Brazil-Turkey

Two emerging powers intensify relations

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Minister |  | Aloysio Nunes Ferreira
Secretary-General |  | Ambassador Marcos Bezerra Abbott Galvão
Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation
President | Ambassador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima
International Relations Research Institute
Director | Minister Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Center for Diplomatic History

and Documents

Director | Ambassador Gelson Fonseca Junior
Editorial Board of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation
President | Ambassador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima
Members | Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg
| Ambassador Jorio Dauster Magalhães
Ambassador Gelson Fonseca Junior
Ambassador José Estanislau do Amaral Souza
Ambassador Eduardo Paes Saboia
Minister Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Minister Paulo Elias Martins de Moraes
Professor Francisco Fernando Monteoliva Doratioto
Professor José Flávio Sombra Saraiva
Professor Eiiti Sato

The Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (Funag) was established in 1971. It is a public foundation linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose goal is to provide civil society with information concerning the international scenario and aspects of the Brazilian diplomatic agenda. The Foundation’s mission is to foster awareness of the domestic public opinion with regard to international relations issues and Brazilian foreign policy.

Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere

Brazil-Turkey

Two emerging powers intensify relations

Brasília – 2018

Copyright ©Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation

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The opinions expressed in this work are solely the author’s personal views and do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Brazilian government’s foreign policy.

Brazil 2018

G993 Güzeldere, Ekrem Eddy.

Brazil-Turkey: two emerging power intensify relations / Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere. – Brasília : FUNAG, 2018.

410 p. - (Coleção relações internacionais)

ISBN: 978-85-7631-760-9

1. Política externa. 2. Política externa - Brasil - Turquia. 3. Diplomacia - Brasil - Turquia. 4. História diplomática - Brasil - Turquia. 5. Política econômica - Brasil - Turquia. 6. Relações acadêmicas - Brasil - Turquia. 7. Relações culturais - Brasil - Turquia. I. Título. II. Série.

CDD 327.098104

Depósito Legal na Fundação Biblioteca Nacional conforme Lei n° 10.994, de 14/12/2004.

Bibliotecária responsável: Kathryn Cardim Araujo, CRB-1/2952

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

After having worked in Turkey for a political foundation and an international think tank for roughly eight years mainly on domestic issues, I decided to resume my academic life and do a PhD. What was clear then, was that it should not have to do anything with domestic politics. The rest was everything but clear. In this phase, the debate on emerging powers caught my interest. The initial idea was to compare Brazil, Turkey and Germany in a study on emerging and established regional powers.

After professor Detlef Nolte, from the GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies, in principle had accepted to supervise my thesis, he not only suggested to reduce it to just two countries, but also helped finding the theoretic framework and directed my attention to important issues like status. I therefore would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my thesis advisor, also for many contacts and ideas concerning the interviews in Brazil and for a very good cooperation over the course of the thesis preparation and writing.

Secondly, I am very grateful to the many people who accepted to be interviewed by me in both Turkey and Brazil. Without their contributions, this thesis would not have been possible in the current form, because it could not have been mastered just using written sources. A special thanks goes to Monique Sochaczewski Goldfeld – and her family – who not only hosted me in Rio de Janeiro, but also introduced me to many Rio-based academics.

When having read in other acknowledgements, appreciations to friends or family who offered a flat on an island or a house near the beach to write in tranquility for some time, I found that a bit exaggerated. Not anymore. I am grateful to my then partner, now wife, who let me write in seclusion in a flat in João Pessoa – close to the beach – for more than a month and to my parents whose house I could use in Urla – also close to the beach – for some six weeks. Without this undisrupted focus, it would not have been possible to finish so determined. The gratitude towards my parents by far exceeds the use of their house, I am thankful and grateful for their constant support and understanding.

This publication is a slightly enlarged and updated version of my PhD thesis, which I finished in October 2016. Two chapters were added – 4.6. Continuity or rupture in foreign policy and 4.7. Personalized foreign policies. There are also some updates on economic figures, statistics and meetings for the period between November 2016 until November 2017.

I am more than grateful to ambassador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, president of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), for the honor to publish my thesis with this prestigious Brazilian foreign policy institution. I am deeply indebted to Eduardo Gradilone, Brazil’s ambassador to Turkey since November 2016, to Paulo Roberto de Almeida, the current director of FUNAG’s International Relations Research Institute (IPRI), and to FUNAG’s Editorial Board, for their support and efforts to make this publication possible. I hope it will serve as a first step for more research on different aspects of bilateral relations.

Istanbul, December 2017

FOREWORD BY PROF. DR. DETLEF NOLTE

With the joint mediation initiative in the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program in 2010, relations between Turkey and Brazil – both countries being members of the G20 and playing a leading role in their regions – garnered for the first time broader academic and public interest. This joint initiative marked a high point of the bilateral relations, which afterwards decreased in importance for both countries.

The author analyzes the relations between Turkey and Brazil as rising powers within a broader historical context that also includes a retrospective on the past relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Empire of Brazil. But the main focus is on the period of the parallel presidencies of Erdogan and Lula (2002/2003-2010), which came to an end with the joint initiative in Iran. This is a central and excellent part of the book. The countries jointly tried to push forward their status as rising powers to be taken into account by established powers in international politics. The author describes and analyzes both the Turkish and the Brazilian position in regard to the Iranian nuclear program and their joint interests and motives vis-à-vis mediating in the crisis.

The book offers a broad overview of Brazilian-Turkish relations, comparing their economic advances, their economic potential, and the obstacles to development that each country faces. It also makes reference to academic cooperation and cultural exchange. The author uses and quotes original sources from Brazil as well as from Turkey. Quite interesting is the information expounded in regard to the influence of the Gülen movement in Brazil. The book also contains important data on the development of the diplomatic service of both countries. It demonstrates that budget and staff development did not adequately keep pace with the expansion of embassies and consulates.

The author provides a wide-ranging panorama of Brazilian-Turkish relations. This is the first comprehensive study on this topic. The book is rich in empirical depth and scope. In the end, the book demonstrates that, official declarations of good will on both the Brazilian and the Turkish side notwithstanding, the basis for the expansion of economic relations between the two countries is limited. There are not many personal contacts between Turkish and Brazilian citizens, virtually no migration from either country to the other, and negligible numbers in terms of tourists and academic or cultural exchange. But this might also be true for the relationship between other so-called “emerging” and “rising” powers.

Hamburg, December 20, 2017

Prof. Dr. Detlef Nolte

Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies - German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

FOREWORD BY AMBASSADOR EDUARDO RICARDO GRADILONE NETO

Ekrem Güzeldere gave me a great honor in inviting me to write this foreword for his book about Brazil and Turkey. The two countries share similar challenges in their path to development, defend comparable positions in multilateral organizations and frequently fight together for a more democratic system of global governance. They have much in common other than their monarchic past. In spite of the geographic distance and of our different cultures, there seems to exist a reciprocal feeling of familiarity and friendship between Brazilians and Turks.

Some of the reasons for that could be our extrovert temperament, the passion for soccer and soap operas, and even the affection with which Brazilians call “Turks” all those who immigrated to Brazil from the former Ottoman Empire. One feels at home in Turkey. Perhaps the Brazilian coffee beans widely used to make Turkish coffee have also some surreptitious influence in the building of this particular kinship. Anthropologists and behaviorists could try to explain better the causes for this singular affinity between our peoples.

Güzeldere’s book serves other purposes. It fills a gap in the literature on Brazil’s and Turkey’s relationship, covering virtually all aspects, from the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1858 up to now. It is thoroughly detailed and very well documented and presented, with plenty of references, tables and charts showing how our countries fare and compare in world statistics. A vast and very useful bibliography is included. It is, therefore, a major contribution for a better knowledge of our countries and their relations, providing important references for other studies related to them. It is, perhaps, the best single source book about Brazil and Turkey to date.

Certain topics, such as the one dedicated to the “Tehran Declaration”, are greatly enriched with interviews with protagonists and experts. Other subjects, such as the economic cooperation that started under the “strategic partnership” established in 2010, with so many areas, actors and documents involved, are very skillfully systematized and presented to the readers. Even our cultural and academic relations are presented in the book, along with information about our national communities, education projects and student programs.

It is innovative and interesting, on the other hand, how Güzeldere applies “role theory” to analyze Brazil and Turkey. In my thesis about “Models of International Relations” written in 1998 for the “High Level Studies” course of the Rio Branco Institute – the Brazilian diplomatic academy –, I stressed that models and theories can be controversial, but they can be useful tools for analyses. Using concepts such as emerging, regional, middle power or “cusp” states, Güzeldere puts in evidence some characteristics of Brazil and Turkey which usually may not be clearly observed at first sight. Being a German who lives in Turkey and is fluent in Portuguese, he was able to consult sources in several languages and to offer a well grounded “foreign perspective” about our countries Sometimes foreigners have a better perspective on certain things about us, as the French Alexis de Tocqueville has shown with his work “Democracy in America” about the United States.

Güzeldere’s is not, however, a book dedicated to praise Brazil and Turkey. On the contrary, in several aspects it is very critical. The author does not disguise a certain disillusion with the fact that moments of more intense approximation between Brazil and Turkey are not many and do not last long, and that ambitious agreements of mutual cooperation and joint projects have not been realized or continued, – largely due to domestic, regional or other external issues which eventually divert our countries attention, or to lack of resources to fulfill their aspirations.

His book, not withstanding, shows that when we get closer and manage to know better each other a sense of discovery sparks and the numbers of our interchanges climb. I am sure his book will contribute for this to happen in a more sustainable and durable way. I am glad, therefore, that FUNAG (Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation, the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s institution for the promotion of diplomacy and international relations studies), intents to publish his book in 2018, when Brazil and Turkey celebrate 160 years of formal diplomatic relations. It will greatly contribute to a better knowledge about our two countries, their relationship and their role in global affairs. This is particularly important in a moment when most of the problems which hindered the proper implementation of our “strategic partnership” are being overcome. There is a general sentiment, shared in governmental and private circles, that this special partnership could shortly be put back on track.

Recent facts and developments justify this more optimistic feeling. Brazil restarted to grow, after two years of the worst economic recession in its history, while Turkey is keeping its high levels of growth and plans to be among the ten biggest economies in the world in 2023. On the 9th of November 2017, in São Paulo, the “Joint Business Council” reactivated their works with the meeting of DEIK – Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey – and its counterpart FIESP – Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo. In Ankara, an intense program of events to promote Brazilian and Turkish cultures and business opportunities in the two countries will take place from next year in the renovated premises of the Brazilian Embassy.

We hope that these initiatives will give concrete fruits and that optimistic expectations about our bilateral relations will not be frustrated again. Güzeldere’s book, for its quality, completeness, frankness and kind of approach, will be an invaluable source of information to help us learn from the experiences of the past and to guide our actions to explore, in a realistic and effective way, the immense potential of the relationship between Brazil and Turkey.

Brasília, December 13th, 2017

Eduardo Gradilone

Ambassador of Brazil to Turkey

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 2

All the world is a stage: role theory in foreign policy analysis

2.1. Bridging structure and agency

2.2. K.J. Holsti’s three main propositions

2.2.1. Foreign policymakers have national role conceptions (NRCs)

2.2.2. NRCs vs role prescriptions by others

2.2.3. Complex sources of NRCs

2.3. More features of Role Theory

2.3.1. No obligation for a specific role – room for creativity

2.3.2. Several roles simultaneously – some might be incompatible

2.3.3. A theory mainly for democratic states?

2.3.4. Consensus and discrepancy, differing NRCs

2.3.5. Continuity and change

2.3.6. Methodology

2.3.7. Ideal role types

Chapter 3

Emerging, regional, (new) middle powers

3.1. Below great power status, things get complicated

3.2. The regional power category and its limits for Turkey (and Brazil)

3.3. Cusp states

3.4. Status

3.4.1. Introduction

3.4.2. Recognition by others

3.4.3. International status of Turkey and Brazil

3.5. Role conceptions of Turkey and Brazil as regional or emerging powers

3.6. Role formulation by leading decision makers

Chapter 4

Foreign policy of Turkey and Brazil

4.1. Introduction

4.2. Traditional Turkish foreign policy

4.3. AKP foreign policy

4.3.1. Ahmet Davutoğlu – architect of Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy

4.4. The Arab Spring and the limits of Turkish regional influence

4.5. Brazilian foreign policy

4.5.1. Brazilian Middle East policy

4.5.2. Foreign policy under Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)

4.5.3. Foreign policy of the Temer government

4.6. Continuity or rupture in foreign policy

4.6.1. Continuity or rupture in Turkey’s foreign policy

4.6.2. Continuity or rupture in Brazil’s foreign policy

4.7. Personalized foreign policies

4.8. Soft power in Turkey and Brazil

Chapter 5

Bilateral relations Turkey-Brazil

5.1. Historic relations 19th century – early 20th century

5.2. Political-diplomatic relations

5.2.1. Bilateral relations post-Cold War

5.2.2. 2003 AKP / PT and bilateral relations

5.3. The 2010 Tehran Declaration on Iran’s nuclear program

5.3.1. Background to Iran’s nuclear program

5.3.2. International negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program 2003-2009

5.3.3. Turkey’s and Brazil’s efforts in the Iranian nuclear program

5.3.4. The 17 May 2010 Declaration

5.3.5. Reactions to the agreement

5.3.6. Evaluation of the Brazil-Turkey diplomatic efforts

5.4. 2010: Towards a strategic partnership

5.5. Bilateral relations under Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)

5.6. 2016-2017: Developments under the Temer government

5.7. Foreign ministries, foreign missions

5.8. Diplomatic problem: the Armenian genocide

5.9. Economic relations

5.9.1. The importance of the economy for emerging powers and the intensification of Turkey-Brazil relations

5.9.2. Turkey and Brazil: economic miracles or just following the trend?

5.9.3. Common problems: brothers in corruption and poor rankings

5.9.4. Two unequal societies

5.9.5. The bilateral economic and trade relations

5.9.6. Brazilian investments in Turkey

5.9.7. Turkish investments in Brazil

5.9.8. Tourism

5.9.9. Outlook on economic relations

5.10. Academic relations

5.11. Cultural relations

5.12. Citizens in both countries

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Bibliography

Newspaper articles

List of Interviews

Annex

Bilateral treaties

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION¹

The 2000s were (tagged as) the golden years for emerging powers. Led by the BRICS and followed by a plethora of less known groupings such as MINT, Next-11, MIKTA or CIVETS, scenarios of a “post-western” world were high on the agenda of both economists and political scientists. Especially during the time of the 2008/09 global financial crisis, the change of the global order as we knew it, seemed almost palpable. The clear protagonist of this movement is China, but Brazil and Turkey are in a subsequent group of countries representing this trend. The BRICS also became a darling for academics. Research centers around the world flourished to describe and compare them, but there is significantly less research between BRICS and non-BRICS emerging powers. For that reason, this work will offer new insights into relations of emerging powers, also on a cross-regional basis.

However, not only this aspect is novel. The bilateral Brazil-Turkey relations in general are a little researched topic with still an exotic flair. After all, in the past 12 years there have been at least a few preliminary studies on the historic relations in books and dissertations formats and some articles on aspects of bilateral relations. Therefore, with this study, still many firsts will be covered and some aspects will be examined in an unprecedented depth. Among the firsts is a detailed description of the historic relations in the 19th century in English, which until now only partly exists in either Turkish or Portuguese. This work merges research in both languages. Further firsts are the chapters on cultural and academic relations. Most articles so far dealt with the 2010 Iran Declaration. Here a very detailed account will be presented taking into account recent written sources in several languages, as is the case for the economic and politico-diplomatic chapters. Since there is little written material about the topical state of bilateral relations, numerous interviews were conducted throughout 2016 in both Turkey and Brazil. This enriches the work with so far unpublished aspects of bilateral relations and gives it a further depth.

Broadly speaking the work is divided into two main parts and several sub-chapters. The first part includes theoretical chapters and aspects of the foreign policies of Brazil and Turkey. The second part is about several aspects of the bilateral relations.

The theoretic frame is role theory, which has been used in foreign policy analysis since 1970. According to it, foreign policy is not decided spontaneously on a case-basis, but follows road maps, which are based on the available resources of a state and the role formulation of decision makers. Therefore, it is a theory combining structure and agency. To best analyze and compare foreign policy performances, ideal types are developed. In our case, the ideal type is that of emerging powers, which is equivalent to rising powers. However, in carving out the role of these states, also regional and middle powers are taken into account, which are researched in more detail. Brazil and Turkey will be defined as both emerging powers until 2013 and new middle powers since then. Additionally, both states are also part of the small category of cusp states, which are characterized as not only geographically lying at the edge of a region, but more importantly having an ambivalent relation to their home region from a historic and political perspective and suffer from problems of recognition. This cuspness of Brazil and Turkey could further increase the desire to strengthen relations with other emerging powers outside the home region.

Brazil and Turkey, to a large extent, fulfill the pre-conditions of emerging powers to dominate their neighbors in economic, diplomatic, military and soft power categories. This is more obvious with Brazil, but also Turkey is in most categories either leading or in second position, but taken all together also a clear candidate for leadership in a given region, in this case the Middle East.

However, resources are not enough. Equally important is that such a role conception is also formulated by leading decision makers. Therefore, these role formulations will be analyzed in both countries from speeches, interviews and written articles or books by leading decision makers. Decisive role formulations would mention to develop a global foreign policy not confined to one region, the importance of trade, economic and investment aspects of foreign policy, to forge alliances with other emerging powers, to launch diplomatic initiatives of global importance or to challenge the current order be it in trade or in diplomatic negotiations. Some of these formulations can be very explicit, others will be more indirect. Especially two motivations are important for the intensification of relations: emerging powers try to raise their status in the global diplomatic hierarchy and are searching for new trade options for their ever more export-oriented economies.

The second part of the first block is a brief analysis of the foreign policies of Brazil and Turkey after the end of the Cold War. Since this is a far too broad subject, only the most important features of especially the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and PT (Workers’ Party) foreign policies will be analyzed. Besides this, a few selected foreign policy issues will be looked at, which can be compared, such as whether the AKP/PT foreign policies represent a rupture with foreign policy traditions or rather a continuation of former foreign policy practices. Another sub-chapter deals with the use of soft power in both countries’ foreign policies.

The second part of the book then describes and analyzes how these two emerging powers intensify their relations in political, economic, cultural and academic fields. Does the bilateral example correspond to the role formulation of emerging power? Even so, before getting to the contemporary relations, the section begins with the historic relations in the 19th until the early 20th century. The first diplomatic contacts had already started in the 1850s leading to a first bilateral treaty to be signed in 1858. Most of the aims of the treaty, direct trade relations, setting up of diplomatic missions or more independence from European powers were not achieved. Despite that, already then, two peripheral powers tried to become more independent from the big economic powers of the time and strengthen their direct relations. Towards the end of the 19th century, the question of migration of Ottoman citizens to Brazil both led to more contacts and connections, but was also a source of problems and accusations. The 1858 treaty was finally abolished in 1912. It lasted up to 1927 until the young Turkish Republic and Brazil signed again a friendship treaty, this time though, without mentioning any economic or political goals. That seemed a wise prevision. The bilateral relations during the Cold War are largely a terra incognita. There were embassies in both countries, but no state visits and only very little economic exchange. This only changed in the 1990s when the first state visits happened and Turkey, for the first time, formulated a Latin America strategy where Brazil would be the major partner. These first initiatives however, had to be postponed because of domestic problems in both countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Therefore, the real intensification of bilateral relations only happened during the AKP governments and PT presidencies, which began almost simultaneously in late 2002 and early 2003 respectively. Contacts were continuously intensified and state visits of the highest level took place to both countries. The climax of diplomatic-political relations was in 2010 when the two countries tried to broker a deal concerning the Iranian nuclear program and signed a comprehensive strategic partnership. Nevertheless, both the Iranian Declaration was not successful and the many concrete plans from the strategic partnership were not realized. The climax in relations and the decline of intensity increased, mainly caused by rising domestic problems. In Brazil, these were economic difficulties, corruption scandals and mass riots, while in Turkey, to a lesser degree, there were also rising domestic problems, but especially growing insecurities caused by the wars in Syria and Iraq, terrorism in Turkey and refugee flows, which forced both countries to focus on domestic issues and the near environment. Hence, independently from the bilateral relations, both countries in general have retreated from the international scene in the past five years. The political relations with less intensity remain good with one exception, the Armenian Genocide, which the Brazilian Senate commemorated in 2015. Since this was only a limited motion, this topic might cause diplomatic disgruntlements again in the future when the Chamber of Deputies will vote on an already planned and much more comprehensive recognition.

Parallel to the political relations, also the economic and trade relations developed strongly under the AKP/PT legislatures, but only until 2011. As in the politico-diplomatic chapter also some economic aspects will be compared, which feature prominent in both countries such as corruption and inequality. Since 2003, the bilateral trade volume increased eight times until 2011 to reach almost three billion USD. However, then it was expected to soon increase to ten billion, whereas it declined to currently only slightly above two billion USD. The main reason for the decline is the economic crisis in Brazil, but also negative experiences of exporters and investors in the two countries and that the economic relations still have to be regarded as new. The market conditions, right contacts and networks are little known. This is also the reason why investments in both countries are low, only a few companies dared to commit to a bigger investment. An exceptional development could be witnessed in tourism, which has increased enormously, but only by Brazilian tourists to Turkey, not the other way around.

Since the economic and financial crisis in Brazil will continue at least until 2018, it cannot be expected that the bilateral trade relations will increase before this crisis is overcome.

To conclude, two more aspects of bilateral relations are analyzed, the academic and the cultural relations. Both remain on a low level, also negatively affected by the domestic and economic problems in Brazil. Concerning the cultural relations, since 2006 the controversial Turkish-Islamic Gülen network has been active in Brazil with a school, cultural centre and a chamber of commerce. However, since the Gülenists and the Turkish government are in open confrontation since December 2013 and even more so since July 2016, this also reduced the financial means and room of manoeuvre of the Gülen movement in Brazil. So far, there is no state or other privately sponsored cultural activities on a comparable level. In Turkey, Brazilian cultural associations are run by private persons only and therefore with far lower financial means and staff. This low level of cultural exchange is also due to the fact that very few Turks live in Brazil and Brazilians in Turkey. Not even 1000 citizens each reside permanently in the other country.

Concerning academic relations, there are currently three university centers in Turkey dealing with Latin America. Two of them were launched during the most intensive period of bilateral relations. In Brazil until today, there is no Turkish studies or similar department. A recent development is that the Brazilian university association Grupo Coimbra started to connect with Turkish universities signing cooperation agreements. However, due to the insecure situation in Turkey, the student exchange so far did not materialize.

In all aspects of bilateral relations, an increase in intensity could be witnessed until 2010/2011. Both countries practiced the role of emerging power in strengthening relations with another emerging power, increasing the trade volume and political contacts and engaging in diplomatic initiatives of global interest. This was also a time of constant economic growth, domestic stability with governments and presidencies of very high approval ratings. However, since then there is a process of de-intensification, which also hints at the limits of what emerging powers can reach in bilateral relations and international diplomacy when domestic problems arise. In the end, they did not prove to be so crisis-resistant as predicted during the global financial crisis in 2008/09. They also lack the physical and human capacities to sustain such an ambitious foreign policy in times of domestic or neighborhood crises. Interestingly, even if this process now has been going on for roughly five years, no adjusting of the role conception could be witnessed. Decision makers still formulate the same active and global foreign policy as ten years ago, whereas the actual policies do not match anymore these ambitions. The retreat from the international scene and the slowdown in bilateral relations is not matched by the role conceptions.

CHAPTER 2

ALL THE WORLD IS A STAGE: ROLE THEORY IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

All the world’s a stage,

and all the men and women merely players²

The concept of role descended from the theater stage and entered social sciences in the 1930s by the application of sociologists and psychologists. For sociologist Biddle, role theory “began life as a theatrical metaphor.”³ More than 300 years after William Shakespeare’s As You Like It was first performed, the role concept was developed on both sides of the Atlantic to explain the behavior of individuals in society,⁴ which would be the stage where individuals enter to play their parts. Until the world became the stage, where states performed their foreign policy role(s), it would last until 1970, when the concept was applied to political science.⁵

Role theory therefore is a theory transfer. Kirste and Maull asked the fundamental question whether “this originally individual-related, psychological and sociological concept of role can readily be delegated to states?”⁶ Despite the huge differences between individuals and collectivities, the core of the analysis did not change. In the end, “roles are performed by individuals ... also within states.”⁷ Gaupp, who in 1983 published one of the first role theoretical analyses in German, added that the “dimensional catalogue of international roles are more complex than interpersonal roles.” But also he approved of this theory-transfer: “Borrowings from advanced disciplines are justified for pragmatic reasons. Such a tradition already exists. Political science has profited to a considerable extent from theory transplantations.”⁸ For the peace researcher and activist Galtung, “sociology is predestined as a reservoir for concepts and hypotheses for the discipline of international relations.”⁹

Kalevi Holsti in an article undertook this transfer in 1970. Some months later, Backman wrote a review of this article, where he conceded “some basis for optimism. While only more empirical research will provide a conclusive answer, this may well be an instance where borrowing a theory has paid off.”¹⁰

2.1. Bridging structure and agency

Role theory combines structure and agency. Through this, it reconciles international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA), which emphasize the importance of different factors for their analyses. IR is occupied with structure, FPA with agency. Within role theory it is not especially surprising that “FPA scholars, focused on individual agency, favored the cognitive approach, while IR and EU scholars who focused on structure or institutions would prefer the structural approach.”¹¹ However, as Breuning stressed “neither a completely structural explanation nor a wholly agent-based one can capture the interplay between decision makers and the environment within which they function. Both agent and structure matter.”¹² Therefore, for Wehner and Thies “one of the fundamental conceptual strengths of role theory is that it is precisely able to bring together both sides in the agent-structure debate.”¹³

In the roughly 45 years of role theory history in FPA, the focus of analysis shifted in waves. The early research by Holsti and other US-based scholars was exclusively focusing on the actor. The initial neglect of the structural perspective was soon to be overcome. For the subsequent research era, Breuning even attested that it “often focused primarily on the way in which the international system compelled states to adopt a specific role or roles. In doing so, role theory-based research remained closely connected to structural theories of international relations ... these structural approaches neglected the agent side.”¹⁴ Aggestam in 2006 completely downplayed the actor: “institutions, not actors themselves, determine roles.”¹⁵ But in 2011, Breuning reasoned that the ego-approach was again more en vogue: “more recent role theory research (BREUNING 1995, BRITTINGHAM 2007, GROSSMAN 2005, LE PRESTRE 1997) takes a more explicitly actor-centered approach.”¹⁶ In contrast, Wehner and Thies in an article written in 2014 argued that “most of the current works on role theory prioritize structure in shaping and determining the role to be selected and enacted.”¹⁷ Breuning relativized this, arguing that “leaders of small states are more likely to perceive that the international structure places a large stamp on their foreign policy than are those of larger more powerful states.”¹⁸ For this research on rather bigger states, this would mean that the actor approach is more important, because the two are relatively less influenced by the international structure and less forced into certain roles.

As with most social science concepts, also concerning role, agreement on an all-encompassing definition is scarce. Biddle and Wiley stated concerning sociology that “the field has no text, no collection of readings and no comprehensive statement of its concepts, theory and knowledge.”¹⁹ Gaupp wrote that since the 1930s, the role concept “had a changeful history and until today no standard definition has been accepted.” 20

Holsti in his seminal article in 1970 did not summarize role in general, but offered a definition of role conception:

A national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.²¹

Goldstein and Keohane defined role conceptions as “a ‘road map’ that foreign-policy makers rely on to simplify and facilitate an understanding of a complex political reality.”²² Kirste and Maull similarly stated the road-map character: “states develop foreign policy role conceptions, their own ideas and expectations of others, which serve as guideline for foreign policy action.”²³ Finally in 2011, Breuning summarized that “the national role conception framework ... seeks to understand how actors fashion their role in the international system, navigating between domestic sources of identity and/or cultural heritage, taking advantage of the material resources at their disposal.”²⁴

Even if there are definitions and as we will see distinct aspects of role theory, for Le Prestre the “concept of role itself as it applies to foreign policy, is poorly understood.”²⁵ The problem Le Prestre referred to, is the colloquial use of role, which is confused with the scientific term. Therefore, after this short historic sketch, let us turn to the main pillars of role theory in foreign policy analysis to better clarify the concept. All the credit for the introduction of role theory into FPA goes to Finnish scholar Kalevi Holsti, who in 1970 asked the fundamental question: “how do policymakers view the roles their nations should play in international affairs?”²⁶ There are three main theses of his analysis:

1) foreign policymakers have national role conceptions,

2) national role conceptions are more influential than the role prescriptions emanating from the external environment in shaping foreign policy behavior,

3) the sources of national role conceptions are a complex mixture of location, capabilities, socio-economic characteristics, system structure, and the personalities of leaders.²⁷

2.2. K.J. Holsti’s three main propositions

2.2.1. Foreign policymakers have national role conceptions (NRCs)

The fundamental assumption of role theory is that foreign policy decisions are not decided spontaneously. Gaupp summarized that

no state understands its foreign policy as a sequence of incoherent unique situations and actions emanating from moods. The state tries to order and plan them, develop action strategies and acquire an arsenal of typical behavior patterns for the mastering of recurrent situation types, i.e. policies.²⁸

The state is central to the analysis as the prime international actor. However, the state “cannot be the role carrier and cannot act.”²⁹ Kirste and Maull underlined that “the foreign policy orientation of the state, the selection of certain instruments and means, is the result of a cognitive process and reflections of the actors about their goals and preferences.”³⁰ Wehner and Thies agreed: “Individuals are the subjects of study.”³¹ Through this, for Benes “it opens the ‘black box’ of the state’s decision-making process.”³²

2.2.2. NRCs vs role prescriptions by others

Even if Holsti argued that “foreign policy decisions and actions (role performances) derive primarily from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic needs and demands,” he also acknowledged the importance of “critical events or trends in the external environment.”³³ For Harnisch, these two entities composing roles can be labelled:

ego-part, representing the impulsive, irreducible part of the self

alter-part, representing the internalized expectations of the ‘other.’³⁴

For Holsti, the alter part was negligible: “While we must acknowledge that the alter or external environment is relevant to foreign policy analysis, this study will consider it a constant. Emphasis will be on the definition of national role conceptions and the domestic sources of those conception.”³⁵ Holsti then saw himself also confirmed by the dominant strands of FPA, which “in particular, emphasizes the self-conceptions of policymakers as determinants of behavior (national interest) and generally neglects the role prescriptions of the alter – that is, of the other states in the system.”³⁶

However, there have been scholars who offered a balanced approach as e.g. Harnisch in 2011 who summarized the ego-alter interplay as follows:

On the one hand, they [roles] regularly comprise ego expectations – that is, domestic and/or individual expectations as to what the appropriate role is and what it implies – and alter expectations – that is, implicit or explicit demands by others become a via media between identities (counter-roles or complementary roles, audience cues).³⁷

Debates on the alter-side of role, include not only the position of other states, but also the already mentioned structural aspects, which influence the role formulation and aspects like “system-wide values; general legal principles or charters of international and regional organizations, the ‘world opinion’ and multilateral and bilateral treaties.”³⁸ Gaupp also stressed the potentially restraining effect of legal norms and international laws. Therefore, state behavior is also “internationally normed.”³⁹

Some scholars distanced themselves completely from Holsti’s actor-focused approach. Hakovirta put the expectations of partners in the focus of his analysis: “States have fixed positions and other states prescribe their behavior on that basic.”⁴⁰ This would however be a very static understanding, which would have difficulty in explaining different role behavior by similar states. Gaupp is more cautious in arguing that the room for maneuvering might be limited by external factors: “They do not necessarily cause certain results, but they exclude certain results for sure or with a certain likelihood.”⁴¹

For Harnisch, the political trend of the past years of globalization and an ever more interdependent world, increased the alter expectations: “formal and informal institutionalization of inter- and transnational politics is expanding. As a consequence, role beholders, both state and nonstate actors, face an increasing number of external expectations by various peer groups.”⁴² This makes “role conceptions inherently contested, because roles and their enactment are closely related to the roles of other actors.”⁴³

Nabers in 2011 argued that the different aspects have to be seen together:

Role conceptions constitute the ego part of the role equation, while role expectations denote the alter part and role performance the actual foreign policy behavior. ... it is worth-while to integrate the three elements of roles, as one is unthinkable without the other.⁴⁴

2.2.3. Complex sources of NRCs⁴⁵

Holsti in his vast study of almost 1000 documents did not get into details on sources, which he described merely as “the socio-economic characteristics of the state itself.” For Wish who was one of the early scholars to pick up role theory in 1980, the foreign policy behavior of states is the product of “possibilities, resources in the broadest sense and the national motivations, goals of decision makers.” She offered a categorization of three source groups: 1) size or capability, 2) economic development, and 3) political orientation or accountability.⁴⁶

Size matters. But which kind of size? There are certainly differences in the behavior patterns of large and small states, but there are also small states, which play a strong international role. For Breuning therefore “size is also a very problematic concept ... foreign policy role conceptions are not exclusively determined by size.”⁴⁷ As Kojala and Ivanauskas rightly clarified, the “operationalization of state size may differ (geography, population, economy, etc.).”⁴⁸ They therefore argued that Lithuania theoretically can play any role, which is even truer for Brazil and Turkey.

More broadly speaking, size and other attributes concern the amount of resources a state may possibly have available to use for foreign policy purposes. Decision makers from larger states usually have more available resources than decision makers from smaller ones. In their national role conceptions they therefore will, according to Wish, among others perceive larger domains of national influence and more often perceive their nations in dominant or leadership positions.⁴⁹

The same concept can also be applied to both economic development and political orientation. Decision makers from states that are more economically and politically developed will strive for a more active and influential role of their countries. Especially concerning diplomacy, they “perceive a greater proportion of national roles that are concerned with political and diplomatic issues.”⁵⁰ For the role of “regional leader” already Holsti in 1970 listed “superior capabilities” as one of the sources.⁵¹

Gaupp grouped national attributes, which “coin the international standing and foreign policy behavior of a state,” into five categories⁵²:

- physical base (territory, climate, strategic location, neighbors, natural resources, population size)

- cultural base (ethnic and religious aspects, homogenous or heterogeneous, national character peaceful or aggressive, isolationist, universalist)

- performance quality (social structure, mobility, education system, economic level of development, type of government, administrative structure, innovation capacities)

- performance quantity (growth, productivity, public spending, military strength, intellectual capacity)

- societal sources, which also effect foreign policy: composition, structure, and operation of a society, extent of national unity.⁵³

Finally, Gaupp included formal ideology, past military strategy, physical resources, economic institutions, political systems, elite structures and past performance in international organizations as domestic sources.

Also Sekhri, who analyzed in his words “Third World” countries, Arab and African states, listed a similar set of different sources⁵⁴ without putting them into a hierarchy, which “form a policy maker’s conception of the nation’s orientations and tasks in the international system.”⁵⁵

2.3. More features of Role Theory

2.3.1. No obligation for a specific role – room for creativity

Based on the national attributes and resources, there is still no automatism. Holsti wrote that “there is no logical or empirical reason to believe that any particular type of state must, or probably would, undertake specific policies or orient itself to the system in a particular way.”⁵⁶ Gaupp formulated more cautiously that “formal coercion to a role for an international actor is mostly not the case.” However, some roles for certain states can almost be excluded: “a small developing country would not suit great power attitude; a super power would hardly strive for roles with marginal room for maneuver and sanction capacities.”⁵⁷

Since there is no obligation, there is room and creativity and the “excercise of individuality”⁵⁸, as Holsti wrote. Kirste and Maull agreed that states have individual foreign policy styles: “role theory provides for the demand of individuality.”⁵⁹

But, no obligation also means that states theoretically can decide not to follow any roles. Holsti in his initial analysis found many foreign policy speeches, which “contained no evidence of national role conceptions.”⁶⁰

2.3.2. Several roles simultaneously – some might be incompatible

Role theory both in sociology and FPA assumed that individuals and sates have a repertoire of roles.⁶¹ Exemplary Aggestam wrote that “foreign policymakers tend to conceive of several roles concurrently.”⁶² Already in Holsti’s initial study the average number of different role conceptions per country was 4.6⁶³, and still if the roles for which only one source was available were excluded, the number was still 3.4. Even back then, there was no state with just one single national role. How many roles a state can meaningfully play depends on the “reservoir of representatives and of the capacity to communicate and coordinate by the responsible role planners.”⁶⁴

Most roles are complementary. There are usually “zones of varying role density. Geographic proximity, political, economic and cultural similarities are crucial for diverse parallel role relations between international actors, especially states.”⁶⁵ Chafetz agreed, writing that roles “vary in overall importance (centrality) and according to the situation (salience).”⁶⁶

However, there are also cases where roles are not compatible. Especially authors dealing with the Middle East or Africa have frequently pointed at incompatibilities. Barnett gave the example of Saudi Arabia, which allowed the US to station troops. As an independent state that is perfectly possibly, but as the leader of the Arab world and defender of the faith, rather not.⁶⁷ Also Sekhri with his analysis of Arab and African states reasoned that “some Third World countries perceive for themselves irrational role perceptions.”⁶⁸ An example for such a role was Gaddafi’s Libya as the anti-imperialist spearhead and protector of the Arab world. “It was unsound to suppose that a country of four million inhabitants could stand up to the West, notably to a state as powerful as the US.”⁶⁹ Since this policy resulted in diplomatic isolation and US military attacks, Libya finally gave up its “irrational anti-West/US role perceptions.”⁷⁰

2.3.3. A theory mainly for democratic states?

Principally role theory can be applied to all states. However, within small, unstable and poor states, there are serious problems for a sound analysis. As Sekhri wrote, both dependence and political instability impede a thorough research. “Political instability can easily undermine the credibility of the state and its opportunities to play active roles.”⁷¹ Therefore he concluded that “role approach can be used to analyze the foreign policy of some Third World states, but not all.” As examples he mentioned the Middle East, because “as compared to other parts of the Third World, the Arab region comprises wealthy states.”⁷²

Most analysts do not explicitly mention the fact that roles are rather to be found in stable, economically potent and bigger states, because most of FPA in general is dealing with the more powerful states. Kirste and Maull argued that if foreign policy behavior is the result of value preferences, then “this can be assumed best for the OECD-world”, explicitly because a “high level of institutionalization took the place of chaos.”⁷³ A problem with non-democratic states is that acting capriciously does not necessarily end in political retribution or diplomatic retaliation. Autocrats rather than democrats can act unrelated to any set of coherent role conceptions or to the expectations of friends and allies.

2.3.4. Consensus and discrepancy, differing NRCs

Elite consensus is an important feature of a sound foreign policy role. The bigger this consensus, the stronger the role conception and in most cases, also the role behavior. Breuning used the term “cultural heritage” to describe why there usually is such a big consensus: NRCs “are (in part) derived from domestic values and cultural heritage. If so, decision makers and citizens of the same society should be in broad agreement on these role conceptions.”⁷⁴ Breuning borrowed this idea from Hudson who already in 1999 stressed that “a nation’s leaders rise in part because they articulate a vision of the nation’s role in world affairs that corresponds to deep, cultural beliefs about the nation.”⁷⁵ This is also necessary, because, as Noesselt argued, “states – in order to secure people’s support and commitment – can only enact roles that are compatible with the dominant value patterns and beliefs of the domestic populace.”⁷⁶

But elite consensus is never absolute in democracies. A situation where competing role conceptions are present among the political elite are called “role conflict,” which Walker/Simon define as “a situation in which multiple roles are elicited by competing or conflicting expectations, cues, and conceptions.”⁷⁷

Wehner and Thies criticize that “the scholarly works tend to assume a unified voice behind the NRC without paying enough attention to the process of selecting a role.”⁷⁸ This is due to the fact that foreign policy is in the end implemented by the executive. Cantir and Kaarbo explained this neglect of domestic contestation, because there is only one role “that is ultimately selected to represent the state externally.”⁷⁹ Wehner and Thies list, whose role conception could also be investigated: “the influence of public opinion, conflicts between government and opposition, multiparty coalitions, and/or diverging views within small groups of foreign-policy decision makers over which role to enact and play.”⁸⁰ Harnisch distinguished that these conflicts can be “intro-role conflicts, e.g. between ego and alter expectations) and between roles (inter-role conflicts).”⁸¹

This is not only a domestic problem, because if decision makers “represent different national motives, through this instability in self-portrayal insecurity among the partners arises.”⁸² This was e.g. the case for large parts of the 1990s in Turkey’s foreign policy. Quickly changing governments with representatives from different parties in the foreign ministry, led to sharp turns in foreign policy formulation. Especially in Turkey’s Central Asia policy one foreign minister would stress the secular tradition, another a pan-Turkish vision and a third one Muslim solidarity. Foreign policy was confusing and the partners did not know what to rely on.

For Harnisch, there are mechanisms in democracies to deal with this issue: “while democracies regularly allow for strong policy competition, they have also spelled out concrete mechanisms to channel and limit the domestic conflict over foreign policy roles.”⁸³ For Wehner and Thies, “leaders (presidents or prime ministers) are the key to resolving internal disputes on the NRC.”⁸⁴

2.3.5. Continuity and change

Foreign policy roles usually have both a large domestic agreement and a long continuity. Wish stressed that roles are usually shared over a long period of time and across party lines. In her study she found that “there were greater similarities among role conceptions expressed by leaders from the same nations ... even though they were in power at different times and therefore experienced different international arenas.”⁸⁵

Issues come and go, but the road maps prevail. For Krotz exactly this “temporal stability makes NRC a useful analytic concept.”⁸⁶ The continuity of a role, also has a positive effect on how that role is performed. The longer people occupy a role, the more elaborate their scenarios will be. For Gaupp, this then also has an effect on others: “Practice can improve the perception of the international role.”⁸⁷

Roles are passed on from one political generation to the other. Therefore decision makers are socialized with certain roles. For Breuning, this situation “leaves little room for reinterpretation of the state’s role and suggests that historical patterns are carried forward. ... there should be substantial continuity in foreign policy behavior across time.”⁸⁸ This aspect is also underlined by Aggestam. Role conceptions are “relatively stable over time, as policymakers are socialised into and internalise these role conceptions.”⁸⁹ For Barnett this implies that “roles are learned,” they are “never created in a vacuum.”⁹⁰ This socialization process is not only affecting the policy makers, but also the politically relevant layers of society.⁹¹

Nabers doubted the overall stability and continuity of roles, because “as moving from a situation of enmity to one of friendship is obviously crucial in international politics.”⁹² This is not the most common foreign policy change. Less dramatic changes of course do occur. Breuning argued poetically that “if history is not destiny, ... then national role conceptions can change over time.”⁹³ For Harnisch, “foreign policy roles are constantly being reconstructed, hence recreated and thus subtly modified.”⁹⁴ There is a broad agreement in the literature about this “subtly”: “role change is a slow process, because it concerns change of mostly internalized orientations and behavior.”⁹⁵ Chafetz, Abramson and Grillet added that “states do not usually abandon role conceptions outright. Instead they slowly downgrade their centrality.”⁹⁶

Change can be stimulated by internal and external factors.⁹⁷ The domestic context can be a change in government or more dramatic changes like revolutions or military coups. It can also be a different economic situation. All can result in a shift in a state’s role conception. Bozdağlıoğlu specified that in such a situation “the foreign policy discourse can be dominated by entirely new organizations or individuals with different identity conceptions.”⁹⁸ This reasoning is shared by Breuning: “foreign policy behaviour changes as different groups attain power (e.g. as the result of election cycles).”⁹⁹

External factors can be a change of the international structure such as after the Cold War, big international economic crises or change in the behavior of major powers. This already indicates that “opportunities for foreign policy change are rare,”¹⁰⁰ as Le Prestre noted. Clearly, the transformations of the early 1990s provided such an occasion to debate and readjust national foreign policy roles. Waltz foresaw that this historic rupture would also lead to role changes: “The old and the new great powers will have to learn new roles and figure out how to enact them on a shifting stage. New roles are hard to learn and actors easily trip when playing on unfamiliar sets.”¹⁰¹ More generally, Thies and Wehner recently argued that also “dilemmas associated with globalization led to domestic actors reconsidering basic beliefs and narratives associated with traditional NRCs.”¹⁰²

How does role change then happen? The two most often mentioned ways are adaptation and learning. Harnisch explained that

role adaptation refers to changes of strategies and instruments in performing a role. The purpose of that underlying role remains fixed. ... shifts in behavior prompted by failure in which neither the values nor the goals of an actor are subject to reassessment.¹⁰³

Noesselt gave an example of adaptation by Chinese decision makers:

National roles derived from China’s internal structures and its historical past led to continuity in Chinese foreign policy, while the ‘new’ roles resultant from China’s rise to global powerhood require it to adapt its foreign policy principles.¹⁰⁴

Secondly, change can also take place through “elite learning of new beliefs, norms and values that necessitates profound changes in the constituent parts of national identity such as the transformation of beliefs, norms and values of the relevant state.”¹⁰⁵ Nye also mentioned the learning process: “Leaders and followers learn roles and change roles as their perceptions of situations change.”¹⁰⁶

Breuning differentiated scales of change: “Program change involves new instruments of statecraft and is qualitative in nature, whereas goal change entails a change of foreign policy objectives. International orientation change is the most radical – an all-encompassing redirection of a state’s foreign policy.”¹⁰⁷ Therefore for Breuning the latter two are the rarest ones, because this would require a “shift in their conception of their state’s role in the international system.”¹⁰⁸

Sometimes however, states also change their roles abruptly. For Gaupp this can happen when less and less role beholders can identify with a role. Then “an accelerated, eventually even abrupt role change” is possible.¹⁰⁹ For Breuning, “rapid shifts in role may occur in states undergoing internal upheaval ... or in new states.”¹¹⁰

All of these phenomena have to be distinguished from deviance as Nabers argued, “which is behavior not connected with the role, thus falling outside the frame.”¹¹¹

Change remains a contested concept in role theory. Breuning therefore suggested for future research among others, “explicitly addressing issues of change and adaptation in national role conceptions.”¹¹²

I agree completely. This work modestly shed light on an aspect of role change, or better, when change does not happen even if the actual policies do. This as we will see has happened in both countries in recent years. A policy change was not matched by a rhetorical change of the role conceptions. It is suggested here that role change does take place when it is regarded as being positive, but not when it is regarded negative or embarrassing.

2.3.6. Methodology

Thies in 2014 argued that one of the weaknesses of role theory is that “there is no definitive methodological account of the best way to identify roles.”¹¹³ What is less contested is, how to excerpt them from the sources. One, which already Holsti used in 1970, is an analysis of primary sources (speeches, interviews, articles by decision makers) and the other an analysis of secondary sources, e.g. academic writings. The latter is used less.

Concerning the first approach, Holsti set the standard. He only used statements from the

highest-level policymakers. They reflect the foreign policy thoughts and role conceptions of presidents, prime ministers, or foreign ministers. The only exception was where an ambassador or other official made a speech or statement that obviously reflected the views of the top leadership.¹¹⁴

Only sources were used that reflected general statements on role, identity or purpose, not sources dealing with specific issues. All these sources meant direct citations or official paraphrases.¹¹⁵

Other early examples of this approach were WISH (1980), who also used “transcripts of elite interviews”¹¹⁶ and GAUPP (1983) who used for his analysis of Switzerland’s roles “primarily the ideas of decision makers.”¹¹⁷ Nabers agreed with this approach, because “as discourse plays a significant part in the transformation of meanings, discourse analysis is seen as a suitable tool with which to gain traction on roles in international politics.”¹¹⁸

Such an approach seems logical, but the novelty in 1970 was not to arrive at roles from a theoretical discussion, but inductively from the views and conceptions of the foreign policy makers themselves. One surprising finding back then was that the roles identified by Holsti, 17 in total, were a lot more than could be found in theoretic discussions, or were derived from treatises on international politics. “The number is almost double.”¹¹⁹

The approach using secondary sources was e.g. used by WALKER and SIMON (1987), who relied on scholarly accounts of events in Southeast Asia to identify roles for their analysis.¹²⁰ Most scholars use a mixture. For Thies, then “in practice, roles are fairly easy to identify from statements made by individuals or secondary accounts of such statements.”¹²¹

Wehner and Thies underlined the importance of interviews, which “can provide a better grasp on how certain actions and thus roles were decided, enacted, and performed.”¹²² Sekhri argued that to have access to primary material in “Third World” states “is not a task that anyone can easily accomplish”, because the “‘black box’ of foreign policy decision making needs to be accessed.”¹²³ In the case of Turkey and Brazil, the leading decision makers have often given interviews on foreign policy issues. Then Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu said on 3 December 2012 about the advantages of interviews in contrast to written texts: “they have their own dialectic ... a naturalness rooted in them being spontaneous.”¹²⁴

An additional primary source, which Holsti et al in the early years of role theory did not use, or could not use, were political and academic articles and books written by decision makers. In the cases of Turkey and Brazil, these written sources offer additional insight into the role conceptions of the two states. Davutoğlu, Turkey’s former prime minister and foreign minister, wrote several books and articles on his vision of Turkey’s foreign policy. But also the Brazilian former foreign ministers Lampreia and Amorim wrote books containing aspects of their foreign policy visions. Exceptional primary sources, which can only be found in few countries.

Let us have a more detailed view on the how Holsti classified roles. He derived his NRCs from coding primary sources such as speeches, parliamentary debates, and press conferences of foreign policy officials of 71 governments between 1965 and 1967. For Holsti, a minimum of 10 sources was necessary. He arrived in two steps at 17 different roles.¹²⁵ Holsti then made a list of these roles and put them on a continuum reflecting the degree of passivity or activity in foreign policy. This ranged from 1, the bastion of revolution liberator to 16 being “isolate” and 17 being “protectee.”

For our study of interest is especially his role number 2, which means a very active one, the “regional leader”: “relation to states in a particular region with which it identifies, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as international communist movements.”¹²⁶ However, at the time, Brazil and Turkey were far away from being such active foreign policy players. Holsti identified for Brazil 10 sources, 9 conceptions (one source had no conception). The by far most often mentioned was “internal developer”, twice “independent” and once “regional collaborator.” For Turkey he then identified 17 sources, of which 15 had a conception. Seven sources indicated an “active independent” role, five times it was “regional collaborator” and three times “faithful ally.” Both countries played three different roles, which is below the average of 3.4 roles per state.¹²⁷ Brazil and Turkey now needed to have more roles and more role conceptions per source than in the late 1960s. Already in 1983 when Gaupp analyzed 66 foreign policy documents, he arrived for neutral Switzerland at 29 international roles.

The average number of themes per source for Holsti’s 71 nation sample was 1.3. Turkey and Brazil rank below this average. In a categorization on NRCs per source therefore both countries are only in the third group out of four. Holsti judged that the states in the third and fourth group as having “minor importance in world affairs, though some of them are active at the regional level. Most of their foreign policy statements are not rich in role conceptions.”¹²⁸

Holsti also grouped the 71 countries along an active-passive line, again having four groups. The five permanent members of the UNSC were all in the first group. However, there are also rather small and less influential countries like Iraq, Hungary, Indonesia, Kuwait and New Zealand. This hinted at the problem of discrepancy between the formulated and the performed role. Their role conceptions might be very active, their actual policy is not. “Most of the ‘middle’ powers, regional leaders, and active non-aligned states are found in the second group.” Turkey is actually at the bottom of this second group. Brazil is only in the fourth group of the least active states.

In Holsti’s analysis, active national role conceptions predominated. They constituted 861 references of the 1269, or 68 percent of the total. Already then, this activity was often to be found on the regional level, where states play their own regional roles, “quite independently of cold war controversies and power distributions. Activity and involvement are not the monopoly of the great powers.”¹²⁹ This aspect of global and regional activity is also underlined by Gaupp who spoke of an “inconsistency between regional and global positions. States such as Germany, India, Brazil might be dominating powers in their region, but on the global level, they must step back to second row.”¹³⁰

I presented Holsti’s article and methodology in such detail, because it is still the home base for role theory analyses. This, however, does not mean that there was no criticism to his study. As we have seen, the material is vast. I agree with Walker, that “an evaluation of this kind of evidence raises questions of reliability and validity.”¹³¹ A more substantial critique is that many of the roles are actually not roles, but merely describe a rough foreign policy orientation. Gaupp criticized that only few of the roles are sociologically grounded, “what Holsti describes are more behavioral types than roles.”¹³² This criticism has been haunting role theory every since. That it is “conceptionally rich, but methodologically poor, which makes its explanatory value questionable.”¹³³

2.3.7. Ideal role types

There is no doubt that role theory can describe different foreign policy strategies. But does this approach satisfy the needed generalizability to be an accepted theory? According to Kirste and Maull to guarantee this, an

ideal type is the most appropriate method to come to conclusions with a generalizable character, as demanded from theoretic concepts. Compliance and deviation of actor behavior from an ideal type can be measured to find out whether and to what extent an actor follows a certain foreign policy, which serves a prior identified goal.¹³⁴

The advantage of the ideal type then is that concrete foreign policy behavior can be tested empirically on certain cases or countries. “Compliance then explain congruity between role concept and role behavior.”¹³⁵

In this work one aspect of the roles of emerging powers will be analyzed. For practical reasons however, the scope is broadened to include also role conceptions of regional powers and middle powers.

CHAPTER 3

EMERGING, REGIONAL, (NEW) MIDDLE POWERS

The end of the Cold War also brought the end of the post World War II bi-polar international structure. With the Soviet Union dissolved, the world transformed into a “uni-multipolar” structure in the words of Samuel Huntington. Few things remained unchanged. One was that the USA continued being a superpower. But, below that, a lot has been changing. Several states in all world regions became more active players in international affairs. Lemke in 2002 called this a “multiple hierarchy model”, where there is a series of parallel and overlying power hierarchies.¹³⁶ Or, as Cooper and Flemes put it: “the current global order reflects a dynamic mix of established great powers, newly emerging regional powers, and multiple regional structures.”¹³⁷

Even if this process, which is also called regionalization, has been going on for more than 25 years, this has not lead to a clarification of terminologies. For Nolte, it is more than a time problem. In 2010 he argued that “a major difficulty in coming to grips with the concept of regional powers is related to the fact that it comprises two terms – region and power – that are conceptualized quite differently in IR theory, with great variation with regard to their meaning.”¹³⁸ And, this is not a new problem. As Godehardt and Nabers showed, an analysis by Thompson of 22 studies published between 1958 and 1971 identified already “more than 20 attributes that can all be regarded as criteria for a basic definition of a region.”¹³⁹ Regions can be defined strictly geographically, but also in political and economic terms, which causes the greatest disagreements.

To define power is even more complicated. A basic definition comes from Nye, the inventor of the terms “soft” and “smart” power: Power is “the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get a desired outcome.”¹⁴⁰ This means that power is always relational, it needs at least two actors. Power can basically be divided up into two complexes, hard and soft and three categories: military, economic and soft power.

For realists since antiquity, the most important (hard) power resource is military power, which can be measured according to the defense budget, the size and strength of the Armed Forces, the size and modernity of the weaponry and the defense industry. Realists also count economic power as part of hard power. Then, economic power is sanctions and coercion, threats not to invest or to stop exporting. But economic power can also as carrots be soft power. Trade liberalization, free trade agreements, FDIs, joint ventures and the like.

Power does not need to be necessarily active, it can also describe the power to resist or deny proposals by other states. Nolte in 2006 wrote that “this reactive and passive power was manifested e.g. during the Iraq conflict through the different capacity of various states to deny the desire of the US for active participation.”¹⁴¹ For Germany this meant that the government denied this quest, in Turkey it was the majority of the parliament who denied it even if the government and the military leadership were in favor of supporting the US.

After the end of the Cold War, a third category was added, soft power. Even if for realists, soft power is basically unimportant, because “the trouble with soft power is that it is, well, soft”¹⁴², the concept is widely used as a special form of power, often used by new emerging powers to increase their influence. In contrast to hard power, where the actor is emphasized, “the concept of soft power underlines the significance of perceptions others hold vis-à-vis the agent/actor.”¹⁴³ According to Nye, it must rest on three primary resources: (a) culture (in places where it is attractive to others); (b) political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and (c) foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).¹⁴⁴ Because perception is central for soft power, Noya argued to use the term “symbolic power”: “This also means that this is a subjective question and highlights the fact that recognition is the key variable.”¹⁴⁵ It is a sort of power of attraction.

Strategies of soft power are student exchanges, visa liberalization programs, export of cultural items (films, series, music), tourism, developmental aid and diplomatic initiatives. Turkey and Brazil are protagonists of the use of soft power, which will be dealt with in chapter 4.7.

Coming back to the “regional powers”. As we have seen, two ambiguous concepts do not sum up to a clear definition. There is everything but consensus “as to the further characteristics of the international power hierarchy.”¹⁴⁶ There is confusion on how to call the states, which are not superpowers, but more important and powerful than most states in their regions. This pyramid to broadly categorize these states is a try to order them from more to less powerful.

Below these categories would be fragile states like Kosovo or failed states like Somalia. 147

Even if any table or pyramid clearly distinguishes between categories, some countries are thinkable in more than one category, depending on the definition.

Besides super power, the category great power is also relatively easy to distinguish and define. In a very limited version, there are only two states in this category, China and Russia and one regional organization, the EU. Great powers are active and influential on a global level and not limited to a specific region. For Saraiva, this distinguishes them from “emerging powers”, which do not possess an agenda for global politics. Recently this could be seen in the Syria and Ukraine crises where the emerging powers left the stage to the great powers.¹⁴⁸ For Narlikar, emerging powers in contrast to great powers “lack agenda setting power.”¹⁴⁹

However, the question of admission into a higher category does not have objective criteria. Gardini therefore wondered “when the rise in fact culminates in the status of internationally accepted great power.”¹⁵⁰ With only three members in the great powers category, the range is still quite big. Only China is expected to advance to super power status, if at all.

3.1. Below great power status, things get complicated

Below the great powers things get more complicated. For Gardini all labels “suffer from some limitations.”¹⁵¹ For Brazil, he concluded that the existing labels do not fit. Therefore he proposed a new term, “international manager.”¹⁵² I will argue that for this analysis of Brazil and Turkey, the most accurate way to label both states until 2013 is emerging power, which is equivalent to rising power. But because of the positive connotation that “emerging”¹⁵³ or “rising” entail, after 2013 the term “new middle power” seems more accurate. The latter term is used e.g. by the Brazilian scholars Lopes, Casarões and Gama in an article in 2013, who defined Brazil, China and India as “new middle powers”, whose “relevance for international politics increased.”¹⁵⁴ This corresponds to the differentiation made by Narlikar of old and new powers. Why it makes sense to distinguish between old and new is explained by some differences. According to Gardini, the traditional (old) powers would be “wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. The latter are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian, recently democratised and with a strong regional influence and self-association.”¹⁵⁵ Besides his stress on the regional influence, this distinction could be applied to differentiate countries like Germany and Brazil or Canada and Turkey. However, their regional influence and acceptance is usually not a distinctive feature.

Even if the terms emerging and rising power are widely used, they are rarely clearly defined and criteria developed for states to belong to this group. Often the emerging/rising is applied as in the literal meaning of rising economies or “emerging markets”, which increased their influence in world affairs. The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University wrote under the headline “emerging powers” that “the usage of the term emerging powers is a recognition of the rising influence of several nations that have recently increased their presence in global affairs.”¹⁵⁶ The Centre for Rising Powers (CRP) at Cambridge University (UK) simply speaks of a “burgeoning interest in scholarly and policy circles in the emergence of new powers”, but limits its focus almost exclusively on the BRICS.¹⁵⁷

Some studies come up with criteria such as the National Council of Intelligence (NIC 2004)¹⁵⁸ in a study on “rising powers.” It listed economic growth, population size, access to progressive technologies and military resources as the decisive criteria for the inclusion to this category. The states listed to belong to that group are China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. So BRICS plus Indonesia.¹⁵⁹

Since this is a broad list of capacities rather than a definition of policies and behavior, it is more fruitful to look at the definitions and criteria of regional and middle powers, which are described in more detail. Almost all discussions about middle powers begin with the disclaimer that the field is conceptually confused and theoretically contested. Chronologically speaking the term middle power is older than regional power. According to Donneur and Alain, the term “first appeared in 1926 when Germany was admitted to the League of Nations. ... [later] the term middle power came into more common usage near the end of the Second World War ... it referred to a handful of states that held a certain degree of influence, albeit less than that of the major powers.”¹⁶⁰ During the Cold War it was used for states, which were neither super nor great powers, but with a significant influence in international affairs. Therefore in the current debate, the middle powers are sometimes called “traditional”, in contrast to the newer regional or emerging powers. Traditional middle powers were mostly defined through their role in international affairs and not their power capacities or regional leadership. States often mentioned in that category are e.g. Canada or Australia.¹⁶¹ They are protagonists of multilateralism and active in international institutions.

Wight offered a definition focusing on the military capacities:

A middle power is a power with such military strength, resources and strategic position that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it.¹⁶²

For most of the countries put into this category, this simply does not apply. Middle powers usually do not even have a special responsibility for the regional security architecture. Montero observed in Brazil “an almost inexplicable unwillingness to become more involved in transborder problems that afflict both Brazil and its South American neighbours.”¹⁶³ For him this lack of taking responsibility poses a general problem, which he called “middle power dilemma. Brazil is unable to exert its interests globally, as it is unwilling to embrace its responsibilities regionally.”¹⁶⁴

A more traditional concept of states below super and great power status is what especially from a US perspective were “pivotal states.” Chase defined a pivotal state as “a key country whose future may not only determine the success or failure of its region but also significantly affect international stability.”¹⁶⁵ In US-American foreign policy these countries should have a special weight. The list of “pivotal states” included Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Mexico and Turkey and Brazil.

3.2. The regional power category and its limits for Turkey (and Brazil)

Most research, definitions and policy roles have been developed for regional powers. A very detailed description of regional (leading) powers was developed by Nolte in articles in 2006, 2010 and 2011. The 2011 version had three core characteristics and eight additional criteria. The core criteria of a regional power is a state that (1) articulates the pretension (self-conception) of a leading position in a region that is geographically, economically and political-ideationally delimited; (2) displays the material (military, economic, demographic), organizational (political) and ideological resources for regional power projection; (3) truly has great influence in regional affairs (activities and results).

The first criteria is the role pronounced by the decision makers of a state whether they subjectively see their state as a regional (leading) power. The second criteria can be measured relatively easily and compared with other important players of the region. The regional power should have significant bigger capacities than the second biggest power in the region. A regional power therefore combines leadership and capacities/resources.

The third criteria is more difficult to measure, but a passive and introverted state can hardly be described as a regional power. Activity in politics, economy and cultural fields are diplomatic initiatives, mediating in regional conflicts, increase in trade turnovers, boost in tourism and cross border trade and cultural activities like exporting culture (TV series, music, cultural centres with language courses and the like) or festivals and fairs with a regional focus.

Among the remaining eight criteria, for our analysis number 10 is the most important one: (10) has a leading position in the region that is recognized or at least respected by other states inside and outside of the region, especially by other regional powers.¹⁶⁶ Also of special importance is: (11) is integrated in inter-regional and global forums and institutions where it articulates not only its own interests but acts as well ... as a representative of the regional interests of others.¹⁶⁷

Why is regional power then not the best bet when comparing Brazil and Turkey? The answer lies in particular in the analysis of Turkey. When looking at the above definitions, a core criterion (in Nolte’s list the first one), is that a state has a “leading position in a region that is geographically, economically and political-ideationally delimited.”¹⁶⁸ Destradi in 2010 even wrote that it is “uncontested in the literature” that a definition of regional power is that “these states belong to the region considered.”¹⁶⁹

That is all not surprising and almost tautological. A regional power should belong to a region. In the case of Brazil, it might seem straightforward to regard the country as part of Latin or South America, both certainly clearly defined regions. However, it took Brazil some centuries to see itself as an integral part of a region. No Brazilian ruler had ever visited another South American country until Campos Salles went to Argentina in 1900.170 For Gratius, Brazil was for a long time “regarded in South America as a passive regional power, identified by a pronounced self-isolation.”¹⁷¹

Former foreign minister Lampreia confirmed that

the concept of Latin America has never been central in our history. In the past, the very Latin American countries did not see Brazil as one of them. Simon Bolivar did not include us to the list of countries invited to the Congress of Panama in 1826, to which even the US was called.¹⁷²

Bethell concluded therefore that “Brazil only became part of Latin America when the rest of the world decided that Latin America existed as an entity, after the Second World War, when several regional organizations were established.”¹⁷³ Until then, as Malamud and Rodriguez wrote, “for the general population and elites alike, Latin America was seen as the region that surrounded Brazil rather than its home region.”¹⁷⁴ Also for Stünkel, the Brazilian relation to its region was troubled: “some see it as a source of problems, some as a shield against globalization, and some as a launching pad for global power. ... Brazil paid little attention to its neighbors during most of the Cold War.”¹⁷⁵ After the Cold War ended, Lampreia explained why South America replaced Latin America as the focus of Brazilian regional attention: “Our decision to prioritize the concept of South America appeared after Mexico joined Nafta in 1993.”¹⁷⁶

Since then, many experts see Brazil as the regional power in South America. Gratius wrote that “Brazil is the actual rival of the US in the American continent.”¹⁷⁷ In the Lula years, as Goedhart and Nabers argued, “Brazil would become the uncontested power in South America, internationally also recognized as such by other states and experts.”¹⁷⁸ In the same volume, Nolte wrote that “Brazil has consolidated its status as a regional leader.”¹⁷⁹ Cline et al also identified Brazil as a regional power among very few regional powers worldwide: “we find that the exclusively regional power club has only five members.”¹⁸⁰ Besides Brazil, these regional powers are Australia, India, Nigeria, and South Africa. Turkey is not included, as there is no Middle Eastern country. Additionally, critical voices allowed Brazil the title regional power. Former French diplomat Howlett-Martin published in 2015 a book entitled “The Disputed Rise of a Regional power.”

In the case of Turkey, the regional grounding gets more complicated. Geographically, the country is to three percent in Europe (Thrace), and 97 percent in Asia (Anatolia). However, Europe and Asia are just two of many identities. As leading politicians over the past decades have underlined, Turkey has a multi-regional identity and not just since Davutoğlu’s 2001 book “Strategic Depth”. Back in 1995, then Prime Minister Ecevit said: “Turkey has a unique position in the world. Turkey is historically, geographically and culturally both a European and Balkan, a Mediterranean and Middle Eastern, a Caucasus and Asian country.”¹⁸¹ The same Ecevit even underlined directly after Turkey finally received EU candidate status on 11 December 1999, a date to stress Turkey’s European vocation that “the Turks have been Europeans for 600 years. But the Turks are not only Europeans. They are also Asian, Caucasian and Middle Eastern at once. Turkey is a power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea basins and the Balkans.”¹⁸² In 2007, former president and prime minister Gül wrote: “the geostrategic position of Turkey cannot be defined as a single geographic region.”¹⁸³ And in early 2008, then foreign policy advisor Davutoğlu almost repeated Ecevit’s wording: “In terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country.”¹⁸⁴ Finally in 2011, Kalın, scholar, diplomat and presidential advisor wrote: “Instead of focusing on a single geographical sphere such as Europe or the Middle East, Turkish policymakers, diplomats, NGOs, businesses, journalists, and others are turning to a wider notion of global geography.”¹⁸⁵

Confusingly, this does not mean that neither Turkish politicians nor academics would use the term regional power when defining Turkey. Whereas politicians stressed the multi-regional approach, academics largely agree that Turkey meaningfully could only exert regional power ambition in one of them. “Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Middle East.”¹⁸⁶ For Bank and Karadağ, there is even a date. “Around 2007 Turkey became a regional power in the Middle East.” They call the interplay of domestic transformations and developments in the Middle East the “Ankara moment.”¹⁸⁷ The fact that Turkey turned its attention South-East therefore was not only due to pull factors, but to push factors too. After the EU membership negotiations lost momentum and EU politicians like French president Sarkozy openly voiced enmity to Turkish membership, “I do not think Turkey has a place in Europe,” Ankara tried to position Turkey as a Middle Eastern regional power. For Fuller, through this “strategically Turkey has become part of the Middle East.”¹⁸⁸ This was a time when Turkey’s image in the Middle East improved, its combination of Muslim identity, strong economy and democratic structure sounded attractive to her Southern neighbors. Surveys by the Istanbul based think tank TESEV on the perceptions of Turkey showed this altered image. In 2010, 75 percent of respondents in seven Arab states had a very or favorable view of Turkey. Only Saudi Arabia had a higher result.¹⁸⁹ Yalvaç went so far as to speak Turkey’s “potential to take on the role of regional hegemon in the Middle East.”¹⁹⁰

Also trade boomed during these years with selected Arab countries between 2003 and 2008. With Egypt the trade volume increased from 517 to 2,369 million USD, with Iran from 2,393 to 10,228 and with the UAE from 815 to 8,672.191 Turkey, long an outsider in the Arab world, according to a 2009 survey was for 61 percent of Arab respondents a model.¹⁹² One prominent promoter of this idea was Tunisia’s Ennahda party. Its leader Rashid Ghannouchi said that the AKP represented “a model of success for his country to follow.”¹⁹³

Concerning the Middle East, Bank and Karadağ argued similarly to what happened in South America that the emergence of new influential players was possible because of the “immense loss of US influence in the Middle East, especially after the second Bush administration from 2005 to 2009, which has allowed the rise of influential regional players.”¹⁹⁴ Turkey seized the moment. Also Kaliber acknowledged that “Turkish policy makers found a considerable maneuvering space to act as an autonomous regional power.”¹⁹⁵

As a result of this development, more and more scholars called Turkey a regional power in the Middle East with ambitions for the Muslim world. Gürbey in 2010 wrote that Turkey was striving to “increase its influence in formerly Ottoman territories and to make Turkey a leading regional power.”¹⁹⁶ In 2011 Oktav saw that the “emergence as a regional power made Turkey’s Muslim identity more visible.”¹⁹⁷ She explained this with a meeting in the Oval Office where Obama greeted Erdoğan in Arabic with “Salam un aleykum.” “This salute signified Turkey’s status as a model country in the Muslim world,”¹⁹⁸ not necessarily limited to the Middle East. Also for Karakaş, Turkey has ambitions beyond the Middle East. The AKP has “the strategic goal to position Turkey as a leading nation in the Islamic world.”¹⁹⁹ In a new global order, Muslims would ideally be represented by Turkey and be able to participate as equals in world affairs. Turkey’s mid-term goal is not only to make Turkey a regional power, where Turkey as a model can increase its weight, “but also the weight of the Islamic world on the global level.”²⁰⁰

In contrast, when Turkey’s decision makers defined Turkey as a regional power, they used a region which does not exist as one clearly defined area. Kaliber called this “region construction: a region where Turkey self-proclaimingly occupies the epicenter.”²⁰¹ The many expressions by Ecevit, Cem, Davutoğlu and leading AKP politicians of Turkey as a central country influential in regions from the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East pose in an analysis of regional power a serious problem. If you do not exclusively belong to one region, you can difficultly be a regional power of one region. Sümer as late as in 2013 still believed that this was possible. He claimed that “Turkey as a central player should not be content with a regional role, but should play a leading role in several regions, and realize its global strategic significance.”²⁰²

Hale in contrast argued that “it had to be accepted that Turkey was not the most influential external actor in any of them. ... Turkey’s ability to project its power into any of these regions could be limited.”²⁰³

A second aspect, which makes it difficult to define Turkey as a regional power is regional security. Nolte in 2010 wrote that “regional powers define the structure (polarity) of any regional security complex.”²⁰⁴ For the Middle East this is not possible to apply. There is just no security architecture and Turkey is not controlling security aspects in its neighbourhood.

There are more reasons against labeling Turkey a regional power. It lost its capacity of mediating between different groups such as it did between Israel and the PLO or in Lebanon between different groups. In 2016 it did not have an ambassador in Egypt, Syria and Israel. The model talk is over. Veteran foreign policy journalist Idiz wrote in December 2015: “Turkey goes from zero problems to nothing but problems in the region.”²⁰⁵

This has all implications for the claim of becoming more than an emerging power, because, “Without a regional power base”, as Nolte argued, “a leading or constitutive role in international relations is not or only limited possible.”²⁰⁶ Gardini contrasted that “sometimes the regional setting might be a liability too. Regional conflict and instability, and regional resistance to the global pretensions of a fellow regional country may all represent an obstacle to international recognition.”²⁰⁷ Empirically, there are, however, not many states, which were or are great powers without being regional powers. Therefore the empiric cases are limited to the UK in the 19th century and the US in the 20th century until today.

Turkey’s contested status is also true for all the other aspirants to regional power status in the Middle East. It is a “region without regionalism”²⁰⁸, as Fawcett argued, and also a region without strong regional organizations. Fawcett laid out all the flaws concerning the “absence of regional leadership” and the fact that regional “institutions are weak.” In this diverse region she noted “a common security dilemma.”²⁰⁹ Lemke concluded that the more powerful a regional power, the more peaceful the region.²¹⁰ Since the Middle East is everything but peaceful, in reverse this also means that there cannot be a strong regional power. None of the important players like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran or Turkey have the power nor the acceptance to be the regional leader. Lemke also provided empirical support for the hypothesis that the greater the relative power capability of the regional power, the greater the number of regional international organizations. The two main international organizations based in the region, the Arab League (“widely regarded a weak institution”) and the OIC are only signs that “the new regionalism simply did not occur in the Middle East”²¹¹, because “regional leadership requires effective institutions and effective institutions require regional leadership.” Both are lacking.

However, this lack of regional leaders is not even an anomaly. There are few regions or sub-regions that demonstrate the clear dominance of a regional power. Nolte argued that “it is not taken for granted that each region quasi-automatically produces its regional power. Instead, this is an open empirical question.”²¹² That is why Destradi is very critical on the approaches defining regional powers. For her the whole conceptualization “seems to be seriously flawed”, because the “notion of regional ‘leading’ powers hardly corresponds to empirical reality, or that the cases to which it is applicable are too rare to constitute a solid base for more general theorising.”²¹³ For Destradi, the biggest problem is that hardly any regional power succeeds in leading a region. For Krapohl et al, the relation of regional powers to their region is “often volatile.” They argue that “this volatility is due to limited intra-regional gains from regional integration.”²¹⁴

If, however, a very broad definition is taken as a basis, then also Turkey easily fits the category. “A regional power is a term used in the field of international relations to describe a state with power and influence that is to some extent limited to its region of the world” (Wikipedia). Or if it is defined with so unconcrete criteria such as by Kappel: “capacity for regional and global action ... high economic growth ... expenditures for R&D increase.”²¹⁵ How should this capacity be measured, what exactly is high growth? Such criteria would include many countries and the boundaries for including or excluding states would be quite arbitrary. If we omit the belonging to a region, also Destradi’s basic definition could be applied to Turkey: a) they are states that display a superiority in terms of power capabilities, b) they possess the largest power share in the region and, c) they exercise some kind of influence on the region.²¹⁶

In conclusion, despite their limitations, Turkey and Brazil are best described as emerging or new middle powers. Many features of regional powers do also apply, but because of the Cuspness of both countries and the difficulties of Turkey to be prescribed to one region, the term regional power is not the most accurate one.

What characterizes them is less a simple economic growth over the past years in absolute and in GDP per capita terms, but that they used their absolute economic strength to broaden their portfolio, widen their access to international markets and demand more weight in trade negotiations. Politically and diplomatically speaking these countries are more active in international organizations than before, launch (often for the first time) diplomatic initiatives, try to mediate in conflicts and reach out diplomatically to the world by opening new embassies and frequent state visits. Their military capacities are limited, they can hardly coerce countries to cooperate or engage with them. Therefore to be attractive they have to stress their soft power capacities from economic benefits to developmental aid, exchange programs, policy initiatives, international fora, big sports events and festivals. They have to be perceived by others outside the region as more important than the rest in a given region. This can be measured by membership in elite clubs, acceptance of this special status by especially super and great powers. A regional power base and acceptance as regional leader can be helpful, but not a necessary requirement to be or become an emerging or new middle power. In the cases of Brazil and Turkey this regional base is rather weak. Therefore the incentive to forge alliances with other emerging countries might be even bigger.

3.3. Cusp states

Emerging powers intensify relations with other emerging powers outside their region to increase their diplomatic status and to broaden their trade options. This is true for all emerging countries. However, I will argue that emerging powers, which are also Cusp States, have an even bigger incentive to look beyond their home region(s). For them, the forging of alliances with far away countries becomes an attractive way to compensate for recognition problems “at home.”

A recent volume (2014) edited by Marc Herzog and Philip Robins offers a fresh look at Cusp States in international relations. It presented both a general analysis of cusp states and case studies including Brazil and Turkey.²¹⁷ What all cusp states have in common, is that they are not super-powers, neither great powers, but in the words of Robins “strategic countries, that is to say states whose moves make a difference as far as the multiple, complex interaction of states in international relations are concerned.”²¹⁸ This corresponds to the notion of pivotal states as we have seen in the previous chapter.

For the editors, the opposite of cusp states are milieu states. A state, which feels comfortable in its region and has a great deal in common with the majority of the other regional states. Examples of milieu states in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In contrast, in the introduction, Robins defined Cusp States as “states that lie uneasily on the political and/or normative edge of what is widely believed to be an established region.”²¹⁹

To define some of the cusp states more precisely, terms like straddling state, involved with more than one region and gravitational state, pulled back and forth by different regions can be added to the analysis. Turkey would certainly also fit the category of a straddling state.

The motivation to focus on cusp states also comes from the disappointment of regionalism, “too much has been expected of these regions.” Herzog and Robins want to “challenge the conventional wisdom about regions and subsystems.”²²⁰ Some of the general statements on cusp states are that “Cusp States tend to be uncertain as to how closely and exclusively they should interact with a single region.” Or, “Cusp States have a tendency to regard themselves as being unique.”²²¹ This is definitely true for both Turkey and Brazil. Both view their history, language, geography, population, role in the region and global affairs as special, something other states in the region can never reach. Two foreign policy roles are predestined for cusp states: bridge and mediator. This was appropriate for both Brazil and Turkey, at least for some time.²²²

Altunışık explained that Turkey is seen as a country straddling several regions, most prominently being in between Europe and the Middle East. It is a country “defined as being part of many regions as well as being part of none.”²²³ Altunışık argued that cuspness does not derive directly from a geographic location, “but rather the geopolitical representation of that location as a discourse and practice.” Therefore this perception can change over time and be influenced by major historic turning points, e.g. the end of the Cold War or the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It therefore has a lot to do with how others perceive that state, as a natural part or ally, or as the other.

Altunışık then showed that the cuspness played a role already in the formulation of foreign policy during the foundation of the republic. Atatürk spoke in 1927 of defending European civilization at the gates of Asia. But at the same time, Turkey is protecting Asia against all of Europe’s imperialist desires.” Later in the 1970s, Turkish politicians started using the ‘bridge’ metaphor, for Altunışık a “perfect representation of Turkey’s cuspness.” After the end of the Cold War, it was again more the straddling between East and West. Then president Özal spoke of Turkey holding two cards:

One is the card we hold with the Western countries, and the other card we hold with these Islamic and Arab countries. Turkey is obliged to carry both these cards. ... The greater our weight in the East, the greater it will be in the West as well.²²⁴

Also Herzog focused his chapter on Turkey. The then Ankara-based scholar argued that the AKP discourse based on the Ottoman past can be called a “multi-regional centrality”, instead of being at the periphery of several regions. This policy made Turkey “a much more integral actor within the sub-system of the Middle East and Northern Africa than ever before in its republican history.”²²⁵ But this importance for the Middle Eastern countries was also due to the membership in many Western organizations. Herzog observed a change of perception with the Arab Spring, reinforcing again Turkey’s “status as a partial outsider.” The popularity of Turkey decreased also among Arab populations where a segment of respondents perceive Turkey to be culturally too different to the Middle East to constitute a natural part of the region. At least since 2011, problems with the Southern neighbors increased, Turkey lost the chance to mediate. For Herzog this was an illustration of “the limits of its regional leadership ambitions.”²²⁶

The Balkans are another region where the AKP pronounced a discourse of historic links in particular to the Muslim communities. However, the perception of Turkey is a lot worse in the Balkans than in the Middle East. Even if Turkey also succeeded in mediation efforts between e.g. Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina, the resistance against a strong role of Turkey among local populations remained high, especially among those where the Ottoman Empire is not seen as a positive past, but one of oppression. Therefore, “Turkey’s attempt to invert its cusp status is resisted much more in the Balkans, on the basis of historical memory, than it is in the Middle East.”²²⁷

Brazil has a different cuspness than Turkey. One that is not geographical, less obvious and less pronounced, but for the understanding of its foreign policy more important than one could assume when just looking at a map. It represents “an atypical case within an atypical category” as Malamud and Rodriguez wrote. As a “Cusp State” it does not lie on the edge of, or in an ambivalent relationship with two regions; rather, it straddles a “shifting region” and the global system. And for the authors, this current cuspness existed in another form already long ago, a circle closed: “Brazil’s century-long journey has taken it from being an overtly Cusp State to becoming a core state (in Latin America) and then a putative leader (in South America) to returning to its status as a Cusp State, only now covertly.”²²⁸

When looking at a map, the regional belonging of Brazil seems straightforward. A (sub-) continent surrounded by water. But “Brazil’s conception of its surroundings suffered consecutive redefinitions over time.” Malamud and Rodriguez describe a pan-Americanism at the beginning of the 20th century, being replaced by a Latin American focus in the 1960s, which was re-defined to South America in the 1990s and greatly enlarged to the South Atlantic in the 2000s.

In this way Brazil has redrawn its region .... This degree of flexibility, which serves to deliberately promote the inclusion and exclusion of other states, signals how little attachment Brazilian elites feel towards a naturally or historically defined region.²²⁹

However, the authors do not deny that Brazil also increased regional efforts after the return to democracy in the mid-1980s. There is a plethora of regional Latin and South American organizations, where Brazil is not only a member, but often was also one of the main drivers. But, these organizations are generally weak and their membership fuzzy. None includes all Latin American countries. Some are also including the US and Canada, others stretch over to Europe to include Spain, Portugal and Andorra and some only a portion of the Latin American states. Therefore, for Spektor, these integration efforts serve other ends²³⁰ and are mostly lip services: “while national leaders vocally support regional integration, in practice they have never provided it with more than token backing.”²³¹ For Brazil, the most important factor for engaging in the region was to gain global recognition as a speaker of Latin or South America in international organizations or in the debate on becoming a permanent member of the UNSC. For Malamud and Rodriguez Brazil’s foreign policy therefore achieved “less in the region and more in the world.”²³²

But also the EU in 2007 made clear that Brazil was a unique player in Latin America when it invited Brasilia to establish a strategic partnership. Brazil was the only Latin American country, which received such an invitation. What the European Commission then wrote to the European Council and European Parliament in 2009 went down well in Brazil, but provoked jealousies among others. The Commission called Brazil not only a “regional leader,” but also a global one, both a “champion of the developing world,” and a “natural leader in South America. Global ambitions, it seems, may come at the detriment to regional achievement.” For Malamud and Rodriguez, this is the core of Brazilian cuspness. The tensions between “regional and global goals have grown steadily over the last two decades, nurturing a foreign policy bifurcation. It is precisely in this that Brazil’s growing cuspness resides.”²³³

Besides the volume by Herzog and Robins, there are numerous authors, who, without using the little known terms cusp state or cuspness, confirm them both for Brazil and Turkey.

For Samuel Huntington Turkey already in the early 1990s was “the most obvious and prototypical torn country.” Torn between a political Western orientation and an Eastern Islamic population. “Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look?”²³⁴ Larrabee and Lesser in 2003, in general rather positive on Turkey’s performance, also acknowledged that Turkey was part of several regional systems, “while remaining on the cultural and political periphery of each.”²³⁵ Walker argued that even if the economy grew impressingly, Turkey “has never dominated its region in the modern period, either in Europe or the Middle East. Given Turkey’s geographic position, it has been an outlier for most of its modern history.”²³⁶ As already seen, the regional power drive got into serious problems with the Arab Spring. Park concluded that “Ankara’s responses to the ‘Arab Spring’ have tended to confirm its outsider status in the Middle East.”²³⁷

There is at least one theory using a similar idea. The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), as developed by Buzan, Weaver and Diez characterized Turkey as an ‘insulator’ state, one that abuts, but is not integral to its surrounding regions.” André Barrinha at least called Turkey “The ambitious insulator.”²³⁸ This insulator image comes very close to cuspness.

In the case of Brazil, some, as German Brazil correspondent Kunath, begin with historic differences: “Brazil has always been the outsiders. The independence in 1822 was a rather reactionary move, different from other countries of the region. Brazil stood also against the trend concerning slavery, it basically took 40 more years than in most other countries.”²³⁹ This is also voiced by Souza Farias who wrote that “Brazil had a distinct geography, history, culture and economy and for this it cannot be considered similar to its neighbours.”²⁴⁰

For Chilenean scholar Claudia Fuentes, who is based at Rio de Janeiro’s PUC University,

Brazil does not integrate well. Few professors of IR work on Latin America. There are few seminars or conferences on the issue, and if they happen then with titles like ‘Brazil and Latin America’, as if it were not the same. University exchange is little, there is much more with the US and the EU.²⁴¹

One of the reasons for the continued outsider status is language. “Before I came to Brazil, I thought the language would not matter. But now being here, yes, it matters. Very few Brazilians speak Spanish.”²⁴² For Fuentes

Brazil has always looked beyond the region. Brazil does not think about that regional power and great power are interconnected. For them these are two different tracks, one global and regional and they see them as separate.²⁴³

But, with the new generation, things might change. Diplomat Candeas gave the example of the final of the 2014 World Cup between Germany and Argentina. “The younger generation supported Argentina in solidarity with South America. For our generation that was unthinkable. Maradona was a national enemy.”²⁴⁴

Turkey’s cuspness is more pronounced than Brazil’s, because it also has a geographic component. But Brazil is not a milieu state either. Both countries therefore should have an interest to strengthen their international position through extra-regional relations. The region or regional organizations as a springboard to international recognition do not work.

3.4. Status

There are two major motivations for emerging powers to intensify relations with other emerging powers. One is new markets for their ever more export-oriented economies. The second is status in the international system. To better understand the latter and why emerging powers seek to increase it, some preliminary remarks.

3.4.1. Introduction

The debate on rising and emerging powers in world diplomacy involves the question that some states will strive for a higher status than they currently possess and how those states occupying the higher status will react. For Volgy et al this desire to climb is driven by a “status inconsistency.” These states feel that their status does not correspond to their power and therefore will try to resolve it by altering their status. If this does not happen, then “dissatisfied rising states can be a significant source of conflict in international politics.”²⁴⁵

This status competition is most visible at the highest levels, states that claim great power status or at least strive to reach this level. This is the case for emerging powers being members of BRICS, MINT or the next-11. It is assumed that their goal is to become great powers. But as Larson and Wolforth argued, this phenomenon can take place at “multiple status levels – great power, major power, regional great power, middle power, or minor power.”²⁴⁶

Larson and Shevchenko distinguished “whether a rising power is primarily concerned with status enhancement or displacement of the dominant power.”²⁴⁷ For the emerging powers, displacement is not an option. Their goal rather is to broaden the category of great powers.

Larson and Wolforth, who recently (2014) edited a volume on “Status in World Politics” drew the attention on a contradictory behavior of at least some rising powers. They

do not always chose to maximize their international status. Determined to sustain their growth trajectory, emerging powers tend to be inward looking states, reluctant to take on the burdens and responsibilities associated with a leading role on the world stage.²⁴⁸

This dilemma that higher status is not available for free and will inevitably include also costly steps, can be seen in the foreign policy of many rising powers, which often opt to avoid extra costs by leaving the floor to the great or super powers.

Lake repeated the almost mantra concerning every social science term that “there is no consensus on what status is and who has it when, why states pursue status, or when status concerns can be accommodated and when they lead to war.”²⁴⁹ However, the editors of the volume where he published this little encouraging sentence, at least tried a definition:

status is collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic clout). In international politics, status manifests itself in two distinct but related ways: as membership in a defined club of actors and as relative standing within such a club.²⁵⁰

The membership in international or multilateral organizations is certainly one of the most important features to measure status. Before coming to this aspect, let us clarify some more elements of status seeking.

According to Thompson, emerging powers

have been expected to ‘make their bones’ by demonstrating their worthiness for promotion into a system’s elite through displaying some degree of martial prowess on the battlefield. ... The history of great power ascensions has been less than pacific ... no state has been accorded great power status without a fight of some sort.²⁵¹

However, beside die hard realists, who continue expecting a necessary war between the US and China concerning China’s rise to super power status, a majority of scholars is convinced that great power status is no longer dependent on military means. Already in 1981, Gilpin wrote that “prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of international relations.”²⁵² More than 30 years later Larson and Wolforth argued that “major power war is unthinkable, aspiring great powers such as India, Brazil and Turkey are gaining status recognition through achievements in areas other than military power.”²⁵³ The only category where a big military power is still necessary is the super power status. Therefore, as Larson and Wolforth argued, “Brazil and India will not reach the threshold of military size and reach nor the level of international activity required to make it into the major power club by 2050.”²⁵⁴

However, below the superpower status, every status category can be reached without being a military giant. Sources for reaching a higher status can be economic, diplomatic, leadership or soft power activities.

3.4.2. Recognition by others

Status is scarce, but not exclusive. It can be shared by at least some states in the same category, the higher the status, the fewer the members as the image of the pyramid illustrates. It is always measured relative just like income, which is also compared to other co-workers. That means that “status is ultimately conferred on a state by others who recognize its position in the system.”²⁵⁵

The importance of recognition is underlined by several scholars. Nolte in 2010 wrote that “states mutually acknowledge the status and social esteem of other states.”²⁵⁶ Larson and Wolforth on several occasions confirmed this: “Status cannot be attained unilaterally; it must be recognized by others.”²⁵⁷ Volgy et al stressed the subjectivity of recognition: “Such status attribution ... is not a mirror reflection of the capabilities of these powers.”²⁵⁸

Cline et al made clear that “status can be attributed by actors within the region, by states outside of the region, and by the state itself.” The latter point does not contradict the argumentation above, because they define the self-attribution as signaling “motivation and interest – does a state intend for itself the regional power role? This is not to say that it then also achieves this status.”²⁵⁹

Volgy et al argued that the recognition by others “creates legitimacy for a wide variety of foreign policy pursuits,” but also “comes with expectations that these states will exercise leadership on a variety of issues and conflicts central to international or regional politics.”²⁶⁰ This indicates a balancing act for accepted members of a club between the wish to stay distant as mentioned by Larson and Wolforth and the necessity to be more active internationally in exchange for recognition. The sharing of responsibility is then again a possible source of enhanced status, but can come with the acceptance of regulations, which e.g. impair their economic growth.²⁶¹

However, once in the club, the advantage is that “it is sticky: once a state obtains a certain status along with the accompanying privileges, it retains a presumptive right to that status, which can outlast the initial conditions that gave rise to it.”²⁶²

The most important currency in gaining status is membership in prestigious international institutions. Larson and Wolforth argued that status markers especially in the 21st century

include membership in elite clubs such as the Group of 8 (G8), permanent membership in the UNSC, leadership positions in international organizations, hosting international sports events, formal state visits, summit meetings and inclusion in informal problem-solving groups.²⁶³

Becoming a permanent member of the UNSC as a marker is too restricted and no state would qualify. However, there are numerous rather new organizations and institutions, which do give their members an increased international status. For Castañeda, emerging powers understood this. He argued that “Brazil and India desperately want to join everything in sight.”²⁶⁴ One such organization that the two (and Turkey) did enter was the G20, which was created in 2009 in Pittsburgh, largely replacing the above mentioned G8. Cooper and Flemes called this a “selective multilateralism”, where new players, which are “jockeying for status and policy space” were incorporated through a “shared participation in G20.”²⁶⁵ This also prevented potential conflicts of a rising power replacing an established G8 power, which needed to drop out. Through this, no one lost its place in the club of the most powerful, but some new states were added, a win-win.

However, as Larson and Wolforth mentioned, there are some more specific new organizations providing its members with a boost in status. They argue that “in the current international system, there are a greater variety of organizations for rising powers to join than in previous eras, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa), Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit.”²⁶⁶ With some, it is doubtful whether they are representing emerging powers or have a positive effect on status, but certainly the catchy label BRIC(S), invented by Goldman Sachs in 2001 had a positive effect on the international status of its members.²⁶⁷ Stünkel made this already clear in the title of an article on the First BRICS Summit (2006) entitled “Emerging Powers and Status”,²⁶⁸ beginning with the sentence: “I argue that the main driver for the first summit to take place and succeed was to strengthen each member country’s international status.” For Stünkel, the summit succeeded in raising “their international status, which proved to be useful for achieving joint or individual national goals later on [and] increase their bargaining power.”²⁶⁹ He concluded that “Brazil, Russia, India, and China turned into de facto representatives of the emerging world and indispensable actors in the construction of tomorrow’s global order.”²⁷⁰ This global order should be more multilateral. That is why the final declaration of the summit also made a commitment to strengthening the G20.

However, also club membership is relatively restricted and static. Therefore there is a whole array of other strategies to increase status, which can be better planned by the individual state and depend on the state’s own initiative and not on others, often more powerful states. Larson and Shevchenko described this strategy as “social creativity.” It may be manifested in major diplomatic initiatives or activism by charismatic leaders such as Nehru, de Gaulle, Gorbachev, or more recently Brazil’s Lula and Turkey’s Erdoğan.”²⁷¹

One of the easily measurable foreign policy activities are state visits, both to foreign countries and visits by foreign state leaders. Another easily measurable foreign policy status indicator are the number of embassies a state maintains in the world and how many foreign embassies a state hosts in its capital. Cline et al explained why they are good indicators:

State visits are a largely symbolic act reflecting the desire of a state to consult with another country of presumed importance, while the presence of embassies signals the perception of relevance by the sending state to the receiving state.²⁷²

There are still also certain areas, which can be used to impress the international system. This means that a state tries to acquire certain status symbols, which can be either produced or bought. For Larson and Wolforth these can be “space programs, acquisition of high-technology weapons.” They cite Barry O’Neill, for whom “nuclear weapons are useful for this purpose because they are technically difficult to acquire and highly visible once tested.”²⁷³ This may have as a consequence for emerging powers to spend lots of money on highly visible measures, which do not benefit the society at large. Money for an expensive space program is lacking for public education or a nationwide health system. But the latter, even if sometimes also a source of status, is internationally less visible and status relevant. These can be also prestigious buildings, which cost a lot in the construction, have enormous costs of maintenance and are often totally over-dimensioned, but built in the desire to impress the own population and the world audience. As president Erdoğan said on 21 May 2016 addressing a crowd in Artvin: “The West is jealous of us because of our dams, bridges and subways.”²⁷⁴

3.4.3. International status of Turkey and Brazil

Many of the above mentioned ingredients of status acquisition have been used by Brazil and Turkey. Both countries are in some studies also mentioned together when arguing about status achievement. Larson and Wolforth described them in their introductory chapter:

Brazil’s prestige is based on its economic size, global diplomacy and foreign aid program, and domestic developmental model. Turkey ... has attained enhanced status for being the leading Islamic democracy and possessing a booming economy that is interlinked with others in the region.²⁷⁵

This short characterization implied that for both countries also domestic factors were an important factor in status achievement. Marco Aurelio Garcia, Lula’s top foreign policy advisor, said, “without the successes of his social policy, President Lula would not be as respected internationally.”²⁷⁶ This is what Zilla called “extraversion”, that a domestic policy is turned into a resource for foreign policy, “to better position the country internationally. Fighting poverty could be used also as promoting oneself abroad.”²⁷⁷

Larson and Shevchenko are optimistic that the two states will increase their status: “we would expect Brazil and Turkey to aspire to a higher status position within the existing order. Since its hegemonic position was not challenged by these rising powers, the United States should have been receptive.”²⁷⁸ The desire is there. Herz quoted a survey from 2001 among the Brazilian ruling elite, which showed that “there was near universal consensus (99 percent) that becoming a world leader was a fundamental objective of Brazilian foreign policy.”²⁷⁹ World leader is not the most scientific expression, but for her therefore “gaining major power status became a central and explicit goal of Brazilian foreign policy during the second term of Lula’s presidency (2007-2010).”²⁸⁰ Gardini agreed in a recent article that “Brazil’s main foreign policy aspiration and driver is to achieve international recognition.”²⁸¹

What comes first to mind are the many international organizations Brazil joined in the 2000s, the “B” in BRICS, IBSA or BASIC. Cooper and Flemes therefore wrote that Brazil is one of the “big three of the emerging powers” together with China, India.²⁸² Eakin, summarizing Brazilian efforts in 2015 stated that “the country has entered into a very elite group of nations.”²⁸³

For Herz, preference for international organizations and multilateralism has historic roots in Brazil: “Since the country became a republic in 1889, it has systematically pursued participation in international forums.”²⁸⁴ Larson and Shevchenko agreed that to increase its status, “expanding its participation in multilateral forums has been Brazil’s main response to this desire.”²⁸⁵ These fora are not limited to emerging or developing countries. The G20 is the club with all the leading Western economic powers. Wigell argued that “in the G20, Brazil has established itself as a leading voice of the developing world.”²⁸⁶ But also the G4, composed of Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, which promoted the expansion of the UNSC, was from the beginning part of the Lula presidency’s strategy.²⁸⁷ However, as Wigell rightly wrote, the most important organization for Brazil was the BRIC membership “as a way to gain global recognition as an emerging power centre and as a way to promote a new more multipolar global power structure.”²⁸⁸ Stünkel, who has been working in Brazil for many years, especially highlighted the positive impact for Brazil, which “gained a good deal. ...The BRICs grouping allowed Brazil henceforth to be grouped together with China, Russia, and India – all nuclear powers that were seen as geopolitical heavyweights in comparison.”²⁸⁹

From the beginning of the Lula presidency, Brazil turned into a contester of the existing trade negotiation architecture. Already in 2003 at the WTO summit in Cancún, “Brazil led a revolt of the developing countries against the use of agricultural subsidies by the United States and the EU. ... Brazilian officials view Brazil’s leadership at the Cancún summit as a turning point in Brazilian diplomacy.”²⁹⁰ Herz confirmed that Brazil is among the most active players in the WTO: “As an indicator of its activism in this issue area, Brazil (together with India) has filed more complaints before the WTO Dispute Settlement System than any other country.” And about Cancún she added that “Brazil demonstrated a vanguard position, demanding changes to the rules governing the commerce of agricultural goods and leading to the formation of the Commercial G20 together with China, South Africa and India in 2003.”²⁹¹

Even if Brazil and no other country could achieve a reform of the UNSC, it managed to be elected to the UNSC in 2009, also in recognition of its growing presence on the world scene with the support of many African and Asian states.

But recognition was also voiced by the super and great powers. Brazil’s importance in global diplomacy was recognized by US president Obama who “has included Brazil in his regional influentials who must be cultivated, along with Turkey and Indonesia.”²⁹² In June 2015, Obama said that “we see Brazil as a global power, not a regional player. If you think about the preeminent economic forum for coordinating between major economies, the G20, Brazil is a major voice in that.”²⁹³

His predecessor was not known for being a great Brazil expert, but his security and foreign policy advisor Condoleezza Rice in 2005 said in Brasilia that “the US searches in Brazil a regional partner and a global leader.”²⁹⁴ And in 2008, again in Brasilia: “Brazil should play a major role, not just in regional affairs but in global affairs.”²⁹⁵

The recognition was also personal. President Lula was praised even by the business world. In 2010, the World Economic Forum in Davos conferred to him the title of “global statesman.” At the same time Brazil was the headquarter of the alternative to Davos, the World Social Forum, where Lula was also celebrated. Bartelt called this “brilliant moments of Brazilian diplomacy.”²⁹⁶ Former foreign minister Amorim proudly mentioned that the usually critical Economist “referred to Brazil as a ‘diplomatic giant’.”²⁹⁷ The same Amorim was called by the journal Foreign Policy in October 2009 simply the “world’s best foreign minister.”²⁹⁸ The article then started without any irony with the sentence: “This may have been the best month for Brazil since about June 1494”, when the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed. The US, the business world and international media worshipped Brazil.

Concerning foreign travels, mega international events and foreign missions, Brazil is a showcase of a country, which wanted to increase its international standing. Lula and Amorim were frequent flyers as never seen before in Brazilian history. President Lula in his first year in office (2003) spent 58 days abroad visiting 32 countries. In 2004 he was 44 days abroad visiting 22 countries and in 2005 he marked a record with 70 days abroad visiting 28 countries. The remaining time in Brazil he received also an unusual amount of heads of states or governments. In 2003 these were 41, in 2004 21 and in 2005 30.299

As Zilla added, another way to intensify international contacts was “through organizing summits at home.”³⁰⁰ For Zilla this policy started with Cardoso, but was hugely broadened under Lula, “to move Brazil from the periphery into the center of international events.” The symbolic coronation was in 2007 when Brazil was elected to host the World Cup in 2014 and in 2009 when Rio de Janeiro was chosen to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. The latter decision was achieved even against Chicago, which was personally supported by US president Obama. President Lula commented the decision enthusiastically:

Today is the most emotional day in my life, the most exciting day of my life. I have never felt more pride in Brazil. Now, we are going to show the world, we can be a great country. We are not the United States, but we are getting there, and we will get there.³⁰¹

Parallel to the number of state visits and hosting of foreign heads of state, also the number of foreign missions increased significantly from 155 in 2003 to almost 230 today. That is more than Germany and India or South Africa and make Brazil the country with the seventh highest number of foreign missions.³⁰² Former foreign minister Patriota mentioned that in December 2011 Brazil became one of the twelve countries in the world, which have diplomatic relations with all UN members.³⁰³ Also the diplomatic corps increased in the 2000s by roughly 50 percent from around 1000 to more than 1500.

Status achievement usually does not come for free. Often it involves participation in military interventions or supervising UN missions. For Brazil the crucial test already came in 2004 with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), following a natural disaster on the island.³⁰⁴ For Herz,

the operation in Haiti is a significant departure from previous policy ... making it the country’s biggest foreign military deployment since the Second World War. Brazil is commanding a UN peacekeeping force of 6700 troops and 1600 police ... Brazil views an active role in the humanitarian sphere as part of the responsibilities of major powers. Therefore it is generating a new role for itself in this arena.³⁰⁵

For Larson and Shevchenko, participating in these kind of mission is crucial also concerning status claims:

the international community’s willingness to confer status is based on new criteria of diplomatic skill, coalition-building success, and norm entrepreneurship. ... Brazil will need to take responsible positions on global governance issues rather than abstaining.³⁰⁶

Another tool to enhance international status is conflict mediation. Brazil has a history of being involved in territorial disputes in Latin America and, in the words of Stünkel, “played the role of a mediator in territorial conflicts between neighboring countries.”³⁰⁷ Brazil was part of a mediating group, which settled the long time territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru and helped reducing tensions in Bolivia between the government and the opposition in 2008. A year earlier, Brazil was invited by then US president Bush to the Middle East Peace conference in Annapolis. The first time that emerging powers were invited concerning the Middle East peace process. Baeza, a lecturer at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, then even wrote an article entitled “Can Brazil mediate the Israeli – Palestinian conflict?”³⁰⁸ President Lula presented himself in an interview with the Israeli daily Haaretz as one who is accepted by all. Haaretz wrote that “Lula describes himself as a negotiator, not an ideologue, a person who manages to get along with both Hugo Chavez and George W. Bush, with Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.”³⁰⁹ Larson and Shevchenko called this “Lula’s rainbow diplomacy.”³¹⁰

But also rather exclusive status drivers were used by Brazil like space activities and nuclear technology. Vaz commented that “it is also a key objective of the partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, in which space activities (particularly the development of satellite launching vehicles and geostationary satellites) rank high on the agenda.”³¹¹ These granted “Brazil access to resources and technologies, as well as in legitimising and underscoring its broader political ambitions and in enhancing its international profile.”³¹²

Since 2008 there have been efforts to build nuclear-fuelled submarines in a Brazilian-French joint venture. In February 2013 the Defense Ministry announced that the first submarines could be ready by 2023.313 Stünkel commented that the “domination of nuclear technology is seen as a national symbol of pride and proof that Brazil is no longer a developing country.”³¹⁴

Turkey has a different history from Brazil concerning the membership in international organizations. Already after the Second World War Turkey’s status as part of the Western world was established. Turkey was among the founding members of the Council of Europe in 1949, it joined NATO in 1952 in the first enlargement of the organization even before Germany and the OECD in 1969. During the Cold War “Turkey’s privileged status arose from its strategic geographic location,”³¹⁵ as Larson and Shevchenko wrote. After the Cold War Turkey became a candidate for EU membership in 1999 and began negotiations in 2005. Turkey, as Brazil, is also a member of the G20.

More focused on emerging powers are the organizations MINT, Next-11, CIVETS or MIKTA. The first (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) was initially developed by Fidelity Investments, but interestingly taken on by Jim O’Neill who created the BRIC label when working for Goldman Sachs.³¹⁶ The same O’Neill then also developed the group Next-11 (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and Vietnam) and within that group, the most promising group MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey).³¹⁷ Analysts from the investment industry have developed one more model, CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa).³¹⁸ And to complicate things further, in September 2013, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia founded the MIKTA group. The first meeting took place during the UN General Assembly meeting in New York.³¹⁹ Interestingly on the webpage of the Turkish foreign ministry in the section international relations, there is only MIKTA mentioned, MINT and next-11 are not included.

None of these groupings, which are sometimes also labeled “near-BRICS”, comes close to the prominence BRICS received. This is related to the fact that these groupings are economically less relevant, even less institutionalized than BRICS and have not so far launched any further reaching initiatives, be it diplomatically or economically. However, the inclusion of Turkey makes clear that it is recognized as a “second-tier BRICS” among a small group of crucial countries. As Grigoriadis argued, “being a member of this group [MIKTA], Turkey can claim a bigger role on a regional and potentially on a global basis.”³²⁰

For Larson and Shevchenko “Erdoğan clearly wants Western recognition as a global player,”³²¹ which he then also received. As an example they quote that “Obama referred to Erdoğan as one of the five world leaders with whom he works most closely.”³²² Obama’s first ever overseas travel in April 2009 brought him among others to Istanbul and Ankara. In the Turkish parliament he said: “Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul to send a message to the world. And my answer is simple: Evet – yes. Turkey is a critical ally. Turkey is an important part of Europe. And Turkey and the United States must stand together.”³²³ In July of the same year then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Turkey an “emerging global power.”³²⁴ In October 2010 David Cameron, then the UK’s prime minister said at a press conference in Turkey: “Everyone is talking about ‘BRIC’ countries and the rapid growth in [the group’s] economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. We think that Turkey is a BRIC country of Europe.”³²⁵

However, Turkey became also more active and respected in Islamic international organizations. Long an outsider, then foreign minister Gül received standing ovations at the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Tehran.³²⁶ From 2004 until 2014, a Turkish citizen, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, was the OIC secretary general. Turkey also improved its relations with the Arab League.³²⁷ Especially at the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 the debate on the model character of Turkey for Middle Eastern countries emerged again. Ghannouchi, who won the first free elections in Tunisia with his Ennahda party would say in 2011: “Turkey is a model country for us in terms of democracy.”³²⁸

As their Brazilian counterparts, also the Turkish leadership has been known as frequent flyers. In 2004, Erdoğan as prime minister made 37 trips abroad, where he spent more than 80 days. In 2010, he travelled 31 times abroad and in the most quiet year 2007 these were still 17 travels. Larson and Shevchenko wrote about the travelling pace of then foreign minister Davutoğlu:

The indefatigable foreign minister backed up his vision with action, making over 100 foreign visits his first year [2009] – to Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, Asia and the United States. ... While some have criticized Turkey’s foreign policy as overambitious, it has greatly enhanced the country’s global and regional status.³²⁹

Turkey in the past 15 years became one of the major destinations for international meetings, conferences and summits. The increase in Istanbul both in absolute numbers and in the world-wide ranking is impressive.

Table 1: ICCA – International Congress & Convention Association Statistics for Istanbul³³⁰

year | No. of meetings | Worldwide ranking | Europe ranking
2000 | 27 | 36 | 21
2005 | 57 | 24 | 19
2010 | 109 | 7 | 6
2013 | 146 | 8 | 7
2014 | 130 | 9 | 8
2015 | 148 | 8 | 7

Some of the major events were in 2008 a Turkish-African summit, in 2011 the 4th United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries³³¹ and in 2015 the G20 summit in Antalya.³³²

Concerning the hosting of big sports events, Turkey also increased its activities. The most striking difference to Brazil is that neither Olympic Games nor a World Cup took place so far in Turkey. But it cannot be said that Turkey did not try. Concerning the Olympics, Istanbul was a bidder for the games in 2000, 2008 and 2020 and applied to the 2004 and 2012 Summer Olympics, but failed to become a candidate. According to government figures, between 2002 and 2012, “more than 100 international sports events were organized in Turkey.”³³³

Turkey has also tried to improve its international image by increasing humanitarian aid and becoming a donor in crisis or disaster ridden countries. Turkey’s official aid spending increased from 73 million USD in 2002 to nearly 1.6 billion (bn) USD in 2013.334 With the same amount in 2014, Turkey’s spending was the third most after the US and the UK.³³⁵ In 2015 Turkey even doubled the amount to 3.2 bn USD, which was still the third most in the world in absolute numbers, but the highest in percentage of the GDP (0.37 percent).³³⁶ A case of special attention for Turkish humanitarian policy is Somalia where Turkey spent from 2011 to 2016 some 400 million USD. As FT’s Laura Pitel commented: “The sum reflects its [Turkey’s] transformation from a net recipient of humanitarian aid to one of the world’s biggest donors – a turning point reached in 2013.”³³⁷ Turkey is also investing heavily in Mogadishu having built and been operating both the airport and seaport and the 200-bed Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan hospital, inaugurated in 2015. Trade profited from this commitment. It grew from 6 million USD in 2010 to 72 million USD in 2015. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud commented the Turkish activities: “The Turks are giving the kind of support we have never seen before. They are changing the face of Mogadishu.”³³⁸

The Somalia commitment was only one aspect of Turkey’s Africa opening, which also paid off in diplomatic terms. Together with Brazil, Turkey was elected as a non-permanent member to the UNSC in October 2008 for the period 2009-2010. 51 of the 53 African countries voted in favor of Turkey. Whereas Turkey only had 12 diplomatic missions in Africa in 2002, this number increased to 39 in 2014. Today only France has more embassies on the continent. Turkey has not been in the UNSC since the early 1960s and therefore it was seen as a “concrete indication of its drive to establish a higher international profile.”³³⁹

The trend in Africa concerning new foreign missions is only confirming the general trend of the past 15 years. During the AKP governments since late 2002, the number of foreign missions increased from around 160 to more than 230. As Davutoğlu wrote in 2013: “When we reach 235 foreign representations ... we will be among the top five countries.”³⁴⁰

Almost as much as Turkey opened new missions abroad, also foreign missions in Turkey increased significantly. In 2002 these were 166, in 2015 these were 237, an increase of almost 50 percent. In 2013, Istanbul was with 64 general consulates after New York the city with most consulates worldwide.³⁴¹

In the early AKP years, Turkey tried to mediate in a series of conflicts in the neighborhood, be it in the Balkans between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians or fractions in Lebanon. However, with the bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel deteriorating since 2009 and the Arab Spring where Turkey is siding with Sunni opposition forces, it lost the attractiveness as a mediator.³⁴²

Broadly also concerning conflict reduction, was the proposition of then Spanish prime minister Zapatero at the UN General Assembly in 2004 to launch an “Alliance of Civilizations” to combat extremism and promote inter-religious dialogue and cooperation. The initiative was co-sponsored by then Turkish prime minister Erdoğan and officially launched by the UN in 2005.343 Hale commented that in co-sponsoring the Alliance, “Turkey was projecting itself as a spokesman of the Muslim world.”³⁴⁴

Finally, Turkey also renewed plans to build nuclear reactors, which have been debated since the 1970s. Currently the government wants to build two reactors. One in the Mediterranean near Akkuyu with Russian financing, the second near the Black Sea city of Sinop with Japanese or Franco-Japanese financing.³⁴⁵ There are non-concretized plans to build a third reactor in the Thracian city of Iğneada. The first units are planned to deliver energy earliest by 2022.346 Former energy minister Güler made the argument in the Turkish parliament in 2006 that nuclear energy “would be beneficial to development, would provide a threshold for attaining high-tech products, and would contribute to Turkey’s prestige.”³⁴⁷

3.5. Role conceptions of Turkey and Brazil as regional or emerging powers

To be able to meaningfully and credibly play a foreign policy role, the state has to both formulate the wish to play that role and possess the capacities to do so. Schirm argued concerning the role of emerging powers that they

dominate their neighbors in terms of power over resources, that is, population, territory, military capacity and gross domestic product. In addition, they articulate a wish to change the distribution of power in the international system and to assume leadership roles in global governance.³⁴⁸

For the analysis of Brazil and Turkey this would mean that the two states dominate their neighbors in power over resources. Most important are hard power resources, economic strength and diplomatic capacities. Besides this, also soft power resources will be taken into account, even if their effect on power distribution is rather small.

For the role definition of emerging power, spoken and written statements of leading politicians will be analyzed. These include a role as regional power, a view of a global foreign policy, the wish to engage in international diplomatic issues and the strive for new economic partners. As Gürzel summarized: “Turkey tried to solidify its long desired role as a ‘rising power’ by increasing its influence in its neighborhood and engaging with other emerging powers.”³⁴⁹ Emerging powers should both formulate this desire and practice it.

Concerning the power resources, there are no thresholds for emerging or great powers. However in analyzing several indicators it becomes clear whether the state can at least theoretically play that role or not.

Starting simple. When just looking at a map, it becomes clear that Brazil “dominates its neighbors.” Brazil is the world’s fifth biggest state with 8,511,965 km2 and by far the biggest country in both South and Latin America. Brazil is more than three times bigger than the second biggest Latin American country Argentina (2,766,890 km2) and almost 48 percent of South America’s territory.³⁵⁰

With Turkey it is less clear cut, but still it is amongst the dominating countries in its neighborhood by size. Turkey is the 37th biggest country in the world with 780,580 km2. There are four bigger Middle Eastern states, the biggest being Saudi Arabia (2,149,690 km2) followed by Libya (1,759,540 km2), Iran (1,648,000 km2) and Egypt (1,001,450 km2). Besides Libya, the other three are also candidates for regional power status in the Middle East. In Southeastern Europe, Romania is the biggest country with 238,392 km2 and therefore significantly smaller. The same is true for the Caucasus where Georgia is the biggest country with less than 70,000 km2.

However, more important than the sheer size of the territory, is the size of the population. The situation is similar. Brazil also ranks on fifth position worldwide with in 2016 roughly 206 million inhabitants. In Latin America the second biggest country is Mexico with 128 million inhabitants. In South America, the difference is huge. There the second biggest country is Colombia with almost 49 million inhabitants, followed by Argentina with almost 44 million inhabitants. Brazil as in size almost represents 50 percent of South America’s population.³⁵¹

Turkey with a population in 2016 of roughly 79 million³⁵² is in the Middle East only clearly surpassed by Egypt with 93 million and almost on pair with Iran. The next biggest population has Iraq with already well below 40 million and by size the biggest country Saudi Arabia has only 32 million inhabitants.³⁵³ In Southeast Europe Romania with roughly 19 million is significantly smaller.³⁵⁴

Concerning economic indicators, both Brazil and Turkey are the strongest economies in absolute terms in their neighborhoods. Both are members of the G20 where they are joined by fellow regional countries Mexico, Argentina and Saudi Arabia. According to World Bank figures, Brazil in 2015 was the 9th biggest economy, Mexico the 15th and Argentina the 21st biggest economy in the world. In absolute numbers with 1,800 bn USD, Brazil was clearly ahead of Argentina with 550 bn USD. For Turkey again it was less clear cut. With a GDP of 718 bn USD it was still clearly ahead of Saudi Arabia with 646 bn USD. The next strongest Middle Eastern country would have been Iran with 425 bn USD, followed by the UAE and Egypt with 370 and 330 bn USD respectively.³⁵⁵ Even if the difference in absolute numbers is not so big, Turkey has a more attractive economic structure than the regional competitors. Besides a strong agriculture, Turkey has an industrialized economy with many strong sectors from textile, construction, car production to a modern tourism infrastructure. Turkey is also much better integrated into the strong European markets. The regional main competitors are oil and gas producers as main source of income.

The most important hard power factor is military power. In the list of the biggest Armed Forces by personnel, Turkey is on ninth position world-wide with 510,000 personnel and Brazil on 16th position with 318,850 personnel. The latter has with this number the second biggest armed forces in South America after Colombia (466,713), which can be explained by the long-lasting civil war, which enforced a big army. Mexico is on 19th position with 270,000 soldiers. No more South or Latin American state is in the top-30.

Turkey is also on second position in its region, only slightly surpassed by Iran with 523,000 personnel. The following Middle Eastern Armed forces are Egypt (12th, 438,500), Iraq (18th, 271,500) and Saudi Arabia (23rd, 233,500).³⁵⁶

Concerning military expenditure³⁵⁷ both countries are in the top-20. In 2015 Brazil’s military budget was 24.5 bn USD and Turkey’s 15.3 bn USD. The Turkish budget declined slightly from a high in 2013 of more than 18.5 bn USD, but the Brazilian budget decreased sharply from almost 37 bn USD in 2011, an expression of the overall financial problems in Brazil. Still both countries increased their military budget significantly from the early 2000s when both had a military budget of less than 10 bn USD.

With these expenditures Brazil has by far the biggest military budget in South America. Colombia had the second biggest with slightly less than 10 bn USD and Argentina the third biggest with roughly 5.5 bn USD. Turkey in the Middle East has the second biggest military budget. With a big difference, Saudi Arabia in 2015 spent most with more than 87 bn USD, which is almost double the size from 2010 and in total the third biggest budget in the world.

Global Firepower prepared a list based on 50 criteria measuring military strength. According to this ranking, Turkey has the 8th strongest Armed Forces and Brazil the 15th strongest in the world. Both are also the strongest Armed Forces in their region. In the Middle East Egypt is on 12th, Israel on 16th, Iran on 21st and Saudi Arabia on 24th position. In South America, Argentina is on 35th position, Peru on 40th followed by Colombia.³⁵⁸ This well reflects the different importance of security issues in two very different world regions.

Another ranking on military strength was prepared by Credit Suisse with the following criteria: number of active personnel (5% of total score), tanks (10%), attack helicopters (15%), aircraft (20%), aircraft carriers (25%), and submarines (25%).³⁵⁹ According to this ranking, Turkey had the 10th strongest Armed Forces worldwide, Brazil was not in the top-20. Turkey’s position was the strongest in the Middle East, next was Egypt on 12th position and Israel on 14th position.

Soft power³⁶⁰ is more difficult to measure. In 2015 Portland, Facebook and ComRes elaborated a top-30 global soft power country ranking. It even had the blessing of the soft power guru Joseph Nye who wrote the foreword to the ranking, praising it as “the clearest picture to date of global soft power.”³⁶¹ It measured six indices: government, culture, engagement, education, digital, and enterprise using data from Facebook on governments’ online impact, and from ComRes, which ran opinion polls on international perceptions of countries. Without going into the details of the methodology, both Brazil and Turkey are within the top-30. Brazil is on 23rd and Turkey on 28th position. In none of the categories are they in the top-10. Especially for Turkey, where the discussion about growing soft power, in particular in the Middle East, has been very popular, this position is disappointing. But it also clearly shows that soft power is more than exporting TV series and tourism figures.

However, for our analysis of Brazil and Turkey’s standing in their neighborhoods, this result confirmed their dominant position in the region. Brazil is the best placed South and Latin American country, only Mexico on 29th position is also in the top-30. Concerning the Middle East, there is besides Turkey only one more country, Israel, on 26th position with a very good score concerning digital. However, for Turkey more important is that none of the regional rivals Egypt, Iran or Saudi Arabia are within the top-30.362

Coming back to the TV series. Turkey by 2016 has exported TV series to “more than 90 countries, as the second-largest soap opera exporter after the US.” As Anadolu Agency reported in May 2016, “years ago, the Balkans were the main market for Turkish soaps. Now the Arab world is the biggest market and Latin America is second.”³⁶³ Also in Brazil, Turkish series are a big success and shown on Band TV.³⁶⁴ However, even if these numbers are impressive and an economic factor with a generated income of 250 million USD in 2015, with positive impacts also on tourism, the power effect is negligible. Arabs love watching these series, but that does not give Turkey leverage over their political leaders.

Another often used soft power indicator are foreign students at home universities. According to data provided by UNESCO³⁶⁵, Brazil in 2013 hosted 15,221 foreign students, most of them were Angolans (1675), followed by Guinea-Bissau (819), Argentina (776), Paraguay (772), Cabo Verde (696) and Portugal (661). Among the first six countries, four are Portuguese speaking and two are neighbors. The eighth most foreign students were from the US (532), Japan sent 358 students, China 314 and Germany 254. Sixteen students were from Turkey. All in all very modest numbers. However, even these low numbers show a huge increase. The first available data was from 2002, when only 1260 foreign students studied in Brazil. In 2009 the number was 16,317. Since then it is slightly decreasing, which is a reflection of the overall difficult financial situation in Brazil, which negatively affects scholarships and international programs. A problem for the attractiveness of Brazilian universities is also the almost complete lack of English-language programs.

Turkey in 2013 hosted 54,387 students, roughly 3.5 times more than Brazil. Most students were from Azerbaijan with almost 7000, followed by Turkmenistan (5887), Germany (1606), Greece (1386), Afghanistan (1310), Indonesia (1155) and Bulgaria (1150). Students from Germany partly and students from Greece and Bulgaria almost exclusively are ethnic Turks. According to UNESCO, there were nine students from Brazil. In 2002 the number of foreign students was only 16,600 and in 2010 roughly 25,000. This shows that Turkey does indeed try to internationalize its universities.³⁶⁶ However, even with these numbers, according to the British Guardian, Turkey in 2014 was not in the top-20.367

Concerning cultural soft power, Turkey joined other states in 2007 with its own cultural centre entitled “Yunus Emre Institutes.”³⁶⁸ There are currently 43 institutes in 35 states, most of them in neighboring countries. So far no institute was opened on the American continent. The Turkish consul in São Paulo said that in Brazil a problem for the opening of an institute is that “in the current difficult situation, there is no support from Brazilian institutions, we needed to do everything alone, which is difficult and expensive.”³⁶⁹

This list can be extended widely, but the general picture does not change, it would by and large be confirmed. Both Brazil and Turkey fit the categories of emerging/rising powers when analyzing objective criteria. Brazil dominates in most power categories its neighbors, often with a huge difference. Turkey is in many power categories also dominating and in others not far from the strongest competitor. All in all, it is justified for both to be treated as emerging/rising powers.

3.6. Role formulation by leading decision makers

In both countries there is a significant degree of continuity in foreign policy, which will be analyzed in chapter 4.6. Still, the focus here will be only statements, interviews and articles by AKP and PT politicians or diplomats during their legislatures. It is tried to refer to sources, which deal in general with foreign policy, as demanded by Holsti. However, when analyzing speeches and articles by e.g. the foreign ministers, understandably the big majority deals with specific issues and not the general line of foreign policy. Therefore also parts of speeches on specific issues will be included. Only primary sources will be used.

In Turkey, the central person formulating foreign policy concepts during the AKP governments was Ahmet Davutoğlu. However, in his most famous book “Strategic Depth”³⁷⁰ (2001) there is very little, which is relevant for a role as an emerging power. This can be explained with the timing of the publication during a deep financial crisis and after a decade of everything but a concise foreign policy. Davutoğlu criticized the policy in the 1990s, coined by “instable coalition governments with their short term maneuvers.”³⁷¹ Foreign policy was missing a “theoretic framework” and an overall strategy for different regions. For the Middle East he diagnosed a “process of alienation”³⁷² and lamented that despite 500 years of leadership experience, Turkey now falls behind Israel with a 50 years presence.

What becomes clear, however, is that already in 2001 Davutoğlu saw Turkey as a very special and central country: “Turkey possesses its own particularities, which are very different from countries in or outside the region.”³⁷³ His point of reference is the Ottoman Empire as a legacy of a powerful state with leadership ambitions. He mentioned Turkey together with “India, Brazil, Egypt, Argentina, Iraq” as “regional powers.” But at the time they all had to align their foreign policy to the wishes of the super power and its political cycles.³⁷⁴

In the main part of the book, Davutoğlu described the relations to the neighboring regions and their importance from a historic and geostrategic point of view. Turkey was for a long time “the centre of a civilization and was order building.”³⁷⁵ But there was not yet the self-confident formulation of a leading role for these regions. However, he would add this role formulation in the following years, e.g. in a series of interviews, which he gave as foreign policy advisor to the prime minister and foreign minister before assuming the position of foreign minister in May 2009. Davutoğlu himself compiled these interviews in a book entitled “From theory to practice – Speeches/Talks about Turkish foreign policy.”³⁷⁶

In November 2002, he underlined in an interview with the monthly Yarın (Tomorrow) the importance of being a strong player in the Middle East: “Turkey is building its relations with all global powers via the Middle East ... the more influential Turkey is in the Middle East, the more negotiating power it will have with the other powers.”³⁷⁷

Already in early 2004, Davutoğlu said that a foreign policy goal is to reach to regions where Turkey so far was not present: “Turkey in 2006 has to become a country, which negotiates with the EU and increases its rhythm of becoming a global actor by activities in areas, which were neglected so far such as Africa and Latin America.”³⁷⁸

In April 2004, he told Turkishtime that “leaving slowly the regional frame, we have to bring Turkey to the situation that it can voice its view on a global level on any topic even if it seems not directly related.”³⁷⁹ In the same interview he stressed the importance of exports and trade: “Exports is such an important parameter in Turkey’s strategic vision ... the important leading companies of the private sector are actually the pioneers of our foreign policy and strategic vision.”

In February 2005 in an interview with CNN Türk he confirmed the vision of a global power: “I am using the term multi-faceted foreign policy. ... If Turkey can show itself everywhere and make itself known, it puts itself forth with a global vision and as a global power.”³⁸⁰ This concretely meant that “from now on we will increase our efforts in Africa and regions where we have fewer relations.”³⁸¹

In late 2006, again talking to CNN Türk, Davutoğlu underlined that in his view, a regional role is not sufficient: “coming to the term regional power, for sure Turkey with its current position is a regional power, but because of its strategic vision, to be a regional power is not enough. That is why Turkey has to become a global actor.”³⁸² He again stressed the importance of being present on the ground and having broad commercial ties: “Places, which you do not reach, you cannot be influential. Places which we newly went to, Turkish Airlines has to reach. The Brazil flights started.”³⁸³

In early 2008, he told CNN Türk that Turkey could raise its weight globally through hosting international summits: “we are a country that shows its presence on all international platforms. This image of a New Turkey has to be evaluated as the first milestones of moving from a central country to a global power.”³⁸⁴

And finally, still in 2008 he gave a date, until when Turkey should be that global power:

Turkey’s engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, and from the EU to the OIC [Organization of the Islamic Conference] will be part of a holistic approach to foreign policy. These initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic.³⁸⁵

Additionally, Davutoğlu also published an interview from 2012, when he was already foreign minister. He said that during the AKP legislatures the opening of new embassies, including in Latin America were examples of a new vision: “This clearly shows that we reached a vision and capacity, which we can enforce in every region of the world.”³⁸⁶

Davutoğlu has been the dominant figure from the beginning of the AKP legislatures at least until May 2016. But, there were of course other important politicians executing foreign policy, but also expressing role definitions.³⁸⁷ Most had Davutoğlu as their advisor.

Abdullah Gül in August 2005 spoke in the function of foreign minister of a leading regional role: “Turkey plays a leading role in establishing regional cooperation, extending from the Black Sea, through the Balkans and reaching beyond the Middle East, extending to a wide Eurasian landscape.”³⁸⁸

Even then president Sezer, who was elected in 2000 before the AKP came to power and represented the old Kemalist state elites, confirmed in 2005 that Turkey should “cement its status as a regional power, to reach its target to be a global power.”³⁸⁹

In 2007 Gül succeeded Sezer as president. Ali Babacan became foreign minister, who in April 2009 also spoke of a global foreign policy:

We are also enhancing our reach to Latin America, the South Pacific Island States, the Caribbean Islands. Turkey is becoming more and more a country, which doe not only have a close regional reach but also a country, which has a sense of global responsibility.³⁹⁰

Later that same month he again stressed the importance of being strong in the region:

Turkey is a country, which has quite a busy foreign policy agenda. It is so natural given our historical ties, cultural ties with such a large geography. When we talk about the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, North Africa, when we talk about issues on Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey is a country which is not only deeply involved, but also a country which has an important responsibility and role for peace and stability.³⁹¹

The final quotes to illustrate a role conception for Turkey come from academic and career diplomat Ibrahim Kalın who was the first director of the office of public diplomacy, which was launched under the Prime Ministry in 2011. Currently he is a foreign policy advisor to the president. In 2011 he wrote:

The new realities of volatile globalization and multiple modernities have both enabled and forced Turkey to reinvent itself as a new political, economic, and diplomatic power ... diversifying its foreign policy agenda in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and engaging in multiple regional issues.³⁹²

About global governance and the relation with other rising powers, Kalın added: “Turkey has consistently sought to develop closer economic relations with other rising powers in Asia and Latin America, partly in an effort to adjust to the shift of world economic power to nonwestern regions.”³⁹³

This was one of the rather rare occasions that from the Turkish side a South approach and challenging the existing system were mentioned, something the Brazilian foreign policy protagonists would do much more often.

In Brazil, there was not one politician as dominant as Davutoğlu, but an equally important tandem. President Lula and foreign minister Amorim. They will be the prime sources defining Brazil’s foreign policy role as an emerging power. The presidency started on 1 January 2003. President Lula in his inaugural speech in the Brazilian Congress gave messages both towards South America, but also beyond:

we need to export more, aggregating value to our products and acting, with energy and creativity, on the international floors of globalized trade ... The great priority of foreign policy during my government will be a construction of a South America, politically stable, wealthy and united, with a base in democratic idea and social justice. For it is essential a decisive action of revitalization of Mercosul, weakened by crises of its members and for visions often narrow-minded and egoistic concerning integration.

Besides this regional focus, he already spoke of other emerging powers: “We will deepen the relationship with the great nations in development: China, India, Russia, South Africa, among others.”³⁹⁴

His foreign minister Amorim confirmed in his inaugural speech the following day that the priority of foreign policy “during the Lula administration will be South America.” But also Amorim mentioned that Brazil will look beyond the region:

Our foreign policy cannot be confined to a single region, nor could it be restricted to one single dimension. Brazil can and must contribute to a construction of a global pacifist and solidarity-based order, based on rights and our principles of multilateralism, conscious of its demographic, territorial, economic and cultural weight and being a big democracy in the process of a social transformation.³⁹⁵

The first month of the new government was busy. Lula and Amorim went both to Davos and Porto Alegre, to the World Economic and Social Forums. Returning from Davos, Lula told Amorim: “Celso, we are in the condition of changing the commercial geopolitics and global policy.”³⁹⁶

Some more examples from the first legislature. In July 2005 Lula said in Paris at a conference entitled “Brazil: Global Actor”: “A country like Brazil does not have the option to live at the margins of global processes.”³⁹⁷ In September 2005 he concretized:

Brazilian foreign policy has reached a new level of maturity. We are no longer limited by imaginary boundaries or ready-made formulas. We are exploring opportunities for dialogue, cooperation and trade, wherever these may be. We have developed diverse partnerships and more balanced relations with all the regions of the world.³⁹⁸

Celso Amorim in November 2005 confirmed this global approach: “Brazilian diplomacy is presently going through a period of great dynamism ... to expand the geographical reach of Brazil’s foreign relations.”³⁹⁹

Marco Aurelio Garcia, the PT’s foreign policy spin doctor said in an interview in 2006: “It can sound arrogant, but either you passively accept the correlation of powers, or you try to change it.”⁴⁰⁰

Lula won the elections again in October 2006. Was his first inaugural speech still rather shy, in January 2007 it was held by a self-confident president:

Brazil is a more respected nation, with a creative and sovereign insertion in the world. Our foreign policy – object of pride for its excellent results was marked by a clear option in favor of multilateralism, necessary to reach a world of peace and solidarity. This option allowed us to keep excellent political, economic and trade relations with the big global powers and, at the same time, to prioritize ties to the South of the world.⁴⁰¹

Amorim, also foreign minister in the second term, wrote in 2007:

We are aware that the affirmation of Brazilian values and interests in the world is, and always be, global in its reach. Without discussing whether this is an advantage or disadvantage, Brazil is not a small country. It does not have and cannot have a foreign policy of a small country.⁴⁰²

In an interview in March 2008, Amorim said that Brazil through its foreign policy recuperated “the status of an emergent middle power.”⁴⁰³ On 25 April 2008 at the Federal University in Rio de Janeiro he stressed both the importance of trade and challenging the existing order:

When we diversified our partnerships, we opened up opportunities for joint political action, expanding our export markets ... Brazilian foreign policy has no prejudices ... Brazil can work with others to create a less static and hierarchical world order.⁴⁰⁴

Four days later he said in his Rio Branco speech:

our policy has always been one of non-intervention. Given the rise in influence of Brazil, there needs to be a new interpretation of this non-intervention. And this new flavor, which does not change the principle, is a non-indifference ... Brazil is today an actor of great weight in international policies.⁴⁰⁵

A year later, the focus finally was completely outside the region. Amorim said in New York: “Lula da Silva’s foreign policy for Brazil is that it really has become global. Previously we had globalization, but our foreign policy was not global. Today foreign policy is global.”⁴⁰⁶ This was confirmed in 2011 as he wrote in an article:

Fostering relations with the developing world was one of the cornerstones of President Lula’s foreign policy. Renewed dialogue and cooperation with countries of the Middle East was part of this larger effort to strengthen South–South cooperation.⁴⁰⁷

Already as defense minister, Amorim said in October 2011 in Paris: “We also expect to deepen the cooperation with other developing countries like India and Turkey.”⁴⁰⁸

On 18 December 2012, Brazilian career diplomat Paulo Nogueira Batista, who became IMF executive director, stressed that “since 2008, the BRICS have been the main alliance for Brazil ... I emphasize: much more important than any other Latin American countries.”⁴⁰⁹ This stands in perfect contrast to the inaugural speeches of Lula and Amorim who both then spoke of South America as the priority.

Between 15 and 18 June 2013, a conference was organized at the Federal University of ABC (UFABC) entitled “2003-2013: A New foreign policy.”⁴¹⁰ At that conference, many protagonists of the two Lula legislatures were among the speakers reflecting on ten years of PT foreign policy. Amorim there again explained his foreign policy vision and foreign policy roles for Brazil:

It was necessary to change our attitude in foreign policy. It means to have a proud and active policy. What I had in mind with these two words was to be proud in the sense that we did not need to bow to the opinions of other powers, not even to those more powerful than us. We had the conditions to explore and defend our points of view and fight for them. This consisted the pride. And the active aspect had also to do with the refutation of a previous concept that said that Brazil should not have a protagonist role.⁴¹¹

He added that foreign policy “would be active, because it would not be reduced to reacting in the face of situations, but would promote issues, initiatives and new agendas.”

After Amorim, his successor Patriota spoke, who during the Lula years was among others ambassador in Washington. About the foreign policy before the PT he said: “it was more reactive, less creative, less transformed to the international realities.” For the legislature of Dilma Rousseff he was convinced that

there will not be a rupture with the previous period. What will be tried is to build on this innovative base, which opened ways, heightened the prestige of the country and brought new opportunities. These opportunities have not been fully appreciated so far. This is a period of consolidation, deepening and widening.⁴¹²

This shows that still in the third year of Dilma’s first legislature and during massive criticism, the big June 2013 protests had already started in São Paulo and other cities, the foreign minister was on a track of continuity of an active foreign policy.

Towards the end of the conference also former president Lula spoke. In retrospect, he underlined the different visions of a state being equal and not subordinate:

The truth is this: we were not taken seriously. But, more important, we were not taken seriously because we did nott respect ourselves. Let us be frank: we had in this country for a long time a part of the leading elite with an inferiority complex. They did not want to discuss to be equals to the others, they thought to be inferior. ... We still think as a poor country, a thing that we are not. We are the sixth biggest economy in the world.⁴¹³

The final quotes by former foreign minister Mauro Vieira showed again the importance of trade and foreign markets in a time of economic downturn. Dilma’s foreign minister for the second legislature said in January 2015:

we will redouble our efforts in the area of international trade, seeking to develop or enhance relations with foreign markets – all foreign markets. A central objective for Itamaraty during President Dilma Rousseff’s second term will be to work hard to open, expand or consolidate Brazil’s access to all foreign markets, promoting and defending the Brazilian productive sector, assisting it in its own initiatives, and helping wherever possible to attract investment.⁴¹⁴

In August 2015, he confirmed this view:

I have sought to bring an eminently pragmatic approach to the actions of the Foreign Ministry, aimed at achieving significant and noticeable results for the country in the form of more trade, more investment, more technology.⁴¹⁵

And finally shortly before the premature end of his term, Vieira said in February 2016: “We have the obligation to search for partners and opportunities in the whole world, the example what already the principle global actors do.”⁴¹⁶

Brazil and Turkey both have the capacities to act as emerging powers in foreign policy and formulate the adequate role conception. Leading decision makers in both countries underlined in several occasions that their countries’ foreign policy should be global, have strong relations with all regions in the world, being active diplomatic players and seeing themselves as equals to the established powers, challenging the current order.

CHAPTER 4

FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND BRAZIL

4.1. Introduction

Libraries have been written full of analyses of Brazil’s and Turkey’s foreign policy. Especially after the end of the Cold War, both countries’ foreign policy attracted the interest of numerous scholars. The aim of this chapter is not to give a summary of these analyses of the past 26 years, but to offer a brief sketch of Brazilian and Turkish post-Cold War foreign policy with an analysis of some aspects adequate for comparison.

4.2. Traditional Turkish foreign policy

Among the most important factors shaping foreign policy from the beginning of the Republic (1920s) were:

- the historical experience of the Ottoman Empire and its end, leading to the importance of a balance of power

- Sèvres syndrome, a suspicion of foreign powers and their interests

- Kemalism, the political ideology of the governing elite, with its self-chosen isolationism

- Western orientation⁴¹⁷

For Oran, these features made Turkey a perfect status quo country.⁴¹⁸ Gürbey called traditional Turkish foreign policy besides status-quo oriented also “passive and one-dimensional.”⁴¹⁹ For Tür and Han the most important result of these criteria was a “preoccupation with security and security-oriented foreign policy.”⁴²⁰

Even if during the Cold War coalitions often changed and several parties participated in governments and held the foreign ministry, “consensus among the traditional decision-making elites was strongest”⁴²¹ concerning foreign policy. This is confirmed by Bilgin and Bilgiç who wrote that during the Cold War period “the foreign policy agendas of centrist parties remained almost identical.”⁴²²

Turkey was a front state in the Cold War, a NATO member bordering the Soviet Union, geostrategically for the West utmost important. However, as Larrabee argued “contrary to the fears of many Turks, the end of the Cold War did not reduce Turkey’s strategic importance in American eyes. If anything, the opposite is true.”⁴²³ However, the 1990s still were a time of transformation and new possibilities. The traditional model did not seem to be sufficient any more. The first politician with whom a more activist foreign policy is associated with was Turgut Özal. Not only this. Also the term Neo-Ottomanism was first used during his presidency, coined by journalist and presidential advisor Cengiz Çandar. Then, it was an “intellectual movement that advocated Turkish pursuit of active and diversified foreign policy.”⁴²⁴ The feeling of exclusion from the West was part of that, leading to a search for other geographical spaces to be attached to. For Özal this was not so much the Middle East, but the Central Asian Turkic states.⁴²⁵ It was also a time, when it was realized that reducing tensions in the neighbourhood would be advantageous for Turkey’s stability and prosperity.⁴²⁶

The politician incorporating the adaptation of foreign policy to new circumstances was Ismail Cem, Turkey’s foreign minister from June 1997 until July 2002. In July 1998 Cem wrote in a preface for the book “Turkey and the World”:

It is worthwhile to note that there are 26 states with which we shared for centuries a common history, a common state and a common fate … By virtue of its historical and cultural attributes and its privileged double-identity, European, as well as Asian, Turkey is firmly positioned to become the strategic ‘Center’ of Eurasia.⁴²⁷

And later he wrote that “since the beginning of the twenty-first century, freed from the chains of a bi-polar world system, Turkey has been able to define its own strategic foreign policy axis ... multidimensional, multilayered, inter-regional and trans-regional foreign policy that positioned it as ‘a multi-regional country.’”⁴²⁸

It is Cem’s bad luck that he just described this change of vision and how Turkey should present herself in the region, without using a catchy term. This would only happen by the foreign policy architect of the 2000s.

Oran, who edited vast volumes on the history of Turkey’s foreign policy, divided foreign policy until the 2000s into six periods where different persons or institutions were dominant.

1919-1950: political leaders (e.g. Atatürk, Inönü, Menderes)

1950-1960: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

1960-1980: public opinion, opposition, intellectuals

1980-1983: military coup

1983-1991: business community

1990s: military⁴²⁹

What would follow in the 2000s would be the AKP with its vision, its own elite and thinking.

4.3. AKP foreign policy

The end of the Cold War was certainly the most dramatic change to the international order of the past decades, which also had significant consequences for Turkey’s foreign policy. When the AKP came to power in November 2002, the Cold War had already ended more than a decade ago, but, in the words of Davutoğlu, another major “earthquake” shaking international affairs, 9/11, only happened a year before. For Oktav, “the tectonic changes following the September 11 incidents re-elevated Turkey’s international position and its foreign policy orientation. This resulted in a proactivism in Turkish foreign policy.”⁴³⁰

Whereas in the eyes of the AKP, the time between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of its legislature was a “lost decade”, the party was prone to develop a “holistic conceptual framework.”⁴³¹ Less than half a year after the AKP came to power, the first clear sign of a more independent foreign policy was the decision of the Turkish parliament on 1 March 2003 not to allow the US to use Turkish territory for the invasion of Iraq. According to Oktav, “Washington was furious with Ankara just because the latter shifted from its previous ‘buffer state’ identity.”⁴³²

This also meant, in the evaluation of Tür and Han, that this foreign policy approach, which they call neo-traditionalist, “no longer identified Turkey’s vital interests with those of the West. ... The ‘Western-ness’ of the country was limited to its functional aspect.”⁴³³ This was also confirmed by Turkish diplomat Kalın who wrote that “Turkey is beginning to read history from a non-Eurocentric point of view and to recognize other possibilities in world history.”⁴³⁴ For Kalın a “process of soul-searching”⁴³⁵ had been undergoing.

Until the Arab Spring, for the majority of experts, this did not yet mean a fundamental change of priorities. For the time until 2006, Oran wrote that Turkey was firmly part of the West and ideologically rooted there, because of the military and bureaucracy.⁴³⁶ For Pope, it was even “a misconception to think of them [the AKP] as Islamist, or even ideological.”⁴³⁷ And Larrabee clearly stated that “contrary to the assertions of some critics, Turkey’s recent diplomatic activism does not represent an attempt by Ankara to turn its back on the West or an ‘Islamisation’ of Turkish foreign policy.”⁴³⁸

However, others argued that especially after 2006 when the EU membership process slowed down, something changed. “Turkey began to turn its attention to neighboring geographical regions.”⁴³⁹ Fuller wrote that through this re-orientation “strategically Turkey has become part of the Middle East.”⁴⁴⁰ This, for Larrabee ended a historic anomaly. “For centuries, the Ottoman Empire was the dominant power in the Middle East. Thus, in many ways, Turkey is simply reintegrating into an area of which it has long been a part.”⁴⁴¹

In 2011, when the Arab Spring began, the Turkish foreign ministry for the first time in its history, presented a report about the promotion of democracy and human rights and called them the priority goals of foreign policy. For Karakaş, the country saw itself as the transmitter of Western values to the East and the West’s outpost in the Muslim Middle East.⁴⁴²

This view changed completely with the Arab Spring. In 2013 Philip Robins wrote that the AKP’s “political value system based on Sunni Islam that has come to replace the repudiated old order.”⁴⁴³

4.3.1. Ahmet Davutoğlu – architect of Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy

Few states have a person as dominant both as a theoretician and a practitioner for its foreign policy as Turkey had with Davutoğlu. As a professor of international relations at Istanbul’s Beykent University, he published with “Strategic Depth” in 2001 what Oran called the “bible of Turkish foreign policy.”⁴⁴⁴ Following the AKP’s electoral victory in 2002, he became the advisor of the prime and foreign ministers, until he became himself the foreign minister in 2009 and served as prime minister from August 2014 to May 2016. Davutoğlu therefore is a prime example of what Ó Tuathail and Agnew referred to as “intellectuals of statecraft.”⁴⁴⁵ Erhan would call this period the “era of Davudism”⁴⁴⁶, especially after 2006.

According to Öktem and Kadıoğlu, with Davutoğlu, “Turkey for the first time since the rule of state founder Mustafa Kemal, based its foreign policy on a home-grown doctrine shaped by the two key concepts of ‘strategic depth’ and ‘zero problems with neighbours.’”⁴⁴⁷ For Oran, this meant that “the Foreign Ministry benefited from a far-reaching perspective and vision, instead of drifting along an endless train of events.”⁴⁴⁸

Strategic Depth, or as Bechev called it “Turkish neighbourhood policy”⁴⁴⁹ includes both geographical and historical depth. They refer to the Ottoman Empire, which becomes reinterpreted as a positive reference and guidance for the future. Turkey can look back to a century long “geographical continuity with its region; however, it has forgotten what this strategic depth implies for its foreign policy.”⁴⁵⁰

According to Davutoğlu, Turkish foreign policy should be based on five basic principles:

1) a balance between ‘security’ and ‘freedom’

2) zero problem policy towards neighbors

3) a multidimensional foreign policy

4) firm flexibility, proactive foreign policy

5) rhythmic diplomacy that is adaptable to different circumstances.⁴⁵¹

Davutoğlu dismissed that Turkey was a bridge between East and West or on the periphery of larger regions. Instead, if Turkey used properly its geography, it would be a “central country” of its own geographic understanding⁴⁵², which is a kind of “Ottoman geopolitical space.”⁴⁵³ Bilgin and Bilgiç therefore spoke of “civilizational geopolitics”, a space represented by a “Turkish/Islamic/Ottoman exceptionalism”, where Turkey assumed leadership.⁴⁵⁴

The AKP establishment has a clear vision of the borders of this geopolitical space. Exemplary, then prime minister Erdoğan said after the election victory in June 2011: “Believe me, Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul, Beirut won as much as Izmir, Damascus won as much as Ankara, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir.” These cities are located besides Turkey in the Balkans, the Mashreq and pay special attention to Palestine. “In religious terms, it is a map made mostly of Muslims, and to be more precise, of Sunni Muslims, mostly of the Hanafi school. This is no doubt a selective image of the empire ... emotive reference to the golden days of the Ottoman Empire.”⁴⁵⁵ What is important to note is not that predominantly non-Muslim cities are ignored, e.g. Thessaloniki or Sofia, but that also (Shia) Iran is excluded. For Davutoğlu this geography is tied together by belonging to an “Islamic civilization”, a term, which according to Murinson he preferred to the more religious term “umma.”⁴⁵⁶

Turkey is the only clear successor state of the Ottoman Empire. For the new Turkish elites, it was not a peripheral empire, but the “center of Eastern and Western world interactions for over six hundred years.”⁴⁵⁷ Leadership ambitions can be explained through this legacy. For Walker, Neo-Ottoman thinkers are “highly critical of Turkey’s Cold War strategy for its myopic reluctance to embrace the country’s obvious advantages – namely, its rich history and geographical location.” For the AKP it offered a great opportunity to also appeal to nationalists who “actively seek to embrace both Turkey’s Ottoman past and former geopolitical space.”⁴⁵⁸

However, not all share this enthusiasm about the Ottoman past. For the Kemalists, politically represented by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), it was a backward, poor and weak empire. And for significant parts of the population, as Tüysüzoğlu rightly underlined, the “Ottoman past is looked ... especially by the Alevis, as a nightmare.”⁴⁵⁹

Other critics of Davutoğlu argue that he is not neo-Ottoman, but argue that Strategic Depth and what followed was a whitewashed version of more radical, more Islamist and anti-Western ideas, he had developed earlier in the 1990s. Behül Özkan, a former student of Davutoğlu at Marmara University, who analyzed numerous of his texts written since the 1980s, concluded that “Mr. Davutoğlu is not a neo-Ottomanist ... He is a pan-Islamist.”⁴⁶⁰ Özkan stressed that Davutoğlu in the 1990s “opposed Turkey’s integration with the West” as then the only professor at Marmara University. “In his lectures, this professor argued that Turkey would soon emerge as the leader of the Islamic world by taking advantage of its proud heritage and geographical potential.”⁴⁶¹ According to Özkan, Davutoğlu, whom he calls “a poster boy for political Islam in Turkey⁴⁶² ... believes in a Sunni Muslim hegemonic order led by Turkey that would encompass the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and include Albania and Bosnia.”⁴⁶³ In another article, Özkan summarized as difference between the early writings that “what I saw was a man who was far more radical in his thinking than as portrayed in Strategic Depth.”⁴⁶⁴

For this analysis, important aspects are that also in Davutoglu’s early view, Turkey as a central country is either a candidate for regional leader or even for leader of the Muslim world. Policies following this ideal seemed rather successful. Until the Arab Spring reached Tripolis.

4.4. The Arab Spring and the limits of Turkish regional influence

According to Robins “initially, the AKP government had ‘a good Arab Spring.’ However, this good Arab Spring only lasted until it reached Libya. The Turkish diplomatic intervention was regarded as siding with Gaddafi. “There were anti-Turkish protests in Benghazi, the cradle of the revolt. It was here that the limits of Turkish diplomacy with the regimes in power in the Arab world, and hence the shortcomings of the ‘zero problems’ philosophy, were most graphically revealed. Gaddafi simply brushed Erdoğan aside.”⁴⁶⁵

The same limitations would become even more obvious in Syria, which according to Sümer until the Arab Spring “was a model success story for the AKP’s foreign policy doctrine and practice.”⁴⁶⁶ Robins called it a “misconceived policy towards Syria”,⁴⁶⁷ which became the “hard reality check”⁴⁶⁸ of a doctrine, which represented “more wishful thinking on the AKP’s part than it does complex and contradictory regional political realities.”⁴⁶⁹ After two years into the Arab Spring, academics largely agreed that “zero problems with neighbours’ has become obsolete and that the Arab Spring has forced Ankara to rebrand its foreign policy”, as former diplomat and think tank founder Ülgen said. For Taşpınar, the “zero-problems policy is no longer reasonable”⁴⁷⁰ and journalist Piotr Zalewski instead spoke of “zero friends.”⁴⁷¹ For Aras, the development of the Arab Spring also “invalidated Turkey’s drive to become an influential regional power.”⁴⁷² For Karakaş, Turkish foreign policy not only reached its limits among Arab states, but was similarly unsuccessful with its European neighbours, especially concerning long-standing diplomatic problems with Cyprus and Armenia, where “little substantial happened.”⁴⁷³

This all had as a consequence, as Dağı argued that Turkey adopted again “a more assertive and aggressive line of policy.”⁴⁷⁴ For Kaliber, this was “ironic”, because the ‘old’ Kemalist policies, which the AKP criticized as “highly securitized, tension-oriented, problem-driven” returned to Turkey’s relations with its neighbours “even more manifestly than in the past.”⁴⁷⁵ For Karakaş, the Arab Spring ended the multi-dimensional Turkish foreign policy and “put the country again into the role of the front-line state.”⁴⁷⁶

4.5. Brazilian foreign policy

There is no Brazilian “Strategic Depth.” According to Vaz, Brazil does not even have “a major formal document outlining its foreign policy priorities and conceptual basis.”⁴⁷⁷ However, this does not mean that there are not any core foreign policy principles. During the Cold War these were according to Vaz: “alignment and commitment to Western values ... sovereignty and independence ... autonomously promoting national development.” A defining trait was “multilateralism.”⁴⁷⁸

The first time, an independent foreign policy (política externa independente) was on the agenda, was already in the 1960s and 1970s during the military dictatorship. After the end of the military rule in 1985, Bernal-Meza argued that under Itamar Franco a new dimension of foreign policy was formulated, which saw Brazil as a continental country and global trader, “approximating to other middle powers like China, India and later Russia.”⁴⁷⁹ Then, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was foreign minister. As president in the late 1990s, he further strengthened relations with these emerging countries, which later would be labeled BRIC(S).⁴⁸⁰ This was a time when reduced US commitment in South America created space for Brazil, which benefitted a more active foreign policy.

With the election of Lula da Silva in late 2002, foreign policy had two main pillars as Gratius wrote in 2004: “an active foreign policy in international fora, including the desire to become a permanent member of the UNSC and to export regionally and globally Brazil’s development model.”⁴⁸¹ The latter is also stressed by Zilla seven years later.

The Lula government tried to conquer the international space by using its national greatness and socio-economic success for foreign policy objectives. Inside the country the hope for prosperity was almost accomplished – this fed the demand for recognition and adoption of a more relevant role on the global level.⁴⁸²

Both, supporters and critics of the PT-presidencies conceal that the Lula years were different in terms of activism. Visentini wrote that “Lula’s foreign policy represented the boldest field of action of his government.”⁴⁸³ For Jean Tible it was a “period of creativity.”⁴⁸⁴ Almeida spoke of “one of the most dynamic periods of Brazilian diplomacy in any era.”⁴⁸⁵ But also strong critics of the government, like former foreign minister Lampreia admitted that

never in our history did we have such an elevated position in the international prestige. There are very few countries, which can exhibit in the past 15 years a comparable increase in its international stature. ... our country will have an ever stronger influence in its region and in international questions.⁴⁸⁶

There is no document like Strategic Depth, but also its content, a special focus on neighborhood policy, is less important in Brazil, even if Gratius wrote that Brazil has “a global foreign policy with a regional focus.”⁴⁸⁷ That regional focus has changed over the decades from Latin America to South America and at least according to some, again back to Latin America, even if this is contested. For Montero “since 1993 especially, Itamaraty has embraced the notion of South America as a geopolitical and economic unit in which, naturally, the largest country, Brazil has an outsize role as the hub of the continent.”⁴⁸⁸ The reason for this focus on South America is that with the signing of NAFTA, active since January 1994, Mexico would be oriented towards the North and US influence too direct and strong in Mexico and further down in Central America. As a consequence, according to Montero, “Itamaraty dramatically increased its diplomatic corps in South America.”⁴⁸⁹ Also Bernal-Meza argued that in the 2000s “Itamaraty stopped referring to ‘Latin America’ as a region.”⁴⁹⁰ However, two years later, the same Bernal-Meza argued that “Brazil returned to Latin America and the Caribbean during the second presidency of Lula.”⁴⁹¹ In this legislature, Lula would visit more Central American countries, especially Mexico and Caribbean. “Brazil went back to ‘Latin America’ because the ‘South America’ project failed.”⁴⁹² There is no consensus on this, but either way, neither Latin America nor South America is comparable in importance as are the neighbouring basins for Turkey. It is hardly imaginable that a Brazilian president after an election victory would say. “Today Brasilia won as much as Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro as much as Santiago, Recife as much as Bogota or Manaus as much as Panama City.”

4.5.1. Brazilian Middle East policy

When the Lula presidency began in 2003, there were still quite some terre incognite for Brazilian diplomacy. One of them was the Middle East. As Velasco commented: “In the 1990s there was no Middle Eastern policy, embassies there were closed.”⁴⁹³ It is striking that Lula was the first president of the Brazilian Republic to visit the region. For Zilla, he used a “summit diplomacy” and the “linking of focus regions.”⁴⁹⁴ According to Clemesha, Middle East expert at the University of São Paulo (USP), Brazilian foreign policy under president Lula “made a genuine effort to engage countries of the Middle East on the bilateral and bi-regional (involving South America as a whole) levels.”⁴⁹⁵

The major diplomatic initiative in this regard was the “Cúpula America do Sul – Países Arabes” (Summit of South American-Arab Countries, ASPA). Brazil proposed it already in 2003, its foundation took place in May 2005 in Brasilia with the participation of 34 states, 12 South American and 22 Arab countries as well as the general secretary of the Arab League.⁴⁹⁶ For Amorim, “with the advent of ASPA, these two parts of the developing world were brought together for the first time.”⁴⁹⁷ For Tible these summits were “a sign of political autonomy.”⁴⁹⁸

Brazilian politicians would stress the historical and personal bonds. There are approximately ten to twelve million Arab-Brazilians. The largest populations of Lebanese and Syrians outside those countries reside in Brazil. For Clemesha these bonds were

helpful for the intensification of relations with the Middle East. There is a very old Arab-Brazilian chamber of commerce. Many Syrian and Lebanese Christian Arabs are members. They are not linked any more to their countries of origin, but there has been a commercial and trade relationship. These contacts were used by Itamaraty.⁴⁹⁹

But, in general, these bonds were rather rhetoric. As Lazarou acknowledged “the history was brought to the surface, because of the economy and international circumstances to start working together. And there you have to construct a myth of a deeper connection.” Lazarou added that research on historic relations then was funded intensively. “Through this, they could say we have historical ties.”⁵⁰⁰ Also for Lessa these were “new ties with countries and regions with which Brazil had historically maintained weak relations.”⁵⁰¹

According to Pecequilo the reaching out to the world was a logical consequence of the development in Brazil, “the foreign policy agenda could not be limited to the American continent or the USA.”⁵⁰² For Amorim, “the deepening of relations between Brazil and countries of the Middle East was long overdue.”⁵⁰³ Lula was known as a frequent flyer. The Middle East was no exception. During his eight years in office he visited Syria, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, Qatar (twice, one state visit, one ASPA summit), Libya (also twice), Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, Palestine and Israel.

For Amorim, this interest was not unidirectional. Already before the active involvement began, Brazil was granted observer status by the Arab League in 2002 as the first Latin American country.⁵⁰⁴ Later, the Middle Eastern states gave “clear indications that they seek better ties with Brazil.”⁵⁰⁵ Middle Eastern heads of states and the Arab League General Secretary were regular visitors to Brasilia.

During the Lula years, Brazil was invited to major conferences on the Middle East such as the Annapolis Conference in November 2007 or the Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy for the Reconstruction of Gaza, in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2009. At Annapolis, Brazil was the only South American country, which participated with its own delegation.

An important motivation was the possibility of intensifying trade relations. Trade between Brazil and Arab countries increased roughly four times from 2003 to 2008, from 5.5 bn USD to 20.3 bn USD.⁵⁰⁶ Through then newly established flight connections, e.g. between São Paulo and Dubai, Tel Aviv and Doha, also the distance was reduced, at least psychologically. Intensive contacts and involvement continued as with other aspects of foreign policy until 2011. At the beginning of the Arab Spring, an IBSA delegation went to Syria to meet with Assad. According to Clemesha, “the moderate language of the final declaration then was also influenced by the Syrian-Brazilian lobby, which pressured not to criticize too harshly the regime.”⁵⁰⁷ In the aftermath, Brazil would disappear from mediating initiatives.

For Clemesha, even after a decade of closer relations and commitment, the policy towards the Middle East is still on a weak fundament.

There is no White paper. There was a meeting of scholars, community leaders, religious leaders in 2014 at the Itamaraty to have visions for foreign policy on a global level. Everyone had six minutes to talk, and I was rapporteur to put it together, which was almost impossible, because the views presented were so different. There is still no foreign policy for the Middle East, there is no strategy.⁵⁰⁸

4.5.2. Foreign policy under Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)

Supporters and opponents of the PT and experts with different views on the impeachment share without exception the view that Dilma Rousseff’s foreign policy performance was poor. The retreat of Brazil from the international stage are besides economic and domestic problems mainly associated with her name.

There were already signs even before Dilma became president indicating that she would show little interest in foreign policy. The journal “Política Externa” published interviews with the three main candidates for the presidency about foreign policy, but “Dilma Rousseff did not answer the indicated questions. In the speech following her victory, she spoke of changes, but did not mention foreign policy.”⁵⁰⁹ For Tible, together with little interest for foreign affairs, “Dilma also has a negative view on diplomacy in general, it is empty talk, waste of time.”⁵¹⁰ A clear example for this view was during one so-called Rio Branco Day under foreign minister Patriota when the new diplomats were inaugurated. As Daniel explained, “first Dilma refused to take a photo together with the new diplomats. Then she asked how many engineers were there, which was understood as a kind of insult.”⁵¹¹

It is almost tautological, but in a presidential system, a lot depends on the president and how he or she organizes daily politics: “Lula was able to delegate, Dilma not.”⁵¹² Whereas Lula had only one foreign minister for the whole two terms (eight years), Dilma had three foreign ministers (Antonio Patriota, Luiz Alberto Figureido, Mauro Vieira) in five and a half years. Besides this quantitative difference, there was also a qualitative one: “She chose bureaucrats with a lower profile. They are technocrats and that fits with Dilma. Her and her ministers charisma was low.”⁵¹³ Velasco added another difference: “Lula and Amorim from the very beginning had an exceptional matching (sintonia). The level of confidence between Dilma and her ministers has never been like under Lula. That matching was not there.”⁵¹⁴

However, there were significant differences between the three ministers. Patriota’s appointment was not a surprise, because he served as the Itamaraty general secretary (check) and replaced Amorim already during the last days of the Lula presidency, because Amorim had to resign because of his age. Patriota had already served at one of the most prestigious diplomatic posts for a Brazilian diplomat in Washington. For Velasco he “was shy in confrontation with Dilma. It was reported from diplomats that Patriota left meetings with Dilma crying. Patriota was an excellent ambassador, but a weak minister.”⁵¹⁵ For Jean Tible, “Dilma and Patriota did not have a good relation.”⁵¹⁶ Alcidez Vaz gave a reason for this: “Dilma was frustrated with Patriota, because her first visit to the US was not as chief of state, but only as leader of the government, there is a different state protocol. Dilma was furious about that, the relations then were damaged.”⁵¹⁷ Because he helped a Bolivian oppositional politician to escape from Bolivia, which caused a diplomatic crisis, he stepped down in August 2013 and swapped job with Luiz Alberto Figureido, who was ambassador at the UN. “Figureido was the opposite to Patriota. He was not of the top Brazilian diplomats, but rather at lower posts.” But he was for many years involved with climate negotiations such as in 2009 in Copenhagen and he presided the delegation of Rio+20. Through these meetings he got to know Dilma who chose him because of his role in the climate negotiations, which lead to the resolution “o futuro que queremos” even if most thought that this would not be possible.⁵¹⁸ Therefore his problem was that his prestige in the Itamaraty was low. He never had the control of his house. “Itamaraty is super hierarchical, almost like in the military. It is difficult to install a 2-star general above the 4-star generals.”⁵¹⁹ Figureido served until the end of Dilma’s first term, but her second term started with a new foreign minister, Mauro Vieira who served both in Buenos Aires and Washington, two of the most prestigious posts for a Brazilian diplomat. Only very few held both of these posts.

Vieira is a top diplomat. With this Dilma wanted to give Itamaraty more prestige. Viera is strong in Brasilia, Dilma through him reached out to Itamaraty. His time for Brazilian policy was rather good but short and probably will not continue. There was again more attention to foreign policy. In 2015 he was both in Beijing at the CELAC-China summit, but he also prepared Dilma’s visit to the US. It was a good combination. And Brazil had a role in the process towards the Paris Climate summit.⁵²⁰

Besides personal reasons, there were already from the beginning also structural ones. Zilla in 2011 spoke of signs that foreign policy activity would be reduced due to a large austerity program and less resources for an expansive foreign policy. “Brazil would probably not open new embassies abroad and in the future abstain from costly foreign policy efforts.”⁵²¹ This had also budgetary consequences. The foreign policy budget was reduced in relative numbers from 0.5 percent of the budget in 2003 to 0.28 percent in 2013.522 In 2015 it was mere 0.15 percent. Also in absolute numbers the budget was reduced from 2.5 bn RS in 2011 to 2.4 bn RS in 2014, which does not look much, but of the 2.4 bn only 1.6 bn RS were actually granted.⁵²³ Also the number of yearly new diplomats was reduced from 100, the maximum reached under Lula, to 18 in 2014. The budgetary problems also affected Brazilian contributions to international organizations and to the embassies abroad. In May 2016 Brazilian debts to the UN stood at 382 million USD, making it number two after the US, which traditionally have the highest debts. Brazilian journalist Patricia Mello added that “currently around 30 embassies, mainly in Africa cannot pay the running costs like water and electricity. It is a shame.”⁵²⁴

All together had as a consequence, as Celestino wrote, that “Itamarty withdrew from the big international debates [and] lost the role of protagonist, which it conquered in the past.”⁵²⁵ Howlett-Martin agreed that “Itamaraty lost prestige.”⁵²⁶ Many foreign policy experts lamented that especially after 2013 “foreign policy was abandoned.”⁵²⁷ Khalil argued that “for the foreign policy this meant a kind of dead point, it is like running idle in a car.”⁵²⁸ For Bartelt, there were also lost opportunities because of this little interest in foreign policy: “That Dilma did not do anything together with Merkel because of the NSA was wasted.”⁵²⁹

There are some striking examples of this being “fora da scena”⁵³⁰ and “missing on the international stage.”⁵³¹ No Brazilian minister participated in the Munich Security Conference (MSC) and the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2014 and 2015. For Velasco this “did not have to do with money, but with lack of interest.”⁵³² However, Vaz thought differently:

The non-participation was because of budgetary problems. Many activities had to be cut down or cancelled. I remember a conference in Pretoria in South Africa, where I met the Brazilian ambassador. He said that he could not participate more than one day, because he had to pay it himself.⁵³³

It was most likely a combination of both, lack of interest and money.

How much Brazil has changed concerning international involvement, could also be seen concerning the Middle East. Velasco gave the example that in early 2014 ahead of the so-called Geneva II negotiations in Montreux, “Russia invited Brazil to participate. Then foreign minister Figureido did not go, because he had to meet the FIFA general secretary Valcke to inaugurate the stadium in Natal.”⁵³⁴ Brazil could have decided differently, it was a deliberate choice to downgrade the international participation in global security topics.

For Velasco, Dilma somehow with Vieira tried to correct the foreign policy inactivity. For him “2015 in general was a good year for foreign policy. But 2016 everything is on hold. It is a surreal situation. And sad for foreign policy.”⁵³⁵ Celestino wrote of a “melancholic situation of Itamaraty ... The economic and political crisis together with the disinterest of the president for international relations left the ministry without money and without projects.” For her “Brazil belittled itself, apparently forgot the dream of entering the club of the big ones ... Diplomacy costs money and needs stability.”⁵³⁶

Mello commented on the paradox that the critics of Amorim’s foreign policy later argued “how great that activism was and how weak and passive it became.”⁵³⁷ Howlett-Martin met Amorim in spring 2016: “Amorim was sad about the state of foreign policy. It is a standstill. For me it was a delusion.”⁵³⁸

4.5.3. Foreign policy of the Temer government

It is in fall 2016 still early to evaluate the foreign policy performance of the interim/end of term presidency of Michel Temer and his foreign minister José Serra. For Tible, Temer’s legislature “will have to live with the problem of legitimacy, that many regard his presidency as the result of an illegal process.”⁵³⁹ When Temer presented his interim program “Bridge to the Future”, there was no mentioning of foreign policy. In a time of deep economic crisis and domestic problems, maybe not surprising. But, according to Mello, Temer’s party, the PMDB, “does not have an ideology, they flow with whomever there is as powerful.”⁵⁴⁰ Therefore foreign policy will be much more influenced by Serra and his PSDB. The choice of Serra was interpreted as giving Itamaraty and foreign policy more importance and prestige. Serra is a politician with a long experience, from being student leader in São Paulo to challenging Lula da Silva at elections. His personality brings more weight to the foreign ministry. And his political ambitions could be of benefit for the foreign ministry and Brazilian foreign policy, as Bernardes argued: “Serra wants to be presidential candidate in 2018, so he cannot fail. He needs success to present himself. That is why he will try to put up a positive agenda.”⁵⁴¹

In the first weeks and months after the impeachment against Dilma, Serra was among the most visible ministers in the Brazilian press and showed great activism in travelling abroad, receiving foreign guests and commenting on national and international issues. When he entered office, he strongly criticized the negative reactions of Bolivarian politicians and the general secretary of UNASUL, Samoer, in a rather undiplomatic language. The foreign ministry “emphatically rejects neighbors allowing themselves to opine and propagate falsehoods over an internal political process in Brazil.”⁵⁴² Such a reaction was unusual, to say the least. As the coordinator-general of Itamaraty’s think tank IPRI/FUNAG, Candeas, commented:

Serra reacted very harsh on comments concerning the ‘coup’ against Dilma, it was a language diplomats are not used to, but it was applauded by the media. His policy will be not to accept pressure from ALBA [Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America], especially not from Venezuela.⁵⁴³

For journalist Mello the effect of “more PSDB will result in less contacts to Bolivarian countries. Maybe this could lead to a Macri-style policy, again approaching the US, gradually, the South-South will not be completely abandoned but with less concentration.”⁵⁴⁴

Those in favour of the interim government like former ambassador Barbosa said that most likely two aspects of foreign policy would change: 1) the re-establishment of the prestige of Itamaraty, to have a voice in international organizations and to regain what was lost; 2) focus on agreements with the great powers such as the US, the EU, China or Japan also for economic reasons.⁵⁴⁵

Candeas also spoke of two changes, but divided them into internal and external:

Externally the focus will be on the relations with traditional partners, especially the US and a stress on foreign trade issues. This will please the São Paulo business circles. Internally, Itamaraty was ill-treated by Dilma, she could not care less about foreign policy. Serra will try to use his high political status to build resources, to repay Brazilian debt in international organizations and have more space for maneuver. Most diplomats are therefore happy with Serra. The majority of diplomats is center-right.⁵⁴⁶

Carpes was skeptical that under Temer-Serra bilateral relations with Turkey (and similar countries) would be intensified:

Temer wants to save money. It is difficult to see how he increases the budget for Itamaraty. It is also questionable whether there will be more resources for the Europe 2 division where Turkey is, because the Eastern European countries of that division are definitely not a priority in his agenda. Africa, the Middle East do not count much either.⁵⁴⁷

4.6. Continuity or rupture in foreign policy

A central question in the evaluation of both the AKP’s and the PT’s foreign policy is whether they signify a fundamental alteration or rather a continuity of traditional foreign policy concepts or of the alignment, which began with the end of the Cold War.

4.6.1. Continuity or rupture in Turkey’s foreign policy

In Turkey, the question whether the country is changing foreign policy direction or axis did not start with the AKP. It was probably first asked in 1967 by then US ambassador who addressed prime minister Demirel, because he played with the idea of accepting loans from the Soviet Union. This question appeared regularly ever since.

It is true that the AKP and Davutoğlu criticized the pre-AKP foreign policy approach as “unnecessarily scaling down the scope of foreign policy.”⁵⁴⁸ Davutoğlu would refer to “the traditional Kemalist foreign policy as static, reactionary and hence passive and see the need for changing it. ... We are not trying to respond to crisis. But our foreign policy is visionary.”⁵⁴⁹ However, as Hürsoy wrote well after eight years of AKP rule, “Turkey has a long tradition of maintaining continuity in its foreign policy that aims to keep its old alliances in balance, while establishing relations with new power centers in its vicinity.”⁵⁵⁰

Beyond the AKP, a big majority of foreign policy experts argued that foreign policy was much more a continuity of what had been going on in the 1990s than a sharp rupture. A policy of strategic depth and zero problems had already started well before the AKP came to power, just without cool names.

As Pope argued, when “the AKP came to power in 2002, it was handed the reins to a country that was already heading in the right direction.”⁵⁵¹ This was especially true for the neighborhood policy of the late 1990s. For Bilgin and Bilgiç, the “groundwork for Turkey’s ‘new geographic imagination’ was laid by Özal and Cem.”⁵⁵² The latter was especially responsible for the improvement of bilateral relations with a series of neighbors,⁵⁵³ the best known was the improvement of relations with Greece in the frame of the so called “earthquake diplomacy” after devastating earthquakes both in Turkey and Greece in 1999.

Therefore Gürbey recapitulated that Davutoğlu’s strategy “tied to the gradual development of a proactive and multidimensional foreign policy during the era of Turgut Özal, but further develops it.”⁵⁵⁴ Grigoriadis agreed, adding that what changed was “the robustness of Turkish economy, as well as substantial political reform between 1999 and 2005.”⁵⁵⁵ Both gave the AKP more opportunities to realize ambitious policy goals. According to Pope, this could be seen in one of the first foreign policy initiatives, a pro-unification attitude for Cyprus, as a first example of a zero problem policy, which Pope called in the case of Cyprus a “legacy of Ismail Cem.”⁵⁵⁶

What was novel, was the broadening of the foreign policy decision making process, at least in the initial phase to civil society and business communities, making the process more dynamic. “As a result, various social groups increased their role in the making of foreign policy.”⁵⁵⁷

The most important difference however, was the vision where to locate Turkey. The traditional Kemalist elites defined Turkey as part of the West and a secular country. The new elites instead interpret the country as “part of Islamic civilization and a Muslim country with strong Western connections ... The second group [AKP] underlined Turkey’s Muslim identity and aimed to integrate the country more deeply with the Muslim world.”⁵⁵⁸ Both groups therefore interpret the past radically different, but also how to participate in regional or global issues. Turkey as a co-sponsor of the UN Alliance of Civilization is there as a Muslim country, whereas Spain’s role is not that of a Catholic country, but representing the West. Turkey is portrayed as speaking for the Muslim world or an Islamic civilization.⁵⁵⁹

Summarizing, Gürbey wrote that “strategic depth does not represent a substantial change of Turkey’s foreign policy as a renunciation of the traditional Western orientation. But it meant a shift of emphasis of foreign policy priorities.”⁵⁶⁰

4.6.2. Continuity or rupture in Brazil’s foreign policy

The context for Brazilian foreign policy could hardly be more different from Turkey’s. Brazil, as former minister Nelson Jobim said in 1999 “does not have enemies.”⁵⁶¹ And this is not only the case for the post Cold War period, but for the past 140 years. No wars, no hostile neighborhood relations. This context should favor continuity in foreign policy orientation. As Zilla wrote “Brazil’s foreign policy was traditionally regarded as highly stable, as a ‘política de Estado’ ... for Latin America an atypical phenomenon.”⁵⁶²

Very schematically, there have been two strands of foreign policy orientation. Americanists and universalists. Priority for the first group were good relations with the US and a North-South orientation. The latter group favored a South-South approach, a developmentalist agenda and a special focus on relations with Africa.⁵⁶³ In today’s political party landscape, the Americanists are among the centre-right and the universalists among the centre-left.

This was confirmed by a study by Vilela and Neiva from 2011 comparing foreign policy speeches of the Cardoso and Lula presidencies. “Their findings show that Lula’s administration was oriented more towards Africa, Asia and the Middle East and away from Europe.”⁵⁶⁴ An alignment rather than a dramatic shift. Also Montero argued that “the practice of Brazil’s international relations did not change fundamentally from the situation under Cardoso. .... [all administrations] maintained a commitment to multilateralism.”⁵⁶⁵ Pecequilo saw the beginning of a new orientation away from a North-South direction even among the “Americanist” Cardoso “towards South America, reintegration emerging countries like Russia, China and India and intensifying a discourse of an ‘asymmetric globalization.’”⁵⁶⁶

However, there are two groups, which spoke of a radical shift. Lula and his entourage and harsh critics. As Zilla underlined, to distinguish themselves from its predecessors, president Lula

chose a discursive strategy, which stressed the rupture to excess. ... Factually, however, many of the values that built the basis for Lula’s foreign policy, could be derived from the national tradition. The foreign policy agenda therefore changed more than its normative base.⁵⁶⁷

Harsh critics of the Lula presidencies like former ambassador Barbosa, disagree:

In the past 13 years the foreign policy was partidarian as never seen before in Brazilian history. It was dominated by the leftist world view of the PT, which postulates that globalization is against Brazilian interests, that the US is evil and that therefore the relations to developing countries have to be strengthened. The past 13 years have been ‘fora da curva’ (an anomaly).⁵⁶⁸

Daniel added that “old diplomats like Barbosa were saying that Brazil with Amorim did not have a foreign minister but a ‘vedete’ (showgirl).”⁵⁶⁹ Or, the PT-hostile weekly Veja used the term “diplomacia companheira” (pro-Communist diplomacy), stressing relations with Cuba, Venezuela and pariah states like Iran.⁵⁷⁰

However, these are rather minority opinions. Most academics emphasized elements of continuity, be it with the 1970s or with Lula’s predecessor Cardoso (FHC). For Visentini, “it is important to emphasize that some features in the current Brazilian foreign policy were instituted during FHC’s term in office. Nevertheless his vision was severely curbed due to internal difficulties and the international crisis underway at the time.”⁵⁷¹ This, similarly to the situation in Turkey, underlined how different the domestic and international circumstances were. This is also highlighted by Stünkel who, arguing in 2011 wrote that “the last fifteen years thus stand in stark contrast to Brazilian foreign policy tradition.”⁵⁷² However, this stark contrast is not the principle but the intensity.

Therefore, Vaz argued that

Lula and his foreign policy was not a rupture with the past. The priorities of Lula were either already priorities of FHC like South America or much older like the focus on multilateralism and international trade negotiations, which are on the Brazilian agenda since GATT. The rapprochement with China and India also started under FHC. A newer element of Lula was his rediscovery of Africa, within a universalist focus of interpreting Brazil as a global actor. But this interpretation is not exceptional, that has been the foreign policy since 1985.573

Tible explained the position of foreign minister Amorim. “He was not an outsider inside the foreign ministry.”⁵⁷⁴ Velasco added that “Amorim was not even against the traditions of Itamaraty, but referred to something that was already present in the past.”⁵⁷⁵ This past were the 1970s, when for the first time an ‘independent foreign policy’ was proclaimed. But, as Tible continued, “in the 60s the material base was weak and in the 70s the moral base was weak. President Geisel supported democracy abroad, but in Brazil there was no democracy.”⁵⁷⁶

Interestingly, the main reference point for Lula’s foreign policy was a military government, far from being leftist. Souto-Maior identified a “considerable analogy between the objectives of the current government and those indicated by President Ernesto Geisel.”⁵⁷⁷ Therefore Bernal-Meza argued that “Lula da Silva would promote the rebirth of an idea: Brazil as a power aligned with the foreign policy guidelines of 1974-1979: autonomy, pursuit of power, aspiration to compete for a major role in regional hemispheric and systemic hegemony.”⁵⁷⁸ And Daniel complemented that “Lula’s policy was a huge intensification of the Geisel ideas. But at that time it was also that the South was the economically most dynamic part of the world. So a focus then made much sense.”⁵⁷⁹

What was different was not so much the practice and policies, but the general vision of Brazil’s position in the world. “When the new government arrived in 2003, the perception about Brazil’s role in the international system made an important turn.”⁵⁸⁰ This was confirmed by Bernal-Meza who wrote of a “shift in the conception that policy and decision-makers had on global politics, although not on the objectives of the country’s international integration.”⁵⁸¹

According to Visentini, the presidencies of Collor and Cardoso, “demonstrated a low self-esteem”. They saw the “country as less advanced in regard to the adjustments demanded by the rich countries.”⁵⁸² Carpes also saw a fundamental difference in the foreign policy vision of the political camps. “That is why it was a big change of perception, the place from which Brazil talks. Cardoso’s view was that Brazil is not ready for an active foreign policy.”⁵⁸³ Former foreign minister Lampreia argued that “Brazil has an adequate role corresponding to its size. Brazil cannot ask for more, because there is a series of limitations, the principal being its social deficit.”

For Almeida,

this view of Brazil being peripheral, was wide-spread. An explanation could be that this elite was very much influenced by the US and Europe and this influences your view and how you see your country. The Brazilian elite has this ‘complexo do vira lata’, a feeling of inferiority towards the world. The Itamaraty elite is educated like that.⁵⁸⁴

According to Tible, for “Lula, Cardoso represented submission. The symbol of submission was that Cardoso’s foreign minister Celso Lafer had to take off twice his shoes at an airport in the US.”⁵⁸⁵ Instead, Lula’s vision was that of being equal, also to the big powers. Tible gave an example of a G8 summit in Evian, to which also Lula and Amorim participated. “They were sitting with the other statesmen around a table. Then Bush arrived and Amorim and the others got up, but Lula said everybody should sit down, because nobody stood up when I arrived.”⁵⁸⁶

Besides the vision, what was also clearly different was the style. As Tible said “Lula and Amorim were ‘performers’, not bureaucrats, not grey figures.”⁵⁸⁷ They produced events, international conferences, summits, with a huge mobilization capacity.

Novelties, at least at the beginning and in clear parallel to Turkey was the involvement of civil society and academics in the foreign policy making process and structural changes to the foreign ministry. For the old elites, “both was a sacrilege.”⁵⁸⁸ For Velasco in the end Lula’s foreign policy “was not an anomaly”.⁵⁸⁹

4.7. Personalized foreign policies

In Turkey, the phenomenon of personalizing foreign policy is mostly attributed to Turgut Özal, one of the dominant political figures after the end of the military coup in 1983 until his death in 1993. He served as prime minister from late 1983 until October 1989 and subsequently until April 1993 as president. As Murinson wrote, Özal “used his prerogative as president to remove some powers from the Foreign Ministry.”⁵⁹⁰ Baskın Oran confirmed this: “Özal’s period saw the most radical changes in the elaboration of Turkish foreign policy.” Oran identified four aspects for these changes of replacing institutional relationships with personal relationships:

decision making became personalized

traditional institutions (MFA, military, TGNA) were excluded from policy formulation

advisors and journalists with no official status were engaged

business leaders acting like diplomats in certain cases.⁵⁹¹

The first three aspects would a decade later also be observed in Brazil. In Turkey, this trend diminished after Özal, but became again a feature of foreign policy formulation and execution under the AKP, as Park wrote: “Turkish foreign policy has increasingly fallen into the hands of the leading political figures and their hand-picked advisory teams. This has involved the by-passing of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once a powerful state institution.”⁵⁹²

In Brazil, critics of president Lula will lament exactly the same, that the once famed Itamaraty lost prestige and foreign policy became personalized and party-politicized. Susanne Gratius already at the beginning of Lula’s term in 2004 explained that there is more space for manoeuvre in foreign policy issues, which is the preserve of the executive ... In contrast, Brazilian domestic policy is coined by more continuity, because of limited resources and national resistance.⁵⁹³ For Claudia Zilla, president Lula’s foreign policy was characterized by three main characteristics, of which the first was the erosion of the monopoly position of the foreign ministry and a presidentialization of foreign policy. This meant that “the actual novelty of the era Lula was that the foreign policy consensus was revoked ... the degree of agreement in foreign policy questions diminished.”⁵⁹⁴

For Montero, presidentialization of foreign policy did not start with Lula, but with Cardoso: “Presidential diplomacy involves more foreign travel, the hosting of international summits and generally more robust forms of personal engagement by the president in the framing and conduct of foreign policy.”⁵⁹⁵ One feature of this form of presidentialization is the more frequent participation of presidents in international negotiations, which previously would have been done by diplomats. “Cardoso already had a foreign policy experience and international contacts, which he had gained as foreign minister. Lula was a long-time union leader in the metal industry and best prepared for complex negotiations processes.”⁵⁹⁶

However, additionally to this general presidentialization of foreign policy, which manifested itself in active participation of the presidents in the foreign policy formulation and execution, with Lula the president’s party became more important in foreign policy issues. Both are intertwined. Presidents have to face elections, their planning is shorter than that of a ministry bureaucracy and they have to take into account public opinion. Since Lula was one of the founders of the PT and a dominant figure ever since, the party view became also reflected in foreign policy. For Zilla Lula and the PT Granden could use this policy of favouring South-South relations and a commitment to South America as a ‘policy sublimation’: “With this foreign policy orientation Lula granted his party an ideological policy-compensation for his ‘PT-alien’ economic policy.”⁵⁹⁷

Different to other Brazilian parties, the PT had a long and profound foreign relations experience. Jean Tible argued that

when the PT was in opposition, it already worked on an international agenda. Marco Aurelio Garcia worked out this international perspective. He was an organic leader of that vision, not someone from outside. They built up many international links, through, e.g ‘Rede Brasileira Pela Integração dos Povos’, mainly in South America.⁵⁹⁸

Suhayla Khalil confirmed that the PT in opposition “built already an international network. There was the ‘Instituto da Cidadania’, close to the PT, which also reached out to Latin America and Africa. There was therefore already an established world vision before coming to power.”⁵⁹⁹

Personalizing this heightened party influence was Marco Aurelio Garcia, Lula’s foreign policy advisor in the presidency. Garcia was long time PT secretary for foreign relations and would appear in Brazil and abroad “leading a certain kind of PR campaign for the government.”⁶⁰⁰ Gratius therefore wrote that “there were factually two foreign ministers: presidential consultant Marco Aurelio Garcia and foreign minister Celso Amorim.”⁶⁰¹ Zilla spoke of a “foreign policy quadriga” comprised of president Lula, foreign minister Amorim, Garcia and Samuel Pinheiro Giumaraes.”⁶⁰² The latter was the Secretary General of the Itamaraty from 2003 to 2008. Guimaraes was not a PT member, but a career diplomat. However, he was “an important thinker of the Left, one of his books is ‘500 years periphery’, an important reference for Latin America’s left.”⁶⁰³ With his extroverted way of administrating and frequent presence in the media and scientific journals, he was seen as “the foreign policy ideologue of the government.”⁶⁰⁴

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a career diplomat and academic, heavily criticized this foreign policy trend of the PT:

for the first time in decades, or ever, Brazilian foreign policy was conceived and conducted under the overriding influence of non-professional diplomats ... a confused mixture of typical (and stereotypical) Latin-American leftism with old-style nationalism and anti-imperialism ... From the standpoint of its organizational structures, the PT is a quasi-Bolshevik party [with an ideological] mixture of old style socialist credo, prior to the fall of Berlin wall, and of social-democratic economic beliefs. ... a consortium of leftists, engaged actively in the party’s cause, which is not exactly a national cause.⁶⁰⁵

However, Alcidez Vaz put this criticism into perspective:

The question whether foreign policy became ideologized, now addressed by critics, has this theoretic view that Itamaraty stays above daily politics. But the ideological cleavages are within Itamaraty and have always been. Celso Amorim was minister under Itamar Franco, then he was known to belong to a group of rather leftist diplomats known as the ‘barbundeiros’. But that does not mean he was an outsider, that was all inside Itamaraty, a confrontation of different views, which coexisted. With Samuel Pinheiro who was minister under Sarney, these leftist representatives were stronger. Then with Lafer they were marginalized. The ideologies were always there and this is natural. The PT did not invent this, foreign policy has always been also ideological.⁶⁰⁶

That it is possible to completely differently evaluate what has happened to foreign policy decision making, is proved by Visentini who wrote in 2014: “Lula’s government put Itamaraty back to its former strategic position of formulating and implementing Brazilian foreign policy.”⁶⁰⁷

4.8. Soft power in Turkey and Brazil

Soft power as a concept gained prominence after the end of the Cold War. Without a fierce block confrontation, the significance of military power and concepts like deterrence and economic sanctions lost importance. The mood of the 1990s was in favor of cooperation and alliances, network building and cultural attraction.

Both Turkey and Brazil have been described as countries using soft power in their foreign policy, especially in the first decade of the 2000s. Not being military giants, both countries used a large repertoire of soft power ingredients from intensified trade relations to a very liberal visa policy, from tourism to scholarships and exchange programs, from TV series, music and popular stars. Some of these were part of an official state policy, other aspects developed independently by private initiatives. Lazarou argued that it was a “determined decision on both sides to pursue a sort of cultural soft diplomacy, in a time that was appropriate for cultural diplomacy initiative.”⁶⁰⁸ For Brazil this was not a major shift in foreign policy understanding, the country has always been known rather as pacific or “South America’s gentle giant.”⁶⁰⁹ For Turkey however, it marked a sea change from traditional foreign policy concepts.

An old proverb expressed the traditional mentality: “Turks have no friends other than Turks.” Kirişçi, then professor at Bosporus University, described this Turkish way of thinking as Hobbesian: “The international environment has traditionally been seen as anarchical and therefore creating the imperative need to be militarily strong and to be prepared to use military force for ‘win-lose’ outcomes.”⁶¹⁰ For Tür and Han, Turkey with its securitized foreign policy in the 1990s was “against the spirit of the time as a coercive regional power.”⁶¹¹ That was a time of growing influence of the military in domestic and foreign policy issues. Turkey was close to declaring war on Greece (Irmia/Kardak crisis) in 1996 and on Syria in the late 1990s because of the presence of PKK leader Öcalan on its territory. Turkey then still felt “surrounded by enemies.”⁶¹²

The Turkish consul in São Paulo, Arman, who served in the late 1990s at the embassy in Brasilia confirmed this in general and concerning the bilateral relations. “In the 1990s soft power did not play such a big role. The relations developed on high politics, state visits, agreements and the like. This only changed in the 2000s.”⁶¹³ For Hürsoy, what happened in the 2000s was therefore a transformation from a “nationally inward-looking hard power to an internationally outward-looking soft power.”⁶¹⁴

In that period both Turkish politicians and local and international scholars stressed the use of soft power in foreign policy. For several authors, Davotuğlu’s Strategic Depth already included important elements for the use of soft power. Larson and Shevchenko argued that his concept meant that “Turkey should use soft power and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.”⁶¹⁵ Murinson observed the “flourishing Islamic culture as a source of the ‘soft power’ of the modern Turkish state.”⁶¹⁶ This view is also shared by Grigoriadis in a recent publication on Turkey’s foreign policy activism: “Davutoğlu’s foreign policy thesis was his attempt to project Turkey’s image as a ‘soft power.’”⁶¹⁷

Active politicians also referred to it. In 2004, then foreign minister Gül said at Bosporus University in Istanbul: “Turkish foreign policy is rapidly developing its soft power.” Three years later, Gül concluded that we “increased our soft power substantially.”⁶¹⁸ In 2009, Kirişçi concluded that “Turkish foreign policy does indeed look like the foreign policy of a soft power. However, it is not always evident in this approach whether soft power constitutes the cause or an outcome of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.”⁶¹⁹

In 2010, an aspect of soft power got an institutionalized frame. In January, an office of public diplomacy was established under the office of the prime minister to, in the words of its director Kalın, “better explain Turkey’s new policies and initiatives to different audiences across the world. ... this made Turkey a major soft-power country.”⁶²⁰

Aras and Görener gave an example where soft power delivered positive results. In 2010 they argued that “Turkey’s civil-economic and soft power is visible in Syria.”⁶²¹ This meant increasing trade relations, visa liberalization, joint ministerial commissions, tourism boom also triggered by popular Turkish soap operas and joint infrastructure projects.

Even with political problems rising in the neighborhood, scholars continued viewing the soft power approach positively. For instance, Yalvaç in 2012 described Turkey’s new “foreign policy activism … based on the use of soft power resources.”⁶²² In 2013 Kaliber identified a “particular foreign policy identity, which defines Turkey as a peace-promoting ‘soft power.’”⁶²³ Tüysüzoğlu still in 2014 stated that “the prime goal for Turkey is to engage in active diplomacy throughout the region, to achieve a positive shift through the exercise of soft power.”⁶²⁴ Looking back at more than a decade of AKP governments, Herzog observed “an overall soft power approach” and concluded that “as an international actor Turkey based its outward-oriented and proactive actorness on the instruments of soft power, emphasizing economic interaction and trade relations, diplomatic mediation and cultural diplomacy.”⁶²⁵

However, with the honey moon ending with the Southern neighbors in the course of the Arab Spring, the limits of Turkey’s soft power became also visible. For Hürsoy, the Middle East is just not an appropriate place for soft power: “it is not possible to conduct a foreign policy based on the soft power concept in an environment governed by the rules of hard power.”⁶²⁶ The problem then is that the required hard power, when attraction is in need of coercion, is not an option for Turkey. Also Herzog saw a problem with the post Arab-Spring developments, which could bring “issues of hard power back to the fore; Turkey’s focus on soft power had placed it at a disadvantage in the new regional dynamic ... [which] caused much damage to its regional and international standing.”⁶²⁷ But also the temporarily deteriorating relations with important players such as Russia (especially from November 2015 to August 2016) or in general the cooling down of relations with the US and the EU might decrease Turkey’s soft power potential, especially in the neighborhood.

In a neighborhood that could hardly be more different from the Middle East, Brazil has also invested in soft power. Sotera and Armijo argued that because Brazil “has neither nuclear arms nor nuclear-armed neighbors; and in a world of growing rivalry and competition, it boasts that it has no foes. Because of these characteristics, it is regarded as the quintessential soft power.”⁶²⁸

For Amorim this even lies in the veins of Brazil: “We are pacific by conviction. We favour dialogue instead of coercive actions.”⁶²⁹ Larson and Shevchenko agreed on the prevalence of soft over hard power: “Brazil is distinctive in its reliance on the soft power of diplomacy rather than the hard power or military might.”⁶³⁰ For Gardini there even existed a consensus “on the essentially soft nature of Brazil’s power.”⁶³¹ Gratius even completely denied any use of hard power: “Through the exclusive use of soft power, Brazil is a civilian regional power.”⁶³² Herz, similarly as in the case of Turkey, argued that activism in international organizations like the G20 helped Brazil “expanding its soft power base.”⁶³³ Lopes, Casarões and Gama also saw in a “flexible multilateralism a salient ‘soft power’ device.”⁶³⁴

As in the case of Turkey, there are also scholars who put water in the Brazilian wine. Malamud and Rodriguez conclude that “soft power is also limited by Brazil’s relatively low level of technological development, whether measured by the number of patents, the absence of universities at the top of global rankings, or the lack of Nobel Prize winners.” The authors saw “tensions between image and achievement.”⁶³⁵

For Turkey and Brazil, the general question remains valid whether great power status is possible without a strong military and defense system. For Jobim this was clear: “What we want is to have a voice and vote in the international arena, and this only goes to countries that have a defense structure to deter and to express national power.”⁶³⁶ If this were true, then for the foreseeable future neither Brazil nor Turkey will reach great power status without significantly increasing their military power.

CHAPTER 5

BILATERAL RELATIONS TURKEY-BRAZIL

5.1. Historic relations 19th century – early 20th century

The first sentence on Turkey-Brazil relations on the website of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry reads as follows: “The diplomatic relations between Brazil and Turkey had their beginning with the signing of the Bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Commerce (1858).” It then jumps roughly 150 years and continues in the second sentence: “There were significantly closer bilateral ties in the first decade of the XXI century.”⁶³⁷ The Turkish MFA confirmed this: “despite diplomatic ties of 150 years, the Turkey-Brazil relations could reach an important acceleration only in the latest time.”⁶³⁸

According to both MFAs there was a treaty and 150 years later the relations gained intensity. However, there is some more to the story.

Until the 19th century, there was basically no contact between the Ottoman Empire and the Americas. Kutlu, director of LAMER (Centre of Latin American Studies) at Ankara University wrote that the so far oldest document discovered in the Ottoman Archives showing an interest with Brazil stemmed from 1807. The document, dated 25 September 1807, described the Napoleonic conquest of Portugal and the following escape of the Portuguese King to Brazil. Kutlu concluded that this document showed that for the Ottomans already then “Latin America was a geography, which they approached with seriousness.”⁶³⁹ This seems a very optimistic evaluation, however, it showed at least that Brazil got on the Ottoman radar.

It then took more than three decades until the first semi-official diplomatic relations began. These were not yet official, because the Ottoman Empire did not engage in diplomatic relations with states it did not sign a treaty with. Therefore a document dating from 29 August 1850 showed the appointment of an Ottoman honorary consul to Brazil: “To Mr. Samuel, appointed şehbender (Ottoman for consul) to Brazil by the honorable Ottoman State.”⁶⁴⁰ The letter formulated in the name of the Sultan, noted that the need to appoint a consul to Brazil was felt to “help with problems of my Ottoman citizens who visit the region and facilitate their trade as done in other countries.”⁶⁴¹ In the final paragraph, the importance of trade and traders is underlined again, which showed that already in 1850 a major motivation for the establishment of relations for the Ottoman State was to diversify its trade relations and reduce its dependence on the European powers.

Little is known about this first consul. Kutlu only assumed that “monsieur Samuel was most likely an Ottoman citizen.”⁶⁴² Sochaczewski mentioned him as João Samuel⁶⁴³, so he could have been either a Portuguese with connections to the Ottoman Empire or a non-Muslim Ottoman-citizen. Samuel could not stay long. Already in 1851, he had to return to Europe and was replaced by Diogo Kenny who corresponded with the Brazilian institutions in English signing as James.⁶⁴⁴ He was a British businessman with exclusive commercial activities in the port of Rio.

The Ottoman Archives showed that a year later also the Brazilians expressed an interest in having a diplomatic mission or at least a representative in the Ottoman Empire. The document from 1851 is a report written by the Ottoman ambassador in Brussels, Visconde de Kerckhove, to the Foreign Ministry. The report covered different topics, but in one paragraph mentioned that

in recent days, Brazilian friends from Rio de Janeiro frequently said that the government of emperor Dom Pedro felt a great desire to enter into sincere relations with our Great Sultanate. The intention of the Brazilian government is to send a chargé d’affaires (maslahatgüzar) to Istanbul.⁶⁴⁵

Kutlu did not follow this trait, but from Sochaczewski’s thesis we learned that Brazil launched its first diplomatic endeavors in the Ottoman Empire not in Istanbul, but in Alexandria. It was rather a curiosity. Andreas Papolani was most likely a Greek-Orthodox Ottoman citizen and already the general consul of Portugal, who started in October 1852 a series of written exchanges with the Brazilian foreign minister Paulino José Soarez de Sousa.⁶⁴⁶ Even if this was not official, Papolani then already used letterheads with “General Consulate of Brazil in Alexandria of Egypt.” Papolani’s problem was that without an official bilateral treaty, there was no chance to be recognized by the Ottoman State.

However, right at that time serious efforts started to establish official diplomatic relations. A key figure in these negotiations was Antonio de Summerer, former dragoman (translator) of the Portuguese diplomatic mission in Istanbul who in modern words “lobbied” for the establishment of bilateral relations. In May 1856, the first high-level contact on the issue took place with Ottoman foreign minister Ali Pasha visiting London, where he met among others also the Brazilian ambassador Carvalho Moreira with the aim of having a friendship, trade and navigation treaty.⁶⁴⁷

The Brazilian foreign ministry was very much in favor of having especially closer trade relations. In 1857 the ministry wrote that relations “could be useful for us, because Turkey consumes coffee.” And a year later the ministry added that “this empire is already a big consumer of Brazilian products.” 648

On 5 February 1858, these first diplomatic contacts bore fruit when in London the first bilateral treaty was signed entitled “Ottoman Empire – Brazil treaty on friendship, residence, commerce and free cruise of ships.” The treaty was signed by the ambassadors Kostaki Musurus Pasha (Ottoman Empire) and Francisco Ignacio de Carvalho Moreira (Brazil). As Sochaczewski wrote, the London legation “functioned from the beginning as a ‘posto avançado’ of the secretariat of the foreign ministry.”⁶⁴⁹ The same can be said for the Ottoman Empire. At that time London was the capital of the super power Great Britain and also distance wise well-located both for the Old and the New World. Traders and companies from all over the world had offices there, including many Ottoman Greek businessmen with also good knowledge of the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea trade. Those were the first candidates for direct trade links between Brazil (Rio) and the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul). One of these families, the Ralli, who were originally from the Aegean island Chios, even then had an office in Rio de Janeiro.

The treaty had 11 articles. The first simply stated that “there should be permanent peace and friendship between the Ottoman Sultan and the Brazilian Emperor, their grandchildren, their successors and without exception the countries and territories.” The most interesting article for the diplomatic relations was the second one:

the signatory parties will be authorized to mutually appoint and substitute diplomats and appoint consuls, vice-consuls and civil servants for the trade benefits of their citizens in all the cities, harbours and other places of the two countries. The diplomats of the parties will have at their duty station the same respect, permission, immunity, support and protection as the diplomats of other friendly states.⁶⁵⁰

Article 2 explicitly allowed the appointment of foreign citizens. The remaining articles dealt with specific administrative-bureaucratic aspects such as the protection from unfair treatment (art. 3), the same taxation as traders from friendly countries (art. 4) or that in the case of a criminal offence the same laws applied as for other foreigners (art. 7). Articles 8-10 dealt with vessels both merchant and military, which had access to the territorial waters and harbours and will be looked after in case of accidents. The final article 11 determined the validity of the treaty with ten years. However, if no party asked for changes or dissolution, the treaty would just continue being valid until one of the governments wished an amendment or its dissolution. From that moment onwards the treaty would be in power another 12 months and then be annulled.⁶⁵¹

As the often used formulation as “other friendly states” suggests, rights and privileges of other foreign states were expanded to Brazil and the Ottoman Empire. The treaty was ratified by Dom Pedro II. in Rio de Janeiro on 10 April and by Sultan Abdülmecid in Istanbul on 18 May 1858. Only two days later, on 20 May, the first medals and orders were exchanged. Brazil honored the sultan with the “Imperial Order do Cruzeiro” and the Brazilian emperor in exchange received the Mecidiye order. Still in 1858, on 29 July, Brazilian prince Adlir and several diplomats, who were involved in the preparation of the bilateral treaty, received at an official visit to the Ottoman capital different orders and medals. Among them was ambassador Carvalho Moreira who received the order of first rank.⁶⁵²

However, beyond these symbolic steps and a friendly atmosphere, the actual diplomatic and trade ventures were disappointing. In fact, Brazil already in June 1860 had a potential consul in Istanbul, Antonio Alves Machado de Andrade Carvalho, a born Brazilian and before general consul in Sweden and Norway. His problem was that according to Ottoman Law only a minister could receive the exequatur. For Machado this was “against the rule in all countries where consuls can ask for their exequatur themselves,”⁶⁵³ as he harshly complained about in a letter. Even the intervention by Antonio de Summerer who consulted the Ottoman foreign minister Fuad Pasha, did not bear fruit. Machado wrote that he “opted to live the most incognito as long as this problem was not resolved.” It was not. That is why Machado still in 1860 left Istanbul and moved to Paris.⁶⁵⁴

This failure in Istanbul did not mean that there were no Brazilian consuls in the Ottoman Empire. The semi-official status of Andreas Papolani in Alexandria continued after the signing of the treaty. Papolani even received the Ordem da Rosa for his duty. In 1868 a kind of consular “dynasty” began in Alexandria with Conde Michel Francisco Debanné. The Neapolitan nobleman, who was already consul of the Two Sicilies, offered Dom Pedro II to also serve for Brazil, which was accepted. Debanné commissioned, in 1870, the construction of a chapel in Alexandria dedicated to St. Peter of Alcantara, which was inaugurated on 2 December 1870, Dom Pedro’s birthday.⁶⁵⁵ Michel Debanné was followed in 1872 by his son-in-law George Nacouz. In 1885 José Debanné took the post. However, these consuls still were not officially accredited with the Ottoman State.

Temel, who published a pioneering book on Ottoman-Latin American relations in 2004, was less detailed in the description of the consular activities of Brazil in the Ottoman lands, but mentioned that “in the early 20th century, Brazil had four consulates in the Ottoman state, three in Egypt (Mansure, Tanta⁶⁵⁶, Cairo) and one in Jaffa⁶⁵⁷, whereas the Ottoman State had two consulates in Brazil, in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.”⁶⁵⁸ The two Turkish consulates were only opened officially in 1908.659 It is interesting to note that Temel does not even mention a consular activity in Alexandria, which Sochaczewski documented for over 60 years. But also for her, all these diplomatic and trade efforts were a failure:

It seems, however, that the idea of approximation with the Ottoman Empire through diplomacy remained more a thin liaison, not materializing the initial intentions of greater commercial interaction through a merchant navy or direct sales of coffee or whatever other product.⁶⁶⁰

For the late 19th century and early 20th century, three more issues are worth mentioning in Brazil-Ottoman relations:

1) the stay of Ottoman navy imam Bağdatlı Abdurrahman Efendi in Brazil in the 1860s

2) the two visits of emperor Dom Pedro to the Ottoman Empire

3) the question of emigration of Ottoman citizens to Brazil

Bağdatlı Abdurrahman Efendi’s roughly three-year stay in Brazil was not an official policy. It was an accident. The second coincidence was that after returning from Brazil in 1871 he documented his experiences in a little book, now a unique document about the situation of Muslims in Brazil in the late 19th century. Furthermore it offered interesting insights into Brazilian life from the point of a newcomer.

As his byname explains, Abdurrahman Efendi was a native of Baghdad. Before moving to Istanbul, he lived in Damascus, at the time not crossing any state border. By profession he was an Islamic cleric, an imam, who came into contact with the Ottoman navy. He had never planned to neither travel to nor live in Brazil. In September 1865 he was as a navy imam with two Ottoman war ships on his way to Basra at the Persian Gulf. Since the Suez channel was only finished in 1869, the boats had to take the huge loop way around Africa. Without giving details, harsh winds and weather conditions deviated the ships, which finally ended up in the port of Rio de Janeiro.

Shortly after the arrival, he joined the commander and a delegation on a visit of the city: “I was wearing the typical ulema [Muslim scholars] clothes. A Sudanese greeted me with great respect.” Abdurrahman had difficulty interpreting this, because the man was dressed in Western style and did not understand neither Arabic nor Turkish. The following day, locals visited the ship, among them also blacks. They greeted saying “Iyo Müslim.” When the blacks returned with a translator, the surprise for both was perfect. “The blacks in Brazil were astonished, because they thought, Islam was only a religion of blacks.”⁶⁶¹

The frame conditions then for Islam in Brazil were unfavourable. The religious knowledge of the Muslims was weak. Abdurrahman stayed 13 days in a community in the outskirts of Rio and gave them basic religious instructions. The commander of the ship feared that this could be regarded as missionary activities and called Abdurrahman back to the port. However, the local Muslims saw their chance to once have a proper Islamic cleric guiding them and asked the commander to leave Abdurrahman with them. The commander accepted and told the Brazilian government that Abdurrahman would stay with the “aim to travel the country to better know it.”⁶⁶²

Through this, an Ottoman imam was in Rio. He started Islam courses from scratch. According to Abdurrahman, some 500 people participated. He had the most important rules translated to Portuguese also to oppose wrong practices such as that conversion was only possible by paying a certain amount of gold. After this “rule” was lifted, the number of Muslims increased significantly, Abdurrahman mentioned 19,000 Muslims, which would be seven percent of then Rio’s population of roughly 270,000, probably a much too high number. There were more deviations from Orthodox Islam. Most Muslim men fasted, but not in the holy month of Ramadan and “women did not fast at all. They ran around openly dressed like the Europeans. Some also drank alcohol.”⁶⁶³ Finally, he found the culprit. It was his translator who was originally from Tanger in Morocco who called himself Ahmet. Since he was upon his arrival in Brazil dressed in a traditional North African style, the local Muslims thought he was Muslim, which he used to his advantages: “Everything he said beyond circumcision and the Eid (feast of the sacrifice) was against Islam ... when I asked him his religion, he said Jewish. He then confessed that he was doing this to his own profit and enmity to Islam.”⁶⁶⁴

Without the ‘vicious’ translator, Abdurrahman tried to turn his community into good Muslims. Not an easy task: “The man all shaved and regarded non-shaved as infidels. ... tobacco was regarded as sin, but alcohol not, which was openly consumed.” Abdurrahman could enforce an alcohol ban, but “some then switched from wine to tobacco.”⁶⁶⁵

Abdurrahman’s travel report also had some general remarks on Brazil, customs, people and food. He was fascinated in particular by two things: exotic fruit and indians. About the latter he wrote: “Their feet were so big in relation to their bodies that when it was raining they could use them as an umbrella laying on the back.”⁶⁶⁶ He was not taken positively by them: “When they speak, it sounds like birds. Some are masters in prospecting iron and bow making. They eat raw fish and some birds. Besides that, they cannot do anything.”⁶⁶⁷

News about Abdurrahman’s presence in Brazil quickly spread to other parts of the country. He was invited to Salvador, where “there were more Muslims than in other cities. But since they did not show much interest in religious rules, their ignorance was no different from the others.”⁶⁶⁸ He stayed one year. His conclusion was rather sobering: “The youth turns Christian, because there are only few Muslims and lots of priests.”

Abdurrahman called his third and last post in Brazil Marnempugo. This name does not appear anywhere outside his book. Since he located the city on the eighth degree of latitude, he most likely referred to Recife, the capital of Pernambuco, which became in the Turkish version Marnempugo. This can also have happened in the transcription from Arabic to Turkish or in the change of alphabets. Since he described an awful heat and humidity, it could definitely be Recife: “Without several daily showers with cold water, I would not have stood it.”⁶⁶⁹

Abdurrahman left Brazil in 1868 or 1869. His return trip had many stops: Lisbon, Andalucía where he visited Cordoba, Tanger, Algeria, Malta and nowadays Egypt and the Arabian peninsula where he made a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. As already in his youth, he then travelled to Damascus and from there back to Istanbul, where he wrote his Brazil report in Arabic. In 2006 it was translated to Turkish with a new subtitle, “The first Muslims in Brazil.”

The year (1871) Abdurrahman returned to Istanbul coincided with the first visit of a Brazilian authority to the Ottoman Empire. Dom Pedro II then travelled for the first time abroad and visited among others also Alexandria where he stayed in November for 10 days, also visiting Cairo. He met with the Brazilian consul Debanné and the Ottoman governor Ismail Pasha. His second visit in 1876 was not only longer, but started in the Ottoman capital where Pedro arrived on 1 October.⁶⁷⁰ Three days later, the emperors Dom Pedro and Abdülhamit II met twice, first in the Dolmabahçe Palace and later in the Hotel Royal where Pedro stayed during his visit to Istanbul. These were the only meetings of the two.

Little is reported about Dom Pedro’s two-week visit. The reasons for this almost silence could be that 1876 was a difficult year for the Ottoman Empire. Three sultans, one being killed after only four days in office, a fragile government and in October it was the month of Ramadan, then a month of holidays. However, Pedro was not idle. He visited several institutions in Istanbul and the first Ottoman capital Bursa across the Marmara Sea. After two weeks he continued his travels first to Greece, then to Izmir, in whose vicinity he visited the archeological sites Sardis and Ephesus. His final stop was Ottoman Egypt, where he arrived on 7 December. Sochaczewski called Pedro II an “orientalist”, but “he was more a dilettante, certainly influenced by the intellectual European fashion.”⁶⁷¹ Therefore this travel was much more driven by personal interest than the visit of a head of state.

At the time of these visits, a phenomenon started, which would intensify the relations, but also complicate them significantly. In the 1870s Ottoman citizens, especially from regions of today’s Syria, Lebanon, Palestine/Israel and Egypt began emigrating to Brazil. Roberto Khatlab argued that D. Pedro II’s visit to this area could have played a role in making Brazil not only known to local Christians, but also attractive. He spoke of a “great visibility among the local Christian population.” Many articles were published e.g. in today’s Lebanon, not only about the monarch but also about Brazil in general.⁶⁷²

Sochaczewski cited sources speaking of between 70,000 and 80,000 Ottoman immigrants between 1870 and the end of WWI. One of them was Kazım Baycar who mentioned 71,870 immigrants between 1870 and 1914, Lesser counted 69,468 in the period between 1890 and 1919 and João do Rio spoke of 80,000 Syrians in 1904.673 Temel offered a broader time range and arrived between 1850 and 1940 at some 105,000 Ottoman immigrants to Brazil, which would include (a probably very small number of) Turkish citizens since 1923.674

This immigration was to roughly 85 percent non-Muslim. The biggest group were Arab (Orthodox) Christians, followed by Greeks and Armenians, the latter coming in waves after the 1890s massacres and during the time of the genocide (1915). But there were also Jewish immigrants especially from Izmir and the Aegean region and also some 10-15 percent Muslim immigrants, both Sunni, Shia and Druze. Many of them settled according to Sochaczewski in the Amazonian regions, e.g. in Acre.⁶⁷⁵

The 19th century was a century of migration, but only knew one direction, from Europe to the Americas. The number of Brazilians in the Ottoman Empire was so small, that Brazil did not even sign the protocol from 1867 allowing foreigners to buy real estate, which was longed for by many European powers.⁶⁷⁶

In Brazil the major motivation for the European immigration was to “whiten” the population after centuries of slave trade from Africa. Therefore the favored immigrants were Central and Northern Europeans (Germans, Scandinavians, Polish) and Italians for whom a systematic recruitment was done through commissioners in several European capitals. Their immigration largely happened in an organized manner towards Southern Brazil. The Central Society of Immigration, founded in 1883, clearly stated that “the country needed the European immigration much more for cultural and civilizational nuances (matizes) than only for their manpower.”⁶⁷⁷ Ottomans were not included into this form of organized immigration, they had to organize and pay their migration themselves. However, even not being first choice immigrants, there was no opposition against their immigration either.

This was different in the Ottoman Empire, where the emigration was officially even forbidden since the 1880s. For Sochaczewski the main reasons for this ban were the “fear to lose tax revenues and population and that the empire’s image could be stained by poor immigrants.”⁶⁷⁸ Politically the Ottomans also feared revolutionary movements by its former citizens abroad, which might fuel certain ethno-religious groups within the Ottoman Empire. But, this official ban did not pose a great obstacle. “The migration happened every time in bigger intensity, because of corrupted Ottoman bureaucrats who closed their eyes regarding the leaving of emigrants.”⁶⁷⁹

With their numbers rising, Ottoman citizens in Brazil asked at numerous occasions to have at least consulates in Rio and São Paulo. Temel quoted Lebanese immigrants who wrote to the Ottoman government to have an Arab Christian consul in São Paulo.⁶⁸⁰ It lasted however until 1908 until the first consulates were opened. Sochaczewski mentioned several consuls in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro preceding WWI. One of them, Münir Süreyya in April 1913 wrote a letter to the Ottoman foreign ministry about the Brazilian migration policy:

The first weapon of the government is propaganda ... They are organizing conferences full of lies about the beauties and richness of Brazil. They had books written full of lies to call desperate poor to Brazil by deceiving them. ... Last year only to the São Paulo province 104,000 poor peasants from Europe were brought and these poor were thrown into the Brazilian hell.⁶⁸¹

Münir Süreyya in this letter also complained that the São Paulo regional government was directly approaching Ottomans suffering from the Balkan Wars and convincing them to migrate to São Paulo where the Brazilians did not even ask for a passport. However, Münir Süreyya not only complained, he also suggested to have a commission dealing specifically with the problems of Ottoman citizens in Brazil. For him it was essential to be diplomatically present, because otherwise the Ottoman citizens would feel betrayed by their home state. Therefore he proposed to ask friendly states for support to open new consulates. To improve relations with the majority of Arab Ottomans, he wrote that an ethnic Arab consul should be sent to São Paulo.

For Temel, this letter was not only a snap-shot of a consul, but an expression of how the immigration question poisoned the bilateral relations. This was also fed by the often hostile tone of the Ottoman immigrants towards the Ottoman Empire. Many Christians did not have the best memories of their native country. Paulo Pinto mentioned texts by Arab intellectuals speaking of the “Ottoman domination of the Great Syria as a time of anarchy, political oppression and continuous economic and intellectual decline.”⁶⁸² Later the Arabic-language press often took an anti-Ottoman positions. Temel at several occasions accused in an openly denigrating manner Christians, especially Armenians, for anti-Ottoman propaganda.⁶⁸³ Sochaczewski mentioned several Arabic language newspapers in São Paulo, whose import to the Ottoman Empire between 1912 and 1915 was partly forbidden, because the Ottoman government feared their anti-Ottoman and pro-Arab nationalism agitation.⁶⁸⁴

But the immigrants were not only problematic for the Ottoman State, also Brazil felt their negative influence on bilateral relations. In May 1908 therefore a new law on citizenship was passed, which automatically naturalized the children of Ottoman citizens, who had to do their military service in the Brazilian Armed Forces. For Temel, this was an illegal deprivation from the Ottoman citizenship.⁶⁸⁵ For Brazil it was an effort to increase control over immigrants who were no longer foreigners.

However, towards the beginning of World War I, this did not improve the official diplomatic relations. Contrary, in 1909, according to Temel, Brazil started efforts to open an embassy in Istanbul, which was even after interventions by France and the US finally denied in 1911.686 In 1912 the Brazilian consul in Beirut did not receive his exequatur. For Temel this was also due to a missing new bilateral treaty, which was obligatory for the opening of embassies and consulates since a legal change in 1896.

Then all efforts to replace the 1858 treaty with a new one were unsuccessful. Therefore on 7 February 1911, the Ottomans declared the 1858 treaty invalid, which was then annulled a year later on 7 February 1912. However, this did not mean that there was no legal basis for Brazilians in the Ottoman Empire. The day, the treaty lost validity, the Ottoman parliament passed rules for Brazilian citizens “treating them according to European law.” Since Brazil did not sign the 1867 protocol on real estate purchase, Brazilians still could not buy property. But, besides this, they were basically treated no different from Ottoman citizens, e.g. concerning criminal offences. They were tried in the same courts, if necessary a translator was organized and sentenced according to the same laws. With WWI, also the Ottomanism of the immigrants became void and they turned Syrian, Armenian or Lebanese. That is why after the end of WWI and the foundation of the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey, in 1923, there was no more human link between the two countries.

A new treaty was finally signed in 1927 between the young Turkish Republic and Brazil, this time in Rome. On 8 September the ambassadors Oscar de Teffé and Moukhtar Suad signed the “Treaty of Friendship”, which only had three short articles.

Article I:

There will be constant peace and lasting friendship between the governments and peoples of the two contracting parties.

Article II:

The contracting parties will have the capacity to establish diplomatic and consular relations, in conformity with the principle of international law. The diplomatic and consular agents of any of the contracting parties will receive a title in reciprocity, in the territory of the other, the same treatment accepted by the general principles of international public general law.

Article III:

The present treaty will be ratified, and the ratifications will be exchanged in Rome as soon as possible. It will enter into force immediately after the exchange of the ratifications.⁶⁸⁷

The ratification took place on 15 September 1928. As provided in article 2, both countries opened embassies, Turkey on 18 July 1929 (then in Rio de Janeiro)⁶⁸⁸ and Brazil in 1930 in Ankara.⁶⁸⁹

However, even with embassies in the two capitals, information about the diplomatic activities are only anecdotal, as the Brazilian ambassador in Ankara recounted: “I found cables from 1942 about von Papen, written by Brazilian diplomats in Turkey. This means that already then the embassy was actively working.”⁶⁹⁰ There was not a single state visit, economic relations were low. In diplomatic language: “official relations were good, but not intensive.”⁶⁹¹

After the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations would slowly intensify. The first official state visit was done by president Demirel in 1995. Then both countries were not yet regarded as emerging powers and there was little talk about a pro-active foreign policy. The debate then had only started.

5.2. Political-diplomatic relations

5.2.1. Bilateral relations post-Cold War

The roughly 27 years since the end of the Cold War, can concerning Turkey-Brazil relations be divided into two main periods and several sub-categories. Simply said, there is a period pre-AKP/PT and an AKP/PT-period. Since May 2016 there is an interim/end of term government in Brazil without the PT participating. However, in terms of bilateral relations, it is too early to judge it as a new era.

Table 2: Main developments in bilateral political relations

692

Period | Turkey | Brazil

1) 1989-2002

still low intensity contacts

- 1992 Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel at the Rio-92 Earth Summit

- 1995 president Demirel, state visited to Brazil

- 1998 Action Plan for Latin America

- 1998 Foreign Minister Cem visited Brazil

2001 | Visa waiver signed
2) 2003-2016 (AKP and PT governments/presidencies) |  |
2.1) 2003-2005 | 2003 Agreement on Cooperation in Defense Related Matters
| 2004: Foreign minister Amorim visited Ankara

2.2) 2006-2010/11

2006 Latin America Year of the MFA

2006: Foreign minister Gül visited Brazil

2009 flight Istanbul-São Paulo (Turkish Airlines)

2009 Latin American studies at Ankara University (and METU)

2010 visit of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (April);

2010 Prime-Minister Erdoğan in Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia and São Paulo

2009 President Lula on state visit in Ankara and Istanbul

2010 Visit to Turkey of Foreign Minister Amorim (January)

2011 Visit of Foreign Minister Patriota (September)

2011 President Dilma (October), state visit to Turkey

2010 Iran Nuclear program, “Operation Yasemin”

2010 Strategic Partnership signed (May)

2.3) 2012-2016 November 2015 | 2012 Participation of Prime-Minister Erdoğan in the Rio+20 Conference | August 2013, Defense minister Amorim in Turkey 2013 Foreign minister Patriota visited Turkey Dilma Rousseff and several ministers at G-20 meeting in Antalya
June 2016 (new government in Brazil) | 3 June, political consultations in Ankara.
691

After Dom Pedro II’s visit to the Ottoman Empire, it lasted almost 120 years until the return visit was realized. The first visit of a Turkish head of state was not yet an official state visit, but the participation in a big international conference. In 1992, then prime minister Demirel participated in the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro,⁶⁹³ giving also a speech in the plenary. Had the Earth Summit taken place in Buenos Aires or Sidney, Demirel would have travelled there. However, the same Demirel, then in the capacity of president returned three years later to mark the first official visit ever of a Turkish head of state to Latin America. Besides Brazil, he then also visited Argentina and Chile. On occasion of this state visit to Brasilia, five agreements were signed on 1) air transportation, 2) trade, economic and industrial cooperation, 3) cultural and educational cooperation, 4) tourism cooperation, 5) visa exemption for “official” passports.

Additionally, a memorandum of understanding concerning mechanisms for political consultation was signed.⁶⁹⁴ For Turkey-based Argentinean scholar Levaggi, Demirel’s visit to Brazil therefore “inaugurated a channel of permanent consultations between the two countries.”⁶⁹⁵

Indeed, in March 1997 the first meeting of bilateral consultations took place as a first step to intensify relations. The following year, Turkey passed an Action Plan for Latin America, which tried to formalize relations. Concrete results of this process were e.g. the first interparliamentary friendship groups and bilateral mechanisms of consultation between Turkey and several Latin American countries,⁶⁹⁶ including Brazil. As a consequence, Turkey received observer status in two regional organizations, CARICOM (Comunidad del Caribe) and in the Organization of American States (OAS). Still in 1998, in November, then foreign minister Cem visited Brazil. For Erol, that this happened in 1998 was not a coincidence, but directly related to the crisis with the EU after in 1997 Turkey was denied candidate status at a EU summit in Luxemburg. “Turkey had to react to that and tried two openings. With Latin America and Africa. For Turkey this was new and it was important that Latin America was included into Turkish foreign policy.”⁶⁹⁷ This direct link of the EU relations to the Latin America policy was also stressed by Cem in an interview with Folha de São Paulo in November 1998. “I think that, independently from whether the relations with the EU are good or bad, to have good relations with Latin America will be a factor, which will influence these relations and will help us in our relations with the EU.”⁶⁹⁸ The Folha article was entitled “Turkey seeks to increase its diplomatic weight.” Cem had meetings with the governor of São Paulo and local business groups.⁶⁹⁹ Already in September 1998 he said that an opening towards Latin America was the goal for 1999.700 However, this was not realized. The current general consul of Turkey in São Paulo, Arman, who was based in Brasilia in the late 1990s commented that “these first state visits of Demirel in 1995 and Ismail Cem in 1998 were definitely important. However, then there were internal problems in Turkey, and an economic and financial crisis and this policy was not continued. This only happened in 2004.”⁷⁰¹

However, in this interregnum period of five years with low level relations and still before the AKP and president Lula came to power, the bilateral visa waiver agreement was signed in 2001. Then there was no direct flight connection between the two countries and the tourist numbers were little. In 2001 only 10,521⁷⁰² Brazilian citizens visited Turkey. In the first years of visa free travelling no positive effect could be noticed, since in 2002 the number even dropped to 8,332 and in 2003 to 7,334.703 However, a decade later, this would certainly facilitate the huge increase in the numbers of Brazilian tourists in Turkey.⁷⁰⁴

5.2.2. 2003 AKP / PT and bilateral relations

With the coming to power of the AKP in Turkey with absolute majority and president Lula almost at the same time in late 2002, the bilateral relations would especially in the period 2006-2010 intensify as never seen before.

A first concrete step towards intensifying bilateral relations was already made in August 2003 when the defense ministers Vecdi Gönül and José Viegas Filho signed in Brasilia the “Agreement on Cooperation in Defense Related Matters.” For the agreement, the Turkish Parliament passed a law on 5 May 2004.705 However, it only came into force in 2007 after the ratification in Brazil, which is a good indicator for the time-span from signing to ratifying and the slowness of Brazilian bureaucracy.⁷⁰⁶

The agreement had seven articles. Articles 2 and 3 described the extent and range of the cooperation. The treaty declared that “the founding of communication channels will be broadened to safeguard the exchange of information in areas of mutual interest” (2.2.). It then had a list of how the cooperation should work in practice (2.5.). There should have been mutual visits by delegations of high-ranking representatives (2.5.1), meetings of military institutions (2.5.2), exchange of teaching personnel (2.5.3), participation in educational courses (2.5.4) and seminars or conferences, visits of military ships and planes (2.5.6). According to article 3, “the cooperation will be determined in detail every year.”⁷⁰⁷ However, no progress on defense issues could be witnessed until 2010 when the ministers met again to discuss concrete issues of cooperation.

In 2004, Celso Amorim visited Turkey as the first Brazilian foreign minister ever. He would visit frequently during his time as foreign minister until 2010, but also as defense minister until 2013. During his first stay in Turkey he met with then president Sezer, the chairman of the Foreign Relations committee in the Turkish parliament, the president of the Turkey-Brazil parliamentary group and his homologue Gül. In an interview with Hürriyet Daily News Amorim said:

More than anything, I was inspired by the need to bring closer together two countries, which have a great potential for mutual cooperation in practically every field. ... Brazil is increasingly playing a more active role on the international stage. It is therefore a logical consequence that closer contact should be maintained with countries like Turkey with similar significant roles to play in an ever smaller global world.

Asked about the focus of the discussions with Turkey, Amorim stayed very general: “The friendship between Brazil and Turkey has no need for limits,”⁷⁰⁸ then giving a number of potential fields of cooperation, which also showed how new and underdeveloped the bilateral relations then were.

Gül’s return visit took place in January 2006.709 This was the first visit of a Turkish minister in the framework of the “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean”, to which 2006 was declared. For Levaggi this meant a “new impetus to the initial ‘Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean’ (1998)” and showed that Turkey has “identified Latin America and the Caribbean as one of the global spaces of interest for its claim as an emerging power in the 21st century.”⁷¹⁰ As Erol stressed, “for Turkey the most important country in Latin America is Brazil.” 711 As part of the Latin America Year also a “Promoting Trade Strategy with Latin American Countries” was issued with the aim of increasing trade relations. Finally also a high level cooperation committee between Turkey and Brazil was established.⁷¹²

In Brasilia Gül met with president Lula, who extended a formal invitation for prime minister Erdoğan, foreign minister Amorim, development and foreign trade minister Furlan, the speakers of congress and the members of the Turkey-Brazil friendship group. Among others a cooperation agreement was signed between the diplomatic academies of both countries. Politically Gül wanted support from Brazil for the situation of Northern Cyprus. After the meeting in Brasilia, Amorim said: “As Brazil, we never approved economic embargoes. Our businessmen can go there for all kinds of activities. We are ready to do all we can for a solution.”⁷¹³ Answering a question by a Turkish journalist, Amorim said that Brazil would support Turkey’s temporary membership in the UNSC for the period 2009-2010 and would expect the same from Turkey. This was almost prophetical. Both countries became temporary members of the UNSC in that period and used it for the most intense period of relations.

The meetings in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro were more of an economic nature. Gül visited the plant of the airplane construction company EMBRAER near São Paulo and said that direct flights between Turkey and Brazil would start soon.⁷¹⁴ On 20 January, under Gül’s chairmanship, the Turkey Brazil Business Council was founded by DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board) and FIESP (Federation of Industries of São Paulo).⁷¹⁵ The same day, the honorary consulate in São Paulo was inaugurated. Gül also had a meeting with all the Turkish ambassadors based in Latin American countries “to discuss our relations with the region and how to develop our cooperation.”⁷¹⁶

During the visit, an agreement for the creation of a “High Level Cooperation Committee” was signed, which entered into force in October 2008, after ratification by the Brazilian authorities. According to the Briefing Note of the Turkish Embassy in Brazil from 12 August 2013,

the Commission was designed as a mechanism responsible for developing policies and strategies of bilateral common interests of the two countries and cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, science and technology, the arms industry, finance, investment, tourism, culture and political dialogue.⁷¹⁷

In 2008 also Turkey’s observer status in regional organizations was broadened to the Association of Caribbean States, Mercosul and the Rio Group. Regarding Mercosul, Turkey also signed the “Framework Agreement to Establish a Free Commerce Area Between Mercosul and the Republic of Turkey.”⁷¹⁸

The exchange of diplomatic visits rose to the highest level with the visit of President Lula to Turkey in 2009 and, in the following year, Prime Minister Erdoğan to Brazil. Lula’s visit to Turkey in May 2009 was the first visit by a head of state since the time of Dom Pedro II. The first stop in Turkey was Istanbul where Lula participated in the meeting of the Turkey Brazil Business Council, where he gave a talk on Brazil’s economy and possible fields of cooperation, e.g. on ethanol where Brazil has great experience. “The bilateral trade volume only reaches one bn USD. It is a pity, we should be ashamed. ... Turkey and Brazil have an enormous potential, of which until now we do not even use 10 percent.”⁷¹⁹ Lula in his presentation wished that two Brazilian institutions would open offices in Turkey, APEX (Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportação e Importação) and Embratur, the Brazilian Tourism Institute.⁷²⁰ Both in the end would not materialize, but reflected the mood of these years when only an intensification and growth of bilateral relations seemed possible. Politically Lula announced the opening of consulates in Istanbul and São Paulo and concluded that “I hope to start some things for which we will not wait another 100 years.”⁷²¹ The Brazilian president was accompanied by roughly 70 business people from various sectors, e.g. construction aviation and machineries.⁷²²

In Ankara, Lula met both with then prime minister Erdoğan and then president Gül.⁷²³ Lula gave a speech at the official dinner with an overall very positive retrospect on his three days in Turkey.⁷²⁴ Positive, but little concrete on both economic and political issues. After the visit, a joint declaration was published, which gave a similar impression. Lots of repetition of accomplished steps such as the direct flight, the opening of consulates or the economic potentials. However, little new concrete measures or agreements could be reported.⁷²⁵

For Derya Sazak, then columnist for daily Milliyet, the visit had important messages also on Lula’s (leftist) vision for a future global architecture. Therefore Sazak would have wished that Lula had also met with the opposition party CHP and the leftist trade union DISK to share his view and political strategy with them. But more than that he regretted that even if Lula was then already a global trade name and political superstar, “the shown interest was quite weak compared to the interest shown towards Brazilian soccer players.”⁷²⁶

5.3. The 2010 Tehran Declaration on Iran’s nuclear program

In between Lula’s visit to Ankara and Erdoğan’s return visit in May 2010, the most intensive period of bilateral politico-diplomatic relations took place. The 2010 Tehran Agreement is considered both the climax in bilateral relations and as diplomatic initiative of the two countries in world politics. Therefore the process, which lead to the declaration, its content, results and consequences will by analyzed in detail.

5.3.1. Background to Iran’s nuclear program

Iran’s nuclear program began in 1959 with the purchase of a research reactor from the US. The plan then was to build 32 nuclear power reactors by the 1990s. But not even a US Congressional Service Report (CSR) from 2006 viewed this then as a “back door to a nuclear weapons program.”⁷²⁷ Throughout the 1970s there was even a big Western involvement in the nuclear program. Iranian engineers were among others trained at the prestigious MIT in the US. The research reactor in Tehran is used for radioisotopes and medical and agricultural applications.

The nuclear program suffered a “sudden paralization” after the Islamic Revolution in February 1979.728 Former Brazilian foreign minister Lampreia who wrote a book on the 2010 nuclear deal, argued that back then because of the (perceived) threat from Iraq, all efforts were put on weapons’ acquisition and planned nuclear facilities such as in Bushehr were ceased. It lasted until the end of the Iran-Iraq war (August 1988) and the death of Khomeini (June 1989) to re-intensify the nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)⁷²⁹ inspected the nuclear facilities in 1992 and 1993 and did not observe any undeclared activities. However, the IAEA complained that substantial inspections were not allowed.⁷³⁰

Ten years later, however, the world learned that there was a reason for this discretion. In 2002, with the help of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), undeclared nuclear activities were detected. The NCRI provided information especially about the nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak.⁷³¹ For Lampreia these “revelations represented the beginning of the international crisis over the Iranian nuclear program.”⁷³² Successive inspections by the IAEA in 2003 revealed significant undeclared Iranian efforts in uranium enrichment and separation of plutonium, as well as undeclared imported material. Iran had to confess that a pilot centre for the enrichment of uranium in Natanz existed and that a reactor in Arak was under construction.

Iran stressed on several occasions as in April 2003 that its nuclear program was strictly peaceful: “we consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles. They have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine.”⁷³³

5.3.2. International negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program 2003-2009

The year of 2003 also marked the beginning of international negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program. The first to start these were the EU-3 (Germany, UK, France), which in October 2003 reached a first agreement that foresaw the suspension of uranium enrichment and the facultative implementation of the Additional Protocol of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).⁷³⁴ In November 2004, the EU-3 and Iran agreed to delay the uranium program if security commitments were made. Former French diplomat in Brazil Howlett-Martin wrote that “our contacts in Brasilia believe, that is the fundamental concern for the Islamic Republic.”⁷³⁵

However, these negotiations, meetings and also agreements did not bear results. On 24 September 2005 the IAEA passed a resolution stating that “the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council.”⁷³⁶ This reference to the UNSC suggested sanctions against Iran for non-compliance. However, the IAEA was then only proposing something that the US had already done in June 2005 with Executive Order 13382. These sanctions against Iran froze the assets of individuals connected with the nuclear program.⁷³⁷

In early January 2006 Iran informed the IAEA about resuming enrichment at the research reactor. This was the opposite of what the international community desired. On 30 January 2006, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the USA and the High Representative of the EU called in London on Iran “to restore in full the suspension of enrichment-related activity, including R&D, under the supervision of the IAEA.”⁷³⁸

For Lampreia, the Iranians speculated that the UNSC would not decide sanctions only because of a pilot reactor.⁷³⁹ They were mistaken. In the period between 2006 and 2008, the UNSC passed three resolutions condemning the Iranian nuclear program and the activities of enriching uranium. These were:

Resolution 1737 December 2006

Resolution 1747 March 2007

Resolution 1803 March 2008

During this time, the negotiations with Iran continued on two fronts. The IAEA in Vienna and the EU-3 (Germany, UK, France). In 2006, after Iran’s decision to restart enriching uranium, the EU-3 were joined by Russia, China and the US, with the grouping renamed as P5+1.740 However, it would last until October 2009 until a major development began, which is known as the ‘fuel-swap.’ According to Howlett-Martin, “it was Iran’s need for enriched uranium to operate the reactor which prompted the swap proposal by the P5+1. Enrichment would take place in Russia and the fuel preparation in France.”⁷⁴¹ This meant that Iran would send abroad 1200 kg of low-enriched uranium and receive nuclear fuel for the research reactor in Tehran. In the end, though, Iran refused this swap, which made many Western governments believe Iran was just trying to gain time. For Eakin, the reason why Tehran refused it were “the lack of necessary guarantees and the opposition of conservative elements in the regime.”⁷⁴²

The crux of the matter was that the P5+1 and the IAEA demanded that Iran would suspend completely its own enrichment. However, not only failed the agreement, in November 2009 the Iranian government approved ten new uranium enrichment plants. In February 2010, escalation mounted when Iran announced plans to heighten the enrichment levels of existing uranium stockpiles. Then president Ahmedinejad declared on the Islamic Republic’s 31st anniversary (11 February 2010) that Iran was a ‘nuclear state.’ Russia and China traditionally have resisted calls for UN sanctions, but in March 2010, President Medvedev signaled that Russia was warming to such a possibility.⁷⁴³

5.3.3. Turkey’s and Brazil’s efforts in the Iranian nuclear program

Even if not very visible or in the form of protagonists, also Turkey and Brazil have been involved with the Iranian nuclear program way before 2010. On 25 April 2007, Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Ali Larijani, Iran’s top negotiator on nuclear issues, were in Ankara upon an invitation by Gül, then foreign minister. His advisor Davutoğlu commented this meeting, “To talk about the Iranian nuclear program we came together in Ankara. Because of this meeting, the attention of the whole world was directed towards Ankara ... which we turned into the solution centre of international diplomacy.”⁷⁴⁴

At around the same time, also Brazil got involved with the issue. As then foreign minister Amorim explained in a recent book (2015) entitled “Tehran, Ramallah and Doha”, the involvement was linked to “president Lula’s wish to have a really universal foreign policy.”⁷⁴⁵ Through visits to the Middle East he was convinced of a rapprochement with Iran. However, concerning a cooperation with Iran, Amorim was more cautious because of Iran’s pariah status in world diplomacy. Therefore the rapprochement had to be linked to a specific issue.

This specific issue would be Iran’s nuclear program, a topic where Brazil claims great competence. Brazil has the world’s sixth largest reserve of uranium and a long experience with nuclear issues. Already during the Second World War it provided the Allies with the natural resources suitable for the Manhattan Project.⁷⁴⁶ Velasco explained that Brazil has a long history in “participating in international nuclear negotiations. There is a Brazilian protagonism concerning that issue.”⁷⁴⁷ Also Amorim stressed the long-time experience with the issue: “For decades, Brazil played an important role in the IAEA, mainly as a strong supporter of the right of nations to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”⁷⁴⁸ For Amorim, a problem with the Western attitude and the IAEA was that they were not clear enough that Iran in principle has this right.

Carpes who wrote her PhD on the nuclear choices of regional powers including Brazil,⁷⁴⁹ confirmed that Brazil was an appropriate negotiator on nuclear issues:

Brazil is a key country in nuclear issues. It has its own program and uses high technology, so-called ultra-centrifugation. Brazil can enrich uranium. But, since the 1990s it is also clear that the country does not want nuclear weapons, there was important trust-building with Argentina (ABACC), the treaty of Tatleco, a drive for a nuclear-free LATAM.⁷⁵⁰

With this policy, Brazil is the only BRICS country that has not built a nuclear bomb. And this is a deliberate political choice as already former president Cardoso made clear: “We do not have any intention to build nuclear weapons. ... Brazil does not feel threatened by the world.”⁷⁵¹ Brazil is in a different position than India or South Africa, which have nuclear weapons. Brazil therefore has more credibility.⁷⁵² This policy has been continued by president Lula, even if he restarted the nuclear program, for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Interestingly, there are even some parallels between the Brazilian and Iranian nuclear programs. Brazil accepted international full-scope safeguards to its nuclear activities in 1994. Since 1998 Brazil has been a full member of the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) and a prominent voice for full nuclear disarmament. However, as Eakin wrote “it refuses to allow the IAEA complementary inspection authority.”⁷⁵³ Eakin then described another similarity between Brazil and Iran: “Iranian authorities stated that the plant was constructed for producing enriched uranium either for supplying medical research reactors or to provide fuel for future nuclear submarines. This in parallel with Brazil.”⁷⁵⁴

Turkey was distance-wise a more obvious mediator in the issue as a neighbor of Iran. However, the Iran-Turkey relations over centuries changed between cooperation, competition and confrontation. As Robins explained “ironically, since the advent of the AKP government, relations between Turkey and Iran have been more problematic than was the case when Kemalist secularists governed in Ankara.”⁷⁵⁵ Robins explained this mainly by the economic leverage of Iran over Turkey because of oil and gas dependency. Therefore as much as Turkey defends the right of any country to have a nuclear program, it is also heavily against an Iran possessing nuclear bombs, which would strengthen Iran’s strategic position in the Middle East at Turkey’s expense.

In charge of much of the diplomatic efforts on the Brazilian side was foreign minister Amorim. For him the nuclear issue was not new. He had been dealing with questions of (nuclear) disarmament since the 1990s, already as minister under the Itamar Franco government. Additionally he had personal experience with mediating in Middle Eastern conflicts within the UNSC. As he wrote: “When Brazil served on the Security Council between 1998 and 1999, I was personally involved in the effort to prevent the Iraq situation from deteriorating.”⁷⁵⁶ Amorim then chaired so-called panels on three different issues from disarmament to the humanitarian situation and stolen property. The findings of these panels were called “Amorim Report.”⁷⁵⁷ For Amorim, the “prospect of coming back to the Security Council for the biennium 2010-2011 helped sharpen our focus.”⁷⁵⁸

In the mid-2000s he mentioned numerous meetings with the IAEA’s president El Baradei. This was also the time, when the topic of Iran became an issue in bilateral conversations, such as during a phone call between Lula and Angela Merkel on 26 January 2006 where Merkel spoke of the importance to find a “consensus at the IAEA and if that was possible, to introduce it also to the UNSC.”⁷⁵⁹ However, neither Merkel, nor any other of the P5+1 then asked for Brazilian involvement in the issue.

In November 2008 the doubts about a Brazil-Iran rapprochement seemed to have faded with the visit of Amorim to Tehran, the first visit of a Brazilian minister to Iran for 17 years.⁷⁶⁰ For Amorim this was not only difficult because of the international image of Iran, but especially, because the Brazilian media were firmly against it. After the meeting, he was still doubtful whether Brazil could contribute to the solution of this international problem. There was no mentioning of Turkey, Amorim spoke of Switzerland as a potential partner in negotiations.⁷⁶¹ But also Iranians visited Brazil. In May 2009, Mohammed Nahavandian, president of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and adjunct secretary of the Iranian National Security Council, visited Brasilia and had talks with Itamaraty Secretary General Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes.⁷⁶²

The question when and who asked Brazil explicitly to mediate came up several times and remains a topic of controversy. Former French diplomat in Brazil Howlett-Martin with good contacts to Amorim wrote that already “at the G8 meeting in l’Aquila in July 2009 President Obama expressly requested President Lula’s assistance in the Iranian question.”⁷⁶³

Towards the end of 2009, things became more concrete. In November Ahmedinejad visited Brazil. Amorim was right concerning the critical attitude of large parts of the Brazilian media, which criticized the human rights situation in Iran and that it was not appropriate to lay the red carpet for Ahmedinejad. Brazilian journalist Mello, currently at Folha de São Paulo, confirmed the difficult relation between the media and Amorim/Lula on the issue: “At that time, a part of the media criticized that Lula shook hands with all sorts of dictators from Ahmedinejad to horrible leaders in Africa.”⁷⁶⁴ The criticism of the media was not only because of direct meetings, but also because of president Lula’s declaration in support of Ahmedinejad’s contested election victory in June 2009. Amorim then saw in the reactions of the media their “martial soul, engaged in a ‘holy war’ against the scheduled visit.”⁷⁶⁵

Also Lampreia heavily criticized the uncritical stance towards Ahmedinejad in a book published in 2009. For Lampreia Ahmedinejad’s denial of the Holocaust and the clamp-down of the protests after disputable elections would have been enough not to invite him. “The hug, which president Lula gave Ahmedinejad contributed to empower the domestic and international standing of the Iranian regime. Brazil in turn did not win anything.”⁷⁶⁶

According to Roett, “the Brazilian president justified the visit of his Iranian counterpart as a long-range Brazilian strategy to become engaged in Middle East peace-keeping.”⁷⁶⁷ Amorim also defended the close contacts arguing that

crimes committed by Iran had no influence on the importance of the country in security issues and the nuclear question. We knew about the situation in Iran, but wondered why such questions never came up during the two visits of Bush despite the ongoing torture in Guantanamo.⁷⁶⁸

The period when the closer contact with Iran was established, was a time when Brazil increased its presence in the Middle East. Montero wrote that Amorim “visited the Middle East 24 times to establish that Brazil could be a partner”⁷⁶⁹, also in international issues. Amorim explained that “in the many conversations with regional leaders, Iran’s importance, for the good or the bad, always came forward, which reinforced the usefulness of a policy of engagement.”

Besides political motivations for closer relations, there was also an economic aspect of this rapprochement. Iran had become one of Brazil’s biggest trading partners in the Middle East, with trade doubling between 2003 and 2007 to nearly 2 bn USD, composed mostly of food sales.⁷⁷⁰ Also Amorim underlined that bilateral trade was not concerning arms or ammunition, but “peaceful chicken.” The Brazilian foreign ministry was accompanied by large delegations of business people at the official visits in 2008, 2009 and 2010. “Iran is a very attractive market for our exports and a potential recipient of Brazilian investments in the fields of energy.”⁷⁷¹ Amorim, however left no doubt that the main driver of this engagement was politico-diplomatic:

A possible Brazilian mediation in the nuclear question ... besides representing a contribution for a legitimate objective of strengthening peace, would also be a way of elevating our status in the global political field.⁷⁷²

Right ahead of Ahmedinejad’s visit to Brazil, Amorim had meetings with two US-experts in nuclear issues within the foreign ministry, Gary Samore and Bill Burns. Amorim wrote that he told Burns that “Brazil made clear to Iran the great advantage that the country would have by accepting the offer made by the P5+1,”⁷⁷³ what regarded the swap deal. The day before Ahmedinejad arrived in Brasilia (22 November 2009), US president Obama wrote a letter to Lula, which he answered on 26 November. These letters were not made public. Amorim mentioned the answer-letter, which had six issues, four were dealing with the nuclear question. “In the letter our president transmitted the impression, which he also authentically had that Ahmedinejad was not closed to dialogue, even if he was under strong domestic pressure.”⁷⁷⁴

With this meeting, the most intensive months of Brazilian involvement in the Iranian nuclear program had started. Brazil was directly involved, but other important players consulted with the Brazilians. On 26 November then secretary of state Hillary Clinton talked with Amorim on the phone also about Iran. At the time French president Sarkozy was on a visit in Manaus, where according to Howlett-Martin “he convinced Lula to help.”⁷⁷⁵ Subsequently Amorim travelled first to Geneva and then in secret mission to Iran where he was to meet with Ahmedinejad in Isfahan without the Brazilian media noticing it.

In January 2010, the Turkey-Brazil partnership on the issue began. Until then, there was only a phone call in the summer of 2009 by Davutoğlu to Amorim who wanted to know how Brazil was judging the situation.⁷⁷⁶ Now it was face to face. Amorim travelled in early January 2010 to Turkey for a meeting of the joint commission with the Turkish trade minister Çağlayan.⁷⁷⁷ Amorim then spoke of the “high level of affinity and real trust that existed in the relation between Turkey and Brazil.” There were meetings also with then president Gül and foreign minister Davutoğlu. “In both cases the Iranian question was highlighted. ... It was in this meeting in Ankara, when the outlines of a joint Brazil-Turkey action in relation to the Iranian nuclear program started.” Amorim spoke of a “high convergence” in his ideas with Davutoğlu’s searching for a diplomatic solution based on a fuel swap as initially proposed by the P5+1.778 Even Lampreia was in high praise about the two foreign ministers: “Amorim met in the Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu a companion of great quality, building with him a good partnership.”⁷⁷⁹

For Lampreia, Turkey and Brazil were driven by the idea that stigmatizing Iran was not possible anymore and that an approach needed to be on par with Iran. Howlett-Martin agreed writing that

Brasilia believes that the inclusion of Iran, a nation in transition, where forces for change wrestle with old orthodoxies, a proud and pugnacious nation, is the best guarantee of non proliferation, rather than its isolation, containment, or overt threats of military intervention.⁷⁸⁰

This was also what Pope wrote on Turkey, whose

engagement with Iran and other hard-line states is based on a wish to modify these states’ behavior, not on a desire to ally with them ... military action against Iran would only delay – rather than stop – Tehran’s effort toward nuclearization ... imposing more sanctions on Iran will only entrench the hard-line regime and hurt Iran’s neighbours.⁷⁸¹

But there was also a motivation that had nothing to do with Iran as Lampreia continued:

they saw in the initiative a possible opportunity to increase the weight of both in the global power scale. That is why, since 2009 ideas and concepts were elaborated by the two MFAs ... Turkey was seen in Brasilia as a fundamental partner, because it was a neighbouring country with a long tradition of relationship with Iran.⁷⁸²

But it was not only Brazil which profited:

The association with Brazil fell as a rain on the Turkish motivation, because the support of an internationally respected country, Christian and extra-regional strengthened the position of Turkey, which could have been accused of Muslim solidarity acting in favour of Iran.⁷⁸³

For Lampreia, Turkey in 2010 was at the height of its success and seemed to have great capacity for a strong regional action. To align with Turkey was for most Brazilians not only not a problem, but not even an issue. More complicated was to be seen as a close ally of Iran.

Davutoğlu, already known for catchy terms like “zero problems with neighbors” also found one for the Brazilian-Turkish cooperation: “Operation Yasemin”, as Amorim noted, “an affectionate allusion to my grand-child whose father is a Turkish diplomat.”⁷⁸⁴ These personal relations to Turkey and their positive impact on the relationship were also underlined by Lampreia: “He [Amorim] had many relations in Turkey and visited often ... That was an important component for the project.”⁷⁸⁵

However, even if the negotiations around the Iranian nuclear program intensified and Turkey and Brazil started coordinating their ideas and future actions, Amorim spoke of many doubts and uncertainties of really being able to find an agreement with Iran. These doubts were mainly due to the positions of foreign ministers like Milliband (UK) or Westerwelle (Germany), but also because of meetings with US representatives like Bill Burns on 26 February 2010 or Hillary Clinton on 3 March 2010 in Brasilia. Amorim concluded in his diary: “my ‘professional optimism’ began to sink given the multiple difficulties which I have encountered.”⁷⁸⁶ According to Amorim, his Turkish colleagues then were more optimistic.

In this climate, 47 states (and the EU, UN, IAEA) met for the Nuclear Summit on 12-13 April 2010 in Washington.⁷⁸⁷ The Brazilian delegation had high hopes in a trilateral meeting between Lula, Erdoğan and Obama, which however turned out to be disappointing. According to Amorim, the meeting took place under time pressure and president Obama “showed little disposition for any kind of opening” and spoke of “naive initiatives” to try to convince Iran just by pure diplomacy. For Amorim, Lula was so upset about the tone of the US president that he even considered “leaving the summit.”⁷⁸⁸ During this meeting, Obama said that if sanctions were not passed quickly, Israel could attack Iran.⁷⁸⁹ For Bartelt this was a clear sign that the “West followed Israel in its Iran policy. That is understandable, especially from a German perspective. But whether that is the best thing for the Middle East, is questionable.”⁷⁹⁰ Obama was not the only skeptical US politician. Brazilian journalist Mello, who attended the summit, remembered that also “Hillary Clinton already then mentioned that there would be sanctions.”⁷⁹¹

Only a few days later, on 16-17 April 2010, Davutoğlu visited Brasilia, where he met with Amorim and Lula. The two countries held the second meeting of the Joint High Level Business Cooperation Commission.⁷⁹² But also the Iran nuclear program was on the agenda.

After the trilateral meeting in Washington and the successive bilateral meeting in Brasilia, Brazilian-Turkish efforts were so prominent on the US-radar, that Obama on 20 April, just a week after the Washington summit, sent a letter to both Lula and Erdoğan laying out the US-position on the Iranian nuclear program. At that time, this confidential letter’s content was not made public.

On 10 May, president Lula replied president Obama with insights Amorim gathered from Tehran. The most important aspect of that letter was that it contained a message that Iran might be more flexible in its position and open to negotiate. For Amorim, this tone of the letter was responsible for the “little common” phone call by Hillary Clinton on 11 May.⁷⁹³ In describing this phone call, Amorim’s often voiced criticism of Hillary Clinton and the US position became obvious:

For those who know the imperial attitude of the high North American authorities, the promptness of Hillary Clinton showed an interest above the normal, only understandable in virtue of a preoccupation of a possible success of the mission we were undertaking.⁷⁹⁴

Clinton made her doubts regarding Iranian credibility once again clear, but for Amorim she had other motivations too: “For me, it was always evident that Hillary followed her own political agenda.” Therefore Amorim judged that Clinton and Obama differed on certain issues, but “Hillary and Obama expected that Lula would fail in his aim to convince Iran.” The difference in the positions for Amorim was that Clinton was also afraid that Brazil and Turkey could be successful.⁷⁹⁵ Amorim was highly disappointed by Clinton’s behavior, which he called little diplomatically “a typical attitude of imperial arrogance.”⁷⁹⁶

The US-attitude ahead of the visit did not increase the optimism not only for finding an agreement with Iran, but one that will be accepted widely. On 12 May, the Brazilian delegation departed for Tehran with stopovers in Moscow (meetings with Medvedev and Putin) and Doha.⁷⁹⁷ In a press conference in Moscow, Medvedev estimated the chances for a success with 30 percent.⁷⁹⁸

The Brazilians arrived before the Turks, because Lula took also part in the G15 summit in Tehran from 15 to 17 May 2010. Created at the Belgrade Conference in September 1989, the G15 included 18 observers and members of the non-aligned nations,⁷⁹⁹ though not Turkey.⁸⁰⁰ Brazilian ambassador Salgado who in 2010 was serving in Tehran said that “Amorim spent the whole day working in a presidential palace in Tehran.” Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu arrived in Tehran on 16 May to join Amorim in his endeavors to find an agreement.

5.3.4. The 17 May 2010 Declaration

Upon his arrival in Tehran, Amorim had meetings with Iranian foreign minister Mottaki, the nuclear chief negotiator Larijani and president Ahmedinejad. For Amorim, the early presence also of Davutoğlu was fundamental for a successful negotiation. Initially Davutoğlu was only scheduled to arrive on 16 May in the afternoon, but the Iranians succeeded to convince him to arrive earlier. Therefore the first trilateral meeting already took place at 7am on 16 May.⁸⁰¹

Amorim pointed out that “between November 2009 and May 2010 Brazil and Turkey had dedicated more time, and certainly more energy to talks with Iran than had the P5+1.”⁸⁰² However, Lampreia saw two problems despite this long commitment: “There was no basic text” for the discussion and even if “the Brazilian and Turkish side had homogenous positions, the Iranian delegation was composed of representatives of distinct groups.” For Lampreia this led to a lack of coordination and a “cacophony.”⁸⁰³

Additionally, there was the overall problem whether Brazil and Turkey were negotiating on their own terms or with the backing, support or maybe even the order of one or more of the P5+1. At least according to Lampreia the Iranians were asking whether Turkey and Brazil had coordinated their approach with the United States and that both delegations reassured Iran that “president Obama himself encouraged their commitment with Iran.”⁸⁰⁴ At this point it is not possible to clarify whether this was really asked and answered, but if Lampreia was right, then both Brazil and Turkey assured the Iranians of something they did not have. It can however, be assumed that the Iranians knew that a trilateral agreement without the backing of the major powers was not worth much.

According to Amorim, the negotiations in Tehran evolved slowly, but “Iran gradually converged to the original wording of the agreement, thanks to largely the power of persuasion and credibility of Brazil and Turkey.”⁸⁰⁵ Even if it took a long time, full 18 hours of negotiations, according to Amorim the three agreed relatively easily to a final text. The only controversial aspect was a reference to sanctions, which the Iranians wanted to be completely excluded as possible means, but Turkey and Brazil thought this would undermine the general trust building tone.

Still years after the declaration, Amorim wrote enthusiastically about it: “17 May 2010. I repeat this date extensively, because who knows, it will turn into a historic date.”⁸⁰⁶ Amorim wrote that “for Davutoğlu and myself, the result ended six months of hard work and intensive emotional involvement. Lula and Erdoğan could celebrate a success that only few thought might be possible.”⁸⁰⁷

The Declaration had 10 articles. Besides much diplomatic language, the most concrete articles were No. 5, in which

the Islamic Republic of Iran agrees to deposit 1,200kg (2,600lb) LEU [low-enriched uranium] in Turkey. While in Turkey, this LEU will continue to be the property of Iran. Iran and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] may station observers to monitor the safekeeping of the LEU in Turkey.

In article 7,

Iran expressed its readiness to deposit its LEU (1,200kg) within one month. On the basis of the same agreement, the Vienna Group should deliver 120kg fuel required for the TRR [Tehran Research Reactor] in no later than one year.⁸⁰⁸

With this result, the Tehran declaration does not differ substantially from the initial proposal from November 2009, which Iran did not accept. However, it did not include anything beyond, such as how to deal with a much larger Iranian LEU stock of more than 2000kg, higher enrichment and the intensification of reactor facilities. As if this was also clear to the signatories, they wrote in article four that this declaration was a “starting point to begin co-operation and a positive constructive move forward among nations.”⁸⁰⁹

The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a press statement: “Thanks to the Joint Declaration, a new and important opportunity has been created to re-start the dialogue between Iran and the international community.”⁸¹⁰ Lula then gave a radio address from Tehran: “The agreement ... is a victory for diplomacy, which came out winning today. I think this was an answer of what is possible with dialogue, building peace, building development.”⁸¹¹ Before boarding planes at the Tehran airport, Lula and Amorim talked to then French president Sarkozy who according to Amorim was positively attuned towards the result.⁸¹²

5.3.5. Reactions to the agreement

As Philip Robins commented, “the full story of the misunderstanding that followed has still to be told.”⁸¹³ Let us give it a try. Even if Amorim was “convinced that at the moment the Tehran Declaration was made public, it would contribute to a peaceful proceeding”⁸¹⁴, as Reid commented,

Lula’s diplomatic victory proved a Pyrrhic one. Within hours of him leaving Tehran, Iran stated that it would carry on enriching uranium regardless. The United States and other Western governments slammed the deal as being no advance on an agreement Iran had reached with the IAEA in October 2009.815

The first negative US-reaction followed shortly after the Brazilian delegation left Tehran, still on 17 May during a stop-over in Torrejón, Spain. Amorim spoke with Clinton on the phone. Then still he interpreted the US’s decline of the declaration with “her perplexity or even her deception with the result of the reunion in Tehran. ... she showed strong unease with the obtained success.” Clinton already then said that “you cannot trust Iran.”⁸¹⁶ However, at that moment the Brazilian delegation was still unsure how the rest would react. Amorim talked to president Lula who was in a hotel in Madrid. Lula told him that he talked to Medvedev who allegedly said that “sanctions are no longer an issue.” Amorim commented in one of the funniest moments of his book: “Until today I have the impression that this ‘optimistic version’ of what the Russian president might have said was due to a mistake in the translation.”⁸¹⁷

The negative US reactions and the unclear position of Russia did not stop the Brazilian efforts to convince the P5 and the other UNSC members of the advantages of the declaration. On 24 May, Lula wrote a letter to Obama stressing that “the swap agreement could be an entrance door for a negotiated solution of the Iranian nuclear question as a whole.”⁸¹⁸

On 26 May, the foreign ministers Amorim and Davutoğlu published a joint article in the New York Times: “we believe that the declaration helps to address the entire issue by providing essential confidence-building, the key missing component thus far ... The Tehran declaration needs to be given the opportunity to work.”⁸¹⁹

However, what followed the day after was the final international bashing of the Tehran Declaration when Hillary Clinton in a conference at the Brookings Institute said:

certainly we have very serious disagreements with Brazil’s diplomacy vis-a-vis Iran. And we have told President Lula, and I’ve told my counterpart the foreign minister [Celso Amorim] that we think buying time for Iran, enabling Iran to avoid international unity with respect to their nuclear program, makes the world more dangerous, not less. ... we think that the Iranians are using you. And that we think it’s time to go to the Security Council, and that it is only after the Security Council acts that the Iranians will engage effectively on their nuclear program.⁸²⁰

The following day, the 3rd United Nations Alliance for Civilizations Forum in Rio de Janeiro⁸²¹, where Brazil and Turkey were represented by Lula and Erdoğan, gave a statement in response to Hillary Clinton: “nuclear arms, not the agreement with Iran, make the world more dangerous.”⁸²²

Brazil and Turkey still had prominent supporters. IAEA’s El Baradei also on 28 May said: “I would hope that this offer is accepted and marks the beginning of negotiations. Saying that sanctions will be applied regardless of this agreement is, to my mind, totally counter-productive.”⁸²³

What followed was the most controversial move during all these negotiations, Reid called it an “extraordinary step.”⁸²⁴ Faced with all the criticism, the Brazilian foreign ministry published the letter, sent by Obama on 20 April to both Lula and Erdoğan. This can be seen as embarrassing for both sides. For the Brazilians because it is a clear breach of diplomatic etiquette and Obama in no word gave Brazil and Turkey a mandate to negotiate in the name of the international community. But also for the US, because through this letter, the world learned that there were no additional criteria for a trust-building agreement, which they later slammed as ‘making the world more dangerous.’ Obama then wrote: “For us, Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile.”⁸²⁵ Obama also expressed skepticism about Iran’s willingness to really send its uranium abroad and its motivations for pursuing negotiations with Brazil and Turkey after rejecting a similar deal only a few months ago. But Obama made no mention of a demand that Iran halt the 20 percent higher enrichment that it began in February. That is what Amorim criticized heavily: “Nobody told us, ‘Hey, if you do not stop the enrichment to 20 percent, forget the deal.’”⁸²⁶

US diplomats tried to counteract the impression of insincerity by saying that between 20 April and 17 May

there were ‘multiple conversations’ between the Americans and their Turkish and Brazilian counterparts laying out what needed to happen, including an end to the 20 percent enrichment. ... But U.S. officials said there was no president-to-president letter laying out those broader concerns. So Lula and Erdoğan went to Tehran with the earlier- and, in the White House’s view, out-of-date - missive. 827

Another aspect brought forth by the US was that Iran’s stockpile of LEU had increased significantly from 1800kg in October 2009 to 2300kg in May 2010.828 However, this was not mentioned either in Obama’s letter.

We learned from discussions between Lampreia and Gary Samore who played an important role in nuclear issues as special advisor to Obama between 2009 and 2012 that there was another issue at stake, which was not directly mentioned. Samore told Lampreia that “even if at trilateral meetings the Brazil-Turkey initiative was quite well received, this is very different from giving a mandate to replace the big powers in the issue.”⁸²⁹ According to Samore, the US were looking for support and potential partners to restart a dialogue with Iran. Obama’s letter “in no way supported a diplomatic action by Brazil in the name of the United States and confirmed that sanctions would be upheld.”⁸³⁰

After the US made their position clear, other P5 joined in negative assessments. By the end of May, French foreign minister Bernhard Kouchner said that “Lula was on the wrong path and ran the risk to be deceived by Iran.”⁸³¹

Amorim in early June could not hide his disappointment of what Actis called “a frustrating mediation effort,”⁸³² not only with the US position, but with the IAEA, the P5 and other UNSC members. He first criticized an ‘aide-mémoire’ of the IAEA, which he qualified as “little serious criticism and half-truths” concerning the trilateral agreement and the Iranian nuclear program.⁸³³ Then he quoted from his notes from 5 June: “The process is coming to an end. The arrogance of the P5, including China and Russia ... will have predominated over the pacifist efforts of two outsiders. The global system was not yet capable to absorb the changes ... in the geometry of power.”⁸³⁴ Especially disappointing for Brazil was the behaviour of China and Russia, which were supposed to be partners as fellow BRICS-members of a new world order.

On 9 June, the UNSC passed Resolution 1929,835 deciding a whole list of new sanctions against Iran and Iranian citizens. The voting was clear-cut. 12 of the 15 members of the UNSC voted in favor of the resolution, one country, Lebanon, abstained and Brazil and Turkey voted against. According to an American official, Turkey had been inclined to abstain, but was persuaded by Brazil to vote against. Amorim wrote of intensive phone conversations between Lula and Erdoğan when the voting started. The two countries agreed, should there be sanctions, to vote against, however: “the pressure by Washington upon Turkey was more vigorous than against Brazil.”⁸³⁶ For Reid, “the decision to vote against marked a rupture with Brazil‘s own diplomatic tradition: on none of the ten occasions since 1946 on which Brazil sat on the Security Council had it ever voted against a resolution that had majority support.”⁸³⁷ For president Lula, however, it was a “question of honour ... a position echoed by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan.”⁸³⁸ Amorim tried to explain the vote that because Brazil and Turkey had another vision for a peaceful solution, “a mere abstention would not have been enough to express our disagreement – not to say – our indignation.”⁸³⁹

For Lampreia, “never before had a Brazilian president put in his personal prestige in an operation of such a high risk.” But, the imagined great success “evaporated in the air and was cancelled.”⁸⁴⁰ Lampreia criticized the Brazilian effort to be based “on a misperception ... something which was called in Classical Greek hubris, which could be translated as excessive self-confidence.”⁸⁴¹ This misperception for Lampreia was to think that the US could accept that such an important international question could be solved without the P5.842

The battle was fought and the war almost over. In the aftermath of the 9 June UNSC voting, there were numerous international conferences dedicated to the issue of the Iranian nuclear program where Brazilian and Turkish diplomats explained their view. But also the wave of sanctions continued. On 17 June the EU agreed on additional economic sanctions “consisting of a ban on certain investments, technical assistance, technology transfers to Iran’s key oil and gas industry, and much of the operation of its shipping and air cargo.”⁸⁴³

The Turkish-Brazilian contact on the issue then was still active. On 4 July Davutoğlu and Amorim talked on the phone also about a new launch of the trilateral efforts, but then Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov “froze eventual expectations. According to him, Brazil and Turkey would not participate in the negations of the Vienna Group with Iran.”⁸⁴⁴

On 25 July, the Tehran Declaration foreign ministers met in Istanbul for lunch. As Amorim commented, this meeting was “the final act of the drama ... from now on, I did not participate (Brazil not either) in any meeting or other practice of any form related to the negotiations process.”⁸⁴⁵

5.3.6. Evaluation of the Brazil-Turkey diplomatic efforts

Unquestionably the most daring initiative of Brazilian diplomacy to date⁸⁴⁶

There are two different readings of what this episode meant in terms of world diplomacy, power hierarchies and the role of emerging powers. For those who see the process positively, two new powers showed their diplomatic capabilities and strength in a world that will be more multipolar and where the Global South wants to have its righteous place. For others, this was an overambitious attempt overestimating their own powers, damaging the international standing and relations with the most powerful in a framework of an overall erroneous foreign policy without (normative) principles.

It is not that in the aftermath of the declaration there were no positive reactions at all. On 3 June, Mariano Aguirre argued that the agreement was “a watershed in the configuration of a new multipolar world.”⁸⁴⁷ Fuller was not only positive, but completely misjudging the scope of what would follow. He wrote that “these two medium-size powers, Brazil and Turkey, have just challenged the guiding hand of Washington in determining a nuclear strategy toward Iran.” This would mean that

neither of these countries (Russia and China) will, in the end, permit the US hard-line approach to win out over the Brazilian-Turkish one in the Security Council, even if the Brazilian-Turkish deal requires a little tweaking. Russia and China champion the emergence of multiple sources of global power and influence that chip away at dying American unipolar power.⁸⁴⁸

The opposite was true and became evident soon. Also overall positive was Turkish scholar Özkan, who in 2016 became the South America director of TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) based in Colombia. In 2011 he wrote: the “deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil has not only changed the nature of the issue, but also the discussion itself.”⁸⁴⁹ This view was shared by Eakin: “the Tehran declaration had an important impact on the international community, because the governments in Ankara and Brasilia seemed to have succeeded where the major powers failed.”⁸⁵⁰ Lazarou in a recent article commented that “regardless of its failure to gain approval by the P5+1, the Turkish-Brazilian initiative was interpreted as a profound paradigm shift in international relations.”⁸⁵¹ Özkan assumed that the issue could no longer be dealt only by the US or the P5+1, but that new players will be important in solving the issue. History proved him wrong. But in 2011 things still looked more positive concerning the role of emerging powers and the way negotiations would be conducted. Özkan wrongly forecasting what would happen continued:

Iranians will not concede to any power that has an inclination to speak from a position of strength ... Turkey and Brazil have not spoken to Iran through the power hierarchy of the existing international system; rather they have spoken to their counterpart as an ‘equal’. It was this atmosphere that defined and facilitated a deal with Iran, not the content, which was by and large the same content that the IAEA had offered Iran in 2009.852

The aspect of respect and fair treatment was also underlined by Fonteijn, Assl and Ingram, who argued that “Iran has found it easier to deal with Turkey and Brazil in relation to its nuclear program since both countries treat Iran as an equal and respected partner.”⁸⁵³ This would fit well into the Brazilian postulations of principles of non-intervention, national sovereignty and its national security doctrine. The Iranian episode therefore also fit well into “one of the ‘cornerstones’ of Brazil’s foreign policy ... focus on the developing world and ‘South-South’ trade relations, as it aims to assume a role as leader of the developing world.”⁸⁵⁴ This reading assumed that countries like Brazil and Turkey can better act where the Western powers are discredited, culturally very distant or carry the burden of colonialism. For Zilla social justice became “the dominant narrative of the Lula government.” Therefore the Western policy towards Iran was discriminatory from the Brazilian standpoint. “There was an underlying vertical conflict line, separating the South from the North. In this frame the unscrupulous rapprochement Lula’s towards Ahmedinejad can be interpreted.”⁸⁵⁵

However, Brazil and Turkey in acting like this faced the dilemma that they want to take part in great power politics and take their place at the table, but also stress their belonging to the South and the developing world. Castañeda reasoned that in the case of Brazil this did not really work: “What Lula achieved was to show that Brazil is still more interested in Third World solidarity than in international leadership.”⁸⁵⁶

A striking and surprising difference in the evaluation of the Tehran Declaration in Turkey and Brazil is that in the latter there is a big debate, former foreign ministers wrote books about it, every scholar on IR has an informed opinion about it and most see it as the climax of Brazil’s diplomatic global efforts. In Turkey it seemed that the public debate about the issue by and large ended in June 2010 after the UN vote and the sanctions. One of few exceptions is Grigoriadis, professor at Ankara’s Bilkent University, who participated in Turkey-Brazil seminars. In 2014, he wrote that Turkey’s involvement “underlined the emancipation of Turkey’s strategic planning and foreign policy.”⁸⁵⁷

The Brazilian debate is fought on different fronts. For Carpes, when looking what the deal meant for Brazil’s international strategy, “then it is not a failure, but an aspect of a more active foreign policy. Brazil showed that it is a capable actor for the so-called ‘high politics.’ In that respect it was a marco fundamental for Brazilian foreign policy.”⁸⁵⁸

But, Brazilian academics and journalists are divided in the evaluation. For Mello, “with the Iran involvement we were over-reaching our capacities.”⁸⁵⁹ Vaz commented that

I think Tehran was a mistake. To see Brazil as an international broker was over-stretched. It was an effort to show that the country can be a protagonist on issues beyond climate. They super-estimated their possibilities of what Brazil could do, a confidence as a global actor. And, they opened many new fronts almost simultaneously, Africa and South America, IBAS and BRICS, UNASUL and CELAC. It was definitely an over-stretch, because there were and are not sufficient resources for such an ambitious policy, neither capital nor human.⁸⁶⁰

This was also emphasized by José Casado, in an article entitled “alô Obama”: “The Brazilian plan to use Iran and its nuclear program as a passport for the principle table of global governance shipwrecked in the sun of the Spanish spring. The Tehran Declaration was reduced to a footnote in the history books.”⁸⁶¹

Two positive voices are Paulo Velasco and Arlene Clemesha. Velasco commented: I think that the US wanted a failure. After the successful declaration, Hillary was disarmed and did not really know what to do. The Brazilian opposition like ex-foreign minister Lampreia called it a disgrace (vexame). I think it was not megalomania, Brazil was ready for some protagonism outside of the continent.⁸⁶²

Also for Clemesha, Middle East expert at USP, “it was worth doing. Strategically, if you want to increase your international prestige, you have to be present also in the Middle East. However, the process was very fast and hard to fill with content and people.”⁸⁶³

This Middle Eastern involvement is one of the most often voiced criticisms. Be it for geographic reasons or the little experience in Middle Eastern issues. Spektor wrote that “the Brazilian participation in this process would be equivalent to a Turkish wish to act in a serious controversy between two South American states.”⁸⁶⁴ This is confirmed by the director of the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Rio, Bartelt: “Brazil should definitely also be active outside the region, but on certain topics like climate or in organizations like the G20, BRICS or BASIC. In the Middle East, that is much more difficult.”⁸⁶⁵ Global activity is OK, but not concerning international security issues, as a senior diplomat added:

There are some issues where Brazil can do something on a global scale, like environment or trade. But international security is not really among our fields of expertise. When I was a Brazilian diplomat at the UN, I was asked about Angola. But nobody ever asked Brazil’s opinion on Kongo or Rwanda.⁸⁶⁶

More negative is Almeida, who judged, “Lula da Silva tried to insert himself in the complicated chessboard of Middle East conflicts, ... which, of course, arrived at nothing.”⁸⁶⁷ But, as Stünkel, professor at São Paulo’s FGV and specialist on the BRICS wrote: “For Lula, the question of Iran is not so important, for he is arguing, above all, that the current structures of global governance are unjust and that the emerging countries need to be more considered.”⁸⁶⁸

What can be clearly observed in Brazil is that there is a sharp division between former and active diplomats and their view on the issue. Lampreia offered an overall criticism that the new powers and Brazil should not overestimate their capacities. He argued that the global impact Brazil can have, will always depend both on its economic power and the ability of its political leaders and diplomats:

But never forgetting to consider the realistic limits of the Brazilian capacity to act in any situation ... in the case of the Middle East, it showed an excessive voluntarism, which showed gratuitous and useless. ... the limits of Brazilian protagonism outside of fields, in which it has credentials and real influence.⁸⁶⁹

But, also Lampreia acknowledged that Amorim “saw in the Iranian nuclear question an opportunity to better spread the presence of Brazil in the global scenario ... this would be an exceptional act if two emerging countries could reach a result, which was globally perceived as of real value.”⁸⁷⁰

Another former diplomat who heavily criticized the Brazilian efforts was Rubens Barbosa:

The 2010 Iran deal was the result of this protagonism in foreign policy represented by Lula and Amorim who wanted this important role for Brazil in world affairs. The letter sent by Obama in my view was wrongly interpreted. This was more an action for the visibility of Brazil on the world stage than a step to solve the problem. Brazil was not prepared at the time to contribute to a solution. And before Tehran, Medvedev told them that the chances were slim. This was a ‘jogada politica’ of Lula who projected himself as a world leader with aspirations of winning the Noble Peace Prize.⁸⁷¹

Active diplomats understandably have a different view, even if they are by majority also politically closer to the centre-right. Brazilian ambassador in Ankara Salgado, who was ambassador in Tehran during the time of the declaration renounced Lampreia’s criticism:

it is not a good book, too simplistic and just taking the US view. I agree maybe that this was a step beyond capability. But, I side with Amorim. The Obama letter presented conditions, we got them all ... we felt kind of betrayed. Brazil and Turkey tried to show the world what diplomacy can do. I am still proud of this initiative.⁸⁷²

The Deputy director of the Rio Branco Institute, Barreiros, said that

the view in the Rio Branco Institute is that in 2010 the two countries were deceived by the US. There was no support by the major powers. It was an effort to create an environment of confidence. That did not work, but you learn most from failures. Retired diplomats can talk differently, they might have resentments against other diplomats and they are no longer bound to the rules of the diplomatic corps. I as a serving diplomat can say that the feeling in Brasilia is that this was a genuine effort with good intentions, which unfortunately did not lead to a final deal. It was also a time of excessive self-confidence. Brazil was ready to act on the world stage. The Middle East and Iran were a good opportunity to show this, with a good and strong partner from the region.⁸⁷³

And there were balanced voices. A senior diplomat from the first generation of Brazilian diplomats who moved to Brasilia and current consul in a European city, generally defended the approach, but said

there also were mistakes. In 1999 Amorim had a mandate. In 2010 he did not. Amorim was a ‘self-appointed’ mediator. This gave the UNSC the opportunity to ignore it. There were no serious negotiations with Hillary Clinton or Lavrov to include them. You have to calculate the negative reaction of the USA when they are not part of the preparations. However, I still defend the idea of that bet, that was legitimate. The Western powers did not succeed for years to create peace. But you have to calculate the US behavior. They should have worked with Hillary, because power is a fact of life, you have to consider it.⁸⁷⁴

There was a lot of hope that this would not just be a one-time episode, but a rule-changer that would be felt more strongly in the future. It then seemed just the beginning of new powers becoming more demanding, but also more influential. Now six years later, an evaluation has to be a lot more sober, because the Tehran Declaration remained a one-time episode, a mere footnote to world diplomacy and nothing close to a rule changer. However, still it was a valid approach and the partners were well chosen. Amorim in an interview coquetted saying “sometimes unlikely couples are the most interesting ones!”⁸⁷⁵ Both were accepted by Iran and could reach concessions from Iran. However, the neglect to consider global power hierarchies gave Turkey and Brazil the possibility to present themselves as the moral winners, but also led to the failure of the initiative. With less ambition, offering themselves more as mediators and facilitators than as prime negotiators and including the P5 into the process, maybe not five years of continuing embargoes and sanctions could have been prevented, but considerable time for sure. The ones who suffered the most from this deadlock was the Iranian population. With this strategy, not only the declaration failed, but also Turkey’s and Brazil’s image suffered and relations to the P-5. Howlett-Martin said that afterwards the “Brazilian-French relations were severely strained and that Brazil was openly castigated by the US.”⁸⁷⁶ The fronts hardened. Amorim, a usually soft-spoken diplomat accused the US of “arrogant imperialism.” However, the blame is not exclusively on the negotiators. The P5 and above all the US could have tried to use the declaration as what it was. A first stept in trust-building on a global security issue and build on the declaration to fine-tune details in a joint effort of something like P5+3 (Germany, Turkey, Brazil). As we have seen in July 2015, the main ingredients of the finally agreed deal were in principle not so different from the 2010 declaration.⁸⁷⁷ It could have served as a basis and therefore was a wasted opportunity.

5.4. 2010: Towards a strategic partnership

Independent from the contacts in the framework of the Iran nuclear program, 2010 witnessed a series of bilateral encounters and important developments. Turkish ambassador to Brazil Diriöz therefore called 2010 “the decisive year.”⁸⁷⁸ Already in early January, the “2nd term Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU) of the Turkish-Brazilian Joint Economic Committee (JEC) was signed in Ankara. The signatories were Turkey’s foreign trade minister Çağlayan and Brazil’s foreign minister Amorim. The MoU included the preparation of a road map for the period between 2010 and 2012. Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu then already mentioned that an action plan for a strategic partnership would be co-implemented. Amorim added that prime minister Erdoğan was scheduled to visit Brazil in May 2010.879

As president Lula already announced in Ankara in 2009, the Third UN Alliance of Civilizations Forum took place in Rio de Janeiro on 28-29 May 2010.880 As a co-sponsor of the Alliance together with then Spanish prime minister Zapatero, Erdoğan participated in the forum giving one of the opening speeches.⁸⁸¹ However, Erdoğan also used his three-day stay in Brazil for bilateral consultations and visits. Already on 27 May, Lula and Erdoğan participated in the meeting of the joint business council in Brasilia. Erdoğan commented that the bilateral relations had gained a “new dimension” after Lula’s visit to Turkey in May 2009: “Our contacts have increased, cooperation has boosted, and our relations have gained a new momentum. ... I wish today’s meeting will have concrete benefits to both sides, and boost our economic relations.”⁸⁸² To facilitate this goal, Lula and Erdoğan signed the “Action Plan for a Strategic Partnership” (APSP).⁸⁸³ For Vaz, this partnership with Turkey was among the

important Brazilian strategic partnerships. ... Even though Turkey is an increasingly relevant political and economic player in Europe, in North Africa and in the Middle East – areas of high political and economic interest to Brazil – bilateral relations are still relatively modest. In order to boost them, the Brazilian-Turkish strategic partnership envisaged initiatives in nine major areas.⁸⁸⁴

(I) Political Dialogue and Cooperation in Multilateral Fora

(II) Trade and Investment

(III) Energy

(IV) Biodiversity

(V) Environment and Sustainable Development

(VI) Defense

(VII) Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime

(VIII) Science, Innovation and High Technology

(IX) Cultural Exchange and Education

The first item seemed very much influenced by the negotiations concerning the Iran nuclear program. The Action Plan stated that

the two countries will regularly consult each other with regard to the developments in their respective regions and coordinate their efforts to ensure peace and security, to contribute to the peaceful settlement of ongoing conflicts. ... Brazil and Turkey agreed to hold consultations and work together on issues of common concern with a view to furthering their common efforts in these fields.⁸⁸⁵

To be able to achieve this, the High Level Cooperation Commission should meet regularly, but also consultations in multilateral fora should have been intensified.

Item II stated a “commitment to expand and diversify bilateral trade, to encourage mutual direct foreign investments ... to encourage their public and private sectors to engage in joint ventures.” More concrete was the planned cooperation in energy issues (III) where negotiations between Petrobras and TPAO had been ongoing since 2006. This cooperation should have “been developed.” It was even planned to launch an “Energy Sub-Committee” that would meet regularly.

Items IV and V are merely stating the importance of the issues without being concrete on bilateral issues. This is only slightly different in item VI where the countries aim to “strengthen the cooperation” beyond the defense agreement already signed in 2003. As with many other issues, also concerning defense, a “joint group” should have been established. Item VII again merely stated the importance of fighting terrorism and cooperating in multilateral fora. Item VIII mentioned that an agreement should be prepared concerning the cooperation of two institutions in both countries in the field of science and technology “to be adopted in a moment of mutual convenience.” Finally, the cultures of the two countries should have been promoted, also including through academic exchange programs.⁸⁸⁶

On his final day in Brazil, Erdoğan inaugurated the Turkish General Consulate in São Paulo, where he also received an award by FIESP for his “contribution to industry.” Later he and his entourage visited the EMBRAER plant near São Paulo. There transportation minister Binali Yıldırım, the current prime minster, proposed to “built a plane together.”⁸⁸⁷

At that time, not only politicians were enthusiastic about the prospects and potentials of bilateral relations. When Lazarou commented on the Turkey-Brazil rapprochement one year after the signing of the Action Plan in May 2011, she wrote: “With the implementation of a number of these items already proceeding rapidly and with particular success, there is little doubt that relations between the two states will continue to grow in 2011 and beyond.”⁸⁸⁸ Bilateral trade was at its peak, visits continued, neither economic nor political problems were on the horizon. Turkish ambassador in Brasilia Diriöz spoke of “a great ardor when the first meetings to place.”⁸⁸⁹

It is easy to be wise afterwards. However, the years following the signing of the strategic partnership did not only demonstrate that basically nothing of the nine items was undertaken, let alone anything concrete accomplished. After 2012 there has even been a slowdown of relations, there were no more high-level diplomatic initiatives, projects in energy failed and were abandoned, those in defense issues never started. Neither were there noteworthy initiatives in the cultural, scientific nor academic field. As the years until 2011 raised the hopes towards a strong and broad partnership of two emerging powers, the years after 2011 witnessed the limits of such an endeavor in the face of economic and political domestic problems. However, the disappointment was not abrupt, it was a rather slow retreat.

Still in 2010, in October, the Brazilian tourism minister Barreto visited Turkey to participate in the workshop concerning a cooperation between Turkish Airlines and Embratur. And in December 2010 EU minister Bağış participated in the Mercosul conference in Foz do Iguaçu.

5.5. Bilateral relations under Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)

In January 2011, Dilma Rousseff’s first term as president began. From the beginning it was known that Dilma would not share the foreign policy enthusiasm of her predecessor. However, whereas it took Lula five years in power to visit Turkey, Dilma already came to Turkey in her first year in office. Between 6 and 8 October 2011 she visited both Ankara and Istanbul, accompanied by the foreign, defense, finance, foreign trade, development, science and communications ministers. In Ankara, Rousseff met Turkish president Gül. At a ceremony, one memorandum of understanding and two agreements were signed.⁸⁹⁰ These were:

Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Higher Education between the Council of Higher Education of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Education of the Federative Republic of Brazil

Agreement on the Transfer of Convicts between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Turkey⁸⁹¹

Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Turkey.

After the signing ceremony, both presidents gave statements.⁸⁹² Gül was especially optimistic about the economic potential: “We are determined to develop our relations in all fields. We are sure that the bilateral trade volume will soon reach 10 billion USD.” Dilma declared support for the international recognition of a Palestinian state and added that the global economic crisis “created an opportunity for us. By increasing our relations we have to find a way that the crisis will have a minimal effect.”⁸⁹³

Additionally, a joint declaration was signed entitled “Turkey-Brazil: A Strategic Perspective for Dynamic Partnership,”⁸⁹⁴ which can be understood as an affirmation and update of the Action Plan signed the previous year. It was presented at a meeting of the Turkey-Brazil Business Forum organized by the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON).⁸⁹⁵ Still the mood of the Tehran Declaration was noticeable:

As the political and economic challenges are intensified worldwide, the role and contribution of the new actors to the resolution of the international problems become indispensable. ... Against this background, the fast growing relations and close cooperation between Turkey and Brazil are getting more relevant both bilaterally and globally.

However, what then followed was basically a repetition of the nine items laid out in the Action Plan of May 2010. The only additional item were the Least Developed Countries (LDC), which were added, because in May 2011 a UN conference on that issue took place in Istanbul. The declaration stated that Turkey had undertaken “a significant initiative and announced an economic and technical cooperation package towards LDCs.” Therefore “the Brazilian Government has decided to launch the Brazilian-LDC Partnership.” However, this is not a bilateral initiative, but both countries acting independently on the same issue. Still the declaration ended hopeful:

Turkey and Brazil are determined to continue the implementation of the provisions agreed in the Action Plan for the Strategic Partnership to further widen the institutional basis of the bilateral relationship and intensify the high level contacts in all fields of common interest and concern in light of their joint strategic perspective for a dynamic partnership.⁸⁹⁶

This state visit was also the first personal meeting of Dilma and her ministers and their Turkish counterparts. Whereas the personal relations between Amorim and Davutoğlu, Lula and Erdoğan have always been described as very good, this positive relationship continued under Dilma, as Brazilian ambassador in Ankara Salgado explained:

The Dilma-Erdoğan relations on a human level were very good. When Dilma was in Turkey, Erdoğan’s mother died. Dilma decided to go to Istanbul and pay condolences to the family. Erdoğan was very moved by this and did not forget it.⁸⁹⁷

In 2012 the central issue being negotiated bilaterally was defense. The prominence of this issue, which had been on the bilateral agenda already in 2003,898 was certainly also related to the Brazilian defense minister of the time. After Dilma’s first defense minister Jobim stepped down in August 2011, long-time foreign minister Amorim who left the government at the end of Lula’s term in 2010, joined Dilma’s government as defense minister, which he remained until the end of her first term.

Soon after Amorim became defense minister he accompanied Dilma on her state visit to Turkey and had a separate meeting with the Turkish defense minister Yılmaz on 7 October 2011 in Ankara.⁸⁹⁹ Yılmaz returned the visit in May 2012 for a meeting at the Military Command in São Paulo. The ministers were joined by high ranking generals from both countries. Amorim told Yılmaz, that “we have excellent possibilities for cooperation and to develop joint projects. Your visit is a demonstration of the interest of your country.” Amorim underlined that both countries were trying to develop modern military projects with national capacity building and autonomous technology in different sub-sectors.⁹⁰⁰

At the end of the meeting on 7 May 2012, a letter of intentions (Carta de Intenções) was signed.⁹⁰¹ The two ministers declared their desire to formalize future cooperation activities in the following areas:

increase joint visits of the Defense Ministries of the two countries

exchange experiences and lessons about defense related issues

develop a cooperation between the defense industries of both countries, including a transfer of technology and joint projects

For Stünkel, the main motivation behind these efforts was that “both countries intent on modernizing their armed forces,” because

neither country currently possesses cutting-edge knowledge in naval technology, space technology, defense against cyber attacks or unmanned aircraft. The ability to develop such technology would not only provide both countries with greater strategic autonomy, but also allow them to export high-tech military equipment.⁹⁰²

When in June 2012, prime minister Erdoğan met with president Roussef at the Rio+20 UN conference, the two leaders especially stressed the progress made by their defense ministers the previous month and underlined the importance of further developing this cooperation.⁹⁰³

The meetings and intentions to intensify the defense relations also continued in the troubled year 2013, even after mass protests in June and July. In August, Amorim travelled with a delegation of civilian and military experts to Ankara. He met with foreign minister Davutoğlu and president Gül whom he gave a letter written by president Dilma about the importance to develop defense cooperation.⁹⁰⁴ After a meeting with Turkish defense minister Yılmaz and high ranking military on 22 August, it was decided to set up five different working groups, which should work on possibilities for concrete cooperation.

These groups comprised 1) naval, 2) aeronautics, 3) space, 4) command and control (C2) and 5) cyber defense issues. It was planned that in all working groups besides civilian and military experts there would also be representatives of defense sector companies from both countries.⁹⁰⁵ In contrast to the “letter of intention” of 2012, the plans then were quite concrete. A communiqué explained that in the naval group the feasibility of a possible joint venture for certain ship types should be discussed. In the aeronautic field one of the possibilities to be studied would be the construction of Turkish helicopters in Brazil and Brazilian planes in Turkey. “The space group will address the possibility of cooperation on launch systems and satellites (sensing and communications). Command and control will have a central focus on military communications.”⁹⁰⁶

The Turkish minister commented that “our relationship already reached the level of strategic partnership. The Turkish defense industry realized great projects and we are ready to cooperate.” It was then planned that technical meetings would take place both in Turkey and Brazil in the following weeks. The Turkish news agency Cihan therefore optimistically concluded that “it is expected that a bilateral defense treaty will be signed by the two countries this year and would include topics like marine, air force, cyber defense and the development of command control mechanisms.”⁹⁰⁷ However, such a treaty or agreement was not signed in 2013 and not even until fall 2016 either.⁹⁰⁸

In late April 2016, Tible said that in “2013 the good life ended” [acabou a vida boa].⁹⁰⁹ He was referring to the protests in Brazil and the increasing economic, political and corruption related problems. However, in 2013 also the “good life” ended in bilateral Turkey-Brazil relations. For Brazilian ambassador Salgado until then the

exception was the defense area. Amorim as minister of defense paid great importance to Turkey and the stakes were still high in 2013 with the planned working groups. Embraer e.g. would have been one partner. There was a good coordination with the defense ministries and the Armed Forces. But, even this process now is stopped. Both countries are being occupied with other issues. Unfortunately the relations did not continue as desired. The mechanisms created in 2010 are stopped.⁹¹⁰

Turkish ambassador Diriöz agreed:

This ardour was lost, because the economies got into problems. Then there were the protests of Gezi and in Brazil, which led to a focus on domestic issues. For Turkey the problems in the neighborhood, especially in Syria absorbed much attention of foreign policy. Then there were continually elections in both countries.⁹¹¹

Lazarou explained that “Dilma was not expecting the protests and social unrest. This was the final blow for looking inward. If you look at Dilma’s first months, there was still this Lula momentum. But after the protests, it turned completely inward.”⁹¹² For Stünkel, however, this process was visible already in April 2013: “both Brazil and Turkey have, more recently, retreated somewhat from the international scene.”⁹¹³

It is quite telling that the relevant sections of the foreign ministries have their latest entries in 2011 and 2012. The timeline of the Itamaraty on bilateral relations ends in 2012.914 The latest post is concerning the visit of the foreign minister Patriota in January 2013 to Turkey.⁹¹⁵ The Turkish MFA bilateral site ends in 2011, with Dilma’s visit to Turkey.⁹¹⁶

5.6. 2016-2017: Developments under the Temer government

Brazil was governed by an interim government lead by vice-president Michel Temer from 12 May to 31 August 2016, when the Senate finally voted to remove Dilma Rousseff from her office. Therefore, Temer and his government will presumably govern until 1 January 2019. Regarding Brazil-Turkey relations, already during the interim government political consultations took place on 3 June 2016 in Ankara. For Bernardes “both ministries are committed to revive these close relations. Under Serra, Itamaraty will have more financial resources to travel abroad and participate in international endeavors.” For him the first political consultations after five years “was very successful, many aspects of a bilateral, regional and multilateral agenda were discussed and for the Brazilian side this was very interesting and important.”⁹¹⁷ This reunion was headed by the Under-Secretary for Europe and Multilateral Affairs, Fernando Simas Magalhães and on the Turkish part by ambassador Ahmet Gün. In May, Bernardes said in Brasilia that these consultations are a first step in the preparation of higher level meetings and finally state visits. A second meeting will take place in Brasilia with the possibility of also visiting São Paulo.⁹¹⁸

For Bernardes, even during very “quiet years” concerning bilateral relations, “the importance of Turkey has always been clear to Itamaraty. Because of domestic reasons, there was no meeting for 5 years. But Itamaraty is committed to lift the relations again to a higher level, because the potential is enormous.”⁹¹⁹

5.7. Foreign ministries, foreign missions

Brazil and Turkey both increased their diplomatic missions and diplomatic corps enormously during the past two decades. In the current ranking of the Global Diplomacy Index⁹²⁰ they are on 6th and 7th position, just behind the P-5 with 225 and 222 diplomatic missions. With this number both are clearly above the OECD average with 133 missions, but also clearly above the G20 average with 191. In the category of foreign missions, they are among the great powers leaving economically more potent countries like Germany and Japan behind. And according to the newest figures this number for Turkey even increased to 233 missions and for Brazil to 226.921

For Brazil, the Lula presidency meant an increase of roughly 50 percent of its foreign missions, which were 150 in 2003. According to then foreign minister Amorim, between 2003 and 2010 “52 new embassies, six missions at international organizations, 22 consulates and one representative office in Palestine were established.”⁹²² Turkey was part of this growing network, since the consulate in Istanbul was opened in 2009, the second Brazilian representation after the embassy, which was already inaugurated in 1930. The embassy’s staff currently is besides the ambassador, six diplomats⁹²³ and local staff. During the past decade the post of military attaché was added. Concerning the Istanbul consulate, vice-consul José Barros commented that the opening of the Istanbul representation “is directly linked to the more active Brazilian foreign policy during the Lula presidencies.” In Istanbul, the criteria for the opening were not, as usual, a high number of Brazilian citizens or especially strong economic or trade relations, but “the fact that Istanbul is an important city in an important country, which is also crucial for the wider region.”⁹²⁴ At the Istanbul consulate a total of 15 persons are employed. Three diplomats and four vice-consuls are Brazilian diplomats, the rest are non-diplomats both Turkish and Brazilian citizens. In the trade department there are three “local” employees, but two of them are Brazilian citizens living in Istanbul. There is also one Syrian citizen dealing with visa applications in Arabic.⁹²⁵

With the missions, also the number of diplomats rose from just a bit more than 1000 in 2000 to 1557 in 2012.926 Since then, the number remained stable, Candeas commented that “there are currently 1500 acting diplomats.”⁹²⁷

Put into perspective, even with this impressive increase, this is a lot less than the diplomatic corps of the countries with the biggest number such as Great Britain with more than 15,000 diplomats or Germany with currently 11,602 diplomats.⁹²⁸ This means that in 2016 the Brazilian diplomatic corps was only 1/7 or 1/10 of the German or British diplomatic corps with basically the same number of foreign missions. It is no wonder that it is a huge task for Brazil, Turkey (more than 2000 diplomats) and other new middle powers to fill so many newly opened embassies and consulates and run a sustainable policy there. However, there are new economic powers like India, a BRICS member, which even have less diplomats than Brazil and Turkey. In 2012 India only had 600 diplomats,⁹²⁹ and in 2014, 950.930

Quantity is one thing, quality another. It is also more difficult to measure. In the Brazilian case, the diplomatic corps already decades ago got its blessing from Henry Kissinger who characterized it as “Latin America’s most effective foreign service – well trained, multilingual, pursuing the Brazilian national interest with a combination of charm, persistence, and a careful assessment of international realities.”⁹³¹

Decades later Daniel criticized this view: “Kissinger thought, they were the best, but they were the best in his view and his interest, not for the Brazilian people. They were completely disconnected from the people.”⁹³² And even senior diplomats who began their career in the 1960s do not fully agree:

Brazil has good diplomats, but this thing that we were the best is exaggerated. This comes from the 1970s and 1980s when Brazil was different from most developing countries. We worked as the West and were regarded as reliable, we would not talk too much at international organizations, we followed a work schedule and stuck to rules etc.⁹³³

However, there is a widespread perception that Itamaraty is different. Former French diplomat Howlett-Martin argued that “Itamaraty is not like other state institutions, it is very professional, high level people, but very conservative.”⁹³⁴ For Vaz, “Itamaraty has an anachronistic culture. Aristocratic. That is why the cooperation and communication with other ministries is very difficult. The other ministries feel that Itamaraty thinks it is better.”⁹³⁵

But as Daniel, who lectures young diplomats and wrote a manual for them explained, things have been changing in the past decade:

For Itamaraty it was like a revolution. The staff increased enormously. From around annually 20 new candidates to 100. This led to the situation that 50 percent of the staff was new. Itamaraty is still not representative, but more representative. Through affirmative action there are more blacks, but also more middle class and people who already worked, that is all new. Before that, it was a microcosm of the elite of the elite of the elite.⁹³⁶

There is a controversy whether this is a good or a bad thing. For Vaz, “the quality did not go down with more young diplomats. To see that change of these more representative diplomats, we need to wait some more years, until they will be in powerful positions.”⁹³⁷ Acting diplomat Candeas also agreed:

With more new diplomats Itamaraty got better. Until the 1980s, most diplomats were from Rio de Janeiro with their own world view. Since the mid-80s the diplomats are becoming more representative. Now there are quotas, Itamaraty got socially, regionally more representative, this can only enrich it. The old elite does not know Brazil, they have never eaten a traditional dish in Paraiba and chatted with locals. Now the diplomatic corps more reflects the country.⁹³⁸

However, as Daniel explained, there was “huge criticism against this policy. The old elite said that PT cadres, illiterates and monkeys entered the Itamaraty.”⁹³⁹ For Daniel

Lula’s transformation of Itamaraty is also a legacy for the future. This will have important changes when this generation becomes ambassador in about 20 years. Some will be absorbed by the system, but some will keep a different view and approach.⁹⁴⁰

Under Lula’s presidencies the foreign ministry witnessed great changes, quantitatively and qualitatively. As Zilla explained, since 2003 the number of the sub-divisions in Itamaraty increased significantly. She called this a horizontal pluralization to which a vertical pluralization was added, meaning the opening towards non-state actors.”⁹⁴¹

Turkey has always been located in the Europe Division. However, a change took place in February 2015. Turkey was moved from the Europe 1 to the Europe 2 Division, which mainly comprises formerly Eastern Bloc countries. Mauricio Bernardes, the head of the Europe 2 Division explained this policy:

We decided to move Turkey, because we think that there are more commonalities concerning the relations with Russia or the Ukraine and with Turkey, than with countries like Portugal, Germany and France where the relations are very established, traditional and settled. Turkey has never been in an Asian Division, even if it has strong connections also there. But since it is an EU candidate, it would not be a good sign to present Turkey in Asia.⁹⁴²

The Europe Division 2, which comprises 22 countries, has thee diplomats dealing with all countries. There are no resources for specialists exclusively working on Turkey. Concerning the knowledge of Turkey and the region, Daniel is rather sceptical: “The knowledge about the Middle East, Turkey, India or African countries is minimal. That is also the fact, because the professors do not know it either.”⁹⁴³

In the diplomatic education at the Rio Branco Institute, Brazil’s diplomatic school, “there are three phases in our training”, as Sergio Barreiros, the deputy director, explained. The first two modules are the main blocks, which

include the part of the education which we think is indispensable. The third phase is the professional model, with specific modules on regions. Turkey is an interesting case, it is an emerging country, a gate between Europe and the Middle East. And Brazil and Turkey acted together. There is also a two-week course on Islam, taught by the Islamic Association. But Turkey is also covered in the module on international policy and Brazil’s foreign policy.⁹⁴⁴

However, Barreiros acknowledged that the real learning takes place on the ground.

The Rio Branco Institute has several cooperation agreements with diplomatic schools around the world, including Turkey. This offers foreign diplomats the possibility to attend a one year program together with their Brazilian colleagues, but it is completely in Portuguese. There is no short term program especially designed for foreign diplomats. So far, no Turkish diplomat has ever participated in that program. “These cooperations are not being used as we wish, because of many financial problems we have been having.”⁹⁴⁵

Theoretically it is possible to learn Turkish in the Itamaraty. If there are five people who want to learn any language, a professor is hired from outside and the lessons take place during working hours. “But concerning Turkish, this has not happened yet. There are some diplomats who speak it, but those served in Turkey.”⁹⁴⁶ The lack of linguistic knowledge is not limited to the diplomats, but there are few Portuguese speakers in Turkey and Turkish speakers in Brazil. The Istanbul consulate does have one translator for Turkish-Portuguese, “that is why we often collaborate with Spanish-Turkish translators. And, there is nobody for English-Portuguese, which is sometimes needed with international delegations.”⁹⁴⁷

Turkey increased its foreign missions since the foundation of the Republic until today by almost 10 times. In 1924, the young Republic had inherited 39 foreign missions from the Ottoman Empire. When the AKP was elected for the first time in 2002, there were 163 foreign missions. The latest numbers from 2016 mentioned 233 foreign missions, among them 135 embassies, 13 permanent representations and 84 consulates. This means that in 13 years, 70 new missions were opened.⁹⁴⁸

On the American continent, the increase in percentage was even bigger. Were there eight embassies, four consulates and two permanent missions in 2002, the number of embassies in 2015 rose to 14. As Turkey’s consul general in São Paulo said:

In the past six to seven years, new missions were opened in Lima, Bogota, Quito, Panama, Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. It is planned to open a general consulate in Rio de Janeiro, in about 2018. The priority is first to open in places where there is no mission at all and then to open new consulates. This is a kind of craziness (delilik) and it needs courage.⁹⁴⁹

Turkey has an embassy in Brasilia and a consulate general in São Paulo. Turkish ambassador Diriöz said that the budget of the embassy in the past years remained stable. The staff of the embassy is two attachés, a new one for military affairs and non-diplomatic staff of roughly two to three Turkish citizens for administration and local staff, which are four secretaries, two drivers, three office workers, two gardeners and a gate keeper.⁹⁵⁰ The Turkish consulate in São Paulo has two Turkish citizens, one Brazilian economist and two Brazilian secretaries plus gardeners, drivers and gate keepers. The consulate works with four licensed translators.⁹⁵¹

It is not surprising that also the number of diplomats had to keep pace with this development. The diplomatic corps rose from 422 in 1944 to over 1000 in 1985. In 2000 there were almost 1400 Turkish diplomats, in 2012 there were for the first time more than 2000 diplomats and in 2016 there were 2217 diplomats. According to Oran, roughly 45 percent of the diplomats are based in Ankara.⁹⁵² Together with the non-diplomatic staff, the employees of the foreign ministry were 6711 by June 2016.953 Concerning the quality of the diplomatic corps, it is not reported the Kissinger had an especially high esteem, but Oran argued that the quality of the diplomatic personnel is “significantly better than in other ministries. The selection process is much stronger.”⁹⁵⁴ Davutoğlu as foreign policy advisor said in January 2008 in a program with CNN Türk: “The most important feature of the Turkish foreign office is its very professional bureaucratic cadre.”⁹⁵⁵

The selection of diplomats happens through an examination of candidates who have already passed the general exam to become a civil servant. Those who want to become a diplomat can participate until the age of 31 to a special exam.⁹⁵⁶ Those who passed both the written and oral exam, then take classes at the “Diplomacy Academy”, which was established in 1968.957 There are several programs, the basic training program is a 60 hour introduction.⁹⁵⁸ However, there are also all sorts of specialization courses offered under the “Program for Field Studies.”⁹⁵⁹ Among them are courses on e.g. the Middle East and North Africa Studies, Eurasian Studies, the Balkans and the Black Sea Studies, European Union Studies or Terrorism and International Politics. This reflects geographically the strategic depth vision. Until today there is no specialization for Latin or South America. The Diplomacy Academy has signed both a “Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between Diplomatic Academies” and a “Protocol on Exchange of Diplomats” with 81 and 15 countries respectively. In both categories there are agreements with Brazil.⁹⁶⁰

In the basic program, English and French are taught, but according to the ministry’s website young diplomats are encouraged to learn other languages too. In the list provided by the ministry, Portuguese is not mentioned.⁹⁶¹ However, within additional training programs in Turkey and abroad, so far four diplomats took part in Portuguese language classes.⁹⁶²

For Oran, the biggest problem remains the limited budget of the MFA, which was only between 0.3 and 0.4 percent of the overall budget. In 2015, this slightly improved, but with a little more than two bn TL (ca. 600 million Euros) is still with 0.5 percent⁹⁶³ far behind the US State Department with a budget of 4 percent of the state budget.

5.8. Diplomatic problem: the Armenian genocide

Mauricio Bernardes, head of the Department for Europe II in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, said that “there are not many diplomatic problems. The biggest headache for us is the issue of the Armenian genocide.”⁹⁶⁴ Similarly commented the Brazilian ambassador Salgado: “The relations are good, but the exception is the Armenian issue, which already negatively affected the bilateral relations.”⁹⁶⁵

On 26 May 2015, two PSDB senators from São Paulo, Aloysio Nunes Ferreira and José Serra, the latter foreign minister since May 2016, introduced a request (requerimento) to be voted upon in the Federal Senate. This “Motion of Solidarity with the Armenian people during the course of the centenary of the campaign of extermination of its population”, read as follows:

The Federal Senate recognizes the genocide of the Armenian people, whose centenary was commemorated on 24 April 2015. In paying tribute to the victims and recognizing the contribution for the economic, social and cultural formation of Brazil of thousands of Brazilians, descendants of Armenian refugees, highlighting that no genocide should be forgotten, so that it will not be repeated.⁹⁶⁶

This short text was accompanied by a much longer “justification” of why in the view of the senators, the massacres and deportations of 1915/1916 determine genocide and some descriptions of what occurred. The text also listed other countries, which have already recognized the genocide in South America like Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela. It then mentioned explicitly Germany and the Vatican, which had also spoken of genocide. It ended:

Unfortunately, the Brazilian government has not yet recognized the Armenian genocide. However, some states have already done it. In Brazil, the legislative assemblies of the states of Ceará and Paraná already recognized the Armenian genocide. In 2015, the State of São Paulo declared 24 April as the Day of Recognition and Remembrance of the victims of the genocide of the Armenian people, integrating it into the official calendar of the state.

The request was unanimously approved by 46 Senators on 2 June 2015.967 Turkey reacted as in other cases with recalling the ambassador the following day and the conveying of the Brazilian ambassador to the foreign ministry. “They called me to the ministry and complained that they would never have expected such a move by a friendly country. I explained that this was not the government but the Senate and that nobody was targeted.”⁹⁶⁸ On 8 June an official condemnation was published by the Turkish foreign ministry:

We condemn the Resolution of the Brazilian Senate on the events of 1915, which distorts the historical truths and ignores the law, and consider it as an example of irresponsibility.

Political decisions of this nature, taken under the influence of the Armenian lobbies can neither change the historical facts nor the legal norms.

In this context, our views have been conveyed to the Ambassador of Brazil in Ankara who was summoned to the Ministry on 3 June 2015.

Turkish Ambassador in Brasilia, Mr. Hüseyin Diriöz has also been recalled to Ankara for consultations.⁹⁶⁹

Even if the Turkish reaction spoke of a resolution, Bernardes clarified that

what the Senate did was a requerimento, which is a very simple instrument. The process is much shorter and the consequences little. But, already this caused diplomatic problems. There is little the MFA can do, be it to influence or to hinder. This is impossible, because the political bodies in Brazil are independent and we have many of them in a federal system. But in the end, the relations quickly normalized.⁹⁷⁰

However, the relations could be strained again in the future, because of the same issue, as ambassador Salgado explained:

The Chamber of Deputies was preparing something more serious, a remembrance day. This would also lead to didactic school material. It might however be that because of the many domestic problems, they will not bring it onto the agenda any time soon.⁹⁷¹

The Turkish ambassador is aware of this, but argued that “Brazil is a fair country. Concerning the claims of the Armenian genocide, they will listen to both sides. For genocide, there needs to be an intent. In our view this intent was not there. What we want is a debate on just remembering.”⁹⁷² On this issue the state and the Gülen movement concur as Howlett-Martin wrote: “The Turkish Cultural Centre ... actively defends Ankara’s position on this issue.”⁹⁷³ Abdullah Boztaş, who heads the office of the Gülen association CCBT in Brasilia confirmed this.⁹⁷⁴

5.9. Economic relations

5.9.1. The importance of the economy for emerging powers and the intensification of Turkey-Brazil relations

A strong economy is the key to enter the elite clubs and to self-confidently ask for more influence in trade negotiations and international diplomatic issues. Brazil and Turkey in the 2000s were internationally recognized as economic power houses. Brazil already in 2001 was “awarded” with the membership in BRIC. Both states became members of the upgraded G20 in 2008, the club of the strongest economies in the world.⁹⁷⁵ In 2011 Turkey also got an emergent Goldman Sachs label as a member of MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey).⁹⁷⁶ Without a strong economy, an independent foreign policy seems almost impossible. A country, depending on IMF credits, has internationally little room for maneuver.

By the end of the 2000s, Turkey and Brazil were described as economic success stories. In November 2009, the Economist titled “Brazil takes off.” In July 2010, Newsweek had on its cover “Turkey rises.” That same year Pope, veteran journalist and analyst on Turkey, asked whether Turkey’s “fast-growing economy ... make it a rising international power on a par with Brazil, China, India, and Russia?”⁹⁷⁷ Hale wrote in 2012 that “by 2011 Turkey was in a far stronger position economically than at any time in its recent past, enabling it to project a more powerful and effective international image.”⁹⁷⁸ For Brazil, Roett concluded in 2012 that “as Brazil’s economy gathered strength, the country’s international profile began to rise.”⁹⁷⁹ A year later, Stünkel summed up that “Brazil’s economic rise over the past two decades has caused the country’s foreign policy making elite to seek a more prominent role for Brazil in the international community.”⁹⁸⁰ The latter comment already indicated that with a weaker economy, an active foreign policy would be more difficult to sustain.

In both countries, one novel characteristic of the 2000s certainly was the inclusion of wider stakeholders in the formulation of foreign policy. Civil society, NGOs, business and exporters’ associations were consulted and accompanied politicians on foreign visits as not seen before. For Kirişçi, the MFA “cooperates with the business world much more closely.”⁹⁸¹ Seufert from the German think tank SWP wrote in 2012 that the “new business elite and the new foreign policy expert pool, which is financed by them, are an expression of the successful integration of the socially conservative population into policy and the economy.”⁹⁸² This is confirmed by Sümer:

a plethora of new economic stakeholders (Anatolian elites) with expanding trade and business interests outside Turkey’s borders emerged and favored Turkey’s multiregional active foreign policy that protects their interests. [...] As an outcome of globalization, the distinction between foreign policy and domestic politics is increasingly blurred.⁹⁸³

Yalvaç argued that for the AKP, “foreign policy has played an especially important role in establishing the conditions for its domestic hegemony.”⁹⁸⁴ This process could also be observed in Brazil as Montero argued:

The internationalization of the Brazilian economy, and particularly the growing importance of trade and transnational investment, made foreign economic policy an extension of domestic economic policy. The focus on promoting Brazil’s economic development remains the centerpiece of the way that the presidency defines the country’s interests in the conduct of foreign policy – yet underscores its inward looking nature.⁹⁸⁵

Ülgen, a former Turkish diplomat and founder of the think tank EDAM,⁹⁸⁶ stated very directly that “one of the main objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy is to ensure that exporters get new export markets and that the country receives more foreign direct investment.”⁹⁸⁷ For active Turkish diplomat Kalın, currently advisor of the president, “Turkey has put economic considerations at the centre of its foreign policy and has advocated closer cooperation with other rising powers.”⁹⁸⁸ His superior then, foreign minister Davutoğlu, addressed in December 2011 ambassadors. He started saying that there is an “ever strengthening role played by economic factors in the formulation of foreign policy.” Then he told the ambassadors how he saw their role: “you should act like a businessman ... You are businessmen on behalf of the country.”⁹⁸⁹

Foreign policy as a form of foreign economic policy. One result of this process was that the external dependencies of both economies significantly increased. This made the search for a diversification of trade partners even more important. Both countries depend as never before on foreign capital, FDIs and a growing export volume. Looking for new markets, the diversification of economic relations, became a necessity.⁹⁹⁰ This trend almost compelled them to become “trading states.” This concept was initially coined by Rosecrance in 1986.991 In 2009 Kirişçi applied it to Turkey with the widely acknowledged article about “The transformation of Turkish foreign policy – The rise of the trading state.” Kirişçi argued that economic factors had been undervalued in analyses of foreign policy and that the interests and priorities of new actors in foreign policy-making “are quite different from those of traditional foreign policy-makers of Turkey.”⁹⁹² For Kirişçi, the

zero-problem policy with the neighbours of the AKP government could be considered a blue-print manifestation of the foreign policy of a trading state ... [which] found it necessary to make the pursuit of economic interest the main element of their country’s diplomacy.⁹⁹³

The interdependence has become “a central characteristic of Turkish foreign policy as a trading state”, which under the AKP lead to the “gradual emergence of export-oriented Anatolian Tigers as constituencies seeking markets abroad.” There was a special role of “trading cities with a wide range of independence.”⁹⁹⁴

This view was shared by Tür and Han who wrote in 2011 that “behind current Turkish foreign policy lies the rise of a trading state.”⁹⁹⁵ There is a “growing hunger of Turkey for new markets.”⁹⁹⁶ Öniş and Kutlay also “observe the rise of Turkey as a ‘trading state’” and see a “similar pattern in this realm to other members of the BRIC grouping, such as China and Brazil.”⁹⁹⁷

In this process both states started to reach out to more distant regions. For Erol “Latin America was the last missing link in Turkey’s foreign policy, it was important to also include that.”⁹⁹⁸ Bechev wrote that “Ankara is also reaching out to other rising powers such as Brazil and Turkish entrepreneurs are making inroads in far-off places in Africa and Latin America.”⁹⁹⁹ Also Hale mentioned explicitly Latin America as one of the reservoirs for new trading partners, “especially the new economic power houses like Brazil.” Kalın confirmed this: “Turkey has consistently sought to develop closer economic relations with other rising powers in Asia and Latin America, partly in an effort to adjust to the shift of world economic power to non-Western regions.”¹⁰⁰⁰ For Ankara based scholar Grigoriadis, within this economic diplomacy

Latin America was meant to support growing economic relations of Turkish entrepreneurs and translate these into stronger political relations. Turkish entrepreneurship has grown into regions, which until recently remained beyond reach. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America attracted unprecedented attention by Turkish diplomatic authorities.¹⁰⁰¹

On the Brazilian side Visentini argued that

instead of focusing on cooperation within large and saturated markets or with countries who see Brazil as secondary, Itamaraty has chosen to concentrate its efforts on unoccupied spaces. By coming closer together with its South American neighbors – particularly Andean ones – along with southern Africa, Arab countries and international giants such as India, China and Russia, Brazilian diplomacy was able to advance considerably and immediately, with astonishing business perspectives.¹⁰⁰²

For Zilla, the commodity boom and demand from Asia, had as a result that Brazil’s “markets diversified. The international economic cycle of the last years – political and economic – was extremely advantageous for Brazil.”¹⁰⁰³ Vaz added that Brazil tried to advance their trade relations by bilateral strategic partnerships: “economic issues come first (trade, investment and finance), followed by education and culture, science and technology and security and defense issues.”¹⁰⁰⁴

In Brazil, a prominent role was played by FIESP (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo), but also within the ministries the trade aspect was strengthened. As Zilla described, the Chamber of Foreign Trade, CAMEX (Camara da Comércio Exterior), which was founded by former president Cardoso and part of the government council, got under Lula important competences concerning the promotion of trade.¹⁰⁰⁵

5.9.2. Turkey and Brazil: economic miracles or just following the trend?

Brazil and Turkey got their entrance to the club of “powerful” countries through their absolute economic strength. Much of the 2000s witnessed an enthusiasm about the performance of emerging powers, described as “trade powerhouses.”¹⁰⁰⁶ The confidence towards the emerging markets was further heightened due to the financial crisis in 2008/09, which they managed fairly well. Table 3 shows the growth of GDP in both countries in absolute and in per capita numbers. The peak so far for Brazil was in 2011, for Turkey in 2013.

Table 3: Turkey and Brazil: GDP (in Mio. USD, current prizes)¹⁰⁰⁷

| Brazil | Turkey
Year | GDP | GDP / Capita | GDP | GDP / Capita
2000 | 655.454 | 3,778 | 266.671 | 4,149
2005 | 891.633 | 4,815 | 482.737 | 7,053
2010 | 2,208.705 | 11,297 | 731.539 | 10,001
2011 | 2,612.400 | 13,234 | 774.729 | 10,437
2012 | 2,459.525 | 12,344 | 788.605 | 10,490
2013 | 2,464.688 | 12,260 | 823.025 | 10,821
2014 | 2,417.158 | 11,920 | 798.332 | 10,381
2015 | 1,772.589 | 8,669 | 733.642 | 9,437
2016 | 1,534.782 | 7,447 | 751.186 | 9,562
2017 | 1,556.435 | 7,495 | 791.239 | 9,969
2018 | 1,608.744 | 7,690 | 833.863 | 10,402

Table 4: The growth rates in both countries during the past 15 years:1008

| 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013  | 2014 | 2015 | 2016
Brazil | 4.1 | 1.7 | 3.1 | 1.1 | 5.8 | 3.2 | 4.0 | 6.1 | 5.1 | -0.1 | 7.5 | 3.9 | 1.9 | 3  | 0.1 | -3.8  | -3.6
Turkey | 6.8 | -5.7 | 6.2 | 5.3 | 9.4 | 8.4 | 6.9 | 4.7 | 0.7 | -4.8 | 9.2 | 8.8 | 2.1 | 4.2  | 2.9 | 41006  | 2.91007

The economic performance of both countries in the 2000s was received positively both among economic experts and leading politicians in both countries. Then Brazilian president Lula in 2008 lectured the West about the economic crisis, which “was caused by no black man or woman or by no indigenous person or by no poor person ... This crisis was fostered and boosted by irrational behaviour of some people that are white, blue-eyed.”¹⁰⁰⁹ With this almost arrogant over-confidence Brazil then strongly lobbied for a greater role of emerging markets in international decision making. But it was not only Lula and the PT, which were blinded by the alleged success. De Almeida wrote in 2010 of “brilliant prospects for the medium term: Brazil is already an ‘emerged’ country, but still an ‘emerging’ economy and a power broker.”¹⁰¹⁰ Lessa, professor at the University of Brasilia, saw in the Brazilian perception “the worldview of a country that sees itself as a regional power on a peaceful ascent, a major emerging market.”¹⁰¹¹ Roett in 2011 wrote that Brazil was labeled a “‘crafty superpower’ arguing that Brazil is becoming a unique regional powerhouse and that with no manual for becoming a global power, Lula’s Brazil seems to be writing one of its own.”¹⁰¹² Still in a publication in 2015 Eakin had not lost his optimism: “In the coming decades those nations that wield the greatest influence will not necessarily require great armies and military power. They will shape global events through economic prowess, and Brazil will be one of those nations.”¹⁰¹³

In Turkey, things were no different. Then Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu, addressing the Third Conference of Ambassadors in January 2011, described Turkey as “‘the shining country, the most spoken about country’ of at the G20 Summits.”¹⁰¹⁴ Karlı, a scholar at Galatasaray University Istanbul and advisor to the opposition party CHP, commented that “statements by the key actors of Turkish foreign policy indicate that they increasingly assert Turkey as ‘a global economic power’.”¹⁰¹⁵ In 2012, according to the IMF, Turkey’s economy was expected to be the fastest-growing in the OECD during the 2011-2017 period, with an average annual GDP growth rate of 6.7 percent.¹⁰¹⁶ It is no surprise that Turkish politicians then were more than confident. Looking back at ten years of AKP rule, then minister of the economy Çağlayan, said in early December 2012 that the world is talking about a Turkish miracle: “This shows how well Turkey’s economy was governed during the past ten years by our government. Now everywhere the Turkish success stories are being discussed.”¹⁰¹⁷ Later in December of the same year, then prime minister Erdoğan added at the Berggruen Institute on Governance in Berlin: “By 2023, we want Turkey to be one of the top ten economic areas of the world. Over the next 15 years we want to increase per capita income from $10,5000 to $25,000. That would require a growth rate of 5.2 percent.”¹⁰¹⁸ In January 2013 emerging market economist at Nomura, Peter Attard Montalto was quoted in CNBC: “Like all emerging markets, that next progression is towards taking the wealth, building the infrastructure and continuing to progress. I think Turkey is at that point.” The article where this quote appeared was entitled “Can Turkey Become ‘the China of Europe’?”¹⁰¹⁹

The accolade for economic performance is the G20. In 2016, Brazil and Turkey found themselves on ninth and 17th position according to the IMF.¹⁰²⁰ Proud members of the club.

Table 5: The G20 in 2016

| Country | GDP Mio. USD
1 | United States | 18.569.100
2 | China | 11.199.145
3 | Japan | 4.939.384
4 | Germany | 3.466.757
5 | United Kingdom | 2.618.886
6 | France | 2.465.454
7 | India | 2.263.523
8 | Italy | 1.849.970
9 | Brazil | 1.796.187
10 | Canada | 1.529.760
11 | Korea, Rep. | 1.411.246
12 | Russian Federation | 1.283.162
13 | Spain | 1.232.088
14 | Australia | 1.204.616
15 | Mexico | 1.045.998
16 | Indonesia | 932.259
17 | Turkey | 857.749
18 | Netherlands | 770.845
19 | Switzerland | 659.827
20 | Saudi Arabia | 646.438

However, is the membership in the G20 really the result of an economic miracle, an outstanding performance of the economies in the past years? Or, have Brazil and Turkey rather followed a global trend without being really spectacular? How were these emerging powers ranked before they were labeled emerging powers?

In 1975, during the military dictatorship, Brazil was already the 10th biggest economy,¹⁰²¹ as in 2000. In 1990, Brazil was as today the 9th biggest economy in the world.¹⁰²² The best position so far was in 2010/2011 being the 7th biggest economy. In the past 45 years Brazil moved between 7th and 10th biggest economy. In Turkey the picture is similar. In a book chapter published in 2012, Karlı presented the following IMF Data:

Turkey ranked as the 18th largest economy in current USD terms in 2010. ... This ranking is very much in line with Turkey’s historical trend. Turkey was the 19th largest economy in 1990; it became 17th in 1993. It entered the new century as the 18th largest economy in the year 2000.1023

In 1975 Turkey’s share of the world trade was 0.95 percent, in 2014 it was 1 percent.¹⁰²⁴

The growth performance is not outstanding either. Although Brazil’s GDP grew by 7.5 percent in 2010, this was a huge exception in the post Cold War period. Brazil had an outstanding growth in the 1970s. In 1971, 1972 and 1973 the economy grew by 11.3, 11.9 and 14 percent¹⁰²⁵ and in the whole decade by 7.8 percent.¹⁰²⁶ Compared to this, growth in the 2000s (2000-2015) with on average 2.9 percent was rather moderate and will decrease further in 2016 and 2017. Therefore Nayyar already in 2010 argued that Brazil “cannot be characterized as an engine of growth in any dimension.”¹⁰²⁷

Turkey’s economy has averaged a growth of 4.2 per cent in the 1980s, 4 percent in the 1990s and 3.7 per cent in the first decade of the 21st century. This compares with 3.4, 3.3 and 6 per cent of the group of emerging and developing countries for the same periods. The numbers for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are 1.3, 4 and 4.8 percent. This shows an over proportional growth in the 1980s, but less so in the boom years of the 2000s. Similar findings are also valid for the 2003-2010 period when the AKP governed. During those years, the Turkish economy grew at an average rate of 4.9 per cent, while the number of emerging and developing countries was 6.6, and 5.1 per cent for the crisis-ridden MENA countries. Even Central and Eastern Europe grew by 4.2 percent.¹⁰²⁸ For Turkey, Karlı therefore concluded:

Turkey has managed to attain a steady and robust level of growth in the years following its 2001 economic crisis, it has failed to produce a ‘miracle story’ reminiscent of the Asian tigers. Its growth largely followed the trends in the developing world.¹⁰²⁹

When looking not at the absolute numbers, but the per capita figures, then the picture is anyway completely different. Even after years of growth, the positions of the two “emerging” powers are still rather sobering. In 2015 Turkey was on 63rd position and Brazil only on 71st position. Whereas Turkey only was downgraded by one position from the previous year, Brazil dropped from 59th position in 2014. Turkey in both years is slightly below the world average, Brazil in 2014 slightly above and in 2015 below.¹⁰³⁰

Overall, with the exception of a few countries, such as China and South Korea, the rankings of the strongest economies have only slightly changed during the past 40 years. Forecasts especially in such volatile times are of course very difficult. However, as there has not much changed in the ranking in the past years, according to the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR), there will not change much in the coming 15 years either. In a report published in December 2015, the CEBR forecasted the strongest economies by 2030. Brazil and Turkey almost keep their positions as 8th and 18th strongest economy.¹⁰³¹

Table 6: G20 forecast 2030

| Country | GDP (bn USD)
1 | China | 34.3
2 | United States | 33
3 | India | 10.1
4 | Japan | 5
5 | Germany | 4.7
6 | United Kingdom | 4.6
7 | Korea | 3.5
8 | Brazil | 3.4
9 | France | 3.3
10 | Canada | 2.75
11 | Indonesia | 2.6
12 | Russia | 2.43
13 | Italy | 2.39
14 | Mexico | 2.39
15 | Australia | 2
16 | Saudi Arabia | 1.85
17 | Spain | 1.8
18 | Turkey | 1.6
19 | Philippines | 1.2
20 | Netherlands | 1.17

With growing economic problems, often accompanied with huge corruption allegations, political instability and large scale protests, at least since 2013 also the mood has changed dramatically among international experts. From acclaimed powerhouses, Turkey and Brazil were included into the group of the “fragile five.” Morgan Stanley in August 2013 wrote that the Brazilian real, the Indonesian rupiah, the South African rand, the Indian rupee, and the Turkish lira

have a lot to lose from the changing global landscape and, as such, we call them the ‘Fragile Five’. High inflation, weakening growth, large external deficits and in some cases exposure to the China slowdown and high dependence on fixed income inflows leave these currencies vulnerable, in our view.¹⁰³²

Now the focus quickly moved away from the opportunities to the problems. Whereas in the 2000s the mood was better than the reality, now the mood seemed worse than the reality. Still, both countries are big and important economies and attractive markets. The FDI inflow in Brazil e.g. has been stable on a very high level even during the past years despite the economic crisis. Inward FDI first boomed, increasing from 10 bn USD in 2003 to a high of 66.6 bn USD in 2011. But still in 2014 Brazil received 62.5 bn USD. With this investment, Brazil received the 6th and 7th highest FDI in the world in 2013 and 2014.1033 Even if in 2015 the FDI decreased relatively sharply to 56 bn USD, 23 percent less than in the previous year,¹⁰³⁴ it is still among the 10 highest in the world.

In Turkey, FDI inflow also increased significantly from just 1 bn USD in 2002 to a high of 22 bn USD in 2007. During the past years, the FDI inflow was relatively stable between 12 and 13 bn between 2012 and 2014. In 2015 despite rising security concerns, FDI grew to 16.5 bn USD.¹⁰³⁵

Table 7: FDI inflow in Brazil and Turkey¹⁰³⁶

| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016
Brazil | 48.5 | 66.6 | 65.3 | 64 | 62.5 | 56 | 58.7
Turkey | 9 | 16.1 | 13.3 | 12.4 | 12.1 | 16.5 | 12

5.9.3. Common problems: brothers in corruption and poor rankings

However, when speaking about the economies of both countries, there is a list of problems, some of them similar in both countries, others rather specific to just one. I will in the following concentrate on some aspects that can be witnessed in both countries. Concerning corruption, both the Brazilian and Turkish political and economic systems have been facing huge scandals and even more allegations over the past decade. It is therefore no surprise that both states do poorly in corruption rankings. After Transparency International announced its latest Corruption Perception Index in January 2016, several international outlets appeared with similar headlines. Bloomberg titled “Brazil, Turkey Among Top Decliners in Global Corruption Ranking”¹⁰³⁷, the United Press Institute titled “Brazil, Turkey rise most in 2015 Corruption Index.”¹⁰³⁸ What both referred to was the fact that Brazil slid down from 69th place in 2014 to 76th in 2015 among 168 states. Turkey only slid two positions to 66th, but has been continuing its downward trend from 53rd position in 2013. The ranking is lead by Denmark, Finland and Sweden, Germany is 10th, Qatar on 22nd and Chile on 23rd position are the best ranked Middle Eastern and South American countries.¹⁰³⁹

On Brazil, Transparency wrote: “It is no surprise that Brazil ... is this year’s biggest index decliner in the Americas.” In the section Europe and Central Asia they commented:

very worrying is the marked deterioration in countries like Hungary, FYR of Macedonia, Spain and Turkey. These are places where there was once hope for positive change. Now we are seeing corruption grow, while civil society space and democracy shrinks.¹⁰⁴⁰

Quiroga wrote in 2014 that the Brazilian elites, after China, Russia and South Korea have most assets in financial paradises with estimated 520 bn USD.¹⁰⁴¹ That is why the findings of the so-called “Panama Papers” are of no surprise either. As the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Latin America correspondent wrote in April 2016: “Brazilian politicians, entrepreneurs and celebrities were regular customers of the Panamanian offshore provider Mossack Fonseca, ... which was used as a kind of ‘offshore assembly line’, to wash bribe money from the Petrobras scandal.”¹⁰⁴² There are at least 107 letterbox companies listed in the Panama Papers founded by 57 people under investigation of Lava Jato.¹⁰⁴³

But, there is also a clear difference regarding corruption as Folha de São Paulo journalist Mello explained:

From the 2013 corruption charges in Turkey there is no politician in prison, but many journalists who reported about it and media outlets are under heavy pressure. In Brazil there is also a corruption investigation and many politicians and business people are actually in prison. And no journalists.¹⁰⁴⁴

However, as Quiroga showed, corruption is only one of several disadvantages known as the “Brazilian costs.” These are among others an

inefficient logistics, a precarious infrastructure, an inflexible and bureaucratic tax system, bureaucratic requirements of different authorities, the late entrance into renewable energy, the lack of qualified personnel, high financing costs as well as little innovation in services and future markets.¹⁰⁴⁵

An additional problem are very high interest rates in Brazil, which lower the investment possibilities of the Brazilian state in infrastructure, education and health. Banks concentrate rather on refinancing public debt than the promotion of productive investments.¹⁰⁴⁶

In Turkey the situation is better, but problems arise especially due to the ongoing wars in neighboring countries and since July 2015 regular terrorist attacks also in the major cities in Western Turkey. Additionally trade was negatively affected by bilateral problems with Russia after a Russian jet was shot down by Turkey in November 2015 and growing authoritarianism and concentration of power in the hands of the president reducing the level of predictability of political and economic decisions. Öniş and Kutlay therefore proposed that “to sustain long-term growth is to improve the institutional structure for education policies, the justice system and general infrastructure in an inclusive manner.”¹⁰⁴⁷ Since savings fall short of investments, Turkey needs foreign capital to finance its current account deficit. “This Achilles heel places certain structural limits on Turkey’s economic growth, primarily driven by inflows of foreign capital.”¹⁰⁴⁸

The problems of the Brazilian and Turkish economies are also reflected in several indexes. The Global Opportunity Index¹⁰⁴⁹, analysing 136 countries according to their attractiveness for foreign investors, ranked Turkey on 54th and Brazil on 85th position. Turkey’s ranking has been rather stable in the past years, but Brazil has an ongoing negative trend since 2010 when the country was ranked 68th.

Table 8: Global Opportunity Index: Turkey and Brazil compared:1050 1051

| Turkey1049 | Brazil1050
overall ranking | 54 | 85
Economic Fundamentals | 57 | 47
Ease of Doing Business | 63 | 92
Quality of Regulations | 43 | 70
Rule of Law | 46 | 80

Interesting with Turkey is that the categories “regulations” and “the rule of law” are both better than the overall result, which could be attributed to the Customs Union with the EU and many applied EU regulations. In Brazil the business-unfriendliness is most clearly shown in the category “Ease of Doing Business”, where the country only ranks 92nd, whereas the “Economic Fundamentals” were still evaluated rather good with a 47th position.

The Doing Business ranking of the World Bank analyzed 189 countries according to criteria such as Starting a Business, Dealing with Construction Permits, Getting Electricity, Registering Property, Getting Credit, Paying Taxes and Enforcing Contracts. In the ranking for 2016 Turkey is on 55th position, Brazil on 116th. Turkey is down four and Brazil five ranks from 2015.1052 The ranking was lead by Singapore, New Zealand and Denmark. Better ranked than Brazil are e.g. Paraguay (100) and Uruguay (92) and better than both Brazil and Turkey are e.g. Colombia (54), Russia (51) and Mexico (38).

5.9.4. Two unequal societies

Also in less strictly economic indexes, the level of development of both countries is evaluated rather poor. In the Human Development Index, which measures life expectancy, expected years of schooling, mean years of schooling and the gross national income per capita, in 2015 Turkey ranked 72nd and Brazil 75th out of 188 countries.¹⁰⁵³ With this, both countries are still in the category of “high development”, but also preceded by Argentina, Russia, Romania, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Cuba.

Despite the “high development”, Brazil still is one of the most unequal countries in the world. The situation however since the 1990s has improved significantly thanks to many social programs introduced in the 2000s. In 1990 the Gini Index, measuring inequality, whereas 0 would be totally equal and 100 totally unequal stood for Brazil at 60.5. In 2005, it improved to 56.6 and in 2012 to 52.7. The latest measure is from 2013 where it slightly declined to 52.9. In this time, the share of wealth by the poorest 20 percent improved from 2.3 to 3.3. However, with this result, Brazil is still among the 10 most unequal countries in the world, the old label “Belindia”, contrasts between Belgium and India, still largely apply. This is also a bad score for the unequal South America, Argentina in 2013 had a score of 42.3.

Turkey is also a rather unequal country, but the numbers are significantly better than in Brazil. In 2005, the Gini index stood at 41.7, improved to 38.8 in 2010 to rise again to 40.2 in 2012. There are no numbers available for the 1990s. The share of the lowest 20 percent was in 2012 5.8 percent of the wealth.

For economic expert Ferracioli, the inequality is one of the major differences between the two countries:

The inequality in Brazil is much bigger than in Turkey. Brazil is one of the most unequal countries in the world. Argentina performs a lot better than Brazil, also their education is much better. In short, Brazil is poorer, less educated and much more unequal than Turkey. Our Gini coefficient improved, but with this economic crisis it will get worse again.¹⁰⁵⁴

5.9.5. The bilateral economic and trade relations

From the beginning of the intensification of bilateral relations, the potential of economic and trade relations was an important issue. When then Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim in March 2004 visited Ankara, he said¹⁰⁵⁵:

Brazil-Turkey relations have no limits, including science and technology, aerospace industry, defense matters, trade and interparliamentary missions, contacts between financial authorities and institutions such as between the Istanbul and São Paulo stock exchanges with great potential for increasing mutual awareness and leading to more dynamic and fruitful relations.¹⁰⁵⁶

Half a year later, in October 2004, the first “Joint Economic Council” convened in Brasilia with the participation of Turkish and Brazilian bureaucrats. When then Turkish foreign minister Gül visited Brasilia in January 2006, the Joint Business Council was founded on 20 January with an agreement between the Brazilian FIESP (Federation of the Industries of the State of São Paulo) and the Turkish DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey).¹⁰⁵⁷ Through this, bilateral mechanisms to intensify trade were founded. However, the workings of these mechanisms did not live up to the expectations. After the first meeting in January 2006, a second meeting took place in 2010 in Ankara. However, the third meeting, which will take place in Brazil is now scheduled for late 2016,1058 clearly delayed by some years.

However, these were years of initial activity and first contacts and agreements. Among the first concrete bilateral cooperation projects was an agreement of the oil companies TPAO and Petrobras concerning test drillings in the Black Sea. A first agreement was already signed in 2006, according to which Petrobras would pay the drilling costs. If oil was found, the revenues would have been shared 50:50 between the partners. Because of a missing platform, the starting date for drillings was set to 2009.1059 However, the trial drillings were not successful and the cooperation ended.

In the year of the most intensive diplomatic relations, in 2010, the Turkish Ministry of the Economy started selecting for a two-year period a set of so-called target and preferential countries. The ‘target countries’ are defined as those “carrying for our export the biggest potential.” The preferential countries in contrast are defined as countries where the market entrance should be intensified.¹⁰⁶⁰ Brazil had been selected as a ‘target country’ in all the three initial periods (2010/11, 2012/13 and 2014/15).¹⁰⁶¹ For those countries, special assistance is provided to participate in fairs and a budget is allocated to facilitate business trips. “Brazil was among those countries, because there were these very good political relations when the decision was made. There was this momentum.”¹⁰⁶²

In all the three periods, Brazil had been the only target country in Latin America. Countries like Argentina and Mexico were chosen as preferential countries. However, e.g. for the period of 2014/15, the statistics for the first nine months show a sharp decrease of Turkish exports from 614 million USD to 369 million USD, which was only 0.3 percent of Turkish exports to these 17 countries.¹⁰⁶³ Brazil was only on 15th position out of the 17 countries and had the second sharpest decline of 40 percent, the sharpest was witnessed in Russia with 40.1 percent and on third position the Ukraine with a minus of 36.7 percent. Exports on average to these 17 countries decreased by 14 percent. This runs counter to the overall idea of target country to which export should be especially intensified. As a result of this disappointing trend, Brazil in 2015 was no longer included to the list of target countries, but downgraded to preferential country. For Turkish trade attaché in São Paulo Sannev, one reason for these poor results is the lack of seriousness among many business people. “Unfortunately many of them use the participation in fairs more for sponsored tourism in Brazil than for real business.”¹⁰⁶⁴ Still Turkish companies participate in about five to six fairs, not including tourism. These are on issues like marble (in the city of Vitoria), nutrition, furniture, automotive, air conditioning/cooling and textile (in the city of Blumenau).¹⁰⁶⁵

Brazil did not have such a mechanism until recently. But, since July 2015, Turkey is one of the 32 “preferential markets” of the Brazilian government, which then announced the “National Export Plan” (Plano Nacional de Exportações, PNE).¹⁰⁶⁶ For experts at CAMEX, this is an important step, because “Turkey is extremely important also for Central Asia and the Middle East.”¹⁰⁶⁷

As Table 9 shows, exports and imports of both countries since the end of the Cold War increased significantly. In Turkey, exports increased more than 11 times, imports more than 9 times. In Brazil, exports rose more than 6 times and imports more than 8 times. However, the table also shows that the growth came to a preliminary end in 2011/2012. Especially 2015 has witnessed a contraction of exports and imports in both countries of between 9 and 25 percent, figures resembling the financial crisis year 2009.

Table 9: Turkey and Brazil: Foreign trade by selected years since the end of the Cold War (1989-2015)¹⁰⁶⁸

Year | Turkey |  | Brazil |  | Turkey |  | Brazil |
| Export | change % | Export | change % | Import | change % | Import | change %
1989 | 11 624 692 |  | 34.382.619.710 |  | 15 792 143 | 10,2 | 18.263.432.738 |
1990 | 12 959 288 | 11,5 | 31.413.756.040 | -8,36 | 22 302 126 | 41,2 | 20.661.362.039 | 13,13
1995 | 21 637 041 | 19,5 | 46.506.282.414 | 6,8 | 35 709 011 | 53,5 | 49.971.896.207 | 51,07
2000 | 27 774 906 | 4,5 | 55.118.919.865 | 14,8 | 54 502 821 | 34 | 55.850.663.138 | 13,28
2005 | 73 476 408 | 16,3 | 118.529.184.899 | 22,6 | 116 774 151 | 19,7 | 73.600.375.672 | 17,13
2006 | 85 534 676 | 16,4 | 137.807.469.531 | 16,26 | 139 576 174 | 19,5 | 91.350.840.805 | 24,12
2007 | 107 271 750 | 25,4 | 160.649.072.830 | 16,58 | 170 062 715 | 21,8 | 120.617.446.250 | 32,04
2008 | 132 027 196 | 23,1 | 197.942.442.909 | 23,21 | 201 963 574 | 18,8 | 172.984.767.614 | 43,42
2009 | 102 142 613 | -22,6 | 152.994.742.805 | -22,71 | 140 928 421 | -30,2 | 127.722.342.988 | -26,17
2010 | 113 883 219 | 11,5 | 201.915.285.335 | 31,98 | 185 544 332 | 31,7 | 181.768.427.438 | 42,32
2011 | 134 906 869 | 18,5 | 256.039.574.768 | 26,81 | 240 841 676 | 29,8 | 226.246.755.801 | 24,47
2012 | 152 461 737 | 13 | 242.578.013.546 | -5,26 | 236 545 141 | -1,8 | 223.183.476.643 | -1,35
2013 | 151 802 637 | -0,4 | 242.033.574.720 | -0,22 | 251 661 250 | 6,4 | 239.747.515.987 | 7,42
2014 | 157 610 158 | 3,8 | 225.100.884.831 | -7 | 242 177 117 | -3,8 | 229.154.462.583 | -4,42
2015 | 143 882 632 | -8,7 | 191.134.324.584 | -15,09 | 207 199 144 | -14,4 | 171.449.050.909 | -25,18
Year | Export Turkey |  | Export Brazil |  | Import Turkey |  | Import Brazil |

The same trend, even with clearer results can be seen in the bilateral trade relations.

Table 10: Turkey-Brazil trade relations (in 000USD)¹⁰⁶⁹ 1070

Year | Export | Import | Volume
1996 | 43,100 | 291,700 | 334,800
1999 | 33,600 | 226,100 | 259,700
20001069 | 41,200 | 301,200 | 342,400
2001 | 89,818 | 212,121 | 301,939
2002 | 48,979 | 236,091 | 285,070
2003 | 50,165 | 401,826 | 451,992
2004 | 69,355 | 566,293 | 635,648
2005 | 103,458 | 798,576 | 902,034
2006 | 121,882 | 934,782 | 1,056,664
2007 | 229,914 | 1,172,669 | 1,402,583
2008 | 318,027 | 1,423,868 | 1,741,895
2009 | 388,244 | 1,105,890 | 1,494,134
2010 | 614,551 | 1,347,525 | 1,962,076
2011 | 883,471 | 2,074,354 | 2,957,825
2012 | 1,002,759 | 1,770,094 | 2,770,094
2013 | 936,096 | 1,408,806 | 2,344,902
2014 | 794,186 | 1,728,745 | 2,522,932
2015 | 458,682 | 1,793,654 | 2,252,336
20161070 | 334 Mio | 1,446,000 | 1,78 Mrd.

1071

The table on bilateral relations shows on the one hand a huge increase of the trade volume from 2000 until 2015 of more than 8 times. But on the other hand it also shows that the peak for the time being was in 2011 with almost three bn USD. Since then, the trade volume almost lost 25 percent. This is disappointing, because the expectations were towards continuing growth. In 2012 then Turkish ambassador in Brazil Erçin said: “We are aiming with our fantastic political relations to first raise the trade volume to 10 billion USD and then to even go beyond that.”¹⁰⁷²

However, not only has this not materialized, the forecast for the near future does not predict an improvement either. Most analysts do not expect a recovery of the Brazilian situation until at least 2018, which could further reduce imports, also from Turkey. For some experts, such as João Daniel, it may even take longer: “They already said two years ago that the crisis would last two years. It will take another four to five years to reach the pre-crisis level.”¹⁰⁷³

Table 11: Total Trade Volume Brazil Turkey (1000USD)¹⁰⁷⁴

Percentage Growth

| Yearly | Last 10 Years
2015 | -10.7 | 149.7
2014 | 7.5 | 297.0
2013 | -15.4 | 419.1
2012 | -6.3 | 872.7
2011 | 50.7 | 879.6
2010 | 31.3 | 470.1
2009 | -14.2 |
2008 | 24.2 |
2007 | 32.7 |
2006 | 17.1 |
2005 | 41.9 |
2004 | 40.6 |
2003 | 58.6 |
2002 | -5.6 |
2001 | -12.3 |

With this low trade level, Turkey in 2014 was only Brazil’s 37th export destination and on 46th position concerning imports. This amounts to mere 0.6 percent of exports and 0.4 percent of imports. The two countries are concerning trade still reciprocally insignificant.

The Brazilian exports to Turkey are mainly basic products (commodities), 61.8 percent in 2014. Manufactured goods were 28.4 percent (mechanic machines and plastics) and semi-manufactured 9.6 percent. In contrast, imports to Brazil from Turkey were to 92.6 percent manufactured, basic products were 7.1 percent and semi-manufactured 0.4 percent. The three highest imports from Brazil in 2014 were metallic ores (383,49 Mio. USD), oil seeds and oleaginous fruit (301,65) and iron and steel (157,97), whereas the three biggest Turkish exports to Brazil were iron and steel (224,47 Mio USD), vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock (95,59) and man-made fibres (59,98).

In 2014, Turkey’s overall imports were only to 1.096 percent from Brazil. However, there are some items, where Brazil’s share in Turkey’s imports is significant:

Iron ore and concentrates, not agglomerated: | 86.7 %
Chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate: | 44.3 %
Semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel, |
less than 0.25% of carbon: | 40.0 %
Tobacco: | 31.6 %
Soy beans: | 26.9 %
Oil-cake and other solid residues (except dregs), |
resulting from the extraction of soya beans: | 21.4 %
Iron ore agglomerated: | 8.5 %
Cotton: | 3.5 %

Table 12: Brazil’s imports from Turkey Brazil’s exports to Turkey (1000USD)¹⁰⁷⁵

Percentage Growth

| Yearly | Last 10 Years |  | Yearly | Last 10 Years
2015 | - 42.3 | 343.4 |  | 3.8 | 124.6
2014 | -15.3 | 1045.6 |  | 22.7 | 205.3
2013 | - 6.5 | 1769 |  | -20.4 | 250.6
2012 | 13.5 | 1947.4 |  | - 14.7 | 649.8
2011 | 43.8 | 883.6 |  | 53.9 | 877.9
2010 | 58.3 | 1374.5 |  | 21.8 | 345.5
2009 | 22.1 |  |  | -22.3 |
2008 | 38.3 |  |  | 21.4 |
2007 | 88.6 |  |  | 25.4 |
2006 | 17.8 |  |  | 17.1 |
2005 | 49.2 |  |  | 41 |
2004 | 38.3 |  |  | 40.9 |
2003 | 2.4 |  |  | 70.2 |
2002 | -45.5 |  |  | 11.3 |
2001 | 115.5 |  |  | -29.9 |

For the Brazilian Chamber of External Trade, CAMEX, the overall global economic development was the main reason for the decreasing trade volume:

The decrease of trade activity has nothing special to do with Turkey, but with the economic problems in Brazil and the global slow-down of the economy. Also the partly strong Brazilian currency made it more expensive to export.¹⁰⁷⁶

Luiz Alberto gave a concrete example of how the currency volatility hit bilateral trade.

The Brazilian shoe company Arezzo, which already exports to Turkey, is now thinking about an investment in Bursa, because of the high dollar. There is already a preliminary agreement between Curitiba and Bursa, which is not yet on the level of a city partnership, but which could be a first step towards such a more solid partnership.¹⁰⁷⁷

DEIK experts on Brazil explained the rise and fall of Turkish exports to Brazil:

Turkey is part of the European economic system with strong links to the Middle East and Central Asia. The other markets are commodity driven and depend a lot on the oil price. With rising oil prices also Turkish exports to these countries, including Brazil, rose. This was in a time when there were dire problems in Europe, which made these for Turkey newer markets in Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific even more attractive. However, now the sinking oil price additionally to all other economic problems has been decreasing the demand from the Brazilian side as a result of a declining purchasing power. That is a global trend, which affects many of the emerging markets. Until 2020 the emerging markets will go slowly. This success story for the time being is over.¹⁰⁷⁸

However, for DEIK’s Hocaoğlu, there are also specific problems with the Brazilian experience of Turkish companies responsible for the downward trend in bilateral trade relations:

There were many negative examples of Turkish exporters and investors. When both countries were in the UNSC in 2010 the relations were very close, there were many visits and a close coordination. This also lead to more business people trying their luck in Brazil. But because of these negative experiences, the intensity decreased accordingly.¹⁰⁷⁹

CAMEX could name only few problems indicated by the Brazilian side:

It is often difficult to get the right information about Turkey, be it about companies or legislation. Often the sites are only in Turkish or do not contain the needed information. Then we try to get it via the embassy in Ankara. In the past years there were very few complaints. We cannot say that Turkey causes many problems for Brazilian exporters.¹⁰⁸⁰

Negative examples DEIK referred to, have mostly to do with high customs, long waiting times at ports and high and often changing taxes. “Therefore we do not suggest our Turkish exporters Brazil as a first choice, but divert them to more liberal markets in Latin America such as Chile and Mexico.”¹⁰⁸¹ There are also sectoral complaints like iron and steel exporters complain about the high degree of monopolization in Brazil. “We mention these problems at every bilateral meeting.”¹⁰⁸²

Paulo Ferracioli agreed that

the situation at our ports is very bad and the bureaucracy is huge and complicated. But, there is a Trade Facilitation Agreement, which will lead to positive changes by 2018. And, the legal situation is good. The justice system is slow, but is working also for foreign companies, which are treated as Brazilians.¹⁰⁸³

For Ferracioli, who has participated in many international trade negotiations and is an advisor to FIESP, the general criticism that Brazil is a very closed market is not valid.

Compared with other countries, Brazil is actually not so closed. It is certainly more open than China. Brazil has a strong concentration on commodities and agriculture. Therefore Brazil wants an opening of markets for agricultural products. That is one of the most important points in the trade negotiations between the EU and Mercosul. The EU does not want to agree on that. There is a blame-game going on. For the other, the counterpart is always protectionist.¹⁰⁸⁴

For Ferracioli, investments outside of infrastructure are easily possible and in particular Chinese and Spanish companies are active in Brazil.¹⁰⁸⁵ That much needed investments in infrastructure are still almost impossible, was confirmed by the Brazilian ambassador in Ankara, Salgado:

I visited the industrial city of Gaziantep to talk about the possibility of investments in the construction sector and to participate in public tenders. But, I have to confess that we also have to do our home work. It is difficult for foreign companies, because the law privileges local companies. We need to change this to have a fairer competition. But this would be a good potential for Turkish companies, which are good, they deliver and have many successful projects. When president Rousseff was in Ankara, she said she wanted an airport like Esenboğa also in Brazil.¹⁰⁸⁶

Luiz Alberto, Turkey’s young honorary consul in the Southern Brazilian city of Curitiba, gave an example of how high taxes in the textile sector made Turkish exports impossible.

I tried to have Sarar [a premium price segment Turkish fashion brand] open a store in Curitiba and talked to their CEO. There was interest, but when we made the business plan, we saw that the tax is too high to enter into the Brazilian market.¹⁰⁸⁷

Ferracioli confirmed the situation for the textile sector.

In the textile sector, taxes are very high, because of the huge production and low prices in countries like China and Bangladesh. However, the textile sector is rather an exception, usually Brazil does not apply higher taxes than other countries.¹⁰⁸⁸

For the Turkish trade attaché in São Paulo, another problem for Turkish exports is that they are not well known brands.

That is true for Sarar and other fashion companies. An Italian suit is sold for 3000 USD, a Turkish one maybe with a comparable quality for only 300 USD. Another example is marble. At a fair in Brazil, companies from Italy and Turkey participated with a similar portfolio. The Italians sold for 45 USD per square meter. The Turkish company started with 40USD, then there is bargaining, it goes down to 25 and in the end it sold for 15USD and he is even happy to have made the deal. But this reduces the profit margin enormously. This also shows that we are still a developing country.¹⁰⁸⁹

5.9.6. Brazilian investments in Turkey

As the trade volume, also the level of investments of Turkish companies in Brazil and Brazilian companies in Turkey remains little. The biggest three Brazilian investments are Votorantim (cement), Metalfrio (cooling/heating) and Cutrale (beverages).¹⁰⁹⁰ The biggest Turkish investment in Brazil is Sabancı Holding’s Kordsa (nylon and polyester yarn, tire cord fabric).

The Trade Promotion Section of the Brazilian Consulate in Istanbul prepared a list of companies with Brazilian capital and distributors of Brazilian products in Turkey. The total number of companies in 2015 was 16. Most, four, were in the footwear sector, all distributors of Brazilian shoe companies such as Havaianas, Dupe, Boaonda, Grendene, Arezzo and Shutz. The second most companies were in the beverages sector with three companies, among them the third biggest investment Cutrale, which formed a joined venture under the name Anadolu Etap. The two other actors in this sector are distributors of the famous Brazilian soft drink Guarana and of the coffee brand Pilão.¹⁰⁹¹ The remaining eight sectors are represented by one company each: automotive, chemical products, construction, cooling/heating, defense/military, electricity/energy, food and tableware.¹⁰⁹²

The biggest investment is the cement holding Votorantim with a total investment of 600 Mio. USD.¹⁰⁹³ Votorantim is the world’s eighth biggest cement producer and entered the Turkish market in 2012. It then bought the Portuguese company Cimpor, which in 2009 bought the Turkish company Yibitaş, which was founded already in 1973.1094 The investment happened via a tender. At first there were two Brazilian companies among the competitors, the other being Camargo Correa. Because of Brazilian law, which allows only one Brazilian company to participate in the same tender abroad, the two companies agreed among themselves where which company would compete.¹⁰⁹⁵ So Votorantim ran for the tender in Turkey and won. The total employees in Turkey are 780, active at four sites at Hasanoğlan (East of Ankara), Yozgat, Çorum and Sivas, and two cement millings in Nevşehir and Samsun. According to the Turkey website, the installed production capacity is three million tons of cement per year.¹⁰⁹⁶ With this, it covers roughly five percent of Turkey’s concrete demand.¹⁰⁹⁷ One of the major construction projects, where Votorantim concrete is used, is the fast train connection between the cities of Kırıkkale and Sivas¹⁰⁹⁸ in Northeastern Anatolia. Therefore, Votorantim decided in 2015 to increase the capacity of the Sivas plant from 0,6 million tons cement to 1,8 million tons through an additional investment of 140 Million Euros. Votorantim’s Turkey CEO Tüzün commented on this expansion, which is planned to operate in 2017: “This investment shows the trust of the company towards Turkey. Votorantim sees a big potential in the construction sector in Turkey.”¹⁰⁹⁹

The second biggest investment is Metalfrio, a producer of refrigerators and freezers. The plant is based in the Aegean town of Manisa, 40km East of Izmir. The initial investment was 120 million USD in 2005. Production started in 2007 with a capacity of 160,000 refrigerators yearly. In 2008, Metalfrio bought 71 percent of the company shares of Şenocak Holding, an Izmir based producer of refrigerators, which sold in Turkey under the name Şenocak and exported under the name Klimasan. Metalfrio paid almost 37 million Euros.¹¹⁰⁰ The Şenocak/Klimasan construction sites in Izmir were closed and moved to the site in Manisa. In 2011 Metalfrio bought the remaining 29 percent shares and became the only owner of Şenocak/Klimasan. Today the annual construction capacity is 450,000 refrigerators. There are more than 1000 employees.¹¹⁰¹

The third biggest investment is the Brazilian Cutrale Group, one of the world’s biggest fruit juice producers. Together with Anadolu Group and Özgörkey Holding, Cutrale established the joint venture Anadolu Etap in late 2009 and started with the plantation of fruit trees in 2010. Currently Anadolu Etap has five fruit farms and two plants (Denizli and Mersin) in Turkey from the Northern Aegean to Southeastern Anatolia (Şanlıurfa). Until 2011 the investment reached an amount of 90 million USD.¹¹⁰² Since 2013 it also has been selling fresh fruit. In 2015 the amount of trees reached 3.5 million, the goal of the company is to reach 10 million trees by 2020. Then the investments will total 500 million USD.¹¹⁰³ In 2014 the company processed 150.000 tons of fruit, which makes it the biggest of its kind in Turkey.¹¹⁰⁴

5.9.7. Turkish investments in Brazil

Similar to their Brazilian colleagues, also the Turkish consulate in São Paulo generated a list of Turkish investors in Brazil. This is created by the commercial section, which has been established in São Paulo together with the consulate in 2009. Caner Sannev is the current commercial attaché. He has been in São Paulo for 1.5 years and will stay until 2019. The latest list is from May 2016. It is not grouped into sectors or distinguishes between production companies and distributors. Even if the list prepared by the commercial attaché is similarly long (5 pages) as the list of Brazilian companies in Turkey and the number of investments is more with 26, there is only one bigger investment.

In recent years a good portion of Turkish companies or shops also had to close down. As Sannev explained, one such investment was the company Aktaş do Brasil, which produced springs for commercial and heavy vehicles and also imported from Turkey. “This is actually a healthy company and a big player in Turkey, but in Brazil their business did not work out.”¹¹⁰⁵ Another example is Güneş Consulting in Curitiba, which closed down its activities in 2014. For the founder Adrien Anıl Güneş who tried to specialize in helping Turkish companies enter the Brazilian market, “the rising currency exchange rates and political decisions made it impossible for small business to import.” For Güneş the interest towards Brazil has been declining, because of the political situation and “the corruption files, which come to light every day. Companies are looking for ways to relocate their business, e.g. to Mexico.”¹¹⁰⁶ According to Sannev, some Turkish exporters had hopes in circumventing direct exports to Brazil via more liberal Latin American countries, e.g. Chile, with which Turkey signed a Free Trade Agreement. However, “that does not really help for trade with Brazil, because Chile is not part of Mercosul and then the same tax and regulations apply as if exporting from Turkey.”¹¹⁰⁷

Most of the Turkish businesses in Brazil are small and more on the shop/store level for import-export. Many of these stores are run by Turks, usually men, who are in Brazil for personal reasons, a relationship or marriage with a Brazilian, and did not come primarily for business activities. For Sannev, therefore, “they often do not know the market and because of that end up with the wrong partners.” This can also happen to bigger companies such as in the case of Biota, a producer of shampoos and hair care products. “Actually a very good company, modern production and good image, but in Brazil they had many problems and lost lots of money because of wrong local partners.” 1108 For the first time on the list in 2016 were three restaurants, all based in São Paulo, which were still missing in the 2014 list.

The by far biggest Turkish investment in Brazil is Kordsa, a subsidiary of Sabancı Holding, one of Turkey’s biggest holdings. Kordsa manufactures “industrial nylon and polyester yarn, tire cord fabric and single end cord.”¹¹⁰⁹ Sabancı Holding has been active in South America since 1999 with two plants, one in Brazil (Camaçari near Salvador) and one in Argentina (Berezatagui, near Buenos Aires), then under the name DuSA, a cooperation with Dupont. In May 2005 Sabancı bought the “Companhia Bahiana de Fibras” (COBAFI) for 19 million USD.¹¹¹⁰ At the acquisition, COBAFI had 330 employees and produced 18 kilo tons of yarn. The COBAFI plant was built in 1978 in Camaçari and had been producing nylon and polyester since the 1980s. In the 1990s it started producing for DuSA. After the acquisition, the merged plant was renamed Kordsa Global. Since 2005 there is one single administration.¹¹¹¹

Arzu Ongün, responsible for South America at Kordsa Global explained that “this was a time when South America was booming. We then also invested in Argentina, but ended our activities there in 2014.”¹¹¹² The plant in Brazil is by no means the only one abroad. In total Kordsa produces in eight different sites in seven countries. The headquarters are in Turkey, other production sites are in Brazil, Germany, Thailand, Egypt, USA and two production sites in Indonesia. The total employees are 3745, with sub-employers 4073. The Brazil plant has 425 employees.¹¹¹³ At all plants there are also Turkish employees sent from the headquarters, to control the important parts of the production process and finances.¹¹¹⁴ Additional to constantly based Turkish staff, there are many and regular visits from Turkey. According to França

there are visitors from Turkey every month, not only from the management, but also engineers, technicians or certain specialists. I travel every year to Turkey for the annual meeting at the headquarters with a delegation.¹¹¹⁵

Luiz Carlos França Duarte, vice-director, who has been with Kordsa Brasil since 2010, explained the uniqueness of the strategy: “Our competitors, mainly from China and Korea, usually have one single huge plant and from there deliver globally. Our strategy is different. We have plants in seven countries, in total our volume is the biggest.”¹¹¹⁶ For Hüseyin Ateş, production director, who arrived in Camaçari in late 2015 and will stay at least three, at most five years, Kordsa is with this

strategy within the Sabancı Group exceptional. This is also unique for the whole Turkish industry. It has a global approach. We are the only Turkish company, which produces on four continents. Many of our leading employees are foreigners. This network can also be important for Sabancı for other operations in the future. If Sabancı Holding wants to introduce a product on a global scale, then there is already the wide-spread presence and the network in many countries with a wide range.¹¹¹⁷

The plant in Camaçari produces currently roughly 18 kilo tons of nylon and polyester, which means the production has not increased since 2005. The Brazilian market is around 21 to 24 kilotons, the rest of South America is not much more. Therefore Kordsa’s production remains to about 90 percent in the Brazilian market. The remaining 10 percent are exported to Venezuela, Chile and Argentina. “Export to countries, which do not have a tax agreement with Mercosul, is almost impossible because of the current cost structure (energy, labour, very high import tax, unnecessary and expensive sea shipment network).”¹¹¹⁸ The biggest purchaser is Pirelli, which has plants in Venezuela and three in Brazil, of which one is also in Bahia. Besides Pirelli, Kordsa Brasil also delivers to Bridgestone and Goodyear, which are also present in Camaçari.

During a time of economic crisis, Kordsa is little to not at all affected as França explained: “Our peculiar situation is that during the Brazilian crisis two competitors had to close down. That is why our position was even strengthened, we work at full potential and can sell all, we are even looking to increase production.”¹¹¹⁹

Kordsa Brasil is by law a Brazilian company and from a legal perspective not different from other Brazilian companies. The rules and regulations, tax and tariffs, workers’ laws are all the same. For França, the administrative-bureaucratic problems are manageable:

All countries have complex laws and regulations and their own specific peculiarities. Therefore it is essential to know the local laws well. Brazilian unions are strong, so you need to have a good relation with them. In Indonesia e.g. you cannot fire a person, Brazil is more flexible if you maintain good relations. The relationship is essential.¹¹²⁰

Both França and Ateş said that the cultural differences are little, similarities prevail. However, there are differences in the work ethics and productivity, as Ateş explained:

The productivity is lower because of laws that grant the workers more time off and leisure, but there is also a cultural difference that Brazilians work to live and not live to work. If there is enough money to get along, there is little incentive to do more. Parties, festivals, carnival, birthdays are very important and last long. The productivity is highest in Turkey. That has also to do with the prestige that this is the mother plant, that it is a Turkish company, that some regard as theirs. Additionally our efficiency also depends on the technology and machine park in use. Some of our equipment is 38 years old. Their performance is lower and we are replacing them continuously, but new machines are very expensive.¹¹²¹

For Ongün the major difficulty in Brazil for foreign investors is “Tax! Incomprehensible complicated and often changing tax laws. Also labour costs are very high in Brazil, you pay twice the amount of the salary.”¹¹²² Therefore, even if according to DEIK, “Kordsa is satisfied with its business in Brazil”¹¹²³, Ongün’s answer to the question whether there are ideas to broaden the investment in Brazil is: “No.”¹¹²⁴ Kordsa Global is overall positive about 2016. However, its CEO Cenk Alper said in an interview in late March 2016 that “the European and the American markets are going fine, besides Brazil.”¹¹²⁵

At the Camaçari Industrial Complex, which has been operating since 1978 and hosts over 90 chemical and petrochemical companies, there is with Peroxy Bahia a second Turkish company, which however, is omitted by the lists of the Turkish Consulate. The construction of the plant began already in 2006. However, it took until 2011 to finally inaugurate it. Peroxy Bahia undertook an investment of 100 mio. RS (then roughly 60 million USD).¹¹²⁶ Currently there are 60 employees, the plant has a capacity of 40,000 tons annually of hydrogen peroxide.¹¹²⁷

With Kordsa alone, but even more so together with Peroxy, Bahia is the Brazilian state with the by far highest Turkish investments. This is surprising, taking into account that Bahia is among the poorer Brazilian federal states, its per capita GDP is only the 19th of 26 states (and the Federal District).¹¹²⁸ It is not a state with many Turkish citizens either, which are heavily concentrated in São Paulo and less so in Rio de Janeiro. However, as statistics prepared by the Turkish honorary consul in Salvador, Espinoza, show, 52 companies from Bahia in 2015 exported to Turkey and 29 companies imported, among them Kordsa.¹¹²⁹ “Bahia wants to sell and buy and not only dried fruit,” commented Espinoza.

Of course we have here excellent fruit, especially mango, ananas and grape. Besides this there is high quality sugar and chocolate. But there are more opportunities in Bahia. We had been debating here two more concrete projects with business delegations from Turkey. One was involving mineral water, there is very good water in Bahia and the other is a project on sun-flower oil. There should be more investments, and also from Turkey. But the current economic crisis and the huge corruption are deterrent for foreign investors.¹¹³⁰

That is why so far none of the projects could be realized.

However, there is still prospect for bigger investments in Brazil. Important would be to get the foot in the door, as DEIK underlined:

If a big tender in the construction sector could be won, then others could follow. It is absolutely crucial to get into the market. There are also possibilities in social housing projects like ‘Minha casa minha vida’ where Turkish TOKI [state social housing agency] already was negotiating, but then it was not followed through. The Brazilians needed to make a political-strategic decision that they want to do a project with a Turkish partner. Then the necessary procedural steps could be done. Without this fundamental political decision, it is difficult.¹¹³¹

5.9.8. Tourism

Tourism plays very different roles for the economies of the two countries. Turkey was the sixth most visited country in the world (2014), Brazil was only on 43rd position.

Table 13: Tourist figures for Brazil and Turkey

Year | Number of foreign tourists in Brazil | Number of foreign tourists in Turkey
1995 | 1,991,000 | 7,083,000
2000 | 5,313,463 | 8,000,000
2001 | 4,772,575 | 10,400,000
2002 | 3,784,898 | 12,800,000
2003 | 4,132,847 | 13,300,000
2004 | 4,793,703 | 16,800,000
2005 | 5,358,170 | 21,200,000
2006 | 5,017,251 | 18,500,000
2007 | 5,025,834 | 23,340,911
2008 | 5,050,099 | 26,336,677
2009 | 4,802,217 | 27,077,114
2010 | 5,161,379 | 28,632,204
2011 | 5,433,354 | 31,456,076
2012 | 5,676,843 | 31,785,780
2013 | 5,813,342 | 39,724,912
2014 | 6,429,8521031 | 41,263,670
2015 | 6,305,8381032 | 36,244,632
2016 | 6,6 | 25,35

1132 1133

Tourism in Brazil has been developing from a very low level. In 1970 there were less than 250,000 foreigners visiting. By the end of the military dictatorship in 1984 this number increased to almost 1.6 million. In the 1990s there was an up and down from a low of just above one million (1990) to a high of 5.1 million in 1999. In the 2000s the figures are more stable but it lasted until 2009 to have a steady growth.¹¹³⁴ In 2014, the year of the World Cup, Brazil for the first time had more than 6 Million foreign visitors,¹¹³⁵ a number Turkey surpassed already in the mid-1990s. Only the city of Antalya had 11.5 million visitors in 2014.1136 In Latin America, Mexico is by far the most visited country with more than 29 million foreign tourists.¹¹³⁷

Turkey is compared to other Mediterranean countries a rather latecomer concerning mass tourism. In 1970, 724,000 foreign visitors came to Turkey, by 1975, this number roughly doubled to just over 1.5 million. Ten years later it was only slightly above 2 million. However, in the 2000s a boom started. Tourist figures have increased from roughly 10 million foreign visitors in 2000 to more than 40 million in 2014. In 2015 a decrease was witnessed to some 36 million, the forecasts for 2016 are due to the bilateral crisis with Russia, terrorist attacks and the failed coup attempt significantly below this number. In the first six months of 2016 not even 11 million foreign tourists visited Turkey, by August these were 17.4 million.¹¹³⁸ By the end of the year this will reach a number between 22 and 27 million.

For both countries, tourists from the other country are not a big factor. However, the number of Brazilian tourists to Turkey increased more than 10 times since the early 2000s and reached in 2013 for the first and so far only time more than 100,000, which represented that year almost three percent of foreign tourists in Turkey. Still in 2015, 85,000 Brazilian tourists represented 2.35 percent of foreign tourists in Turkey. The other way around the numbers are much more modest and do not show any sign of increase. Unfortunately, there is a lot less data available, the highest number of Turkish tourists to Brazil was in 2010 with 4,765, in 2013 there were only 1,862 and for 2014 and 2015 there are no numbers published, “because the Turkish authorities say the number is too little to measure.”¹¹³⁹

Table 14: Tourism Figures between Brazil and Turkey¹¹⁴⁰

| Brazilian Citizens to Turkey | Turkish Citizens to Brazil
2015 | 85,473 | Not available
2014 | 91,627 | Not available
2013 | 113,433 | 1862
2012 | 88,903 | 1841
2011 | 89,442 | 2810
2010 | 65,246 | 4765
2009 | 52809 |
2008 | 43089 |
2007 | 32412 |
2006 | 23214 |
2005 | 20146 |
2004 | 9737 |
2003 | 7194 |
2002 | 8212 |
2001 | 10587 |
2000 | 11277 |
1999 | 6837 |
1998 | 18129 |
1997 | 18193 |
1996 | 16626507 |

1141

Turkey’s attractiveness for Brazilian tourists was pushed by the popular soap opera “Salve Jorge”, which was broadcasted on Globo TV from October 2012 to May 2013 in 179 episodes every evening at 9pm.¹¹⁴² The series, written by famous Brazilian producer Gloria Perez, was set besides Brazil in Istanbul and Cappadocia with beautiful pictures of both sites. Brazil’s honorary consul in Izmir, Ali Tamer Bozoklar, commented that “if I had known from the Salve Jorge soap opera before the production started, I would have asked them to move at least one episode to Izmir. The effect on tourism is enormous.”¹¹⁴³

The increase in Brazilian tourists to Cappadocia even led to the appointment of an honorary consul for the region. Brazilian ambassador Salgado explained: “In May 2013 I arrived in Turkey, this was shortly after a balloon crashed and three Brazilians died. Mr. Tosun was very helpful then with logistics, hospitals etc., he then was only suggested but soon received the exequatur.”¹¹⁴⁴ Ömer Tosun, who runs a hotel in the heart of Cappadocia where already before many Brazilian tourists stayed, was appointed in September 2013. He is based in the city, or better, village of Uçhisar. It is otherwise rather unusual that honorary consuls are based in places with around 4000 inhabitants.¹¹⁴⁵ Laila Winther from the Brazilian Consulate in Istanbul confirmed the “Salve Jorge-effect” and added that “we do not have anything similar in Turkey, we needed a Turkish TV series based in Brazil.”¹¹⁴⁶

Facilitated was this tourism increase also through direct flights by Turkish Airlines between Istanbul and São Paulo, which started in 2009 via Dakar and was upgraded to non-stop in 2010. According to DEIK this flight is one of the biggest losses among Turkish Airlines’ destinations.

For Turkish Airlines, Latin America is a difficult market, because it is easier to get people from a Western European hub to Brazil, we are a bit on the edge. However, Turkish Airlines will also fly to Bogota and Panama in 2016. This will not be profitable, but to raise your prestige as a world trade, you need to show presence also in these regions. With such a big company, these losses can be compensated easily with very profitable destinations like in the case of THY Somalia.¹¹⁴⁷

Bozoklar added that such a direct flight connection “reduced the psychological distance.”¹¹⁴⁸

According to the General Consulate of Brazil in Istanbul, the world’s fourth biggest aircraft producer, the Brazilian Embraer, sold eight aircrafts to the Turkish airline company Borajet.¹¹⁴⁹ Additionally, the Turkish Airlines offshoot Anadolu Jet has five Embraer in its fleet, two Embraer-190 and three Embraer-195.1150 In the high time of Turkish-Brazilian rapprochement, there was even talk about an Embraer plant in Turkey.¹¹⁵¹ At that time, there was much talk, but nothing became concrete. “Embraer CEOs were often in Turkey, also on defense issues. But since 2013 everything is on hold.”¹¹⁵²

Turkey has the advantage of being close to richer European and Gulf countries, whose citizens travel a lot. Brazil is surrounded by poorer countries whose citizens travel less abroad. But, there are also significant infrastructure problems, which hinder the development of tourism in Brazil. This affects basically all aspects of tourism infrastructure from airports, roads to hotels, all insufficient to deal with higher numbers of tourists, but also not good enough to attract more. Therefore for the Turkish ambassador in Brasilia “tourism would be a sector where Turkish investments were possible. Turkey started late into mass tourism, that is why the quality is very good, our portfolio looks very good.”¹¹⁵³ DEIK’s Hocaoğlu confirmed that

Brazil is in dire need of numerous investments in the hotel infrastructure. Rio is one of the most beautiful cities of the world, but has only 1/6 of tourists of Antalya, also because the bed-capacity is totally insufficient. Turkish companies are very good and experienced especially in the hotel sector. However, when we mention this to Turkish companies, they answer that Brazil is very far away and there are many opportunities in the neighbourhood. Brazil unfortunately is still too little known in Turkey and is not inspiring confidence.¹¹⁵⁴

Luiz Alberto, Turkey’s honorary consul in Curitiba, worked for advertising at four Brazilian airports.

Many of the airports are managed by foreign consortiums, São Paulo by a South African, Brasilia by an Argentinean, Rio by a Singaporean. That would be a great potential for Turkish airport management for the next round of privatization and open tenders. Now the chances are also good.¹¹⁵⁵

Both consulates long realized the potential for tourism. The Brazilian consulate in Istanbul despite a shrinking budget over the past years continued participating in a tourism fair. In 2013 the consulate still participated in five fairs, in 2014 and 2015 only in two, one being food and one being tourism. “The tourism fair is always accepted by Brasilia.”¹¹⁵⁶ Besides fairs, the consulate is in contact with tourism agencies, offering workshops, e.g. “two years ago we did a workshop with TURSAB [Association of Turkish Travel Agencies¹¹⁵⁷]. One aim is to make Brazil better known and offer complete packages, not only beaches and Carnival, but also cultural sights, natural beauties in different parts of the country, so that it offers more than Rio de Janeiro.”¹¹⁵⁸

Also the Itamaraty’s Department for Europe II agreed that more should be done to attract Turkish tourists.

But, such activities and cultural events also depend on money, and the budget was really low the past years. Turkey is a ‘prioritarian market’ for Brazil, but an example how dramatic the budgetary situation was, occurred when the consul in Istanbul wanted to travel to Ankara for 100 Euros, it was refused. In such a situation, big steps are not possible.¹¹⁵⁹

The Turkish consulate said that every year there is a so-called “national participation” in two tourism fairs. This means that the participation is especially supported by the state. To these fairs around 10-12 tourism agencies participate. In 2015 Istanbul was one of the chosen cities and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce had its own stand. Brazil became a country of potential tourists for Turkey and that is something new and was not the case in the 1990s.¹¹⁶⁰

5.9.9. Outlook on economic relations

Even if Turkey and Brazil have a history of one decade of intensifying relations, according to the Brazil desk of DEIK, which published a detailed country report on Brazil in November 2015, the “relations with Brazil are still very fresh.” Therefore one obstacle to more intense economic relations is the “little knowledge about the market conditions.”¹¹⁶¹ Bozoklar agreed:

The two countries and two peoples do not know one another well. That only changes now. It is not so easy from scratch to go to such a distant country and start a business, you do not know the market, the rules etc., so it is important that there are delegations going with ministers where the first direct contacts could be made.¹¹⁶²

This view is also shared by Ferracioli:

a big problem is the lack of information and lack of right contacts. It is essential to know the right persons in ministries, without that it is difficult, but that is the case in the whole world. Turkey does not yet have that experience. Germany and Korea have been present in Brazil over decades with established networks and contacts and often citizens present in Brazil.¹¹⁶³

Something that could, at least theoretically, increase contacts and knowledge about the other country would be city partnerships. Currently the only bilateral partnership is between Istanbul and Rio de Janeiro. For Istanbul this was the first ever signed sister city agreement, which already exists since 1965. The partnership was renewed in 2012.1164 However, as the Turkish consul in São Paulo, Arman, commented,

it is not really active. The Istanbul side says that they have so many requests and works going on that it is too much. That is why they did not want to have a partnership with São Paulo, because it would not be meaningful, so Izmir will sign a partnership with São Paulo soon.”¹¹⁶⁵ Izmir has also been negotiating with Salvador about a partnership. Turkey’s honorary consul in Salvador, Espinoza, said that the partnership “is stuck in the city parliament in Salvador.¹¹⁶⁶

Turkish business circles and exporters discovered new markets, which they know a lot better. Some of them like Pakistan or Kazakhstan are also big markets. According to DEIK,

they follow closely developments in these countries. For Brazil this is not the case. Since the distance is big, to be able to do meaningfully business in Brazil, the size of the mandates needed to be rather big to also bring along employees and managers to e.g. set-up a machine park.¹¹⁶⁷

However, concerning the employment of foreigners, Brazil according to DEIK is not an easy market: “In Venezuela it was easily possible to employ Turks. In Brazil, the unions are very strong and work permits for engineers difficult to get. This discourages Turkish companies.¹¹⁶⁸

Therefore DEIK proposed to “increase the bilateral visits again, to have import-export delegations, increase the participation in fairs and cultural activities.”¹¹⁶⁹ Increasing the contacts could also start in Brasilia. As CAMEX experts said, “many embassies and diplomats make meetings with us, like from the Ukraine or Egypt. From Turkey, so far, there has been nobody, they seem to be more distant.”¹¹⁷⁰

There are certainly some specific problems in Turkey-Brazil economic relations, independent from the current crisis. For the Brazilian ambassador in Turkey a general problem for intensifying trade and investments is that “both countries do not really have complementary economies, to a large extent they produce the same things and even are competitors in third countries. To increase trade significantly at this point is very difficult.”¹¹⁷¹ However, according to Bernardes, Turkey’s problems in the neighborhood could be a chance for new openings:

Concerning infrastructure, Turkey was very active in Russia, now, because of the obvious reasons not anymore, there are capacities that could be diverged. There is a lot of need in Brazil for infrastructure investments, be it alone or in joint ventures. There are no legal obstacles to the investment of foreign companies. But there is a lack of knowledge, lack of contacts and networks. For Turkey, Brazil is not a natural market, so any developments will also need time.¹¹⁷²

As long as the economic crisis in Brazil and the difficult political-security situation in Turkey continue, none of the interviewees in any country expected big changes. Issues like a free trade agreement between Turkey and Mercosul are not expected to lead to quick results either, because according to DEIK “there are many inner Mercosul problems to be resolved first and that will take time.” For Hocaoğlu therefore “what is more important than the FTA is a mentality change.”¹¹⁷³ However, whether this will be possible in the current situation is doubtable. According to Daniel, there will not be economic nor political stability for the next four to five years, “the situation will rather get worse. This will force any government to concentrate on domestic issues. Four, five years will pass as in Argentina in the 2000s. The problems will continue.”¹¹⁷⁴ How long the crisis finally will last, is contested, but there is big consensus that “2016 is a lost year.”¹¹⁷⁵

The year of 2017 was not very different, however, on 9 November the joint economic initiative was revived by a DEIK-FIESP meeting in Sao Paulo, where Turkey’s current ambassador in Brazil, Savut, said: “Everybody agrees that our trade volume and bilateral economic relations will enter again into a period of growth and increase.”¹¹⁷⁶

5.10. Academic relations

“There was an enthusiasm in the bilateral relations, noticeable among business circles and within the Turkish economic ministry”, said Aylin Topal, chairwoman of Latin and North American Studies at METU, “which does not exist in the academic world.”¹¹⁷⁷ However, in the course of intensifying politico-diplomatic relations, also academia, albeit cautiously, joined the bandwagon. At Ankara University, the link between political relations and the launch of the Center of Latin American Studies (LAMER) was direct as Seçkin explained: “It was in 2009 by initiative of the education ministry and the higher education board that a centre focusing on Latin America would be established at our university.”¹¹⁷⁸ Ankara University, a state university founded in 1946 whose prestigious political science faculty was already founded in the mid 19th century, has currently 44 so-called “centers” (merkez) on regional issues such as Eurasia, Cyprus or Africa, but also on issues like women’s studies, earthquake or brain research. The category center means that the academic personnel are invited from other faculties, sometimes even from other universities. Only two professors are directly employed at LAMER, the director and deputy director. Centers do not belong to a faculty, but are directly linked to the university president’s office. The director of LAMER from the beginning has been Necati Kutlu who came from the faculty of language, history and geography being an expert on Spanish-language literature. Giving classes and helping with administrative tasks are professors from physics to theology, anthropology and political science.

LAMER does not offer any country specific courses, but general issues where then also Brazil is one of the covered countries. In the academic year 2015/2016 some offered courses were: “Education in Latin America”, “The independence period in Latin America”, “International Security Regimes in Latin America”, “Paleo-anthropology in Latin America”, “The cuisine culture of Latin America”, “Agriculture and rural development policies in Latin America” or “Health systems in Latin America.” There is one course dealing especially with “Turkey’s Latin America policy” given by professor Erol from Gazi University Ankara. Erol is an expert on Turkey’s foreign policy and a regular columnist for Millet daily.¹¹⁷⁹

Concerning the language courses, Ankara University is unique with its recent offer of Portuguese classes additionally to Spanish, which is widespread at Turkey’s universities. Portuguese only started in March 2015 after LAMER was accepted in 2014 as a “Centre for the Evaluation of Portuguese as a Foreign Language” (CAPLE – Centro de Avaliação de Português Língua Estrangeira), a certificate in interestingly Portugal’s Portuguese for foreigners developed by the University of Lisbon.¹¹⁸⁰ “There is one teacher from Brazil and one Turkish teacher who did her master’s in Portugal. The demand exists.”¹¹⁸¹

Besides the regular course program, there are also lectures by and meetings with visiting scholars or diplomats and cultural activities:

For this, we are in constant contact with the embassies of Latin American countries, among them also regularly with the Brazilian embassy, e.g. we have been organizing a film-week, including Brazilian movies over the past years.¹¹⁸²

At LAMER there are currently slightly less than 100 students in the master’s program. Theses can be written directly at LAMER only as of late. That is why there is yet no trend recognizable of which topics are chosen most or which countries are most popular. It is planned to soon also offer a PhD program. LAMER has two cooperation agreements with Latin American universities. Since 2013 with the National University in Havana/Cuba and since 2014 with the National University in Colombia where professors from Ankara offer courses in Turkish Culture (Türk Kültürü). So far, there is no agreement with a Brazilian university.¹¹⁸³

LAMER has been regularly organizing Latin America related conferences and seminars. One of the most recent bigger events was organized in 2013, the conference of the “Federación Internacional de Estudios sobre América Latina y el Caribe” (FIEALC), which took place in Antalya. Kutlu was the president of this federation from 2013 to 2015.

The second university in Ankara, offering courses on Latin America is the prestigious Middle East Technical University (METU). Latin America is dealt within the master’s program of Latin and North American Studies (LAN).¹¹⁸⁴ Its director is Aylin Topal¹¹⁸⁵, a professor from the faculty of political science and public administration. In contrast to LAMER, Topal explained the founding of the Latin America program as

not having a direct link with political developments, it is rather an independent decision by the university. We were founded in 2009 as an offspring of the faculty of social sciences where we deal with the whole world and already had several specialized area studies.¹¹⁸⁶

As LAMER, the centre at METU does not have its own personnel either, but professors from several faculties offering courses. In the academic year 2015/16 there were 38 students, roughly 10 new students every year. As Topal said “the interest is increasing.” METU does not have institutionalized contacts to Latin American universities, but Topal does have contacts on a personal level. “I collaborate with colleagues from Brazil on issues concerning the middle class, but it is not only on Brazil and Turkey, there are also colleagues covering India, Germany and Laos.”¹¹⁸⁷ On the issue of social classes, LAN organized in May 2014 the conference “Brazil: Politics, Religion and Social Classes” with Brazilian professors from the Fluminense Federal University and the Federal University of Juiz de Fora.¹¹⁸⁸

At LAN there is only one course on Latin America that all students have to attend, “Latin America: Past, Present and Future Trends.”¹¹⁸⁹ Besides that, students can according to the center’s website chose between “approximately 20 courses offered every year by various departments exploring historical developments of Latin and North American societies, states, economies and political systems.”¹¹⁹⁰ However, most courses are on the US, only two courses per term deal specifically with Latin America.¹¹⁹¹ Additionally there are language courses in Spanish, but not in Portuguese. “There is demand from time to time from students, but there are not even Portuguese courses offered at TÖMER [one of the biggest language schools], which is a problem.”¹¹⁹²

In Istanbul, not only Turkey’s biggest city, but also the city with by far the most universities, 55 out of a total of 178 universities are located there,¹¹⁹³ Latin American Studies are still in their beginning. The pioneer here is a private university, Bahçeşehir. According to Nilüfer Narlı, dean of the university’s sociology faculty¹¹⁹⁴ and a Latin America expert, in 2012 Latin America was added to the Center of American Studies. In 2014 Narlı, together with Argentinean Ph.D. candidate Levaggi from Istanbul’s Koç University had the idea of organizing an inaugural international conference on Latin America at Bahçeşehir University to also promote Latin American Studies. This conference, entitled “Eurasia-Latin America International Conference” (ELAIC) finally took place on 26-27 March 2016.1195 It was jointly organized by the Latin American Project of Bahçeşehir University and La Plata University of Argentina. On the final day of the conference, the “Latin America and Caribbean-Turkey Academic Network” (LACTAN¹¹⁹⁶) was launched, which is based at Bahçeşehir University. The network’s aim is to bring together scholars working on Turkey (Eurasia) in Latin America and those working on Latin America in Turkey (Eurasia).¹¹⁹⁷ It is planned to have the second conference (ELAIC) in 2018 at Anáhuac México Sur University.¹¹⁹⁸

Even if there is not much academic work going on in Turkey on Latin America, the situation in Brazil still undercuts the Turkish situation with not a single university offering either Turkish Studies or courses on Turkey in a larger faculty of e.g. Middle Eastern Studies. What do exist are Turkish language courses, offered at several Brazilian universities, among them PUC in Rio, USP in São Paulo or UnB in Brasilia. These are invariably offered by the CCBT (Centro Cultural Brasil Turquia),¹¹⁹⁹ which belongs to the controversial movement of Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen. The CCBT does not offer any academic courses at Brazilian universities.

However, there is quite some recent activism by a Brazilian institution to intensify academic relations between Brazil and Turkey. The “Grupo Coimbra of Brazilian Universities” (GCUB)¹²⁰⁰, which was founded in 2008, brings together 72 Brazilian universities (15 state, 6 confessional, 51 federal; there are no private universities in the group). According to Luisa Moutinho, who is responsible for the regions “Asia, Africa and Canada”, the first contacts with Turkey were made in 2013. Until July 2016 there were agreements with seven Turkish universities (Istanbul, Gediz, Fatih, Bahçeşehir, Bilkent, Antalya International, Middle East Technical). The universities Gediz¹²⁰¹ in Izmir and Fatih in Istanbul were shut down after the 15 July coup attempt, because these were two of 15 Gülen-affiliated universities. With this, also the cooperation agreements ended, but continue with the other universities.¹²⁰²

Interestingly, the cooperation is with both public and private, so-called “foundation”, universities in Turkey. The latter are by law still non-profit, however, partly very expensive tuition based universities: “Most cooperation so far is with Istanbul and Fatih Universities.”¹²⁰³ The close cooperation with Fatih was not surprising, because GCUB and CCBT closely collaborate. “A big partner is CCBT, they support us in Turkey and give Turkish lessons for free.”¹²⁰⁴ The executive director of the GCUB, Rosanna Silva, is even on the board of the CCBT branch in Brasilia.¹²⁰⁵ This close cooperation will be a problem for future programs with Turkish universities.

The cooperation with Fatih University contained a program of student mobility of either six months or one year. In 2015, in the first round of the program, five Brazilian students participated. For 2016 (fall term), there were 18 selected candidates, but “the final number of participants might be smaller due to security concerns of parents.”¹²⁰⁶ In fact, as Moutinho wrote on 9 September 2016, “none of the students will go to Turkey this year.”¹²⁰⁷

There was also a six-month internship program with daily Zaman newspaper agreed upon for students of journalism. However, “before it started, Zaman was taken over by a state trustee. The selected students then were transferred to Fatih University.”¹²⁰⁸ Zaman newspaper was the biggest newspaper of the Gülen network and in the end shut down completely.

The university cooperation takes place under a general agreement on technical cooperation between Turkey and Brazil. Therefore, no approval by any ministry or state body is necessary. As Moutinho added, “there are very good relations to the Division of Educational Issues in the Foreign Ministry.”¹²⁰⁹

In theory, all agreements are reciprocal. However, the problem not only for Turkish, but for all foreign students is that the courses offered in Brazil are almost exclusively in Portuguese, a language not much taught and learnt in Turkey. Therefore, there have not been Turkish participants so far studying in Brazil through the GCUB partnerships. There are, however, some Turkish students in Brazil, most of them members of the Gülen movement. In Brasilia, in 2016, there were twelve of them.¹²¹⁰

Especially during the most intensive period of the bilateral relations around 2010, there were two institutions organizing academic seminars focusing on Turkey-Brazil relations. In Brazil this was the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), different to the name, a university. In Turkey it was the think tank TASAM.¹²¹¹ The latter started already in 2009 with the first so-called “Turkish – Latin American and Caribbean Forum”, which took place in October 2009 in Istanbul.¹²¹² A second forum took place in September 2010 in Ankara with the title “Economic Integration, Cooperation and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.”¹²¹³ At the second forum, FGV’s Elena Lazarou gave a talk entitled “Between the West and the Rest? Turkey and Brazil as rising powers in the new world order.”¹²¹⁴ Lazarou, then based at the FGV’s Rio campus,¹²¹⁵ explained that the Turkish embassy in Brasilia was looking for stakeholders in different domains, interested in Turkey-Brazil relations, “to give the partnership visibility. That is how they found us.” Even if according to Lazarou the initiative came from the Turkish side, the first “Turkey-Brazil Roundtable” took place in March 2012 in Rio de Janeiro. It was entitled “Turkey and Brazil – New Powers in a Transforming Global Order?”¹²¹⁶ Among the participants were academics, diplomats and journalists from both countries and international experts. The workshop was divided into seven sessions covering issues like the general political landscape in both countries, the relationship of both with the EU and the US, energy politics globally and how the two countries are positioned or urban development in both countries. Only the final session was dedicated to the bilateral relations. Lazarou described the atmosphere at the meeting:

It was perceived as quite exotic. Experts on foreign policy, people interested in the Tehran Declaration, which was still fresh then, were really committed and knew what was going on. But, when we tried to talk about issues that were relevant to each side, such as urban or social policy, especially for the Brazilians, Turkey was a complete unknown. However, that was a time in Brazil where there was a lot of interest in trying to understand the rest of the world. Brazil was becoming part of a lot of networks and also spent money on scholarships and joint research programs and on more cooperation with research agencies in different countries. There was also an activism not seen before of funding bodies for this kind of activities. We saw big investment in bilateral engagement, not because the two of them are ideal partners, but because the moment was very similar in wanting to project themselves. And, people then found a lot of similarities between the countries, but it is not said that because there are these similarities that this is transferred into concrete initiatives.¹²¹⁷

The year after the inaugural workshop, FGV organized a business trip to Istanbul, not for a conference, but with several meetings and events. However, “our visit coincided with the Gezi protests and most got cancelled.”¹²¹⁸ Since then, parallel to the diplomatic relations, also on the academic front, the intensity of relations has been lost. There was no more Turkey-Brazil roundtable by either TASAM or FGV since 2012. However, the TASAM website mentioned a second bilateral roundtable scheduled for 2016 entitled “Turkey and Brazil: Rising Powers in the Changing World Order”,¹²¹⁹ but no details were known on date and program by October 2016.

Since the contacts are both rather recent and still scarce, it is of no surprise that the academic output concerning bilateral relations, be it Turkey-Brazil or for the larger regions Eurasia-Latin America relations or the occupation with Brazil in Turkey or Turkey in Brazil is still very rudimentary. Ayşe Yarar, currently PhD candidate at Ankara University’s Latin American Centre with a thesis on Turkey-Mexico relations, put together a list of articles and books published by scholars in Turkey, Turks abroad and books available on Latin America in Turkish.¹²²⁰

Indicative for the “intensity” of research activities is also the database of Brazilianists from all over the world by the think tank of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, IPRI/FUNAG. For Germany, the list contains 65 persons based at numerous universities across the country, both Germans and Brazilians. For Turkey, the database is empty.¹²²¹

5.11. Cultural relations

Due to the big distance, the general low level of contacts and the lack of a significant immigrant population, it is no surprise that the cultural relations are so far only little developed. Until the 2000s there is only anecdotal reference on cultural activities. Turkey’s honorary consul in Salvador, Angel Espinoza mentioned a concert by Erol Erdinç in the theater of Salvador in 1994 in coordination with the Turkish Embassy. In 1997 Espinoza organized “a festival of food and music from Bahia in Istanbul, Odolun, Samba and Xe.”¹²²²

In the 2000s, parallel to the overall intensification of the bilateral relations, also Turkish cultural activities in Brazil increased due to mainly two reasons. The more regular cultural efforts of the Turkish embassy and consulate and the presence of the Turkish Islamic Gülen movement in Brazil.

According to ambassador Diriöz, the Turkish embassy in coordination with the Turkish Foreign Ministry has been organizing annually four to five concerts by Turkish artists in Brazil where the tickets are covered by the Turkish MFA. As Diriöz explained,

because of the expensive plane tickets, we cannot bring big groups like Anadolu Ateşi¹²²³ to Brazil, which I could when I was serving in Jordan. To Brazil we can only bring smaller groups. A country like Turkey has to invest also in this. Diplomacy today is a lot more, it is not only diplomats and politicians, it is also culture. When these artists come, we want them to visit several cities and also other South American countries.¹²²⁴

The Turkish consul in São Paulo listed some of the Turkish artists having given concerts in Brazil recently. Idil Biret (piano), Gülşin Onay (piano), Cihat Aşkın (violin) or the Ebru artist (paper marbling) Hikmet Barutçugil.¹²²⁵

Since 2013 there is also an effort by the embassy and the consulate to help on religious issues concerning the education of imams and theological faculty support by the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) together with religious NGOs like IHH and Milli Görüş, which also visited Brazil. There is a cooperation with Muslim federations in Brazil, there was also a summit of Muslim religious leaders from Latin America in Istanbul.¹²²⁶

Besides the state, there are private initiatives, which are, however, in the two countries very different in scope and means. In Brazil, the Turkish Islamic Gülen movement set up a private school, a cultural centre and a chamber of commerce. Until late 2013, the governing AKP and the Gülen movement collaborated in Turkey and abroad, the Gülen movement was almost part of Turkish public diplomacy through their many contacts to civil society, politics and business circles. However, since December 2013, there is an open confrontation between the two in Turkey, a power struggle of two former allies, which the AKP has been clearly winning. The movement since then is officially labeled a terrorist organization named FETÖ (Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü, Fethullahist Terror Organization) or “parallel state structure” (paralel devlet yapısı, PYD), whereas the self-proclaimed, euphemistic name of the movement is Hizmet (Service). The confrontations at home also affected the relations between the movement and Turkish state institutions abroad. In countries where Turkey has very good relations and easy access to the state leaders, such as in Azerbaijan, the Gülen schools and associations were shut down. In Brazil, things are different as the Turkish consul in São Paulo explained:

Gülen was part of Turkish soft power and it then had state support. Now, the situation is completely different, but we have to act according to the different conditions in every country. The Gülen movement is for the Brazilian state not a terror organization. They argue that in Brazil there are organizations from all over the world, they are a country of freedom and that there is nothing wrong with cultural activities, song contests and symposia about peace, love and understanding. We do share our views with respective institutions, but this has its limits. We promoted the Gülen movement some years ago, now to present them as terrorists is not very credible for the Brazilian side. However, with the movement there is zero dialogue and no contact at all.¹²²⁷

However, for Brazilian institutions, Itamaraty included, the cooperation has become more complicated: “The cooperation with the CCBT [Gülen association in Brazil] is problematic, because of Turkey’s internal issues.”¹²²⁸

Within the scope of this thesis, it is not possible to analyze the Gülen movement in depth. However, since the movement is present with several institutions in Brazil and well connected with Brazilian universities, associations, journalists and politicians, it is necessary to classify the movement at least rudimentary. Often, the movement almost monopolizes parts of bilateral relations as the Brazilian Consulate in Istanbul underlined:

Much of the private visits that are not organized by the Brazilian government is done by the Turkish Cultural Centre in São Paulo, they organize trips and delegations and meet with us. But we do not do any of the organization and do not pay anything of their trip.¹²²⁹

Another example would be university cooperation organized by the Brazilian university association Coimbra, which said that “our most important partner is the Gülen movement.”¹²³⁰

Until 15 July 2016 there were no signs that the movement was terrorist, if terrorism is defined using weapons and violence. For the Turkish state, FETÖ was the main actor behind the attempted coup, which caused the death of almost 300 people. The investigations in fall 2016 are ongoing, an involvement seems clear, but other groups participated as well. However, for some other aspects of the movement there is more evidence. Since the 1980s there are numerous reports about the infiltration of the movement in the police, Armed Forces, judiciary and administrations¹²³¹ and reports about the ultra-conservatism and intolerance towards others.¹²³² Liberal and Alevi professors in rural universities mention the pressure by the Gülen movement to join them with promises if they did, they would make a swift career, if not, they would be blocked. One professor told the author that he was offered potential spouses from the movement to integrate him to the movement.¹²³³

The social conservatism is also taught in the language classes the movement offers in Brazil as one participant explained:

I almost had arguments with the teachers. They presented a picture of Turkey that I do not share. They presented a house and said there is the place for the women and there for the men. I have been many times to Turkey, and there are certainly places like this, but there are also others. Like Istanbul, the Aegean coast or Ankara, I have not experienced Turkey that way, but that is their way of presenting Turkish culture.¹²³⁴

Another Brazilian professor wanted to take private Turkish lessons with a female student from the movement, but the student was not allowed to leave the house in the evenings alone. Both not illegal or terrorist, but a very conservative life-style and view on women.

There have been striking examples of authors who were arrested for preparing or writing critical books about the movement. The best known cases are journalists Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener who both spent almost 400 days in prison on made-up charges that they would belong to the terrorist network Ergenekon. And, the Kurdish political movement, currently represented by the HDP, claims that since April 2009, more than 7000 activists and politicians had been taken into custody and more than 1500 arrested in the frame of the so-called KCK trials, orchestrated by Gülen-affiliated police, prosecutors and judges. This only, because Fethullah Gülen and his movement oppose negotiations with the Kurdish PKK and tried to torpedo the then ongoing peace process.

If only part of this is true, then the Gülen movement is not a moderate, tolerant, dialogue-oriented civic movement, but an ultra-conservative Islamic movement with political ambitions, using its economic and (former) media power to silence critics and pressure people and groups not belonging to them. This is not illegal, but whether a society like Brazil gains anything with a strong presence of such a movement, is more than questionable.

The founder and still current director of the Gülenist NGO CCBT (Centro Cultural Brasil Turquia) is Mustafa Göktepe. A native of the central Anatolian province of Konya, he grew up in Izmir. Göktepe has been living in Brazil since March 2004. Since 2005 other members of the movement have settled in Brazil. After having learned Portuguese and offered Turkish lessons, a group around Göktepe founded a private school, the Colegio Belo Futuro, in the Santo Amaro district of São Paulo. “The most important bridge is a school,” Göktepe said in a documentary portraying him in a series for Irmak TV called “Çağın Muhacirleri”¹²³⁵ (emigrants of our age). The school was opened in February 2007.

In 2011, the “Centro Cultural Brasil Turquia”¹²³⁶ was founded in São Paulo. Later offices in Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Brasilia followed. Göktepe himself moved to Brasilia in 2012 to set up the association there, then moved back to São Paulo in 2015. The CCBT in all its offices offers language classes both of Turkish and Portuguese, together with art and music classes. Beyond that it organizes concerts, exhibitions, conferences, seminars and trips to Turkey for different groups, e.g. for Brazilian journalists. The association also offers translation services and consultancy.¹²³⁷

The Brasilia office is run by Abdullah Boztaş, who has an exemplary career within the movement. Directly after finishing high school at the age of 17, Boztaş moved to Russia where he studied with the support of the movement. He wrote a PhD on language comparison between Turkish, Russian and other Turkic languages. After 15 years in Moscow he came in 2014 to Brazil and always lived in Brasilia.

Our goal is to make Turkish culture known. There are lots of wrong information and misunderstandings about Turkey. Our goal is, to also show a different image of Islam. Both in Russia and here, there is an equation of Islam with violence and terrorism. We show a different image, also living Islam. We pray five times a day, but that does not influence our work life, we do it at the office.¹²³⁸

To earn money, Boztaş works as an English teacher.

In São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the movement has been organizing for about four to five years so called dialogue “iftars” (fast-breaking dinners) and are distributing meat to the poor during the month of Ramadan. Last year these were 15 tons of meat.¹²³⁹

Since 2014 the CCBT has been organizing a “Turkey Day” in São Paulo on 29 May, symbolically chosen as the day of the conquest of Istanbul in 1453. Since 2015, people are honored for their contributions to the bilateral relations. In 2015 among the first awarded was Gloria Perez, the producer of the telenovela “Salve Jorge” and the soccer player Alex de Souza who played from 2004 to 2012 for Fenerbahçe Istanbul.¹²⁴⁰ In 2016, e.g. the former soccer player Zico who worked as a manager from 2006 to 2008 in Turkey (Fenerbahçe Istanbul) and the director of the TV channel Band, which has been broadcasting several Turkish TV series, were given special awards.¹²⁴¹ On 19 May 2016, the CCBT organized a conference about the international Gülen movement in São Paulo.¹²⁴²

However, all the activities also in Brazil are happening in the shadow of the harsh clampdown against the movement’s companies, private schools, universities and media in Turkey. Until summer 2016 numerous Gülen affiliated institutions have been taken over by state trustees who then either shut down the company or turned it pro-government.¹²⁴³ This not only meant a loss of influence, but also a huge financial loss for the movement. It was therefore only a question of time, when this would also affect the workings of the movement abroad, including in Brazil. On 22 June 2016 the CCBT announced on its website that it had to close down the office in Belo Horizonte and the partner association BAKUM in Istanbul. Additionally, all remaining offices in Brazil, in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia changed address to less expensive locations.¹²⁴⁴ This might not have been the last closure of offices in Brazil in light of the speed and determination of Turkish president Erdoğan’s zeal against the movement. On 21 June 2016, even before the attempted coup, Erdoğan seemed already confident that the “parallel structure” was already “shattered like a glass palace after their betrayal came to light.”¹²⁴⁵

In Turkey, cultural activities are a lot more moderate. This is due to the financial problems of the Brazilian institutions in Turkey and the very private nature of associations dealing with Brazil in Turkey. The cultural budget of the Brazilian consulate in Istanbul has been zero for the past two years. The support to cultural activities organized by others therefore was mainly moral.¹²⁴⁶

However, on 15 November 2017, the Brazilian embassy in Ankara organized a commemoration of Brazil’s national day at Ankara Palas. Brazilian ambassador Gradilone said that “in 2018, Brazil and Turkey will celebrate the 160th anniversary of official diplomatic relations. For this reason we are planning various events and festivities.”¹²⁴⁷ Brazilian piano player and professor at Anadolu University in Eskişehir, Dr. Lilian Tonella Tüzün, gave a recital. Mrs. Tonella Tüzün has been living and working in Turkey for many years and regularly performs as a musician.

As in Brazil, there have been also cultural efforts by honorary consuls. In February 2008, Izmir honorary consul Bozoklar organized a Brazilian film festival at 9 September University in cooperation with the Brazilian embassy.¹²⁴⁸ A similar event took place in May 2014 at Istanbul’s Bahçeşehir University, the Brazilian Film festival.¹²⁴⁹

This was the year, when the first cultural association dedicated to Brazil was founded in Turkey. It is the story of Can Gümüş, a Turkish musician, who studied music in Porto Alegre from 2010 to 2013. Back in Turkey in late 2013, he organized Portuguese classes together with Brazilians residing in Istanbul. “After having lived in Brazil and returned to Turkey, you miss certain things from Brazil and want to live them also in your country.”¹²⁵⁰ In early 2014, together with eight Brazilians, he founded a cultural centre and the “Brezilya Kültür Dernegi” (Brazilian Cultural Association), which is the first association to offer exclusively Portuguese classes in Turkey. These can be in the office in Kadıköy on the Asian shore of Istanbul or in companies. In the first two years there were about 60 students per year. According to Gümüş, this is not only due to an interest in Brazil, but “for investors Angola and Mozambique became interesting recently.”¹²⁵¹ Besides the language classes, the association offers consultancy and translation services and organizes roughly twice a year bigger events like a Carneval, Festa Agostina or a music festival.

Another personal story is that of Aydın Takmaz and his wife Alessandra. The Turkish-Brazilian couple set up the consultancy At Exclusive¹²⁵² in Istanbul specializing in Turkey-Brazil relations and Brazilian activities in Turkey. Aydın and Alessandra met in Florida while studying there. In 2001, after graduating, they opened a café in a shopping centre in Campinas in the São Paulo province. In 2005 they also opened a restaurant in the same shopping centre, but things did not work out as planned. In 2006 therefore both moved to Istanbul where Aydın could work with his family.

Alessandra met in her Turkish classes spouses of Brazilian soccer players. At that time there were many in Turkey. In 2007, some of them asked her to help out with translations in meetings, in hospitals or in the school for the children. This spontaneous helping out became more regular, involving also companies.¹²⁵³

In 2009, Aydın Takmaz was asked by the Brazilian embassy that a translator for Portuguese was needed. Later Takmaz also translated at the Alliance of Civilizations meetings and still is president Erdoğan’s translator for Portuguese as at the G20 meeting in November 2015 in Antalya.

When Aydın Takmaz got also involved in “Brazilian affairs” in 2009, they decided to found the consultancy. In the following year they worked with TV producer Zeca Camargo on a documentary about Istanbul. At Exclusive also collaborated in the production of the telenovela Salve Jorge and in 2014 with the Brazilian soccer team of the Fifa U20 World Championship, which took place in Turkey.

However, “the economic problems in Brazil, the decrease of visits and delegations, also negatively affected our work in 2015 and 2016. What always works is translating for the police or at court in cases against Brazilian drug dealers.”¹²⁵⁴

5.12. Citizens in both countries

The number of Brazilian citizens in Turkey and Turkish citizens in Brazil is despite a recent increase still very low. According to the Turkish Consulate in São Paulo there are roughly 750 Turkish citizens in Brazil. “With those coming and going these could be at most 1000. This is not much, but when I was here in the late 1990s, there were only 60-70 Turks in Brazil, so it is a huge change.” Most of the Turkish citizens live in São Paulo, followed by Rio de Janeiro.

There are also Syriacs, Greeks and Armenians who came in the 1930s and 1940s to Brazil. The first generation kept the Turkish passport, the second and third generation integrated into Brazilian society as Brazilian citizens. But, they have the right to apply for citizenship.¹²⁵⁵

Besides the legal citizens, there are also about 20 Turkish inmates in Brazil. These could be transferred to Turkey, but the agreement on the transfer of convicts was not yet ratified by Brazil.

Most of the inmates are drug smugglers who swallow drugs and transport them in their bodies. We organize lawyers, come up for their basic needs such as tooth paste and shaving items and do the communication with the families in Turkey.¹²⁵⁶

According to the honorary consul in Curitiba “there are about 30 Turkish families in Paraná, six of them in Curitiba. In Foz do Iguaçu there is a small Turkish community, among a much bigger of Syrians and Lebanese.”¹²⁵⁷

In Turkey, the number of Brazilians is even lower. The Brazilian Consulate in Istanbul estimated that “there roughly 500 Brazilian citizens in Turkey, 400 of them in Istanbul.” According to Viviane Oliveira “this number is constantly increasing from 2011 to 2016, but how much is difficult to put in numbers.” Among the Brazilian citizens in Turkey there are those who came for or after marriage, in general women. Besides that there are Brazilian pilots of Turkish Airlines, CEOs and workers with Ford and Fiat, soccer players and other athletes (female volleyball players) and a few students.¹²⁵⁸ Geraldo Barbosa from the Brazilian embassy in Ankara counted in the season 2016-2017, in total 35 Brazilian soccer players in Turkey’s first and second division. Most Brazilian players, nine, were active for Adanaspor.¹²⁵⁹

The honorary consul in Izmir, Bozoklar, guessed that there are “roughly 50 Brazilians in and around Izmir. Some are married to Turks, others engineers. I do not know that for sure, because they only come when there are problems.”¹²⁶⁰ Honorary consul Tosun in Cappadocia said that there are “some Brazilians in Cappadocia.” According to the Consulate in Istanbul, there are “only very few Brazilians in Ankara.”

There is about a similar number of Brazilian inmates in Turkey, also by majority for drug-related crimes.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This Ph.D. journey was rather short. From having a rough idea in late 2014, to refining the topic and gathering literature in early 2015 to the official start in October 2015 until finishing the thesis in fall 2016. However, in this short period of about two years, a lot has changed in both countries, little to the positive. In the time of writing this conclusion, Brazil does not have an elected government after a questionable impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff. The Temer (interim) government’s approval ratings since May 2016 have never surpassed the 15 percent, in October 2016, they were only 12 percent in the current centre-right stronghold Sao Paulo.¹²⁶¹ Rousseff was not the only one who had to step down. Former speaker of the chamber of deputies, Eduardo Cunha, was stripped of his mandate and several ministers of the Temer government had to resign on corruption charges. Leading industrialists like Marcelo Odebrecht were sentenced to prison terms during these two years and former president Lula was arrested to be questioned on corruption charges. The main corruption trial Lava Jato continues and will reveal much more dirty details of Brazil’s corrupted political system. The prosecutors responsible for the trial do not always take the law too seriously either. In this shaky political situation, the economy, only years ago the pride of Brazil in the world, plummeted to almost – 4 percent in 2015 and in 2016 by – 3.5 percent. On 11 August 2016, the Swiss daily NZZ spoke of “Brazil’s inexorable decline.”¹²⁶²

In Turkey, things are similarly grim. In these two years, the almost (civil) war-like situation returned to the Southeast after the June 2015 elections. Between 20 July 2015 and 19 July 2016, Crisis Group “counted” 1761 casualties, among them 307 civilians.¹²⁶³ Several Kurdish cities resemble cities in Syria. On 15 July 2016, a failed military coup took place causing almost 300 deaths. Three days later a state of emergency was announced, for the first time in Turkey’s history for the whole country. It will most likely last “at least one year”, as president Erdoğan said. During the state of emergency, so far more than 100,000 alleged sympathizers of Fethullah Gülen, whom the government assumes to be behind the coup, were arrested or lost their jobs. By early October 2016, 15 universities were closed, 28 television channels, more than 1000 private schools and 28 elected mayors were dismissed. Critical journalists, academics and civil society figures were arrested, unrelated to the military coup plotters, usually being either (pro-)Kurdish or leftist.

Surreal times in both countries. Much of the problems are self-inflicted. The overall global economic downturn deteriorated the problems in Brazil and the slowdown of bilateral trade. The high expectations that existed in 2010/2011 concerning the future of bilateral relations, but also the status of both countries in global diplomacy were largely disappointed.

Since the bilateral relations are little researched, there is still plenty that could be analyzed. Concerning historic relations especially the black hole of the time of the Cold War could be investigated. With two embassies having been working constantly since the 1930s, there must be more to be discovered. Concerning the current state of emerging powers, more comparisons could shed light on whether the evolution of Brazil-Turkey relations from 2004-2010 was rather an exception for cross-regional emerging power relations, or following a global trend? How then developed Brazil-Indonesia, Brazil-Nigeria or Turkey-Mexico, Turkey-Australia relations? Was the intensification similar, as the decline since 2011? Or would we be confronted with a different pattern?

Theoretically, the question of change in role theory needs more research to clarify under what conditions the role conception is most likely changed and under what conditions it is not. From this research, it could be assumed that change in role conception does not happen, if it is regarded as negative or embarrassing for the state in question. However, more empirical studies were needed to confirm this assumption.

I am aware that my overall evaluation is quite sobering and different from the often enthusiastic literature on emerging powers and their influence in trade negotiations and global diplomacy. Had this thesis been written between 2009 and 2011, my assessment would have been quite different. The tone and the future perspectives seemed to know only one direction towards further intensification. But, the developments of the past five years cannot be ignored, not only concerning Brazil and Turkey, but also the potentials of emerging powers. In the golden years of both commodity boom, stronger growth in emerging powers, financial-economic crises in the US and the EU, the capacities of emerging powers were also overrated and the also then huge problems ignored. Now, with the mood changed, the focus is on the problems, the risks and no longer on the opportunities and potentials. But, many of the criticized issues like education, health, public security are better now than under the positive atmosphere some years ago, just the focus was different. The diplomatic corps of emerging powers is by far insufficient to compete with the established powers, but ten years ago, the difference was significantly higher.

After five years of intensification of bilateral relations and global initiatives and five years of slow-down, therefore, there should come the time for a more realistic evaluation of the prospects of Brazil and Turkey and in general of emerging powers. They will continue, especially in times of political and economic stability, to increase their influence in trade organizations, diplomatic and political institutions, in UN missions and as donors. However, this will not shake the current system within some years. If at all, it will take decades for a major re-shuffle of global hierarchies. China is not the norm, but an almost singular exception.

Therefore, realistically looking at the prospects of bilateral relations for the near future, there is no need for either great optimism nor fatalistic pessimism. These will depend much more than on the role conceptions of the decision makers, on the domestic developments in Brazil and Turkey’s neighborhood situation. Only during a stable situation can these states again focus on less urgent topics and more distant regions. Unfortunately, there are few signs that the dire domestic situation in Brazil or the war in Syria will be overcome soon. This also means that the re-intensification of bilateral relations will not materialize in the coming years. There could be some exceptions concerning certain aspects, such as academic relations, but it has to be expected that the overall diplomatic-political and economic relations will remain on the current low level. As Brazilian ambassador in Turkey Salgado accurately said, this is “no time for diplomacy and big dreams.” This time and the dreams might come back some day, but most likely not very soon.

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YALVAÇ, Faruk (2012). Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the World System, International Relations 26(2).

ZILLA, Claudia (2011). Brasilianische Außenpolitik, Nationale Tradition, Lulas Erben und Dilmas Optionen [Brazilian Foreign Policy, National Traditions, Lula’s heritage and Dilma’s options], SWP-Studie S29, Nov. 2011.

Newspaper articles

AGUIRRE, Mariano (3 June 2010). ‘Brazil-Turkey and Iran: a new global balance’, Open Democracy, available at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/mariano-aguirre/iran-turkey-brazil-new-global-balance>.

AMORIM, Celso, ‘Foreign Policy in the Lula Government – Two Years’, Plenarium Magazine, 25 November 2005.

BBC Mundo, ‘Europa se enamora de Lula’ [Europe falls in love with Lula], 31 December 2009, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/lg/america_latina/2009/12/091230_lula_europa_mr.shtml>.

BENDER, Jeremy, ‘Ranked: The world’s 20 strongest militaries’, Business Insider UK, 3 October 2015, available at <http://uk.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2015-9/#19-indonesia-2>.

BORGER, Julian, ‘Iran nuclear deal: world powers reach historic agreement to lift sanctions’, The Guardian, 14 July 2015, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/iran-nuclear-programme-world-powers-historic-deal-lift-sanctions>.

BOZZO, Albert, ‘A Decade-Long Ascent to Economic Power’, CNBC, 15 August 2012, available at <http://www.cnbc.com/id/48550382>.

BRAGA, Paulo Henrique, ‘Turquia busca aumentar peso diplomático’ [Turkey seeks to increase diplomatic weight], 1 November 1998, available at <www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mundo/ft01119808.htm>.

CANDEMIR, Yeliz, ‘Turkish GDP surprises with 4% growth in 2015’, MarketWatch, 31 March 2016, available at <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/turkish-gdp-surprises-with-4-growth-in-2015-2016-03-31>.

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DONAHUE, Patrick, ‘Brazil, Turkey Among Top Decliners in Global Corruption Ranking’, Bloomberg, 27 January 2016, available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-27/brazil-turkey-among-top-decliners-in-global-corruption-ranking>.

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THE ECONOMIST, ‘Has Brazil blown it?’ 28 November 2013, available at <http://www.economist.com/node/21586833/print>.

EKINCI, Ibrahim, ‘Votorantim, Sivas’a yarım milyarlık yatırım yapıyor’ [Votorantim invests half a billion TL in Sivas], 29 May 2015, available at Dünya <http://www.dunya.com/guncel/votorantim-sivasa-yarim-milyarlik-yatirim-yapiyor-263732h.htm>.

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ERDOĞAN, Recep Tayyıp (2012). ‘The Turkish Economy Meets EU Entry Criteria’, Huffington Post, 28 December 2012 at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/recep-tayyip-erdogan/the-turkish-economy-meets_b_2205265.html>.

FERGUSON, Niall (2009) ‘Think Again: Power’, Foreign Policy, 3 November 2009, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/03/think-again-power/>.

FLECK, Isabel, ‘Itamaraty perde espaço no Orçamento’ [MFA loses space in the budget], Folha de São Paulo, 25 December 2014, available at<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2014/12/1566948-itamaraty-perde-espaco-no-orcamento.shtml>.

FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, ‘Brasil e Turquia fortalecem relação estratégica em visita de Dilma a Ancara’ [Brazil and Turkey strengthen strategic relations during the visit of Dilma to Ankara], 7 October 2011, available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2011/10/987511-brasil-e-turquia-fortalecem-relacao-estrategica-em-visita-de-dilma-a-ancara.shtml>.

GLÜSING, Jens, 2009, ‘South America’s Gentle Giant: Brazil Flexes Muscles over Honduras Crisis’, Der Spiegel, 9 October, 2009, available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/south-america-s-gentle-giant-brazil-flexes-muscles-over-honduras-crisis-a-653753-2.html>.

HABERTÜRK, ‘Her yerde Türkiye mucizesi konuşuluyor’ [Everywhere the Turkey miracle is talked about], 3 December 2012, available at <http://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/para/haber/799914-her-yerde-turkiye-mucizesi-konusuluyor>.

HERRMANN, Boris, ‘Multiple Depression’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, available at <http://panamapapers.sueddeutsche.de/articles/57067eeca1bb8d3c3495b8bc/>.

HÜRRIYET, ‘Gül: THY Brezilya’ya doğrudan uçacak’, [Turkish Airlines will fly directly to Brazil], 20 January 2006, available at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gul-thy-brezilyaya-dogrudan-ucacak-3816650>.

HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS, ‘Brazilian-Turkish friendship should not be limited’, 20 March 2004, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/brazilian-turkish-friendship-should-not-be-limited.aspx?pageID=438&n=brazilian-turkish-friendship-should-not-be-limited-2004-03-20>.

HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS, ‘Turkey is BRIC of Europe, British PM Cameron says’, 13 October 2010, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=david-cameron-regards-turkey-as-bric-of-europe-2010-10-13>.

HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS, ‘Ennahda takes Turkey as model for democracy’, 27 October 2011, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ennahda-takes-turkey-as-model-for-democracy.aspx?pageID=438&n=ennahda-takes-turkey-as-model-for-democracy-democracy-2011-10-27>.

HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS, “Erdoğan says ‘civil society groups working against Turkish state’ largely destroyed”, 22 June 2016, available at <www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-says-civil-society-groups-working-against-turkish-state-largely-destroyed.aspx?pageID=517&nID=100789&NewsCatID=338>.

IDIZ, Semih, ‘Turkey goes from zero problems to nothing but problems in the region’, Al-monitor, 15 December 2015, available at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/turkey-syria-russia-crisis-reduces-ankaras-regional-clout.html#ixzz3uZDXifDe>.

KINIKLIOĞLU, Suat, ‘The Return of Ottomanism’, Today’s Zaman, 20 March 2007.

KIVANÇ, Ahmet, ‘Brezilya’da 18’inci sondajda petrol bulan Petrobras, Türkiye’nin umudu’ [Petrobras, which found oil after the 18th drilling in Brazil, is Turkey’s hope], Radikal, 21 December 2007, available at <http://www.radikal.com.tr/ekonomi/brezilyada-18inci-sondajda-petrol-bulan-petrobras-turkiyenin-umudu-835108/>.

KURT, Süleyman, ‘Brazil Lends Shoulder to Turkey for Cyprus and UN’, 21 January 2006, Zaman, available at <http://www.lobicilik.com/hispano-turco/Hispano-LatinYear2006Turkey.htm>.

LEPESKA, David, ‘Turkey’s rise from aid recipient to mega-donor’, Al Jazeera America, 25 April 2014, available at <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/turkey-internationalaidafricasomaliamiddleeasterdorgan.html>.

MAGALHAES, Luciana, ‘O’Neill, Man Who Coined ‘BRICs,’ Still Likes BRICs, But Likes MINTs, Too’, Wall Street Journal, 9 December 2013, available at <http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/12/09/oneill-man-who-coined-brics-still-likes-brics-but-likes-mints-too/>.

MACUROCT, Juliet, ‘Rio Wins 2016 Olympics in a First for South America’, New York Times, 2 October 2009, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/sports/03olympics.html?_r=0>.

MARTIN, Eric, ‘Goldman Sachs’s MIST Topping BRICs as Smaller Markets Outperform’, Bloomberg, 7 August 2012, available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-07/goldman-sachs-s-mist-topping-brics-as-smaller-markets-outperform>.

MERCOPRESS (2009). ‘Lula da Silva predicts Brazil will become world power in ten year’. Available at: <http://en.mercopress.com/2009/09/19/lula-da-silva-predicts-brazil-will-become-world-power-in-ten-years>.

MILLIYET, ‘Ankara’nın hedefi: Latin Amerika’ [Ankara’s goal: Latin America], 2 September 1998, available at <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/09/02/siyaset/siy04.html>.

MILLIYET, ‘Lula: Türkiye’yle ticaretimiz 1 milyar dolar, utanmalıyız’ [Lula: Our trade with Turkey is 1 billion dollars, we should be ashamed], 22 May 2009, available at <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Ekonomi/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&KategoriID=3&ArticleID=1097525&Date=22.05.2009&b=Lula:%20Turkiyeyle%20ticaretimiz%201%20milyar%20dolar,%20utanmaliyiz>.

NASCIMENTO, Alessandra, ‘Peroxy Bahia é lançada em Camaçari’ [Peroxy Bahia opened in Camaçari], 5 December 2011, Tribuna da Bahia, available at <http://www.tribunadabahia.com.br/2011/12/05/peroxy-bahia-e-lancada-em-camacari>.

NOTÍCIAS DA TURQUIA, ‘Declaração conjunta por ocasião da visita do presidente Lula à Turquia’ [Joint declaration on the occasion of president Lula’s visit to Turkey], 22 May 2009, available at <http://noticiasdaturquia.blogspot.com.br/2009/05/declaracao-conjunta-por-ocasiao-da.html>.

ÖZKAN, Behül, ‘Turkey’s Imperial Fantasy’, New York Times, 29 August 2014, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/opinion/ahmet-davutoglu-and-turkeys-imperial-fantasy.html?_r=0>.

ÖZKAN, Behül, ‘Early writings reveal the real Davutoğlu’, Al Monitor, 13 August 2014, available at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/zaman-davutoglu-ideologue-behlul-ozkan-academic-akp-islamic.html#ixzz3vzy7HVxA>.

ÖZTÜRK, Hamdullah, ‘Brezilya ile stratejik ortaklık tamam hedef 10 milyar dolarlık ticaret’ [The goal of the strategic partnership with Brazil is 10 billion USD trade], 21 June 2012, Interview with ambassador Ersin Erçin, available at <http://www.turkiyebrezilya.com/brezilya-ile-stratejik-ortaklik-tamam-hedef-10-milyar-dolarlik-ticaret-481.html>.

PALAVAR, Murat, 2016 Görünümü daha iyi [2016 Outlook better], 25 March 2016, Yeni Şafak, available at <http://www.kordsaglobal.com/media/img_press/photo/Yeni-Safak-2016-gorunumu-25032016.jpg>.

PEIXOTO, Fabrícia, ‘Agenda de Lula na Turquia tem “afinidades políticas” e comércio’ [Lula’s agenda in Turkey has ‘political affinities’ and trade], BBC, 20 May 2009, available at <http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2009/05/090519_lula_apresntaturquia_fa_cq.shtml>.

PITEL, Laura, ‘Somalia reaps rewards of Ankara’s investment’, Financial Times, 25 May 2016, available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bae31b04-fa6f-11e5-8f41-df5bda8beb40.html#axzz4GY7l4NMU>.

PRIMOR, Adar, ‘Brazil Leader Talks Mideast Peace, How to Be Friends With Both Israel and Iran’, Haaretz, 11 March 2010, available at <http://www.haaretz.com/brazil-leader-talks-mideast-peace-how-to-be-friends-with-both-israel-and-iran-1.264691>.

RAJA, John Samuel, ‘No one is talking about India’s real diplomatic crisis’, Quartz, 17 January 2014, available at <http://qz.com/167746/no-one-is-talking-about-the-real-diplomatic-crisis-in-india>.

RIO TIMES, ‘Brazil Sees Foreign Spending and Tourism Boost in First Quarter’, 27 May 2016, available at <http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/first-quarter-foreign-spending-and-tourism-boost-brazil/#>.

ROZEN, Laura, ‘Obama admin. dismisses leak of Obama letter on Iran fuel deal’, Politico, 28 May 2010, available at <http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0510/Obama_admin_dismisses_leak _of_Obama_letter_on_Iran_fuel_deal.html>.

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VATAN NEWSPAPER, ‘Brezilya’dan Türkiye’ye sürpriz transfer’ [Surprising transfer from Brazil to Turkey], 4 October 2007, available at < http://www.gazetevatan.com/brezilya-dan-turkiye-ye--surpriz--transfer-140238-gundem/>.

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ZALEWSKI, Piotr, 2013, ‘How Turkey Went From ‘Zero Problems’ to Zero Friends – And lost its leverage everywhere’, Foreign Policy, 22 August 2013, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/how-turkey-went-from-zero-problems-to-zero-friends>.

List of Interviews

17 June 2016, Carlos Milani, via skype

24 May 2016, Mariana Carpes, UnB, Brasilia

23 May 2016, Abdullah Boztaş, CCBT director, Brasilia

23 May 2016, Mauricio Bernardes, Itamaraty, director of Department for Europe II, Brasilia

20 May 2016, Alcides Costa Vaz, professor at UnB, Brasilia

20 May 2016, Helder Paulo M. Silva and Rafael Lameiro da Costa Rocha, CAMEX, Department for International Negotiations, Brasilia

20 May 2016, Luisa Moutinho, Grupo Coimbra, Brasilia

19 May 2016, Sergio Barreiros, Deputy General Director of Rio Branco Institute, Brasilia

18 May 2016, Hüseyin Diriöz, Turkey’s ambassador in Brazil, Brasilia

18 May 2016, Alessandro Warley Candeas, IPRI's coordinator-general, Itamaraty, Brasilia

10 May 2016, Jose Angel Espinoza, Turkey’s honorary consul in Salvador

9 May 2016, Luiz Carlos França Duarte, Kordsa Global, Camaçari, Bahia

9 May 2016, Hüseyin Ateş, Kordsa Global, Camaçari, Bahia

6 May 2016, Paulo Afonso Velasco, Rio de Janeiro

6 May 2016, Claudia Fuentes (PUC), Rio de Janeiro

5 May 2016, Monique Sochaczewski Goldfeld, Rio de Janeiro

5 May 2016, João Daniel Almeida, Rio de Janeiro

5 May 2016, Paula Sandrin, PUC, Rio de Janeiro

4 May 2016, Dawid Danilo Bartelt, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Rio de Janeiro

4 May 2016, Wolfgang Kunath, correspondent for German newspapers, Rio de Janeiro

3 May 2016, Paulo Ferracioli, FGV, Rio de Janeiro

2 May 2016, Patrick Howlett-Martin, Rio de Janeiro

29 April 2016, Jean Tible, São Paulo

29 April 2016, Suhayla Khalil, São Paulo

27 April 2016, Arlene Clemesha, USP, São Paulo

27 April 2016, Rubens Barbosa, São Paulo

26 April 2016, Mehmet Özgün Arman, Turkey’s General Consul in São Paulo

26 April 2016, Caner Sannev, Trade Attaché at Turkish General Consulate in São Paulo

26 April 2016, Patricia Mello, Folha de São Paulo

25 April 2016, Luiz Alberto, Turkey’s honorary consul in Curitiba

8 April 2016, Elena Lazarou, Brussels (via skype)

6 April 2016, Gelson Fonseca, Brazil’s consul in Porto, Portugal

24 March 2016, Ali Tamer Bozoklar, Brazil’s honorary consul in Izmir

14 March 2016, José Barros, Laila Winther and Viviane Oliveira, Consulate General of Brazil in Istanbul

14 March 2015, Ömer Tosun, Brazil’s honorary consul in Cappadocia (via mail)

25 February 2016, Antonio Luis Espinola Salgado, Brazil’s ambassador in Ankara

24 February 2016, Aylin Topal, Middle East Technical University in Ankara

24 February 1016, Şengül Kuru, Öznur Seçkin, Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, Ankara University, LAMER (Centre of Latin American Studies)

17 February 2016, Can Gümüş, Brazil Cultural Association, Kadıköy-Istanbul

17 February 2016, Aydın Takmaz, director of AtExclusive, Istanbul

18 February 2016, Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), Istanbul

ANNEX

Bilateral treaties 1264 1265

Date | Title of Agreement / Treaty | ratified | situation1263
10/07/2011 | Agreement about the transfer of convicts |  | In process
12/16/2010 | Double-Tax-Agreement to prevent double taxation and prevent fiscal evasion of taxes from income |  | In force
10/21/2010 | Agreement about remunerated work of diplomatic personnel and consular offices |  | In process
10/07/2010 | Agreement about joint judicial assistance in penal materials | 10/07/2011 | In process
05/27/20101264 | Action Plan for Strategic Partnership between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Turkey | 05/27/2010 | In force
05/27/2010 | Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Brazil and the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Republic of Turkey about the exchange of diplomats | 09/14/2010 | In force
05/27/2010 | Agreement about joint administrative assistance on customs affairs |  | In process
05/27/2010 | Memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (Brazil) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (Turkey) about Agricultural Cooperation | 05/27/2010 | In force
01/04/2010 | Joint Economic Commission, 2nd Protocol |  | In force
01/19/2006 | Memorandum of understanding between the ministries of foreign affairs about cooperation between the diplomatic academies | 10/08/2008 | In force
01/19/2006 | Memorandum of understanding for the creation of a joint commission of high level |  | In process
10/07/2004 | Joint Economic Commission, 1st Protocol |  | In force
08/14/2003 | Agreement about cooperation in defense related issues | 10/23/2007 | In force
08/20/2001 | Agreement about visa exemption for holders of common passports |  | In force
10/04/19951265 | Memorandum of understanding for the establishment of consultation mechanisms | 04/10/1995 | In force
04/10/1995 | Agreement about visa exemption for holders of diplomatic, service and special passports | 07/09/1995 | In force
04/10/1995 | Agreement about tourism cooperation | 11/12/1996 | In force
04/10/1995 | Agreement about cultural and educational cooperation | 04/13/1996 | In force
04/10/1995 | Agreement about commercial, economic and industrial cooperation | 03/19/1997 | In force
12/14/1953 | Adjustment of payments between the Bank of Brazil and the Turkish Central Bank |  | NOT in force
09/21/1950 | Agreement about air traffic | 03/07/1952 | In force
09/08/1927 | Friendship Treaty | 09/15/1928 | In force1266

1266 1267

1 This book is written in American English. All translations were done by the author. All links were controlled again between 10 and 13 October 2016.

2 SHAKESPEARE, William. As you like it, Act II Scene VII. Probably first performed in 1603, written in 1599 and published in 1623.

3 BIDDLE, Bruce J. (1986). Recent Developments in Role Theory, in Ann. Rev. Social, 12: p. 68. In 2014 also one of the contemporary leading FPA role theorists, Cameron Thies (2014, p. 2), acknowledged that “the concept of role is obviously borrowed from the theater.”

4 Among the early protagonists were George Herbert Mead (1934) and Ralph Linton (1936). Sekhri (2009, p. 425) listed both early American and European scholars using the concept of role, e.g. from the US tradition Charles Horton Cooley, Edward Ross and Robert Ezra Park. But there were also European psychologists such as Alfred Binet, Pierre Janet and Charles Aime and European sociologists and philosophers such as Emile Durkheim, Max Ferdinand Scheler, Jakob Levy Morono and Moritz Eggert.

5 However, there were some pre-1970 attempts in using roles when analyzing state behavior, at least according to Holsti. Already in 1950, Strausz-Hupé and Possony in their monograph “International Relations” tried to classify foreign policy. One needs some imagination to interpret these “techniques” as in chapters 8 and 9 (p. 210 ff.) as foreign policy roles, because they are very broad descriptions of a country’s position in the global system, such as different forms of ‘isolation’ or ‘neutrality.’ Holsti there saw the first seeds for a role-like classification: “Though the authors use the term ‘strategy’ instead of role, the meanings are roughly equivalent: each strategy involves the general orientation of a state toward the external environment and its patterns of commitments and responses over a period of time” (HOLSTI, 1970, p. 252).

6 KIRSTE, Knut & MAULL, Hanns W. (1996). Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie [civilian power and role theory], Zeitschrift für international Beziehungen, December 1996, p. 287.

7 Ibid.

8 GAUPP, Peter (1983). Staaten als Rollenträger: die Rollentheorie als Analyse-Instrument von Außenpolitik und internationalen Beziehungen [States as role carriers, role theory as an analytical instrument of foreign policy and international relations], p. 22.

9 Quoted in GAUPP (1983), p. 22.

10 BACKMAN, Carl (1970). Role Theory and International Relations: A Commentary and Extension, International Studies Quarterly, 14 (3), p. 319.

11 THIES, Cameron G. & BREUNING, Marijke (2012). Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis (2012) 8, p. 2.

12 BREUNING, Marijke (2011). State of the art and blind spots, in HARNISCH; FRANK; MAULL. Role Theory in International Relations, 2011, p. 19.

13 WEHNER, Leslie E.; THIES, Cameron G. (2014). Role Theory, Narratives, and interpretation: The domestic contestation of roles, International Studies Review (2014) 16, p. 413. See also AGGESTAM 1999; THIES 2010.

14 Breuning (2011). p. 17. Walker’s publications in 1987 are typical examples of the structural dimension of role theory.

15 AGGESTAM, Lisbeth (2006). Role theory and European foreign policy, in ELGSTRÖM, Ole; SMITH, Michael, The European Union’s roles in International Politics, p. 15.

16 BREUNING (2011), p. 27.

17 WEHNER; THIES (2014), p. 414.

18 BREUNING (2011), p. 19.

19 BIDDLE, Bruce J.; WILEY, Edwin John Thomas (1966). Role theory; concepts and research.

20 GAUPP (1983), p. 25.

21 HOLSTI, Kalevi. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 1970), p. 246.

22 GOLDSTEIN, Judith; KEOHANE, Robert (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy, p. 3.

23 KIRSTE and MAULL (1996), p. 283.

24 BREUNING (2011), p. 26.

25 LE PRESTRE, Philippe (1997). Role Quests in the post Cold War era, p. 251.

26 Holsti (1970), p. 6.

27 WALKER, Stephen G. (1997). Conclusion, Role Theory and Foreign policy Analysis: An Evaluation, p. 242. KIRSTE; MAULL (1996), p. 291.

28 GAUPP (1983), p. 95.

29 Ibid., p. 95.

30 KIRSTE; MAULL (1996), p. 295.

31 WEHNER; THIES (2014), p. 417.

32 BENES, Vit (2011). Role Theory: A Conceptual Framework for the Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis?, in Third Global International Studies Conference, 17–20 August 2011, University of Porto, Portugal, p. 13.

33 HOLSTI (1970), p. 243.

34 See HARNISCH, Sebastian (2011b). Conceptualizing in the minefield: Role theory and foreign policy learning, Foreign Policy Analysis, 8(1), p. 39-40.

35 HOLSTI (1970), p. 244.

36 Ibid., p. 241.

37 HARNISCH, Sebastian (2011). Operationalization of key concepts, in HARNISCH; FRANK; MAULL: Role theory in International Relations, p. 8.

38 HOLSTI (1970), p. 246.

39 GAUPP (1983), p. 95.

40 Quoted in GAUPP (1983), p. 90.

41 Ibid., p. 17.

42 HARNISCH (2011b), p. 49.

43 HARNISCH (2011), p. 8.

44 NABERS, Dirk (2011). Identity and role change in international politics, in HARNISCH; FRANK; MAULL: Role theory in International Relations, p. 78.

45 WALKER (1997), p. 242 and KIRSTE; MAULL (1996), p. 291.

46 See WISH, Naomi Bailin (1987). National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A Capability-Motivation Model, in WALKER (ed., 1997), p. 96.

47 BREUNING (2011), p. 18.

48 KOJALA, Linas; IVANAUSKAS, Vilius (2015). Lithuanian Eastern Policy 2004-2014: The Role Theory Approach, p. 54.

49 See WISH (1987), p. 97.

50 Ibid., p. 97.

51 HOLSTI (1970), p. 296.

52 GAUPP (1983), p. 104.

53 Ibid., p. 132.

54 “Culture, history, domestic laws and institutions, national values, personality, the political needs of policy makers, capabilities, resources, location, traditional roles, ideology, domestic needs and demands, or external circumstances and resources connected with the international milieu such as treaty commitments, the structure of the international system, or a feeling of danger from enemies or neighbors.” SEKHRI, Sofiane (2009). The role approach as a theoretical framework for the analysis of foreign policy in third world countries, in African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 3 (10), October 2009, p. 425.

55 Ibid., p. 426.

56 HOLSTI (1970), p. 250.

57 GAUPP (1983), p. 106.

58 HOLSTI (1970), p. 298.

59 KIRSTE; MAULL (1996), p. 293.

60 HOLSTI (1970), p. 259. This was e.g. the case in foreign policy speeches of Argentina in 1967-1968.

61 HARNISCH; FRANK; MAULL (2011). Role theory in IR, Introduction, p. 1.

62 AGGESTAM (2006), p. 20. Similarly, the international system is perceived as a social structure, each nation would occupy many social positions or national roles in relationship to other nations. WISH (1980), p. 533.

63 HOLSTI (1970), p. 277.

64 GAUPP (1983), p. 144.

65 Ibid., p. 145.

66 CHAFETZ, Glenn (1997). The Struggle for a National Identity in Post - Soviet Russia, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 4, p. 664.

67 BARNETT, Michael (1993). Institutions, Roles and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System, in International Studies Quarterly (1993) 37, p. 277.

68 SEKHRI (2009), p. 429.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., p. 428.

73 KIRSTE; MAULL (1996), p. 286.

74 BREUNING (2011), p. 28.

75 Ibid., p. 23.

76 NOESSELT, Nele (2014). China and Socialist Countries: Role Change and Role Continuity, in GIGA Research Programme: Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems; No 250; August 2014, p. 2.

77 WALKER, Stephen. SIMON, Sheldon (1987). Role Sets and Foreign Policy Analysis in Southeast Asia, in WALKER, Stephen (ed.), Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 142.

78 WEHNER; THIES (2014), p. 415.

79 CANTIR, Cristian; KAARBO, Juliet (2012). Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory, in Foreign Policy Analysis (2012) 8, p. 6.

80 WEHNER; THIES (2014), p. 416.

81 HARNISCH (2011), p. 8.

82 GAUPP (1983), p.152.

83 HARNISCH (2011b), p. 52.

84 WEHNER; THIES (2014), p. 418.

85 WISH (1980), p. 550.

86 KROTZ, Ulrich (2002). National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared, in Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper 02.1, p. 7.

87 GAUPP (1983), p. 137.

88 BREUNING (2011), p. 24.

89 AGGESTAM (2006), p. 14.

90 BARNETT (1993), p. 275.

91 KIRSTE and MAULL (1996), p. 287.

92 NABERS (2011), p. 81.

93 BREUNING (2011), p. 30.

94 HARNISCH; FRANK; MAULL (2011), p. 2.

95 GAUPP (1983), p. 43.

96 CHAFETZ, Glenn; ABRAMSON, Hillel; GRILLOT, Suzette (1996). Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarusian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Political Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 4, p. 736.

97 OVALI, Şevket (2013). Decoding Turkey’s Lust for Regional Clout in the Middle East: A Role Theory Perspective, in Journal of International and Area Studies, Volume 20, Number 1, 2013, p. 3.

98 BOZDAĞLIOĞLU, Yücel (2003). Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity, 2003, p. 25.

99 BREUNING (2011), p. 25.

100 LE PRESTRE (1997), p. 251.

101 Quoted in LE PRESTRE (1997), p. 3.

102 WEHNER; THIES (2014), p. 431.

103 HARNISCH (2011), p. 10.

104 NOESSELT (2014), abstract.

105 HARNISCH (2011), p. 10.

106 NABERS (2011), p. 88.

107 BREUNING (2011), p. 30.

108 Ibid., p. 31.

109 GAUPP (1983), p. 70.

110 BREUNING (2011), p. 31.

111 NABERS (2011), p. 84.

112 BREUNING (2011), p. 27.

113 THIES, Cameron G. (2014). Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America, Foreign Policy Analysis, 0, p. 8.

114 HOLSTI (1970), p. 256.

115 See also CHAFETZ; ABRAMSON; GRILLOT (1996), p. 740.

116 WISH (1987), p. 99.

117 GAUPP (1983), p. 15.

118 NABERS (2011), p. 74.

119 HOLSTI (1970), p. 273. An example Holsti gave was the “concept of the balancer, often discussed prominently in the literature, appears only in a few references made by President de Gaulle” (p. 272).

120 THIES (2014), p. 9.

121 Ibid., p. 10.

122 WEHNER; THIES (2014), p. 422.

123 SEKHRI (2009), p. 430.

124 DAVUTOĞLU, Ahmet (2013). Teoriden Pratiğe - Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar [From theory to practice - Speeches about Turkish foreign policy], p. 11.

125 HOLSTI (1970), p. 261.

126 Ibid., p. 261.

127 See ibid., p. 278.

128 Ibid., p. 282.

129 Ibid., p. 293.

130 GAUPP (1983), p. 154.

131 WALKER (1996), p. 242.

132 GAUPP (1983), p. 88.

133 WALKER (1987), p. 2.

134 KIRSTE; MAULL (1996), p. 295.

135 Ibid., p. 303.

136 LEMKE, Douglas. Regions of War and Peace, (2002), p. 15, chapter 3 exclusively deals with the model.

137 COOPER, Andrew; FLEMES, Daniel. Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: an introductory review, Third World Quarterly, (2013). Vol. 34, No. 6, p. 945.

138 NOLTE, Detlef. How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics, in Review of International Studies, 36, (2010), p. 883.

139 GODEHARDT; NABERS (2011), p. 2.

140 For a definition of power and for the concepts of hard, soft and smart power see: NYE, 2004, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, and NYE, J., 2008, The Powers to Lead.

141 NOLTE, Detlef. MACHT und MACHTHIERARCHIEN in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ein Analysekonzept für die Forschung über regionale Führungsmächte, (2006). GIGA-WP-29/2006, p. 12.

142 FERGUSON, Niall. Think Again: Power, Foreign Policy, 3 November 2009, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/03/think-again-power/>.

143 OĞUZLU, Tarık Soft power in Turkish foreign policy, Australian Journal of Intl. Affairs, 61:1, (2007). p. 82.

144 NYE, Joseph. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (2008). p. 97.

145 NOYA, Javier (2005). The symbolic Power of Nations, Real Instituto Elcano, WP35.

146 NOLTE (2010). p. 885.

147 Examples for secondary regional powers: Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Iran, Morocco, Spain, Italy, Poland, for small states: Portugal, Ecuador, Uruguay, Baltic and Balkan states. See for the term middle range power. WANG, Hongying and Erik French, (2013). Middle Range Powers in Global Governance, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, Iss. 6.

148 SARAIVA, Miriam Gomes (2014) Balanço da política externa de Dilma Rousseff: perspectivas futuras? [Assessment of Dilma Rousseff’s foreign policy], in Relações Internacionais, December 2014, 44, p. 26.

149 NARLIKAR, Amrita (2013). Negotiating the rise of new powers, International Affairs, Volume 89, Issue 3, p. 561.

150 GARDINI, Gian Luca (2016). Brazil: What rise of what power? Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 35, No 1, p. 7.

151 Ibid., p. 14.

152 Ibid., p. 6.

153 Definition in the Merriam Dictionary, available at <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emerging>.

154 LOPES, Dawisson Belém, Guilherme Casarões, and Carlos Frederico Gama (2013). A Tragedy of Middle Power Politics: Traps and Contradictions in Brazil’s Quest for Institutional Revisionism, International Studies Association Annual Meeting-San Francisco, Panel: Institutional Dynamics in International Organization, p. 1.

155 GARDINI (2016), p. 12. Hurrell also underlined this geographical dimension: “emerging powers lie either outside, or on the margins of the mostly liberal Greater West” (HURRELL 2006, p. 3).

156 Homepage CIC, at <http://cic.nyu.edu/topic/emerging-powers>.

157 Homepage CRP, at <http://www.crp.polis.cam.ac.uk/about>.

158 Report of the NIC’s 2020 Project. December, 2004, available at < http://www.futurebrief.com/project2020.pdf>.

159 See Nolte (2006), p. 7.

160 DONNEUR, Andre and Caroline Alain (1997). Canada: A Reassertion of its role as a middle power, in Philippe Le Prestre: Role Quest in the post-Cold War era, p. 225.

161 See NOLTE (2010), p. 890.

162 WIGHT, Martin (2002), Power Politics, p. 65.

163 MONTERO, Alfred (2014). Brazil - Reversal of Fortune, Chapter 7: Brazilian Foreign Policy (152), p. 172.

164 Ibid., p. 175.

165 CHASE, Robert, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (eds. 1999). A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World, p. 9.

166 See NOLTE, Detlef (2011). Regional powers and regional governance, in GODEHARDT, Nadine and Dirk Nabers, Regional Powers and Regional Orders, p. 57.

167 See NOLTE in GODEHARDT; NABERS (2011), p. 57. The additional criteria for a regional power are a state that (4) is economically, politically and culturally interconnected with the region. This means that the mere economic power as measured by the GDP is not enough, the economic connectivity is most important; (5) influences in a significant way the geopolitical delimitation and the political-ideational construction of the region; (6) exerts this influence by means of regional governance structures (7) defines and articulates a common regional identity or project (8) provides a collective good for the region or participates in a significant way in the provision of such a collective good; (9) defines the regional security agenda in a significant way.

168 NOLTE (2010), p. 893.

169 DESTRADI, Sandra (2010). Regional powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership, Review of International Studies / Volume 36 / Issue 04 / October 2010, p. 905.

170 REID, Michael (2014). Brazil - The troubled rise of a global power, p. 245.

171 GRATIUS, Susanne (2004). Die Außenpolitik der Regierung Lula [The foreign policy of the Lula government], SWP S7 March 2004, p. 6.

172 LAMPREIA, Luiz Felipe (2009). Brasil e os ventos do mundo [Brazil and the winds of the world], p. 171.

173 BETHELL, Leslie (2010). Brazil and Latin America, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 42- 3, p. 457-485.

174 MALAMUD, Andrés and Julio Rodriguez (2014). Straddling the region and the world - Brazil’s dual foreign policy comes of age, in HERZOG, Marc and Philip Robins: The Role, Position and Agency of Cusp States in International Relations, p. 117. More on this “Cuspness” of Brazil in Latin and South America in the following chapter.

175 STÜNKEL, Oliver (2013). Brazil, South American Regionalism and Re-defining the ‘Atlantic Space’, in KORNEGAY, Francis and Narnia Bohler-Muller (eds.), Laying the Brics of a New Global Order. From Yekaterinburg 2009 to Ethekwini 2013, Africa Institute of South Africa, p. 328.

176 LAMPREIA (2009), p. 171.

177 GRATIUS (2004), p. 7.

178 GODEHARDT; NABERS (2011), Introduction, p. 1.

179 NOLTE, in GODEHARDT; NABERS (2011), p. 50.

180 CLINE et al. (2011). Identifying Regional Powers and their status, p. 135. In their analysis, Turkey is in Europe, but not a regional European power.

181 KAZA, Işıl (2002). Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean seen from Turkey, in DIEZ, The EU and the Cyprus conflict, Modern Conflict Postmodern Union, p. 63.

182 Statement of Prime Minister Ecevit in Helsinki on Turkey’s Candidacy to the EU, 11 December 1999, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-prime-minister-bulent-ecevit-in-helsinki-on-turkey_s-candidacy-to-the-eu_br_december-11_-1999-.en.mfa>.

183 GÜL, Abdullah (2007). Yeni yüzyılda Türk dış politikasının ufukları [Horizons of Turkish foreign policy in the new century], p. 68.

184 DAVUTOĞLU, Ahmet (2008). Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10 / No. 1 / 2008, p. 79, available at <http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_10_no_1_2008_davutoglu.pdf>.

185 KALIN, Ibrahim (2011-12). Turkish foreign policy: Framework, values, and mechanisms, International Journal, Vol. 67, No. 1, Charting the new Turkish foreign policy (Winter 2011-12), p. 12.

186 LARRABEE, Stephen and Ian Lesser (2003). Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 3.

187 BANK, André and Roy Karadağ (2013). The ‘Ankara Moment’: the politics of Turkey’s regional power in the Middle East, 2007–11, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2013, p. 287.

188 Quoted in MURINSON, Alexander (2006). The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Nov. 2006), p. 946.

189 ALTUNIŞIK, Meliha Benli (2010). Turkey: Arab Perspectives, TESEV Foreign Policy Analysis Series. 11.

190 YALVAÇ, Faruk (2012). Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the World System, International Relations 26(2), p. 174.

191 ALTUNIŞIK (2010), p. 20. Numbers based on Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade.

192 KIRIŞCI, Kemal (2011). Comparing the neighbourhood policies of Turkey and the EU in the Mediterranean, in ALTUNIŞIK, Meliha Benli, Kemal Kirişci and Nathalie Tocci. Turkey: Reluctant Mediterranean Power, Mediterranean Paper Series 2011, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, p. 32.

193 IBRAHIM, Azeem (2013). The Turkey Model: Does Turkey Offer a Model for Tunisia and Egypt? ISPU, p. 5.

194 BANK; KARADAĞ (2013), p. 299.

195 KALIBER, Alper (2013). The Post Cold War Regionalisms of Turkish Foreign Policy, Journal of Regional Security, issue: 1 / 2013, p. 29.

196 GÜRBEY, Gülistan (2010). Wandel in der türkischen Außenpolitik unter der AKP Regierung? Außenminister Davutoğlus Konzept der „Strategischen Tiefe“ [Change in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government? Foreign minister Davutoğlu’s concept of “strategic depth”], Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, 02/March 2010, p. 20.

197 OKTAV, Özden Zeynep (2011). Concluding remarks, in OKTAV, Özden Zeynep. Turkey in the 21st Century - Quest for a New Foreign Policy, p. 214.

198 Ibid., p. 214.

199 KARAKAŞ, Cemal (2014). Der Umgang der Türkei mit Zielkonflikten in ihrer neuen Außenpolitik, Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, 01 / 2014, p. 18.

200 Ibid., p. 11.

201 KALIBER (2013), p. 30.

202 SÜMER, Fahrettin (2013). Turkey’s Changing Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring, The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 18(1), 2013, article 8, p. 12.

203 HALE, William (2012). Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, third edition, p. 255.

204 NOLTE (2010), p. 887.

205 IDIZ, Semih (2015). Turkey goes from zero problems to nothing but problems in the region, al-monitor, 15 December 2015, available at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/turkey-syria-russia-crisis-reduces-ankaras-regional-clout.html#ixzz3uZDXifDe>.

206 NOLTE (2006), p. 8.

207 GARDINI (2016), p. 13.

208 FAWCETT, Louise (2011). Regional Leadership? Understanding power and transformation in the Middle East, in GODEHARDT; NABERS (2011), p. 164.

209 Ibid., p. 157 - 158.

210 LEMKE (2008). Dimensions of Hard Power - Regional Leadership and Material Capabilities.

211 FAWCETT (2011), p. 166.

212 NOLTE (2010), p. 893.

213 DESTRADI (2010), p. 907.

214 KRAPOHL, Sebastian, Katharina Meissne and Johannes Muntschick (2014). Regional Powers as Leaders or Rambos? The Ambivalent Behaviour of Brazil and South Africa in Regional Economic Integration, JCMS 2014 Volume 52. Number 4. p. 879.

215 KAPPEL, Robert (2011). The Challenge to Europe: Regional Powers and the Shifting of the Global Order, Intereconomics 2011, 5, p. 275.

216 DESTRADI (2010), p. 905.

217 HERZOG, Marc and Philip Robins (2014), p. 2. Besides Brazil and Turkey, the editors included to the list of cusp states Iran Japan, Mexico, Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan.

218 Ibid., p. 2.

219 Ibid., p. 1.

220 Ibid., p. 5 and 6.

221 Ibid., p. 8.

222 I will describe in detail the joint mediation effort concerning the Iran nuclear swap deal in 2010 in chapter 5.3.

223 ALTUNIŞIK, Meliha Benli (2014). Geopolitical representation of Turkey’s cuspness: discourse and practice, in HERZOG; ROBINS, p. 27.

224 Ibid., p. 31-32.

225 HERZOG, Marc (2014). From cusp to hub? How Turkey tried to instrumentalize its cuspness as an aspiring multi-regional middle power, in HERZOG; ROBINS, p. 49.

226 Ibid., p. 53.

227 Ibid., p. 55.

228 MALAMUD; RODRIGUEZ (2015), p. 123-125.

229 Ibid., p. 117.

230 Quoted in ibid., p. 121. Matias Spektor: “Brasilia now sees regionalism as a foreign policy instrument and not as an end in itself.”

231 Ibid., p. 112.

232 Ibid., p. 111.

233 Ibid., p. 116.

234 HUNTINGTON, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, September 1993, available at <http://www.bintjbeil.com/articles/en/d_huntington.html>.

235 LARRABEE; LESSER (2003), p. 189.

236 WALKER, Joshua W. (2009). Turkey’s Imperial Legacy: Understanding Contemporary Turkey through its Ottoman Past, PGDT 8, p. 495.

237 PARK, Bill (2014). Turkey’s ‘New’ Foreign Policy: Newly Influential or Just Over-active?, Mediterranean Politics, 19:2, p. 163.

238 BARRINHA, André (2014). The Ambitious Insulator: Revisiting Turkey’s Position in Regional Security Complex Theory, Mediterranean Politics Vol. 19, Iss. 2.

239 Interview with Wolfgang Kunath, 4 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

240 FARIAS, Rogerio de Souza (2007). Relações internacionais do Brasil em um mundo em transição [International relations of Brazil in a world in transition], in OLIVEIRA, Henrique Altemani & LESSA, Antônio Carlos (orgs.), Relações internacionais do Brasil: temas e agendas (vols. 1 e 2), p. 178.

241 Interview with Claudia Fuentes, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

242 Ibid.

243 Ibid.

244 Interview with Alessandro Warley Candeas, IPRI/FUNAG (Itamaraty), 18 May 2016, Brasilia.

245 VOLGY et al. (2014). Status Considerations in International Politics and the Rise of Regional Powers, in LARSON; WOLFORTH, Status in World Politics, p. 59.

246 LARSON, Deborah Welch; WOLFORTH, William C. (2014). Status and World Order, in LARSON; WOLFORTH, Status in World Politics (2014), p. 25.

247 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014). Managing Rising powers: The role of status concerns in LARSON; WOLFORTH, p. 37.

248 PU, Xiaoyu; SCHWELLER, Randall L. (2014). Status Signaling, Multiple Audiences, and China’s Blue-Water Naval Ambition, in LARSON and WOLFORTH, p. 141.

249 LAKE, David (2014). Status, Authority and the End of the American Century, in LARSON; WOLFORTH, p. 246.

250 LARSON; WOLFORTH (2014), p. 7.

251 THOMPSON, William (2014). Status conflict, hierarchies and interpretation dilemmas, in LARSON; WOLFORTH, p. 219.

252 GILPIN, Robert (1981). War and Change in World Politics, p. 31.

253 LARSON; WOLFORTH (2014), p. 20.

254 Ibid., p. 26.

255 LAKE (2014), p. 249-250.

256 NOLTE (2010), p. 900.

257 LARSON; WOLFORTH (2014), p. 10.

258 VOLGY et al. (2014). Status Considerations in International Politics and the Rise of Regional Powers, in LARSON; WOLFORTH (2014), p. 58.

259 CLINE et al. (2011). Identifying Regional Powers and their status, in VOLGY et al., Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics - Global and Regional perspectives, p. 145.

260 VOLGY et al. (2014), p. 61.

261 See LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 34 and 36.

262 LARSON; WOLFORTH (2014), p. 19.

263 Ibid., p. 10.

264 CASTAÑEDA, Jorge G. (2010). Not Ready for Prime Time: Why Including Emerging Powers at the Helm Would Hurt Global Governance, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 5 (September/October 2010), p. 110.

265 COOPER & FLEMES (2013), p. 957.

266 LARSON; WOLFORTH (2014), p. 23.

267 CASTAÑEDA (2010), p. 109.

268 STÜNKEL, Oliver (2014). Emerging Powers and Status: The Case of the First BRICs Summit, Asian Perspective 38, p. 89-109.

269 Ibid., p. 89-90.

270 Ibid., p. 98.

271 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 41.

272 CLINE et al. (2011), p. 146.

273 LARSON; WOLFORTH (2014), p. 12.

274 Erdoğan Recep Tayyıp, 21 May 2016, speech in Artvin, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3n8ZQk1-BA>.

275 LARSON; WOLFORTH (2014), p. 20.

276 GLÜSING, Jens (2009). South America’s Gentle Giant: Brazil Flexes Muscles over Honduras Crisis, Der Spiegel, 9 October 2009.

277 ZILLA, Claudia (2011). Brasilianische Außenpolitik, Nationale Tradition, Lulas Erben und Dilmas Optionen [Brazilian Foreign Policy, National Traditions, Lula’s heirs and Dilma’s Options], SWP-Studie S29, Nov. 2011, p. 21.

278 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 43.

279 HERZ (2011), p. 170.

280 Ibid., p. 159.

281 GARDINI (2016), p. 11.

282 COOPER & FLEMES (2013), p. 943–962.

283 EAKIN, Marshall C. (2015). The Country of the Present, or Leaving the Future in the Past, in NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. (ed), Emergent Brazil: Key Perspectives on a New Global Power, University Press of Florida, p. 14.

284 HERZ (2011), p. 161. An early example was the 1907 II Peace Conference in The Hague or that Brazil took part in the creation of the UN System.

285 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 49.

286 WIGELL (2011), p. 5.

287 VISENTINI, Paulo Fagundes (2014). Brazil: From ‘Sleeping Giant’ to Emerging Power, in CASTRO, F. De; KOONINGS, K.; WIESEBRON, M. (eds.), Brazil Under the Workers’ Party-Continuity and Change from Lula to Dilma.

288 WIGELL (2011), p. 4.

289 STÜNKEL (2014), p. 104.

290 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 50.

291 HERZ (2011), p. 165.

292 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 52.

293 EBC Agencia Brasil, Obama refers to Brazil as global power, 30 June 2015, available at <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2015-06/obama-refers-brazil-global-power>.

294 Condoleezza Rice. Remarks at the Memorial Museum of Juscelino Kubitschek, 27 April 2005, available at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/45276.htm>.

295 Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, 13 March 2008, available at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/03/102228.htm>.

296 Interview with Dawid Danilo Bartelt, director Heinrich Böll Foundation, 4 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

297 Celso Amorim (2011). Brazil and the Middle East - Reflections on Lula’s South–South Cooperation, Cairo Review 2/2011, available at <http://thecairoreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Brazil-and-the-Middle-East.pdf>, p. 48.

298 David Rothkopf. The world’s best foreign minister, Foreign Policy, 7 October 2009, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/07/the-worlds-best-foreign-minister/>.

299 See BOURNE, Richard. (2008). Lula of Brazil - The Story so far, University of California Press, p. 155.

300 ZILLA (2011), p. 10.

301 Juliet Macuroct. Rio Wins 2016 Olympics in a First for South America, New York Times, 2 October 2009, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/sports/03olympics.html?_r=0>.

302 See for more details chapter 4.7.

303 See ACTI, Esteban (2014). Los tres ejes autonómicos de la política exterior de Brasil (2003-2013) [The three autonomic axes of Brazilian foreign policy], p. 24.

304 MINUSTAH homepage, available at <http://minustah.unmissions.org/>.

305 HERZ (2011), p. 169.

306 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 52.

307 STÜNKEL, Oliver (2010). Strategic international threats Surrounding Brazil, KAS International Reports, 10/2010, p. 112.

308 BAEZA, Cecilia. Can Brazil mediate the Israeli - Palestinian conflict? Assessing its strategy and capabilities (2003-2010).

309 PRIMOR, Adar (2010). Brazil Leader Talks Mideast Peace, How to Be Friends With Both Israel and Iran, 11 March 2010, available at <http://www.haaretz.com/brazil-leader-talks-mideast-peace-how-to-be-friends-with-both-israel-and-iran-1.264691>.

310 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 50.

311 VAZ, Alcides Costa (2014). Brazil’s strategic partnerships: origins, agendas and outcomes, Fride, Working paper 9, July 2014, p. 11.

312 Ibid., p. 17.

313 KELLEHER-VERGANTINI, Serena (2013). Brazil Moves Toward Nuclear Submarine, Arms Control Today, April 2013, available at <http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2013_04/Brazil-Moves-Toward-Nuclear-Submarine>.

314 STÜNKEL (2013), p. 337.

315 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 52-53.

316 Luciana Magalhaes O’neill. Man Who Coined ‘BRICs,’ Still Likes BRICs, But Likes MINTs, Too, Wall Street Journal, 9 December 2013, available at <http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/12/09/oneill-man-who-coined-brics-still-likes-brics-but-likes-mints-too/>.

317 Eric Martin, Goldman Sachs’s MIST Topping BRICs as Smaller Markets Outperform, Bloomberg, 7 August 2012, available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-07/goldman-sachs-s-mist-topping-brics-as-smaller-markets-outperform>.

318 COOPER & FLEMES (2013), p. 943-962.

319 The first meeting of MIKTA Foreign Ministers was held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-first-meeting-of-mikta-foreign-ministers-was-held-on-the-sidelines-of-the-un-general-assembly.en.mfa>.

320 GRIGORIADIS, Ioannis N. (2014). Turkey’s foreign policy activism: vision continuity and reality checks, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 14:2, p. 163.

321 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 56-57.

322 Ibid., p. 55.

323 The White House, Remarks By President Obama to the Turkish Parliament, Office of the Press Secretary, 6 April 2009, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-turkish-parliament>.

324 Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 15 July 2009, available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm>.

325 Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey is BRIC of Europe, British PM Cameron says, 13 October 2010, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=david-cameron-regards-turkey-as-bric-of-europe-2010-10-13>.

326 The European Commission noted Turkey’s “constructive role in its neighborhood and the wider Middle East through diplomacy”, Turkey 2008 Progress Report (05.11.2008, SEC (2008) 2699 Final). Similarly, general praise for Turkish foreign policy was also mentioned in Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009 (05.11.2008, COM (2008) 679 Final).

327 MFA Turkey, Turkey’s Relations with the League of Arab States (AL), available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/guam_.en.mfa>. In 2004 a “Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and the General Secretariat of the AL” was signed, which led in 2006 to the establishment of the “Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum.” An AL mission was inaugurated in Ankara in January 2010 and in April 2010 the Turkish Embassy in Cairo has been accredited to the AL since April 2010.

328 Hürriyet Daily News, Ennahda takes Turkey as model for democracy, 27 October 2011, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ennahda-takes-turkey-as-model-for-democracy.aspx?pageID=438&n=ennahda-takes-turkey-as-model-for-democracy-democracy-2011-10-27>.

329 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014). p. 55.

330 Istanbul Convention and visitors’ bureau, available at <http://icvb.org.tr/icca-statistics-reports-2014/#.V6UduK0nuEc>.

331 4th United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, available at <http://ldc4istanbul.org/icerik.php?no=15>.

332 G20 Antalya Homepage, available at <http://g20.org.tr/>.

333 Prime Ministry, Office of Public Diplomacy, Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Spor Etkinliği Karnesi [Certificate of Turkey’s international sports events], available at <http://kdk.gov.tr/sayilarla/turkiyenin-uluslararasi-spor-etkinligi-karnesi/20>. Some of the bigger events in the reign of the AKP were: 2003, European Beach Volleyball Championships in Alanya; 2010, The 2010 FIBA (Basketball) World Championship; 2011, Winter Universiade, Erzurum; 2012, Istanbul was selected as European Capital of Sport, 2012, FINA World Swimming Championships, Istanbul; 2013, 17th Mediterranean Games, Mersin (6000 athletes from 24 countries), 2013 FIFA U-20 World Cup in seven cities.

334 World Humanitarian Summit, Turkish Humanitarian Policy, Istanbul, 23-24 May 2016, available at <http://whsturkey.org/turkey-and-the-summit/turkish-humanitarian-policy>.

335 Turan Yılmaz, Turkey ranks 3rd most generous donor country, Hürriyet Daily News, 4 October 2014, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-ranks-3rd-most-generous-donor-country.aspx?PageID=238&NID=72519&NewsCatID=510>.

336 Daily Sabah, Turkey most generous country in the world for humanitarian aid, 27 June 2016, available at <http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2016/06/28/turkey-most-generous-country-in-the-world-for-humanitarian-aid>.

337 Laura Pitel, Somalia reaps rewards of Ankara’s investment, Financial Times, 25 May 2016, available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bae31b04-fa6f-11e5-8f41-df5bda8beb40.html#axzz4GY7l4NMU>.

338 David Lepeska, Turkey’s rise from aid recipient to mega-donor, Al Jazeera America, 25 April 2014, available at <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/turkey-internationalaidafricasomaliamiddleeasterdorgan.html>.

339 HALE (2012), p. 246.

340 DAVUTOĞLU, Ahmet (2013). The Three Major Earthquakes in the International System and Turkey, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 48:2, p. 4.

341 Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Office of Public Diplomacy, available at <http://kdk.gov.tr/fotograf/800/0/1390094176_1387816896dis-temsil-gorsel.jpg>.

342 See for an analysis of the mediating experience under the AKP, Gabriel Mitchell (2015). Turkey: The Almost Mediator State, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2015, available at <http://turkishpolicy.com/pdf/Turkey-The-Almost-Mediator-State-Spring-2015_683e.pdf>.

343 Homepage, available at <http://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/>.

344 HALE (2012), p. 248.

345 See for an overview of Turkey’s nuclear policy, UDUM, Şebnem (2010). Turkey›s Nuclear Comeback, The Nonproliferation Review, 17:2, p. 365-377.

346 For more recent developments see JEWELLA, Jessica and ATESA, Seyithan Ahmet (2015). Introducing nuclear power in Turkey: A historic state strategy and future prospects, Energy Research & Social Science 10, p. 273-282.

347 Statement by Hilmi Güler, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), 20 April 2006.

348 SCHIRM, Stefan A. (2010). Leaders in need of followers: Emerging powers in global governance, European Journal of International Relations 16(2), p. 198.

349 GÜRZEL, Aylin (2014). Turkey’s Role as a Regional and Global Player and its Power Capacity: Turkey’s Engagement with other Emerging States, Rev. Sociol. Polit., v. 22, n. 50 (June 2014), p. 98.

350 Geohive, the 50 largest (area) countries in the world, available at <http://www.geohive.com/earth/area_top50.aspx>, the next biggest countries in Latin America are Mexico (1,972,550 km2), Colombia (1,138,910 km2) and Bolivia (1,098,580 km2).

351 2015 World Population Data Sheet, available at <http://www.prb.org/pdf15/2015-world-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf>.

352 Turkey population, available at <http://www.nufusu.com/>.

353 List of Middle East countries by population, available at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Middle_East_countries_by_population>.

354 Romania population, available at <http://countrymeters.info/en/Romania>.

355 GDP worldwide 2015, World Bank data, available at <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>.

356 29 Largest Armies in the World, available at <http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/29-largest-armies-in-the-world.html>.

357 Wikipedia, Military Expenditure worldwide, available at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_past_military_expenditure#2010.E2.80.932019>.

358 Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2016), available at <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>. The difference in South America is big, available at <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-south-america.asp>.

359 Jeremy Bender, Ranked: The world’s 20 strongest militaries, Business Insider UK, 3 October 2015, available at <http://uk.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2015-9/#19-indonesia-2>.

360 See for a debate on soft power in Turkey and Brazil, chapter 4.7.

361 Soft power Portland ranking, available at <http://www.comres.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Report_Final-published.pdf>, p. 7.

362 Ibid.

363 Directorate General of Press and Information, Turkish TV Series Exported To Over 90 Countries, 2 May 2016, available at <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/english/agenda/turkish-tv-series-exported-to-over-90-countries/94472>.

364 In August 2016, three Turkish series are shown on Band TV, available at <http://entretenimento.band.uol.com.br>/ (Sila, Fatmagül and A thousand and one night).

365 UNESCO, Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students, available at <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx>.

366 Ibid.

367 Top 20 countries for international students, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/blog/2014/jul/17/top-20-countries-international-students>.

368 Yunus Emre Institutes, homepage, available at <http://www.yee.org.tr/en/>.

369 Interview with Consul General of Turkey, Mehmet Özgün Arman, São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

370 The Strategic Depth concept will be shortly analyzed in chapter 4.3.1.

371 DAVUTOĞLU, Ahmet (2001). Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth], 107th edition 2015, p. 45.

372 Ibid., p. 57.

373 Ibid., p. 65.

374 Ibid., p. 75.

375 Ibid., p. 81.

376 DAVUTOĞLU Ahmet, 2013, Teoriden Pratiğe – Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar [From theory to practice – Speeches about Turkish foreign policy].

377 Ibid., p. 83.

378 Ibid., p. 119.

379 Ibid., p. 137.

380 Ibid., p. 219.

381 Ibid., p. 231.

382 Ibid., p. 275.

383 Ibid., p. 280.

384 Ibid., p. 355.

385 DAVUTOĞLU, Ahmet. Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Vision, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, p. 96.

386 DAVUTOĞLU, 2013, p. 24.

387 The most influential politician of the past two decades in Turkey is without doubt Erdoğan, since August 2014 the president of the Republic. The reason why he is not included here, is more practical. Speeches by the former prime ministers are not available on the site of the prime ministry and on the site of the presidency the speeches largely deal with domestic issues or very specific foreign policy issues such as during a state visit or on the refugee situation. Therefore here, statements by other leading politicians will be used.

388 Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs, First Global International Studies Conference, Bilgi University Istanbul, 25 August 2005, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/BAKANLAR/ AbdullahGul_Speecheskisaltilmisversiyon.pdf>, p. 30.

389 Speech by Ahmet Necdet Sezer, available at <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalari-ahmet-necdet-sezer/1721/7759/address-by-h-e-ahmet-necdet-sezer-president-of-the-republic-of-turkey-at-the-opening-session-of-the-22nd-term-4th-legislative-year-of-the-turkish-grand-national-assembly.html>.

390 Speech Delivered by H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, at Vienna Diplomatic Academy, 15 April 2009, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-by-h_e_-mr_-ali-babacan_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey_-at-vienna-diplomatic-academy-15.en.mfa>.

391 Speech Delivered by Ali Babacan, Aspen Atlantic Group’s 2009 Annual Meeting, TOBB, 24 April 2009, Ankara, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-by-h_e_-mr_-ali-babacan_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey_-at-the-aspen-atlantic-group-mee.en.mfa>.

392 KALIN, Ibrahim (2011-12). Turkish foreign policy: Framework, values, and mechanisms, International Journal, Vol. 67, No. 1, Charting the new Turkish foreign policy (Winter 2011-12), p. 8.

393 Ibid., p. 16.

394 Lula da Silva’s inaugural speech, 1 January 2003, available at <www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u44275.shtml>, video at : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azjU-Sve1cg>.

395 Inaugural speech by Celso Amorim, 2 January 2003, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-discursos/7547-discurso-proferido-pelo-embaixador-celso-amorim-por-ocasiao-da-transmissao-do-cargo-de-ministro-de-estado-das-relacoes-exteriores>.

396 Parts of the interview with Emir Sader and Pablo Gentili, included to the book Lula y Dilma, coordinated by Emir Sader (2013), Flacso-Brasil, p. 9-30.

397 Speech by President Lula, 13 July 2005 in Paris, opening of the seminar “Brazil: Global Actor”, p. 203.

398 Speech given by President Lula at the graduation ceremony of the “Celso Furtado” Class at the Rio Branco Institute - Brasilia, 1 September 2005.

399 Celso Amorim, Foreign Policy in the Lula Government-Two Years, Plenarium Magazine, 25 November 2005.

400 Marco Aurelio Garcia, Interview with the Agencia de Noticias, “Carta Maior” de Brasil [bigger role of Brazil], 7 June 2006, p. 203, available at <http://www.voltairenet.org/article139857.htm>.

401 Speech by Lula da Silva in the Brazilian Congress, 1 January 2007, full text, available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u88185.shtml>.

402 Celso Amorim (2007). A diplomacia multilateral do Brasil - Um tributo a Rui Barbosa [Multilateral diplomacy of Brazil - A tribute to Rui Barbosa], p. 7, available at <http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/548-A_diplomacia_multilateral_do_Brasil_Um_tributo_a_Rui_Barbosa.pdf>.

403 Interview with Celso Amorim in the daily O Estado de S. Paulo, 15 March 2008, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-entrevistas/7962-entrevista-concedida-pelo-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-embaixador-celso-amorim-ao-jornal-o-estado-de-sao-paulo-brasilia-df-16-03-2008>.

404 Celso Amorim, Creation and Innovation in Brazilian Foreign Policy, lecture at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 25 April 2008.

405 Celso Amorim, Speech at the Instituto Rio Branco – Brasília, 29 April 2008, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-discursos/7975-discurso-do-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-embaixador-celso-amorim-na-cerimonia-de-formatura-da-turma-2005-2007-do-instituto-rio-branco-brasilia-df-29-04-2008>.

406 Celso Amorim, Lecture at a seminar organized by the Valor Economico and Wall Street Journal, New York, 16 March 2009.

407 AMORIM, Celso (2011). Brazil and the Middle East - Reflections on Lula’s South–South Cooperation, Cairo Review 2/2011, p. 48.

408 AMORIM, Celso (2011). Uma Visão Brasileira do Panorama Estratégico Global [A Brazilian vision of the strategic global panorama], Paris, 18 October 2011, Contexto int. vol.33 no.2, July/Dec. 2011, p. 273.

409 Quoted in MALAMUD; RODRIGUEZ (2014), p. 111.

410 Gilberto Maringoni, Giorgio Romano Schutte and Gonzalo Berron (2014). 2003-2013 – Uma Nova Política Externa [A New Foreign Policy], available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/brasilien/11346.pdf>.

411 AMORIM, Celso, Início de uma política externa altiva e ativa [Beginning of a proud and active foreign policy], in MARINGONI et al., 2014, p. 33.

412 PATRIOTA, Antonio. Próximos anos: cenários e desafios da política externa [Next years, scenarios and challenges of foreign policy.], in MARINGONI et al., 2014, p. 21.

413 SILVA, Lula da. O Brasil no mundo: mudanças e transformações [Brazil in the world: changes and transformations], in MARINGONI et al., 2014, p. 176.

414 Speech by Minister Mauro Vieira on the occasion of the ceremony in which he took office as Minister of Foreign Affairs-Brasília, 2 January 2015, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs-speeches/7172-speech-by-his-excellency-ambassador-mauro-luiz-iecker-vieira-during-the-ceremony-in-which-he-took-office-as-minister-of-foreign-affairs>.

415 Speech by Minister Mauro Vieira, graduation ceremony for the ‘Paulo Kol Class’ (2013-15) of the Rio Branco Institute - Brasilia, 12 August 2015, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs-speeches/10760-discurso-do-ministro-mauro-vieira-por-ocasiao-da-cerimonia-de-formatura-da-turma-paulo-kol-2013-2015-do-instituto-rio-branco-brasilia-12-de-agosto-de-2015>.

416 Lecture of Minister Mauro Vieira at the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) – Rio de Janeiro, 16 February 2016, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs-speeches/13153-lecture-of-minister-mauro-vieira-at-the-brazilian-center-for-international-relations-cebri-rio-de-janeiro-february-16-2016>.

417 See MURINSON, Alexander (2006). The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Nov., 2006), p. 946.

418 See ORAN, Baskın (ed., 2010).Turkish Foreign Policy – 1919-2006, University of Utah Press, p. 19.

419 GÜRBEY (2010), p. 18.

420 TÜR, Özlem and HAN, Ahmet (2011). A framework for understanding the changing Turkish Foreign Policy of the 2000s, In OKTAV, Özdem Zeynep (2011). Turkey in the 21st Century – Quest for a New Foreign Policy, p. 9.

421 Ibid.

422 BILGIN, Pınar & BILGIÇ, Ali (2011). Turkey’s “New” Foreign Policy toward Eurasia, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 52:2, p. 174. Basically all governing parties could be labeled ‘centrist.’

423 LARRABEE, Stephen F. (2010). Turkey’s New Geopolitics, Survival (April-May 2010), p. 175.

424 MURINSON (2006), p. 946.

425 TÜR; HAN (2011), p. 12.

426 LARRABEE (2010), p. 158.

427 Preface Written by Ismail Cem for the book “Turkey and The World”, 23 July 1998, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/preface-written-by_mr_-ismail-cem-for-the-book-_turkey-and-the-world_-presented-to-the-press_br_july-23_-1998_br_.en.mfa>.

428 HÜRSOY, Siret (2011), Changing Dimensions of Turkey’s Foreign Policy, International Studies, 48, 2 (2011), p. 150. Quote from Ismail Cem, 2001, Turkey in the New Century.

429 ORAN (ed., 2010), p. 36.

430 OKTAV, Özdem Zeynep (2011). Turkey in the 21st Century – Quest for a New Foreign Policy, p. 1.

431 HALE (2012), p. 253.

432 OKTAV (2011), p. 210.

433 TÜR; HAN (2011), p. 12-13.

434 KALIN (2011-12), p. 20.

435 Ibid., p. 9.

436 ORAN (ed., 2010), p. 13.

437 POPE, Hugh (2010). Pax Ottomana? The Mixed Success of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, The World Ahead (November / December 2010), p. 162.

438 LARRABEE (2010), p. 158.

439 TÜYSÜZOĞLU, Göktürk (2014). Strategic Depth: A Neo-Ottomanist Interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism, Mediterranean Quarterly 25:2, p. 93.

440 MURINSON (2006), p. 946.

441 LARRABEE (2010), p. 160.

442 See KARAKAŞ (2014), p. 15.

443 ROBINS, Philip (2013). Turkey’s ‘double gravity’ predicament: the foreign policy of a newly activist power, International Affairs 89: 2 (2013), p. 381.

444 ORAN, Baskın (2012). Preface, A Proactive Policy with Many Hunches on the Back, In ÖKTEM, Kerem, et al., Another Empire, A decade of Turkey’s Foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party, p. xviii.

445 TUATHAIL, Gearóid Ó; AGNEW, John (1992). Geopolitics and discourse - Practical geopolitical reasoning In American foreign policy, Political Geography, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 190-204, available at <http://www.elsevierscitech.com/pdfs/JPGQ/1992_Geopolitics_and_discourse_Practical_geopolitical_reasoning_in_American_foreign_policy.pdf>.

446 TÜR; HAN (2011), p. 21.

447 ÖKTEM; KADIOĞLU (2012), p. 2.

448 ORAN (2012), p. xx.

449 BECHEV, Dimitar (2011). Turkey’s rise as a regional power, European View (2011), p. 175.

450 YALVAÇ (2012), p. 168.

451 Ibid., p. 168.

452 See DAVUTOĞLU (2008), p. 92.

453 BILGIN & BILGIÇ (2011), p. 173.

454 Ibid., p. 181.

455 ÖKTEM; KADIOĞLU (2012), p. 4.

456 MURINSON (2006), p. 949.

457 WALKER (2009), p. 494.

458 Ibid., p. 505.

459 TÜYSÜZOĞLU (2014), p. 93.

460 ÖZKAN, Behül (2014). Turkey’s Imperial Fantasy, New York Times, 29 August 2014, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/opinion/ahmet-davutoglu-and-turkeys-imperial-fantasy.html?_r=0>.

461 Ibid.

462 ÖZKAN, Behül, Early writings reveal the real Davutoğlu, Al Monitor, 13 August 2014, available at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/zaman-davutoglu-ideologue-behlul-ozkan-academic-akp-islamic.html#ixzz3vzy7HVxA>.

463 Ibid.

464 Ibid.

465 ROBINS (2013), p. 391.

466 SÜMER (2013), p. 21.

467 ROBINS (2013), p. 382.

468 GRIGORIADIS (2014), p. 170.

469 BANK & KARADAĞ (2013), p. 297.

470 ARAS (2014), p. 2.

471 ZALEWSKI, Piotr (2013). How Turkey Went From ‘Zero Problems’ to Zero Friends – And lost its leverage everywhere, Foreign Policy, 22 August 2013, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/how-turkey-went-from-zero-problems-to-zero-friends>.

472 ARAS (2014), p. 2.

473 KARAKAŞ (2014), p. 17.

474 ARAS (2014), p. 2.

475 KALIBER (2013), p. 41.

476 KARAKAŞ (2014), p. 15.

477 VAZ (2014), p. 7.

478 Ibid., p. 8.

479 BERNAL-MEZA, Raúl (2002). A política exterior do Brasil: 1990-2002, Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 45 (1): p. 39. The ‘third-worldism’ in this view was latest formulated by Sarney (1985-1990).

480 VAZ (2014), p. 9.

481 GRATIUS (2004), p. 11.

482 ZILLA (2011), p. 6.

483 VISENTINI (2014), p. 67.

484 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

485 ALMEIDA (2004), p. 67.

486 LAMPREIA, Luiz Felipe (2014). Aposta em Teerã – O Acordo Nuclear Entre Brasil, Turquia e Irã [Gambling in Tehran-The nuclear agreement between Brazil, Turkey and Iran], p. 73 and 74.

487 GRATIUS (2004), p. 11.

488 MONTERO (2014), p. 152.

489 Ibid., p. 154.

490 BERNAL-MEZA, Raúl (2010). International thought in the Lula era, Rev. bras. polít. int. vol. 53, p. 204.

491 Ibid., p. 204.

492 Ibid., p. 205.

493 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

494 ZILLA (2011), p. 19.

495 Interview with Arlene Clemesha, 27 April 2016, São Paulo, USP.

496 Itamaraty, Cúpula América do Sul-Países Árabes (ASPA), available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/mecanismos-inter-regionais/3675-cupula-america-do-sul-paises-arabes-aspa>.

497 AMORIM (2011), p. 52.

498 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

499 Interview with Arlene Clemesha, 27 April 2016, São Paulo, USP.

500 Skype Interview with Elena Lazarou, 8 April 2016, Brussels – Munich.

501 LESSA, Antonio Carlos (2010). Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010), Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition), p. 118.

502 PECEQUILO, Cristina Soreanu (2008). A política externa do Brasil no século XXI: os eixos combinados de cooperação horizontal e vertical [Brazil’s foreign policy in the 21st century: the combining axis of horizontal and vertical multilateral cooperation], Rev. bras. polít. int. vol.51 no.2 Brasília July/Dec. 2008, p. 148.

503 AMORIM (2011), p. 50.

504 Later also Venezuela was granted observer status, which also has a large Arab-origin community.

505 AMORIM (2011), p. 51.

506 Ibid., p. 52.

507 Interview with Arlene Clemesha, 27 April 2016, São Paulo, USP.

508 Ibid.

509 Saraiva (2014), p. 34.

510 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

511 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

512 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

513 Interview with Suhayla Khalil, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

514 Interview with Velasco. Already in June 2014 Guilherme Casarões (FGV) told the author of this episode.

515 6 May 2016, Paulo Afonso Velasco, Flamengo. Already in June 2014 Guillerme Casaroes (FGV) told the author of this episode.

516 Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, Sao Paulo, Avenida Paulista.

517 20 May 2016, Alcides Costa Vaz, UnB, Brasilia.

518 6 May 2016, Paulo Afonso Velasco, Flamengo.

519 6 May 2016, Paulo Afonso Velasco, Flamengo.

520 6 May 2016, Paulo Afonso Velasco, Flamengo.

521 ZILLA (2011), p. 35.

522 Isabel Fleck, Itamaraty perde espaço no Orçamento [MFA loses space in the budget], Folha de São Paulo, 25 December 2014, available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2014/12/1566948-itamaraty-perde-espaco-no-orcamento.shtml>.

523 Diário do Poder, Dilma ‘tungou’ R$ 588 milhões do Itamaraty [Dilma ‘stole’ 588 mio. RS from Itamaraty], 5 September 2015, available at <http://diariodopoder.com.br/noticia.php?i=39295459096>.

524 Interview with Patricia Mello, 26 April 2016, Folha de São Paulo.

525 CELESTINO, Helena. Um Brasil silencioso [A quiet Brazil], Valor, 6 May 2016, p. 16 and 17.

526 Interview with Patrick Howlett-Martin, 2 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

527 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

528 Interview with Suhayla Khalil, 29 April 2016, Centro Cultural São Paulo.

529 Interview with Dawid Danilo Bartelt, 4 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

530 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

531 Interview with Patrick Howlett-Martin, 2 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro

532 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

533 Interview with Alcides Costa Vaz, 20 May 2016, UnB, Brasilia.

534 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

535 Ibid.

536 CELESTINO (2016), p. 16.

537 Interview with Patricia Mello, 26 April 2016, Folha de São Paulo.

538 Interview with Patrick Howlett-Martin, 2 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

539 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

540 Interview with Patricia Mello, 26 April 2016, Folha de São Paulo.

541 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, Itamaraty’s Department for Europe II, 23 May 2016, Brasilia.

542 MercoPress, Brazil warns neighbors about “propagating falsehoods over the internal political process”, 16 May 2016, at <http://en.mercopress.com/2016/05/16/brazil-warns-neighbors-about-propagating-falsehoods-over-the-internal-political-process.>.

543 Interview with Alessandro Warley Candeas, IPRI/FUNAG (Itamaraty) 18 May 2016, Brasilia.

544 Interview with Patricia Mello, 26 April 2016, Folha de São Paulo.

545 Interview with ex-ambassador Rubens Barbosa, 27 April 2016, São Paulo, IRICE office.

546 Interview with Alessandro Warley Candeas, IPRI/FUNAG (Itamaraty) 18 May 2016, Brasilia.

547 Interview with Mariana Carpes, 24 May 2016, UnB, Brasilia.

548 TÜR; HAN (2011), p. 24.

549 Ibid., p. 21.

550 HÜRSOY (2011), p. 150.

551 POPE (2010), p. 163.

552 BILGIN & BILGIÇ (2011), p. 187.

553 Among the projects launched by Cem were the exchange of ambassadors with Iran, the creation of the Neighborhood Forum Initiative (1998) to introduce regional confidence-building measures, the establishment of a Turkish-Greek Mideast Initiative to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians, and the convening of the OIC-EU Joint Forum on Civilization and Harmony (2002).

554 GÜRBEY (2010), p. 27.

555 GRIGORIADIS (2014), p. 160.

556 POPE (2010), p. 164.

557 ARAS (2009), p. 135.

558 TÜR; HAN (2011), p. 23.

559 See BILGIN & BILGIÇ (2011), p. 182.

560 GÜRBEY (2010), p. 25.

561 Interview with Spanish daily El País, 28 October 1999.

562 ZILLA (2011), p. 5.

563 Interview with Suhayla Khalil, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

564 MONTERO, Alfred (2014). Brazil – Reversal of Fortune, Chapter 7: Brazilian Foreign Policy (152), p. 157.

565 Ibid., p. 191.

566 PECEQUILO (2008), p. 141.

567 ZILLA (2011), p. 31.

568 Interview with ex-ambassador Rubens Barbosa, 27 April 2016, São Paulo.

569 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

570 Interview with, Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

571 VISENTINI (2014), p. 69.

572 STÜNKEL (2013), p. 329.

573 Interview with Alcides Costa Vaz, 20 May 2016, UnB, Brasilia.

574 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

575 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

576 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

577 Luiz Souto Maior (2003). Desafios de uma política externa assertiva, Rev Brasl Polit. Int. 46 (1), p. 19.

578 Bernal-Meza, 2010, p. 206.

579 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

580 ACTIS (2014), p. 201.

581 BERNAL-MEZA (2010), p. 206.

582 VISENTINI (2014), p. 69.

583 Interview with Mariana Carpes, 24 May 2016, UnB, Brasilia.

584 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

585 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

586 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

587 Ibid.

588 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

589 Ibid.

590 MURINSON, Alexander (2006), The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Nov., 2006), p. 947.

591 ORAN, Baskın (ed., 2010), Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006, University of Utah Press, p. 41.

592 PARK, Bill (2014) Turkey’s ‘New’ Foreign Policy: Newly Influential or Just Over-active?, Mediterranean Politics, 19:2, p. 164.

593 GRATIUS, Susanne, Die Außenpolitik der Regierung Lula, SWP S7 März 2004, p. 27.

594 ZILLA (2011).

595 MONTERO, Alfred (2014) Brazil – Reversal of Fortune, Chapter 7: Brazilian Foreign Policy, p. 153.

596 ZILLA (2011), p. 10.

597 Ibid.

598 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, Sao Paulo. See for the “Rede Brasileira Pela Integração dos Povos”, available at < http://www.rebrip.org.br/>.

599 Interview Khalil, 29 April 2016.

600 ZILLA (2011), p. 12.

601 GRATIUS (2004), p. 10.

602 ZILLA (2011), p. 12.

603 Interview with Alessandro Warley Candeas, IPRI’s coordinator-general (Itamaraty), 18 May 2016, Brasilia.

604 ZILLA (2011), p. 12.

605 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de, (2010), Never Before Seen in Brazil: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s grand diplomacy, Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (2), p. 163.

606 20 May 2016, Alcides Costa Vaz, UnB, Brasilia.

607 VISENTINI (2014), p. 63.

608 Skype Interview with Elena Lazarou, 8 April 2016, Brussels - Munich.

609 GLÜSING (2009).

610 KIRIŞÇI, Kemal (2006). Turkey’s foreign policy in turbulent times, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Chaillot Paper No. 92, September 2006.

611 TÜR; HAN (2011), p. 11.

612 GÜZELDERE, Ekrem Eddy (2009). Turkish Foreign Policy: From “Surrounded by Enemies” to “Zero Problems”, In SCHÄFFER, Sebastian and TOLKSDORF, Dominik (eds.), The EU member states and the Eastern Neighbourhood – CAP Policy Analysis, available at <http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2009/CAP-Policy-Analysis-2009-01.pdf>.

613 Interview with Consul General of Turkey in São Paulo, Mehmet Özgün Arman, 26 April 2016.

614 HÜRSOY (2011), p. 140.

615 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 55.

616 MURINSON (2006), p. 950.

617 GRIGORIADIS (2014), p. 162.

618 Quoted in PILCH, Jakup (2012). Turkey’s Recent National Role conceptions and shifts in its Foreign Policy, MA thesis, CEU Budapest.

619 KIRIŞCI (2009), p. 37.

620 KALIN (2011-12), p. 19.

621 ARAS; GÖRENER (2010), p. 90.

622 YALVAÇ (2012), p. 167.

623 KALIBER (2013), p. 26.

624 TÜYSÜZOĞLU (2014), p. 94.

625 HERZOG (2014), p. 53 and 56.

626 HÜRSOY (2011), p. 149.

627 HERZOG (2014), p. 57.

628 SOTERO, Paulo and ARMIJO, Leslie Elliott (2007). Brazil: To be or not to be a BRIC?, Asian perspective 31(4).

629 AMORIM (2011), p. 270.

630 LARSON; SHEVCHENKO (2014), p. 48.

631 GARDINI (2016), p. 9.

632 GRATIUS (2004), p. 28.

633 HERZ (2011), p. 162.

634 LOPES et al. (2013), p. 3.

635 MALAMUD; RODRIGUEZ (2014), p. 116.

636 Quoted in MAURO (2012), p. 7.

637 Itamaraty, Republic of Turkey, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=5458&Itemid=478&cod_pais=TUR&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=pt-BR>.

638 Turkish MFA, Türkiye - Brezilya Siyasi İlişkileri [Turkey-Brazil political relations], available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-brezilya-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>. The latest date added is from 2011.

639 KUTLU, Mehmet Necati (2012). Osmanlı Imparatorluğu-Brezilya Ilişkilerinin Başlangıcında Dair bir Deneme [An attempt about the beginning of Ottoman Empire-Brazil relations], In Kutlu/Atakan/Yurtaydın/Kaygusuz/Çiçek/Erdem, 2012, Osmanlı Imparatorluğu-Latin Amerika (Baslangıç Dönemi) [Ottoman Empire Latin America, early period], p. 31.

640 Ibid, p. 36. The appointment letter has the number BOA.A.DVN.MHM, file No 8/A, Gömlek No 79 in the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry.

641 Ibid, p. 36.

642 Ibid, p. 36.

643 SOCHACZEWSKI, Monique (2012). O Brasil, O Império Otomano e a Sociedade Internacional: Contrastes e Conexões (1850-1919) [Brazil, the Ottoman Empire and the International Society: Contrast and Connections], p. 131.

644 Ibid, p. 132.

645 KUTLU (2012), p. 36.

646 SOCHACZEWSKI, Monique (2012), p. 133.

647 Ibid., p. 134.

648 Ibid., p. 134.

649 Ibid., p. 59. At that time there were no Brazilian embassies, these were called legação, legation.

650 TEMEL, Mehmet (2004). Osmanlı Latin Amerika Ilişkileri [Ottoman-Latin America Relations], p. 89.

651 Ibid., p. 91.

652 See ibid., p. 95. Temel mentioned two more cases of medal exchange in 1859 and 1860, and a letter sent in 1861 by Pedro II, on the birth of a grandchild, princess Dona Izabel.

653 SOCHACZEWSKI, Monique (2012), p. 135.

654 From Paris he was ordered to Rotterdam in 1861 where he stayed until 1883.

655 SOCHACZEWSKI, Monique (2012), p. 141.

656 Mansure is a city North of Cairo and Tanta is located in the Nile delta.

657 Today the oldest part of Tel Aviv.

658 TEMEL (2004), p. 96.

659 Embassy of Brazil in Ankara, Bilateral Relations, available at <http://ancara.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/relacoes_bilaterais.xml>. Sochaczewski only in 1911 spoke of an official consulate in Alexandria, then headed by Conde Miguel Debanné.

660 SOCHACZEWSKI, Monique (2012), p. 143.

661 EFENDI, Bağdatlı Abdurrahman (2013). Brezilya’da İlk Müslümanlar - Brezilya Seyahatnamesi [The First Muslims in Brazil - The Brazil Travel Book], p. 11.

662 Ibid., p. 29.

663 Ibid., p. 36.

664 Ibid., p. 37.

665 Ibid., p. 40.

666 Ibid., p. 52.

667 Ibid., p. 53.

668 Ibid., p. 58.

669 Ibid., p. 60.

670 His wife, Teresa Cristina, who accompanied him already in 1871, arrived already earlier on 20 September.

671 SOCHACZEWSKI, Monique (2012), p. 154.

672 See ibid., p. 168.

673 Ibid., p. 165.

674 TEMEL (2004), p. 11.

675 Interview with Monique Sochaczewski Goldfeld, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

676 TEMEL (2004), p. 92.

677 SOCHACZEWSKI, Monique (2012), p. 164.

678 Ibid., p. 161.

679 Ibid., p. 161.

680 Temel (2004), p. 97.

681 Ibid., p. 99.

682 See SOCHACZEWSKI, Monique (2012), p. 167.

683 TEMEL, 2004, e.g. p. 7-8 or concerning Brazil p. 110-118.

684 Ibid., p. 186.

685 TEMEL (2004), p. 106.

686 Ibid., p. 96 and 103.

687 Brazil Federal Senate, DECRETO N. 18.406 – 25 September 1928, available at <http://legis.senado.gov.br/legislacao/ListaTextoIntegral.action?id=57782&norma=73635>.

688 Republic of Turkey, Embassy in Brasilia, available at <http://brezilya.be.mfa.gov.tr/Mission.aspx>. In 1972 the Turkish embassy moved to Brasilia.

689 Brazilian Embassy in Ankara, Bilateral Relations, available at <http://ancara.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/relacoes_bilaterais.xml>.

690 Interview with ambassador Antonio Luis Espinola Salgado, 25 February 2016, Ankara, Brazilian embassy.

691 Interview with Brazil’s ambassador Salgado in Ankara, 25 February 2016.

692 Süleyman Demirel speaking in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, photo taken by the author in the Demirel Museum in Islamköy near Isparta, July 2015.

693 UN Conference on Environment and Development, available at <http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html>.

694 Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, Department of economic and social studies, Brazil Country report, 11 January 2008, available at <http://www.ito.org.tr/Dokuman/Ulke/Brezilya.pdf>, p. 8.

695 LEVAGGI, Ariel S. González (2012). América Latina y Caribe, la última frontera de la ‘Nueva’ Política Exterior de Turquía, Araucaria, Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 14, nº 28, p. 188.

696 These countries were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico and Peru.

697 Interview with Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, at LAMER Ankara, 24 February 2016. Erol is professor at Gazi University giving courses on foreign policy at Lamer.

698 Paulo Henrique Braga, Turquia busca aumentar peso diplomático [Turkey seeks to increase diplomatic weight], 1 November 1998, available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mundo/ft01119808.htm>.

699 Dışişleri bakanı Ismail Cem’in Brezilya ziyareti [Foreign minister Ismail Cem’s Brazil visit], 7 November 1998, available at <http://www.porttakal.com/ahaber-disisleri-bakani-ismail-cemin-brezilya-ziyareti-61992.html>.

700 Milliyet, Ankara’nın hedefi: Latin Amerika [Ankara’s goal: Latin America], 2 September 1998, available at <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/09/02/siyaset/siy04.html>.

701 Interview with Consul General of Turkey, Mehmet Özgün Arman, São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

702 Turkish Statistical Institute, Brazilian entries 2001, available at <http://rapory.tuik.gov.tr/12-03-2016-11:18:27-2520466471012386520280553990.html>.

703 TUIK, Brazilian tourists in Turkey 2002/2003, available at <http://rapory.tuik.gov.tr/12-03-2016-11:20:51-809855910248561457711629463.html>. Interestingly in 1996 the number was already 16,626, of which more than half of them arrived by cruise ships. This number in 2003 was only 231 persons.

704 See for the importance of tourism, section 5.9.8. in the economic chapter.

705 Law No 5165, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5165.html>.

706 See LAZAROU, Elena (2016). Brazil–Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Deconstructing Partnership between Emerging Powers, Insight Turkey Vol. 18 / No. 1 / 2016, p. 123-141.

707 Law No 5165, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5165.html>.

708 Hürriyet Daily News, Brazilian-Turkish friendship should not be limited, 20 March 2004, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/brazilian-turkish-friendship-should-not-be-limited.aspx? pageID=438&n=brazilian-turkish-friendship-should-not-be-limited-2004-03-20>.

709 See LAZAROU, Elena (2011). Regional Powers in Growing Dialogue: The Brazil Turkey Strategic Partnership and its Implementation, GPoT Brief no. 2, May 2011, p. 2.

710 LEVAGGI, Ariel González (2013). Turkey and Latin America: A New Horizon for a Strategic Relationship, Perceptions, Winter 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 4, p. 107.

711 Interview with Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, at LAMER Ankara, 24 February 2016.

712 LEVAGGI (2013), p. 109.

713 Süleyman Kurt, Brazil Lends Shoulder to Turkey for Cyprus and UN, 21 January 2006, Zaman, available at <http://www.lobicilik.com/hispano-turco/Hispano-LatinYear2006Turkey.htm>.

714 Hürriyet, Gül: THY Brezilya’ya doğrudan uçacak, [Turkish Airlines will fly directly to Brazil], 20 January 2006, available at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gul-thy-brezilyaya-dogrudan-ucacak-3816650>.

715 Selahattin Alpar, Latin Amerika-Hızla Gelişen İlişkiler [Latin America - Quickly developing relations], Turkish Foreign ministry, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye--latin-amerika-_-hizla-gelisen-iliskiler-.tr.mfa>. The two institutions signed the official founding agreement in 2007, DEIK, Turkey - Brazil Business Council, available at <http://en.deik.org.tr/Konsey/34/Turkey_Brazil.html>.

716 Turkish Foreign Ministry, Statements by the ministry, No: 4, 16 January 2006, Dışişleri Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Sayın Abdullah Gül’ün; Brezilya’ya Yapacağı Resmi Ziyaret hk., [About the official visit of foreign minister Abdullah Gül to Brazil], available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_4--16-ocak-2006_-disisleri-bakani-ve-basbakan-yardimcisi-sayin-abdullah-gul_un_-brezilya_ya-yapacagi-resmi_ziyaret-hk_.tr.mfa>.

717 Turkish Embassy in Brasilia, Briefing Note, Relações bilaterais entre a República da Turquia e a República Federal do Brasil [Bilateral relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Federal Republic of Brazil], 12 August 2013, available at <http://brezilya.be.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=128762>.

718 LEVAGGI (2013), p. 110.

719 Lula defende negócios entre Brasil e Turquia [Lula defends trade between Brazil and Turkey], 21 May 2009, available at <http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/economia/2009/05/21/ult35u69747.jhtm>.

720 Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Seminário Internacional Brasil-Turquia, Istanbul [Speech of president Lula on the occasion of the international Turkey-Brazil seminar], 21 May 2009, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-discursos/11120-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-por-ocasiao-do-seminario-internacional-brasil-turquia-istambul-21-de-maio-de-2009>.

721 Milliyet, Lula: Türkiye’yle ticaretimiz 1 milyar dolar, utanmalıyız [Lula: Our trade with Turkey is 1 billion dollars, we should be ashamed], 22 May 2009.

722 Fabrícia Peixoto, Agenda de Lula na Turquia tem ‘afinidades políticas’ e comércio [Lula’s agenda in Turkey has ‘political affinities’ and trade], BBC, 20 May 2009, available at <http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2009/05/090519_lula_apresntaturquia_fa_cq.shtml>.

723 Press conference of presidents Lula and Gül, 22 May 2009, Ankara, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEmytZzM-M0> (in Turkish).

724 Dinner speech by president Lula, Ankara 22 May 2009, available at <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/2o-mandato/2009/22-05-2009-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-durante-jantar-oferecido-pelo-presidente-da-turquia-abdullah-gul>.

725 Declaração conjunta por ocasião da visita do presidente Lula à Turquia [Joint declaration on the occasion of president Lula’s visit to Turkey], 22 May 2009, available at <http://noticiasdaturquia.blogspot.com.br/2009/05/declaracao-conjunta-por-ocasiao-da.html>.

726 Derya Sazak, Lula ziyareti [The Lula Visit], 23 May 2009, Milliyet, available at <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/lula-ziyareti/derya-sazak/siyaset/siyasetyazardetay/23.05.2009/1097981/default.htm>.

727 CRS Report for Congress, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, Order Code RS21592, 6 September 2006, available at <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21592.pdf>, p. 1. (quoted in CRS Report for Congress, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, Order Code RS21592, 6 September 2006, p. 2.

728 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 51.

729 Homepage of the IAEA; available at <https://www.iaea.org/>.

730 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 54.

731 In 2002 the Institute for Science and International Security identified these centers (in Natanz und Arak).

732 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 57.

733 Statement by H.E. Mr. G. Ali Khoshroo, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, Second Session of the Prepcom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 29 April 2003.

734 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV /2003/75, 10 November 2003, available at < https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-75.pdf>.

735 HOWLETT-MARTIN, Patrick (2015). The disputed rise of a regional power 2003-2015, p. 265.

736 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005, GOV/2005/77, available at < https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2005-77.pdf>.

737 Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 2005, Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters, available at <https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13382>. Unilaterally, for the US, these were by no means the first sanctions against Iran. These started already in November 1979 when bank accounts were frozen after the hostage crisis in Tehran. Already in 1995 a total embargo was decided. The final unilateral sanctions were decided on 3 July 2013 against the car industry and the Iranian currency.

738 IAEA, 31 January 2006, Foreign Ministers Issue Statement on Iran, available at <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/foreign-ministers-issue-statement-iran>.

739 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 60.

740 ÖZKAN, Mehmet (2011). Turkey-Brazil Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue: What Is the Big Deal?, in Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2011, p. 26-30.

741 HOWLETT-MARTIN (2015), p. 261.

742 EAKIN (2015), p. 266.

743 ÖZKAN (2011), p. 27.

744 DAVUTOĞLU (2013), p. 35.

745 AMORIM, Celso (2015). Teerã, Ramalá e Doha - memórias da política externa ativa e altiva [Tehran, Ramallah and Doha-memories of an active and proud foreign policy], p. 18.

746 The Manhattan Project was a research and development project that produced the first nuclear weapons during World War II. It was led by the United States with the support of the United Kingdom and Canada.

747 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

748 AMORIM (2011), p. 59.

749 Mariana Carpes, CV, available at <http://brasilia.academia.edu/MarianaCarpes/CurriculumVitae>.

750 Interview with Mariana Carpes, 24 May 2016, UnB Brasilia.

751 CARDOSO, Fernando Henrique (2001). A política externa do Brasil no início de um novo século: uma mensagem do Presidente da República [Brazilian foreign policy at the beginning of a new century: a message from the President], Rev. Bras. Polit. Int. 44 (1), p. 7.

752 Interview with Mariana Carpes, 24 May 2016, UnB Brasilia.

753 EAKIN (2015), p. 264.

754 Ibid., p. 265.

755 ROBINS (2013), p. 394.

756 AMORIM (2011), p. 58.

757 Report of the First Panel Established Pursuant to the Note by the President of the Security Council on 30 January, 1999S/1999/356, 27 March 1999, available at <www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/Amorim%20Report.htm>.

758 AMORIM (2011), p. 59.

759 AMORIM (2015), p. 18.

760 Ibid., p. 19.

761 See ibid., p. 22.

762 HOWLETT-MARTIN (2015), p. 258.

763 Ibid., p. 266.

764 Interview with Patricia Mello, 26 April 2016, Folha de São Paulo.

765 AMORIM (2015), p. 23. Amorim acknowledged that statements made by Ahmedinejad negating the Holocaust did not help calming the atmosphere.

766 LAMPREIA (2009), p. 286.

767 ROETT, Riordan (2011). The New Brazil, Brookings Institution’s Press, p. 146.

768 AMORIM (2015), p. 23.

769 MONTERO (2014), p. 170.

770 ROETT (2011), p. 147.

771 AMORIM (2011).

772 AMORIM (2015), p. 25.

773 Ibid., p. 29.

774 Ibid., p. 42.

775 Interview with Patrick Howlett-Martin, 2 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

776 AMORIM (2015), p. 28.

777 Ibid., p. 50.

778 Ibid., p. 50.

779 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 86.

780 HOWLETT-MARTIN (2015), p. 264. “The more Iran feels threatened, the more it will hope to prevail with its nuclear program” (p. 265).

781 POPE (2010), p. 169.

782 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 81.

783 Ibid., p. 86.

784 AMORIM (2015), p. 51.

785 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 84.

786 AMORIM (2015), p. 54.

787 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, available at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Nuclear_Security_Summit>.

788 AMORIM (2015), p. 56.

789 Ibid., p. 56. Lula and Amorim were on a state visit to Israel in March 2010 where they met with Perez, Netanyahu and Livni who informed them about the threat Iran posed to them. Amorim said that he met with Israeli experts who presented him ‘proofs’, photos, which he found little convincing.

790 Interview with Dawid Danilo Bartelt, director of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 4 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

791 Interview with Patricia Mello, 26 April 2016, Folha de São Paulo.

792 Turkish Foreign Ministry, Dışişleri Bakanı Davutoğlu‘nun Brezilya’yı Ziyareti Hk [About the visit of foreign minister Davutoğlu to Brazil], 14 April 2010, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-82_-14-nisan-2010_-disisleri-bakani-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-brezilya_yi-ziyareti-hk_.tr.mfa>.

793 AMORIM (2015), p. 60.

794 Ibid., p. 60.

795 Ibid., p. 61.

796 Ibid., p. 62.

797 Ibid., p. 62.

798 Ibid., p. 65.

799 Homepage G15, available at <http://g15.org/>.

800 G15 members, available at <http://g15.org/member-countries-2/>.

801 AMORIM (2015), p. 71.

802 HOWLETT-MARTIN (2015), p. 258.

803 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 94.

804 Ibid., p. 92.

805 AMORIM (2015), p. 67.

806 Ibid., p. 78.

807 Ibid., p. 79.

808 Full text of the agreement in English: Nuclear fuel declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8686728.stm>.

809 Ibid.

810 Turkish Foreign Ministry, Press Release No: 101, 17 May 2010, Press Release Regarding the Agreement on Iran’s Nuclear Program, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-101_-17-may-2010_-press-release-regarding-the-agreement-on-iran_s-nuclear-programme.en.mfa>.

811 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 99.

812 AMORIM (2015), p. 81.

813 ROBINS (2013), p. 394.

814 AMORIM (2015), p. 14.

815 REID Michael (2014). Brazil - The troubled rise of a global power, p. 239.

816 AMORIM (2015), p. 82.

817 Ibid., p. 84.

818 Ibid., p. 84.

819 DAVUTOĞLU, Ahmet and AMORIM, Celso, Giving Diplomacy a Chance, New York Times, 26 May 2010, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/opinion/27iht-eddavutoglu.html>.

820 DREYFUSS, Robert (August 2010). United States Slams Turkey, Brazil over Iran, available at <http://www.wrmea.org/2010-august/four-views-the-turkey-brazil-iran-agreement-thanks-but-no-thanks.html>.

821 3rd UN Alliance for Civilizations Forum in Rio de Janeiro, available at < http://www.unaoc.org/global-forums/rio/>.

822 HOWLETT-MARTIN (2015), p. 266.

823 Jornal do Brasil, 29 May 2010.

824 REID (2014), p. 240.

825 Full text published at: <http://www.voltairenet.org/article165719.html>. In the letter, published by Brazilian foreign affairs website Política Externa.

826 Glenn Kessler, U.S., Brazilian officials at odds over letter on Iranian uranium, Washington Post, 28 May 2010, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052705151.html>.

827 Ibid.

828 Laura Rozen, Obama admin. dismisses leak of Obama letter on Iran fuel deal, Politico, 28 May 2010, available at <www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0510/Obama_admin_dismisses_leak_of_Obama_letter_on_Iran_fuel_deal.html>.

829 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 111.

830 Ibid., p. 114.

831 Ibid., p. 101.

832 ACTIS (2014), p. 204.

833 AMORIM (2015), p. 84.

834 Ibid., p. 84.

835 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1929 (2010), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, 9 June 2010,available at < https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf>.

836 AMORIM (2015), p. 86. Amorim wrote that on 4 July Davutoğlu called to tell him how disappointed the US was with the dissenting vote.

837 REID (2014), p. 240. This aspect was also confirmed by Amorim (2015, p. 86).

838 HOWLETT-MARTIN (2015), p. 259.

839 AMORIM (2015), p. 86.

840 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 108.

841 Ibid., p. 109.

842 Ibid., p. 110.

843 FONTEIJN, Marteen et al. (2010). New Players in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program, BASIC, August 2010, available at <http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/Iran-Brazil-Turkey-new-players_0.pdf>, p. 3. On 26 July 2010, the EU added travel bans for Iranian personalities. Until 2012 the list of frozen bank accounts and black lists of Iranian companies and persons became longer and longer.

844 AMORIM (2015), p. 92.

845 Ibid, p. 95.

846 HOWLETT-MARTIN (2015), p. 257.

847 Mariano Aguirre, 3 June 2010, Brazil-Turkey and Iran: a new global balance, available at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/mariano-aguirre/iran-turkey-brazil-new-global-balance>.

848 FULLER, Graham (2010). Brazil and Turkey Shift Global Politics, New Perspectives Quarterly, Volume 27 # 3, Summer 2010, available at <http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2010_summer/07_fuller.html>.

849 ÖZKAN (2011), p. 26.

850 EAKIN (2015), p. 266.

851 LAZAROU (2016), p. 133.

852 ÖZKAN (2011), p. 28.

853 FONTEIJN et al. (2010), p. 5.

854 Ibid., p. 7.

855 ZILLA (2011), p. 22.

856 CASTAÑEDA (2010), p. 119.

857 GRIGORIADIS (2014), p. 169.

858 Interview with Mariana Carpes, 24 May 2016, UnB, Brasilia.

859 Interview with Patricia Mello, 26 April 2016, Folha de São Paulo.

860 Interview with Alcides Costa Vaz, 20 May 2016, UnB, Brasilia.

861 LAMPREIA (2014), p. 123.

862 Interview with Paulo Afonso Velasco, 6 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

863 Interview with Arlene Clemesha, 27 April 2016, USP, São Paulo.

864 Quoted in LAMPREIA (2014), p. 82.

865 Interview with Dawid Danilo Bartelt, 4 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

866 Interview with a senior Brazilian diplomat, April 2016.

867 ALMEIDA (2010), p. 174.

868 Quoted in LAMPREIA, 2014, p. 82.

869 Ibid., p. 136.

870 Ibid., p. 83.

871 Interview with ex-ambassador Rubens Barbosa, 27 April 2016, São Paulo.

872 Interview with Brazilian ambassador Salgado, 25 February 2016, Brazilian embassy in Ankara.

873 Interview with Sergio Barreiros, Deputy Director, Instituto Rio Branco, 19 May 2016, Brasilia.

874 Interview with senior Brazilian diplomat, April 2016.

875 The Soft-Power Power (Interview of Celso Amorim to Foreign Policy, 28 November 2010), available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs-interviews/8096-the-soft-power-power-foreign-policy-28-11-2010>.

876 Interview with Patrick Howlett-Martin, 2 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

877 See about the details of the July 2015 agreement, Julian Borger, Iran nuclear deal: world powers reach historic agreement to lift sanctions, The Guardian, 14 July 2015, available at < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/iran-nuclear-programme-world-powers-historic-deal-lift-sanctions>.

878 Interview with Hüseyin Diriöz, Turkey’s ambassador in Brazil, 18 May 2016, Turkish embassy Brasilia.

879 Invest in Turkey, News, 6 January 2010, Turkey and Brazil to build a strategic partnership, available at <http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/turkey.brazil.form.partnership.aspx>.

880 Report of the Third Forum, available at <http://www.unaoc.org/docs/UNAOCrioforumReport_lr.pdf>.

881 Address by Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey, 28 May 2010, available at <http://www.unaoc.org/rioforum/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/100608-Erdoğan.pdf>.

882 Anadolu News Agency, avaialable at <https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/10/1028459_re-os-brazil-turkey-turkey-aims-to-upgrade-ties-with-brazil.html>.

883 Action Plan for Strategic Partnership between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Turkey (full text), available at <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/2010/action-plan-for-strategic-partnership-between-the-federative-republic-of-brazil-and-the-republic-of-turkey/at_download/arquivo>.

884 VAZ (2014), p. 12.

885 Action Plan for Strategic Partnership, 2010, p. 2.

886 Ibid.

887 Takvim, Erdoğan’a jet servis [A Plane service for Erdoğan], 28 May 2010, available at <http://www.takvim.com.tr/ekonomi/2010/05/28/erdogana_jet_servis>.

888 LAZAROU (2011), p. 3.

889 Interview with Hüseyin Diriöz, Turkey’s ambassador in Brazil, 18 May 2016, Turkish embassy Brasilia.

890 See for the signed agreements, 7 October 2011,available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/2791->.

891 The agreement was still not ratified by the Brazilian authorities in 2016. Information by the Turkish general consul in São Paulo.

892 Press conference with Dilma Rousseff and Abdullah Gül, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZUGMwm02_g>.

893 Folha de São Paulo, Brasil e Turquia fortalecem relação estratégica em visita de Dilma a Ancara [Brazil and Turkey strengthen strategic relations during the visit of Dilma to Ankara], 7 October 2011, available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2011/10/987511-brasil-e-turquia-fortalecem-relacao-estrategica-em-visita-de-dilma-a-ancara.shtml>.

894 See for the full text of the declaration in Portuguese and English, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/2792->.

895 TUSKON was founded in 2005 by companies, which formerly were members of MÜSIAD, the Islamic-conservative business association close to the AKP. TUSKON was the unofficial business association of Gülen-affiliated companies. In Turkey it was shut down after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt.

896 See for the declaration in Portuguese and English, available at <www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/2792->.

897 Interview with Brazilian ambassador Salgado, 25 February 2016, Brazilian embassy Ankara.

898 See 2003 Defense agreement, available at <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/2003/b_46/at_download/arquivo>.

899 Website of the Turkish Embassy in Brasilia, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti-Brezilya İkili İlişkileri [Bilateral relations between Turkey and Brazil], 29 March 2012, available at <http://brezilya.be.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=121727>.

900 Brazilian Defense Ministry, 7 May 2012, available at <http://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/noticias/3981-07052012-defesa-brasil-e-turquia-estreitam-cooperacao-no-setor-de-defesa>.

901 Brazilian defense ministry, letter of intention (Carta de Intenções), 7 May 2012, available at <http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes05/carta_brasil_turquia.pdf>.

902 World Politics Review, For Brazil and Turkey, a Natural Defense Partnership Deepens, 21 May 2012, available at <http://www.postwesternworld.com/2012/05/21/for-brazil-and-turkey-a-natural-defense-partnership-deepens/>.

903 Türkiye-Brezilya Ortak Bildirisi [Turkey-Brazil joint communiqué], 21 June 2012, available at <http://www.haberler.com/turkiye-brezilya-ortak-bildirisi-3726357-haberi/>.

904 Cihan news agency, Brezilya, Türkiye’nin stratejik savunma ortağı [Brazil is Turkey strategic defense partner], 26 August 2013, available at <http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/1066608-brezilya-turkiyenin-stratejik-savunma-ortagi>.

905 Defesa Aérea & Naval, Brasil e Turquia reforçam laços de defesa [Brazil and Turkey strengthen defense ties], available at <https://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/brasil-e-turquia-reforcam-lacos-de-defesa/?print=pdf>.

906 Brazilian Ministry of Defense; communiqué, 22 August 2013, available at <http://www.trmilitary.com/viewtopic.php?t=3594>.

907 Cihan news agency, 26 August 2013.

908 See for the list of bilateral treaties, at <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br>. The latest bilateral agreement was signed in October 2011 about the transfer of condemned persons. However, this agreement is not yet ratified.

909 Interview with Jean Tible, 29 April 2016, São Paulo.

910 Interview with Brazilian ambassador Salgado, 25 February 2016, Brazilian embassy Ankara.

911 Interview with Hüseyin Diriöz, Turkey’s ambassador in Brazil, 18 May 2016, Turkish embassy Brasilia.

912 Skype Interview with Elena Lazarou, 8 April 2016, Brussels - Munich.

913 STÜNKEL, Oliver. Brazil-Turkey: Can the Love Last?, published at <http://www.postwesternworld.com/2013/04/10/brazil-turkey-relations-can-the-love-last>.

914 Itamaraty, relations with Turkey, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/ficha-pais/5458-republica-da-turquia>.

915 Itamaraty, Press note concerning the visit of foreign minister Patriota to Istanbul and Izmir, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/3277-visita-do-ministro-antonio-de-aguiar- patriota-a-republica-da-turquia-istambul-e-izmir-2-a-5-de-janeiro-de-2013>.

916 Turkey Foreign Ministry, Turkey-Brazil political relations, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-brezilya-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

917 Mail answer by Mauricio Bernardes on 9 September 2016. Bernardes participated in the meeting in Ankara.

918 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, head of Division Europe II in the Brazilian foreign ministry, 23 May 2016. Bernardes has been head of this division since 2013. Before he served in Chile and Madrid.

919 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, 23 May 2016.

920 Global Diplomacy Index, Ranking 2016, available at <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/global-diplomacy-index/country_rank.html>.

921 Itamaraty, Foreign Relations, Frequently asked questions, available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=699&Itemid=131&lang=pt-BR#I.6>. For Brazil these are 139 Embassies, 52 General Consulates, 11 Consulates, 8 deputy-consulates, 13 missions and 3 offices.

922 Quoted in FONSECA, Raoni Mauricio da (2012). Asia Central e Caucaso: As relações com o Brasil sob a égide do novo grande jogo de sécoulo XXI [Central Asia and the Caucasus: the relations with Brazil under the aegis of the new great game in the 21st century], p. 65.

923 Brazilian Embassy in Ankara, available at <http://ancara.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/contatos_da_embaixada.xml>.

924 Interview with José Barros, Laila Winther, Viviane Oliveira, General Consulate Brazil in Istanbul, 14 March 2016.

925 Interview with José Barros, General Consulate of Brazil in Istanbul, 14 March 2016.

926 Globo, Número de diplomatas brasileiros cresce mais de 50% em uma década [Number of Brazilian diplomats grows more than 50% in a decade], 18 October 2012, available at <http://noblat.oglobo.globo.com/noticias/noticia/2012/10/numero-de-diplomatas-brasileiros-cresce-mais-de-50-em-uma-decada-470838.html>.

927 Interview with Alessandro Warley Candeas, 18 May 2016, IPRI/FUNAG (Itamaraty) Brasilia.

928 German MFA, employees, available at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/AuswDienst/Mitarbeiter_node.html>.

929 STÜNKEL, Oliver. How many diplomats does an emerging power need?, 14 October 2012, available at <http://www.postwesternworld.com/2012/10/14/how-many-diplomats-does-an-emerging-power-need/>.

930 John Samuel Raja, No one is talking about India’s real diplomatic crisis, Quartz, 17 January 2014, available at <http://qz.com/167746/no-one-is-talking-about-the-real-diplomatic-crisis-in-india/>.

931 Does America need a foreign policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, New York 2001, p. 101. Kissinger praised Brazil in several other publications as well, e.g. available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2001/05/15/brazils-destiny-an-obstacle-to-free-trade/ca2db3ef-7362-434c-bbeb-32c8ec78d7d8/>.

932 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro,

933 Interview with senior Brazilian diplomat, April 2016.

934 Interview with Patrick Howlett-Martin, 2 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

935 Interview with, Alcides Costa Vaz, 20 May 2016, UnB, Brasilia.

936 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

937 Interview with Alcides Costa Vaz, 20 May 2016, UnB, Brasilia.

938 Interview with Alessandro Warley Candeas, IPRI/FUNAG (Itamaraty), 18 May 2016, Brasilia.

939 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

940 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

941 ZILLA (2011), p. 9 and 10.

942 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, 23 May 2016, Itamaraty’s Department for Europe II.

943 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

944 Interview with Sergio Barreiros, Deputy Director of the Rio Branco Institute, 19 May 2016, Brasilia.

945 Interview with Sergio Barreiros, Deputy Director of the Rio Branco Institute, 19 May 2016, Brasilia.

946 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, Itamaraty’s Department for Europe II, 23 May 2016.

947 Interview with José Barros, Laila Winther, Viviane Oliveira, General Consulate of Brazil in Istanbul, 14 March 2016.

948 Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Office of Public Diplomacy, 13 yılda 65 yeni temsilcilik [In 13 years 65 new representations], http://kdk.gov.tr/sayilarla/13-yilda-65-yeni-temsilcilik-turkiyenin-yurtdisindaki-temsilcilik-sayisi-228e-cikti/41.

949 Interview with Consul General of Turkey in São Paulo, Mehmet Özgün Arman, 26 April 2016.

950 Interview with Hüseyin Diriöz, Turkey’s ambassador in Brazil, 18 May 2016, Brasilia.

951 Interview with Consul General of Turkey in São Paulo, Mehmet Özgün Arman , 26 April 2016.

952 ORAN (ed., 2010), p. 25. For Oran most diplomats prefer to serve abroad, because the payment in Ankara is significantly less, which negatively affects the quality in Ankara, p. 32.

953 History of the Foreign Ministry, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-disisleri-bakanligi-tarihcesi.tr.mfa>.

954 ORAN (2010), p. 33.

955 DAVUTOĞLU (2013), p. 363. Interview with CNN Türk on 2 January 2008.

956 Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/meslek-memurlari.tr.mfa>.

957 Diplomacy Academy, available at <http://diab.mfa.gov.tr/en/about/about/>.

958 Diplomacy Academy, available at <http://diab.mfa.gov.tr/en/education-programs-2/diplomatic-studies-program/basic-training-program/>.

959 Diplomacy Academy, available at <http://diab.mfa.gov.tr/en/education-programs-2/diplomatic-studies-program/program-for-field-studies/>.

960 Diplomacy Academy, Collaboration, available at <http://diab.mfa.gov.tr/en/about/cooperation-activities/>.

961 Diplomacy Academy, Language programs, available at <http://diab.mfa.gov.tr/tr/egitim-programlari/dil-programlari/>.

962 Naci Koru, Acting Deputy Undersecretary, available at <http://diab.mfa.gov.tr/en/about/message-from-the-deputy-minister/>.

963 Ministry of Development, 2015 Budget, available at <http://www.sp.gov.tr/upload/xSPTemelBelge/files/TClM0+8579_ ovmpekleri-2015-2017.pdf>. The budget of the Directorate of Religious Affairs was 1.4 percent.

964 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, head of Department for Europe II, Brazilian foreign ministry, 23 May 2016.

965 Interview with Brazilian ambassador Salgado, 25 February 2016, Brazilian Embassy in Ankara.

966 Cabinet of Senator Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, Initial Text of the motion, 21 May 2015, available at <http://www.senado.leg.br/atividade/rotinas/materia/getTexto.asp?t=166535&c=PDF&tp=1>.

967 See for the motion, the voting result and additional documents, Federal Senate, Requerimento nº 550, de 2015, available at <http://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/121399>.

968 Interview with Brazilian ambassador Salgado, 25 February 2016, Brazilian embassy in Ankara.

969 MFA Turkey, 8 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Resolution Adopted by the Brazilian Senate on 2 June 2015 on the Events of 1915, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-171_-8-june-2015_-press-release-regarding-the-resolution-adopted-by-the-brazilian-senate-on-2-june-2015-on-the-events-of-1915.en.mfa>.

970 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, head of Department for Europe II, Brazilian foreign ministry, 23 May 2016.

971 Interview with Brazilian ambassador Salgado, 25 February 2016, Brazilian embassyin Akara.

972 Interview with Hüseyin Diriöz, Turkey’s ambassador in Brazil, 18 May 2016, Turkish embassy in Brasilia.

973 HOWLETT-MARTIN (2015), p. 260.

974 Interview with Abdullah Boztaş, CCBT director, Brasilia 23 May 2016, CCBT office in Brasilia.

975 The G20 was already founded in 1999, but until 2008 only finance ministers and the presidents of the central banks would meet under that label, available at <www.g20.org/English/aboutg20/AboutG20/201511/t20151127_1609.html>.

976 The term was initially coined by the Boston based investment firm Fidelity, available at <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mints-mexico-indonesia-nigeria-turkey.asp>.

977 POPE (2010), p. 161.

978 HALE (2012), p. 156.

979 ROETT (2011), p. 127.

980 STÜNKEL (2013), p. 327.

981 Ibid., p. 49.

982 SEUFERT, Günter (2012). Außenpolitik und Selbstverständnis. Die gesellschaftliche Fundierung von Strategiewechseln in der Türkei, SWP Study S 11, p. 30, available at <https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2012_S11_srt.pdf>.

983 SÜMER (2013), p. 10.

984 YALVAÇ (2012), p. 172.

985 MONTERO (2014), p. 153.

986 EDAM (Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies), available at <http://www.edam.org.tr/en/>.

987 Quoted in KARLI (2012), p. 113.

988 KALIN (2011-12), p. 10.

989 Quoted in KARLI (2012), p. 109.

990 See ibid., p. 111.

991 ROSECRANCE, Richard N. (1986). The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World.

992 KIRIŞÇI (2009), p. 33.

993 Ibid., p. 42.

994 Ibid., p. 43. The Anatolian tigers mentioned most often are the cities Konya, Kayseri and Gaziantep. They all are strongholds of the governing AKP.

995 TÜR and HAN (2011), p. 22.

996 Ibid., p. 23.

997 ÖNIŞ & KUTLAY (2013), p. 1414.

998 Interview with Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, at LAMER Ankara, 24 February 2016.

999 BECHEV (2011), p. 174.

1000 KALIN (2011-12), p. 16.

1001 GRIGORIADIS (2014), p. 164.

1002 VISENTINI (2014), p. 69.

1003 ZILLA (2011), p. 8.

1004 VAZ (2014), p. 11.

1005 See ZILLA (2011), p. 9.

1006 ROETT (2011), p. 137.

1007 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016, World Economic Outlook Database, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx>.

1008 Created from World Development Indicators: GDP growth (annual %), available at <http://databank.worldbank.org/>.

1009 ROETT (2011), p. 141.

1010 ALMEIDA (2010), p. 161.

1011 LESSA, Antonio Carlos (2010). Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010), Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (special edition), available at <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v53nspe/v53nspea07.pdf, p. 117>.

1012 ROETT (2011), p. 143.

1013 EAKIN (2015), p. 26.

1014 Quoted in KARLI (2012), p. 110.

1015 Ibid., p. 110.

1016 BOZZO, Albert. A Decade-Long Ascent to Economic Power, CNBC, 15 August 2012, available at <http://www.cnbc.com/id/48550382>.

1017 Habertürk, Her yerde Türkiye mucizesi konuşuluyor [Everywhere the Turkey miracle is talked about], 3 December 2012, available at <http://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/para/haber/799914-her-yerde-turkiye-mucizesi-konusuluyor>.

1018 ERDOĞAN, Recep Tayyıp. The Turkish Economy Meets EU Entry Criteria, Huffington Post, 28 December 2012, available at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/recep-tayyip-erdogan/the-turkish-economy-meets_b_2205265.html>.

1019 ELLYATT, Holly. Can Turkey Become ‘the China of Europe’?, 18 January 2013, available at <http://www.cnbc.com/id/100390252>.

1020 World Bank data, available at <https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table>.

1021 Wikipedia, List of countries by GDP, available at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_largest_historical_GDP>.

1022 WEISENTHAL, Joe. The World’s largest economies: 1990 vs. 2011, Business Insider, 9 March 2012, available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-worlds-largest-economies-1990-vs-2011-2012-3>.

1023 KARLI (2012), p. 114-115.

1024 GDP Turkey; 1970-2014, available at <http://www.kushnirs.org/macroeconomics_/en/turkey__gdp.html>. Turkey is also roughly home to one percent of the global population.

1025 GDP Brazil; 1970-2014, available at <http://www.kushnirs.org/macroeconomics_/en/brazil__gdp.html>.

1026 KLEINWÄCHTER, Kai (2012). Wachstum-Wohlstand-Instabilität, Brasilien in Zahlen, in Welttrends Nr. 85, p. 76.

1027 Quoted in MAURO (2012), p. 6.

1028 See for the numbers, KARLI (2012), p. 117.

1029 Ibid., p. 118.

1030 See for the list of countries, available at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29_per_capita>, Uruguay is on 46th position, Argentina on 52nd, followed by Chile. Right ahead of Turkey are with Kazakhstan and Malaysia two rather big Muslim majority countries.

1031 CEBR, World Economic League Table 2016 Highlights, 26 December 2015, available at <http://www.cebr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Cebr-World-Economic-League-Table-2016-26-December-2015-final.pdf>.

1032 Morgan Stanley Research, Global EM Investor - The Fragile Five, 5 August 2013, available at <http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/MorganStanleyFragileFive.pdf>.

1033 Unctad, World Investment Report 2015, available at <http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/WIR2015/WIR15_tab01.xls>. Hong Kong is counted apart from China, so some analysts also write that Brazil received the 5th most FDI.

1034 Santander Bank, Brazil, FDI in Figures, available at <https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/brazil/foreign-investment>.

1035 Invest in Turkey, FDI inflow into Turkey up 32 pct., hits USD 16.5 billion, 11 February 2016, available at <http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/110216-turkey-2015-fdi-up-32-percent.aspx>.

1036 World Investment Report 2017, available at <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf>.

1037 DONAHUE, Patrick. Brazil, Turkey Among Top Decliners in Global Corruption Ranking, Bloomberg, 27 January 2016, available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-27/brazil-turkey-among-top-decliners-in-global-corruption-ranking>.

1038 PESTANO, Andrew V., Brazil, Turkey rise most in 2015 Corruption Index, 27 January 2016, available at <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/01/27/Brazil-Turkey-rise-most-in-2015-Corruption-Index/7351453899198/>.

1039 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2015, available at <https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2015_corruptionperceptionsindex_rep?e=2496456/33011041>, p. 7-8.

1040 Ibid., p. 14.

1041 QUIROGA, Yesko (2014). Vom Auf- zum Absteiger? Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, Macht und halbe Wahrheiten in Brasilien, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Internationale Politikanalyse, Oktober 2014, p. 7.

1042 HERRMANN, Boris. Multiple Depression, Süddeutsche Zeitung, available at <http://panamapapers.sueddeutsche.de/articles/57067eeca1bb8d3c3495b8bc/>.

1043 See for a list of the 26 persons, known by name in April 2016 and their political or professional affiliation, available at <http://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/noticias/quem-sao-os-brasileiros-citados-no-panama-papers>.

1044 Interview with Patricia Mello, 26 April 2016, Folha de São Paulo.

1045 QUIROGA (2014), p. 9.

1046 Ibid., p. 11.

1047 ÖNIŞ & KUTLAY (2013), p. 1417.

1048 Ibid., p. 1416.

1049 Global Opportunity Index, Milken Institute, available at <http://www.globalopportunityindex.org/>.

1050 Ibid., available at <http://www.globalopportunityindex.org/opportunity.taf?rankyear=2015&page= country&code=TUR>.

1051 Ibid., available at <http://www.globalopportunityindex.org/opportunity.taf?rankyear=2015&page= country&code=BRA>.

1052 World Bank Group, Doing Business, available at <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.

1053 Human Development Report 2015, available at <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2015_statistical_annex.pdf>.

1054 Interview with Paulo Ferracioli, 3 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

1055 Turkish Daily News, 20 March 2004.

1056 Yüksel Söylemez, Turkey discovers the Americas, Hürriyet Daily News, 29 January 2006, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-discovers-the-americas.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkey-discovers-the-americas-2006-01-29>.

1057 DEIK, webpage on the bilateral business council, available at <https://www.deik.org.tr/Konsey/34/T%C3%BCrkiye_Brezilya.html. FIESP, http://www.fiesp.com.br/>.

1058 Information note by the Turkish General consulate, 31 March 2016, available at <http://saopaulo.bk.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=122062>, on the third meeting, information also received from Turkish and Brazilian institutions in Brazil.

1059 See Ahmet Kıvanç, Brezilya’da 18’inci sondajda petrol bulan Petrobras, Türkiye’nin umudu [Petrobras, which found oil after the 18th drilling in Brazil, is Turkey’s hope], Radikal newspaper, 21 December 2007, available at <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=242240>.

1060 Turkey, Ministry of the Economy, Target countries, explanation.

1061 Turkey, Ministry of the Economy, 2014-2015 Dönemi Hedef ve Öncelikli Ülkeleri [Target and preferential countries in 2014-2015].

1062 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1063 Material given by DEIK, builds on statistics of TUIK.

1064 Interview with Caner Sannev, Trade Attaché Turkish general consulate São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1065 Interview with Mehmet Özgün Arman, Turkish general consul in São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1066 Os 32 Mercados Prioritários para o Comércio Exterior Brasileiro segundo o PNE – TURQUIA, COMEX, 11 August 2015, available at <https://www.comexdobrasil.com/os-32-mercados-prioritarios-para-o-comercio-exterior-brasileiro-segundo-o-pne-turquia/>.

1067 Interview with Helder Paulo M. Silva und Rafael Lameiro da Costa Rocha, Brasilia, 20 May 2016, CAMEX, Department of International Negotiations.

1068 Statistics for Turkey, Turkish Statistical Institute, available at <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>.

1069 DEIK, Brezilya Ülke Bülteni Kasım 2015 [Brazil Country Bulletin 2015], p. 10. Data from 2015 and before 2003 from the Brazilian Consulate in Istanbul.

1070 Figures until 2000 from Istanbul Ticaret Odası Ekonomik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Şubesi Brezilya Ülke Raporu [Istanbul Chamber of Commerce - Economic and Social Studies department, Brazil Country Report], 11 January 2008, p. 4.

1071 Demir Şarman, chairman of DEIK Turkey-Brazil Business Council, available at <http://www.star.com.tr/kobi/turk-is-dunyasindan-brezilya-seferi-haber-1269931/>.

1072 ÖZTÜRK, Hamdullah. Brezilya ile stratejik ortaklık tamam hedef 10 milyar dolarlık ticaret [The goal of the strategic partnership with Brazil is 10 billion USD trade], 21 June 2012, Interview with ambassador Ersin Erçin, available at <http://www.turkiyebrezilya.com/brezilya-ile-stratejik-ortaklik-tamam-hedef-10-milyar-dolarlik-ticaret-481.html>.

1073 Interview with João Daniel, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

1074 Consulate General of Brazil in Istanbul, Import Export Figures between Brazil and Turkey, SECOM Istanbul, 3 February 2016.

1075 Consulate General of Brazil in Istanbul, Import Export Figures between Brazil and Turkey, SECOM Istanbul, 3 February 2016. The author got the documents from the Consulate in March 2016.

1076 Interview with Helder Paulo M. Silva and Rafael Lameiro da Costa Rocha, Brasilia, 20 May 2016, CAMEX.

1077 Interview with Luiz Alberto, 25 April 2016, honorary consul of Turkey in Curitiba.

1078 Interview with Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1079 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1080 Interview with Helder Paulo M. Silva und Rafael Lameiro da Costa Rocha, Brasilia, 20 May 2016, CAMEX.

1081 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1082 Ibid.

1083 Interview with Paulo Ferracioli, 3 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

1084 Ibid.

1085 Ibid.

1086 Interview with Brazilian ambassador Salgado, 25 February 2016, Brazilian Embassy Ankara.

1087 Interview with Luiz Alberto, Curitiba, 25 April 2016. In other sectors, import is possible and does take place. In Curitiba, e.g. already during the time of Luiz Alberto’s father as honorary consul, the company La Violetera, which imported dry fruit (e.g. figs, apricots) from many countries concentrated on Turkey.

1088 Interview with Paulo Ferracioli, 3 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

1089 Interview with Caner Sannev, Trade Attaché, Turkish general consulate São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1090 After finishing the thesis, this group of three was joined by BRF food company, which bought the majority of shares of the Turkish food company Banvit, paying 915 mio TL in January 2017 (at that time roughly 230 Mio Euros).

1091 The coffee distributor is: Numara on Kahve, available at <http://noonkahve.com.tr/index.html>.

1092 See on the publications site of the General Consulate of Brazil in Istanbul also the list of Brazilian companies in Turkey. In July 2016, there was a previous list online with then 18 companies, available at <http://istambul.itamaraty.gov.br/en-us/publications.xml>. The author received the most topical list from the consulate.

1093 Handout received by Ali Tamer Bozoklar, Brazil’s honorary consul in Izmir.

1094 Votorantim Turkey website, history, available at <http://www.votorantimcimentos.com.tr/en-us/company/history>.

1095 Telephone interview with Votorantim Turkey, 25 February 2016.

1096 Votorantim Website, available at <http://www.votorantimcimentos.com/pt-BR/global-presence/Paginas/turkey.aspx>. It has 16 centers for polished (ready mixed) concrete in the regions of Ankara, Cappadocia and Black Sea and two plants of concrete aggregates, one in Ankara Lalahan and the other in Kayseri-Bünyan.

1097 Votorantim Turkey website, available at <http://www.votorantimcimentos.com.tr/kurumsal/tarihce>.

1098 Votorantim Website, Success Stories, Linha ferroviária de alta velocidade na Turquia [High speed train connection in Turkey], available at <http://www.votorantimcimentos.com/pt-BR/products-and-services/success-cases/Paginas/high-speed-railway-in-turkey.aspx>.

1099 Ibrahim Ekinci, Votorantim, Sivas’a yarım milyarlık yatırım yapıyor [Votorantim invests half a billion TL in Sivas], 29 May 2015, Dünya newspaper, available at <http://www.dunya.com/guncel/votorantim-sivasa-yarim-milyarlik-yatirim-yapiyor-263732h.htm>.

1100 Vatan newspaper, Brezilya’dan Türkiye’ye sürpriz transfer [Surprising transfer from Brazil to Turkey], 4 October 2007, available at <http://www.gazetevatan.com/brezilya-dan-turkiye-ye--surpriz--transfer-140238-gundem/>.

1101 See the website of Metalfrio / Klimasan in Turkey, available at <http://www.klimasan.com.tr/>.

1102 DALAN, Necla. Türkiye’nin meyve devi olacak [It will become Turkey’s fruit giant], Vatan newspaper, 19 September 2011, available at <http://www.gazetevatan.com/turkiye-nin-meyve-devi-olacak-400514-ekonomi/>.

1103 ETAP, Anadolu, press release, Anadolu Etap’tan meyve suyu için dev proje [Giant project for fruit juice by Anadolu Etap], no date given, available at <http://www.anadoluetap.com/Cms/Upload/news/2.pdf>.

1104 Anadolu Etap website, about, available at <http://anadoluetap.com/Content/1/5/hakkinda>.

1105 Interview with Caner Sannev, Trade Attaché Turkish general consulate São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1106 Email to the author on 11 April 2016.

1107 Interview with, Caner Sannev, Trade Attaché Turkish general consulate São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1108 Ibid.

1109 Kordsa Global website, about us, available at < http://www.kordsaglobal.com/kordsaglobal.asp?d=en>.

1110 Sabancı Holding, Press Release, Sabancı Holding to acquire COBAFI, 16 May 2005, available at <https://www.Sabancı.com/en/press/press-releases/Sabancı-holding-to-acquire-cobafi-companhia-bahiana-de-fibras-Camaçari-salvador-do-bahia-brasil/i-921>.

1111 Interview with Luiz Carlos França Duarte, vice-director, Kordsa Global, 9 May 2016 Camaçari, Bahia.

1112 Mail answer by Arzu Ongün, Kordsa Istanbul, 12 February 2016. Since 2010 there was a process of reducing the capacities in Argentina and move more capacities to Camaçari. After the plant was sold, much of the machines were either brought to Camaçari “or to our plant in Egypt.” Also some of the staff was moved to Camaçari, “our work force was increased by 10-12 percent. This made the production more efficient.” Interview with Hüseyin Ateş, 9 May 2016, Kordsa Global, Camaçari.

1113 Most employees are in Turkey (1326), followed by Indonesia (1287). Kordsa Global-Annual report 2015, available at <www.kordsaglobal.com/media/downloads/faaliyet_raporlari/KORDSAGLOBAL_ANNUAL_REPORT_2015.pdf>, p. 43.

1114 Interview with Hüseyin Ateş, 9 May 2016, Kordsa Global, Camaçari, Bahia.

1115 Interview with Luiz Carlos França Duarte, 9 May 2016, Kordsa Global, Camaçari, Bahia.

1116 Ibid.

1117 Interview with Hüseyin Ateş, 9 May 2016, Kordsa Global, Camaçari, Bahia.

1118 Kordsa Global website, about us, available at <http://www.kordsaglobal.com/kordsaglobal.asp?d=en>.

1119 Interview with Luiz Carlos França Duarte, 9 May 2016, Kordsa Global, Camaçari, Bahia.

1120 Ibid.

1121 Interview with Hüseyin Ateş, 9 May 2016, Kordsa Global, Camaçari, Bahia.

1122 Mail answer by Arzu Ongün, Kordsa Istanbul, 12 February 2016.

1123 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1124 Mail answer by Arzu Ongün, Kordsa Istanbul, 12 February 2016.

1125 Murat Palavar, 2016 Görünümü daha iyi [2016 Outlook better], 25 March 2016, Yeni Şafak, available at <http://www.kordsaglobal.com/media/img_press/photo/Yeni-Safak-2016-gorunumu-25032016.jpg>.

1126 Alessandra Nascimento, “Peroxy Bahia é lançada em Camaçari” [Peroxy Bahia opened in Camaçari], 5 December 2011, Tribuna da Bahia, available at <www.tribunadabahia.com.br/2011/12/05/peroxy-bahia-e-lancada-em-camacari>.

1127 Peroxy Bahia website, available at <http://www.peroxybahia.com/>.

1128 GDP per capita, Terra newspaper special site, available at <http://economia.terra.com.br/pib-capita/>.

1129 José Angel Espinoza, April 2016, Perfil das Relações Comerciais Brasil Turquia. Espinoza presented the data at a conference in Salvador in April 2016.

1130 Interview with José Angel Espinoza, Honorary Consul of Turkey, 10 May 2016, Salvador.

1131 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1132 Estatística básica de Turismo [Basic tourism data] – December 2015, available at <http://www.dadosefatos.turismo.gov.br/dadosefatos/estatisticas_indicadores/downloads_estatisticas/Estatisticas_Basicas_Turismo_Brasil_2014_Dez2015.xlsx>.

1133 Rio Times, Brazil Sees Foreign Spending and Tourism Boost in First Quarter, 27 May 2016, available at <http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/first-quarter-foreign-spending-and-tourism-boost-brazil/#>.

1134 Estatística básica de Turismo [Basic tourism statistics) – December 2015, available at <http://www.dadosefatos.turismo.gov.br/dadosefatos/estatisticas_indicadores/downloads_estatisticas/Estatisticas_Basicas_Turismo_Brasil_2014_Dez2015.xlsx>.

1135 Tourism Ministry Brazil, Mais de 6.4 milhões de turistas estrangeiros visitaram o Brasil em 2014 [More than 6.4 million foreign tourists visited Brazil in 2014], available at <http://www.turismo.gov.br/ultimas-noticias/5227-mais-de-6,4-milh%C3%B5es-de-turistas-estrangeiros-visitaram-o-brasil-em-2014.html>. In 2013 the number was 5.8 million.

1136 Governmental website on cultural tourism in Antalya, available at <www.antalyakulturturizm.gov.tr/TR,122303/2015-yili.html>.

1137 World Bank Data, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.ARVL?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc>.

1138 Hürriyet Daily News, Foreign arrivals to Turkey plunge 38 pct in August, 29 September 2016, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/foreign-arrivals-to-turkey-plunge-38-pct-in-august.aspx?pageID=238&nID=104403&NewsCatID=349>.

1139 Interview with José Barros, Laila Winther, Viviane Oliveira, Consulate of Brazil in Istanbul, 14 March 2016.

1140 Consulate General of Brazil in Istanbul, Import Export Figures between Brazil and Turkey, SECOM Istanbul, 3 February 2016.

1141 In 1996, half of Brazilian tourists arrived by cruise ships, this number declined to some hundred in the 2000s.

1142 Website of “Salve Jorge”, available at <http://gshow.globo.com/novelas/salve-jorge/>.

1143 Interview with Ali Tamer Bozoklar, Brazil’s honorary consul, Izmir, 24 March 2016.

1144 Interview with Brazilian ambassador Salgado, 25 February 2016, Brazilian embassy Ankara.

1145 Mail answer by Ömer Tosun on 14 March 2016, Brazil’s honorary consul in Cappadocia.

1146 Interview with Laila Winther, Brazilian Consulate Istanbul, 14 March 2016.

1147 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1148 Interview with Ali Tamer Bozoklar, 24 March 2016, Brazilian honorary consul, Izmir.

1149 Consulate General of Brazil in Istanbul, The Bulletin, July – August – September 2014, available at <http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/Istambul/en-us/file/JULY%20AUGUST%20SEPTEMBER %202014.pdf>.

1150 Anadolu Jet’s airline fleet, available at <http://www.anadolujet.com/aj-tr/corporate/about_us/fleet/index.aspx>.

1151 ÖZTÜRK (2012).

1152 Interview with Aydın Takmaz, 17 February 2016, Istanbul Ataşehir, founder and director of the consultancy ATexclusice, specialized in Turkey-Brazil relations. Takmaz translated at meetings with Embraer.

1153 Interview with Hüseyin Diriöz, 18 May 2016, Turkey’s ambassador to Brazil, Brasilia.

1154 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1155 Interview with Luiz Alberto, 25 April 2016, honorary consul of Turkey, Curitiba.

1156 Interview with José Barros, Laila Winther, Viviane Oliveira, Consulate of Brazil in Istanbul, 14 March 2016.

1157 Homepage of TURSAB, available at <http://www.tursab.org.tr/en>.

1158 Interview with José Barros, Laila Winther, Viviane Oliveira, Consulate of Brazil in Istanbul, 14 March 2016.

1159 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Division Europe II, director.

1160 Interview with Mehmet Özgün Arman, Turkish general consul in São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1161 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1162 Interview with Ali Tamer Bozoklar, 24 March 2016, Brazilian honorary consul, Izmir.

1163 Interview with Paulo Ferracioli, 3 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

1164 Istanbul Municipality, sister cities, available at <http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/kurumsal/Pages/Kardes_Sehirler.aspx>.

1165 Interview with Consul General of Turkey Mehmet Özgün Arman in São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1166 Interview with José Angel Espinoza, Honorary consul of Turkey in Salvador, 10 May 2016.

1167 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1168 Ibid.

1169 Ibid.

1170 Interview with Helder Paulo M. Silva und Rafael Lameiro da Costa Rocha, Brasilia, 20 May 2016, CAMEX.

1171 Interview with Brazilian ambassador Salgado, 25 February 2016, Brazilian Embassy Ankara.

1172 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, Itamaraty’s Department for Europe II, director.

1173 Interview with Mustafa Oğuz, Merih Kepez Örnek, Melike Hocaoğlu, 18 February 2016, DEIK Istanbul.

1174 Interview with João Daniel Almeida, 5 May 2016, Rio de Janeiro.

1175 Interview with Caner Sannev, São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1176 “Brezilya-Türkiye İş Forumu” (Brazil-Turkey Economic Forum), 9 November 2017, available at <https://www.haberler.com/brezilya-turkiye-is-forumu-sao-10225903-haberi/>. List of participants available at <http://www.fiesp.com.br/agenda/forum-de-negocios-brasil-turquia/>.

1177 Interview with Aylin Topal, dean of Latin and North American Studies (LAN) at the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara, 24 February 2016, METU Campus.

1178 Interview with Fatma Öznur Seçkin, LAMER, 24 February 2016, Homepage of LAMER available at <http://latinamerika.ankara.edu.tr/>.

1179 Erol is the director of the “Strategic Research Institute” at Gazi University, see <http://gsam.gazi.edu.tr/?language=tr_TR>.

1180 See <http://latinamerika.ankara.edu.tr/2016/04/19/portekizce-dil-kursu/>.

1181 Interview at LAMER, 24 February 2016. On 5 May 2016, LAMER celebrated the Day of the Portuguese language in collaboration with the Portuguese embassy and the Camoes centre showing Portuguese language movies, available at <http://latinamerika.ankara.edu.tr/2016/04/29/uluslararasi-portekizce-gunu/>. The Portuguese classes continue in the academic year 2016/2017.

1182 Interview at LAMER, 24 February 2016, Ankara.

1183 The only Brazilian employee so far was an intern who then continued his PhD studies at Hacettepe university in Ankara.

1184 Homepage of the Latin and North American Studies at METU: <http://lna.metu.edu.tr>.

1185 Middle East Technical University, Political Science and Public Administration, Assist. Prof. Dr. Aylin Topal, available at <http://padm.metu.edu.tr/assist-prof-dr-aylin-topal>.

1186 Interview with Aylin Topal, 24 February 2016, METU Campus Ankara.

1187 Interview with Aylin Topal, 24 February 2016, METU Campus Ankara.

1188 See announcement of the conference, at <http://lna.metu.edu.tr/duyuru/latin-and-north-american-studies-conference-brazil-politics-religion-and-social-classes>.

1189 Latin and North American Studies Masters Program, must courses, at <http://lna.metu.edu.tr/must-courses>.

1190 Latin and North American Studies, About, at <http://lna.metu.edu.tr/about>.

1191 See e.g. the Spring Term courses, available at < http://lna.metu.edu.tr/spring-term-courses>.

1192 Interview with Aylin Topal, 24 February 2016, Ankara, METU Campus.

1193 Website of the Higher Education Board YÖK, at <http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/universitelerimiz> (consulted in August 2016). Before the 15 July coup, the total number of universities was 193, of which 58 were located in Istanbul. After the coup, 15 Gülen-affiliated universities were shut down.

1194 Narlı explained this to the author during the ELAIC conference at Bahçeşehir University on 26 March 2016. See for prof. Narlı, at <http://bahcesehir.edu.tr/kadro/iktisadi_idari/sosyoloji>.

1195 Homepage of the ELAIC conference, available at <http://www.elaic2016.com>.

1196 LACTAN homepage, at <http://www.lacntos.org/>.

1197 The initial focus on Turkey was broadened to Eurasia through the interest of scholars from Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan.

1198 The author attended both the ELAIC conference and also the launch of the academic network.

1199 Homepage of the CCBT in Portuguese, available at <http://www.brasilturquia.com.br/>.

1200 Homepage of the GCUB, available at <http://www.grupocoimbra.org.br/Default.aspx>.

1201 Even before July 2016 there was government pressure against the Gülen movement in Turkey, which regarded the movement as a “terrorist” organization, which tried to topple the government. Gediz University Senate made an announcement in April 2016 that they are not involved in any illegal activities, see: <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/517951/Gediz_Universitesi_nden__paralel__aciklamasi.html#>. However, this did not really convince the government.

1202 Mail answer by Luisa Moutinho on 9 September 2016.

1203 Interview with Luisa Moutinho, 20 May 2016, Grupo Coimbra office in Brasilia.

1204 Interview with Luisa Moutinho, 20 May 2016, Grupo Coimbra office in Brasilia.

1205 CCBT Brasilia, consultative council, available at <http://www.brasilturquia.com.br/conselho-consultivo-do-ccbt-em-brasilia-1295.html>.

1206 Interview with Luisa Moutinho, 20 May 2016, Grupo Coimbra office in Brasilia.

1207 Mail answer by Luisa Moutinho on 9 September 2016.

1208 Interview with Luisa Moutinho, 20 May 2016, Grupo Coimbra office in Brasilia.

1209 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division on Educational Issues (DCE), available at <http://www.dce.mre.gov.br/index.php>.

1210 Interview with Abdullah Boztaş, 23 May 2016, CCBT office Brasilia.

1211 TASAM - Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies, available at <http://www.tasam.org>. The think tank was founded in 2003 and has offices in Istanbul and Ankara.

1212 Announcement of the first Turkish - Latin American and Caribbean Forum, 08 - 11 October 2009, available at <http://www.tasam.org/en/Etkinlik/82/turkish_-_latin_american_and_caribbean_forum>.

1213 See for the program and final report of the second forum, at <ttp://www.tasam.org/en/Etkinlik/71/2nd_turkish_-_latin_america_and_caribbean_forum>.

1214 FGV, Center for International Relations, at <http://ri.fgv.br/en/events/2nd-international-turkish-latin-american-and-caribbean-forum>. It then lasted fully six years until the third forum took place. The “3rd Turkish - Latin America and Caribbean Congress” took place on 21-22 April 2016 in Istanbul entitled “Strategical Cooperation and Los Turcos”, See for the program at <www.tasam.org/Files/Etkinlik/File/Program/LAK3_Program_EN_pdf_1dd418f6-15b5-4696-866e-38bd4f0e0af1.pdf>.

1215 FGV, Elena Lazarou’s personal page, available at <http://ri.fgv.br/en/team/elena-lazarou>. Currently, Lazarou is a political advisor at the European Parliament in Brussels.

1216 See for a program of the workshop at <http://cpdoc.fgv.br/sites/default/files/Agenda%20do%20workshop%20FGV%20TASAM_finalversion.pdf>.

1217 Skype Interview with Elena Lazarou, 8 April 2016, Brussels - Munich.

1218 Ibid.

1219 Turkey - Brazil Round Table Country Meeting - 2. “Turkey and Brazil: Rising Powers in the Changing World Order” at <http://www.tasam.org/en/Etkinlik/5803/turkey_-_brazil_round_table_country_meeting_-_2>.

1220 See for the publication list at <http://www.lacntos.org/publications/>.

1221 Interview with IPRI’s coordinator-general, Alessandro Warley Candeas, 18 May 2016, Itamaraty, Brasilia.

1222 Interview with José Angel Espinoza, honorary consul of Turkey in Salvador, 10 May 2016.

1223 Anadolu Ateşi, which means Fire of Anatolia is Turkey’s most famous and internationally renowned dance group consisting of roughly 90 dancers, available at <http://www.anadoluatesi.com/about-history>. Ambassador Diriöz was able to invite a smaller group of around 60 dancers to Jordan where he served before coming to Brazil.

1224 Interview with Hüseyin Diriöz, Turkey’s ambassador in Brazil, 18 May 2016, Turkish embassy Brasilia.

1225 Interview with Consul General of Turkey Mehmet Özgün Arman in São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1226 Ibid.

1227 Interview with Consul General of Turkey Mehmet Özgün Arman in São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1228 Interview with Mauricio Bernardes, head of Department for Europe II, Itamaraty, 23 May 2016.

1229 Interview with José Barros, Laila Winther, Viviane Oliveira, Consulate of Brazil, Istanbul, 14 March 2016.

1230 Interview with Luisa Moutinho, Grupo Coimbra office in Brasilia, 20 May 2016.

1231 Then prime minister Erdoğan said in November 2013, “is there anything we did not do that they wanted”, available at <http://www.medyagundem.com/cemaat-ne-istedi-de-geri-cevirdik/>.

1232 The most encompassing study was directed by sociology professor at Bosporus University, Binnaz Toprak, 2009, Being Different in Turkey - Religion, Conservatism and Otherization, available at <http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/tr_farkli_olmak.pdf>. One finding of the study was that the Gülen movement in Anatolia is putting pressure on those who do not want to join the movement, non-Sunnis and those not following a conservative lifestyle. The study has examples from the education and business fields. The reaction of the Gülen movement was a slander campaign in their media against Toprak.

1233 Numerous meetings and interviews by the author in various cities in Turkey. In the majoritarian Kurdish-Alevi city of Tunceli, local NGOs set up three working groups to tackle the most urgent issues of the community: prostitution, alcoholism and the Gülen movement.

1234 To protect the interviewees in Turkey and Brazil, their names are not made public.

1235 Mustafa Göktepe - Çağın Muhacirleri [emigrants of our age] – Brazil, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_KBMLDdO_Og> (1st Part), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRQ3Mph8rZM> (2nd Part) (uploaded in February 2016).

1236 Website of the CCBT at <http://www.brasilturquia.com.br/> (in Portuguese).

1237 CCBT website, about us, at <http://www.brasilturquia.com.br/quem-somos-1051.html>.

1238 Interview with Abdullah Boztaş, CCBT director, Brasilia, 23 May 2016.

1239 Mustafa Göktepe - Çağın Muhacirleri [emigrants of our age] - Brazil, 2016.

1240 CCBT Award Ceremony 2015, at <http://www.brasilturquia.com.br/premiaco-anual-do-ccbt-1306.html>.

1241 Comemoração do Dia da Turquia e a Premiação Anual do CCBT [Commemoration of the Turkey Day and the annual award of CCBT], 25 May 2016, at <http://www.brasilturquia.com.br/comemoraco-do-dia-da-turquia-e-a-premiaco-anual-do-ccbt-1338.html>.

1242 CCBT organizou na USP conferência internacional sobre Movimento Hizmet e Fethullah Gülen [CCBT organized at USP an international conference about the Hizmet Movement and Fethullah Gülen], 15 June 2016, at <www.brasilturquia.com.br/ccbt-organizou-na-usp-conferencia-internacional-sobre-movimento-hizmet-e-fethullah-gulen-1362.html>.

1243 Some examples until summer 2016 were the holdings Kaynak and Ipek (media), Feza Publications (Zaman newspaper, Cihan news agency), Fatih University, Mevlana University Konya, Haliç University Istanbul, Şifa University Izmir, Bank Asya. After 15 July 2016 this process became both accelerated and broadened.

1244 CCBT declaration on closure of offices and change of addresses, 22 June 2016, available at <http://www.brasilturquia.com.br/ccbt-fecha-as-filiais-em-belo-horizonte-e-istanbul-e-muda-de-endereco-em-so-paulo-brasilia-e-no-rio-de-janeiro-1365.html>.

1245 Hürriyet Daily News, Erdoğan says ‘civil society groups working against Turkish state’ largely destroyed, 22 June 2016, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-says-civil-society-groups-working-against-turkish-state-largely-destroyed.aspx?pageID=517&nID=100789&NewsCatID=338>.

1246 Interview with vice-consul José Barros, responsible for culture, Consulate of Brazil Istanbul, 14 March 2016.

1247 Timeturk, Brezilya Milli Günü Ankara’da kutlandı [Brazilian National Day was celebrated in Ankara], 15 November 2017, at <https://www.timeturk.com/brezilya-milli-gunu-ankara-da-kutlandi/haber-778829>.

1248 Ali Tamer Bozoklar, Brazilian honorary consul, 24 March 2016, Izmir. See also Mehmet Kurt, Brezilya sineması İzmir’de [Brazilian cinema in Izmir], Milliyet, 21 February 2008, available at <www.milliyet.com.tr/2008/02/21/ege/ege33.html>.

1249 İstanbul’da Brezilya Havası Esecek [Brazilian winds will blow in Istanbul], 8 May 2014, available at <http://www.beyazperde.com/haberler/filmler/haberler-60946/>.

1250 Interview (in Turkish) with Can Gümüş in Kültür Sanat, January 2016, available at <http://kultursanat.com.tr/dergi/sayi10/>, p. 46-47, also with photos of the cultural events.

1251 Interview Can Gümüş, Brezilya Kültür Derneği, 17 February 2016, Kadıköy-Istanbul.

1252 Website of AtExclusive, available at <www.atexclusive.com> (Portuguese).

1253 Interview with Aydın Takmaz, AtExclusive, 17 February 2016, Ataşehir-Istanbul.

1254 Ibid.

1255 Interview with Consul General of Turkey, Mehmet Özgün Arman, in São Paulo, 26 April 2016.

1256 Ibid.

1257 Interview with Luiz Alberto, honorary consul of Turkey, 25 April 2016, Curitiba.

1258 Interview in the Consulate General of Brazil in Istanbul with Vice consul José Roberto Hall Brum de Barros and the Trade and Investment Officers Laila Winther and Viviane Oliveira, 14 March 2016.

1259 This information was shared by ambassador Eduardo Gradilone, 13 December 2017 (by mail).

1260 Interview with Ali Tamer Bozoklar, Brazilian honorary consul in Izmir, 24 March 2016, Izmir.

1261 Globo, Governo Temer é aprovado por 12% e reprovado por 42% em SP, diz Ibope, [According to Ibope the Temer government is approved by 12 % and disproved by 42% in Sao Paulo], 29 September 2016, available at <http://g1.globo.com/sao-paulo/eleicoes/2016/noticia/2016/09/governo-temer-e-aprovado-por-12-e-reprovado-por-42-em-sp-diz-ibope.html>.

1262 Gunnar Heinsohn, Brasiliens unaufhaltsamer Niedergang, NZZ, 11 August 2016.

1263 Berkay Mandıracı, Turkey’s PKK Conflict: The Death Toll, Crisis Group, 20 July 2016, available at <http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/07/20/turkey-s-pkk-conflict-the-rising-toll/>.

1264 Brazilian governmental site on bilateral treaties, available at <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/pesquisa_ato_bil>.

1265 State Visit of Prime Minister Erdoğan to Brazil

1266 Signed during the first state visit of Süleyman Demirel as president of Turkey to Brazil.

1267 Brazilian governmental site on bilateral treaties, available at <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/pesquisa_ato_bil>.