the war in Ukraine, and specially on the war in Gaza and Israel's military actions, have not affected the relationship between Brazil and the US, as demonstrated in Secretary of State Antony Blinken's meeting with Lula in February 2024, when, in addition to global issues, matters of interest to both countries were discussed.

In relation to BRICS, there has been a change of position by supporting the Chinese-inspired increase in the number of member countries, which could turn the bloc into an anti-Western movement. The new priorities facilitated proximity with the US as well as joint initiatives, led by Presidents Lula and Biden, on the issues of the environment and climate change, biofuels, the defense of workers, and strengthening of unions. Joint military exercises were held in the Amazon region and the visa regime for Americans was modified. Brazil and the US are working together to ensure that the presidential elections in Venezuela in 2024 are transparent and monitored by international organizations. The crisis between Venezuela and Guyana and the threat of occupation of contested territory by the Maduro regime could lead to US involvement in a conflict in South America of direct interest to Brazil. Minister Fernando Haddad proposed a "privileged status in bilateral negotiations with the US, more consistent from a social and environmental point of view." The president of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, Reta Jo Lewis, noted that the US wants to expand trade relations with Brazil through financing in

the areas of renewable energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure. Looking ahead, the issue that could broaden and deepen the relationship between Brazil and the US is the environment and climate change agenda. It is a global issue of great relevance, in which Brazil is a powerhouse, as well as in the issues of food security and renewable energy. It will be on these issues that the relationship between Brasilia and Washington could develop, if Brazilian foreign policy is not contaminated by ideological or partisan considerations, above the national interest. Brazil will host the G20 and BRICS in 2024 and COP 30 in 2025, events of great global political significance. Brazil and the US will be able, without prejudice, to establish a broad collaboration to achieve concrete progress in these fields.

American Diplomacy and Brazilian Independence in the Correspondence of the Founding Fathers (1807-1825)

Marcos Sorrilha Pinheiro¹

Presentation

On May 26, 1824, José Silvestre Rebello presented himself to US President James Monroe, who graciously recognized him as Brazil's Chargé d'Affaires to the United States. This auspicious beginning marked the advent of diplomatic relations between the two countries. A little over a year later, on October 29, 1825, Condy Raguet was similarly recognized by Dom Pedro I for the same position in Brazil. Raguet had arrived on Brazilian soil on September 8, 1822, coincidentally the day after the declaration of independence. However, this date would only gain due recognition decades later (Kraay, 2010).

Nevertheless, even before the first American ambassador arrived in Brazil, relations between the two countries had been quite dynamic. Since the declaration of its independence and the creation of its first model of governance, still in the form of a confederation, in 1781, the USA had sought to establish a trade agreement with Portugal that would allow it access to Brazilian ports. Despite the establishment of treaties and the flourishing of trade relations between the two countries, the Americans' desire to export goods directly to Brazil remained unfulfilled until the beginning of 1809. However, it would be inaccurate to suggest that formal trade relations were not in place. As Charles Lyon Chandler (1946)

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demonstrated in a very early article, there was considerable movement of American ships in Brazilian ports between 1792 and 1805.

It is worth noting that exchanges between Brazil and the USA were not limited to informal trade. As the continent's first republic, the northern neighbors served as inspiration for separatist groups dissatisfied with the way the Portuguese Crown ran its colony. The best-known case was the Inconfidência Mineira of 1789. Two years before it came to light, Coimbra medical student José Joaquim Maia e Barbalho (Vendek), who would go on to join the insurrectionist movement, met Thomas Jefferson in France, requesting American assistance in organizing an uprising in Minas Gerais. This meeting is explored in detail in *o Livro de Tiradentes*, edited by Kenneth Maxwell (2013).

In light of these considerations, this chapter presents the results of the research conducted on the epistolary documents of the founding fathers in two databases: Founders Online,² an online archive maintained by the National Archives with the support of six other institutions,³ and Rotunda,⁴ a digital archive maintained by the University of Virginia. The documents were searched using keywords related to Brazilian territory, which resulted in the selection of 63 letters written or addressed to presidents and secretaries of state in the period from August 1807 to July 1825, with a few exceptions. The purpose of reading these sources was to find out how the events that marked the process of Brazilian Independence were described in the Founding Fathers' epistolary writings and what their impressions of the event were.

Historian Luiz Carlos Villalta (2022) states that the understanding of Brazilian emancipation as it happened is a result of three previous transformations: the arrival of the Royal Family in Brazil in 1808; the Pernambuco Revolution of 1817; and the Liberal Revolution of Porto in 1820.

² Available at: https://education.blogs.archives.gov/2013/09/18/founders-online/>. Access on: 11 Apr. 2024.

³ Massachusetts Historical Society, Harvard University Press, Yale University Press, Columbia University Press, Princeton University Press e University of Virginia Press.

⁴ Available at: https://www.upress.virginia.edu/rotunda/>. Access on: 11 Apr. 2024.

The first transformation was responsible for turning Brazil into the seat of a European monarchy, which attracted groups of important people, traders, and landowners from what is now the southeast of Brazil. These individuals began to interact with the Prince Regent, gaining social, political, and economic advantages as a result. This new reality resulted in what Maria Odila da Silva Leite (1972) called the "interiorization of the metropolis," which could be described as a movement responsible for converting part of the colony into a metropolis and, at the same time, promoting the exploitation of the north and northeast regions by groups close to royal power.

The second transformation can be viewed as a response to the "interiorization of the metropolis," which became an extremely important event for Brazil's independence: the Pernambuco Revolution. For approximately 75 days, a significant portion of the region encompassing the states of Pernambuco, Alagoas, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Norte, and a portion of Ceará, declared its independence from Brazil. This declaration was made in the name of a republic inspired by the third stage of the French Revolution of 1789. The Pernambuco experience represented one of the earliest expressions of discontent with Portuguese rule and aspirations for a liberal republic in Brazil.

The third stage was responsible for the spread of anti-absolutist ideas and the defense of greater autonomy for the Portuguese provinces, especially in Brazil. The Liberal Revolution of Porto advocated for the establishment of a constitutionalist monarchy in Portugal and the drafting of a new constitution for the Empire. With regard to the Brazilian captaincies, as they came into contact with the discourse emanating from Europe, they began to use a vocabulary through which they expressed their dissatisfaction with the exploitation promoted by the metropolis whose capital was Rio de Janeiro.

Having identified these three milestones as key points in the development of Brazil's independence process, it is now time to present the contents of the letters that mention these events and how they were mobilized by American rulers and diplomats. As we examine these letters, it will become clear that diplomats made an effort to provide decision-makers

in Washington, D.C. with information so that they could take a position on the new directions that history was taking Brazil.

The arrival of the Court in Brazil and American interests (1807-1812)

From 1807 onwards, the United States began to show an interest in Brazil. The rulers of the United States were concerned that Dom João VI might abandon his neutrality and join the continental system imposed by Napoleon Bonaparte. In the summer of that year, the French ruler informed the Braganza monarchy of Portugal that it should close its ports to British trade. Although Napoleon's aim was to stifle the British economy, the Americans were concerned that this could also affect their business. Portugal's reluctance to adhere to the summons was not solely due to its proximity to the British. There was also a concern that this could potentially impact "its colonial holdings (Brazil in particular) and commercial prosperity" (Mikaberidze, 2020, 117).

As the year drew to a close, the alliance between the Spanish monarchy and the French ruler began to unravel. Napoleon seized the opportunity presented by the power struggle between King Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII to question the legitimacy of the Spanish crown (Mikaberidze, 2020, 121). From that point onward, there were whispers that Napoleon might be planning to attack Portugal. These rumors began to spread among people close to Prince Dom João.

Some believed that the movement of Napoleonic troops to the west was merely a ploy to persuade the Portuguese to finally take a side in the dispute. Others saw a real and imminent danger that the Portuguese monarchs might face the same fate as their counterparts in Europe. It was suggested that plans be made to ensure the Braganças' control of the Portuguese colonies. One option was to send the Prince of Beira, Dom Pedro, to Brazil, or to arrange a complete move of the Royal Family and their subjects to Salvador.

As Rodrigo Lopes (2015) shows us, there have been indications that plans to move the Portuguese court to Brazil may have existed since at least 1796. In the letters analyzed for this research, references to the transfer of the Royal Family appear in 1801. In a letter to James Madison,

then Secretary of State in Thomas Jefferson's government, William Loughton Smith wrote on July 6: "It is reported that a British naval force is sailing between Lisbon and Cadiz. It is likely that the purpose was to prevent Spain from reinforcing Egypt or attacking Portugal, and perhaps to transport the Portuguese royal family to Brazil." Smith was a lawyer and politician from South Carolina. When he wrote this letter, he was acting as US ambassador to Portugal.

In any case, although the idea and rumors of a departure from the Portuguese monarchy were not new, the fact is that in the autumn of 1807, discussions to bring this plan to fruition became even more intense. This is evidenced by a series of letters written by William Jarvis to James Madison between August and November of that same year. Mr. Jarvis was a merchant with good relations with Spain and Portugal. In 1805, he was appointed US consul in Lisbon by Thomas Jefferson.

In a letter sent by Jarvis to Washington D.C. on August 20, 1807, he commented on the ultimatum given by Napoleon to Dom João. According to the diplomat, the "proposal" made by the French ruler to the Portuguese monarch, if accepted, would have the potential consequence of losing his colonies, including Brazil. As he wrote,

There has been considerable rumours here for several days past, as I mentioned in my last that the Emperor Napoleon had required that the ports of Portugal should be shut against the Commerce of Gt. Britain.. [...] Portugal without her Colonies, is a body without a Soul, a Country which at this time hardly exports enough of produce cultivated at home to pay for her importation of Bread stuff only. From the Superiority of the British Navy too the trade if not the possession of the Brazils must fall into the hands of that Nation.

On September 1st, Jarvis mentioned a possible French invasion of Portugal, suggesting that it was a remote possibility. He went on to say that the situation was favorable to the Portuguese. At the same time, he said that six English ships were moving around Lisbon, supposedly to transfer the Court to Brazil. However, the diplomat believed that all this was just a stage play to impose limits on Napoleon's interests:

I have just been informed that six Portugueze Line of battle Ships are to be prepared for Sea, but nobody, that I have seen, knows with what object. Possibly to hold out the idea, if urged too far, that the Royal Family will proceed to the Brazils. This among a variety other things has been talked of. [...] I still think that money has or will be given & there will end this affair.

From that point onward, Jarvis's mood oscillated between the belief that the royal family would leave or not. In some of his correspondence, he suggested that the plan was to send only the Prince of Beira. In other writings, he proposed that the situation might be a ruse to dissuade the French. It is important to note that until the beginning of November, Jarvis did not have a clear understanding of the developments within the Lisbon cabinets. On the 9th of that month, for example, he expressed his belief that an agreement was being made for Portugal to side with France and close its ports to the British. He was one of the many witnesses who watched in disbelief as the Royal Family left Portugal on November 29, precisely for this reason. On that same day, he wrote to Madison to inform him of the developments:

At the moment I am writing the Portugueze Squadron consisting of 8 line of battle Ships 2 frigates & 4 Smaller vessels are under weigh. The Prince Regent & the whole Royal family is embarked; the Duke of Cardenal first Prince of the blood, the 〈 〉ional [sic] Anadie & Mr. d'Araujo the Minister of Marine & Foreign Affairs, the Marquis of Pombal & several other Nobility with a number of Officers of Government, Servants &c. Few or no Soldiers except the Marine Corps have embarked.

The letter concluded with the hope that the French troops would arrive in Lisbon that night or, at the very least, the following day. Almost a month later, on December 21, Jarvis wrote again, this time sharing his thoughts on the French occupation and its potential impact on American

business. Among other measures, American ships would be able to continue their operations without flying the country's flag.

Since then, Jarvis' missives have taken on a somewhat pessimistic tone regarding Portugal's fate, while extolling the new role that Brazil would assume on the international scene. Even for this reason, on January 29, 1808, he suggested relocating to Salvador to take on the role of Consul General in Brazil, if he had the approval of President Jefferson, of course.

While Jarvis was writing, the squadron carrying Dom João and the Royal Family had already arrived in Salvador on January 22. Madison had received an update on the voyage from James Leander Cathcart, a sailor/diplomat of Irish origin, who wrote to the Secretary of State directly from Madeira Island on January 3 to inform him of the passage of the ships to Brazil on December 11.

Among the various interpretations of the situation proposed by Jarvis, it is worth noting that he identified Brazil as a key player. This assessment was not unique, as Henry Hill, a prominent merchant and diplomat who had served the US in Havana, also recognized the potential for Brazil to assume a leading role. Hill, in fact, wrote a detailed letter to James Madison upon learning of the Portuguese court's arrival in Brazil. In a letter dated February 17, Hill respectfully suggested that the United States should consider presenting itself as a potential partner to Brazil at this pivotal moment. Hill proposed a number of ideas for potential avenues of collaboration between the two countries, including the opening of a commercial exchange.

Firstly, it would be necessary to secure a free trade agreement with the Prince Regent and, secondly, to rule out the possibility of Great Britain monopolizing these commercial relations. As the Bragança administration of Brazil developed, it would continue much as it had been in Portugal (corrupt, Catholic and attached to traditions), but now with much more land and without their old enemies surrounding them. On the other hand, Brazil's neighbors, the Spanish colonies, were just as rudimentary as the Portuguese, so the prince soon realized that it would be necessary to open the ports to other free nations, such as the USA. It was therefore important to gain Dom João's trust before he opted for British exclusivity.

Two days later, he wrote to Madison again, now commenting on the declaration made by Dom João VI on his arrival in Rio de Janeiro. For Hill, it seemed evident that all the sovereignty of the Kingdom had been transferred to Brazil, which made it a special place. Hill suggested that encouraging trade with Brazil might be a constructive response to the government's opponents, who were dissatisfied with the embargo imposed by Jefferson in 1807. It might also serve as an electoral asset for the upcoming contest, which would feature Madison as a candidate. It was therefore time for Thomas Jefferson to consider writing a letter of welcome to the prince. In addition, if the president were so pleased to accept, Hill would be willing to carry the letter, taking on the role of US consul in Rio de Janeiro. As follows:

I should feel gratiful and highly honored again to have it in my power under other circumstances and with greater experience, to manifest a zeal I feel for the honor and interests of my Country, and to promote the views of the administration. [...] but I think I might aid in such an object and I should be highly gratified with an appointment to Rio-Janiro as Consul, for which I beg you will be pleased to consider me an applicant.

Hill's excellent presentation on the potential for trade with Brazil and the strategies to be adopted was so impressive that he was chosen to forward the letter of welcome to the prince. In addition, Hill would be offered the position of consul in Salvador, not Rio de Janeiro, as he had suggested. This is what appears in James Madison's letter to him on May 3, 1808: "It is proper to apprize you that the President has it in view to Commission you as Consul for St. Salvador in the Brasils, and that you should apply in person to the Government at Rio Janeiro, for its sanction to the appointment." Jefferson drafted the letter to Dom João on May 5, and the next day Madison wrote back to Hill, giving more details about his mission:

The object of it is to manifest to the Prince Regent the friendly sentiments which continue to be entertained by the United States, to cherish a Continuance of his, and to promote dispositions favorable to a Commercial Intercourse, such as may be presumed to be consistent with the policy applicable to the Change of the Brazils from its Colonial to its present Character.

Furthermore, the letter informs Hill that the president will appoint someone else to be the US consul in Rio de Janeiro. During the period that he remains in the city, waiting for the Prince to approve his position, Hill should be aware of all important information regarding Brazil's new status. He is encouraged to report to the State Department whenever possible.

Over the following months, a series of letters were exchanged between Madison and Hill with the aim of working out the details of the diplomat's trip to the south of the continent. These included matters such as travel costs, salaries and the amount paid for the ship's freight. The first letter written by Hill in Brazilian territory was dated October 12. In it, he tells of his meeting with the Prince on September 29. On that occasion, he handed over the letter written by Thomas Jefferson, which read as follows:

Having learnt the safe arrival of your Royal Highness at the City of Rio Janeiro, I perform with pleasure the duty of offering you my sincere congratulations by Mr. Hill a respected Citizen of the United States who is specially charged with the delivery of this letter. [...] On the part of the United States I assure you, that these which have hitherto been their ruling Objects, will be most particularly cultivated with your Royal Highness and your Subjects of Brazil, and they hope that that Country so favored by the gifts of Nature, now advanced to a Station under your immediate Auspices, will find in the interchange of Mutual wants and supplies the true Aliment of an unchanging friendship with the United States of America.

In addition to reporting on his meeting with Dom João, Hill took the opportunity to describe his first impressions of trade with Brazil, highlighting some of the goods that could find a market in those lands, as well as their tariffs. Hill traveled to Salvador and from there wrote a series of five letters on November 10 and another on November 18. These are the only letters we have found from Hill during this period. It is known that he stayed in Salvador until 1819, when he returned to Rio de Janeiro, leaving Brazil just before Condy Raguet arrived in the country in 1822.

As for the consulate in Rio de Janeiro, on March 6, 1809, the newly inaugurated president of the United States, James Madison, appointed Thomas Sumter Jr. as minister plenipotentiary to the Portuguese court. Sumter's father had fought alongside James Monroe during the American Revolution. Monroe, in turn, had just been appointed Secretary of State. Sumter remained in Rio de Janeiro until 1819.

We have been fortunate to find the first letter from the new minister in Brazil, which was written on May first, 1811. While there are no previous records, this letter provides some insight into why the American government may have lost interest in Brazil, given the small number of letters leaving the country after 1808. According to Sumter, the organization of an armed resistance to Napoleon in both Portugal and Spain led him to believe that Brazil's leading role would not last long. As he wrote to Monroe,

There was a moment (immediately after the emigration) when much was begun & much done towards establishing a govt here which might do, in time, without foreign aid & withdraw from foreign control — but as hopes encreased in Portugal & Spain the desire abated with the necessity [...].

It is worth noting that Sumter shared Hill's opinion that Brazil would become independent in 1808, but that this view was eventually lost over time. In another letter written on October 1, 1812, we have a second clue as to the cooling of American interest in Brazil: the entry of the USA into a war against England, the so-called *War of 1812*, which would last until 1815.

It is true that, in addition to the growing Portuguese resistance to Napoleon's troops and the outbreak of the War of 1812, Hill's plan to pre-empt England in order to make the United States the Court's primary partner in Brazil proved unsuccessful. Even before the royal family left for

the Americas, the British preference had been guaranteed by agreements that, among other things, provided for the escort of Dom João to Brazil. In any case, if from a diplomatic point of view things did not work out as expected, it is not true that the rapprochement was not advantageous in the commercial field. In 1809, before Sumter arrived in the country, Henry Hill and the foreign minister of the Brazilian court, Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, negotiated the rights of American citizens to trade with Brazil. As a result, imports from the United States to Brazil that year reached US\$ 883,732.00, compared to just over US\$ 1,041.00 in goods smuggled in from the U.S. (Wilson, 1927, 379).

The Pernambuco Revolution of 1817

In 1815, the Treaty of Vienna was signed to restore order among the European powers after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Among the points agreed upon, the permanence of the Portuguese Court in Brazil was recognized, elevating the colony to the status of a United Kingdom. This is an important fact for the historiography of Brazilian independence, as stated. With this, the process of "interiorization of the metropolis" was consolidated, causing dissonance between the elites of the southeast (close to the Crown and its benefits) and their counterparts in the north and northeast. The strongest reaction to this movement came with the Pernambuco Revolution of 1817.

In the correspondence analyzed, there is no mention of the aforementioned treaty with specific regard to its impact on Brazil. This is in contrast to the case of Pernambuco's declaration of independence. Months before the revolution broke out in the northeastern province, Henry Hill had written to James Monroe, still Secretary of State, informing him that things were not going well in the relationship between Brazil and the United States. According to him, this was due to some external factors, but above all to "the lack of talent, information, diligence, skill, industry, and personal respect and dignity in our representative at the Court of Rio de Janeiro," i.e., Thomas Sumter Jr. Perhaps Hill was seeking a position in the capital and had written to the future president, who would take office in March of that year, trying to persuade him.

In any case, when the revolution began, this became the main subject of the letters, which mobilized important players in American politics at the time, such as President Monroe himself and former presidents Madison, Jefferson and John Adams. Jefferson was the first to write on the subject on May 14, 1817, in a letter to his French friend from other revolutions, the Marquis de Lafayette:

Portugal grasping at an extension of her dominion in the South has lost her great Northern province of Pernambuco, and I shall not wonder if Brazil should revolt in mass, and send their royal family back to Portugal. Brazil is more populous, more wealthy, more energetic, and as wise as Portugal.

The attention given to the event can be attributed to two factors. The first is that it coincided with the Spanish colonies' struggles for independence. In a way, Pernambuco was part of the same context. In a letter dated June 27, Madison, now ex-president, wrote to Richard Rush, then US attorney general, to explain this relationship:

May not the event at Pernambuco, if not caused by actual oppression, tend to give, at the present moment, an unfavorable turn to the sentiment of European Sovereigns in relation to the revolutionary Scene in S. America? The struggle of the Spanish part, having the appearance of shaking off a foreign yoke, appeals merely to the interest and sympathy, of those Sovereigns. That in the Brazils may be viewed by them as an attack on a domestic Throne, and as adding an example in the new World, to those which have inspired so much alarm in the old.⁵

The second explanation is linked to the fact that, as soon as Pernambuco's independence was declared, the province sent an ambassador to

⁵ The interest in independence in Spanish America also had other motivations than just diplomatic and political. According to Catlin Fitz in her book Our Sister Republics (2016), after the end of the War of 1812, a patriotic sentiment took hold of the common people of the USA, who began to associate the independence movements in the south of the continent as a kind of continuation of the great republican project inspired by the USA.

the USA with the aim of obtaining financial and military support from its northern neighbors for the independence struggles. His name was Antonio Gonçalves da Cruz. According to research published by Flávio Cabral (2015), as soon as he arrived in the USA, Cruz attempted to utilize the local press to disseminate information about the situation in Pernambuco. He also established contact with prominent figures involved in the American Revolution.

As Monroe wrote to Madison on May 16, 1817, the Portuguese ambassador in Washington, José Correa da Serra, went to Monroe's office to discuss the possibility of Cruz's visit. He also presented "a note address'd, in a strong tone, against the Insurgents, etc. He partakes strongly of the anti-revolutionary feeling on this subject, more so than is strictly consistent with his liberal & philosophical character." A few days later, Cruz paid a visit to John Adams, as he wrote to his friend Jefferson on May 26.

The presence of the Pernambuco "ambassador" may have contributed to José Correa's lack of enthusiasm. Rush wrote to Madison on June 18 to inform him that the diplomat had paid him a visit. During this meeting, Correa revealed that he had anonymously published articles against the Pernambuco revolution in the *National Intelligencer*. Correa's revolt was not only a sign of concern about how the news would be received in the US, but also that the information Cruz had provided was out of date. In his article for the newspaper, he even informed the public that the movement had been disbanded since March 26.

It would be inaccurate to suggest that the US authorities' decision not to assist the insurgents in northeastern Brazil was influenced by pressure from José Correa da Serra. However, it is worth noting that he was one of the diplomats with the most traffic in Washington DC at the time. He was appointed by Dom João VI to the post in the USA at the beginning of 1816, according to a letter sent by the Prince himself to James Madison on February 1st of that year. During this period, he became involved in a number of areas, including foreign policy and subjects related to the study of botany and philosophy, which brought him closer to Thomas Jefferson, with whom he became friends and a regular

visitor to his estate, Monticello. For this reason, his departure from the United States in 1820 was so much regretted by the former president in a letter written on November 29 of that year: "no foreigner I believe has ever carried with him more friendly regrets." It is perhaps unsurprising that Correa's stance on the Port Revolution also caught Jefferson's attention.

The Liberal Revolution of Porto in 1820 and Brazilian Independence

The Liberal Revolution of Porto is also one of those events that help to understand Brazil's independence in all its complexity. The news of a movement dedicated to putting limits on the King's power and advocating greater autonomy for parliament crossed the Atlantic, bringing hope that the centralization represented by Rio de Janeiro would bring greater freedoms to the northern provinces. The drafting of a new constitution was met with enthusiasm, as it offered a chance to establish a new political pact. The winds of transformation also had an impact on the lives of the sovereigns, forcing Dom João to swear to the new constitution and then retreat to Portugal, where the king's throne was to reside.

Gradually, enthusiasm for the revolution lost ground in Brazil and the constitution came to be seen as an imposition (Slemian, 2022). What seemed like a promising step towards establishing provinces with more autonomy and greater representation of Brazilians in the Constituent Assembly (Cortes) ultimately proved to be a challenge. Firstly, the Cortes sought to eliminate absolutist institutions created by the Portuguese monarchy during its time in Brazil. Secondly, there was a movement to remove Rio de Janeiro from any kind of leading role. In the second half of 1821, for example, decrees 124 and 125 established by the Cortes demanded the return of Dom Pedro, the Prince Regent of Brazil, and appointed new commanders of arms for the provinces. There was also discussion about the closure of the higher courts created in Rio de Janeiro, which would in fact be closed at the end of the year. Finally, the government sent troops to the cities of Bahia, Pernambuco, and Rio de Janeiro to address any potential uprisings.

As the decisions were being considered, there was a growing concern that Portugal might propose a plan to "recolonize Brazil." This led to a shift

in thinking about independence, which began to spread from the capital to the provinces of the Kingdom through the influence of political leaders. Dom Pedro was encouraged to embrace this cause in order to prevent the emergence of separatist movements, such as the one in Pernambuco.

The events related to the Liberal Revolution in Porto appear quickly in the correspondence analyzed, especially in those written by Thomas Jefferson between 1820 and 1821. In a letter written on November 29, 1820, Jefferson discussed the ambassador's departure with Francis W. Gilmer, a former pupil of José Correa da Serra. The former president commented on the potential implications of the Cortes organization in Portugal and how it could serve as a model for other aspirations in Brazil, which could potentially cause further concern for his friend. Jefferson inquired as to whether Correa was disheartened by the lack of a position from the US government on the events in Portugal. He concluded his letter by saying: "while our duties oblige us to wish well to these revolutionary movements, they do not forbid our prayers for their favorable effects on his [Correa's] fortunes: and certainly in spirit he must go with them."

A little over six months later, Jefferson once again commented on Brazil and the possibility that the instability caused by the courts might bring about a new fate for the country. On July 23, 1821, he wrote to Thomas Sumter Jr., who had just left his post as U.S. minister plenipotentiary in Brazil and returned to his native South Carolina. In addition to welcoming him back, Jefferson pondered:

I sincerely congratulate you on your safe return to your own country, and that you have escaped the dangers to health which great changes of climate sometimes produc[e.] I think it possible too that dangers of another character may threaten Rio Janeiro for awhile: for I suppose the of the king may become the signal for those scenes of violence which constitute the commencement and course of revolution in countries not prepared [for] self-government.

Jefferson's assessment was indeed accurate. As previously mentioned, by the beginning of 1822, the discourse of independence was gaining more and more strength. Since the former president's last letter, there

has been a notable absence of references to Brazil. There is no mention of the Declaration of Independence on September 7, nor of Dom Pedro's acclamation on October 12. On November 12, 1822, William Short, an important diplomat and former secretary to Thomas Jefferson, wrote to the former president with news about José Correa da Serra and his new role in the government of Portugal, elected deputy for Évora. In the same letter, he mentioned Dom Pedro, celebrating the fact that the new Emperor had shown Europe that it was possible for countries to exist in America without the protection of their metropoles. On the other hand, he expressed regret that Brazil had chosen to maintain a monarchy headed by an heir to the old regime. However, like a representative of the American diplomacy of his time, he concluded the letter in a pragmatic manner: "What have we to do with this? All that we should ask is that they should enter in to the American system by shaking off the European yoke."

In the following days, Jefferson received new correspondence with news about Correa da Serra and Brazil. Henry Dearborn, who had been appointed US ambassador to Lisbon, shared his initial impressions of life on European soil. The diplomat confirmed Jefferson's suspicion that his Portuguese friend was disappointed with the American government, suggesting that future treaties between Portugal and the United States might be more beneficial for all parties involved. At the time, they were unaware that Correa da Serra's mandate would be relatively brief, as he passed away in September of that same year. The letter proceeded to recount some of the experiences they had learned. In his remarks about the now king, Dom João VI, Dearborn described him as a leader who was greatly loved by his people and who was happy to have been "rid" of his wife, Carlota Joaquina, who had been deported from Portugal after plotting a conspiracy against her husband. The only somewhat uncomfortable consideration in relation to Dom João was the high expenses incurred by the monarch in his attempt to regain the territory of Brazil. According to the ambassador:

> Portugal would be going on very well if the Government and people could be cured of the rageing epidemak, for holding the Brazil, in subjection, they are exhausting their resources

by sending fruitless expeditions to Brazil, it is a subject on which I consider it proper for me to be perfectly silent here.

This quote offers a fascinating insight into the recent findings of Brazilian historiography on the process of Brazil's emancipation. It challenges the long-held view that Brazil's separation from its former metropolis was a consensual and conflict-free process. It seems that the desire to regain Brazil's independence had become a kind of epidemic among the people, and the efforts to achieve this were not only costly, but also became taboo, a subject to be avoided in public comments. As Hélio Franchini (2019) has shown, the struggles for Brazilian independence took place between 1822 and 1823. They involved the mobilization of sixty thousand soldiers in battles that took place in three theaters of operation: the southeast, north, and northeast of the country. These struggles resulted in the deaths of up to five thousand people, as well as thousands of wounded and prisoners of war. Military operations continued until 1824 in the Cisplatina region, and hostilities by procrown groups only ended with Portugal's recognition of Brazil in 1825.

Final considerations

It is well known that the United States recognized Brazil one year earlier, in 1824. The letters analyzed do not mention this fact, nor the so-called Monroe Doctrine, which supports the analysis of Harry Ammon (1981) that the president's speech to Congress in December 1823 had much less impact on the universe of American diplomacy than is now attributed to it. In addition, it was tied to electoral interests for the presidential election the following year.

Thus, the history of Brazil-US relations during the Brazilian independence process could end here, without further mention of the dates and facts that often populate school materials. However, it is possible to add other features to this picture. In the Summer of 1825, José Silvestre Rebello, Brazil's first ambassador to the United States, organized a tour of Virginia, with the intention of passing through James Madison's country to meet him. This desire reached the ears of the former president through Daniel Brent, Chief of Staff of the State Department,

who recommended the visit of the Brazilian ambassador in this way: "This Gentleman has resided amongst us several years, and no foreign Agent ever has been, or is more esteemed here, than himself; and it is upon this ground, as much as your kindness, that I rely for my excuse, in the Liberty I thus take."

Rebello's intention with the meeting was not merely diplomatic; it was also a way of integrating himself into the culture and history of the country that had welcomed him. As Álvaro da Costa Franco (2009, 13) explains, "Silvestre Rebello sought, as soon as he arrived in the United States, to establish links with cultural and scientific organizations." As a result of this activity, he was made an honorary member of the *Columbia Institute* [...] to which he donated books and botanical collections." Rebello was aware that there was some resistance to Brazil because of its choice of monarchy, and so it was necessary to show goodwill in order to awaken business opportunities in American pragmatism.

So the requested meeting did indeed take place. However, Rebello not only met Madison, but also the other former presidents who lived in Virginia, Jefferson and Monroe. As he described in one of his dispatches made on August 26, 1825:

I had the pleasure of visiting the three former presidents, who reside in this area. I was graciously received and found Jefferson to be a wise man, still imbued with the revolutionary spirit. Madison, a polished diplomat, demonstrated his commitment to safeguarding the flag and protecting property. Monroe, in his own way, is an excellent man (Franco, 2009, 273).

Interestingly, these were the three most active and dedicated to US foreign policy during the period in which Brazil was unknowingly experimenting with the development of its emancipatory process. Armed with their diplomats, as we have seen, they chose not to intervene in the matter, in keeping with the American tradition of the time inaugurated by George Washington. Even so, they still saw a good relationship with Brazil and the opportunity to become a first-rate partner.

In any case, it is curious how Rebello refers to them and how this relates to the events described so far. Brazil's diplomacy with the US, after decades of waiting for independence, began with a handshake and the reverence of an "esteemed gentleman," "a wise revolutionary," "a polished diplomat," and "an excellent man."

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World War II: Brazilian Entrepreneurs between Autonomous Development and a Privileged Relationship with the United States

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Introduction

When writing a chapter in a book commemorating the bicentenary of Brazil-United States relations, it seems appropriate to revisit a debate that has been going on for many decades, since the last century, which is still strong today. The period we will be discussing is the years between 1930 and 1942, during the Second World War. The debate is about national autonomy, development and Brazil's relations with the United States. We will see how there are issues discussed over the years whose meaning remains relevant today.

The regime established in Brazil in 1930, according to different authors, was fundamental for strengthening the national state, providing essential elements for its consolidation. Different factors contributed to this, including external factors. This article focuses on analyzing the

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role of the Brazilian industrial bourgeoisie in formulating a project for economic and industrial development, as well as its relationship with political power. It is crucial to understand the Vargas Government's ability to direct Brazilian international policy, especially after December 1941, in the post-Pearl Harbor context. Brazil's participation in the Second World War was not determined solely by external factors; the Vargas Government had a certain margin of choice, as evidenced by the different policies adopted by other Latin American countries from 1942 onwards.

In Brazil, there is an intense debate about the motivations behind the military, industrialization and foreign relations policies of those years (Vigevani, 1989). The interpretation of these motivations and the existence of long-term strategies that could articulate a hegemonic national project are complex issues. This article suggests that no single dominant segment at the time had the capacity to formulate a national project. Foreign policy is not determined solely by immediate circumstances, but is influenced by a series of variables, even in a peripheral country like Brazil, with a recent history.

A country's place in the international system, especially during the period in question, cannot be explained solely by the division into spheres of influence, determined by political and strategic powers and the economic conditions governing trade and investment, and therefore by the interests of the most powerful states. In addition to these factors, the ideas, feelings and objectives of those in power in each country play a significant role in the formulation of foreign policies. According to Aron (1979), the theorist of realist liberalism in International Relations, the behavior of states is not determined exclusively by relations of force or class and political affinities. It is necessary to consider the nature of states and the objectives of their rulers. In this context, the concepts of homogeneous and heterogeneous systems, proposed by Papaligouras and adopted by Aron (1979), are relevant. Homogeneous systems group together states with similar political principles, while heterogeneous systems bring together states with contradictory principles. In the history of international relations, it is common to observe the coexistence and interaction between these two types of systems. Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s exemplifies this dynamic, being more economically tied to the

United States, but also maintaining relations with powers from different political systems, such as Germany, among others.

Considerations about the historical period

Despite the dictatorship established in Brazil in November 1937, which could suggest political affinities with fascist regimes, part of the ruling classes understood the importance of aligning themselves with the US system, reflecting an adaptation to the dominant structures in different fields, with implications for the country's policies and ideologies. On the other hand, the diversity of political systems does not prevent the formation of alliances. In 1942, Vargas showed caution in formulating foreign policy during the opening of the III Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics³, indicating the complexity of international relations and the need to consider multiple factors when making political decisions:

The aggression against the United States in the Pacific Ocean, followed by the declaration of war by Germany and Italy on our great friend, necessarily had to bring us together once again. So here we are, sovereign representatives of the American family of free and peace-loving homelands, to reaffirm our unanimous solidarity with the nation suddenly attacked and to resolve, prudently and decisively, what suits the security and protection of our peoples. The program of this Third Conference, drawn up by an illustrious commission of public men with a fondness for dealing with common problems, dictates the order of the issues to be settled, giving those of defense the primacy that they cannot fail to have (Vargas, 1942 quoted in Silva, 1972).

After the conclusion of the III Meeting of Consultation, in which Brazil positioned itself as an ally of the United States in Latin America, while maintaining security margins, the central concerns changed

³ Convened at the request of the Chilean Government because of the Japanese attack on the United States on December 7, 1941. It was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, between January 15 and 28, 1942. For full minutes, see: https://www.oas.org/consejo/sp/RC/Actas/Acta%203.pdf. Last access on: 14 Feb. 2024.

significantly. The need arises to take advantage of the new link for one's own benefit, looking for ways to obtain favorable treatment from the power to which the country is linked, an association that largely proves irreversible in the same historical period.

It is important to note that, at this point, Vargas' position reflects a search for the use of an element that had already been present in Brazilian foreign policy for some time — as seen in Brazil's position during the First World War and in the actions of Ruy Barbosa. At the end of January 1942, when addressing Roosevelt, Vargas highlighted this element of Brazilian policy, linking it to the United States. This articulation shows a strategy to maximize the benefits of the association with the USA, revealing the complexity of international relations in the face of the political and economic circumstances of the time:

Brazil's attitude was long established. It was dictated by our constant position as vanguards in the movements of continental fraternization, reinforced by the relations of unaltered cordiality between our two countries, made more solid and objective in recent years by the expansion of economic and cultural exchanges, a work of rapprochement that owes much to your vigilant assistance. We obey the imperatives of our condition as American people and as sincere and loyal friends of the State of the Continent, which has been attacked by a country that does not belong to it (Vargas, 1942).

The speech given by Vargas in June 1940, often cited as a significant demonstration of the Brazilian Government's attempt to maintain a neutral position, and even sympathize with the Axis, can perhaps be better understood if it is seen as an appeal to domestic public opinion, especially the Armed Forces, rather than an attempt to reach out to the fascist countries, precisely at a time when the fall of Paris symbolized the latter's strength (Vigevani, 1989). Initially, Vargas recognizes American solidarity and then, in a manner consistent with the principles underpinning the Estado Novo, exalts strength, a sense of patriotism and national progress:

[...] There are no longer antagonisms on the Continent: we are united by bonds of close solidarity with all American countries, around ideals, aspirations and in the common interest of our defense [...]. We are moving towards a future that is different from what we used to know in terms of economic, social and political organization, and we feel that the old systems and outdated forms are in decline. But this is not, as the pessimists and hardened conservatives claim, the end of civilization, but the tumultuous and fruitful beginning of a new era. Vigorous peoples, fit for life, need to follow the course of their aspirations, instead of dwelling on what is crumbling and falling into ruin [...]. Instead of this panorama of balance and fair distribution of the earth's goods, we are witnessing the exacerbation of nationalisms, strong nations imposing themselves through organization based on the feeling of the Homeland and sustaining themselves through the conviction of their own superiority [...]. Fortunately, in Brazil, we have created a regime suited to our needs, without imitating others or joining any of the existing doctrinal and ideological currents. The complete equipping of our armed forces is a necessity that the entire nation understands and applauds. No sacrifice will be excessive for such a high and patriotic purpose (Vargas, 1940).

Understanding Brazilian foreign policy during the war raises questions about whether it was mainly the result of the pragmatism of the Vargas Government and the skill of the ruling group, or whether there were social factors that had a significant influence, linked to some kind of long-term project. While some argue that pragmatism was dominant, others suggest that there were elements of an autonomous historical project for Brazil. Gambini (1977), for example, emphasizes pragmatism, suggesting that the Estado Novo refined its ability to take advantage of the temporary advantages arising from the rivalries between the United States and Germany, to the detriment of an autonomous historical project for Brazil. This perspective emphasizes the search for immediate

and tactical advantages during wartime circumstances, without a clear long-term vision. This discussion suggests the complexity of Brazilian foreign policy formulation, involving an interaction between short-term pragmatic considerations and possible long-term aspirations or interests. The analysis of these aspects is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the motivations and directions of Brazil's foreign policy during the war period. This interpretation is similar to that of Wirth, who states verbatim that "Vargas would only accept military cooperation with the United States if he could get a good exchange. Probably, if he didn't get any more concessions from the United States, he would be strongly pressured to cooperate with Germany" (1970, 116).

According to other interpretations, the determinants of Brazilian foreign policy during the war period were ultimately historical events, especially the consequences of the military conflict, which, from the end of 1939, influenced Brazil's choices in a specific direction. Recognizing the solid factual basis of these analyses, the concern arises to understand whether there are elements in Brazilian society that can provide *insights* into long-term perspectives.

In this sense, the central conclusion in Moura's (1980) analysis of these issues stands out. A country's international insertion is determined by a series of factors. During this period, it is difficult to identify any class or sector with a national project of major political influence. Neither the industrial bourgeoisie, nor the landowners, nor the military, nor even the ruling elite of the state apparatus presented such a project. However, the international insertion of a country with the relative degree of political, social and economic sophistication as Brazil, depended to a large extent on the interests of its social forces, especially those capable of becoming protagonists in this scenario. Moura reiterates the idea that alignment is not the automatic result of economic and geographical conditioning factors, "it is a process that is negotiated over a long period of time and this presupposes some strength on the part of the subordinate ally" (1980, 188).

It can be argued that Brazil's participation in the Second World War, including the deployment of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB),

reflects the presence of national interests in the formulation of state policies. Isolation and mediation played important roles, contributing to the search for advantages within the limits of Brazilian capacity. These advantages include the aspiration for international power, together with the corporate interests of various segments of society. It is therefore rash to state peremptorily, as Seitenfus does, that "Brazil did not have an independent and autonomous foreign policy during the period 1930-1942. The great but weak Brazil cannot allow itself to raise its voice and must necessarily seek composition" (1985, 431). In this article we will try to better understand the different interpretations and identify the thinking of the representatives of industrial interests. Remembering that the latter was only just emerging.

Simonsen, who would be an important, sometimes lonely, even if authorized by his peers, spokesman for this project, saw the North American system as the most significant source of lessons, even in December 1918, at the end of World War I, a period in which Brazil's fundamental economic relations with the outside world were still moving in other directions.

The politics of Brazilian industrialists

Roberto Simonsen built his political agenda around one central concern: Brazil's economic and industrial development. He believed in the need for strong state intervention to promote growth and industrialization to reduce dependence on foreign imports and stimulate domestic production. It follows, therefore, from the premise that his economic nationalism sought to guarantee Brazil advantages from an autonomous project.

Simonsen even draws attention to American industrialization and its benefits for the population. Addressing the workers who work in his companies, seeking to instill "intelligent and conscious discipline" and the idea of "cordial cooperation," the example he cites is the United States. "In the United States, the best organized companies, that is, the ones that can produce the cheapest, are the ones that pay the highest wages"

(Simonsen, 1973, 437). Gorender takes this approach a step further and goes so far as to state that:

[...] the spokespeople for the industrial bourgeoisie — Simonsen, Horácio Lafer, Euvaldo Lodi, Guilherme Guinle and others — tended to identify industrialization with the national interest, rejected accusations of the artificiality of Brazilian industry, emphasized its legitimacy and fought for an explicit policy of state intervention in favor of private capitalist initiative (1982, 65-66).

Simonsen's speech, given after taking over the presidency of the São Paulo State Industries Center (CIESP) in 1937, offers a significant summary of his ideas on the relationship between industrialization, national independence, and modernization. He shows concern about these issues, while at the same time identifying elements of the North American model for Brazil, despite emphasizing the importance of autonomy. The analysis indicates the industrial bourgeoisie's lack of autonomy in developing a hegemonic project, evidenced by its concern with maintaining good relations with the state and seeking its political protection:

In this memorable Brazilian moment when, under the beneficial influence of a wise administrative orientation, the great conquests made by the nation on the wide road of progress are being directed and consolidated, it does not seem out of purpose, in the solemn installation of the Center of Industries of the State of São Paulo, to try to fix, even if only pallidly, what industrial activity has done in our country. Brazilian industry was born out of local needs, it has grown and evolved amid the greatest difficulties, and despite this, it has already rendered remarkable services to the nation. [...] Everywhere industries are considered the standard of a people's progress. [...] If it is true that the basis of Brazil's economic structure must rest on the culture of the land, it is no less true that at the current stage of civilization, the economic independence of a great

nation, its prestige and its political performance as an independent people in the concert of nations can only be taken into due consideration if this country has an efficient Industrial Park, on a par with its agricultural development. Thus, Brazilians who fight the establishment and spread of industries in the country are consciously or unconsciously working in favor of foreign nations interested in conquering our markets, working to make us regress to the position of a colony of foreign producers, still at the mercy of an economic blockade in the event of war. In the United States. where industry has grown and evolved under a strong protectionist policy, the biggest consumer of that country's formidable industrial production is the American people themselves, with less than 10% of their industrial output being exported. When established in the same country, the industrial park and agricultural culture should combine, grow, assist, and develop in a harmonious and efficient effort. Instead of one class competing for dominance over the others, they must complement each other, combine their efforts, and intertwine their interests in such a way that one cannot live without the other. This is how it is in the United States. [...] In the United States, there is intense propaganda everywhere to improve the methods of industry and business, which are seen as a kind of public function, with social responsibilities and duties towards the community. Production in all its aspects is being considered in the countries that are at the forefront of civilization as a business of the nation and not as an individual interest. Everywhere, the concentration of all patriots around the support and promotion of production, the fundamental basis for the creation of a strong people capable of playing a prominent role in the concert of nations, is being preached. [...] The political independence of a nation is only effective in all its aspects if it is based on a strong economic situation, on relative economic independence, without which political

independence does not really exist. [...] For all the above reasons, there is a clear and absolute coincidence between the goals pursued by industrialists and the true national interests [...] (Simonsen, 1973, 53-65).

The 1930 Revolution, as Fausto (1979) points out, was not supported by industrialists, especially those from São Paulo, who expressed their support for the candidacy of Júlio Prestes. Simonsen's position reflected this stance. Although the Liberal Alliance⁴ did not present a pro-industry program, its democratizing objectives did not resonate with São Paulo industrialists. However, in a subsequent moment, when tensions between the economic interests of different countries profoundly affected Brazil's international position, a phenomenon initially triggered by the 1929 crisis, Simonsen showed a growing concern with defending Brazilian economic interests, as evidenced in his inaugural speech at the Free School of Sociology and Politics, after the São Paulo defeat of 1932:

Looking at the situation of our economy in the context of international economies, we must orient our foreign policy on the basis of our own economic and social indices, i.e. from the inside out, and not copy international political guidelines, which don't fit our realities and needs (1973, 469).

The defense of Brazilian industry began to be foreshadowed in the face of US pressure, which would become more acute in 1935. In fact, an important part of the New Deal policy, initiated by Roosevelt when he became President, was — after the shock caused by the Great Depression — aimed at re-establishing free trade. Feis wrote that:

[...] with the continuation of the depression and the doubt about gradual policy and the uncertainty regarding Europe after Germany and Italy expressed their challenges,

⁴ The Liberal Alliance was a Brazilian political coalition formed in 1929, led by Getúlio Vargas and João Pessoa, which opposed the Government of Washington Luís. Its aim was to launch an opposition presidential candidacy in the 1930 elections. The Alliance advocated political decentralization and social and economic reforms. After accusations of electoral fraud, the 1930 Revolution resulted in the fall of Washington Luís and the rise to power of Vargas, inaugurating the so-called Vargas Era in Brazilian history (Fausto, 1979).

many countries imposed new restrictions and controls on transactions between their citizens and those of other countries. In fact, the United States began its program of negotiating reciprocal reductions in trade restrictions in 1934. A small number of countries, such as Sweden, stubbornly and successfully continued their course of commercial and financial freedom. Great Britain and Japan increased their restrictions only moderately and as a necessity akin to an obligation; many of the Latin American countries showed a similar reluctance. Despite this, in many European countries, and gradually throughout the world, the system of restrictions and controls was used more intensively. The tariff reductions that marked the triumphs of the free trade era were completely out of use. The use of quotas or authorization systems spread from country to country (1971, 30-31).

As we know, the system of controlled and compensated trade was one of the reasons that precipitated the War. The Bretton Woods system, from 1944 onwards, sought to overcome this logic through "liberalization," with the generalization of the "most favored nation" principle.

In the words of someone who had been an advisor to the International Economic Affairs section of the US State Department and a special advisor to the Conferences of American States in 1936, 1938 and 1939, we can see that the flexibility shown by the US towards Brazil, even in the face of the intense growth in relations between Brazil and Germany, was mainly the result of an international context in which the US was actively intervening, seeking to change this dynamic, but aware that it could not do so entirely in the short term.

Considering the politics of industrialists, especially those in São Paulo, the question arises as to whether, at any time prior to the war or Brazil's entry into it, there was a significant rapprochement with Germany that threatened the pan-Americanism prevalent among the political, economic, and socially influential groups in Brazil. Seitenfus suggests that the answer may be yes for the approximate period from 1934 to 1938.

However, after the liquidation of the Brazilian Integralist Action and the consolidation of the Estado Novo, despite oscillations in discourse and political pressure, Brazil ended up definitively joining the bloc led by the United States:

Now, despite the apparent comings and goings, Brazilian foreign policy effectively obeyed, from March 1938, rigid principles guided by an entente seen as necessary and indispensable with the United States. On the other hand, before March 1938, Brazil's position was much less explicit. In fact, before this date, which marked Oswaldo Aranha's entry into Itamarati, there were extremely close ties — economic, political, police and ideological — with the Axis powers (Seitenfus, 1985, 428).

It is undeniable that economic relations with Germany experienced significant growth during this period, as evidenced by concrete data, especially on trade. However, the question under discussion is whether this growth implied a political and ideological change on the part of the Brazilian ruling groups. The Brazilian Government, represented by figures such as Macedo Soares, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Oswaldo Aranha, Ambassador to Washington, as well as through Getúlio Vargas himself, played a crucial role in pressuring Congress to approve the Trade Treaty.⁵ Hilton's conclusion that "Brazil's response to German-American rivalry in this period undoubtedly represented a triumph for Berlin and a crushing defeat for Good Neighbor diplomacy" (1977, 125) seems contradictory.

In fact, during the years from 1935 to 1938, there is no evidence of any strategic decision by the Vargas Government that indicated a policy that was truly distant from Pan-Americanism (Vigevani, 1989). It is notable that, in agreement with Hilton, the Brazilian political actors of this period, both those who favored rapprochement with Washington and those who sought ties with Berlin acted under pressure from groups with specific interests to defend, such as industrialists, coffee and cotton

⁵ The Trade Treaty between Brazil and the United States, signed on March 12, 1935 under Getúlio Vargas, established mutual tariff reductions and facilitated bilateral trade. Despite criticism, it was an important step towards economic cooperation between the two countries.

producers, importers, among others. The industrial sector's response, led by Simonsen in 1936, when he was President of the Industrial Confederation of Brazil and a member of the National Constituent Assembly, sought to diversify production and take advantage of the opportunities available. He emphasized the importance of support from foreign capital, mainly from the US and the UK. At a meeting of the Consultative Council of the National Coffee Department, Simonsen outlined essential horizons for Brazil, emphasizing the need for autonomy in the face of international circumstances in 1936.

Seitenfus (1985), Hilton (1977) and other scholars of the Vargas period suggest a rapprochement with Nazi Germany. Some go further, pointing out that the clearly dictatorial characteristics of the Vargas Government, from November 1935 onwards, with the successive imposition of states of siege and states of war, were accompanied, in terms of foreign policy, by a rapprochement with fascist countries. "The new constitutional guidelines were an imitation of European corporatist and fascist models, especially those of Portugal and Italy," says Skidmore (1969, 50), who goes on to characterize the Estado Novo as an attenuated Brazilian version of the European fascist model. Despite this, throughout this period, Brazil's strategic ties with the United States never ceased to exist. All the real initiatives of the Brazilian Government and, even more so, of the leading groups, left no doubt as to this tendency. The Continent, the New World and Pan-Americanism are constant in official discourse. In November 1936, when greeting Roosevelt at Itamaraty, Vargas (1936) once again reiterated the solidarity of the Brazilian people and Government with the convening of the Pan-American Conference in Buenos Aires.

There is evidence of collaboration with fascist countries during this period. The identification of Olga Benário Prestes in April 1936 was the result of a confidential decision by the Gestapo to cooperate with the Brazilian police, facilitated by the anti-communist stance of the Brazilian Ambassador to Germany, Moniz de Aragão. The anti-communist wave affected various sectors internationally in those years, and the collaboration between the Gestapo and the Brazilian police took place in this context. The signing of the Anti-Komintern Pact by Germany and Japan

in November 1936, followed by Italy, took place while the intelligence services had also been articulating anti-communist efforts since 1935, collaborating with the Brazilian authorities in the repression of communism. It should be borne in mind that the Treaty of Munich, in September 1938, was justified in French and English circles as a barrier "against the communist revolution and possibly against the immediate Bolshevization of Europe" (Maulnier, 1979, 37) or even that "one will not understand anything of the behavior of this fraction of the French bourgeoisie if one does not hear it murmuring in half a voice: better Hitler than Blum" (Boullon and Geneviève, 1986, 37).

The literature that analyzes the years 1936, 1937 and 1938 often considers the repercussions of publicity, journalism, and the intentions of government circles. Hilton (1977) emphasizes that the abandonment of parliamentary government, the corporatist nature of the new system and Vargas' radio speeches gave rise to widespread speculation about the possibility of a fully fascist state in Brazil. The North American press showed concern, even claiming that the Nazi-fascist axis had spread to America with the Estado Novo. Meanwhile, Germans and Italians sought Brazilian sympathy, with Italian Foreign Minister Ciano declaring his sympathy for Vargas' policy, and the Brazilian Ambassador's interlocutors in the German chancellery doing the same.

After November 10, 1937, the correspondence between Vargas and Aranha reveals a new dynamic. Liberal public opinion in the US reacted negatively to the coup, but gradually changed after a secret meeting between Undersecretary of State Summer Welles and journalists aimed at influencing their reporting and commentary. Aranha (1937) highlights some reasons for the critical attitude towards the new regime in Brazil and begins to outline the lines that would gradually be consolidated in relations with the United States. The suspension of remittances and payments of the foreign debt increased unease and generated misinterpretations. In North American circles, it was said that the Estado Novo's

⁶ The Treaty of Munich, signed on September 30, 1938, was an informal agreement between Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy on the Sudeten crisis. It allowed Germany to annex the Sudetenland in exchange for Adolf Hitler's promise not to seek any more territories in Europe. However, it was later widely criticized for encouraging Nazi aggression and contributing to the outbreak of the Second World War.

first economic and financial measures were inconsistent, varying between liberal, communist, fascist, and nationalist policies. Aranha emphasized the importance of seeking rapprochement with the US, highlighting Brazil as a faithful point of support for the *good neighbor* policy. Vargas agreed, stressing the need for US capital and the acquisition of military and railroad equipment.

During the Estado Novo, the industrial bourgeoisie in Brazil defended an industrializing policy through some of its representatives. Following Simonsen's programmatic elaboration demonstrates the difficulties faced by those thinking about the bourgeoisie's policy with regard to relations with the state and national autonomy. What can be discussed and questioned is the reformist content that some attribute to it (Lima, 1963). In this context, industrialization is discussed, especially the formation of heavy and basic industry. Development did not occur under the direct control of entrepreneurs. Interactions between different classes and social groups, especially those with the capacity to propose guidelines, influenced the actions of the state; and Vargas' Government, especially after 1937, illustrates this dynamic. In this case, Draibe is right to recognize that what he calls the autonomy of the state is ultimately based on "the heterogeneity and hegemonic incapacity of the social classes" and that "the unstable correlations of force defined in the field of political struggle demarcated not only the limits within which this autonomous action would be exercised, but also the meaning it would have" (1985, 43).

In short, the autonomy of the state is always influenced by dominant interests. In a context of contradictions between empires, states that articulate their national interests seek relative advantages, maintaining themselves in specific political-strategic fields and adopting compatible economic models. Simonsen's projects, at the same time, involve criticism and dependence on the state, the search for national autonomy and constructive cooperation with other countries, especially the United States, and the preservation of national unity, a critical issue in 1937:

We have already had the opportunity, and more than once, to emphasize that the national industry enjoys an

exceptional situation: all its legitimate desires coincide with the high interests of the nationality. [...]. Next, the São Paulo Federation shows that there is no antagonism between industry and international trade, since Brazil needs to reserve its purchasing power abroad for the purchase of defense instruments and items necessary for our economic apparatus, there is a vast field that can be reserved for the country's industrial development and yet another large space, free of the imports we need, for the purposes mentioned above. [...] The adoption of free trade always translates, in the economic sector, into expansion facilities for the states where economic activities are more advanced, at the obvious sacrifice of those that are more backward. Until today, we have not been willing or able to understand that reciprocity treaties, based on the mostfavored-nation clause, containing legal and theoretically equal conditions for both contracting parties, in fact entail, from an economic point of view, a progressive vassalage of the less-equipped and more powerful nation [...], we can no longer postpone the general revision of the lines along which our foreign economic policy is carried out. Brazil, a poor country, with minimal and ever-decreasing exports per capita, absolutely cannot adopt the standardized trade treaties preferred by the big industrialized and capitalist nations. Rather, we are forced to make different arrangements with the various nations, taking into account the different economic progress of each one and the economic and political relations that exist with them. The United States, for example, as the biggest buyer of our products, could have absolute preference for certain items of their production, which we need so much for our economic apparatus. However, the Americans must understand that our agricultural exports are not enough to create the purchasing power needed to buy a great variety of their manufactured products en masse, and that nature itself,

by debasing our currency and progressively impoverishing our people, will in the near future prevent these purchases, which are theoretically allowed by the letter of the treaty. An enriched Brazil would be the largest buyer of the basic and specialized products of American industry [...] (1973, 70-90).

It is clear that Simonsen, as President of the Industrial Confederation of Brazil and representative of FIESP, outlined industrializing policies and promoted an international stance for Brazil with certain autonomy, recognizing the crucial importance of the relationship with the United States. These positions reflect hegemonic aspirations by seeking paths of interest to the dominant classes, while also trying to influence and attract the subaltern classes, despite resistance to labor legislation. The question of relative autonomy seems well established. However, it is the state that is increasingly taking on the role of laying the foundations for basic and heavy industry. The Brazilian case is testimony to the difficulty faced by the bourgeoisie of a peripheral and underdeveloped country in developing a consistent development project within the international capitalist system.

In this context, Brazil sought advantages in its external relations, without consolidating a single direction, but recognizing the importance of relations with the United States for the ruling classes. It is important to note that the economic and military influence of the US began to have an even greater impact on Brazil, especially after 1938. For an important part of the political and economic elite, supporting this power became an objective for measuring the country's international prestige. Against a backdrop of international change, Brazil explored new opportunities. In 1939, despite maintaining options for relations with Germany, it sought to keep open the possibility of a privileged relationship with the USA. For a growing part of Brazil's ruling classes, this ability is fundamental.

In the same year, Simonsen was among the spokespeople for the dominant sectors who understood the role of improving relations with the Americans, while seeking concrete advantages for the country. According to him, "the formation of new capital is too slow. The foreign exchange

difficulties we are facing, largely due to international economic policies, have made it difficult for foreign capital to help set up basic industries here" (Simonsen, 1973, 22). He attacks the US position on international trade, but at the same time calls on foreign capital to intervene in the main sectors of the Brazilian economy, and the capital that is actually in a position to do so is that of the United States itself. It defends the right "to follow a clearly protectionist policy," as the Americans themselves have done in the past, and at the same time recognizes "the beneficial influence of American capital and technology on our economic development." Let's look at the connection between this economic approach and the political issue itself:

I sincerely join those who hope that the United States will really be able to maintain cooperation and rapprochement with us in the economic and industrial fields, in harmony with the political ties for which we all long (Simonsen, 1973, 24, 31, 49).

At the beginning of the Second World War, to the same extent that autonomous development was advocated by the industrial bourgeoisie, as we have seen in Simonsen, which did not dispense with the search for help from foreign capital and the pursuit of the North American model of industrial growth, the Brazilian Government's search for international balance persisted. Until the United States entered the war in December 1941, its actions were increasingly geared towards the inclusion of Brazil in its own area of influence: it was no longer a question of an ideological position, but above all the implementation of measures that implied a reduction in the levels of sovereignty. During Aranha's trip to Washington, as well as Marshall's to Rio de Janeiro and then Góes Monteiro's to Washington in February, May and July 1939, new axes of relations were defined: re-establishment of financial normality and military cooperation. In order to understand the FEB's motivations, it is important to consider that the US strategy gave little room for action by Latin American forces, even though it was requested. This strategy assigns the defense of the continent to the US, without providing for effective military participation by other American countries. During this period, Dutra, in particular,

stressed that it was not a question of maintaining total equidistance from the powers in conflict. Moura is explicit, "the role reserved specifically for the Latin American armed forces would be to maintain internal order in their own countries" (1980, 148).

Simonsen, still in May 1940, even in a context of continental solidarity, addressing the Scientific American Congress in Washington, pointed out the need for a universalist demographic policy and, recognizing what he saw as the motivations behind the fascist countries' war policy, considered Pan-Americanism to be an alternative for relieving tensions:

Germany, Italy and Japan constitute, at this instant, three great nuclei of accentuated demographic pressure. All the great nations of the world must take an interest in ensuring that not only their own populations, but also those of the other countries, have a satisfactory standard of living [...]. Nothing could be more natural, therefore, than for the countries of the American continent, guided by a general policy of improving internal standards of living, to cooperate in raising them and even to take an interest in those of the other populations of the world (Simonsen, 1973, 386, 388, 420).

In September 1940, Simonsen, defending development and social hierarchy as inherent in the "nature of things," suggested that Brazil's external positioning should have national foundations. This reflects a perspective that is not necessarily self-centered, but rather the perception of favorable opportunities that could make it easier for the national state to maintain control of decisions:

Facing the situation of our economy in the concert of international economies, we have to orient our foreign policy, starting from our own economic and social indices, that is, from the inside out, and not copy international political guidelines, which do not fit our realities and needs (Simonsen, 1973, 469).

We have seen that in Simonsen's September 1940 positions, we can also find a search for autonomy from the Americans, at a time when they were the decisive partner and their pressure for Brazilian alignment was strong. Shortly afterwards, in December 1940, addressing the Minister of Labor, Industry and Commerce, Waldemar Falcão — and therefore the central government — Simonsen opposed the directives coming from those sectors seeking to reproduce the fascist corporatist model in Brazil. In this case, Simonsen's motivations are explained by corporate reasons, defending the interests of FIESP (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo) and the Engineering Institute of São Paulo, as well as regional reasons, aiming to protect the specific interests of São Paulo, which outweigh those of other regions of the country. This highlights the need, on behalf of the industrial bourgeoisie, to seek its own political and administrative solutions, avoiding the influences of the fascist model. We can see how the Keynesian model of capitalist development, therefore identifiable with the New Deal prevailing in the United States at the time, is visible:

[...] contrary to what was then being peddled, that in Brazil there was expensive living, stemming from tariff protectionism, the truth was that in the country there truly existed insufficient earnings, and, as a consequence, underconsumption, the poverty of our internal markets and low wages (Simonsen, 1973, 147).

We can therefore see the insistent defense of the industrializing hypothesis as part of a national project that would guarantee external autonomy and promote the country's development. It is also worth noting how Simonsen, representing the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, did so from a perspective specific to Brazil.

Final considerations

Repeating what we said at the beginning of this article, the discussion we have just had taken up a long-standing piece of research, and revisiting it has led us to a conclusion of the utmost importance: in the 200 years of relations between Brazil and the United States, there are permanent

issues. The exercise has shown that supposedly ancient themes retain their strong contemporary relevance. Highlighting them is topical. Of course, except for the enormous changes! Changes in the configuration of the international system, of the world. Changes in power relations. Changes in both countries, the United States and Brazil. The economy has changed. Technology has gained a much greater importance, previously unimaginable. In the same way, the power of the financial system has increased in significance.

Domestic policy has changed, and in Brazil Simonsen's emphasis on industrialization has evolved contradictorily. From 1980 to 2020, industry's share of GDP fell sharply, while political forces have gained ground in an attempt to reverse this decline. The debate we are presenting is that of national autonomy and development. From this perspective, the important issue of Brazil's relations with the United States arises. We have seen that issues discussed over the years, decades and centuries remain fully valid. We believe we have shown that, structurally, Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s was more closely tied to the United States, and that the alternatives that existed in that period were used more from a bargaining perspective. We have seen that industrial entrepreneurs, in particular Simonsen, defended industrial policies on the part of the state, knowing that apparently "egalitarian" trade agreements would only serve the interests of the most developed states, in particular the United States. Even though they considered "Americanism" to be necessary for Brazilian modernization. That's why they defended the prospect of attracting capital and technology. In conclusion, this chapter has proposed a debate on the national interest as it relates to Brazil's foreign policy in the 1930s and 1940s, specifically in relations with the United States.

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Blue Afternoon at Hotel Embajador: Notes on Brazil's Abetment of the US Intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965-1966)

Filipe Nasser¹

The episode we intend to revisit in the following pages was not one of the most auspicious in the history of the relationship between Brazil and the United States. This is because it revealed the limits of a type of bilateral rapprochement that is easily confused with mimicry, if not with the very notion of *automatic alignment*, in the fullness of the risks, dangers and losses that are incurred by subordinating national interests to those of a foreign capital.

This was exactly the case with the decision by the government of Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco to accede to the US request to deploy Brazilian military personnel in the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), dispatched to the Dominican Republic by the Organization of American States (OAS) in May 1965.

By circumstantially favoring alignment with the hegemonic power — in the region and in the West — in an adventure with a fragile legal basis and dubious political legitimacy, Castelo renounced historical principles of Brazilian foreign action, including the commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states and uncompromising adherence to international law. Derived from the desire to strengthen relations with Washington and enlist Brasilia in the hemispheric struggle against

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communism, participation in the IAPF translated into a relativization of decision-making autonomy in foreign policy matters, of which many things can be said, including that it is not in keeping with the attitude expected of a country of continental dimensions and with the diplomatic credentials of Brazil.

One of the iconic photographs associated with the Dominican civil war (1965-1966) depicts Brazilian Army Colonel Carlos de Meira Mattos attaching to US General Bruce Palmer's right arm a sash — very similar to those worn by soccer team captains — bearing the three capital letters by which the Organization of American States is known in Latin linguistic variations (OEA). A couple of men in uniform are witnessing the scene from close up, but the captions below the image don't go far enough to eternalize their names. However, the word *Ejército* can be seen pinned to the uniform of one of them, hinting at — or, rather, misleading — his origin: neither Brazilian nor American.

The United Press International snapshot was taken on May 23, 1965 on the rooftop of the Hotel Embajador, located in Bella Vista, an upscale neighborhood in Santo Domingo. The occasion? The ceremony that established the Inter-American Peace Force, mandated to "re-establish peace and conditions of democratic normality" in the Dominican Republic, according to a decision taken by the OAS Council of Ministers in the wake of the intensification of fighting in the capital and — also — the landing of US Marines on Caribbean beaches.

Meira Mattos would go on to become the grand cardinal of Brazilian military geopolitics, which is why the institute of studies at the country's Army Command School was named in his honor. A member of the 11th Infantry Regiment of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) sent to Italy in 1944 to drive the Nazis out of Monte Castelo, he was also famous for leading the *putsch* that resulted in the closure of the Brazilian National Congress in 1966. Between one biographical highlight and another less meritorious one, the then Colonel was given command of the Brazilian

battalion (FAIBRAS), made up of 1,150 Caxias' soldiers, at the diplomatic ceremony on May 23rd.

Commander of the US forces since the invasion at the end of April — and therefore before the formal creation of the IAPF — Palmer would later take command of the theater of war in Vietnam. In the Dominican Republic, he was placed under the orders of Brazilian General Hugo Penasco Alvim, who was the supreme commander of the Inter-American Peace Force, which, in addition to the Brazilian battalion and the US division, was also made up of soldiers and police from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay — the countries from which, it can be assumed, the extras in the UPI photograph came. Palmer was responsible for up to 22,000 US soldiers and marines, by far the largest foreign contingent sent to the Dominican Republic.

The Hotel Embajador served as more than accommodation for hemispheric authorities, diplomats, military personnel and foreign correspondents rushing to the Dominican capital because of the outbreak of a tangled civil war. Its large, gloomy central atrium served as the true epicenter of diplomatic action that year, where information, not always reliable, exchanged hands until it was telegraphed to the capitals of the hemisphere in an attempt to influence decision-makers and regional public opinion.

It's worth remembering: it was the outburst of a phalanx of "rebels" in the hotel lobby that led a suggestive President Lyndon Johnson to order an increase in the number of US military personnel dispatched to the Caribbean, mischaracterizing the professedly "humanitarian" vocation of the operation and giving material support to the hypothesis that the intervention was actually intended to establish a US "friendly" government in Santo Domingo. Under the scorching sun shining down on the golf course, the operation was set up to extract Uncle Sam's subjects and other "elite" foreigners by helicopter. This, by the way, was the original "humanitarian" justification for the US military entering Dominican sovereign territory.

The Secretary-General of the OAS at the time, the Uruguayan José Antonio Mora, stayed at the Embajador during the persistent months

of his *séjour* in Santo Domingo. The representative of the UN Secretary-General, the Venezuelan José Mayobre, also used his suite in an effort to make room for the Burmese U Thant and his United Nations in the Dominican imbroglio. The OAS Commission, made up of a triad of notable ambassadors — including Brazil's Ilmar Penna Marinho — had its HQ on the roof of the hotel.

The UPI photograph, reproduced in various works dedicated to the Dominican crisis of 1965, invites a plethora of symbols, meanings and interpretations. For a few — especially according to the officialist prose spouted by actors directly linked to the political-military-diplomatic undertaking — it captures the notion that the IAPF tied US intervention in favor of the "restoration of democracy" — and against what was intended to be characterized as a "communist threat" — to the logic of multilateral action with hemispheric backing.

However, most of the specialized literature — echoing the prevailing assessment among political observers at the time — saw another argument framed by the image: that the OAS was instrumentalized by Washington's hierarchs, with the aim of lending a patina of legitimacy to a unilateral and illegal military intervention when the fact was already basically consummated. For this line of thinking, the decision of the OAS Council of Ministers lacked solid legal foundations, since, in a restrictive view of its text, the Bogotá Charter does not delegate to the Organization of American States the authority to instruct the use of armed force, let alone to carry out a military intervention in the internal political affairs of a sovereign and independent member state.

Among those who subscribe to this interpretation of the events that took place in the Dominican Republic between 1965 and 1966, the prevailing opinion is that the US action, in addition to its voluntarist character and dubious legal basis, was guided by an erratic decision-making process, marked by tactical advances and retreats, as well as being ill-informed, irrigated by inaccurate and unbalanced information about the real dimensions of the communist presence among the "rebel" forces loyal to deposed President Juan Bosch.

The photographic record of the camaraderie between Palmer and Meira Mattos also provides a vivid illustration of the policy of automatic alignment with the United States, which was unquestioningly adopted during the first phase of the Brazilian military regime, the most visible expression of which was perhaps the decision to support Washington in the controversial crusade for the restoration of Dominican democracy.

In April 1965, the outbreak of a civil war in the Dominican Republic precipitated unilateral US intervention, which was hastily approved by the hemispheric regional body. The remote causes of the uprising lay in the power vacuum installed in Santo Domingo since the assassination of dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina some four years earlier, and in the fragility of Juan Bosch's democratic government; those of the military intervention lay, on the one hand, in Lyndon B. Johnson's ascension to the White House in November 1963 and, on the other, in the broader geopolitical framework of the Cold War.

The modern history of the Dominican Republic is divided into before and after the dictatorship of the Generalissimo (1931-1961). In its three decades, Trujilloism filled every pore of Dominican life, bringing with it a particularly brutal and relatively unideologized form of totalitarianism beyond the very personal cult of *El Jefe*. Trujillo didn't just want to perpetuate his hold on power by any means, he wanted to annul any trace of opposition to his absolute rule over the eastern side of the Hispaniola island, to the point of curbing any sense of individual or collective identity that clashed with his own (Crasweller, 1966; Diederich, 2017).

In the period between Trujillo's magnicide in May 1961 and Bosch's deposition in August 1963 — except for the brief period of darkness in which Ramfis Trujillo tried to hold on to power by resorting to explicit violence, persecuting, torturing and killing almost all the conspirators of the paternal *ajusticiamiento* — Dominicans were able to enjoy broad democratic freedoms for the first time in a generation. Bosch ascended to the National Palace after surprisingly competitive and orderly elections. The underlying political conditions were, however, painfully precarious,

marked by constant attacks from the military establishment, sometimes nostalgic for the prestige they enjoyed under Trujillo, sometimes exaggerating the alarm about Bosch's leftist tendencies. With a strong popular appeal, Bosch turned out to be an unstable politician, prone to emotional outbursts, as well as a confused and fickle manager. It was the disturbance in civil-military relations and the President's supposed tolerance of communist elements — people who, in general, supported him in the electoral contest, but were far from preponderant in the government arrangement — that ultimately led to his sacking from office after just seven months in the presidency (Martin, 1966).

The removal of Juan Bosch from the National Palace in August 1963 resulted — with a gap of more than a year, during which he governed as a triad under the leadership of Donald Reid Cabral — in a close contest for power between the self-proclaimed military junta of Colonel Juan Benoit and the "rebels" led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño, the latter advocating the return of the deposed president to complete his constitutional mandate. With the benefit of hindsight, far from being a classic dispute between an established government and opponents challenging the current order — or freedom fighters confronting the authoritarianism of the tenants of power — the plot unfolded in a non-linear fashion, with the ownership of roles and the legitimacy of power changing hands at a disconcerting pace.

In contrast to Bosch/Caamaño's constitutionalist claim, Colonel Benoit's junta officially requested US intervention in an attempt to not only defeat the insurgent forces in the capital, but also to legitimize itself internally and internationally as an established power and, furthermore, to deconfigure what could be interpreted as undue US interference in Dominican internal affairs. Although it served as a justification for Operation Power Pack — as President Johnson admitted in a television broadcast on the evening of April 28, 1965 — the request for foreign intervention was not, in the end, enough for the junta to be recognized as a functioning government by Washington, which sought other political formulas to stabilize the Caribbean country. Between comings and goings, the efforts of international facilitation and mediation, in particular the OAS ad hoc commission, finally resulted in the choice of diplomat Hector

García Godoy, Bosch's former Foreign Minister, to lead the provisional government until the inauguration of the president to be elected in the elections called for June 1966.

The outcome of the Dominican struggle was the election of the former puppet president who served as a front for the Trujillo dictatorship: Joaquin Balaguer, returning from exile in New York, who, with barely disguised American enthusiasm — if disguised at all — defeated Juan Bosch himself, recently returned from exile in Puerto Rico, in a contest that was even competitive for the prevailing circumstances. Balaguer would go down in history as the "eternal President" of the Dominican Republic: from 1960, when Trujillo first imposed the presidential sash on him to give the regime a more internationally acceptable face, until 1996, he was out of the National Palace for a mere twelve years. It was in one of these interregnums that the civil war and the unilateral intervention sanctioned by a hemispheric organization unfolded, producing, in addition to 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded Dominicans, the momentary usurpation of the sovereignty of an independent country in exchange for the misinterpreted geopolitical interests of one of the Cold War powers.

The Dominican civil war was internationalized with the entry of the 82nd amphibious division of the US Army and, subsequently, the Inter-American Peace Force — its anabolic and regionalized version. Initially conceived as a surgical operation to rescue and extract US citizens from a combat zone, the US invasion was soon stripped of its "humanitarian" character, taking on the purpose of preventing the rise of a "communist government" in Santo Domingo. This, after all, was how Washington had come to see the prospect of enthroning, if not former President Bosch, or even his lieutenant Caamaño, then radical elements within the movement who could hypothetically kidnap it, installing yet another Soviet-friendly regime in the Caribbean.

Two orders of factors intertwined in the US decision-making process — the international and the national — and they were not always perfectly discernible from one another. President Lyndon Johnson's

decision to intervene militarily in the Dominican Republic obeyed the newly installed logic of *détente* between the superpowers — which would reach its most polished form years later with Nixon and Kissinger — according to which the dynamics of the Cold War were shifting from the center to the periphery of the international system, also due to the wave of Afro-Asian decolonization, as a way of managing the rivalries between Washington and Moscow over a low flame. From the moment tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union reached boiling point during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 — and the risk of mutual destruction ceased to be a mere abstraction — the bipolar conflict found other escape valves: it materialized in the allotment of zones of influence on the periphery of the system and, from the US point of view, in the fight against the spread of communism in the corners of the Third World.

In the specific case of the Dominican Republic, it was not just a dangerously close periphery: the Caribbean was perceived as the heart of Washington's natural zone of influence in the geopolitical-ideological tussle with Moscow — just as, in a way, Eastern Europe and Central Asia were for the Soviets. It was imperative to avoid, almost at any cost, the reprise of a nightmare that had haunted Washington's political, diplomatic and military establishment since January 1, 1959: the emergence of another strategic Soviet satellite — a "new Cuba" — in Latin America. If this had been true to some extent in the case of the little more than tacit. support for the military coup in Brazil the previous year, it would again apply with much greater force in the case of another island country less distant from Miami. In practice, the US attitude towards Latin America that had matured over the course of three decades. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, was broken, although it is prudent to admit that the CIA's underground action to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz another social democrat taken for a communist — in Guatemala in 1954 foreshadowed the Bay of Pigs, Operation Brother Sam and the armed intervention in Santo Domingo.

The US zone of influence in Central America and the Caribbean had already suffered a severe blow, not yet fully absorbed by the ruling establishment in Washington, with the loss of Havana to the Soviet camp. A second case would not be tolerated, otherwise the Western camp in the hemisphere would be shortened. Except that the civil war fought in a few neighborhoods of the old Santo Domingo de Guzmán was more the product of a claim for legitimacy and national power by antagonistic political forces than a battle for the heart of civilization inscribed in the bipolar dynamics of the Cold War.

There were, of course, domestic political factors in Washington's equation. Johnson had come to the presidency less than two years earlier as a practical consequence of JFK's assassination. He took office impromptu, aboard an Air Force One still stuck to the ground in the Dallas that had taken his predecessor's life. The nomination of the powerful Texan chief — perhaps the most influential Senate majority leader in American history — to be on the ticket with the young and charismatic Massachusetts politician had only made sense in response to the need to unify the progressive and southern wings of the Democratic Party after the 1960 primaries, lest a fractured party convention was triggered.

As vice-president, LBJ was never privy to the Court of Camelot, as the roster of the "best and brightest" chosen to guide the country's destiny, led by JFK at the head, came to be known. His impressive political dexterity notwithstanding, Johnson was a foreign body there, often the target of derision among Harvard intellectuals at the head of the government. Handily re-elected in 1964, and heading a cabinet almost entirely inherited from his predecessor, Johnson sought to assert his presidential authority internally and externally, with episodes of great historical reverberation in his rearview mirror, such as the Cuban Revolution (1959), the failure at the Bay of Pigs (1961), the missile crisis (1962) and the mysterious assassination of Kennedy (1963) (Caro, 2012; Dallek, 1998).

The crisis in the Dominican Republic offered Johnson a chance to polish his credentials as a reliable statesman on national security issues and an anti-communist "champion" — both permanent challenges for the Democrats during the Cold War, with the intractable Vietnam War as a backdrop. Misled into an error of judgment, not least by the flow of inaccurate information transmitted by the Embassy of the US in Santo Domingo, Johnson ordered the mobilization of marines to prevent the civil war in Santo Domingo from resulting in yet another "communist"

in power in his neighborhood. In the marketplace of ideas of his circle of advisors, there were those who sold Bosch as a communist puppet in the service of Moscow or, at least, as someone susceptible to the influence of the most radical elements of the rebellion, which is why the democratically elected and illegitimately ousted president could not be reinstated in the National Palace under any circumstances. Coincidentally, the then Vice-President had been Kennedy's representative at Bosch's inauguration, in the now distant February of 1963, leaving a photographic record, also present in various works on the subject, which is not only iconic, but ironic, to say the least (Szulc, 1965; Chester, 2001; Lowenthal, 1995).

Confirming the Johnson administration's misguided strategy towards the Dominican Republic, it should be noted that, at a given moment, there were a large number of senior US emissaries and mediators in Santo Domingo, who, understandably, did not always work in the same direction and with the same objectives: Johnson's own National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy; Thomas C. Mann, a Latin Americanist at the State Department; John Bartlow Martin, Kennedy's former Ambassador to Santo Domingo; William "Tap" Bennet, Ambassador accredited to the Dominican Government at the time; and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, a member of the OAS triumvirate, who was entrusted with the political direction of the IAPF.

Safe for the negative regional repercussions and the very alienation of the sovereignty of an authentic member of the hemispheric community, the results obtained by Washington with the Inter-American Peace Force were basically achieved and were perfectly compatible with US strategic objectives in the Cold War. Noted for theses that he would support in the then distant future, Professor Samuel Huntington demonstrates an undeniable power of synthesis:

Whether or not there was a threat of Communist takeover on the island, we were able to go in, restore order, negotiate a truce among conflicting parties, hold reasonably honest elections which the *right man won*, withdraw our troops, and promote a very considerable amount of social and economic reform. (Huntington quoted in Schaffer, 2003, 158, emphasis added).

LBJ was not indifferent to the trauma that armed aggression against a sovereign state could cause in relations with Latin America. It was therefore necessary to justify it with minimally credible arguments and to base it on multilateral foundations, even if only for Latin Americans to see. In order to back up what he claimed was unilateral action, Johnson encouraged the OAS Council of Ministers, meeting in Washington, to establish a "peace force," made up of Latin American military and police officers — in addition to US troops — to "restore peace and democratic normality" in the Caribbean country. In practice, it sought to give the appearance of multilateral and hemispheric legitimacy to a fait accompli.

Once in place, it didn't take long for the IAPF to take sides in the Dominican conflict. While at first it sought to safeguard US nationals and economic interests, it soon gave support to the junta once the rebel movement had gained the military advantage on the ground. Over the sixteen months of its existence, the Inter-American Peace Force oscillated between the roles of praetorian guard for the military junta, traffic inspector, armed arm of a diplomatic committee tasked with conducting its good offices with the combatant parties and, finally, a semblance of a peacekeeping operation. There were even times when, having secured the political objective of stifling the threat of Bosch's restoration to power, it acted at odds with the destabilizing instincts of radical elements within the Dominican armed forces in favor of a civilian transition of power in the country.

It was no coincidence, therefore, that the US intervention endorsed by the OAS received, from the outset, strong criticism from sectors of the international community and public opinion, especially in the Latin American and Caribbean neighborhood. The ghost of the US's history of interventionism in the region provided the backdrop for the presence of foreign troops on Dominican soil to haunt the IAPF from the outset and throughout its duration. Not only was the credibility of the OAS

as a mediating body in regional disputes tarnished, but also that of the countries that joined the United States in the endeavor.

In addition to the frailty of the legal grounds supporting the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force and the controversial rationale behind the US intervention, the fragility of the premises supporting the decision-making process in Washington and the very *sui generis* nature of the operation were factors that aroused reactions, often adverse, to the foreign intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

These reactions can be organized around the following themes:

- i) The questionable legitimacy of using armed force to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, which today would be described as "regime change;"
- Lack of hemispheric consensus on the adoption of democratic breakdown or the nature of political regimes as criteria justifying multilateral military intervention;
- iii) Weakness of the legal basis available to the OAS to deploy military force in one of its members without explicit authorization from the UN Security Council;
- iv) The hybrid and heterodox nature of the IAPF, which was not characterized as a multinational peace enforcement force or peacekeeping operation, in line with the rules and practice of international organizations;
- Validity of the request for foreign intervention made by the selfproclaimed military junta (which was not in the constitutional line of succession);
- vi) Whether the assumption that the "constitutionalist" movement was stimulated, armed, financed or even supported, directly or indirectly, by the Soviet Union or the international communist movement was correct; and
- vii) Doubts about the real extent of the presence of communist elements among the rebel forces, about the genuine coziness of these few radicals to the leaders of the pro-Bosch movement

and, after all, about the effective possibility of the communist regime capturing power in Santo Domingo.

It should be remembered that, at the time, even within the framework of the creation of the IAPF, serious consideration was given to establishing a permanent inter-American force, a proposal that never prospered. Respect for democracy and the preservation of institutional order entered the hemisphere's legal order through the Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter (1992) and the Inter-American Democratic Charter (2001) itself. Among the punishments provided for in these instruments in the event of a breakdown of institutionality in a member state are economic sanctions and temporary suspension of the body's work; there is no provision for the use of force to reverse a coup or stop civil unrest in the OAS order. It would not be unreasonable to categorize the OAS's ex post facto military intervention in the Dominican Republic as an odd multilateral arrangement, to say the least.

Since General Castelo Branco's ascension to the Planalto Palace the year before the events in the Dominican Republic, Brazil had been a loyal and enthusiastic member of the Western bloc led by the United States. If the 1964 military coup was the result of an internal political dynamic that had been cooking for at least a decade, it cannot be said that political calculations and narratives were indifferent to the temperature variations of the Cold War.

The Embassy of the US in Rio de Janeiro likely helped set the stage for the pre-coup behind-the-scenes movements. The subversive action of the Brazilian Institute of Diplomatic Action (IBAD) helped to inflate the communist threat in the representation of the effective radicalization promoted by João Goulart in the last months of his turbulent time as President. The promise of US support, in the form of Operation Brother Sam, should the "Revolution" encounter any obstacles — which in the end it didn't —, was another ingredient to corroborate the view that, despite a fundamentally indigenous institutional rupture, the 1964 military coup was a child of its time and historical circumstances.

This also includes criticism of the autonomist ideology, with its thirdworld touches, associated with the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) — the diplomatic platform set forth by both the left-wing Labor's Jango, but also of the conservative UDN's Jânio Quadros.

Having adopted, since at least the second Vargas government, an attitude of seeking autonomy in its foreign action, of relative independence in relation to the geopolitical and ideological dispute between Washington and Moscow, whose clearest doctrinal expression had been precisely the PEI, Castelo's Brazil took an undisguised side in the Cold War. Encouraged by the "theory of concentric circles" — the brainchild of Castelo's General Golbery do Couto e Silva — the foreign policy of the first phase of the Brazilian military regime proposed a "course correction" in relation not only to the PEI, but to the maze of guiding principles of Brazilian foreign action.

It was, in practice, a re-engineering of Brazilian diplomatic action produced by an institutional rupture in the domestic order. Even the sacrosanct principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, crystallized in Brazilian foreign policy at least since the end of the Paraguayan War (1870), was sacrificed on the altar of the policy of "interdependence" conceived by Golbery. Territorial borders were replaced by ideological ones as the organizing principle of the international system; in other words, the lack of affinity with the type of regime practiced in a foreign state could, at the limit, justify interference in its internal affairs and, eventually, encroachment on its sovereignty. The theory of concentric circles positioned Brazil firmly in the Western camp, to the detriment of other aspects of Brazil's international identity. The practical consequence was automatic alignment with the United States — the standard-bearer of the West and the "free world" in the view of the new tenants of the Planalto Palace.

The Dominican Republic was the theater where this alignment manifested itself most visibly and palpably. As a corollary, participation in the IAPF was seen as a possible contribution to the Vietnam War within the framework of the fight against communism on a global level: troops were lent to the Caribbean that would not be sent to Southeast Asia.

Invited repeatedly to lend blood and treasure to South Vietnam, the Castelo Branco government refused — much due to the resistance of the Minister of War, Costa e Silva —, demonstrating that the policy of alignment was running up against its limits. If the Vietnam War and the intervention in the Dominican Republic were umbilically linked in the decision-making process in Washington, they were, to a certain extent, also linked in Brasilia (Política Externa Independente, 1965; Lira Neto, 2004; Ricupero, 2017). Furthermore, there is reason to believe that, from the point of view of Castro's Planalto, the deference given to Brazil by LBJ's White House was a sign of recognition of the regional leadership exercised by the country and, not only that, of the expectations that were being placed on the role to be played by Brasilia, by more or less indirect delegation from Washington, in hemispheric affairs from then on.

The newly installed Brazilian military regime, brought to power by a coup d'état, took part in the intervention in the internal affairs of a partner of the Latin American community on the pretext of preventing a rupture in its institutional order and ensuring that, presumably, the Dominicans could choose their representatives freely, at the request of the United States, which, a loyal practitioner of a certain strain of *realpolitik*, had shown little appreciation for democratic continuity in Brazil just over a year earlier.

In the Washington of the Cold War, the countries of the developing world were reduced to pawns on a large geopolitical chessboard, to be moved, manipulated and sacrificed according to the interests of the "kings" on either side. That's how it was with Brazil in 1964, and that's how it was with the Dominican Republic in 1965.

At the beginning of May 1965, Lyndon Johnson dispatched his personal emissary, Averell Harriman — former Governor of New York and candidate for the Democratic nomination for the White House in 1952 and 1956 — on a Latin American tour to take the pulse of the region and mobilize support for his Dominican venture. In Brasilia, he had the mission of urging Castelo Branco to contribute troops to the

multinational force that was being set up in the OAS. In the audience he granted the diplomatic envoy at the Planalto Palace, Castelo endorsed the US intervention, but conditioned the deployment of the Brazilian military on the approval of a multilateral mandate and authorization by the National Congress.

By Johnson's decision, Brazil was invited to join the IAPF in a position of artificial protagonism: General Hugo Panasco Alvim was given nominal command of the IAPF as a reward for the Brazilian government's determination to send a battalion to the Caribbean. This meant that, on paper, the commander of the US troops, General Palmer, was subordinate to Alvim's authority, although this did not always correspond to the reality of the facts on the ground. In his memoirs, Palmer comments that Alvim often assumed more realistic attire than that of the "king" himself and, among other inconveniences, accused Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker — a celebrated "anti-communist hawk" in the upper echelons of US diplomacy — of being a total... *communist*! (Palmer, 1989; Schaffer, 2003; Cunha, 2003).

Although there was no shortage of praise for the operational competence, preparedness and professionalism demonstrated by the Brazilian battalion — naturally, more from their North American peers than from the Dominican constitutionalist rebels — Brazil's contribution to the IAPF lay more in the realm of political symbolism than in its military muscle. That said, FAIBRAS was entrusted with important tasks for the success of the multinational force's strategy, including taking over and guarding the National Palace a few days after landing in the Caribbean. It was also up to the Brazilian troops to isolate Ciudad Nueva — the prime area where the corridor established by the US troops began — from the reach of the Constitutionalist forces. Once Godoy's Provisional Government was in place, the troops joined the effort to maintain "law and order" in the capital's four-hundred-year-old streets. In total, four Brazilian soldiers fell on Dominican soil; eight of our men were wounded in combat.

It is worth noting that, in the face of the regime's closure, especially after the enactment of the regime-closing Institutional Act 2, the Johnson administration resisted exerting pressure on Brasilia so as not to

stimulate what would be perceived as a premature withdrawal of Brazilian troops from the Dominican Republic, contrary to a desideratum more central to US global strategy than civil and political liberties in Brazil. On his way out of the Hotel Glória, where he had given a speech to the Second Extraordinary Inter-American Conference, which was being held in Rio de Janeiro in November 1965, Castelo was stopped by a group of intellectuals opposed to the deployment of Brazilian military personnel in the Dominican Republic — among them, Glauber Rocha, Antônio Calado, Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, Carlos Heitor Cony and the forcefully-retired Ambassador Jayme Azevedo Rodrigues — who were also responsible for a public manifesto with the same content. The prevailing version is that Castelo would have been annoyed to receive the epithet "dictator" from the protesters, thus allowing himself to link his foreign policy platform to the nature of the new regime (Lira Neto, 2004).

The game of mirrors seems to be backed up by the admissions of some of the main characters involved. Once the Caribbean sands had been settled, Castelo Branco's first Foreign Minister, Ambassador Vasco Leitão da Cunha, betrays immense clarity and overwhelming sincerity:

The Brazilian government's opinion was that the United States had asked for help and that we should give it. Averell Harriman came to Brasilia to visit President Castelo Branco on behalf of President Johnson, and President Castelo invited him to have lunch with me, saying that he agreed to mobilize the Brazilian military. Johnson was very grateful to Brazil (Cunha, 2003, 249).

The prose of Lincoln Gordon, the US diplomatic representative in Brazil between 1961 and 1966, is just as loquacious: "some Brazilian diplomatic historians condemn this period as a simple and retrograde subordination to the United States. That was clearly not the view of the professionals in charge, led by Vasco Leitão da Cunha" (Gordon, 2001, 204).

It is curious that the Castelo Branco government, considered to be the least authoritarian and perhaps the most "institutional" of the five military-led governments — the one that genuinely demonstrated a commitment to restarting the democratic process (and was therefore the object of a "coup within a coup"), — was precisely the one that strayed furthest from the Brazilian diplomatic canon. It was up to the general-presidents who succeeded him, starting with Costa e Silva and Médici, who were responsible for closing down and brutalizing the regime, to organize "a course correction of the course correction" in the face of the excesses and lack of practical results of Castro's diplomacy.

Geisel's "Responsible Pragmatism," coinciding with the "slow, safe and gradual" opening, even recovered the foundations of the Jânio's and Jango's PEI and expanded them in its concrete action, possibly laying the foundations for the foreign policy guidelines that prevailed for most of the duration of the New Republic. Since then, the *universalist* paradigm, according to which, as an expression of autonomy and independence, automatic alignments are rejected in favor of a broad, plural and diversified foreign relationship, has been established as the preferred option for Brazilian foreign policy. Since then, the policy of automatic alignment with the United States (or with any other foreign power) has not re-emerged — at least not in a sustained way — in our diplomatic history, having reappeared in more or less brief spasms, leaving a trail of invariably disappointing results.

In the case of the Inter-American Peace Force, Brazil's involvement was less problematic because of the suggestion that it should take on a leading role in a US-initiated venture sanctioned by the OAS — which, in other circumstances, if it had legal backing and political legitimacy, could have been perfectly appropriate — than because it was embarking on an ill-founded operation, conceived with objectives that escape the mandate and purpose of multilateral organizations, in response to the immediate interests of another capital and in defiance of the sovereignty of a member of the Latin American and Caribbean community.

It should not be said that Brazil's foreign policy under Castelo Branco was maneuvered from overseas, and there is no credible evidence that

Brasilia received instructions from Washington or anyone else at the time. It is plausible to assume that the high degree of intelligence between the two capitals and Brazil's adherence to the Western camp were combined with the natural sympathies caused by the more or less explicit support of Johnson's staff for the institutional rupture that handed the military the keys to the Planalto Palace. It is true that the intention to follow Washington in the Caribbean crusade was not expressed in terms of shameless mimicry or vassalage in Brazilian prose, regularly identifying a coincidence of visions in the fight against communism and a shared notion of hemispheric security. In the logic of linking Brazil's international insertion to the United States, expectations of attracting credits and resources to finance development and balance national public accounts were also present, although this dimension was not voiced to support the deployment of troops abroad. After all, decision-making processes are usually vectorial products of visions and voices that test each other, overlap and, incidentally, come together.

Be that as it may, the result was that the episode relativized a genuinely proper reading of the national interest in favor of affirming loyalty to the United States — or at least increasing the overlap of interests between the two capitals, with the White House's views taking precedence over those of the Planalto. The practical implication, on a foreign level, of the decision to accede to the proposal in Averell Harriman's briefcase was the linking of our interests to those of others. The inglorious maxim of Juracy Magalhães, Castelo's emissary in Washington at the time — "what's good for the United States is good for Brazil" — would have been, even more than an *ode* to the United States or a *flight manual* for diplomatic action, a mere *caricature* of the philo-American attitude of Castelo, *Doctor* Vasco, Magalhães, Roberto Campos and other contemporaries, but not for that reason detached from the facts.

In other words, although those in power at the dawn of the military regime argued that it was in Brazil's national interest to join the US in the bipolar confrontation and actively combat what was perceived as the threat of international communism — and they are not denied the internal coherence of their reasoning or the gravitational force of the political circumstances of the time —, history and historiography have challenged

the premises behind that choice and laid bare the lack of concrete results for development, national security or Brazil's international insertion in that historical quadrature, vindicating, even well before re-democratization itself (1985), the triumph of the foreign policy paradigm antithetical to automatic alignment.

There is another important element that should not be overlooked: Brazil's specific weight in the Latin American and Caribbean context. It should be a permanent foreign policy guideline to avoid arousing the concerns of neighbors about the intentions of the largest country in Latin America and the Caribbean behind its good relations with Washington, so that they are never confused with a form of delegation between powers known as "sub-imperialism." A country committed to the ideology of integration, which has been the case with Brazil at least since the 1988 Federal Constitution — where the objective of creating a community of Latin American nations was enshrined in law — cannot be at the service of interests that are confabulated in other places, even though they may be legitimate, if they are not our own.

We had historically played a more praiseworthy role on the international stage, including alongside the United States, and we would once again make our effective contribution to peaceful coexistence between nations, to international law, to strengthening multilateralism as a channel for expressing the interests of states and to the good causes of humanity, in perfect correspondence with our genuine national interests, on other international stages and boards. This was not the case in the Dominican Republic in mid-1965.

The ceremony this time was held in the auditorium of the Eduardo Brito National Theater, flanking the Máximo Gomes Avenue, in central Santo Domingo. It was the opening of the 46th session of the OAS General Assembly, the third time in history that the Dominican Republic has hosted the hemispheric synod. On June 2, 2016, President Danilo Medina — only recently elected to a second term at the head of the Dominican Executive — delivered a harsh speech, far removed from his normally

restrained and conciliatory personal style, against the OAS intervention in the country 50 years earlier.

A big wig of the modern PRD, the party founded by Juan Bosch in 1939, Medina called for the approval of a condemnatory declaration by the OAS General Asembly, which, in the end, was done, despite the timid reaction of the US delegation. The text of the declaration does not mention the US by name — Medina has never been known for antagonizing Washington —, nor the other member states that assisted him in the adventure, nor does it go so far as to attribute objective responsibility to the Organization of American States for the violation of Dominican sovereignty, contenting itself with lamenting the loss of human life and expressing regret for the "actions that disrupted the process of constitutional restoration" (OAS, 2016). The declaration implies recognition by the OAS, framed by the diplomatic language possible, of the intrinsic mistake represented by the employment of the IAPF in May 1965. The depth of the scars that remain in the Dominican imagination about the foreign intervention sanctioned by the OAS had been exposed.

At the end of the day, around 300 communist sympathizers — some of whom had actually taken up arms — spread over a perimeter of less than fifteen square miles, playing a merely supporting role in the pro-Bosch rebel/constitutionalist ranks, were used as a justification for the deployment of 25,000 men from eight countries with confusing objectives, which ranged from restoring security and order to restoring democracy and, ultimately, choosing who should govern the Caribbean country until elections were held. They were also a pretext for tearing up international law in broad daylight and sacrificing the Rooseveltian Good Neighbor Policy that had been cultivated for decades. In addition, part of the luster of Brazil's international credentials was removed, as its external action has historically been characterized by avoiding unnecessary and unprovoked animosities in the region. Ambassador João Clemente Baena Soares, the only Brazilian to have headed the OAS — between 1984 and 1994 —, minced few words:

During the Castelo Branco government, Brazil invaded the Dominican Republic, in an action that was illegitimate under international law and, for us, of no advantage. Later, at the OAS, I had to face some resistance because of this antecedent in the Dominican Republic. This really had a negative impact on our foreign policy at the time. We had the idea of concentric circles, which was a pro-American idea. We only took part in the invasion because the Americans asked us to, but we received nothing in return. (D'Araujo et al., 2006, 47-48, emphasis added).

On the bicentenary of the long, complex and multifaceted relationship between Brazil and the United States, revisiting an episode that is not always vivid in our diplomatic memory invites a timely reflection on the past and the future. The commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, in 2024, offers an opportunity to remember that the bilateral rapprochement and the strengthening of dialogue between Brazil and the United States can be translated into an engine for economic growth in both countries, especially in Brazil, and for closer ties between friendly peoples. Strong relations between our countries can also generate a radiating force in favor of peace, stability, prosperity and democracy in the Americas — and in other parts of the world.

However, there are obvious limits. Given the persistent asymmetries of power, bilateral rapprochement cannot, under any circumstances, be converted into automatic alignment and subordination of Brasilia to Washington, otherwise Brazil's international position will be swallowed up by the scale of US power. It is vastly preferable to manage a rich, thriving relationship, full of promise and potential, sometimes tense and subject to occasional sparks, than to give up our achievements in terms of autonomy, independence, our own opinion and an uncompromising and resourceful attitude in our interactions with the other members of the community of nations.

What remains clear is that any form of automatic alignment, vassalage or subordination does not suit Brazil, in its continental dimensions,

benefiting from a privileged geographical location in the South Atlantic and far from the existential threats typical of geopolitically thornier regions. This observation is even more powerful in the current situation, in which, either by circumstance or by expression of will, the country is asserting itself as one of the dynamic and active poles of an increasingly multipolar international order.

On the eve of its sixtieth anniversary, Brazil's assistance in the US intervention in the Dominican Republic has left at least one cautionary lesson for future generations, who should not have the luxury of neglecting or forgetting it, for the sake of Brazil's place in international relations — and not least for the success of the strategic bilateral relationship between Brasilia and Washington.

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
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Appendices



Brazilian Army Colonel Carlos de Meira Mattos adjusts US General Bruce Palmer's right arm band bearing the three capital letters by which the Organization of American States is known (Source: United Press International)



Coincidentally, the then Vice-President had been Kennedy's representative at Bosch's inauguration in February 1963 (Source: Bettman/CORBIS)

The Foreign Policy of Brazilian Re-democratization (1985-1992): Tensions and Opportunities in the Relationship between Brazil and the United States Guilherme Stolle Paixão e Casarões1

The second half of the 1980s was decisive for Brazilian foreign policy. On the one hand, thanks to the process of democratic transition, there was a theoretical and normative expectation that Brazil's international orientation would move ever closer to Western values of political liberalism and economic openness. On the other hand, it was hoped that the new parameters of Brazilian democracy would guide the formulation of foreign policy, less centered on the insulated bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) and more open to the demands of civil society and interest groups. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the evolution of Brazil's global insertion in the years of re-democratization, between the arrival of a civilian government in 1985 and the impeachment of the first directly elected president in 1992. In particular, we will analyze the fundamental axis of our foreign policy: the relationship with the United States, which was gradually consolidating its position as the world's only pole of power.

Our hypothesis suggests that the combination of transformations in Brazilian society — re-democratization and the collapse of the nationaldevelopmentalist model — and structural changes in the international system with the end of the Cold War produced a new foreign policy guideline. The strategy that emerged at the turn of the 1980s, consolidated with the arrival of Fernando Collor de Mello to the presidency, can be called autonomy through modernization: in order to maintain its autonomous

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insertion in the world, Brazil needed to modernize its international agenda and its economic model. With the collapse of the bipolar order and the "disarray" of the Third World observed almost simultaneously, Americanism presented itself as the best alternative for alignment, even if Brazil did not pursue it, as in other times, in an unconditional or subservient manner. The United States — faced with new challenges such as the rise of drug trafficking, as well as the triumph of democracy and the free market — was also interested in getting closer to Brazil and recovering a relationship that had cooled in previous decades.

In this context, Itamaraty, linked to the declining national-developmentalist paradigm, was able to secure part of its leading role in the formulation of foreign policy, especially in defense of the principle of autonomy, which led to recurrent friction with the US. At the same time, the opening up of the international agenda to the demands of civil society and the economic redirection inspired by the Washington Consensus served as a counterpoint to the traditional bureaucratic guidelines, opening up new spaces for dialog with the US government through presidential diplomacy.

With bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States as the main focus, this text presents a discussion of the structural constraints imposed by US strategic interests, which have increasingly imposed themselves on Brazilian foreign action. The external debt, already a critical element since the beginning of the 1980s, and the informatics dispute, which worsened the relationship between the Brazilian and US governments from the second half of that decade, will form the main axis of the text. Finally, the process of regional integration, which culminated in the creation of MERCOSUR, is assessed vis-à-vis the hemispheric project of the Initiative for the Americas, as a partial alternative for overcoming the systemic constraints placed on Brazilian integration.

Brazil-United States relations in the context of the 1980s

The 1980s were marked by the progressive deterioration of relations between Brazil and the United States, which are the main systemic constraint imposed on Brazilian foreign policy. Driven by significant economic growth throughout the 1970s, the military governments, with the due backing of the Foreign Ministry, took Brazilian nationalism to the ultimate consequences, pursuing its military, nuclear, technological and economic emancipation. The United States was never exactly comfortable with this situation, increasingly viewing Brazil, a newly industrialized country (Sennes, 1998), as a potential competitor at the hemispheric and multilateral levels. This became particularly apparent from the start of the Reagan administration: even though the main focus of US foreign policy was to rescue the US's global economic hegemony, Brazil's regional role could not be ignored (Lima and Hirst, 1995).

The aim of Brazil's international insertion was to continue pursuing its political autonomy throughout the 1980s, strengthening its classic capabilities and diversifying partnerships, while remaining well away from the US radar. The United States, on the other hand, wanted to make Brazil a weaker country and therefore a less haughty and demanding interlocutor. Their fear was perhaps less of finding a candidate for regional leadership in the military sense, but above all of seeing a country like Brazil, if successful in its nuclear or technological policy, serving as an example of "dubious conduct" to neighboring nations (Fishlow, 1978). The relationship between the two countries therefore became a multidimensional quarrel, involving everything from the nuclear issue and human rights — which had marked the tense relations between the Carter and Geisel administrations — to foreign debt, information technology, patents and trade liberalization, which defined the Reagan administration's stance in opposition to Figueiredo or, later, Sarney.

Under pressure, Brazil has always seen its nationalist groups grow stronger, as was initially the case with information technology, foreign debt and even patents. For much of the 1980s, the country resisted US pressure as much as possible (Ferreira, 2006). Initially, Brazilian governments were able to resist not exactly on their own merits, but because the initial threats were excessively vague (Odell, 1993). Over the course of the decade, the United States adopted a strategy of persistence, based on constant threats, but rarely taken to their ultimate consequences; based mainly on exploiting the intersections between issues on the bilateral agenda as a way of guaranteeing the credibility of what was said;

aimed, in the end, at exhausting Brazil's possibilities of resistance from within, in other words, dividing the interested sectors and undermining the legitimacy of the government's own actions.

Foreign debt management and the breakdown of the national economic consensus

At the dawn of the New Republic, the foreign debt represented the main political obstacle to the Sarney government, both domestically and internationally. Internally, the macroeconomic instability resulting from the debt, translated into inflationary surges and fiscal disarray, frayed the national-developmentalist model that had sustained Brazilian growth over the previous decades. Externally, the economic crisis reduced the alternatives for autonomous international integration and, above all, further eroded relations with the United States, given the bilateral disagreements over the debt issue (Ferreira, 2006).

Throughout the Figueiredo government, the negotiation of the foreign debt involved two different strategies: attempts at agreements with public and private creditors, on the one hand, and agreements with the International Monetary Fund, on the other. None of the alternatives came to fruition, thanks to the growing economic difficulties the regime was going through, in a clear crisis of legitimacy (Ferreira, 1984). At the beginning of 1985, Brazil and other debtor countries were encouraged by the reduction in oil prices and the formalization of the Cartagena Consensus, after which the creditor countries became more sensitive to the politicization of the debt issue (Cerqueira, 2003). Nevertheless, the insufficient macroeconomic performance demonstrated in the last months of the Figueiredo government led the IMF not to recommend that banks and creditor countries formalize contracts with Brazil. This, by the way, was one of the issues raised in conversations between Tancredo and US Secretary of State George Shultz during the president-elect's visit to Washington in February 1985 (Lafer, 1985; Ricupero, 2010). The tone adopted by the American government, despite the positive signals initially given to the new civilian regime, was one of deep skepticism

regarding the fulfillment of the goals set by the fund and, consequently, the permanence of the agreements.

Faced with systemic vulnerabilities — translated into an intertwined combination of interests and threats from the IMF, creditor governments and commercial banks — the transition to the New Republic did not signal better times for Brazilian foreign policy. Furthermore, unlike the unpopular macroeconomic decisions taken in the last years of the military regime, the new government could not sustain a similar situation, otherwise it would jeopardize the democratic transition itself. The circumstances, of course, became even more delicate with Tancredo's death, after which certain political pacts had to be redone. This explains the stance adopted by the Sarney government, which was not to sign any agreement with the IMF that would impose draconian measures (Cerqueira, 2003).

At the same time, Brazil joined other Latin American debtors in the Cartagena group. At first, the multilateral attacks seemed to have an effect: in October 1985, during the annual meetings of the World Bank and the IMF in Seoul, US Treasury Secretary James Baker presented the so-called Program for Sustainable Growth, or Baker Plan, based on the understanding that maintaining the economic growth of debtor nations was important for dealing with the debt crisis (Fritsch, 1986; Cerqueira, 2003). The Baker Plan, however, failed to take off: many governments in the region objected to the vagueness of the terms offered by the Reagan administration, fearing their possible long-term effects (Batista, 1994). In addition, the small amount of money made available by the multilateral banks (IMF and World Bank) and the cold reaction of the private banks to the American initiative soon undermined the viability of the US plan (Fritsch, 1986).

Stunned by the shortage of reserves and the return of inflation, in February 1987 the Sarney government suspended payments to foreign commercial creditors. The moratorium deeply irritated the US: for more than six months, US government officials pressured Brazil with threats of economic retaliation, until conventional debt negotiations were resumed with the commercial banks (Moniz Bandeira, 1999).

Three factors contributed to making it easier for the United States to double down on Brazil. Firstly, in the face of the resounding failure of the Cruzado Plan and the fickleness of his economic team, Sarney had lost legitimacy and destroyed the political "center of gravity" of the ruling bloc. Secondly, the US benefited from the lack of domestic support for the moratorium: the "nationalist" solution, aimed at guaranteeing the "sovereign negotiation" of the debt, met with opposition from economic and political sectors, especially those that would be directly penalized by the government's so-called irresponsible measure, in the event, for example, of US retaliation. Thirdly, the very behavior of the Brazilian negotiators weighed in favor of the Reagan administration, since they were intimidated by the threat of credit reclassification by the institutions linked to banking supervision in the United States. The Brazilian government's declared willingness to resume interest payments in full as of January 1988 was the final blow to Brazil's bargaining power with regard to its foreign debt (Batista Jr., 1988).

The deep connections between the debt issue and the country's economic capacity are clear, as is the difficulty of finding a solution that tackles both dimensions at the same time. In the circumstances that led to the moratorium, the government's calculation seemed simple: if the debt is unpayable and has consumed the national reserves, suspending its payment would necessarily imply an evolution of macroeconomic indicators in the short term. In a world where systemic constraints weighed heavily on the backs of developing countries, however, this maneuver proved to be inadequate, especially insofar as it eroded relationships (such as with the United States) that were fundamental to our own economy. In fact, until Sarney left the presidency in March 1990, Brazil was in an undeclared moratorium

The issue of information technology in the context of Brazil-US relations

The area of technological development also appeared to be a bottleneck in relations between Brazil and the United States. Combining economic and strategic objectives, the development of the IT sector represented, at the same time, an important asset in the military project to turn Brazil into a power and, more forcefully, the final frontier of the universalist paradigm in terms of the search for an independent foreign policy, clearly marking the strategy of "autonomy through distance" (Fonseca Jr., 1998). At the same time, its deepening created increasingly numerous points of friction in the relationship with the United States, leading technology issues to represent the core of the economic dispute between the two countries, permeating not only the issue of information technology, but also pharmaceutical patents and intellectual property in general (Lima and Hirst, 1995).

It is true that until Figueiredo's departure in March 1985, the dispute between the two countries was not well defined. There was a series of diffuse threats from large foreign companies against Brazilian commercial practices, but they were too weak to mobilize the US government to impose concrete sanctions on the military or to justify changes in Brazil's conduct. It is worth highlighting, however, an inflection in the US government's policy towards Brazil, part of a broader set of transformations undertaken by Reagan at the start of his second term in 1985, in response to growing trade deficits. The computer industry was one of several to join the chorus of protectionist measures against other countries, notably Brazil (Odell, 1993).

In this sense, Brazil was not only an obvious target, but a politically fragile one. It therefore differed from other trade cases raised by the US, such as Japan and South Korea. The market reserve problem was treated less and less as a diplomatic issue and more as a commercial dispute, within whose rules there were legal mechanisms for pressure and possible coercive measures (Tapia, 1995). At first, the American reservations involved consultations with the GATT on the suitability of Brazilian laws in the field of information technology. However, on September 7, 1985, less than six months into the civilian regime, the Brazilian government was surprised by President Reagan's announcement of the opening of a formal investigation into Brazilian IT policy. If unfair trade practices on the part of Brazil were proven, the country would suffer trade retaliation (Vigevani, 1995).

The first reaction of the Brazilian authorities was to protest against the US decision. President Sarney himself came out publicly to repudiate Reagan's decision, claiming not only that the market reserve was legitimate — either because of Brazilian domestic legislation, which should not be questioned, or because of GATT's agreement with the infant industry argument — but also that the truculence of the US government's attitude could jeopardize Brazil's democratic transition process. The chorus was joined by businessmen, scientific and professional organizations and other members of the government, generating an apparent consensus between various sectors and organized interests in defense of the national IT policy. This unity was undermined as the dispute between the two countries took on clearer contours, and generic complaints and accusations gave way to tangible threats, such as against Brazilian exports (Tapia, 1995).

As the pressure on the Brazilian government increased, the differences between the nationalist forces, unconditional defenders of the IT Law, and the exporting sectors, fearful that their economic activity would be jeopardized by US retaliation, came to the surface. The differences came to light between President Sarney, who was opposed to legislative changes, and the newly appointed Chancellor Roberto de Abreu Sodré, who was an open supporter of changes to the IT Law, in line with the demands of the US government (Tapia, 1995).

Faced with growing friction within the national Executive, the Reagan administration was gaining ground in the bilateral dispute. By mid-1986, a third of Brazilian exports faced protectionist barriers imposed by Washington. On a political level, the US was attacking Brazil's positions on foreign debt and bilateral trade, even suggesting the replacement of the Brazilian representative at GATT, Paulo Nogueira Batista (Vigevani, 1995). Itamaraty, in particular, had three main reasons for opening a broad dialog with the Americans. Firstly, global relations between the two countries were more important than the preservation, under the terms imposed by the market reserve, of a specific sector. Secondly, it was essential to avoid antagonism towards the US in order to maintain open bilateral channels in the foreign debt negotiations, the failure of which was detrimental to the economy as a whole. Thirdly, the domestic and

international political situations were not favorable enough, especially in terms of economic issues, to sustain a policy aimed at a small sector, however strategic (Tapia, 1995).

Sarney's visit to Washington in September 1986 failed to improve bilateral relations or ease the tensions that had been growing since the previous year. Reagan received the Brazilian president with the rude warning that "no nation can expect to continue exporting freely to others if its own markets remain closed to foreign competition" (Moniz Bandeira, 1999, 158). Sarney reacted, in an article published by Foreign Affairs at the end of that year, accusing the United States of practicing arbitrary policies, lacking a clearer understanding of Latin American reality, with regard to Brazil and its neighbors: "I believe that there is no greater historical mistake on the part of the United States in its relationship with South America than the third-class treatment given to the continent, as if the whole region were just turf for multinational corporations" (Sarney, 1986).

From 1987 onwards, there was a change in President Sarney's stance, which was now more favorable to negotiating the dispute. However, this did not prevent Reagan from continuing to increase the pressure on Brazil, to the point of announcing, in November of that year, a package of unilateral sanctions, which involved an increase in tariffs on Brazilian exports to the US and a ban on imports of certain computer components into Brazil. The bilateral dispute was only resolved in June 1988, when the Brazilian government received an official communication from the Reagan administration stating that the conflict was over (Tapia, 1995).

George Bush and a Brazil in government transition

The election of George H. W. Bush in November 1988 represented an important turning point in relations between Brazil and the United States (Lima and Hirst, 1995). By replacing ideological premises with pragmatic motivations, Bush's foreign policy towards Latin America produced advances in the financial and commercial fields (Lowenthal, 1989). In the first case, there was an effort to get the countries of the region to find a medium and long-term solution to their foreign debt,

through the so-called Brady Plan (1989), which recognized the need for a more ostentatious official commitment on the part of the US to reduce the debt of Latin American nations (Devlin, 1990).

In the second case, in 1990 President Bush proposed the so-called Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, or Bush Plan, which envisaged the creation of a free trade zone "from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego." This initiative would enable the United States, in the context of difficulties in reducing its trade imbalance by opening up other markets, to increase exports to Latin American countries without the need to negotiate with their governments and make other concessions (Moniz Bandeira, 1999).

Even so, at the turn of the 1990s, still under the Sarney government, the only dispute with the United States that had been resolved was over information technology. On the issue of debt, Brazil was in a situation of "silent moratorium." In other areas, such as patents for pharmaceutical processes and products, the Americans continued to sanction the Brazilian government, even after the disputes over computers and software had been resolved (Cepaluni, 2006). To make matters worse, as global concerns about the environment and human rights increased, the Sarney government became the target of criticism over its Amazon policies and its treatment of indigenous populations. In fact, the pressure on Brazil was no longer just coming from the US government, but also from Congress and transnational civil society groups.

In his last months in office, the Sarney government took important steps to restore Brazil's credibility with international public opinion — and with the United States. It launched the ambitious Programa Nossa Natureza (Our Nature Program), created the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) and presented its candidacy to host a global ecological summit in 1992, in the wake of the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference. These initiatives, however, were unable to minimize Sarney's Brazil's "worldwide reputation as a trickster and forest arsonist," as Paulo Francis ironically put it (1989). On December 22, 1988, the murder of Chico Mendes, a rubber tapper and environmentalist with worldwide prestige, raised the tone of criticism of Brazil — including the thesis that the international community

had the "right to interfere" in Brazilian sovereignty in the face of the environmental crisis. This understanding became clear during the visit of a delegation of twenty US congressmen and public officials to Brazil in January 1989, when the young senator Al Gore declared: "contrary to what Brazilians believe, the Amazon is not their property, it belongs to all of us" (Casarões and Farias, 2022).

The gradual erosion of Brazil's international credibility was the backdrop to the fierce 1989 presidential election, the first to be held directly in 29 years. In response to this process, the main candidates, including Fernando Collor de Mello, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Leonel Brizola and Paulo Maluf, made international trips during the campaign (Casarões, 2022). Collor, in particular, organized his candidacy around new global issues — ecology, human rights and the indigenous question — as a way of bringing Brazil closer to the first world agenda at the end of the Cold War. In order to stand out from the other contenders, mainly on the right wing, Collor also embraced the neoliberal rhetoric of the Washington Consensus, 2 moving away from the fragile national-developmentalist pact in force (Hirst and Pinheiro, 1995). These commitments were reiterated during Collor's trip to the US as president-elect in January 1990, when he met with businessmen and George Bush and his economic team (Casarões, 2015).

Brazil-United States relations in the Collor government

At least on a discursive level, the Brazilian international agenda inaugurated by the Collor government was oriented around three main lines of action: (1) adapting the country to the new themes and dynamics of the "new" international order; (2) building a positive agenda with the United States, in contrast to the tense relations observed over the last few governments; and (3) an effort to de-characterize Brazil as a thirdworld country (Hirst and Pinheiro, 1995). Nevertheless, a comprehensive

² It was a prescription developed by John Williamson at the Institute for International Economics, aimed at monetary stabilization and the full re-establishment of market laws. According to Moniz Bandeira, the Washington Consensus "was summed up in the recommendation that the state withdraw from the economy, both as an entrepreneur and as a regulator of domestic and international transactions, so that all of Latin America would submit to market forces, which would later make possible the formation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) [...]" (1999, 168).

analysis of the Collor government, whose mandate was interrupted by an impeachment process in September 1992, reveals nuances in Brazil's international performance. I argue that, throughout this period, Brazil pursued a strategy of autonomy through modernization (Casarões, 2015). On the one hand, this involved rebuilding bilateral relations with Washington, incorporating elements of economic and foreign policy modernization. On the other hand, Brazil strengthened the process of regional integration, embracing MERCOSUR — officially launched at the end of March 1991 — as the mechanism for regional autonomy, translated into the idea of competitive integration.

The issue of debt was given absolute priority by the new government. Constrained by the quasi-moratorium situation and unable to promote an improvement in economic indicators, Collor quickly adhered to the logic of the Brady Plan and began to renegotiate the debt under the new framework. However, while the Collor Plan did not have the desired effects, the Brazilian government pledged not to resume payment of the foreign debt (Moreira, 2001). Minister Zélia Cardoso de Mello's team spent six months traveling to the US and negotiating with US authorities, multilateral bank leaders and private creditors, until Brazil presented a proposal to pay interest and arrears in October 1990. But the intransigence of the private banks, coupled with the Bush administration's lack of interest in improving the political conditions of the Collor government's position, exposed the weaknesses of the Brazilian economic situation and culminated in Zélia's resignation in May 1991 (Bresser-Pereira, 1991). The minister was replaced by the then Brazilian ambassador to the US, Marcílio Marques Moreira, signaling the Collor government's willingness to make concessions to public and private creditors from then on (Freitas, 1991).

The setbacks of the debt renegotiation meant that the Collor government received other US initiatives with more skepticism. One of these was the Washington Consensus. Although the US neoliberal prescription was used as the basis for a set of administrative and economic reforms that Collor saw as necessary, it was relativized in the face of Brazilian specificities, especially during Zélia Cardoso de Mello's period in charge of the economy. The same happened with the

ambitious US proposal for hemispheric free trade. Following the trend of his predecessors, Collor opted for the integration of the Southern Cone as a counterpoint to the regionalism proposed by Washington. The signing of the 4+1 agreement between the members of what would become MERCOSUR demonstrates the Brazilian government's desire to safeguard the interests of the subcontinent in the face of a so-called "positive" US agenda for the region (Amorim, 2009).

The meaning of foreign policy in its symbolic dimension — presidential trips, speeches, preferred partners — was clearly oriented towards the First World and Latin American partners, many of whom were going through political and economic processes similar to ours. However, when it came to long-term actions that were central to Brazil's modernization agenda, the general guideline was resistance. Collor gave in on the issues of patents and information technology, for example, in an attempt to delay the debt negotiations, which were much more stressful and costly for the country. He gave in on his willingness to negotiate a general framework for trade cooperation with the United States under the terms of the Bush Plan, to ensure the consolidation and viability of MERCOSUR. It gave in punctually on the non-proliferation agenda in order to maintain the central guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy — non-intervention, sovereignty and universalism.

Brazil's concessions, especially to the United States, were insufficient. In the context of asserting its hegemonic power, the Bush administration continued to put pressure on the Brazilian authorities, including in areas where Brazil had already made important overtures, but which depended on legislative authorization (such as patents) or where the timing of the process was not entirely within the country's control, especially when it involved triangular negotiations (such as debt). When the most painful concessions began to appear, the President's dissatisfaction was converted into a contestatory, third-world discourse. The new rhetoric, tributary to the universalism of other times, worked as a compensatory mechanism for what Brazil was giving up, especially in the economic area. On the integration front, Itamaraty, duly backed by the president, strove to keep MERCOSUR together, in the face of Argentina's anxiety about joining the NAFTA negotiations (Vigevani and Veiga, 1991; Mello, 2002).

The Collor government's project of *autonomy through modernization*, however, faced growing obstacles. If at first they were predominantly external, they were now internal. By the end of 1991, the "national reconstruction" proposed by the President already seemed impossible. Anticipating the seriousness of the political crisis, the President still tried to sophisticate his rhetoric, embracing the concept of social-liberalism, which he publicized internationally in his UN speech and domestically in mass-circulation newspapers: a way of challenging the current order without confronting it, or of adapting to the dominant ideology by synthesizing it to the national reality (Merquior, 1987).

But the worsening of the crisis between the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992 did not allow Collor to go far with his new ideology. As soon as he could, he transferred his government's prerogatives and leading role to figures who, gathered in his ministry, came to be called "notables." The impact that the establishment of this ministry of notables had on foreign policy was significant. By giving Itamaraty a leading role in formulating Brazil's international orientation, the principle of *autonomy through modernization* reached its peak. The circumstances were favorable: Rio-92 guaranteed, at least during the conference, a central role for Brazil as a promoter of dialogue, building bridges between North and South, by its very nature. By embracing ecology not just defensively, but propositively, the country was contributing more to the construction of a new order than by sending frigates to the Persian Gulf, a US request that Collor was right to refuse.

Closing remarks

The melancholic end of the Collor administration — a process that dragged on from September 1992, when the President was removed from office, until his resignation at the end of December — temporarily took the spotlight off international issues involving Brazil. The political crisis in which the country found itself caused an important moment of introspection, in which not only the objectives of foreign policy were rethought, in the light of the experience of the two and a half years of President Collor de Mello, but also its means. With regard to the

objectives, the risks of any kind of unilateral adherence to the demands of the United States became clear, even when such acts seemed to defuse the relationship and guarantee long-term gains. In the end, this gamble proved to be dangerous, confirming more than ever the realist maxim that "states have no friends, only interests."

The sympathy with which the Bush administration treated the Collor administration, even before he took office and during its first few months, quickly waned, giving way to a series of pressures — channeled in the US, but coming from creditor banks, the pharmaceutical industry, international financial organizations, environmentalists or businesspeople — that quickly undermined Brazil's ability to resist an agenda that was being imposed on it from above. It should not be forgotten that Brazil was already at the center of international criticism on several simultaneous fronts during the 1980s, from debt to ecology, from patents to minority rights, always seeking to resist US attacks on the interests of strategic sectors of the national economy.

Little by little, however, Brazil discovered interstices in which to act, becoming, at the end of the process, an incipient rule-maker rather than a thwarted rule-taker. By completing and deepening regional integration, despite resistance from Argentina and the United States — both of which, for different reasons, wanted to dilute the initiative, which had acquired a strong political character in Brazil — the country took important steps towards competitive integration, an idea that lay at the origins of the modernization discourse, and which was never dissociated from it. Remodelled, the concept of autonomy through modernization will take on new colors — integration, participation — which ultimately do not represent rupture, but evolution from the basic assumptions established there.

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The Image of American Think Tanks about Brazil in the Lula 1 and 2 Governments: Homogeneity and Low Representation of the Country about Itself

Tatiana Teixeira¹

Introduction

Trying to follow relations between Brazil and the United States exclusively through traditional political and diplomatic channels will give us a very limited understanding and only partial explanations of this historic bilateral dynamic and the interests involved in it. Based on this first premise, this chapter will present Brazil from the perspective of some of the main US think tanks (TTs) that research the country. A second premise, which justifies the choice of these institutes as the object of analysis, is their relevance as a tool for the production and dissemination of ideas in the domestic and foreign spheres of US politics, a system as populous as it is entropic with agents eager to exert some kind of influence.

This chapter investigates the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Inter-American Dialogue (now known as The Dialogue) and the Brazil Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, between 2003 and 2010, corresponding to the two terms of then President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Our aim is to map the content produced by these institutions on Brazil in order to

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answer the questions: is there a Brazil "of" the think tanks? Is there a multiplicity of visions about the country and variety in the institutional representativeness of the researchers? Considering that, when acting, the specialist in these research centers is immersed in a network of pre-existing values and beliefs and acts in a specific epistemic community, it is possible to expect some homogeneity in this narrative.

This investigation is motivated by the idea that a better understanding of a type of institution that may be influencing (the projection of) Brazil's image and reputation abroad may be useful. This process takes place through the research and information they produce and publish, which is useful to their specific audience: policy makers, congressmen, opinion formers, the press, researchers, grassroots movements.

As has already been shown (Teixeira, 2007; 2015), US TTs experts often create and disseminate new frames and concepts that spread, become naturalized and consolidated in the United States and in the main international organizations. As Stone (2001, 131) points out, many policy institutes contribute to establishing the "dominant paradigms" that are adopted by policy-makers. This knowledge about the work and space occupied by these institutes can be one of the ways to recognize and deconstruct concepts (and their origins) that are disseminated according to specific logics, as happens with the creation of names and expressions that are widely used in the political field. As Amorim (2011, 270) states, "[...] in a world of not fully defined contours, [...] diffuse concepts are used to impose conceptions and interests."

This increases the relevance of our starting point: the beginning of the Lula administration (2003). At that time, Brazilian foreign policy (BFP) issues converged with the domestic agenda in many areas, being used by the government to project the image of a country in transformation and with the necessary conditions to be seen as a global player and a legitimate, reliable, mature and relevant interlocutor on the international stage. Therefore, the beginning of a window of opportunity resulting from a combination of exogenous and endogenous factors is taken into account (Brasil, n.d.; Cervo, 2008; Cervo and Bueno, 2008; Marques, 2005; Roett, 2011). In the midst of a change in the BFP's profile, which

fostered and, at the same time, reflected this momentum, there followed greater insertion and visibility of the country abroad, which increased the interest of selected think tanks in the country.

If we assume that TTs are also part of the strategies for preserving and expanding the power of hegemonic structures² (Guimarães, 1999) and that they have been increasingly influenced by the interests of donors and politicians, as discussed in the literature (Abelson, 2006; 2014; Stone, 2004), what can their analysis of Brazil reveal? Along the same lines, it is believed that the growing interest of American think tanks in Brazil could be one of the valid indicators of an increase in the US government's attention to the country's growing global presence and regional influence. The same premise applies in the opposite direction, with a greater lack of interest in Brazil on the part of these TTs being a sign of a shift in Washington's attention.

It is also believed that the change in Brazil's regional and international profile — which began under Fernando Henrique Cardoso and expanded and diversified under Lula (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007) — has increased the need to deepen bilateral knowledge and dialog in order to review discursive structures with a rhetorical effect on "inattention," "attention deficit," "historical and mutual misperceptions," "mutual incomprehension," "frustrated expectations," "new beginnings," "waiting time," "inconsistency of agendas," "misunderstandings and mismatches," among other expressions that are more repeated than renewed (Moniz Bandeira, 2004; Crandall, 2011; Hakim, 2010; 2014; Hirst, 2004; Patriota, 2008; 2009; Pecequilo, 2012; Sotero, 2002; 2010).

Of a qualitative nature, this is a bibliographical and documentary study, enriched with field research in the US and 43 interviews with experts in think tanks and in Brazil, as well as with authorities, carried out during my doctoral internship — many of them anonymously. Primary sources include the material released by these policy institutes — such

² Among the "strategies of domination," Guimarães (1999, 31-39) mentions the expansion of international agencies, the co-opting of new players, the fragmentation of smaller states, the generation of ideologies and the control of this process, the formation of elites in peripheral countries and the use of the mass media for ideological dissemination.

as annual and task force reports and policy briefs — and their activities, such as conferences and participation in congressional hearings.

Although our thematic focus is Brazil, when studying bilateral ties, it is inevitable to consider Latin America (LA). After all, Brazil is still (to a large extent, but not only) treated collectively in this context (also in the context of the "Americas," "South America" and "Southern Cone"), rather than as an individual actor. In anticipation of what will be discussed, we suggest:

- 1) considering the capillarity of power, governments and TTs are interrelated, and it is possible to establish the relationship of influence between the work of these institutes and the vision developed in a given administration about Brazil;
- 2) US TTs may have become more engaged in studies on Brazil when the country began to act more as a power and regional leader in South America, a historic US zone of influence;
- 3) the specific belief system to which TTs and their specialists belong, in the terms of American Exceptionalism (Pecequilo, 2003; Teixeira, 2007), determines values, mindsets, perceptions and preconceptions beforehand, affecting their intellectual production about Brazil;
- 4) in relation to Brazil, these TTs would not exert continuous pressure/influence on US decision-makers, since Brazil is not seen as a threat to national security (in military terms), but rather function more reactively (when called upon), as agents informing the debate, soft power tools for maintaining and guaranteeing the influence of the US government at a lower and less aggressive cost, as well as having the function of networking above all, with Brazilian elites to install, disseminate and crystallize policies and ideologies.

In addition to the Introduction and Conclusion, this chapter has three more sections. The first gives a brief description of US TTs. The next section presents the institutes chosen and, in the third, Brazil " of" the think tanks.

Think tanks, neutrality and invented tradition

The ever-increasing intersection between the various actors that populate US politics accentuates the recurring attempt to delimit think tanks conceptually, a methodological dilemma incorporated into the nature of these institutes per se and which is not random. As Medvetz (verbal information)³ states, "the question of naming and being named is, in itself, a question of identity and a dispute over power." This populous and dynamic political environment includes NGOs, universities and lobbies, accentuating what Donald Abelson (verbal information)⁴ describes as the "blurring effect," and Tom Medvetz (2008, 2012) and James McGann (verbal information)⁵ as "hybridity."

One of the alternatives to reduce this imprecision seems to be to investigate these actors' *modus operandi* and apply a kind of negative categorization in relation to think tanks (Teixeira, 2013). With the observation of what works best in the dispute for more influence, the tendency has been towards an interchangeable process, with each actor seeking to assimilate traits from the other in search of effectiveness (Teixeira, 2007, 121-122).

For Abelson (verbal information),⁶ the most important and defining aspect of a think tank is its essential commitment to some kind of public policy study, produced and disseminated to inform and influence governments and public opinion on important domestic and international issues. The ability to innovate and the priority given to analyses with medium and long-term perspectives aimed at political practice (and not as research confined to academia), while maintaining independence, are also conditions indicated in the literature and in different interviews as elements for recognizing a think tank and even justifying its existence. It should be noted that mention of these aspects is often accompanied

³ Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [1:19'10"]. Washington, D.C., Dec. 27, 2012. At the time: professor at the University of California, San Diego.

⁴ Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [52'10"]. Skype, Dec. 14, 2012. At the time: professor at Western University, Canada, and director of the Canada-U.S. Institute and the Center for American Studies.

⁵ Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [28'20"]. Philadelphia, Dec. 20, 2012. At the time: senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, director of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program and deputy director of the International Relations Program (UPenn).

⁶ Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [52'10"]. Skype, Dec. 14, 2012.

by a discussion about their real margin of autonomy, since they depend on donors and contracts of various kinds and agendas and must be accountable to them.

The most common is short-term financial support, which leads institutes to develop projects that can attract resources in this direction (Troy, 2012). In general, the aim is to capture the topic of the moment and list possible themes under this umbrella. This is called "study money" (Evan Ellis, verbal information). This implies that topics that are not on Washington's immediate radar may lose space in these institutes, or will be related to the issues on the agenda — sometimes in a politicized and artificial way.

Characteristic of institutes such as Brookings and CFR (of the first wave), the preference for academic credentials has largely contributed to the perception of TTs as politically neutral and objective institutions (Abelson, 2002). Although "reputation" is their most important "asset" and the defense of "private interests" is characteristic of lobbies, PACs and pressure groups, as McGann (2014) states, independence, neutrality and analytical objectivity should not be taken for granted when it comes to TTs. Neither should ballast, density and quality of analysis.

This "invented tradition" set the course for their definition in general and how they should operate from then on, consolidating the place of these institutes as one of the key pieces in the American political machinery. The expression is used in the terms of Hobsbawm (2000, 1, 4), who, by "invented tradition," means a set of organized and openly or tacitly accepted practices of a ritualistic and symbolic nature. Through a continuous "process of formalization and ritualization," the author explains, values and norms of behavior are assimilated through repetition. Although many think tanks still try to be guided by this "commitment" to neutrality instituted at that founding moment, this view is increasingly nostalgic and not so representative, given the transformations undergone after the 1970s and the accentuated tendency towards politicization in their forms of action (Troy, 2012).

⁷ Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [1:45'45"]. Washington, D.C., Dec. 7, 2012. At the time: associate professor at the Strategic Studies Institute (United States Army War College).

Analyzed think tanks

The Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Inter-American Dialogue and the Brazil Institute (Wilson Center) were selected from among the 50 institutes considered to be the most important in the US, based on different editions of the Global Go-To Think Tanks ranking, drawn up by James McGann (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012). Those chosen are those that, from 2003 to 2010, presented a program or initiative on Brazil and/or Latin America — provided that, in this case, Brazil was a separate category, or with updated material. As an additional criterion, an exploratory search of the sites showed that they were the most active in terms of constant publications and content, organization of events, presence in the press, interaction with Brazilian institutions and scholars and were already carrying out research dedicated to Brazil and/or Brazil-US relations. In the interviews carried out in the US, these same institutes also appeared as the most mentioned by the interviewees, as well as the individual researchers who are part of them, with cross-mentions. Another criterion was the recognition by scholars of the subject of the excellence of the quality of the material produced. Using more than one criterion was an attempt to minimize the ephemeral aspect that characterizes the duration of many of the projects at these institutes. This duration will be related to political and thematic interests, which will influence the flow of resources for many of these projects. We therefore investigated:

- 1) Brookings Institution and its Latin American Initiative, created in 2008 as part of the Foreign Policy Research Program. It produces material on an ongoing basis, although not intensively, and organizes events on Brazil;
- 2) Council on Foreign Relations and its Global Brazil Initiative, created in 2009 and now defunct. It was part of the Latin American Studies Program and was responsible for a report that had a major impact on the Brazilian elite and press, "Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations," in 2011;
- 3) Inter-American Dialogue and its Program on Brazil and the Southern Cone;

4) Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and its Brazil Institute, created in 2006 as part of the Latin American Program.

In a message sent from the Embassy of Brazil in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomat Rubens Barbosa (2003) presents programs and researchers specialized in Latin America working at the main US TTs. He explains that these institutes usually attract "smaller and less stellar audiences," with the exception of the CFR, the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and the Wilson Center, which cover several areas (thematic and regional) and have a larger infrastructure, budget and income. Barbosa (2003) reports that, except in the cases mentioned, the major TTs do not usually have specific regional programs, and "there are no regional programs for the continent among the main conservative centers." In an article from the same period, Sotero (2002, 137) corroborates these assessments and adds that, when they do exist, these programs are "very small and temporary." In this group, the author includes organizations with a more ideologically defined profile, such as the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute, in which "the debate on regional issues depends on the presence of individuals who are personally interested in Latin America." In addition to the Dialogue, the Wilson Center and Brookings, Sotero (2002, 136) mentions the regional programs of CSIS and the Institute for International Economics.

Brazilianists, such as Wayne Selcher, Marshall Eakin, Albert Fishlow, Thomas Skidmore and Kenneth Maxwell (ex-CFR), are rare in think tanks, where Riordan Roett (SAIS and CFR) and Peter Hakim (mainly Dialogue, but also CFR) are the most recurrent voices talking about Brazil. In general, what is more common are Latin Americanists, such as Abraham Lowenthal (Brookings, Pacific Council, Dialogue and Wilson Center), Johanna Mendelson Forman (CSIS), Julia Sweig (ex-CFR), or Howard Wiarda (ex-CSIS, ex-AEI and ex-Wilson Center), who, during (or from) a certain period, add Brazil to their main research theme — such as Central America, Cuba, Mexico, democracy, development and poverty.

Brookings Institution

Like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (created in 1910) and the CFR (1921), Brookings (1927) — the union of the Institute for Government Research (1916), the Institute for Economics (1922) and the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government — dates back to the time when the aim of these institutions was allegedly to produce quality academic research to educate and guide government and society, rather than the direct and incisive pursuit of political influence.

According to Ted Piccone (verbal information),⁸ although there is no specialist dedicated exclusively to Brazil, the country is studied in different programs at the institution. He claims that it is difficult to find qualified researchers on the subject who are available to join Brookings. Launched in 2008, the Latin America Initiative began as a joint project between the Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development Programs because, according to Piccone (verbal information):⁹

[...] we felt that it was important that these experts on the economic side, as well as on the political and security sides, work together to analyze, to understand Latin America. And our initial idea, which still works in a lot of cases, was to really try to understand the current developments in Latin America and bring that data to Washington, as opposed to a kind of top-down perspective that only looks at Latin America from a Washington point of view. So we try to look at Latin America from a Latin American point of view and integrate that into the decision-making process here.

Even though Brookings is one of the think tanks that maintains a relatively constant activity on Brazil, the country occupies a very small part of the institution's activity. During the period evaluated, there was no group on Brazil. The country is a "topic" and has been the subject of events (four specific and one on Latin America), a book (Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, 2009), various publications (two specific and one on

⁸ Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [31'40"]. Washington, D.C., Nov. 20, 2012. At the time: senior fellow at the International Order and Strategy Project and the Latin America Initiative.

⁹ Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [31'40"]. Washington, D.C., Nov. 20, 2012.

inter-American partnership) and specific reports (one on Latin America and two on global challenges). It is often cited, unsurprisingly, in the "BRICS" category and in the Latin America Initiative and, eventually, in the areas of American Foreign Policy and Economic Development, also in relation to other "developing countries," or "emerging markets," and not as an individual actor (Teixeira, 2011). Even so, Piccone (verbal information)¹⁰ sees "a lot of interest in Brazil in Washington" and adds that "a lot of this is happening under the radar." This interest, he explains, would be diffused in other issues, such as climate change, global governance, democracy, or the future of global cooperation — especially in areas such as piracy, maritime and food security, or the Arctic, in which the country would be a "key player."

Council on Foreign Relations

Like Brookings, the CFR defined the nature of its mission as being non-partisan, "without an institutional position" on the issues it addressed (CFR, 2008, 4), with the aim of educating public opinion and mobilizing it towards a greater internationalism in American foreign policy (Parmar, 2004, 37; Teixeira, 2007; 2011; Wiarda, 2010, 35). Since 1921, when it was founded by businessmen, bankers and lawyers (CFR, 1999, 5), several well-known figures in American politics have passed through the CFR, including former presidents, secretaries and diplomats, as well as names related to the elite of their respective fields in academia, the world of finance, or the press (Parmar, 2004; Wiarda, 2010, 35).

Brazil appears in one of the Council's groups, which may suggest a political-ideological narrowness in the representation of Brazilians and, perhaps, in the perceptions and possible native contributions on ways of thinking about Brazil. From 2001 to 2009, at least, the former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Vice-President Emeritus of the Brazilian Center for International Relations (Cebri), Luiz Felipe Lampreia, was a member of the International Advisory Board, formed in 1995 by the Council's board of directors (CFR, 2001, 83; 2002, 83; 2003, 90; 2004, 67; 2005, 67; 2006, 67; 2007, 74; 2008, 73; 2009, 19). From

¹⁰ Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [31'40"]. Washington, D.C., Nov. 20, 2012.

different countries, its members met annually, together with the CFR's board of directors, to help strengthen ties with foreign institutions and exchange opinions on international issues related to US foreign policy interests.

Founded in 2012 under the CFR's International Institutions and Global Governance Program and with funding from the Robina Foundation, the Council of the Councils (CoC) brings together each year some of the most prominent think tanks from the most influential countries in each region (CFR, 2013, 69; 2014, 72; 2015, 73). The aim of these regional conferences is to "facilitate dialog between influential opinion makers" in emerging and core countries, in order to "inject the conclusions of their deliberations into the high-level Foreign Policy circles of member countries." Although it is outside our time frame, it is worth noting that Brazil has been represented by the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) since its inception.

Occasionally, events at the CFR are used as a showcase, a calling card and/or a platform by Brazilian authorities, such as Presidents Fernando Henrique and Lula.

As described in the 1999 annual report (CFR, 1999, 16), the Council's Studies Department (David Rockefeller Studies Program, as of 2007) is seen as the institution's think tank, home to its sixteen programs, including the Latin America Studies Program, which has been active since 1989 with projects on Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, globalization and democracy. According to Barbosa (2003), the program works together with Latin American institutions such as Cebri. From 1989 to 2004, the program was directed by Brazilianist Kenneth Maxwell. During his tenure, the group on Brazil was created in 2001 and published the "Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S. Policy toward Brazil" (Robert and Maxwell, 2001). In the document, the authors defend the country's potential and insist that the George W. Bush administration should pay more attention to bilateral relations with Brazil.

The Global Brazil Initiative only came into being in February 2009. It remained active until January 2015, led by Julia Sweig. During its existence, it published the report Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations

(CFR, 2011), which had a major impact on Brazil (Eichenberg, 2011; O Globo, 2011). In general, the tone was celebratory among politicians and academics, above all because of the recommendation that Washington officially and clearly support Brazil's candidacy for a seat on the United Nations Security Council. There are no details or justification for the end of the Initiative on the CFR website or in the annual reports. It is possible that the change in Brazil's domestic scenario and the downturn in the economy led to a decrease in interest in the country. At the same time — and perhaps because of this — the resources that sustained the Initiative may not have been renewed, and "creating a sustainable initiative, of course, requires both expertise dedicated to the project and sufficient funding to maintain the effort over time" (Selee, 2013, 46).

Inter-American Dialogue

Created in 1982 as an "ad hoc conference of leaders from throughout the hemisphere" (IAD, 2015, 4), Dialogue describes itself as the first center for political analysis dedicated to the Western Hemisphere (IAD, 1998, 1), which is bipartisan and remains the only think tank exclusively dedicated to the region. While Peter Hakim (verbal information), 11 one of the most prolific authors on Brazil in this universe, considers Dialogue to be a think tank — because it "tries to influence" — Shifter (verbal information) 12 says it is more of an "action tank," which would be "a question of emphasis."

In his texts (a total of eight selected), in highlighting the different paths taken by both diplomacies, Hakim resorts to ambiguity. At times, Brazil's more autonomous behavior is seen in a positive and even expected light, given the country's resources; at others, in a negative light, as an attempt to take over Washington's leadership, or as a potential threat to American interests, especially in the Southern Cone. Some of the interviewees and authors investigated for this research took the same line. At the same time as Brazil's progress is welcomed, especially in an

¹¹ Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [1:34'22"]. Washington, D.C., Nov. 13, 2012. President of the Dialogue (1993-2010).

¹² Interview with the author. 1 WAV file [54'42"]. Washington, D.C., Nov. 14, 2012. At the time: president of the Dialogue.

environment of cooperation with the US and as a regional ally to help maintain stability and predictability of political actions in the region, there is a perception that the country "isn't ready," "doesn't know what it wants," and that an excessively autonomous (or "partisan"/"ideologized") Brazilian foreign policy can be seen as unrealistic, disconnected from reality, arrogant and confrontational to the United States. In this last aspect, which refers to the constructed concept of an "anti-American" sentiment, both Brazilians and Americans adhere to it. In fact, no consistent rhetorical evidence of confrontation or threat to the US was found in the speeches of the main Brazilian authorities during the period analyzed.

As human, intellectual and political capital, the Dialogue highlighted at the time that 17 of its members were former Presidents of countries in the region, including Fernando Henrique Cardoso, an emeritus member of the board of directors. For Cardoso (1994, 97), the Dialogue is a "forum that has always been able to recognize the importance of Latin America for the foreign relations of this great country [USA]." When he left the Planalto Palace in 2003, Fernando Henrique became co-chair of the board of directors of the think tank, of which he is one of the founding members (IAD, 2003, 1).

Like the Wilson Center, its policy programs tend to reflect, with a few exceptions, the thematic biases and priorities of US foreign policy — security, trade, Nafta, drug trafficking — and its country programs, the political priorities of the State Department: Central America, Colombia and Cuba. According to Wiarda (2008; 2010), smaller organizations can be influential and make a difference in specific issues or areas. In this sense, the strategy for smaller think tanks, or for those that are not located in Washington, is to seek to influence those who influence politicians. As a smaller institute specializing in a region, the Dialogue seems to gain relevance when considering specific events and/or themes that are the institute's specialty, such as remittances and migration.

Wilson Center

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was created by the United States Congress on October 24, 1968 (PL. 90-637), following the passage of bill S. 3174 (USA, 1968). Its operation is the result of a public-private partnership. As the then Vice President of Programs and founding director of the Mexico Institute, Andrew Selee (2013, 25), explains, "the Wilson Center, which is not only a think tank but also a presidential memorial to Woodrow Wilson, steadfastly avoids controversial issues that could put its status as a federal trust in jeopardy." In it, Presidents Lula and Dilma Rousseff have already been honored with the institution's Public Service Award — on September 21, 2009 and September 20, 2011, respectively (Wilson Center, 2009-2010, 4; 2011-2013, 9-10). It is the only institution in the capital with an institute dedicated solely to Brazil, a specificity highlighted by the think tank itself in its various reports and documents (Wilson Center, 2008, 1; 2015, 58). The institute was headed by a Brazilian, journalist Paulo Sotero, who was a correspondent for *Estado de S. Paulo* in Washington from 1989 to 2006.

The history of the Brazil Institute dates back to 1999, on the initiative of the then Brazilian ambassador to the US, Rubens Barbosa, as a "strategy to increase [Brazil's] lack of visibility in Washington" (Sotero, 2002, 138), from a national perspective. The diplomat managed to bring together Brazilian companies interested in the American market to invest, together with the government, in a program about the country at the Wilson Center, a specialized institute at Georgetown University (or Columbia University) and the Brazil Information Center (Sotero, 1999; 2002, 138). In 2000, Brazil @ The Wilson Center was created, with support and financial resources from the Embassy of Brazil, the Brazilian Ministry of Culture and private partners ADM, ChevronTexaco, Cargill, FMC and GE Foundation in the 2003-2004 biennium (Wilson Center, 2003-2004). The project survived and was transformed into the Brazil Institute in 2006, "in recognition of Brazil's growing international influence and the importance of strong relations between the United States and Brazil," in the words of the then president of the WWC, Lee H. Hamilton (Wilson Center, 2006-2007, 1).

Brazil "of" the think tanks

What interviews, visits to think tanks and analysis of primary sources have revealed is the existence of a relatively homogeneous group, with very similar credentials and interests, talking about Brazil in the programs investigated. In this exchange, or rather, in this arena of interlocution provided by the American TTs to outsiders, there seems to be a certain Brazil presented by Brazil itself. There was a prevalence of representatives from official Brazilian channels (such as Itamaraty), think tanks (such as Cebri), private educational institutions (such as FGV and PUC-RJ and SP), consultancies, banks and companies, to the detriment of public educational institutions, NGOs and other civil society organizations. Most of the names (of Brazilians and Americans) in these think tanks are recurrent in the debate, which seems to have strict conditions for authorizing discourse. There is a lack of institutional, perspective and trajectory diversity.

In this sense, among the institutes evaluated, the Brazil Institute, due to its proposal, profile and convening power, seems to be the most diversified in terms of topics and guest speakers. Even so, there is a tendency towards repetition and homogeneity in the choice of visiting, resident and non-resident lecturers, fellows and scholars. This is indicated by the information collected in the material analyzing eight hearings in the US Congress between 2007 and 2010;¹³ 24 events; 13 reports; and 37 publications, including Op-Eds, analyses, articles, interviews, Background Documents, books and policy briefings on Brazil/Brazil-USA/LA-USA from the four institutes between 2003-2010.

In the course of the interviews and the literature review, other institutes appeared as producers and suppliers of material on Brazil and/or Latin America, although without the same constancy. These include the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, CSIS, the Center for American Progress (CAP), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Carnegie

^{13 2007:} Hearings "Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America" (March), "South America and the United States: How to Fix a Broken Relationship" (June), "U.S.-Brazil Relations" (September); 2008: "National Security and Latin America: Challenges and Opportunities on Energy Cooperation" (March); 2009: "U.S. Policy toward Latin America in 2009 and Beyond" (February), "The Summit of the Americas: A New Beginning for U.S. Policy in the Region?" (March); 2010: "U.S. Policy Toward the Americas in 2010 and Beyond" (March) e "Latin America in 2010: Opportunities, Challenges, and the Future of U.S. Policy in the Hemisphere" (only one in the Senate, December).

and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (Coha). Advocacy groups that are sometimes called think tanks, such as the Washington Office on Latin America (Wola, dedicated to defending human rights in the subcontinent) and the Council of the Americas (with a more business-oriented profile), are also consulted. In the case of the Council of the Americas and CSIS, their experts are eventually called to testify in Congress at hearings on the region and Brazil.

In his analysis, Barbosa (2003) reports that most of the major think tanks — especially the conservative ones, such as AEI, Heritage, Hoover Institution and Cato — do not have specific programs for Latin America. He highlights the existence of individual academics at these institutes, such as Stephen Johnson (ex-Heritage, CSIS), Stephen Haber (Hoover), Lael Brainard and Lincoln Gordon (ex-Brookings), and Moisés Naim (Carnegie and Dialogue). From AEI, Barbosa (2003) and Sotero (2002) mention Mark Falcoff. In the 1980s, while still in a tense political context of the Cold War and security issues in the region, especially in Central America, the AEI published ostensibly on Latin America (Wiarda, 1999; 2009).

In the exploratory stage of this research, Heritage and Hudson were momentarily left aside: the former because it had no initiative on Brazil and only one topic on Latin America; and the latter because, despite having a Center for Latin America Studies, it had no specific material on Brazil. In 2009, CAP published the report "The United States and Brazil: Two Perspectives on Dealing with Partnership and Rivalry" (Meiman and Rothkopf, 2009), but it did not develop a space for the country. In this document, the authors recognize the complexity of Brazil-US relations and the existence of unresolved points of tension, but advocate a strategic partnership. In addition to highlighting the favorable climate for greater rapprochement, they note that Brazil is emerging as "a solid democracy" and "an expanding economy." Meiman and Rothkopf (2009) argue that the US needs to recognize the geopolitical change that is underway and that the next few years will be about reinventing or renewing existing institutions for a new global architecture. Commenting on the report, the then Brazilian ambassador to the US, Antonio Patriota (2009, 92), says that a good bilateral moment seems to be emerging.

Among the topics that mobilized think tanks and their experts in the time frame monitored are: Brazil ("regional power," "rising power," "economic superpower," "global power," "global player"?), Brasil-US relations ("new test," "commercial agenda," "Iran," "reluctant partner," "irresponsible stakeholder," "more conflict"?), LA-US relations ("terrorism," "disappointing," "new beginnings," "remaking," "second chance," "hemispheric partnership," "new direction," "new relationship," "repairing"?), South America-US relations ("broken relationship"?), biofuels, climate change and energy ("cooperation"), or even new directions for the BFP ("leadership and responsibility").

In addition to the use of these institutes as a showcase for Brazilian authorities and the socialization and connection of specific groups, another aspect attracted attention.

There seemed to be a subtle change in the construction and narrative of bilateral relations. In the midst of the expressions that are repeated in this community with each government (Brazilian and American), one can see the suggestion (on the part of specialists), the demand (from actors inside and outside the government, such as businesspeople) and the occurrence of a more sectoralized policy for Brazil, in a targeted way, with the involvement of other non-governmental actors. Less of a "big" policy for the country and more "policies" for areas where the country is a major player, such as the environment, negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) within the G20, or South American relations. Frames like "new beginning" and "strategic partnership" appeared more frequently alongside the usual "attention deficit," "mutual incomprehension," or "off the radar." Competing conceptions and unstructured belief systems about Brazil can be useful for inserting the country into an international political landscape in transition.

This indication of a change in the *modus operandi* of US Foreign Policy towards Brazil has meant a greater pulverization of the centers of agenda formulation for the country, with Brazil being seen in an increasingly sectorialized way in US policy making. It also means a conscious effort by Washington to include more non-governmental actors in this dynamic, "outsourcing" the presence of the United States. This aspect appears in

the interviews and refers to the movement to "privatize foreign policy" and intensify public diplomacy.

The fact that Brazil is not a priority on the foreign and security policy agenda and the perception of experts and policymakers that (even so) the country "matters" and should not be "abandoned" underpin our understanding of the "privatization" of diplomacy for Brazil as an alternative way of optimizing this relationship. This would make it possible to remain influential at a lower cost. This aspect appeared in different speeches by Presidents and Secretaries and Undersecretaries of State selected for this investigation.

Closing remarks

This study set out to investigate, firstly, whether Brazil was a topic of interest for American think tanks during the first two terms of the Lula administration (2003-2010) and, if so, to identify the institutes and specialists seen as their main interlocutors. As has been said, the universe of think tanks is dynamic and highly mobile, its main characteristics being the circulation of a continuous flow of experts and the ephemerality of "initiatives" and projects created in response to conjunctural issues and concerns. Perceived as relevant at a given moment, they can quickly lose their value. This seems to have been the case with the Brazil Initiative at the CFR, which has now been terminated. One possible explanation is that American "liberal" (in the political sense) donors tend to support projects, and conservative ones, institutions (Rich, 2004).

There is an intertextuality in the material produced between the different think tanks, with dialog, partnership and the constant exchange of information between their members. Considering that the body of specialists (Brazilianists and Latin Americanists) is relatively small, homogeneous and cohesive, with mutual citations and references and has been identified for a long time (they are always the same, go to the same places, quote each other in books, journals and interviews), the ideas about Brazil originating in the think tanks seem to suffer from recurrent circularity, a high degree of similarity and a perspective that is still very much from Washington.

This aspect could first be verified in the literature and then in the interviews. In general, in each conversation, there seemed to be a common script about Brazil at that time: the current situation (the sixth largest economy in the world in 2011 and until mid-2012, a peaceful country of continental dimensions, the pre-salt discoveries, etc.); perennial challenges (the so-called "Brazil cost," which involves infrastructure problems, lack of political and tax reform, corruption, low investment in education and innovation, etc.); and bilateral relations (estrangement, mutual incomprehension, eternal new beginnings, shared Western and democratic values, etc.).

It was observed that, in practice, in these American think tanks with programs on Brazil and Latin America, their ability to bring people together and contribute to circulating a more or less consensual idea is more important than actually renewing the debate. Thus, the networking aspect is a very important distinguishing feature in the group examined, connecting notorious members of different segments of the Brazilian elite with American experts. At least two interviewees (verbal information) — one a current at the time and the other a former State Department official who asked not to be identified — said that, in fact, this subtle form of influence is very effective and very difficult to quantify because it happens "behind the scenes." Although it seems to be largely down to luck, just as important, if not more so, is the network of relationships and the prestige of the writer and the think tank in which they find themselves.

In terms of the American political debate, the selected institutes are more in the center of the spectrum, which suggests that political orientation may determine the theme, duration and type of analysis in studies on Latin America and Brazil. In the exploratory phase of this research, the more conservative TTs did not come up with specific initiatives on Brazil, and the country was dealt with in the context of very specific issues (such as involvement with Iran), the same happening for LA (Cuba, immigration, Venezuela and Chinese expansion in the region). In these analyses, this was the main context in which Brazil and LA appeared in conservative institutes: security.

The data and information collected shows that presidential visits have mobilized activity (basically conferences, interviews and opinion articles in American and Brazilian media) and that there is no permanent interest in a specific topic. Movements are cyclical and reactive. In the case of Brazil, there was no profound change in perception or paradigm in the selected institutes, even with changes of government (and their respective political orientations and agendas) in the United States and Brazil. It is suspected that this is due to the fact that these are the same people, in the same networks, sharing the same belief system and codes of belonging and validation of the knowledge produced, regardless of the political context. It is believed that the existence of think tanks talking about Brazil can help soften government rhetoric and policies and create a positive chatter. This is not the same as saying that it is decisive.

On the one hand, a superficial knowledge of think tanks and American politics can affect the Brazilian government's ability to identify official and unofficial agendas and "discourses" and to respond to issues of interest in US-Brazilian foreign policy in a proportionate manner and in the tone appropriate to the respective interlocutor. On the other hand, greater interest in the subject can help improve Brazil's instruments of public diplomacy and its use of soft power. This will be all the more beneficial for Brazil when there is a greater diversity of actors, institutions and political perspectives involved. Having a more accurate understanding of external perceptions of Brazil can help the Brazilian government to identify and correct misinformation, whether on purpose or not, contributing to better management of Brazil's image internationally.

Would greater investment in partnerships and agreements between the government and Brazilian public and private organizations and institutions and these American think tanks help to make analysis and debate about Brazil in the US more intelligible? Perhaps so, provided that the circulation of experts is more varied (in thematic, political-ideological and institutional terms) and that the projects resulting from this investment are minimally medium-term. Ideas take time to circulate, find the right space and "stick" — to use a term used by several members of these think tanks. Any investment will not have an immediate return, and it is highly unlikely that one will even be able to perceive its usefulness and materiality

in the short term. We are talking not only about disseminating ideas and stimulating debates, but also about cultivating relationships in the center of the center of power, that is, Washington.

Brazil and the US maintain a mutual ambiguity, with precarious information production on both sides. There are still few Brazilianists and few Americanists. In general, Brazil does not appear in isolation in American foreign policy. Although the country is not on Washington's list of foreign policy priorities, it cannot be said that the United States is not "attentive" to what is happening in the south of the hemisphere. The US has an interest in Brazil, as long as it does so on its own terms. We are therefore talking about a power with global influence, weight and influence — and therefore with equally global interests. A minor interest, or just a specific interest, does not mean a lack of interest. A great power has, it should be remembered, the politics of a great power.

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Militarisms and the Global Extreme Right: A Comparative Study between the USA and Brazil

Clarissa Nascimento Forner¹

Introduction

The rise of the so-called "new global right" has aroused increasing interest in International Relations literature. Despite its local and temporal specificities, there seems to be a reasonable consensus among scholars that this is a phenomenon with cross-border features, affecting different continents. With this in mind, this chapter aims to make a further contribution to the debate by analyzing the US and Brazilian realities, particularly during the administrations of Donald Trump (2017-2021) and Jair Messias Bolsonaro (2019-2023).

Rather than exhausting or reiterating what has already been presented in other chapters of this volume, this text sets out to analyze a more specific aspect of the phenomenon in question, namely the relationship between the strengthening of extreme right movements in the aforementioned countries and the variable of militarism. According to Mudde (2019), far-right movements are not homogeneous and include the extreme right and the radical right. While the extreme right is fundamentally characterized by its rejection of democracy, the radical right is differentiated by its denial of liberal values and pluralism. Seeking to establish common elements between these currents, the author lists three aspects: a) nativism, presented as a mixture of nationalism and xenophobia; b) authoritarianism, understood as the overvaluation of

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hierarchical social organization and security devices of criminalization; c) populism, whose essence involves the construction of oppositions between the people versus the traditional elites, usually portrayed as corrupt and inefficient.

Analysing the Latin American context, Sanahuja, Burian and Vitelli (2022) understand that the characterization proposed by Mudde (2019) presents some limitations by not emphasizing, for example, the link between extreme right movements and the rejection of the effects of globalization and the institutions of the Liberal International Order (LIO). Instead, they propose the concept of the "neopatriotic extreme right," which the authors define as "a 'counter-movement' [...] against the impact, risks and uncertainties of a globalization in crisis" (Sanahuja, Burian and Vitelli, 2022, 114-115), and which essentially turns into anti-globalist practices, such as questioning international institutions. These authors, like Stokes (2018) and Crothers (2019), recognize the anti-globalist behavior of some sections of the American extreme right, connecting the context of the rise of Trumpism to the effects of the 2008 economic crisis and the growing rejection of the country's participation in multilateral arrangements.

Among other elements common to the extreme right in the countries of the Global North and South, and particularly in the United States of America (USA) and Brazil, are distrust of (national and global) institutions, denialism and conservatism, often materialized in the proposal for a nostalgic revival of values and patterns of social organization considered "traditional," as well as in the attempt at self-appropriation of patriotic symbols, such as national flags and the use of chauvinistic political slogans, such as "Make America Great Again" or "Patria Amada Brasil."

The militarism dimension, on the other hand, has been associated more recurrently with the Brazilian case, due to the authoritarian legacy and the historical participation of the military in the country's political processes, which is reinforced by the Bolsonaro government (Kalil and Rodrigues, 2023; Aliaga, 2023). As far as the analysis of the US context

² As pointed out by Brown (2019), the values in question involve, for example, the emphasis on the heteronormative family nucleus and the principles of Christianity, highlighting the strong religious component of such movements.

is concerned, there are dissonances, since some of the literature seems to be heading towards the conclusion that the Trump administration represented an unprecedented imbalance in civil-military relations (Binkley, 2022; Pion-Berlin, Bruneau and Goetz Jr., 2023), while other perspectives point out that the effect of Trumpism should not be overestimated in this regard, considering the absence of significant ruptures in civilian authority (Brooks, 2021). The use of the term "militarism" per se is less observed or predominantly reserved for the foreign policy sphere (Duss, 2023).

What we are trying to argue in this essay is that militarism operates as a structuring variable in the actions of the extreme right, not only in Brazil, as already indicated by Kalil and Rodrigues (2022), but also in the United States. Without losing sight of the historical and institutional particularities of the countries analyzed, it is argued that it is possible to identify similarities between the American and Brazilian experiences, taking militarism as a conceptual reference.

Despite the lack of terminological consensus, the concept of militarism has been used to describe the cultural, social and political processes that involve the valorization and reification of practices associated with the military organization and/or way of life in society. Among the characteristics of this phenomenon are, for example, the construction of the military institution as a model of social organization and the cult of the use of violence. It can thus be seen that the phenomenon of militarism goes beyond the limits of government spaces and finds part of its support and vehicles for reproduction in civil society, which is considered fundamental for understanding the advances of the global extreme right.

The purpose of the text, therefore, is to identify and compare the forms of manifestation of militaristic socio-political structures in Trump's USA and Bolsonaro's Brazil. Based on the similarities between the two cases, the aim is to reflect on the impacts of militarism and militarization on foreign policy and US-Brazil bilateral relations.

From a methodological point of view, this is a comparative case study, based on documentary sources, presidential speeches and an analysis of specialized literature. The text is divided into three sections, in addition to this introduction and the final remarks: in the first section, we will present some conceptual propositions for the terms "militarism" and "militarization"; in the second section, we will analyze the case of the US under the Trump administration; and finally, in the third section, we will look at the Brazilian context.

Militarism and militarization: a brief conceptual note

The consolidation of the modern state as a hegemonic political organization culminated in the concentration of devices for perpetrating violence and, subsequently, in the expansion of modern professional military apparatuses. From the middle of the 20th century onwards, these developments led to growing concerns in Western academic debates about the possibility of the decision-making power of the armed forces supplanting civilian power, undermining the functioning of democratic bodies.

Part of these fears were galvanized by the then nascent field of civil-military relations studies, which initially included authors such as Samuel Huntington (The Soldier and the State, 1957). According to the Huntingtonian model, objective civilian control, understood by the author as ideal in democratic states, would involve the separation of the civilian and military spheres, based, among other things, on mutual non-interference between the two domains and increased military professionalization, as a means of guaranteeing greater political neutralization and restricting military advice to tactical aspects, while retaining civilian protagonism over political and strategic aspects (Domingos Neto, 2019; Binkley, 2022). Even at that time, the model proposed by Huntington was criticized, such as by Morris Janowitz (1961), who pointed out the limits of professionalization as an instrument for reducing military political influence. As the author argued, expertise could be converted into an important political asset (Forner, 2020), albeit indirectly.

More recently, new shortcomings have been pointed out in the concept of civil control, not only in the literature produced in the North, but also in countries of the Global South and Latin America. In particular,

the main questions relate to the fact that: a) the concept of civilian control does not satisfactorily capture the complexities of the dynamics of the production of contemporary violence, which tend to "cloud" the distinctions between the civilian and military fields; b) the use of the concept becomes unproductive from the point of view of countries in which, as in many Latin American cases, the presence of the military in internal political processes has historically been the rule rather than the exception; c) the apparent balance of civil-military relations or the direct absence of the military in political-decision-making bodies has not necessarily meant greater democratic stability or a reduction in structural violence in society (Diamint, 2015; Brooks, 2021; Rodrigues and Kalil, 2022).

Another point to be added concerns the emphasis on civilian control over government decision-making, which sometimes tends to limit the perception of the impact of such dynamics on other spaces, such as civil society. In this regard, and despite its possible problems, the concepts of militarism and militarization are considered to offer a more holistic perspective which, in turn, is fundamental to understanding the causes and consequences of the strengthening of extreme right movements.

It should be noted that these are two concepts whose definitions are not agreed upon in the literature. Here, we will use the term militarism to refer to tendencies to overvalue the ideas and practices usually associated with the military organization and way of life, which can culminate, under certain conditions, in permanent social mobilization for conflict (Mann, 1986). These behaviors include: the worship of patriotic symbols; the exaltation of the military way of life as a reference point and model of social organization; and the tendency to use violence effectively or to constantly threaten to do so. Also associated with contexts of exacerbated militarism is an increase in authoritarian and exclusionary practices, such as racism and sexism (Mann, 1996; Enloe, 2014), traits perceived in the conduct of the Trump and Bolsonaro governments, as well as their supporters.

In turn, the concept of militarization will be used to refer to the processes of penetration of militaristic practices in society and in government spheres, which can culminate, for example, in increased direct participation or influence by the military in decision-making bodies; greater incorporation of military doctrines and practices into government policies; and increased public spending related to the military sector (Mathias, 2003; Kalil and Rodrigues, 2022; Kinsella, 2013). It can therefore be seen that these phenomena go beyond the aegis of civilian control, so that, as Levy (2016) points out, it is possible to observe countries with reasonably stable levels of civilian control over the military, but which are also highly militaristic and militarized. As we discuss later, the US is often pointed to as an example of this (Forner, 2020), but there have been growing perceptions that indicate an increase in problems involving civil-military relations in the country (Bacevich, 2007; Binkley, 2022; Pion-Berlin, Bruneau and Goetze Jr, 2022).

In view of the above, the discussion on militarism for the selected cases, i.e. the United States under the Trump administration (2017-2021) and Brazil under Jair Messias Bolsonaro (2019-2023), will be divided into two spheres: a) the analysis of the processes of militarism and militarization in the governmental axis (including the domestic and foreign fields); and b) the mapping of such phenomena in the social sphere. As pointed out above, these considerations will be outlined with a view to allowing reflections on the impacts of such structures on the conjuncture of US-Brazil bilateral relations, since foreign policy can also be understood as a reflection and instrument of feedback from militarization and militarism. In the next section, we will examine the US case.

Militarism in Trump's United States

Donald Trump's arrival as President in 2017 was marked by ambiguities regarding his relationship with the military apparatus. During the 2016 election period, praising the military became one of the future President's main campaign platforms, even though it was sometimes combined with critical stances on US military interventionism abroad, especially in relation to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If, on the one hand, Trump saw the reinvigoration of the military apparatus and the increase in defense budgets as essential pillars of the project to make

America "great again" and to build "peace through strength," on the other hand, he understood that the US had weakened itself by engaging in what he considered to be "ideological wars."

At the same time, the President gave interviews criticizing the Obama administration's inaction on Syria and promising to adopt a more robust plan to eliminate the Islamic State in the region. On more than one occasion, he claimed to be "the most militaristic person of all time" (Trump, 2015), praising military figures from the US political spectrum. As a result, the Trump campaign enjoyed a wide margin of support from retired generals and war veterans. At the time, support was declared in a manifesto signed by 90 former generals (Schacke, 2016), raising questions about military politicization and the document's impact on the autonomy of the officer corps. When elected, the President also surrounded himself with military figures in command positions in the bureaucracy, such as General Michael Flynn (National Security Council), James Mattis (Department of Defense)³ and H.R. McMaster (National Security Council).

In the field of foreign policy, Trump deepened the imbalances between the Department of Defense and the Department of State, reducing the resources of civilian agencies and foreign aid budgets by almost a third, and keeping diplomatic posts abroad vacant. Although this process did not begin during the Trump era, the administration has contributed to its worsening, with the closure of almost 30% of US diplomatic offices abroad (Forner, 2020), corroborating, together with the withdrawal from relevant multilateral arrangements — such as the Paris Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) —, the country's increased isolation internationally. In addition, the non-interventionist rhetoric has been counterbalanced by the increase in US military troops in Afghanistan (before the withdrawal process began in 2021), Yemen and Syria.

In addition, the President has expanded the use of drones, continuing the trends observed in the Obama administration, and has expanded the

³ The case of Mattis, in particular, was quite emblematic, since the secretary was appointed without completing the seven years of military service required to run the defense bureaucracy. Historically, in addition to Mattis, two other Secretaries of Defense have received a relaxation of the quarantine period: Secretary George Marshall (Truman administration) and Secretary Lloyd Austin (Biden administration).

margin of autonomy of military authorities in the field, as opposed to the centralization efforts made by his predecessor (Greenberg, 2017). The Trump administration has also shown itself to be less observant of transparency when it comes to the deployment of the US military abroad: a report published by the think tank Congressional Research Service pointed out that, since 2017, the Department of Defense has not released data on the number of US troops, regular and contracted, deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria (Congressional Research Service, 2019). The department stopped reporting on airstrikes carried out by US troops, based on the idea, shared by President Trump, that the US could not "disclose" elements of its strategy to its enemies. These behaviors were complemented by the maintenance of high defense budgets — at a level of more than US\$ 700 billion/year (United States of America, 2020) — and by increased competitive relations with powers such as China and Russia, often described as "revisionist" in the administration's main strategic documents (Weaver, 2017).

Still in the sphere of foreign policy, the Trump administration was marked by the intensification of the use of arms transfers (FELDSCHER, 2020). According to Hirst and Pereira (2022), increased security cooperation was observed in bilateral relations with Brazil. In 2019, the two countries negotiated a new Strategic Partnership Dialogue, a high-level mechanism that included, among other things, security and defense cooperation among its priorities. In the same year, the Trump administration had already designated Brazil as an extra-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally, making the country eligible to receive facilitations in the field of arms exports and in carrying out joint military training and education programs (Hirst and Pereira, 2022). As warned by Milani, Oliveira and Wietchikoski (2023), the decision was a unilateral move by the US government, which did not extend to relations with other members of the organization. Even so, the increase in cooperation flows and initiatives in the field of security and defense consolidated what Hirst and Pereira (2022, 438) classified as "armed bilateralism," reinforcing the militaristic component of foreign policy.

On the domestic front, militarization can be seen in one-off events, such as demonstrations of force and military parades at events

like the Fourth of July celebrations, as well as in the administration's more perennial agendas, such as the intensification of surveillance and policing on the border with Mexico. However, it is possible to say that the phenomenon peaked in 2020, during the Black Lives Matter (BLM) demonstrations, which took place after the death of George Floyd, in a clear example of the exacerbation of police and racial violence in the country.

Faced with the increase in protests, the Trump administration activated the National Guard and threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act, a provision that allows the domestic use of the armed forces in situations of rebellion and domestic violence (Brooks, 2021; Binkley, 2022). It should be noted that the use of the military domestically has been rejected in the US since the 19th century, with the decree of the so-called Posse Comitatus Act,⁴ reinforcing the seriousness of the measures considered by the presidency in that context. Also striking was the rhetoric adopted by Trump, who declared himself a "law and order president" (Trump, 2020), in reference to the policy adopted by the Nixon administration in the 1960s at the start of the War on Drugs, which largely contributed to the militarization of public security and the country's relations with Latin America.

The 2020 demonstrations further deepened the tendency towards military politicization, when the then Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley was photographed parading alongside President Trump in Lafayette Square at a commemorative event, which was understood as a gesture of support for presidential conduct in relation to domestic repression. At the time, the general publicly retracted his remarks and later, in his retirement speech, reiterated that: "We [the military] don't take an oath to a king, or a queen, or to a tyrant or dictator, and we don't take an oath to a wannabe dictator [...] We take an oath to the Constitution [...]" (Milley, 2023). This episode, added to other similar incidents that marked the administration, 5 indicated a worsening crisis in civil-military relations

⁴ Domingos Neto (2019) reminds us, however, that this did not prevent the military from being used domestically to massacre indigenous populations during the formation of the nation.

⁵ Some notable examples were: the Charlottesville protests in 2017, in which the military condemned the practice of racism sustained by Trump's supporters; and the opposition to the process of withdrawing troops

and contributed to the fact that, in the 2020 elections, polls showed 41% support for Joe Biden's candidacy among the military (Brooks, 2021), something that was accentuated after Trump suggested that the military be used to monitor polling centers.

Two aspects should be highlighted about the status of civil-military relations under the Trump administration: if, on the one hand, it is true that we can understand the crisis as the fruit of presidential attempts to politicize the armed forces in order to expand their political capital (Brooks, 2021; Binkley, 2022), it is also true that the episodes that permeated the administration contributed to raising the profile of the forces themselves, to the extent that they, as indicated in General Milley's speech, were able to claim for themselves the role of legitimate defenders of the Constitution and the values of the homeland, to the detriment of behaviors often reduced to "follies" of the "wannabe dictator," occupant of civilian power. Emblematic in this sense are the media reports of the time, which sometimes portrayed the military representatives as "the adults in the room," responsible for protecting the proper functioning of the institutions from a childish Donald Trump (Woodward, 2018). The same can be said of some academic analyses of the period, which seem to echo the discourse of the officerate.⁶ On the other hand, politicization also produced the burden of reducing the social capital of the military institution, particularly with regard to the association between the military and the repression of BLM.

In any case, it seems to us that the events of the period reinforce the operating logic of "military patriotism," identified by Domingos Neto (2019). According to the author, "The military's nationalism is based on a corporate vision of society [...]" (Domingos Neto, 2019, 29), which means that it is also a corporate interpretation of the demands and ideal values to be pursued by that society, as well as a tendency to reject and assign

from Afghanistan, perceived as hasty by high-ranking military personnel, which led to the resignation of Secretary of Defense James Mattis in 2018. These events were also compounded by the fact that, on yet another occasion, the president referred pejoratively to soldiers, calling them "losers" or doubting their level of commitment to the nation (Binkley, 2022).

⁶ For Binkley (2022, 19), for example: "[...] military criticism of the president was actually a defense of professionalism, the Constitution and the broader values of American society."

the role of "enemy" to individuals and groups who propose a change to the current social order.

This dimension becomes particularly relevant when we analyze the social manifestations of militarism which, in our understanding, became more noticeable in the context of the storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021, during the act of Congress confirming President Biden's inauguration. The riot was organized by Trumpist groups, including representatives of various extreme right movements, such as the Alt-Right, QAnon and armed militias (Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, Proud Boys, among others). Subsequent investigations confirmed Donald Trump's awareness of and support for the protesters, after numerous pronouncements on social media accusing the electoral process of fraud ("Stop the steal") and encouraging social mobilization.

According to a *CBS News* survey⁷ conducted in 2021, more than 80 of the 700 individuals investigated for collusion in the events of January 6 had connections to the military and security forces. The majority of those investigated were veterans, and at least five were active military personnel under investigation by the Pentagon. As we have analyzed elsewhere, the closeness of ex-members of the forces or active military personnel to conservative movements has shown itself to be a trend, particularly in the actions of extreme right-wing militias. In addition to characteristics such as nativism, conservatism and distrust of institutions, these groups claim for themselves the duty to defend "real American values," the homeland and the Constitution (Milani, Motta and Forner, 2023), echoing military self-perception. In addition, some features of military organization are mimicked by the militiamen, such as hierarchy and the use of violence.

We can therefore conclude that US militarism is not a product of the Trump era, nor is it restricted to the governmental axis; it is a phenomenon with more complex and multifaceted roots. In the next section, we will analyze its resonances with the Brazilian case.

⁷ Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/capitol-riot-january-6-military-ties>. Last access on: 20 Mar. 2024.

The Brazilian case: differences and approximations

As observed in the US case, Brazilian militarism transcends the context of the rise of Bolsonarism. However, when it comes to Brazil, the component of direct military participation in politics is an important particularity. As Ferreira (2000) points out, the military has been a recurring presence in Brazilian political history from the post-independent period, through the direct exercise of power during the military dictatorship (1964-1985), to re-democratization. In this sense, the arrival of Jair Messias Bolsonaro in power can be interpreted, as Kalil and Rodrigues (2023) suggest, not as a movement of "return" of the military to power, but of continuity, both from a historical point of view and from the contemporary conjuncture.

In the recent period, the same authors indicate that, since the government of Michel Temer (2016-2019), the military has exercised a "sneaky protagonism" (Kalil and Rodrigues, 2023), influencing the process of deposing President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and, subsequently, gaining more space in the government administration, whether through the increase in Law and Order Guarantee (GLO) operations or the reactivation of bureaucracies such as the Institutional Security Office (GSI) headed, initially, by General Sérgio Etchegoyen. Other important portfolios occupied by military personnel were the Ministry of Defense (General Joaquim Silva e Luna) and the Secretariat of Public Security (General Santos Cruz).

However, it was during the Bolsonaro administration that the militarization of public administration reached its highest levels since the military regime. According to Aliaga (2023), in just the first year of Bolsonaro's presidency, the number of civilian positions occupied by military personnel more than doubled, reaching a total of 6,157 military personnel (the total was 3,515 in 2019). High-ranking positions included Vice President Hamilton Mourão, Augusto Heleno (GSI), Marcos Pontes (Science and Technology), Jorge Oliveira (General Secretariat of the Presidency), Tarcísio Gomes de Freitas (Infrastructure), Bento Albuquerque (Mines and Energy), among others. Portfolios such as Education (Milton Ribeiro) and Health (Eduardo Pazuello) were also occupied by the military at the

height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Aliaga (2023) also points out that the 2022 elections saw a significant increase in candidates from the military and/or public security professionals, signaling the intensification of the strength of militarism in politics.

In terms of foreign policy, the president reactivated some of the doctrinal elements articulated by military thinking and applied to the regime's foreign policy during the Cold War (1947-1989), such as anti-communism and the maxim of guaranteeing sovereignty. In his very first speech at the United Nations General Assembly, the then president said that Brazil was "resurgent" after being "on the brink of socialism" (Bolsonaro, 2019). In the same tone, he also criticized the Venezuelan government and reiterated that he would not tolerate "the instrumentalization" of environmental or indigenous issues, as a form of interference by the international community in Brazilian sovereignty. The rhetoric of preserving sovereignty was contrasted, in practice, with the neoliberal economic platform proposed by Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes.

Another aspect of Bolsonaro's foreign policy was his bilateral rapprochement with Trump's United States. Since the 2018 campaign, Bolsonaro has been nicknamed "the Trump of the Tropics" because of his ideological and personal closeness to the US president. However, despite some visa concessions and the establishment of export quotas for Brazilian beef, agreed during Bolsonaro's first official visit to the US in 2019, the most substantive cooperation initiatives have been restricted to the security field, such as the renewal of the strategic partnership, the appointment of Brazil as an extra-NATO ally and the negotiation of the agreement for US use of the Alcântara military base. The emphasis on the security and defense dimension is not exclusive to Trump-Bolsonaro relations and replicates the militarized pattern of US relations with Latin America in recent decades (Forner, 2023). The initiatives listed, added to the personal stances shared by the two leaders, such as anti-communism and anti-globalism (Pecequilo, 2021), seem to have contributed to reinforcing the phenomenon.

With regard to the domestic sphere, in addition to the growth of military occupation in public administration positions, other aspects of

the impression of militaristic logic on politics are highlighted by Kalil and Rodrigues (2023), such as the reduction of transparency — and the spread of disinformation —, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the incorporation of the grammar of conflict and war into political relations, culminating in the treatment of government opponents as enemies and threats. This aspect seems to be very relevant for understanding not only presidential behavior, but also that of their supporters. Elements such as incitement to armament among the population and the increase in hate crimes across the country can be understood as side effects of the militarized socio-political structure. In an almost cartoonish way, as observed in the US context, this set of factors culminated, on January 8, 2023, in an invasion of the Brazilian Congress, carried out by Bolsonaro supporters, in retaliation for the victory of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) in the 2022 elections. What is striking about these events is not only the unprecedented virulence and depredation of public property, but also the fact that the barracks became "reference points" where protesters camped, calling for the return of the now ex-President Bolsonaro and military intervention. The episode also included the participation of military personnel and representatives of public security forces, deepening the prospect of the politicization of the military institution.

Despite the unsuccessful efforts to build an apparent distance between the barracks and the figure of Bolsonaro (Rodrigues, 2021), the effects of military politicization have contributed to the decline in the reputation of the armed forces. A survey released in 2023 by the Datafolha Institute revealed that 61% of those interviewed believed that the military were involved in the irregularities of the Bolsonaro government (Folha de S. Paulo, 2023). The fact that the military participated more directly in the administration, in the Brazilian context, means that the exposure of the military institution is proportionally greater compared to the North American context, as are the burdens arising from it. In our view, however, the reduction in social confidence in the institution does not necessarily mean a cooling of militarism, especially if we consider the long-term structural features of the phenomenon, such as its link to structures of racial and gender domination, and its manifestations across

the social spectrum. These issues transcend the relationship with the military institution and, as such, demand broader and deeper measures to tackle them.

Final remarks

This chapter sought to discuss the rise of extreme right movements and governments in Brazil and the United States from a comparative perspective, taking the phenomena of militarism and militarization as conceptual starting points. To this end, the Trump and Bolsonaro governments were analyzed in their governmental (domestic and foreign policy) and social spheres. As we sought to elucidate, looking at militarism and militarization, despite its limitations, allows us to observe the functioning of the structures that produce violence in society, beyond the governmental sphere, normally taken as a starting point by traditional studies of civil-military relations.

The analysis of these processes has also made it possible to identify similarities between the US and Brazilian experiences, although, as has been discussed, the US has traditionally been held up as a benchmark for success when it comes to the functioning of civilian control over the armed forces. Emblematically, not only does the Trump administration seem to have contributed to deepening the erosion of relations between civil power and the armed forces, but the militaristic dynamics in the government apparatus and in society have also deepened.

In the Brazilian case, Bolsonaro's arrival as president symbolized the revival of the military presence in politics, continuing the historical trends observed in the country. As in the US context, militarism and militarization were part of the administration's modus operandi and spread to social organization, culminating in the events of January 8, 2023. Unlike in the US, however, the direct participation of the military in the government meant that the effects of politicization on the reputation of the military institution were more intense, something that is not observed in the US context, even though the military also occupied relevant spaces in the Trump administration.

On the other hand, in the US, the extreme right movements in support of President Trump seem to have reached a more substantive degree of organization and institutionalization. The case of the militias is quite emblematic in this sense, considering the fact that many of these groups have been operating in the country since before Trump's arrival as president, but have certainly gained more strength since the presidential backing.

Even so, other elements such as the exaltation of military organization, the logic of "military patriotism" and the incorporation of the grammars of violence into politics are observable characteristics in both countries, which, as discussed, make up the features of militarized societies. As a consequence, the emphasis on the dimensions of security and defense in the field of foreign policy was a central point in the articulation of US-Brazil bilateral relations during this period.

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The US-Brazil Alliance Against the Windmills of Globalism

David Almstadter de Magalhães¹

"Those that you see over there," responded his master, "with the long arms—some of them almost two leagues long."

"Look, your grace," responded Sancho, "what you see over there aren't giants—they're windmills; and what seems to be arms are the sails that rotate the millstone when they're turned by the wind."

"It seems to me," responded Don Quixote, "that you aren't well-versed in adventures—they are giants; and if you're afraid, get away from here and start praying while I go into fierce and unequal battle with them."

(Don Quixote. Cap I/VIII)

Introduction

For enthusiasts of history, geography and the arts, resisting the charm of maps and nautical charts from the medieval and Renaissance era is a significant challenge. These maps represent more than simple navigation tools; they are works of art, adorned with colorful illustrations and symbolic details that reflect the medieval mentality. One of the most notable features of medieval cartography was the monsters and fantastic creatures that emerged from the oceans, such as giant sea serpents, dragons, mermaids and hybrid creatures, often with terrifying or mysterious aspects.

In the 21st century, armed with GPS and applications that map every square centimeter of the globe, it seems natural to dismiss medieval cartography as obscurantist, superstitious and outdated. However, observes John Vogler (quoted in Herz, 1994), decision-makers often make their political choices not through "modern maps," but by orienting themselves

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by medieval cartography. The metaphor reveals the complexities and barriers encountered in formulating foreign policy. This analogy is particularly valuable in highlighting the need for a comprehensive understanding of decision-making processes in international politics. It suggests that, in addition to relying on objective facts and technical advances (symbolized by "modern maps"), it is crucial to recognize and incorporate the underlying perceptions, beliefs and assumptions that influence policymakers (represented by "medieval cartography"). This approach emphasizes the importance of balancing factual and technical reality with perceived and culturally rooted realities.

The positivism trap, as Herz (1994) points out, can be an obstacle to a complete understanding of foreign policy. By overemphasizing rational choice models and analysis based on objective data, one runs the risk of ignoring how perceptions, interpretations and beliefs shape decision-making. That is, many navigators in Spain, Portugal or Holland were discouraged from crossing the oceans because medieval beliefs created subjective lenses that filtered reality, creating images of imaginary monsters that influenced human actions.

Robert Jervis was one of the first authors in International Relations to study how psychological mechanisms — with their perceptions and false perceptions — influence the decision-making process. Jervis states that:

once you have formed a belief or opinion, it will influence the way you perceive all important information. Once you've made up your mind that a certain country is hostile to yours, you'll be predisposed to interpret ambiguous movements or acts as demonstrating hostility to those people (Jervis, 1976, 44).

Information is interpreted and integrated on the basis of preexisting beliefs, expectations and theories that are already established in individuals' cognitive frameworks. This dynamic underlines how the perception and understanding of new information is shaped and influenced by the set of ideas and conceptions already ingrained in the minds of the actors. As transcribed in the epigraph to this chapter, Don Quijote navigates a "medieval map" in his perception of windmills as giants, illustrating how distorted perception can lead to misguided actions, even when more accurate information (or "modern maps") are available.

Where Don Quijote saw giants, Trump, Bolsonaro, Steve Bannon and Olavo de Carvalho saw globalism, an imaginary beast whose goal would be to annihilate Judeo-Christian civilization and create, in its place, a government whose tentacles would extend across the planet imposing a progressive ideology on all nations. Between 2019 and 2020, Brazil and the USA forged an alliance against the windmills of globalism.

The notion of a globalist threat worked as a powerful narrative to mobilize the foreign policies of Brazil and the US, opposing globalism to traditional and national values, similar to the way Don Quijote saw his mission as a heroic battle in defense of chivalric values. Here it matters less whether globalism exists as an objective phenomenon catalogued by International Relations scholars. If it exists as a threat in the minds of policymakers, it is enough to influence the formulation of foreign policy.

In this way, the perception of globalism as a threat has had significant practical implications for the international insertion of Brazil and the US, influencing diplomatic decisions that will be analyzed in this chapter. First, however, it is necessary to understand the anti-globalist mentality, understood here as the ideological foundation of these countries' foreign policy during the administrations of Donald Trump (2016-2020) and Jair Bolsonaro (2018-2022).

The anti-globalist mentality

Unlike globalization, "globalism" has not been the object of attention by academics studying International Relations. The publications on globalism, roughly speaking, are reduced to analyzing how far-right-wing actors have used the banner of the "anti-globalist struggle" to defend tribalist agendas against the expansion of a cosmopolitan culture that is advancing in the wake of globalization.

Walker (2012, 183) notes that the term globalism first appeared in English in 1943 as a synonym for globalization, i.e. "the belief, theory, or practice of adopting or pursuing a political course, economic system, etc., based on global rather than national principles; [...] the fact or process of large businesses, organizations, etc., operation and having an influence on a worldwide scale, globalization."

Within the scientific world, Paul James was the one who addressed the differences between globalization and globalism. Globalization, he argues, refers to the extension of social relations and economic, political and cultural practices throughout the world. It is a complex and layered process that involves integration and interaction between people, companies and governments in different countries. It is characterized by transnational flows of capital, information and people. Globalism, in turn, is described as the ideology or subjectivity associated with globalization. It refers to the beliefs and policies that support or promote the process of globalization. Globalism is often related to ideologies that emphasize and defend global interconnection and interdependence in various spheres such as economics, politics and culture. Therefore, globalization can be seen as the process in action, while globalism is the ideology or perspective that informs and, to a certain extent, directs this process (James, 2006).

Even Letícia Pinheiro, one of the most important specialists in Brazilian foreign policy, when proposing a "globalist paradigm" to understand Brazil's different international behaviors, used globalism as a synonym for universalism, an attitude that characterized Brazilian diplomacy from the Jânio Quadros and João Goulart governments onwards, seeking to diversify Brazilian economic and political partnerships and reduce dependence on the USA (Pinheiro, 2010).

Therefore, the academic understanding of "globalism" differs considerably from what is conceived by the far-right-wing intelligentsia that supported the Trump and Bolsonaro governments (and other radical right-wing actors such as *Vox* in Spain, *Chega!* in Portugal, Giorgia Meloni in Italy and Viktor Orban in Hungary). *Globalism, for the purposes of this chapter, is understood by far-right-wing governments as a political scheme of world domination exercised by cosmopolitan elites whose purpose is to*

destroy Judeo-Christian civilization and replace it with a progressive culture ("cultural Marxism"). Thus, understanding the meaning of globalism used by Trumpists and Bolsonaro supporters involves three elements: 1) the populist strategy of the radical right, which extends beyond the national dimension; 2) the conspiratorial mentality; 3) the decadent vision of Western Civilization.

Both the Bolsonaro and Trump administrations are considered to belong ideologically to the radical right.² According to Cas Mudde (2007; 2019), the extreme right rejects the essence of democracy, i.e. the idea of popular sovereignty and majority rule (*volunté general*). The most emblematic example of the far right is fascism. The radical right, on the other hand, accepts the essence of democracy, but opposes the elements of liberal democracy, i.e. the right of minorities, separation of powers and the rule of law. Three elements characterize the radical right: it is nativist, authoritarian and populist.

The populist character of the radical right, which is what interests us most in understanding globalism, has been the frequent object of attention in academia. Tormey (2019) and Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), for example, propose a lowest common denominator to conceptually frame populism, considering it a low-density ideology that divides society into two antagonistic and homogeneous groups: the pure people and the corrupted elites. The populist, in this sense, would be the legitimate representative of the majorities in a belligerent position against the system.

The concept of "corrupted elites" transcends national borders, incorporating the "cosmopolitan elites" ensconced in international organizations, foundations, NGOs, etc. In this way, national elites work together with international elites to frustrate the "general will" and undermine Western values, which are shared by the majority of the population in both Brazil and the USA. By imposing the "globalist agenda," such as the rights of women and LGBTQIA+ minorities, the globalist elites are usurping democratic rule. This anti-minority narrative reveals the

² There is a reasonable consensus in the specialized literature that the far right can be divided into two ideological subgroups: the radical right and the extreme right.

illiberal nature of the radical right while reinforcing its populist appeal. This same expedient has been used constantly by the European populist radical right, when it condemns the collusion between national elites against the "Brussels elites" (Goodhart, 2017).

The use of conspiracy theories offers an additional corollary to the rhetoric of the radical right, reinforcing the populist strategy of demonizing the elites. It is well known that conspiracy theories are a global phenomenon that affects almost every field of human activity and is by no means exclusive to the right-wing camp. They generally operate on the belief in secret plots hatched by a small group of powerful people with malevolent intentions. In this sense, it is often embedded within the Manichean logic of populism. Although sometimes harmless, they can undermine trust in institutions, promote hate speech, disregard scientific evidence, incite violence and even cause deaths, as in the case of anti-vaccine propaganda. Furthermore, as Schulze et al. (2022) note, conspiracy theories are amplified on social networks due to their ability to create ideal structures for the emergence, dissemination and acceleration of these narratives. And it must be taken into account that social platforms allow for the formation of echo chambers, where ideas reinforce each other, promoting radicalization and extremism.

One of the most caricatured manifestations of the articulation between populism and conspiracism is the QAnon theory, widespread among supporters of Donald Trump and even reverberating in Brazil, which claims that a secret group of global elites is involved in criminal activities against the US government. These elites would be promoting pedophilia and human trafficking, claiming that an impending "storm" would expose and bring down these elites (Conner and MacMurray, 2021).

There are, however, less delusional gradations of conspiracist narratives that have spread on the populist radical right circuit. The ideologue Olavo de Carvalho, for example, disseminated in Brazil the thesis that great fortunes met in the dead of night to "plan the establishment of a world government and inaugurate a new planetary civilization." Olavo often recommended reading Daniel Estulin's book *The True Story of the Bilderberg Club*, which tells the story of an organization

made up of political, financial and multinational corporation leaders. Estulin describes the club as extremely powerful and influential, capable of choosing presidents, starting wars and influencing the price of oil, being labeled the "worst enemy of humanity" by the author (Estulin, 2006).

Another very popular variation on the theme of globalist elites versus the people is the thesis that George Soros — the Jewish financier, philanthropist and billionaire — is the great articulator of the globalist elites who finances progressive foundations and NGOs whose purpose is to usurp the sovereignty of nations and destroy Western civilization. Soros' name is often associated with "globalism" and "cultural Marxism." In this sense, the paradigmatic example of the anti-globalist struggle is Viktor Orban, prime minister of Hungary for more than two decades, who has launched a war against his compatriot George Soros, accusing him of destroying the Christian identity of the Hungarian nation.

It is worth noting that the idea of cultural Marxism was developed by paleoconservative authors in the US, such as William S. Lind, who argued in the early 1990s that Marxist intellectuals such as Antonio Gramsci and Georg Lukács, after the First World War, proposed the need to transform Western culture and the Christian religion in order to promote socialism. This strategy involved a "long march through the institutions" of culture, such as schools and the media. The Frankfurt School, founded by Felix Weil, and thinkers such as Adorno and Marcuse would have promoted this agenda, influencing counter-culture movements of the 1960s and 1970s. According to Lind, these ideas infiltrated US cultural institutions, spreading agendas such as feminism, LGBTQIA+ rights, environmentalism and multiculturalism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, this theory gained traction in Brazil, having been spread by Olavo de Carvalho, identifying new enemies such as academics and human rights activists (Magalhães, 2018).

Anti-globalism is therefore the great ideological force that has driven and continues to drive the international insertion of radical right-wing governments. In Bolsonaro's Brazil and Trump's USA, anti-globalism has claimed to defend Western civilization in the fight against globalist elites. The next section will discuss how Brazilian foreign policy under the

Bolsonaro administration took aim at Trumpism in order to close ranks in the supposed defense of the West against the globalist elites.

Brazil and the US in the fight against globalism

To a large extent, Brazil's foreign policy stance against the windmills of globalism stems from Trump's mimesis. The US president, elected in 2016, cursed globalism as an anti-national ideology. During the election campaign, Trump said that the US would "no longer surrender America, or its people to the false song of globalism" (Fox News Insider, 2016). As president, on the platform of the UN General Assembly, Trump said that "the future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots. The future belongs to sovereign and independent nations who protect their citizens" and that "globalism exerted a religious pull over past leaders, causing them to ignore their own national interests" (Trump, 2019).

Beyond mere rhetoric, Trump put into practice a foreign policy that was hostile to globalism. Among the various attitudes, we can remember the US withdrawal from the Paris agreement and UNESCO, the break with the WHO in the middle of the pandemic, suspending its funding to the Organization, the repeated attacks on the WTO, the ban on US funding to foreign groups that perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning, the transfer of the Embassy of the US from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, contrary to a broad international consensus on the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, among many other decisions of US diplomacy.

As stated in the editorial of *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (Peters, 2020), the anti-globalism promoted by Donald Trump has had profound impacts on liberal-internationalism, a doctrine that has shaped international relations since the end of the First World War. Liberal-internationalism advocates multilateral cooperation, free trade, and strong international institutions as means to promote peace, prosperity and human rights. Trump's approach, by contrast, has emphasized national sovereignty, border protection and national interest, questioning many of the fundamental principles of liberal-internationalism. In other words,

Trump's foreign policy has set off on a collision course against the architecture of a Liberal International Order whose main promoters were the Americans themselves.

In Brazil, Bolsonaro's campaign was inspired by Trumpism. However, it wasn't just a tropical reproduction of the ideas of the American radical right. Trump's campaign strategist, Steve Bannon, worked with leaders close to Jair Bolsonaro to support the anti-globalist candidacy in Brazil. After the electoral victory, three groups vied for control of Bolsonaro's foreign policy: anti-globalists, liberal-cosmopolitans and the military. The anti-globalist core brought two of Olavo de Carvalho's students to strategic government posts: Filipe Martins and Ernesto Araújo. Filipe Martins, who holds a bachelor's degree in International Relations, was appointed International Advisor to the Presidency, a position that had been held by Marco Aurélio Garcia in the Workers' Party (PT) governments (Magalhães, 2019).

Ernesto Araújo, a little-known diplomat, came to prominence with his blog *Metapolítica* 17, started in September 2018. Before that, in 2017, Araújo contributed to the Foreign Ministry's magazine with an article entitled "Trump and the West," where he argued in favor of Trump's foreign policy as a tool to rescue the West from its supposed decadence. Araújo proposed a vision of the West not based on post-Cold War capitalism and liberal democracy, but on a civilization centered on the values of a Judeo-Christian tradition, suggesting that Brazil should ally itself with this struggle to save Western civilization from its destruction by globalism (Araújo, 2017). The article was praised and disseminated on social media by Olavo de Carvalho and, since then, Ernesto Araújo has been on the radar of Olavists who have linked themselves to Bolsonaro's candidacy.

In his inauguration speech as Foreign Minister, Ernesto Araújo, interspersing quotes in Latin, Greek and Tupi, adopted the same tone as Trump mentioned earlier:

We're not here to work for the global order. This is Brazil [...] For a long time, Brazil said what it thought it should say. It was a country that spoke to please the administrators

of the global order. We wanted to be a good student at the school of globalism, and we thought that was everything [...] Globalism is made up of hatred, through its various ideological ramifications and its instruments that are contrary to the nation, contrary to human nature, and contrary to human birth itself. [...] Today we hear that the march of globalism is irreversible. But it is not irreversible. We are going to fight to reverse globalism and push it back to its starting point (Araújo, 2019).

As much as he claimed to defend Brazil, Ernesto Araújo started from the premise that Brazil was part of a broader identity macro-structure, Western civilization, in line with the definition of globalism presented earlier in this chapter. An example of this was the change that the chancellor made to the Rio Branco Institute's curriculum, introducing "Classics" subjects and removing subjects on Latin America and Brazilian diplomatic history. Diplomatic training should include the study of the canons of Western culture, such as Dante Alighieri, Sophocles, Miguel de Cervantes and John Milton. In order to defend Brazil, in Ernesto Araújo's view, the diplomats should know the civilizational matrix of which Brazil was supposedly a part. Ernesto also changed the organization chart of Itamaraty, introducing a sub-secretariat dedicated to "national sovereignty," vigilant against the globalist threat.

Under the auspices of Ernesto Araújo, the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation, an institution linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dedicated to promoting cultural and educational activities in the field of international relations and Brazil's diplomatic history, organized a seminar entitled "Globalism." In addition to Ernesto Araújo, who gave the event's inaugural lecture, and the Presidency's International Advisor, Filipe Martins — who defended the thesis that globalism is an existing phenomenon, not a conspiracy theory —, the seminar was attended by several bloggers and influencers from the new Brazilian right (FUNAG, 2020). The various speakers who took part in the event painted globalism as an enemy of Brazil and Western values and defended a foreign policy that would resist the onslaughts of the globalist elites.

Contrary to the diplomatic tradition of making the first visit to Argentina, Bolsonaro's first international trip was to the USA. The start of the tour was marked by a dinner at the Embassy of Brazil, a celebration in honor of Olavo de Carvalho, considered the intellectual mentor of the Bolsonaro movement and who has been hailed as the main architect of Brazil's "conservative revolution."

During the diplomatic meeting, Brazil was designated as an important non-NATO ally, a status that offers advantages, especially in the acquisition of military equipment, similar to those granted to countries like Argentina, Australia, Japan and South Korea. In addition, an agreement was reached for the use of the Alcântara Base, allowing companies with US technology to launch satellites and rockets, in exchange for payment to Brazil and the guarantee of protection against espionage.

Other commitments included Brazil's unilateral visa exemption for tourists from the US, Canada, Australia and Japan, without reciprocity from the US. US support for Brazil's entry into the OECD was also secured, which would require Brazil to adapt to pro-market policies, as well as environmental and LGBTQIA+ minority commitments, which did not please the anti-globalist core. In addition, Brazil agreed to establish a quota for wheat imports from the US, causing discomfort in Argentina, and renounced special treatment in the WTO as part of the agreement for US support for OECD membership, giving up advantages intended for developing nations (Magalhães, 2019).

Bolsonaro's second international destination was Israel, fulfilling an itinerary that reveals much about Brazil's insertion into a Judeo-Christian civilizational axis. Although Brazil's unprecedented automatic alliance with Israel can be understood from the exponential increase in Brazil's evangelical population, it can also be interpreted as part of an anti-globalist agenda.

Two fundamental reasons underpin the anti-globalist core's unconditional support for Israel. Firstly, the perception of international relations from a civilizational perspective, where the existence of the West depends on the preservation of the Judeo-Christian connection,

supposedly threatened by globalism. On the other hand, a situational aspect of the Brazil-Israel alliance, promoted by the anti-globalists, focuses on the figure of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, seen as a leader in the fight against globalism. According to Filipe Martins, an advisor to the President, Brazil should recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, positioning the country's nationalism as an anti-globalist paradigm, a model for the protection of national sovereignty and opposition to the undue influences of the globalists. Thus, once again mimicking Trump, Bolsonaro promised in his election campaign to move the Embassy of Brazil from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. However, the economic interests of the agro-export sector and security concerns ended up weighing on the Brazilian government's decision to keep the Embassy in Tel Aviv.

In this way, the automatic alliance with Israel serves a domestic political base, the evangelicals, and an ideological imaginary of the new Brazilian right. This led the Bolsonaro government to choose Israel as the second destination of its official trips. There were high expectations that Bolsonaro would announce the transfer of the Embassy of Brazil to Jerusalem, but this did not happen. And it didn't happen because the decision would displease the rural caucus and the military core of the government.

Hostile to international organizations and seen as a den of unelected bureaucrats, in 2019 Brazil withdrew from the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. However, unlike the US, which has astonishing structural power and is less vulnerable to international pressure, Brazilian foreign policy did not abandon international organizations. Nevertheless, during the Bolsonaro administration, Brazil accumulated R\$ 4.6 billion in debts to international organizations such as the UN, WTO, OAS, WHO, among others, compromising its participation in multilateral forums (Máximo, 2024). And whenever it had the chance, the Brazilian government endorsed Trump's criticism of the UN or the WHO (Maia, 2021).

During the pandemic, Bolsonaro's foreign policy followed Trump in blaming China for the spread of COVID-19 and the global technocrat

elites for overestimating the health crisis. In addition, both Trump and Bolsonaro bet on hydroxychloroquine as a populist panacea to confront the global technocracy, which in the radical right's narrative was described as a group made up of Big Pharma, scientists, academics, the professional media, artists who adhered to social isolation measures. As Casarões and Magalhães (2021, 207) state:

Trump and Bolsonaro have been able to fully exert the strategies and performances of medical populism. They have persistently touted hydroxychloroquine in spite of feeble scientific evidence, in an attempt to garner and secure political support by pitting the masses (or "the people") against doctors, mainstream scientists, and public health authorities (or "the establishment").

These are some examples that illustrate how anti-globalist ideology has driven many of Brazil's foreign policy decisions, reinforcing the alliance between Trump and Bolsonaro in favor of an illiberal order for international relations.

Final remarks

Under Bolsonaro and Trump, anti-globalist ideology became a central pillar of Brazil's and the US's foreign policies. Both governments saw globalism as a threat to national sovereignty and traditional values, impacting strategic decisions and international alliances, such as the Brazil-US partnership itself. Antagonism to globalism was a rhetorical and practical tool, shaping the governments' approach to multilateral institutions and international agreements.

As we have seen, in various instances, both Trump and Bolsonaro challenged the paradigms of global cooperation, opting for policies that prioritized immediate national interests to the detriment of multilateral diplomacy. This movement reinforced a narrative of confrontation with what they perceived as globalist influences, affecting trade agreements, strategic partnerships and positions in international forums.

The anti-globalist stance also highlighted the symbolic value of political actions. Decisions such as the US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and Brazil's ambiguous stance on the same issue, transcended pragmatic politics, reflecting an ideological identification with Westernism and a rejection of perceived globalist impositions. Thus, Bolsonaro and Trump not only formulated policies based on an antiglobalist perspective, but also used this vision to solidify their domestic political bases and project an image o1f resistance on the international stage.

Finally, the story of Don Quijote offers a metaphor for foreign policy under the influence of anti-globalist ideology. Just as the ingenious nobleman saw giants in windmills, driven by his perceptions and convictions, leaders like Bolsonaro and Trump have shaped their foreign policies based on a vision in the image of globalism. This episode highlights the critical importance of perception in diplomacy and international relations, where realities are often constructed not only from facts, but also from the beliefs and visions of the actors involved.

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Brazil-United States Bilateral Relations in the Context of the New Right

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Introduction

Bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States have not followed a linear path, nor have they gradually intensified over time. Over the years, they have been marked by periods of cooperation and competition, of special alignment and "benign neglect," of mistrust and strategic alliance, among many other comings and goings of rapprochement and estrangement. However, even at times when US foreign policy was less interested in South America, or when Brazilian foreign policy emphatically called for international action with an autonomist orientation, the bilateral dynamics between the two countries have always been important for both foreign policies.

Recently, with the rise of former Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro, there has been a period of ideological confluence between the two countries. Belonging to what the literature calls the "new global right" (Abrahamsen et al., 2020), the fourth wave of right-wing movements (Mudde, 2019) or even the "radical right" (Mudde, 2019), both Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro have questioned democracy in their respective countries, as well as challenging elements of liberalism, such as human

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rights, minority rights, the gender agenda and the plurality of views, creeds and political opinions. Given this context, it is important to ask ourselves how this confluence has reverberated in bilateral relations, as well as in Brazil's relationship with the hegemonic and hemispheric power.

In this sense, this chapter aims to take stock of the actions adopted by Brazil and the United States in the context of their bilateral relations, at a time when the two Presidents of the so-called "new global right" were overlapping. We argue that the shift to the right produced changes in both the form and content in which Brazil and the United States related to each other and conducted their relations, when compared to the period after re-democratization. Ideological convergence has not helped to reduce asymmetries. On the contrary, the alignment without rewards proposed by Brazilian foreign policy made these asymmetries even more evident.

In methodological terms, we will proceed with a documentary analysis of the four bilateral meetings between the Presidents, during the period from 2019 to 2020, when both Trump and Bolsonaro were in office. Thus, in addition to this introduction and the final considerations, the chapter is divided into two sections. The first provides an overview of bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States, focusing on the post-democratization period. The second, in turn, will go on to analyze the bilateral dynamics between the countries in the 2019-2020 timeframe, based on the documents produced on the occasion of the four meetings between Trump and Bolsonaro.

Brazil and the United States in the post-democratization era

The United States was a constant element in Brazil's diplomatic orientations. As Hirst (2009) argues, it is possible to delineate these relations based on five trends — alliance, alignment, autonomy, adjustment, and affirmation — from which it is possible to identify the degree of rapprochement with the US. Another fundamental debate for understanding the history of relations between the countries is the existence of two paradigms in Brazilian foreign policy: Americanism and globalism (Pinheiro, 2004). While in the Americanist paradigm Brazil understood that close ties with the hegemonic power could bring

it benefits, in the globalist paradigm this relationship was nuanced by the inclusion of new partnerships with a view to achieving greater bargaining power vis-à-vis Washington. As we will see in the next section, the Bolsonaro government could fall under what Pinheiro (2004) called ideological Americanism. Separating the Americanist paradigm into two branches, instrumental Americanism would translate into a pragmatic association with the US, while ideological Americanism would be linked to a sharing of ideas and values, as occurred during the Castelo Branco administration.

From a historical point of view, the start of bilateral dynamics with the Brazilian state was successful. Inspired by the Monroe Doctrine, the United States was the first country in the northern hemisphere to recognize Brazil's independence, always pursuing, as Federico Gil (1989 quoted in Souto Maior, 2001) points out, two main objectives: to "exclude from the western hemisphere extracontinental rival or hostile powers" and to "secure the dominant politico-economic presence of the United States in the region." In this sense, although in circumstances similar to independence US support was fundamental to advancing Brazilian national interests, this relationship has always been marked by the evident asymmetry between the countries and the clash of interests, especially the US quest for preponderance in the region (Souto Maior, 2001). The conflicts, mostly one-off, have revolved over these 200 years of bilateral relations around two main themes: the trade agenda, as in the disputes between Brazil and the United States in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and debates on the multilateral agenda, such as disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and reform of the Security Council (Almeida, 2002).

The end of the Cold War and re-democratization in Brazil posed new challenges for these relations, whether due to the Brazilian perception that the dynamics between Brazil and the United States were no longer conditioned by bipolarity or, on the part of the US, the impossibility of demanding solidarity from the countries of the region in the fight against the communist danger. In this context, one of the main themes that mobilized diplomacy between the two countries was the construction of hemispheric economic integration, via the Free Trade Area of the Americas

(FTAA) project, initially proposed by former President George H. W. Bush (Souto Maior, 2001). Despite the differences in terms of political agenda, both the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and Lula administrations were reluctant to tackle this project. FHC, despite his close relations with former President Clinton and good relations with Washington, questioned "how" the relationship would be established. In his words, Brazil would not accept "just any FTAA" (Marin, 2006), so one of his main concerns was that economic liberalization would harm Brazilian industrial production, among other sectors (Souto Maior, 2001). Lula, on the other hand, was more emphatic in his criticism, refuting the very raison d'être of the FTAA, calling it an "annexation project" (Marin, 2006).

During the first two Lula administrations, Brazil raised the tone in a more autonomist diplomacy, with which it sought to take advantage of the new maneuvering spaces for developing countries. However, relations with the United States remained stable and positive. In addition to the explicit recognition that Brazil is a country with growing international influence, with which Washington must build deep and more effective partnerships (The White House, 2010, 3), these years were marked by presidential visits, the establishment of important agreements, such as the Memorandum of Understanding for the Advancement of Cooperation in Biofuels, in 2007, as well as the creation of the Strategic Partnership, in 2005. From the point of view of the obstacles, in addition to the aforementioned disagreement on economic issues, which lasted throughout the 2000s in the WTO negotiations (Pecequilo, 2010), one of the main events that generated noise between the countries was on the occasion of the nuclear agreement with Iran, in which the United States went back on its support for the Brazilian and Turkish initiative, and decided to maintain sanctions and unilateral actions (Lampreia, 2014).

Also in this period, some of the literature points out that September 11 and the interventions in the War on Terror reduced the US presence in South America, creating a post-hegemonic structure (Hakim, 2006; Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Drezner, 2015). However, recent productions question this argument. Although the region has not been seen as a priority, there has been no reduction in Washington's actions in the region (Milani, 2021). For example, in addition to identifying the South Atlantic

as a region in which US foreign policy should resume its projection, through the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in 2008, the US also strengthened its U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) with the reactivation, also in 2008, of the Fourth Fleet (Pecequilo, 2014).

While at the end of Lula's first two terms in office the cordial relationship between him and former President Obama made bilateral relations more fluid, the same dynamic was not established with the entry of former President Dilma Rousseff. Although several agreements were signed between the countries³ and the Brazil-United States Strategic Dialogue was elevated to presidential level (Pecequilo, 2014), much of the literature points to a reduction in the diplomatic profile adopted by Itamaraty (Pecequilo, 2014; Cornetet, 2014). In this sense, as Pecequilo (2014) points out, the reduction in specific conflicts between the countries was not due to an increase in convergence, but rather to the retraction of diplomacy, which consequently reduced the points of tension between Washington and Brasilia.

In any case, the bilateral dynamics between Brazil and the US, with Rousseff and Obama at the helm of their respective countries, remained structurally sound. The National Security Agency (NSA) spying scandal in relation to Brazil and the former President caused a stir in bilateral relations, especially with the cancellation of Rousseff's presidential visit to the US in 2013, but there was no break between the countries. In retrospect, the 1990s and 2000s showed a clear maturing of these relations (Almeida, 2002), so it is not surprising that the governments that succeeded Rousseff and Obama sought to follow a similar macro project. As we will see in the next section, the big surprise in the bilateralism between Bolsonaro and Trump was both in content and form.

³ Among other examples, it is worth mentioning the Global Partnership Dialogue between Brazil and the United States in 2012, the Strategic Dialogue on Energy, and trilateral agreements between Brazil, the United States and Central American, Caribbean and African countries on issues such as combating HIV/AIDS, forced and child labor, drug trafficking, as well as cooperation to protect the environment and guarantee food security.

Bolsonaro and Trump: Brazilian foreign policy and bilateral relations

Throughout his presidential campaign, former President Bolsonaro emphasized not only relations with the United States, but above all with Donald Trump's United States, highlighting his admiration for the former US President and enjoying the nickname "Trump of the tropics." The identification that Bolsonaro's foreign policy, especially in his relations with the US, was an unprecedented event in the history of Brazilian foreign policy is almost a consensus in the literature (Gonçalves and Teixeira, 2020; Saraiva and Silva, 2019; Moll Neto and Ioris, 2023). This can be found in Brazil's stance as an international pariah (Thomaz and Vigevani, 2023; Araújo, 2020), in the lack of reciprocity in relation to concessions made to the US, especially in strategic sectors for Brazil (Thomaz and Vigevani, 2023; Berringer et al., 2021; Moll Neto and Ioris, 2023), in a foreign policy that did not serve national interests (Velasco, 2019) in the turn to the extreme right (Guimarães et al., 2023; Casarões and Farias, 2022; Saraiva and Silva, 2019) and, following US foreign policy, in questioning multilateralism (Motta and Succi Junior, 2023).

Although we can relate this moment in Brazilian diplomacy to Castelo Branco's ideological Americanist foreign policy (Pinheiro, 2004), Velasco (2019) points out that there was a "break, yes, but the cut made is much longer and deeper: it not only separates us from the foreign policy of the post-democratization period, but from the historical tradition of Brazilian diplomacy." In this sense, the unprecedented accession had an impact not only on bilateral dynamics, but on Brazilian foreign policy as a whole. Called "almost completely automatic and uncritical" (Gonçalves and Teixeira, 2020), "explicit passive subordination" (Berringer et al. 2021) and even an illiberal bandwagon (Masukata, 2023; Spektor and Fasolin, 2018), the "new foreign policy" proposed by former Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo sought to distance Brazil from "globalism," giving diplomacy a "moral compass" (Araújo, 2019a) that could liberate "Brazil through truth" (Araújo, 2019b) and eliminate the "civilizational indifference" (Araújo, 2019a) that existed in Brazil's post-Baron of Rio Branco foreign policy.

In this way, some of Bolsonaro's foreign policy inflections can be understood in light of the relationship he and his Foreign Minister have established with Trump's United States, such as the adoption of an antigender agenda (Selis and Prado, 2021; Simioni and Kyrillos, 2024), the reformulation of the human rights agenda to adopt "real human rights" (Milani and Motta, 2023; Araújo, 2019c, 1) and the questioning of climate change and the need to protect the environment (Casarões and Flemes, 2019). While these changes may reflect a broad convergence of Trump and Bolsonaro with the "new right," in their proposal for a conservative foreign policy, the actions adopted by Brazilian diplomacy in relation to Israel and Venezuela are illustrative of an inflection that occurred mainly because of this alignment.

Concerning Israel, although both countries reiterated their commitment to peace in the Middle East (MRE, 2020e), on the occasion of the fourth bilateral meeting between Trump and Bolsonaro in 2020, an initiative by Washington that contributed to heightening animosities in the region was the move of the Embassy of the US to Jerusalem in 2018. In the wake of this decision, former President Bolsonaro stated on his Twitter account and to the conservative newspaper *Israel Hayom* that he would follow in the footsteps of the United States and Guatemala, fulfilling his campaign promise to move the Embassy of Brazil to Jerusalem (G1, 2018a).

In relation to Venezuela, both countries reiterated their support for the self-proclaimed President of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó (MRE, 2019a; Trump, 2019f; MRE, 2020e; The American Presidency Project, 2020a). While unilateral meddling in the region's affairs is nothing new in US foreign policy, Brazilian diplomacy has historically sought dialogue on South and Latin American problems in multilateral regional forums, based on the constitutional principles of self-determination of peoples and the defense of democracy (Brazil, 1988). In addition to this initiative, both governments discussed the possibility of intervention in Venezuela. In Ernesto Araújo's subsequent trips to meet Michael Pompeo, US Secretary of State, and John Bolton, national security advisor, both of whom favored intervention, the United States pressured Brazil to adopt greater

"military incisiveness," even offering, in exchange, a military cooperation package similar to the one directed at Colombia (Gielow, 2019).

When asked by reporters after his meeting with Trump what Brazil's position would be in a possible US-led military intervention, Bolsonaro replied that he could not give details about his strategies, because if they became public they would lose their tactical value (The American Presidency Project, 2019f). The dubiousness of Bolsonaro's speech left it open, at that moment, whether Brazil would remain faithful to another of its constitutional principles, that of non-intervention (Brazil, 1988). Although the intervention did not take place, largely due to the reticence of the Brazilian military, both support for Guaidó and the failure to immediately reject the interventionist option illustrate that alignment with the United States has produced changes in form and content in Brazilian foreign policy.

Although we agree that ideological convergence has not structurally redefined bilateral relations, which remain marked by asymmetry (Moll Neto and Ioris, 2023), we argue in this chapter, based on documentary analysis of the bilateral meetings between Trump and Bolsonaro, that convergence to the right in both countries has produced changes in both the form and content in which Brazil and the United States have related and conducted their relations, when compared to the period after re-democratization. For the documentary research, repositories of official documents from each country were used in order to find files that mentioned bilateral meetings, encounters or agreements. The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) was used to search the archives of the Brazilian government. For the collection of US documents, two platforms were used: The American Presidency Project, a non-governmental project of the University of Santa Barbara that seeks to compile presidential documents, and the website of the US State Department, specifically the archived part from 2017 to 2021.

The keywords used in the websites' search engines were "Trump" and "Bolsonaro," "Ernesto Araújo" and "Michael Pompeo," "United States" and "Brazil," and the year filter (2019-2020) was applied when available. The collection was done manually by reading the documents and searching

for the theme that was consistent with the objective of the work, i.e. if it mentioned any type of bilateral meeting, agreement or measure that was the result of these meetings. In total, 84 official documents were collected, 50 from Brazil and 34 from the US, including notes, joint communiqués, speeches, press conferences, lectures, interventions, and statements. After this first stage, in which we carried out an exploratory reading, we went on to select the documents. As the focus of the research is the bilateral meetings between Trump and Bolsonaro and their aftermath, we excluded all documents from meetings between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister, as well as speeches and press releases from them that were not directly related to what was discussed by the Presidents. This left 25 documents, 14 Brazilian and 11 American, which make up our corpus of analysis. As a second step, we carried out a new detailed reading of the 25 documents, based on a qualitative and content analysis, seeking to identify the main topics discussed, the agreed actions, convergences, and divergences in the bilateral dynamics, as well as elements of the Bolsonaro administration's foreign policy that, above all because of the ideological alignment with Trump, differed from the history of post-democratization Brazilian foreign policy.

Bolsonaro and Trump met bilaterally four times: a visit by Bolsonaro to the US as soon as he was elected in 2019; a quick meeting before the G20 Summit in Osaka, Japan; a meeting during the 74th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA); and a second trip by Bolsonaro to the US in early 2020. However, no documents were found relating to the meeting that took place during the UNGA. It seems that it was a brief private meeting, which is why only the other three meetings and their respective outcomes were analyzed.

In general, the documents indicate that relations between Bolson-aro and Trump have always been very cordial and respectful, with a real appearance of reciprocity. Both mentioned on several occasions that Brazil and the US had never been closer and that this was due to their friendship and shared interests and ideals (The American Presidency Project, 2019a; 2019b; 2019e; 2019f; 2020b). According to Bolsonaro,

⁴ This was the last bilateral face-to-face meeting between the Presidents, just days before the World Health Organization characterized COVID-19 as a pandemic.

this moment in the relationship would be both the maintenance of a tradition and a novelty. The former President presented himself as the representative of a counterpoint to the "anti-Americanism" that supposedly defined relations between Brazil and the United States for decades and prevented the real potential of the partnership from being achieved (The American Presidency Project, 2019f). This element is one of the fundamental pillars for understanding not only the alignment between the countries proposed by Brazil, but also the nickname given by former Minister Ernesto Araújo to the foreign policy of the period: "new foreign policy." Among other elements, the "new" referred to the resumption of the partnership with the USA abandoned during the PT governments.

The very word "reciprocity" was used by Trump during a joint press conference to describe the countries' bilateral relations, a word that was later questioned by a reporter when he asked what Brazil would receive in return for all its concessions to the US (The American Presidency Project, 2019f). One of the moments in which the deference embedded in this aura of reciprocity became evident was when former President Bolsonaro waived visa requirements for American tourists, an initiative that was not reciprocated by Trump. After the first meeting, there was only a communiqué in which both agreed to take the necessary steps for Brazil to participate in Global Entry,⁵ a program that allows pre-approved travelers to enter the US, but does not replace the need for a visa (MRE, 2019a; 2019d; 2019e; The American Presidency Project, 2019b).

Brazil's non-inclusion on the former US President's diplomatic travel route can also be analyzed in the light of the asymmetries that exist in this alleged reciprocity. Trump was the first US President in more than 40 years not to include Brazil in his diplomatic trips, causing a certain strangeness, especially given the unprecedentedly close relationship that Trump and Bolsonaro claimed to have. The US President came to South America only once to attend the G20 summit in Argentina in 2018 (G1, 2018b).

Broadly speaking, the main themes discussed between the Presidents during the bilateral meetings revolved around the following topics:

⁵ Brazil was only accepted into the program in 2022.

security, defense, science and technology, trade, and political issues in Latin America. Other topics were also mentioned during the talks, such as energy and the environment, but they were not the focus of the bilateral relationship. Throughout our analysis, we were able to observe that, at first glance, the results of the relationship were mostly mechanisms for debate and dialogue.⁶

These themes are considered commonplace when analyzing the past of Brazilian foreign policy, especially in the relationship between Brazil and the United States. Trade, defense, and security issues and debates about Latin America have permeated previous governments, as this chapter shows. However, during the period in which the Bolsonaro administration and the Trump administration overlapped, there were some changes in the content of these debates.

With regard to trade, one of the main topics discussed between Trump and Bolsonaro was Brazil's entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Brazil applied for membership in 2017, during Michel Temer's administration, but participation became a focus of the Bolsonaro administration, which saw this initiative as a great opportunity for Brazil's development and to demonstrate the country's importance globally (Folha de S. Paulo, 2019). According to Ernesto Araújo, taking part in the OECD also meant "choosing a model of society" that would come from adhering to the parameters of political and economic freedom preached by the organization and its member countries, which, for him, are examples of economic and civilizational values due to the position they occupy globally (MRE, 2019d; 2020f; 2020a).

Thus, participation in the OECD was considered a "strategy of national reconstruction and insertion in the world," in order to reposition Brazil in the international sphere, dialoguing primarily with the more developed countries of the Global North (MRE, 2020a; 2020f). In previous times, Brazilian foreign policy sought strategies to diversify and expand Brazilian partnerships, strengthening relations with developing or underdeveloped countries, and identified it as important to maintain

⁶ For example, the proposal to create the Brazil-US Innovation Forum; the creation of the Brazil-US Energy Forum; and the deepening of the Brazil-US Permanent Security Forum and the Brazil-US Senior Executives Forum.

the position of a developing country within the WTO, as this gave it some privileges, such as "special conditions to close free trade agreements" (Laporta and Trevizan, 2019). During the Bolsonaro administration, however, this status was abandoned precisely so that the country could join the OECD.

It is worth mentioning that, before applying for membership, Brazil already had key partner status in the OECD and could voluntarily join any of the Organization's instruments, as well as participate in all its bodies and ministerial meetings (Azzi, 2021). The model of society mentioned by Araújo was linked to a different political and economic concept, based on a liberalizing project and the intense opening up of the Brazilian economy. To this end, domestic policy measures such as the labor and social security reforms, the establishment of the spending ceiling and the privatization project are closely linked to the aim of belonging to the richest countries club.

From the US point of view, Trump considered the Brazilian request to be a "laudable goal" and, during bilateral meetings, he constantly reaffirmed his support. In fact, when asked by a reporter if he would continue to support the Brazilian initiative even though the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) was against such an action, Trump maintained the same answer (The American Presidency Project, 2019f).

Despite this verbal support, there have been no concrete US actions to help Brazil achieve this goal. Furthermore, in October 2019, a letter addressed to the OECD Secretary-General was leaked in which Michael Pompeo only supported the entry of Argentina and Romania into the organization, without mentioning the Brazilian candidacy (Folha de S. Paulo, 2019). This fueled rumors that the US did not in fact support Brazil's application, which Pompeo refuted the same day by publishing a note on the State Department's website. He stated that the content of the letter did not represent the country's real interests, since the United States was enthusiastic about Brazil's entry into the OECD, supporting its continued efforts and reforms towards this goal (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2022).

Trump, for his part, took a stand and said that the news about the letter was "fake news" and recalled that the joint communiqué from the first meeting with Bolsonaro demonstrated the US government's "total support" for the Brazilian candidacy (Adghirni and Sink, 2019). In addition, he pledged to make an even greater effort to assist Brazil and, at the next bilateral meeting in March 2020, he once again reaffirmed his support (MRE, 2020e; The American Presidency Project, 2020a).

Another important topic in trade relations between the countries was the Brazil-United States Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (ATEC). This commitment, first established in 2011 at the beginning of the Dilma administration, created the Brazil-United States Commission for Economic and Trade Relations with a view to bilaterally discussing trade and investment issues (MRE, 2011). The update made during the partnership between Trump and Bolsonaro was called the Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency. It was made official a few months after the fourth bilateral meeting between the Presidents, but only came into force in 2022 (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2022; MRE, 2020c; 2020d; 2020b).

In this proposal, three new areas were added to the agreement: Trade Facilitation and Customs Administration; Good Regulatory Practices; and Anti-Corruption. According to the Brazilian government, the aim was to create a more favorable context for receiving investments and to help reinsert Brazil into the international economy in a competitive manner (MRE, 2020g). According to a note from the MRE, one of the main aims of this update was to lay the foundations for "a broad trade agreement to be negotiated in the future" between the countries (MRE, 2020b; 2020c).

On the subject of defense, one of the most prominent issues was the designation of Brazil⁷ as an extra-NATO ally by the US, in which Trump declared his intention to make Brazil a strategic military partner from the first meeting with Bolsonaro (MRE, 2019a; The American Presidency Project, 2019b). Then, in May 2019, he notified Congress (The American Presidency Project, 2019d) and in July the official designation took place (The American Presidency Project, 2019c). In the press conferences,

⁷ Before Brazil, Argentina was the only country in Latin America to hold the title (G1, 2019).

Trump justified the action by saying that the relationship with Brazil was great and that the appointment would be a thank you for the Brazilian partnership, as well as recognition for President Bolsonaro and an advance in security and cooperation for the relationship between the countries (The American Presidency Project, 2019e; 2019f). For Brazil, this meant not only a rapprochement in these areas, but also the possibility of obtaining military assistance, access to defense research and technologies, joint training, and easier acquisition of military and defense materials and equipment. However, these expectations may have been dashed, since such cooperation in security and defense would need to be negotiated within the already existing institutional mechanisms, something that was not verified after the announcement (MRE, 2019b). Furthermore, designation as a non-NATO member, in addition to not obliging the United States to transfer any type of defense technology to Brazil, may also be more favorable to the US counterpart, since Brazilian access to materials and equipment contributes to the exports of its war industry.

The signing of the Technological Safeguards Agreement (TSA), which regulates the commercial use of the Alcântara Space Center (CEA), was also considered by the Bolsonaro government to be a breakthrough in the bilateral partnership with the United States. The agreement had been under negotiation for twenty years and was even signed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, but was then blocked by Congress (Brant, 2019; Dias, 2019). The main problem that resulted in it not being approved was the perception that it infringed on Brazilian sovereignty. Initially, in addition to establishing total secrecy over the equipment and technologies used by the US at the Alcântara base, Brazil would be barred from accessing various areas of the base. More recently, Temer made an effort to close the deal, but approval only came with the Bolsonaro government (Coletta, 2019).

A safeguards agreement is designed to protect the technology, in this case aerospace technology, used by countries so that it is not copied or used without permission. Currently, the agreement signed by Trump and Bolsonaro also allows the launch of rockets and satellites that contain US technology in their launches, as long as Brazil protects US technology. This was a mandatory condition for the use of the CEA by any country

wishing to make space launches. In addition, no country is allowed to launch missiles, including the US, because Brazil is a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which aims to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Brazil, 2019).

In addition to these objectives, one of the positive sides of the agreement defended by the Brazilian government was the possibility of using the Brazilian Space Center commercially. However, according to the agreement, Brazil could not use the income from renting the base to invest in its own space program (Brazil-USA, 2019). Thus, although the agreement makes it possible for Brazil to launch rockets and satellites from any country that contains some US technology component, which is the case with most of the world's space equipment, the Brazilian Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) project does not benefit directly, especially since there is no technology transfer clause in the TSA.

According to the Bolsonaro government, the agreement could allow for the future construction and launch of a satellite developed jointly by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Brazilian Space Agency (MRE, 2019c). In any case, the set of restrictions accepted in the TSA do not seem to stand up to the promises of future gains. In addition to allowing "access to Restricted Areas" to be "controlled by the Government of the United States of America or, as authorized [...] by U.S. Licensees" (Brazil-U.S., 2019), the TSA could also weaken the already existing aerospace partnership with China. Since 1988, both countries have partnered to build advanced remote sensing satellites, called the CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite) Program (CBERS, 2018). In addition, the TSA prevents the entry into Alcântara of any equipment, labor, and technology from countries that are not signatories to the MTCR, a regime of which China is not a member.

In a press conference, Trump expressed his satisfaction with the agreement and mentioned that one of his goals as president was to revive the US space legacy (MRE, 2019a; The American Presidency Project, 2019b). By enabling ballistic launches closer to the Equator, the TSA allows the United States to reduce costs, especially with fuel, and to be more competitive with European countries, which use bases in French

Guiana, which is further from the Equator than Alcântara (Thomaz et al., 2021).

Concluding remarks

Bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States have a history of closeness, especially with the maturation of the 1990s onwards. However, the convergence between the Presidents of the new global right, Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, has produced changes in the dynamics between the countries. Fostered above all by Bolsonaro, the inherent asymmetry between the countries has not only become more evident, but more serious. From the point of view of form, Brazilian foreign policy has adopted a tone of uncritical adoration of the United States and its former President, seeking bilateral ties not as a means to achieve national benefits, but as an end in itself. Like a child who admires their favorite superhero, the Bolsonaro government's foreign policy sought recognition from Western civilization, via the United States, to validate Brazil in the world.

In terms of content, some of the initiatives presented as the government's main achievements — Brazil's entry into the OECD, the extra-NATO alliance and the Technological Safeguards Agreement — had either already been considered previously or were the result of negotiations begun under the previous government. From this point of view, some analysts may argue that there has been no change in Brazilian foreign policy, but rather continuity in relation to the political-economic project put forward by the Temer government. However, we have argued throughout the chapter that the ideological link has also produced an inflection in terms of content. Unlike in previous periods, the maxim of any foreign policy has been broken: guaranteeing national rewards and interests.

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US and Brazil in Lula's Governments (2003-2010, 2023-Current): Thinking About a Partnership

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Introduction

Brazil-US relations need to be seen as structural in the making of Brazilian foreign policy, linked to the discussions regarding alignment and autonomy, pragmatism and idealism, rapprochement and distancing. Envisioned as a priority in Brazil's international relations due to its political, cultural, social, and strategic relevance, this partnership had become, as it evolved, even more complex. Such complexity is not always clearly understood and reflects both the proximity and divergences between these two hemispheric nations, resulting from changes in their relative power in the global balance of power and their internal political dynamics. In Brazil, considering the domestic debate, it is still a source of polarization and Manichaeism that cast shadows on the characteristics of this cooperation which involves two powers whose interests will converge and diverge. Given this reality, one of the most symbolic presidencies of these multiple dynamics is that of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in his two cycles as head of the Brazilian government: 2003 to 2010 and 2023-current.

To evaluate these cycles, the text is divided into two sections, added to this Introduction, Final Thoughts and References: "Changing Partners: A Complex Relation (2003/2010)" and "Lula 3, Year 1: Conjuncture and Perspectives (2023)." The aim is to help both countries find paths to enhance their strength, and those that allow them to face separate

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challenges without this being seen as conflict. After all, this is a partnership between nations that are equal, but different, in their projection and resources, history and traditions, visions of the South and North, but always close due to their values.

Changing partners: a complex relation (2003/2010)

Over a decade after its end, Lula's first presidential cycle in Brasilia, composed by two mandates, 2003-2006 and 2007-2010, is still the object of studies. As if there were a continuous timeline between these administrations, several of these studies extend to his third term. However, there is a real gap between 2011 and 2022, a period in which Lula was not in power, with Brazil experiencing a "lost decade."

The concept was created to portray the 1980s in a Latin America immersed in the debt crisis, pressured by the end of military regimes and the difficult processes of post-authoritarian re-democratization, and later became a synonym to define periods of low economic growth and stagnation. The new coronavirus pandemic from 2019 to 2021 only worsened this socioeconomic scenario.

During this decade, the presidency was held by Lula's immediate successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), whose second term ended after an impeachment process based on accusations of corruption. Such accusations have affected the Workers' Party (PT) since the end of the Lula administration in the form of *Mensalão*, extending to Operation Lava Jato. Lula was arrested and prevented from running for president in 2018 because of these investigations and was later acquitted. In 2022, he was able to run again for the presidential chair and took office in 2023.

Dilma's government was characterized by the relative continuity of Lula's foreign and social policy, as well as for adjustments to the economic model (Bastos and Hiratuka, 2020). Even though she was re-elected in 2014, Dilma faced difficulties and protests (mostly in 2013). After the impeachment she was succeeded by her Vice-President Michel Temer

² Not all these studies will be discussed, due to the length of the text. The goal is to generate thought. Check Pecequilo, 2012 and https://unifesp.academia.edu/CristinaPecequilo for additional material on bilateral relations.

(2016-2018) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022).³ These two governments had external and internal projects that were different from The Workers' Party administrations.

With regard to Brazil-US relations, there was a mediated-pragmatic alignment during Dilma-Temer — with clashes during Dilma, linked to the spying accusations attributed to the *National Security Agency* (NSA) — an automatic automatic realignment of Bolsonaro-Trump (2019-2020) and non-alignment Bolsonaro-Biden (2021). Therefore, the decade shows alternating imbalances in the South-South and North-South axes, with the instrumentalization of the external sector to overcome sequential Brazilian crises (Pecequilo, 2021).

At this point, a more attentive reader may be questioning: but isn't this a text about Lula's governmental cycles and its bilateral relations with the US? For sure, but this contextualization is needed to explain the differences between the two Lula's cycles and the impacts of this decade on the nation's foreign policy and the Brazil-US agenda.

As the title of this section indicates, this is a period of change. The transition of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (FHC's) government to Lula's represents the transformation of the external paradigm. Since 1999, FHC was already updating his agenda by criticizing asymmetric globalization, searching for a rapprochement with South America based on the South American Regional Integration of Infrastructure project (IIRSA), launched during the South American Countries Summit in Brasilia, and by enhancing the partnership with emerging countries such as China, India, and Russia. However, the foreign policy logic was North-South.

This movement, more tactical than strategic, was produced by situations such as the exhaustion of Latin America neoliberal projects, the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the US, and the Eurasian crisis linked to them, such as the Global War on Terror (GWOT), including the Afghanistan War in 2001 (the Iraq War started in 2003, already in Lula's term). Internally, the situation was challenging, in a scenario of economic stagnation, slow growth, unemployment and well-known problems: income distribution

³ Regarding these periods, Farias and Alves (2020); and Hirst and Pereira (2022) can be cited.

inequality and difficult access to basic goods of food security, health, housing, and education.

In January 2003, Lula took office in a situation of national, regional, and global vulnerability. He came into power amid internal and external fears that Brazil would suffer a radicalization process, due to his labor union past and the Workers' Party, with ties with controversial politicians such as Fidel Castro (Cuba) and Hugo Chávez (Venezuela). These alliances would be preserved in a pragmatic manner and would continue to be the focus of political criticism by the opposition.

The hemispheric context corresponds to the rise to power of left-wing and center-left governments in Latin America, a process known as the "Pink Wave" (Chodor, 2015). Not only Lula or Chávez represented this "turn" to the left, but also Evo Morales (Bolivia), Nestor Kirchner (Argentina), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Michele Bachelet (Chile), among others. Regardless of these polarizations, the Lula, and these other administrations, brought changes to the political-economic and social model adopted by their predecessors.

Therefore, it is this set of changes that affected relations with the USA and Brazil's position in the world. But what were the priorities adopted by Lula? As Pinheiro and Lima (2018) point out, Lula focused on a foreign policy of autonomy, of transforming the country's relative position in the global balance of power, prioritizing the South-South axis, with the recovery of agendas associated with development, the fight against inequality, and social reforms.

Foreign policy overlapped with domestic policy. In a trade-off, it was necessary to change from the inside out, allowing the construction of a more just society, and from the outside in, seeking political, economic, and social partnerships that would allow Brazil to reach a new level of modernization. Such partnerships would be more productive with southern countries, due to their common difficulties and to the growing strategic relevance of Russia, India and China — the BRICs as of 2009 (BRICS after South Africa joined in 2011).

Comparing several periods, Pinheiro and Lima (2018) emphasize that, in addition to Lula's cycle 1, periods of autonomy only occurred on

three other occasions: the first Vargas Era (1930-1945), the Independent Foreign Policy (1961-1964) and the Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism (1974-1979).⁴ Any other use of the notion of autonomy, "autonomy through integration," "autonomy through exclusion" is misleading as it does not represent effective autonomy.

It is not our goal deepen this discussion. We only intend to pinpoint what is central to the effects on the bilateral relationship with the US: Lula's foreign policy, called by Ambassador Celso Amorim, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, as assertive and active (Amorim, 2015), sought and achieved concrete autonomy, repositioning Brazil in the international system. The question is not whether there was autonomy, it is assumed that there was. Why did this autonomy generate changes in the dynamics of exchange with the US? Why was it so easily deconstructed?

Regarding the first question, the answer derives from the concept of autonomy. That is, with greater Brazilian projection and changes in its system of alliances and relative power, there tend to be more frequent clashes of interests with the US. This is a normal dynamic of power struggles among nations, as meetings at negotiating tables become more frequent and one of the partners appears less reactive, presenting proposals and requests.

It is important to remember that this is not a one-way process. It was not only Brazil that changed, but also the US and other countries on the South and North axes. On the US side, the period from 2003 to 2010 corresponded to the Republican presidencies of George W. Bush (2001-2008) and the Democratic terms of Barack Obama (2009-2016). Furthermore, the first decade of the 21st century was marked by the aforementioned GWOT, and the priority given to Eurasia.

The power vacuum in Latin America was a reality. The process of securitization of the regional agenda was expanded, based on themes such as transnational terrorism (see the case of the Triple Border) and narcoterrorism (as an addition to the traditional war on drugs in South America with Plan Colombia). Between 2004 and 2008, the Fourth Fleet of the South Atlantic was reactivated, investments in the Southern Military

⁴ For Brazilian foreign policy studies check Cervo and Bueno, 2002; Ricupero, 2017; and Visentini, 2020.

Command increased, and the African Military Command (USAFRICOM) was created. If the 1990s were known for US economic proposals to Latin America such as the Initiative for the Americas (IA), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), this period was characterized by a focus on security and defense.

This focus was not only related to the GWOT, but to changes in the hemispheric scenario due to the growing presence of left-wing and center-left governments and the increase in integration projects proposed by Brazil and Venezuela. In the case of Brazil, the South American foreign policy identity was emphasized by the continuity of IIRSA, the revitalization of MERCOSUR and the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). These actions aimed at political-strategic and economic development, seeking to strengthen South America as a projection platform, as represented by the little-remembered and littleknown South America-Arab Countries and South America-Africa Summits and the negotiations with the European Union. In 2010, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) would also be created. None of these arrangements were confrontational with the US, but rather soft balancing movements.⁵ In contrast, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), proposed by Chávez's Venezuela, was associated with the agenda of 21st century socialism and an inflammatory rhetoric against hegemony.

Another phenomenon was China's growing presence in the hemisphere, reinforcing its bilateral partnerships. In just over a decade, China has become the largest single trading partnership of many countries (including Brazil), and other emerging nations such as Russia and India have expanded their system of local alliances. Coalitions of variable geometry such as the BRICS, IBAS (India, Brazil, South Africa), the increase in South-South Cooperation (with the resumption of African and Middle Eastern politics), are examples.

⁵ Soft balancing is based on diplomatic character movements (variable design coalitions), in social, economic, and cultural issues, that are not related to an agenda of political-military confrontation with the US (Walt, 2006).

Another change was generated by the 2008 global crisis, which affected the US and the European Union, strengthening emerging countries. This recession was followed by trends still present in the domestic and foreign policies of States: right-wing conservative, polarized and radical responses to the crisis, supported by nationalist and xenophobic agendas. Simultaneously, three factors prevail: de-concentration of power, tendency towards multipolarity and hegemonic transition.

The combination of these factors had increased points of contact between Brazil and the US, with Brazil assuming a more assertive position and with greater projection in strategic geopolitical theaters, such as the Middle East and more resistance on the geoeconomic board. If on the one hand this dynamic leads to the US recognizing a new regional and global role for Brazil (Rice, 2008; Obama Whitehouse, 2010), on the other, it reflects a new balance of power that needs to be incorporated by both partners in their political calculations.

On the North American side, there is a need to understand this Brazilian presence in new arenas, while on the Brazilian side, there is the importance of understanding that this dynamic will not always be accepted without challenge by the US. One of the most illustrative points of diverging visions (in addition to the cases that will be listed) is the Brazilian request for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Despite there being a perception that Brazil has an important role, the US does not formally support the country, as it does with India and Japan, which is perceived with reticence by Brazil. Both the United States and Brazil could find new bilateral negotiation standards that might lead to their mutual accommodation of demands-expectations in the 21st century context.

When mechanisms of mutual adaptation are not well-balanced, the trend is that confrontations appear more clearly, even if there is convergence in divergences. In a non-exhaustive list, what were the convergences and divergences between the Lula-George W. Bush-Obama administrations?

Starting with convergences (and convergences in divergences), the processes of regional mediation in Latin America can be listed. Venezuela and Cuba are the most prominent topics, as well as the search for greater economic stability and development through integration projects. Relevant issues on the Lula-G. W. Bush agenda were the establishment of the Strategic Partnership (2005) and energy, especially ethanol. The proactivity of the Lula administration in the human rights and environmental agenda appears in the Lula-Obama overlap, as well as in welfare policies associated with gender equality, and the examples of *Fome Zero* and *Bolsa Família*. Brazil's participation in multilateral bodies, in the financial G20 and the post-2008 crisis meetings in this forum can be included in this positive agenda.

Assessing the divergences, the main issues refer to the FTAA trade negotiations, the WTO negotiations (bilateral disputes and negotiation rounds), the demands for the reform of international institutions (and the creation of coalitions of variable geometry), and the Brazilian position in the Iraq War in 2003, when it was more aligned with the so-called Axis of Peace (Paris, Berlin, Moscow) positions than with those of George W. Bush government.

The main tensions with the US took place in 2010, the last year of Lula's government. Among them it can be mentioned the managing of the crisis in Honduras (deposition of Zelaya), the Israel-Palestine talks and, mainly, Brazil's relations with Iran, which involved the human rights case with Sakineh Ashtiani (Iranian woman sentenced to death by stoning) and the Iran-Brazil-Türkiye Tripartite Nuclear Agreement. Added to the instrumentalization of these issues by the opposition in Brazil, in an election year, there was a geopolitical disagreement between the two countries in the case of the Tripartite Agreement (Hirst, 2019). This dynamic reflects the absence of mutual adaptation mechanisms, as mentioned.

More than the matter of human rights, Brazil's involvement in the nuclear issue, as well as Türkiye's, generated noise. The agreement did not enter into force and new negotiations in the field would only return successfully (and under new conditions) with the 2015 P5+1 Agreement

(USA, China, Russia, France, United Kingdom, and Germany). Signed during the Obama administration in 2015, that agreement would be abandoned by Trump (2017-2020) and has not been resumed.

The most serious conflicts of the period revolve around the clash of strategic interests, which derive from three issues: Brazil's greater assertiveness in previously unoccupied arenas, an increase in the country's power of resistance and the exercise of an agenda of bilateral and multilateral movements expanded to the South. Despite being natural, these movements generate tensions and are exacerbated internally.

Domestic politics, its fragmentations, and polarizations, was one of the dimensions underestimated by Lula's government. This responds to the second question presented at the beginning of this topic about how easy the dismantling of the internal and external agenda was. These dimensions are interconnected and, in addition to domestic politics, involve the South-South and North-South agendas.

Regarding the South-South dimension, Brazil managed less efficiently the complexity of South-South Cooperation, which involved elements of competition. Brazil's bargaining capacity was affected by the absence of an economic model that promoted sustainable development. There was no breaking of the economic pacts of the 1990s, when priority was given to the commodities and financial sector, opening doors to trade and privatizations, with low investments in science, technology, innovation and education. The post-2010 period represents a retreat for Brazil, and a detachment from China and other emerging countries.

The second dimension was North-South, with regard to clashing interests and expectations, and mostly the hegemonic containment mechanisms imposed by the Western field, mostly the US. As discussed, as points of contact between both powers increased, divergences and conflicts of interest became more frequent. In the Brazilian domestic field, this dynamic intensified disputes and led to the counter-reaction of more conservative sectors (Casarões, 2019).

Lula 3, Year 1: Conjuncture and Perspectives (2023)

In 2023, Lula's return to government revealed a divided country and overlapped with the Democratic presidency of Joe Biden in the US (2021-current). Despite the economic crisis, the opposition vote was significant and became dominant in Congress. The difficulties that the Lula government would face were already visible by the end of the vote-counting, when protests took place on the country's roads. On January 8, 2023, Brazil — like the United States on January 6, 2021 — faced major challenges to its democracy. The contestation of the electoral results of legitimate elections, the destruction of public spaces and of the democratic logic were part of these demonstrations. These political situations, associated with the economic crisis and the pressure to preserve the cost containment model, with a guarantee of zero deficit, with a relative emptying of science, technology, innovation, health, and education projects (despite the resumption of important social policies), indicate structural limits.

How do these limits affect foreign policy and bilateral relations with the US? Anticipating conclusions, and sharing views with Hirst (2023), Lima (2023) and Rodrigues (2024), a positive but fragile balance can be seen. Neither Brazil, nor the region, nor the world of 2023 are the same as they were in 2003.

Considering the first line of change, regarding Brazil: polarization, fragmentation, and the economic crisis reduce power resources for external projection and make consensus more difficult. Even so, the government's focus was not to appease and/or please groups opposed to the external agenda (despite the high political composition on the domestic agenda), but to regain protagonism. Although the aspect of reconstruction and that Brazil is back to the international arena stands out, it is necessary to understand that this is happening in new terms.

In the regional field, conditions in Latin America are like those in Brazil in terms of polarization and crises, even though the country emerges, within the hemisphere, as the most stable. The recurring instability in democratic regimes, radicalism and the overtrhowing of governments set the tone of the year: the cases of the Argentine presidential election with

Javier Milei's victory and the Guyana-Venezuela crisis in the Essequibo region are some examples. Brazilian offensives aimed at resuming projects such as UNASUR, advances in MERCOSUR and debates at CELAC seem to have little effect in generating a united front. Negotiations between MERCOSUR and the European Union received high attention, without major progress due to issues associated with protectionism and the environment. The fragmentation of progressive forces, the advance of the right and the extreme right and alternations of power (legitimate and non-legitimate) prevail.

At the global level, the region plays a supporting role in the US-China dynamics. In the hemisphere, China's bilateral relations remained solid, as noted by a growing number of countries (between 2020-2023) joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through Memorandums of Understanding. Launched in 2013 under Xi Jinping's government, the BRI expands beyond its Eurasian land and maritime corridors, reaching the hemisphere. Although Brazil did not join the BRI, in the third Lula government the partnership with China has deepened in the fields of infrastructure and investments in cutting-edge industries. The Biden government seeks to respond with initiatives such as the traditional Summit of the Americas, pacts to strengthen democracy and investments with projects such as the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP) (McKinley, 2023).

Globally, the detachment of the US and China from other nations in the global balance of power in a competitive coexistence brings challenges (Pecequilo, 2023). Debates about this transition and US-China bilateral relations (and dynamics such as "decoupling" and "de-risk") affect Sino-Brazilian and American-Brazilian exchanges. What is the status of Brazil-US relations, focus of this article, after the completion of year 1 of Lula 3?

It can be said that bilateral relations remain in positive adaptation. Positive in the sense of the numerous convergences between Lula-Biden in the field of the environment and human rights, as the political-economic summits throughout 2023 (G20, COP-28, among others) demonstrated. There has been an emphasis on climate change, energy transition, human rights (gender, initiatives to defend decent work, migration agenda, class

and race as some relevant topics) and defense of democracy. However, there have been convergences in divergences: financing for development and environmental preservation, technology transfer, investments, and infrastructure.

The geopolitical arena is more sensitive. Take the resumption of Brazil's protagonism in coalitions of variable geometry such as the BRICS and its positions in the face of ongoing conflicts: Russia-Ukraine (February 2022-current) and Israel-Hamas (October 2023-current). The expansion of BRICS to BRICS Plus (or BRICS+) with the entry in January 2024 of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, and Iran represents progress for the South agenda.

Mechanisms such as the BRICS Bank, led by Former President Dilma Rousseff, raise important discussions about the global economic order. Argentina's withdrawal is a negative fact, but exemplary of the political instrumentalization of international agendas by the extreme right. The ongoing conflicts remain points of attention, with Brazil resuming its leading role around neutrality and the defense of mediation by multilateral organizations and the application of international regimes. In these dynamics, "agreeing to disagree" prevails. It is worth, even if a little long, remembering the words of Presidents Biden and Lula in September 2023:

President Biden: Well, Mr. President, it's great to see you again. Welcome to New York. You know, when I hosted you at the White House in February, you said that we have an obligation to leave the next generation a better world, and I couldn't agree with you more [...] We've begun it, and we're going to continue. We're working in lockstep to tackle the climate crisis, [...] to conserve the Amazon and the critical ecosystems in Latin America [...] to promote inclusive economic growth. And the two largest democracies in the Western Hemisphere are standing up for human rights around the world and in the hemisphere. That includes

⁶ US role in the defense of democracy in the 2021-2023 Brazilian transition was pivotal to signalizing the need for political forces to respect the regime in the country.

⁷ One source of previous disagreements, WTO talks is not listed, as the organization is facing a stagnation of its negotiations.

workers' rights [...] President Lula [...]: I believe that this is a historical moment that should serve as a role model when we look to the geopolitics in the world, and we perceive that the opportunities are becoming narrower [...] and democracy is becoming more and more [...] in danger, because the denial of politics [...] So, at this meeting here, Mr. President, I believe that it's more than just another bilateral [...] it's a faith relationship that we're building here and a new era for the U.S.-Brazil relation, amongst equal partners, a sovereign relationship [...] (The White House, 2023).

The projected scenario is that these initiatives will allow some kind of reconstruction of Brazilian foreign and internal policy. Regarding bilateral Brazil-US relations, as Mauro Vieira pointed out in an interview with Amado (2023), the 2024 presidential elections in the US do not change either the centrality or the importance of this relationship. A sense of continuity prevails, of a 200-year partnership, in a field that becomes more solid with partners who recognize themselves as strategic, regardless of the interest groups and coalitions in power.

Final thoughts

This text reflected briefly, almost as an essay, about the complexity of Brazil-US bilateral relations during the two Lula's presidential cycles in Brazil. These cycles, 2003-2010 and 2023-current, illustrate both the potential and the difficulties of the interaction between powers that share the same hemisphere and move on different power axes due to their needs, interests, and asymmetries.

Like other nations, Brazil is undergoing a period of polarization that is the result — internally, regionally and globally — of a civilizational crisis, created by exclusionary economic models that open the door for nationalism, xenophobia, violence, and inequality. It is fundamental to understand these realities to overcome oscillations and instabilities. This is a necessary path for convergences (without divergences) between Brazil and the US and the strengthening of their democracies. strengthening of their democracies.

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Economic Relations between Brazil and the United States: Legacies and Challenges

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Introduction

The importance of the United States to Brazilian trade is undeniable, even with the numerous changes that have occurred in the international system since the beginning of this relationship. At times closer, at times more distant, the relationship remains strategic for Brazil, not only because of the obvious importance of the United States for hemispheric relations, but also because of the nature of commercial ties between the two countries. From the point of view of the United States, regional stability has always been one of the guiding pillars of its relationship with Brazil. Unlike developed nations, which rely on economic and military resources to ensure their global influence, Brazil seeks to promote its international presence through active participation in regional and multilateral political and economic forums (Barbosa, 1996; Cervo, 2006). This approach aims to safeguard the country against potential threats and vulnerabilities, while also seeking to increase its own power, a concept referred to by Pinheiro (2024) as pragmatic institutionalism.

This text suggests that Brazil-US relations present significant contrasts, but are relatively stable. While economic data are not decisive in isolation, they serve as a relevant indicator, pointing to solid and

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strong economic relations. They also point to a relative decrease, mostly due to the rise of China. The discussion will examine the dynamics and challenges in bilateral relations, considering the pre- and post-Cold War context, permeated by tensions between hegemony and systemic decompression that have permeated these relations.

To this end, we will discuss the relationship between Brazil and the United States, with an emphasis on international political economy issues, in order to identify the dynamics and challenges in the relationship, as well as the legacy of previous administrations. A brief overview of the recent history of these relations is provided, highlighting the fact that the growth of other poles of power is forcing new patterns in contemporary international economic relations. This is followed by a closer look at these changes, focusing on trade and economic aspects from the Brazilian point of view. In this sense, data are presented that form the material basis for the central interpretation of the text: the United States is of great importance for the world and for Brazil, but there is a slow, long-term trend towards the reestablishment of a certain balance.

A brief history of a complex relationship

It is evident that the United States has played a pivotal role within Brazil's strategic and commercial partnerships over time. However, this relationship has undergone periods of flux, with ebbs and flows. Furthermore, the bilateral relationship is shaped by broader structural movements within the international system. Therefore, it is not solely dependent on the political will of the two countries.

At the beginning of the 20th century, for example, Brazil was heavily dependent on exports to Europe, with the region's share reaching around 55-60%. However, from the 1950s onwards, there was a significant change in this scenario, with Brazilian exports increasingly going to the United States. As for imports, at the beginning of the 20th century, Brazil imported predominantly from Europe, with the United States emerging as an important trading partner. During the first few

decades, Europe held a significant share, but throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the United States became the main source of Brazilian imports, reaching a share of around 60% during the World War II. This pattern continued in the following decades, reflecting a close and mutually beneficial commercial relationship between Brazil and the United States.

Over the following decades, the United States share decreased, but the country was still Brazil's main trade partner absorbing around 30-35% of Brazilian exports. This was largely due to the United States' primary objective of containing the advance of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the resistance of groups allied to it during the Cold War period (1945-1999). This purpose served as a justification for proxy wars and various political and military interventions abroad. The strategy of containment, which was a prominent feature of the Cold War, was based on vigilance and active intervention to frustrate the adversary. This approach manifested in a number of ways, including negative interventions such as armed conflicts and embargoes, as well as positive interventions, exemplified by the Marshall Plan (Larson, 2021). This approach assigned a secondary role to Latin American partners.

80,00%

40,00%

20,00%

1920

1940

1960

1980

2000

South America — United States — Europe — Asia — Middle East — Africa

Figure 1 – Percentage share of Brazil's total exports by region during the 20th century

Source: Authors, based on Comex Stat, 2024.




Figure 2 – Percentage share of Brazil's total imports by region during the 20th century

Source: Authors, based on Comex Stat, 2024.

Among the many attrition points, it is worth highlighting Brazil's almost constant search for autonomous spaces. The independent foreign policy (IFP) adopted by Brazil during João Goulart's government in the 1960s represents an important chapter in the country's diplomatic and economic history. Seeking autonomy and non-alignment on international issues, the IFP emphasized the diversification of exports as a crucial strategy to reduce dependence on primary products and expand trade relations. Under the leadership of Chancellor San Tiago Dantas, Brazilian diplomacy sought to distance itself from external influences, promoting a more active approach in multilateral forums. The diversification of exports was seen as a means of adding value to production and providing greater economic stability (Manzur, 2014).

Although the IFP was interrupted by the military coup of 1964, its legacy endured and influenced subsequent approaches adopted by Brazilian diplomacy. The attempt to diversify exports continued to be a relevant theme in discussions about Brazil's economic development. The consequences of these initiatives shaped the country's view of its position on the international stage and still play a significant role in contemporary debates about autonomy, development, and global participation.

The 1970s represent a crucial turning point in understanding the current economic configuration and the origins of the "lost decade." During this period, trends that had already existed in the 1950s and 1960s intensified and culminated in a different international scenario. The "responsible and ecumenical pragmatism" attributed to Brazil's foreign policy under Geisel was significantly influenced by the United States. This non-aligned stance, in addition to seeking Brazil's development, allowed for flexibility in international policy according to national interests. The priority was to integrate Brazil autonomously into the international system and guarantee its development. The absence of preferential alliances, as in contrast to countries aligned with the United States, and the search for new poles of interaction are the main elements of this foreign policy. Considering that the US was at the center of the economic

upheavals of the time, its relationship with Brazil is highlighted in this study (Mendonça and Miyamoto, 2011).

Although the analysis is focused on the relationship with the US and economic crises, it is recognized that it offers only a partial view. Other crucial issues, such as relations with Argentina, Middle East, Europe, Asia and Africa, were equally important in Geiselian diplomacy (Mendonça and Miyamoto, 2011). These factors are emphasized because they highlight the transformations in the structure of the international system in the 1970s. The crises in US leadership and in the global economy reconfigured the environment in which Brazilian foreign policy operated, motivating independent action through Geisel's "responsible and ecumenical pragmatism."

With the dissolution of the USSR, there was a review of the configuration of US foreign policy, which for decades had been guided by the paradigm of containment. Thus, even after the end of the USSR, international dynamics continued to carry legacies from the Cold War, with China, Russia and their growing areas of influence remaining the main adversaries of the US. The systemic changes in international politics had an impact on the business conducted by Brazil. From the 1980s onwards, Brazil diversified its import sources. The participation of the United States decreased, while Europe and Asia became more important. The entry of China as an important trading partner for Brazil is evident from the 1990s onwards, reflecting changes in global economic dynamics. This movement reflects not only bilateral economic dynamics, but also Brazil's ability to adapt to changes on the international stage.

Brazil's geographical diversification of exports is in line with a global trend, but the United States continues to play a central role. Figures 1 and 2 reflect the search for new markets and the expansion of Brazil's presence in different regions. However, it is important to note the consistency and relevance of the economic relationship with the United States over time.

US foreign policy in the new millennium has retained certain characteristics of the Cold War era, particularly in relation to Latin

America. This has led to a certain mismatch between the US position and the expectations of Latin American leaders. The unilateralism of the US, without adequate consultation and support from the international community, has contributed to the formation of coalitions aimed at countering US actions and opposing the US agenda. As Veiga, Iglesias, and Rios (2009) observed, this trend made it easier for Brazilian foreign policy to navigate different international themes (such as the environment, the G20, financial issues, trade negotiation rounds and others). The country's actions demonstrated a proactive stance that found support at home. However, they could only be hindered if there were setbacks to the country's interests, whether from protectionist or nationalist policies in central countries or even in China.

To the extent that Obama adopted a conciliatory discourse, distancing himself from W. Bush and expressing a willingness to re-evaluate the US presence in Latin America (Colombo and Frechero, 2012), his actions contributed to reinforcing the US's intended hegemony over the region. This led to discontent among Latin American leaders, who began to favor regional forums that did not include the United States, such as UNASUR and CELAC. This preference led to a decline in the influence of the OAS and IDB and intensified ties with extra-regional actors, particularly Russia, Iran, and China (Colombo and Frechero 2012). During the Obama administration, economic assistance to Latin America surpassed security assistance, indicating an intention to diversify the United States' points of influence and move away from the security-centered approach espoused by President George W. Bush (Milani, 2021).

In the context of Brazil's trade policy and US-Brazil trade relations, changes in the US approach to Latin America have played a significant role. Trump's disinterest in Latin America, for example, has aligned with his protectionist policy, which has opened up more space for a greater presence of extra-hemispheric powers, such as China, in the Brazilian trade balance. This situation presented Brazil with an opportunity to play a more prominent role in regional affairs, both at the bilateral level within MERCOSUR (Scheller, 2017). However, the Brazilian leadership

at the time (Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro) shared with the Trump administration a lack of interest in relations with Latin America.

The Joe Biden administration currently follows the historic US strategy for the American continent, committing itself to collaborating with regional initiatives (Sullivan, 2022) and showing a willingness to foster dialogue and offer material incentives to strengthen these relations. However, similarly to Obama, Biden's intention to update foreign policy towards Latin America did not materialize (Granato, 2022). US foreign policy under Biden once again focuses on extra-hemispheric security issues, such as the Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine and South China Sea conflicts, to the detriment of policies that might meet Latin American demands and serve as alternatives to projects that expand the influence of adversaries, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, presented by the G7 in 2021 as an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the aim of promoting investment and infrastructure construction in the Global South, especially in Latin America (Mwadi Makengo et al., 2022), is a notable example of a US initiative that could be considered a positive intervention. However, while the United States has expressed its intention to contribute US\$ 200 billion to the project by 2027, it is understood that this amount would be sourced from the private sector, with the Biden administration playing a pivotal role in mobilizing these resources (The White House, 2023). This, coupled with the scarcity of literature on the amount of money already spent by the US on B3W, suggests that the United States' engagement in positive interventions in Latin America may not be as pronounced as in negative interventions aimed at its adversaries.

Brazilian pragmatic institutionalism in bilateral relations with the United States in the post-Cold War era

There is a widespread perception that there is a solid relationship between Brazil and the United States that has remained structurally unchanged since 1990, even during the Workers' Party (PT – Portuguese acronym for Partido dos Trabalhadores) governments. In the context of Brazilian trade policy, the relationship between Brazil and the United States has played a crucial role in providing a counterweight to U.S. unilateralism. These relations have withstood criticism and allowed for a policy of understanding and cooperation (Patriota, 2008).

In the context of Brazilian trade policy, exports and imports to the United States are of great significance. During the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) administration, which was characterized by a liberalization process, privatizations and economic openness, Brazilian foreign policy took a new direction. FHC sought to influence the definition of the rules of the international system with the aim of increasing Brazil's role and autonomy on the global stage (Visentini and Silva, 2010). This approach included strengthening Brazil's engagement in international forums, following the paradigm of integration or pragmatic institutionalism. The latter refers to the use of collective action in multilateral bodies to solve problems, allowing Brazil to establish its autonomy vis-à-vis larger states (Pinheiro, 2004).

In terms of trade policy, the FHC government sought to reinforce the option of strengthening international multilateral institutions. This choice was based on Brazil's self-perception as an intermediary country with limited power resources. According to this perception, adherence to international regulatory norms was seen as a guarantee for the preservation of autonomous spaces. At the same time, Brazil's actions were based on principles of power and on its status as a member of a peripheral power subsystem. This approach sought to provide Brazil with greater autonomy and support in the global system (Pinheiro, 2004). However, with the rise to power of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in a context of discredited neoliberal policies and discontent with the asymmetry of US power, the centrality of the United States for Brazil began to diminish. This new correlation of forces influenced not only domestic policies, but also trade relations. The significance of exports to and imports from the United States became a crucial factor in global dynamics, reflecting Brazil's pursuit of autonomy and equilibrium in its international relations.

During President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's tenure, Brazilian foreign policy underwent a strategic reorientation. This reorientation was characterized by an emphasis on rapprochement with South America and the maintenance of multilateral policies, with the priority being the safeguarding of national sovereignty. Although this stance generated tensions with developed nations, notably the United States, it reflected an approach that was not primarily aimed at opposing the US, but rather at balancing any excess power on the part of the latter, thus strengthening Brazil's negotiating capacity in bilateral relations (Silva and Holleben, 2022).

In general, Lula da Silva's rise to the presidency intensified a process of distancing from the United States, particularly on hemispheric issues. At the regional level, Brazil played a leading role in a cooperation agreement between the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) and MERCOSUR. In addition, the country promoted physical and energy integration projects in the region, many of which were made possible with the financial support of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). On the other hand, relations with Washington were not as strong as they could have been. In addition to Brazil's prominent role in the failure of hemispheric negotiations, accusations from Washington suggested that Brazil had played a role in the failure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Summit in Cancun, revealing a scenario of disagreement and tension between the parties.

Nevertheless, the strengthening of multilateralism was accompanied by a cordial relationship between the United States and Brazil. The Memorandum of Understanding for the Advancement of Cooperation in Biofuels, which regulated the use of Brazilian ethanol in US fuels, was viewed as a positive step. However, in matters pertaining to the Middle East, there are differing perspectives. At the same time, Brazil is seeking to achieve a new balance in its bilateral relations with the US. In contrast, US foreign policy has consistently indicated that Latin America is not a significant concern for the US.

In this process, Vigevani (2011) highlights the following elements that contributed to these transformations and changed the political space

available for Brazilian international action: i) the intensification of US unilateralism in the first decade of the 21st century and its consequences for the legitimacy of power; ii) the restructuring of the axes of world development; iii) the impact of the rise of China; iv) the increase in trade flows to countries that until 1990 were not commercially relevant to Brazil; v) the role attributed by Brazil to multilateral economic negotiations, including in the phase immediately following the 2008 crisis, evidenced by the country's active participation in the financial G20; and vi) the consolidation of a regional scenario, in MERCOSUR, South America and Latin America, in which there is no leadership, but favorable conditions are created for a stronger dialogue with the US (Vigevani, 2011).

President Dilma Rousseff adopted a foreign policy approach similar to that of her predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, but with notable distinctions, including a greater focus on the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and a reduction in efforts to maintain Latin American regional integration. The domestic and international environment during her term was less favorable, as the 2008 crisis unleashed protectionist measures that were disadvantageous for the countries of the Global South, impacting the effectiveness of Brazil's international projection and protagonism strategies, as well as its regional integration initiatives (Silva and Holleben, 2022). In addition, internal instability, culminating in her impeachment process in 2016, diminished the proactivity of Rousseff's foreign policy. With regard to the relationship between Brazil and the United States during Rousseff's administration, there was a mixture of cordiality and conflict, following the pattern established by Lula. However, this arrangement was substantially weakened after the revelation of the US espionage scandal. In this context, Rousseff incorporated an extremely important issue into her foreign policy agenda: cyber security (Silva and Holleben, 2022). This inclusion resulted in the implementation of the Marco Civil da Internet (Civil Rights Framework for the Internet) and a contribution to the establishment of a cyber security regime.

Michel Temer's government marks the beginning of a reorganization of Brazilian foreign policy, moving away from the approach of the PT governments and towards an agenda more aligned with that of FHC. Temer

maintains a pro-multilateralism discourse, but neglects South-South cooperation, taking a liberal and anti-progressive stance, prioritizing bilateral relations with developed countries — mainly the US — and stressing his commitment to free trade to the detriment of protectionist policies. In short, Brazil's foreign policy under Michel Temer was unable to make progress on the agendas considered to be priorities, due to the United States' unwillingness during Donald Trump's administration in the case of the OECD, a lack of legitimacy, and domestic political and economic instability. Given this difficult context and Brazil's inability to implement a proactive agenda, Temer's Brazil acted externally with a negative agenda, such as Brazil's actions with Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia, Chile and Peru, who jointly announced on April 20, 2018 the suspension of participation in the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) (Ramos and Mendonça, 2020).

The foreign policy of Jair Bolsonaro's government has taken an antiglobalist, anti-system stance and abandoned Latin American demands (Casarões, 2019; Casarões and Farias, 2022), showing dissatisfaction with multilateral and regional bodies such as the UN and MERCOSUR as well as a preference for bilateral agreements of identity alignment with states under right-wing leadership (Casarões, 2019). It could be said that Bolsonaro's foreign policy represents a more dramatic and extreme version of the one initiated by Temer (Silva, 2022) and an attempt to emulate Trump's policies. In addition to the unconditional alignment with the US and Trump, Bolsonaro's foreign policy is marked by a contradiction between his anti-globalist discourse and commitments previously made by Brazil. This contradiction weakened some partnerships and displeased pragmatic domestic sectors, such as those involved in trade with China and the export of Halal meat to the Middle East. Consequently, Brazil's international isolation under Bolsonaro resulted in a reduction in Brazilian participation in international strategies and hindered joint actions, as would have been necessary during the pandemic (Silva and Holleben, 2022).

It seems that Lula's third term follows a strategy that was employed in previous PT administrations. This strategy is marked by a search

for political autonomy, support for multilateralism and the expansion of Brazilian participation in the international system. There is also a willingness to engage in South-South relations, especially with regard to the BRICS and in issues of Latin American regionalism. Rousseff's appointment as president of the NDB³ in 2023 could be seen as a factor of support to Brazilian foreign policy at this time. As previously mentioned, this active and assertive stance has occasionally led to situations of disagreement with of US foreign policy. One example is the proposal for a ceasefire in the Israel-Palestine conflict, presented by Brazil to the UN Security Council in 2023, which was vetoed by the US.

It is worth noting that there are similarities between the current US-Brazilian relations, under Biden and Lula, and those of the past decade, under W. Bush, Obama, Lula and Rousseff. In the North, with Obama and Biden, there have been calls for a shift in US foreign policy, towards a rapprochement with Latin America. However, this has not necessarily led to a complete break with traditional policies, with a continued focus on the Middle East, China and Russia. In the South, with Rousseff and Lula, we see proposals for Brazil to exercise leadership in Latin America, to position itself as independent from US policy, and to evolve from "backyard" to "neighborhood."

Economic indicators and their significance in Brazilian bilateral relations

Figure 3 shows the evolution of trade balances between 1997 and 2023. Despite the strong presence of the United States, this relationship does not stand out. From 2000, the balance with the United States is positive, but in 2006 it begins to decline and in 2008 it becomes negative. In contrast, Brazil's trade balance with China has increased significantly since 2015. Brazil's balance with South America has remained positive, with some variation, and is surpassed by that with Asia (except China) in 2019. It is noteworthy that Brazil, in quantitative terms, has kept pace

³ New Development Bank, known as the "BRICS Bank."

with the increase in international trade, which has allowed it to maintain its influence in international negotiations.



Figure 3 - Brazil's trade balance by region between 1997 and 2023

Source: Authors, based on the Foreign Trade Secretariat (Comex Stat 2024).

Figure 4 illustrates Brazilian exports. It shows the marked growth of the Chinese presence, to the detriment of the other selected states and regions, peaking in 2020 (32.41%), decreasing slightly in 2022 (26.76%), but still surpassing any other partner in 2023 (30.71%). And while Africa, the Middle East (~5%) and Asia (~12%) remain stable, the participation of the US, EU and South America has decreased. The USA's share grew until 2002 (25.48%), but then declined until 2009 (10.28%), remaining stable until 2023 (10.85%). The EU's share fell gradually between 1997 (26.07%) and 2023 (13.62%), in a similar way to South America (from 24.14% to 12.64% in the same period).




Figure 4 – Percentage share of Brazil's total exports by region between 1997 and 2023

Source: Authors, based on the Foreign Trade Secretariat (Comex Stat, 2024).

Figure 5 shows the evolution of Brazilian imports. China grew almost linearly between 1997 (1.91%) and 2023 (22.08%), surpassing Brazil's other partners in 2018. Asia (~13%) and the Middle East (~4%) remained stable, while Africa experienced a peak between 2004 and 2014 (~8%) before returning to previous levels (~3%). South America's share fell gradually between 1997 (21.25%) and 2023 (11.76%). The EU grew between 1997 (24.33%) and 1999 (28%), then went through a period of decline until 2022 (16.24%) and grew again in 2023 (18.86%). And the USA fell between 2001 (22.73%) and 2013 (14.91%), growing until 2022 (18.82%) and falling again in 2023 (15.76%).




Figure 5 – Percentage share of Brazil's total imports by region between 1997 and 2023

Source: Authors, based on the Foreign Trade Secretariat (Comex Stat, 2024).

Another factor of great importance for international economic relations is foreign direct investment (FDI). As can be seen in Figure 6, the US has been an important supplier of capital to Brazil. This is a historical trend, dating back to the beginning of the 20th century. It has continued to play a major role, although this has been relatively attenuated in recent decades, since the 1960s, when other developed countries began to participate on a large scale in FDI in Brazil, reducing the US share. Unlike trade, direct investment in Brazil remained stable between 2010 and 2021, with strong participation from the EU, especially countries known as tax havens (the Netherlands and Luxembourg). China has so far maintained low levels of investment in Brazil.




Figure 6 – Total direct investment in Brazil from 2010 to 2021 (Equity Participation and Intercompany Operations)

Source: Authors, based on the Foreign Trade Secretariat (Comex Stat, 2024).

The differences between the evolution of trade and FDI flows in relative terms is an important indicator of why Brazil's relations with the US continue to be so significant. In international trade in general, and in trade between the two countries in particular, intra-firm trade has become increasingly important. There are therefore alternative trends, which help to explain the continued centrality of the US for Brazil's foreign policy, in a context of growing doubts and perplexities, in which the country appears better positioned by the attenuation of the relative importance of these ties.

Final considerations

The study of economic relations between Brazil and the United States reveals a complex web of historical legacies, contemporary challenges and transformations in global dynamics. Over the decades, bilateral relations between the two countries have oscillated between moments of stability

and adjustment, reflecting changes in the international scenario and in the political leaderships of both nations.

The post-Cold War era imposed significant challenges, with Brazil seeking to consolidate its international presence through pragmatic institutionalism, while the US faced the need to reconfigure its foreign policy after the dissolution of the USSR. The War on Terror and the US's unilateralist stance had an impact on relations with Latin America, including Brazil, which sought alternatives and built regional coalitions. The Obama and Trump administrations implemented different approaches, but both raised challenges to bilateral relations. Trump's pursuit of a protectionist policy and his lack of interest in Latin America have opened up space for extra-hemispheric powers, while the Biden administration expresses continuity in the US's historical strategy towards the continent.

Brazil's foreign policy has also been shaped by different administrations. The pragmatic institutionalism of FHC; Lula's emphasis on national sovereignty; multilateral policies and distancing from the US during the Rousseff administrations; and the anti-system stance and unconditional alignment with the US under Bolsonaro show a complex and multifaceted trajectory.

The economic indicators analyzed in this article suggest a diminishing centrality of the United States in the Brazilian perspective. The growth of relations with China, as evidenced by trade balances and the share of exports, highlights the rise of new poles of power. The presence of the United States, although still relevant, is changing, while Asia is gaining importance in Brazilian trade.

In this scenario, Brazilian diplomacy faces the challenge of balancing different interests considering the rise of regional and global powers. Assertive participation in multilateral forums, the search for strategic partnerships, and the diversification of trade relations appear to be crucial strategies for Brazil to build its position on the international stage. However, the future trajectory of these relations will depend not only on political choices, but also on the global transformations that will shape the international context in the coming decades.

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Brazil-United States: Convergence, Paradoxes and Differences in the Promotion of Democracy and Peace (1945-2023)

Antonio de Aguiar Patriota¹

About to celebrate two hundred years of bilateral relations, Brazil and the United States today position themselves as two great democracies in a geopolitical scenario of growing tension between the world's leading military powers. Although the US retains economic and military preponderance, the unipolar moment has come and gone, while Beijing demonstrates an unquestionable ability to challenge Washington's persisting hegemonic ambitions. Worryingly, the war in Ukraine carries the risk of a gradual deterioration in the relationship between NATO and the two largest non-Western nuclear-armed powers. Meanwhile, Brazil has developed a worldwide network of diplomatic and commercial contacts in the 21st century and has come to represent a vector for democracy and peace in its region, as well as globally.

The episodes of vandalism against the Capitol and the Praça dos Três Poderes experienced by the current administrations in Washington and Brasília have awakened in both nations the same instinct of redoubled attention to preserving and improving democracy. The Ukrainian conflict, on the other hand, exposed contrasting diplomatic profiles between a Brazil that is increasingly assertive in its pacifist profile and a United States almost permanently involved in wars. US adherence to the UN Charter, in its defense of territorial integrity and rejection of the use of force

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not authorized by international law — provoked by the Ukrainian crisis — could have created conditions, in theory, for a possible convergence between the two countries, regarding the promotion of international peace and security through the multilateral system.

However, the crisis in the Middle East triggered by the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack in southern Israel introduced a complicating element in this panorama. A US veto imposed on a draft resolution presented to the Security Council by Brazil, as rotating President, generated some perplexity in Brasília. The text received the support of the ten elected members, three permanent members, and British abstention. The draft resolution aimed at promoting a humanitarian pause and demanded compliance with international law by the parties. The pretext presented by Washington to express its opposition, in claiming that the Israeli right to self-defense should be explicitly recognized in the draft — fell short of convincing even the other NATO members with a seat in the Security Council.

Throughout history we have not always seen eye to eye regarding matters related to the promotion of democracy and peace. Alongside examples of convergence and even identity of purpose, there are episodes and periods of misunderstanding, mutual distrust, and even conflicting agendas. The two countries fought side by side during World War II against Nazi-fascism, demonstrating a keen ability to join forces in defense of democratic ideals. The Cold War, in turn, would lead the US to intervene in Latin America's internal affairs in a direction contrary to pluralism and favorable to autocracy. North American support for the 1964 military coup in Brazil, in addition to even more explicit and perverse interference in other countries in the region, represents a stain that time has not erased.

Regardless of the commercial relationship, which gained traction as of the end of the 19th century and brought the business communities from both countries closer since then, asymmetries in military and financial power translated into a pattern of ups and downs in the quality of the political dialogue, dictated by international circumstances and national identities. As historian and diplomat Eugênio Garcia reports, President

Franklin Roosevelt defended the inclusion of Brazil as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council during the negotiation of the UN Charter after the successful military partnership established with President Getúlio Vargas for the war effort and the liberation of Italy (Garcia, 2011). Ironically, it would be a Brazil presided by a General (Ernesto Geisel), in principle favorable to close relations with Washington, who would interrupt military cooperation with the USA several decades later.

After breaking relations with the Axis in 1942, Brazil was singled out by the USA as a preferred ally in the South Atlantic. The North American air bases in the Northeast and the participation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) in Europe represented a historical example of military cooperation in the face of a common enemy. Roosevelt visited Brazil in 1936 and 1943, the latter for the Natal summit, where the issue of possible compensation for participation in the war (Brazil was the only Latin American nation to fight alongside the Allies) came up for discussion. Although the permanent seat in the Security Council did not materialize (due to objections from other allied powers) diplomatic proximity between Washington and Rio de Janeiro would persist until, at least, the Dutra government in the mid-fifties.

The Independent Foreign Policy of the early sixties was oriented towards avoiding automatic adherence to one of the camps in the geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, experienced in the Americas through the tensions generated by the Cuban revolution. When taking a stand against the suspension of the Castro regime from the Organization of American States (OAS), advocated by the United States, San Tiago Dantas — the visionary Foreign Minister of the João Goulart government — would resort to principles that are still part of the Brazilian diplomatic vocabulary today: non-intervention and self-determination; skepticism regarding the practical effects of diplomatic isolation; defense of international law and promotion of peace. In San Tiago's view, at once pacifist and pragmatic, isolation entailed the risk of intervention by force and would push Cuba even further into the socialist camp.

After several decades, it cannot be said that this view was essentially wrong. It is, moreover, a stance that would figure prominently in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which includes, among the principles governing international relations, self-determination, non-intervention, and the pacific settlement of disputes — in addition to upholding the concept of a Latin American community of nations. As Rubens Ricupero observes, however, the Independent Foreign Policy contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Brazil and the USA, even if those who conceived it did not have such deliberate intentions in this regard (Ricupero, 2017). And this despite the care taken by Araújo Castro, one of San Tiago's successors at the head of Itamaraty, in distancing himself from the rhetoric of the Non-Aligned Movement (which Brazil never joined).

The agenda proposed by Araújo Castro in his famous "Three Ds" speech (Development, Decolonization and Disarmament) reaffirmed Brazil's commitment to the UN and multilateralism in addressing the international challenges of the time. Brazil had resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in November 1961 and sought constructive ties with both competing blocs. At the same time, Araújo Castro's reaction to the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, concluded in 1968 — in an environment of circumstantial consensus among the five nuclear powers of the time — illustrated a systemic concern with what he described as the "freezing of world power" and the division between haves and have nots. The scant attention given to the priorities of the developing world, denounced by Araújo Castro, would become a persistent feature of Brazilian diplomacy in the years to come (Vargas, 2013).

Although it relied on the political and material support of the United States, the dictatorship established in Brazil from 1964 onwards did not bring about a lasting convergence between the two countries in matters of foreign policy. The idea of a "free world" as espoused by the US — encompassing the group of nations that opposed the members of the communist bloc during the Cold War — was not incompatible with support for authoritarian regimes as long as these were aligned with American geostrategic interests. In Brazil's case, however, such support would not survive the hardening of the dictatorship brought about by the enforcement of the AI-5. Accusations of human rights violations during

the Carter administration, would revive Brazil's inclination to pursue an autonomous foreign policy path, as in the 1975 recognition of Angolan independence.

The constraints imposed on Brazil by the USA during the so-called "Years of Lead" period of the military governments had the indirect consequence of stimulating an Africanist policy under Foreign Minister Mario Gibson Barbosa. Ties with newly independent nations in the Continent would require a new dose of pragmatism in light of privileged relationships — such as those maintained by Brazil with a Portugal still reluctant to face the anachronism of its colonial empire. Neither did the Brazil-Angola friendship align with Washington and London, or the South African regime for that matter, with which the US and the UK maintained close coordination (notwithstanding its institutionalized discrimination towards the black majority under Apartheid). The three were directly opposed to the Angolan government led by the Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

The American role in destabilizing democratically elected progressive governments in Latin America and other parts of the developing world during the Cold War is well known and documented. As Ricupero states, invariably, the attempts at left-wing reformism, from Arbenz in Guatemala to Allende in Chile, provoked a contrary reaction from conservative and religious sectors with the support of the armed forces, as well as with US encouragement. A similar process removed Goulart from power in Brazil. This would not prevent Araújo Castro from declaring in 1971, before assuming the Embassy in Washington that "Brazil is perhaps one of the few Latin American countries in which marked anti-American popular sentiment does not prevail" (Araujo Castro, 1971).

That statement was accompanied by an addendum, in which Araújo Castro noted Brazil's lack of "a historic resentment" against the United States and pledged "not to create such sentiments artificially." Historians today might not necessarily agree with the first part of that statement. Brazil's re-democratization would coincide with a period of financial vulnerability during the 80s and 90s, with a significant increase in public debt, during which the US held considerable power to pressure

the Brazilian government and did not hesitate to use it. Typical of this period were statements made by Brazilian diplomatic interlocutors to the effect that Brazil "does not enjoy a surplus of power" and a recurrent emphasis on the economic and commercial agenda. In charge of foreign relations, Luiz Felipe Lampreia and Celso Lafer focused their attention on the multilateral trading system.

With the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), special importance was given to training qualified staff to deal with cases submitted to its dispute settlement system. There seemed to be scant interest in the promotion of international peace and security. As a Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations in New York between 1994 and 1999, I recall Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia's visits, in which he instructed us to "curb our enthusiasm" in relation to the debate that began in 1992, at the UN General Assembly, on the expansion of the Security Council. According to an authorized source, the then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did not hesitate to call Lampreia regularly and complain about Brazilian positions that were out of step with specific US interests at the United Nations.

At the height of the unipolar moment, it is worth recognizing that Brazil was not a preferential target of that type of interference, which reflects unilateral impulses that have not entirely disappeared from US diplomatic behavior. Suffice it to recall how Albright opposed the reelection of Boutros-Ghali to the UN General Secretariat based on calculations more related to the domestic political dynamics in her country than to the professional qualities of the senior Egyptian diplomat. In his autobiography "Unvanquished," Boutros-Ghali describes in detail the clashes with the American ambassador to the UN, who was subsequently elevated to the position of Secretary of State in the second Clinton administration (Boutros-Ghali, 1999). When serving as Brazilian Ambassador in Cairo, I dedicated an article to Boutros-Ghali in which I celebrate his defense of the "democratization of international relations" (Patriota, 2023a).

I open a parenthesis to observe that defenders of democracy at the domestic level do not necessarily embrace democratic values as a pillar of the international order. The first UN Secretary-General to do so was Boutros-Ghali in 1992 when he published his Agenda for Peace. In democratic regimes it is not conceivable that citizens with exceptional economic resources or political influence be placed above of the law. A similar understanding should be observed in the international realm. The same parallel between internal and external legal frameworks can be applied to decision-making processes, which only deserve to be described as democratic when inclusive and representative. It is unnecessary to emphasize that neither notions of "exceptionalism" nor oligarchic decision-making circles are consistent, at the international level, with a truly democratic approach.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who held the position of Foreign Minister for a brief period, adopted a high diplomatic profile as President. The visibly friendly relationship between the Cardoso couple and the Clintons was unprecedented. In his biography, Bill Clinton describes FHC as "one of the most impressive leaders" he had encountered (Clinton, 2005). On an official visit to Brasília, Clinton recalled the partnership between the two countries during World War II and proposed that Brazil and the USA build a future of freedom and democracy together. The USA was still Brazil's primary economic partner. Freedom, mutual respect, development, and peace were the themes of FHC's speech upon welcoming Clinton. As Sergio Danese concludes in his study on Presidential Diplomacy, it is possible to state that the positive relationship between the two leaders was a factor in avoiding stress and building confidence during this period (Danese, 2018).

September 11, 2001, will remain etched in the collective memory of the United States and the world as a tragic date when thousands of innocent civilians fell victim to Islamic extremism. The international community, in its entirety, demonstrated solidarity towards the US government and society. That consensus, however, would not last in the face of retaliatory acts carried out in the name of a war on terror, which not only disregarded international law but also spread instability in and around Iraq. The ousting of Brazilian diplomat José Maurício Bustani from the post of Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was deliberately orchestrated by the US

government in order to prepare the ground for military intervention in Iraq, allegedly in possession of weapons of mass destruction. Today, the fact that the pretext for that invasion was false is no longer subject to controversy.

From 2003 onwards, a new diplomatic resourcefulness would be personified in Celso Amorim's "active and self-confident" foreign policy. Surprisingly, the relationship between the Washington unilateralists of the "unipolar moment" and a more assertive Brazil was one of considerable mutual respect. George W. Bush, in addition to not reacting negatively to (President-elect) Lula's comment at the White House — to the effect that the only war worth fighting for Brazil was the one against hunger and poverty — would subsequently invite his Brazilian counterpart to dine at Camp David. Brazilian repudiation of the Iraq intervention did not constitute an inhibiting factor. Serving then as ambassador to the US, I attended that dinner and witnessed firsthand the ease in communication between Lula and Bush. Incidentally, that was the last gathering between Heads of State of the two countries at Camp David.

On the other hand, an emblematic episode of unsatisfactory communication between the Brazilian and US governments came about in the context of the joint initiative by Foreign Ministers Amorim and Davutoglu, of Turkiye, regarding the Iranian nuclear file. The Tehran Declaration of May 17, 2010, simultaneously illustrated, according to Amorim himself, the potential for diplomacy in addressing peace and security and the limitations of "soft power" at the time. It is worth bearing in mind that Turkiye and Brazil were then elected members of the Security Council and invested their efforts in the context of the responsibilities befalling the UN organ with primary responsibility, under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 23.1).

In his book *Tehran*, *Ramallah and Doha*, Amorim reports in detail all the complex stages of a negotiation carried out at the encouragement of President Obama and in strict compliance with the parameters outlined by the US President in a letter addressed to President Lula. Amorim's assessment, however, is that the expectation, both on the part of Obama himself and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was that Lula would not be

successful in persuading his Iranian counterpart to accept limits, under international inspection, on the nuclear program (Amorim, 2018). From the moment a successful outcome in negotiations with Iran seemed imminent, Hillary Clinton introduced new conditionalities, not foreseen in the presidential letter, changing the goal posts.

In reality, coordination was taking place in parallel between the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) aimed at adopting a new series of sanctions against the Iranian leadership. The US cannot be exclusively held responsible for favoring sanctions to the detriment of the approval of the agreement negotiated by Brazil and Turkey. The other permanent members participated in the same equivocation. Nevertheless, the curious inconsistency between the initial encouragement and subsequent restraint from the Americans caused understandable discomfort in Ankara and Brasília. Three years later, when the P5+1 (Germany) negotiated a similar agreement with Iran, the amount of lightly enriched uranium in the country had jumped from 2,000 to 7,000 kilograms. The Economist magazine would only refer to Brazil as a "diplomatic giant" once the Turkish-Brazilian effort had been shelved (The Economist, 2010).

Subsequently, as Foreign Minister, I maintained regular and productive contacts with the State Department under the leadership of Hillary Clinton. I cite, in particular, the establishment of a pioneering joint action program to combat racial discrimination — in recognition of the similar challenges faced by the two societies with the largest populations of African descent in the Americas. During a visit to Brazil for a "Global Partnership Dialogue" meeting, the Secretary of State even stated at a press conference that "it would be very difficult to imagine a Security Council in the future that does not include a country like Brazil, with all the progress it has been achieving and the democratic model it represents." I mention other positive initiatives from this period in an article I published in the CEBRI magazine (Patriota, 2023b).

The divergence between the two governments, concerning military interventions and issues related to peace and security more generally, should not be underestimated. Brazil would begin to express with increasing firmness its opposition to violations of the UN Charter and the resort to the use of force in international relations. This attitude would give rise to frequent misunderstanding of Brazilian intentions by successive North American administrations. Barack Obama, who voted against the invasion of Iraq when he was a Senator, would demonstrate a singular lack of sensitivity regarding Brazil's attitude in the Libyan case. In his book A Promised Land, Obama states that Brazil "avoids taking sides in international disputes" (Obama, 2020). The disastrous consequences of NATO's military intervention in Libya, which were anticipated by Brazilian warnings to the Security Council in early 2011, are duly ignored.²

Such differences did not prevent Brazilian engagement in Haiti from being appreciated by the US government. In reality, the US gave repeated demonstrations of support for the participation of Brazilian military personnel in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Haiti and, throughout MINUSTAH's existence (2004-2017), favored maintaining Brazilian military officers in command of the Blue Helmet contingent authorized by the Security Council. It is also worth remembering that, during the George W. Bush administration, the US organized a conference in Annapolis promoting peace between Israel and Palestine, with Brazilian participation, in implicit recognition of Brazilian diplomatic credentials to discuss issues beyond the Americas. Interestingly, Barack Obama would later recognize Brazil's "global influence" in a press conference alongside Dilma Rousseff in Washington (30/06/2015) (The Obama White House, 2015).

Although the Brazilian government appreciated these manifestations, a residual level of mistrust remained. Journalist Glenn Greenwald uncovered evidence that Brazil's Mission to the United Nations had been subject to spying, following the orders of the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations during the Obama administration (GREENWALD, 2014). This revelation came in addition to serious evidence regarding the monitoring of President Dilma Rousseff's phone by US intelligence — a fact denounced by Edward Snowden which was never clarified to

Explanation of Brazil's abstention vote, in a speech given by Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, on the occasion of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya (17/3/2011). Viotti, 2023.

the satisfaction of Brazilian authorities. A target of similar espionage, Germany joined Brazil in presenting a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly on the "right to privacy in the digital age." The text was adopted by consensus despite pressure exerted by the US Permanent Mission in New York to discourage the co-authors from pursuing the initiative.

Among the five BRICS (in the format that precedes the recent expansion of the group, announced in August 2023 at the last Pretoria Summit), Brazil was the only one to vote in favor of the resolutions at the UN General Assembly, which condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These votes are examples of Brazil's non-selective adherence to international law. Notwithstanding this consistency, however, a spokesperson for the White House National Security Council felt authorized to react to Brazilian statements in favor of a peace process regarding Ukraine in a disrespectful way, considering them as favorable to Moscow. The incident in itself had no consequence. It constitutes, however, yet another instance of disregard towards the concept of the pacific settlement of disputes embraced by Brazil.

The current crisis between Israelis and Palestinians poses an additional challenge. Brazil has always valued its relations with Israel. MERCOSUR negotiated, during the previous Lula administration, a free trade agreement not only with Israel but also with the State of Palestine, recognized as such in December 2010 by Brasilia. On the other hand, the Brazilian government has expressed, for some time, its concern with unilateral interpretations of the right to self-defense. In addition to the universal condemnation of the attacks of October 7, 2023, to which Brazil unequivocally added its voice, the compatibility of the Israeli response in Gaza with international humanitarian law is now widely questioned. Faced with tens of thousands of civilian deaths, the call for a ceasefire takes on urgency. By not joining this chorus the US position remains at odds with the vast majority of the international community.

This situation arouses large-scale indignation and illustrates a worrying pattern of inconsistency in the face of violations of the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions. Condemnation of punitive actions by Russia against the Ukrainian civilian population contrast

with a resistance by the US to demand respect for international law by Israel. British peace activist Daniel Levy, President of the US Middle East Project who worked for the Israeli government during the Ehud Barak administration, resorts to extremely critical terms when commenting on the behavior of the Israeli armed forces in Gaza. The same expert observer encourages countries with credibility in promoting peace — and a history of good relations with both sides — to assume a more visible leadership role, while regretting that Washington can no longer be included in that category (Middle East Eye, 2023).

I open a new parenthesis to recall that President Lula as early as 2003, when he first opened the UN General Assembly, has equated the improvement of the multilateral system with that of promoting full democratic governance within each state. According to his declaration, "every nation committed to democracy at the domestic level must ensure that decision-making processes are transparent, legitimate, and representative at the international external level as well." In a letter addressed to the Summit for Democracy, promoted by the Biden administration in March 2023, Lula would explain that fighting for democracy is also fighting for equality and social justice, and that true democracy entails the acceptance of diversity and the promotion of inclusion. He concludes that the flag of democracy cannot be used to build walls or create divisions. In other words, international processes in promoting peace, sustainability and human rights cannot be effective if pursued by groups of the like-minded only.

In the period during which I assumed Brazil's permanent representation to the UN, between 2013 and 2016, I developed a friendly rapport with my US counterpart, Samantha Power. We had met years before at the launch of her book on Sergio Vieira de Mello, *Chasing the Flame*. When she came to Brazil to launch the Portuguese edition, I invited her to Brasília in my capacity as Foreign Minister and proposed that she address the students at our Diplomatic Academy the Rio Branco Institute. She captivated the audience. Power does not conceal her admiration for Vieira de Mello and his efforts in favor of peace in the former Yugoslavia, Timor-Leste, and numerous other places. She followed his activity with undeniable enthusiasm (as we know, Vieira de Mello lost his life in Iraq

amid a herculean attempt to pacify the country after the US-led invasion). I venture to suggest that, within the Biden administration, Samantha may represent a valuable asset when it comes to adequately assessing Brazil's commitment to peace.

The visits to Brazil in 2022 by the American National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will have represented important signs of Washington's confidence in the Brazilian electoral system. By all accounts, these interlocutors made it clear in Brasília that the US would not support any eventual coup attempts. Subsequent meetings between Presidents Lula and Biden in Washington and on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly demonstrate a renewed convergence around democratic ideals and sustainable development with social justice. The unprecedented bilateral partnership for the promotion of labor rights, recently launched through a joint statement in New York (September 20, 2023), opens a promising chapter of mutual support around shared ideals.

A recent Brookings Institution seminar on the future of Brazil-United States relations sought to update the debate about each other's strategies in the current geopolitical environment. A genuine effort at understanding the contours of a bilateral relationship, rightly described as "complex" was then attempted. As rightly stated in its conclusions, the US should not expect Brazil to join anti-China coalitions in the future. Also correct is the suggestion that the US must understand that Brazil values its autonomy and is unlikely to submit to automatic alignments with Washington or any other power. The idea that an autonomous Brazil will make significant contributions to regional and global security that deserve to be valued by the US is a positive final note.

At the same time, the conclusion that Brazil needs to "update" its "strategic autonomy strategy" appears to stem once again from a misunderstanding. An article published by the seminar's organizers (Jones et al., 2023) states that if Brazil wishes to raise its profile on the global stage, it will have to adapt to a new geopolitical context and abandon its "hands-off neutrality." Nothing is said about Brazilian coherence in defending the UN Charter, in contrast with US volatility in this central

aspect of the international order. Nothing is said about Brazil's engagement with social justice and the defense of peace, or its non-selective approach to international law. The bilateral relationship will only have matured and reached its full potential when such misunderstandings are overcome.

Brazil's foreign policy in 2023 reflects a commitment to three fundamental causes for advancing human civilization on Earth: democracy, sustainability and peace. This statement does not imply underestimating the challenges faced at the domestic level — from combating hunger and poverty to promoting equality or reducing criminality. In his speech to the 78th UN General Assembly, President Lula underlined a word that perhaps summarizes the general orientation of the Brazilian government, both domestically and internationally. This word is "humanism." "We need to rescue the best humanist traditions that inspired the creation of the UN," he stated (Brasil, 2023). The UN would not have seen the light of day without US leadership. That basis for a humanist-inspired bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Brazil and the United States continues to exist.

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
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Brazil and the United States: Fading Interdependence?

Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira¹

In 2011, I wrote an article for *Orbis* journal titled *Brazil and United States: Fading Interdependence*. That year, China had surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy and had just become Brazil's main trading partner, replacing the United States, which had held that position for almost a century. Based on trade and investment data, I detected a clear trend of declining interdependence between Brazil and the United States.

More than a decade later, in the context of the bicentennial of relations between the two countries, I propose in this text to analyze the changes in interdependence between Brazil and the United States since the publication of that article. The analysis of available data seems to suggest a reversal of the downward trend in interdependence between Brazil and the United States observed at the beginning of the last decade, especially in the last five years. For this reason, the title of the present text, in contrast to the categorical statement made in the title of the article written at the beginning of the previous decade, is in the form of a question.

Interdependence is a central concept in international relations, which refers to the degree of connection and interaction between

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countries in different dimensions, such as trade, investment, security and culture. Interdependence can be symmetrical, when countries are equally affected by the relationship, or asymmetrical, when one country is more dependent or vulnerable than the other. This latter type of interdependence is what characterizes Brazil's relationship with two of its main trading partners — the United States and China. One of the key issues that makes the concept of interdependence relevant to international relations is that it can be used as a source of power and influence, when one country uses its dominant position to gain advantages or impose its interests on the other.

In this text, I try to demonstrate that, despite China becoming Brazil's main trading partner in 2009, the trade relationship between Brazil and the United States has remained stable since then, without registering any significant drops. While the United States lost relevance in Brazilian trade in the first decade of the 21st century, in the last 15 years the United States' share of Brazilian exports and imports has remained relatively stable. Similarly, after significant growth, China's share of Brazilian trade has been stabilizing over the last five years. In addition, the United States continues to be the largest foreign direct investor in Brazil by a wide margin, while Chinese investments, even though they have grown in recent years, are still secondary, below European countries such as Spain, for example.

The text is divided into three parts. In the first, I briefly review the literature on the concept of interdependence, preparing the ground for the analytical part, in which I present data and analyses on the evolution of economic interdependence between Brazil and the United States, considering both trade and investment. Finally, I offer some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.

Defining interdependence²

The inherent complexity regarding a precise definition of interdependence has been a persistent challenge in academic research.

² This section was adapted from the aforementioned Poggio Teixeira, Carlos Gustavo. Brazil and United States: Fading Interdependence.

Since the first incursions into this field, it has been difficult to reconcile different perspectives on the concept. During the initial phase of studies on the subject, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein (1973) complained that "one of the problems in unraveling the disagreements about interdependence is the absence of an agreed definition of the term" (Rosecrance and Stein, 1973, 2). Thirty years after this statement, it seemed that things had not changed much, when Katherine Barbieri (2002) stated that operationalizing interdependence was difficult due to a "lack of a clear consensus" on what the term really intends to capture (Barbieri, 2002, 53).

Despite the lack of a single, consensual definition, interdependence can be conceptualized as a complex network of connections and interactions between international actors. This network generates reciprocal effects and implies opportunity costs, manifesting itself in various dimensions, such as trade, investment, security, culture, the environment and human rights. However, there is a common understanding among scholars that trade plays a central role, giving economic interdependence fundamental relevance.

Albert O. Hirschman's seminal 1945 study National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade stands out as one of the first significant explorations in this field. Hirschman (1945) postulated that the "power to interrupt trade and financial relations with any country" is the "root cause" of international influence. His pioneering ideas transcend the classical liberal notion, focusing on the idea that once trade is established, the costs of breaking the relationship can be so substantial as to become an "effective weapon in the struggle for power." Hirschman (1945) calls a country's gains from trade relations the "supply effect." But as he was interested in looking not only at the economic but also the political dimension of trade, the important concept here is the notion of the "influence effect," i.e. using the possibility of trade disruption as a tool of power (Hirschman, 1945, 16-17). In short, the greater the supply effect of trade for a given country, the less influence that country has, since the other country can use the threat of interrupting trade as a political tool to achieve its goals. In other words, Hirschman anticipated by at

least twenty years the idea of asymmetrical interdependence that other scholars would later recognize.

In their influential study on interdependence, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) expanded on Hirschman's work. The authors defined interdependence as a situation "characterized by reciprocal effects between countries or between actors in different countries." According to Keohane and Nye (1977), the reciprocal cost effects of transactions make interdependence different from mere interconnection. This is consistent with Kenneth Waltz's definition of interdependence as a relationship that is costly to break (Waltz, 1979). Keohane and Nye point out that these reciprocal cost effects are not necessarily symmetrical, and it is precisely this cost asymmetry that gives power to the less dependent country. Interdependence also implies sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity refers to a country's response to changes in an interdependent relationship, while vulnerability rests on the relative availability and cost of alternatives. The latter is more crucial, as argued by David Baldwin, who highlights the practical emphasis on vulnerability over sensitivity. This approach, centered on the vulnerability of interdependence, is corroborated by Hirschman, who developed indexes measuring the concentration of trading partners for different countries. Vulnerability, measured by the concentration of trading partners, becomes central, since a country with few trading partners has fewer options if a partner interrupts trade, making it more vulnerable to a breakdown in the relationship.

In addition to trade relations, foreign investment is a crucial component in the analysis of economic interdependence. Hirschman had already argued that "financial relations" are a component of this interdependence (Hirschman, 1945, 16). Gasiorowiski (1985), when considering international capital flows, confirmed the hypothesis that "the interdependence of the least developed countries associated with foreign investment is overwhelmingly vertical" (Gasiorowiski, 1985, 337). He highlights three types of international capital flows — foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign aid and financial capital flows. Gasiorowski (1985) emphasizes, however, that as far as interdependence analysis is concerned, "there is little point in examining the international structure of financial capital flows" since "financial capital flows give creditors much less influence

over debtors than direct investment or aid flows. Therefore, the interdependence associated with financial capital flows is actually systemic and not bilateral." Thus, the examination of foreign direct investment flows emerges as another fundamental component for the analysis of interdependence.

From this perspective, in which economic interdependence manifests itself through trade and foreign direct investment, the following analysis will seek to examine the evolution of these relations between Brazil and the United States over time. We will focus especially on the behavior of trade and investment interactions, seeking to understand the trends and dynamics that characterize this interconnection over the years.

Trade between Brazil and the United States


Trade is one of the most traditional and visible forms of economic interdependence between countries, for it involves the exchange of goods and services that affect the production, consumption, income and employment of populations. Trade can also be used as a foreign policy instrument to promote cooperation, integration, influence or conflict between countries. Trade between Brazil and the United States has a long history, dating back to the 19th century, when the United States became the main market for Brazilian exports of coffee, rubber and other primary products.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the United States became Brazil's main trading partner. In 1901, Europe accounted for around half of Brazil's imports and exports. After the First World War, the United States' share of Brazilian foreign trade increased significantly, declining in the interwar period and increasing again after the Second World War. The United States remained the main market for Brazilian exports until at least 1960, accounting for around 40% of Brazil's total trade. Brazil mainly exported agricultural products, such as coffee, sugar and cotton, and mainly imported industrial products, such as machinery, equipment and automobiles.

From the second half of the 20th century, the United States' share of Brazilian trade began to decline, due to Europe's recovery after the Second World War. This diversified Brazil's export portfolio, taking the United

States from around 40% of Brazilian exports and imports to around 20% in the 1990s. From the 2000s onwards, the United States' share of Brazilian trade continued to fall, mainly due to the rise of China as Brazil's main trading partner. China has displaced the United States to a secondary position. China thus became Brazil's main trading partner in the 21st century, rising from around 3% of Brazilian exports and imports to over 30% in the first two decades of the century. The complementarity between the two countries' productive structures was a central factor in this change. As in its relationship with the United States at the beginning of the last century, Brazil exports mainly primary products to China, such as iron ore, soybeans and oil, and imports manufactured goods, such as electronics, machinery and clothing.


Graph 1 illustrates this dynamic with regard to Brazilian exports at the turn of the 20th to the 21st century. It shows that the United States' share of Brazilian exports fell from 18% in 1997 to 11% in 2022, a reduction of 7 percentage points over a 15-year period. On the other hand, China's share of Brazilian exports rose from 3% to 27% in the same period, a significant increase of 24 percentage points.



Graph 1 — Share of Brazilian exports (in percent)

Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. Trade statistics open database. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/comercio-exterior/estatisticas/base-de-dados-bruta. Made by the author. "Europe" includes Russia.

A closer look at the graph reveals another, more recent dynamic. After China became the main individual destination for Brazilian exports around 2009, the United States' share stagnated, stabilizing at around 10% of Brazil's total exports. It is also noteworthy that China's share of Brazilian exports has been falling since 2020. It remains to be seen whether this is a cyclical issue — due to the effects of COVID, for example — or whether it represents a more structural trend. China's greater share of Brazilian exports since 2009 seems to have come at the expense of Europe, while MERCOSUR has shown clear signs of exhaustion since the end of the last century, accounting for only 7% of Brazilian exports in 2022. A similar dynamic can be observed with regard to imports, as shown in Graph 2.



Graph 2 — Share of Brazilian imports (in percent)

Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. Trade statistics open database. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/comercio-exterior/estatisticas/base-de-dados-bruta. Made by the author. "Europe" includes Russia.

Regarding Brazilian imports, the United States' share fell from 23% in 1997 to 19% in 2022, a reduction of 4 percentage points in 15 years. However, if we look at just the last 10 years, after reaching a low of 14% in 2012, the trend has been an increase in the United States' share of

Brazilian imports, so that today the United States represents more or less the same share of Brazilian imports as it did at the beginning of the century. On the other hand, China's share of Brazilian imports rose from 3% in 1997 to 23% in 2022, an increase of 20 percentage points. However, since 2018, China's share has remained relatively stable. Graph 2 shows that, over the last 25 years, the US curve differs from the European and MERCOSUR curves, which seem to show a more constant downward trend over the long term. This is an important conclusion, for it indicates that Brazil still has a relevant and stable economic relationship with the United States, which is still the world's largest consumer market and economic power. The analysis of the import and export data presented in the graphs above allows us to conclude that, since China became Brazil's main trading partner, the US-Brazil trade relationship has witnessed a period of clear stability.

Among the factors that can explain the stability of the United States' share of Brazilian trade over the last 15 years is the recovery of the US economy after the 2008 crisis, which increased demand for Brazilian products, especially agricultural products. On the other hand, the slowdown in Chinese growth is a factor that can help explain the stability of China's share of Brazilian exports since 2018. In fact, recent estimates of Chinese growth point to some obstacles, such as an ageing population, reduced productivity and growing competition from other Asian countries. In addition, some analysts believe that, contrary to what has been anticipated in recent years, China may not replace the United States as the world's leading economy in the coming decades. This is the conclusion, for example, of a recent report by the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER). The JCER report projects that China's nominal GDP will reach US\$ 26.8 trillion in 2035, while the nominal GDP of the United States will reach US\$ 33.2 trillion. The graph below illustrates that, contrary to previous JCER projections, the institute's most recent projections indicate that China will not overtake the United States as the world's leading economy in the coming years.

Chinese GDP fails to overtake U.S. in latest survey
(Chinese GDP minus that of U.S. in trillions of dollars)

2022 survey
2021 survey
2020 survey

6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
2020
'25
'30
'35

Graph 3 — JCER projections for Chinese GDP growth in relation to that of the United States

Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER), "Chinese GDP fails to overtake U.S. in latest survey," Nikkei Asia, 15 dec. 2022. Available at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/China-s-GDP-unlikely-to-surpass-U.S.-in-next-few-decades-JCER.

The JCER report also points out that China is losing its competitive edge in some areas, such as electronics manufacturing. This is because other Asian countries, such as Vietnam and India, are becoming more competitive due to factors such as lower production costs, more skilled labor and access to foreign markets. The conclusions of this report have important implications for the global economy in general and for Brazil in particular. If China fails to maintain its pace of growth, this could lead to a shift in the balance of economic power in the world and consequently impact trade relations with Brazil.

FDI between Brazil and the United States

Investment is another important form of economic interdependence between countries, as it involves the transfer of financial, technological and managerial resources that affect the development, productivity and competitiveness of economies. Investment can also be used as a foreign policy instrument to promote cooperation, integration, influence or conflict between countries. Like the trade relationship, investment between Brazil and the United States has a long history, dating back to the 19th century, when the United States began investing in sectors such as railroads, energy and mining in Brazil. Graph 3 shows the evolution of the United States' share of total foreign direct investment in Brazil between 2010 and 2021, which is the most recent data available from the Central Bank of Brazil at the time of writing.

35% 30% 25% 20% %IED 15% 10% 5% 0% 2010 2011 2015 2016 2017 2020 2021 China %

Graph 4 — Share of Direct Investment in the Country — Share of capital (in percent)

Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Relatórios de Investimento Direito [Direct Investment Report]. Available at: https://www.bcb.gov.br/publicacoes/relatorioid. Graph by the author.

US FDI in Brazil is the oldest and most significant, reflecting the long and intense economic relationship between the two countries. In 2021, the stock of US FDI in Brazil reached an all-time high of US\$ 190 billion, which represented 31% of the total, making it by far the main country of origin of FDI in Brazil. US FDI in Brazil is mainly concentrated in the service sectors, such as telecommunications, finance, energy and technology, but also has a significant presence in the industrial sectors,

such as automotive, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and food. As graph 3 demonstrates, the share of US FDI in Brazil has shown an upward trend over the last decade, rising from one fifth of total FDI in the country in 2010 to almost one third in 2021.

China's foreign direct investment in Brazil, on the other hand, is more recent and, although it has shown a growth trend, it remains relatively modest, behind European countries like Spain, for instance. In 2021, China's FDI stock in Brazil was US\$ 30 billion, which represents 5% of the total and places it as the seventh country of origin of FDI in Brazil. China's FDI in Brazil is mainly concentrated in the infrastructure sectors. such as energy, mining, transportation and telecommunications, but it also has a growing presence in the industrial sectors, such as automotive, electronics and steel. China's FDI in Brazil has shown an upward trend in recent years, in line with growing Chinese demand for natural resources and Chinese interest in diversifying and consolidating its presence in the Brazilian market. However, despite being Brazil's largest trading partner in terms of direct investment, China continues to lag behind not only the United States, but also European countries. Spain's FDI in Brazil, for example, is the most diversified and the most integrated, reflecting the historical, cultural and linguistic proximity between the two countries. In 2021, Spain's FDI stock in Brazil was US\$ 48 billion, which accounted for 8% of the total and makes it the second country of origin of FDI in Brazil. Spanish investment in Brazil is spread across various sectors, such as services, industry, commerce, construction and agriculture, but it stands out mainly in the telecommunications, energy, banking and tourism sectors. Spain's FDI in Brazil, however, has shown a downward trend in recent years, in line with the economic and political crisis in Spain and the downturn in the Brazilian market. In 2021, Spain's FDI in Brazil was the lowest since 2015.

Foreign direct investment in Brazil has shown an upward trend in recent years, driven by the economic recovery and by the search for new business opportunities in the country. However, FDI from the United States in Brazil not only remains the main source, but has also shown a tendency to increase its share of total FDI in Brazil over the last few years. On the other hand, there seems to be a progressive decline in the

participation of European countries, as demonstrated by the case of Spain. Although Chinese investment has gradually increased over the last 10 years, in terms of the total invested in the country, China still occupies a relatively modest position. These data, combined with those shown in the previous section, seem to point to an increase in asymmetrical interdependence between Brazil and the United States, reversing the trend observed since the beginning of the 21st century.

Conclusion

The data and analyses we have presented show that economic interdependence between Brazil and the United States declined considerably in the first decade of the 21st century, but did not change much in the second decade. The United States is still Brazil's main trading partner, but it has lost ground to China. However, when it comes to investments, the dynamic is different. The United States continues to be the main foreign investor in Brazil, with a growing share that currently represents around a third of total FDI in the country. China, for its part, is also a growing investor but, unlike the dynamics seen in foreign trade, does not yet seem to be threatening the United States in this sector.

Therefore, there are two factors that we should pay attention to, as they could have implications for the future of economic interdependence between Brazil and China. The first factor is that China's share of Brazilian trade has remained stable since 2018, at around 30% of exports and 20% of imports, and with no great expectations of change. This may indicate that the trade relationship between Brazil and China has reached a limit, and that there is no more room for significant growth. The second factor is that China's investment in Brazil, despite rising, is still low compared to the United States. In 2020, China's investment stock in Brazil was US\$ 30 billion, while that of the United States was US\$ 125 billion. This may indicate that China does not yet have a consolidated presence in the Brazilian market, and that it faces barriers and challenges in investing in Brazil.

Thus, even in the context of China's rise, there seems to be a window of opportunity for Brazil and the United States to strengthen their

relations with a view to the future, if they so wish. The United States and Brazil share common values, such as democracy and human rights, and have converging interests, such as sustainable development, regional security and multilateral cooperation. To this end, the United States must recognize Brazil's role and importance in the region and the world, and offer favorable conditions for deepening the economic interdependence between the two countries through trade, investment, cooperation and innovation agreements. Brazil, for its part, must maintain a pragmatic and proactive stance, seeking the best for its development, without submitting to pressure or automatic alignments. It must maintain a respectful and constructive relationship with China, its main economic partner and a strategic player in the world order. Brazil must seek a more diversified and balanced trade and investment relationship with China, involving more sectors, more products and more benefits for Brazil. Brazil has a privileged position on the international stage, which allows it to have an economic interdependence with the United States and China, which can be advantageous and positive for its development. However, Brazil also has a responsibility and a challenge, which is to manage this economic interdependence in a sovereign and balanced manner, which respects its interests and values and contributes to regional integration and global cooperation.

In brief, the results presented here suggest that, despite the rise of China as Brazil's main trading partner, the United States not only continues to be an important economic partner for Brazil, but the trend since 2020 seems to be towards an intensification of this relationship. We will still need a more robust historical distance to be able to identify whether these trends are merely cyclical or in fact represent longer-term structural changes. It will be up to future researchers to assess this. Future research could also explore the economic interdependence between Brazil, the United States and China in more detail. Such research could analyze interdependence in different sectors of the economy, such as agribusiness, industry or services. They could also analyze the implications of economic interdependence for public policies. Moreover, it will be important to follow the trend of economic interdependence between these three countries over the next few years. If we are indeed

seeing a stagnation or possible decline in China's share of Brazilian trade, this will have significant implications for relations between Brazil and the United States in the near future.

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Studies on the United States in Brazil: A Field in Formation

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An intriguing paradox

There is something paradoxical about cultural relations between Brazil and the United States. On the one hand, the Brazilian public is intensely exposed to the manifestations of American culture, in its most varied forms: music, cinema, literature, sports... Coming to us through all kinds of channels — books, newspapers, magazines, radio and television, the internet — the amount of information we have about the economy and politics of the United States, its ways of life, the rites of its judicial system is also fed by the direct interaction that many Brazilians have, regularly or sporadically, with that country in the exercise of economic or academic activities, or as tourists. And we must not forget the very significant contingent of Brazilians who live or have lived in that country as migrants.

On the other hand, there is a notable lack of serious studies on the United States. Some newspapers have correspondents in New York or Washington, but there is little space for their articles. Few in-depth articles, few books, little debate. We know a lot about the great country of the North, but the information we have is not organized into structured, meaningful sets. Instead, we often find stereotypes, both positive and

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negative. Although it seems familiar to us, we know very little about the United States.

A paradox? Not exactly. The thoughtlessness is largely explained by the feeling of proximity that information overload gives us. As an obliged and almost always insatiable consumer of sounds and images from abroad, the average citizen runs the risk of remembering episodes from American history more easily than important facts from our past. The feeling of familiarity is so strong that astonishment does not occur, and doubt, which is the mother of knowledge, does not arise.

On another level, this particular (lack of) knowledge has to do with the marked asymmetry between the two societies. We have a lot of information about the United States, but not the information we choose, because we generally limit ourselves to the role of more or less passive recipients. The same attitude shapes our perception of the country's place on the international stage. As distant observers of the successes (many) and failures (some) that have historically marked the trajectory of the United States on the great stage of world politics, our image of its role in this field is more often than not fed by information and arguments produced in the vast and dense circuits of communication (journalistic and academic) that constitute one of the country's trump cards in its relationship with its peers.

And that's not all: in a specular movement, we very often use the United States as a model, a mirror in which we look at ourselves — to identify our own characteristics, measure our shortcomings, and define the figure of the collective being we would like to become.

Although it retains some essential elements of the situation it aims to describe, this succint assessment needs to be qualified.

The United States as a mirror and object of knowledge

The first qualification to make concerns the way in which Brazil-US cultural relations have been described. True, we are bombarded daily by a flow of information originating in that country, the volume of which far exceeds our capacity for conscious and thoughtful assimilation. However,

it has not always been like this, and the relationship between the recipients and senders of these messages has never been entirely passive.

Early evidence of this can be found in the experience of Hipólito José da Costa, the first of a long list of more or less illustrious Brazilian travelers who left their impressions of the Northern Republic for posterity. In fact, we owe one of them — Alceu de Amoroso Lima, about whom I will say a word later — the publication, in 1954, of *Diário da minha viagem* para a Filadélfia (Diary of my trip to Philadelphia), a manuscript that had been lost in the Eborense library in Lisbon until then. A graduate in law and philosophy from Coimbra, like so many sons of the colonial elite, Hipólito da Costa was given the task by the Portuguese government in 1798 of traveling to the United States to observe cultivation methods and collect plant samples. A keen and methodical observer, the 24-year-old traveler recorded his impressions in a dry but picturesque text, rich in information about the physical and social landscape of the young Republic. The seedlings that Hipólito da Costa collected did not make it across the Atlantic, and his comments remained forgotten for more than a century and a half. However, the American experience marked the political vision of the founder of the Correio Braziliense, a newspaper published in London between 1808 and 1822, which exerted enormous influence on the dawn of Brazil as an independent country.

But the emergence of the United States on the international scene had earlier effects on us. The attraction exerted by the American Revolution on the conspiracy of 1789 in Minas Gerais is well known. Less well known are the sources that the *inconfidentes* used to form their idealized image of the country that inspired them. One of them was the book *Recueil des Loix Constitutives des États Unis de l'Amérique*, published in Paris in 1778, available in Portuguese translation in a work coordinated by Kenneth Maxwell, which also brings together various studies on the political and intellectual context of the movement. But it was not the only one. To take one example from this historian's essay, Robertson's *Histoire de l'Amérique* and Mably's *Observations sur le gouvernement des États-Unis de l'Amérique* were seized from the conspirators' libraries, among other subversive texts (Maxwell, 2013, 34-35).

In itself, the dissemination of works like these in French says something about the global impact of the American Revolution. There is no need to dwell on it. But it is worth noting that in the second decade of the 18th century, when the crisis of the Atlantic system was reflected in the struggles for independence in Iberian America, the model of the American Republic was competing with the constitutional monarchy—either English or French — for the preference of the elites of the new countries.

Brazil was no stranger to this debate. Despite the preponderance of the monarchical formula, in the name of which the State imposed its control over the immense territory of the former Portuguese Empire in America, the example of the United States was present in the debate on issues relating to the degree of autonomy of its provinces (Wright, 1978).

As we know, the controversy cooled down after the Act of Interpretation of the Additional Act was enacted in 1840, which consecrated the victory of the Conservative Party over its liberal opponents and laid the foundations for the strong centralization characteristic of the Second Empire.

It cools down — it should be stressed — but it does not die. It would reappear twenty years later in Tavares Bastos' criticism of the Viscount of Uruguai, one of the main intellectual leaders of the *Saquaremas*, as the conservatives of the time were called, and then in Republican propaganda.

Studies on this controversy highlight the role played by references to the United States in the rhetoric of the adversaries. The virtues of American society are not questioned — on the contrary, their recognition constitutes the common ground on which the contenders meet to fight. But while Tavares Bastos, the liberal, proposes the application of American solutions to Brazilian problems, denouncing imperial centralization and advocating the autonomy of the provinces, Uruguai insists on the conditions that led to the slow development of representative institutions in England — by extension, in the United States — and on the deleterious consequences of blind attempts to mimic them in a reality as different as that of Brazil at the time (Ferreira, 1999).

Distintos pero iguales. Different but equal. In elaborating their common image of the United States — a social construct, in Natalia Bas's accurate definition — both Tavares Bastos and Uruguai made use of French works: Alexis Tocqueville, in the first place, but also Laboullaye and Michel Chevalier, authors who today are seen as lesser, but of enormous prestige in their time (Bas, 2011).

If you look closely at the footnotes in their books, however, one can see that it was not just them. In formulating their respective arguments, both mobilized primary materials — legal texts, administrative acts and reports — and American reference works, duly cited in the original. Prominent among these was *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States*, a three-volume treatise published in 1833 by Joseph Story, a Supreme Court justice and forerunner of legal studies at Harvard University (Roosevelt III, 2013).

Not by chance, this book was acquired, along with a copy of Tocque-ville's Democracy in America, by the young Rui Barbosa, when he was in his second year at the Law School in Recife (Pereira, 1924 quoted in Venâncio Filho, 1977, 134). They were perhaps the first of an immense "American" library that the publicist built up — and devoured — throughout his career.²

Uruguai, Tavares Bastos, Rui Barbosa — three outstanding public men, three distinguished representatives of the Brazilian legal and political culture of their time. Their education — like that of their peers - did not take place in the classroom — given the precariousness of the legal education given at the Law Schools of São Paulo and Recife, created and strictly regulated by the State, the only ones in existence in the country until Benjamin Constant's reform at the beginning of the Republic. As the pioneering work of Venâncio Filho and Sergio Adorno amply demonstrates, the education of the most promising bachelors, the future leaders of the country, did not take place within the walls of the schools, but outside, in the network of debating clubs, newspapers and student societies,

² This is what Carleton Sprague Smith shows in his lecture Os livros norte-americanos no pensamento de Rui Barbosa (The North American books in Rui Barbosa's thought).

where they exercised their oratory skills, tested their poetic talents and recognized each other (Venâncio Filho, 1977; Adorno, 1988).

For the argument outlined here, the important thing is to stress that, through more or less institutionalized channels — it does not matter — the illustrated layer of the Brazilian political elite had, in the second half of the 19th century, the means to find out about American society, and that many of its members made good use of these resources.

The unsuspecting observer becomes aware of this when leafing through the book *Cartas da Inglaterra* (Letters from England), by Rui, or o *Regime federativo e a república brasileira* (The federative regime and the Brazilian republic), by Amaro Cavalcanti. And they become convinced when they discover that Story's treatise was published in Brazil in 1894, translated and adapted by Theophilo Ribeiro, a lecturer at the Free Faculty of Law in Minas Gerais (Story, 1894).

The autodidacticism of its most cultivated members was not, however, the only channel of access to information and analysis about the United States available to the Brazilian political elite at the time. Just as important, if not more so, was the regular activity of professionals who regularly supplied the rulers with both. I am referring, of course, to diplomats.

Take, for example, the case of Miguel Maria Lisboa. Having entered his career at the age of 18 as an attaché at the Brazilian legation in London, Lisboa was an experienced diplomat when he took over as head of the Brazilian Legation in Washington in December 1859. At that time, the United States was already immersed in the political crisis that would culminate in the Civil War. In his three years in that position, Lisboa provided the Brazilian government with precise information on the evolution of events and prescient analyses of their wider implications. This correspondence has already been pointed to as a source of inspiration for the change in imperial policy on slavery, the first sign of which was the Free Womb Law of 1872 (Youssef, 2016). Here, however, the point to emphasize is the diplomat's mastery of the facts of American politics and the exceptional acuity of his analysis. The following quote, from a long letter dated December 13, 1860, is a powerful illustration of this:

[...] if the South does well in the present struggle, it will undoubtedly wish to fortify itself for the future, and one of the means of fortifying itself is to acquire [...] new territories in which it can establish slavery [...] This is an evil against which we must guard ourselves [...]. But this evil is distant and infinitely less than an emancipation propaganda protected simultaneously by Europe and the North of the United States, or than a civil war that abruptly secured freedom for nearly four million American slaves, leaving us with no more all[ies] in the struggle between abolitionism and the institution on which our wealth currently depends and will so for some time to come (Lisboa, 2015, 420-421).

[...]

A civil war in the United States would be [...] a giant step towards the total extinction of African slavery in the countries where it exists (Lisboa, 2015, 423).

Miguel Maria Lisboa's explicit commitment to defending the nefarious institution shocks the sensibilities of contemporary readers. But there is no way to stifle the surprise at the insightfulness of his analysis.

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The space available is scarce for the length of the article, but I could not close this topic without saying a quick word about two other categories of agents with an important role in the production of images of the United States in Brazil: journalists and travelers — in particular, established writers, with more or less long stays in the country.

But first, a warning. We must not reify these roles. In the conditions of Brazil at the turn of the 20th century, they were often confused. As in the case of Oliveira Lima, who has been said to have been the first Brazilian Americanist. Having stayed in the United States between 1896 and 1899, as First Secretary of the Brazilian Legation in Washington, Oliveira Lima worked as a correspondent in that country for *Revista Brazileira* and *Jornal do Commercio*, publications for which he wrote the

articles that would serve as the basis for his book Nos Estados Unidos: impressões políticas e sociais, a comprehensive work that expresses the deep knowledge acquired by the author and his not insignificant sympathy for the country in which he lived (Lima, 1899).³

The purest — and most curious — case is that of José Carlos Rodrigues, owner of the *Jornal do Commercio*, from whom Oliveira Lima had received an invitation to write about the United States. With a brilliant start to his career — at the age of 19, he was the author of a work on constitutional law that was very well received by the public and critics (it had 10 editions by 1889) — José Carlos Rodrigues moved to New York in obscure circumstances in 1867, after having served as an official in the Ministry of Finance in two offices in the Empire. Soon hired as a correspondent for the *Jornal do Commercio*, Rodrigues inscribed his name in the history of Brazilian journalism as the creator of the illustrated monthly *Novo Mundo*, published in New York, which went on to sell 8,000 copies in Brazil, where it was sent by ship. **Novo Mundo** had illustrious Brazilian contributors, but its purpose was different. It was thus presented to potential advertisers:

This publication provides the countries and colonies where Portuguese and Spanish are spoken with a more complete summary of the course of events, particularly the political and industrial progress of the United States, [...] with a view to strengthening the existing political, commercial and friendly ties between the various countries of the Western Hemisphere (*O Novo Mundo*, 2, quoted in Boehrer, 1967, 132).

Many years later, when the Republic was proclaimed, José Carlos Rodrigues confirmed his prominent place in the history of Brazilian journalism by acquiring the *Jornal do Commercio* and making it one of the heralds of the policy of alliance with the United States undertaken by his friend Rio Branco, who wrote regularly in its pages under a pseudonym, a

³ On the writing of this work and the reception it received, see Henrich, 2016.

⁴ Sandroni, issued.

policy whose alleged excesses were harshly attacked by Oliveira Lima, in the articles collected in his book *Pan-Americanismo* (Lima, 1980).

Despite the efforts of so many, Brazil remained for a long time in the sphere of European cultural influence.⁵ It was after World War I, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, that the United States invaded the imagination of urban Brazilians, with the widespread use of cars and the irresistible appeal of mass culture. This period also saw the structural transformation of the Brazilian press, now dominated by large companies with modern equipment and supplied by international news agencies, among which the two big American ones, United Press and Associated Press, stood out (Moniz Bandeira, 1973, 208).

It was also at this time that the publishing market expanded and consolidated in Brazil, allowing the emergence of a new and charming category of social agents: professional writers, the most successful of whom were able to comfortably make a living off the royalties of their books. Three of them lived for some time in the United States and perpetuated their impressions of that country in exquisite texts: Monteiro Lobato, Érico Veríssimo and Alceu de Amoroso Lima.

Lobato's role in popularizing elements of American society and culture is well known. It's enough to add that his book *América* is just one of the means he used to this end.

Gato preto em campo de neve (Black cat in a snowy field), by Veríssimo, is a delightful story, in which the author displays the acuity of his observation and the fine irony of his spirit on every page.

A realidade americana (The American Reality), by Alceu de Amoroso Lima, is an product of a different kind. It was written in 1954, "without notes" and "without ciphers," on his return to Brazil, after living in Washington for two years as Cultural Director of the Pan-American Union, an organ of the OAS. In the beauty of its prose the book offers a comprehensive interpretation of the United States — in its multiple dimensions: "Landscape," "Man," "Education," "Economy," "Politics,"

⁵ As indicated by José Veríssimo's account of a session at the Academy of Letters in which none of those present could name two American writers. See Veríssimo, 2003.

"Culture," "Religion" — under the prism of the Christian humanism characteristic of the mature work of the great Catholic thinker.

*

The list I have just presented is very brief — I did not even mention famous names such as Joaquim Nabuco, Salvador de Mendonça, Eduardo Prado or Vianna Moog, much less the cinematographic and, in my opinion, misunderstood figure of Olympio Guilherme, author of an astonishing four-volume work, published in 1934, on the history, economy, politics and society of the United States (Guilherme, 1934). Nevertheless, this list makes it clear that our problem is a little more complex than we might imagine.

In fact, there has been in the past a considerable effort at appropriation, and Brazil has built up a not insignificant stock of knowledge about the United States. In this sense, the generalization that served as our starting point needs to be corrected.

But not abandoned. When we combine the photograph it provides with the quick historical reconstruction made here, the question arises: given this background, how can we understand that, when they were constituted as academic disciplines, History and the Social Sciences in Brazil remained at a distance from this object for so long?

The institutionalization of American Studies in the United States and its post-war internationalization

In fact, the impression that we are facing a paradoxical situation is reinforced when we look away from ourselves and try to see what is happening around us, i.e. in the field of studies on the United States in other countries.

At this point, a preliminary observation is in order. The title of this article designates its object through a term whose referent is a well-defined political unit in the international system: the United States.

However, when we try to situate ourselves comparatively, we realize that we are inserted in a universe that self-identifies as American Studies.

The difference is not innocent.

America is a concept that refers neither to a political unit, with its clearly demarcated territory, nor to a defined geographical space. Since colonial times, America has designated an idea, a symbolic place that defines itself in opposition to the old continent — where inequality, tyranny, war and oppression prevail — as a land of freedom and prosperity, an "asylum" for humanity in the words of Thomas Paine, one of the first and most eloquent propagators of the myth.

Not coincidentally, the only article I could find by googling the heading "American Studies in Brazil" — a five-page research note, no more — made express reference to the objections raised against the term by a Brazilian colleague, the historian Marcos Pamplona, at an international seminar some 40 years ago (Bray and Brown, 1986). We can imagine the reason for his discomfort and the direction of his arguments. In vain, since this is the term that has become established around the world: "American Studies."

The shaping of this field is an intriguing topic for research, and one that is practically unexplored in our country. But a quick examination of the vast literature on the subject allows for some specific observations.

1. It emerged in the United States in the 1930s, driven by historians such as Vernon Louis Parrington — author of a book that was acclaimed when it was published and then condemned to oblivion: Main Currents in American Thought, a three-volume work that reconstructs the evolution of American literature as an aspect of the broader process of the economic and social history of the United States. Having lived all his life as a professor of literature at second-tier universities, Parrington was a left-wing liberal, a progressive, and his book, the first volume of which appeared in 1927, had a great impact and exerted a strong influence on the American cultural milieu in the 1930s. In the following decade, his prestige waned under the weight of the merciless attack of the "new critics," who accused him of sociological reductionism and insensitivity

to the formal, aesthetic aspects of the works he analyzed.⁶ But not only because of this, he was also hit by the radical change in the economic and political framework of the period — the entry of the United States into the Second World War and its enthronement as the leading power of the Free World in the Cold War that followed.

- 2. In any case, the program outlined in Parrington's work shared some basic characteristics with the predominant orientation in the second phase of American Studies. Namely:
 - a) the idea of America as a homogeneous reality;
 - b) a holistic view of American society and culture;
 - c) the definition of the intellectual program as a self-reflection, a work of that society on itself, to maintain, preserve, correct, fully realize the promise it contained.

In this sense, incidentally, it has something to do with the genre cultivated by the classics of our social and political thought — I think of Gilberto Freyre, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda or Caio Prado Júnior, but we could include many other authors in the long series of so-called "interpreters of Brazil." With one significant difference: with one or two exceptions, in our case the content of the self-reflection tends to be much more critical.

There lies one of the palpable differences between the first generation of American Studies practitioners and their successors. In fact, having been formed during a period in which the United States was experiencing a deep economic crisis and times of broad social reform, there was room in this phase for a dose of criticism that would disappear almost entirely later on. War against Nazifascism; fight against communism. In the subsequent period, what predominates in the field of American Studies is the celebratory bias of the enterprise. America, a land of many problems but enormous possibilities, gave way to America as an example to the world, a land of prosperity, democracy and freedom.

⁶ For a comprehensive interpretation of the curious fate reserved for Parrington's work, see Hofstadter, 1969. Parrington's career is thoroughly reconstructed in Hall, 1994.

A brief note is enough to illustrate this point: in the early 1960s, when the US government launched the Peace Volunteers Program, before being sent on a mission to the target countries, the young people who answered the call were required, as part of their training, to take courses in American Studies, regardless of their specialty.

This is how we can understand the anecdote told by one of the most prominent representatives of the second generation of specialists in American Studies, who no longer had enough to explain to the famous English professor what his field of study consisted of and ended up exclaiming "I believe in America."

- 3. In the United States, American Studies preserved the tradition inaugurated by Parrington for a long time, basically focusing on the study of literature, society and culture, to the detriment of economic and political themes, the domain of other established and much more consolidated disciplines.
- 4. With this vocation, American Studies became institutionalized in the 1940s and 1950s as an academic discipline, with a recognized presence in the university system. In this movement, it was initially promoted by private foundations, and later by government agencies as well.
- 5. Despite the permanence of the label, it is not appropriate to speak of American Studies as a static reality. On the contrary, it is common to find in literature the notion of "movement" used in connection with it. A mobile, dynamic reality, then. Thus, in this summary characterization, it is important to highlight the impact on the field of the social movements that shook the American political and cultural scene in the 1960s and 1970s all of which were given institutional expression in the academic world, in the form of emerging areas of research and teaching: Black Studies; Women Studies; Native American Studies; LGBT Studies; and other less flashy names. We cannot dwell on these developments, each of which has its own specificities. What is important is to point out how they have shaken the field's constitutive convictions, rendering implausible the

⁷ The interlocutors were the English sociologist Richard Hoggart and the then young Fulbright scholar Leo Marx, who recounts the dialogue in a long essay for a dossier on American Studies published in American Studies. Marx, 2005 quoted in Tally, 2006.

idea of unveiling the soul, the genuine American spirit, and producing a malaise defined by many analysts as an identity crisis.

6. This effect is probably felt most acutely in the United States. This fact should be emphasized because, although it was originally a domestic phenomenon, in the post-war period American Studies spread internationally.

As one might expect, they got a strong boost in the Soviet Union, where, in the 1980s, there were thousands of specialists in the United States. No surprise there. Geopolitical competition required the training of personnel capable of reading and interpreting information coming from the rival power, for instrumental reasons and to better conduct the propaganda and counter-propaganda activities inherent in the hybrid relationship that was being established between them.

Something similar can be said about China, where the field of American Studies began to take shape in the 1960s in response to demand from the Party-State. It expanded in China from the following decade, under the influence of the rapprochement between the two countries promoted by the Nixon administration. Today, in very different conditions, reminiscent of the Cold War, China has a wide network of Centers and Institutes, with their own specific association and periodicals (Mei and Li, 2012; Zhu, 1987).

In both cases, these were autonomous developments. In the rest of the world, the spread of American Studies as an academic activity owed much to the efforts of the United States itself.

Here too, private foundations played an important role. But unlike what happened in the process of institutionalizing American Studies in its country of origin, the leading role was played by government institutions. Starting with the Fulbright Act of 1946 — sanctioned by President Truman in 1948 — the American state began to promote the implementation of American Studies programs, mobilizing a special agency created at the same time: the USIA (United States Information Agency). As far as I can see, this effort was concentrated in Europe — with an emphasis on Germany and the Netherlands — and in Asia — with an emphasis on India.

The Indian experience is notable for its early commitment. The first agreement signed with the government for this purpose dates back to 1950 — and the involvement in the Program, from the very first phase, of eminent figures from American academia, such as the historian Merli Curti, who traveled to India and remained there for relatively long periods, carrying out teaching and cultural dissemination activities, testifies to the seriousness with which this mission was viewed.

With different nuances, these programs follow the pattern established in the United States: concentration on the study of English, American literature, culture and society. In the Indian case, the emphasis is on interethnic relations, specifically the Indian diaspora in the United States (Shrivastava, 1987; Jaidka, 2013).

China is no exception. Here, too, we will find a vast network of institutions, with programs, associations and journals specializing in American Studies. Now, as you might imagine, the priorities are different: economics, domestic politics and US foreign policy. These areas concentrated the bulk of research activity in the first stage of American Studies in China. From 1979 onwards, with the opening up of the economy, closer ties with the United States, a wider range of financial resources for the field and the intensification of cultural exchanges between the two countries, there was a clear diversification of themes. In China, however, the field of American Studies comprises two markedly different segments: with teaching and research centers focused on political and economic analysis, on the one hand, and centers dedicated to the study of the English language, American culture and civilization, on the other. To complete this succint characterization of American Studies in China, it is also necessary to note the existence of a huge contingent of "watchers," who work outside the academic universe in the production of policy-oriented research, meeting the demands of the economic, political and military sectors (Bloch, 2008).

The space available does not allow me to go any further in the description. But for the argument I am making here, that would be unnecessary. What is of primary interest in this quick overview is not the particularities of each national case, but the contrast that is revealed when

we compare them with the Brazilian experience of academic studies on the United States.

Absence of American Studies in Brazil, with a hypothesis

The contrast in question concerns US foreign policy. We are all aware of the importance it has attached to cultural cooperation with Brazil. This has been the subject of numerous important works, including the first doctoral thesis defended in the San Tiago Dantas International Relations Program. But the USIA's focus, as Fernando Santoumauro's detailed research reveals, was on teaching English and on exchange programs aimed at familiarizing promising young Brazilians with the attractions of American social and political life. This is, of course, not to mention direct action — through films, art shows, articles in mass-circulation newspapers — aimed at the general public. However, there is no noteworthy investment in the implementation of teaching and research programs in the area of American Studies on the organization's agenda (Santomauro, 2015).

The same can be said of the Fulbright Program, the subject of an important thesis by Daniela Costano, defended at the University of Brasília in 2017 (Costano, 2017). Established in 1957, the Fulbright Commission in Brazil developed a strong exchange program, focusing on the areas of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts — but did not include the promotion of American Studies in its plans. Better said; it has lately made some moves in this direction, supporting the Eleanor Roosevelt Program in North American Studies and Public Policy, created at the University of São Paulo in 2000, and the Center for American Studies at the Federal University of Ceará at the same time. But neither initiative seems to have borne fruit. Today, the creation of the Center for North American Studies at the Federal University of Minas Gerais may indicate a reorientation of the institution's priorities. To be seen.

And what can we say about the Ford Foundation, which was so important in setting up the Postgraduate Science Programs (Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology) in Brazil? I invite the reader to browse through the books that Sergio Miceli and his team have prepared

on the subject. The pattern is clear: they all focus on research on Brazil. The researchers-doctors go to the United States, with support from the Ford Foundation, in large numbers, but to equip themselves with the analytical tools they needed to conduct their empirical research, the object of which was Brazil.

Of course, Brazil was not entirely absent from the process of forming the international American Studies network. Our colleagues were present at the founding of IASA (International American Studies Association) in 2000 and had already created their own association, ABEA — Associação Brasileira de Estudos Americanos (Brazilian Association of American Studies). But this organization did not prosper, and today we can hardly find any trace of it.

How can we understand this delay? We found a clue in a paper that Inderjeet Parmar wrote about the Kissinger and Salzburg Seminars a few years ago.

Allow me to quote him:

[...] the leaders of American philanthropy saw numerous threats to their globalist aspirations: European envy and resentment of American power and wealth, as well as ignorance or misunderstanding of the new superpower's society, culture and politics. Opposition to US foreign policy, therefore, was seen as based on emotion, ignorance, and nostalgia. The solution for liberal internationalist Americans was cultural or public diplomacy specifically targetted at European elites to persuade them that the United States was a force for good in the world, defending freedom and fighting tyranny; that its culture was deep and not shallow, that its material wealth was not alone the obsession of its culture, that it had an abiding and serious interest in abstract problems and ideas — in art, music, and philosophy (Parmar, 2010, 109).

The extroversion of American Studies took place in a new context, in which the United States felt the need to overcome the reticence of the European and Asian elites, convincing them that it was prepared to assume the political-intellectual leadership of the capitalist bloc and defend everyone's interests against the Soviet threat.

Brazil was comfortably situated in the United States' area of influence and its elites had maintained close relations with the American ruling class for many decades.

Seductive imperialism, no doubt. But seduction, in both cases, has different targets, and is exercised with arts that are not the same.

It does not matter. For a mixture of geocultural, geopolitical and other reasons to be investigated, United States Studies — or American Studies, according to internationally accepted usage — has historically not received external or internal stimuli to consolidate itself among us.

And yet... Present situation and challenges for the field of US studies in Brazil

And yet... one must sing, said the beautiful song by Vinicius de Moraes and Carlos Lyra. Well, in our case, we have been singing for a long time.

Now, who sings? What do they sing? What is the size and structure of our choir? Do we form a choir? Or are we a handful of small ensembles, singing different things in different places, without much communication with each other? In stricter terms, to what extent is it possible to talk about the existence of a field of US studies in Brazil?

Some time ago, we carried out exploratory research at INCT-INEU (National Institute of Science and Technology for Studies on the United States) in an attempt to start answering these questions. It was an artisanal exercise conducted by two members of our team — Neusa Bojikian and myself — but it was a lot of work and produced a number of interesting results. Without explaining them in detail, I must say a word about the concept that informed us, and the general conclusion suggested by the data generated in the research.

With its origins in physics, the concept of field has had a long run in sociological literature, where it has given rise to different definitions. For the very limited purposes of our investigation, it seemed more interesting

to use the operational definition found in a work on International Political Economy, rather than examining the differences between these abstract conceptualizations.

I will now give the floor to its author, the well-known Professor Benjamin Cohen:

An academic field may be said to exist when a coherent body of knowledge is developed to define a subject of inquiry. Recognized standards come to be employed to train and certify specialists; full-time employment opportunities become available in university teaching and research; learned societies are established to promote study and dialogue; and publishing venues become available to help disseminate new ideas and analysis. [...] an institutionalized network of scholars comes into being—a distinct research community with its own boundaries, rewards, and careers (Cohen, 2008, 2).

With this definition as a guide, we carried out a major survey on the Lattes Platform, looking for academics (doctors) who publish regularly on the United States. Using various filters — the last of which was individualized analysis of curricular data — we identified a significant number of them in the area of Social Sciences (Anthropology, Sociology, Political Science and International Relations), and a slightly smaller number, but also significant, in the area of History. We must point out that these figures are merely indicative and far from accurately portraying reality. However, with all their acknowledged shortcomings, they provide us with a crucial element for solving the problem we have raised. In 2018, there were at least 89 social science researchers and 79 historians in Brazil with a sustained interest in studies on the United States.

Although smaller than in many of the countries mentioned in this article, that amount would be more than enough to shape a vibrant field. However, the data from our survey and our experience show that we are far from achieving this result.

Eloquent indications: 1) the existence of two research networks on the United States — the one centered on INCT-INEU and the United States Studies Network, created more than ten years ago, bringing together Brazilian historians from various states; 2) the lack of a specialized scientific journal and the enormous dispersion of vehicles used to disseminate the production of these scholars on the subject — 34 in the case of Social Sciences; 152 in the case of History.

That is why we should talk about Political Studies on the United States in Brazil as a field in formation, and not as something given.

Created in 2009 as part of the National Institutes of Science and Technology Program and supported by a number of federal and state funding agencies, the INCT-INEU has the threefold mission of producing original knowledge about the United States, training qualified human resources to work in this area and disseminating information and analyses that contribute to a deeper understanding of that country in Brazilian society. In doing so, we are also advancing the institutionalization of studies on the United States in Brazil, a result that has been on the horizon of our activities from the outset.

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Brazilians and the United States: Public Opinion in a Decade of Change

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In this chapter, we look at the evolution of Brazilians' opinion about the United States over a little more than a decade (2010-2022) and explore some of the variations found over the period. Our sources are panel surveys conducted with the public every four years, coinciding with the final months of each presidential term and the formation of the new government chosen by the voters.³

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³ Surveys carried out as part of the project "Brazil, the Americas and the World: Public Opinion and International Politics", with support from Fapesp (thematic projects 2010/06356-3, 2013/04495-4 and 2018/00646-1) and CNPq (proc. 478921/2009-8). The surveys are carried out a few months after the election

Our data shows a quite positive public opinion towards the United States in the context of bilateral interactions, and a much more divided one on the role it plays in global terms. There is also more skepticism on the part of Brazilians when they are asked to express feelings, in other words, judgments based on emotions, an issue that is still little explored in studies on public opinion carried out in the country. We also found important variations over the decade and depending on the political leanings of the interviewees.

This article is based on two assumptions. First, following solid and empirically grounded conclusions from international literature, we assume that the general public has opinions on international issues that show coherence, consistency and a certain stability over time, i.e. they are not random or erratic.⁴ They are therefore worth assessing and taking into account. The data presented here show that, despite variations over time and depending on the political leanings of the interviewees, the patterns of responses are reasonably stable and, when they vary, they do so consistently.

Secondly, these representations are influenced both by the country's previous experience of foreign relations and by contingent factors that have had an impact on those relations over the last decade. In other words, more permanent features of the relationship between Brazil and the United States over time, and domestic and international events that characterized the period under consideration, were important in shaping Brazilians' perceptions of the Northern country.

In the first part of the paper, we discuss, in very general terms, the place — and importance — that relations between Brazil and the United States occupy in our country's external action. In the second part, we summarize domestic and global events that have taken place over the last decade, which we believe are significant for the interaction between the two nations. In the third part, we present the trajectory of Brazilian public opinion on bilateral relations and the role of the United States

period and are finalized in the year following the election. For the sake of simplicity, we have indicated the year in which the surveys began.

⁴ Shapiro and Page, 1988; Page and Shapiro, 1982; 1992; Holsti, 1992; 2004; Wittkopf, 1990; Almeida, Fernandes and Guimarães, 2021.

in the world, exploring variations in time, the political inclinations of the interviewees and the emotional involvement required in answering different questions.

A special relationship⁵

The importance of the United States for Brazilian foreign policy is not restricted to the many issues involved in the official relationship between the two countries and in the issues they have in common.

Brazil's diplomatic relations with the US resemble repeated games of chess played simultaneously on three boards. The first is the bilateral one, in which the two nations seek the best possible understanding to take into account the multiple state, private and non-governmental interests on both sides.

In this area, analysts agree that a mature relationship has long been achieved. This is based on dialogue around a cooperation agenda that covers a wide range of issues — education, science and technology, defense and security, the judicial system, the movement of people, the environment. It also involves an effort to smooth over differences, especially on economic issues such as investment and trade.

The United States cannot either be ignored on the South American chessboard, where lies the center of gravity of Brazilian foreign policy. Here, although it is equally convenient for both countries to maintain peace in the region and cooperate in combating the new threats created by drug trafficking and organized crime, their respective purposes and styles of action often differ.

The United States interest is that nothing might challenge its hegemony. It also aims at reducing the possibility of interference by extra-regional powers. Brazil is interested in obtaining the recognition of its neighbors and the regional prestige that will enable it to make itself heard in the wider world — something incompatible with an automatic alignment with the power of the North.

⁵ This topic is inspired by the reading of seminal texts on the subject, such as Ricupero, 2017; Hirst. 2006; 2009; 2013; Amorim Neto, 2011; and Fonseca Jr., 2003.

On the global chessboard, American and Brazilian calculations are even more different. That is why they often diverge in their commitment to the principles of multilateralism or on the stage of multilateral organizations - the United Nations General Assembly and Comissions, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund or the G20. Their attitudes towards the major international conflicts and, in particular, to the new rising world power, China, are also predictably different. ⁶

On the other hand, contact between the two countries does not end at the diplomatic level — v.g. at government-to-government interaction. Nor does it result only from investment and trade flows. There are strong ties at the societal level, materialized in the flow of tourists and in the networks of all kinds that are established between organizations and people: academic, professional, social activism, sports, artistic or cultural interactions. Furthermore, at least since the 1940s, the country's mass culture and even its language have been profoundly influenced and transformed by the currents coming from the United States — a manifestation of soft power, inseparable from being a hegemonic power.

The significant exchange between the two societies and the daily presence of products of the North American cultural industry are part of the personal experience of a significant number of Brazilians with an impact on how they see the US. These representations are to a certain extent independent of what happens in the field of diplomacy and the ups and downs of bilateral trade or investment.

Brazil and the United States in the second decade of the 21st century

Important changes in world geopolitics and domestic politics in the United States and Brazil constitute the backdrop against which the opinions of the public in Brazil have evolved.

⁶ Brazilian diplomacy towards China seems to seek cross-commitments that increase the costs for China and the US of attempts to isolate or penalize the country (Fernandes, 2023).

⁷ Portugal, the United States and Argentina are the top three international destinations for Brazilian tourists.

The most important of these was unequivocally the international rise of China and its growing weight, first in world trade, and then in multilateral arenas and in the coalitions aiming to increase the bargaining power of their members vis-à-vis the United States, such as the BRICS. During this period, China established itself as Brazil's main trading partner — as well as that of other South American neighbors — gaining ground in spaces previously occupied by the United States and, to a lesser extent, the MERCOSUR. It has also increased its weight in the BRICS coalition, which is gradually becoming an element of support to Chinese foreign policy and a Chinese alternative to the institutions of the liberal international order promoted by the United States. On a global scale, China's rise has pointed to changes in the distribution of influence among the great powers, towards a multipolar arrangement that is still in the making.

China's robust presence in the great powers' arena and in trade flows has posed challenges for the redefinition of Brazil's international strategies that had not yet been faced. They concern not only, but also, relations with the United States on the global, regional and bilateral chessboards.

However, those relations were also affected up by a bilateral crisis and the political turmoil brought about by the rise of far-right populists to the presidency of both countries: Donald Trump in 2017 and Jair Bolsonaro in 2019.

During Dilma Rousseff's administration (2011-2016), Brazil's foreign policy remained on its traditional track, although without her predecessor's ambition to play a leading international role through an active presidential diplomacy. On a bilateral level, cooperation around common interests and the pragmatic negotiation of differences were jeopardized when, in 2013, the initiatives of US intelligence agencies to spy on the Brazilian government became public — the WikiLeaks case. Among the espionage actions was the monitoring of communications and data of Brazilian companies, citizens and important political personalities, among whom President Rousseff herself. The Brazilian response was sober and included: the cancellation of a planned official visit to the US. But the

lack of trust momentarily cooled off relations between the two countries, despite the center-left orientation shared by both governments.

The political crisis that engulfed the Rousseff government since the start of her second term in 2015 had a paradoxical effect on Brazilian foreign policy, in all areas, including bilateral relations. On the one hand, it hindered new or important international initiative and, on the other, it transformed the country's foreign action into the object of heated internal disputes between supporters of the government and its opponents, ranging from the center-right to the most extreme currents. Foreign policy, which used to generate internal consensus, became one of the markers of political polarization.

Paradoxically, the victory of the populist ultra-right in both countries hampered bilateral cooperation, despite the convergence of world views espoused by Trump and Bolsonaro. From the US president's point of view, the lack of interest in South America — and Brazil — limited interaction. From the Brazilian point of view, the unconditional and personalized support for the Republican government meant a disruption of the parameters that defined relations between the two countries and, ultimately, froze them when the Democrats returned to the presidency, with Joe Biden, in 2022.

In short, the Brazilian public opinion on the United States is formed within the framework of complex relationships with different forms and meanings in the global, regional and bilateral arenas. They also go beyond government-to-government interaction and show great vitality at societal level and through the influence of American mass culture in the country. Contingent events also have influenced the context in which Brazilian attitudes towards the American nation were measured by surveys. On the one hand, the controversy over foreign policy became an ingredient in the division between the left and the right. On the other hand, the electoral victory of far-right forces here and in the North destabilized the international behavior of the two nations, as well as the usual forms and instruments of bilateral understanding.

The data we have from our surveys corroborates the consistency of opinions over time, although it does not allow us to establish causal links

between the context highlighted above and the opinions revealed over the decade and discussed below. But they can certainly suggest hypotheses and avenues for future research.

The Brazilians and the United States⁸

Brazilians' view of the US is not very different from that of citzens of other countries around the world. A survey carried out as part of the Global Attitudes Project by the Pew Research Center in 2023 shows that Brazil ranks ninth out of 24 countries in terms of approval to the USA. Around 63% of Brazilians had favorable attitudes regarding the country, a figure close to that found in nations as diverse as India, Italy, Mexico and South Africa. This can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1 — Approval of the United States (2023)

| Country | Approval (%) | Country | Approval (%) | |
|---------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|--|
| Poland | 93 | United Kingdom | 59 | |
| Israel | 87 | Netherlands | 58 | |
| South Korea | 79 | Germany | 57 | |
| Nigeria | 74 | Canada | 57 | |
| Japan | 73 | Indonesia | 56 | |
| United States | 72 | Greece | 56 | |
| Kenya | 71 | Sweden | 55 | |
| India | 65 | Spain | 55 | |
| Brazil | 63 | Australia | 52 | |
| Mexico | 63 | France | 52 | |
| Italy | 60 | Argentina | 51 | |
| South Africa | 59 | Hungary | 44 | |

Source: Pew Research Center — *Global Attitudes Survey* (2023).

⁸ The data presented in this section is the result of a panel-type opinion poll, using a questionnaire completed in a face-to-face interview and carried out every four years, with a random, representative, national and stratified sample. The questionnaires were applied in the months following the presidential elections of 2010, 2014, 2018 and 2022, with samples of no less than 1,600 cases. The database, codebooks and full methodological information can be found at: https://las-americas.github.io/cebrap/.


⁹ Percentage of positive answers to the inquiry "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States."

The data collected by the *O Brasil, as Américas e o mundo* (Brazil, the Americas and the World — BAM) Project, in turn, allows for a more detailed discussion of the Brazilians' attitudes towards their main hemispheric partner over time, as well as the variations between different segments of the population. Brazilians' opinions about the United States reflect the complexity of relations between the two countries in the different spheres discussed in the previous section. They are clearly positive when referring to US influence in the country and bilateral interaction, but they seem more skeptical when the assessment requires the mobilization of feelings towards the Northern country.

Confirming the scenario revealed by the Pew Research Center survey, the data collected by the BAM Project indicate that, in 2022, around 70% of Brazilians considered US influence in the country to be positive or very positive.

Graph 1 shows that the proportion of those who rate positively the relations between the two countries is high and remained so between 2010-2022. More than 70% of those characterize them as relations of partnership or friendship, while the proportion of those who consider them to be relations of threat or rivalry has varied between 11% and 20% in the same period. 10

¹⁰ Answer to the question "Would you say that Brazil's relationship with the US is one of friendship, partnership, rivalry or threat?"



Graph 1 — United States-Brazil bilateral relations (2010-2022) (% of people who rated the bilateral relations as positive)

Source: *O Brasil, as Américas e o Mundo* (2010-2022). Proportion of people who rated the Brazil-US bilateral relationship as positive when asked "Would you say that Brazil's relationship with the US is one of friendship, partnership, rivalry or threat?"

Note: The number of respondents in the 2010 to 2022 samples was 2000, 1881, 1849 and 1601 people respectively. Ideological stand is considered based on the vote in the first round of the presidential election. The *Others* category covers respondents who indicated a third candidate, didn't vote or didn't answer the question; the *PT* category indicates voters of the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT) candidates (Dilma Rousseff in 2010 and 2014, Fernando Haddad in 2018 and Lula da Silva in 2022) in four presidential elections; the *Right* category groups together the voters of the main PT opponent in the election: in 2010, José Serra (PSDB), in 2014, Aécio Neves and, in 2018 and 2020, Jair Bolsonaro. The *Brazil* category refers to the proportion of positive responses across the entire sample.

In addition to that, voters for the Workers' Party and their main opponents in the presidential elections had equally positive opinions. In other words, voters for Dilma Rousseff (2010 and 2014) and Lula da Silva (2022) did not differ much in this respect from those who supported José Serra (2010), Aécio Neves (2014) or Jair Bolsonaro (2022). Only in 2018


was there a significant difference of eleven percentage points between the voters of Fernando Haddad and Jair Bolsonaro.

The picture changes when the question is no longer about the state of relations between the two nations or their consequences for Brazil, but about the feelings of trust or distrust regarding the United States. The question, which appeals to the emotions of the interviewees, ends up revealing a more critical and skeptical attitude towards the hemispheric partner. Within the population, there is less unanimity and more division according to the political preferences of the interviewees. There is also more variation over the years: the feeling of distrust grows and surpasses its opposite in 2014, 2018 and 2022, when we look at the responses of the whole sample. 12

The year 2018, during the Trump administration, saw the peak of distrust, with 63% of respondents expressing skepticism about the US, while only 31% showed trust. On the other hand, the importance of political preference in distinguishing responses has grown since 2014. In 2010, the proportion of those who distrusted the United States was practically the same among those who voted for PT and its competitors, close to the national average and lower than those who trusted the US — 34.5% for the PT voters and 33.8% of those who chose the PSDB.

¹¹ Answer to the question "Which of the following words describes your feelings towards the USA: trust, distrust, don't know or don't want to answer."

¹² The "indifference" alternative was presented to respondents in the 2010 survey and was chosen by 15% of them. This explains the lower percentage of distrust (34%). With the removal of this option in subsequent surveys, around 50% or more of all samples opted for the distrust alternative.



Graph 2 — Trust in the United States (2010-2022)
(% of positive responses)

Source: *O Brasil, as Américas e o Mundo* (2010-2022). Proportion of positive answers to the question "Of the following words, which describes your feelings towards the USA: trust, distrust, don't know or don't want to answer."

Note: see note on Graph 1.


Since 2014, distrust has surpassed positive sentiment, reaching a peak in 2018. At the same time, the gap between left-wing and right-wing voters grew, indicating that attitudes towards the United States have been affected by political radicalization — the increase in distrust is general — and may have become one of its markers. The gap between left and right also grew. In the year of Bolsonaro's election, 71% of Haddad's voters declared themselves distrustful, in comparison with 55% of the winning candidate's followers.


It is important to point out here the relevance of the words used to evaluate the relationship between the countries. While the Pew Research Center survey asks about approval/disapproval, the BAM Project uses the

term trust/distrust. They are different questions that measure different things. The first asks the respondent to evaluate the United States, the second inquires about their feelings towards that country.

The results suggest that when the US are evaluated according to affective criteria, people tend to adopt a more skeptical stance.

Graph 3 — Trust in the United States to Maintain World Peace (2010-2022)





Source: *O Brasil, as Américas e o Mundo* (2010-2022). Proportion of responses indicating the United States in the question "Which country inspires the most trust in you to maintain peace in the world"? Alternatives: United States, China, Russia, France, England, other, none, don't know/no answer.

Note: see note on Graph 1.

The United States is the country that Brazilians trust most when it comes to maintaining world peace compared to other possible candidates for the task. A moderate trust, however. Less than half of Brazilians have

a positive expectation of the country's ability to deliver. Over the last thirteen years, the proportion of those who had such expectations has varied without ever surpassing the 41% mark recorded in 2010. It declined in the second decade of the century and seems to have been affected by domestic political polarization in 2018 and 2023, attested to by the significant difference in opinions between PT voters and Jair Bolsonaro voters. In those two moments, the trust of the left-wing candidate's supporters in the Americans was around ten percentage points lower than that revealed by the followers of the right-wing leader, again pointing to the importance of the ideological preference of individuals.

In short, the complexity of Brazil's relations with the United States and the political turbulence that affected both nations — as well as the interaction between the two — over the last decade are mirrored in the nuanced opinions of Brazilians. They see both the US influence in the country and the bilateral relationship as positive, but they are still wary of their partner and its role in guaranteeing world peace.

Concluding remarks

In this brief chapter, we analyze the evolution of Brazilian public opinion about the United States from 2010 to 2022, highlighting the possible influence of geopolitical events and domestic changes in both countries. The multifaceted and dynamic nature of the interaction between the two nations is a result of a double change in the global geopolitical scenario and domestic events in both countries. Recognizing this complexity is crucial to understanding the nuances and trends in Brazilians' opinions about the hemispheric power.

There was broad convergence of positive attitudes towards the American influence in Brazil, as well as regarding bilateral relations. These attitudes coexist with widespread feelings of distrust among Brazilians towards the US as a partner and guarantor of world peace. Everything seems to indicate that affectively motivated evaluations are associated with more skeptical views of that country and are more sensitive to the political preferences of those interviewed.

Finally, it is too early to say whether — and to what degree — radicalized political competition and the transformation of foreign policy into a topic of domestic discussion have contributed to reducing the pre-existing domestic consensus around Brazil's foreign relations in general and with the United States in particular. This still seems to be an ongoing process.

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Americanism, Anti-Americanism or De-Americanism? Dawisson Belém Lopes¹

Introduction

If there were a championship of misinterpretations about Brazilian foreign policy today, I dare say that the "anti-Americanism" thesis would be a strong contender for the title. Aired in important journalistic and academic circles, the idea that Brazil's current presidential administration is driven by a feeling of aversion to the United States of America disregards the long and dense history of diplomatic, military, economic and cultural relations that inexorably bind the two national societies. In other words, there is no room for substantiation of this phenomenon.

For two hundred years, the two largest countries in the Americas have been forming ties, forged at critical international junctures — national independences, the Monroe Doctrine, two World Wars, the Cold War, 9/11 — and in the continuous interaction between their leaders. At different times in its two-century history, there was great proximity to, and even a certain tutelage by, Washington. It is also true that, over the course of two centuries, the priorities of national states have gradually differentiated. This was followed by a process of relative autonomy for Brasilia.

In this essay, we will look at the construction of this complex relationship in three stages. In the first section of the text, we will do a very brief political archaeology of the diplomatic relationship between the actors, focusing on the most significant moves. In the second part, we will show how the political agendas became more specific and, as a

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result, the national interests of the United States and Brazil partially ceased to converge. In the third and final section of the chapter, we will look at the future of the Brasilia-Washington dyad and all its potential. The aim here is to encourage reflection that will help promote qualitative progress in bilateral cooperation between Brazil and the United States over the coming decades.

Asymmetrical evolution

The political independence of the USA and Brazil

After the national independence of the United States in 1776, Americans sought to consolidate their country by affirming its political structures. The expansion of the freedoms and political rights of its citizens, coupled with external struggles (Second War of Independence, 1812), contributed to the consolidation of the American nation and republic. With the internal and external political problems solved, the US set about expanding its borders through different mechanisms — friendly agreements, the purchase of regions and bloody battles. Thomas Jefferson bought the state of Louisiana from France (1803); later, Florida was acquired from Spain (1819). This was also the beginning of the legendary "March to the West," which would allow the United States to incorporate millions and millions of square kilometers into its national contour (Belém Lopes et al., 2021).

At the same time, the international political scene in Europe was turning upside down. With a view to curbing Bonapartist impulses and re-establishing order in post-Napoleon Europe, a Congress was convened in Vienna between 1814 and 1815. The agreement of the positions of the various powers present was only possible on the basis of two principles: legitimacy (restoration of the European monarchies) and balance (reestablishment of the balance of power). Metternich and Talleyrand, the plenipotentiaries of Austria and France, played a leading role in the event. The agreements drawn up in Vienna gave rise to the formation of a bloc, the Holy Alliance, made up primarily of Russia, Prussia and Austria, which would be joined in the future by the previously aloof England and France.

The Holy Alliance, of a very conservative nature, would, not surprisingly, try to intervene in American political affairs (Kissinger, 2012).

Faced with the imminent threat of a new wave of European imperialism in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, the then President of the United States, James Monroe, the leader of a nation that was already a counterweight to England's interests in 19th century international relations, decided in 1823 that, just as European affairs should be dealt with and resolved among Europeans themselves, the issues of the American hemisphere would also be left to the peoples of the Americas. Soon, the motto echoing across the continent would become "America for the Americans." Already at that time, the destinies of the two largest countries in the hemisphere would cross paths, given that Brazil — a former colony recently emancipated from Portugal in 1822 — was centrally contemplated by the monarchist discourse. It was no coincidence that, in May 1824, the Washington government anticipated the Europeans and recognized the independence of the nascent South American Empire without imposing any major conditions (Bethell, 2019).

Building commercial ties

In the aftermath of the Civil War, from 1865 onwards, there was American pacification. The United States began to grow rapidly, supported by its powerful agriculture and flourishing northern industry. Also noteworthy were the advances in the railroad network, communications and the banking system, as well as the fierce protectionist policy practiced in favor of domestic industry and the good availability of raw materials that the country's entrepreneurs relied on. By the end of the 19th century, US interests were already clearly focused on expansion in Central and South America. Encouraging inter-American trade perhaps concealed the imperialist policy that was beginning to take shape on the continent. Repeated interventions in Panama, Puerto Rico, Mexico and Cuba showed this (Anderson, 2017). For the scholar Tulio Halperín Donghi, the second half of the 19th century, when national independence was consolidated in the hemisphere, could be seen as "the era of neo-colonialism." Formal independence was achieved without, however, untying the deepest knots

of economic dependence between the dominators and the dominated. In anti-Americanist circles, it is not uncommon to parody the Monroe Doctrine as having meant, in reality, the demand for an "America [the whole continent] for the *North* Americans" (Halperín Donghi, 2001).

Brazil, for its part, was fighting for a better place in the game of nations. As a peripheral economy, supplying agricultural and mineral goods to the advanced capitalist world, it lacked the means to exert pressure and make credible threats in its foreign relations. In the absence of cannons and material strength, the South American giant was left with the path of diplomacy. Throughout the 19th century, the construction of the Brazilian nation took place largely in response to the urgencies of international trade, through negotiation and international law (Ricupero, 2016). In this logic, as Brazil became more economically viable, its diplomatic strength also increased. The ability to resist British domination in the second half of the 19th century coincided with a rapprochement with the USA, which became a major importer of our coffee at the turn of the century (Bethell, 2019; Mazzuca, 2021).

A bipolar foreign policy

In its foreign policy, the United States is portrayed as a bipolar nation that alternates between cycles of introversion and intervention. The paternity of the isolationist tendency is attributed, in some narratives, to Alexander Hamilton, the former Secretary of the Treasury who convinced George Washington, President of the Republic, not to entangle the United States in the dispute between England and France, on the grounds that this confrontation did not concern his country. This approach, which prevailed at the time, was contested by the then Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, for whom the Americans owed allegiance to the French — guarantors of the United States' independence from the British. Rightly or wrongly, the historiographical interpretation is that Jefferson was a forerunner of American diplomatic adventures around the world (Ikenberry and Trubowitz, 2015).

The period of "splendid isolation," with resources channeled to defuse tensions and heal domestic wounds, lasted from the end of the

Civil War, in the second half of the 1860s, until the Americans entered the First World War in 1917. After a frontal and decisive engagement, which resulted in the Allied victory in 1919, there followed a return to the cocoon. Although President Woodrow Wilson was responsible for delivering a series of goals and operating principles in his famous 14-point speech to Congress in 1918, the United States Senate did not ratify the constitutive treaty of the League of Nations, an organization designed to govern the post-war world multilaterally. Initially devoid of what would become the greatest power of the 20th century, the League was characterized by European predominance, expressed by all its members and its decision-making body, the Council (Belém Lopes, 2012).

The US retreat lasted until December 1941, when the military installations at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii were bombed by the Japanese. That was the beginning of the greatest war the United States had ever fought. The victorious confrontation with the Axis countries (Germany, Italy and Japan), promoted by the Allies (the United States, England, France and, eventually, the Soviet Union), to which Brazil joined from 1942 onwards, revolutionized international relations and the role of the old colonial powers. Washington's global leadership, seconded by Moscow, was the novelty that emerged at the end of the 1940s. In 1945, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the President, and his Vice President and successor, Harry Truman, set up the United Nations, replacing the ill-fated League of Nations, whose mission was to safeguard the international order, this time with the presence of the United States in its membership. The introverted actor was increasingly giving way to the world policeman (Seitenfus, 2003; Ikenberry, 2001).

The post-war era

The case of the United States remains emblematic in the post-war period. It is the country that, in addition to being the largest financier of international institutions, is home to global (UN, IMF, World Bank) and regional (Organization of American States) agencies and forums. It is the champion of the post-1945 liberal order. Michael Dunne (2003) notes, however, that from the 1960s onwards, "the Americans became

disillusioned with the UN, where the 'Afro-Asian' bloc seemed to represent the politically unreliable and economically demanding Third World as a whole, and Latin Americans were no longer dependable [on the US]." Japan and Western Europe, key elements of the American sphere of influence, began to disagree with the United States on specific issues. In 1971, the People's Republic of China joined the United Nations, taking the place of Taiwan's representation on the Security Council. Increasingly, as Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan described it, the UN was becoming "a dangerous place for the Americans." That was the password for a new period of hibernation and momentary abdication of the role of global sheriff.

Thus, for about two decades, the United States turned its back on the global institutional order, which it could no longer control, until, with the end of the Cold War, it attempted a triumphant return. The Gulf War (1990-1991) and George H. W. Bush's call for a "new world order" seemed to symbolize, for a moment, the effective return of the US to the scene. The suspicions that the UN would be a platform for a single hegemonic power after the Cold War quickly dissipated in the face of two specific events: NATO's intervention in Kosovo (1999) and, especially, the military invasion of Iraq (2002-2003). In neither case were American diplomats able to bend the UN to their will — although there were persistent attempts to do so. In both cases, international public opinion expressed its opposition, with repercussions in the press (Dunne, 2003).

The decisive event, however, took place on September 11, 2001. In a cinematic terrorist act, claimed by the extremist organization Al-Qaeda, three planes were dropped on iconic buildings in the United States — the two Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon headquarters in Washington. Thousands died and a fracture was exposed in the field of values. Samuel Huntington, a leading political scientist, presciently elaborated the thesis of the "clash of civilizations" and, in the wake of the events, went on to speak of a "solitary superpower," with flagrant difficulty in leading. It was the inauguration of a brave new world, increasingly characterized by security issues on the international agenda and amplified turbulence. It is arguable that we are still living under its aegis (Belém Lopes et al., 2021).

Autonomization is not anti-Americanism

The shift from Europeanism to Americanism, a feature of Brazilian foreign policy in the 20th century, would not have happened without the participation of the Baron of Rio Branco and Joaquim Nabuco. The former, patron of Brazilian diplomacy, foresaw the rise of the USA to the status of global power, while the latter, an active ambassador to Washington, defended the partnership between the countries and did everything in his power to achieve it. One of the moments that cemented this new alliance was, of course, the Second World War. After flirting with the Third Reich, Getúlio Vargas ultimately aligned with the USA. Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha was one of the architects of this alignment. As we know today, an important part of our industrial park, the steel industry in particular, is genetically linked to US contributions in the pre-war period. The Brazilian Armed Forces (especially the Brazilian Air Force, created in the 1940s) also benefited greatly from this rapprochement (Seitenfus, 2003).

The experienced Ambassador Rubens Ricupero once recounted that, at the beginning of his career, in the 1950s, there was a tacit guideline for Brazilian delegates serving in multilateral forums: when Brazil's position on a given issue was not well known, they voted according to the US delegate (Ricupero et al., 2023). According to Ricupero, this was the degree to which Brazil's national policy was oriented towards Washington. It doesn't stop there. During the 1964 military coup, the behind-the-scenes work of US ambassador Lincoln Gordon is well known. When he took over the presidency, Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco spoke of "correcting course," advocating a prompt realignment with the US after João Goulart's heterodox foreign policy. Brazilians were completely engulfed by visions emanating from the White House. Those days, however, are behind us.

As can be seen from Graph 1, which shows the votes of Brazilian and US representatives in the UN General Assembly between 1946 and 2020, Brazil moved in the second half of the 20th century from a strong alignment with the United States, which was unconditional on most topics on the international agenda, to a stance that was quite detached from Washington, especially from the 21st century onwards. The monitoring of the two countries' votes at the UN even suggests a growing

distance between Brasilia and Washington over the last four decades, a phenomenon less associated with the alternation of parties/presidents in power, and more with structural aspects of the relationship (Belém Lopes, 2020). To support this hypothesis, it is enough to recall that the so-called "anti-Americanists" Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1961-1964) converged much more with the US at the UN than the "Americanists" Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), Michel Temer (2016-2018) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2020). An epochal shift has apparently taken place.

Voting agreement with Brazil Country 1.00 - China United States of America Voting Agreement with Brazil President Bolsonaro Collor FHC Lula Other Rousseff 0.25 Sarney Temer 1960 1980 2020 2000 Year

Graph 1 — Convergence of Brazil's votes with the US and China at the UN: (1946-2020)

 $Source: Elaborated \ by \ Thales \ Carvalho. \ Adapted \ from \ Voeten \ et \ al., 2009.$

Graph 1 also suggests another interesting aspect: the strong structural convergence between the interests of Brazil and the People's Republic of China in international relations. As these are votes in the UN General Assembly, a body that covers areas as diverse as economic development, international finance, decolonization, human rights and nuclear policy, it is to be expected that the governments in Brasilia and Beijing will position themselves in a similar way, regardless of who their

heads of state are, given their country profiles. It's also worth noting that, a century after the US became Brazil's biggest trading partner, China took its place. In 2022, the Asians accounted for around 35% of Brazil's foreign trade transactions (in total values), compared to 15% for the Americans (Belém Lopes, 2023).

With the arrival of a left-wing government in power in 2003, in conjunction with systemic factors (September 11, the rise of new poles of power), Lula da Silva's innovative foreign policy experience was set in motion in Brazil. One of the tokens of this movement is the BRICS, a grouping of emerging middle powers (with the exception of China, which can even claim the identity of an emerging country, but not that of a middle power). While the United States today still has the world's largest economy (in dollar terms), the largest techno-scientific park and by far the largest military capacity on the planet, Brazil is an emerging economy and one of the revisionist players from the Global South. It's only natural, therefore, that Washington's and Brasilia's foreign policy options should increasingly diverge. As the former advisor for international affairs to the Presidency of the Republic, Professor Marco Aurélio Garcia, said in a very direct conversation with this author in 2015 about the evolution of bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States:

There was a certain disconnection not between Brazil, but Latin America in general, and the United States, even though we have maintained very good relations with the United States. The only two incidents that have occurred throughout this whole period [2003-2015], one of them, if you can call it an incident, is that we didn't accept the FTAA, in Mar del Plata, 2005. But we did it in company of many, and company that continued after 2005. The second was the snooping episode, which is a late episode [the revelation of US National Security Agency spying on President Dilma Rousseff in 2013]. Of course, the general direction of foreign policy was not anti-American, but independent, and I think the Americans understood this and tried to cope with it. We have always maintained bilateral contacts with the United States, in which they have placed enormous

trust in us to cooperate in certain situations. Venezuela, for example, how many times? The Group of Friends process reached a point where Colin Powell, concerned about the presence of an American diplomat in Congress, submitted to Celso Amorim the speech that he was going to deliver at his next presentation (Garcia and Belém Lopes, 2017).

Different, yet quite compatible

Understanding the position of the Federative Republic of Brazil on the contemporary international stage requires taking into account the two traditional axes of geopolitical reasoning — North/South and East/West — and the ways in which they interact. Global North and South, we know, do not correspond strictly to purely geographical elements of countries on the world map. Rather, they refer to the resources historically accumulated by national societies and the ways in which states behave in international relations. These axes have been the subject of reflection in academia and formulations by the diplomatic corps, albeit under different names, for almost ever.

Brazil's self-image in the concert of nations is that of a large country that is incessantly seeking its redemption through the path of socioeconomic development. This is why, for much of the 20th century, we actively pursued development agendas within the United Nations and other forums such as the G77 and UNCTAD. In the regional dimension, Brazil also promoted the notion that the poor should unite in pursuit of their goals. ALALC, ALADI and MERCOSUR made the same kind of appeal in different ways (Fonseca Jr., 1998). If Brazil's international identity is well defined in terms of poor vs. rich, difficulties in framing it on the horizontal axis — east and west — are quite meaningful. Although Brazil was colonized by Europeans, this never resulted in its full incorporation into the "rewards club" of the West. To a large extent, we picked up the values of the conqueror — Christianity, the neo-Latin language, Roman-Germanic legal institutions, a market economy and representative democracy. Despite this, we have been perceived, in the most self-congratulatory way, as the "other West" — poorer, more

enigmatic, different, and still troubled (Merquior, 1990). In the less concessive hypothesis, we are seen as an exotic civilization, made of material other than European/Western (Huntington, 1993).

It is important to remember that, despite promoting debates such as the one on the New International Economic Order (NOEI), the Brazilian state has not moved away from the magnetic field of the West during the 20th century. For example, it never joined the Non-Aligned Movement, the offspring of the 1955 Bandung Conference. Our diplomatic-military machine has consistently tilted towards the West. Our biggest trading partners — Portugal, and then England, and then the United States — exerted an irresistible ascendancy over us at different historical moments. The presumed alignment with the North Atlantic was, until recently, a sort of *fait accompli* of our foreign policy. After all, there were no strong reasons to question it. Even when Brazil was denied the status of a Western country, "de facto Westernism" was deployed by diplomats and members of the local political elite.

However, factual circumstances have changed — and changed seriously. In such a scenario, we believe that analytical emphasis should be shifted from the mismatches between agendas — predictable for a dyad of autonomous countries as profoundly asymmetrical as Brazil and the US — to the various possible areas of intersection and agreement, ranging from compatible views on democracy and human rights to common challenges in terms of environmental management and combating social inequalities (Belém Lopes, 2023).

Conclusion: between past and future

In his third term as Brazilian head of state, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has already had the opportunity to get to know some of his American counterparts — Republicans and Democrats — and share moments with them. Generally speaking, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Joe Biden have maintained cordial and constructive relations with the South American president, effectively dispelling fears that Washington would sabotage a former union leader in the Planalto Palace. Instead, a mature and haughty relationship was established between the parties.

When the United States took over the baton from the British in the first decade of the 20th century and began exporting its values here as it imported our coffee, there was a profound shift in diplomatic loyalties from Europe to North America. In the 21st century, the story is different. While China is slowly advancing its presence in South America, massively importing agro-mineral products and building infrastructure, the US is not going back so far. It continues to be the country that invests most financially in local markets and, in any case, as the 2022 presidential election has shown, the international actor that most influences Brazilian national politics. At a critical juncture in history, where the old doesn't want to die and the new cannot be born, the most "westernized" of the BRICS countries, Brazil, wants to serve as a bridge between rich and poor, East and West, G7 and G77. So far, all the possibilities remain open for the bicentennial relationship between the giants of the Americas. Let's make sure we exploit them well.

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Influence and Strategy of Business Interest Groups in Relations Between Brazil and the United States¹

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Introduction

Trade relations between Brazil and the United States over the last 200 years constitute a broad field of study that crosses diverse geopolitical contexts. These relations, often examined from the perspective of governmental interactions, reveal a high complexity of processes of cooperation, competition and the search for mutual influence. This study, however, seeks to analyze a less explored but nonetheless significant perspective: the impact and influence of the business sectors in shaping these bilateral relations.

Since the 19th century, Brazil and the United States have followed paths that have often intertwined. These paths have been marked by moments of cooperation, such as the aftermath of the Second World War, by phases of relative distance during the Cold War, and more recently, by growing interdependence in the era of globalization. Each of these

¹ I am thankful for the support and information provided by Diego Bonomo regarding the work and organization of the Conselho Empresarial Brasil-Estados Unidos (CEBEU) and the Brazil-United States Business Council (BUSBC). The provided information was vital in the development of the article.

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periods reflects not only global political and economic dynamics, but also the internal transformations and strategies adopted by each nation.

The analysis of International Relations theories offers a lens through which one can examine the role of non-state actors, especially business interest groups, in diplomacy and trade policies. Authors such as Andrew Moravcsik (2020) and Helen V. Milner (1997) argue that foreign policies are often a reflection of the preferences of influential domestic actors. These include interest groups, voters, and bureaucrats, who pressure and shape foreign policies to suit their specific interests. This perspective challenges the traditional view that emphasizes exclusively the role of states and their institutions in international relations, as well as incorporating the pluralist perspectives of political science and international relations (Skonieczny, 2017).

Within this context, Brazil and the United States have interesting developments. In the United States, business interest groups have played a significant role in trade policymaking, influencing government decisions that reflect their ideological orientations and economic interests, as noted by Mahrenbach (2019). In contrast, in Brazil, the influence of interest groups emerges from a tradition of corporatism, especially during the Vargas era, where business unions maintained close ties with the government (Diniz, 2010), often with less operational autonomy than the public sector. This relationship has undergone significant changes since the country's democratization and Brazil's greater international prominence in recent decades.

According to Loomis, Francia and Strolovitch (2013), the way in which interests are represented in the states has also changed over the years, with different periods of activity spanning from the 1950s to the 1990s and post-1990s, with new action strategies with the government and legislators. This has also been associated with lobbying legislation in the United States, which has created mechanisms for interest groups to act (Skonieczny, 2017).

This paper aims to understand how the main interest groups have articulated their demands in the Brazil-US bilateral relationship over the

years. We will investigate how these dynamics interact with key events from the perspective of Brazil-US bilateral relations.

The influence of interest groups from an international relations perspective

The intergovernmental liberalism proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2020) considers that the national preferences and foreign policies of states are predominantly a reflection of the interests and pressures exerted by domestic interest groups. He suggests that foreign policy decisions, including trade decisions, are determined by a complex interaction between domestic interests (Moravcsik, 2020). In the case of Brazil and the United States, this implies that trade policies and bilateral relations are strongly influenced by industrial and agricultural sectors. These groups, with their own interests and agendas, exert significant pressure on policymakers, seeking to promote environments that favor their businesses. This influence is evident in various trade agreements and policies that have been formulated over the decades, reflecting the interests of these powerful economic actors.

Milner (1997) strengthens Moravski's (2020) argument by addressing the influence of economic interests and the availability of information on political decisions. Milner argues that a country's foreign policy, including its trade relations, is deeply affected by domestic dynamics, especially the relationship between economic power holders and policy makers.

In the context of trade relations between Brazil and the US, Milner's analysis suggests that the way in which information is disseminated and used by economic and political actors has a significant impact. For example, the industrial and agricultural sectors, being better informed and organized, can influence policies more effectively. This leads to a scenario where political decisions, especially in trade and economics, are not only responses to global conditions, but also to the power and information controlled by these interest groups.

When we analyze moments in bilateral relations, we can understand the process of influence by domestic actors, as postulated by Milner and Moravcski. In this sense, the 1935 Trade Treaty is an emblematic example of the influence of interest groups in Brazil-US trade relations. Lima (2013) analyzes how the industrial and agro-export sectors, represented by different parliamentarians and technical councils, influenced the debate and ratification of this treaty. The industrial sector, fearing trade opening and external competition, was opposed to the treaty, while the agro-export sector supported it, seeing opportunities for market expansion.

The approval of the Treaty was an effort by the Executive and the political elites who were looking for sources of funding for domestic development. The industrial sectors, represented by the Federation of Industries of São Paulo (FIESP), were opposed to the agreement, claiming that the clauses would harm the still incipient industrial sector, favoring an increase in imports. On the other hand, the agro-export sector, especially linked to the coffee industry, supported the Treaty, considering it important for free trade and Brazilian foreign trade (Lima, 2013).

Lima (2013) points out that the debate on the Treaty took place through the deputies who represented each of the interest groups, as well as participation in the technical councils, where representatives of the sectors sought to influence the bureaucrats in their decisions.

After the 1935 Treaty, trade relations between Brazil and the US went through several phases when it came to the role of the private sector in influencing the policies of both countries. According to Loomis, Francia and Strolovitch (2013), the post-war period saw the rise of multinational corporations, especially in sectors such as oil and automobiles, in influencing public policy in the United States. In Brazil, the growing industrialization process led to the formation of business groups that were increasingly influential in the government agenda, but in a corporatist model of action (Diniz, 2010; Diniz and Boschi, 2003).

During the Cold War, trade relations took on new forms. The United States sought to strengthen economic alliances in Latin America to contain Soviet influence, resulting in significant investments in Brazil. This period was marked by a growing influence of business groups in policymaking, with American companies establishing significant operations in Brazil.

In the US, the increase in corporate influence on foreign policy was significant at this time, as analyzed by Loomis, Francia and Strolovitch (2013) and Skonieczny (2017). The 1960s and 1970s saw an upsurge in the influence of interest groups, with US foreign policy increasingly influenced by corporate interests, especially in sectors such as oil, automobiles, and technology.

The Cold War introduced a new dynamic into commercial relations. As Smith (2008) explores, the United States sought to strengthen strategic alliances in South America, while Brazil saw relations with the US as an opportunity for technological advances and investment. In Brazil, the military regime (1964-1985) created an environment where business groups could wield significant influence, often in close alignment with government interests (Diniz, 2010; Diniz and Boschi, 2003).

The interaction between domestic interests, foreign policy and global historical events created a scenario in which business interest groups played crucial roles, often defining the direction and nature of bilateral trade relations. This insight is essential for analyzing the subsequent developments and dynamics of Brazil-US relations.

Business councils and economic diplomacy: shaping the Brazil-US trade relations

Over the course of bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States, various entities have emerged to represent business interests alongside governments. One of the most significant structures is the Conselho Empresarial Brasil-Estados Unidos (CEBEU), together with its American counterpart, the Brazil-United States Business Council (BUSBC).

The establishment of CEBEU and BUSBC in 1976 represented a milestone in Brazil-US trade relations, reflecting a joint effort to improve economic cooperation and bilateral investments.

CEBEU/BUSBC marked a crucial moment in the resumption of relations between the two countries during the Geisel and Nixon administrations. Inspired by Kissinger's vision of the importance of strengthening bilateral ties and boosting the business agenda, CEBEU/

BUSBC became a key mechanism in building the agenda and resolving disputes between both nations. These organizations have emerged as key platforms for promoting business interests, exerting considerable influence on political decisions and bilateral cooperation.

These two bodies act independently of governments, although they have different organizations and approaches. The Brazilian Section is headed by the National Confederation of Industry (CNI). CNI invites companies and business entities to join the group, with one company leading the team. The work program is defined jointly between CNI and the participating companies and associations, reflecting the agenda of interests of Brazilian companies and sectors regarding bilateral issues. In the American Section, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce leads the executive secretariat, but the companies are affiliated with BUSBC and are part of the board of the American section. Just as in the Brazilian case, the program and the agenda of interests are developed in collaboration between the U.S. Chamber and its members, with a company chairing the meetings.

The councils have also demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to different political and economic contexts. In general, CEBEU and BUSBC adjusted their strategies and agendas in response to changes in government administrations and the dynamics of the global economy, especially after the end of the Cold War. In this context, CEBEU and BUSBC had to adapt not only to changes in national policies in Brazil and the United States, but also to a more integrated and competitive global economic environment.

An analysis of the documents and work programs, published every two years, shows how the councils responded to changes in political administrations in both countries. With each new government, new priorities and trade policies emerged, requiring the councils to adapt quickly and reorient their strategies in order to remain effective in their mission to promote bilateral trade and investment (CEBEU/BUSBC, n.d.).

The Council's work has been crucial in several agendas over recent years. For example, between the 1970s and 1990s, Brazilian exporters faced a series of anti-dumping measures from the United States, which affected bilateral trade. Brazil was the target of six actions under Section

301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 between 1975 and 1991. In 1988, the United States imposed 100% tariffs on Brazilian paper, pharmaceutical and electronic products entering its market (Abreu, 1993).

Another relevant incident involved Brazil's IT policy in 1985, when the USTR threatened to impose retaliatory measures on Brazilian exports due to restrictions on American companies' access to the Brazilian software and hardware market. This conflict led Brazil to accept, in 1987, the opening of the sector to foreign companies (Abreu, 1993). Jacobus and Souza (2109) show how the dispute mobilized different organizations to defend the Brazilian IT sector, which was looking for a strategy to postpone the sector's opening to foreign companies. On the other hand, the authors point to the efforts of US sectors to take retaliatory measures against Brazil. However, this period can be identified as a model of articulation that was still very dependent on government demands and positions on the Brazilian side. From the US perspective, the resistance to free trade represented a major obstacle to expanding operations in countries like Brazil. In addition, economic instability in the country also limited advocacy, which was restricted to multinationals established in Brazil and to sectors that were already exporting (Abreu, 1993). As will be seen below, the model of interest representation underwent extensive changes from the 1990s onwards, especially in Brazil, but also in the United States. New forms of sectoral articulation of interests and mechanisms were implemented.

Within the logic of institutional representation of private sectors in bilateral relations, it is important to point out the CEO Forum, created in 2007 by Presidents Lula da Silva and George Bush. The Forum represents a mechanism for public-private dialogue, in which the United States government is represented by the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the National Economic Council, as well as the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, while the Brazilian side includes the Ministry of the Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade. The participating Brazilian companies are invited by the government. On the other hand, in the United States, an application period is opened, and applications are analyzed by government representatives. The exclusive group has 12 Brazilian and 12 American participants,

composed of presidents or CEOs of Brazilian companies who participate not as representatives of associations or sectors, but as entrepreneurs. The Forum was created to facilitate understanding and discussion between Brazilian and American businesspeople, promoting the trade and investment agenda. At the end of the meetings, recommendations are drafted for both governments with the goal of expanding bilateral cooperation.

Analysis of the CEBEU/BUSBC documents reveals that the business sectors maintain a consistent focus on seeking to implement trade and economic cooperation agreements (ATEC). They also aim to promote good regulatory practices, eliminate technical and customs barriers, and boost value chains. One of the specific targets is to remove Brazil from the 301 list in intellectual property matters and reduce the analysis time for Brazilian patents (CNI, 2023).

On the other hand, the CEO forum presents recommendations more geared towards improving the business environment for companies wishing to operate in the two countries. The 2023 document emphasizes cooperation in areas such as taxation, trade, infrastructure, energy, and education. Some of the recommendations include pursuing a bilateral tax treaty, collaborating on clean energy, and encouraging education in science and technology (CEO Forum, 2023).

Generally speaking, the positions of the institutionalized interest groups reflect a positive vision of the possibilities for expanding bilateral cooperation. However, there is a noticeable narrative that highlights the importance of the bilateral relationship as a counterpoint to the growing influence of business between Brazil and China. The documents emphasize the relevance of the US economy for Brazilian interests and the opportunities for advancing the agenda of liberalization and expansion of trade.

Other articulations and coalitions have emerged with the increased involvement of the private sector, indicating a new phase in the representation of business interests. In an ever-changing global scenario, the resilience and flexibility of business councils are fundamental to maintaining and strengthening Brazil-US trade relations.

Transformations in the representation of Brazil-United States interests: the role of business coalitions in the age of globalization

Starting in the 1990s, there was a meaningful change in the way Brazilian and American business interest groups articulated themselves and exerted influence. With globalization and economic reforms, these groups have had to adapt their strategies in order to remain effective. Veiga and Rios (2023) discuss how the Brazilian business sector, historically more dependent on close relations with the state, began to seek greater autonomy and direct influence over trade policies.

The emergence of business coalitions such as the Brazilian Business Coalition (CEB) and the Brazilian Industry Coalition (BIC) exemplifies this new phase of interest articulation. These coalitions, as described by Motta Veiga (2005), represent a more proactive and structured approach to defending business interests, especially on trade and investment issues.

The change in the Brazilian business community's stance on trade issues began with the negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), especially after the Belo Horizonte Summit in 1997. During the 1990s, a more protectionist view predominated among Brazilian interest groups, with a strong ability to lobby the government. Although there was also a liberal view, interest groups argued in favor of government action to protect the competitiveness of sectors, especially industry. Measures of this kind would favor market competition for Brazilian producers and protect local companies from foreign competition. Regarding the FTAA negotiations, considered a milestone in the structuring of the sector in Brazil, the creation of the Business Coalition represented a capacity for articulation and agenda-setting on the part of Brazilian businesspeople (Mancuso and Oliveira, 2006).

Until 1997, Brazilian businesspeople had very limited involvement in the negotiations. However, during one of the parallel meetings of businesspeople from the Americas, the lack of preparation and knowledge of Brazilian businesspeople in relation to the negotiating agenda became evident, compared to their American counterparts. This led to the creation of a coalition of different business sectors to prepare a negotiating agenda and defend Brazil's interests (Pizetta, 2005).

Following the failure of the FTAA and the existence of various disputes, such as the cotton dispute, the United States Section of the Business Council created the Brazil Trade Action Coalition (BRAZTAC), made up of a wide variety of agricultural, industrial, service and technology companies that supported a definitive solution to the Brazil-US cotton case at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Its aim was to prevent Brazil from imposing trade retaliation against US goods and intellectual property rights (Exame, 2010).

BRAZTAC was created at the beginning of 2010 and played an active role in resolving the Brazil-US cotton case at the WTO, both in the United States and in Brazil. Initially, it was created to facilitate dialogue between the American and Brazilian governments in order to avoid Brazilian trade retaliation worth almost US\$ 1 billion against US goods and intellectual property rights. Through BRAZTAC's work, the United States and Brazil settled on a temporary agreement in 2010, in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a Framework Agreement.

Over the next two years, BRAZTAC worked actively with the Congress to prevent the dismantling of this temporary agreement on five occasions. BRAZTAC sent letters and communications to government sectors in Brazil and the United States, as well as promoting academic studies, meetings and dialogues on the impacts of this process. On its website³ it is possible to find a detailed description of all its activities and the results of its influence with both governments between 2010 and 2013.

Another strategy to defend the interests of Brazilian industrial sectors was the organization of the Brazilian Industry Coalition (BIC), which operated from 2000 to 2018 and acted as a lobbying tool with US legislators to defend Brazilian interests. The Brazilian Industry Coalition (BIC), active from 2000 to 2018, emerged as a strategic initiative to represent the interests of Brazilian industry in the United States. Its main objective was to defend the interests of the Brazilian industrial sector before US legislators, seeking to influence commercial and economic policies that affected bilateral trade.

³ Available at: http://www.brazilcouncil.org/initiatives/brazil-trade-action-coalition-braztac. Last access on: 25 Mar. 2024.

The BIC operated as a forum for articulation and cooperation between Brazilian companies and industrial associations in the United States. Its work focused on specific issues, such as reducing trade barriers, promoting more favorable conditions of access to the US market for Brazilian products and resolving trade disputes involving Brazil and the United States.

The Coalition brought together various industrial sectors, representing a wide range of Brazilian business interests in the United States. This diversity of members strengthened its advocacy capacity, since it could address a range of issues and concerns specific to different industries (Folha S. Paulo, 2013.).

One of BIC's main achievements was its role in mitigating trade tensions between Brazil and the United States. At times of trade disputes, the BIC has played an important role in promoting dialogue and seeking solutions that avoid trade retaliation that is harmful to both countries. Its ability to influence trade policies and defend Brazilian interests in the US context has been recognized as a valuable contribution to the bilateral relationship.

In addition, the BIC represented a significant shift in the strategy for defending business interests, indicating greater autonomy and action capacity for Brazilian companies on the international scenario. Its work helped strengthen the presence and influence of the Brazilian industrial sector in the United States, consolidating it as a relevant player in bilateral trade and economic discussions.

The Brazilian Industry Coalition (BIC) has played a crucial role in defending the interests of Brazilian industry in the United States, acting as an important lobbying and advocacy instrument. Its wide-ranging action and its ability to mitigate trade tensions have proven the importance of interest representation strategies in the context of bilateral trade relations between Brazil and the United States.

Articulation and influence: the agricultural sectors of Brazil and the United States

In addition to the strategies of the industrial sectors, it is also possible to identify new models of representation in the Brazilian agricultural sector. At the end of the 1990s, the Brazilian agro-export sector took on significant political participation, marking an important change in the representation of business interests in the country. Previously, the primary business associations were officially supervised by the state, which limited their ability to lobby and defend private interests. However, the agro-export sector began to establish its own independent associations, allowing them to articulate their interests more effectively (Mahrenbach, 2019). The creation of the Sugar Cane Industry Union (Unica) in 1997, as discussed by Jank (2002), symbolizes this change. Unica, along with other agro-industrial associations, began to play a major influence in Brazil's trade and environmental policies, promoting the sector's interests on the international stage.

In partnership with the Confederation of Agriculture, Unica and other associations from the agro-industrial sector began to work with the Brazilian government to adopt a more assertive stance in international trade negotiations, aiming to expand Brazil's export markets (Jank, 2002). It is important to note that the agro-export sector maintains close ties with the government, with many representatives of the sector occupying important positions in the government.

Another key institution was the Institute for International Negotiations (ICONE), created to offer technical analysis and support in international trade negotiations. As Hopewell (2014) details, ICONE played an instrumental role during the WTO Doha Round negotiations, providing crucial information that helped shape Brazil's negotiating position. ICONE aimed to produce sophisticated technical analysis to support the Brazilian government in international negotiations. During the Doha Round negotiations, ICONE played a fundamental role, preparing 62 confidential technical documents and simulations that were used by the Brazilian government to develop its negotiating positions (Hopewell, 2014).

The most relevant result of this joint effort was the ability of Brazil and its agro-industrial sector to put the agricultural subsidies of the United States and the European Union at the center of the negotiations. The G20, for example, secured a staggered formula for reducing subsidies, ensuring that the countries that provide the most support are obliged to make the biggest reductions. This has reflected many of the proposals of the Brazilian agro-industrial sector (Hopewell, 2014).

However, unlike the industrial sector, which seeks interlocution between the Brazilian and American sectors, the agricultural sector often adopts an approach of direct pressure on their respective governments. The two-level theory applies in this context, showing how strengthening the actions of domestic actors reflects a country's strategy. The Brazilian agro-industrial sector faces a US sector that is equally powerful in terms of political strength and articulation capacity (Jank, 2002).

The US agricultural sector, in turn, has exerted considerable influence on trade negotiations with Brazil. American agricultural subsidies and protectionist policies have often become sticking points in bilateral trade relations, highlighting the role of the ethanol lobby and the National Corn Growers Association in defense of American agricultural interests (Thomaz, 2016).

Thomaz (2016) gives a detailed presentation of the weight and influence of the US agricultural sector with congresspeople, highlighting its ability to use political bases to guarantee the maintenance of agricultural subsidies and trade barriers. An emblematic case is the ethanol sector, which stands out for its strategy. The National Corn Growers Association, which represents 33,000 members in 48 states, uses the Legislation Action Center to connect legislators with their members. In addition, joint action with other organizations, such as the American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE) and Growth Energy, creates a proactive vision of the sector's importance to the US economy.

The strength of the ethanol lobby in the United States is further amplified by donations to electoral campaigns in the districts most relevant to producers. This strategy has a significant impact on the influence of interest groups (Thomaz, 2016).

Even with this influence, the memorandum of understanding agreement between Brazil and the United States in 2007, as well as President Obama's support for agreements to use biofuels in the aviation sector in 2011, have generated opportunities for cooperation between the two countries. The recent alliance on the biofuels agenda demonstrates the possibilities for joint action.

The articulation of the Brazilian agricultural sector and the influence of the US agro-industrial sector are crucial elements in bilateral trade negotiations. While Brazil seeks to strengthen its position and expand its presence in international markets, the United States has a powerful agricultural lobby to protect its interests. This complex dynamic shapes negotiating strategies and the development of trade policies in both countries.

Challenges and opportunities for the private sector in Brazil-United States relations: sustainability, competitiveness and geopolitics

Contemporary challenges in Brazil-US relations, such as sustainability and the green agenda, have gained prominence. Increased awareness of environmental issues and pressure for sustainable business practices are themes explored by Keohane and Victor (2016). They highlight the need for business sectors to adapt to these new paradigms, emphasizing the importance of commercial strategies that align economic growth with sustainability.

Another important issue on the private sector agenda involves the growing influence of business between Brazil and China, which represents both a challenge and an opportunity for Brazil-US relations. The importance of Brazil-China trade has led to a reconfiguration of commercial and political priorities in Brazil, which may influence the commercial partnership with the United States.

Adapting to global and regional economic and political transformations is vital for interest groups in Brazil-US relations. The ability of business sectors to adapt and respond to these changes will be decisive for the future of bilateral relations. This includes understanding and responding to geopolitical dynamics as well as changes in global value chains.

The ability to navigate a climate change scenario, the rise of China as Brazil's trading partner and transformations in global power and trade structures are critical to shaping the future nature of economic cooperation and investment between the two countries.

The 2023 CEBEU position statement highlights the importance of the competitiveness agenda for the Brazil-US relationship, reinforcing the partnership over the years. Relations between Brazil and the United States are becoming increasingly relevant, and domestic sectors will play a crucial role in building an option that brings benefits and maintains the gains made.

As noted by the Independent Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations in 2011, strengthening the private relationship over time is a valuable resource that should be encouraged by governments to overcome persistent resistance and barriers in the coming years. The challenges ahead will require significant public and private sector involvement in promoting cooperation between the two countries (Bodman; Wolfensohn and Sweig, 2011).

Final remarks

When analyzing trade relations between Brazil and the United States, concentrating on the influence of business sectors, it is evident that the dynamics of bilateral relations are profoundly influenced by a variety of actors and factors, many of which transcend traditional government policies.

The development and evolution of the Councils of Businesses CEBEU and BUSBC illustrate how dedicated channels of dialog and negotiation can effectively shape and influence trade and investment policies. The ability of these councils to adapt to different political and economic contexts demonstrates the importance of flexibility and strategic response in an environment of geopolitical transformations.

Furthermore, the emergence of strong business coalitions symbolizes an era of greater proactivity and autonomy for business sectors, especially in the context of complex international trade negotiations. The influence of these coalitions in the formulation of trade policies reflects

a significant change in the representation of business interests, marking an evolution from dependence to more active and direct participation in the scenario.

In a world that is constantly changing, marked by contemporary challenges such as sustainability and the rise of new economic powers like China, adaptation, proactivity and the ability to influence trade policies are becoming increasingly fundamental to bilateral relations.

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JAPER — What is it? Brazil and the United States Together in the Anti-Racist Struggle

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Introduction

When Brazil and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1824, the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity of the French Revolution inspired thinkers from North to South of the New World. However, neither the American Founding Fathers nor the crafters of Brazilian independence were able to overcome the paradox of the coexistence of slavery and freedom. Among the similarities between the two nations was the denial of citizenship rights to the majority of the population — women, indigenous peoples and the enslaved. The policy of black slavery in both countries (in the case of the US, mainly in the southern states) was associated with the conservative groups' conception of national development, which made Brazil the last country in the Americas to put an end to the transatlantic trafficking of people and abolish slavery. Nevertheless, the difference between the "races" persisted after emancipation, reinforced by the scientific racism of the late 19th century, and maintained harmful

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forms of ethnic-racial discrimination, which to this day affect society as a whole and jeopardize the full exercise of democracy.

Brazil and the US are not only the largest democracies in the Americas; they are also the two countries with the highest concentration of the black diaspora. Self-declaration as black ("pretos e pardos" in Brazil, according to the criteria of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics — IBGE; "black" in the USA, according to the Census Bureau) has been increasing in recent years, with 55.5% of blacks and browns in Brazil, according to the IBGE's 2022 Census,³ and 13.6% of blacks in the US, according to the 2020 Census.⁴ Although there are nuances between the history of Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Americans, it can be said that the issue of race brings Brazil and the US closer together due to the contribution of the common African heritage to the diversity of their societies, the confrontation of racial abuse and discrimination over centuries and the persistent challenge of eliminating the structural barriers that prevent the full social and economic inclusion of black and indigenous peoples.

In 2007, Brazil and the United States opened up a new and necessary front in their already historic bilateral relations. It was the year in which two black women, pioneers in the positions they held at the time — Matilde Ribeiro, as Minister of the Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality (SEPPIR) and Condoleezza Rice, as US Secretary of State —, converged on the point that both countries had been facing the same problem for centuries — racism — and that it would be possible to share successful experiences and work together to build ways to overcome it.

The meeting between Condoleezza Rice and Matilde Ribeiro at the State Department in Washington on October 25, 2007 was symbolic for several reasons. For the first time, thanks to the efforts of the Embassy of Brazil in Washington, the Chief Minister of SEPPIR was received by the head of US diplomacy, respecting the hierarchy of protocol. Until then, meetings of that Brazilian authority had been held at the level of Under-Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (at the time

³ See: . Accessed on: 25 Mar. 2024.

⁴ See: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI225222. Accessed on: 25 Mar. 2024.

Ambassador Thomas Shannon). Secondly, these were two black women, descendants of enslaved people, in the highest position in their respective organizations. Thirdly, Rice was warmly receptive to Brazil's proposal to resume the negotiation of a bilateral cooperation instrument in the area of racial equality on issues of common interest in the fight against racism, which would become the first bilateral human rights cooperation agreement between Brazil and the USA — the Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality, or JAPER.

First stage (2008-2013)

A brief contextualization of the political situation in 2007-2008

It can be considered that the political situation in both countries favored the establishment of this new axis in bilateral relations. That year, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was in the second year of his second term as President of Brazil. With Celso Amorim and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), President Lula had been building a proud and active foreign policy, marked, on the one hand, by Brazil's eminently sovereign position on the international stage; on the other, by the development of new axes in foreign policy, manifested above all through alliances with countries in the global South. The Presidency of the Republic and Itamaraty were interested in treading new paths in foreign policy, with greater international presence, while maintaining traditional alliances. This could be seen in other areas of the federal government, especially in SEPPIR, which was created in 2003 in response to pressure from the black movement, which had been strengthened after its significant participation in the Third World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance (Durban Conference, 2001).

In the United States, George W. Bush was in the last year of his second presidential term. The country was facing the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, and it was necessary for the government of a president affiliated with the Republican Party, with known liberal tendencies in the economy, to intervene in the national economy in

order to mitigate the effects of the crisis that had spread to various national and international markets. The Bush administration sought to revisit relations with Latin America through a "new narrative," based on sharing democratic values, which would include, in a broader context, the promotion of social justice. Brazil was recognized as a regional leader and an emerging global player, a partner in building a truly positive agenda on issues such as energy independence, eradication of malaria and the fight against racism and intolerance, examples of which are the Memorandum of Understanding on Biofuels, signed in 2007, during President George W. Bush's visit to Brazil; and JAPER, which would be signed in March 2008, during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's official visit to Brazil.

Creation

From the first draft of what would become the Action Plan, Rice, in line with her academic profile, her experience as a university professor and her relationship with the Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), prioritized the inclusion of academic exchange mechanisms, including scholarships. In this context, during the preparations for the Secretary of State's visit to Brazil, scheduled for 2008, Minister Matilde Ribeiro met with the Executive Director of the White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Leonard Haynes III, to discuss increasing the exchange of students, professors, curricular topics and, eventually, trade and business in the JAPER Education Working Group. Some HBCUs, as well as other North American universities participating in the Brazil-United States Higher Education Consortium Program, already had projects that addressed ethnic-racial issues, among others. In the midst of the discussions on educational cooperation within the framework of JAPER, Brazil proposed an increase in funding for this program, administered by the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) and its US counterpart, the Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education (FIPSE).

The initial draft text of the then Memorandum of Understanding to Combat Racial Discrimination and Promote Equal Opportunity, which

gave rise to the Joint Action Plan, was drawn up by the US. The negotiation involved, on the US side, the Western Hemisphere geographic area of the State Department and, on the Brazilian side, the human rights area of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SEPPIR. The negotiations went smoothly, resulting in a balanced framework document, which recognizes "the democratic, multiethnic and multiracial nature of Brazilian and US societies" and reaffirms the two governments' commitment to racial equality, equal opportunities and cooperation for the promotion of human rights, which guide cooperation "in eliminating racial and ethnic discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity for *all people*," without specifically mentioning Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples or any other ethnic group.⁵

JAPER is a bilateral agreement, not intended to serve to coordinate the positions of the two countries on racial issues in other forums. Its governance takes place through the Steering Committee for the Promotion of Equal Opportunities ("Steering Committee"), which is responsible for discussing matters of interest and monitoring the actions implemented, and which must meet at least once a year, in alternate countries. Educational cooperation, due to its priority, is the subject of an annex describing the areas and methods to be considered. Another nine themes make up the areas of action: culture and communication; work and employment; housing; protection of the law and access to justice; anti-discrimination legislation and policies; sports and leisure; health; ethnic-racial prejudice; and access to credit and training. The Action Plan also favors the formation of public-private partnerships and partnerships with nongovernmental organizations, as well as cooperation with higher education institutions, international organizations and civil society.

On March 13, 2008, in Brasilia, the then Minister of SEPPIR, Edson Santos, and the then Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, signed JAPER, in the context of the official trip of the head of the US diplomacy to Brazil. With the aim of bringing together Brazilian and American societies, with the support of the respective governments, the document

⁵ Emphasis added. See: . Accessed on: 25 Mar. 2024.

serves as a framework for promoting bilateral cooperation to overcome the structural racism shared by both nations. For the first time, after overcoming attempts to oppose the myth of Brazilian racial democracy and the segregationist policies of the USA, the two largest democracies in the Americas recognize that, when it comes to the issue of race, they have many more similarities than differences. From this perspective, they are willing to cooperate to overcome the impact of colonialism, slavery and the racist theories of the Modern Age and pseudo-scientific theories of the 19th century, which have been determining factors in socio-economic disparities and inequality of opportunities and social inclusion, to the disadvantage of non-white populations from North to South.

Between 2008 and 2014 various activities were carried out under JAPER, listed in Annex I.

Implementation

Between 2008 and 2013, six JAPER plenary meetings were held in Brazil and the US, alternately, with broad participation from government and civil society, followed by Steering Committee meetings. Until the 2nd Plenary Meeting in Salvador (2009), at Brazil's request, the Steering Committee meetings were reserved for government representatives. Under pressure from civil society, the following meetings incorporated civil society representation from both countries. The format of the meetings combined high-level dialogues and debates in thematic panels and working groups (WGs), organized according to the main axes of the Action Plan — education; health; culture and communication; access to justice and public security; work and entrepreneurship, including major events; and environmental justice or environmental racism (proposed by the US). The Steering Committee's plenary sessions were prepared at technical meetings, which also took turns to discuss other issues related to the Action Plan.

In addition to the technical meetings and the Steering Committee, videoconferences, technical visits from both sides, seminars and other events have been organized within the framework of JAPER. Among the concrete actions, one can mention, in the area of health, the collaboration

between the Ministry of Health and SEPPIR with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for the promotion of equality in health, which generated the 2012-2014 Work Plan, with an emphasis on HIV/ AIDS, violence, sickle cell anemia and chronic non-communicable diseases. In the area of education, the increase in student exchanges, by encouraging the Memorandum of Understanding between CAPES and the HBCU-Brazil Alliance, 6 as well as the agreement between the Zumbi dos Palmares Citizenship University (Unipalmares) and Xavier University. In the area of public security, the preparation of subsidies for inclusion in the national curriculum matrix developed by the Ministry of Justice's National Secretariat for Public Security (SENASP/MJ) of a transversal approach to combating racial discrimination, including training against racial profiling. In the cultural area, the project "A Journey Through the African Diaspora" was developed, a partnership between the Emanoel Araújo Afro Brasil Museum and the Prince George's Afro-American Museum, for an exchange between students from the São Paulo state public school system and students from Prince George's County, Maryland. The project involved artistic training on the impact of the African presence on Brazilian and North American cultures and learning the language of the partner country.8 In the area of communication, at the initiative of the Department of State (DoS), a JAPER logo and a Facebook page were created, which is still active ("Joint-Action Plan").

On an international level, JAPER has been recognized as a good cooperation practice in the fight against racial discrimination by United Nations bodies and the Organization of American States (OAS), among others. At the initiative of Brazil and the US, UNESCO launched the "Teaching Respect for All" project in 2012 to combat discrimination in and through education. The DoS's enthusiasm for JAPER also inspired the creation in 2010 of the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Racial and Ethnic Equality (CAPREE), a bilateral cooperation program on racial issues with Colombia. The US even suggested extending JAPER to other

⁶ See: https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/wha/rls/2012/198434.htm>. Last access on: 25 Mar. 2024.

⁷ See: https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/wha/rt/social/brazil/education/index.htm. Last access on: 25 Mar. 2024

⁸ See: http://www.museuafrobrasil.org.br/educacao/projetos-especiais>. Last access on: 25 Mar. 2024.

Latin American and Caribbean countries with a large Afro-descendant population, in order to turn it into a regional or even multilateral network. However, Brazil preferred to maintain bilateral cooperation between the two countries, focused on concrete actions. The Action Plan also includes the possibility of carrying out projects in third countries (which has not yet come to fruition).

JAPER's uniqueness is largely due to the role of civil society. From the Brazilian point of view, "the Action Plan consists of an innovative and pioneering form of diplomacy, which unites two democracies through their respective governments and civil society." Ambassador Thomas Shannon refers to the initiative as a form of "social inclusion diplomacy," also stressing the democratic character that the participation of civil society and the private sector gives to the Plan. In fact, JAPER has aroused great interest and expectations from segments of Brazilian civil society, especially non-governmental organizations linked to the black movement, particularly with regard to funding. The private sector, in turn, has shown growing interest in the mechanism, with a significant presence at the plenary sessions in Salvador (2009) and Atlanta (2010). It is worth highlighting the encouragement of black entrepreneurship in the major sporting events that would take place in Brazil in 2014 and 2016 (FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games, respectively), which was on the Action Plan's agenda from the outset. On the US side, the participation of civil society was mainly through academics and experts linked to think tanks. At the business level, the Department of Commerce's Minority Business Development Agency collaborated by sharing experiences with black entrepreneurs. The State Department has also sought to attract the attention of the legislature to JAPER, with the involvement of congressmen, particularly from the Black Caucus,9 and budgetary designation.

During this first phase of JAPER, there were some differences of perception regarding its nature, objectives and long-term perspective. In terms of its nature, Brazil sees it as a human rights agreement, while the

⁹ The Congressional Black Caucus. It is a non-partisan body made up of African-American members of Congress, created in 1971 to present policies and bills that would guarantee equal rights, opportunities and access for black Americans and other marginalized communities.

US sees it as a bilateral policy issue. This would explain the monitoring of the Action Plan by the human rights area, linked to Itamaraty's Secretariat for Multilateral Affairs, together with SEPPIR, and by the Western Hemisphere policy area (more specifically by "desk Brazil"), linked to the DoS Political Affairs Secretariat. The absence of a US governmental body to coordinate human rights policies produces a certain imbalance in the dialogue. With regard to the objectives, although both partners prioritize civil society, the US sees the Steering Committee only as the driving force — and not the executor — of the initiatives. According to one of the people responsible for implementing the program at SEPPIR, the internal understanding was that JAPER would be an unconventional public policy, combining government and civil society initiatives, seen in practical terms as complementary to the agency's policies. Cooperation was supposed to provide funding for projects in Brazil, a perception that was even more pervasive among non-governmental organizations. In the medium and long term, Brazil aspired to a model of horizontal cooperation in the fight against racism, with a real exchange of experiences underpinning mutual knowledge and the strengthening of bilateral relations. Both SEPPIR and Itamaraty resented Washington's welfarist stance, in the sense that it wanted to teach Brazil how to deal with racism, as if they had nothing to learn from the Brazilian experience. This position generated tensions in the preparatory meetings and plenary sessions, marked by the Brazilian side's efforts to avoid the next meeting being about racism in Brazil, as well as jeopardizing the implementation of the Action Plan, resulting in alternating moments of intense activity in the preparation of the meetings, followed by relative apathy.

Although according to government representatives "JAPER is an agreement for civil societies," in the opinion of more than one of our interviewees, there has been a failure to communicate with civil societies, which to this day don't really understand what it means. On the Brazilian side, there was a frustrated expectation of funding, while on the US side, there was a lack of mobilization and disinterest, as they considered JAPER to be a vertical initiative to help Brazilian NGOs. SEPPIR showed great capacity to mobilize civil society, but had to face the harsh criticism that "JAPER doesn't work." At the time, the cross-cutting

relationship with other ministries was still under construction, revealing weaknesses. Nevertheless, the mechanism's focal points were appointed in the various bodies involved in the projects, especially the Ministries of Justice; Health; Education; Labor and Employment; Human Rights and the Environment; the Federal Public Defender's Office and the Palmares Cultural Foundation, among others, who were part of the Steering Committee and took part in meetings in Brazil and the US. However, as the representatives sent to the Steering Committee discussions were usually officials with no decision-making power, the cross-cutting nature of the process was weakened.

President Barack Obama's administration tried, right from the start, to make the Action Plan more dynamic, in response to allegations from US civil society of a low level of government commitment to the initiative. It also sought to strengthen relations with the respective national Congresses and attract the participation of more companies, which could contribute to financing projects and discussing social responsibility, among other aspects. The concrete result of the new administration's efforts was the announcement, at the plenary meeting in Salvador (2009), of the creation of the Brazilian Fund for Human Rights, with a contribution of US\$ 200,000 from the US government and US\$ 100,000 from the Kellogg Foundation. These funds were used to finance twelve social projects in Brazil, selected by the NGO Brazil Foundation, 10 with the support of the Brazilian government, which were implemented from 2011. Each received a micro-grant of US\$ 25,000. The Obama administration made other gestures of support for JAPER, such as choosing the campus of Faculdade Zumbi dos Palmares for the visit of then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2010; funding Brazilian civil society delegations to JAPER events in the US; bringing together the US Congress and business community, and with communications professionals, among other actions. The Steering Committee meeting in Atlanta (2010) — "A Call to Action" — was emblematic, with Congressman Gregory Meeks (D-NY) as the guest of honor, and with significant business and journalistic participation in the side event on "Diversity in the Media."

¹⁰ See: https://brazilfoundation.org/en/japer-list-of-selected-projects-released/. Accessed on: 25 Mar. 2024.

The Embassy of the US in Brasilia, in direct contact with civil society organizations and universities, articulated cooperation projects, despite the parties' understanding that all projects should go through the Steering Committee. The lack of prior coordination with SEPPIR led to some difficulties, particularly in educational cooperation. Academic exchange programs took hundreds of Brazilians to higher education institutions in the US, but CAPES did not take racial criteria into account. As a result, there were complaints both from the HBCUs, which received mostly white students with no interest in the history of Afro-descendants or racial awareness, and from the students, who were unaware of the racial component of the agreement.

In 2011, Minister Luiza Bairros took over as head of SEPPIR determined to reformulate JAPER, amid criticism from civil society about the Action Plan and the work of the Secretariat as a whole, in particular the lack of funding. Although there was resistance from Minister Bairros and her team to greater commitment to the Action Plan, at the insistence of Itamaraty, the meetings were kept regularly until the VI Plenary Meeting was held in Brasilia on July 18, 2013. Shortly afterwards, the disclosure of evidence of US intelligence spying on Brazilian officials, including President Dilma Rousseff, led to a cooling of Brazil-US relations. According to the then Executive Secretary of SEPPIR, Giovanni Harvey, the interruption of JAPER's activities was due to the situation at the time and not to any alleged anti-Americanism on the part of Luiza Bairros' administration. Afterwards, the DoS made a number of attempts to reactivate JAPER, including during Donald Trump's administration, which did not arouse Brazil's interest.

The resumption of JAPER (2023-)

A brief contextualization of the political moment at the beginning of 2023

The year 2023, when JAPER was resumed, found Brazil and the United States in different political configurations to those of 2008, but with some similarities.

While in 2008 Brazil had a president affiliated with the Workers' Party (PT) and the US a president affiliated with the Republican Party, in 2023 Brazil was once again led by a PT president, but the US had a Democratic Party president. In addition, both faced very polarized and disputed elections, in a democratic manner: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won the 2022 elections with 50.9% of the valid votes and Joe Biden won the 2020 elections with 51.3%.

There is another similarity in the most recent electoral processes in Brazil and the US: in both countries, the vote of the black population was important for the winning candidates. In Brazil, polls carried out in the context of the 2022 elections showed that the majority of black women and men in the country intended to vote for Lula, while in the US, a large majority of the black population voted for Biden. In response to this support, both Presidents have adopted measures to combat racism and promote racial equality, such as the relaunch of a body dedicated to this issue in Brazil — the Ministry of Racial Equality (MIR) — and the creation, in the United States, of the position of Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice within the State Department.

In February 2023, a new profile began to emerge for bilateral relations, very different from the one observed between 2019 and 2022. On a state visit to the United States, Presidents Lula and Biden discussed the need to strengthen the Brazilian and American democracies, bearing in mind the threats experienced in the recent past, which culminated in the attacks on the Capital in Washington DC on January 6, 2021 and on the buildings of the Praça dos Três Poderes in Brasilia on January 8, 2023, by rioters dissatisfied with the election results in the US and Brazil, respectively. The two leaders also considered establishing partnerships to tackle climate change, including the announcement of a US contribution to the Amazon Fund and the resumption of JAPER, the anti-racism aspect of bilateral relations. This resumption meets the demands of the presidential transition group and organized civil society; on the eve of the state

¹¹ See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/10/joint-statement-following-the-meeting-between-president-biden-and-president-lula/>. Last access on: 25 Mar. 2024.

visit, representatives of black movements sent a letter to both Presidents, requesting the return of the bilateral initiative to combat racism. ¹²

Leading women at the head of JAPER

If, in 2007, JAPER was the result of the initiative of two black women in leadership positions in their respective governments, in 2023 two other black women would be the protagonists of its reactivation — Brazil's Minister of Racial Equality, Anielle Franco, and the United States Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield. The authorities chose the city of Salvador, Bahia, to announce the resumption of JAPER on May 3, 2023. "We are here, in Salvador, the heart of black Brazil, because this city represents both the past of racism and the optimistic future we want," said the ambassador, a high-ranking member of President Biden's administration. The Brazilian minister, for her part, stressed that the Action Plan still "has a lot of power to grow and to transform the lives of many black people."

Improving JAPER in this second phase will be the responsibility of Minister Anielle Franco, whose counterpart will be the Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice, Desirée Cormier Smith. These are two young black women with solid academic backgrounds, experience of working in civil society and deep connections with their grassroots communities.

The Minister of Racial Equality, Anielle Franco, has two bachelor's degrees and two master's degrees on her *curriculum vitae*, as well as a doctorate in progress. She was a scholarship student at historically black universities in the USA, having studied English and Journalism at North Carolina Central University (NCCU), and she holds a Master's degree in Journalism from Florida A&M University (FAMU). In Brazil, she obtained a second degree in English Literature from the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), and a second master's degree in Ethnic-Racial Relations from the Celso Suckow da Fonseca Federal Center for Technological Education (CEFET/RJ). She co-founded and ran for five years the Marielle

¹² See: https://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/movimento-negro-pede-a-lula-e-biden-a-retomada-de-projeto-antirracista/. Last access on: 25 Mar. 2024.

Franco Institute, a non-profit organization aimed at inspiring, connecting and empowering black women, LGBTQIA+ and residents of the outskirts. The Institute is named after Marielle Franco, the Minister's sister, a Rio de Janeiro councilwoman assassinated in March 2018. At the head of the Marielle Franco Institute, she consolidated a consistent position in organized civil society, having undertaken measures with an impact on national politics, such as the joint action with the NGOs "Educafro", "Movimento Mulheres Negras Decidem" and "Coalizão Negra por Direitos", which came together to demand that the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) define a proportional distribution of funding and advertising time for black candidates in Brazilian elections. In November 2022, Anielle Franco joined the Women's Group in the presidential transition team, in line with her position on black feminism.

Désirée Cormier Smith is the first Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice of the United States Department of State, appointed by President Joe Biden in June 2022. She studied at prestigious US universities — Political Science and Psychology at Stanford University and Public Policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. At the DoS, she served as a senior advisor in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and also worked in Mexico and South Africa. Cormier Smith has also worked for civil society, having been Senior Policy Advisor for Africa, Europe and Eurasia at the Open Society Foundation. The creation of the position she currently holds is the result not only of the impacts of the assassination of George Floyd in 2020, but also of decades of demands from civil society for the DoS to act more incisively in defense of the rights of historically discriminated individuals in the country. Its activities involve ensuring that US foreign policy promotes the human rights of discriminated populations, as well as that the government acts globally to combat systemic racism, discrimination and xenophobia.

In this new stage, JAPER is based on four pillars aimed at combating racism and promoting racial equality, each of which has its own working group (WG). They are: I – access to and permanence in education systems; II – racial justice, with a reduction in social vulnerabilities and lethal violence against communities marginalized by race and ethnicity, including Afro-

descendant and indigenous communities; III – recognition and preservation of history, culture and memory; and IV – access to health systems. The Ministry of Racial Equality participates in the meetings of all the WGs, sharing responsibilities, according to their respective competencies, with the Ministries of Education; Justice and Public Security; Culture; and Health. Representatives of civil society have demanded the creation, as yet unrealized, of a fifth pillar, which would deal with the promotion of racial equity and the reduction of socio-economic inequalities not only in a broad way, but also in a specific way, with an emphasis on the sphere of work. Another demand from civil society is for JAPER to address environmental racism and the impacts of climate change.

The first meeting after the resumption of the mechanism took place in Brasilia on May 23, 2023, with the participation of Minister Anielle Franco; the Secretary-General of the MRE, as Acting Minister of State, Ambassador Maria Laura da Rocha; the Minister of Women, Cida Gonçalves; and the Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Human Rights and Citizenship, Rita de Oliveira. Representing the US were the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Brian A. Nichols; the Special Representative for Equity and Racial Justice, Desirée Cormier Smith; and the US Ambassador to Brazil, Elizabeth Frawley Bagley. A joint work plan was drawn up and the governments agreed to explore the role of civil society in JAPER. ¹³

Civil society in the resumption of JAPER

Civil society has shown growing interest and engagement with JAPER in this context of resumption. Brazilian civil society organizations have been in contact with government representatives through meetings and letters, with the aim of highlighting the importance they attach to JAPER and increasing their participation in the initiative. An example of this position is the letter sent to Presidents Lula and Biden on February 8, 2023, requesting that the implementation of the agreement includes the effective participation of civil society in both countries and not

¹³ See: https://www.gov.br/igualdaderacial/pt-br/assuntos/copy2_of_noticias/brasil-e-estados-unidos-fazem-primeira-reuniao-de-trabalho-apos-retomada-do-japer>. Last access on: 25 Mar. 2024.

be limited to government actions. In addition, representatives of civil society have expressed on more than one occasion that they consider it necessary to participate in discussions and recommendations within the framework of JAPER, so that their participation is not limited to following meetings and giving opinions on what the governments have decided, but is more incisive, integrating the efforts of reflection and outlining actions in the working groups. These organizations advocate the adoption of measures in the context of the JAPER pillars, such as the adoption of programs to encourage the inclusion of black people in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) fields, the construction of an action plan with goals and objective parameters on the reduction of lethal violence against the black population, and investment in policies aimed at increasing the number of black female and male doctors.

The aforementioned letter to Presidents Lula and Biden was signed by ten civil society organizations, under the coordination of the Washington Brazil Office (WBO). This institution has been working to support the role of organizations from Brazil's black movements, especially in the WBO's WG on Racial Justice, created in December 2022. The WG expanded in 2023, reaching a total of 16 organizations, and made innovative progress last November by establishing the Luiza Bairros Black International Articulation, named after Luiza Helena de Bairros, a black movement icon and SEPPIR Minister from 2011 to 2014.

It is not only in Brazil that civil society has demanded greater participation in JAPER. Special Representative Désirée Cormier Smith's team has also received requests for more contact with Brazilian civil society, so that they can learn about the actions they have been advocating. In fact, in both countries there are organizations interested in participating not only in JAPER, but also in other international forums dedicated to the black population, the anti-racist struggle and the promotion of racial equality. A large number of Brazilian and North American organizations took part in the Second Session of the UN Permanent Forum on People of African Descent, held in New York from 30 May to 2 June 2023. Black movement organizations are considered to have a truly international

vocation, as they come to international forums with a lot to say and a lot to contribute.

The present: challenges and successes

After the resumption of JAPER in February 2023, it is already possible to take stock of the challenges and successes of this first year. Some of the challenges faced by JAPER are related to the government structures that lead it, not only in Brazil but also in the United States. Representatives of the Brazilian government agree that rebuilding a ministry and building public policies simultaneously has been a Herculean task, especially given the budget and staffing difficulties faced by the Ministry of Racial Equality. The United States, despite having a committed Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice, faces difficulties in implementing measures agreed at JAPER meetings, perhaps to a lack of a robust body of civil servants dedicated to the agenda, perhaps due to a lack of greater status of the position designated to lead the process. On another front, the challenge of incorporating projects and programs aimed at indigenous peoples, the Roma, and other ethnic minorities persists. When consulted, the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples (MPI) has begun to show interest in joining the Action Plan. It should be borne in mind that indigenous issues were not addressed in the first phase of JAPER. At the time, there was no independent body for indigenous policies, which were the responsibility of SEPPIR.

Despite the difficulties, there have been positive results after JAPER's resumption. One of them is the fact that both countries have managed to make progress in the working group meetings and are close to finalizing work plans for each pillar in the coming months. On the Brazilian side, the fact that there is a Ministry dedicated to the fight against racism and the defense of racial equality has led to better structured discussions. A Working Group has been set up, with eight civil servants from different areas of the MIR and four representatives of civil society (two of whom are members and two of whom are substitutes), to elaborate proposals for implementing the cooperation agreement signed between Brazil and

the United States of America, called the Joint US-Brazil Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality — JAPER. The competencies of this working group include:

I – to propose cross-cutting actions, policies and programs for the elimination of racial and ethnic discrimination, with a view to promoting racial equality, to be implemented by the competent bodies;

II – to attempt integration strategies through cooperation between the public policies on racial equality of the Brazilian State and the United States; and

III – to promote intersectoral dialog within the government and with civil society actors aimed at eradicating racist practices and promoting racial equality in Brazilian sport at all levels.

Brazil has shown a good capacity to respond to what is agreed with US partners, which can be attributed to at least three factors. Firstly, responsiveness is the result of close monitoring of the actions proposed by the various areas of the MIR involved in JAPER, which report directly to the Minister and have maintained constant dialogue with civil society and US partners. Another factor to be taken into account is the interested and cooperative dialog between the ministries participating in JAPER, which have presented concrete proposals to advance initiatives under the four pillars that structure the Action Plan. For example, at the meeting of the Culture WG, the Minister of Culture, Margareth Menezes, began discussing the initiative to establish an exchange program for Brazilian curators with the Smithsonian Institutes. Finally, an important part of JAPER's success is closely related to the engagement of a civil society that is enthusiastic about the Action Plan, has brought valuable contributions to the discussions and has provided input at all the meetings it has attended. This civil society has shown interest in collaborating with the government on other initiatives to combat racial discrimination at the international level, such as the United Nations Permanent Forum on People of African Descent.

Since the inauguration of President Joe Biden in 2021, the US has had more time to reflect on its racial-ethnic policies. The resumption of JAPER came in the wake of other initiatives to combat racism, such as the reactivation of the United States-Colombia Action Plan on Racial and Ethnic Equality (CAPREE), the signing with Mexico and Canada of the Declaration on North American Partnership for Racial Equality and Justice, as well as active engagement in multilateral mechanisms, such as the UN Permanent Forums for People of African Descent and Indigenous Peoples, and the International Mechanism of Independent Experts to Advance Racial Equality and Justice (EMLER).

In 2023, the DoS earmarked US\$ 500,000 for the development of actions under JAPER. The non-governmental organization Race & Equality was one of those selected to implement cooperation projects on racial equality with Brazil and Colombia. In Brazil, the NGO intends to train thirty JAPER Young Ambassadors in partnership with the Peregum Institute, the Makurayeta indigenous organization and the National Coordination for the Articulation of Quilombos (CONAQ). In addition to this project, Race & Equality, in partnership with the Open Society Foundations, organized on March 25, 2024, a working visit by a delegation made up of African-American congressmen Sydney Kamlager-Dove (D-IL) and Jonathan Jackson (D-IL) from the Black Caucus to Brazil. They were received by Minister Anielle Franco and Brazilian parliamentarians.

Conclusion

The promotion of racial equality and the fight against racism are priorities of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's government, supported by the 1988 Federal Constitution. Like the Durban Declaration and Action Plan, JAPER is one of Brazil's foreign policy priorities. Built on the historical similarities between Brazil and the United States, aware of the many common challenges in the racial agenda, JAPER is concrete proof of a positive human rights agenda between Brazil and the US, bringing together civil societies — particularly Afro-descendants — in

both countries, as emphasized by Ambassador Alexandre Ghisleni, one of the main negotiators of the Action Plan on the Brazilian side.

Announcing the resumption of JAPER, Ambassador Linda Thomas Greenfield emphasized that "our diversity is, in fact, our main strength. And because racism is a problem shared by all, we all benefit from its elimination." This is JAPER's main challenge, which is why this initiative is a central part of the celebration of the bicentenary of Brazil-United States diplomatic relations in 2024.

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Giovanni Harvey, Executive Director of the Baobá Fund for Racial Equity; Magali Naves, International Advisor to SEPPIR from 2003 to 2017;

Martvs Chagas, National Secretary for Combating Racism of the Workers' Party (PT);

Náthaly Calixto, Brazil Program Officer of the International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights.

Annex I. JAPER activities (2007 to 2013)

Background, technical meetings and plenary sessions


- Washington, October 25, 2007 Visit by SEPPIR Minister Matilde Ribeiro to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, with the participation of Brazil's Ambassador to Washington, Antonio Patriota, and to the OAS, Osmar Chohfi, and the DoS Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, Thomas Shannon;
- Brasilia, March 13, 2008 signing of JAPER;
- Brasilia, October 30, 2008 Technical meeting at the Embassy of the US;

- Brasilia, October 31, 2008 1st Steering Committee Meeting;
- Washington, April 2009 1st Plenary Meeting of the Steering Committee;
- Brasilia, September 8-9, 2009 Technical Meeting;
- Salvador, October 22-23, 2009 II Steering Committee Plenary Meeting;
- Washington, February 25-26, 2010 Meeting;
- Atlanta, May 20-21, 2010 III Steering Committee Plenary Meeting;
- Brasilia, December 6-7, 2010 Technical Meeting;
- Washington, December 8-9, 2011 IV Plenary Meeting;
- Brasilia, June 4, 2012 Interministerial meeting to evaluate JAPER;
- Brasilia, August 21-22, 2012 Technical Meeting;
- Washington, December 8-9, 2012 5th Plenary Meeting of the Steering Committee;
- Brasilia, July 18, 2013 VI Plenary Meeting of the Steering Committee;

Other events

- Brasilia, May 12-14, 2010 Seminar "Public Security and the Promotion of Racial Equality";
- Columbia Law School, October 27, 2010 Panel on Affirmative Action in Brazil and the USA — "Does Race Still Matter?" (https://aapfarchive.wordpress.com/tool_to_speak_out/public-education-events/does-race-still-matter/);
- Brasilia, September 1-2, 2011 Seminar "Sharing Experiences for the Promotion of Racial Equality in Brazil and the USA";
- Rio de Janeiro, October 4, 2011 International Seminar on the Promotion of Racial Equality in the Context of Major Events (https://brazilfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/annual_report_2012.pdf);

- Brasilia, August 21-22, 2012 Binational seminar "Public education policies in Brazil and the USA: analyzing ethnic-racial relations and equality";
- São Paulo, August 24, 2012 Meeting of the Brazil-United States Joint Action Plan for the Promotion of Racial and Ethnic Equality (JAPER). The event aims to discuss and reflect on the inclusion of Afro-Brazilian entrepreneurship and the inclusion of black artistic productions in the business and cultural sectors (https://www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/subprefeituras/noticias/?p=44609);
- Brasilia, February 3, 2014 Binational Seminar on the Health of the Black Population, at the II EXPOGEP — National Exhibition of Experiences in Strategic and Participatory Management of the SUS (https://agenciapatriciagalvao.org.br/mulheres-de-olho/diversas/05022014-seppir-discute-parcerias-entre-brasil-e-eua-na-eliminacao-do-racismo/).



Brazil and the United States: A Renewed and Promising Partnership

Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti¹

As we celebrate the bicentennial of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States, it is important to assess, as done in other chapters of this book, how this relationship has evolved over time. Looking to the past helps us understand how this bilateral relationship — marked by periods of relatively close ties — has reached its current stage. It seems to me equally important to point to the prospects and possibilities that lie ahead for the relationship between Brasilia and Washington in the coming years.

This is a promising moment for Brazil-U.S. relations. In Washington, relations with Brazil are increasingly seen in their own specific light, rather than merely an element in the broader spectrum of U.S. relations with Latin America. Brazil is increasingly recognized for the weight of its own influence and as an important player in the search for solutions to issues on both the regional and global agendas — from combating climate change and promoting sustainability, social inclusion, the energy transition, and food security, to reforming global governance and addressing matters related to international peace and security.

The resumption of a proactive and universalist diplomacy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil's participation as a member of the United Nations Security Council in 2022 and 2023, its presidency of the G20 in 2024, and its hosting of the Conference of the Parties to the

¹ Ambassador of Brazil to the United States since June 2023. Previously, Ambassador Viotti was Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (2017-2021), Under-Secretary-General for Asia and the Pacific at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016), Ambassador of Brazil to Germany (2013-2016), and Permanent Representative to the UN (2007-2013). In the last position, she led the Brazilian Delegation to the UN Security Council (2010-2011) and presided over the Council in February 2011. In addition to multilateral affairs, Ambassador Viotti worked in Brasilia and abroad in areas such as political affairs, human rights, trade promotion, and regional cooperation. She served as Counselor at the Embassy of Brazil in La Paz (1993-1996). Ambassador Viotti holds a degree in Economics.

United Nations Convention on Climate Change (COP-30) in Belém in 2025, among other factors, all point to the perception that Brazil is an increasingly relevant player, creating new opportunities for coordination with the United States.

President Lula's visit to Washington on February 10, 2023, just forty days after his inauguration, relaunched the bilateral relationship on a new footing and demonstrated the importance Brazil attaches to its relationship with the United States. U.S. interest in fostering closer relations with Brazil had already been expressed when National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with the then president-elect in November 2022, conveying President Biden's invitation for a presidential visit to Washington.

The meeting between the presidents at the White House not only confirmed the convergent visions of the two leaders. It also allowed for expanded discussions, including between important ministerial delegations from both sides that reflected a mutual interest at the highest level in deepening cooperation in several areas. At the end of the meeting, the two presidents issued a joint statement (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2023a) that is both an important political milestone and roadmap for bilateral relations.

Presidents Lula and Biden reaffirmed the "vital and enduring nature" of the bilateral relationship, with an emphasis on strengthening democracy, promoting, and respecting human rights, and combating climate change. Beyond these key issues, they identified other areas in which their countries can work together, including combating hunger and poverty while ensuring global food security; promoting trade; strengthening international peace and security; and intensifying bilateral cooperation in the economic-commercial, energy, health, scientific, technological, defense, educational, cultural, and consular areas. The two leaders also addressed a wide range of global and regional issues. They discussed the need for a reform of the United Nations Security Council in order to make it more representative and effective, while underscoring the United States' support for a permanent seat for Latin America on an expanded

Council. In short, there emerged from the meeting a comprehensive agenda reflecting a renewed and promising partnership.

The most recent meeting between the two Presidents on September 20, 2023, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, reinforced the political momentum of bilateral relations begun in February.

In New York, the two Presidents delved further into the issues they had previously discussed. They also launched the innovative Partnership for Workers' Rights, reflecting their concern with the promotion of decent jobs, the increasing precariousness of working conditions and inequality, especially in the face of challenges posed by new technologies in the labor market.

The two meetings highlighted the potential for an enhanced partnership between Brazil and the United States based on affinities with regard to public policy, including an emphasis on sustainability, social inclusion, and reindustrialization; an improved economic environment in both countries; and the importance attached to issues involving work and employment.

This convergence of views is reflected in the interest in deepening cooperation between the two countries at various levels, including promoting democracy, protecting human rights, combating climate change, and exploring opportunities presented by the energy transition, investment in activities linked to the green economy, and efforts to strengthen regional supply chains.

A necessary partnership in a changing world

Relations between Brazil and the United States are, naturally, not immune to major developments on the international stage. The rapprochement between the two countries is taking place amid — and is influenced by — a turbulent external environment. The negative social and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are still being felt throughout the world, especially in developing countries. The climate crisis and its impacts require that the international community find urgent solutions.

Furthermore, geopolitical competition appears to be intensifying, with rising political tensions and impacts on the global economy, such as disruptions in international supply chains. The outbreak of conflicts in various parts of the world, such as in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and tensions in Asia, with consequences that go beyond their immediate regional scope, pose a particularly complex additional challenge. The use of force or its threat are factors contributing to increased instability at the international level.

At the same time, international relations increasingly reflect a multipolar world. This is expanding the space for developing countries in the so-called Global South to play a more important role in setting the global agenda. Large emerging economies, such as Brazil, have more influence in finding lasting solutions to major problems affecting the international community. Diplomacy is needed more than ever.

The strengthening of a broad and balanced partnership between Brazil and the United States must, in this context, take into account their respective worldviews, towards a comprehensive dialogue and relationship that, in the words of Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, will develop "on an equal footing, based on common values and interests, without any kind of prejudice in terms of issues and topics, and free from automatic alignments. [...] We will deal with any differences in a mature manner, as is natural in a relationship of this importance and density" (Vieira, 2023). Therefore, the goal is to seek an ever-greater scope for understanding and to make the most of opportunities for cooperation.

Brazil's relationship with the United States reflects — as it should — the particular nature of Brazil's historical evolution and national reality, but also the characteristics of its international presence. The Brazilian government's commitment to constructive engagement and dialogue, as well as to the pursuit of development and peace, is based on a diplomatic legacy of promoting international law, multilateralism and negotiated solutions based on respect for the principles of equality between states, sovereignty, self-determination, and non-intervention — as enshrined in the Brazilian Federal Constitution and the United Nations Charter.

Brazil's vocation for peace and for a sustainable, inclusive development is evident, above all else, in its own regional environment. The Brasilia Consensus, adopted at the Meeting of South American Presidents on May 30, 2023, reflects Brazil's vision of South America as a region of peace and cooperation. MERCOSUR is an essential vector for economic integration. The Amazon Summit in August 2023 reinforced the commitment to sustainability and forest preservation. The quest for regional integration in Latin America, a constitutional precept, is advancing thanks to the strengthening of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Brazil remains committed to maintaining the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation.

Similarly, Brazil has strengthened its ties with partners in other regions, and its presence in blocs of varying dimensions, such as the BRICS and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, among others, always as a voice for peace, cooperation, and sustainable and inclusive development. These characteristics add weight to Brazil's influence on the international stage. They also lend additional relevance to the bilateral dialogue with the United States.

In addition to the common values and interests of both countries, which frame their bilateral relationship, there is the recent challenges to democracy they faced that have brought them closer together and confirmed the strength of their institutions and their peoples' natural propensity for openness and plurality.

In addition to the concrete benefits for both Brazilians and Americans of a strengthened bilateral agenda of dialogue and cooperation, a closer relationship between Brazil and the United States could also have a positive impact regionally and globally, contributing to the promotion of democracy, multilateralism, international law, development, peace, and stability.

² Article 4, Sole Paragraph, of the Brazilian Federal Constitution: "The Federative Republic of Brazil will seek the economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America, aiming at the formation of a Latin American community of nations." Brasil, 1988.

Strengthening the bilateral political dialogue

A fluid political dialogue is an essential condition for a sustained strengthening of an agenda of cooperation between Brazil and the United States.

In addition to two presidential meetings, the year 2023 was marked by an intense agenda of high-level visits and contacts. On the diplomatic front, there were frequent exchanges between Minister Mauro Vieira and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The White House National Security Council and the Special Advisor to the President of the Republic of Brazil maintained a fluid dialogue throughout the year. It is worth noting that political consultations were also resumed at the Deputy Foreign Minister level, when Ambassador Maria Laura da Rocha visited Washington in May.

An intensive exchange of visits at the ministerial level reinforced the renewal of relations at the political level and gave new momentum to the sectoral dialogue between the two governments. The U.S. Secretary of the Interior, President Biden's Special Envoy for Climate, the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the Director of NASA, and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce were among the senior U.S. officials who visited Brazil in 2023. On the Brazilian side, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Racial Equality, Agriculture, Health, Social Security, Mines and Energy, and Management and Innovation in Public Services, as well as other Brazilian senior government officials, came to Washington in different contexts throughout the year.

The revitalization and strengthening of bilateral working groups and dialogues, based on guidelines established at the presidential or ministerial levels, have played an important role in reestablishing "state-to-state" relations based on a set of shared interests and a long-term perspective. These bodies give strength and stability to the relationship between the two countries, regardless of the political orientation of the government in power in either country.

Last year, the two governments engaged in an enhanced dialogue through meetings held within established cooperation mechanisms in areas such as agriculture and the environment, human rights, disarmament and non-proliferation, rare minerals, consular issues, clean energy, trade, and political and military affairs. A meeting of the Brazil-United States CEO Forum³ was convened, bringing together government and the private sector around a strengthened agenda for economic, trade, and investment cooperation. In this bicentennial year, these and other mechanisms addressing topics such as science and technology — including space cooperation and advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing — or the defense industry — in order to ensure greater access to the U.S. market for Brazil's defense products — are expected to convene, in an effort to deepen the bilateral cooperative relationship. In this context, the possibility of reviving a broader mechanism coordinated by the respective Foreign Affairs bureaucracies and aimed at strategically structuring the bilateral relationship could be explored.

Bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States are strong also at the congressional and subnational levels. Congressional and federative diplomacy are essential for strengthening relations with key players in the United States and promoting Brazilian interests in the country. Over the past year, ten senators (including the President of the Federal Senate), fourteen federal congressional representatives, thirteen state representatives, twelve state governors, three lieutenant governors, and four mayors visited the U.S. capital.

In 2023, a Brazil-United States Parliamentary Group was set up in the Brazilian Senate, and, in the Brazilian lower house, the Brazil-United States Congressional Group and the Brazil-United States Parliamentary Front were established. In Washington, the Brazil Caucus was formally reinstated in the U.S. Congress last year.

Beyond the bilateral sphere, the relationship between Brazil and the United States has benefited from increased consultations and, whenever possible, coordination on the multilateral level, especially at the United

^{3 12}th Plenary Meeting of the Brazil-United States Forum of Senior Executives (CEO Forum), Dec. 12, 2023. The Brazilian Government Progress Report can be accessed at: https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/documentos/forum-ceos-2023/ptg-relatorio-de-progresso-2023-ceo_forum.pdf. Recommendations presented by the senior executives at the meeting are available at: <a href="https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/documentos/forum-ceos-2023/2023-us-brazil-ceo-forum-recomendacoes.pdf>. Last access on: 22 Mar. 2024.

Nations, for example in the Security Council, the Human Rights Council, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. At the hemispheric level, the two countries enhanced dialogue and consultation within the Organization of American States. The G20 and the G7 — in whose summit Brazil was invited to participate — provided favorable environments for deepening the bilateral political dialogue at a high level. Other initiatives of variable geometry and with specific objectives, such as the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation, offered additional opportunities for interaction between the two countries.

All these developments have helped steer bilateral relations towards actions geared to concrete results. In this context, it has become clear that closer perceptions regarding democracy and human rights, as well as the role of the state in promoting development, represent another step toward convergence, opening new and promising opportunities for bilateral cooperation in the short and medium term.

Shared values: democracy and human rights

With diverse, multi-ethnic, and vibrant societies, whose similar backgrounds allow them to identify with each other and see each other in a positive light, Brazil and the United States face common challenges in strengthening democracy and promoting human rights, social inclusion, and racial equity. The attack on the U.S. Capitol in Washington, on January 6, 2021, and the anti-democratic acts that culminated in the assault on the seats of the Three Branches of Government in Brasilia, on January 8, 2023, have strengthened the perception on the part of the governments and societies of both countries of the urgent need to intensify the bilateral dialogue on issues related to the defense of democracy.

In their meetings in Washington and New York, Presidents Lula and Biden made clear that defending democracy is a central pillar of the bilateral relationship and stressed the need to signal to the world the importance of strengthening democratic institutions. In this context, a more robust bilateral dialogue on issues related to the defense of democracy must include efforts to combat extremism, political violence, and misinformation in the digital environment and involve the executive,

legislative and judicial branches of government and civil societies of both countries.

As essential elements of a healthy society, the promotion and protection of human rights and the creation of opportunities and spaces for participation for vulnerable and marginalized groups serve as crucial foundations for strengthening democracy and democratic institutions. The Brazil-United States Working Group on Global Human Rights, one of the first bilateral mechanisms to meet again in 2023, has provided an ideal environment for sharing views and coordinating actions on issues of human rights in multilateral forums and for advancing bilateral cooperation, with full respect for international law.

In line with guidance from both presidents to revive the Brazil-United States Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality (JAPER), the mechanism met again last year for the first time in a decade to discuss the promotion of equal opportunities and to identify specific areas and forms of cooperation with participation of marginalized ethnic and racial communities and civil society. Increasing access to education, ensuring greater access to healthcare, combating violence, promoting justice, valuing culture, and preserving memory were identified as priority areas for cooperation (Ministério da Igualdade Racial, 2023).

Work in these bilateral mechanisms and initiatives will continue in 2024 to encourage additional joint efforts to promote human rights in areas such as gender and racial equality; protection of the rights of LGBTQIA+ people, indigenous communities, and people of African descent; and workers' rights. This is an especially important element to be celebrated in the context of the bicentennial of relations between Brazil and the United States.

The Partnership for Workers' Rights, launched by Presidents Lula and Biden with the support of the International Labor Organization, offers an innovative platform for bilateral cooperation on a current and highly relevant issue for the strengthening of democracy and the promotion of human rights. The initiative seeks to protect workers' rights; promote their empowerment; end workplace exploitation, including

forced and child labor; promote safe, healthy, and decent jobs; promote worker-centered approaches to the energy and digital transition; ensure the use of technology for the common good; and combat discrimination in the workplace (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2023b). This forms an important agenda for building a strong partnership between Brazil and the United States, to be developed with the involvement of trade unions and labor organizations, and which points to the fundamental relevance for the bilateral relationship of the economic and trade element geared to sustainable and inclusive development.

Convergence of public policies and investments: sustainability, the energy transition and strengthening supply chains

Economic relations between Brazil and the United States are noteworthy for their intensity, dimension, and scope. The United States is Brazil's most important trading partner in services, and second in goods, after China. Our bilateral trade is dynamic, of high quality, and diversified, with Brazil exporting a significant share of manufactured products and products of medium to high technological scale. The United States is also the main source of foreign direct investment in Brazil, with an estimated stock of US\$ 191.6 billion, and is an increasingly important destination for Brazilian investments, already at US\$ 30.59 billion, generating wealth and jobs. The progress of Brazil's reform agenda (with recent legislative approval of a new fiscal framework and tax reform) makes the country even more attractive to foreign direct investment, expanding opportunities for bilateral economic cooperation.

Against the broader backdrop of economic and trade interests, the prospects for increased cooperation in areas such as sustainability, the energy transition, and investment in the green economy — in which Brazil and the United States have extraordinary potential — are particularly encouraging. A convergence of interests can also be found in strengthening regional supply chains in areas such as semiconductors, healthcare, and rare minerals.

⁴ By Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO), in 2021. Banco Central do Brasil, 2023.

⁵ By Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO), in 2022. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2020-2022.

There is a recognition, on the part of both the Brazilian and U.S. governments, of the magnitude of the challenges associated with climate change, as reflected in the importance attributed to advances in crosscutting policies at the domestic level and greater ambition regarding efforts towards collective international action. Parallel public policy advances in Brazil and the United States also contribute to greater convergence and opportunities for trade and investment related to the sustainability agenda. This positive dynamic is evident, for example, in the U.S. government's announcement that it will work with Congress to contribute US\$ 500 million to the Amazon Fund over the next five years.

In Brazil, a significant reduction in deforestation must be highlighted, along with efforts to internalize sustainability objectives in national policies, such as the Ecological Transition Program, the Growth Acceleration Program, and efforts to establish or improve regulation of various renewable energy sources. In the United States, there is an unprecedented government effort towards energy transition based on a model of government subsidies for activities with high social return, as reflected in the bipartisan infrastructure plan, and the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. The joint statement issued by the two countries on the sidelines of COP-28 in Dubai, in support of Brazil's Ecological Transition Plan (Ministério da Fazenda, 2023), reflects these common features of their domestic agendas.

Bilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms have also adapted to developments in the sustainability agenda, as reflected in the decision to reactivate the High-Level Working Group on Climate Change, the recent meeting of the Working Group on Climate Change within the Consultative Committee on Agriculture, and the reorientation of the Brazil-United States Energy Forum towards initiatives focused on renewable energies. The establishment of the Trade and Sustainable Development Working Group under the Commercial Dialogue and the interest in issues related to sustainability by the Brazil-United States CEO Forum further point to a strong interest on both sides in identifying trade and investment opportunities and promoting scientific and regulatory cooperation.

⁶ Announced by the United States' Government, Apr. 20, 2023. Ministério do Meio Ambiente e Mudança do Clima, 2023.

A similar trend can be seen in the private sector's priorities for bilateral relations, with sustainability figuring prominently on the agenda of recent business missions on both sides. This dynamic has been particularly evident in settings such as the Clean Energy Industry Dialogue (under the Brazil-United States Energy Forum), with the recent participation of government and private sector representatives in the launching of the Carbon and Methane Management Action Committee. It also raises the prospect of similar advances in promising sectors such as clean hydrogen, offshore wind energy, and sustainable aviation fuels, in which Brazil (which has the cleanest energy mix among G20 countries) and the United States stand out as potential major producers.

The potential of both Brazil and the United States to spearhead energy transition on some of its most promising fronts prompted President Lula to write to President Biden in January, proposing a New Partnership on Energy Transition.

Brazil and the United States are the world's two largest producers of biofuels, and both countries have considerable potential to produce low-carbon hydrogen. In addition, both countries have complementary features, allowing them to provide the necessary components for the production chains of photovoltaic panels, wind turbines, and batteries for multiple purposes. An opportunity thus arises for strategic bilateral cooperation through a balanced partnership, supported politically at the highest level, in a sector where both countries enjoy a comparative advantage, aiming at producing shared benefits through worker training; creating "green" jobs; generating economies of scale; boosting technological development; promoting production chain integration; improving competitiveness and the business environment; and attracting investment.

Beyond its bilateral dimension, the New Partnership also seeks to help define, at the international level, the contours of a new global low-carbon economy, including through the current process of international rules and standards setting.

The proposal received a favorable response from the White House and ongoing technical-level work aims to launch New Partnership in the coming months.

The implementation of U.S. government programs in energy transition and semiconductors, coupled with the goal of diversifying supply chains in a context of change in the international environment, opens interesting opportunities for attracting U.S. investment to Brazil — including in advanced sectors — while seeking to achieve greater complementarity between the economies of the two countries. In line with the presidents' joint statement, government-to-government dialogue on this issue has sought to support private sector efforts in areas such as semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and renewable energies, and could facilitate progress in trade in steel products and critical mineral processing. In Brazil, the implementation of the Plan to Support the Development of the Semiconductor Industry and advances in the regulatory framework for renewable energies create a favorable environment for bilateral dialogue.

The United States occupies a central position in the semiconductor sector, in the areas of research, development, design, and international investment flows. The implementation of investment projects in the United States in the context of the CHIPS Act is expected to increase its production of end products, affecting the sector's supply chain. This could create external opportunities in encapsulation and testing, with the potential for advances in other areas. Brazil, which already has a solid foundation of U.S. investments and access to raw materials (as well as installed production capacity and the availability of skilled labor), is well positioned in this area. Bilateral cooperation could also benefit from advances in public and regulatory policies in Brazil and from cooperation between governments and the private sector in both countries.

There is also interest in intensifying cooperation between Brazil and the United States in healthcare supply chains. As part of efforts to strengthen global health and make it more resilient after the pandemic, the United States has been promoting the Economic Health Dialogue of the Americas, which was launched at the IX Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, in June 2022. In addition to supporting stronger supply chains, the initiative, which is supported by the Pan American Health Organization and the Inter-American Development Bank, could also include smart spending in healthcare, transformation of the sector, and income protection during pandemics.

Possibilities for greater complementarity between Brazil and the United States in areas such as the production of inputs, vaccines, medical equipment, and medicines will benefit from Brazil's existing installed capacity and the launching of its National Strategy for the Development of the Health Economic-Industrial Complex in September 2023. With planned investments of R\$ 42 billion, the program seeks to expand domestic production of priority items for the Brazilian Unified Health System (SUS) and to reduce Brazil's dependence on imported inputs, medicines, vaccines, and medical equipment, in order to achieve an average 70% local production. The size of its consumer market contributes to the potential expansion of the health sector in Brazil's economy. Additional opportunities for cooperation in the health sector are on the agenda of the Bilateral Health Dialogue between the Brazilian Ministry of Health and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which was reinstituted in 2023 after four years of inactivity.

The rare minerals sector represents another significant opportunity for bilateral cooperation, in light of its importance to the energy transition agenda, of Brazil's significant share of global reserves and production, and of the industry's supply chain challenges. The United States has indicated that it is open to cooperating with Brazil, pointing to initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership (which also includes Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and India) and to Brazil's goal of increased added value and sustainability in the sector. The Brazil-United States Working Group on Critical Minerals has been discussing continued cooperation in areas such as geological research, market studies, production chain added value, investment promotion, regulation, and opportunities for the production and transformation of minerals in Brazil

A solid foundation for robust cooperation on sustainability, energy transition and supply chains having been established in 2023, the aim should now be to move as quickly as possible from identifying op-

⁷ The National Strategy for the Development of the Health Economic-Industrial Complex was established by President Lula through Decree No. 11.715, Sept. 26, 2023. More information is available at: https://documento-de-r-42-bilhoes-ate-2026. Last access on: 22 Mar. 2024.

portunities in strategic sectors or specific niches to implementing projects through coordinated efforts between the governments and private sectors of both countries. Similarly, potential barriers that may hinder bilateral investment and trade should be identified, and government actions should be promoted to remove them or to improve the regulatory environment. The recent decision by the U.S. Government to eliminate anti-dumping measures against Brazilian steel exports is, therefore, a step in the right direction.

The bicentennial of Brazil-United States relations: a milestone in a renewed and promising partnership

Brazil and the United States have a history of close and productive relations. Nonetheless, the current moment offers favorable prospects for a qualitative strengthening of their relationship, thanks to the political momentum generated from the highest level signaling an interest in expanding the bilateral relationship even further to confront the challenges posed by a changing world. The two governments should leverage their convergence in values and interests with respect to defending democracy, protecting human rights, and promoting sustainable and inclusive development, and avail themselves of the unique milestone represented by the celebration of two hundred years of Brazil-United States relations, in order to build a stronger relationship, with tangible, long term results for both societies.

Both nations are faced with the task of developing a robust, balanced and results-oriented agenda. This will require mobilizing a wide range of stakeholders, including government officials, congressional leaders, the private sector, civil society, think tanks, academia, the scientific community, and the media. Consistently positive expressions of interest at all levels in deepening exchanges and dialogue with Brazil give rise to a justified optimism about the future of the bilateral relationship. In an increasingly complex international environment, Brazil and the United States have before them the opportunity of deepening their partnership, with a positive impact for their peoples, the region, and the world.

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Bilateral Relations between Brazil and the USA: What Kind of Cooperation? Could we Have an Industrial Policy to Promote the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy?

Neusa Maria Pereira Bojikian¹

On the threshold of his new term in office, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) was received at the White House by President Joseph (Joe) Biden. The meeting took place in February 2023 and was marked by commitments to cooperate in solving the serious problems of climate change. Given that the two governments share similar environmental challenges and favorable structural conditions, the commitment seemed natural.

Months before the meeting, President Biden had secured the approval of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which covers climate solutions and clean energy, with the aim, among other things, of accelerating investments in national productive capacity, encouraging domestic purchases or purchases from commercial partners of critical products and services, boosting Research and Development (R&D) and the commercialization of advanced technologies. The IRA and the Infrastructure Investment & Jobs Act (IIJA) provide a robust institutional framework for the public policies needed to develop a set of technologies to produce clean energy,

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tackle the climate crisis and improve energy security. Capable of storing and supplying large amounts of energy without emitting carbon dioxide (CO_2) during combustion, hydrogen has stood out as one of the resources facilitating decarbonization.

Brazil has the potential to become an important supplier of clean hydrogen due to its conditions for generating electricity from wind, solar and hydroelectric sources. But it needs appropriate incentive measures. Brazil's current hydrogen production is concentrated in the oil (refining and industry) and fertilizer (ammonia) sectors, which contribute to high ${\rm CO}_2$ emissions. In order to move towards the energy transition, Brazil needs robust cooperation to initially make investments in hydrogen production, using emission reduction technologies applicable to the energy system as a whole and moving forward with innovative and clean projects.

This chapter analyzes the extent to which Brazil could count on US cooperation to implement an industrial policy aimed at promoting the transition to a low-carbon economy. The next two sections of this chapter present the respective Brazilian and US initiatives on the energy transition and, in the following section, outline an interpretative argument based on the idea that more significant cooperation on the part of the US, which is fundamentally important for Brazil, tends to be difficult to achieve in practice.

The movement towards the energy transition and US industrial policy

The movement towards the energy transition aims to decarbonize the planet and avoid environmental collapse. The leading countries in this movement are guided by the idea that the next phase of the energy transition will focus on using green hydrogen (GH2) as the basis of the economy. This is actually an energy vector, which means that hydrogen can be used to store and transfer energy that is non-toxic to the environment and can be distributed across oceans and great distances (Zimbres, 2023).

Note the uniqueness of typifying this chemical element, which is odorless and invisible to our eyes, based on colors. In the 1970s, after the first major oil crisis, hydrogen proved to be an alternative, mainly as a source of energy for production (Indústria Brasileira de Gases, n.d.).

The most common form of hydrogen today is the so-called gray hydrogen. Its denomination is not casual, as it is produced from natural gas in a highly polluting process: ten kilograms of ${\rm CO_2}$ per kilogram of hydrogen (Gurlit, 2021). Almost all the hydrogen produced in the USA (95%) is gray, used mainly in the processing industry, such as oil and metal refining, as well as the production of chemicals, fertilizers and, rarely, as automotive fuel (Leber, 2023).

Another type is green hydrogen, produced through the electrolysis of water. However, its production consumes a large amount of energy, coming from renewable sources such as solar, wind — which are intermittent or dependent on weather conditions — and nuclear. This is an important aspect that shows the sense of urgency in developing new technologies and the complexity involved in political and economic solutions.

Climate issues featured prominently in the last — historic — US presidential election, won by Democrat Joe Biden. His promise to lead a "clean energy revolution" in order to revitalize the US energy sector, boost the growth of the entire economy and transform the country into a clean energy superpower was at the heart of his electoral platform. His proposal contrasted with that of Donald Trump, who was running for re-election with a policy based fundamentally on fossil fuels to guarantee US energy dominance on the world stage. Trump had abruptly ended the US commitment to the Paris Agreement — around which countries and multinational companies base their energy transition strategies. Industrial and environmental deregulation were Trump's hallmarks (Fawthrop, 2020).

Biden pledged to invest US\$ 400 billion in clean energy and innovation, aiming for "technological breakthroughs" to create new jobs and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. On his first day in office, the Democrat began changing environmental policies, revising and strengthening the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and issuing executive orders to revise or undo his predecessor's policies.

After tough political disputes, he passed robust laws to support his projects and put in place a typical industrial policy. I'm referring in particular to the IRA, passed after the IIJA, which already aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions with major investments in public transport, road and bridge repairs and investments in new clean energy technologies such as carbon capture and electric vehicle charging stations.

The IRA foresees historic climate investment from the US federal government, including around US\$ 390 billion to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. With this, the creation of an entire ecosystem capable of generating a new energy product, overcoming major technical problems surrounding its production, distribution and storage, becomes feasible. The laws institutionalize the state's more active and intentional role in creating new industries.

Industrial policy in the US has long been practiced, but in a relatively veiled way, so as not to confront liberal orthodoxy and its worship of the market as opposed to the state as an inducer of economic development (Block, 2008; Block and Keller, 2016). However, in the context of competition with China and its economic model, a more vigorous industrial policy has seemed essential to guarantee the future vitality of the USA. This means that state action on various fronts, such as promoting R&D, subsidizing production, government purchases, especially of experimental products, and financing, is no longer seen as anathema.

The set of bills signed into law by the Biden administration by September 2022, including the CHIPS and Science Act (2022), could represent almost US\$ 100 billion in annual industrial policy spending over the next five years. That would nearly double the spending that can be categorized as industrial policy. "This could grow to about 0.7% of America's GDP, catapulting it past France, Germany and Japan, keen practitioners of industrial policy" (The Economist, 2022).

It should be noted that the above estimates do not include the aerospace and defense industries, the very industries that help hide many of the US industrial policy practices. The disapproval of state involvement in business as counterproductive does not include the formidable US production in the name of defense. In 2020, US\$ 778 billion was spent on

defense. Such spending often exceeds the cumulative defense spending of countries like China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the United Kingdom, India, France, Japan, Germany and South Korea (Mordor Intelligence, 2023). Not to mention the increase with the current political tensions with China, the war in Ukraine and Israel's war in Gaza.

Incidentally, the defense industry is increasingly interested in GH2-powered platforms, which are considered ideal for use in remote or austere environments. This is not the place to list all the initiatives. One example will suffice. In March 2023, the Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL), part of the US Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), announced that it would be testing a new technology to support energy resilience. As part of a cooperation agreement, Nel Hydrogen was contracted to build electrolyzers to produce GH2 for use as fuel in emergency situations. According to Nick Josefik, industrial engineer at CERL, "this electrolyzer project provides an exciting and unique opportunity to advance the research in efficient and low-cost hydrogen production which could improve the Nation's competitiveness in the global energy market" (Skaggs, 2023). Josefik touches a central point: the expectation of widespread application of technological innovation developed with a public budget.

Beyond the borders of defense and in a context of flexibilization of industrial policy, the support of recent US laws is becoming more clear. In the form of a tiered tax credit system, the IRA provides US\$ 3 per kilogram for the production of GH2 over ten years, and smaller credits (US\$ 0.60 per kilogram) for the use of fossil fuels to produce hydrogen (The White House, 2023c). The cost of ten years of GH2 production subsidies provided by the IRA is expected to be US\$ 13.2 billion (Congressional Budget Office, 2022). The government estimates that the tax credits will generate revenues of US\$ 140 billion and 700,000 jobs by 2030 and will help the country produce 50 million metric tons of GH2 by 2050 (Hussein and McDermott, 2023).

In October 2023, another Biden administration initiative was announced in support of a nascent industry in the energy sector: the creation of a set of GH2 centers across the country, envisaging the centers

as clusters of pipelines and facilities over hundreds of kilometers. The Department of Energy (DOE) has pledged to spend US\$ 7 billion on the construction of these centers.

Federal funding is expected to be the initiator that will attract private projects worth around US\$ 40 billion. And the significant government subsidies established in the IRA and IIJA are intended to encourage the private sector to boost both GH2 production and consumption. Craig Segall, of the environmental policy group Evergreen, in an interview with Rebecca Leber of Vox, helps to size up the efforts behind the emergence of such an industry: "It's as if we were at the beginning of coal or gas" (Leber, 2023). In this case, the role of the state will be to induce not only the production and consumption of the new energy product, but also innovation and sustainability.

Brazil on the road to energy transition

Brazil really does have a great chance of becoming a global clean energy powerhouse. It ranks 7th in the global list of energy generators, with a current installed capacity of 175 GW (2021), and 3rd in renewable energy, behind the USA and China. Brazil leads the way with 85% of its energy coming from renewable sources, 63% of which coming from hydroelectric plants. With an integrated, low-carbon electricity grid, the country also has potential in the production of wind and solar energy, biomass and GH2. Its long coastline and suitable climate are attributes that favor the installation of offshore wind and solar farms, which can generate electricity from the electrolysis of seawater. In other words, Brazil has water resources, both saltwater and freshwater, which can be used in the GH2 generation process. The Levelized Cost of GH2 produced in Brazil would be around US\$ 1.50/kg in 2030, a figure that allows the country to compete with other players, mainly the USA, Australia, Spain and Saudi Arabia. By 2040, this cost could fall to approximately US\$ 1.25/ kg (Gurlit, 2021).

It is estimated that production could result in up to US\$ 20 billion in revenues by 2040. More than half of these revenues are expected to come from domestic supply, particularly in the road transportation

sector, steel production and other energy-intensive industries. And up to US\$ 6 billion could come from exports of GH2 derivatives, thanks to Brazil's geographical attributes. Part of its production could be exported to Europe and the east coast of North America. However, such a scenario requires significant investments: around US\$ 200 billion in the GH2 sector, including 180 GW in additional renewable energy production (more than the country's current installed capacity). Another highlight is that investments to produce GH2 in the country could take advantage of the existing electricity grid, as the energy used in processing corresponds to 70% of the cost of GH2 (Gurlit, 2021).

As already noted, while GH2 tends to be the desirable solution at the moment, this does not mean that it can be produced easily and that it will be able to overtake gray hydrogen in the short term. The price barrier hinders commercial expansion and requires a solution. The energy transition involves restructuring the entire production chain, from generation to distribution and consumption.

President Lula took office with promises to tackle the imperatives of the energy transition and make Brazil a powerhouse in GH2 production. There is a genuine intention in his speeches that the transition should be more than investing in a new energy vector. It is intended to be essentially a vector for development, reduction of inequalities and environmental sensitivity.

When elected, he encountered an energy sector that was different from that of the 2000s. Among other changes, there is a reduced state presence in the electricity sector with the privatization of Eletrobras and the restrained performance of Petrobras. The state-owned company has disposed of assets in fertilizers, biofuels and renewable energies in the last five years and presented a lean investment program (Ramalho, 2023a).

This situation increased his awareness of the importance of maintaining dialogues with Brazilian economic agents, dialogues that he felt could be well handled by his Vice President Geraldo Alckmin. In fact, a new articulation of the National Council for Industrial Development (CNDI), linked to the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services (MDIC) and chaired by Vice President Alckmin, gained prominence

as of July 2023. Disbanded since 2015, the CNDI is once again meeting regularly to define the industrial policy to be implemented in the coming years around at least six major axes (CNDI, 2023).²

At the same time, the government began work on the so-called New Growth Acceleration Program (Novo PAC) — a strategic infrastructure investment program designed in collaboration with the ministries and the state governments — which was published in August 2023. With planned investments of R\$ 540 billion, the energy transition appears as a prominent axis in the Novo PAC, as well as in the CNDI. The figure above is global, covering energy transition, transportation, social infrastructure, digital inclusion and connectivity, basic sanitation and urban infrastructure. The part earmarked for investments in low-carbon fuels for the energy transition and the reduction on climate change impacts is a fraction. The program estimates R\$ 26.1 billion for the sector, with most of the investments concentrated between 2023 and 2026 (R\$ 20.2 billion); after 2026, there will be R\$ 5.9 billion (Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2023).

The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Environment are also involved in the CNDI's discussions on decarbonizing the economy. Together they have laid the foundations for the Ecological Transformation Plan, with the aim of directing public investment towards economic activities with a positive environmental impact, as well as creating a regulated carbon market capable of rewarding companies with low greenhouse gas emissions (Marques, 2023).

The proposal, as suggested by President Lula, is to articulate public and private investments and financing from official banks in a convergent way. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) would be a re-industrializing and "green bank." Aloizio Mercadante, president of the BNDES, said it would be a new pattern of industrialization: "[...] digital and decarbonized, based on circularity and intensive in knowledge. This will require innovation and major investment in applied research" (Ramalho, 2023b).

² The CNDI meets with: representatives from twenty ministries; around twenty councillors from civil society and the productive sector; and other entities linked to the government and invited entities.

Mercadante pointed to the US, as well as Europe, as references for industrial policies to promote the low-carbon economy. "These economies are making industrial policy, rethinking the state/market relationship, seeking new regulatory standards, especially post-pandemic fiscal regularity frameworks, and Brazil needs to look at these experiences" (Machado, 2023). The references are not random. They seek a kind of shield against predictable criticism from liberal economic and political agents in Brazil aligned with foreigners against industrial policy initiatives.

With R\$ 8.6 billion in investments projected for 2023 in renewable energies, Mercadante again seeks to justify his plans, highlighting the problematic cost of capital in Brazil, which could cancel out the Brazilian assets incorporated into the energy matrix and the renewable generation potential that make GH2 viable. He uses the example of Germany, whose government is financing GH2 projects at "zero interest."

The environmental and climate change objectives declared by the Lula government would be unquestionable to justify industrial policies. Using the industrial policy practices of the US government — the center of "exaggerated" confidence in the market's ability to solve economic and social problems (Block, 2008) — as a benchmark is also a good criterion. However, the conditions for practicing an industrial policy in Brazil today can be contested. This is because cooperation on the part of the US, although fundamental, is considerably difficult to verify in practice.

In projecting such a scenario, it is firstly valid to assume that manufacturing-based industrial policy has a dependent set of parts that move around axes: a kind of "internal wheel" whose effects depend on "external wheels" driven by macroeconomic conditions — specifically exchange rates conditioned by trade flows and volatile capital flows — and underlying political agreements (Wade, 2015).

Macroeconomic conditions have historically been unfavorable to Brazilian competitiveness. Exchange rate fluctuations are a constant concern, and the interest rate is inconceivably high, which has made Brazil an attractive country for domestic and foreign rentiers. Furthermore, despite the efforts of the Ministry of Finance and the real commitment to fiscal balance, mistrust tends to prevail.

The same can be seen in the coordination work carried out by Vice President Alckmin with various sectors of the Brazilian business community. In fact, some economists fear possible market distortions and inefficient allocation of resources that would be caused by picking winners and losers (Agarwal, 2023), something that has already been the subject of harsh criticism against previous PT governments. The current government has made an effort to ensure that industrial policy proposals are designed in the light of reconsiderations and lessons learned. The orientation towards major axes and missions of impact on the economy and society positively differentiate the character of the current proposed Brazilian industrial policy. However, economic agents still tend to behave refractorily or exaggeratedly suspicious, not to mention those who are opportunistic or openly opposed to any proposals put forward by the Lula government. These attitudes make it difficult to implement a consistent industrial policy.

US cooperation: fundamental, but difficult to see in practice

Internal difficulties could be offset by international cooperation. Although the perception has spread that the three commandments — privatization, stabilization and liberalization — preached by the international multilateral institutions, under the US-led order, were not exactly conducive to economic development, this has not effectively changed the conditions faced by developing countries. Circumverting the constraints imposed by international regimes, including international trade and investment agreements, can be an insurmountable challenge (Bojikian and Menezes, 2023).

The World Trade Organization (WTO), of which Brazil is a member and a signatory to its main agreements, imposes various rules that reduce countries' political autonomy to implement industrial policy. Tariff restrictions, quotas, local content requirements, export targets, subsidies, conditions on government purchases, rules on intellectual property are some of the main rules that need to be strictly observed, under penalty of heavy trade retaliation. And the various rounds of multilateral negotiations have been marked by strong disagreements

between the US and Brazil, which has faced recurring difficulties in expanding multilateral trade in a way that is favorable to its interests.

Although the US can challenge principles, norms and rules that it helped to establish in the multilateral sphere, generating legitimacy crises in the trade system, it does not allow others to do so, not even its closest allies and trading partners. Brazil has historically been the subject of countless disputes over trade issues, science and technology, intellectual property and development funding, not to mention the harsh conditionalities attached to foreign debt negotiations and renegotiations, which reverberate on the role of the state in the economy.

Apart from the difficulties that the US may raise against Brazil by virtue of the international trade agreements in force at the WTO and political-diplomatic understandings in other international forums, bilateral cooperation has not been sufficiently comprehensive. While communications, memoranda of understanding and agreements in general always stress the importance of the partnership, the importance of Brazil for the US appears secondary to a closer look at the results of cooperation agreements.

In July 2023, in Goa (India), on the occasion of the 14th Clean Energy Ministerial and 8th Mission Innovation meeting of the G20, a bilateral cooperation instrument was signed, renewing the U.S.-Brazil Energy Forum (USBEF), a bilateral dialog channel created to promote technical, political, commercial and investment cooperation on the energy transition. The parties committed to working together with the private sector to foster GH2 initiatives, among other goals. The commitments also included mobilization to form new public-private action committees under the Clean Energy Industry Dialogue (CEID) by COP28 (Agência epbr, 2023).

What does this mean in practice? It's certainly not possible to anticipate and state unequivocally what the final outcome of such commitments will be. But previous cooperation experiences may indicate trends.

Take the example of the Brazil-U.S. Commercial Dialogue. Its working groups address various topics, such as regulations and technical standards, conformity assessment, good regulatory practices, trade facilitation and

customs issues. This produces results in the sense of harmonizing norms, rules, procedures and technical standards, mainly speeding up customs flows. However, its results do not effectively facilitate access to the US market for more competitive Brazilian products.

The Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Brazil to Advance Cooperation on Biofuels, signed in 2007 and focused, among other commitments, on studies for the creation of markets, was unfortunately not enough to prevent barriers to the access of Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol to that market. Domestic groups successfully lobbied the US Congress to protect the domestic corn-based ethanol market. Only in 2010 did the EPA legitimize the technical qualification of Brazilian ethanol, recognizing its capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 61% compared to gasoline and classifying it as an "advanced biofuel" (Unica, 2010). And the fight by the Brazilian government and economic agents against the import tariff of US\$ 0.54 per gallon of Brazilian ethanol established in the US lasted until 2011, when the tariff was finally removed.

Returning to the assessment of the USBEF, created in 2019: it was presented as a kind of platform for collaboration between the countries on technical, regulatory and political issues of joint interest and with a commitment to hold annual meetings between the respective energy ministries. During this period, the respective governments — Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro — were aligned, with the Brazilian government intentionally and manifestly willing to make concessions without reciprocity.

At the USBEF meeting in 2022, the parties — representatives of the Biden administration and representatives of the Bolsonaro administration, two governments with very different thoughts, so to speak — inaugurated the CEID, led by the private sector of the two countries. The launch took place at the Business Council of the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington, and five working groups were established on the occasion: GH2, offshore wind energy, grid modernization and storage, sustainable fuels and carbon and methane management (UDOP, 2022). This is a platform that connects groups of experts with extensive technical and

market knowledge to exchange important ideas, but this is quite different from commitments between government agencies willing to endorse cooperation that involves facilitating Brazilian access to practical means of promoting local industry.

David Turk, Deputy Secretary of the DOE, was in Brazil in April 2023 to discuss bilateral cooperation. His remarks, however, may be interpreted in the same that the US and Brazil will ultimately be competitors, and that it will be up to each to leverage their own R&D, investment and commercial strategies. "Brazil and some other countries around the world are in a very good competitive position. But the national government [of Brazil] and the companies need to act to take advantage of this position" (Coronato, 2023).

Secretary Turk knew that Robert Habeck, Germany's Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, had visited Brazil in March 2023 and emphasized Germany's interest in importing GH2 from any country that "offers the best deal." As already mentioned, Brazil has many attributes that make it a great competitor. However, the US tends to be the big player and, with an arsenal of political and economic instruments, can guarantee the country's technological supremacy in this sector as well. By highlighting the public budget for investments and the generous tax credits approved by Congress, he shows off the US's incomparable capacity.

The secretary, who has long been enthusiastic about GH2, is interested in building a viable international market around this source. The market arises from the moment suppliers and buyers are connected and a supply and demand mechanism is articulated. Is it in Brazil's interest to develop an international market? Yes, but this requires a lot of integrative action.

One might think that the US's primary interest is to ensure Brazil's partnership in maintaining the mineral supply chain needed to realize the US's energy transition. When he says that he talked to several clean energy companies on his visit to Brazil, he mentions the importance of

minerals for the production of photovoltaic solar panels and batteries in the US. The obvious interest is in trade in basic items.

It would be different if bilateral cooperation included the effective promotion of technology-sharing policies and the promotion of higher value-added production and the security of regional supply chains. Thinking along other lines, one can recall the cooperation commitments between the US and India.

More recent initiatives include (1) the US-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), "to elevate and expand bilateral strategic technology partnerships and defense industrial cooperation between the governments, businesses and academic institutions of our two countries" (The White House, 2023a); (2) the Strategic Trade Dialogue, "to undertake regular efforts to address export controls, explore ways of enhancing high technology commerce, and facilitate technology transfer between the two countries" (The White House, 2023b); and (3) the Indo-U.S. Quantum Coordination Mechanism, "to facilitate collaboration among industry, academia, and government, and our work toward a comprehensive Quantum Information Science and Technology agreement" (The White House, 2023b).

Other significant technological cooperation commitments with India were announced by the Biden administration, including cooperation on the energy transition "to create innovative investment platforms that will effectively lower the cost of capital and attract international private finance at scale to accelerate the deployment of greenfield renewable energy, battery storage, and emerging green technology projects in India" (The White House, 2023b).

These examples show important differences in the treatment given by the US to India, involving strategic cooperation on climate, economic and technological issues. Despite the disagreement between the two countries over digital technology and controls established by the US due to India's violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998, the cooperation commitments with India are more substantive.

The reader may argue that the relations — US-India and US-Brazil — are incomparable. True. The Indo-US relations are conditioned by unequivocal geopolitical and geo-economic factors, which tend to favor India in negotiations with the US. But, given the US concern about the Sino-Brazilian relations and China's presence in the region, and given the legitimate mutual interest in the energy transition, shouldn't it be a case of taking action, promoting cooperation based on sharing and facilitating access to practical means of achieving goals and objectives?

In principle, yes. The problem is that, although it makes sense to promote a relationship based on political actions that effectively give new meaning to cooperation with Brazil, there are still restrictions that make this difficult. There are eligibility criteria that exclude Brazil from this possibility. If meaningful technological transfer cannot take place, if foreign investment cannot materialize due to numerous conditionalities, if funding from international organizations cannot be granted without reductions in the country's regulatory autonomy, if the U.S. DFC — the U.S. government's foreign investment arm — canot provide loans to support projects run by state-owned companies, what kind of cooperation are we talking about?

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Cold Wars, Yesterday and Today: Perceptions of Brazilian Foreign Policy in Polarized Times

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The Cold War cast a long shadow over Brazil. The 1954 Guatemalan coup, designed in Washington, instilled a fear of communist infiltration in Latin America as well as a sense that the U.S. could and should act decisively to counter it (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982). In Brazil, President Juscelino Kubitschek's ambitious development plan, while economically successful in some ways, raised concerns about fiscal irresponsibility as well as supposedly growing ties with left-wing groups. In the wake of the Cuban Revolution, the architects of U.S. foreign policy worried about Brazil's potential drift toward socialism. Such concerns grew further under President João Goulart, a former labor secretary associated with nationalist and reformist political actors who embraced land reform, the nationalization of key industries, and an independent foreign policy. Concerns over Goulart's direction manifested in economic pressure, veiled threats, and covert operations aimed at undermining his administration.² The legacy of U.S.-Brazil relations in the early 1960s is a cautionary tale. It reveals how Cold War anxieties and superpower interference can destabilize domestic politics, undermining democracy and human rights. It also teaches us about the complex interplay between domestic and international forces in shaping foreign relations.

The specter of a new Cold War, this time between the United States and China, looms over the twenty-first century, injecting uncertainty

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² On the campaign to destabilize Goulart's government, see: Fico, 2008.

into a geopolitical framework that seemed solid not long ago. Amidst this escalating rivalry, Latin America's largest nation finds itself in a delicate position, navigating between two great powers with some overlapping interests that fail to obscure deeply divergent worldviews and priorities. Understanding Brazil's role and potential actions necessitates examining its unique strengths, vulnerabilities, and strategic options in this complex geopolitical landscape. Historical comparisons can help sharpen our analyses. With that in mind, this essay has two goals. The first is to analyze how Brazilian foreign policy was justified, evaluated, and understood in the 1960s, a decisive period in the history of the Cold War. The second aim is to consider the current moment in light of that history, discussing attempts by the Lula administration to revive the Brazilian tradition of robust independent action on the world stage. I conclude by suggesting that healthy U.S.-Brazil relations in the near future depend on Washington recognizing that its approach in the last Cold War must not be repeated if there is to be a new one. To its credit, the Biden administration has not forced Brazil to pick sides in this confusing moment of bipolar multipolarity, at least not publicly. That impulse is correct. This essay does not intend to be a thorough assessment of the questions raised. Rather, my modest hope is to highlight what I deem to be a key historical dynamic that both countries should consider as the United States and Brazil reflect on two centuries of relations.

Cold War I: a friendship betrayed

President Goulart's visit to Washington DC in April 1962 marked at attempt to demonstrate unity of purpose with the United States. On April 3, Goulart, suspiciously close to leftwing forces in the eyes of many Kennedy administration figures, was feted with a state dinner hosted by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Earlier in the day, Goulart addressed the Organization of American States, calling that body's creation in 1948

the formal recognition, by all the Governments that make up it, that cooperation between sovereign States, however intimate it may be, does not give the right to any of them, not even to the Organization they compose, to act in a field reserved exclusively for the internal sovereignty of the nations.³

The following day, Goulart sought to explain the meaning of Brazilian foreign policy to a joint session of Congress, saying that "Brazil's international action responds to no other objective than to favor, by all means within our reach, the preservation and strengthening of peace."4 Goulart, who two years later would be overthrown by a civil-military coup supported by the United States, insisted in his speech that "the end of dangerous arms emulation must be found through coexistence and negotiation" (Goulart, 1962, 2). While defending his nation's geopolitical independence, the Brazilian President nevertheless placed Brazil in general alignment with the international priorities of the United States: "Brazil understands that coexistence between the democratic world and the socialist world can benefit the knowledge and integration of common experiences, and we hope that such contacts will show that representative democracy is the most perfect form of government and the most compatible with the protection of man and the preservation of his freedom" (Goulart, 1962, 2).

Later that year, participating in the graduation ceremony for new diplomats in Rio de Janeiro, Goulart underscored the message of peace and negotiation he had emphasized in Washington, asserting that:

We emerge into the responsibilities of international life at a critical moment in the history of humanity, but we should not fear the difficulties that we will certainly encounter, rather we must understand them as an incentive for clarity and definition of our attitudes. We find the world troubled by the clash of ideologies and forces, which generate dangerous tensions for the preservation of peace (*in* Domingos, 2018b, 46).

Brazil, as Goulart put it, had a special role to play in the increasingly strict bipolarity of the Cold War. But this rhetoric could only ever get

³ Speech to the Council of the Organization of American States. Washington, 3 Apr. 1962. See: Marcelino, 2009, 28.

⁴ For Goulart's full remarks, see: Goulart, 1962, 2.

Goulart so far with the Kennedy administration. As historian Charles Sidarta Machado Domingos notes, "Goulart's foreign policy displeased the Kennedy government, especially its principles of self-determination and non-intervention, which went against the general political formulations of the United States in the Cold War, and even more so in relation to Latin Americanization following the Cuban Revolution" (Domingos, 2018a, 544).

Indeed, with due historical perspective, it is clear that the major elements of Brazilian international activity in the early 1960s were rejected outright in Washington, which did not see Goulart as a reliable partner against communism. This mismatch contributed to the Lyndon Johnson government's significant support for the conspiracy against Goulart, with tragic results for Brazilian society. Indeed, as historians Rafael Ioris and Vanni Pettina put it in their overview of recent works on the Cold War in Latin America:

it was the ever more limiting constraints of the polarized logic of the post-WWII global, hemispheric, regional, and domestic contexts that helped derail the path of socioeconomic, political and cultural transformations unfolding in many Latin American nations. Altogether, this resulted in large-scale, in most places unprecedented levels of violence, the deepening of political and ideological divisions, the entrenchment of exclusionary oligarchic rule, and ultimately, delaying the possibility of implementing more inclusive policies for one or even two generations (Ioris and Pettina, 2023, 4).

By late 1963, Goulart's equivocations and inability to reign in radical leftwing forces, from the point of view of Washington and its emissary, Lincoln Gordon, meant that a change was needed. The Brazilian military, with U.S. support, staged a brazen coup d'état, deposing the country's legal head of state according to the Constitution in effect at the time. For conservative forces in Brazil as well as foreign policy architects in Washington, Goulart had been become indissociable from a set of policies

that, whether misguided or genuinely radical, posed an unacceptable risk to the country's stability, justifying a drastic intervention.

The new regime's political agenda was much discussed in its first year, no doubt in an effort to mitigate the perception of the coup as mere power grab. In the public campaign to justify Goulart's ouster and explain the divergent policies that unelected men would pursue in his stead, the regime's technocratic civilian component would play a leading role. A month after Castelo Branco was sworn in on April 15, 1964, economist and former diplomat Roberto Campos joined the government as Minister of Planning and Economic Coordination. He would then spend much of August and September speaking to various groups across the country to present the new regime's fiscal policies along with a broader defense of the need for the military intervention (Santos, 2000, 112-121). On September 19, he gave a speech sponsored by the Porto Alegre chapter of the Associação dos Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), the alumni association for graduates of the nation's foremost war college, analyzing the flaws of the Goulart administration. Campos' speech is a good indication of how the regime saw itself: rational, responsible, and indispensable.

Goulart's worst offense, according to Campos, was sacrificing sober consideration of policy for sloganeering and self-aggrandizement. Aided by "engineers of chaos," the former President deliberately sought to ravage the economy so as to introduce "the Trojan horse of political and social subversion." Campos argued that since the elected presidency of Getúlio Vargas, national governments had embraced measures that made no empirical sense. The new government was intent on undoing Goulart's mystifications, one of which Campos dubbed "temperamental nationalism," which he defined as an outlook that mistook tough language against foreigners for a strategy of economic development. Campos blamed this type of nationalism for a host of maladies, including the unrestrained growth of the public sector and foreign indebtedness, both of which actually made the nation less able to act independently. A rational nationalism, he posited, would seek efficient investments above

⁵ FGV/CPDOC, 1964, 1.

all, be they domestic or from abroad, rather than "heaping on others the blame for our poverty." Inflation, hostility to foreign investment, and class-based invectives were, under the previous government, percussion instruments in a "bizarre nationalist symphony," Campos declared.⁷

Two years later, between September 19 and 22, 1966, the city of Rio de Janeiro hosted the Second Inter-American Conference of the Partners of the Alliance at the stately Hotel Glória. Representatives of sixty-two partner committees from North, Central, and South America, as well as observers from governments, private organizations, and foundations, attended the meeting. The opening remarks by President Castelo Branco emphasized continental solidarity and hemispheric cooperation. For his part, Stuart H. Van Dyke, Director of the USAID Mission to Brazil, stressed Latin American initiative, noting that the task of the partners of the Alliance was "to bring about a renewal of faith in the Alliance, a new dedication to its success, and a new sense of participation by all the people of Latin America."8 The Brazilian dictatorship was clearly seen as a better partner to the United States in this undertaking than the democratic government that preceded it. In backing the new regime, however, Washington was pushing Brazil into a period of violence, authoritarianism, and repression. On the bicentennial anniversary of U.S.-Brazil relations, this betrayal of Brazilian democracy must not escape notice, not least because remembering it might be useful in avoiding the same mistake in the future.

Cold War II: the chance to learn from the past

Whether or not there is today, or whether there will be, a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing is a topic of much debate. It remains an open question. Unlike the clear ideological and even geographic demarcation of the past, the U.S.-China clashes are often entangled with practical concerns like intellectual property theft, cybersecurity, and regional disputes in the South China Sea. This pragmatic context allows

⁶ FGV/CPDOC, 1964, 1.

⁷ FGV/CPDOC, 1964, 3.

⁸ Office Files of the White House Aids, Charles Horsky: "The Second Inter-American Conference Partners of the Alliance." 9/12-22/66, Box 57, OFWHA, LBJ Library.

for limited cooperation in areas of mutual interest, like climate change or global health crises. Comparing the present to the Cold War highlights the need for a new understanding of how superpowers compete and how non-aligned countries like Brazil pursue their own interests amid sharp international divisions. The bicentenary of the US-Brazil relationship is an opportune moment to think about how acts of geopolitical violence such as Washington's support for the 1964 coup, can be avoided in a context of growing hostilities around the world. As in the past, Brazil today insists on its right to act independently in defense of its interests. The story this time can and should be different.

In his 2023 book *Cold Peace: Avoiding the New Cold War*, political scientist Michael Doyle argues that the world is currently facing a dangerous new Cold War, primarily between the United States and China, with Russia playing a smaller but still significant role. He warns of the devastating consequences of a full-blown conflict between these powers, particularly its impact on tackling global challenges like climate change and pandemics. He does not suggest that conflict is imminent but that the world must take more concerted steps toward establishing a working framework for global understanding. Doyle insists that "we need a more concerted effort to manage global security tensions by developing compromises and common ground on climate, cyber relations, Ukraine, and Taiwan" (Doyle, 2023, 7). Doyle emphasizes that avoiding a new Cold War is not just possible, but essential for the future of humanity. He is hardly an opponent of the so-called liberal international order, yet he recognizes that the world has changed. Dispelling the illusion that the world today is the same as it was after World War II is the first step toward building a global order more suited to today's challenges.

In the shifting context of global affairs, Brazil's insistence on independent activity on the world stage has been cast as either naïve, dastardly, or sharp. The world has changed dramatically since he first took office twenty years ago, but Lula remains committed to securing a prominent place for Brazil on the world stage. His return has revived what might be called Brazil's independent buy-in to the international system, that is, an eagerness to engage other countries on the most pressing issues of the day but from a distinctly Brazilian position of

strategic neutrality. To demonstrate that buy-in, Lula in his third term has traveled extensively, meeting with more heads of state in five months than Bolsonaro did in four years (Alves and Oliveira, 2023). He was even criticized for spending so much time abroad (Paraguassu, 2023). But these were not mere goodwill expeditions. Their purpose was to restore Brazil's presence in major international fora and as a player in debates shaping the future of global governance. As Oliver Stuenkel, professor at the School of International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas, has noted:

[...] while multipolarity is often seen as less stable and more difficult to manage than bipolarity or unipolarity, Brasília's view has traditionally been more optimistic: Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota coined the terms "benign multipolarity" and "cooperative multipolarity," which regard the emergence of multipolarity not as a threat, but as an opportunity (Stuenkel, 2023).

To embrace multipolarity, as Lula has done in each of his administrations, is to distrust that U.S. hegemony serves Brazilian interests more often than not. Contrary to what some observers seem to believe, Lula and his advisors have their share of criticism of Chinese and Russian leaders. But they are especially attentive, even if good diplomatic manners keeps them from saying so explicitly, to what they may consider as ambiguities on the part of the US. They recall NSA spying on former President Dilma Rousseff and believe firmly that the U.S. Justice Department helped legitimize Lula's 2018 arrest. On top of these more recent traumas, of course, is the memory of U.S. involvement in the 1964 coup and support for the dictatorship that followed. Lula does not intend to sour relations with Russia or China based on Washington's complaints. Instead, Lula, like several Brazilian leaders before him, will pursue Brazilian interests on a case-by-case basis independently of what the U.S. position is on a given matter. On environmental and labor issues, the Brazilian government is in line with the Biden administration. On the other major geopolitical issues of the day, however, the terrain is bumpier.

First, Brazil does not share U.S. alarmism regarding the rise of China. Instead, Lula wants to collect the benefits of a warm working

relationship with China without incurring blowback from the United States. His April 2023 visit to Beijing was covered closely, a kind of recognition that the Beijing-Brasilia connection is a central storyline in the future of the Western Hemisphere. On that trip, Lula insisted Brazil's deep trade relationship with China should not cause friction with Washington. "When I talk to the United States," he told the press on the last day of his trip, "I don't worry about what China's going to think of my conversation with the United States. I'm discussing the sovereign interests of my country. When I come to China I'm also not worried about what the United States thinks about my talks with China" (Prazeres, 2023). Many commentators seem intent on urging Lula to pick sides in the emerging cold war between Washington and Beijing. To its credit, however, the Biden administration does not — at least publicly.

Second, Lula has refused to lend Brazilian resources to the Ukrainian war effort, calling instead for a small group of countries with no direct involvement in the conflict to mediate negotiations to end the war immediately. While he has condemned the Russian invasion, his position has been criticized widely for equating Russian and Ukrainian culpability in the ongoing conflagration (Kluth, 2023). John Kirby, U.S. National Security Council spokesman, even accused Lula of "parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda" (Wright, 2023). The reality, however, is that Lula's position is rational considering his nation's interests and helps to illustrate broader misgivings about the supposedly liberal international order (Stuenkel, 2023).

Finally, the Lula administration does not see eye-to-eye with Washington when it comes to the situation in Venezuela. Indeed, Lula has been compared unfavorably to President Gabriel Boric of Chile, a younger progressive leader who has taken a harsher line against Nicolás Maduro. It is important for policymakers in Washington to understand Lula's reasoning in this case as well. Lula's long-held objective is to position Brazil — and himself — as a go-between for sticky diplomatic problems in the region and beyond. Maduro is almost completely isolated on the world stage. What would Lula accomplish by joining the overwhelming chorus of condemnation against him? What ultimate goal would that bring? It is unclear such an approach would do anything to shift the

current stalemate. Instead, Lula insists on warm relations in the hope that Brazil can preserve credibility all around and eventually help broker an agreement. Whether this approach will yield tangible results or not remains to be seen, but it is a clear, concrete strategy. Recognizing the strategic thinking of Brazil's foreign policy moves is the bare minimum required in establishing a more trusting relationship between Washington and Brasília.

Tellingly, Lula's first international trip was to neighboring Argentina for the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) summit. Founded in 2010 as a counterpoint to the U.S.-dominated Organization of American States (OAS), CELAC is composed of 33 countries — including Venezuela and Cuba. After rejoining the body following Brazil's withdrawal under his predecessor, Lula took the opportunity to reiterate his country's support for a policy of non-intervention in the region. "In the same way that I am against territorial occupation, as Russia did to Ukraine," Lula said in his speech, "I am against much interference in the process of Venezuela" (Gomes and Borges, 2023). Brazil's return to CELAC marked the country's renewed commitment to regional integration efforts, which Lula sees as key to his country's interests and the region's shared prosperity.

For the Brazilian president, the project of South American integration is a matter of geopolitical strategy and, to a lesser extent, ideological affinity. Above all, however, Lula is committed to multipolarity because he believes it serves the interests of Brazil and other countries that see few avenues for ascension under the current global arrangement. His administration aims not to undermine the so-called liberal international order but to expand its democratic appeal. Against the common refrain that a dilution of U.S. power in international affairs would lead to worse human rights outcomes around the world, Lula argues that greater influence for a broader array of nations would actually strengthen democratic commitments around the world.

In a telling interview conducted during a visit to Portugal in April, he was asked about the UN charter and whether there is any such thing as universal values that should guide the conduct of international affairs. He pointed out that members of the UN Security Council themselves

don't always respect the value of the UN charter but are shielded by their veto power, which he said must end. Those responsible for the most destructive recent wars, he pointed out, are permanent members of UN Security Council: "The US invaded Iraq without UN authorization, France and England invaded Libya without UN authorization, and now Russia invaded Ukraine." That's precisely why it is imperative to expand democratic participation in global governance, he concluded, adding that "we have to guarantee that Africa is represented [on the UN Security Council], that Latin America is represented" as well as India and Germany. The United States must grapple seriously with this critique if it is interested in a more productive partnership with Brazil in the medium to long term.

It is a longstanding truism in Brazilian foreign policy that Brazil should resist choosing sides in international disputes in which it is not directly implicated. Independence is a clear strategy, despite what some of Lula's present critics suggest. If it can deliver real material gains for Brazilians, it will likely be considered a success. In response to Brazil's ambitions and legitimate critiques, Washington would do well to demonstrate flexibility, self-awareness, encouragement, and even — yes — a degree of deference. Some fear that Brazil's embrace of a multipolar world signifies a distancing from the U.S. However, Lula has sought to dispel this anxiety by showcasing productive partnerships with diverse nations and with governments of various ideological hues. This model of flexible diplomacy, transcending ideological boundaries, suggests that Latin American international relations haven't yet congealed into the rigid blocs of a new Cold War. Perhaps, Brazil's approach can offer a hopeful path for other nations seeking to navigate a complex, interdependent yet increasingly unstable world.

Conclusion: building trust in a polarized era

In dealing with Brazil, the U.S. government would do well to recognize that the leaders of Latin America's largest nation chafe at the sense

⁹ Lula interviewed by RTP, 22 Apr. 2023. Available at: https://twitter.com/RTPNoticias/status/1649858927717171203?s=20. Last access on: 5 Apr. 2024.

¹⁰ Lula interviewed by RTP, 22 Apr. 2023. Available at: https://twitter.com/RTPNoticias/status/1649858927717171203?s=20. Last access on: 5 Apr. 2024.

that they are held to a different set of rules on the world stage than the one Americans set for themselves. Much of the criticism of Lula's independent foreign policy in the press and by some public officials would seem to suggest that there is no legitimate critique of U.S. hegemony. President Joe Biden, for example, voted to authorize the war in Iraq, a move the Brazilian government considered then and now to be a gross violation of international law. From the Brazilian perspective, there is precious little accountability for U.S. foreign policy catastrophes even as Brazil risks diplomatic backlash for refusing to contribute weapons to a war in which it is not directly implicated. The paradox is clear: Lula's thoughts on any foreign policy matter are heavily scrutinized to gauge Brazil's democratic commitments and determine whether it can or should be allowed to have a bigger say in global affairs while U.S. hegemony is taken as a given despite the mottled history of the twentieth century. This double standard contributes to the trust deficit between the hemispheric giants and feeds a sense that more voices need to be heard in the construction of a new framework of international governance. This so far is the project of Lula's third term when it comes to foreign policy.

Aside from a robust trade relationship, which is mutually beneficial and largely uncontroversial, there are a number of things small and large that the United States can do to signal that it sees Brazil as a valuable partner and to show that it can itself be a productive, trustworthy ally. Brazil is a massive country with a youthful population, bountiful resources, and technical proficiency in several key areas. Since the return of democracy in the late 1980s following two decades of military rule, successive administrations, particularly in the last twenty years, have passed social-democratic policies that have earned international acclaim. The United States could do more to formally recognize Brazil's policy achievements, like lifting millions out of poverty and fighting hunger. Explicitly holding the South American giant up as a model in specific areas is a small, inexpensive, but potentially powerful gesture the U.S. could make to create warmer relations with Brazil.

Foreign policy is more challenging but also presents opportunities for improvement. To its credit, the Biden administration has shown glimmers of receptivity to a new approach toward Venezuela after the Trump administration's efforts at regime change. It has not publicly bashed Brazil's reluctance to contribute to the Ukrainian war effort nor has it sought to dissuade Lula's attempts to reignite South American integration. The most important thing Washington could do is genuinely get behind Brazil's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Doing so would indicate to Brazil — and other so-called developing nations — that their voice matters and there is a viable path to inclusion in the current architecture of global governance. Participating fully in the OECD is less pressing but would also grant Brazil access to greater economic collaboration, policy sharing, foreign investment, specialized initiatives — not to mention recognition — that it craves. Greater intelligence sharing efforts — not just military or law enforcement collaborations — would also tell Brazilians that the United States trusts them and sees them as vital partners in the years ahead.

When it comes to repairing historical mistrust, the U.S. could take the simple step of declassifying all remaining records related to the 1964 dictatorship. Washington can and should provide a full account of the documents that remain unavailable to researchers and divulge them. It did so for Chile in 2023 on the fortieth anniversary of that country's coup (Bartlett, 2023). An official apology for supporting the coup would also demonstrate that the United States is serious about charting a new course in its relationship with Brazil, one rooted in an abiding respect for democracy — even when its fruits displease Washington. The bicentennial anniversary of U.S. recognition of Brazil's independence this year offers a prime opportunity for a positive grand gesture of this sort.

This combination of policies and other efforts along the same lines will enable the United States to more credibly present itself as a trustworthy interlocutor. Credibility is not built overnight, but leaders in Washington can do a host of small things now to improve its historic standing with Brazil and, in so doing, signal to millions of people around the world that it has the maturity, self-awareness, and vision to empower other actors in the construction of a global order based on restraint and collaboration rather than competition and dominance. It is not too late for the United States to demonstrate that it can be a valuable and viable partner. This year, which celebrates the noteworthy friendship of the

hemisphere's giants, north and south, is a shining opportunity. Let it not be wasted.

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The evolution and prospects of Brazil-USA relations: from opponents to partners

Roberto Abdenur¹

I joined the Brazilian Foreign Service in 1963. This period was characterized by the acute tension of the Cold War between the USA and the USSR, heightened by the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, when the world narrowly escaped a devastating nuclear war. It was a *confrontation* between democratic, market-economy countries and communist dictatorships.

In Brazil, the late 1950s and early 1960s were a time of instability, political polarization and uncertainty about the future. In that context, there was a movement focused on two objectives: carrying out the socalled "basic reforms." The main one was agrarian reform on the domestic front; on the external front, the fight against the enormous obstacles to our development, through changes in the key multilateral institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT and the UN itself) and in the power relationship between rich and developing countries. The latter were growing in number and strength thanks to the decolonization process and the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. My motivation to pursue a diplomatic career was precisely this second set of ideas. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, I was involved at various times in the euphemistically named North-South Dialogue, when in reality it was a relatively harsh confrontation between the rich and the poor - a struggle for an idealized "New International Economic Order." Throughout that period, the United States, the main economic power with the tutelage over the international financing organizations, presented itself as the boldest adversary of developing

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countries, notably Brazil, which to no small extent was a leader of the movements of the South against the North.

In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the USA was the main "adversary" on issues of great importance to Brazil. With their hegemony in the international economy and finance, it was the toughest interlocutors on a number of fronts: our efforts for greater access to their markets; the battle for a more equitable international order; intransigence on the debt issue; and pressure to forcibly introduce in the GATT the new themes of services and investment (which were not on the institution's agenda). At the same time, Washington was trying to open the Brazilian market to such activities. This attempt brought to light a new problem in the bilateral relationship: a serious clash between the American advances and our policies of technological development and capacity-building, where, for example, we practiced a market reserve in the field of information technology.

Over time, however, both Brazil on the one hand and the US on the other went through changes. The most controversial problems were left behind. The result was that the US went from being an "adversary" to a "partner." The process began with the friendship between Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Bill Clinton, the good understanding between Lula and George W. Bush and then the rapprochement between Dilma Rousselff and Obama. It culminated with the meeting in Washington at the beginning of 2023 between Lula and Biden. This meeting was highlighted, unfortunately, by the defense of democracy – not only in third parties, but in their own countries, under the impact of current and possible future far right attacks.

To better describe the trajectory of Brazil-US relations, it is interesting to follow the changes, over time, in the lexicon, in the semantics used by the two sides when important meetings take place.

Earlier, following the re-democratization of Brazil, two of our Presidents had contact with then President Ronald Reagan: João Figueiredo on a visit to Washington in May 1982, and when he welcomed the American president in Brasilia in November of the same year; and José Sarney on

a trip to the USA in September 1986, for a dialogue with Bush's father, George H.W. Bush.

In the first case, there was a significant disparity between the statements made by the heads of government. While Figueiredo spoke extensively about the international situation, expressing concern about the tensions of the Cold War, criticizing unilateral measures in the economic field, and calling for greater dialogue between the developed countries and the Third World (he indicated Brazil as belonging to both the Third World and the West), Reagan made relatively brief pronouncements, in which he praised the communion of values and Brazilian democracy (a term Figueiredo had also emphasized), and the important role Brazil played in the hemisphere. Reagan thus expressed a limited perspective on Brazil's role on the international stage.

Sarney's visit was dominated by the serious problem Brazil was facing at the time with its unpayable foreign debt. He and Bush converged on general comments about the problems of the international financial system and the IMF. The agenda of the conversation was limited to these pressing issues for Brazil, and did not address any other subjects.

Between 1991 and 1992, Fernando Collor and Bush met on the occasion of a session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York and during Rio-92. During these conversations, they exchanged ideas on the international context and, at Rio-92, Bush praised Brazil's performance on environmental issues. On the American side, there was no major assessment of Brazil's presence on the international scenario.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso met with Bill Clinton in the USA in 1995, 1998 and 1999. And then with George W. Bush, also in the USA, in April and November 2001.

In April 1995, at a meeting in Washington, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Clinton decided to declare a new partnership, with the mission of opening markets more widely between the two countries. FHC also made statements to reinforce confidence in Brazil among investors and financiers. With Clinton, FHC mentioned Brazil's postulation for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is worth noting that this visit showed considerable progress in the bilateral relationship,

with the establishment of the new partnership and talks on the UN Security Council. It was, as I understand it, the first "official" reference to the idea of a "partnership" as such.

In 1998, FHC traveled to New York for a UN meeting on drug trafficking. He then stayed at Camp David for a meeting with Clinton and lunch with businessmen, academics and journalists hosted by the prestigious Americas Society, where he spoke about the economy and his government's foreign policy. Clinton praised the rapid recovery of the Brazilian economy after the 1999 financial crisis in some Asian countries and Russia. With Clinton, and later with Bush, there were more in-depth conversations on the main international issues, including the Middle East, the financial system and the FTAA (the controversial project launched by Clinton in 1994 for a large free trade zone encompassing all the nations of the hemisphere). With Clinton, FHC again raised the issue of Brazil's claim for a permanent seat on the UNSC, receiving generic comments about the need to reform and update the United Nations. There was no commitment to Brazil's postulation.

As far as I can tell, the allusion to a new partnership would have been the first mention of such an idea. Despite its limited scope, this evolution in language is significant. For the first time, Brazil-US relations, once marked by a certain antagonism, are mentioned in a positive sense – and also in a constructive sense, since the concept of "partnership" points in the direction of progress, of steps forward.

In December 2002, while still President-elect, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva traveled to Washington to meet with George W. Bush. His aim – in the same vein as his *Letter to the Brazilian people* – was fundamentally to dispel the fear among the American government, Wall Street bankers and financiers, investors and the "market" in general, that his government would pursue an irresponsible and heterodox economic policy, thus leading Brazil into a serious crisis capable of causing turbulence in the international economy.

Lula was clear and convincing, thereby putting an end to the serious concerns that then existed in Washington and Wall Street. Bush praised Lula and said that Brazil was "vital" for the US. In June of that year, Lula

made another trip to the US, now as incumbent president. To follow up their talks, the two Presidents set up three working groups on trade, finance and energy.

In these two meetings, progress was made, with the establishment of a fluid, friendly and even informal dialog between the two Presidents. Bush made emphatic comments about the importance of the bilateral relationship, and agreed to the creation of a Working Group dedicated to the issue of reforms in the United Nations and its Security Council. It is worth noting the importance of this first step by the US towards our request. Bush thus gave a constructive response to the comments made earlier on the subject by FHC and Lula himself. It was a significant step forward.

Lula later met George W. Bush for a barbecue when the American visited Brasilia on November 5, 2005. Despite the informality of the meeting, there were substantive conversations on issues such as the FTAA, Brazil's interest in the UNSC, threats to international peace and security, and the need for greater assistance from rich countries to developing countries. But the meeting was particularly relevant when Lula praised the fact that a strategic dialogue was in progress – the first time this far-reaching word has been introduced into the lexicon of relations between the two countries.

In 2007, in Washington, Lula and Bush signed an agreement to expand the use of *ethanol* internationally and exchanged ideas on various international issues, with an emphasis on the Doha Round negotiations at the World Trade Organization.

In 2009, Lula met with President Barack Obama in Washington. They agreed to coordinate positions within the G20 on dealing with international financial crises and supporting developing countries.

Three months into Dilma Rousseff's first administration, in 2012, President Obama was keen to come to Brazil, and in 2015 Dilma Rousseff traveled to the USA. The two meetings opened, in a way, a new stage in the bilateral relationship, as expressed in extensive and wide-ranging joint statements, which addressed an agenda dedicated to multiple issues of a political, economic, trade, finance and investment nature, health,

education, science and technology, among others. It is worth noting the introduction of the word "global" in the conversations and documents — both as an adjective for Brazil's role on the international stage and as a reference to huge challenges, such as the environment and climate change, human rights, energy and food security, poverty and inclusion, health, education, and science and technology. Obama declared that relations "have never been stronger." This episode completed the enrichment of the vocabulary concerning the relationship between Brazil and the United States: "vital," "partnership," "strategic," and "global."

In 2019, then-President Jair Bolsonaro traveled to Washington. The meager — and uncertain — results of the meeting with Donald Trump: the promise of support for Brazil's rapprochement with NATO and possible participation in the OECD.

This visit had two important highlights: Bolsonaro's enthusiastic meeting with the USA far right and Brazil's positioning as a *passive partner* of the USA.

At the beginning of 2023, Lula visited President Joe Biden. It was a meeting of great significance, as it shaped a strong partnership focused on problems and challenges common to both countries – and with an impact on the entire international community: the defense of democracies (regrettably threatened in Brazil and, surprisingly, in the USA itself, previously seen as an indestructible paradigm of democracy), the battle against extremism and political violence, disinformation and hate speech; the promotion of human rights; the fight against hunger and poverty; the battle against racism; energy security; threats to peace, as in the case of Russia's attack on Ukraine.

Among this broad agenda, two topics stand out: the intention of the two leaders to take a *leading role* in tackling climate change (for which they set up a high-level Working Group) and the commitment to work together towards a "significant" reform of the UN. It was a great achievement for Lula to have obtained Biden's promise to work for an increase in the number of permanent seats on the Security Council with the inclusion of Latin American and Caribbean countries, in order to make it more

representative and effective. Although there was no nominal reference to Brazil, it is clear that this commitment applies to our country in practice.

As I finish writing this article, at the beginning of January 2024, I am worried about the prospects for Brazil-US relations. There are different possibilities. If Biden (or another Democrat who replaces him) wins the election in November, the Lula administration will face a situation of tranquility and predictability in the last two years of its term, in a constructive partnership in support of democracy, human rights, the battle against climate change, diversity, social inclusion, the battle against poverty and the protection of minorities. And on the economic front, in light of the progress made by Brazil in fiscal stability, reducing inflation and unemployment, in structural reforms and in reducing poverty and equality, there will be a tendency to increase trade and investment, given the promising opportunities that Brazil will continue to offer in infrastructure, energy transition, electricity and new technologies.

However, the situation will be different in the event of a Trump victory. There will be disagreements precisely on the issues that form the current partnership, with Trump adopting a posture of denial about them. The presence in the White House of a head of government at the worst extreme of the right will mean that his radicalized ideological stance will cause instability, unpredictability and turbulence in the relationship. It should also be borne in mind that Trump will stir the extreme right in Brazil (as in the rest of the world), causing undesirable political tensions in our country.

If Trump is elected while Lula is still in office, mismatches will tend to occur between a "healthy" Brazil and a "dystopian" USA. In addition to political problems, trade difficulties will arise if Trump goes ahead with his plans to increase the protectionism he began in his first term, with the application of an additional 10% across-the-board tariff on all imports. We can only hope that the American private sector remains interested in business opportunities with Brazil.

In the event of a coincidence between a Trump administration and a counterpart from the Brazilian right – even if not as extremist as in the Bolsonaro times – an environment of greater stability, harmony and

understanding between Washington and Brasilia will prevail (with the possible occurrence of difficulties in the field of trade). Although more attenuated, without Bolsonaro's submission to Trump, the situation I call a "passive partnership" between the two countries could be reproduced to some extent.

In short: it is difficult to make any long-term predictions about relations, given the uncertainty and unpredictability of the short-term scenarios, the impact of the surprising phenomenon caused by the arrival in power, in both countries, of an unprecedentedly cohesive, organized and intensely mobilized far-right.

That being said, we must also bear in mind Brazil's evolution for the better in political, economic, social and diplomatic terms. This evolution tends to sustain a basic line of continuity in our public policies and foreign policy, even in the event of a meeting between the two right-wing parties. After January 8, 2023, our democracy looks solid and capable of resisting destabilizing attempts. And the economic scenario is encouraging.

In the social field, there have been significant improvements in poverty reduction, education, sanitation, transportation and security. When it comes to inclusion, progress has been made towards protecting ethnic minorities such as indigenous peoples, as well as women, and in gender issues. Brazil is recovering and rebuilding after the years of regression under the Bolsonaro government.

In the sphere of diplomacy, the country has embarked on courses of action that are largely unavoidable and irreversible, even under a rightwing regime: the universalism of its foreign policy, present and active in all parts of the world; its leading role at the multilateral level, including the fight for reform of the UN and its Security Council, as well as financial organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank; our call for better global governance; our solid position, and sometimes even leadership, in relatively new institutions, such as the WTO, the BRICS and its Development Bank and the G20, whose presidency we hold until November 2024; our realism and pragmatism in placing ourselves in balanced and equidistant positions in the context of new and challenging geopolitical tensions, in particular the worrying

strategic confrontation between the US and China. In the same vein, our central and even decisive position in the face of the greatest existential challenge facing humanity today and for generations to come – climate change.

In conclusion: after experiencing almost three decades – the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s – when we saw the US as "adversaries" (a situation that marked my career for a long time), in 2004 I found myself Ambassador to Washington, my last post. I was pleased to see that relations between adversaries had been transformed into a genuine, vigorous and fruitful partnership. At the end of my observations, I declare myself confident that this partnership is here to stay, even if it forces setbacks at one time or another.

200 Years of Brazil-United States Partnership: A Brief Look at the Economic Results and Next Steps

Abrão Arabe Neto¹ Fabrizio Sardelli Panzini²

Introduction

The 200 years that have gone by since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States in 1824 have seen significant economic results for both sides.

From the first half of the 19th century, bilateral trade in goods gained impetus and began to grow gradually and consistently. As a result, the United States assumed the position of Brazil's main trading partner and held it throughout the 20th century. Currently, the country is sustaining and growing as the main destination for Brazilian industrial exports (US\$ 29.9 billion in 2023) and those with higher added value and technological intensity.

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Director of Public Policy and Government Relations at Amcham Brazil. Previously, he was Superintendent of Government Relations at Amcham Brazil. He has 17 years' experience working in business organizations such as the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), where he was International Integration Policy Manager (2020-2022), International Negotiations Manager (2017-2020) and International Negotiations Specialist (2012-2017). He was Coordinator of Economic Analysis of Foreign Trade at the Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP) (2008-2011). He holds a master's degree in Economic Policy from Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), a postgraduate degree in Economics from Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV-SP) and a degree in International Relations from the Faculdades de Campinas (FAC-AMP). He was awarded the Order of Rio Branco by the Brazilian government, has published articles on international trade in newspapers and magazines such as *Valor Econômico* and coordinated a book on China's trade and industrial policy.

Although we do not have a long historical record in foreign trade in services, the United States outranks all of Brazil's other trading partners in that area by a wide margin and is repeatedly the main destination and origin of trade in the sector. The country also has above-average growth and a predominance of high-productivity sectors, such as financial services, information technology and aircraft maintenance.

A similar scenario can be observed in investments, where the United States is the main foreign investor in Brazil in terms of stock of productive capital, number of companies and net revenue, as well as the most important destination for the internationalization of Brazilian companies.

Brazil and the United States also have a long tradition of cooperation in a range of industrial, technological, scientific, and educational areas, with positive and structuring results for Brazil. These include, for example, the creation of the Technological Institute of Aeronautics (ITA), the development of Brazil's steel sector and the origin of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES).

These three dimensions of the economic-trade relationship (goods, services and investments) and some emblematic cases of successful bilateral cooperation are presented below, as a way of explaining how the United States has become Brazil's biggest economic partner over the last 200 years. Finally, some important suggestions for deepening the bilateral economic relationship in the coming years are outlined.

The Brazil-United States partnership in trade in goods Trade in goods in the 20th century


Official data³ on Brazilian foreign trade by partner is only available from 1901 onwards. However, various records and statistics highlight the importance of trade between Brazil and the United States over the last 200 years.

³ Data base on "Outras Estatísticas de Comércio Exterior." Available at: https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/comercio-exterior/estatisticas/outras-estatistica-de-comercio-exterior
Last access on: 6 Feb. 2024.

Since the opening of Brazilian ports in 1808, the United States has shown remarkable interest in trade with Brazil, both to supply its domestic market and to resell to other markets. By 1816, the United States was already emerging as England's main commercial rival in trade with Brazil. In the 1840s, the number of American ships passing through Brazilian harbors was practically equal to the number of English ships (Moniz Bandeira, 2007).

The United States moved forward as it gained ground in the world economy. Some authors (Tammone, 2013)⁴ argue that towards the middle of the 19th century, the North American market already accounted for around 30% of the total coffee exported by Brazil.

However, it was in the 20th century that the United States became Brazil's main trading partner,⁵ overtaking the traditional European dominance. Brazil's official foreign trade statistics for the period only provide aggregate data on trade with Europe, without breaking it down by country, as shown in Graph 1 below. Even so, one can observe that in 1915 the United States, individually, overtook Europe for the first time (36.6% against 34%) as Brazil's largest partner.



Graph 1 — Participation in Brazil's trade flow (Decades)

Source: MDIC. Elaborated by the authors.

During the World War II, the United States experienced a major industrial boost, and its GDP grew by 72% (Boradberry and Harrinson,

⁴ Relações econômicas entre Brasil e Estados Unidos na primeira metade do século XIX, 2013.

⁵ Data referring to individual countries.

2020). This leap helped the country expand its position as a global power, accounting for 50% of trade with Brazil in the decade 1941-1950 and 40% and 34% in the following decades. Even when the European countries regained their position as a group, the United States would not lose its position as Brazil's first individual partner in the 20th century.

It was only at the end of the first decade of the 21st century that China took over as Brazil's main partner in trade in goods, when it registered a bilateral flow of US\$ 36.9 billion in 2009. On the one hand, Brazilian exports to China were favored by the unprecedented change in the terms of trade⁶ (IPEA, 2020), which increased the prices of basic goods in which Brazil was competitive. On the other hand, there was an increase in Brazilian purchases of mainly industrialized goods. Since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Brazilian imports from that country have grown 46-fold — jumping from US\$ 1.3 billion to US\$ 60.7 billion in 2022.

The increase in added value of exports to the United States

Despite losing its position as Brazil's largest trading partner at the end of the 2000s, the United States remained the main destination for Brazilian exports of industrialized and more technologically intensive goods. Several factors explain this scenario, including the high presence in Brazil of US companies with direct involvement in the period of greatest Brazilian industrialization.

From the 1960s to the early 2000s, Brazil experienced a remarkable change in its export profile, with a vigorous and unique growth in the share of industrial goods (Batista Santos, 2007). There was an increase in the amount⁷ of manufactured goods exported above or equal to that observed in general and in all the other sectors between 1964 and the early 2000s.


In the 1950s, among semi-manufactured and manufactured goods, only "sugar and alcohol" and "footwear and leather" appeared among the main Brazilian goods exported to the world, with a 3.1% share of the

⁶ Ratio between a country's import prices and export prices (IPEA, 2016).

⁷ Quantity exported from the sector calculated using the net kilogram metric. In this way, the indicator captures the increase in the physical volume of sectoral exports and not the value in dollars.

total. These items went on to account for 28.3% in the 1970s, 51.0% in the 1980s and 56.4% in the 1990s. Then, for the first time, the three main goods exported by the country were industrial: metallurgical products, machinery and equipment and transportation materials (MDIC).


The United States became the most important destination for Brazilian industrial exports at the end of the 20th century and have maintained this position throughout the 21st century, occupying first place in every year between 1997 and 2022. When the comparison is made with the MERCOSUR and European Union blocs, one can see (Graph 2) that the United States was the main destination in 16 of the 26 years and the main destination in the last eight years as well.



Graph 2 — Brazilian exports of industrialized goods (US\$ billion)

Source: MDIC. Elaborated by the authors.


The change in the terms of trade of industrialized goods in relation to agricultural and mineral goods has slightly altered the share of industrial products in the total sold to the United States. In any case, the average between 2001 and 2022 was 82.7%, considerably above the world average of 68.8%. However, as shown in Graph 3, while the share of industry in Brazilian exports to the world shows a consistent downward trend, from 81.6% in 2001 to 54.3% in 2022 (27.3 percentage points), the share of Brazilian exports to the United States decreased less, from 95.9% to 78.8% (17.1 percentage points). Thus, the United States has helped to mitigate the strong primarization and reduction in technological content of Brazil's exports from the 2000s onwards (CNI, 2022).



Graph 3 — Share of industrialized goods in Brazilian exports

Source: MDIC. Elaborated by the authors.

Considering high-tech and medium-high-tech goods combined, the United States also stands out in Brazilian exports from 1997 onwards, even though the list has also decreased in terms of technology. In 2022, Brazilian exports of these two groups of goods amounted to 26.4% of the total sold to that country. For the world, this percentage was 14.9% (11.5 percentage points less). These sectors accounted for a significant 48.0% in 2011 and 43.3% in 2016 of sales to the United States.



Graph 4 — Share of medium-high and high-tech exports in Brazilian exports

Source: MDIC. Elaborated by the authors.

Looking only at high-tech goods, since the beginning of the 2000s, on average, the United States has accounted for 49.5% of total Brazilian

exports to the world. Among the ten most important products in Brazil's shipments to the United States in that sector are aircraft and their parts (50.9% of the total and the top 4 products on the list), followed by pharmaceuticals (4 products), electronics and medicines.

Table 1 — Brazilian high-tech exports to the United States (2022)

| Product | Value | Share of the sector's |
|---|----------------|-----------------------|
| Product | (US\$ milhões) | total |
| Other aircraft and other aerial vehicles over | 1 004 4 | 28,8% |
| 15,000 kg | 1.824,4 | 20,0% |
| Aircraft and other aerial vehicles from | 000 4 | 10.407 |
| 7000 kg < weight <= 15000 kg | 660,4 | 10,4% |
| Other aircraft parts or helicopters | 427,8 | 6,7% |
| Turboreactor or turbopropeller parts | 312,0 | 4,9% |
| Other vaccines for human medicine | 154,0 | 2,4% |
| Cell phone transmitter | 128,1 | 2,0% |
| Other medicines with heterocyclic compounds | 127,2 | 2,0% |
| Medications with other polypeptide hormones | 119,9 | 1,9% |
| Heparin and its salts | 114,5 | 1,8% |
| Other medicines | 112,5 | 1,8% |
| Others | 2.360,4 | 37,2% |
| Total | 6.341,2 | 100,0% |

Source: MDIC. Elaborated by the authors.

The Brazil-United States partnership in trade in services

Services account for most of the GDP and jobs created in the largest economies. In global trade, their importance and dynamism has been growing, accounting for 22% of total trade between countries. Trading in this sector has become easier and more technology-intensive and has incorporated gains of scale (WTO, 2022). The Organization also states that trade in services is related to increased productivity and economic diversification (WTO, 2020).

The databases on trade in services don't have long records that allow for historical analysis or even a sectoral breakdown. The WTO, for example, provides more structured statistics from 2005 onwards. In Brazil, official data on trade in services is available from the Central Bank

and shows that its share in Brazil's total trade flow will be 15.9% in 2022, which is lower than the world figure in 2022.

The United States occupies the position of Brazil's most important foreign trade partner in services. The value of Brazil's trade in services with the US is 28.5%, almost 10 percentage points higher than trade with the rest of the world (15.9%).

The total value of trade in services between Brazil and the United States in 2022 was US\$ 25.3 billion (US\$ 11.1 billion in exports and US\$ 14.2 billion in imports). In 2022, the United States accounted for 44.9% of Brazilian exports in the services sector and 38.6% of Brazilian imports. This share has been increasing for imports. On the export side, the country maintains a stable position, at a high level, above 40% throughout the period between 2010 and 2022.

60,0% 50,0% 40.0% 30,0% 20.0% 10,0% 0.0% 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 _Imports Exports

Graph 5 — Participation of the United States in Brazil's

Trade in Services

Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Elaborated by the authors.

Consequently, the United States outranks Brazil's other partners in the sector by a wide margin (Tables 2 and 3). Another relevant fact is the dynamism of these bilateral exchanges. Between 2010 and 2022, there was a total growth of US\$ 8.1 billion in absolute value, of which more than half (US\$ 4.3 billion) came from increased sales to the United States. In the case of imports, the total absolute growth in the period was US\$ 5.2 billion, with foreign purchases from the United States amounting to US\$ 5.9 billion. This explains the leap in participation as the largest provider of services to Brazil.

Table 2 — Brazilian exports of services by destination (US\$ million)

| Country | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | Share in 2022 | Difference in value 2022 x 2010 |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|---------------------------------|
| United States | 6.789 | 9.021 | 10.810 | 9.199 | 10.051 | 8.426 | 7.936 | 8.375 | 8.396 | 8.319 | 8.120 | 9.111 | 11.075 | 44,9% | 4.286 |
| United Kingdom | 1.078 | 1.079 | 828 | 1.079 | 1.511 | 1.096 | 1.017 | 1.082 | 896 | 1.071 | 992 | 1.222 | 1.591 | 6,4% | 513 |
| Switzerland | 461 | 671 | 669 | 1.182 | 1.289 | 1.185 | 1.038 | 1.040 | 686 | 775 | 672 | 728 | 626 | 4,0% | 518 |
| The Netherlands | 930 | 206 | 1.196 | 1.594 | 2.444 | 1.234 | 1.019 | 1.143 | 1.006 | 1.022 | 754 | 863 | 206 | 3,7% | -23 |
| Germany | 756 | 842 | 904 | 825 | 845 | 965 | 866 | 1.102 | 1.004 | 926 | 892 | 721 | 902 | 3,7% | 149 |
| Ireland | 282 | 148 | 351 | 358 | 431 | 357 | 382 | 644 | 200 | 531 | 456 | 209 | 736 | 3,0% | 454 |
| France | 746 | 754 | 269 | 771 | 726 | 683 | 622 | 574 | 564 | 513 | 393 | 433 | 479 | 1,9% | -267 |
| Others | 4.661 | 6.025 | 5.646 | 5.504 | 6.163 | 5.898 | 6.075 | 5.706 | 6.285 | 6.155 | 4.949 | 5.930 | 7.074 | 28,7% | 2.414 |
| Total | 16.535 | 20.551 | 22.369 | 21.732 | 24.852 | 21.014 | 20.208 20.721 | 20.721 | 20.753 | 20.300 | 17.888 | 20.527 | 24.676 | 100,0% | 8.142 |

Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Elaborated by the authors.

Table 3 — Brazilian imports of services by origin (US\$ million)

| | | | | | | | ۱ ا | | | • | , | | - | | |
|-------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|------------------------------------|
| Country | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | Share in 2022 | Difference in value 2022 x 2010 |
| Inited States | 8.332 | 10.117 | 12.141 | 12.453 | 11.394 | 11.081 | 10.486 | 10.262 | 9.829 | 10.618 | 10.266 | 12.119 | 14.234 | 38,6% | 5.901 |
| Netherlands | 6.293 | 8.247 | 9.142 | 9.185 | 11.723 | 11.133 | 11.823 | 10.540 | 10.209 | 7.804 | 5.973 | 2.032 | 3.744 | 10,2% | -2.549 |
| Germany | 1.180 | 1.387 | 1.332 | 1.523 | 1.501 | 1.234 | 1.069 | 986 | 1.096 | 1.017 | 1.102 | 1.062 | 1.368 | 3,7% | 189 |
| reland | 376 | 409 | 516 | 629 | 780 | 718 | 613 | 654 | 629 | 854 | 468 | 515 | 1.052 | 2,9% | 929 |
| | 1.308 | 1.496 | 1.376 | 1.399 | 1.908 | 1.415 | 1.289 | 1.095 | 828 | 746 | 752 | 833 | 688 | 2,4% | -419 |
| United Kingdom | 2.420 | 2.395 | 2.659 | 2.235 | 2.815 | 2.428 | 2.155 | 2.191 | 2.027 | 1.237 | 1.512 | 902 | 876 | 2,4% | -1.544 |
| | 517 | 683 | 791 | 829 | 901 | 863 | 865 | 938 | 819 | 829 | 733 | 793 | 816 | 2,2% | 298 |
| Others | 11.211 | 12.260 | 14.308 | 15.443 | 16.000 | 15.608 | 11.445 | 11.441 | 10.657 | 12.703 | 11.242 | 11.989 | 13.881 | 37,7% | 2.671 |
| Total | 31.637 | 36.994 | 42.266 | 43.724 | 47.020 | 44.479 | 39.745 | 38.107 | 36.153 | 35.808 | 32.049 | 30.246 | 36.861 | 100,0% | 5.223 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Elaborated by the authors.

The Report by the Brazilian Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) details Brazilian trade in services by sector in 2020 and 2021, not presenting cross-referencing by country. According to the Report, the Brazilian exports of services to the world in the sectors of business services; transportation; telecommunications, computing and information; and travel amounted to 85% of the total sold by Brazil in 2021 (Table 4).

Table 4 — Structure of Brazilian service exports in 2020 and 2021

| Type of service | 2020 | 2021 | Variation | Part. 2021 |
|--|----------------|----------------|-------------|------------|
| Type of service | (US\$ million) | (US\$ million) | 2021 x 2020 | 1411.2021 |
| Other business services, including | 13.666,7 | 15.375,3 | 12,5% | 46,4% |
| architecture and engineering | 15.000,7 | 13.575,5 | 12,570 | 40,470 |
| Transports | 5.059,2 | 6.459,7 | 27,7% | 19,5% |
| Telecommunications, computing, and | 2.551,7 | 3.258,9 | 28,0% | 9,8% |
| information | 2.331,7 | 3.236,3 | 20,070 | 3,870 |
| Traveling | 3.044,0 | 2.947,3 | -3,2% | 8,9% |
| Maintenance and repair services | 1.061,9 | 1.080,1 | 1,7% | 3,3% |
| Financial services | 829,4 | 1.050,8 | 26,7% | 3,2% |
| Insurance | 581,3 | 783,7 | 34,8% | 2,4% |
| Intellectual property and R&D services | 634,3 | 705,3 | 11,2% | 2,1% |
| Government services | 611,5 | 669,1 | 9,4% | 2,0% |
| Cultural, personal and recreational | 410,5 | 668,9 | 62,9% | 2,0% |
| services | 410,3 | 000,3 | 02,370 | 2,0 /0 |

Source: Relatório SECEX. Elaborated by the authors.

Considering how significant the United States is in the foreign sales of services by Brazilian companies, it is possible to infer that, as a rule, these sectors are also relevant in Brazilian exports to the US market. To help with this analysis, it is possible to use studies carried out in previous years, which provide data on trade in services by sector in bilateral trade, although more outdated.

The comparison between the data in Table 4 and the composition of Brazilian exports of services to the United States (Table 5) is not a simple task, due to the time lag, possible changes in the trade profile and even differences in nomenclature. However, these data suggest that Brazilian exports to the United States are more deconcentrated and that financial

services; IT services; R&D services; and maintenance and installation services are gaining more space on the list.

Table 5 — Composition of Brazil's services exports to the United States in 2016

| Type of service | Value (US\$ million) | Share |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|-------|
| Other professional services | 1.855,3 | 30,3% |
| Financial services | 808,9 | 13,2% |
| IT services | 767,7 | 12,6% |
| Business support services | 524,1 | 8,6% |
| Serviços de P&D | 385,2 | 6,3% |
| Maintenance and installation services | 308,6 | 5,0% |
| Transport support services | 301,1 | 4,9% |
| Legal and accounting services | 292,3 | 4,8% |
| Cargo transportation services | 221,7 | 3,6% |
| Telecommunications services | 177 | 2,9% |

Source: CNI 2018. Elaborated by the authors.

The IT and aircraft engine maintenance cases

IT services: IT services are the third most important category of services, both in overall Brazilian sales (Table 4) and to the United States (Table 5). According to data from the Association of Information and Communication Technology and Digital Technology Companies (Brasscom), the sector exported US\$ 4.6 billion in 2022, a 36% increase over the previous year, surpassing hardware exports for the first time (Valor, 2023).

This increase in Brazilian exports is directly related to the US market, among other reasons due to the popularization of remote services for software development and systems support, and the fact that the Brazilian time zone is closer to the US time zone. Another relevant point is the demand for services provided by subsidiary companies to their headquarters in the United States under global contracts, as in the case of IBM, which has three Brazilian units that export software to its headquarters in the United States. The company even acquired

companies in Brazil in 2020 to offer robot process automation (RPA) systems, including for the US market (Valor, 2023).

The list of exporting companies and services in the IT field is long. There are companies with national or foreign capital present in Brazil that export to the United States (and elsewhere) workspace digitalization services, infrastructure, cybersecurity and systems with the agile methodology, banking systems, software for digital channels and fraud detection, digital automation services and data analysis for the industrial and logistics areas.

Aircraft engine maintenance services: Brazil has the largest aircraft engine overhaul facility in Latin America and exports professional and maintenance services for turbines and aircraft engines to various parts of the world, especially the United States. According to data from the former Siscoserv, the United States accounts for 48.2% of Brazilian exports of aircraft maintenance and repair services (Estado de Minas, 2013).

This large engine maintenance and overhaul facility, which was also the first turbine factory in Brazil, is the result of a joint venture dating back to 1991 between a Brazilian company (Companhia Eletromecânica Celma) and a US company (General Electric — GE), giving rise to GE Celma.

GE Celma began overhauling and maintaining engines used in Boeing's 747 and 787 aircraft, as well as assembling engines made in Brazil, used in Embraer 190 and 195 aircraft, and exported to various regions, including Latin America, China and Europe, in addition to the United States, its main customer.

The joint venture has created a company that is efficient in exporting assembly and maintenance services, with verticalized processes, with more than 90% of the services done in-house. Efficiency is also based on competitive costs, quality, and speed of delivery, especially due to investments in logistics, computerization and trade facilitation policies (including those in force under the Brazil-US bilateral agreement), which have streamlined export and import processes for the parts used in engine overhauls.

The two cases described above are part of economic activities with above-average salary earnings in Brazil, according to official data from the

Central Business Register Statistics (CEMBRE)⁸ of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). In both sectors, average monthly salaries by gender and level of education are above the national average, with figures 104.5% and 149.8% higher respectively for information technology services and activities related to the manufacture and maintenance of aircraft.

The services sector represents the largest part of the countries' GDP, including Brazil. It is also the sector that concentrates job creation. One of the biggest challenges in this sector is productivity gain. Internationalization is a way of achieving this goal, according to the WTO study Trade in Services and Economic Diversification (2022). In the case of Brazil, this gain necessarily involves the commercial relationship with the United States, which is responsible for purchases in this sector in activities that generate greater value, remuneration and impact on Brazil's economy.

The Brazil-United States investment partnership

The first records of US investments in Brazil

For foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Brazil, the 19th century is portrayed in literature as a British century (Tammone, 2013). In fact, the existing data on FDIs in Brazil mostly refer to Great Britain, which between 1860 and 1902 had contributed around 81.4 million pounds (78% of the total), involving 127 companies (Alam and Dalla-Costa, 2022).

Despite British dominance during that period, there are records of 2.4 million pounds and 8 companies with US capital in the 19th century, especially the famous Brazil Railway Company, led by US investments (Lanna, 2013).

Although it was from the 1970s onwards that FDI accelerated in Brazil, there had been an important movement by US companies at the beginning of the 20th century in the wake of incipient industrialization

⁸ Data can be found in the table entitled "Number of companies and other organizations, total occupied personnel, salaried occupied personnel, average salaried personnel, salaries and other remunerations, average monthly salary, in minimum wages and Reais, by sex and level of education, according to the sections, divisions and groups of the classification of activities – Brazil – 2021" at the link: .">httml?=&t=resultados>.

(Suzigan and Szmreczanyi, 1994). These companies participated in three ways: i) processing raw materials for exports; ii) supplying the domestic market; and iii) replacing some imported goods.

The first way includes the industrialization of meat in Brazil, with refrigerators from the United States, such as the Continental Products Company (1917), Armour (1920) and Swift (1919), which at that time already employed 1,200 workers in the country.

In the second way, we highlight Goodyear, which signed a contract to set up a rubber factory in Rio de Janeiro (1917); and the Diamond Match Company (1930), one of the phosphorus companies producing in Brazil.


In the third way, there were a large number of cases at the beginning of the 20th century. In machinery and equipment, the US companies Singer Machine (sewing), United Shoes Machinery (footwear) and Internacional Harvester (agricultural machinery) stand out. In electrical equipment, General Electric began operations in 1919 and supplied 35% of Brazil's demand for light bulbs in 1927. In motor vehicles, Ford began operations in 1919 in three states, and General Motors began operating in the 1920s in São Caetano. In chemicals and personal care products, Procter & Gamble and Du Pont set up production units in the 1930s (Suzigan and Szmreczanyi, 1994).

The Brazil-United States investment partnership today

US investments in Brazil

According to the Brazilian Central Bank, the United States is the largest source of FDI⁹ in Brazil, with U\$S 123 billions.


⁹ From the perspective of the final controller.



Graph 6 — FDI stock in Brazil by country (US\$ billion) – final controller

Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Elaborated by the authors.

The Central Bank also calculates FDI inflows regardless of the final controller, meaning that even if a US company owns the capital, the inflows could come from countries with favorable taxation. Based on this data, the United States accounted for an average of 18.2% of FDI inflows between 2001 and 2022, with a peak of 33.1% in 2021. The country was the main origin in 11 of the 22 years, behind the Netherlands, which Brazil considers to be a favored tax country for holding activities. ¹⁰



Graph 7 — US share of FDI inflows to Brazil

Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Elaborated by the authors

¹⁰ More information available at: http://normas.receita.fazenda.gov.br/sijut2consulta/link.action?idAto=16002.

Between 2001 and 2022, inflows from the United States grew above the world average, by 146.2% compared to 106.7%. In 2001, these inflows amounted to US\$ 4.5 billion. In 2022 they reached US\$ 11.0 billion. The peak over this period was reached in 2021 (US\$ 13.0 billion).

14,0
12,3
11,1
10,3
11,0
10,0
8,0
6,0
4,5
4,0
4,6
4,5
4,0
2,6
2,0
2,0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Graph 8 — FDI inflows from the United States to Brazil (US\$ billion)

Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Elaborated by the authors.

In sectoral terms,¹¹ based on data from 2010 to 2022, 71.1% went to the services sector, 15.0% to the industrial sector and 13.9% to agriculture, livestock and mining. These figures differ from the profile of total FDI received by Brazil in the period, since services accounted for 49.9% (18.5 percentage points less), while industry accounted for 33.6% of FDI inflows worldwide (18.5 percentage points more).

From the main sub-sectors' point of view (Table 6), there are significant similarities and differences between the FDI profile of the United States and the FDI profile of the world in Brazil. Among the similarities are the extraction of oil and natural gas, as well as trade, with close shares. Among the differences are real estate (9.5% x 3.2%), finance (8.4% x 5.5%), insurance and reinsurance (5.7% x 2.4%), and information technology (5.4% x 2.2%).

¹¹ These refer to gross inflows of direct investments in the country – capital participation, excluding reinvestment of profits. The total flows by sector of economic activity do not necessarily correspond to the sum of the figures by country for confidentiality reasons.

Table 6 — Sectoral composition of FDI from the United States vs. the World in Brazil (2010-2022)

| Main sector of economic activity | 2010-2022 | Variation (2022 x 2010) | Parti. FDI EUA no Brasil | Variation US\$ | Part. World FDI in Brazil |
|--|-----------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| TOTAL | 118 564 | 78,9% | 100% | 4 848 | |
| Oil and natural gas extraction | 12 704 | -84,8% | 10,7% | - 1 352 | 9,4% |
| Trade, except vehicles | 11 642 | 105,4% | 9,8% | 465 | 8,9% |
| Real estate activities | 11 209 | -8,2% | 9,5% | - 45 | 3,2% |
| Financial services and auxiliary activities | 9 980 | 263,4% | 8,4% | 1 923 | 5,5% |
| Insurance, reinsurance, pension, and health plans | 6 743 | 42,3% | 5,7% | 10 | 2,4% |
| Motor vehicles, trailers, and truck bodies | 6 432 | 593,3% | 5,4% | 140 | 6,3% |
| IT services | 6 347 | 1317,1% | 5,4% | 1 204 | 2,2% |
| Transport | 4 872 | 78,5% | 4,1% | 64 | 2,4% |
| Financial services — non- financial holding companies | 4 683 | 271,8% | 4,0% | 761 | 2,4% |
| Provision of information services | 4 027 | 6233,5% | 3,4% | 637 | 1,2% |
| Building construction | 3 601 | -89,9% | 3,0% | - 359 | 1,2% |
| Non-real estate rents and intangible assets | 3 089 | 171,9% | 2,6% | 41 | 0,9% |
| Other sectors (or confidential information) | 2 495 | -35,1% | 2,1% | - 154 | 0,0% |
| Professional, scientific, and technical activities | 2 240 | 25382,6% | 1,9% | 877 | 0,5% |
| Extraction of metallic minerals | 1 938 | 26,5% | 1,6% | 30 | 3,3% |

Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Elaborated by the authors.

According to a ranking by *Valor Econômico*, out of the 1,000 companies operating in Brazil with the highest net revenue in the fiscal year 2021, 198 had foreign capital. Out of the total, 23.2%, or 46 companies, had capital from the United States, and had a net revenue of R\$ 242.6 billion in that year, or 22.6% of the total revenue of companies with foreign capital in Brazil. The main sectors are food and beverages, chemicals and petrochemicals and information technology (Table 7).


Table 7 — Major US companies operating in Brazil (2021)

| Company | Headquarters | Sector of activity | Net revenue (in R\$ billion) | Capital (Origin) |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| CARGILL | São Paulo | Food and drink | 67,16 | US |
| BRF | Santa Catarina | Food and drink | 39,47 | BR/US |
| OI | Rio de Janeiro | IT & telecommunications | 18,78 | US |
| MOSAIC | São Paulo | Chemistry and petrochemistry | 17,96 | US |
| WHIRLPOOL | São Paulo | Electro-electronics | 9,26 | US |
| CORTEVA | São Paulo | Chemistry and petrochemistry | 6,01 | US |
| EMPRESAS PROCTER & GAMBLE | São Paulo | Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics | 5,75 | US |
| UNIDAS | Minas Gerais | Transport and logistics | 5,59 | BR/PT/US |
| FMC | São Paulo | Chemistry and petrochemistry | 5,59 | US |
| ALLIED TECNOLOGIA | São Paulo | IT & telecommunications | 4,72 | US/BR |
| AGCO | Rio Grande do Sul | Vehicles and spare parts | 4,54 | US |
| IP BRASIL | São Paulo | Pulp and paper | 4,02 | US |
| BALL BCSA | Rio de Janeiro | Metallurgy and mining | 4,01 | US |
| PFIZER | São Paulo | Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics | 3,69 | US |
| ESHO | Rio de Janeiro | Medical services | 3,12 | US |

Source: Valor 1000. Elaborated by the authors.


Brazilian investments in the United States

The Central Bank provides data on Brazilian investments abroad since 2006. The statistics include countries with facilitated tax treatment, but even in this scenario, the United States stood out as the biggest destination for five years, especially between 2018 and 2022. The peak of participation as a destination was in 2022, with 31.2% and the highest value was reached in 2007, with US\$ 4.8 billion, mainly due to the purchase of the Swift meatpacking plant by JBS for the announced amount of US\$ 1.4 billion.



Graph 9 — The United States' share of Brazil's FDIs

Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Elaborated by the authors.



Graph 10 — Brazilian FDI in the United States (US\$ million)

Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Elaborated by the authors.

The Central Bank's data does not provide sectoral details of Brazilian operations in the United States, but based on statistics related to greenfield investments, ¹² it is possible to identify (Table 8) that the largest investments by Brazilian companies in the US market are in food, wind energy and petrochemicals.

¹² New investment, i.e. not including acquisitions of pre-existing companies.

Table 8 — The 10 Brazilian companies with the largest greenfield investment announcements in the USA – 2013 to 2022

| Company | Sector | Number of Projects | Capex (US\$ million) | Capex Participation (%) | Estimated Jobs |
|---------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|
| JBS | Food | 6 | 622 | 21.7% | 849 |
| Omega Energia | Wind Energy | 1 | 219 | 7.6% | 693 |
| Braskem | Petrochemicals | 2 | 218 | 7.6% | 198 |
| Bauducco | Food | 1 | 214 | 7.5% | 100 |
| Votorantim | Metallurgy | 2 | 194 | 6.8% | 336 |
| Fiesta | Clothing | 3 | 160 | 5.6% | 117 |
| Portobello | House and Construction | 2 | 95 | 3.3% | 400 |
| Natura | Cosmetics | 6 | 89 | 3.1% | 115 |
| Embraer | Aviation | 3 | 87 | 3.0% | 900 |
| Oxiteno | Chemistry | 1 | 84 | 2.9% | 168 |
| Arezzo | Footwear | 3 | 70 | 2.4% | 216 |
| Other (74) | - | 79 | 814 | 28.4% | 4,122 |
| Total | | 109 | 2,865 | 100% | 8,214 |

Source: Relatório ApexBrasil. Elaborated by the authors.

Examples of results of Brazil-United States cooperation

Technological Institute of Aeronautics – ITA

ITA is a prestigious and widely recognized institution, which graduates around 2,000 professionals a year in six different engineering courses. The trained workforce mainly serves the aeronautics industry located in the interior of São Paulo, especially Embraer, which was created in 1969.

ITA's history is linked to the Brazilian Armed Forces, with Air Marshal Casimiro Montenegro Filho playing a leading role. The idea took shape after a presentation to the Aeronautics Department of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the California Institute of Technology (CALTECH). The ITA model faithfully followed MIT's and contributed to the fact that, during the first 10 years of ITA's existence, the deans, professors, and some management positions were occupied by American professionals (Guimarães, n.d.).

The Brazilian aeronautics industry is currently one of the most competitive in the world. It is the most innovative industry in Brazil, with almost 3% of its production spent on R&D (Morceiro, 2018) and one of the leading exporters, with 84% of its production sold abroad — the highest rate in Brazilian industry, much higher than the average of 25.9% (CNI, 2023). The United States absorbed more than 60% of Brazilian exports in the sector. Aircraft and their parts are the 4th most exported product by Brazil to the United States and the 5th most imported, making it one of the main examples of supply chain trade between the two countries.

Finally, Brazil is now the third major engineering center for the US company Boeing, with 500 employees in São José dos Campos. The two main motivations for Boeing's expansion in Brazil were precisely the quality of the workforce and confidence in Brazil as a supplier at a turbulent geopolitical moment (Martins, 2022).

National Steel Company (Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional - CSN)

CSN was created by decree in 1941 as a mixed economy company to manufacture pig iron, steel, and derivatives. The creation of a large steel company had been a goal of the Brazilian government since the 1920s and was considered a strategic and national security issue (Atlas FGV, 1998).

However, the setting up of this large company faced financing challenges and Brazil sought to combine national and foreign capital. The country started looking for solutions in Europe and the United States, in a mission led by then Chancellor Oswaldo Aranha. Brazil and the United States began conversations, but the partnerships with Itabira Iron Ore Company and United Steel did not prosper as they were not approved by the Brazilian National Steel Commission.

Faced with an international climate of political instability and international conflicts, the governments of Brazil and the United States moved closer together again under the Washington Accords¹³ (Correa, 2022). This led to the release of US\$20 million by the Export-Import

¹³ A series of agreements signed between the Governments of Brazil, the United States and England in Washington in March 1942, covering various measures relating to the production of raw materials.

Bank of the United States (U.S. Eximbank) to Brazil, making it possible to build CSN. This movement gave impetus to the creation of new steel mills (Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais — USIMINAS and Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista — COSIPA, for example) and to Brazil's heavy industrialization process in the 1950s, supporting the development of other industries (Franca, 2020).

From the 1960s onwards, steel-related products began to appear on Brazil's export list and by the 1980s these products were already the most exported by Brazil, accounting for 13.7% of the list.¹⁴

Brazil currently has the largest steel industrial park in Latin America, is the world's sixth largest net exporter and ranks ninth as a steel producer in the world. ¹⁵ Semi-finished iron and steel products and pig iron, two of the most important items on Brazil's export list to the United States, ranked first and third in 2023.

Joint Commission and the BNDES

The National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE), currently the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), was created in 1952 and was born out of the dialogues of the Brazil-United States Joint Commission (CMBEU), from 1951 to 1953 (Agência BNDES de Notícias, 2017).

The CMBEU was linked to Point Four, a program of international technical cooperation and transfer of know-how and technology from the United States to countries in the developing world. The Commission's goal was to draw up diagnoses of the main barriers to Brazil's economic development and submit infrastructure improvement projects to organizations such as the World Bank and the U.S. Eximbank (Gomes, 2022). Brazil was the first country in the world to establish a partnership with the United States under Point Four.

¹⁴ MDIC data, available at: https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/comercio-exterior/estatisticas/outras-estatistica-de-comercio-exterior.

¹⁵ Data from the Brazil Steel Institute, available at: https://acobrasil.org.br/site/historia-do-aco/>.

The CMBEU was considered a technical success, due to the results of the studies, its impact on subsequent development plans such as the Plano de Metas and, above everything, the creation of the BNDE (Gomes, 2022).

The BNDES is currently one of the largest development banks in the world and offers financing and guarantees for agriculture, services, industry, and infrastructure. From the 1990s to the 2010s, 15% of the country's gross fixed capital formation was financed by the Bank (Barboza, 2019). The BNDES is also key in supporting Brazilian exports, including credit insurance, having supported US\$ 100 billion in exports of goods and services between 1972 and 2022, especially high-tech machinery and equipment and aircraft.

Partnership for the present and future

The challenging international environment and the worsening climate crisis in recent years have increased the risks associated with supply chain disruption and, as consequence, the interest and urgency of countries in searching for resilience and the transition to a low-carbon economy. The United States has been a great example of public policy activism to address supply chain security challenges and encourage decarbonization.

This scenario opens valuable possibilities to be explored between Brazil and the United States, also due to geographical proximity, business ties, complementarity between productive sectors and shared values. In light of these factors, we suggest some ways to deepen current and future cooperation between the two countries.

Supply chains

The United States' efforts in this area have been based on two main lines. The first involves policies to encourage reshoring and the diversification of suppliers, through public policies such as the Chips Act (semiconductors) and the Inflation Reduction Act, which encourages the production of electric cars, batteries and other clean energy manufacturing. The second initiative consists of bilateral or plurilateral arrangements

to promote the diversity of regional and global supply chains, as well as inducing investment and trade in sectors that are considered strategic.

This path deserves priority attention from Brazil and the United States in order to make progress on measures such as:

- i) signing a bilateral agreement on supply chain diversification, with the purpose of reducing risks and increasing resilience in relevant sectors, and helping exports from Brazil to qualify for tax advantages offered by policies such as the Inflation Reduction Act;
- ii) structuring a high-level bilateral group, with the participation of representatives from the private sector and government of both countries, seeking to identify opportunities for cooperation in relevant sectors (e.g. semiconductors; critical minerals and batteries; low-carbon hydrogen; basic health inputs, medical devices and vaccines; renewable fuels; fertilizers; among others).

Low-carbon economy

The governments of Brazil and the United States have placed the environmental agenda at the center of their public policies. Cooperation to achieve their respective environmental goals is a powerful point of convergence between the two countries and offers important economic and social opportunities. Some of the measures that could be jointly adopted include:

- i) greater participation by the business sector in the work of the Brazil-United States Clean Energy Industry Dialogue;
- ii) the search for convergence between recent national policies on clean hydrogen, prioritizing a bilateral plan to stimulate hydrogen transport and convergence on certification of the clean origin of hydrogen;
- iii) financial cooperation for the implementation of environmental preservation actions in Brazil, including through the Amazon Fund;
- iv) collaboration to ensure that preserving the environment and fighting deforestation do not create unnecessary and disproportionate barriers to trade;

v) promotion of private partnerships and investments in battery energy storage systems, as well as technical and scientific cooperation for the development of a battery recycling industry and the reuse of critical minerals;

vi) promotion of partnerships in sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), prioritizing the convergence of rules and standards on scope 3 emission measurements, in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) guidelines.

Bilateral agreements

In 2020, Brazil and the United States took an important step towards expanding the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (ATEC) by signing protocols on trade facilitation, good regulatory practices and anti-corruption measures in trade.

This agreement has generated concrete progress in reducing nontariff barriers in bilateral trade and for advancing regulatory quality in Brazil. In the first case, the results include greater transparency and speed in the clearance and transit of goods, rationalization of charges and fees and mutual recognition of authorized economic operators (AEOs).

ATEC

The ATEC is still limited in scope, but the possibility of its continuous improvement and expansion offers a window to gradually advance and raise the ambition of economic and trade integration. In this sense, some of the following areas can be explored:

- i) Sustainable development: environmental rules, which are increasingly frequent in trade agreements, help to achieve international climate goals, especially by reaffirming the adoption of international commitments, stimulating bilateral cooperation and preventing unnecessary barriers to trade.
- ii) Domestic regulation of services: the enormous importance of trade in services between countries justifies the negotiation of rules for good regulatory practices in services, such as transparency and private

participation in regulation and publicity in the definition of requirements for the authorization of service providers.

iii) Digital economy: digitalization is reducing international trade costs, and countries that advance this agenda are more productive. Defining rules for regulatory approximation between Brazil and the United States on issues such as cybersecurity, regulation of electronic transactions or artificial intelligence (AI), for example, will boost business in both directions.

Agreement to avoid double taxation

Investment flows, which are very important in the bilateral relationship, are related to a series of cross-border activities, such as trade in services, royalty payments or bilateral loans (including intercompany), which in turn are subject to income tax in both countries. Double taxation agreements (DTAs) contribute to reducing the transaction costs of this income.

Brazil has been gradually modernizing some core issues that are part of its DTA model, including new transfer pricing rules approved in 2023. The convergence of the Brazilian and US DTA models should be the target of bilateral work to further advance bilateral business and investment.

Final remarks

In 200 years of diplomatic relations, the United States has become Brazil's largest economic partner.

Among the factors that have contributed to this position are: i) the consolidation of the United States as the most important destination for Brazilian exports of manufacturing and technology-intensive products; ii) the significant representativeness of trade in services with Brazil (44.9% and 38.6% of imports and exports, respectively, in 2022), mainly in sectors with higher productivity in the economy; iii) the stock of foreign direct investment, which has made the country the largest destination and origin of Brazilian foreign investment, also in sectors with comparatively higher incorporation of technology.

The challenging international environment and the worsening of the climate crisis in recent years have increased international risks in supply chains, as well as the interest and urgency in the transition to a low-carbon economy. These aspects should guide the next cycle of relations and cooperation between Brazil and the United States, and could be boosted by the following concrete measures:

- to promote the development of more resilient regional supply chains in sectors considered strategic by both countries;
- to promote the convergence of actions on the environment, climate and energy, on fronts ranging from exploiting the great potential in renewable energies (biofuels and electricity sources) to financial cooperation and issues related to forests and biodiversity;
- to negotiate rules within the the ATEC framework and to avoid double taxation, which might boost integration between the two countries and enable new flows of productive investment.

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Post-Neoliberalism? Notes on Political Trends in the USA and their Impact on Brazil

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In January 2016, I arrived in Washington to work in the political division of the Embassy of Brazil. At that time, the last year of the Obama administration was beginning. When I left in July 2019, the Trump administration had already entered its second half. In July 2023, back in Brasilia, I took over the United States and Canada Division of Itamaraty, with President Biden's term about to enter its final year.

Throughout my time as a "professional observer" of US political life, the feeling is of witnessing a period of transition. The political rhetoric of the administrations of Presidents Trump and Biden is both about leaving the past behind, albeit with different emphases and tones. The former, already at his inauguration, spoke of "stopping the American carnage" and "making America great again" (Trump, 2017). The latter, although in a more sober vein, has taken every opportunity to denounce the withering away of the middle class, the closing of factories and the transfer of jobs to other countries in recent decades — see, for example, his State of the Union speech in 2023, in which he claimed: "I ran for President to fundamentally change things" (Biden, 2023).

The very coining of the term "Bidenomics" and its adoption by official White House communication channels seek to mark this departure from previous economic policy – a departure that does not refer to the Trump administration specifically, but to the last few decades. This idea has been conveyed in a more forceful and definitive way by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who has sought to detail it in two major

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speeches, separated by a few months: in April 2023, in a lecture given at the Brookings Institution; and in October of the same year, in a piece published in Foreign Policy magazine. In his April speech, Sullivan says that the current moment calls for a "new consensus" — which he then refers to as the "new Washington consensus" (Sullivan, 2023a); in the October article, he returns to the idea of an "inflection point" and defends the need to "revisit old assumptions," "adapt structures" to meet "new challenges" and "lay a new foundation of American strength" (Sullivan, 2023b).

This common desire to break with the past of the "last few decades" hints at overcoming an era that the specialized literature describes as "neoliberal," paradigmatically (Gerstle, 2022), or, in geopolitical terms, as "post-Cold War" (Gaddis, 1991) or "hyperglobalization" (Subramanian and Kessler, 2013; Subramanian, Kessler and Properzi, 2023). The economic and financial crisis of 2007-2008, by demanding a large-scale government response that "contradicted the conventional narrative of economic history since the 1970s" (Tooze, 2018), constitutes a first important push in that direction. Movements contesting the "neoliberal" status quo of different hues (libertarian, nationalist, progressive, conservative) gained strength from then on, both on the left —Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, the political rise of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren — and on the right — from the Tea Party to the election of Donald Trump and the consolidation of his hold on the Republican Party (Gerstle, 2023). These developments have led economic historian Adam Tooze to assess that the economic and financial crisis that began on Wall Street in 2007-2008 and culminated in the eurozone crisis up until 2012 has become, in the years since, a "comprehensive political and geopolitical crisis of the post-Cold War era" (Tooze, 2018).

This scenario was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The impacts of the pandemic have once again shown the limits of the market in finding solutions to major crises, requiring new rounds of state intervention of unprecedented magnitude. At the same time, the responses of central governments in several countries, including new forms of social welfare policies, pointed to "a new regime beyond neoliberalism" (Tooze, 2021). In light of these developments, critical and

academic analysis has speculated on the "end of neoliberalism" (Reinsch, 2023), the "fall of neoliberalism" (Menand, 2023) and the "fall of the neoliberal order" (Gerstle, 2022).

There is, however, less certainty about the exact contours of the era that follows this "fall," which we could call "post-neoliberalism" — not in the sense of complete overcoming or a definitive paradigm shift, but the weakening and transformation of some of its main assumptions by "an emerging set of reasonings, critiques and movements" (Davies and Gane, 2021). Historian Gary Gerstle, in his study of the "political orders" that govern the major lines of American politics, considers that we are at a "signal moment" in which "one reigning political order (the neoliberal one) comes apart and another struggles to be born" (Gerstle, 2022).

In Gerstle's definition, a "political order" implies "a constellation of ideologies, public policies and interest groups that shape American politics in ways that go beyond electoral cycles." At its peak, the principles of a political order "shape what broad majorities of elected officials and voters regard as politically possible and desirable," offering a common basis for the actions of all groups aspiring to power. The paradigmatic examples of this "ideological hegemony" would be Republican Dwight Eisenhower's acquiescence to the principles of the New Deal and Democrat Bill Clinton's acquiescence to neoliberal parameters (Gerstle, 2022).

Clues to what might become a new "political order" in the US, capable of structuring the decision-making process in the medium to long term, can be sought in the points that constitute the core of the political debate during the Trump and Biden administrations. In some of them, there is a big difference between the two sides — for example, with regard to the environmental and climate agenda and also social rights, such as access to abortion, which continue to be a central component of the "culture war" between conservatives and liberals. These differences between the two will be vigorously highlighted by the parties themselves during the electoral contest that is set to take place in 2024.

At the same time, analysts point to significant elements of continuity between one administration and the other: the expressed desire to reindustrialize and rebuild the middle class, the revision of trade policy in a more protectionist direction and the adoption of the logic of "competition between great powers" as a guide for relations with China. Based on these common traits, the chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times has even been described President Biden as "Trump's heir" (Rachman, 2023).

The description is clearly exaggerated and does not take into account the multiple and very evident differences which remain between the two. It is less a question of an "inheritance" than of similarities arising from circumstances, between political platforms designed against the same backdrop, to tackle the same set of challenges. It is precisely this background and this set of challenges that this article seeks to shed light on, in the hope that they can contribute to a sharper definition of the outline of American policy for the coming years.

To this end, in three brief sections, some of the central issues for a "post-neoliberal" policy in the US will be addressed: i) the adoption of the logic of "competition between great powers" as a guide for relations with China; ii) the renewed influence of geopolitical considerations and strategic competition on the trade agenda; iii) the renewed use of industrial policies and their link to strategies for addressing the climate crisis and the energy transition. In all three cases, as will be seen, there has been a change of course in the conduct of American policy, in the sense of giving the State a greater and more active role.

The final section seeks to summarize these notes, as well as to briefly point out the main impacts of this emerging "post-neoliberalism" for Brazil — in terms of challenges, but also opportunities.

Strategic competition with China

In the immediate post-Cold War period, Sino-American cooperation ceased to be guided primarily by strategic logic and began to place increasing emphasis on the economic and commercial opportunities offered by the Chinese market (Tucker, 1998). At the same time, it was assumed that China's integration into the global trading system, including through its entry into the WTO, would help drive changes in the country — both economic, towards a market economy, and political, towards democratizing reforms.

This logic, which already guided the administration of President George H.W. Bush, gained emphasis under President Bill Clinton, who defended China's accession to the WTO as "the most significant opportunity that we have had to create positive change in China since the 1970's' and "clearly in our larger national interest" (Clinton, 2000). This optimistic vision was inherited by President George W. Bush, as his famous statement in the 2000 election campaign makes clear: "trade freely with China and time is on our side" (Bush, 2000).

This emphasis on economic opportunities was not only based on the promises of gains related to the gigantic Chinese market. The economic approach was made possible by the geopolitical moment in which "for the first time in over half a century, no great power, or coalition of powers, poses a 'clear and present danger' to the national security of the United States" (Gaddis, 1991). Since the terrorist attacks of the September 9, 2001, American strategic attention has turned to the "War on Terror." Some analysts believe that this reduced interest in East Asia has allowed China's presence and influence in the region to increase (Lee, 2023).

The Obama administration faced a different scenario. In 2009, China became the world's largest exporter; in 2010, it became the second largest economic power (by nominal GDP in dollars). Beijing established itself as a major power, and the post-Cold War scenario of a lack of strategic competition no longer served as a basis for American foreign policy thinking. This is when the work of political scientist Graham Allison on the risk of conflict arising from the so-called "Thucydides trap," when an established great power is challenged by the rise of a new power — Sparta and Athens in Thucydides' time; the US and China in the 21st century — gained notoriety (Allison, 2015 and 2017).

The rise of China's strategic stature and its growing assertiveness in the region are central factors justifying Washington's "pivot/rebalance to Asia" policy, which seeks a "larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future" (Obama, 2011). The new policy included a revision of the American military strategy for Asia, starting with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, reversing, for instance, the trend of decreasing American military presence in Japan and South Korea (Davidson, 2014).

At the same time, it went beyond strictly military issues. There was a renewed emphasis on building alliances; the US-ASEAN relationship, for example, was declared a "strategic partnership" in 2015, leading to a first summit meeting at the beginning of the following year. At the same time, the Obama administration was negotiating the ambitious Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — more than a trade agreement, a "gigantic project of commercial, financial, technical and legal integration, with geopolitical intent" (Tooze, 2018), as well as a "de facto China containment alliance" (Landler, 2016).

Until then, the strategy for dealing with China's rise fell into a familiar pattern: reviewing the military posture, accompanied by deepening political and commercial integration with Asia. President Donald Trump's administration would mark a rupture with this pattern. Notable examples of this rupture are the abandonment of the TPP in his first week in office and the launch of a "trade war" with China the following year. The "war" continued to escalate throughout the Trump administration and eventually resulted in the imposition of tariffs of 25% on the equivalent of around US\$ 250 billion in Chinese imports, and 15% on another US\$ 102 billion (for a detailed analysis of the "trade war" and its effects, see Bown, 2022).

At the same time, there was a rhetorical escalation, with the redefinition of China as a "strategic competitor" and economic threat to the US, along with accusations against Beijing for stealing US jobs and intellectual property (National Security Strategy, 2017; Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2018; Trump, 2019).

While the main focus of the economic agenda with China in the 1990s and 2000s was the opportunities offered by the Chinese market, in this new context more emphasis is being placed on the negative impacts of the bilateral relationship on sectors of the business community and workers (especially industrial) in the US. The logic of competition between great powers also began to impose active government participation in conducting relations with China, including the use of coercive tools, as a way of preventing Beijing from "taking advantage" of the US, in the language used by President Trump himself (Trump, 2020).

The Biden administration showed a moderation in tone. The logic of competition between powers was maintained, but there was a new emphasis on the "responsible management" of this competition. This expression was even used constantly by President Biden and other US officials in 2023, a year in which there was a clear effort to overcome the crisis surrounding Representative Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and the "Chinese balloon crisis," which involved visits by the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Commerce to Beijing and culminated in the meeting between Presidents Biden and Xi in November in California.

There is also a more explicit recognition of the deep imbrications between the US and Chinese economies — a fundamental difference from the Cold War, to which the relationship between the US and China is often compared. In a speech dedicated exclusively to economic relations with China in April 2023, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen emphatically rejected the idea of "decoupling" between the US and Chinese economies, something that would be "disastrous for both countries" and "destabilizing for the rest of the world" (Yellen, 2023). A week later, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reinforced the point, invoking statements by European Union President Ursula von der Leyen to define American objectives as "de-risking and diversifying, not decoupling."

These important caveats aside, there has essentially been no reversal of course. The logic of competition between powers continues to guide American foreign policy towards China, albeit with greater care to avoid crises or more serious damage. At the same time, some of the Trump administration's emblematic measures against China, especially the "trade war" tariffs, have been maintained. As will be shown below, new tools have been established to restrict trade with China; new policies have been developed that fit into the context of strategic competition with the Asian country, including in terms of industrial policy; and new fronts for this competition have been created – for example, around the configuration of clean energy supply chains.

This trait of continuity is an important indication that the change in US foreign policy towards China since the Trump administration is more

than a passing adjustment. This reconfiguration is also directly linked to the other parts of the new order in the making.

Trade, national security and resilience

The growing strategic competition between the US and China was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for launching the "trade war." It also fits into a broader conceptual context, with the proliferation in the academic mainstream of numerous works questioning globalization and relativizing the benefits derived from international trade (Rodrik, 2018).

The Chinese case, naturally, served as an illustration for many of the works that sought to highlight the deleterious effects of international trade. In a series of articles, economist David Autor and co-authors described the "Chinese shock," arguing that the exponential increase in trade with China had brought with it significant adjustment costs, with distributive consequences. In particular, they reported wage depression and falling industrial employment in affected sectors for periods of more than ten years (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2021; Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2016; Autor and Dorn, 2013). The work garnered enough attention to earn Autor the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2020.

Since the Trump administration, this negative diagnosis has gained prominence in the definition of trade policy. At the same time, there is a growing perception that the international trade system, with the WTO at its core, is unable to contain the harmful effects of globalization on producers, workers and communities affected by growing imports and job losses. There is also resentment towards the countries of origin of these imports, accused of unfair competition due to the lower cost of their labor and/or the forceful actions of their governments in the economic field, including through subsidies.

The proposed solution involves the more recurrent use of unilateral measures, without the constraints imposed by WTO rules. Not surprisingly, the blocking of new referrals to the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism renders inoperative the very body that could impose higher costs on the use of such unilateral tools. At the same time, a rejection of the traditional model of free trade agreements is taking hold, which

began under the Trump administration and was maintained by the Biden administration (Lighthizer, 2023).

The "trade war" is therefore born from the marriage between the geopolitical challenge posed by China and a new drive to redefine the major lines of US trade policy in a more assertive and unilateral direction. The main objectives are twofold: to guarantee industrial competitiveness against imported equivalents, preventing plants from closing down and the consequent disappearance of jobs; and, on a macro level, to ensure the continued prominence — economic, technological, military — of the US on the international stage.

The instruments of trade policy are therefore put at the service of geostrategic competition and therein seek political legitimacy, with the consequent ever deeper intertwining of trade and national security, which are no longer separate political tracks: the Department of Commerce and the Trade Representative's office frequently refer to issues on the security and geopolitical agenda, while the National Security Council also deals with the economic and trade issues (Farrell and Newman, 2023). In this context, there has been increasing recourse to the GATT's national security exceptions, which in turn opens up new tensions with the WTO (for an analysis of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism's decision on the application of tariffs by the US on the basis of the national security exception, see Bown, 2023).

Curbing the transfer of critical technologies to China, in turn, required tools other than the imposition of tariffs. Starting in 2018, the Commerce Department imposed restrictions on the export of goods or services to Chinese behemoths such as ZTE, Huawei and SMIC (for a timeline of the main measures taken in the "trade war," updated over time, see Bown and Kolb, 2018). In the same year, Congress passed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), expanding the monitoring powers of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). At the core of this expansion is the scrutiny of investments in companies involved in "critical technologies," many of them of dual use, which are of particular importance in the strategic competition between the two countries (Aggarwal and Reddie, 2021).

These moves, which began under the Trump administration, were maintained and sometimes deepened during the Biden administration. The discourse on the negative impacts of globalization was also maintained in essence, while undergoing conceptual refinement.

Emphasis was placed, for example, on the impact of opening up trade in previous decades on increasing inequality and the hollowing out of the middle class — a process which, in turn, would have "frayed the socioeconomic foundations on which any strong and resilient democracy rests" (Sullivan, 2023a). It was also articulated more explicitly that, in the new US trade policy, market mechanisms — the search for efficiency and low costs — would be subordinated to political goals, such as protecting jobs, promoting sustainability and building resilience (Tai, 2023).

In practical terms, the "trade war" tariffs were fully maintained, as was the ban on filling vacant positions on the WTO's dispute settlement body. Also on the agenda was the rejection of traditional trade agreements, accused of contributing "to the same problems we are now trying to address" (Tai, 2023).

The policy of preventing the transfer of critical technologies to China was also expanded, with the imposition of export controls and new monitoring rules on US investments in the Asian country, focusing on fields such as semiconductors, quantum technology and artificial intelligence (Chorzempa, 2023). The logic would be to impose severe restrictions ("high fence") on exports or investments to China, in a restricted number of sectors of strategic importance ("small yard"). Such restrictions would be "motivated solely by (US) concerns about security and values" and would not seek to "gain competitive economic advantage" (Sullivan, 2023a; Yellen 2023).

Over the course of this period, other events, in addition to the competition with China, have contributed to reinforcing the intertwining of trade and national security. Russia has also demonstrated "globalization's geopolitical innocence" (Tooze, 2021). In a particularly dramatic way, the dependence of certain European countries on Russian energy imports, consolidated in the post-Cold War period, became an asset in the clash between Moscow and the West after the invasion of Ukraine.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been another key force behind the growing opposition to many of the assumptions on how international trade works in recent decades. Government measures in response to the pandemic, such as lockdowns and border closures, have generated major disruptions in global value chains, most notably the semiconductor supply crisis for the automotive industry. Even more serious were the difficulties in accessing strategic supplies to fight the pandemic itself — from masks to vaccines.

These supply crises have created renewed urgency around the search for self-sufficiency or, at least, greater diversification in the supply chains of certain goods — especially in cases like semiconductors, where global production is very concentrated, resulting in "a critical economic risk and a national security vulnerability" (Sullivan, 2023a). The goal of minimizing "overreliance" becomes a prominent feature of the political discourse on trade in the United States (Tai, 2023).

The prescription for tackling the problem also gained prominence: the search for greater "resilience" in supply chains, with the diversification of suppliers, the repatriation of productive investments (re-shoring) and their reallocation in the immediate regional environment (near-shoring) or in allied countries (friend-shoring).

When reading the lines of continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations, pointed out above, analysts see a "new Washington trade consensus," a "compromise trade platform that Democrats and Republicans could accept," and that could "emerge organically from the alternation of power" (Hanson, 2023).

Reindustrialization, employment and energy transition

Behind the redesign of US trade policy, therefore, there seems to be a virtually consensual diagnosis: the desire for greater competitiveness against China and other countries; the search for a new boost for the industrial sector, with the creation of quality jobs; the strategic aim of being at the forefront of the production of critical technologies for the 21st century economy; the desire to build resilient supply chains that can avoid new supply crises, even in crisis situations.

In the Biden administration, in addition to the commercial sphere, this same diagnosis also began to stimulate a new development of first-order importance for "post-neoliberal" policy in the US: the return of industrial policy.

Three pieces of legislation, approved between 2021 and 2022, form the backbone of this policy: the *Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act*, the *CHIPS and Science Act* and the *Inflation Reduction Act* — IRA. Together, the three earmark almost US\$ 2 trillion over the next 10 years for infrastructure improvement, clean energy capacity building, domestic semiconductor production and R&D (for a useful summary of the three laws, see the McKinsey&Company report, *Reinvesting in America*).

In this case, the legislative impetus coincides entirely with the Biden administration, with no similar movement during the Trump administration. It is important to note, however, that the infrastructure bill and the *CHIPS and Science Act* went forward with the support of some Republicans in the House and Senate. Only in the case of the IRA was there a difficult legislative process and approval along strictly partisan lines, for which the deep differences between Democrats and Republicans on the climate and energy transition agenda played an important role (Meyer, 2022).

The choice of sectors to prioritize is not surprising. In addition to the case of semiconductors, mentioned in the section above, the case of clean energy chains stands out. There is an associated geopolitical challenge here: the extensive Chinese dominance in several of these chains, including, for example, photovoltaic panels, wind energy systems and batteries for electric vehicles. In addition to the technological race, Washington faces the inconvenience of depending on Chinese imports to meet its decarbonization objectives, which the Biden administration has made a priority. Once again, the economic-commercial agenda intersects with that of national security; in this instance, the climate issue feeds into the objective of diversifying supply chains and creating in-house production capacity in those areas of strategic sensitivity.

The background to this return to the political and academic mainstream of industrial policy — anathema in the US during the height of the neoliberal order — is similar to the one presented for the reconfiguration of US trade policy. It includes, for example, growing geopolitical tensions, the technological race and the search for the re-shoring of productive investments. There are, however, some additional points worth exploring.

Part of the "multiple crises" that the resurrection of trade policy aims to tackle would be the "sluggish post-financial crisis growth" (Evenett et al., 2024). In fact, the recovery of economic activity after the 2007-2008 crisis, even with the Fed's aggressive action, fell short of what analysts expected. Larry Summers, for example, who held prominent positions in the Clinton and Obama administrations, called, as early as 2013, for expansionary fiscal policy, with an emphasis on increasing public investment, as a way of dealing with the effects of "secular stagnation." The arguments were of a technical nature, related to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy to stimulate the economy in an environment of excessively low neutral interest rates (Summers, 2016).

Also in academia, lines of research gained momentum in the same period that sought to explore cases of successful industrial policies (Cherif and Hasanov, 2019) and propose requirements for replicating this success — for example, through the imposition of conditions (Mazzucato and Rodrik, 2023). In both cases, the aim is to respond to the recurring criticism that successful cases of industrial policy — especially in China and the "Asian tigers" — are accompanied by a huge number of failures, in a kind of "anarchy of success" (Easterly, 2009).

In parallel with these developments in academia, there has also been a political-electoral dispute of major importance: the fierce contest for votes in the Midwest — more specifically, in the so-called "Rust Belt," which includes industrial centers that have been in decline over the last few decades. Democratic strongholds since the 1980s, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin gave Trump victory in the 2016 election, in the wake of the promises to the industry embodied in the slogan "Make America Great Again." Without those three states' Electoral College votes, won by a combined total of a mere 78,000 votes, Donald Trump would not have won the majority to be elected president (Davis, 2017).

In the 2020 elections, on his way to electoral victory, Biden took back those three states for the Democrats (Pennsylvania is actually his home state). In any case, in light of the 2016 stumble and the narrow victory in 2020 (in Wisconsin, in particular, by just 20,000 votes), the three states are no longer considered "blue" but among the five or six "swing states" — where the results are more unpredictable, and where the final outcome of the election tends to be decided (see the electoral survey conducted by the New York Times and the University of Siena — Parlapiano, 2023).

In this context, the political importance of developing a platform that appeals to the electorate of these states is clear. Appealing to industry — including workers and industrial unions — is part of this electoral strategy. Labor unions still represent an important part of the Democratic electoral coalition, despite the decline in membership registered in recent decades, and their support for Biden in states like Pennsylvania was important for the 2020 electoral victory (Foroohar, 2023). At the domestic level as well, therefore, the resumption of industrial policy is explained not only by strictly economic reasons, but also by political ones (on the "political economy of economic policy," and the central role of the Midwestern industrial states in this context, see Frieden, 2020).

In the first year since the passing of the *CHIPS and Science Act* and the IRA, according to a survey by the Financial Times, more than 110 large-scale manufacturing projects driven by the new legislation were announced. The total value of large-scale manufacturing investments (at least US\$ 100 million each) announced in the period amounted to US\$ 224 billion, with the promise of creating 100,000 jobs. Michigan is the third state to receive the most investment in this context, with a focus on the battery industry (including a billion-dollar project by Chinese company Gotion). Two other swing states – Georgia and Arizona – appear in first and fifth place on the same list (Chu, Roeder and Irwin-Hunt, 2023).

In broader terms, the period of implementation of this strategy of fiscal expansion and industrial policy coincides with a historic low in unemployment levels in the US. The data on unemployment and job creation has been widely disseminated by the White House and will surely be highlighted by President Biden in his re-election campaign.

There is also an additional, more personal element in the US government's emphasis on industry: the president's personal relationship with industry unions. At the end of September, Biden became the first sitting US president to take part in a strike by joining a picket organized by the United Auto Workers (not coincidentally in Michigan) against the "big three" US car manufacturers — General Motors, Ford and Stellantis. The president also expressed support for the strikers' demands, including a 40% wage increase.

This is not to suggest that these moves stem from mere electoral opportunism. On the contrary: Biden has had positive relations with trade unions since the beginning of his political career and has, over time, been more aligned with the positions of the AFL-CIO (the largest federation of trade unions in the US) than the Democratic Party average (Nichols, 2023). This relationship now takes on renewed importance for the presidential race.

In an election year, it is also important to note that, beyond the dynamics specific to the industrial states of the "Rust Belt," the political agenda of labor unions finds support in public opinion. A Gallup poll shows that the public's approval rating of labor unions stands at 67% (compared to 48% in 2009). On the labor dispute between the UAW and the "big three," 75% said they supported the workers' side, against 19% in favor of the employers. They also matched or surpassed historical records for positive evaluations of the impact of unions on unionized workers (77%) and non-unionized workers (47%), as well as on the US economy in general (61%). The Gallup report concludes that "labor unions are enjoying a moment of high public approval and strong belief in the benefits they offer to workers, businesses and the economy" (Saad, 2023).

Finally, the launch of an industrial policy with an emphasis on clean energy gives the US — especially Democratic governments — an avenue to work domestically on the climate and energy transition agenda.

In previous Democratic administrations, attempts to promote "market" solutions to the problem ran into decisive opposition from Republicans and were overturned in Congress. In 1993, under Bill Clinton, an energy tax based on the heat content produced by different fuels was

proposed; under the Obama administration, a carbon emissions trading scheme (cap-and-trade) was pursued. In both cases, the initiatives failed to pass in the Senate due to resistance from the Republican opposition (for a post-mortem analysis of the two initiatives, see Nordhaus, 2008, and Skocpol, 2013, respectively).

The approval of the IRA therefore contrasts with this history of Democratic failures in Congress on the climate front. In large part, the success was due to a legislative maneuver that made the bill immune to the filibuster — a procedure that requires a qualified majority of 3/5 to pass legislation in the US Senate (Newell, 2022).

Beyond this procedural maneuver, however, there is another important reason for the initiative's approval, linked to the difference in design between the IRA and previous legislative bills: while the latter imposed additional costs on the manufacturing sector, through taxes or the need to buy emission permits, the IRA offers benefits to companies and consumers, in the form of tax exemptions, subsidies and loan guarantees. After the IRA was approved, the Washington Post published an article based on interviews with former US congressmen, comparing the legislative process of that law with the Obama administration's capand-trade bill. One of the conclusions, based on an assessment by former Senator Barbara Boxer, was: "carrots are easier than sticks" (Joselow and Montalbano, 2022).

Conclusion: the contours of the new order and its impact on Brazil

Each of the above sections would merit extensive research and analysis. These brief lines seek to do no more than point to a few notable episodes and try to make sense of the changes underway on the US political scene.

Similarly, other topics could have been included in this work, to the benefit of the robustness of the thesis and the detailing of the general picture of US politics, both domestically and internationally. There is no mention, for example, of the evolution of relations with the European Union; tensions with Russia, in turn, are referred to in passing, which does not do justice to their importance for national security strategy.

In any case, I trust that the subjects covered here are enough to indicate certain macro-trends in Washington — many of which are also reflected in other parts of the world. I would like to believe that the inclusion of other topics, in general, would reinforce the lines of argument presented here rather than contradict them.

The choice of themes was based not only on the need for brevity, but also on their importance for US political discourse and the intertwined nature of their reciprocal relations. Bidenomics, as Tooze explains, combines several parts, each with its own political logic: "a climate component, an industrial policy component, an inequality component, a crisis of American democracy component and the China component" (Tooze, 2023a). This interweaving, I believe, tends to contribute to the fundamental features of this new economic agenda enduring over time.

There are, of course, caveats and challenges. Certain components of this agenda may clash with each other, forcing compromises between the different goals of the government's agenda. Foroohar points, for example, to the fact that an important part of the productive investments announced under the IRA should be concentrated in the US South — where labor and environmental standards are lower — to the detriment of the industrial North and its unionized workers (Foroohar, 2023; on the tensions between the IRA and the union agenda, see Tooze, 2023b). Cases like this may require the government to mediate and calibrate its priorities.

Another possible hurdle for "post-neoliberal" policy concerns the return of inflation in the US, which reached 8% in 2022 and threatens to be one of the major themes of the next presidential election. It is true that this return has been influenced by acute crises that escape the usual logic of macroeconomic policy, from the COVID-19 pandemic to the conflict in Ukraine. There is no consensus, among economists or on Wall Street, on the weight of each of the variables for the rise in prices that year — the biggest since 1981. In any case, the theoretical link between tax expansionism, increased aggregate demand and inflation is well-established enough to make allegations of price level mismanagement credible. Inflation control in the US, as in other countries around the

world, coincided with the "neoliberal" era of controlling public accounts. The academic debate about the exact causal relationships and the "fiscal space" is up to economists, but the task of dealing with the drawbacks of political narratives about inflation and high interest rates may fall to the government of the day. The issue may become even more sensitive in Republican governments, which have been characterized by promoting large tax cuts.

It should also be noted that parts of the agenda outlined in the previous sections do not enjoy bipartisan support. There remains, for example, a deep divide between Democrats and Republicans on the environmental and climate issues, which could have a direct impact on the future implementation of the IRA, should they return to the White House

Still on the subject of the IRA, apart from these very clear differences over the "green" agenda, there doesn't seem to be the same fierce resistance to the concept of industrial policy itself. Some elements of the party still reject the idea of "big government," but this group seems to have lost strength recently. It is symptomatic that former President Trump's attacks on the IRA have not been repeated, for example, regarding the subsidies and incentives provided for in the CHIPS and Science Act — and that a sizeable number of Republicans voted to pass the bill in both the House and the Senate.

Be that as it may, the concept of a "political order," to invoke Gerstle's conceptual framework once again, does not presuppose the absence of disagreements, even fierce ones, on certain items on the political agenda of the day. On the contrary: every political order contains ideological contradictions and conflicts between constituencies, which it needs to manage. The height of the "neoliberal order," for example, coincides with the deepening of the political polarization in the US, in the context of the so-called "culture war" (Gerstle, 2022). President Bill Clinton and the Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, embodied the kind of logic that governs the relationship between the "order" and its intrinsic elements of tension: the public clashes between the two did not prevent them from

working together to pass legislation of mutual interest, many of them related to the economic agenda (Gerstle, 2022).

Strictly speaking, since at least the Obama administration, the environmental and climate agenda has been part of this set of issues on which the differences between the two parties are intense and growing; today, the issue is one of those that arouse the greatest degree of political polarization, along with the immigration policy and others related to social issues and the "customs agenda" (see the summary of the most recent Gallup poll on political polarization: Newport, 2023).

What we have, then, is a broad outline of what could be a budding "political order" in the US, with the necessary caveats about its limits. Given this picture, the question remains: what about Brazil?

The answer is not simple. The growing tensions between the US and China can cause discomfort for a country like Brazil, which does not take sides in geopolitical disputes and maintains intense relations with both powers. The logic of friendshoring, for example, could be an obstacle to Brazil's position in supply chains linked to the US productive sector, if the concept of "friend" in this case is interpreted from an anti-China logic.

The Biden administration's industrial policy, on the other hand, represents an obvious challenge for other countries when it comes to competing to attract investment and build value chains in the semiconductor and clean energy sectors. It should be mentioned, by the way, that several of the new investments in these sectors in the United States, since the IRA was passed, have been made by foreign capital — especially from South Korea, Europe and Japan (Chu, Roeder and Irwin-Hunt, 2023). Not surprisingly, these countries have expressed their concern about the impact of US subsidies on their economies.

I do think, however, that the moment also offers opportunities. Many of them have already begun to be explored in the recently completed first year of the Lula administration.

Firstly, the Biden administration's economic agenda finds important parallels with that of the Lula administration. Even before Lula's election victory, a book was published, organized by economists André Roncaglia and Nelson Barbosa, entitled Bidenomics in the Tropics — Roncaglia and

Barbosa, 2022). In the same vein, Brazilianist Brian Winter commented in a recent article that Biden would probably be "the most 'petista' (a member of the Brazilian Workers' Party) President of the United States in at least half a century" (Winter, 2023).

The possible synergies between the IRA and the Ecological Transformation Plan, for instance, constitute an interesting field for exploration in bilateral dialogue — work that had its first result, incidentally, with the approval of a "Joint Declaration on Support for the Brazilian Ecological Transformation Plan" by the Minister of Finance, Fernando Haddad, and the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, in a meeting held at the beginning of last December, on the sidelines of the UNFCCC COP-28.

The Biden administration's labor agenda also has important points of convergence with President Lula's administration, whose union background and history of support for workers' causes make him an obvious partner for any international endeavor on the subject. The launch of the Partnership for Workers' Rights last September was a first step in this direction. The implementation of the Partnership was the subject of a first meeting between the Minister of Labor and Employment, Luiz Marinho, and the Deputy Undersecretary of the United States Department of Labor, Thea Lee, at the end of November. The discussions covered various topics, such as the platform economy, tackling inequalities and promoting equity, quality jobs and the green economy, among others.

With regard to the effort to redesign global supply chains around the incentives approved by the CHIPS and Science Act and the IRA, there also seem to be opportunities for the Brazilian industry to enter these chains and for attracting investments to Brazil. This line of action also fits in with the Brazilian government's neo-industrialization policy. There is even a good coincidence between the sectors prioritized on both sides: last year, the Brazilian government launched not only the aforementioned Ecological Transformation Plan — which has parallels, *mutatis mutandis*, with the IRA — but also the New Program to Support the Technological Development of the Semiconductor Industry (PADIS).

The IRA's impetus could give Brazilian industry a new chance to enter supply chains that, until now, have been heavily concentrated in Asia. Brazil can and should benefit from nearshoring and friendshoring, provided that the concept of "friend" in this case is not interpreted in such a way as to demand exclusivity or automatic alignments. In mentioning this idea, *Inter-American Dialogue*'s Margaret Myers mentions the idea of "making friends-shoring."

Brazil has, for instance, productive capacity for semiconductor packaging. With new investments announced in the production of semiconductor wafers in the US, the need for packaging is expected to increase significantly, and Brazil could be a candidate to receive investments in expanding and improving its capacities to help meet this demand.

The opportunities involving clean energy supply chains, in which Brazil has important comparative advantages, are even more obvious, and the issue has been the subject of discussion since the beginning of President Lula's administration. The opportunities even extend to cutting-edge sectors such as green hydrogen and sustainable aviation fuels. With its abundance of critical minerals and existing production capacity in battery packs, Brazil would also be a candidate to receive productive investments covering the rest of the electric car battery production chain — including battery cells, a sector in which the US is seeking to counter Chinese hegemony.

These possibilities were discussed at various bilateral meetings throughout the year, by officials from Itamaraty and the ministries of Finance, Energy and the Environment. The US Chamber of Commerce, with the support of AmCham Brazil, also organized a business mission to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo with this specific purpose (GreenTech Businnes mission). The private sector's interest in the matter was also more than evident at the last edition of the Brazil-US CEO Forum, held in December 2023 at the Itamaraty Palace.

Finally, there is the question of navigating geopolitical tensions between the US and China. This is a broader and more complex subject, which does not allow for hasty conclusions at the end of an already brief text. In any case, it seems fair to say that the current moment also offers opportunities.

There are, of course, those who rail against the "myth of neutrality" and see in the current situation an irresistible pressure on developing countries to choose sides between the two powers (Fontaine, 2023). Others, on the other hand, speak of a re-emergence of the non-aligned movement, stressing that the Global South rejects the logic of "competition between great powers" and does not want to join new artificially imposed blocs (Hill, 2023).

I don't see any elements that support the thesis of imposing a binary choice. At the same time, I see important differences between the present moment and the Cold War, which call for caution when resurrecting concepts conceived for another historical moment and another geopolitical reality. The international order today seems more fragmented, with more room for the search of autonomy and flexibility. Emerging countries, in general, have sought to keep their options open and have given preference to partnerships around specific themes, rather than general alliances (Spektor, 2023). Certain structural alliances remain, but even these are fraught with internal tensions and sometimes divergent agendas.

On this subject, the Financial Times published a series of articles last August on the rise of the "middle powers" — not in the sense of their weight, but in the sense that they occupy an intermediate position between the US and China. The theory is that, in the new geopolitical order, these middle powers would not have to choose from a fixed menu of alliances and could serve themselves à la carte. It correctly points to the fact that a large number of emerging countries are currently developing productive relations with the US and China, and are taking advantage of the benefits that each of these relations can offer. According to an investment analyst interviewed for the article, "we should no longer talk about of non-aligned movement, but of the multi-aligned movement" (Russell, 2023).

On the part of US analysts and the Washington authorities themselves, there seems to be a greater understanding of the reality of emerging countries and the inconvenience of imposing a binary choice on them (Jones, Hart and Paz García, 2023). As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan himself acknowledges, "it is only natural that countries aligned with neither the United States nor China will engage with both, seeking to benefit from the competition while endeavoring to protect their own interests from any spillover effects" (Sullivan, 2023b).

This seems a very favorable reality for Brazil's tradition of pragmatic and independent foreign policy. In conducting our bilateral relationship with the US, we shall continue to pursue all opportunities to advance Brazilian interests, without choosing sides or closing doors. In our consistently candid and constructive dialogue with Washington, it will be necessary to emphasize that the "multi-aligned" character of the Brazilian foreign policy does not call into question the depth of our – now bicentennial – friendship.

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The bicentennial of the establishment of bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States is a significant occasion in our diplomatic history. One of the first countries to recognize Brazil's independence on May 26, 1824, the United States has established itself throughout this period as an indispensable partner for Brazil in the international community.

In the multipolar order that is taking shape today, the Brazil-US relationship can play an important role in addressing the major global issues: climate change, the fight against global warming and the promotion of sustainable development; the reduction of socioeconomic asymmetries between and within countries, including the fight against hunger and poverty; the reform of global governance decision-making bodies; the maintenance of international peace and security; nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; the protection of human rights and the defense of democracy.

Mauro Vieira Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil





