



BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT

Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy

(1750-1964)

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José Vicente de Sá Pimentel
editor

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Map of the back cover:

World-map made by the Venitian Jeronimo Marini in 1512, the first one to insert the name Brazil in it. It is also unique in placing the Southern Hemisphere at the top.

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PART III

**THE STATE REFORM AND THE
MODERNIZATION OF DIPLOMACY**



INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN POLICY AND TO THE DIPLOMATIC IDEAS OF MODERN BRAZIL

Eiiti Sato

The essays written in this part of the book refer to a period which spans over two decades remarkably plagued by turbulence and significant changes in the international order. Approximately 2,500 years ago, Thucydides started his *History of the Peloponnesian War* by saying that, “the Athenian Thucydides wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning from the first signs expecting that it would be bigger and more important than all the previous ones [...]”.¹ Since then, many other authors, somehow, repeated such a feeling that the time which one lives in is always the most complex and the most crucial. In many respects, however, Thucydides was right since, in fact, the war between the Athenian League and Sparta’s allies was decisive for the decline, until the complete collapse of that world of City-States that formed classical Greece, which left to us the huge cultural heritage we learned to admire so much. Indeed we can

¹ Thucydides. *História da Guerra do Peloponeso*. Editora UnB, IPRI/FUNAG, Official Press of the State of S. Paulo, 2001. Book I, p. 1.

say something similar about the period between the late 1930's and the early 1960's, which is the period covered by this part of the book. It was a time marked by lots of events and changes that produced a truly new world, with many unprecedented elements in history that reflected both in the content and in the form of doing diplomacy.

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD

In the late 1930's, the nations were still trying to find a way out of the Great Depression when the world was plunged into World War II. Then there was a period of reconstruction which brought about completely new initiatives in international relations, such as the Marshall Plan and the creation of the European Communities. The post-war period also witnessed the emergence of the phenomenon of a bipolarized world around opposing ideologies and where the power poles were no longer in the hands of the traditional European powers. By the end of the war, there was an international hierarchy in which, at the top, were the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain – the *Big Three* – the three powers that effectively commanded the arrangements of Yalta, Potsdam and San Francisco. However, only ten years later, the Suez crisis, of the mid-1950s, soon exposed the British inability to continue to be an actual global power. At the same time, the decolonization process in Africa and in Asia advanced quickly bringing along dozens of new nations with demands and values that substantially increased the complexity of the international order; not to mention the advent of the nuclear age in the field of international security and the incorporation of multilateralism as inherent components of the forms of doing diplomacy.

Those developments, among many other changes which were not mentioned, turned the period into an “interesting time” in the sense referred to by the Ancient Chinese wisdom: a time of change, novelties and many uncertainties, anxieties, and anguish. It became very difficult for the national governments to accompany the frenzy succession of new realities and untold initiatives in the international sphere. International integration intensified, but the national economic and political institutions still were not acquainted to multilateralism and to the coexistence with more structured international regimes. As a matter of fact, most of the acting rulers and diplomats were from a generation trained within a political culture in which the perceptions of the Victorian era, focused on permanence and stable institutions, had not completely disappeared yet. Thus, the ministeries of foreign affairs had much difficulty to understand the most important outlines of a changing international order.

Today, having in our favor the passage of time, which consolidated tendencies, transformed the facts into history and, especially, without the need to make decisions on the verge of events, we can analyze and identify the place that Brazil actually occupied in those times of change. The reading of the essays of this part of the book can lead us to understand that two developments were particularly important in defining the Brazilian diplomatic concerns. On the one hand, the introduction of new elements in international relations, such as the recognition of the prominent role of economic diplomacy, multilateralism and diversification of diplomatic partnerships. On the other hand, substantial domestic changes of the economic and political life of Brazil which increasingly sought modernization as a goal to be pursued with eagerness. The texts of this part of the book focus on the responses of the Brazilian diplomacy, but they show that there was such a widespread effort among other nations too, which, regardless

of their international status, needed to adjust their national institutions to more political and economic developments, which showed themselves increasingly integrated in international terms.

Indeed, the range of the new weapons became wider and able to reach targets thousands of kilometers away, turned the problem of investment in security into an issue impossible to be addressed only from the point of view of the strict limits of the geographical frontiers of sovereign nations. In the sphere of the economy and society, the notion of wealth and welfare of nations was becoming more connected with life and with the interests of other nations through trade. Furthermore, the advances in information technology and transport, led the individual and collective aspirations and demands to have increasingly intense connections with the way of life of other societies. Thus, everywhere, authorities were trying to find new ways to organize the State, both in terms of the instruments to collect resources and the mechanisms to use those resources for goals that disseminated internationally, such as the promotion of wealth and the supply of services directed towards welfare and social security. In this context, the diplomatic agenda and the ways of conducting foreign relations changed considerably. Brazilian diplomacy – like in all other nations – had before it, the difficult task of adapting appropriately to that new emerging reality while it took initiatives to cope with the demands of the events that unfolded unexpectedly in the context of international relations.

THE PORTRAIT OF AN ERA THROUGH ITS CHARACTERS

In the general presentation of this work, both the form and the goals of the texts gathered here were already made explicit. However, it seems important to emphasize some aspects to

understand better this set of characters whose actions were developed between the late 1930's and the early 1960's. The general purpose of the book is to bring together the experience and views of diplomats, scholars, and of those who have played a relevant role in the study and implementation of the Brazilian foreign policy. Such an approach, based on what the most relevant players saw and thought, allows us to observe developments in foreign policy not only from the point of view of political circumstances and conditions of each moment, but also to observe certain elements, such as the human factor, which are often decisive though imponderable for the outcomes of a crisis or for the product that results from the controversies that occurred in the context of an international conference.

The present compilation may complement and even help to better understand other works such as the now classic *História da Política Exterior do Brasil*, by Amado Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, which presents an overview of the Brazilian foreign policy since the country became an independent nation in the international scenario.² It also complements works such as the one organized by J. A. Guilhon Albuquerque entitled *Sessenta Anos de Política Externa Brasileira: 1930-1990* in which several scholars present their thematic views, that is, issues and problems that, over the chosen period, occupied the attention of the rulers and designers of the Brazilian foreign policy.³ We can also say the same thing about the numerous works and authors who addressed specific Brazilian foreign policy themes, such as the issue of atomic energy, economic development and regional cooperation or even of the Brazilian relations with a certain country or group of countries.

2 A. L. Cervo & C. Bueno. *História da Política Exterior do Brasil*. (Ed. Ática, 1992) Editora Universidade de Brasília, 3rd edition, 2008.

3 J. A. Guilhon Albuquerque. *Sessenta Anos de Política Externa Brasileira, 1930-1990*. Cultura Editores Associados and NUPRI/USP, S. Paulo, 1996 (4 vols.).

In the beginning the organizers of this panoramic view of Brazilian foreign policy intended to establish standards and editorial rules that should provide homogeneity to the texts. However, when the first texts began to arrive in the hands of the editorial committee that idea began to shake. Indeed, the first reaction was to ask the authors to review their essays to accommodate them to the editorial established standards in the work's original idea, but upon reading the texts, it became clear that much of the information and observations brought were too interesting to be excluded, and thus it was realized that in many respects, to homogenize, implied, not only hurting the style of their authors, but to a certain extent, even impoverishing the character's presentation. In fact, the organizers realized that to look at the Brazilian foreign policy by means of the thought and of the deeds of those who acted in it or influenced it in a prominent manner, meant bringing to the reader a true mosaic of moments and views in which the variety of styles and approaches was also a way to reflect on a period of time studied, with its characters and its own idiosyncrasies.

Among various characters which are portrayed in this book much has already been written, while about others, even though important, there is relatively little written although their passage through the paths of Brazilian diplomacy was striking despite the discretion, as the conditions and circumstances of the moment required. In such a mosaic, one can identify some relatively obvious virtues, common to those characters, such as the concern with the building of a good image of the country, but each moment in history demanded different attitudes by her diplomats and by those who acted in instances where Brazil was represented. A remarkable quality, present in all characters portrayed, especially in an environment of great changes, is the discernment. Good discernment is a quality easy to be verbalized but hard to be

actually practiced. In diplomacy it is crucial to have the capacity for both small and large-scale actions. As Monsieur de Callières, who had served Louis XIV in several diplomatic missions, used to state, to register the events as they actually happen and, especially, to understand properly their meanings is a talent that not even the most powerful Prince can neglect. According to Callières, that talent allows you to build good alliances and to prevent the Kingdom against the formation of hostile articulations.⁴ Two centuries after Louis XIV, the wars were no longer an ordinary fact for most nations, but they became more destructive and many new forms of international interaction emerged leading the national security and the interests of the societies to depend on the forces in action within the international reality, thus reinforcing the importance of discernment as a core virtue to diplomacy.

One can say that two developments that took place after World War II in the sphere of international relations were remarkably important to reinforce the role of the ability of discernment for diplomacy: the speed of the changes and the access to increasing amounts of information. As it has been already mentioned, when change became an intrinsic component of the international order, it brought about the constant concerns about the future, turning it less distant and more unpredictable. On the other hand, the access to increasing amounts of information also led to increasing difficulties, among so much data and information, to select and capture accurately what is, in fact, relevant to Brazil. In this way,

4 "One may say that knowledge of this kind is one of the most important and necessary features of good government, because indeed the domestic peace of the state depends largely upon appropriate measures taken in its foreign service to make friends among well-disposed states, and by timely action to resist those who cherish hostile designs. There is indeed no prince so powerful that he can afford to neglect the assistance offered by a good alliance..." (M. de Callières. *On the Manners of Negotiating with Princes*. University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p. 12. The first edition of the work dates from 1716 and was entitled *De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains*).

discernment became a virtue even more valued and desired, both to carry out personal life undertakings and to run public affairs.

Some characters were important not because they had accomplished any deed that changed the course of Brazilian diplomacy, but because they understood that good policy is not always made up of noisy and sounding initiatives to the public. Understanding their own time is not an easy task and it is even harder to translate such understanding into decisions and actions, considering that a nation becomes powerful when it can hold its course with persistence and steadiness when facing adverse situations. Even though the attention will always go back to the times when a defiant posture or a bold initiative was necessary, diplomacy is a much more complex activity and, although sometimes it is necessary to find out new courses of action, there are also circumstances in which discretion, persistence and even cold blood are the required qualities. The novel writer C. Virgil Gheorghiu used to say that the true man is not in the acts and in the heroic moments. One must seek the true man in the calmness, in the simplicity of what he does in his daily life.⁵ According to Gheorghiu the heroic act is actually an undesirable accident, sometimes needed just before “interesting times”, which the Chinese actually considered a curse.

Using a metaphor, one can say that the organizers’ option was to prefer to let authors choose vehicles that seemed more appropriate to go through the path of the Brazilian foreign policy made up sometimes of plains, rough terrain and sometimes slightly firm and even wetlands. In other words, the set of essays could not be different from the reality, which is always varied and often paradoxical, bringing together elements of harmony

5 The image that the author uses is “moving with the speed of the human step,” referring to the steadfastness and tranquility for which the man of integrity in their craft not swayed by fashion, by the temptations of easy gain and momentary or shrill noise from the streets. C. Virgil Gheorghiu. *A Casa de Petrodava*. Livraria Bertrand, Lisbon, 1961.

and homogeneity with the diversity that characterize humanity. Furthermore considering that most readers of this book are students and professionals well acquainted to international politics, the reader must also contribute using his sensitivity and patience to take into account the circumstances, the style and the peculiarities of each contribution.

DIPLOMATS AND NON-DIPLOMATS: THINKING ABOUT BRAZILIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

As the reader will notice, the idea of discussing the Brazilian diplomatic thought does not imply the notion that, at some point, there would have been a perfectly structured and articulated view about what foreign policy is or how the Brazilian foreign relations ought to be. The understanding, implicit in the collection of essays is that over time, there has always been, to a greater or lesser extent, a concern to establish broader purposes and also to turn the course of diplomatic actions more organic. Accordingly, by way of introduction, it might be interesting to draw attention to a few remarkable facts of the period, which appear in the collection of texts.

In that period, there was an increasing engagement of influential figures in Brazilian diplomacy who were not career diplomats or Chancellors, and even without ever occupying leadership positions in permanent missions. Helio Jaguaribe, for example, stands out for the growing importance of the Brazilian intellectual world's initiatives, which started not only to discuss in a systematical manner the problems and prospects of the Brazilian foreign affairs, but also became an agglutination factor of thinkers with various backgrounds who were willing to exert some influence on Brazil's performance on international scene from structured

institutions. Later, those initiatives were identified by the English term *think tanks*. In the same way, Jose Honório Rodrigues, who was also a historian gave remarkable contributions to the study of history that helped to understand the Brazilian participation in the world politics. Although he used to insist strongly in the defense of principles such as national sovereignty and "national interests", the inclusion of his work in this collection can be mainly seen as a proper recognition of the historical studies for orienting diplomatic issues and also as a way of legitimizing the work of other historians, for instance, Amado Cervo, Clodoaldo Bueno, and Varnhagen himself - who was also included in this collection, and despite being a diplomat, his remarkable legacy was in the field of the study of history. Another remarkable case that stands out is that of Álvaro Alberto, who was a career military and represented Brazil at the UN Atomic Energy Committee, in 1946. He did not produce any ideas or interpretations about the Brazilian foreign policy, but his importance derives from the fact that he noticed and he actively experienced adjustments in the organization of the Brazilian State based on the observation of international politics. It can be said that, to a large extent, the creation of CNPq was due to his participation in the UN Nuclear Energy Committee, which provided him a unique opportunity to observe the new paths of scientific research in the world, especially in terms of their relationship with State institutions.

Besides those aspects, several other developments are reflected in the essays that were included in this book. All of them were quite significant to the Brazilian diplomatic activity. During the 1930-64 period, there were changes in the relative importance of the players with whom Brazil needed to interact while, at the same time, the demands of the international environment brought about many initiatives influencing the reorganization of the diplomatic career, both in the form of entrance to said

career and in the training of the diplomatc skills. In the sphere of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, certain action areas were strengthened, such as the economic diplomacy, and the instances of diplomatic representation because of the creation of the UN system and of the establishment of political and commercial relations with a growing number of countries. Old themes, such as disarmament, resurfaced with completely new drapery because of the advent of the nuclear age, while new issues such as decolonization and the Cold War became conditioning factors of the international agenda. The essays also reflect several moments of Brazilian diplomatic trajectory such as the frustrated prospect for Brazil to become the sixth permanent member of the UN Security Council, the controversies around the launching of the Pan-American Operation, the formulation of the Independent Foreign Policy and the Brazilian defense in the UN of the idea that disarmament, economic development and decolonization were distinct faces of a same strategy geared towards the promotion of peace. The readers can always understand that such a collection should include other characters, but obviously, the editors had limitations, including resources and the availability of specialists to write about essays. In short, the understanding is that the present set of essays offers a sufficiently faithful portrait of a time of turbulence in the international order and of adjustments in the activities and instruments of the Brazilian diplomacy. In fact, any effort to understand the Brazilian foreign relations today should always include the major transformations that occurred over the two decades following the World War II.





OSWALDO ARANHA

Born into a traditional *gaúcho* family in the far southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, on February 15, 1894, Oswaldo Aranha attended military school early in life and earned a degree in Law and Social Sciences in the then capital of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro in 1916. Returning to his home state, he worked as an attorney for eight years, and he entered politics, becoming mayor of his home city of Alegrete and later a Federal Representative. As one of the leaders of the Liberal Alliance, Aranha was active in the armed movement that overthrew the Old Republic in 1930 and brought his friend and mentor – as well as fellow *gaúcho* – Getúlio Vargas, to the country's presidency. Appointed Minister of Justice in the Vargas' Provisional Government, Aranha became Minister of Finance in 1931, and in 1934, Vargas nominated him Ambassador to the United States. While in the U.S., Aranha built a special relationship with the Roosevelt administration, cultivating friendships that became relevant to the military alliance during

World War II. He resigned his post after the coup d'état of the *Estado Novo*, in 1937, and returned to Brazil as the virtual leader of the opposition. His friendship with Vargas, however, eventually prevailed, as he agreed to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1938-44), during which time he acted to keep Brazil in the coalition of democratic and antifascist forces.

Aranha left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 15, 1944, over disagreements with Vargas, who was then a dictator. Vargas, himself, was deposed a little over a year later, and by that time, Aranha had accumulated huge political prestige, which many believe could have catapulted him into the presidency had he so chosen. Aranha, however, briefly returned to the private sector, devoting himself to business and law for a few years. Then, in 1947, he returned to government service as he accepted a nomination made by Vargas' successor, President Eurico Dutra, this time to represent Brazil at the United Nations. While at the U.N., Aranha chaired the session that approved the partition of Palestine and shortly thereafter the creation of the State of Israel. He also served again as Brazil's Finance Minister (1953-54) in the second Vargas government.

After Getúlio Vargas' suicide, in August 1954, Oswaldo Aranha devoted himself, once again, to business and consulting. He died in Rio de Janeiro, on January 27, 1960, less than a month short of his 66th birthday.

OSWALDO ARANHA: IN THE CONTINUITY OF RIO BRANCO'S STATESMENSHIP

Paulo Roberto de Almeida;¹ João Hermes Pereira de Araújo

Brazilian diplomacy is the school of peace, the organization of arbitration, the politics of harmony, the practice of good neighborliness, the equality of peoples, the protection of the weak, the defense of international justice, [and] therefore, one of the purest and highest glories of a universal and legal civilization.

Oswaldo Aranha, inaugural speech at Itamaraty Palace, Rio de Janeiro, March 15, 1938²

THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC TRAJECTORY OF OSWALDO ARANHA

Although Oswaldo Aranha was not a career diplomat, he was possibly the most diplomatic of the Brazilian politicians of his time. Even before he engaged in the external representation

1 Special thank yous are due to Stanley Hilton and Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago for their various topical corrections and specific suggestions that helped prevent factual errors in the text and perfected the conceptual arguments about Oswaldo Aranha's political action.

2 Cf. *Oswaldo Aranha, 1894-1960: Discursos e Conferências*. Brasília: FUNAG, 1994, p. 25. The same excerpt, *ipsis litteris*, is included in a speech made at Tiradentes Palace on 12/23/1940; Cf. ARANHA, Oswaldo. *A Revolução e a América*. Rio de Janeiro: Department of Press and Advertisement, 1940, p. 9.

of his country, Aranha was one of the most important players in the political transition that ended the Old Republic and began the so-called Vargas Era (1930-1945), during which he was one of his country's major public servants, especially in the early phase of that era.³

Aranha's political career began in his home state of Rio Grande do Sul during the 1920s; his leadership and prestige were recognized even after the death of his mentor and friend, Getúlio Vargas, in 1954. He was faithful to Vargas, who hailed from his same home state, throughout his active life, even to the detriment of his own political career. The impact of this great political leader, on both internal and external policy matters, however, goes far beyond this crucial period of Brazilian modernization. It was felt throughout the twentieth century.

As a diplomat, Aranha distinguished himself in one of the most challenging moments of contemporary Brazilian history – a history which might have been different had he not led the Ministry of Exterior Relations, Itamaraty, especially during the dramatic years of World War II. Aranha can be considered a pragmatic heir to the Baron of Rio Branco, as he realistically evaluated the external environment regarding Brazilian safety and – based on grounds similar to those of Rio Branco – established strong cooperative ties between Brazil and the United States, an alliance that proved to be decisive in those turbulent years. His drive was propelled by his vision of the future: identifying the full Brazilian interest in the continuation of a relationship he wished was increasingly egalitarian and in compliance with the respective sovereignties. In many ways, his performance in foreign policy was an extension of his personal trajectory within the framework

3 The historian Stanley Hilton drafted the most complete biography on Oswaldo Aranha's life and political action, *Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia*. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 1994.

of the intensive activism that characterized his life in national politics even before the Revolution of 1930.

Had it not been for Oswaldo Aranha's decisive action and proven leadership in the assembly of the armed movement of the Liberal Alliance against the oblique presidential succession of Washington Luís, in 1930, Brazil might not have undergone the top down process of modernization that was eventually associated with the name of Getúlio Vargas. The hesitations of Vargas at decision-making moments were well known, and the Revolution of 1930 might not have occurred without the initiatives of Aranha, who has been identified as "the star of the Revolution."⁴

Brazil would probably also have followed other paths without Oswaldo Aranha's decisive action during the World War II era. The country could even have been very different if Aranha had become President of the Republic – which could have happened at numerous times, including: the 1930's, when he was at the height of his political prominence; in 1945, when Getúlio Vargas was deposed; and again in 1950, when his mentor returned to power, this time through the ballot box. Aranha, however, preferred to remain loyal to Vargas. Even in 1955 – the year after Vargas' death – Aranha had various options of partisan alliances available to him, yet he chose not to pursue them.⁵

4 CF. Aspásia Camargo, "Oswaldo Aranha: A Estrela da Revolução". In: CAMARGO, Aspásia; ARAÚJO, João Hermes Pereira de; SIMONSEN, Mário Henrique. *Oswaldo Aranha: A Estrela da Revolução*. São Paulo: Mandarin, 1996, p. 15-102. The Brazilianist Joseph Love calls him "the main architect of the Revolution of 1930"; CF. *Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971, p. 219.

5 Francisco Iglesias stated that the performance of Oswaldo Aranha as a "possible candidate for the Presidency of the Republic ended in 1954, with the death of Getúlio Vargas. The latter cut his career in 1934, in 1938 and in 1944. Aranha did not reach the supreme rank due to a certain lack of effort: a competent politician, he lacked the ambition that animates and guides those aspiring to power, and he was excessively loyal to Getúlio," in CAMARGO-ARAÚJO-SIMONSEN. *Oswaldo Aranha: a estrela da revolução*, op. cit., cf. p. 9.

Likewise, Brazilian foreign policy could have been different had this man of thought and action not been at the head of the Ministry of External Affairs during the crucial times of choosing between the major coalitions of hegemonic forces during the late 1930's: the growing power of Nazi-fascism, which had the clear sympathies of several political and military leaders of the Vargas government; and the apparently hesitant and perhaps declining British Empire, along with the erratic isolationism of the growing American power. If Brazil placed itself on the "right" side in the military disputes of World War II and, above all, on the side of the democracies and market economies, it was basically due to the firm and decisive actions of Oswaldo Aranha.

As Minister of Finance, both before and after his diplomatic missions, Aranha also had a preeminent role in handling Brazilian weaknesses in its foreign economic relations. His actions in that arena contributed to the solution of currency crises and to macroeconomic stabilization. During his first term as the Minister of Finance, November 1931 to July 1934, Aranha adapted Brazil to the impacts of the global crisis, competently dealing – in a Keynesianism *avant la lettre* way – with overproduction in the coffee economy – and creating a solution for the foreign debt problem. The so-called Aranha Plan, which reduced the amount of principal that had to be paid in the proceeding four years, obtained a savings for the country of 57 million (out of a total of 91 million) British pounds.⁶

During his second term as Finance Minister, June 1953 to August 1954, again on behalf of his friend, Getúlio Vargas, Aranha also dealt with serious foreign exchange problems, along with inflationary pressures that Brazil's Labor Minister, João Goulart, had sparked. In addition, Aranha

6 Cf. HILTON, *Oswaldo Aranha*, op. cit., p. 177.

proved himself competent at dealing with the exacerbated nationalism of the Brazilian president on the issue of profit remittances by foreign subsidiaries, thereby minimizing Vargas' populist instincts, which had resulted in heavy pressure for an irresponsible expansion of the money supply.

Born in the small town of Alegrete, in Getúlio Vargas' home state of Rio Grande do Sul, on February 15, 1894, Oswaldo Euclides de Souza Aranha participated in several political episodes of his state before reaching national politics in 1927, when he became a representative in the federal Chamber of Deputies. The following year, Getúlio Vargas, who had been elected governor of the state, invited Aranha to be his Secretary of the Interior, and shortly thereafter, both he and Vargas became engaged in the national political renewal effort, within the context of the Liberal Alliance.⁷

When Getúlio Vargas became president, in 1930, Oswaldo Aranha was successively the Minister of Justice (1930-31) and Finance (1931-34) in Vargas's provisional government. In these positions, Aranha left his mark in both the preparations for the new constitution and in overcoming the effects of the international crisis on the economy. His choice as Ambassador to Washington, which many believe was a Machiavellian move on Vargas' part – to “exile” a possible successor – proved to be crucial, to both Aranha and Brazil, as it offered him the opportunity to weave a network of alliances within the American political scene, starting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Undersecretary Sumner Welles. In particular, Aranha's close friendship with Welles turned out to be the most powerful factor of the so-called Brazil-United States military alliance in the turbulent World War II years.

7 The episodes of his life until the Revolution of 1930 were widely reported, including unpublished elements in historiography, in Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago: *Oswaldo Aranha: O Rio Grande e a Revolução de 1930; Um Político Gaúcho na República Velha*. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1996.

Less than a year after renouncing his position in Washington, over objections to the 1937 *Estado Novo* coup, Aranha was nominated to head Itamaraty, a position in which his decisiveness again proved crucial, especially as the rise of Nazi-fascism seemed irresistible to some. It is within the framework of his activities as diplomatic representative and Foreign Minister, during the stormy decade between 1934 and 1944, that one must evaluate this individual, who can be placed in the intellectual and practical realm of the Baron of Rio Branco. Both Oswaldo Aranha and José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the Baron of Rio Branco, defended Brazilian sovereignty and its interests in the context of an unwritten yet real alliance with the United States. Aranha can thus be considered a spiritual follower of Rio Branco, “the father of Brazilian diplomacy,” one of his predecessors at the head of Itamaraty.

AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON: FORESEEING THE BRAZILIAN FUTURE⁸

Domestic policy problems drove Oswaldo Aranha to leave both the Ministry of Finance and the leadership of the government in the Constituent Assembly in 1934; however, that same year, he was named ambassador to Washington. He traveled to the United States via Italy, aiming to undertake trade agreements directly with Mussolini (which did not happen). In a letter to Vargas, dated September 5, 1934, Aranha described Europe in a “*potential* state of war,” with Italy fallen into Bonapartism and Russia in the Thermidor. “If war does not break out,” he wrote, “we will live

8 Here begins Paulo Roberto de Almeida’s summary of the chapter about João Hermes Pereira de Araújo, “Oswaldo Aranha and the Diplomacy”, in: CAMARGO-ARAÚJO-SIMONSEN, *Oswaldo Aranha: A Estrela da Revolução*, op. cit., p. 105-379.

a peace without justice, without humanity, [and] with general misery.”

Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Aranha expressed a most vivid admiration for the country with which he was to have a close relationship: “It is a Herculean construction of the American miracle. (...) Everything is huge, colossal, and unimaginable.”

Aranha handed his credentials to President Roosevelt on October 2, 1934 and started to act immediately. A trade agreement, based on an American proposal of July 1933 that had faced difficulties due to competing bids from Germany, was finally signed in February 1935, during the visit of the new Finance Minister, Artur da Souza Costa. (Brazil concluded another agreement, with Germany, in June 1936.) In the final stages of negotiation of the agreement, the Americans insisted on inserting a clause of most-favored-nation in the case of foreign exchange controls, which Sousa Costa accepted, in view of delicate financial negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom. The American government was divided between the advantages of commercial liberalism, advocated by Secretary Cordell Hull, and strict reciprocity, which the president's economic advisers preferred.

In mid-1935, President Roosevelt proposed to Brazil, through the exclusive channel of the Embassy in Washington, a Conference of Union of the American Peoples, to ensure both peace and hemispheric security. Vargas welcomed the idea, and Aranha saw a possibility to extend Monroism to a truly Pan-American understanding. Itamaraty, however, sought to involve the U.S. Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, and proposed an “inter-American collective security pact” to be agreed upon in Buenos Aires, which contradicted the goals of the United States.

Aranha warned about the negative spirit of the American Congress to this type of plan, which had already motivated their refusal of the League of Nations. The State Department reduced the text of the formal pact proposed by Itamaraty from six to three articles, but the Brazilian foreign office considered it too vague. In a letter to Vargas on August 26, 1936, Aranha complained about Itamaraty's attitude, considering the initiative for the pact "a great thing for Brazil, even if other countries eventually refuse it in Buenos Aires."

En route to the special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held in the Argentine capital, December 1-23, 1936, President Roosevelt made a brief stop in Rio de Janeiro, in late November, consolidating relations and reinforcing positions Aranha advocated concerning bilateral and hemispheric affairs.

At the conference opening itself, the president of Argentina even looked for arguments from the discourse of the late Brazilian Foreign Minister, the Baron of Rio Branco, to guide his country's position. President Roosevelt supported the idea of the pact in terms very similar to those that Aranha advocated. As Aranha had predicted in Washington, however, Buenos Aires objected vehemently to Itamaraty's idea of a collective security pact. But the principles of consultation and non-intervention – the latter proposed by Mexico – were approved. Always defending unanimity and conciliation, Aranha was tireless to deal with the ill will and the opposition of Argentina on minor issues. *The Herald Tribune*, of Chicago, even referred to an "Aranha Doctrine," and *The New York Times* wrote an editorial, stating that the Brazilian Ambassador had become the "major exponent of Monroism."

Brazil's relations with Argentina, and the U.S. desire for neutrality in the competition of both countries concerning military

training, influenced parallel negotiations on the acquisition of new naval and military defense equipment. Before Aranha arrived in Washington, the Brazilian Navy had planned to acquire 12 coast guard vessels from the U.S. After he presented his credentials to President Roosevelt, however, he changed his mind and decided to purchase two cruisers. Then after the London Naval Conference (December 1935 to March 1936), Roosevelt informed Vargas in a letter, dated July 8, 1936, that "he could not provide the cruisers anymore," and he promised to offer a counterproposal.

Another complicating factor was the need for Congressional approval, and the contract included a clause whereby the lessee could use the ships only for education and training purposes, pledging not to employ them against any nation. The Ambassador of Argentina in Washington asked the State Department to postpone the matter until "there was prior understanding among the American nations." Aranha agreed to wait for an easing of the tensions, but on August 14, 1937, he made it clear to the U.S. State Department that it should not compromise under pressure from other countries.

The negotiations were suspended, and the *Estado Novo coup d'état* in Brazil less than two months later fully buried the entire deal. The episode caused the worst impact on American public opinion. Aranha submitted his resignation, but still as an Ambassador, he embarked to Brazil. The plan to lease destroyers was considered ended.

Immediately after the coup Rio de Janeiro, Aranha resigned his position in the U.S., arguing: "I cannot continue to represent Brazil, efficiently, because neither its government nor its people can believe in my statements and information as before. In this situation, my presence would not only be useless but, it seems, it would be detrimental to the interests of Brazil"

(Tel. Conf. 188, November 12, 1937). And in a telegram to Vargas on November 15, 1937, he stated unequivocally: "I don't agree, in fact, I condemn, what has been done in our country, and what's expected to be done, of which the new Constitution is an alarming indication. Thus I resign in an irrecusable manner." Vargas tried to dissuade him by telegram on the 17th, but Aranha retorted the next day: "The disagreement with what has been done, mainly with the text of the new Constitution, is of such a nature that it does not allow me, with dignity, to continue to carry out my current duties."

In a new letter dated November 24, 1937, Aranha prepared his exit in order to preserve the future collaboration with the United States. Even with the undeniably Fascist tendencies of the new Constitution, he argued, it would be of interest to the U.S. government – as well as to Roosevelt, himself – to continue the close relationship with Brazil, and seek to "Americanize or Pan-Americanize Brazil, before it became fully Europeanized under the influence of Hitler or Mussolini." Finally, he agreed to remain an ambassador despite his "call back" to Brazil, in order not to have it appear he had opposed the new political realities in Brazil. Thus, it was in this context that Aranha embarked, on December 11, 1937, on his way back to Brazil; confident that he had fully carried out all his responsibilities as Ambassador in Washington.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE REFORMIST DEMOCRAT

Oswaldo Aranha arrived in Brazil as a symbol of opposition to the Nazi-fascist currents that, even within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wished to extrapolate the ideas and principles in the Constitution of 1937 to the international field. It was

to avoid such transposition that Aranha decided, in March 1938, to accept Vargas' appointment to become the country's Foreign Minister. He did so to balance the opposing trends to his convictions, and to avoid modifications to Brazilian foreign policy that he had fought since his term in Washington. He accepted the invitation with the understanding that Vargas would lead domestic policy, while *he* would be in charge of foreign policy. He made that clear in his inaugural speech on March 15, when he said: "At Itamaraty, I will be one of the ministers of the President of the Republic, limited only to the exercise of this function."

Globally, the biggest events of 1938 were the annexation of Austria by Hitler's Germany, followed by the Munich Agreement – which represented the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by that same Nazi State. In the Western hemisphere, a peace treaty marked the end of hostilities between Paraguay and Bolivia in the Chaco War, and the Eighth International Conference of American States was held (December 9 to 27) in Lima, Peru.

Relations with Germany and Italy, and their expectations of an ally in the Americas with the Estado Novo coup of 1937, were soon frustrated, when Vargas abolished all political parties and refused to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. He also carried out a nationalization policy that affected German immigrants, of which there were many in southern Brazil, as well as much of the Italian immigrant population and their descendants. In addition, a decree strictly forbidding the political activity of foreigners in Brazil prompted protests from the German ambassador, which created such animosity it made Itamaraty qualify him as *persona non grata*. Relations between the two countries, however, remained unaltered in the commercial sphere.

Aranha was personally engaged in negotiations with other South American countries that led to the signing, in July 1938, of the definitive Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries between Bolivia and Paraguay, ending a war that had lasted two years, leaving behind a legacy of an almost insoluble armed truce. Shortly thereafter, in October, an arbitration report sponsored by the countries of the Southern Cone ascribed most of the Chaco region to Paraguay.

The undertaking of the Eighth International Conference of American States, planned for Lima in December of that year, was jeopardized for some time due to border hostilities between Ecuador and Peru. Aranha worked towards having Ecuador participate in the conference. His greatest effort, however, concerned Argentina, which was strictly against giving the project the formality of a treaty or a convention. Itamaraty, in 1936, had submitted it as a Collective Security Pact, thereby consecrating its passage from the stage of consultations to that of solidarity. Despite Argentine concerns regarding form, however, it was possible to reach a *Declaration of Principles of American Solidarity*, preserving the substance of what Brazil desired: the reaffirmation of continental solidarity; defense against any intervention or threat to the sovereignty of the American countries; and the coordination of consultative mechanisms in case of threats to the peace, security or territorial integrity of any of the American republics, by means of meetings held at the initiative of any one of them.

In the domestic sphere, Aranha continued the reform process of careers at Itamaraty, begun by Melo Franco in 1931. Two staffs had been created – one consular and one diplomatic – which could serve both abroad and within the Secretariat of State. By a decree

dated October 1938, Aranha ended the centuries-old separation, unifying both careers and establishing a single staff.⁹

Between January and March 1939, upon the invitation of President Roosevelt himself, Aranha also made an official visit to the United States. Among the issues discussed during his visit were the Brazilian national defense program, American investments in Brazil, and the Brazilian debt situation. Aranha met alone with Roosevelt for an extended period of time, dealing with the European situation, its impact on the Americas, as well as American domestic politics. Shortly after Aranha's visit, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George Marshall, traveled to Brazil, and the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Army, General Góes Monteiro, visited the United States. President Roosevelt met the Brazilian general twice at the White House. The American president had already drawn attention to the Fernando de Noronha Islands and Cape São Roque. He revealed fears that the Germans intended to establish air and naval bases off the western shores of Africa from which they could attack American countries. It was clear that the United States had already planned its future logistics support from Brazil for operations in Northern Africa and Europe.

THE OPTION FOR NEUTRALITY: AN AWARENESS OF BRAZIL'S FRAGILITY

With the start of the war in Europe, Itamaraty acted to reinforce the bonds of hemispheric solidarity, mainly with the United States, and the Brazilian foreign office acted to resolve the many issues that emerged from the declaration of neutrality in the face of the warring countries.

9 Cf. CASTRO, Flávio Mendes de Oliveira. *Itamaraty: Dois Séculos de História, 1808-2008*. Brasília: FUNAG, 2009, vol. I: 1808-1979, p. 365-374.

Brazilian neutrality was proclaimed by decree on September 2, 1939; the next day, the U.S. government proposed a consultative meeting, in accordance with the agreements made in Buenos Aires and Lima. The first such meeting took place in Panama from September 23 to October 3, 1939. Aranha guided the work of Itamaraty at the meeting.

Although President Roosevelt had offered him the Cruiser *Trinidad* for the trip to Panama, Aranha decided to stay in Rio, while maintaining close contact with the main protagonists throughout the preparatory period as well as during the meetings. Aranha also wrote a statement on the continent's territorial waters, which was approved, together with two other statements: one on security and the other on neutrality. In fact, the neutrality of the American waters was broken by the Graf Spee incident shortly thereafter, in Uruguayan waters, followed by another incident with a German freighter, this time in Brazilian waters. Aranha and the military leaders anticipated difficult days for the American countries, mainly Brazil, which had an extensive Atlantic coast.

The year 1940 witnessed a complete change of the political and military map of Europe, with victories by German troops, and the occupation of both belligerent and neutral countries. The changes led to complex problems for diplomatic and consular representatives of neutral countries such as Brazil. Aranha wrote a lengthy letter to Getúlio Vargas, dated November 5, 1940, echoing some of the arguments of Rui Barbosa, made at a Conference in Buenos Aires in 1916. Some of the topics in his letter included his beliefs that there could be no indifference between right and wrong, and one cannot be impartial between legality and crime.

Despite Aranha's clear statements on such matters, however, on June 11, 1940, during a celebration of the seventy fifth anniversary of the Brazilian Naval Battle of Riachuelo – during the

Paraguayan war – President Vargas gave a speech which was quite ambiguous, if not even pro-Axis. While proclaiming support for Pan-Americanism, Vargas also denounced “short-sided liberalism,” and he proclaimed an organization of the economy and work by the State.

International repercussions to his speech were immediate. Many interpreted it as a demonstration of independence from – or even a rejection of – the United States. Aranha immediately considered resigning, again. He decided to stay, however, precisely to not reinforce the Fascist faction of the government.

WARRING TENSIONS BECOME DEEPER

In Italy and Germany the official reactions to Vargas' June 11th speech were positive, contrasting sharply with the repudiation of democratic countries. Reactions in the United States were strong. On June 14, the U.S. government issued a statement that had the visible collaboration of Oswaldo Aranha: confirming the maintenance of a Brazilian foreign policy “of full American solidarity, in the continent's common defense against any foreign attack.” Nevertheless, on June 29, Vargas gave a new speech, in which he emphasized his authoritarian – and some even said his anti-Semitic – leanings as he spoke of something he called “cosmopolitan financial capitalism” of “those without a country.” Vargas was somewhat ambiguous, however, as he continued to confirm Brazil's neutrality, and he defended Pan-Americanism with full respect for national sovereignties and the rights of each people to choose their own political system and form of government.

In the face of activism by the Germans – Friedrich Krupp AG, a firm very friendly to Hitler, had offered Vargas a steel plant – Aranha urged the U.S. Ambassador in Rio, Jefferson Caffery, to

hasten the supply of credits for a steel plant and military equipment for Brazil. The question of the steel plant was resolved extremely quickly, via an unusual scheme, as state property and control, by means of funding from the Eximbank, and technology from companies in the United States (e.g., the U.S. Steel Corporation) became available to Brazil. In addition, the re-equipment of the Brazilian armed forces was decided between late 1941 and early 1942. Thus, the political and military alliance between Brazil and the United States was strengthened.

At the Second Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Havana, Cuba, July 21 to 30, 1940, there were discussions on the issues of neutrality, economic cooperation and peace in the Americas – the latter included a defense of “Inter-American ideals,” and the Brazilian government feared that the political regimes of the countries were inappropriately raised. Aranha claimed that there were “reasons beyond his will” not to attend. Instructions given to the Brazilian representative, the Secretary-General Mauricio Nabuco, did not fail to note that “Pan-Americanism was never a doctrine for the defense of political regimes, nor a practice of intervention.” The *Havana Conference* dealt with the situation of European colonies in the Americas, which could be placed under a “provisional administration scheme” by the American republics. A resolution on Reciprocal Assistance and Defensive Cooperation of the American Nations stated: “Any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against the States which sign this declaration.”

In 1940 and throughout 1941, Aranha sought to strengthen ties with the United States, overcoming the “equidistance” and “pragmatic balance” phase, present in some of Vargas’ speeches. In January 1941, when Germany appeared to consolidate an

unshakable dominance in Europe, Aranha issued a statement in which he said that Brazil would "remain faithful to its continental, political, economic, and military commitments," and "loyal to the historic solidarity, both in peace and in war, which always related its government and its people to the United States." He concluded by reaffirming that "the European war, with its unforeseen events, complications or possible outcomes, does not have any influence capable to alter the always coherent Brazilian position on the Americas, which is dictated to it by the country's best interests." Shortly thereafter, Vargas himself confirmed, to an American executive who had brought him a personal letter from Roosevelt, that the unlimited collaboration with the U.S. was the cornerstone of Brazil's foreign policy: if the United States was attacked, Brazil would not remain neutral; it would take the U.S.' side.

Germany, however, was the second largest commercial partner of Brazil. Trade between the two countries dispensed with the use of foreign currency, and Vargas himself addressed trade issues with the German ambassador, without knowledge of his Foreign Minister. But the trade flow had virtually stopped due to an intensification of the British naval blockade. Since 1940, Aranha had already warned the Americans of the intensity of trade with Germany, urging them to be more dynamic themselves. In 1941, bilateral trade between Brazil and the U.S. almost doubled.

Washington intended to install bases in the northeast of Brazil, possibly with American troops, within the framework of a true "military alliance." The Brazilian military preferred to ensure the defense of the territory themselves, but with materials they hoped to buy from the United States. In April 1941, the Eximbank opened a line of credit for ordinance (which was not used because the Brazilian military considered it insufficient). That same month, an agreement was signed for anchoring and supply facilities for American warships in the northeast in exchange for cooperation

with the Brazilian Navy. A new agreement in July of that year created a joint military commission, headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, which greatly increased the scope and the dimension of bilateral cooperation in that sphere. It was followed by another agreement in October concerned with the supply of defense material.

PEARL HARBOR AND THE AMERICAN CONSULTATIONS MEETING IN RIO DE JANEIRO

The Japanese attack on the American bases on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941, caused great commotion in Brazil. The very next day Vargas telegraphed Roosevelt, informing him that, having assembled its government, Brazil declared itself sympathetic to the attacked country. Aranha reported to the American Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, that all the Brazilian cabinet ministers declared themselves ready to carry out the solidarity policy. The Foreign Minister immediately called the Latin American representatives urging them to act, and he accelerated preparations for the Third Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the Americas, which took place in Rio de Janeiro, January 15 to 28, 1942. Nearly all of the nations in attendance at the meeting supported the U.S., but the Argentine government faltered. That country's Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Navy and Justice tended towards the totalitarian countries; while those of War and the Interior tended to support the United States. Aranha was kept perfectly informed of these matters.

On January 7, 1942, Roosevelt personally wrote to Aranha, demonstrating that he fully trusted his ability to lead. When President Vargas opened the consultation meeting, on the 15th, in Rio, he gave priority on the schedule to defense matters, leaving

economic cooperation in second place. In the face of threats made by the ambassadors of the three Axis countries, Aranha wrote to remind them that the breaking of diplomatic and commercial relations is a measure with restricted range, which does not imply war. If their governments "understand otherwise, however, the Brazilian government was very sorry for that, but Brazil is certain its acts exonerate it of such liability."

While he led the meeting, Aranha confronted two major problems: one internal and one external. Internally, the military leaders - Minister Dutra and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Góes Monteiro - complained that Aranha had made decisions unilaterally, and that the breaking of diplomatic relations almost represented war against the Axis powers, a situation for which Brazil was not militarily prepared. Externally, Argentina made an effort to maintain neutrality, for which it obtained the support of Chile and a lack of decision by Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay, although these countries *did* support the final declaration a few days later. Argentina, however, attempted to exercise a veto right over decisions of the entire hemisphere. Despite Aranha's efforts to arrive at an acceptable formula for them, the Argentines refused to accept a unanimous decision on the breaking of diplomatic ties. The final resolution, therefore, included only a "recommendation" of such action, and this was interpreted as a victory for Argentina.

In the course of the meeting, Vargas delivered to U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, detailed lists of the ordinance that Brazil wished to acquire. It was in this context the two countries signed, in March 1942, the most important of their mutual assistance agreements: that of "Lend-Lease," by which Brazil would be equated with Great Britain and the Soviet Union in ordinance supply, up to a limit of 200 million dollars. A new agreement, in May 1942, created two military commissions - one

in each capital – with the one in Washington subordinated to Itamaraty. Aranha engaged directly in the military acquisitions.

THE CONSCIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN WAR

After the Conference in Rio de Janeiro, there was an intensification of torpedo attacks against Brazilian ships, including on the Brazilian coast itself, as well as against passenger ships on cabotage trips. On August 22, 1942, Aranha informed all Brazilian diplomatic missions in the Americas that Brazil was declaring war on the Axis powers of Germany and Italy; and on the 31st, Vargas decreed that the entire national territory was in a state of war. Aranha's popular prestige grew during this period; he began to be identified as the leader of the Anti-Fascist currents and a possible new national leader.

The year 1943 witnessed decisive developments in the trend reversal that until then had favored the Axis powers. There were also important initiatives towards the effective involvement of Brazil in the military effort that would lead to the defeat of the totalitarian countries. Returning from a meeting with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Casablanca, President Roosevelt stopped in Natal in late January 1943, and he and President Vargas had long talks there. Although Oswaldo Aranha was absent from the meeting, in a preparatory letter he outlined the points he considered relevant from the Brazilian point of view.

The two national leaders discussed all the major issues Aranha had addressed in his letter. Vargas had shown the letter to the U.S. Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, who advised President Roosevelt. Soon after the meeting, Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S., Carlos Martins, with full powers on behalf of Brazil, signed

the United Nations Declaration in Washington, in the presence of U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.

One year after the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Argentina and Chile were the only countries of the Western hemisphere that still remained neutral in the war. Finally, in late January 1943, after having failed to convince Argentina to change its position, Chile decided to follow the recommendation of the group. The president of Argentina, however, said that neutrality was the cornerstone of his country's foreign policy. The pressure of pro-Nazi military officers – which included Juan Peron – made any change of position difficult. It was not until a change of presidents in early 1944 did Argentina break relations with the Axis powers, and even then, most of the officers were against the decree.

TORPEDOED BY VARGAS, ARANHA LEAVES ITAMARATY

Oswaldo Aranha's absence at the presidential meetings in Natal in January 1943 was surprising. It is difficult to explain why he did not attend since he was the main adviser to President Vargas on foreign policy matters. His absence was even more shocking as President Roosevelt was accompanied by his special advisor, Harry Hopkins, and by U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Jefferson Caffery. Such a diplomatic presence should have had as a counterpart the participation of the Brazilian Foreign Minister.

In 1938, when Aranha had accepted his position as Foreign Minister, he was clearly against the Constitution of 1937, which he believed was of totalitarian inspiration. Thus, he decided to devote himself exclusively to foreign policy in order to prevent the ideas that prevailed in influential sectors from projecting

themselves into the international field, and possibly translating into ostensible support for the Axis countries. An issue that attracted Aranha's attention – even though the Constitution was not formally in force, since the plebiscite that it called for had not been carried out – was the establishment of a presidential term of six years duration. Vargas's term was, therefore, scheduled to end on November 10, 1943. Aranha believed that Vargas would be re-elected and thus, legitimized, and that he would, therefore, have more authority to participate in the post-war negotiations. Others claimed that the declaration of war of 1942 had suspended the term of the presidential mandate, and that Vargas would still have, according to this interpretation, one year and two months in office *after* the end of the period of exception. This latter thinking, however, did not stop the beginning of unrest, with popular pressure calling for elections and statements by leaders in favor of democratic ideals. Some believed that Aranha could crystallize that movement and emerge as the political figure of the transition towards democracy.

The exit of Sumner Welles from the U.S. State Department, in August 1943, also affected the level of dialogue that Aranha had achieved for several years with top level American diplomats. In March 1944, the State Department published a document about the U.S. foreign policy that stated: "There is no more need for spheres of influence, alliances, balance of power or any other special agreement." Aranha complained to Ambassador Caffery that the U.S. was relegating Brazil to a lower level of countries. Cordell Hull sent him a telegram that intended to be reassuring, saying that relations with Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China were the *sine qua non* condition to win the war, but that such a situation did not weaken relations within the hemisphere. Aranha retorted on May 17, saying that those claims seemed to reduce the strength of the Brazilian-American Alliance. He considered that

interdependence and cooperation were the basis of the Brazilian hemispheric policy, and that only unlimited confidence of the Brazilian government in the loyalty of the American leaders to these principles could justify the unprecedented Brazilian policy of concessions, cooperation and openness.

In reality, the change of the military scenario and the loss of the strategic importance of Brazil changed the American policy of special relationship. The United States was now more focused on cooperating with *all* the American republics, without singling out Brazil – except when it was in its interest. Two months later, Cordell Hull sent a friendly letter, inviting Aranha to Washington on August 17, to have a meeting with President Roosevelt and discuss with him, in direct and private talks, several issues of hemispheric and international security matters. In his invitation, he referred to Brazil as a power, able to participate in the organization of the security of the new postwar world.

Aranha responded to the invitation on August 7, by means of an interlocutor, saying that he and President Vargas were entirely in accordance with the proposal, but that “for reasons beyond their will,” it was not possible to travel at that time. The response demonstrated the difficulties that existed between Aranha and Vargas.

Having been invited to be Vice-President of the Friends of America Society, Aranha should have formally taken on duties of the office on August 10. The day before, however, police officers invaded and closed the headquarters of the entity, located at the Automobile Club in Rio de Janeiro. The next day, officers, again, invaded the Club, this time including its restaurant, where Aranha happened to be located, and they arbitrarily evacuated the premises.

Certain of the connivance of Vargas in the episode, and having waited for several days, in vain, for some explanation, Aranha wrote

a letter of resignation to the head of government, and he issued, on August 22, a telegraphic circular to the diplomatic missions abroad, informing them that he was leaving his duties. Aranha was losing his official status, but he kept his prestige intact.

The international repercussions of Aranha's actions were enormous. The American and the Argentine press especially devoted much attention to his resignation, and he received numerous expressions of solidarity from American, Hispanic-American, as well as Brazilian figures.

AT THE UNITED NATIONS: AN EPISODIC RETURN TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

After leaving Itamaraty, in 1944, Aranha again devoted himself to the practice of law and later, to business activities. He did, however, serve Brazil again with much success on two more occasions, both times in the foreign arena. In 1947, he was nominated to head the Brazilian delegation at the UN; a position he again held in the Twelfth United Nations Assembly, in 1957.

Aranha was in the United States in January 1947 for a meeting of leaders of the Council on World Affairs at the invitation of *Time* magazine. While there, he received the unexpected invitation from Vargas' successor, President Eurico Dutra, to head Brazil's delegation at the UN, a position which had become vacant with the death of Pedro Leão Velloso. Aranha's name had been suggested by the publisher of *Time*, Henry Luce, who had chosen to use one of Aranha's phrases at that meeting: "The people who disintegrated the atom now have the mission of integrating humanity." When Aranha sent his report of the meeting to the Brazilian government, he reported on Brazil's image abroad, concluding that "the

general opinion in relation to Brazil is of mistrust" and that "Pan-Americanism is in crisis."

Even though there was no mutual sympathy between Dutra and Aranha – for reasons dating back to their having had opposing political views on both domestic and foreign matters during the Vargas era – upon the recommendation of Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes, President Dutra accepted Aranha to occupy the "position of most responsibility abroad," as he telegraphed to Aranha on February 5, 1947.

The international situation and Brazil's relations with the United States had changed substantially since Aranha had resigned in August 1944. Brazil had not participated in the Dumbarton Oaks talks, which had laid the foundations of what would be the United Nations as an organization, in 1944; nor was the country seen positively at the Yalta Conference, in 1945, when the three major powers – the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Great Britain – discussed what would become the UN Security Council. Later, during negotiations at the UN Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco in 1945, Brazil defended the universal character of the organization, insisting on the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. The country failed, however, to have its claim awarded as a permanent member of the Security Council.

When Oswaldo Aranha was nominated, the second part of the First United Nations General Assembly was already over and a meeting of the Security Council was taking place, the presidency of which, in February 1947, was held by Brazil. Great Britain had requested that the matter of Palestine be included on the agenda of the Second United Nations General Assembly, and a special session was held, to establish and instruct a committee in charge of studying the matter.

In addition to participating, in February, in the Security Council proceedings, which he chaired; in April, Aranha also headed the Brazilian delegation to the First Special Session of the General Assembly, to which he was elected president. At the end of May, he returned to Brazil, but then he went back to New York in September for the General Assembly's Second Special Session. In his duties, Aranha demonstrated that he had all the qualities to be a perfect mediator of debates, and soon he made Brazil stand out among the member States.

The matter of Palestine was the most complex issue with which he had to deal at the beginning of his term of office. The only item on the agenda of the special session was the establishment of a committee and the preparation of a report to be forwarded to the General Assembly. Some of the Arab States, however, had requested the inclusion of an additional item: "the end of Great Britain's mandate over Palestine, and the declaration of its independence." By means of a maneuver by the Secretariat and the support of several Latin American delegations, Aranha ended up being elected to head the session by the lopsided vote of 45 to 5.

The second UN General Assembly began in September 1947 at Flushing Meadows, NY, with Aranha as provisional president since he had headed the previous special session. Despite reluctance from Rio de Janeiro, Aranha was eventually elected with a large majority to head the General Assembly. Itamaraty hinted that he had been elected with votes from the Soviet bloc, whose own candidate received few votes in the first round. A second election to the UN Security Council, with Soviet support, made Aranha seen, in certain media, as a "supporter of Russia" and "anti-American." Itamaraty, however, intended that Brazil always followed the American positions, regardless of rules of procedure and established practices of equilibrium in representations on UN bodies. Amid disagreements with Itamaraty and President Dutra,

who had decided to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Aranha, accompanied by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, was honored with the title of *doctor honoris causa* in Law at Lafayette College, in Easton, Pennsylvania, one of the most traditional educational institutions of the United States.

As expected, the theme of Palestine was the most complex and difficult issue on the agenda of the second session of the UN General Assembly. Aranha had a brilliant performance, not exactly to fight for the partition, but for the plenary to decide the problem immediately, without delays or postponements. His performance was the subject of unanimous praise from virtually all the delegations, and the explicit recognition of the future State of Israel. His closing speech at the second session of the General Assembly had huge acclaim: it obtained a headline on the front page of the *New York Times* as well on the covers of the *World Report* and *UN World* magazines, and it was included in a book that compiled the world's most famous speeches.¹⁰

Oswaldo Aranha's name was always remembered when delegations to subsequent General Assemblies were chosen. An invitation was made to him, to lead the Brazilian representation at the world body, again, in 1956, but he did not accept. The following year, however, President Juscelino Kubitschek reiterated the invitation, and Aranha considered it his duty to head the delegation to the twelfth session of the UN General Assembly. It was at the height of the Cold War and his opening speech, in the general debate, addressed the issue of nuclear disarmament. There was a conflict between Turkey and Syria going on, and it seemed at the point of war. There were also liberation wars ongoing in Algeria and

10 Cf. Oswaldo Aranha, "A New Order through the United Nations." In: COPELAND, Lewis (coord.). *The World's Great Speeches*. 2nd ed.; New York: Dover, 1958, p. 621-623. The same speech is included in the gathering made by Itamaraty in order to celebrate one hundred years of his birth: *Oswaldo Aranha, 1894-1960: Discursos e Conferências*, op. cit., p. 101-106.

in the Portuguese colonies. The focus of Aranha's speech, however, was development. He suggested that the United Nations should focus its efforts on that issue, although in a letter to President Kubitschek he recognized that the international moment was not the most conducive to obtain economic aid. On the other hand, he acknowledged in the same letter, that support to colonialist Portugal had almost cost Brazil a defeat in the election to the Commission on Mandates:

Our attitude in favor of the colonial powers, yet opposite to our training ... heavily weakens our position and reduces our authority, even among the Latin American countries. I restricted myself to the letter of our instructions but, now, I think it is my duty to advise a review of that guidance... There has been the creation of a global state of mind in favor of the liberation of people still enslaved, and Brazil will not be able to counter that current without compromising its international prestige and even its continental position.

The head of the delegation to the twelfth UN General Assembly was the last diplomatic activity of Oswaldo Aranha, who passed away in January 1960. Until he was 40 years old, he had devoted himself to domestic affairs. Nominated Ambassador to Washington in 1934, a function that he held until 1937, Aranha managed, as few others, to perform not only in bilateral diplomacy, but also in hemispheric arrangements. He was perhaps the only person that was ever in charge of an era in the relationship between Brazil and the United States, during which time he obtained full American cooperation for the beginning of Brazilian industrial development.

As the head of Itamaraty at a particularly difficult period, from 1938 to 1944, he justifiably was considered one of the country's greatest Foreign Ministers. It was at that stage – the most difficult of his career as a public man – that he demonstrated his political

leadership qualities at the highest degree, managing to lead the Brazilian international position in the right direction, at a crucial moment in history.¹¹

OSWALDO ARANHA: IN THE PRACTICAL CONTINUITY OF THE BARON OF RIO BRANCO

Oswaldo Aranha died at the age of 65, in January 1960, a little more than two years after his last diplomatic mission. Two years before his death, in an article published in the *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (n. 2, of June, 1958), he recommended the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The USSR along with other countries of the Soviet bloc were potentially large buyers of Brazilian coffee, an export business to which members of Aranha's family from the state of São Paulo had been associated. His two terms as the country's Minister of Finance – separated by two decades – had caused him to realize the relevant role of that basic product in Brazil's balance of trade. But there was more to it than that.

Both of the times Getúlio Vargas had placed Aranha at the head of the national economy were periods when the Brazilian economy was facing especially difficult international problems. As Mário Henrique Simonsen, an economist and, himself, a Finance Minister of Brazil (1974-1979) has said of Aranha: his "double passage through the command of the nation's finances, in 1931-34 and again in 1953-54, is less important in his biography than the achievements both in politics and in diplomacy. But, if his life were limited to what he did in the Ministry of Finance, Aranha would

11 Here ends the summary of the text by Ambassador João Hermes Pereira de Araújo.

have already conquered his private seat in Brazilian history.”¹² Simonsen, who fully agreed with both of Aranha’s macroeconomic stabilization plans, considered that his actions in the crisis of the 1930s were crucial to reduce the impact of the Great Depression on the Brazilian economy, and that the “most controversial aspect [of Aranha’s second term] was the coffee policy” (p. 437).

Aranha was basically a pragmatic individual. In both of the situations mentioned above, as well as when he was Ambassador in Washington and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he took the practical course of action. Armed with democratic principles in politics and liberal ones in economics, without limiting himself to theories or ideologies, his way of work, his philosophy of life – his political and diplomatic thought – was similar to that of the Baron of Rio Branco: both were guided by a practical spirit enabling them to overcome obstacles and difficulties, while always bearing in mind the larger interests of Brazil.

Aranha was not a systematic memorialist. However, his personal files, consisting of an immense wealth of letters, speeches and work notes, as well as official documents, provide the basis upon which some historians have already worked. A thorough review has been conducted by the Brazilianist Stanley Hilton – allowing us to recover fragments of his thoughts on several topics of international politics.¹³

12 See Mario Henrique Simonsen, “Oswaldo Aranha e o Ministério da Fazenda”, in: CAMARGO-ARAÚJO-SIMONSEN, *Oswaldo Aranha: A Estrela da Revolução*, op. cit., p. 381-442; cf. p. 383.

13 Compared to letters and documents, the specifically conceptual texts of Oswaldo Aranha’s authorship are relatively few, and they are generally restricted to issues linked to positions he held throughout his political life. An exception, perhaps, are those of a conference that occurred on the Jubilee of the Republic, on 11/27/1939: *Fronteiras e Limites: A Política do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1940. A compilation of his speeches and lectures produced on the occasion of the centenary of his birth (*Oswaldo Aranha, 1894-1960: discursos e conferências*, op. cit.) contains exactly 120 pages, although several other texts could be added, especially those relating to domestic policy; some of which can be found in the collection organized by Moacyr Flores: *Oswaldo Aranha*. Porto Alegre: IEL, 1991.

The ideas gleaned from Aranha's letters, notes, and speeches clearly illustrate his thought on relevant issues of Brazilian foreign relations, in which his truly democratic positions in the political and institutional sphere should be highlighted. This might have been an inheritance from his younger years, when, in defense of the Western democracies, he sided with Rui Barbosa, who had fought against the imperial autocracy of the German Reich during World War I. His disagreements with Getúlio Vargas, concerning the organization of the State as well as his adhesion to constitutional rights subject to the rotation of the ballot box, were both notorious and consistent, culminating in his departure from the Embassy in Washington, due to the *coup d'état* of the Estado Novo, in November 1937.

Aranha's practical side, however, usually prevailed. Thus, few months after resigning as Ambassador to the U.S., he agreed to serve the dictatorial regime, in order to reinforce the fragile democratic pole in a government filled with supporters of European fascism, some even willing to align Brazil with Nazi Germany. Much later, when he had already left Itamaraty, which was still under the Vargas dictatorship, in 1945, in an interview that Radio Tupi should have transmitted, but was banned by the censorship regime, Aranha gave a more detailed explanation of his political decision at the time:

I joined the government in 1938, not to serve the Estado Novo, but determined to avoid the repercussions of its internal harm the Brazilian international diplomacy. (...) Much of for the Constitution of 1937, many of its innovations – almost all of which were translated from European and Asian totalitarian constitutions – I let it be known, were repugnant to me, to my beliefs and my fidelity to democratic commitments and purposes of the October

*Revolution. (...) During that period, when I attended government meetings, and I was very intimate with the Head of Government, I did not have any responsibility for Brazilian domestic affairs, except when they threatened to jeopardize the achievement of foreign policy. I was, uniquely and exclusively, Foreign Minister, exercising my functions, closed in the room where the great Rio Branco lived and died: the biggest and best example of how every Brazilian has a duty to serve his country at Itamaraty, without it resulting in the sacrifice of his political and personal convictions. I did not resign my ideas nor did I deny a single one of those principles that were, are and will be an inseparable part of my life of devotion to Brazil. In that role, I defended those ideas and principles and, thanks to my fidelity to them, I avoided, with the agreement of the people, that Brazil was dragged into error and defeat by the political trends enshrined in the Constitution of 1937. (...) The course of the war was threatening and my intransigence seemed to jeopardize the position with the winners at the time. I, myself, had days of perplexity, and if I did not vacillate, it was because I have always believed that man still has not invented a weapon capable of defeating ideas. (...) The victories of force are ephemeral, albeit spectacular, in the face of the determination and courage of a well-formed conscious and heart.*¹⁴

Aranha's reference to the Baron of Rio Branco was not random. It added to the qualification he made of the duty to serve one's country, "without it resulting in the sacrifice of political and personal convictions." This way of thinking corresponded entirely to his thoughts and actions during the Estado Novo, a

14 Cf. *O Jornal*, 02/24/1945, apud ARAÚJO, "Oswaldo Aranha e a diplomacia", op. cit., p. 176-78.

period in which he faced several political and personal setbacks, mainly caused by actions of the Minister of War, Eurico Dutra, the Minister of Justice, Francisco Campos, and the Chief of police, Filinto Müller. Yet, despite these setbacks, Aranha always endeavored to serve Brazil in the best way possible.

Aranha was inspired by Rio Branco, to address the difficult relations with Argentina. A *gaúcho* from the border, a lover of Buenos Aires, where he had treated his eyes when he was young, Aranha was also deeply aware of the military threats that always focused the attention of the Brazilian military on the Southern borders. He, therefore, struggled throughout his diplomatic administration to find a *modus vivendi* that respected the peculiarities of Argentina, in both regional and international contexts, which he hoped could be conciliated with Brazilian interests. He strongly desired to deepen hemispheric solidarity in the face of the Fascist threats.¹⁵ This, however, was not an easy task, especially because Aranha had to reconcile American unilateral positions with the susceptibilities of the regional neighbors, often repeatedly engaged in potential or actual conflicts – such as Paraguay and Bolivia around the Chaco, or Peru and Ecuador in border disputes. In the American conferences, Aranha had to use all his diplomatic skills to avoid Argentina adopting an isolated stance, which might have led to a break in Pan-American solidarity, or even, in the worst case scenario, to the implementation of that nation's Nazi-Fascist sympathies, as several officers of its high military summit desired. Different from Rio Branco, however, Aranha saw in the intensification of commercial ties with Argentina, the possibility of closer ties

15 See the article by Stanley Hilton, "The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy", *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 100, n. 1, Spring 1985, p. 27-51, as well as his biography of Aranha already mentioned, which is particularly rich, regarding the Brazil-Argentina relationship.

between the two countries. As a result, he sought, incessantly, to multiply agreements and to expand reciprocal trade.¹⁶

A PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE OF BRAZIL

Although he was the head of Itamaraty from 1938 to 1944, Oswaldo Aranha had no control over decision-making on important diplomatic issues¹⁷, and he saw himself marginalized by Getúlio Vargas on several occasions, such as those concerning relations with Nazi Germany or the establishment of an alliance with the United States.¹⁸ Some observers attribute Vargas' treatment of Aranha, in this respect, to his viewing the Foreign Minister as a rival and possible presidential contender. The most dramatic and symbolic example of Vargas' personal attitude towards Aranha took place when the Brazilian president met the U.S. president, Franklin Roosevelt in Natal, in January 1943. Already aware of his exclusion from the meeting, Aranha was still worried about the direction the talks could take, and in a long letter to Vargas in preparation for the meeting, he laid out his

16 Bilateral trade actually increased significantly during World War II, in part due to the interruption of Argentina's transaction with Great Britain, but also, as Stanley Hilton demonstrated, due to the Brazilian agreements and missions to its neighbor; CF. "Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930-1945: A Reappraisal of His Attitude Toward Industrialization and Planning", *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 35, no. 4, December, 1975, p. 754-778; esp. 775-76.

17 According to Hilton, Aranha "was an influential factor, sometimes crucial, in the decision-making process on foreign policy, but he could not control this process. And he should not have been expected to have mastered it because, after all, the president was, for more than a decade, a man with whom he had a relationship of younger brother to elder brother. It would even be surprising if Vargas had ceded control over foreign policy, especially in an era when the events abroad threatened to affect the country's destinations like never before." CF. *Oswaldo Aranha: uma biografia*, op. cit., p. 354.

18 According to Sérgio Danese, Vargas was probably the first Brazilian representative practicing presidential diplomacy, being, on several occasions, his own Foreign Minister; see *Diplomacia Presidencial: História e Crítica*. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1999, p. 307.

thoughts, concerning the international scene and the positions he believed Brazil needed to take – both immediately in relation to the war and during the medium-term post-war years.

The key aspects of Aranha's thought, regarding the foreign policy Brazil needed to adopt, can be summarized in the formula: "support the United States in the world in exchange for its support in South America." The guidance that he thus recommended to Vargas was to follow the United States "in the war, until the victory of American weapons and, in peace, until the victory and consolidation of American ideals." As Aranha also pointed out, in the postwar period the U.S. would be in charge of leading the peace, so Brazil "must align itself alongside the United States," initially by joining the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration, and then by seeking a seat on military councils and by participating in studies of a future international organization. In the Western Hemisphere, Brazil should confirm its adherence to Pan-Americanism, since without a perfect understanding with the United States on that principle, "Pan-Americanism would not be possible and the United States could not rely on the unanimous support of the continental peoples in the war." Aranha acknowledged that Brazil was a weak country, in both economic and military terms, but he had no doubt that, in the future, "it would inevitably be one of the great political and economic powers of the world." Nothing, therefore, justified Brazil's withdrawal from world politics. On the contrary, he believed it should fully engage in the war effort, and in this way it would achieve advantages in times of peace.

Aranha recommended that after the war, the economic policy should be one of liberalization of international trade, intensification of the American cooperation in Brazil's industrialization and development program, the broad freedom of immigration, and the attraction of foreign capital to Brazil. Early in 1943, Aranha did

not think it was necessary to send troops to the war front, although he thought that perhaps later it would be in Brazil's interest to do so. In any event, Brazil needed to prepare as if it were on the verge of going into combat because "the preparation, itself – even if the country were not called to battle – would be counted as a victory at the peace table."

Summarizing his thoughts, the Brazilian Foreign Minister finally referred to the goals that Brazil should pursue both internationally and in the area of development. Internationally, Aranha desired a better position for Brazil, a strict collaboration with the United States in order to stimulate the development of Pan-Americanism. Additionally, he was concerned with global reconstruction.

Domestically, Aranha was concerned with the country's development of its armed forces as well as its heavy industry; the creation and development of industries related to defense, to agriculture, and to mineral extraction; plus all other industries necessary for the progress of the country. He gave a special emphasis to the exploration of oil and other fuels.¹⁹

Aranha's ten-page letter²⁰ included his thoughts on Brazil's positions in both regional and international arenas – at that time and in the future. Several elements of his diplomatic thought easily approximated those of Rio Branco three decades earlier. As a synthesis, he offered eleven goals that Brazil needed to pursue over the course of the war and immediately thereafter. He believed the goals were worth the entire effort of the government, then and throughout the process of political and economic modernization

19 Excerpts from the letter from Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, January 25, 1943, reprinted in Araújo, "Oswaldo Aranha e a Diplomacia", op. cit., p. 297-299.

20 Eugenio Vargas Garcia, in turn, mentions a letter with only seven pages, included in the Estevão Leitão de Carvalho Archive, Lot 507, Book 3, IHGB; see GARCIA, *O Sexto Membro Permanente: o Brasil e a Criação da ONU*. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2012, p. 45 and p. 46, note 110.

of Brazil, which he thought should be a national project. In its basic structure, Rio Branco could also have, *mutatis mutandis*, delineated the same goals that Aranha summarized. For the historical record, Aranha's eleven goals justify their full transcription:

1. A better position in world politics;
2. A better position in the politics with neighboring countries;
3. A more confident and closer solidarity with the United States;
4. An increasing influence on Portugal and its possessions;
5. Development of a maritime power;
6. Development of an air power;
7. Development of an industrial park for heavy industries;
8. Creation of a defense industry;
9. Creation of agricultural, extractive and light industries complementary to those of the United States, necessary for world reconstruction;
10. Expansion of railways and highways for economic and strategic purposes;
11. Exploration of basic fuels.²¹

Corresponding to the highly promising expectations that Aranha nurtured for the maintenance of the bilateral alliance – that he had been building laboriously since his arrival in Washington, almost ten years prior and that his letter to Vargas clearly anticipated – Roosevelt, in one of their conversations in Natal, confirmed to Vargas that he hoped to have him by his

21 Cf. McCANN, Frank D. *A Aliança Brasil-United States, 1937-1945*. Rio de Janeiro: Library of the Army, 1995, p. 244.

side at the expected peace conference. The comment had made the dictator especially satisfied.²²

The points covered in his letter were precisely Aranha's plans for the future of Brazil. His careful preparations for the international insertion of Brazil into world affairs immediately after the war and in the post-war years, an insertion that he foresaw as the result of a constant and exhausting process of negotiations with the United States – even an effort to “educate” the U.S. about what Brazil really was – in order to shed some light on this new posture of the country. It was his belief that Brazil could not fail to closely associate itself with this vision of the world and the values of American democracy, which he regarded as also Brazilian in a full and indivisible way.

The concerns of Vargas, in Natal, to negotiate armaments and Brazil's involvement in the war, were to ensure his own maintenance in power; while those of Aranha were of a leader who wanted to use the meeting as leverage to build a post-war Brazil. This is why Aranha rejected the emerging view – hinted at in the meetings of the three main Allied powers – of a hegemonic accommodation in the world and in the functioning of the future United Nations. To Aranha, the basis of Brazilian hemispheric policy was a relationship of cooperation and interdependence with the United States and, starting from there, creating the foundations of a future projection into the world.

Roosevelt was very aware of Aranha's beliefs and ideas. He knew that within the context of Brazilian politics, the best possible relation that the United States could desire in South America, and even in the world, was that of Oswaldo Aranha. It was with that in mind Cordell Hull wrote an important letter to Aranha on July 17, 1944, inviting him, on behalf of President Roosevelt,

22 Cf. McCANN, p. 245; Vargas and Roosevelt spoke directly in French.

to come to Washington in August of that year. In the letter, Hull wrote that he and the president accepted in an "unrestricted" manner the basic concept, which Aranha had stated on May 17, of continuing the "extraordinarily strict and productive cooperation that characterized our relations during the war." He continued by inviting Aranha to visit Washington for a long enough period of time, to develop a new understanding:

Besides matters that concern specifically Brazil and the United States, there are others of a hemispheric nature and also some of a global scope, which may only be discussed in the intimacy of private talks. I believe that your suggestions, concerning your situation and the participation of powers, such as Brazil, in the organization of the security of the new post-war world, as well as concerning the Inter-American system in the face of the organization mentioned, deserve special attention. I do not know any other way to examine those matters on which depend our peace and welfare in the future, other than through direct and private conversations. (...) The president, who will be very pleased to have a long conversation with you, may see you on August 17, if you are in Washington at that date.²³

The invitation – certainly one of the most important ever made in the history of the bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States – probably prognosticated a favorable political evolution to American interests in Brazil, at the end of the war. That might have been exactly the reason Vargas vetoed its acceptance.

It must have been much against his will that Oswaldo Aranha had to respond to Cordell Hull, not by direct letter, but by means of a telegram to the Embassy in Washington, issued on August 7, 1944, three days before the beginning of the crisis that led to his

23 Cf. Araújo, op. cit., p. 314. 24 Idem, p. 315.

definitive removal from Itamaraty, after so many disappointments. The Brazilian Embassy was simply instructed to transmit the position of Aranha and Vargas concerning the invitation: "I cannot travel now, for reasons beyond my will. The President is assessing the possibility [to travel] at some mutual time to be scheduled."²⁴ Then on August 10, Aranha, insulted by Vargas in the episode of the Friends of America Society, decided to leave Itamaraty.

At that point, Brazil might have lost its best chance to build a mature relationship with the main hemispheric and global partner, a relationship which could have been leveraged into a more intensive participation in the negotiating forums that were building the principles of the international post-war order. The next year – when it elected a president who was not trusted in Washington and London, and even less so in Moscow, due to his ambiguous stances early in the war, to the detriment of the one who might have represented an infinitely more cosmopolitan perspective for a country that was still backwards in material terms – Brazil witnessed the closure of an opportunity that would not open again during the turbulent years of the Cold War and during its own years of political and social instability.

To a certain extent, Oswaldo Aranha lacked the ambition to impose himself decisively in the political sphere. He had been the "star of the Revolution" in 1930, the embodiment of the best values of the rising urban middle classes – who, themselves, desired a kind of political leadership different from the old rural oligarchs, the new opportunistic people of labor, or even the *caudilhos* that existed here and there. In his own way, however, he was also a charismatic leader, having left his deep mark in the institutions in which he had worked and led in the public sector, as well as in the history of the country itself.

24 Idem, p. 315.

Brazil might have developed in another way had Aranha aspired to and obtained positions of even greater responsibility than those he occupied throughout his extraordinary political trajectory. Regardless of what might have been, however, Oswaldo Aranha certainly contributed to turning Brazil into a better country, in all of the numerous areas in which he exercised his competence and his extraordinary intellectual honesty.

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CYRO DE FREITAS-VALLE

Cyro de Freitas-Valle was born in São Paulo, on August 16th, 1896, the son of Senator José de Freitas-Valle and Antonieta E. de Sousa Aranha de Freitas-Valle. He graduated from São Paulo Law School (1916). He joined the diplomatic service in 1918 and occupied various functions both in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and abroad. He was the Brazilian Ambassador to La Paz (1936), Bucharest (1937), Berlin (1939-42), Ottawa (1944), Buenos Aires (1947-48) and Santiago (1952-55). Twice nominated Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs (1939 and 1949-51). He headed the Brazilian delegation to the 1944 meeting of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). He attended the San Francisco Conference and the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (1945), as well as the 1st UN General Assembly in London and the Paris Conference among the Allied countries (1946). He represented Brazil in the Security Council, having chaired the organ between February and March 1946. He headed the

Brazilian delegation to the 4th and 5th Sessions of the UN General Assembly (1949 and 1950), when the tradition of Brazil being the first country to speak began. He was the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations in New York (1955-61). He attended sessions of the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) and chaired the Conference on Disarmament, in 1958. He retired from Itamaraty in 1961 and died in Rio de Janeiro on November 7th, 1969.

CYRO DE FREITAS-VALLE: UNITED NATIONS, BRAZIL FIRST

Eugênio Vargas Garcia

INTRODUCTION

Cyro de Freitas-Valle might have been, in his time, the Brazilian who knew best the intricacies of the United Nations, the emergence of which he witnessed. He was one of the delegates who had the privilege of signing the UN Charter, on behalf of Brazil, on June 26th, 1945. Until his retirement, he witnessed pivotal moments in UN history, attended several conferences and meetings, often led the delegations representing Brazil and always kept a close link with the practices of multilateralism in all its dimensions.

His first contact with the new structure that was emerging had been in the 1944 meeting of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), created to provide aid to millions of refugees and displaced persons during the war. Ambassador in Ottawa, he was nominated delegate to the San Francisco Conference. Shortly thereafter, he joined the United Nations Preparatory Commission, which was responsible for preparing the operational measures necessary for the first

sessions of the General Assembly and other UN organs, including its Secretariat. He attended the General Assembly, held in London, and was the representative for Brazil when the country exercised for the first time, as a non-permanent member, the Presidency of the Security Council, in 1946. At the opening of the annual general debate, he spoke before the General Assembly in New York four times. He exercised other functions as Ambassador and culminated his multilateral career as Permanent Representative to the UN, from 1955 to 1961, a period of political effervescence and growing diplomatic challenges.

Despite his expertise and his personal engagement with multilateral issues, and even the recognition he received in life from his peers and subordinates as a differentiated Ambassador and a reference within Itamaraty, little has been written so far about his legacy. There are no substantial specific studies and references to Freitas Valle's diplomatic thought are scarce in the bibliography. One reason for that may have been that he, a pragmatic man, identified with the *Zeitgeist* of the Brazilian society of the mid-20th century, did not consider himself a theorist of international relations. Even though political reflection was part of his daily life, he left relatively little material structured in such a way that could establish a line of thought liable to systematization. Directed towards action and concerned about solving problems as they emerged, Freitas-Valle represented a tradition of diplomats who, being efficient in their function, did not feel compelled to theorize in depth about their profession or about the major international issues that absorbed them in their daily work. Maybe for that very reason, to understand better their worldview also means to honor countless individuals who, although not necessarily engaged in formal or academic considerations, printed their mark as foreign policy practitioners.

PRESENT AT THE CREATION: THE PLACE OF BRAZIL

The major powers that led the winning military alliance in World War II carried out the preparatory process that led to the creation of the UN. The political-strategic planning for reestructuring the postwar world order took place in absolute secrecy. In 1944, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which brought together the four Policemen (USA, USSR, Great Britain and China), a preliminary text was approved, in October of that year. That draft Charter was the negotiation basis for the Conference carried out in San Francisco, with the explicit purpose of establishing a new organization to replace the discredited League of Nations.

At Dumbarton Oaks, Brazil was the only country considered as a possible sixth permanent member in the future Security Council. Both Great Britain and the Soviet Union resisted President Franklin Roosevelt's proposal. The American delegation itself, after an internal meeting, recommended that Roosevelt gave up the idea. Both the British and the Soviets rejected an increase in the number of permanent seats larger than five. They claimed that, if it was too expanded, the effectiveness of the Council could be jeopardized. In addition, both Churchill and Stalin were against the possibility of allowing the entry of a further "certain vote" for the United States.

Without being aware of Roosevelt's plans and of the discussion that took place at Dumbarton Oaks, Freitas-Valle foresaw that a window of opportunity was opening to Brazil. He confided to an American diplomat that nobody would dispute the need to include the Big Three as permanent members, along with France (to deal with European affairs) and China (representative of Asia). He suggested that such was the same position of Brazil and asked if something could actually be done in South America "without Brazilian cooperation". For that reason, he dared saying, if a UN

Charter was to be written for the next century, it would be a “good investment for all” to grant a permanent seat to Brazil.¹

It is worth recalling that such position was not unanimous in Itamaraty. In fact, there was no consensus about that within the Government. Hildebrando Accioly, Raul Fernandes and José Carlos de Macedo Soares belonged to the group that, in the committee of notables that reviewed the Dumbarton Oaks project, was against the participation of Brazil in the Security Council. Pedro Leão Velloso, who was the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs after Oswaldo Aranha’s exit, tried to remain neutral, even though privately sympathizing with that group. The other camp, led by President Getúlio Vargas, included Carlos Martins, Ambassador in Washington, Freitas-Valle and other diplomats and jurists who wished to see Brazil recognized for its contribution to the war, by the size of its territory and population, as well as by its position in South America.

It might have been weighed in the consideration of the problem the memory of the crisis of March 1926 in the League of Nations and the subsequent withdrawal of Brazil in June, amid criticism and condemnation, after the failed attempt to get a permanent seat on the Executive Board of that organization. To the skeptics, avoiding the repetition of such an embarrassing situation seemed to be a solid reason to discourage a new investment in the world organization that was set up in 1945. For the advocates of the idea, however, the historical experience imposed a “duty of consistency” and it should be worth reintroducing the Brazilian bid to reinforce the old aspiration for the same reasons pointed out before in the League.

Another name deserves to be recalled here. Afrânio de Melo Franco, who before being the Ambassador of the Revolution of

1 Freitas-Valle to Sumner Welles, letter, Ottawa, October 16th, 1944, CFV ad 44.02.00.

1930 had been Ambassador to the League of Nations in Geneva, had defended the permanence of Brazil in the Council: “I still believe that, for us to be considered in the Society of Nations and to have, within it, the authority to which our greatness, our devotion to the ideals of the Society and our large population entitle us, we must have a seat on the Council”. Melo Franco argued that the work towards success could not be done “in the turmoil of the Assembly’s activity, but rather in the intermissions of the sessions and by negotiation among governments”. However, he disagreed about the uncompromising way in which President Artur Bernardes decided to address the subject, which embarrassed the Locarno agreements and threatened to veto the entry of Germany in the League (“win or not lose”).

Freitas-Valle accompanied that crisis from a distance, but he did make public his opinion. In an article for a newspaper from São Paulo, he acknowledged that with its attitude (the veto to Germany), Brazil had “torpedoed” Locarno. The country lacked the support of the major powers and other Latin American nations, which “inexplicably were jealous of us.” The 1926 aftermath would have been the “alienation” of solidarity from the rest of the continent, with disappointing results for Brazil, isolated in the region and seen in Europe as responsible for the fiasco of the Assembly.² Like Melo Franco, Freitas-Valle supported the Brazilian aspiration. The mistake in the League had been of method and tactics: Bernardes turned the claim into a zero-sum game, he overestimated his abilities, opposed the country to the European powers and deprived himself of the alternative of a negotiated solution or a strategic retreat.

At the San Francisco Conference, the works of which began in late April 1945, the number of five permanent members had

2 *Correio Paulistano*, São Paulo, March 23rd and April 11th, 1926, CFV 25.12.28d.

already been closed by the great powers. The unexpected death of Roosevelt, two weeks before, sealed any prospect of review of the Brazilian claims to the Security Council. Leão Velloso still talked about it to the US Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, but he got nothing. Freitas-Valle was in charge of the technical-level discussion. At the First Committee of the Third Commission (on structure and functioning of the Security Council), the position that the delegation took on represented, in practice, an indirect candidacy. Brazil supported the creation, in the first place, of a permanent seat for Latin America (that Itamaraty believed it should go to Brazil). Without realistic chances of success, Freitas-Valle took on a cautious approach, according to the instructions he had received.³

The Brazilian strategy of discretion in San Francisco was exactly opposite to the histrionics shown in the League of Nations, but neither one was successful. Here is a dilemma that must be weighed. Excellent credentials and a well-articulated campaign can contribute to strengthen the election, but the achievement of the goal, due to its inherently political nature, also depends on other broader factors and on a global foreign policy project that gives credible support to the candidacy. Those requirements were absent both in 1926 and in 1945.

The only option left to Brazil was to become a non-permanent member by the ballot of the General Assembly. Freitas-Valle deemed that it was necessary to ensure that Brazil was elected to the Security Council and other main organs of the United Nations. He knew the dispute would be close. "That is why I previously said that it will not be an easy task for His Excellency [Leão Velloso], to claim to Brazil, in the concert of nations, the place it really deserves.

3 On May 14, 1945, the Brazilian delegation withdrew its proposal and, as a result, the Committee decided "not to favor the creation of a sixth permanent seat representing Latin America".

Do not forget that Ukraine, Egypt and Canada also intend to be the sixth country (after the Big Five) in the world”.⁴

Thus, when Brazil was elected for the first time as a temporary member for a two-year term (1946-47), with an expressive voting, Freitas-Valle evaluated that the victory was fair, since in that way Brazil fulfilled “its sole and legitimate aspiration within the United Nations”, that is, to integrate the maximum organ of the structure that the Charter created. It might have been a way to reward the effort that Brazil had made in the war, as the only Latin American country to send military forces to fight in Europe.⁵ The outcome of the experience, however, remained as an accomplishment not fully achieved. Still for a long time, Brazilian politicians and diplomats pondered about what “could have been” if there had been a different setting of factors by the end of the war to make Brazil the sixth permanent member.⁶

THE FOUNDER OF A TRADITION

Some hypotheses have already been suggested to try to clarify why Brazil is the first country to speak at the opening of the general debate of the UN General Assembly, in September. Considered as “established practice” by the Secretariat, such honorable privilege obtained formal recognition in the protocol of the organization by means of the Resolution 51/241 of the 1997

4 Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, Ottawa, July 28th, 1945, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

5 Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, London, September 17th, 1945, CDO, Pack 40,235.

6 Years later, João Neves da Fontoura, Foreign Minister during the second Vargas Government, perhaps reflecting the view of the President of the Republic, expressed himself in favor of that goal, not without a sense of regret and contained frustration: “I have always thought that our country should have been a *permanent* member of the Security Council. But history repeated itself in 1945 as in the deceased League of Nations. And then we’re out”. Fontoura to Freitas-Valle, letter, Rio de Janeiro, January 21st, 1953, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

General Assembly, entitled “Strengthening of the United Nations System”. Paragraph 20 of the annex to the resolution, item (d), concerning the general debate, provides that the Secretariat shall prepare the list of speakers on the basis of the “existing traditions” and in expressions of preference to best accommodate the needs of the Member States (GARCIA, 2011, Special Attachment).

Based on the historical knowledge available to date, Freitas-Valle stands out as the likely founder of that tradition. We know that Brazil did not inaugurate the debates in 1946 and in the years immediately following. It was only in the 4th General Assembly, in 1949, when Freitas-Valle actually became the first one to speak in plenary as head of the Brazilian delegation. The following year, that happened again. According to Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, the invitation to Brazil resulted supposedly from a disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union: “Since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wished to open the debate, the Secretariat probed several European countries which refused, it claiming in general that they could not speak in a useful manner before listening to the superpowers. Once the European possibilities were exhausted, the Secretariat turned to Brazil and Cyro immediately accepted it”(GUERREIRO, 1992, p. 41-42).

However, even though Mário de Pimentel Brandão was also the first one to make his speech in 1951, the deference to Brazil was interrupted for three consecutive years. Nobody knows exactly why. In 1955, nominated once again to represent Brazil, Freitas-Valle did not approve the situation that he found. Throughout his career, he always had in mind the question of the country’s image. Before the start of the General Assembly, he addressed a letter to the Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes, complaining about the “declining prestige of Brazil at the UN”. The fault, he said, could not be blamed to “anyone specifically”. It was only a matter of fact observed over the years. After landslide elections to the Security

Council and ECOSOC in the recent past, Brazil now had difficulty to compete with much smaller countries for elective posts in major organs of the United Nations. Freitas-Valle regretted the accusation that Brazil voted “almost invariably and in accordance with the United States” and that the list of its initiatives in ten years of existence of the organization was “small and poor”.⁷

It is perfectly plausible that Freitas-Valle had decided to seek ways to raise Brazil’s shaken prestige. One of the ways could have been, to place Brazil back in the position of first speaker. Indeed, in 1955, he opened the debate of the 10th General Assembly and again in 1956. From then on, the sequence was no longer discontinued and the tradition of Brazil having that honor was consolidated. The speech is currently often made by the President of the Republic or, in his absence, the Foreign Minister. If this is true, it is time to give credit where it is due.

POLITICS AT THE UN: ORIGIN OF ITS PREDICAMENT

The UN is an institutionalized space for dialogue, negotiation and debate among sovereign States. It is an intergovernmental organization that seeks to discipline the conduct of those States, but it does not propose to have supranationality functions. One of its challenges is to harmonize the individual and the collective, the community and the *raison d'état*. According to the concept developed by Gelson Fonseca Jr., the States have certain “multilateralizable interests” that can be forwarded through cooperation. The multilateral sphere, in that sense, can be either the locus to legitimize norms, concepts and practices of States or to the identification of common interests with potential

7 Freitas-Valle to Raul Fernandes, letter, New York, July 06th, 1955, CDO, 6,727 Folder, UN 1945-56.

to take on a concrete manifestation of a jointly coordinated action (FONSECA, 2008, *passim*).

Of course, in the UN the political differences manifest themselves in all their fullness. Several months of tough negotiation can result in a fragile consensus or simply sink without reaching any port. That prospect may seem frustrating and, in fact, some good faith negotiators and much of the public opinion see it that way. However, this must not obscure the fact that, in the face of conflicts or problems that require a collective response, there are few credible alternatives to replace diplomatic negotiation. It would be a serious mistake to ignore the problem and to choose, from the beginning, inaction or, even worse, allow differences to be solved in a violent manner without a genuine effort to solve them peacefully.⁸

A practical example, which Freitas-Valle witnessed, was the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1955, which eventually led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That Conference, despite the division between East and West, was “proof of the rewards gained by using our organization extensively”. Thus it became apparent, the instrumental role of multilateralism in offering cooperative spaces for the negotiation of international agreements and mechanisms that, if successful, change the way that States deal with dissent, even in those issues of high political sensitivity.

Still, in the long run, few are really satisfied with the results. The uneven balance of UN accomplishments does not offer enough solace. Marcos Azambuja summarized the problem well in the following way:

8 As a positive note, no country becomes a Member State except by its free consent. If today those 193 States do not intend to abandon the UN, maybe it is because at least they see some benefit, no matter how small, in staying there. Or it can be imagined that they estimate that the losses would be greater if they were outside.

For the visionaries, everything that was obtained in terms of fair international planning, of peacekeeping and respect to the law was far shorter than what they had dreamed. For pragmatics, multilateralism is diffuse, declaratory, romantic, and seeks to escape the brutal constraints of force and power. With those two pillars of public opinion being displeased, multilateralism continues to operate in a narrow area of relative dissatisfaction and tinted skepticism (AZAMBUJA, 1989, p. 190).

It is useful to recall the assessment Freitas-Valle made about the San Francisco Conference. Despite the large number of amendments to the Charter, the Security Council, the “master gear of the organization”, kept its powers virtually intact, as well as the aura of “almighty” entity that had presided over its design. Freitas-Valle argued that the minor powers (Brazil included) tried to change basic provisions of the plan of 1944, “but strength prevailed, since it was well noticed that the *Big Five* would not succumb in what they considered as rights deriving from the sacrifices incurred and from the duty to prevent its renewal.” He emphasized that, “the authority of the major powers derived from their suffering, of their greater experience with the doom of war, of the cataclysm that it was and still is, that needs to be the last one”. In the face of that juncture, its conclusion derived from the very roughness of those facts of international life, exacerbated by the global carnage that had wiped over the world: “Among all the concessions made, the veto was the most costly. Then, the conflict between the idealism of the minor powers and the pragmatism of the major ones appeared in its full force. And yet, the right to veto is something that arises from the fact that there are major powers and small States”.⁹

⁹ Report of the activities of the III Commission of the Conference and of the Coordination Committee, as well as of the 1st meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, Ottawa, July 9th, 1945, CDO, Pack 42,949.

In San Francisco, Freitas-Valle was in charge of presenting the Brazilian position in the Committee that had the task to study the controversial question of the veto. He stated that Brazil “firmly” opposed, as a matter of principle, the granting of such power to the permanent members and did not believe in the effectiveness of the veto system for a quick action by the Council. The unanimity rule, adopted in the Council of the League of Nations, had demonstrated “in practice its inefficiency and it quickly became the unfortunate weapon that turned that organization untrusted”. Thereby, the Brazilian delegation would support all proposals to reduce the chances of exercising the veto. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate that the main concern of Brazil was to “contribute to the complete success of this Conference”, if no amendment reached the majority required for its adoption, so – if the Brazilian vote was “useful to form majority” – Brazil would vote in favor: “Such constructive step is given to show that we believe in the good faith that the four sponsoring powers [France was later included in the P-5] claim to be an unquestionable need for peacekeeping that they should have the right to veto and that we should trust they will use it in a prudent manner”.¹⁰

At the same time, with the support of other medium-sized powers, Brazil sought to advance a proposal for a periodic review of the Charter. In internal discussions, Freitas-Valle launched that idea, which became known in the hallways as the “Velloso amendment”, as a reference to the head of the Brazilian delegation. There would be a new constituent Conference, in which any change in the provisions of the Charter could be adopted by a majority of two-thirds (with no veto). That would be the way to make the public opinion in countries that opposed the veto understand and accept such a concession, intended to be provisional, of an emergency

10 Words by Freitas-Valle, Committee III/1, San Francisco, May 21st, 1945, CDO, Pack 42,949.

character. After a few years, the Charter would be reviewed and the anti-democratic privileges could be abolished.

Unfortunately, the Brazilian suggestion in the hope which expected to “soften the brutality of the granting of the veto”, was not enough to overturn the victorious motion of the sponsoring powers, which eventually prevailed (Article 108). Nor did the promised review of the Charter ten years later take place, as had been stipulated in Article 109. In 1955, when the General Assembly considered the matter, Freitas-Valle verified that the existing disharmony among the Member States and the cracks of the international scenario did not provide much hope to obtain support for the approval of a broad reform of the Charter: “This applies not only to its adoption in terms of votes, but also to the slower ratification process” (made dependent on the agreement of the P-5). Thus, realistically, the Brazilian delegation merely proposed a decision in favor of convening that Conference, leaving to the next session of the General Assembly the task of scheduling it for a future date (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 144). As it is known, that date was never set.

After the signing of the Charter, the United Nations Preparatory Commission met in London in order to take the practical measures for the convening of the 1st General Assembly. Represented by Freitas-Valle, Brazil participated in the work as one of the members of the Executive Committee. The general guideline, according to Leão Velloso, was “to follow the United States on issues of capital importance to its policy”. Once that work was completed in late 1945, Freitas-Valle sent to Itamaraty considerations about the preparation that was needed for the international meetings that Brazil would attend. He gathered practical suggestions in order to improve the efficiency of the service of the delegations, such as making arrangements in advance, collecting material regarding the schedule of the meetings, drafting instructions and appointing

representatives in a timely manner so that they did not depart late. The lack of detailed instructions often led to improvisation. The Ministry, in Rio de Janeiro, should be equipped and centralize the tracking of each event. The delegations would also need to be provided with adequate staff, resources and facilities, including attention to payment of daily expenses. All that would help strengthen the country's presence since "Brazilian importance did not exist for more than a quarter of a century" and now it would be "a reality". However, Freitas-Valle considered that in order to maintain that situation of "preeminence", it was crucial to ballast it with an efficient collaboration: "Not to do that would be to jeopardize that same prestige".¹¹

Freitas-Valle was the first to suggest to João Neves da Fontoura, in 1946, that a permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN in New York should be created. It is interesting to verify that, fifteen years later, according to his assessment, "the Mission's work may be fascinating, but it is extreme". He regretted that it had a limited staff for the needs of the job and the material conditions were precarious for the good exercise of the diplomatic function: remuneration, additional benefits and wage adjustments abroad. He also complained about the delay to receive answers to the consultations made to the Ministry. The lack of quick instructions led to all kinds of problems: "When there are no orders about a certain matter, deadlines, and opportunities to communicate points of view and to formulate suggestions are lost". His proposal (later accepted) was to create a United Nations Division within the Foreign Ministry, "with qualified staff", to improve the quality of service and give more agility to dispatches. Freitas-Valle feared

11 Another suggestion was to include in delegations "public men, representing all Brazilian parties", as was being done by the USA, France, Canada and other governments, which invited parliamentarians to compose their delegations. Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, London, December 31st, 1945, CDO, Pack 40,235.

that the delay in replying would diminish Itamaraty in the eyes of other Latin American countries (*Vale Dico*, p. 56).

Another historic moment happened in February 1946, when Brazil took on the Presidency of the Security Council, with Freitas-Valle as the head of the delegation. In drafts of his statement, he was “standing by, in the same way that the fireman does not need fire to be ready, and if any threat occurs to world peace, then soon I will have the duty to convene and put to work the Security Council, which during one month, rendered so much talk”. He recalled that the Council had been in charge of the Iranian complaint against the Soviet Union, the latter’s complaint against the presence of British troops in Greece, that of the Ukraine regarding the situation in Indonesia and, finally, the complaint made by Syria and Lebanon against maintaining British and French troops in their territories. “All these cases were solved or, at least, the Security Council was convinced that it indicated its solution”. The eleven members of the body were permanently represented in its headquarters, in order to be able to attend meetings immediately, whenever they were summoned. He claimed that Brazil had been performing “with clear votes” on principles that constituted the country’s foreign policy tradition.¹²

THE COLD WAR AND ITS MULTILATERAL IMPACT

Freitas-Valle often referred to the fact that, in 1945, Brazil had shown its confidence in the ability of the major powers to use the veto “wisely”. In the face of the Cold War conflict, his main concern was “to rescue the spirit of San Francisco”, that is, to rescue the sense of unity that would have been the uniting element of the

12 Declarations by Freitas-Valle, London, February 1945, CFV ad 44.09.20.

Alliance that defeated Fascism and guided the design of peace under the guarantee of the United Nations. The discredit that befell the UN, he said in 1949, was the result of the attitude of the States, or more precisely of the governments, who gave more attention to the interests attached to their “own subsistence”, rather than worrying in a genuine manner with the progress of the UN.

After the war, the idealism that had characterized the work of the delegations that attended the San Francisco Conference went into sharp decline. The unity of the major powers did not happen as expected:

Although it is admitted that international politics should not be subject to violent changes, it is no less real that it is extremely difficult to maintain the balance in a structure whose foundations have been established under the auspices of a group of countries that, since the beginning of the work, lost the capacity for mutual understanding and began to walk along antagonistic paths in the sphere of collective security.

He explained that it was not the UN that was wrong, “but the world itself” (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 83).

The Western countries dominated the early years of the UN. With more members, the bloc led by the United States, which included Brazil, was able to approve, by vote, resolutions of their interest in the General Assembly. In the Security Council, however, the Soviet Union used its veto power to block decisions that it believed could damage its interests (from 1946 to 1955, the Soviet delegation used the veto 75 times). It should be recalled that Brazil had severed diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1947, amid an atmosphere of external antagonism and of a virulent anti-Communist campaign by Dutra’s government internally.

The year 1949 was especially tense. As early as January, in Moscow, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecom) was established among the Eastern European countries. In April the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also established to forge a military alliance among the Western countries opposed to the Socialist bloc. In the Central Europe, the German territory was divided into two distinct States. As if that was not enough, in August the USSR tested its first atomic bomb and broke up the American nuclear monopoly.

That context of confrontation had intense repercussions at the UN, where the Soviet government proposed, to the surprise of many, a “new peace pact”. In the debate on the subject in Lake Success, in November 1949, Freitas-Valle stated that Brazil would vote against the proposal and expressed himself in the following manner:

The United Nations Charter is the most beautiful instrument of international cooperation that man has ever elaborated, such a perfect and balanced document that the world's governments consented to take the unexpected measure to admit that five among them, due to services rendered in the domination of Nazi-Fascism and to the strength and fidelity they had shown, had primary responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security. Mr. President, it was not easy to take such a measure, but we did so because we had full confidence in the five permanent members of the Security Council. [...] Unfortunately, the Soviet Union was not favorably disposed towards this. As a result, the fear of war, of a new total war, became once again the constant obsession of all of us. In addition, this kind of concern is extremely harmful, because it can lead people to lose faith in the United Nations.

Later, he regretted that the veto, intended to be used in an “exceptional and conscientious manner, “had become an instrument of pressure and partisanship”. He added that both the TIAR and NATO were regional agreements that fit the Charter clauses and that “they were celebrated only because of the Soviet policy of obstructing the peace mechanism of this organization”. He concluded: “If the Soviet Union persists in its current tactic of disturbing the normal life of peaceful nations, through an unrestrained imperialist expansion, we can only stick to the security clauses of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and of the Atlantic Pact”. The difficulty caused by the “abuse of the right of veto” was coherent with to the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Brazilian diplomacy. According to Freitas-Valle, “the Soviet foreign policy and communist propaganda are inseparable phenomena, as we all know”. He considered the growth of communism as being dangerous and he abhorred “the dissemination of a wicked creed throughout the world, in an insane anarchy fever”. The acrimony that stopped the action of the Security Council had a defined guilty party, according to him: Moscow was inciting “the growing condemnation by the whole world with its negative attitude”.¹³

In that loaded context, under the threat of a nuclear conflagration, security issues were high on the agenda. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States mobilized the General Assembly instead of the Security Council, which resulted in the adoption of the famous resolution *Uniting for Peace*, of 1950. Freitas-Valle considered the American proposal “downright subversive” in relation to the original plan of the United Nations. He admitted, however, that the delegates changed his point of view “because of the need” (the resolution was approved by 52 votes in favor, including Brazil, five against and two abstentions). This

13 Speech by Freitas-Valle on the Soviet proposal, New York, 1949, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

episode demonstrated, for better or for worse, the ability of the Organization to adapt to different political scenarios. Although the Charter is virtually the same as it was in 1945, the practice of States can produce new formulas or mechanisms, not always legally well founded – and much less seen as consensual.

In the discursive sphere, Freitas-Valle sought to safeguard the congruence of the Brazilian conduct, in line with his proposition that nobody “would discuss the honesty of Brazilian international purposes”.¹⁴ Aware that political expediency does not resist for long without support from international legitimacy, he went on to argue that it was necessary to better equip the Organization with a view to establishing an international force or a system for the immediate mobilization of common resources that Member States could contribute. He deplored the fact that the UN had not been able to put together a military force to ensure an energetic action wherever there was a threat of aggression or imminent breach of peace. Therefore, in the 11th General Assembly, he welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force to intervene in the Suez conflict. He saw that experience as a possible core “from where it will emanate the force that will give this Organization the physical power that it has been lacking so much” (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 152).

In fact, UNEF I was later considered, in the classic sense, the first *strictu sensu* peacekeeping operation, since it used troops under the UN flag, wearing blue helmets, to create a buffer zone and oversee the withdrawal of the warring forces at Suez.¹⁵ In a way, Freitas-Valle collaborated for the concept to be strengthened.

14 Speech by Freitas-Valle when he took over the post of Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro, February 18th, 1949, CFV ad 1949.02.18.

15 The UN even sent observer missions to monitor prior agreements, such as the truce after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (UNTSO) and the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in 1949 (UNMOGIP). International intervention in the Korean War was more properly described as an *ad hoc* coalition authorized by the UN, different, therefore, from the traditional model of *peacekeeping*.

He was in charge of presenting, in 1956, Brazilian suggestions to endow the UN of ways to act at the right time. The Brazilian proposal foresaw that the armed forces of each Member State should have, on permanent basis, one or more units always at the disposal of the United Nations. The size of those units, would be defined sovereignly by the interested government according to its ability to contribute. Freitas-Valle said that

the psychological effect obtained, if that suggestion was accepted, might create, in global bases, a feeling of greater respect for our Organization, and the convening of troops in compliance with resolutions adopted by both the Security Council and the General Assembly would become a normal procedure. (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 155).

Obstacles and adversities were common in the daily work in New York. As Freitas-Valle understood it, the Organization was conceived “not to complicate, but to simplify international life.” He was worried about the excessive and loosely meetings of organs, functions, agencies, funds, programs, bodies and various other forums: “The result of that is the almost automatic creation of institutions and commissions to solve problems submitted on a daily basis to the Organization as being new ones. The problem is not solved, but an international apparatus to study it is immediately created, which only turns it more complicated and with a more difficult solution”. Consistent with his operational vision of doing things, he did not consider auspicious the exponential increase in the amount of meetings. Quantity did not mean quality nor guarantee of effectiveness. The excessive proliferation of activities of the UN and its specialized agencies could result in *overlapping*, that is, redundant and unworkable services. Satisfactory conclusions were not reached in the same proportion as the effort expended. Once a certain problem was

detected, a committee was created to analyze the matter and to submit a report, followed by other studies and technical meetings that continuously fed themselves automatically.

Once the works of the 4th General Assembly were concluded, Freitas-Valle noted that, among the decisions taken, a Brazilian proposal to try to contain this trend, and turn the administrative machine leaner to obtain greater budget savings,¹⁶ had been accepted by a unanimous vote of the 59 nations represented. In that same vein, he advocated greater fairness in the distribution of posts in the Secretariat. He wrote to the Secretary-General Trygve Lie specifically to request more transparent criteria: “Without a broad geographical representation of nationalities on its staff, the United Nations Secretariat would not be able to acquire a broad international profile, a combination of culture and experience and impartiality essential to the performance of its functions”.¹⁷

Last but not least, the question of development also stood out in his list of concerns. Freitas-Valle spoke about the need for “greater effort to correct the tremendous disparity of economic development among the various regions of the world.” This was one of the main purposes of the Organization. He argued that Brazil should apply for membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in which it could submit its claims with more authority as a developing country. His goal was not to require that all countries should be “equally rich,” but that inequality in the international arena, including the deterioration of terms of trade or protectionism, did not represent an additional obstacle to the well-being and quality of life in poor countries.

The industrialization of the underdeveloped countries and the price stabilization of primary products were recurring

16 Press releases by Freitas-Valle, Rio de Janeiro, December 1949, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

17 Freitas-Valle to Trygve Lie, letter, New York, November 25th, 1949, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

themes on the ECOSOC agenda in the 1950's. Unfortunately, disenchantment soon came. The scarce results were cause for criticism by the Brazilian delegation, which accused the organ of being "old-fashioned and negligent", unable to close the growing gap between rich and poor countries. Freitas-Valle complained that part of the problem arose from the deep ideological division between capitalist and socialist countries. Bloc politics affected the least developed countries,

whose peoples can no longer accept underdevelopment, in a desperate search of the means by which they can speed up their development process, involving themselves in various systems of military alliance in the hope that we can count on larger aid by leaders or subleaders of these systems (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 153).

The bonds of the Cold War could not be easily undone.

AGAINST THE "DUPLICATION OF THE VOTE"

During a lecture he made in 1950, Freitas-Valle praised the cooperation with the United States, according to the Brazilian Government's official position:

A recurrent factor of Brazilian foreign policy has been our close alliance with the United States of America. However, that is not the result of planning, but the spontaneous product of Brazilian political genius. All men, of all parties, in the Empire and the Republic, always considered the intimate understanding with the United States the cornerstone of our foreign policy. It is natural, therefore, that our intimacy always increases. Two wars in common, in which we enter at a risky moment, contributed to

*accentuate among us a spirit of collaboration, which is indispensable both for them and for us.*¹⁸

However, it is necessary to tint his public statements and confront them with his real thought about the meaning of the relationship that Brazil should maintain with the greatest power in the world. Even during the war, Freitas-Valle was one of those concerned with the effects of *a priori* alignment in foreign policy. In 1944, he wrote a private letter to Leão Velloso to caution him about this matter that he believed “it was wrong within the correct policy by the Itamaraty of friendship with Washington: to always know, in any international event, that Brazil will be *invariably* with the United States”. He understood that forming a bloc with the American countries might not be, in all circumstances, the best for Brazil. The problem would be the loss of credibility caused by the perception that the Brazilian vote in multilateral forums was already known in advance. “I am not naive enough to ignore how much we need the United States and to follow its policy. But we’re actually harming it when the others consider us their servants”. Other countries, for example, would be opposed to a permanent seat for Brazil at the Security Council if that represented a “duplication of the American vote”. That belief, he said, did not serve either Washington or Rio de Janeiro, since “in order to make our common policy triumph, they need to respect our opinions every now and then and always our interests”.¹⁹

Freitas-Valle sustained that critical view on other occasions, even in disagreement with the line established by his Government. His repairs had to do with the rigidity of a position that, on the contrary, should be considered on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with national interest. As a non-permanent member

18 “A Escola Superior de Guerra e o Itamaraty”, lecture at ESG, Rio de Janeiro, 1950, CFV 03f.

19 Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, Ottawa, December 13th, 1944, CFV ad 44.02.00.

of the Security Council, in the 1946-47 period, Brazil followed the American vote. Freitas-Valle alerted his bosses to the risks inherent in the lack of flexibility in his statements: “it always seemed to me that the Brazilian representative should not try to agree, systematically, his votes to those of the Americans, which weakens its position, since it creates the impression of duplication of votes”.²⁰ After Brazil was elected for its second term, in 1951-52, he said that the delegation should have the ability to act with autonomy and firmness, because of the “clarity of our attitude, defending principles of international cooperation and not bending the Brazilian delegates in the face of difficulties arising, to serve or contradict interests of this or that country”.²¹ Providing a basis for his thought was the perception that automatism would weaken the possibility of obtaining a permanent seat, in so far as the possibility of a “double vote” generated mistrust in other countries and caused support to diminish.

Another aspect that invited reflection was his defense of principism as a multilateral strategy. According to him:

*When we all believed (more than today) in the UN, still writing from London, I insisted to Itamaraty that temporary members of the Security Council focused on the principles, not getting involved in the concrete cases, except to make up high-level decisions.*²²

This feature of his thought has two conflicting elements. Firstly, it is suggested that a posture based on principles is the most appropriate one as a guide to take on positions, which certainly provides a right prescription from the point of view of

20 Freitas-Valle to Fontoura, telegram, London, February 4th, 1946, AHI 79320.

21 Declarations by Freitas-Valle, Rio de Janeiro, November 10th, 1950, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

22 Freitas-Valle to Ernesto Leme, letter, Santiago, May 27th, 1954, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

the formulation of a policy that intends to be consistent, based on international law and on other basic principles of relations among the States. His second suggestion, however, proposed the lack of engagement in concrete cases, except to “compose high-level decisions”, which seems to indicate that, as a rule, the Brazilian delegation should not participate in the debates when they were outside the realm of principles and entered the contentious sphere of the clashing interests. In those situations, Brazil would only contribute with its vote, but without intervening in the matter as such.

Freitas-Valle’s recommendation fits nicely within the guidelines of foreign policy of his time: a country with limited economic interests, modest ambitions and scarce projection outside its region. For a reasonable multilateral performance at that time, it was enough to protect itself under the cloak of principled statements and to abstain in major discussions. When it was the case, Brazil would follow the consensus or, a more common hypothesis during the Cold War, it would help make up a decision that the Western pro-USA bloc had approved. It is clear that there is nothing wrong about joining a position, regardless of what it might be, if it actually corresponds to the national interests, to Brazilian values and to its worldview. The difficulty emerges when, *a priori*, the Brazilian vote is defined without a critical consideration of the problem, from all possible angles and regardless of the definition of its own position, as well, which may coincide (or not) with the position of another country or group of countries.

PUBLIC SERVICE AT ITAMARATY: “NOT JUST A JOB”

Shortly before his retirement, in 1961, Freitas-Valle sent from New York a series of telegrams that he entitled *Vale Dico* (from

Latin meaning, “I say goodbye”). His purpose was to share the knowledge he had acquired in 43 years of career, which he called “knowledge from actual experiences”. He did not try to carry out high politics analyses about the major themes of foreign affairs. He focused on management and on the operational aspects of daily life, inserting here and there some personal recollections.

For him, working needs were definitely more important than the convenience of the employee. He was annoyed with the cases of abuse in the enjoyment of vacations and removals, claiming that he rarely used that benefit. He was constantly worried about the form, the protocol and the worship of the vernacular, which he believed was a tradition of the correspondence at Itamaraty. The service had to be “pure and neat”, from the writing of protocols to technical opinions, from archive to cryptography. His often irreducible stance made many people consider him a severe and disciplinarian boss, who demanded the work to be carried out to the letter and the full devotion of the employees. That motivated the nickname he received after he took on the General Secretariat of Itamaraty for the first time, in 1939: Broadway Dragon.

He valued the “silent work” that was made in the House, which he also called, in a more self-sacrificing and ascetic tone, “spirit of contrition”. He always repeated that the diplomat’s mission was to think about the nation’s permanent interests, “Brazil of tomorrow and 50 years from now”²³. He called such mental attitude as a “sense of projection”. Even taking into account the past experience and current reality, long-term had to be on the agenda of the international operators. This was his strategic view of diplomacy as vanguard of a country that still had to be built. It is not enough to defend present-day Brazil. It is necessary to act

23 Speech by Freitas-Valle in his inauguration as Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro, February 18th, 1949, CFV ad 1949.02.18.

with future perspective and prepare the field now for a country that is changing, which will be something else in a few decades. He considered this a task inherent to the diplomatic profession when exercised with zeal and responsibility.

Freitas-Valle was the typical representative of a time that no longer exists. The old-fashioned Itamaraty, headquartered in Rio, was restricted to an elite and relatively small core of people who knew each other or who often were relatives or old friends. There were those who proudly cultivated the belief that they belonged to a selected group of connoisseurs with their own peculiarities and idiosyncrasies, many of whom descended from aristocrats or from traditional families. In fact, they were rarely in contact with the deep Brazil that represented the reality of most of the population. The emphasis in the protocol and their isolation in relation to society often contributed to derail professional priorities.²⁴

Needless to say over the last few years, the social composition, habits and available technologies in Itamaraty are also clearly changing. The challenges of the 21st century are such that there is no handbook good enough to guide any student of the Rio Branco Institute, regardless of how well they are trained, to the situations that they will inexorably have to deal with in real life. In the 1950's, Freitas-Valle foresaw that the transformations that were taking place were already starting to have an impact on the traditional organization of the Ministry: "The formulation of a foreign policy is, by its own nature, very complex and a single man as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot take on such a great task". Itamaraty was "made to explain Brazil to the foreigner and the

24 As Azambuja pointed out: "Two books might have summarized the spirit of Itamaraty of that time. One – the *Yearbook* – said who we were, where we were and what we did. It was our *Who's Who*. The other one, The *Service Handbook*, was our *Vade-Mecum*, the almost Koranic compilation – because it was exhaustive and categorical – of how to act in every circumstance. The two basic books were on the table of each Brazilian diplomat of that time. Texts about international relations were only occasional visitors" (*Vale Dico*, p. 13).

foreigner to Brazil". He acknowledged, at the same time, the need for openness and dialogue with other government agencies, with Congress and civil society.²⁵

Freitas-Valle supported the project to create a permanent Consultative Foreign Policy Council, in charge of discussing diplomatic policy with former Foreign Ministers, the Committees of Foreign Affairs of the Senate and the House of Representatives and other authorities. In the UN, he gave attention to the composition of the delegations to the General Assembly: he advocated the appointment of Congressmen or personalities from public life to act as delegates to represent the country's interests, regardless of its partisan affiliation "being in favor of the government or against it". He understood that Itamaraty should fully take on its role of ultimate coordinator of governmental actions in the international arena. Finally, his warnings and suggestions show his commitment to foster motivation and the high level of the work to be carried out:

*Itamaraty must create volume within the national opinion. [...] The staff of the Ministry must be sure that each one of us, large or small, have a mission to fulfill, rather than only a job. Within our staff there is such hedonism that it justifies the phrase, popular there, that some of our staff serve for everything and many for nothing at all. Most of the staff does only what it is specifically ordered to do, according to the justified belief that the person who does not do anything cannot make any mistake. There is an absolute absence of esprit de corps and a flagrant lack of concern for collective work.*²⁶

25 The War College and the Itamaraty, lecture at ESG, Rio de Janeiro, 1950, CFV 03f.

26 Freitas-Valle to Fontoura, letter, Paris, 5/5/1946, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

CONCLUSION

A distinctive feature of Freitas-Valle's diplomatic thought was the notion that the United Nations reflected the wish and the state of the relations among its Member-States, embedded in the condition given by world politics in a certain historical context. Because of that, the work in the UN was basically political, even when the discussion seemed technical. Decades after its creation, international analysts do not hesitate to agree on that, but few people had the merit to distinguish it so quickly. As he stated in the beginning of the Organization: "The United Nations currently suffer from the same evil as the world. If the five Foreign Ministers [of the P-5] do not reach an agreement, how can the Security Council work?".²⁷

Freitas-Valle was aware of the tension between the outside world and the somewhat hermetic reality that multilateral space builds for itself. Those two worlds may often communicate with one another, get into conflict or remain apart from each other for a long time. The diligent representative may believe for one moment that procedure and the legal apparatus of multilateralism – in addition to much effort and some creativity – will provide the key to unlock the problems. However, the outcome is often conditioned by forces and elements that belong to the "outside" world, despite what is said or done at the negotiation room or at the plenary.

In that sense, Freitas-Valle was a witness of how the UN changes itself, even though its Charter remains unchanged. As it was originally thought, the Security Council would be at the center of power of the institution, the main task of which was to preserve

27 Freitas-Valle to Leão Velloso, letter, London, 7/10/1945, CFV ad 1944.09.20.

peace. The Cold War jeopardized that assumption.²⁸ Even though the Council remained a restricted committee with undeniable powers, its paralysis due to the veto turned the organ less able to carry out its function according to those who conceived it. It was necessary to wait for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the changes of the 1990's for the dynamics of the Council to acquire another meaning.

The Security Council is often related to power (its ability to impose decisions), while the General Assembly, since its resolutions are non-binding, is related mainly to representativity (its universal character). Such dichotomy, which arises out of the Charter's structure, must not be treated as an unchangeable element. There is broad space for States to claim – and that actually already occurs – that the General Assembly should have its role strengthened and the Council be more representative, which would result in the reinforcement of its legitimacy in the long run. The combination of those two changes would be beneficial for the Organization since it could enable the unbalances present at the Charter to be addressed. Freitas-Valle knew about the importance to ensure a future reform of the text. After all, in San Francisco, he was the one who had the idea, which Brazil supported, to call a Review Conference after a few years. That wide reform is still to come, but Cyro's thought might serve as an inspiration for the new generations that seek to harmonize what is ideal and the possible in the fulfillment of national goals.

28 As Freitas-Valle had pointed out in 1956: "Everyone knows that the alliance that could be made against the destructive force of the fascist aggression could not be kept during the years after the establishment of an unstable peace. This unfortunate circumstance is at the root of all the problems of the world today" (SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2012, p. 151).

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JOSÉ CARLOS DE MACEDO SOARES

José Carlos de Macedo Soares, the son of José Eduardo de Macedo Soares and Cândida de Azevedo Sodré de Macedo Soares, was born on October 6, 1883 in São Paulo. He graduated from the Largo São Francisco Law School, in São Paulo, in 1905. A respected lawyer, he married Matilde Melchert da Fonseca in 1908, the daughter of a wealthy São Paulo family. He worked in the law, as well as in his family's school. He was also a leader in a São Paulo business group, a position that caused him to become a mediator in the July 1924 *Revolta Paulista* (São Paulo rebellion). When the rebellion was over, however, he was accused of collaborating with the rebels, and he was arrested. Freed a month later, he went to Paris, where he lived in exile from 1924 to 1927, writing two books while he was there. Back in Brazil, he supported the Liberal Alliance and the Revolution of 1930 that brought Getúlio Vargas to power. In 1932, he headed special diplomatic missions, among which was the Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva. In 1933/34, he was

a representative to the national Constituent Assembly, and from 1934 to 1936, he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position in which he distinguished himself during negotiations that led to peace between Bolivia and Paraguay, in 1935. He was also the Minister of Justice in 1937 but, unhappy with the direction of the government, he resigned shortly before the coup d'état that established the *Estado Novo* of the Getúlio Vargas government.

In addition to his private and political work, Macedo Soares was also the president of a number of prestigious institutes, including the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, for *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*), the Brazilian Academy of Letters (ABL, for *Academia Brasileira de Letras*), and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and History (IHGB, for *Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*). After Getúlio Vargas was deposed, in 1945, Macedo Soares was appointed the federal *interventor* (provisional governor) of São Paulo state, a post he occupied until 1947. In 1955, interim president Nereu Ramos appointed him to head the foreign office for a second time. Among other achievements during that tenure, he created the *Museu e Arquivo Histórico e Diplomático* (MHD), in the Palácio Itamaraty in Rio de Janeiro. President Juscelino Kubitschek kept him in the position when he came into office, in 1956, but Macedo Soares had personal disagreements with the government at the time of introduction of the *Operação Pan-Americana* (OPA), and he resigned in July 1958.

José Carlos de Macedo Soares died on January 28, 1968, in his native São Paulo, at the age of 84.

JOSÉ CARLOS DE MACEDO SOARES: LIBERAL, NATIONALIST AND DEMOCRAT

Guilherme Frazão Conduru

This paper outlines the contributions of José Carlos de Macedo Soares (1883-1968) to Brazilian foreign policy. It puts into context, the performance of this statesman in important events of Brazilian political and diplomatic history. It also seeks to identify the characteristics of the thought of this man who twice served his country as foreign minister. The facts are presented in an episodic manner without biographic intention, to provide the reader with highlights that might serve as a guide to a closer investigation of Macedo Soares' character and, in turn, as benchmarks for comparative evaluations of other leading figures in Brazilian foreign policy.

José Carlos de Macedo Soares was a leader of action. In his varied professional life, he worked as a teacher, a secondary school principal, a São Paulo businessman, and a lawyer, as well as the executive director of a number of public institutes. In the political sphere, Macedo Soares was a state secretary, a representative to the constituent assembly of 1934, a state *Interventor* (appointed

governor), and a cabinet minister. From the time of the second *Revolta Tenentista* (revolt of the “lieutenants,” or low-ranking Army officers), in São Paulo, in 1924, until the Conference of Punta del Este, in 1962, he was present in many of the important events of Brazil’s domestic and foreign politics. This paper concentrates on his presence in the diplomatic arena.

The son of an enterprising pharmacist from a wealthy family, originally from the state of Rio de Janeiro, Macedo Soares, with his education in law, was a typical representative of the urban liberal elite of São Paulo. In 1882, his father, José Eduardo de Macedo Soares, had emigrated with his family from the hinterland of Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo, the capital of the fastest growing Brazilian province, which at the time was also beginning to receive a large influx of immigrants. In São Paulo, José Eduardo founded a secondary school that bore the family name, and the future minister eventually became the school’s director (AMARAL, 1983, p. 14).

In addition to exercising various professional activities, José Carlos de Macedo Soares also distinguished himself as an intellectual, particularly in the field of history. In the technical and administrative arenas, he made important contributions to the government’s usage of statistics and geography, as for 15 years he was the president of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, for *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*). Additionally, in 1955, when he was the country’s foreign minister for a second time, he created the Historical and Diplomatic Museum of Itamaraty Palace (MHD, for *Museu e Arquivo Histórico e Diplomático Palácio Itamaraty*), an entity devoted to the preservation and divulgence of Brazil’s diplomatic history.

As a precondition to evaluating Macedo Soares’ thought on diplomatic relations and foreign policy, it is useful to know something about his political performance. We will, therefore,

describe his participation in different historical periods, when he distinguished himself with his sense of ethics, his loyalty to the democratic system of government, and his search for a conciliation of views and interests.

FROM LOCAL TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL: PROJECTION IN THE POLITICAL SCENARIO

Mediation, arrest and self-exile: acting during the Revolt of 1924 in São Paulo

A decade before his first appointment to the position of foreign minister, José Carlos de Macedo Soares had already played a major role in the public life of his country. On July 5, 1924, a military rebellion, part of the cycle of rebellions known as *tenentismo* (named for junior Army officers, including lieutenants), took place in São Paulo. The matter became complicated after the state government and its armed forces withdrew from the site of the protest, leaving an absence of legal authority. Macedo Soares, then the president of the commercial association of São Paulo, spoke with leaders on both sides. He led actions to defend order and protect property, seeking to limit the destructive effects of the confrontations on the city and the population of São Paulo. To prevent looting and the destruction of warehouses and shops, he obtained the cooperation of the rebels to support the municipal militia and restore order. He signed several dispatches and bulletins written to the population at large, and he asked – unsuccessfully, as it turned out – that the legal forces spare the city from bombardment. In addition to the local destruction, he was concerned with the negative repercussions the continued fighting would have in the international sphere, as São Paulo had a large amount of foreign interests and investments (AMARAL, 1983,

p. 25-49). To demonstrate his commitment, during the period of revolt, July 5 to 28, Macedo Soares hosted negotiations in his home, to search for an to end the hostilities. At one point, general Isidoro Dias Lopes (1865-1949), the leader of the rebels, even proposed that Macedo Soares become a governor of São Paulo, in a triumvirate that would also have included two military officials. Soares, however, refused the suggestion, claiming that since the beginning of the conflict, he had only positioned himself to defend the law and the established authorities.

When the conflict ended in late July, however, the federal government of President Artur Bernardes (born 1875 - died 1955) accused Macedo Soares of having collaborated with the rebels. He was arrested on August 4 and transferred to Rio de Janeiro the next day. Although he was freed on September 22, and the city of São Paulo hosted a great popular demonstration in his honor, he did not attend it, as pressure from police authorities led him to avoid the capital. In December of that year, he decided to go to Europe in exile, and for the next three and a half years, he lived in Paris (AMARAL, 1983, p. 50-9; GUIMARÃES, 2008, p. 8).

A host of Getúlio Vargas in São Paulo: giving support to the Revolution of 1930

Although he acknowledged the role that political parties play as organizers of opinion and instruments of democracy, Macedo Soares' enthusiasm to serve the public cause did not "mean a submission to a partisan political life." He did not, for example, join the *Partido Democrático* (PD), which had been organized by Councilor Antonio Prado (1840-1929), in 1926, as an offshoot opposition to the *Partido Republicano Paulista* (PRP). When the Liberal Alliance was created, in 1929 – combining the forces of the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais – however, he did join its

ranks (SOARES, 1937, p. 19-35). He also aligned himself with the revolutionaries of 1930, eventually becoming the Interior Secretary of the state of São Paulo in the first government established after the ousting of Washington Luís (1869-1957) from the presidency on October 24, 1930. The cabinet then established included mostly members from the Partido Democrático, which had become part of the Liberal Alliance. He did not, however, have direct participation in the movement that arose on October 3rd.

When Getúlio Vargas (1882-1954) arrived in São Paulo on October 29, 1930, enroute to the federal capital of Rio de Janeiro, he nominated a veteran from the *tenentista* rebellions, Colonel João Alberto Lins e Barros (1897-1955), as his military advisor. He convinced members of the Partido Democrático to accept his nomination, and they remained with most of the civilian offices of the cabinet. During his brief stay in São Paulo, Vargas, the leader of the Revolution stayed in the house of José Carlos de Macedo Soares; it was then that they began a relationship of mutual friendship and respect (GUIMARÃES, 2008, p. 8).

During the 40 days that Macedo Soares was the Interior Secretary of São Paulo, he began the task of modernizing its archives. He also took measures to improve the quality of education in the state's technical schools, and he paid attention to the *Instituto Butantã*, a biological research facility, in addition to the state's medical school. The divergences between João Alberto, the appointed governor of the state, and the federal cabinet soon, however, became serious. In December 1930, the discretionary arrest of members of the Republican Party of São Paulo and the nomination of members of the Democratic Party to positions as deputies of the chief of police, Vicente Rao (1892-1978), – contrary to the wishes of the Interventor – led to the collective firing of the entire civilian cabinet. In April 1931, there was a failed coup attempt against João Alberto, which caused the arrest of more than 200

civilians and military individuals related to the Democratic Party. It was in this context – with a lack of compatibility between the federally appointed Interventor and state politics – that Macedo Soares established a strong relationship with Getúlio Vargas, which allowed him to intercede on behalf of his state (CARONE, 1974, p. 289-94; GUIMARÃES, 2008, p. 8).

Ambassador: between a commitment to his state and loyalty to the Head of State

In 1932, Macedo Soares was nominated to head the Brazilian delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and the XVI International Conference on Labor, which convened in Geneva. The Conference on Disarmament, called by the League of Nations, did not lead to any formal commitment. Indeed, Germany, which had been unarmed at Versailles and had not obtained its desired equality of rights, decided to withdraw from both the conference and from the League of Nations.

Macedo Soares performance at the Conference garnered praise from the president of the United States, Herbert Hoover (1874-1964) (OLIVEIRA, 1968, p. 52). That same year, he was nominated to represent Brazil as the special and plenipotentiary ambassador to the special mission paying tribute to general Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) as well as to the opening of a monument in Rome honoring the memory of Anita Garibaldi (1821-1849), both of whom had participated in the Farroupilha Revolution in southern Brazil in the late 1830s. Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) received him, when he assisted the Holy See on matters concerning bilateral relations between the Vatican and the Quirinal Palace – then the residence of the Italian royalty – which rendered him privileged access to the Vatican (BOSI, 2008, p. 50).

When he became aware of a rebellion begun in São Paulo, on July 9, 1932, calling for the state's autonomy and the constitutionalisation of the country, Macedo Soares resigned from his diplomatic missions by means of a telegram addressed to the foreign minister, Afrânio de Melo Franco (1870-1943). On that same day, he informed Getúlio Vargas of his resignation and, confident of the conciliatory spirit of the Brazilian leader, he pointed out that, "the conflict cannot have a military solution; it will only have a political [one]." In response, Vargas said that Macedo Soares' return would be appropriate, to collaborate in the restoration of peace.

During the crisis between the São Paulo political class and representatives imposed by the provisional government, Macedo Soares took a stand against the policies of the federal government. Nominated to head the diplomatic mission of Brazil in Brussels, he did not take the post for reasons that he said were "on behalf of the autonomy of São Paulo." He risked taking the ambiguous position of defending the restoration of the state's autonomy, while also trusting Vargas' leadership and his "extraordinary qualities of political spirit" (SOARES, 1937, p. 26-8).

In new correspondence with Vargas, Macedo Soares informed the Brazilian leader of his willingness to participate in negotiations, in order to end the fratricidal fight. In his letter, he said he would return to Brazil earlier than planned, if Vargas thought that would be useful. In an expression of honesty and loyalty – both to his state's political leadership and to the national head of state – the Ambassador confirmed that, regardless of what happened, he was firmly with those from his state. "I would rather lose with São Paulo than win against it," he said (cited in SILVA, 1967, p. 171-176).

Constituent Representative on the Single Slate for a United São Paulo” (1933-1934)

In the elections that took place for the Constituent National Assembly, on May 3, 1933,¹ Macedo Soares was one of the representatives elected on the “United São Paulo” slate that included members of the *Partido Democrático* and the *Partido Republicano Paulista*. During the debates of the Constituent Assembly, which was installed on November 15, 1933, Macedo Soares, again, maintained a neutral profile, taking on the difficult position of supporting his fellow members from São Paulo, while also remaining loyal to Vargas.

Even before the installation of the Constituent Assembly, the Vargas government was greatly concerned with the control it would have over the writing of the country’s new constitution. Beyond the antagonism that existed between those who favored centralization and those who supported more autonomy for the states, there was also the issue of Vargas’ own continuity in power. Most of the elected representatives supported the government, which had made an effort to consolidate ties with the state oligarchies, articulated around the appointed governors, the Interventors. This situation produced a plan to alternate political support, similar to that which had occurred during the First Republic. The opposition was concentrated in the remaining members of the “lieutenants’ movement,” the opposition of the state oligarchies, and the São Paulo delegation (SILVA, 1969, p. 30-1).

Early in the workings of the Constituent Assembly, a telephone conversation between Macedo Soares, in Rio de Janeiro, and

1 In February 1932 – therefore, prior to the Constitutionalist Revolution – Vargas had approved, by decree, the Electoral Law that called elections for May 3rd of the following year that would choose members for a Constituent National Assembly. Among the innovations of the new electoral legislation were the establishment of the secret vote, the extension of the vote to women, and the creation of an electoral judicial system.

Armando de Sales Oliveira (1887-1945), then the Interventor in São Paulo, was recorded and transcribed for Vargas. This example of the discretionary powers of the head of state demonstrated his ability to follow – even through illegal means – the politics of the Constituent process, thereby exposing limitations on the full exercise of democracy during the era. In that telephone conversation, Macedo Soares described the environment on the first day of meetings at the Assembly, as being antagonistic towards *paulistas* (members from the state of São Paulo). He explained to the Interventor that it would be best if the representatives abandoned a confrontational and revengeful stance in relation to the government (SILVA, 1969, p. 50 e 123-4).

In an April 8, 1934 letter to Vargas, Soares complained of the difficulties he had with the paulistas, saying that measures that could have been taken, to garner their support – such as an amnesty; the re-employment of those who had lost their jobs after the 1932 rebellion; an end to the military occupation, and the removal of military personnel deemed incompatible with the state government – had not been taken.

In a new letter, dated April 11, Soares informed Vargas of the decision of the paulistas to submit an amendment, to prevent the election of the head of the provisional government [Vargas], the then current cabinet ministers, as well as the Interventors. The letter also said that the paulistas would not support any other candidate. It added that most of the Brazilian military were against the liberal democracy, and it warned that the candidacy of general Góes Monteiro (1889-1956) would represent an antidemocratic solution. And, as a way to denounce what they considered to be Vargas' neglect of their interests, the letter insisted on the "need to coordinate the political currents of Brazil" (SILVA, 1969, p. 463-5).

The new constitution was promulgated on July 16, 1934. The next day, the Constituent National Assembly elected Getúlio Vargas as president of the Republic, and he was inaugurated four days later. Vargas chose a new cabinet, in which he kept only the ministers of the Navy and of War. José Carlos de Macedo Soares was the first foreign minister of the new constitutional government of Vargas, and Vicente Rao, from São Paulo, was selected as the minister of Justice and Internal Affairs. One reason for the selection of Macedo Soares could have been that it was in Vargas' interests to cultivate the paulista elite and its political representation; it could also, however, have been that Vargas was acknowledging the support he had received during the writing of the constitution, as demonstrated by Soares' stands of moderation and neutrality.

AS A MINISTER OF STATE UNDER VARGAS: AT ITAMARATY AND JUSTICE (1934-1936 AND 1937)

Macedo Soares replaced Félix de Barros Cavalcanti de Lacerda (1880-1950) as the head of Itamaraty on July 26, 1934. Lacerda, a career diplomat, had been general-secretary when Afrânio de Melo Franco, the first foreign minister of the regime established by the Revolution of 1930, resigned on December 28, 1933. In full constituent process, Vargas decided to keep the general-Secretary as minister, first as acting, then as titular.

Inaugural address at Itamaraty: giving value to tradition and continuity

In his inaugural address at Itamaraty, Macedo Soares mentioned all the foreign ministers who had preceded him,

beginning with the Baron of Rio Branco (1845-1912). He also invoked tradition as the reference for the behavior he would take on. Macedo Soares identified foreign policy as a “conservative” function, an issue of international continuity and credibility. He ascribed importance to precedents and historical antecedents as the sources upon which to make decisions and, consequently, he emphasized the need to maintain the archives in an organized fashion (SOARES, 1937, p. 11-4).

In the introduction to a report referring to events of 1934, Macedo Soares stated his thoughts on the relations between tradition, foreign policy, and history:

No department of public administration is so tied to the past as the ministry of which I am in charge. It has responsibility for the country's foreign policy, and [as such] it represents the nation internationally. Even before [political] parties and governments, its basic feature is continuity. [...]. In the conduct of foreign policy [...] one can sense the essence of the nation, an inherent force, marching in a movement intertwined with tradition and the future – the permanent nation, with its basic problems and its unchanging principles, over which we have to keep watch so that they remains eternal, unperishable. This is the basic reason of all foreign policy of a nation. Thus, the administration of the Ministry and its political guidance are subordinate to this very conservative concept. This is, therefore, the basis of all our research, our quest to find solutions to international problems; it takes precedence over everything we do.²

For Macedo Soares – a servant of the country and, therefore, an advocate of the nation state – the nation is natural, “permanent,” “eternal,” “unperishable.” This justifies his attachment to tradition

2 Report of the MRE referring to 1934, Introduction, p. XI-XVII.

and the value he places on continuity, in addition to his belief in a conservative foreign policy. Although the content of tradition has not been elaborated in terms of doctrine – since tradition is a value in itself, a positive that defines the nation, and gives it international legitimacy – a pacifistic dimension of Brazilian diplomacy was also implicit there. In that sense, all good foreign policy should be conservative, that is, attached to tradition and based on “precedent.” In addition, pacifism would be Brazil’s diplomatic tradition. There would be the defense of peace and the search for peaceful solutions to international controversies.

Instinct of conciliation in the negotiations to end the Chaco War

From May 16 to June 8, 1935, aboard the battleship *São Paulo*, Getúlio Vargas conducted the so-called “journey to the Plata,” the second official journey of a Brazilian president abroad.³ The trip included visits to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, in return for visits to Rio de Janeiro by the president of Argentina, general Agustín Pedro Justo (1876-1943), in October 1933, and the president of Uruguay, Gabriel Terra (1873-1942), in August the following year. In Buenos Aires, the visit coincided, by design, with the beginning of another round of negotiations, in an attempt to establish peace between Paraguay and Bolivia. The negotiations resulted in the end of the war that had been fought, since 1932, over the sovereignty of the broad region of the Chaco Boreal. The war had depleted both countries. The role of Macedo Soares, who remained in Buenos Aires after Vargas went on to Montevideo, was praised in the Brazilian official record of diplomatic mediation. The negotiations

3 The international trips of Pedro II had been made privately. In 1900, President Campos Salles had visited Buenos Aires to return the visit of the president of Argentina Julio Rocca to Rio de Janeiro the previous year.

led to the signing of the *Protocol on the Calling of a Peace Conference* (DANESE, 1999, p. 292-6).

After successive attempts at mediation, involving the neighboring countries, the United States, and the League of Nations – in which conflicting strategic interests reflected the need for diplomatic leadership – the negotiations conducted in Buenos Aires, in May and June 1935, ended the hostilities. Then, illustrative of the rivalries in the region, Brazil was initially not included as an addressee on the invitation made by the foreign offices of Argentina and Chile for a conference on economic issues resulting from the conflict. Attributed to a typing error, the omission was later excused, but not before Macedo Soares expressed his surprise in a note to the ministers of Argentina and Chile in Rio de Janeiro, concerning the absences of Brazil, United States and Uruguay. The reaction to the incident caused discord between Macedo Soares, who had planned to place Rio de Janeiro at the center of the negotiations, and Oswaldo Aranha (1894-1960), then the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, who had advocated the formation of a new negotiating group because of the proposal made by Argentina and Chile. Certain that the negotiations would not advance if representatives of the warring countries did not participate in them, Macedo Soares suggested that the foreign ministers of Bolivia and Paraguay – along with the support of mediators – be invited to direct negotiations with one another (SILVEIRA, 2008, p. 16-23; LANÚS, 2001, p. 494-521).

The Argentine foreign minister, Carlos Saavedra Lamas (1878- 1959), reiterated to the Brazilian minister in Buenos Aires his excuses for the supposedly inadvertent omission and, on May 9, a group of mediators – composed of representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the United States, Peru and Uruguay, were joined by the foreign ministers of Bolivia and Paraguay on May 22. After intensive negotiations, in which Macedo Soares'

skills as a conciliator stood out, the peace protocols were signed on June 12. They established, among other items, an immediate end to the hostilities, a demobilization of the armies, a prohibition to acquire military supplies, and the establishment of a neutral military commission that would oversee the cease-fire. In order to acknowledge the Argentine government for its behavior in the negotiations, Macedo Soares returned to Rio de Janeiro aboard the *25 de Mayo*, a cruiser of that country's Navy. The territorial issue was only defined after a long peace conference, assembled in Buenos Aires, from June 1935 to January 1939. As a result of his contribution to the restoration of peace, in December 1936, Saavedra Lamas became the first Latin American to receive the Nobel Prize. For his part, when he visited La Paz in his second term as foreign minister, Macedo Soares was the object of a simple, yet meaningful demonstration: Bolivian mothers and wives of veterans of the Chaco War, stood in front of the Brazilian Embassy to show their gratitude, and they honored him with flowers (LANÚS, 2001, p. 521-532; AMARAL, 1982, pp. 146 and 165-189).

In a speech he made during an internal ceremony in his honor, when he returned to Itamaraty after his trip to Buenos Aires, Macedo Soares invoked the "noble and generous traditions of this house" as the basis for his performance during the negotiations of the peace protocol. And, he added, those traditions were epitomized in the desire for peace, which was the "common purpose of Brazilian diplomacy."

In order to demonstrate, with facts, Brazil's diplomatic tradition to cultivate peaceful relations and legal solutions to international conflicts, Macedo Soares listed the following: the constitutions of 1891 and 1934, which condemned wars of conquest and espoused the principle of obligatory arbitration and international litigation; the peaceful solution of border matters by Rio Branco; the defense by Rui Barbosa (1849-1923) of the

principle of the legal equality of States; the contribution of Raul Fernandes (1877-1968) in the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice; the mediation of Afrânio de Melo Franco, to resolve the conflict between Colombia and Peru concerning the Letícia case, as well as his contributions to the Antiwar Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, signed when the president of Argentina, Agustín Pedro Justo, visited Brazil. Later, in a speech to law students, Macedo Soares reiterated that, during the negotiations, he based his work on the peaceful traditions of Brazilian foreign policy; adding to the list: the diplomatic work of José Bonifácio (1763-1838) and Gonçalves Ledo (1781- 1847); the manifesto to friendly nations signed by the regent prince, the future Pedro I (1798-1834); the action of the Empire in the fight against tyrannies; and the performance by Epiácio Pessoa (1865-1942) as a magistrate of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague (SOARES, 1937, p. 51-5 e 65-8).

International cooperation to fight the communist threat

The insurrections in November 1935 that aimed to establish a communist government in Brazil, the *Intentona Comunista*, triggered violent repression and intensified the government's hostility towards the Soviet Union – a nation with which Brazil did not then have diplomatic relations. According to Macedo Soares, there were no doubts concerning the communist nature of the revolt, nor that it had been funded by Moscow, and the divulcation of information on large financial movements of the Soviet Legation in Montevideo strengthened his conviction about that country's engagement in the attempted coup. Once the revolt in the Northeast broke out, but before the rebellion at Praia Vermelha, in Rio de Janeiro, the Embassy in Montevideo had already been instructed to intervene in the government of Gabriel

Terra, to disavow the operation of the commercial agency of the Soviet Union (Yuzhamtorg) in the Uruguayan capital. With news of the insurrection in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's goal was the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Montevideo and Moscow. Convinced of the proof that the Soviet Legation had purchased Brazilian currency, on December 27, President Terra severed the relations (HILTON, 1986, p. 121-8).

Cooperation with governments that were also in the fight against communist infiltration was intensified. From Buenos Aires, Saavedra Lamas sided firmly with Macedo Soares in favor of suppressing the rebellion. In London, the British government provided clues that led to the apprehension of two agents of the Comintern. In Rio de Janeiro, documents that the police apprehended after the insurrection had been dominated were made available to the U.S. Ambassador, and an American diplomatic agent was authorized to talk to supposed American political prisoners. The death in a Rio de Janeiro jail of an American citizen, Victor Barron, caused the intensification of criticisms towards Brazilian police in the American press. The U.S. government, however, accepted the official version of suicide (HILTON, 1986, p. 128-148).

When the Soviets were recognized as enemies, attempting to subvert order in Brazil, Brazilian diplomacy began to identify those who were against the Soviet Union as its allies. In that context, Macedo Soares advocated, to no avail, the recognition of the state of war that rebellious Spanish forces, led by general Francisco Franco (1892-1975), were engaged in, against the Republican government of Madrid, considered to be an ally of Moscow. Additionally, the foreign minister instructed José Joaquim de Lima e Silva Moniz Aragão (1887-1974) – who, in 1936, was nominated the first Brazilian Ambassador in Berlin – to contact the political police and other German agencies with the purpose of gathering information

on the activities and plans of the Comintern in Brazil (HILTON, 1986, p. 148-159; RODRIGUES, 1995, p. 352-9).

Resistance to the closing of the regime and Interventor in the democratic restoration

Macedo Soares resigned from Itamaraty on November 26, 1936, and Mário de Pimentel Brandão (1889-1956) replaced him as the foreign minister. Soares had intended to run for president in January 1938, but he soon realized that he lacked the necessary support. In early 1937, he represented Brazil in the second inaugural ceremony of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) as president of the United States, and Vargas invited him to return to the Ministry. Before he accepted his role as Minister of Justice, however, Macedo Soares negotiated a commitment from Vargas that constitutional guarantees would be restored, and that the state of war would not be renewed. He believed that the fight against subversion could be carried out within the constitutional framework, which ensured individual rights.

Macedo Soares became Minister of Justice and Domestic Affairs on June 3, 1937, a time still under the effects of the communist insurrections of November 1935. To ensure support during the return to constitutionalism, he held meetings with leaders of the national Congress who, for the first time since November 1935, refused to renew the state of war. In a desire to ensure the validity of the state of law and, thus, to create an environment of political détente, he determined the freedom of 345 political prisoners who had not been formally accused. This action rendered him the antipathy and lack of trust of the high military command. In a humanitarian gesture, he also visited the headquarters of the special police, which held in precarious conditions the prisoners, Luís Carlos Prestes (1898-1990) and Harry Berger-Arthur Ewert (1890-1959), who had both been

militant communists. The hostility of the military became clear when the chief of police, Filinto Müller (1900-1973), along with support from the Minister of War, general Eurico Dutra (1883-1974), refused to obey the order to transfer both Prestes and Berger-Ewert from the police headquarters to the reformatory (HILTON, 1986, p. 160-7).

In a meeting with President Vargas at Guanabara Palace, then being used as the president's official residence, the military ministers and the police chief complained about the freeing of the political prisoners and the end of the state of war. Also in attendance at the meeting, Justice Minister Macedo Soares argued that the indefinite interruption of the constitutional guarantees would not lead to social peace. He claimed that a modernization of the judiciary and the police, within the framework of the constitution, would be the best way to deal with the propaganda that Moscow was funding. The divergences between Macedo Soares and the heads of the military became deeper, despite the anti-communist efforts of the Minister of Justice, who participated in the creation of the *Defesa Social Brasileiro* (DSB), an entity whose purpose was to support the regime through propaganda and information against communist infiltration in Brazil⁴ (HILTON, 1986, p. 168-171).

In such an atmosphere of political tension, in September 1937, the military hierarchy decided on a subversive, authoritative solution called the Cohen Plan, under which the government justified the suspension of constitutional rights of citizens for 90 days. The Cohen plan was decreed on October 2. In an earlier meeting in general Dutra's office, in mid-September, Macedo Soares attempted to convince the military command that it was possible to reform the constitution without the need to suppress

4 Presided by Cardinal Sebastião Leme (1882-1942), the official ceremony of introduction of DSB took place in the Itamaraty Palace.

basic freedoms. Vargas created the Superintendent Commission of the State of War (CSEG, for *Comissão Superintendente do Estado de Guerra*), to which he nominated Macedo Soares and two generals, whose roles were to coordinate repressive actions, such as preventing the reception of Soviet radio broadcasts, developing an anti-Communist educational program, and identifying press agencies and books that should be censored. Macedo Soares favored the guarantee of individual freedoms and the preservation of the representative democratic system.⁵ He, therefore, conflicted with the other members of the CSEG, and in a letter dated November 5 addressed to President Vargas, he resigned from both the commission and the ministry. On November 10, a *coup d'état*, establishing the *Estado Novo* (New State) took place, with the closing of the Congress, the dissolution of political parties, and the cancelation of elections that had been scheduled for January 1938. A new constitution of corporatist inspiration that granted vast discretionary powers to the president was also promulgated⁶ (SKIDMORE, 1982, p. 49; HILTON, 1986, p. 178-83; AMARAL, 1982, p. 190-203).

Although he was far removed from the top level of the government, Macedo Soares, as with many scholars of his time, still collaborated with the *Estado Novo*, as he remained president of the IBGE. But after a military coup led by general Góes Monteiro deposed Vargas, on October 29, 1945, elections for the state governments and legislative assemblies were suspended and new

5 Macedo Soares' belief in representative democracy may be summarized in the following excerpt of a speech he gave in Campinas, SP, in 1934: "Partisan politics is the organization of opinion. It expresses itself by the vote, which is the instrument of democracy. Therefore, the ballot is the source of political legitimacy and, at the same time, the moral and legal base of the modern State" (SOARES, 1937, p. 24).

6 The Constitution, which became known as the "Polaca," because of its similarities to that of the fascist regime of Poland, had been written by Francisco Campos (1891- 1968), the new Minister of Justice, Macedo Soares' successor just before the coup of November 10, 1937.

Interventors were nominated to replace those that Vargas has indicated. José Linhares (1886-1957), the president of the Federal Supreme Court, who was sworn in as president of the Republic, nominated Macedo Soares as the new Interventor in São Paulo.

In his inaugural address as Interventor, on November 5, 1945, Macedo Soares praised the restoration of democracy, calling for the re-establishment of public rights and freedoms as well as a commitment to the free expression of the popular will through the election of political representatives. He also praised the Armed Forces, which he said were in charge of implementing the new political regime, with “detachment, generosity and patriotism.” As Interventor, he gave priority to balancing the state budget as well as to public education, with the creation of high schools and normal schools in dozens of towns. He re-established the state symbols – the flag and the coat of arms – which had been forbidden during the Estado Novo. He also organized state elections, which were held on January 19, 1947, and on March 14, of that year, he delivered the state government to the winner, Ademar de Barros (1901-1969) (AMARAL, 1983, p. 67-73).

Cultural symbiosis and the promotion of international academic cooperation

When Macedo Soares was the foreign minister, in 1936, Getúlio Vargas nominated him as president of the National Institute of Statistics (INE, for *Instituto Nacional de Estatística*), and after Soares repeatedly refused to accept the nomination, Vargas appointed him against his will. Created in 1934, the INE became the IBGE in 1938, and Macedo Soares was its first president, a position he held until 1951, and later again in 1955-1956. In his first inaugural address at the institute, he emphasized the significance of statistical data, to guide the development and conduct of public policies, as well as to identify and prevent deviations from

principle. He also recognized the important contribution of the standardization of data to the workings of public agencies and to government services in general (SOARES, 2008, p. 59-61).

In 1938, Macedo Soares was also elected to the Brazilian Academy of Letters (ABL, for *Academia Brasileira de Letras*), which he served as president from 1942 to 1943, simultaneously with the presidencies of the IBGE and the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB, for *Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*). His link to the IHGB dated from 1921, when he was accepted as a partner-correspondent after the publication the previous year of his book, *Falsos Troféus de Ituzaingó*. In 1939, his quick rise from benefactor and partner to president of the institute was mainly due to the coincidence of the institutes needs, and the recognition by Max Fleiuss (1868-1943), the perpetual secretary of the institute, of Macedo Soares as an enterprising scholar with leadership spirit, generosity, and availability – in addition to having many acquaintances in political, diplomatic, business and other cultural institutions that could assist the institute (GUIMARÃES, 2008, p. 9-11). Macedo Soares election as president of the IHGB was, thus, a symbolic exchange of respect between the politician, former minister, successful businessman and philanthropist, and the nation's most traditional institute of historical knowledge in a permanent search for the continuity of official support. As a consequence, during the Estado Novo, the IHGB had the support of Vargas at a time of great change in the official and the private worlds of culture, resulting in the creation and organization of a number of institutes concerned with the preservation of patrimony and memory.⁷

7 Examples include: the University of São Paulo (USP), created in 1934; the University of the Federal District, created in 1935, eventually absorbed by the University of Brazil, in 1937; the Service of National Historical and Artistic Patrimony (SPHAN, for Serviço do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional), created in 1937; and a number of museums created during the Estado Novo, such as the

As president of prestigious cultural institutes – whether official, such as the IBGE, or semi-official, such as the IHGB and the ABL – Macedo Soares developed joint activities that benefitted all of them, while also reinforcing his personal prestige. Taking advantage of his simultaneous positions at the top of a number of the institutes, he nurtured intensive academic cooperation. There were international meetings concerned with geography and cartography as well as several scientific congresses, seminars and conferences promoted by the IBGE and held at the IHGB. He also took the initiative to foster closer ties with other South American historical institutes, especially those of the Plata River Basin countries, with the purpose of strengthening a common South American identity. Accordingly, he increased the staff of foreign correspondent partners, and he both promoted and attended cultural missions and international academic events held throughout the region. A significant example of his desire for approximation was the symbolic donation of a gold coin, minted in 1851, with the face of Pedro II (1825-1891) on one side, given to the Argentine National Academy of History. Thus, even outside of Itamaraty, Macedo Soares implemented a “cultural diplomacy” through an intensification of relations with the neighboring countries (CAMARGO, 2008, pp. 28-9).

Historian and ideologist of “territorial nationalism”

As it is possible to get to know facets of Macedo Soares thoughts on Brazilian foreign policy when one studies his role in the promotion of cultural activities, the same can also be said about his historiographical production. His works in this area include two that today may still be considered useful to contemporary history: *Justiça: A Revolta Militar em São Paulo*, an account of the *tenentista*

National Museum of Fine Arts, in 1937, the Imperial Museum of Petrópolis, created in 1940 (opened in 1943), and the *Museu da Inconfidência* of Ouro Preto, which opened in 1944.

movement of 1924, written during his voluntary exile in Paris, and *O Brasil e a Sociedade das Nações*, which he also wrote while abroad and was published in 1927. The latter is a study of Brazil's participation in the negotiations at Versailles after World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, as well as an analysis of Brazil's withdrawal from that Geneva organization.

All of the important works of history written by Macedo Soares have in common transcription from primary sources, presentations in luxury editions, and a documental value more significant than their analytical content. *Fontes da História da Igreja Católica no Brasil* (Historical Sources of the Catholic Church in Brazil), for example, is a 1954 work of rare erudition in Brazilian historiography. It offers material on documentary collections of museums, archives, libraries and public ecclesiastic and private institutions, both Brazilian and foreign. The reader obtains information on where to find documents that can be consulted for a historical study of the Catholic Church in Brazil, a personal ambition of Macedo Soares.

In *Santo Antonio de Lisboa, Militar no Brasil*, published in 1942, Macedo Soares transcribed documentation concerning the Portuguese Franciscan friar from the thirteenth century, who was canonized by the Roman Catholic Church in 1232. Portuguese military units in America developed a cult around the saint, believing that one garnered payments corresponding to one's rank. This was an original theme of Macedo Soares, and it demonstrates his sensibility to a historiographical perspective. Such a study would currently be classified in the field of the history of thought or of the mindset of ideas (NEVES, 2008; LACOMBE, 1968, WILLEKE, 1968).

To explore more of the "diplomatic thought" of José Carlos de Macedo Soares, itself, his book, *Fronteiras do Brasil no Regime*

Colonial (Brazilian borders in the colonial period), would be the most useful source. This thesis was originally submitted, in 1939, to the III Congress of National History, in celebration of the centennial of the founding of the IHGB. The publication is composed of an introduction and eight chapters, followed by a bibliography and comments. There are also eight maps and various graphic designs by José Wasth Rodrigues (1891-1957). The text transcribes 10 papal bulls of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, along with seven border treaties, signed between 1494 and 1821, plus a treaty of 1825, concerned with the recognition of the Brazilian Empire by Portugal.

In Macedo Soares' work, the writing of history is conditioned by an ideological perspective that does not hesitate to resort to "territorial nationalism," to justify the establishment of Brazil's borders. Accordingly, he said: "In the New World there was never a dynastic feeling; we were all born with a nationalist idea." In other words, American nationalism came even before the formation of nations, before nation States. The historian/ideologist believed that the territory had value as an original patrimony and a constituent of nationality. In that sense, the territory was a maker of the national identity: "The complete border defines the country, the seat of an organized people. The border ensures the property instinct that is as natural and necessary in peoples as it is in individuals." According to this "territorial" idea of nationalism, the fullness of the national awareness would only be attained when the borders were no longer an abstract idea to most Brazilians; only then would Brazilians own the entire national territory (SOARES, 1939, p. 5; NEVES, 2008, p. 38-9).

One can identify in his work an emphasis on the expansion of Luso-Brazilian territory, along with the consequent shape of the territory that became Brazil. This expansion was the result of efforts made by the *bandeirantes* (literally, flag-carrying explorers):

“The late sixteenth century was the beginning of the trail blazer epic of western and southern Brazil, which the *bandeirantes* carried out brilliantly.” For Macedo Soares the *bandeirantes* were the creators of the Portuguese colonial empire in America. To illustrate this, in an epigraph to a chapter concerned with negotiations on the 1750 Treaty of Madrid, he mentions a phrase by Rocha Pombo (1857-1933), a consecrated historian of the time: “Without the work of the paulista *bandeiras*, Brazil would not be the same.” Although it is not a historiographical classic, *Fronteiras do Brasil no Regime Colonial* shares with other works of its time a concern for the creation of a national awareness, a Brazilian nationality (SOARES, 1939, p. 92 e 122; NEVES, 2008, p. 39).

It is also worth noting that the book was conceived as a tribute to the Brazilian Army, the defender and demarcator of the borders, their “innate guard [...], both in peace and in war.” And it was especially a tribute to general Cândido Rondon (1865-1958), the “peasant general,” a selfless and exemplary servant of Brazil. The Army, as represented by Rondon, with effort, devotion and patriotism in their “work of conquest and national foundation,” according to Macedo Soares, was a continuation of the *bandeirantes*.

The anachronism of the ideologist/historian is clearly revealed in the following passage concerned with the period between 1580 and 1640, the Iberian union: “Portugal might have lost something with the Spanish domination, but there is no doubt that Brazil greatly profited during the reigns of the three Felipes” (SOARES, 1939, p. 6 and p. 92).

According to that perspective, Brazil was a non-historical entity that existed before its political independence. The territorial definition of Brazil – Portuguese lands beyond the “ocean” – came before its historical and geographic awareness. Thus, the territory existed before the nation and the State. Although this is a view of the historian Macedo Soares, its nationalistic logic was also the

basis of his political and diplomatic thought: Nationalism existed prior to the nation; it was based on the unity of a large territory. It was a counterweight in the thought of Macedo Soares, the diplomat and statesman (SOARES, 1939 p. 3-4; NEVES, 2008, p. 38-9).

BACK TO ITAMARATY: HISTORY AND FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE JUSCELINO KUBITSCHKEK ERA (1955-1958)

Diplomacy at the service of history and vice-versa: research, “consultancy” and a museum

On November 12, 1955, José Carlos de Macedo Soares, at 72 years of age was appointed foreign minister for a second time. It was a period of institutional instability and political confusion in the country, following the suicide of President Getúlio Vargas, in August 1954. Juscelino Kubitschek (1902-1976) had won the presidential election of October 3, 1955, and he was scheduled to be sworn in as president the following January; some members of the armed forces, however, did not want him to take power. Faced with the prospect of a coup, to prevent Kubitschek's inauguration, one day prior to Macedo Soares' appointment, general Henrique Teixeira Lott (1894-1984), the Minister of War, staged a preemptive coup, deposing the interim president of the Republic, Carlos Luz (1894-1961). Luz, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, who occupied the national presidency for just a few days after the heart attack of Café Filho (1899-1970); who, in turn, had been the vice president under Getúlio Vargas, and had assumed the presidency after Vargas' suicide. After Trott deposed Luz, who had been opposed to Kubitschek, Nereu Ramos (1888-1958), the vice-president of the Senate, was sworn in as another interim president

of the Republic. Ramos allowed the Kubitschek inauguration to go forward, but for the two and a half months prior to Kubitschek, he formed his own ministry, and he invited his former colleague from the Constituent Assembly of 1933-1934, Macedo Soares, to be the foreign minister. When Juscelino Kubitschek was inaugurated, on January 31, 1956, he kept Soares at the head of Itamaraty. Macedo Soares remained in the position until his resignation in July 1958.

Three initiatives by Macedo Soares during his second administration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demonstrate his belief in the political application of historical knowledge. With these initiatives, he sought to: (1) facilitate the availability of the diplomatic service for historical research; (2) revitalize the Commission of Studies of Texts of the History of Brazil (CETHB, for *Comissão de Estudo dos Textos de História do Brasil*); and (3) create a historical museum and archive (MHD, for *Museu e Arquivo Histórico e Diplomático*) to be used in the formulation of foreign policy.

By means of a ministerial order on January 16, 1956 – resuming a practice from the era of the Brazilian Empire – Macedo Soares determined that research should be undertaken in European countries, using documents of interest to the history of Brazil. Accordingly, employees at embassies in Lisbon and Madrid were appointed to draw up a general index of documents related to Brazil. The documents were then sent to the CETHB, and – as the IHGB had done during the Empire – that entity indicated which should be used to give instructions to the diplomatic corps, and also determine where the documents should be archived.⁸

8 The Order of January 16, 1956, by Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Carlos de Macedo Soares. AHI, Part II, Internal Documentation, 134/3/15, Orders (1943-1959). Despite the determination of the Minister of State, the nomination of researchers was not welcome in the diplomatic missions. This is evident from the letters of Eliseu Araújo Lima, a researcher from outside the ministry, who was sent to Madrid as an employee of the National Archives. The Archives of the IHGB has letters from Araújo Lima to Macedo Soares, from 1956, in which he described the progress of his research, as well as the difficulties of relationship with Embassy staff. IHGB, José Carlos de Macedo Soares fund, Tin 796, File 11.

Such an initiative revealed an “instrumentalist” view of diplomacy as a facilitator of historical research. The use of diplomats and diplomatic missions to search files could, therefore, be interpreted as an “instrumentalization” of the Foreign Service for historiographical reasons; thereby reproducing a practice, inspired by the Enlightenment – of using history as a diplomatic tool – all in accordance with the original purpose of the IHGB, which had been created in 1838.

Another initiative taken by Macedo Soares during his second term as foreign minister gave more value to history itself, as seen in the revitalization of the CETHB, a consultative unit created by the ministerial decree on April 13, 1943, of then foreign minister Oswaldo Aranha. When originally established, the commission had five members – including historians, diplomats and the military – all appointed by the Minister, who presided over the unit.⁹ The Commission met 29 times in 1955 and submitted 150 opinions.¹⁰ Now headed by Macedo Soares, the “new” CETHB was reorganized by means of another ministerial decree issued on May 28, 1956. The commission’s membership was increased to ten, including the head of the Documentation Service of Itamaraty, who was its secretary-general. The commission also now had three assistants and a representative from the IHGB – of which, Macedo Soares was the president.¹¹ Soares did not, however, plan to improve the commission’s work only by increasing its numbers; he also saw to an increase in the skill levels of its members.

9 Order dated April 13, 1943 by Minister Oswaldo Aranha. AHI, Part II, Internal Documentation, 134/3/15, Orders (1943-1959).

10 Report of the MRE referring to 1955, Rio de Janeiro, MRE/Publications Service, p. 205.

11 During the administration of Macedo Soares, the number of members of CETHB was raised, again, to 11. In 1959, Negrão de Lima, Soares’ successor, raised it to 12 members, more than twice the original membership. AHI, Part II, Internal Documentation, 134/3/15, Orders (1943-1959).

In addition to creating bibliographies on all major works and articles related to the history of Brazil with transcriptions, summaries, and reviews of the information gathered – some even indicating inaccuracies – other accomplishments of the revitalized commission included: the reorganization and re-publication of a journal whose publication had been interrupted, the *Anais do Itamaraty*, along with transcriptions of primary sources from the collection of the *Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty* (AHI), and other archives on themes related to Brazilian foreign policy history; instructions to guide researchers in the archives; as well as recommendations as to what should be kept in the Ministry's archives and where it should be kept. In addition, the writing of opinions on historical matters related to foreign policy continued. According to its 1957 *Report*, Macedo Soares sought to “ascribe to the commission a similar role as that of the Historical Division of the U.S. State Department, which maintained a large program of research abroad.” The Minister was, thus, in tune with initiatives of foreign offices outside the country, to build Brazil's diplomatic history and preserve its memory.¹²

One of the tasks that the reorganized CETHB performed for the Minister was the aforementioned writing of opinions on historical subjects related to foreign policy. The role of the historian as a consultant for political purposes was acknowledged, and historical knowledge was valued as complementary to diplomacy. Thus, the revitalization and institutional strengthening of the CETHB, as well as the acknowledgement of its function as an information source for the formulation of political and diplomatic policies, show the pragmatic view that Macedo Soares had of historical knowledge.

12 *Report of the MRE referring to 1957*. Rio de Janeiro, MRE/Publications Section, 1958, p. 329.

A third initiative of Macedo Soares' second term as Brazil's foreign minister, which also demonstrates his pragmatic view of diplomatic history as a political tool, was the creation of the *Museu e Arquivo Histórico e Diplomático* (MHD). Approximately 40 days after he became the foreign minister, Macedo Soares submitted to interim President Nereu Ramos the decree that created the museum, after first listening to Ambassador Hildebrando Accioly (1888-1962), the legal counsel of the Ministry. Immediately after the museum's creation, Macedo Soares requested advice from the director of the National Historical Museum, who at the time was Gustavo Barroso (1888-1959), the same individual who had created that museum in 1922 and had been responsible for the development of a pioneer course for training museum professionals.

The decisions to create the MHD, to revitalize the CETHB, and to order the research of historical documents in foreign archives all have in common a concern for the building and preservation of diplomatic history, integrated into a strategy of giving value to historical knowledge as a tool for diplomatic and political action.

Critique of “legalism”: “depolitization” and the immobilization of diplomacy

The initiatives of Macedo Soares reveal a view of diplomacy in which the history of the nation plays a central role, thereby, identifying traces of the man's “diplomatic thought.” An analysis of two texts he wrote also enriches a reflection on his thoughts, on international politics, and on Brazil's presence in the world.

In response to a questionnaire formulated by the *Jornal do Comércio*, concerning a draft of the UN Charter written at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, in Washington, D.C., during September and October 1944, Macedo Soares demonstrated he was

skeptical about the future of the organization then in gestation. He thought it would be a coercive international organization which, in order to prevent wars, would use the armed forces of the major powers. In the final analysis, he believed that the United Nations would be the union of the military chiefs of staff of the members' armed forces used to control turbulent states. He acknowledged, however, that it could be useful to carry out the transition from war to peace. The Security Council would be the trustee of international peace and security. Thus, it would act with mandates and resources from the member countries. He pointed to the contradiction between the professed sovereign equality of States – set forth as a basic principle of the organization – and the composition of the Security Council, which provided for permanent and temporary members. He also observed that the peace the new organization would ensure – obtained not by an armistice, but through the unconditional surrender of the Axis forces – would be established by a group of the major powers.

Despite his criticism of the United Nations, he pointed out that Brazil had already recognized the reality of power in the League of Nations when it accepted the permanence of the major powers on the Council, in 1918. An idealist, he did not refrain from voicing an opinion, at the right time, about the commitment to representative democracy and the guarantee of democratic freedoms, despite disparities between levels of culture and political organization of the member States. Macedo Soares believed that Brazil should not take on the responsibilities of membership on the Security Council; rather, he felt it should become a member of the Economic and Social Council, with a view towards discussing solutions to economic, social and humanitarian problems and the promotion of respect for human rights and basic freedoms (SOARES, 1945, pp. 22-7).

The idea of foreign policy as a factor of continuity, which Macedo Soares announced during his inaugural address as foreign minister, in 1934, was confirmed in the agency's *Report* of 1955, in which he said that by preserving and displaying the objects, furniture and documents at the Itamaraty Palace, the MHD was contributing "to preserve a feeling of worship and respect that all owe to Brazil's noble past." As a legal consequence of such a view, Macedo Soares believed that the solution to international problems would come from the study of precedents; that international controversies should be resolved according to criteria based on history, rather than politics. In addition, the Minister shared a "positivist" view of historical investigation, as an inquiry that would disclose the truth hidden by the vestiges of the past.¹³

Based on Macedo Soares' school of thought, there are two leading consequences of the use of history as the key to resolving international controversies: the first is "to depoliticize" diplomatic activity, limiting it to a legal dimension. And the second is that since there are a great variety of possible interpretations of history – some even contradictory to others – such a perspective runs the risk of immobilizing diplomacy.

Concerning the idea that the law should be at the forefront of foreign affairs, the historian, José Honório Rodrigues (1913-1987), wrote the following about the stagnation of Brazilian foreign policy from the time of the death of the Baron Rio Branco, in 1910, until the mid-1950s:

Diplomacy had been a class dynasty. With the creation of the Rio Branco Institute [in 1945, however], the law began to dominate the political and diplomatic arena. The role of international law – although reduced in relations among States – was given more value and politics was subordinated

13 *Report* of the MRE referring to 1955. MRE, Rio de Janeiro, "Exposição", p. 199.

to it. The law is a kind of straitjacket that diplomats use to disguise their lack of political expression or their inability to defend the State's interests (RODRIGUES, 1966, p. 57-8).

A positive consequence of giving more value to history was its “instrumentalization” – the ability to use it as a tool – for political and diplomatic purposes. Through a modernization of the archives, diplomats were able to use history and institutional memory as vehicles of social communication. This was the purpose of the creation of the museum – and especially the archives – at Itamaraty. It was also the reason for organizing the archives, to facilitate access to the documents for consultation.

The foreign policy of Juscelino Kubitschek: ambiguities and contradictions

The ability to conciliate economic growth and industrialization, along with democracy and institutional stability – despite coup attempts, a succession of financial crises, inflation, and strikes – contributed to the belief that the era of Juscelino Kubitschek was a “golden age” for Brazil. It was not, however, without its critics. Although controlled, the polarization of public opinion around the economic development model that combined State intervention and the participation of foreign capital was a main feature of the period that was also reflected in its foreign policy.

As time went on, the external dimension was perceived as fundamental to national development: industrialization advanced, the economy became diversified, and both society and the State became more complex. Under these conditions, the formulation of foreign policy received the interest of various players and bureaucratic agencies. It is, therefore, difficult to define the foreign policy of Juscelino Kubitschek, as it had both ambiguities and contradictions (MOURA, 1991, p. 24; cited in GONÇALVES, 2003, p. 165).

Macedo Soares was the foreign minister during half of the presidential term of Kubitschek. His resignation from the Ministry, in July 1958, was related to the introduction of the *Operação Pan-americana* (OPA), considered a turning point as it distinguished the period of alignment with the United States – 1954 to 1958 – from that of 1958 to 1961, when a policy of bargaining with Washington was resumed, and there was an attempt to increase international partnerships (VIZENTINI, 1995, p. 133-9). Although the exact periods of time are debatable, the fact is that during Macedo Soares' second administration of the Ministry of Exterior Relations, there were major repercussions in public opinion, with Itamaraty labeled as conservative, if not regressive, in its formulation of foreign policy (GONÇALVES, 1993, p. 165-195).

Limitations on the traditional Alignment: Suez, Noronha, Portugal and Eastern Europe

A number of examples of Brazil's foreign policy during the Kubitschek years reaffirm the country's traditional alignment with the West. These include: the 1957 decision to send troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in the Middle East, after the October 1956 to March 1957 closing of the Suez canal and the war that resulted from the nationalization of the canal by Egypt; negotiations with the United States for the installation of a missile-tracking base; support to Portugal in defense of its colonial possessions; and limitations on a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

The January 21, 1957 agreement authorizing the installation of a base in the archipelago of Fernando de Noronha for the observation of guided missiles was an attempt by Kubitschek, to cultivate the support of the United States for its development programs while, simultaneously ensuring the internal support

of the military. Although the agreement restated a traditional alignment, it involved the political trade of re-equipping the Brazilian Armed Forces. The negotiations on the missile-tracking base produced a strong parliamentary reaction from nationalist sectors of the president's own political party. After a heated debate, however, the Congress concluded that the agreement did not need to be approved by the legislature, since it was protected by the Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement of 1952 (WEIS, 1993, p. 100-2).

Concerning relations with Portugal and Brazil's position on the decolonization process, rhetorical manifestations of solidarity with movements of national liberation, and an acknowledgement of the principle of self-determination contrasted with the support given to the colonial powers at the United Nations. Brazilian foreign policy during the Kubitschek period did not criticize or condemn colonialism. The alignment with Portugal, in 1957, had one of its most shameful and, at the same time, most eloquent moments in a speech made by the Brazilian delegate to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, which defended the thesis that Portugal did not have any colonies, just "overseas territories" (CERVO; BUENO, 2008, p. 300-1; GRIECO, 1957).

One regressive and narrow aspect of Brazil's foreign policy during the Kubitschek years expressed itself in the debate concerning rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which arose from the need to open new markets for Brazilian exports. Macedo Soares opposed the resumption of relations, which was mainly defended by sectors – including within the government – who were tied to the export of agrarian products. Oswaldo Aranha, the Brazilian representative to the United Nations in New York, was in favor of the resumption of diplomatic relations and, once again, he went against Macedo Soares. Eventually, the resumption of *economic* relations prevailed, while that of diplomatic ones did

not. In November 1959, Brazil sent a trade mission to Moscow – although, by then, Macedo Soares was no longer the Brazilian foreign minister (MOURA, 1991, p. 38-9).

Final actions: a nationalist in the Roboré Agreements; without prestige during the OPA

Another foreign policy issue that emerged as a major issue during the second administration of Macedo Soares at Itamaraty was that of the so-called Roboré Agreements between Brazil and Bolivia. The agreements were a set of 31 diplomatic notes, negotiated in Corumbá and Roboré by the country's respective foreign ministers, Macedo Soares and Manoel Barrau Pelaez (1909-1972), and signed, on March 29, 1958, in La Paz. The most important of the diplomatic notes related to the exploration of oil in Bolivia and efforts to upgrade the bilateral treaties of 1938. They were also concerned with the export and use of Bolivian oil, and issues related to railroad connections.

A controversy surrounding the agreements developed and impacted public opinion. The reasons for the controversy were basically twofold: First, there was an ideological divide between “nationalists” and “cosmopolitans” – or *entreguistas* as they were called by those on the left: people they felt were too willing to *entregar* (give away) the country's natural resources. The issues also concerned the State's intervention in the economy and the role of foreign capital in national development. The second reason for the controversy revolved around the debates on the agreements. These were amplified by those in the opposition, and converted into a harangue between the legislative and executive branches, serving as a tool to harass the government – with eyes on the next election.

The government's position on Bolivian requests to review the treaties of 1938 demonstrates the complexity of the deci-

sion-making process of foreign policy. With many divergent interests and bureaucratic rivalries, the need for specialized public administration increases the functions of the State and causes a multiplication of new bureaucracies – which, in turn, represent a tool the president can use, to overcome the traditional organs (SKIDMORE, 1982, p. 228). In the case of the Roboré Agreements, various units of the federal government participated in the decision-making process. In addition to organs of direct administration, such as Itamaraty and the military, there were technical entities involved, such as: the CACEX (the *Carteira de Comércio Exterior* – the foreign trade division of the Bank of Brazil), and SUMOC (the *Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito* – the Bureau of Currency and Credit); along with public enterprises, such as Petrobrás (the state oil company), the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE, for *Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico*), the Bank of Brazil, itself; plus councils, such as the National Council of Oil, and the National Security Council.

Negotiations on the Roboré Agreements involved three issues of great controversy and political manipulation: 1) The role of Petrobrás; 2) The definition of “Brazilian,” especially as it related to companies that could receive concessions to explore for oil; and 3) The ability of diplomatic notes to change the content of previously signed contracts.

Although Bolivian legislation prohibited the participation of state-owned companies in the exploration of oil, this did not prevent Itamaraty from attempting to obtain concessions for Petrobrás – a situation which the opposition presented as a threat to the State oil monopoly.

With regard to the second item – the definition of a “Brazilian company” – the BNDE was in charge of defining the term “Brazilian nationality.” Contrary to the content of the agreements, the

BNDE, the president of which was Roberto de Oliveira Campos (1917-2001), made provisions for the participation of foreign capital in companies involved in oil exploration. And regarding the use of diplomatic notes to alter the content of previously signed contracts, it was argued that Bolivia's requests to update the Treaties of 1938, allowed for revertive notes, which would be submitted to the Congress for ratification – according to Gabriel de Resende Passos (1901-1962), who wrote an opinion against the revertive notes.

Throughout the negotiation process, Itamaraty sought to include Bolivian interests in the agreements – something to benefit both countries. Despite this, it was written into the revertive notes that companies participating in the exploration for oil in Bolivia were exclusively Brazilian in nature. All of this produced a strain on the executive branch, in particular, on Itamaraty. Called to testify in a congressional investigation looking into accusations of improper preferences in the selection of the companies, Macedo Soares – who sought a nationalist solution to the issue – defended the Roboré Agreements, while he also expressed disagreement with the criteria that BNDE used to select the Brazilian companies (GUILHERME, 1959, p. 209-14).

The replacement of José Carlos de Macedo Soares by Francisco Negrão de Lima (1901-1981) as the head of Itamaraty began with a cascade of events related to the Operation Pan American (OPA) which, itself, began with a letter written by Juscelino Kubitschek addressed to the president of the United States, Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969), on May 28, 1958. In his memoirs, Brazilian diplomat, Mario Gibson Barboza (1918-2007) presents his version of the story. Barboza writes that when he was the *chargé d'affaires* in Buenos Aires, he was officially called to report to Rio de Janeiro and summoned to Laranjeiras Palace, then the official residence of the Brazilian president, Juscelino Kubitschek. He further states

that Kubitschek then put him in charge of obtaining the support of the president of Argentina, Arturo Frondizi (1908- 1995), for a speech he, Kubitschek, would make, explaining the principles of OPA. After meeting with Kubitschek, Barboza presented himself at Itamaraty, where he informed the secretary-general of the mission he had received. The secretary-general said that he was not aware of the mission and, indeed, the foreign minister, Macedo Soares, was also not aware of it. Less than two months later, the foreign minister resigned his position (July 1958). (BARBOSA, 1992, p. 47-55; GONÇALVES, 2003, p. 185).

The question remains open: Did Macedo Soares resign strictly because he felt slighted by Kubitschek, or did he disagree with the content of the OPA? The fact is, that instead of first presenting the initiative to Itamaraty, Kubitschek entrusted an aide who did not even belong to the diplomatic staff – the poet, editor and businessman, Augusto Frederico Schmidt (1906-1965) – with the plans' conception, development, and execution, even though OPA was intended to be the most important diplomatic proposal of his government: an innovative plan that linked the fight against communism to a need to overcome poverty and underdevelopment; which many say, became the model for the Alliance for Progress of U.S. president, John F. Kennedy three years later.

FINAL THOUGHTS

In this attempt to evaluate the role and influence of José Carlos de Macedo Soares on the doctrine and practice of Brazilian diplomacy, we would be remiss if we failed to mention an article published on January 17, 1962, in the Rio de Janeiro newspaper, *O Globo*, which Macedo Soares co-authored with three other former Brazilian foreign ministers: João Neves da Fontoura (1887-1962),

Vicente Rao (1892-1978), and Horácio Lafer (1900-1965). In the article, concerned with the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, to be held in Punta Del Este, Uruguay the following week, the four diplomats said Brazil should position itself in favor of isolating Cuba, by breaking diplomatic relations with the island nation. The article further argued that, since the goals of Pan-Americanism were the consolidation of democratic regimes and a ban of all totalitarian regimes, and Fidel Castro (1926-) had implemented a dictatorship in Cuba and allied himself with the communist powers, the attitude that should be taken – without violating the principle of non-intervention – was to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) (GARCIA, 2008: 513-6).

Macedo Soares was an ethical politician and a democrat; he also had an instinct for conciliation. As a diplomat, he always advocated the primacy of the law. It is possible that his worldview was too influenced by the rigidity of the ideological bipolarity of the Cold War and by a fear of the threat that Marxism-Leninism could represent to Brazil. Perhaps for that reason he could not see that the breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba by the American republics would have a counterproductive effect, and it would contribute to integrating Cuba even more into the socialist bloc. In addition, the expelling of Cuba from the OAS, at that conference, violated the Charter of Bogotá itself, as Brazil's then foreign minister, San Tiago Dantas (1911-1964), pointed out.

Macedo Soares' "diplomatic thought" was conditioned by a liberal worldview, which advocated a representative political system and a respect for democratic freedoms, while also defending the national interest. His style of nationalism was expressed by an attachment to the traditions of a pacifistic foreign policy, devoted to the search for legal and conciliating solutions. In both liberalism and nationalism, Macedo Soares acknowledged that the centrality

of the law sometimes inhibited diplomatic action. Thus, if one were to list the basic characteristics of Macedo Soares' "diplomatic thought," they would be: liberalism, nationalism and "legalism."

In the mid-1930s, the São Paulo city government decided to install a monument in a residential zone near the historic downtown, to honor Augustus (63 BC–14 AD), the first Roman Emperor. The Italian government donated the bronze monument, cast in Naples; it reproduced the original statue, *Augusto de Prima Porta*, with the right arm of the emperor extended, as if he is saluting a military parade. The condition of a great metropolis had already infused in the inhabitants of São Paulo the casualness typical of major urban centers in the tropics. Popular humor soon led to a nickname for the monument. Referring to the location to which the extended arm of Emperor Augustus pointed, the people said: "That is where Carlito lives" – an allusion to the large house of José Carlos de Macedo Soares, on Major Quedinho Street.

That small urban anecdote – related, without onomastic accuracy, by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009), and mentioned, again, by the historian Guilherme Pereira das Neves – reveals the intimacy and fondness that Soares' fellow *paulistanos* (residents of the city of São Paulo) had for the former teacher and political representative. It is a fitting tribute to close this fragmented outline of the diplomatic thought of José Carlos de Macedo Soares, the statesman known as "Carlito."

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**ADMIRAL ÁLVARO
ALBERTO**

Born in 1889, he was a navy officer and was appointed Admiral by a Presidential Decree in recognition of his contribution to the training of Naval and Army officers and to science and research in Brazil. Among the many achievements, Álvaro Alberto stood out as a pioneer in the study and research of nuclear power and, in 1939, the study of this subject was included in the curriculum of the Navy Academy. His importance to Brazilian foreign policy is associated with his role as the Brazilian representative to the Atomic Energy Commission established by Resolution no. 1 of the United Nations, in 1946. As member of the Commission, one of his concerns was to use the reserves of atomic minerals, which was supposed to exist in large scale in the country, to develop the Brazilian technological and industrial capacity in the atomic energy sector. Álvaro Alberto chaired the Working Group that designed the project of creation of the National Research Council (CNPq). The project was sent

to President Dutra and it was approved in January 1951. It can be said that largely the project that created CNPq also resulted from his experience and his sensitivity to capture with accuracy the international scenario. Álvaro Alberto was the President of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences (1935-37 and 1949-51) and the first President of CNPq (1951-1955). He died in 1976.

ADMIRAL ÁLVARO ALBERTO: THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Eiiti Sato

The objective of this essay is not to present a brief biography of Admiral Álvaro Alberto da Mota e Silva, nor to discuss the leadership role he played in the establishment of important institutions for the development of the scientific community in Brazil. Other works have already done it, and certainly many others will follow without, necessarily, exhausting the subject. The objective of this essay, according to what was established in the general purpose of the book, is to find out among Álvaro Alberto's achievements, elements that significantly have marked the trajectory of Brazilian foreign policy. In general, the essay discusses possible explanations for two aspects or issues that, in Álvaro Alberto's work, present themselves as two sides of the same coin. On one side, why Álvaro Alberto, a career military with remarkable involvement in the scientific community in Brazil, should be included among those who played a significant role in the country's foreign policy? On the other side of the coin, the essay discusses how and to what extent international relations and Brazilian foreign policy played a

significant role in the establishment of CNPq as the main institution of the Brazilian science and technology system. Indeed, the public figure of Admiral Álvaro Alberto became strongly related to his works and deeds in the field of scientific research in Brazil, ahead of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences and leading the creation of CNPq and other institutions dedicated to scientific research, but also at the same time was associated with the Brazilian representation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission and the concern with the management of national mineral resources that could be used in the nuclear energy sector.

From the point of view of foreign policy, Álvaro Alberto's actions left several important legacies. Probably the most general among these legacies was the recognition of science and technology as a relevant dimension of the interface between nation and the international environment. Álvaro Alberto understood that it was not enough to recognize such importance and to bring to Brazil's foreign relations agenda the theme of scientific and technological development. His understanding was that the research and the use of scientific knowledge were increasingly related to the transformations and to the national defense policies and development of all nations.

A second legacy of his performance was to show that the observation of the international environment was crucial to capture scientific and technological development trends in the world and as their directions as crucial elements to establish the guidelines that national authorities should provide. Strategic security and science had become much more integrated especially in the area of nuclear energy, and international cooperation in that field demanded the participation of experts capable of understanding the meaning and the implications of the scientific findings.

A third legacy of Álvaro Alberto was his perception that the notion of “defense of national natural resources” could only be properly applied by means of the development of the technological capacity of the country to take advantage of the incorporation of new developments in its own industries. To Álvaro Alberto to develop a national industry in the nuclear area was the only way to actually disseminate to the entire nation the benefits of owning mineral fields. The fact that the concept of “Dutch disease” only emerged many years later does not mean that the problem did not exist. On the other hand, only in this way foreign nations, especially the major powers, would not need to be seen as opponents or as greedy adversaries to be fought, but as nations with which, to the extent possible, the country should fetch new forms of both commercial and technological cooperation.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A CHANGING WORLD

A starting point for the discussion of possible explanations to the issue analyzed in this essay is to consider that any interpretation of possible motivations for the action of entrepreneurial minds must take into account both the man’s intellectual profile and his concerns about the political and sociological context of his time. The phrase “*Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia...*” has become one of the most quoted among those phrases taken from the work of Ortega y Gasset because it synthesizes the inescapable symbiosis between man and his time.¹ Such symbiosis between man and his environment, between the thought and its time, was always important. However, in the 20th century, to understand this relationship became more complicated, since the 20th century was a

1 The complete sentence says “*yo soy yo y mi circumstance y si no la salvo a ella no me salvo yo*” and was extracted from *Meditaciones Del Quijote*, by José Ortega y Gasset, in 1914.

period of great turmoil due to a flurry of changes. Several thinkers produced remarkable works showing that the 20th century was a century that went through true earthquakes in the political and social sphere, which led to transformations and uncertainties in which both beliefs and traditional institutions were replaced, and in which technological standards, which affect human existence, started to last for less than one generation.²

Indeed, in the international sphere, throughout the first half of the 20th century, the European political geography was redesigned more than once, the United States and the Soviet Union became the world's major powers, and the ideological and strategic bipolarity combined with the advent of the nuclear age, showing the need for new concepts for any attempt to understand properly the play of forces in action in the international sphere. In this changing environment, the military issues extended radically the strict domain of strategic thinking, in order to become integrated with government policies for the benefit of industry and scientific research. Even for a country like Brazil, which has always valued inward looking attitude, the dynamics of international politics in the years after World War II became an increasingly relevant factor. Among the changes under way, the use of atomic energy emerged with great prominence influencing perceptions about diplomacy, security strategies, and the future of scientific research and industrial development.

The perception that the advent of the nuclear age changed many things in radical ways was quite generalized, but not always its implications were clearly interpreted. The mainstream press and the people in general could be astonished with or concerned about the devastating effect of nuclear weapons, but they had difficulty to notice the many implications and political consequences of the

2 See, for example, the works by Hobsbawn (2002) and Galbraith (1977).

new weapon. Ordinary people may feel horror, outrage or concern when they see a crime scene or they witness the collapse of a bridge, but the experienced police officer or the expert engineer, although they may have the same feeling of repulse in the face of a destruction scene, they also have a more technical vision of the scene, allowing them to establish plausible hypotheses about causes and consequences of the event they are witnessing. Álvaro Alberto was among the few who, due to his military training and to his knowledge about the scientific world, could understand more clearly the extent and the significance of the ongoing changes in the Brazilian nation.

In the military domain, the atomic weapons changed completely the notion of strategic balance. It was no longer about increasing the range and the accuracy of existing weapons or of increasing permanent and moving troops to more regions. The atomic bombs dropped on Japan made in less than a week what dozens of well-armed traditional divisions would have a hard time to carry out in several months of bloody fighting. The devastating character of nuclear weapons had left political leaders, analysts and the general population before questions of basic concepts about the problem to understand and to formulate security strategies on completely new basis. It was a feeling radically different of the previous experiences such as, for example, upon the fall of Constantinople when the traditional notions of strategic security also began to be questioned. When the writer Stefan Zweig made an account of the fall of Constantinople, he recalled that the walls surrounding Constantinople had proved to be efficient to protect the city for more than a thousand years, but the large cannons that Muhammad II ordered to manufacture, soon showed that those solid walls could not withstand the firepower of the new war weapon. In fact, for millennia, high and solid walls had been crucial to resist the attack of armies made up of soldiers, archers

and knights supported by catapults and other war machines used over the centuries to lay siege to fortified towns (ZWEIG, 1999, p. 41-73). According to history, since Troy had the means to ensure food and other supplies, it was only conquered because of the cunning of Ulisses, who noticed that the city walls were invulnerable to attacks of the mighty Greek army. In other words, to build walls – as did Adrian, Theodosius and many other famous kings and generals in European cities until the Middle Ages – was no longer decisive to protect cities or regions. Nevertheless, until Constantinople's fall, more than two centuries had passed since gunpowder had been invented and, more important, about four centuries still would pass until the technology of firearms turned traditional bladed weapons totally obsolete.

Indeed, the advent of the nuclear age was something completely different. It was suddenly brought with the impact of the first blows and much more basic changes were produced. The atomic bombs that had devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, more than a formidable weapon of destruction, in a single blow had made it clear that the world was on the threshold of a new era, bringing with it a series of new dilemmas. However, to have nuclear weapons was not an issue which depended only on the political decision of rulers and on the availability of financial capacity. In this respect, governmental decisions also depended on the existence of an active domestic scientific community and a wide complex of technological and industrial infrastructure, which few societies actually had. Furthermore, in the international sphere, humankind had never been faced with the possibility that a war could produce such a broad destruction and even put at risk the very continuity of the human species. Before such a tragic reality an inevitable option of governments in order to build their capacity in nuclear technology started to demand the approval of the international community, specially of the major powers.

Within such a new global framework, the standards of international coexistence were also changing, which demanded new forms of diplomatic action and new institutional bases. The holding of international conferences, and even the existence of international organizations was already a fact, however, along with the creation of the United Nations to replace the League of Nations, it can be said that our current multilateralism actually began. The UN differed from the League of Nations, both in its formal institutions and in the circumstances as well as by its operational mechanisms, including multilateralism. A characteristic element of that multilateralism is the recognition that many issues that, in principle, were bound to the sovereign decisions of the nation-states started to be assessed by the international community due to its inevitable implications for the interests and the needs of other nations. In this sense, it is symptomatic that *Resolution no. 1* of the newly established organization was the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission, the purpose of which was to discuss and to submit proposals for a system able to regulate and to supervise the issues derived from the development of nuclear technology.³

Given those circumstances, one can better understand the reasons that led the Brazilian government to appoint Álvaro Alberto, a military man and scientist, to head the Brazilian representation at the UN Atomic Energy Commission. One can also understand to what extent that position was privileged to someone like Álvaro Alberto – who knew both the military

3 The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was established on 24 January, 1946. It was Resolution n. 1 of the UN General Assembly and it established as the Commission's purpose to produce specific proposals on: (a) how to promote the exchange among the nations of basic scientific information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy; (b) how to control atomic energy to ensure that it would be used only for peaceful purposes; (c) how to promote the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction existing in national arsenals; (d) how to provide effective guarantees to protect the nations that joined the proposed measures, of fortuitous factors and violations by other nations.

environment and that of scientific research – as an observer of the ongoing trends in the world of science and of the security issues. Indeed, the experience of Álvaro Alberto in the Commission served to show not only the extent of the difficulties of obtaining consensus on international security, but also enabled to realize more clearly that security should be seen beyond the strictly military aspects. In the new era, science and technology gained importance for the development of modern societies and could only be properly seen and evaluated with reference to developments in international politics. The debates about the implications and the meaning of atomic weapons for security and for the world political order made clear that a pretty radical distinction between those who possess this technology and those who do not possess atomic weapons started to exist. On the other hand, in many ways, the owning of nuclear technology was a real “passport” for the maturity of the science and technology of a nation. As a result, nations that sought to develop that capacity could not be seen necessarily as aggressive and potentially hostile to world peace.

The strong rejection to the Baruch Plan by the Soviet Union and other countries, including Brazil, derived largely from those perceptions.⁴ In the case of the Soviet Union, the concern focused more on the issue of security, but it was clear that in Brazil’s case the concern of Álvaro Alberto focused more on the question of the field of nuclear technology as a factor of scientific development and as a basis for the exploitation of natural resources which was believed

4 Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal prepared a proposal for a system of licensing for countries seeking nuclear energy technology for peaceful purposes. Licensing would stimulate the civilian use of nuclear energy, however, President Truman appointed Bernard Baruch, successful businessman and White House councillor to present the plan to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. Baruch modified the proposal prepared by Acheson and Lilienthal proposing a regime far more rigorous and intrusive to any research and atomic products — both civilian and military — through an Atomic development authority, under the more direct supervision of the United States, not the UN.

to be abundant in the country. Considering the fact that his mind was also well familiar with the world of science, he could see with particular clarity the crucial role that scientific and technological activity was increasingly important to modern societies, both in security matters and in the process of yielding prosperity of nations. In fact, the Commission's works had a clearly diplomatic purpose, but they directly involved a good deal of knowledge of the strategic and scientific aspects brought by atomic energy. It is within this framework that it should be seen the appointment of Álvaro Alberto for the UN Atomic Energy Commission, as well as his performance while the Commission remained active.

CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY AND THE RESOURCES OF MILITARY POWER

The perception that the civilian technology and the development of armaments were always very close to each other is very old, but it was in the 20th century that this relationship became more evident, more complex and more critical.⁵ It was especially with the advent of the nuclear age that the concept of *dual technology* was gradually included in the current vocabulary of international policy, designating the technologies that can have both civilian and military use. In addition to nuclear technology, in other areas this dual use was also becoming increasingly evident, such as in space technology, in the construction of satellite launcher rockets, in the aviation industry, in the development of computers, in chemical industries, etc. Rockets can be used

5 The *Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, organized by Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1986) includes the Vauban essay: The Impact of Science on War (p. 64-90) in which Henry Guerlac discusses the importance that Luis XIV attributed to Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, military engineer whose job was to guide the French army regarding techniques to defend strongholds and lay siege to fortified towns.

to launch satellites, but they can also be used to carry nuclear warheads; the satellites, in turn, can serve to transmit images and monitor environmental changes, but they can also serve to spy on and to guide the missile firing. All technologies, to some extent, allow a potential dual use. The problem is that in the case of certain technologies it is more difficult to separate the civilian use from the military one. In discussions within the UN Atomic Energy Commission, the Soviet Union feared that without nuclear weapons the nation would remain dangerously vulnerable in the face of American power dramatically disclosed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the same time, the representatives of other nations, including Brazil, saw how close the investments in security and the future of scientific and technological research were. The nuclear age made it much more difficult to bound the scientific and technological development just to the civilian sphere.

In fact, the development and the production of the first atomic bombs had shown that the relationship between the pure scientific research and its use for military purposes had been reversed. That is, traditionally, first there was some advancement in knowledge because of research conducted in universities or laboratories for civilian purposes and then its use in military artifacts was developed afterwards. Among the many developments that followed such a procedure perhaps the most remarkable case was that of dynamite. The development of the potential for the use of dynamite gave Alfred Nobel a large fortune by its use in mining, to open tunnels and to build dams and other works that demanded the use of explosives. However, dynamite also served as the basis for a substantial increase in the destructive power of bombs, grenades and other war weapons. Paradoxically, the fortune amassed by Alfred Nobel with the industrial exploitation of that technology of war and destruction served to establish the most remarkable incentive to action and

reflection on peace: the Nobel Peace Prize. Especially in the case of Álvaro Alberto, the example of Alfred Nobel must have always been present since he used to teach the course on “Chemistry of Explosives” at the Navy Academy and, although he did not achieve the same success as Alfred Nobel, he had also an industrial plant to produce explosives.

To a large extent, the advent of the nuclear age reversed the traditional logic in which scientific knowledge was developed at universities and laboratories and, after that, strategists sought to apply this knowledge in the development of weapons and other military equipment. That does not mean that previously, in some cases, the military research did not generate new knowledge. Many improvements made for military purposes, especially in World War I, were later used to increase efficiency in transportation and productivity in the industry. In the nuclear age, however, the search for military purposes was identified with scientific research and the advancement of knowledge.

While the duality between civilian and military purposes was increasingly evident in weapons and equipment employed in the war, the same thing had to happen with man in relation to his occupations, that is, with the scientist and his findings. The names involved with the development of nuclear weapons became the same as those who debated the issues located on the edge of physics: Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, Carl von Weizsacker, Ernest Rutherford, Richard Feynman, Arthur Compton, Eugene Wigner, Von Neumann, among others.

In order to understand the atmosphere of scientific research of those days it is necessary to take into account the fact that it belongs to human nature to be interested in what attracts the attention of the vast majority of people at a certain moment. In

human societies, fashion, the issues of the moment, or the latest events always caught the attention of people everywhere, and with the scientific community, it could not be different. It would be hard to think that the scientific community in Brazil, which was booming, was not concerned with the research topics that moved the institutions and the most renowned names of science in the world in the first half of the 20th century. By the time of Galileo and Newton, astronomy was considered as the “Queen of Science”, that is, the great names of science were astronomers such as Kepler, Huygens, Cassini and Tycho Brahe, besides Newton and Galileo themselves. Obviously, scientific activity was not restricted to astronomy, other names stood out, such as Francis Bacon, Blaise Pascal and Leibniz, who devoted themselves to other branches of science, but it is noteworthy the interest that astronomy caused for the vast majority of those who acted as scientists or thought about joining the scientific community. When Louis XIV founded the Académie Royale des Sciences, in 1666, one of the first initiatives was to build an astronomical observatory and, a decade later, in England, King Charles II established the Royal Observatory of Greenwich and created a new position of high social recognition – The Royal Astronomer – which corresponded to the position of Director of the Royal Greenwich Observatory.

Something similar was happening to the scientific environment in the wake of World War II in relation to Physics, especially in relation to Nuclear Physics. A country to become a full participant in the international scientific community, it needed to build its capacity in the field of nuclear energy. That is, what scientists such as Fermi, Bohr and Arthur Compton thought and researched, is what appeared relevant and stirred the curiosity and interest of scientific societies everywhere, including in Brazil. Indeed, there are several facts in the history of science in Brazil that are clear evidence of this close connection between the scientific community

with that circle of scientists who were developing Atomic Physics. Simon Schwartzman, writing about the formation of the scientific community in Brazil says that, in 1941, Arthur Compton organized a scientific expedition to measure the impacts of cosmic rays on the Bolivian Andes and on the city of São Paulo. The project included such scientists as Gleb Wataghin, who had come from Italy to lead the installation of the Physics Institute at the University of São Paulo, as well as the young Brazilian scientists Marcelo Damy de Sousa Santos and Paulus Aulus Pompéia. In 1942 Arthur Compton left this project to be nominated Director of the *Metallurgical Laboratory*, where he was in charge of developing the *Manhattan Project*, with the purpose of producing the first the atomic bomb (SCHWARTZMAN, 2001, p. 204).

The case of Gleb Wataghin is quite revealing of this dominant environment on the Brazilian scientific community. Wataghin came from Italy to Brazil together with Luigi Fantapié to join the project of creation of the Physics Institute and of the University of São Paulo itself, in 1934. His role was to turn the Physics Institute into a cutting-edge scientific research center, which meant being connected to that remarkable circle of scientists involved in nuclear research, such as Arthur Compton and Enrico Fermi. By means of Wataghin names that became famous in Brazilian science, such as Cesar Lattes, Paulus A. Pompéia, Marcelo Damy, Mario Schenberg and Oscar Sala, could learn and discuss the developments the occurred at the thresholds of new paths in the field of Physics (SCHWARTZMAN, 2001, p. 204). Another fact the revealed the close connection between the Brazilian scientific community and the core of the thinking group of Nuclear Physics in the world was the arrival, already in the 1950's, of Richard Feynman, who had worked directly as a theoretical physicist on the *Manhattan Project* and who later, in 1965, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics. Feynman stayed in Rio de Janeiro as a teacher for almost a year

in the early 1950's teaching physics at the Brazilian Center for Physical Researches.⁶

In short many remarkable events showed that the relationship between the world of scientific research and that of strategic security had been clearly reversed, that is, the possibilities of military use of knowledge served as encouragement and guidance to scientific research. Any national scientific community, which wanted to participate in the most relevant scientific debates and developments needed to act in the field of research in nuclear energy and nuclear research, in turn, was inevitably associated, as it still occurs today, to the production of atomic weapons.

The observation of those facts is very important to understand why the creation of the CNPq in the early 1950's, under the leadership of Álvaro Alberto, is related to the concern with the development in Brazil of the scientific and technical capacity in nuclear energy. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the creation of the CNPq sent to President Eurico Gaspar Dutra, prepared by a Commission of scientists of high recognition, headed by Álvaro Alberto, it is stated that:

...All the revolutionary countries of civilization seek to develop culture as much as possible, increasing the science, technique and industry as bases of their progress and their prestige.... The foundation of the atomic power industry looms large among the objectives collimated. There are already some ancillary industries, and others depend on the training of technicians and on the economic and financial possibilities⁷ (A CRIAÇÃO..., 2000, p. 184).

6 Feynman wrote a book where he recounted his memories in the form of good-natured chronicles. His passage by Brazil is reported in the chronicle entitled *O Americano outra Vez!* (R. P. Feynman, Deve Ser Brincadeira, Sr. Feynman, Editora UnB, 2000 p. 225-245).

7 The Commission included 22 members, mostly scientists and researchers, such as César Lattes, Francisco Maffei, Luiz Cintra do Prado, Marcello Damy, Theodoro A. Souto and Álvaro Alberto himself.

In other words, from the perspective of the scientific research community there was a clear concern that the Brazilian scientific community should be integrated into the ongoing advances in science in the world, and capacity in the area of nuclear energy seemed to be of major importance.

The idea that it was necessary to create an institution to promote and coordinate scientific activity in Brazil, was a natural consequence of the observation of these developments that were taking place in major countries in the world. Furthermore, in order to understand properly the meaning of the creation of the National Council of Research for a country like Brazil at that moment, is also important to consider, the experience of the development of atomic energy by its institutional side. In Brazil, the universities focused primarily on teaching, while applied science laboratories, such as the Biological Institute, the Manguinhos Institute and the Agronomy Institute of Campinas focused on specific purposes, such as fighting the coffee plague or developing vaccines to prevent epidemic diseases and, therefore, they were not really aware of the cutting-edge scientific research.⁸ The creation of the University of São Paulo, in 1934, resulted from the growing concern that was spreading out among the illustrated circles in relation to the development of a real Brazilian scientific community able of actually "doing science". In that context, it is easy to understand how this perception was present in an environment such as that of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences, where Álvaro Alberto had already become a prominent leader. The current understanding was that the State should play a decisive role in the promotion of scientific and technological development and, for such a purpose, the natural channel would be the establishment of a National Research Council. The case of the United States was the most well known,

8 See especially chapter 4 of Schwartzman (2001).

but other countries, such as Canada, Italy, France and England are specifically mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum to the creation of the CNPq, as examples or models that Brazil should use to establish its own National Research Council. After summarizing the role and the trajectory of the National Research Council of Canada, the Explanatory Memorandum argues:

The results provided by this excellent organization inculcate it as a paradigm, which it actually has been for similar institutions. Other very useful cases were products of similar legislations in France, Italy, England, and in the United States (A CRIAÇÃO..., 2000, p. 185).

The beginning of the nuclear age brought about another development that served to push even further that perception that scientific activity was increasingly dependent on direct governmental policies. It was at that time that the notion of *Big Science* was consolidated as an organization standard for the scientific research. The term *Big Science* derived from the understanding that the advancement of scientific knowledge was no longer the product of the findings made by the hidden genius behind the romantic figure of the scientist, somewhat maladjusted and misunderstood in society, working alone in his laboratory at the University or in the basements of his own home with his burettes, test tubes, retorts and other rudimentary equipment. Knowledge now started to advance by means of large integrated projects involving several scientists from different areas of expertise, organized into multidisciplinary teams and based on facilities and on expensive and complex technological resources, such as particle accelerators, spectrophotometers and generators and power transformers hundreds of times more powerful than the domestic ones. Later, when Alvin M. Weinberg, Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, observed those events, he wrote that *Big Science* resulted from three separate developments, but,

to a large extent, simultaneous: 1) the massive increase of the scientific production and, consequently, the amount of scientific information available; 2) the multidisciplinary institutionalization of applied science and focused on far-reaching purposes and established with political and strategic objectives; 3) perhaps the most important, the increasing complexity and the high cost of the necessary equipment and facilities for scientific research (WEINBERG, 1972, p. 113-140).

In those circumstances, only the large corporations and, in certain cases, only the rich and powerful governments actually had the necessary financial resources to sponsor those projects of *Big Science*. In other words, the findings of science and of the research no longer resulted only from the individual genius, interest, and inspiration and became products of governmental policies. *Project Manhattan*, which generated the atomic bomb, had been the most paradigmatic case of doing science in such a way. It was born from a strategic decision of the American government and it was remarkably organized as a *Big Science* project. Arthur Compton was the Director of the *Metallurgical Project*, but the project was broad and the chain reaction technology would need physicists, mathematicians, chemists, metallurgists, experts in the handling of sensitive and complex equipment, engineers of various fields of expertise to transform the findings into controlled instruments and processes, and it was revealed that even biologists were necessary in order to track and to avoid the radiation levels which could jeopardized the environment of the laboratories. Compton and his fellows believed it was very clear that the chain reaction went well beyond a work of experimental Physics but a great deal of work had to be done by the team. That set of researchers had to work in an integrated manner and they needed that a huge sum of resources and laboratory facilities were available. All that, in turn, was subordinated to the *Office of Scientific Research and Development*

– OSRD, which was an agency directly linked to the White House.⁹ OSRD was headed by Vannevar Bush, an experienced scientist and engineer, but more important, he was part of the small group of decision makers put on top of the U.S. government responsible for conducting the official policy.

Originally the CNPq was not considered to be large bureaucracy or an agency for the distribution of financial resources for research in atomized manner, but simply as a high level Council working directly with the summit of the government and setting the general guidelines of a scientific policy for Brazil. The understanding was that the existence of that Council was the way for Brazil to make it feasible to join the small group of nations able to act effectively on the edge of scientific discovery. In a lecture delivered at the Brazilian Academy of Science in December 1948, Álvaro Alberto mentioned the *Vannevar Bush Report* to the President Truman and later published under the title *Science, the Endless Frontier*. John R. Steelman, scientific councilor to the President, stated when he submitted the report:

In war, the laboratory became the first defense line and the scientist became the indispensable warrior [...]. The nation that stays behind in basic scientific knowledge – that allows itself to fall much behind in the exploration of the unknown – will be severely handicapped in any war that occurs (EXCERPTS..., 2001, p. 250-1).

9 In a letter addressed to Vannevar Bush, President Roosevelt said "... the Office of Research and Scientific Development, of which you are the director, represents a unique experience of team and cooperation work in the coordination of the scientific research and in the application of the existent scientific knowledge for the solution of basic technical problems in war. His work is unfolding with maximum secrecy and without any kind of public recognition. However, tangible results can be seen in the memoranda that arrive from the battle fronts worldwide... However, there's no reason for the lessons learned in that experience not to be applied in an advantageous manner in times of Peace..." (Letter on Plans for Postwar Scientific Research and Development, Document Archive, 122, 22/11/1944).

A lesson to be drawn, Álvaro Alberto argues that, “the examples – both the positive and the negative ones – that we invoked are fertile in terms of useful precepts. We must establish a science and research policy, in accordance with the national interests” (*EXCERPTS...*, 2001, p. 252).

THE MINERAL RESERVES FOR NUCLEAR POWER: A POLITICAL ISSUE

In addition to the concern with the scientific research, another concern of Álvaro Alberto and of the Brazilian representation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission was with the control of the nuclear technology. Decisions on the subject would be very important to define the ways by which a country like Brazil could explore and use its mineral resources used in the atomic technology industries. Technical surveys had noticed that the country had considerable reserves of uranium, thorium and other minerals used in the nuclear industry, and Álvaro Alberto, understood that the only way to ensure the protection and the effective use of those resources was by mastering the nuclear technology and by using those reserves by the national industry. To protect the mineral reserves supposed to be existent in Brazil by the simple imposition of restrictions to the exports would not only be ineffective, but it would also be sterile as a source of wealth for the nation. Only those nations able to develop research and to have their own nuclear industry could benefit and make the mineral reserves of uranium or any other raw materials of the nuclear industry not to become just a source of greed and international pressures. The expression *Dutch disease* appeared in the field of Economics only later, but it is obvious that many people, even if they did not say it in a systematized way, noticed intuitively that only exporting

commodities brought limited benefits to the countries. The term started to be used only in the 1960's as a result of the observation that, while on the one hand the prices of gas favored the exports of that resource by the Netherlands, on the other hand, the increase in the Exchange revenues brought as a side-effect the valuation of the national currency (Florins) harming, by that manner, other industries of the country. The logic that justified that claim is that the valuation of the national currency reduces the prices of imports and, at the same time, turns more expensive the exported goods and that effect has an influence on the sector of manufactured products that competes directly with products which are manufactured in other countries. The concept is still controversial, but the facts show that the great majority of the industrially advanced economies are countries that do not export *commodities*, but, on the contrary, are strongly dependent on the import of raw materials and other primary goods.¹⁰

Álvaro Alberto's proposal of "specific compensations" for the exports of minerals used in the nuclear industry can be understood under the light of the "Dutch disease" argument. In other words, minerals such as uranium and thorium should be exported having as counterpart the transfer of technologies directed towards the development of Research and Development of a nuclear industry in Brazil. Before he went to his mission to represent Brazil at the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Álvaro Alberto sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the proposal to create, within the scope of that ministry, a National Atomic Energy Commission as a way to have actual control of the execution of the policy of "specific compensations". João Neves da Fontoura, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, established a Commission

10 The concept of "*Dutch disease*" is still controversial and the most structured economic formulation of the claim was proposed as a consequence of the Oil Crisis of the 1970's by W. Max Corden and J. Peter Neary.

to prepare a bill for the formation of that National Atomic Energy Commission (or Council).¹¹ Therefore, that Commission, should go beyond the simple control of the exploitation and the exports of atomic minerals and their by-products. The Commission should also guide the development strategies for atomic energy industry, in which the “specific compensations”, that is, the technological cooperation by the importing countries – mainly the United States – in the form of the supply of equipment and training of experts would be important. According to the proposal, such a Commission should be composed by representatives of the military ministries and of the Ministry Foreign Affairs. The Commission should also include representatives of the main Brazilian universities and research institutes, and of the Brazilian Academy of Science, and of the Brazilian Department of Mineral Production.

The enthusiastic effort of Álvaro Alberto to promote institutionally the scientific research and the defense of the national mineral reserves expressed his strong nationalist feeling. It is important, however, to understand that such nationalism did not have the somewhat pejorative meaning that is currently associated to the term. At that time, the expression was much closer to what is currently referred to as patriotism, in the moral sphere, and as the promotion of national interests, in diplomatic language. Nationalism basically meant to produce policies that benefitted the nation as a whole and was a feeling cultivated everywhere. In the cultural sphere, when Álvaro Alberto was still a young Navy officer, one of the most remarkable events that took place in Brazil, which turned evident that generalized feeling of valuation of the nationality was, no doubt, the Cultural Week of 1922, where

11 Among those invited to make up that Commission were: J. A. Alves de Souza (Director of the Mineral Production Department) and the Professors J. Carneiro Felipe and J. Costa Ribeiro, of the University of Brazil (currently UFRJ) and Professor Luis Cintra do Prado, of USP (J. C. Vitor Garcia, *Álvaro Alberto. A Ciência do Brasil*, p. 22, footnote 43).

such figures as the painters Di Cavalcanti and Anita Malfatti, the writer Mário de Andrade and the musician Heitor Villa-Lobos stood out as leading characters in the Brazilian cultural circles. The Week was marked by the activism of such groups as the *Movimento Pau-Brasil*, the *Grupo da Anta*, the *Movimento Verde-Amarelo* and the *Movimento Antropofágico*. The two remarkable aspects in those manifestations were, on the one hand, the presentation of a new aesthetic perception for the art and, on the other hand, the valuation of the historical and anthropological bases that had shaped the national culture.

In the political sphere, Álvaro Alberto's generation saw the birth, in 1916, of the National Defense League, with the participation of remarkable characters of Brazilian history, such as Olavo Bilac, Rui Barbosa, Pedro Lessa and Miguel Calmon, and whose first chairman was President Wenceslau Braz himself. The League exerted a significant influence in the training of the youngsters and its actions were directed towards public spirit and the national pride feelings, and the League had in the Armed Forces one of its most active and better-structured operation bases. Among the many campaigns that marked the trajectory of the League at the time of Álvaro Alberto were the diffusion of the National Anthem and other national symbols, as well as the "O Petróleo é Nosso" (The National Oil for Brazilians) campaign, which mobilized the entire nation and that was ultimately decisive in the creation of Petrobrás. Thus, it would be unthinkable that someone like Álvaro Alberto, even being a career military, was indifferent to that movement represented by the National Defense League.

In fact, it is also important to consider that, in the first half of the 20th century, civic movements with the purpose of spreading the nation values were common all around. Robert Baden Powell, an officer of the British army, had founded the Boy Scout movement in 1907, which spread worldwide. In England, the

mobilization effort in World War I benefitted a lot from the civic feeling transfused by movements such as that of the Boy Scouts. In the United States, the National Civic League was probably the most influent one, but there were many other local associations with similar purposes, that is, to spread feelings of public spirit and of praise of the national values and symbols.

Ultimately, there is no doubt that patriotic or nationalist reasons played an important role in Álvaro Alberto's initiatives and that they were present both in his actions ahead of the Brazilian representation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission and in his proposals to protect the national natural reserves of raw materials, and to establish the institutional bases to modernize Brazilian scientific and technological research. Álvaro Alberto's nationalistic feeling was, in a certain way, shared by the entire society. As a consequence in such a political atmosphere the most important was his evaluation regarding how to handle both the development strategies of the scientific research in Brazil and his understanding that the Brazilian mineral wealth should not be protected, but rather, should be used by the nation by means of the establishment of a real national atomic energy industry.

ÁLVARO ALBERTO'S INITIATIVES AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE

The difficulties that Álvaro Alberto had to face were strongly related to the international political environment that was changing drastically due to the events brought about by World War II. Largely, obviously those changes also influenced the role and acts of political forces in the domestic sphere of the countries, often creating additional obstacles to the implementation of public policies. The two decades after the end of World War II were

marked by the political environment of the Cold War which may be summarized in two terms: fear and lack of trust. *Fear* due to the catastrophic dimensions of the destruction caused by war and to the devastating effect of the nuclear weapons. *Lack of Trust* which resulted from the uncertainties of a new order that was emerging and of the conflicting and opposing ideologies that prevailed within the main powers.

Within the Cold War environment that emerged after the war it became difficult to claim the legal principle that the only acceptable reason for a just war was an aggression or a serious injury. The Western legal tradition had introduced this principle into International Law. However, in the nuclear age, an aggression could take on unacceptable proportions. Pearl Harbor had become a perfect symbol of what would be a just war in the sense that the Japanese aggression against Peal Harbor was a clear act of armed hostility which justified a declaration of war on Japan perfectly in accordance with the principle of just war of International Law. In fact, the principle that only an aggression or a serious injury would be enough justification for a war was an important part of the evolution of the International Law codes which painfully had emerged in Europe under the social and political strains of the religious wars. The notion that religion could justify the war had divided Europe in a bloody manner and, only slowly, the social philosophers built the bases of an International Law for modernity in which religion was no longer a reason for war. Francisco de Vitoria, one of such thinkers, even though he was a religious man from the Dominican Order, was a precursor of that principle when he did not recognize the right of the Spanish Empire to go to war against the indigenous peoples of America because they were not ruled by Catholic kings.¹² However, it is interesting to note that in

12 Among the most remarkable works left by Francisco de Vitória (1483-1546) are *De Indis* and *De Jure Belli Hispanorum In Barbaros* (1532), which deal with the relations between Spain and the Native

the arguments of Francisco de Vitória one of the clauses associated to the concept of "just war" said that only the princes and kings had the right to declare war when facing a serious injury or an aggression. The attack of Japan on Pearl Harbor was against a military base, but there was no previous declaration of war. However, to what extent could a power wait to be attacked with nuclear weapons to strike back? Furthermore, could not a nuclear attack be made by a power without any formal declaration of war? Which ruler, in the nuclear era, would be willing not to take pre-emptive measures to avoid a possible attack? It is important to consider that the UN Atomic Energy Commission had started its works less than six months after the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In the aftermath of World War II, the debates which dominated every intellectual circles were driven to understand the meaning of those dilemmas. Even a thinker like C. P. Snow, whose main concerns were the education and the nature of scientific knowledge, became notorious for his lectures published in the book *The Two Cultures* (1965), in which he identified the huge gap between the knowledge that can produce the atomic bomb and the knowledge that make men decide to produce it and, even worse, to use it. Another very influential thinker in the 1940's and 1950's, was Reinhold Niebuhr (1952), who saw the tragic and ironic dilemma with which the United States and the West were facing: although they trusted their virtues, it was necessary to have atomic bombs ready to be used with the purpose of avoiding a new world conflict and also to avoid that those weapons were used again. In other words, it was ironic that the possibility of a conflict became increasingly inevitable due to the threat and, however, the

Indians in America. He was one of the thinkers who resumed the discussion of the "fair war" concept developed in the Middle Ages.

threat had to be kept exactly with the purpose of avoiding that such possibility came true.

The most complete theoretical interpretation and the one that reflects most fully the international environment of the Post-War appeared in the works by Hans Morgenthau.¹³ In fact, at least three reasons made the so-called realism to emerge as the prevailing thought in the world politics. The first one, more obvious, was the fact that the world had just left a war of unthinkable consequences that severely affected all the major nations. The general perception was that bad rulers, which were either ambitious or based on hate and resentments had promoted aggressive nationalist policies, bringing about a war which involved in a tragic manner the entire international community. The second reason was the lack of trust which became a generalized dimension of the political practice. Within an environment of uncertainties in which the fear and the lack of trust prevailed, the States and its rulers should observe and should be observed continuously since in their actions were the best hopes that tension areas did not degenerate into conflicts that could tragically affect their interests and, above all, their security. In the individual sphere, it is necessary much moral force to respond to the feelings of threat and to the lack of trust with trust. In the sphere of the States, such thinkers as Machiavelli, Rousseau and Hobbes had taught that, in most circumstances, to respond to a threat and to the lack of trust with trust is close to irresponsibility.

The third reason had to do with the changes in the relation between government and the industrial and technological activity. The rulers always declare good and virtuous intentions, but as

13 The first edition of *Politics Among Nations*, by Hans Morgenthau, was released in 1948 and caused huge repercussion among the policy formulators everywhere, mainly in Washington. "The purpose of this book is to introduce a theory about international politics", wrote Morgenthau, and the power of his statements came from his careful and even obsessive observation of the reality around him, that is: the current facts, the fears and the behavior revealed by States and their rulers.

in the Greek tragedies, in the end, it is the political logic which ultimately prevails and determines the course of events. In addition to that, even a cooperative and virtuous government one day will be inevitably replaced by another one, which might have other purposes and other perceptions about their neighbors and even about their allies. In such an environment of fear and lack of trust, the atomic bomb became a kind of “sword of Damocles” pending on the governments and on the societies' head.¹⁴ The most concrete expression of such atmosphere of tensions and lack of trust in the international policy was the Cold War and the possibility to build atomic weapons transformed the feelings of threat into something dramatic, unsettling and even unacceptable.

In chronological terms, the landmark for the beginning of the Cold War was the publication of the famous *X Article*, by George Kennan¹⁵, but the facts show that by the time of the capitulation of Nazi Germany and Japan, the Cold War was already present in the division of Germany, in the occupation of the Eastern European countries by the Soviet troops and in the launching of the atomic bombs on Japan. The *X Article* is very important since it brought to the world of politics a conceptual and theoretical basis to understand and to interpret the phenomenon of the ideological and strategic bipolarity in international politics.

It is worth highlighting that the political leaders in both sides, as well as in Great Britain – the third power that made up the *Big*

14 Cicero, in his *Tusculanes* tells that story or moral fable in which, when Dionysius heard the flatterer Damocles praise the glories of power, he offered him the possibility, in a banquet, to sit in the royal throne and to enjoy all the honors of the position. Damocles lost all enthusiasm when he saw that, over the throne, there was a sword tied only with a thread taken from a horse's tail.

15 The title of the article was *The Sources of Soviet Conduct* and it had been published in July 1947 in the magazine “Foreign Affairs” as “X”, instead of the author's name, since Kennan had a high post in the State Department. Kennan had sent the *long telegram*, which was the base for X Article, in February 1946, when he was a Minister-Councillor in Moscow and it had been written upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, who wanted explanations about the behavior of the Soviet government in relation to the IMF and the World Bank.

Three alliance, which had established the peace terms of the end of World War II, shared such interpretation of international politics based on the bipolarity and on the perception that a war between the U.S. and the Soviet Alliances was an inevitable outcome. Indeed, that fact became clearer only with the end of the Soviet regime half a century later. The opening of the Kremlin archives after the end of the USSR brought to light documents showing that almost one year before the publication of the famous *X Article*, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union in the United States, Nikolai Novikov, had sent to the Kremlin a *long telegram* in which he discussed the foreign policy of the United States arguing that the conflict between both powers was inevitable, since, for the American capitalist system, the imperialist expansion was a consequence that belonged to the nature of capitalism and that only the USSR was able to check such expansion (JENSEN, 1993). In turn, the *long telegram* sent to the State Department by George Kennan in early 1946, when he was the *Chargé d'Affaires* in the American Embassy in Moscow, which originated the *X Article*, had a very similar content to that of Ambassador Novikov, only the direction was, obviously, the opposite, and it based its arguments on the observation that the Soviet security was associated to the expansion of the communist doctrine worldwide and that the United States was the only power able to stop the Soviet advance. At that same time, in March 1946, Richard Cables, the British Ambassador to Moscow, had also produced a *long telegram* in which he reported to the *Foreign Office* (the British Ministry of Foreign Relations) the deterioration process of the diplomatic relations among the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. In the telegram, Richard Cables argued that since the end of World War II the policy of the USSR became increasingly hostile to the West (JENSEN, 1993).

In short, the facts show that while the UN Atomic Energy Commission carried out its works, the environment of

confrontation and even of political hostility between the USSR and the powers of the capitalist West were already obvious and were deteriorating in the statements and in the attitudes relating to the many issues which the alliance that had defeated the Axis powers did not solve. The division of Germany, the occupation of the Eastern European territories and the dispute for the influence on the governments of Turkey, Greece and Egypt, were only few among the many issues that revealed themselves intractable in the immediate Post-War. Even between allies, such as the United States and Great Britain, there was not a perfect atmosphere of understanding and cooperation able to reduce the tensions in the international environment. There are reports, for example, that in the Bretton Woods Conference, there was a remarkable lack of trust between Henry White and Henry Morgenthau, on one side, and Keynes and the British government, on the other side. The American government believed that the major purpose of the British was to use the American money in order to maintain and reinforce their colonial system, which was in sharp decline and that the Americans rejected and even suspected (STEIL, 2013). Arms race is an old issue in international politics. Even Thucydides reported the occurrence of arms races more than two thousand years ago, but with nuclear weapons, the issue became both more dramatic and more urgent. Nothing could better illustrate that logic than the so-called *prisoners' dilemma*, a metaphor characteristic of the political realism, which seeks to illustrate the fact that in politics one cannot even trust the allies.

The fact is that a real paranoia took over the American politics, even in the domestic sphere, to such an extent that someone like Harry Dexter White himself, who had represented the United States at the Bretton Woods Conference, was considered a suspect of collaborating with the Soviet Union (STEIL, 2013, p. 44-46). Certainly, "McCarthyism" was the most remarkable phenomenon

involving that real paranoia that took over the American politics in the years subsequent to the end of World War II. If the Americans did not even trust their own citizens, why should they trust the foreign governments? In Brazil's case, obviously the pressures came mainly from the United States, since Brazil was within the American influence area, but in the Soviet sphere the term "pressure" did not even apply since there was a real control on the rulers and on the institutions of the countries under her influence. In a certain way, the situation reproduced the environment of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. It was in that environment of lack of trust and conflict, which affected almost all the organized European nations and States, that Thomas Hobbes (1993, p. 56), had written "really, one can think of nothing more absurd than to liberate and to let a weak enemy become strong, which was previously restricted to our power."

The importance of the political environment's description enables us to better understand the nature and the size of the difficulties conditioning the negotiations which were going on within the UN Atomic Energy Commission. It also helps one to notice how difficult it was for Álvaro Alberto to carry out the "specific compensations" and even to create an Atomic Energy Council tied to the Ministry of Foreign Relations with the purpose of building between Brazilian development strategy and the world great powers policy. In the First Report of the UN Atomic Energy Commission it had been included, by initiative of Álvaro Alberto, a clause stating that "the ownership, by ADA (Atomic Energy Agency proposed to be created by the UN) of the mines and the minerals that still were not extracted must not be considered as obligatory". However, in that same year, the American Congress enacted the McMahon-Douglas Law in order to restrict the access of foreign companies and governments to scientific and technological knowledge which were developed in the area of atomic energy

in the American territory (MOTOYAMA, 1996, p. 65-69). As a consequence, already in the 1950's, the Brazilian initiative to acquire centrifuges in Germany to enrich thorium, another Álvaro Alberto's proposal, was interrupted by pressures from the United States (CERVO; BUENO, 2008, p. 282).

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: HOSTILE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND EXPANDING NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY

Under any perspective, there is no doubt that Admiral Álvaro Alberto left an important heritage strictly related to the Brazilian foreign relations. Among his most remarkable legacies, there is the fact that his experience as the Brazilian representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission was essential to provide the decisive drive for the creation of CNPq. The position of privileged observer of the most momentous issue of his time – the beginning of the nuclear era – allowed him to consolidate the idea and to reinforce his perception of the importance for Brazil to create a National Research Council able to transform the scientific and technological development into a State policy to be followed by Brazilian authorities in the future.

Resolution n. 1 of the UN General Assembly, which created the Atomic Energy Commission, determined that it would include the representatives of the countries that were members of the Security Council and Canada. Brazil was a member, although a non-permanent one, and such participation was important, among other reasons, due to the reserves of atomic minerals that were supposed to exist in great quantity in the country. His simultaneous knowledge of security matters and scientific research, allowed Álvaro Alberto to observe that the reserves availability did not

mean only the ownership of a source of raw materials with both commercial and strategic value that the Brazilian rulers should protect, but it also implied something much more complicated and more difficult to be carried out: the capacity for the country to develop the nuclear technology capacity. In fact, the mere ownership of any kind of natural resource may benefit few people, but the only way to turn those resources into a source of benefits for the entire nation is by the development of its technological capacity to use them industrially.

The possession of mineral reserves, which are considered strategic turns such reserves into a merely object of greed and international pressures, unless the country can use them in their own industries. In fact, the International Law tradition acknowledges that the access to basic goods is a “perfect right” of the nations. Jurist Emer de Vattel (2004, p. 65), in his *Law of Nations*, published in 1758, already recognized that “[...] a nation has the right to obtain by a reasonable price the things that she lacks, buying them from the peoples who do not need them for themselves. That is the principle of the right to trade among nations and, above all, of the right to purchase”. In other words, as far as essential goods are concerned – that is, goods with strategic interest – the nations that own them may discuss prices and conditions, but they cannot refuse to supply them to those who need them. The concept of “specific compensations” clearly brought that understanding: Brazil should not rest on the condition of mere supplier of input to the nuclear industry of other countries, but to fulfill such a purpose Brazil needed to develop her own technological capacity to use properly that kind of raw material.

The Post-War conjuncture, however, imposed major political difficulties due to the environment of fear and lack of trust that characterized the international politics. Thus, while on the one hand, the proximity between scientific research and technological

development turned the international cooperation into a basic dimension, on the other hand, the environment of fear and lack of trust that prevailed in the world politics scene turned the international cooperation into a hard task, mainly in such a sensitive area as that of nuclear technology. The importance of the cooperation and informative exchange among scientists is well illustrated by the play called *Copenhagen*, written by Michael Frayn (1998). The play describes the meeting between Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr, in 1941. There was not any documented registration of what they have discussed during that meeting, but in 1941, Heisenberg actually visited Niels Bohr and his wife Margrethe, and they probably had dinner and strolled together along the gardens of Bohr's house. In the play, Margrethe even feels offended by Heisenberg's request, made between the lines for her husband to cooperate with him, who was supposedly working in the development of a nuclear weapon at the laboratories of Munich. The war had placed in opposite fields a disciple and his master, two scientists, two old friends. Even so, it was important to talk about the principle of the indetermination, about the possibilities to split the atom in a chain reaction and about what his old acquaintances, such as Enrico Fermi and Otto Hahn, were doing those days.

In addition, the beginning of the nuclear era brought the notion that national policies of scientific and technological development, should be discussed by the international leaders and organizations due to their close relations with defense and security matters. Even today, the development of capacity in nuclear technology goes beyond the sovereign decision of the governments, being the object of attention of other countries, mainly the major powers. In that sense, it was symptomatic that the first resolution that the UN produced was the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission with the purpose of trying to

establish a regime to regulate the development and the use of atomic energy by the nations. As far as Brazil is concerned, the episodes that involved the nuclear issue also serve to question the rather simplistic hypothesis, but very common in the historiography of the Brazilian foreign policy, that the period when Dutra was President there was a phase of “automatic alignment” with the commands of the American policy.

If on the one hand the international environment was a difficult obstacle to overcome, on the other hand, Álvaro Alberto had as his allies the entire Brazilian scientific community which, in many ways, worked with the same purpose and, even without an explicit understanding, saw the relations between the world of politics and of the scientific and technological development from the same point of view. Álvaro Alberto’s understanding and his initiatives had the same impulses that led to the foundation of the University of São Paulo around the creation of the Faculty of Philosophy, Science and Letters, in 1934, and to the creation of the University of the Federal District (UDF), in Rio de Janeiro. Antônio Paim (1981, p. 77-79) assessing the importance of UDF to build, around the universities, of a scientific community that was more dynamic and more compatible with the modern scientific research. In his analysis, Paim emphasizes the leadership role played by Anísio Teixeira who, as Secretary of Education of Rio de Janeiro, taught the inaugural class of UDF proposing that model of university in which, beyond the traditional teaching, scientific research should be performed systematically.

In that same direction, another initiative is quite instructive regarding the way by which in Brazil the military sphere, the society, and the international scientific community became very close to each other. In 1946 the Brazilian Air Force decided to establish a compounded center for technological development in the outskirts of the city of São José dos Campos. The technological

compound included an Aeronautical Institute of Technology (ITA) and an Aeronautical Technical Center (CTA) - currently called the General Air & Space Technology Command. The initiative was led by a military, Brigadier Casimiro Montenegro Filho, who understood that aviation had played a decisive role in the fate of World War II and that, in addition, aeronautics would be increasingly important in any future scenario, both in military terms and in the civil aviation industry. Three important vectors can be identified in the implementation strategy of the technological complex of São José dos Campos: 1) the strategic decision of the Brazilian government to invest in a broad and long-term scientific and technological project; 2) the attainment of an agreement between the Brazilian Air Force and the American government, which enabled remarkable and experienced scientists and professors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Cornell University to come to Brazil; 3) the gathering of remarkable Brazilian experts not only around a complex of laboratories, but also around a school of engineering that was innovative and able to integrate basic research and technological development. Like Álvaro Alberto, Casimiro Montenegro had noticed that to be up to date with the current advances in science and technology was essential to Brazilian security and its position in the international scenario. Needless to say that such initiative was the real embryo that, later, originated Embraer which is currently one of the largest jet plane producers in the world market.

While, on the one hand, the international environment was an obstacle to Álvaro Alberto's projects and those of the Brazilian diplomacy to develop the national capacity in nuclear energy and the scientific and technological autonomy of Brazil, on the other hand, there were good reasons for Álvaro Alberto to have the support and the recognition of the Brazilian scientific community. In fact, Álvaro Alberto was more a scientist than a military officer.

In his classes at the Navy School, although he taught the course on “The Chemistry of Explosives”, his concerns used to be well beyond the strict content of the processes of producing explosives, their effects and their military and civilian applications. He stood out for his active participation in the current scientific debates. He became a member of the Brazilian Academy of Science due to his constant search for new knowledge typical to the scientists. He discussed the logic of Aristotle and always taught his students to look at Physics and Chemistry from the perspective of the minds that build modern science, such as Berthelot, Newton and Lavoisier. He also revealed to be very much up to date with the science of his time presenting reflections on the works of Nils Bohr, Heisenberg, Rutherford, Irving Langmuir and Wilhelm Ostwald. A collection of his writings was organized by the Navy Press and was published since 1960 under the suggestive title of “Alongside Science” (v. 1, 1960; v. 2, 1968; v. 3, 1970; v. 4, 1972). The four volumes include lectures delivered at the Brazilian Academy of Science, in scientific congresses and in the Brazilian and foreign universities. The collection also includes articles published in newspapers and scientific journals. In his writings, his concern with the nature of science and its advances is remarkable. In fact, in the lecture he gave in 1948 at the Catholic University of Washington he discussed the crisis of materialism from the point of view of the current knowledge of atomic Physics (v. 2, p. 61-90). Still in the 1920’s he debated the theory of relativity and the meaning of the works of Marie and Pierre Curie (GARCIA; ALBERTO, 2000, p. 14-15).

In short, while Álvaro Alberto had against himself an adverse, almost hostile international political environment, he had on his side an active scientific and military communities, which noticed the importance of science and technology for the nation. Álvaro Alberto’s professional career was a live testimony that the world had turned diplomacy into an activity that was more complex

and more integrated to important segments of society, mainly the scientific community. It started to become clear that a good negotiator could not have much success, unless he had been supported by a society that was active and organized in solid institutions, and able to interact in a relatively balanced way with other nations. Because of World War II, it also became clear that the practice of diplomacy introduced multilateralism and the need for experts to act in a systematic way together with the diplomatic missions. Even though the UN Nuclear Energy Commission did not produce agreements and consensus like Bretton Woods, it served to show that multilateralism – which turned certain national topics into a concern directly used to other nations – it had become a regular dimension of the diplomatic activity. The nuclear issue also reflected the fact that a new relationship between government, diplomacy and society had emerged.

A rich and complex legacy was left by Álvaro Alberto under the form of institutions as CNPq, for example, but it can also be considered that something less visible to the eyes was left as an important legacy by Álvaro Alberto: he transferred to the practice of diplomatic actions the perception that science and technology were essential to promote national interests. When it is observed that the young diplomat nominated to integrate the Brazilian representation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission was Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, one must think that the Brazilian participation in that Commission was also important for the training of staff in the Brazilian diplomacy with a more modern view of the international politics and of the relation between the possession of natural resources and their effective use. In fact, 30 years later, already as Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Saraiva Guerreiro was important in the negotiations of the Nuclear Agreement with Germany and in the building of the Brazilian diplomatic actions in a period in which the Brazilian government

had to face the pressures of the major powers again, mainly from the United States¹⁶. Certainly, in the fulfillment of his functions and in the missions in which he engaged throughout his path as a diplomat, Saraiva Guerreiro might have had in his mind the images of his experience within the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 around the issue of atomic energy as a set of references to guide his actions.

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16 Saraiva Guerreiro was Vice-Chancellor (Secretary-General of the Itamaraty) when Geisel was the President (1974-79) when Brazil, despite the pressures of the American government, signed the Nuclear Agreement with Germany and made several initiatives in the diplomatic sphere, such as recognition of the Independence of Angola and the establishment of relations with several countries whose governments were notably leftist. Saraiva Guerreiro was Chancellor of the Figueiredo government (1979-85). See Saraiva Guerreiro in *Lembranças de um Empregado do Itamaraty* (1992).

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**EDMUNDO PENNA
BARBOSA DA SILVA**

Graduated in Law, Barbosa da Silva was a diplomat, farmer, philanthropist and businessman. He was attaché to the Brazilian Embassy in London, from 1939 to 1941, when he worked in the Special Division for the Safeguard of the Italian Interests in Great Britain. He participated, as a member, of the Brazilian delegation to the International Conference of Civil Aviation, in Chicago, in 1944. He negotiated agreements about air transportation with ten countries between 1946 and 1948. He was executive secretary of the Consultative Commission of Commercial Agreements (1950) and president of the Consultative Commission of Wheat (1951). He headed the Economic Division and, later, the Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1952 to 1961. In that period, he led the negotiations with various countries for setting up the Limited Convertibility System of Multilateral Payments. Among those countries were Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Austria and France. He organized

the trip abroad of the elected President Juscelino Kubitschek and headed several sessions of the Contracting Parties of GATT. After leaving Itamaraty, he worked in various private companies. His greatest achievement was to expand and consolidate the role of the Ministry in the economic sector.

EDMUNDO PENNA BARBOSA DA SILVA: FROM “SECOS & MOLHADOS” TO MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Rogério de Souza Farias¹

On April 3rd, 1939, eighteen young men entered the Foreign Minister's office in the Itamaraty Palace. They soon stepped on the Persian Oushak rug that decorated the majestic room. The *gaúcho* Oswaldo Aranha, who was the Chancellor at that time, hosted them “with frugal gestures and a glowing sympathy” (Silva, 1994, p. 3). The room was solemn. Not for the large jacaranda table or for the faded green curtains. The reason were the golden letters engraved in the green frieze, imitating marble, which covered part of the the environment's ceiling, recalling that the Baron of Rio Branco, patron of the Brazilian diplomacy, and the creator of traditions still in use, had worked and died there.

Aranha was one of the main leaders of the revolution that broke out in October 1930 and in March 1938, he became Foreign Minister. One of his first administrative measures was to complete

1 I am thankful to the Barbosa da Silva family for the kindness of the interviews and to the Minister Paulo Roberto de Almeida, to Ambassador Raul Fernando Leite Ribeiro, to the Secretary Marianne Martins Guimarães, to Marcílio Marques Moreira and to Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago for the valuable comments.

the unification of the consular and the diplomatic careers. Another effort was to change the profile of the organ's labor force. Among the almost 300 employees of the Brazilian Foreign Service in 1939, 70 of them were born before the Proclamation of the Republic. The average age was 42 years old. However, it was not enough only to increase the number of diplomats. It was necessary to improve the recruitment system, using the public exam as the only hiring process. For that reason, he supported the Administrative Department of the Public Service (DASP) in the task to expand the base of candidates and to turn the procedure more based on merit. The public exam opened the ministry's doors to the growing urban middle class not necessarily linked by blood and friendship ties to the ruling political class.

The immediate result of that initiative was the group of young people that had entered the office. They underwent the strictest selection process ever carried out by the government until that moment in Brazil. The competition was not high by contemporary standards – 55 candidates for 18 places. What turned the competition hard was the number of exams and their requirements, in addition to uncertainties about the nomination. In the following decades, Antônio Borges Leal Castello Branco, Sergio Corrêa da Costa, Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva, Antônio Correa do Lago, Paulo Leão de Moura, Celso Raul Garcia, Roberto Campos and the other members of the class proved that the selection process was successful. It was a new tradition that became integrated into the Brazilian diplomacy. The young people presented there adapted the ministry to a new era, respecting, at the same time, the basic principles laid down by the Baron of Rio Branco.

One of the youngest of the group was Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva. Born in Curvelo (MG), on February 11th, 1917, he graduated in Law from the University of Brazil, in 1937. He had a long life, dying in 2012 after a great career in the diplomacy

and in the private sector. Today, his importance is ignored, in clear contrast with the prominent role he played. The diplomat, strangely enough, was never posted abroad after he came back from his first mission. From 1942 until 1961, when he left the Economic Department, he, together with his generation of classmates, forged a new language to justify the diplomacy’s control in the area of international economic negotiation and, beyond that, he created a tradition in the economic sector of Itamaraty, which stopped being a marginal area of the organ and started to play a central role in Brazilian foreign policy.

WORLD WAR II AND THE EMERGING MULTILATERALISM

Right after passing the entrance exam, Edmundo received a scholarship from *Cultura Inglesa* to study in the United Kingdom (Vinícius de Moraes was one of the winners in the previous year). His purpose was to study in prestigious British universities and, later, to work on a PhD about the commercial relations between the UK and Brazil, from the Methuen Treaty (1703) until the Opening of the Ports (1808). The choice of the subject showed how the young law bachelor was already concerned about the economic themes.

Barbosa da Silva was unable to conclude his academic project. World War II started while he was crossing the Atlantic Ocean and, about one year after he installed himself in Cambridge, the Brazilian government was in charge of safeguarding the Italian interests in Great Britain. The young diplomat was called to London to carry out the delicate job to defend the interests of an enemy before authorities who were not very willing to respect the law of war. The small team that he integrated as sub chief cared for 12,000 civilian interns and some 250,000 prisoners of war (including 91

Generals) in the United Kingdom and other places – Lybia, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, India and Canada. Here he began to learn the difficult art of persuasion, acting as an intermediate between the Italian and the British interests. His stay in London coincided with the horrors of the Blitz. Many times, he was almost seriously injured in the bombings.

After he came back to Brazil, in early 1942, Barbosa da Silva went to work in the transport area of the Economic and Commercial Division of Itamaraty. At that time, the subject was very important, since the eclosion of World War II had broken most of the ties of international transportation. There was a further relevant factor. Since the 1920's the transportation by airplane promised to be an alternative to the long and tiresome sea travels. However, there was no significant framework to regulate the economic and logistical dimensions of that kind of transportation. It was in that environment that Barbosa da Silva started to study the subject. His first important role was being a member of the Brazilian delegation at the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944).

Multilateralism after World War II was richer and more complex than the League of Nations period. The institutional architecture of the emerging multilateralism was based on the assumption that interdependence would lead to many opportunities, but also to many clashes, which called for a more aggressive dialogue and policy harmonization. According to Barbosa da Silva, there was “a progressive universal trend to use the international economic cooperation organs to discuss and seek solutions for the major problems that afflict humanity”. In 1946, he already stated that such reality would demand from Brazil a close review not only of the domestic regulatory framework, but also of the domestic process by which it was articulated – “problems grow and those in charge of politics, both

in the international and the national spheres, will have to seek the appropriate solution for them” (Silva, 1946, p. 4).

The Chicago Convention analyzed complex subjects in an environment of great power unbalance. It was undeniable that the international system comprised highly unequal states, with Brazil in a disadvantageous position. Such situation, for many diplomats and observers of that time, was a source of resentment. Although Barbosa da Silva agreed with the conclusion, he had a different opinion about its consequences for the country. He believed in the Brazilian capacity to obtain gains in negotiation, but without sliding to nationalist proselytism or opportunistic blackmail. He was certain that the diplomatic isolationism was equivalent to deny reality. While that prevented the inherent risks of an unequal relationship, the position also eliminated the possibilities of benefits – which Brazil urgently needed. According to him, the responsibility of the Brazilian diplomat was “not to turn his back on international cooperation, either receiving it or providing it, depending on the case”. Working in this field, Edmundo learned a lesson that guided him in the future: “Today [in 1946], governments no longer leave their companies alone in other countries asking for rights. They discuss those rights themselves, and they know how to defend them very well [...]” (Silva, 1946, p. 1 and 21). That was a call to narrow the ties between the public and the private sectors and the acknowledgement that the Brazilian government (that is, the Itamaraty) could defend the interests of Brazilian companies in an increasingly integrated international economy. He put that teaching into practice in the following years, when he negotiated agreements on air transportation with 10 countries.

“SECOS & MOLHADOS”

In the mid-1920's, there were still three separate careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - the diplomatic, the consular and the Secretary of State. One of the few moments when all employees interacted was during the extraordinary vacation, when both diplomats and consuls packed the hotels in Rio de Janeiro. On one such occasion, Raul de Campos, its director-general for Commercial and Consular Affairs, organized a visit to some industrial establishments. One of the most enthusiastic about the project was José da Fonseca Filho, the Brazilian Consul in Cádiz. He was pleased about the idea to gather samples of Brazilian products to send them to Brazilian consulates abroad. The Minister of State ordered the Itamaraty Palace to provide a room for him to receive the commodities. Fonseca Filho, one day, arriving at the scene, encountered an extraordinary poster: “Big *Secos & Molhados* warehouse. Fonseca Filho e Cia”. Scattered in the room were strings of onions and garlic, a few kilos of jerked beef and two gigantic pieces of cod.² That was a joke made by his colleagues from the Secretary of State. Being used to associate the Itamaraty Palace to major social events and to the sober solemnity of the bureaucratic daily life, the activities that were becoming stronger in that environment were strange. However, they had to get used to the increasing importance of the commercial area. During Félix Pacheco's and Octávio Mangabeira's administrations, the celebration of commercial agreements and the promotion of the Brazilian products abroad started to receive more attention from the head of the organization.

2 Several observers point out that, already in the 1930's, it was common to use the term “secos & molhados” to designate the economic area of the organ. About Fonseca Filho see: Palavras de Saudade a Dois Cônsules Brasileiros. *Jornal do Brasil*. March 1st, 1934.

That situation did not last long, since there was resistance to the advancement of the economic activities. When a commentator pointed to the “commercial excitement” of that time, he censored those who wished to “convert the diplomats into commercial travelers”.³ The jurist Pontes de Miranda criticized, a few months before Barbosa da Silva took over, the “solid conviction that the diplomat had to stop being a politician in order to become a mere commercial agent of his people” (Miranda, 1939, p. 51). Immediately after World War II, however, other economic institutions progressively marginalized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The greatest challenge occurred in the late 1940’s, with the creation of the Consultative Commission for Foreign Exchange (CCIE) of the Export and Import Portfolio of Banco do Brasil (CEXIM), in December 1949, which took the coordination power in the commercial area from Itamaraty. Shortly after that, CEXIM created a sector of International Agreements, negotiating commercial treaties directly with foreign governments – seven of them between 1949 and 1950 – without properly informing Itamaraty. In that period, the ministry was so unequipped that foreign diplomats rarely addressed the organ to deal with economic matters. Most of the agreements, at that time, arrived in Itamaraty only to be signed.

In early 1950, there were enough diplomats of Edmundo’s class who worked together with their superiors, to reverse that. In fact, during that period, several diplomats from what can be called “DASP’s generation” acted in the area – Roberto Campos, Otávio Dias Carneiro, João Baptista Pinheiro, Antônio Correa do Lago, Sergio Armando Frazão, Maury Gurgel Valente, Celso Raul Garcia, George Maciel, Miguel Osorio, Paulo Leão de Moura and Alfredo Valladão. Celso Raul Garcia and Roberto Campos, in particular, led

3 Um Tema Para Debate. *O Imparcial*. June 20th, 1928.

the formulation process and Barbosa da Silva the implementation of the reform. They disagreed with the fact that trade policy was conducted without any consideration of their impact on the Brazilian foreign policy and on the country's commitments with its international partners. There was neither a concern with the background, nor with the preparation of delegations sent abroad. They did not conform to the situation, especially when they were criticized when problems occurred in negotiations conducted or led by CEXIM or other government agencies (FARIAS, 2012, p. 68-69). However, Barbosa da Silva, Roberto Campos and Celso Raul Garcia did not have the means to reverse, in Itamaraty, the situation in the short term. The legal framework was inadequate. Contacts with the private sector was fragile, and there was not any information repository, which added to the serious lack of staff to expand the performance in the area. Finally, although it had the support from the top, the prestige of the economic area did not help, since most diplomats still considered it as a banishment – the image of “Secos & Molhados” remained.

In an entrepreneurial manner, Roberto Campos started the process that solved those problems in the future. He came back to Brazil in the late 1940's, after several years of intensive learning abroad. In the multilateral meetings he had attended, he noticed the lack of information to guide an adequate formulation of the Brazilian position. For that reason, he proposed the creation of an economic policy research unit in Itamaraty. The proposal was not to respond to specific daily problems, but to try to “anticipate the problems and formulate adequate economic guidelines in advance”. The service would have to introduce “practical suggestions”, which, if they were approved, could be conveyed to other government organs “as a contribution from Itamaraty to define national guidelines”. Such ambition is interesting, since it shows that they sought in expert economic knowledge the legitimacy to

converge the economic policies of other organs to the preferences of Itamaraty. In order to solve the problem of lack of personnel, Campos requested employees from other ministries and Banco do Brasil. With such a maneuver, important government sectors with qualified labor were emptied and there was the creation, within the Itamaraty, of a team of statisticians and economists. Raul Fernandes approved the proposal in January 1950. The second initiative by Campos, which both Cyro de Freitas-Valle and Celso Raul Garcia supported, was the approval of the Commercial Agreement Consultative Commission (CCAC). Campos, however, soon moved away from the daily activities of the Economic Division to act outside the organization and Barbosa da Silva was in charge of implementing CCAC and the Section of Studies and Research (Farias, 2012, p. 69-70).

His first struggle was to ensure both budget and human resources to the recently created organs. In 1946, when there was the fusion of the Economic and the Commercial Divisions, the area had over 20 employees. Five years later, that number had been reduced to less than 10, in a situation of increasing responsibilities – the Economic Division received an average of 80 demands daily. Its employees, plunged into excessive tasks, did not follow much the matters that interested the organ when they were abroad. Edmundo made successive waves of requests to his superiors to obtain resources. His greatest victory was to transfer the economists and the statisticians hired to the Section of Studies and Research to operate in the daily activities of the economic area. Several professionals participated in that group – Antônio Patriota, Lúcia Pirajá, J. O. Knaack de Souza, Olintho Machado, Mário Guaraná de Barros, Joaquim Ferreira Mangia, Jayme Magrassi de Sá, Benedicto Fonseca Moreira, Wander Batalha Lima, among others. The ministry lost the think tank that Roberto Campos had planned, but gained a technical base that projected it

to the forefront in the formulation of the foreign economic policy in the government.

Barbosa da Silva, like Roberto Campos, assumed that Itamaraty was a political ministry *par excellence*, but the economic factor was one of the most determinant variables of Brazilian foreign policy. According to him, the economic relations with foreign countries had to be planned according to political purposes, with the most important one being to to guarantee the welfare and the economic security of the Brazilian people. However, what institution should guide Brazil abroad? In his opinion, Itamaraty had to play the leading role, since it had a view of the whole. The diplomat understood, however, that the support of the domestic organs and the private sector as a condition to strengthen the Brazilian foreign position was extremely relevant. It was a major challenge to obtain both.

From the point of view of domestic bureaucracies, Barbosa da Silva behaved with a humble stance, always encouraging their participation in Brazilian delegations abroad. His strategy was to create broad contacts with them. After all, they were the ones who had the expert knowledge necessary for a good performance in international negotiations and, often, it was through them that international commitments were carried out domestically. It was due to that effort that those institutions accepted, over time, Barbosa da Silva as a domestic leader, as well as both head and guide to diplomats abroad, when the matters of their respective areas were discussed in bilateral or multilateral activities. He also introduced businessmen as members of CCAC and invited them to participants in negotiations abroad. Barbosa da Silva believed that the diplomatic success was intimately related to the articulation with the private sectors.

It was by the hands of Vasco Leitão da Cunha and Vicente Rao that, as a young second-class minister, Barbosa da Silva became head of the Economic and Consular Department. The nomination showed the trust of his superiors, since they preferred to nominate a diplomat with a legal background instead of others with an economics background. His superiors assessed correctly that the international economy was regulated by a system of rules and principles, and that the capacity to be a great negotiator and to act within the parameters of diplomatic legalism were more significant than the specific background in economics.

The relations with other government sectors, the contacts with politicians, the constant trips abroad and the quick promotions for which Barbosa da Silva fought tirelessly for his employees was a powerful source of attraction for the most brilliant young people who entered the diplomatic career. Many of his subordinates would have major impact on diplomacy (and outside it) in the following decades – an incomplete list would include Paulo Nogueira Batista, Sérgio Bath, Raul Leite Ribeiro, Marcílio Marques Moreira, Luiz Paulo Lindenberg Sette, Luiz Augusto Souto Maior, Octavio Rainho, Carlos Proença Rosa, Amaury Bier, Sérgio Paulo Rouanet, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandes, Arnaldo Vasconcellos, Marcelo Raffaelli and Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima.

When he became head of the Department, a position that he kept until the early 1960's, his persona was already consolidated before his peers and subordinates. At that time, Barbosa da Silva was an Apollonian figure. He wore his linen suit like a Lord. His English was Etonian in terms of wit and manners – ironic without being sarcastic, affirmative without being arrogant, cautious without being passive, educated without being distant. He had one of the greatest qualities that François de Callières saw in a diplomat: the capacity to listen attentively to everything and rule his behavior according to equilibrium (Callières, 1983 [1716], p. 145).

He was calm, focused, skillful when he spoke and persuasive when he wrote. An employee introduced to him in the early 1950's said he was "a young, handsome and elegant man", in addition to being "very serious" who spoke "like a British". According to Antônio Patriota (Senior), he was a "sympathetic personality, physically similar to actor Robert Taylor, nicknamed Lord Ho-Ho because of his strong British accent". For, Gibson Barboza, he was "one of the best diplomatic negotiators" he had met (Barboza, 2002, p. 55; Moreira, 2002, p. 21-23; Patriota, 2010, p. 95). Even though he obtained such recognition, Barboza da Silva preserved a rustic simplicity, a personality from Minas Gerais that was, at the same time, proud and circumspect. He sharpened his pencil with a blade and, whenever he had the chance, he put on his boots and fled to his family's farm, in Campos.

The first problem he faced was the serious situation of the Brazilian balance of payments. During the beginning of the second Vargas government, the system of import licenses was overly relaxed, causing, in an environment of overvalued exchange rate, problems in the country's ability to pay its imports. Later, that dynamic was aggravated with the decline of export earnings. Barbosa da Silva led, in that first moment, the renegotiation of commercial contracts, at the same time in which he reviewed the system of bilateral commerce and payments (there were 30 in force in 1953). In 1955, he was able to restructure the payment system with six European countries.

In early 1956, he participated in a mission that changed his career forever. Once Juscelino Kubitschek was elected president, he decided to make a trip to the United States and Europe before his inauguration. The purpose of the journey was to get away from the political disputes, and to present to the international community a plan for the rapid development of Brazil. Edmundo was chosen to organize the delicate initiative. First, it was necessary

to ensure that the president was well received in the countries he would visit. The struggle for protocol and ceremonial was a major success. He was able to schedule a visit to Eisenhower in Key West and the Queen of England left her vacations to meet JK. In Spain and Portugal, the reception was an apotheosis. In all ten countries he visited, the president-elect and his aides were followed with interest by businessmen and potential investors – many of whom started or increased investments in Brazil in the following years. Those results were obtained through intensive work. That involved writing dossiers of information that presented the profile of his interlocutors, bilateral agendas of controversies, notes for conversations, reports on the economic and political situation and, above all, a guide to present an optimistic position about the economic potentials of the country for international investors. During the trip, Barbosa da Silva enjoyed both the trust and the intimacy of JK.

With the prestige of relying on the president's trust, Barbosa da Silva devoted himself to the activity of strengthening even more the economic area of the ministry. First, he was able to move away from the Economic Department and the consular issues. Second, he made provisions to separate the Commercial and the Economic Divisions, increasing the staff of both. Third, he promoted greater delegation of competencies for subordinate areas, leaving for himself more time for the high-level articulation of the area's guidelines. Fourth, he made the agenda be addressed by pairs of economists and diplomats in the daily routine. In addition, despite the resistance of many diplomats, he turned himself to the internalization, within the scope of Itamaraty, of the activities from the Commercial Offices that the Ministry of Labor kept abroad for the commercial promotion activities – a transference that only took place in the mid-1960's. As in the 1920's, there were serious critics to the expansion of the economic area. One of the

most eloquent of them was Vasco Leitão da Cunha. Both in the Reform Commission of 1953 as in that of 1958 he was vehement in his opposition to what he considered an excessive distortion of the diplomatic activity (Cunha, 2003, p. 21, 171 and 303; Farias, 2012, p. 335-336). Although they held totally opposite views about what the diplomat should do and how the Brazilian Foreign Service should be organized, Leitão da Cunha and Barbosa da Silva were great friends and did not let the confrontation interfere in their professional and their personal lives.

Relying on the collaboration of Antônio Correa do Lago, one of his best friends and who took the exam at the same time, Barbosa da Silva worked to reposition the Brazilian foreign trade, in order to reduce the serious balance of payments problems that Brazil was facing since the early 1950's. Like other members of his generation, he believed that economic development depended on the ability to import, which, in turn, depended on the exports. Even though he was more liberal than most of his contemporaries, the diplomat considered the deterioration of the exchange terms a crucial term of the Brazilian commercial life. That influenced his view that the country should diversify its export agenda, broaden foreign markets, work to avoid cyclical oscillations of international markets and have an economic policy profile focused on attracting foreign capital.

The first task he engaged in was to follow the long and complicated process of reform of the Brazilian trade policy (tariffs). Since it was specific, not *ad valorem*, inflation constantly corroded the protection level of the economy. In the late 1940's, the government used the system of licenses, later replaced by the mechanism of currency auction in order to face the problem. Import duties could not be raised because of the commitments that Brazil consolidated at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The solution was first to obtain a waiver in GATT, approve

a new tariff schedule in the Brazilian Congress (more protectionist and *ad valorem*) and, finally, to renegotiate new commitments with commercial partners. Barbosa da Silva delegated almost all the work to his competent peers and subordinates, but he worked in the background – with the Ministry of Finance and the Congress. The negotiations with commercial partners were the greatest that Brazil carried out in commercial multilateralism between 1947 and the late Cold War period. Many countries criticized the fact that the transposition of the rates from the specific system to *ad valorem* was accompanied by an aggressive increasing of the protection level. Brazil, in turn, answered that if commitments could not be renegotiated, he would denounce the multilateral arrangement. In the end, the Brazilian Congress approved, with changes, the renegotiations, but the country continued to request for the next 30 years waivers in GATT (Farias, 2012, p. 217-225).

The increase in trade protectionism was a sign to international investors that Brazil would deepen its process of development by import substitution. The closing of the economy, however, raised instead of decreasing the need for dollars. To make the situation worse, Brazilian exports faced increasing difficulties to be competitive in world market. Besides the reduction of the price of coffee, the greatest challenge resulted from the consequences of the Treaty of Rome. The creation of the European commercial bloc led to the rise of preferences to former colonies, the rise of the domestic taxes on commodities (such as coffee, sugar and cocoa) and the inappropriate harmonization of the tariffs to other countries, which seriously harmed Brazil. In the meetings of the Contracting Parties of GATT, Barbosa da Silva sought compensation for the harm that the arrangement caused to Brazilian exporters and requested repeatedly that the institution preserve multilateral rules.

The results were discouraging. From then on, many Brazilian diplomats sought an alternative and more aggressive way to reformulate the multilateral trade system. Barbosa da Silva agreed with them that the international economic and financial cooperation system established by the end of World War II, despite having created a dialogue environment and a better technical understanding of the reality, had failed in the correction of the most adverse aspects of the underdevelopment conditions in the Third World. However, he believed, unlike that group, that even with all the mistakes, Brazilian problems could still be solved in GATT. It was worthless the unstoppable search for institutional arrangements to replaced it, since the players were the same and they would defend their interests in a similar way wherever it was. GATT attracted Edmundo because of its flexibility to fulfill its mission, since it was considered that, if it carried out its mandate in a strict and intransigent way, it would no longer serve as an element of discipline of international trade. He had the opportunity to support GATT in a crucial moment. He was chosen, in 1959, to head the meeting of GATT's Contracting Parties in Tokyo. At that occasion, Edmundo led the creation of the Council of Representatives, an instance for managing the multilateral trade system, he raised from 70 to 90 the staff members of GATT, and, finally, he articulated the launch of the Dillon Round, the fifth cycle of tariff negotiations after the war (Farias, 2012, p. 286-7).

The fact that he appreciated GATT did not mean he believed that there were not other actions to favor Brazilian interests. In the second half of the 1950's, he led two initiatives that had a major impact on Brazilian foreign policy: regionalism in Latin America and the expansion towards Eastern Europe.

Barbosa da Silva not only articulated domestically the coalition of government technicians and businessmen that led to the creation of ALALC, but he was also the most important player

in the defense of the regional arrangement in GATT meetings. In both tasks, he relied on the support of the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL). He still had great admiration for the institution. In the future, when, according to him, the Commission was immersed in an "autarchic position," he revered his position. As far as Latin America was concerned, during the period of the Pan-American Operation, he considered that the initiative would provide "a sense of objectivity to what should be done, instead of always adapting an empty speech characteristic of the Pan-American meetings." According to Edmundo, "it is worthless to seek theoretically valid formulas, but without any support". For him, the countries of the region were unprepared both to formulate plans and to benefit from foreign assistance – they lacked clear purposes and discipline in the application of resources of the national and foreign financial organs. According to him, instead of requesting foreign help, recipient governments had to rationalize their domestic budgets and avoid waste (Silva, 1984).

Since the Pan-American Operation meetings, Edmundo already noticed that Brazil was a very different country from its neighbors. In the following decades, already far from diplomacy, he refined such perception. According to him, countries like India and Brazil, despite being underdeveloped, had "a much greater notion of responsibility than the rest", since they were undergoing a rapid process of economic transition. He believed that Brazil would be a major power. What differentiated his theses as compared to those by his peers was the defense that, despite being able to understand the Third World, an "alignment from below" should not be carried out. He also disagreed with the confrontation tactics of the group (Silva, 1984).

Even if it was successful, regionalism would not solve Brazilian economic problems. It was for that reason that Barbosa da Silva bet on the expansion of Brazilian trade to the Iron Curtain. He did not

do that, in a blind and ideological manner. He was not persuaded by the thesis that the socialist block had millions of eager consumers and, therefore, it was crucial to invest in that trade relation. He believed that it was worthless to foster commercial ties if there was not demand for Brazilian products or if the block could not supply products Brazil needed.

The trade expansion project was controversial. It caused serious conflict in Brazilian society – which was reproduced even within the Itamaraty, where the Political Department and the minister's office itself were against increasing economic ties with Eastern Europe. The first tactical position of Barbosa da Silva to overcome the resistance was to limit the Brazilian goal to the economic relationship. The second one was to start by the satellite countries of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and, later, gradually establish trade ties with the Russians. The third one was to seek allies in the private sector and other governmental areas as a way to raise the legitimacy of the initiative. The fourth was a serious technical work to detect trade opportunities. The fifth was to make the contacts throughout several months, in order to get the public opinion used to the movement. In November 1959, after several years of political and bureaucratic battles, Barbosa da Silva led a trade mission to Moscow – the first Brazilian diplomat to deal with official affairs in the Soviet capital since both countries broke diplomatic relations in 1947.

DIPLOMACY AS EQUILIBRIUM AND MODERATION

By the end of JK's government, Barbosa da Silva had great prestige. He was the first one of his class to reach the highest post of the career – first class minister. The promotion, which took place in May 1959, caused consternation. He was only 42 years old and

he ranked 30th in the antiquity list. Since he had come back from London, in 1942, he had not been posted abroad. The ascent was the acknowledgement of his work and served as a sign for all young diplomats. The economic area now was far from being a Groceries Warehouse as it was in the past – at least 10 of the 17 graduates of the Rio Branco Institute in 1956, showed interest in working in the economic area⁴. Many presidents and foreign ministers had thought about posting him abroad – Bonn, London, Buenos Aires and Paris. He repeatedly refused the appointments. Edmundo considered Itamaraty a citadel, and had no interest in abandoning it. The fact that he had no interest in posts abroad and that he had already reached the top of the career diminished conflicts with colleagues from the career. That relative independence and his competence eventually made him ascend to the post of Secretary General and, later, head of Itamaraty, both provisionally (1960-1961).

When he entered the career, the stereotype of the diplomat was of one of pretentious conservatives removed from Brazilian reality. The effort made by his generation changed that image. That was one of the few themes Barbosa da Silva left his ideas systematically, because of his speech as patron of the 1959 Rio Branco class. Edmundo appreciated the Alexis Saint-Léger’s definition that diplomacy

Is about imagination, preparation, suggestion, representation, execution. The diplomat is an authority in critical analysis and the creator of great plans. He must have the courage, he must have the patience, and he must humbly accept the limits of the possible. In disagreement with his ministers, he must fight against falsehood using

4 Diplomacia dá as mãos à Economia. *O Observador Econômico e Financeiro*. N. 287. Year XXIV. January 1960, p. 7.

all his skill, but always in a loyal way, as their subordinate. Whether in the building or the prevention, his role must be both recluse and anonymous. He is an innovator, but also a doer tied by the disciplines of the civil servant (Silva, 1959, p. 9).

That quotation shows the great tension between tradition and innovation, between hierarchy and reform. In that clash, Barbosa da Silva was at the side of renewal. It can be stated that he agreed with the Joaquim Nabuco's saying that "a little bit of tradition is necessary, a little bit of past, mainly regarding the habits, but it is also necessary, and much more so, the transformation and future" (Nabuco: 2006, 578). Not for the attachment to ideologies, not for the search of a renewal as end in itself. What he desired was a diplomacy that was closer to the challenges that the country was facing and, above all, according to the Brazilian social reality. In his speech he stated:

Therefore our duty – yours and of all of us – was to bring Itamaraty right into the core of national life, to make it representative of the current Brazil, its problems, its contradictory aspects and its uncontrollable hopes. We cannot close ourselves within the refuge of our offices, with our ears sealed to the echoes of the agricultural works, to the varied sounds of the plants where our material progress is forged, to the roar of the engines that displace men and their goods without stop, through land, sea and air, with the purpose of creating wealth. We cannot disconnect from the productive work of the schools, universities and the patient research from their laboratories where the elites of rulers, technicians, engineers, jurists, professors and philosophers, who will prepare the country to the multiple tasks that result from the new Brazilian structure,

are trained. Therefore, we cannot remain limited to the contemplation of our past, our tradition, old formulas or diplomatic formalities (Silva, 1959, p. 10).

However, the defense of the renewal did not place Barbosa da Silva among the most radical diplomats of that period. He believed that Brazil faced instability, and political and social crises. He criticized those who defended instant, automatic or painless solutions with blind nationalism. He believed that such position had already caused great problems to the country and it was necessary to fight it. The nationalist populism was a recurrent, easy and convenient way, but it only delayed the *day of reckoning*. Creativity, courage and persistence to face the unpopular, the painful, the unpredictable and, above all, the imperfect were necessary. The trade agreements with the communist area, for example, were far from being ideal tools, but they were ways that could not be discarded due to ideological bias. Another difference in relation to the most radicals was his belief that Brazil was not a unit, in the sense that there were various interest groups. Radical formulas, in that environment, had no agglutination power and polarized society unnecessarily. That was why he admired the ability to compromise, separating the vital interests and defending them with persistence, but with enough maturity to know where and how to conciliate.

DIPLOMACY AT THE SERVICE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

By the end of JK's government, Barbosa da Silva was invited to head the Institute of Sugar and Alcohol (IAA). In October 1961, he took over the position and remained there until September 1962. His nomination, as he stated, "caused perplexity to many people", even to several who knew him. He was leaving Itamaraty, where he

had completed his training to serve the Republic in another area. It was an acknowledgment of his skills, both as a negotiator and a sugar cane farmer, the difficult and complex task to guarantee a new policy for a strategic sector of the economy.

Barbosa da Silva identified that the main source of constraints and opportunities was abroad. Between 1953 and 1958, sugar production worldwide increased by 47%, while consumption increased only 23%. The price of the product had fallen by half in the 1950's. That was a situation very convergent with Cepal's assumptions. Facing that situation, Edmundo defended the stabilization of the market, in order to protect the sector from sudden price variations, from the deterioration of terms of trade and from trade barriers that closed international markets. Maybe his greatest victory, in that sphere, was the expansion of the Brazilian exports to the American market in the context of the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution (Oliveira, 1975, p. 59-61; Silva, 1961, p. 118-122).

The diplomat knew that Brazil could only profit from foreign opportunities if the domestic sector was increasingly efficient, which did not occur. Both the production and the industrialization faced growing costs and low yields. Unfortunately, change public policies for the sector in order to change that situation was a task that the diplomat was not able to achieve during his short administration. At that time, the economy was extremely regulated. While the government controlled the price of final products in order to control the inflation, it limited the supply and granted punctual subsidies to the productive chain. In that bureaucratic network of contradictory incentives, Barbosa da Silva dared to establish the urgent need to privatize Companhia Usinas National (Pérola Sugar) because of its high operational costs. The measure was carried out only after 20 years and much harm. The lack of prior willingness by politicians and diplomats to carry

out the difficult short-run measures because of the fear of being unpopular irritated him. He believed that crises had the effect of slowly reduce the resistance of the population to the inevitable economic reforms. That situation of waiting, however, weakened the social and economic fabric in such a way that it turned the adjustment process even more painful. Talking many years later about that period, he asked himself: “Who talks about saving? Who carries out a violent policy to contain public expenses?” (Silva, 1984).

Those questions were certainly on his mind when he followed, from a distance, the deterioration of the economic conditions of the Goulart administration. After the 1964 Coup, Vasco Leitão da Cunha invited him to be Secretary General of Itamaraty. Edmundo refused the invitation, but he accepted to lead delicate negotiations. The first one was to substitute Dias Carneiro as head of the delegation to Unctad, in May 1964. Then, he dealt with the restoration of the Brazilian foreign credit. Finally, he negotiated two important agreements of guarantees of investments – one of them with Germany and the other one with the United States.

From 1963 to March 1979, when he retired, despite being a career diplomat, he did not earn much by the Treasury and he did not carry out any executive function. After he withdrew from the Itamaraty, he did not settle down. As he once stated, “life is like riding a bicycle: if you stop, you fall down”. His skills in leading teams, and in the art of negotiation placed him in a privileged position in the private sector. After he retired, he worked in the Administrative, Fiscal or Consultative Council of several companies, such as Pirelli, Honeywell Bull, Mercedes Benz, MBR, Swift-Armour, Eletro-Cloro, Bank of Montreal and General Polyclinic of Rio de Janeiro. He had a great performance at CAEMI: he presided Generali do Brasil and the holding JARI. He participated in the creation of the Community Action of Brazil

(1967), of the Regional Development Institute of Amapá, the Milk Cooperative of Campos (1965) and of the North Fluminense Regional Development Foundation (Fundenor).

THE NEW DIPLOMACY

In a famous text, Sir Harold Nicolson claimed that the diplomacy in the early 20th century underwent a considerable change. The main change was the growing use of methods, ideas and practices used domestically to prescribe how international relations should operate. Thus, characteristics of the old diplomacy (absence of advertisement, limited attention by the public and lack of urgency) were overcome by a new reality (Nicolson, 1962, p. 100-104; Drinkwater, 2005, p. 104). The statement was exaggerated, but it did capture the sense of a new era. The elders continued to dream that diplomacy was a level basically apart from the domestic policy, including in terms of goals, methods and establishment of forces. The new generation, however, knew that such ideal had never actually existed and that the world had changed a lot.

Barbosa da Silva was a member of a group of diplomats that worked in that fluid transition. It would be a mistake to ascribe to the diplomat the responsibility for having created the economic area of the Brazilian diplomacy. When the Marquis of Barbacena made an effort to seek the recognition of the Brazilian independence, the economic diplomacy was already present. Later, as Renato Mendonça, biographer of the Baron of Penedo, demonstrated, the Brazilian Legation in London “dealing with the economic issues was as important as the political ones” (Mendonça, 2006, p. 225). As we could observe, in the 1920’s, there had been a great effort to expand the economic side of Brazilian diplomacy. In the face of

such front, what was the contribution of the diplomatic thought and action of Barbosa da Silva and his generation?

The first one was the assumption that the pressure of society on the state was normal. Diplomacy could not disconnect from the nation. That does not mean that it should accept the domestic political mood. Quite the contrary, the diplomat should be guided by a national interest that transcended the disaggregation of the specific to reach the general, without being tied to the past, but, at the same time, considering precedents and tradition when scrutinizing the future. Edmundo managed to deal with those tensions as few others did.

The second one was his perception that, in that new era, the diplomat was not the only voice and ears for the country abroad. He had a basic role to play in the domestic life of a democracy. In the face of political and social turmoil, often it was not noticed that domestic measures had foreign impacts and that the international obligations could not be broken to fulfill the illusions of the day. His many years at Itamaraty were largely spent in close contact with business, academic and bureaucratic circles, in an ongoing exercise of consultations focused on the prevention of those conflicts.

The third contribution by the diplomat was to understand the new role that Itamaraty would play in the post-war. Barbosa da Silva and his contemporaries correctly recognized that the grandeur of the Baron of Rio Branco was related to his competence to interpret the problem of his time (the definition of the national borders) and to work to solve it. Barbosa da Silva and his generation faced another kind of challenge: to support the national economic development. Edmundo and many of his contemporaries thought that the nature of the international economic system brought serious constraints to development, particularly for a predominantly agricultural country. Without

an active vigilance policy to remove such obstacles, the domestic effort could become jaded. Another equally important work was to look for opportunities abroad, mainly in terms of investments, technical cooperation and building an appropriate image for attracting foreign capital. He believed that the diplomat, because of his training and his position in the state, should be placed at the vanguard of that movement.

However, Barbosa da Silva's greatest contribution was to make the economic diplomacy as a basic mission of Itamaraty. In fact, when he entered the ministry, the economic area still kept its disdainful status of "Secos & Molhados". The fact that other organs negotiated trade agreements with foreign diplomats without the intermediation of Itamaraty shows the level of alienation that existed by the late 1940's. It was with patience, intelligence, tact and competence that the diplomat helped to transform that situation. When he left diplomacy, the economic area was a disputed destination for the new diplomats who entered the old palace at Marechal Floriano Street.

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HELIO JAGUARIBE

Helio Jaguaribe de Mattos, born April 23, 1923, in Rio de Janeiro was the son of geographer, cartographer, and Army general, Francisco Jaguaribe de Mattos, and Francelina Santos Jaguaribe de Matos, a Portuguese-born daughter of a wine exporter from Porto. Helio, who graduated in law from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, in 1946, participated in a regular gathering of intellectuals, who came to be known as the *Grupo de Itatiaia*. The meetings led to the foundation, in 1953, of the Brazilian Institute of Economics, Sociology and Politics (*Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Política* – IBESP), an entity on which he served as the Secretary-General for a number of years. In 1955, he was also one of the founders of the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (*Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros* –

ISEB) a political-economic think-tank in his native Rio, tied to the Brazilian Ministry of Education. In 1958, however, he published the influential and somewhat controversial book, *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira* (*Nationalism in the Brazilian Reality*), which was considered by some as the cause of an internal crisis at ISEB that culminated in his expulsion from the organization in 1959.

After his expulsion from ISEB, Jaguaribe devoted his time to managing his family's business operations, including an expansion of the Vitória Iron and Steel Company. With the military coup in 1964, however, he moved to the United States where he taught sociology at major universities, including Harvard (1964-1966), Stanford (1966-1967) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1968-1969).

Returning to Brazil, in 1969, Jaguaribe joined the Cândido Mendes University, in Rio de Janeiro. In 1979, he was a founding member of the Institute of Political and Social Studies (*Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais* – IEPES), an entity of which he remains a Dean Emeritus. In 1992, he was the Secretary of Science and Technology in the Fernando Collor de Mello administration. After his short stint in the government, Jaguaribe devoted a number of years to research and writing, and in 2001 he published the two-volume work, *Um estudo crítico da história* (*A Critical Study of History*). In 2005, he was elected to occupy Chair 11 of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, which had been held by the Economist, Celso Furtado.

HELIO JAGUARIBE: THE GENERATION OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTALISM

Antonio Carlos Lessa

INTRODUCTION

A sociologist from Rio de Janeiro, Helio Jaguaribe is considered one of the most lucid interpreters of the vicissitudes of Brazilian society and an exponent of the national ideology known as “developmentalism.” The author of influential works of political and sociological analyses of contemporary Brazil, Jaguaribe has inspired many generations of social scientists. He is also part of a productive generation of public scholars who, since the 1950s, have served to promote the ideology of nationalism and articulate a resolute development strategy.

Jaguaribe’s interpretations of Brazil – both domestically and internationally – during the 1950s and 1960s were crucial to the development of some of the most important and celebrated creations of Brazilian international relation strategies. Examples of his influence include the country’s “Independent Foreign Policy,” begun in the early 1960s and resumed again in the 1970s, along with the policy known as “Responsible Pragmatism.”

Helio Jaguaribe was one of the core players of the intellectual community that extended beyond the boundaries of traditional modernization since the 1940s. These scholars not only criticized the existing environment, but they also recommended policies to promote economic growth in order to overcome the social evils that have long plagued Brazil.

Jaguaribe was the central figure of institutes of major importance in Brazilian intellectual and political life, such as the Itatiaia Group, the Brazilian Institute of Economics, Sociology and Politics (*Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Política* – Ibesp), and the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (*Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros* – Iseb). He is one of the leading names of a generation that believed in the ability of such institutes, to interpret and act in Brazilian politics, albeit with different instruments and focuses. The Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (*Instituto Brasileiro de Administração Municipal* – Ibam), for example, focuses on matters at the urban level, while the Brazilian Institute of International Relations (*Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais* – Ibri), has a more global vision. Despite their differences, all of the institutes endeavor to understand the challenges – and overcome the parochialism and other roadblocks – existent in Brazil.

Two of the most important theses Jaguaribe sought to demonstrate – from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s – were that reform and political transformation must be understood as dynamic factors of social transformation; and that State planning – with a focus on a development strategy – must necessarily start from such transformations. Jaguaribe was the precursor of a pragmatic interpretation of nationalism, which laid the foundation for a modernization strategy of the State, and highlighted the supplementary role that foreign policy played in national development.

The prominence that Jaguaribe's thought is given in the formulation and implementation of Brazilian foreign policy is the subject of this chapter. We will also analyze the origins and development of the institutional environment of the time, including vehicles such as the *Brazilian Journal of International Politics* (*Revista Brasileira de Relações Internacionais* – RBPI). We do not intend to analyze Jaguaribe's works in a critical and comprehensive manner; rather, we will examine his production through the lens of national-developmentalism, in order to review how his work synthesizes and represents a modernizing thought that has inspired Brazilian international policy since the 1950s.

AN EFFERVESCENT INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A number of scientific studies analyze the role of scholars in Brazilian politics. Such a role has been even more incisive since the early twentieth century, when the country's intellectuals began to focus on more nationalistic themes – such as seeking the roots of a “Brazilian nature,” during the modernist generation of the 1920s; or claiming a national awareness role as an interpreter of social life in the 1930s (PÉCAUT, 1999, p. 10). Between 1930 and 1945, a re-structuring of the State's bureaucracy also occurred with the creation of various economic planning agencies, to address issues related to development, especially those based on industrialization. At that time and into the next decades, the State – informed by militant scholars, supported by industrial businessmen, and served by a growing and competent group of civilian and military technicians – took upon itself the responsibility of directing the top-to-bottom modernization program that Brazil required (BIELSCHOWSKY, 2000, p. 253-258).

One of the main characteristics of this modernization process was a growing economic nationalism, which sought to legitimize the State's intervention in the economy and claim control of the development process by national forces. This was evident with the triumphant return of Getúlio Vargas to power in 1951, and it was also the political environment that controlled the development debate when a group of young scholars began, in August 1952, to meet regularly, to address the country's major problems. As the group met in a building in the Itatiaia National Park – on the border between the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro – they called themselves the *Grupo de Itatiaia*.

In a column in the *Jornal do Comércio*, Cristina Buarque de Hollanda, a political scientist at the *Universidade Federal Fluminense* in Rio de Janeiro, has speculated that the Itatiaia Group may have been the direct heir of another group of intellectuals who also focused on Brazil's problems in 1947 (HOLLANDA, 2012). Whatever their origins, the Itatiaia Group ambitiously sought to “clarify issues related to economic, political, cultural and sociological interpretations of [its] time with an analysis of the then current ideas and political phenomena, and a systematic and historical study of Brazil.” The trajectory of the Itatiaia Group is unequivocally tied to the conceptual sophistication of the ideology of nationalism.

In 1953, some members of the Itatiaia group created the aforementioned IBESP, which was headed for many years by Helio Jaguaribe. This research entity maintained a schedule of debates and studies, and produced the periodical, *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo* (Reports for Our Time), which, although it had a short period of circulation – its only 5 volumes were published from December 1953 through March 1956 – became an anthological publication. The periodical was not a perfect translation of the diversity of thought and analytical perspectives attained by IBESP, but

Cadernos brought to light many issues that became influential in economic, sociological, and political analyses of Brazil.

It would be an exaggeration to say that all the participants of the Itatiaia Group unequivocally shared the same interpretations of Brazilian reality. What one *can* say, however, is that everyone in the group shared ideas, the most important of which was a concern for what they saw as the underdevelopment of Brazil. In addition, according to Schwartzman (1979), there was a “search for a non-aligned international position, that of a ‘third force’, a type of nationalism that became especially strong in relation to Brazil’s natural resources. There was also a desire for a greater functioning of the country’s public administration, and a greater participation of the population in political life.”

As with Jaguaribe, the group’s members were highly educated; they were also from varied backgrounds and training. Their ranks included sociologists, political scientists, historians, politicians and others from the social sciences. They were scholars and intellectuals, such as: Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, Juvenal Osório Gomes, Moacir Félix de Oliveira, Carlos Luís Andrade, Cândido Mendes de Almeida, Ewaldo Correia Lima, Heitor Lima Rocha, Fábio Breves, João Paulo de Almeida Guimarães, and Oscar Lorenzo Fernandes.

In addition to their advanced educational levels, a second characteristic the IBESP members shared was a desire to create a political program to develop the country; one in which scholars would play a major role. The best example that demonstrates this was the collectively written article, *Para uma Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento* (For a National Development Policy), published in the final issue of *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo*. The political program they sought would be founded on:

...an ideological clarification of progressive forces [...] – the industrial bourgeoisie, the proletariat and technical sectors of the middle class – along with a political regimentation of these forces. Both of these conditions, they believed, required the active support and guidance of a capable and well-organized political vanguard.

Theirs was essentially a reformist political program, designed to engage in transformation; it was not, however, revolutionary. The scholars of IBESP and *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo* were, themselves, the vanguard of a great intellectual endeavor that had its most concrete expression in a modernization of the nationalist ideology. They wanted a progressive – as opposed to a conservative – form of nationalism. At the same time, the scholars began the process of apprising others of limits the Cold War imposed on countries such as Brazil. This led to the defense of a “third way”: a position of independence with respect to liberalism and Marxism-Leninism, an independence from both blocs led by the superpowers of the time: the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Although *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo* was not focused strictly on international matters, it was a pioneer publication in that respect as two thirds of its articles were concerned with an analysis of international policy matters (Almeida, 1998).¹ According to Hollanda, although there are no detailed studies of *Cadernos*, the publication became the preferred vehicle through which this intellectual network sought to “clarify the state of the art of politics in the country, consider ways to act in the various segments of society, and both nurture and adjust their movement” (HOLLANDA, 2012).

1 The five volumes of the *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo* were republished in Volume 4 of the magazine *Revista Estudos Políticos*, accessible at <<http://revistaestudospoliticos.com/numero-4/>>.

The scholars of IBESP comprised the base of ISEB, which was created by decree no. 37.608, within the Ministry of Education of the Café Filho government, on July 14, 1955. The emergence of ISEB is the apogee of the formation of such institutes based on vague visions of nationalism and a modernization of the country's political, economic and social structures. The government – already expanded since the end of World War II, especially in the first half of the 1950s² – saw the creation of institutes, such as IBAM, in 1952, and the IBRI, in 1954. Although in different spheres and with their own agendas, they each carried out their interpretations of the “modernizing” thought that was characteristic of the era.

Although some of the institutes were private, they often interacted with the State in ways similar to ISEB, as they either received some funding from official sources, or a large part of their members were linked to the state bureaucracy in some way. In addition, the institutes often shared members – which at times were common to two or more of them. The modernization theories – plus their interpretations and reinterpretations – were, therefore, widely circulated, as they were distributed to this large group of inter-related people. As Raphael Nascimento wrote in a study published in 2005: there existed an “epistemic community,” which can be described by what would come to be called “national-developmentalism.”

2 Various such organs were created in the second government of Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954), including, at the top of the list, the *Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico* – BNDE (National Bank of Economic Development), and Petrobrás (the national oil company). In addition, there were the *Assessoria Econômica da Presidência da República* (Economic Advisory Body of the President of the Republic), the *Comissão de Desenvolvimento Industrial* (Commission of Industrial Development), *Superintendência do Plano de Valorização Econômica da Amazônia* (Superintendency of the Plan of Economic Valuation of the Amazon), the *Banco do Nordeste* (Bank of the Northeast), the *Banco Nacional de Crédito Cooperativo* (National Bank of Cooperative Credit), the *Instituto Nacional de Imigração e Colonização Nacional de Política Agrária* (National Institute of Policies for Agricultural Immigration and Colonization), and the *Serviço Social Rural* (Rural Social Service). Plus, in higher education, there were the *Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas* – CNPq (National Research Council), and the *Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior* – CAPES (Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Level Staff), which are also from the same period (D'ARAÚJO, 2004).

The multiple participation of members of the “epistemic community” involved in “national developmentalism”:

Personality	IBRI	IBAM	ISEB
Adroaldo Junqueira Alves		X	X
Cleantho de Paiva Leite	X	X	X
Evaldo Correia Lima	X		X
Helio Jaguaribe	X		X
Herbert Moses	X	X	X
Hermes Lima	X		X
José Honório Rodrigues	X		X
Luiz Simões Lopes	X	X	X
Marcos Almir Madeira	X		X
Mário Augusto Teixeira de Freitas	X	X	
Mário Travassos	X		X
Oswaldo Trigueiro	X	X	
Rômulo de Almeida		X	X
San Tiago Dantas	X		X
Temístocles Cavalcanti	X		X

Source: Nascimento, 2005, p. 60.

In the agenda of public municipal administration, the focus of IBAM, the principal goal was to break the patterns of the patrimonial State and improve public services in response to the rapid urbanization that Brazilian society had undergone.³ Nascimento, again, said (p. 54):

3 IBAM was created as a private, non-profit organization without political purposes or affiliations. The federal government recognized it as a public entity in November 1953. Its proposed activities included studies and research; the promotion and dissemination of practical ideas that would contribute to the development of municipal administration; the provision of technical assistance to municipalities, including educational courses aimed at improving municipal administration; and the publication of the *Revista Brasileira de Administração Municipal* (Nascimento, p. 54). IBAM still exists, with these same goals. It is headquartered in Rio de Janeiro.

[IBAM] ... fit within a broader movement that began in the 1930s. It advocated a streamlining of public administration with the creation of the Administrative Department of Public Service (DASP), [in 1938],... more specifically, [it was] an effort ... to provide municipalities – which had gained prominence with the Constitution of 1946 and ... the ongoing process of Brazilian urbanization – with the technical staff trained to respond to new challenges. Similarly, the appearance of institute is related to a specific group of people, including Luiz Simões Lopes, Rafael Xavier and Mario Augusto Teixeira de Freitas, responsible for transferring the values of the public administration movement from the federal to the municipal level. This same group was also responsible for the creation of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and the Brazilian School of Municipal Administration (EBAP), in addition to the aforementioned DASP.

The goal of the IBRI was to promote and encourage reflection on “international problems, especially those of interest to Brazil.” This was the first effort of Brazilian intellectuals concerned with world issues at an especially complicated time in international politics. The Cold War was a reality for almost a decade, and all countries sought to learn how to deal with it.

Shortly after the traumas of World War II, the outbreak of the Korean War reminded everyone that the possibility of new conflicts was very real. At the same time, the effects of the global ideological confrontation created new and profound divisions in domestic environments. In the Western bloc, efforts to contain communism were used to justify the curtailment of fundamental liberties; making political life a game of rules that played good against evil, as with McCarthyism in the United States and similar examples in the politics of its subordinate allies.

At the time, disarmament was not a significant agenda item. Quite the contrary; the superpowers sought the technological means to ensure military supremacy at all costs. Decolonization and the fate of the former colonial territories were beginning to emerge as increasingly important issues by the early 1950s. In 1951, a long journey towards the construction of Europe's integration process began with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and a joint effort to overcome European rivalries. The Bandung Conference, held in 1955, just one year after the creation of the IBRI, pointed to the existence of a much more varied international life, one that contrasted with the schematic nature of bipolarity. The concept of the Third World began at this time. The situation offered many challenges to countries such as Brazil, especially in understanding the risks of the new world order and envisioning the opportunities it offered.

In Brazil, the creation of an organization such as the IBRI was more symbolic than practical, as the institute did not maintain a professional secretarial structure, nor did it intend to intervene in Brazilian foreign policy matters. It was, above all, an authentic expression of the urgency to understand, on a national level, problematic international situations. The institute was created by individuals who were partly from IBAM and partly from what would soon become ISEB. In addition to the scholars, who defended the causes of modernization, several career diplomats also made up its membership base.

The opening ceremony of the IBRI took place on January 27, 1954, at the Itamaraty Palace in Rio de Janeiro, the then headquarters of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The location – and thus its connection with the State – cause one to ask what impact the institute's ideas and debates had on Brazilian international politics. The IBRI dealt with a diverse complexity of events large and small, such as the organization of lectures series

and seminars. Its major effort, however, as declared in its articles of incorporation, was to publish social science research, beginning with the 1958 launch of the aforementioned Brazilian Journal of International Politics (*RBPI*).⁴

ISEB, in turn, during its relatively brief existence (the military regime dissolved it in April 1964), played a central role in the debate of ideas, especially those concerned with modernization programs in Brazil. The institute, thereby, provided the theoretical part of national development. In the specific context of its early operation, during the initial years of the Juscelino Kubitschek administration, the institute and its members became important players in the debate, especially since the government recognized their importance to the process of public-policy formulation.

Since ISEB was strictly a state agency, as with IBAM, it had a regular structure. Roland Corbisier was the institute's first executive director (1955-1960). He led a departmentalized structure, which revealed its goals: Helio Jaguaribe was in charge of matters dealing with Political Science; Cândido Mendes, History; Ewaldo Correia Lima, Economics; Álvaro Vieira Pinto, Philosophy; and Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, Sociology.

According to Cândido Motta Filho, a writer, teacher, and politician, who served on the Supreme Court of Brazil, 1956 - 1967:

[ISEB's purpose was to] devote itself to the Social Sciences; applying the categories and data of these sciences to an analysis and critical understanding of the Brazilian reality; using their theoretical tools, to stimulate and advance national development (apud PÉCAUT, 1999, p. 110).

4 The IBRI worked in Rio de Janeiro until 1992, publishing the *RBPI* continuously, albeit with much difficulty. Both the organization and the journal moved to Brasília in 1993, and they are still inspired by a group made up of diplomats and academics.

ISEB assembled numerous scholars, who were “invited for their abilities not only to intervene directly in the management of economic policy, but also to participate in the construction of a new legitimacy; thereby, placing themselves at the creation of a national developmentalist synthesis” (PÉCAUT, 1999, p. 110). ISEB’s trajectory, therefore, was irreversibly linked to nationalist thinking with a focus on development.

Jaguaribe, himself, in a critical and retrospective analysis he wrote on the trajectory of ISEB, recalled that the analyses developed there attempted to overcome the limitations of Marxist and positivist perspectives, to seek a new understanding of the era and the country. He knew the institute was engaged in a very complicated task (JAGUARIBE, 1979).

The scholars who participated in ISEB at the beginning, whose names were immortalized as “historical *Isebians*” – Jaguaribe, Álvaro Vieira Pinto, Cândido Mendes and Roland Corbisier – understood that nationalism had unifying and motivating powers, which allowed for the transformation of progressive interests of society. They also believed there was a need for autonomy in relation to foreign constraints, more specifically, concerning its ties to the domestic environment. In other words, whether it is imperialism or foreign capital – whatever is proposed – it should have a “rational and functional” view with a goal of benefiting the international insertion of the country and its modernization.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTALISM AND JAGUARIBE'S WORK

Helio Jaguaribe is one of the most consistent advocates of an autonomous and multidimensional approach of nationalism. He understands it as a historical and social phenomenon related to the poignant transformations that Brazil has undergone since the 1930s. In his influential book, *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira*, Jaguaribe sought definitions for the terms: "political" and "economic nationalism." He also sought to understand how they could be used to articulate different positions within the spheres of Brazilian international policy and action. In his perspective, nationalism acquires its own sense, an "awareness of Brazilian interests in contrast to those of other nations" (JAGUARIBE, 1958, p. 31-32).

According to Jaguaribe, the economic transformations accompanying industrial growth, allow one to see basic changes in a country's social make up. In his mind, there were two sectors driven by different worldviews: one nationalist, and the other cosmopolitan. Nationalism, he believed, was tied to industrialism, a new form of production that demanded that the State act in favor of development. He said this would come about from the industrial bourgeoisie, the growing middle class, and a modern State bureaucracy working together.

Jaguaribe saw the cosmopolitan worldview as tied to the primary and export sectors of the economy, led by large estates and the commercial bourgeoisie. Economic development, he believed, was the natural ambition of the nationalist sector (JAGUARIBE, 1958, p. 35).

What separated Jaguaribe from other scholars of the group of historical Isebian was his interpretation that nationalism must be pragmatic; it should be a means and not an end in itself. In that sense, Jaguaribe's ideas came very close to those also advocated by

the economist and diplomat, Roberto Campos, who at the time was part of the Juscelino Kubitschek administration. Both Campos and Jaguaribe defended the central role of the State and, consequently, of State planning, in industrialization and development strategies. One difference between the two was that the ideas Campos defended had immediate application in Kubitschek's *Programa das Metas* (Plan of Targets), and in the establishment of a non-ideological approach regarding the role that foreign capital should play in Brazilian development (BIELSCHOWSKY, 2000, p. 105).

Although Jaguaribe's ideas were not directly part of a government program at that time, they were the basis of a radical process of modernization that began to be outlined in the spheres of foreign policy and development during the Kubitschek administration. The nationalist sector, in Jaguaribe's conception, had to define a modernization strategy in which foreign participation had a central importance. According to Nascimento (2004):

[In] foreign policy, the projection of the nation's interest [is] expressed by pragmatism; by means of a cost-benefit analysis of the results vs the efforts; by a relatively non-ideological approach to international relations. The core goal of a national developmentalist foreign policy [is] to increase goods and services: that is national development.

A good definition of pragmatism can be found in the aforementioned Plan of Targets of the Kubitschek administration. The tripod upon which that plan's design rested its development strategy was composed of an association of state monopolist capital, national private capital, and foreign capital. This model also characterized the later mature phase of the modernization strategy of national developmentalism.

The most remarkable influence of Jaguaribe's ideas in the international arena, however, came relatively soon after the Kubitschek years. Although it did not yet offer any immediate concrete results, it actually occurred when the strategy of Independent Foreign Policy was developed during the government of Jânio Quadros. Jaguaribe's book, *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira* – which outlined a similar strategy – was published almost three years before the public disclosure of Quadros' Independent Foreign Policy plan appeared in the journal, *Foreign Affairs*, in 1961. Jaguaribe, therefore, had already espoused many of the arguments that were later incorporated into the nation's foreign policy.

Jaguaribe stated that a change in Brazil's foreign policy was crucial, and that a clear connection should exist between the country's foreign policy and its development strategy. He then classified two worldviews with different forms of international insertion for the country: a "cosmopolitan view," in favor of an alignment with the United States, part of an essentially American axis; and a "nationalist view," which sought a neutral position, tied to a better understanding of the nation's interests, in which the country would permanently be in a state of nonalignment. The consistent criticism of these two approaches, along with a third – the so-called "realistic" approach – is at the center of debates concerning the course of Brazilian foreign policy.

Jaguaribe's analysis of the options concluded that the "neutralist" way offered the greatest possibilities to fulfill the interests of a country such as Brazil. This conclusion was supported by a recognition of the historical ties the country had with the West, and above all, the weight the United States had on this bloc – especially, in defense of "Western civilization," to which Brazil unequivocally belonged. Neutralism allowed Brazil to expand. It could fulfill its interests in its asymmetric relations

with the United States and other developed countries, while simultaneously seek new opportunities in the developing world.

Among those new opportunities, one constant and highly valued theme in Jaguaribe's writings was a search for better relations with Argentina. Indeed, in *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira*, as well as several of his other works, the need to overcome the historic rivalry between the two countries and enter into a mutually beneficial cooperative economic relationship was one of the most remarkable constants in his thought. He believed that Latin American economic integration, especially more collaboration with Argentina, was necessary, to limit the supremacy of the United States in the region and, consequently, increase Brazil's autonomy.

Jaguaribe acknowledged the difficulties Brazil would face with the adoption of a "neutralist and pragmatic" foreign policy. In the domestic sphere, there would be the need to overcome the interests of the *Estado Cartorial*, a term coined by Jaguaribe, himself, in 1950, roughly meaning a public entity whose main purpose is to provide jobs, but not necessarily function efficiently. In the international sphere, he recognized that major difficulties could arise, depending on the United States' reaction to the country's claim of a neutralist position and – although to a lesser extent – how such a policy would be received in the bipolar world; in other words, how *both* superpowers would behave relative to neutral countries.

Although Helio Jaguaribe's internationalist thought and its interpretations were present in the Independent Foreign Policy developed in the early 1960s, by those such as Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco and Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas during the short presidency of Jânio Quadros, it is important to note that Jaguaribe was not necessarily the intellectual father of that plan.

It is credible to assume, however, that his earlier thoughts and writings were included in the political debate, and they decisively influenced the making of the policy.

INTERPRETATIONS OF A TIME OF CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION: THE *REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL* – *RBPI*

The Brazilian Journal of International Politics (*Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* – *RBPI*) is one of the most traditional of Brazilian scientific publications.⁵ The quarterly periodical was created in Rio de Janeiro, in 1958, by the IBRI. Initially, not a scientific vehicle; it acquired that feature, in 1993, when its publication was moved to Brasília.⁶ Conceived as a vehicle to disseminate ideas and debates on international issues,

5 The *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (RBPI) can be accessed at <<http://www.scielo.br/rbpi>>. The issues published between 1958 and 1993 were digitalized and published in *Mundorama–Iniciativa de Divulgação Científica em Relações Internacionais*, at the University of Brasília. They are accessible at <<http://www.mundorama.net>>.

6 The *RBPI* has seen three major phases to date: From its inception in 1958 until 1993, the periodical published Brazilian thought on international relations as expressed by intellectuals, diplomats and a few academics. The majority of the academic community was not yet involved, however, and the management of the periodical was outside the university environment. In 1993, the Brazilian Institute of International Relations was transferred to Brasília, and the *RBPI* was placed in the hands of a group of researchers at the University of Brasília, where it has maintained its operating base ever since. In its new headquarters the process of consolidation of the scientific aspects of the periodical began, exactly when the study of international relations was expanding in Brazil with the growth and sophistication of a specialized academic community and an exponential increase in the number of undergraduate courses offered in the subject area. The *RBPI* became an eminently scientific magazine, similar to those published in first-line study centers around the world. In addition, the growing international insertion of Brazil made Brazilian foreign relations a subject of interest to new and diverse segments of society, and the editors of the publication responded with an expansion and diversification of objective analyses. And finally, in phase three, the current time, information technology and a modification of traditional models of scientific communication have equipped the publishers of the periodical with the same quality standards existing in countries of great tradition in the area. The publication has, therefore, extended its international visibility, increased its circulation, and met the increasingly demanding criteria of national development agencies, both for its own economic viability and its ascent in the rating scales of national and international indexing.

it established an important dialogue with the Brazilian academic environment as the debate about international relations gained stature with the strengthening of the Brazilian university system. The *RBPI* was devoted to stimulating thought and reflection on international matters, especially those significant to Brazil.

The *RBPI* was not the first Brazilian periodical to publish studies on international issues. The aforementioned *Cadernos do Nosso Tempo* had already included many studies with international themes in its brief existence; and military journals – such as the *Revista Marítima Brasileira*, as early as 1851, and *A Defesa Nacional*, in 1913 – had also done the same (Almeida, 1998). Additionally, the *Revista Brasileira de Economia* and the *Boletim de Conjuntura Econômica*, both created in 1947, had published documents and analyses about international economics, as had the *Revista Estudos Econômicos*, published by the Federation of Commerce of Rio de Janeiro (Almeida, 1998). The *RBPI* was unique, however, in that it was not connected to the State, and because – from its initial edition – it sought to offer *Brazilian* views on international matters. The ambition to frame international politics from a Brazilian perspective, at the time of the spectacular transformations of the Cold War when the publication was launched, says much about the intentions of the group of scholars and diplomats in charge of its design.

From its beginning, the *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* was considered a vehicle of national thought devoted to the central theme of modernization with a broadening of the country's international horizons and a connection to national development. That feature was clearly established in its first few issues, and throughout its many volumes of constant publication. The direction and oscillations of Brazilian international politics – along with ideas related to the international order, major confrontations among world powers, the rise and fall of empires,

and numerous other themes on the international agenda – were all systematically followed and critically analyzed.

When the creators of IBRI published the *RBPI*, their aim was to produce a medium that could explain both the challenges of international politics, and the resulting transformation of Brazil's international insertion. Since its origins, the *Revista* discussed each of the crucial moments of Brazilian history, as seen from the point of view of their foreign challenges. The *Revista* addressed such varied matters as: the launching of Operation Pan-America, by the government of Juscelino Kubitschek; the Independent Foreign Policy of the Jânio Quadros government; changes of political regimes; the complexity of relations with neighboring countries; the universalization of foreign relations; national security issues and their relations to national defense strategies; relations with international partners, especially the United States and Europe; the building of new relationships, including openings towards Africa and Asia; the connections of foreign policies with economic development strategies; and the evils of structural dependence. As such, the *RBPI* became the preferred vehicle of the national debate concerning the international choices of Brazil (Almeida, 1998).

Major themes of contemporary international politics were also the object of attention by analysts, who found in the *RBPI* an appropriate space in which to discuss their research and ideas. Topics such as international trade, economic integration, international financial flows, scientific and technological development, the environment, human rights, Antarctica, international cooperation, international security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, among many others, received pioneering treatment in Brazil in the pages of the *Revista* (Lessa, 2007). Indeed, the *RBPI* was the first publication – both in Brazil and in Latin America – to address some of these issues from an internationalist perspective.

Throughout its existence, the *RBPI* has maintained an extraordinary consistency with its founding purpose. The teams that have published it, have made decisions to ensure that it is not only a vehicle of academic debate, but also a way to view and think about international relations, as well as current issues in general. That may be the reason for its survival while so many similar publications have folded.

CONCLUSION

Helio Jaguaribe is considered one of the most eloquent intellectuals of his generation – the “national developmentalism generation.” Some have even called him the last “public scholar” of Brazil. He is the survivor of a dynamic network that sought to discover reasons for the country’s lack of advancement and solutions to its problems.

The term public scholar is a proper description for Helio Jaguaribe. He was not an academic in the strictest definition of that word as he did not conduct most of his work in universities. His trajectory should, therefore, not be confused with a long university career, which has become the norm with other Brazilian scholars due to the expansion of universities and the subsequent growth of the social sciences in the country since the 1960s. Jaguaribe was, however, an important figure for universities. His passage through major academic centers in the United States, for example, asserts the extraordinary prestige of his thought. The university environment may, however, have been too narrow to support his restless thought and the unusual ways he interpreted Brazil along with the difficulties of national modernization.

Much of Helio Jaguaribe’s broad analytical thought is related to the international sphere of Brazil. He is concerned with the

traditional political, economic and social structures of the country: how they could be obstacles to international policies, the tools of national development, or both. His interpretation of international constraints and his prescriptions for action were fundamental to those who developed Brazil's foreign policy during the past half century. It is not difficult, for example, to see the marked influence of his ideas in the strategy of Independent Foreign Policy. His vision of the state of the world is relevant to the future of Brazil.

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**JOSÉ HONÓRIO
RODRIGUES**

José Honório Rodrigues was the son of the merchant Honório José Rodrigues and Judith Pacheco Rodrigues. Although he was a graduate of Law from the old University of Brazil, in 1937, his interest in History started when he was 24 years old, standing out in the field as a prestigious scholar and soon after as a professor of Brazilian History in important teaching institutions. His knowledge endowed him with a seat at the Brazilian Academy of Letters in 1969 and various awards, including a Medal of the National Congress in 1980. He worked to improve the methodology in the study of History as science with the purpose of changing the attitude towards History. He was a great admirer of Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen and Capistrano de Abreu for their incomparable works on both General and Brazilian History. He was married to the historian Lêda Boechat Rodrigues.



JOSÉ HONÓRIO RODRIGUES: HISTORIAN OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND AFRICANISM

Paulo Visentini

The Brazilian foreign policy is a clean reflection of all its history. It has the same unstable and endless framework, of advances and regressions of the domestic history. Dominated by an oligarchy who is served by the Nation instead of serving it, headed by an elite alienated by its training, the foreign policy had, as our entire history, the hours of autonomous and free creation, and rulers that knew how to firmly defend the Brazilian interests.

José Honório Rodrigues

The historian José Honório Rodrigues was mainly a scholar and intellectual, not having exercised diplomatic activities or occupied political positions. However, this does not mean that his work, since a certain moment, has not become politically engaged and inserted in a broad movement of change of the Brazilian diplomacy. When he studied the diplomacy of the Empire, he was able to identify some axis of the Brazilian foreign policy, along the line that Pierre Renouvin called *Deep Forces*. That was specifically the case of the *national interest*, of *sovereignty* (or, at least, of the *autonomy*), of the *mixed nation* and of the *development*.

In the effervescence of the nationalism of the 1950's and the first half of the 1960's, with the Independent Foreign Policy, his work and his position acquired some aspects of "organic intellectual". His theses on the Brazilian diplomacy found great materiality in the foreign policy of Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart and, obviously, it suffered a deep impact with the implementation of the Military Regime, in 1964, and its apparent break regarding the paradigm of the Brazilian international insertion. In this aspect, his contemporary and most important works, *Brasil e África: Outro Horizonte* and *Interesse Nacional e Política Externa*, are marked by some pessimism, not sensing that the Military Regime would give continuity to various basic policies of the previous phase. Although the works analyzed here are about the pre-1964 period, many of them were published later as a compilation of sparse texts prior to the military coup. For that reason, they were included in this chapter.

THE ACADEMIC TRAJECTORY OF JOSÉ HONÓRIO RODRIGUES

José Honório Rodrigues was one of the greatest names of the Brazilian historiography (history of history), as well as of the Brazilian Diplomatic History. He was born in Rio de Janeiro, on September 20th, 1913, and he died in the same city, on April 6th, 1987. He was the son of the merchant Honório José Rodrigues and of Judith Pacheco Rodrigues. He studied in the Law School of the old University of Brazil, where he wrote for the magazine *A Época* and graduated in 1937. Despite graduating in Law, his interest in History became evident when, by the age of 24, he won the Knowledge Award of the Brazilian Academy of Letters with the book *Civilização Holandesa no Brasil*. He spent one year (1943-

44) in the United States, with a scholarship of the Rockefeller Foundation, for historical research at Columbia University.

When he came back to Brazil, he worked as a librarian in the Sugar and Alcohol Institute, in 1945, and head of the Research Section of the Rio Branco Institute, in the Ministry of External Relations (1948-1951). In the National Institute of the Book, he worked with Sergio Buarque de Hollanda, between 1958 and 1964, and was the director of the Division of Rare Works and Publications of the National Library and provisional director in some occasions. Here, Rodrigues had available to him a great amount of bibliography and sources about the history of Brazil, absorbing the knowledge that he conveyed in his works. One of the high public positions where he worked was as head of the Rio de Janeiro National Archive, from 1958 to 1964, where he carried out a major reform. In addition, from 1964 to 1968, he was executive secretary of the Brazilian Institution of International Relations (as well as Editor of the Brazilian Journal of International Politics) and was a member of the Commission of Texts on the History of Brazil of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also collaborated in the Program History of America, of the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History of America, mainly in the book *Brazil – Colonial Period* (1953).

As a professor, Rodrigues began his career in 1946, teaching disciplines of Brazilian History, Brazilian Diplomatic History, Brazilian Economic History and Brazilian Historiography, in various teaching institutions, such as the Rio Branco Institute, the School of Economic Science of Guanabara State, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, the Federal Fluminense University and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. He was also a lecturer, collaborator and visiting professor in many other universities, both Brazilian ones, such as in the Higher School of War, where he graduated in 1955, and American ones, such as those

of Texas and Columbia, in the 1960's and 1970's. He also taught at Oxford University, in the United Kingdom, as a visiting professor. He was a member of various societies, academies and institutes that taught History, both in Brazil and abroad. He was elected member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters in 1969, and won various awards, including a Medal of the National Congress, in 1980. He worked to improve the methodology in the study of history as science, freeing himself from the narrative and questioning the Brazilian historiographical production. His purpose was not to be a simple spectator, he wanted to understand the reality and reach a combative attitude towards History that not only projected current problems in anachronistic procedures (IGLÉSIAS, 1988, p. 77). He was a great admirer of Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen and Capistrano de Abreu, for their incomparable works of General and Brazilian History. He was married to the historian Lêda Boechat Rodrigues.

According to Francisco Iglésias (1988), José Honório Rodrigues has an extensive work, made up of books, articles, prefaces, lectures, small works and collaborations in books, which may be classified into:

- Theory, methodology e historiography, with such publications as *Teoria da História do Brasil* (1949); *Historiografia e Bibliografia do Domínio Holandês no Brasil* (1949); *A Pesquisa Histórica no Brasil* (1952); *Brasil, Período Colonial* (1953); *O Continente do Rio Grande* (1954); and *História da História do Brasil, a Historiografia Colonial* (1979).
- History of specific themes, with writings such as *Civilização Holandesa no Brasil* (1940); *Brasil e África, Outro Horizonte* (1961); *O Parlamento e a Evolução Nacional* (1972); *A Assembleia Constituinte de 1823* (1974); *Independência, Revolução e Contrarrevolução* (1976); *O*

Conselho de Estado: Quinto Poder? (1978); O Parlamento e a Consolidação do Império – 1840-61 (1982).

- Historiographical essays, in texts such as *Aspirações Nacionais* (1963), a work based on lectures made at the Higher School of War, between 1957 and 1964; *Conciliação e Reforma no Brasil* (1965); *História e Historiadores do Brasil* (1965); *Vida e História* (1966); *Interesse Nacional e Política Externa* (1966); *História e Historiografia* (1970); *História, Corpo do Tempo* (1976); *Filosofia e História* (1981); *História Combatente* (1983); *História Viva* (1985); *Tempo e Sociedade* (1986).
- Reference works: *Catálogo da coleção Visconde do Rio Branco* (1953); *Índices da Revista do Instituto do Ceará* (1959) e da *Revista do Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano*, (1961); *As Fontes da História do Brasil na Europa* (1950) e *Situação do Arquivo Nacional* (1959).
- Finally, editions of texts, with dozens of titles, mainly *Os holandeses no Brasil* (1942); *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional* (vols. 66 to 74); *Documentos Históricos da Biblioteca Nacional* (vols. 71 to 110); *Publicações do Arquivo Nacional* (vols. 43 to 50); *Cartas ao Amigo Ausente*, de José Maria da Silva Paranhos (1953); *Correspondência de Capistrano de Abreu* (3 vols., 1954 to 1956); *O Parlamento e a Evolução Nacional* (7 vols., 1972); *Atas do Conselho de Estado*. (13 vols., 1978); *Capítulos de História Colonial*, de Capistrano de Abreu (4.ed., 1954), whom he admired very much; and prefaces of various books.

WORKS OF HISTORICAL GROUNDING

Some of those writings will be analyzed here for the understanding of the work by José Honório Rodrigues concerning the study of history and of the Brazilian foreign policy. When he analyzed the Brazilian history of the colonial and imperial periods, he gathered a set of material information and theoretical analyses that allowed him to observe certain problems and constant elements of the Brazilian diplomacy, which grounded his statements about the contemporary period. Above all, it can evaluate the essence of the *national interest* and the importance of *autonomy*, as a base for the development of the nation, both in its domestic and its foreign dimensions.

Civilização Holandesa no Brasil (1940)

José Honório Rodrigues and Joaquim Ribeiro wrote the book *Civilização Holandesa no Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1940) that won the 1st Knowledge Award of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, in 1937. In the preface by Joaquim Ribeiro, the author states that José Honório practically wrote the entire work, with his collaboration being limited to the work's general outline and a few chapters. In the introduction, the book was considered an instrument to understand preliminary problems for a "clear and authentic reconstruction" of the period of Maurício de Nassau. The authors claimed that the first problems had to do with the Atlantic matter, with the episode of the Dutch invasion in the Brazilian Northeast being only part of its expansionism in America. The preliminary issues continued with the land problems, of "anthropogeographic" (p. 1) reasons to understand the reason for the Dutch to settle in Pernambuco; and of the problems of the peoples, the study of the races and anthropology, of the cultural elements and the linguistic influence of Dutch Brazil. In addition, throughout the book, the figure of Maurício de Nassau, as political

leader, will also be addressed, through a general bibliography about the theme, as a source guide. José Honório did not abandon the theme, studying deeply the Northeast, becoming a reference in terms of Dutch domination, even editing basic texts of the national and international bibliographies (IGLÉSIAS, 1988, p. 65).

***Teoria da História do Brasil:
introdução metodológica (1949)***

The main theme of the book *Teoria da História do Brasil: introdução metodológica* (São Paulo: Instituto Progresso, 1949), by José Honório Rodrigues is history as science, using basic themes of the Brazilian historiography to question history (IGLÉSIAS, 1988, p. 62).

Already in the preface to the first edition, Rodrigues showed the importance of Methodology for the study, the research, the historiography, the theory and the philosophy of History. The author indicated that there is a mistake in the teaching of history in Brazil, where the discipline of Methodology was not taught, unlike the European, American and Argentinean universities. Such book was considered, at that time, a guide for the historiographical study in Brazil, an introduction to history and the historical research for the scholars of the subject, in the exhibition of theories, methods and criticisms. In the second edition, in turn, in 1957, the author praised the creation of the discipline of Introduction to the Historical Studies, by the regulation of Law 2594, of September 8th, 1955, which provided autonomy for the courses of History and Geography, for a new series. The second edition also underwent many changes in order to fulfill the new restlessness of the history scholars.

Historiografia e bibliografia do domínio holandês no Brasil (1949)

Rodrigues believed that such work resulted from a systematic process to gather material and to sort both in bibliographic and in critical terms the Dutch domination in Brazil. Much of the material gathered came from Brazilian and Dutch historical magazines. The period began in 1621, with the analysis of the consequences of the war against Spain, of 1555, and reaching the warring expansion and the capitalist logic by the sea “Oceanic” sea and the Atlantic beaches. Thus, the books and small works were distributed along the book into nine chapters, which include works on general and Dutch history, on the history of the Brazilian States, mainly those of the Northeast, in order to understand the Dutch colonial expansion in Brazil, as well as on the general history of the Dutch in Brazil, diplomatic history of the Netherlands and the Iberian Peninsula, among other chapters that serve as guide to understand the theme, based on the set of bibliographies gathered in the text.

Pesquisa histórica no Brasil: sua evolução e problemas atuais (1952)

Many years of investigation about historical research in Brazil made José Honório lecture about it at the International Colloquium of Luso-Brazilian Studies, in Washington D.C., in October 1950, in the Commission of Work Instruments, which resulted in this book. Rodrigues claimed the historical research in Brazil included the gathering of informative data, existing written documents of historical value, surveys, personal observation, “in short, what provides to us material for the reconstruction of the historical life” (p. 19). Rodrigues distinguished the public and private historical researches, and throughout the book, he analyzed and described the evolution of both, with the introduction of Historical Institutes both in Brazil and abroad; researches by various historians, such as

Varnhagen (whom he considered the Master of Brazilian General History) and Capistrano de Abreu, Rio Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, among others; national and international missions; and analyses of archives and libraries. Finally, Rodrigues justified and idealized the creation of the National Institute of Historical Research to solve the current problems of the historical research in Brazil. *A pesquisa histórica no Brasil: sua evolução e problemas atuais*. Rio de Janeiro: National Press, 1952.

Vida e história (1966)

In the work *Vida e história* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966), José Honório Rodrigues showed lectures, contributions, seminars, essays and articles about the tendencies, the conceptualizations and the renewals of the Brazilian and the foreign historiographies (p. XV). Thus, this book gathered the studies about tendencies and interpretations of the new and Brazilian historiography, and about the characteristics of the people from Rio de Janeiro, in the first part, articles about foreign historians, scholars of the history of Brazil, in the second part, and, in the third part, it showed foreign historians about General History, given the lack of knowledge of the Brazilian scholars as compared to the foreigners. In that work, a passage by Rodrigues stated that “the historian must never have a longing or reactionary purpose, since that means avoiding the dialogue between past and future, [...] the historian must not see life like a moralist, since he knows that virtue is not on one side and sin is on the other” (p. XVI).

História da história do Brasil (1979)

The book *História da história do Brasil* (2nd ed. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1979), by José Honório Rodrigues, belongs to a collective effort to analyze the historiographical

evolution concerning Brazil and to make a triptych of theory, research and historiography (IGLÉSIAS, 1988, p. 9). In his preface, the author established the criteria of delimitation of the historical work, the proper inclusion in historiography, and the difficulties of application in the study of the historiography of the history of Brazil. The author believes that the value of the historical work is its contribution for the epistemological evolution of the discipline, rather than its formal and literary aesthetic aspects (p. XV). Thus, the work concerning the study of history is the one that gives sense to its description or interpretation since the interaction with the historical process, while the past gives sense to the analysis (p. XVII). That excludes from the historiographical study “[...] official documentation (legislation, for example), historical documents, such as mail, representations, writs, requests, petitions, certificates, consultations, etc. [...]” (p. XVII) and the chronicles. The latter, according to the author, include the greatest difficulty in the historiographical study of Brazil. According to the author, the historical study is different from the chronicle since the latter is made up of a narrative without any “historical awareness”, being the object of the historical study, not of the historiographical one and the one that distinguishes itself for historical awareness. The author exemplified his argument in the analysis of the bandeirante lack of productivity and Jesuit productivity, “He [the bandeirante] does not long for the current approval, did not care for the future historical assessment, unlike the Jesuits, whose historical awareness suggested narrator, next to the missionary or in himself” (p. XVIII). Finally, for the Brazilian historical case, the author emphasized the specific character of the exclusion of the reports of the European travelers to Brazil in the early colonial period in the historiographical analysis, which is closer to the chronicle than to the historical study (p. XIX). In that sense, the referential historiographical production by José Honório Rodrigues is focused

on the idea of “avoiding that a historiography eventually becomes a history of the historical documentation” (p. XIX).

A revolução americana e a revolução brasileira da independência (1776-1822) (1977)

In the article “A revolução americana e a revolução brasileira da independência (1776-1822)” (Revista de História de América. Mexico, n. 83, January/June 1977, p. 69-91), Rodrigues presented, first, the evolution of the concept of the word Revolution, from the Latin, meaning return, until the application to politics, as a violent and total change in the government and the State, as macro-historical change and break in the system. According to Rodrigues,

the structure is the set of the economic, social, political and psychological conditions. The revolutionary situation may be defined as a short-term crisis within the system, with domestic long-term tensions, which offer a revolutionary awakening. The structure may be a pre-condition, while the situation is a precipitating factor (p. 70).

According to the author, the American Revolution had a significant importance, since it was the first struggle to stop imperial relations in the modern time, and for that reason it has three interpretations about the causes of the Revolution, which emphasize more the political, or economic or commercial issues. Later, Rodrigues states that the liberal-bourgeois American Revolution represented the victory of capitalism and of the Calvinist Protestantism (p. 76). The United States broke relations with Great Britain, and established a new economic structure and they tied the economic liberalism to the political one, and such structural change affected the economic, social and political spheres.

The author claimed that in Brazil there was a revolutionary succession between 1789 and 1817, despite the oppression, the militarization, the injustices and of the spoliation of colonialism and absolutism. There were expressions of revolution in structural chain, such as the *Inconfidência Mineira*, conspiracies in Rio de Janeiro, in Bahia, of the Suassunas, until the Revolution of 1817, with the permanence of the rebels for two months in power. Rodrigues presented the Revolution of 1822 with its revolutionary and counterrevolutionary features of control, based on the repercussion of the American and the French Revolutions according to José Bonifácio. It is worth emphasizing that even though a Portuguese monarch carried out the Independence, the USA was the first country to recognize it, even supporting a total break with the metropolis. According to the author, in the USA there was a radical change, an actual revolution, unlike ours, which was carried out by a counter-revolution, which resulted in the economic, political and social underdevelopment (p. 91).

Uma História Diplomática do Brasil: 1513-1945 (1995)

This book was an effort of Lêda Boechat Rodrigues and of Professor Ricardo Antônio Silva Seitenfus with the purpose to edit José Honório's classes on the History of Brazil and Diplomatic History in the Rio Branco Institute, where he began to teach in 1946, by invitation of the Ambassador Hildebrando Accioly. In a first moment, his classes were transcribed into study aids about the theme, and José Antônio Soares de Sousa analyzed them, for some possible publication. Rodrigues remembered the study aids only in 1986 because of a letter from Editora Paulistana, regarding some publication project. However, with the stroke he had on May of that same year, there could not be any review. When he died, in April 1987, Lêda, his wife for 46 years, saw the need to publish many works that her husband wrote and organized, with the help

of Professor Ricardo Seitenfus, who kept contact with Rodrigues since the 1970's, the post-humous book of Rodrigues, *Uma História Diplomática do Brasil*.

In chapter 1, "The Concept of Diplomatic History", the author tries to emphasize the role of periodization in history, as a collection of structural elements and spiritual goals that mark a characteristic phase (p. 25). Thus, periodization was considered a distinction in historical terms, not a division, taking into account the several factors that influence the aspects of human activity. The author claimed one cannot study and isolate diplomacy within itself, with the economic, geographic, social and political contexts, in addition to foreign policy being an expression of the National Power, or a sum of contracts among the national policies of the independent sovereign States (p. 27). Rodrigues pointed out that the techniques that we use during the history of the international relations were isolation, expansion, neutrality, arbitration and pacifism, in face of the dichotomous alternatives of peace and war. In this book, Rodrigues, with the review of Seitenfus, emphasized the game of the power politics, more than the simple diplomatic history, to create true permanent national goals for our foreign policy (p. 29), such as the improvement of the Brazilian economic power to a new position of National Power.

In the topic about the periodization, the authors applied Jung's theory of extroversion and introversion, according to Klingberg, to distinguish a pattern of alternance among those first positions since 1776, in the United States, in order to explain the history of the foreign policy in that country. Thus, Jung's theory was presented as the introversion position being "inwards character[...], distracted, full of self-esteem, often ill-adapted to his environment", and the opposite extroversion, outwards, "sociable, expansive, submissive to fashion, friend to all novelties

[...] it did not correspond to the warrior, conqueror, imperialist and annexing behavior [...] but to the pacifist, conciliator, internationalist” (p. 35). Thus, because of events such as wars, armed expeditions, annexations and diplomatic warnings, Jung set phases of introversion (that lasted 21 years on average) and extroversion in the USA (that lasted 27 years on average), the causes of which had both foreign and domestic factors (p. 40).

Starting here, the authors presented a suggestion for the periodization of the Diplomatic History of Brazil, into 1) Imperial or Expansion Period (From the Treaty of Tordesilhas to the loss of Uruguay, 1928); 2) National Period, or of consolidation of the political and military defense of the territory (until Rio Branco); and 3) Interamerican Period, or of integration in the continental community (p. 45). According to the theory, the first extroverted phase included the expansion of the bandeirantes, the Treaty of Tordesilhas, the papal bulls, the concept of ownership (*uti possidetis*), among other issues. The first introverted phase was the greater awareness of the geographic reality of the continent and it limited the national willingness to defend and preserve its territorial heritage, opposing the expansion of Argentina (p. 46). The second extroversion phase included, for example, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance against Rosas, in 1850 and later the intervention in Uruguay and the Paraguay War. The second introversion phase is “to solve serious domestic problems: slave abolition, the matter of the bishops, Republic, progressing in that manner until the occupation of the Trindade Island (1895)” (p. 47). Rio Branco and the definition of the Brazilian territory are the greatest examples of the third extroversion phase, and when he died, the foreign policy turned inwards for the third time, to maintain the position conquered, until the fourth extroversion phase, when Brazil entered World War I, against an extra continental country, passed by the League of Nations and participated in the world matters (p.

48). With the crisis of 1929, in the 10 following years, our position was of introspection in the world scenario (unlike Latin America, which participated in resolutions such as the Letícia matter and the Chaco War), which eventually changed with World War II, in the fifth extroversion phase.

Despite the contribution of José Honório Rodrigues for the development of History as Science, endowing it with a stricter methodology, this work was inserted more in the traditional line of the Diplomatic History. However, this contradiction might only be a reflection of the conservative demands of the institution, Rio Branco Institute.

AN ENGAGED ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL'S AFRICAN POLICY AND THE INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

Interesse Nacional e Política Externa (1966)

The author, already as a diplomatic history professor, described the work *Interesse nacional e política externa* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966) as “a work that is neither organic nor planned”, a compilation of studies focused on “the search for the regularities and tendencies of the Brazilian historical process, influenced in its foreign sphere by the outside pressures, or seen according to its international effects” (p. 1). From the methodological point of view, the author claimed that, given the bureaucratic isolation and the elitist nature of the decision making in the national politics, “the long silence of the Brazilian people”, which is the object of analysis of the book is at the study of the “leaders” (p. 3). Following this consideration, the author developed his analysis based on the dispute between the “archaic and the new Brazil”. The materialization of this debate in the context in which

it is written is expressed in the criticism to the “harmful aspects of militarism” (p. 4-5). According to the author, the latter derives from the fact that security overcame development as the core of the political agenda, which was established by the penetration of ideas foreign to the national thought and, consequently, moved away from an authentic nationalism on behalf of interdependence. The last phrase of the author’s preface showed his view: “independence is a condition for existence and interdependence is the ideology of national suicide” (p. 7). Iglésias (1988, p. 74) claimed that José Honório addressed themes as grounds of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, of the Independent Foreign Policy, of the relations between Brazil and the United States, Brazil and the Far East, and Brazil and Africa.

In his conclusion, he came back to the debate of the preface and explained the compilation of analyses of the book.

During half a century as a republic, the Brazilian foreign policy was unreal, too modest, shy, irrelevant, but was never so hopeless about international victories indispensable to development, before the deadlines are over, which the demographic boom shortened.

The quotation showed the predominance of archaic Brazil in its foreign policy and the need to return to the unwise ideas focused on national development (p. 215).

Política externa independente: a crise do pan-americanismo (1965)

In the book *Política externa independente: a crise do pan-americanismo* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1965), José Honório Rodrigues inserted an article called “Uma Política Externa Própria e Independente”, in which he presented the foreign policy grounded on power and means of action, regardless of those resources being economic, populational power or national

characteristics. According to the author, already at the time of the Empire, there were permanent goals in the Brazilian Foreign Policy, such as the defense of sovereignty and independence, of the territorial integrity and the peaceful relations, as well as the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. However, the latter was part of a transitory policy, covered with legal formalities, which, after being exhausted, if necessary would give space to the imposition of decisions based on the use of force. In addition, such goals could undergo breaks because of other larger goals, in the defense of basic interests. Peace was crucial for the country to maintain a path of progress and consolidation in relation to the dominant European powers, mainly in the mid-19th century, when there were such events as the *Bill Aberdeen* and the Christie Matter. Thus, during the Empire, it was impossible to have a proper policy, because of the loans and the international prices, which were controlled by the major powers, which increased the Brazilian dependence.

Because of his more political than legal worldview (which was typical of the bachelors, who were the majority in the Empire), Rio Branco, by means of the definition of the borders and his political skill, took the first step to defend the territorial *status quo* and the equilibrium in South America, and to unlink the European influences to the Brazilian Foreign Policy. In order to maintain an equilibrium in the international system, the foreign policy carried out the considerable inflection towards the United States of America, through an integral follow-up of the policies, both the Interamerican and the global ones, even with restrictions. Thus, Law played again a predominant role in the face of politics, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is worth emphasizing the author's critical stance in relation to the Brazilian political elites of the Northeast, minoritarian and shaped according to the European image, of bachelors who

lived in an Africanized world and had great lack of sense of representativeness of their people, which was a reflex of the domestic policy. The author claimed that, “truth is that the country had been ruled by a representative oligarchy of rural interests, expressing [basically] its opinions and desires, [more] than those of the people, which did not exist in political terms until a short time ago. The diplomatic exercise was tied to the existence of this means and it was almost a monopoly of a kind of caste voted in a hereditary manner to the foreign policy do country” (p. 27). Thus, it can be stated that the diplomatic staff could even be partyless, but it was not socially neutral.

In “Uma Política Externa Própria e Independente”, Rodrigues also introduced the idea of underdevelopment, which raised in the national awareness after World War II, in paradox with the following of the American policy by the Brazilian Foreign Policy. The author claimed that only with Juscelino Kubitschek there was an intensive development policy, pointing, for example, to the Pan-American Operation, which, nevertheless, maintained the pro-United States line. Rodrigues stated that OPA, “as an economic policy of regional block, took away all intercontinental character from the Latin American international policy” (p. 32) since there did not seem to be any intention of universal participation or Latin America seemed an isolated portion of the world, in an almost impossible attempt to flee from the interdependence in relation to the West. Besides, the author criticized the “whitewashed” Brazilian elites and Positivism, as an ideology that he considered as underdeveloped, a subproduct of the European culture imposed on the Latin American countries, which eventually generated in their elites a thought of superiority as compared to the African and the Asian countries. José Honório indicated that the foreign policy option of that time between “Western orthodoxy or heresy” (p. 33) was not the most correct one, but that cooperation would

be the best solution for the development. A passage from the author exemplifies that thought: “We’re not against anyone, we’re only in favor of ourselves, as a people willing to obtain economic progress and social justice” (p. 33). Thus, the principles of pacifism, legalism, non-intervention, self-determination, anti-colonialism and the right to one’s own policy were those that ruled an own and independent foreign policy, according to Rodrigues.

With Jânio Quadros and his attempt of “globalization”, in addition to the change of our position in the Western free area, this led to an

adjustment policy that respected the hemispheric regionalism, did not devalue the intercontinental goals, broadened the trade and the political relations, refused the absolute commitments and ensured the interests of the representative regime and of the defense of peace (p. 35).

According to Rodrigues, since Quadros, the global significance of Brazil became stronger and our country more important, being able to request the equality of rights, treatment and competition. It is considerable that the relations with the United States were never neglected, because of their economic and commercial weight for Brazil. However, it became clearer that there could be some disagreement and contestation between both countries when our interests were differentiated or harmed. The author also points to the agreement of the public opinion about the Brazilian foreign policy with the administrations of Jânio Quadros, and later, João Goulart, being the agenda of party programs. However, it is worth emphasizing that, “the own and independent policy is not partisan. It is inspired in the radical nationalism, that is, in the roots of the national independence, in the idea of progress, in the real sources of the national behavior and in the democratic belief that the power comes from the people” (p. 39).

Brasil e África, um outro horizonte (1964)

In this work (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1964, 2 vols.), which became one of the main exponents of the intellectual production of José Honório Rodrigues, and of the studies about relations between Brazil and Africa, it can be observed the analysis of the elements that make up the close ties between both sides of the South Atlantic, through mutual relations and contributions, as well as its low level of interaction nowadays (in relation to the 19th and 20th centuries). In the preface, he clearly showed his goals in the work: “I believe that this book, written from the Brazilian point of view, maybe even too parochial, represented an effort towards understanding and a fraternity message” (p. XVII). However, he makes it clear that what guides his analysis is not any sentimental tie with Africa, but the perception of the benefits to the national interest that the better understanding of this theme could bring. The contribution that the author intends to make in the book is organized, still in the preface to its second edition (1964), in 19 theses about the ties between Brazil and Africa.

If the theses are analyzed as a whole, they offer a high power of synthesis to the content explored throughout the book, besides turning explicit the contribution that the author intends to offer. First, there were more intensive ties between Brazil and Africa than between Brazil and Portugal between the 16th and the 19th centuries, which meant that there existed an intercolonial community within the Portuguese Empire, in which the metropolis was the least important part. In this context, the period of slavery represented a phase of intensive Africanization of Brazil. Thus, both the African and the Native Indian collaboration contributed decisively to make up the basic structures of our society, with Brazil as the most Africanized nation in Latin America.

However, with the interruption of traffic around 1850, the 19th century represented an inflection point in the Brazilian Africanization. Despite that, Brazil became “one of the most perfect existing forms of racial friendship”, since the racial mix became a characteristic of the nationality and grounded the previous thesis. Brazil became a mixed-race Republic, with Africa making up a basic element of the Brazilian civilization matrix, although there was the distancing from Africa, since the 19th century, because the dynamics of the post-independence foreign policy moved Brazil away from Africa. Although there were solid ties between the Brazilian and the African settlers at the time of the Brazilian independence, the end of the slave traffic led to the ideological identification of the elites with Europe. Great Britain was considered an “ally” of Brazil in this context.

Thus, the work may be analyzed according to three groups, having the reading guided by the theses mentioned above. The focus of the first one is the analytical description of the relations established between the Brazilian settlers and the colonies in Africa and how those relations generate ties, mainly those deriving from the demographic interchange, which makes up the Brazilian civilization matrix. The second one shows how the intensive European immigration in the 19th century, first with the arrival of the Portuguese court in 1808 until the “whitening” of Brazil by the end of the century, together with the end of the slave traffic halfway through the same century, started a process that reduced the relations of Brazil with Africa. The last group points to the permanent ties that derived from the relations with Africa in the first few centuries of Brazilian colonial history as they were materialized in the formation of the Brazilian mixed-race society. This information lived with a distance from these populations of Africa itself, given the current moving away.

First, it is worth emphasizing the analysis made by the author of “Imagem da África”, in its first chapter. According to Rodrigues, the image of Africa and the African resulted from the confluence of myths cultivated in the midst of the lack of knowledge of Medieval Europe regarding Africa and of the discoveries and interpretations that derived from the first contacts with the continent in modernity. Distrust and fear predominated in the myths that added to the difficulty to dominate the African people, as well as their conversion to Christianity. The absence of a conscious denial to conversion led to a perception by the Europeans, of the incapacity by the Africans to join the Christian faith. The author claimed that this perception is at the base of how the Brazilians see Africa and in the secondary and stereotyped place that we have of it. That image “of a difficult territory because of the natural conditions, the barbarism of its people and the ferociousness of its animals” was fed by the extremely low level of formal knowledge offered to the Brazilian people about the African reality (even though within a broader Eurocentrism).

Next, he analyzed the first stage mentioned above. The author described and analyzed the role of the Brazilian settlers in the African colonial dynamics. According to the author, settlers of Brazilian origin dominated the evolution of the colonial enterprises and of trade in itself. Ultimately, the trade of African slaves supposedly created a tie between the Brazilian and the African colonies in a solid and autonomous manner in relation to Portugal.

In chapters 3 and 4, the author exploited the second group of the theses addressed in the work. In chapter 3, called “The African Contribution”, he stated that this resulted from the demographic increase that resulted from slavery and of the civilization content that resulted from this flow, as he exemplified in the passage: “by

the number of the population of African origin, by the mix of races, by the labor force and by the civilization fact that it represented, we must acknowledge the black and mixed-race contribution to Brazil". The author also claimed that there is a Brazilian-Afro-Asian society, with limited participation from Portugal, in the 18th century, with Africa making up a path of relations closer to the Brazilians than to the Portuguese. For States like Angola, Dahomey and Mine Coast, there was greater contact with Brazil than with Portugal, even because of the figure of Brazil as a former Portuguese colony. In chapter 4, Rodrigues exploited the influences of mixed-races in the formation of the Brazilian society. The author claimed that the plurality of cultural contents that resulted from the ethnic fusion of the mixed-race produced a society with a high level of interracial tolerance, which was crucial for the peace and social stability of Brazil.

Then, Rodrigues reaffirmed his defense of the ties between Brazil and Africa, based on the "Brazilian Contribution". According to the author, besides the Brazilian settlers having been in charge of the viabilization of the Portuguese colonization in Africa, products of Brazilian origin started to make up the productive agenda of these places. Thus, it was supposedly the geographic similarity itself that turned easier the general interchange between both sides of the South Atlantic.

In chapter 6, the author analyzed the process of the distancing of Brazil from Africa in the 19th century. That distancing might have originated in the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Brazil, which redimensioned the Portuguese significance and, as a consequence, the European one, in the Brazilian daily life. The end of the slave traffic, halfway throughout the century, turned this process stronger since it broke the support axle of the trade and political relations between Brazil and the African colonies.

Finally, the European immigration policy of the late 19th century, which he called the “whitening” of Brazil, represented a reflex of an increasing tie of the Brazilian elites with the European powers, whose development started to be a reference to ours.

An important dimension of the relations with Africa is the role of the South Atlantic, which became significant as an economic space as compared to the North Atlantic in the 17th century. Since the 16th century, there were intensive commercial exchanges between Brazil and Africa, the tropical nature of the human expansion and the Africanization of our ethnic group. José Honório Rodrigues even mentioned “an alliance that lasted three centuries” between Brazil and Africa. However, since the 18th century, with the beginning of the European industrialization, the North Atlantic became a greater protagonist and, with the end of the slave traffic in 1850, there was the alienation of the Brazilian elites, which claimed to be “white and Western”. In order to complete the picture, the Monroe Doctrine and the British squad, which dominated the seas, excluded Iberian America from the global balance of power.

Only with the end of World War II, the situation changed, with the advance of anticolonialism and of decolonization. From then on, José Honório Rodrigues became a member of the Third World, showing that most of the new States would be “underdeveloped” and made up the region known as Third World, which should unite for a more effective international action. Mainly because, in the case of Africa, before the decolonization there had been the formation of the European Economic Community, which had articulated neocolonial ties, mainly through France. Such ties created strong commercial competition between the new States and Brazil, as far as the European market was concerned. The competition took place mainly concerning tropical products, such

as coffee and cocoa, benefitted in comparison to the Africans by the European preferences regime.

As far as the Brazilian policy towards Africa was concerned, the author highlighted its shyness and its mistakes. He considered that decolonization represented a decisive historical phenomenon, since it ended an era marked by colonialism. Vasco da Gama was replaced by Kwame Nkrumah (President of Ghana), one of the major paladins not only of the independences, but also of the autonomy of the new States. The ties between Brazil and Africa at the time were mainly with South Africa, which led to the aversion by the other States. The problem is that such relations did not have only a domestic issue, but also an international one, since the United Nations Organization condemned the racist regime of *Apartheid* and the occupation of the African Southwest (currently Namibia).

Another serious problem was the impact of the relations with the Salazar regime of Portugal on the African States, mainly the issue of the decolonization of the so-called Portuguese “Overseas Provinces”. Rodrigues considered that the Treaty that created the Luso-Brazilian Community represented a victory of Lisbon. The Brazilian stance, which was one of abstention in the condemnation of Portugal in the UN, when there was the start of the armed fight and Salazar’s repression, was harmful to our diplomacy. In fact, the Brazilian international policy oscillated between the theses of the geopolitics of the Cold War and the principles of the Independent Foreign Policy of Quadros and Goulart.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AUTONOMY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

The principles that guided Brazilian international policy were identified in the work *Interesse Nacional e Política Externa*, by José Honório Rodrigues.

The Manifestos of 1822 define well our initial goals. Together with the integrity and the unity, since then there are many idealist or utopic elements, as well as other ones that are both subtle and complex. It involved many purposes and ideas, such as: security and prosperity, glory and national honor, happiness, the sense of dignity, sovereignty, peace, free trade, anticolonialism, non-intervention and self-determination (p. 10).

However, the difference between desire and reality was huge. When José Bonifácio addressed the acting American Consul, P. Santoris, in 1822, he expressed the Brazilian desire in the following way:

My dear Sir, Brazil is a Nation and, as such, it will occupy its place without the need to wait for or request the recognition of the other powers. Diplomatic agents or Ministers will be sent to them. Those that receive us in that way and treat us from Nation to Nation will continue to be admitted in our ports and will be benefitted in their trade. Those that deny it will be excluded from it (apud Rodrigues, p. 10).

After that solid demonstration of political will, there was a very different reality. According to José Honório Rodrigues himself,

we were born weak, baptized in infamous treaties, in which the economic grants combined with extraterritorial

rights of the European Powers. We suffered intermittent violations and insults, threats and intimidations, we had incidents and we paid undue indemnities. In turn, the powerful from Europe, mainly the English and the French, as well as the Americans, disrespected us (p. 12).

According to him, our foreign policy was shy until 1844, since it was “dominated by the Europeans, not allied to them, [since they supplied] the capital, the markets and labor, the latter mainly after 1850” (p. 49). The hemisphere was almost an absent dimension: in 1841, Chancellor Aureliano de Souza e Oliveira Coutinho stated that “it is an unchangeable principle of the imperial policy to observe strict neutrality in the ongoing wars that dilacerate the American States, mainly in their domestic affairs” (apud Rodrigues, p. 18). Thus, we had a bitter submission in relation to the North and an inescapable distancing in relation to the neighbors.

Rodrigues did not believe that there were major strategic projects in the Brazilian diplomacy. According to him,

I believe more in an admirable improvisation capacity and in the extraordinary intelligence of some builders of this policy. I also do not believe that we have undergone cycles of introversion and extroversion, of isolation and expansion. Unlike the United States, where this theory has been applied, we have always been directed towards the sea, towards communication and an extracontinental policy (p. 13).

This situation, once the ties with Africa had been cut and those with Europe had been reinforced in the mid-19th century, made our elite try to become more “latinized and westernized”, which led to the “whitening” thesis. Although always taking on the perspective of a developmentalist capitalism within the framework of a democratic system, he always fought what he considered an

inconsistent argumentation by this segment of the elite. According to him,

Western, although heretic, is Marxism, which dominated continental China and influences the Asian policy. What concerned the “non-caiada” elites⁷ and the majorities was the fear that Europe led us to the horrors of the Asian exploitation (p. 3).

In another passage, he quoted the dialogue in which the Italian Prime-Minister Amintore Fanfani told President Kennedy that

it is an irony that the communists, who believe in the dictatorship, are always addressing the masses, while the West, which believes in the democracy, always addresses the leaders (apud Rodrigues, p. 3).

In this context, he points to the fact that the foreign policy was ruled by a minority elite, without any ties to the mass of the population, alienated from the national reality and directed towards the Northern Powers. And turned easier the pressure of the powers on the nation, restricting its desires, submitting those elites and made its international strategy less independent, with the submissions always being economic, not political ones (p. 83).

Rodrigues claimed that the grounds of the Brazilian foreign policy were pacifism, legalism (international law), non-intervention, the right to self-determination, anti-colonialism and the right to formulate a proper policy. Basically, those are the same elements that San Tiago Dantas indicated when he defined the Independent Foreign Policy. Also in the same line, he suggested the need for a really global policy:

7 “Caiada” means the basic white painting applied to the external walls. According to the author, it represents the elite directed towards the whitening of the nation, the horizon of which was always Europe and the United States.

Brazil is a continental nation that must think in intercontinental terms, not only in the relations with America as a whole, but with everyone, including in the restoration of the tie to Africa, which Great Britain made us break in the mid-19th century (p. 74).

Such view was followed by a criticism to the policy of President Juscelino Kubitschek, who emphasized the diplomatic regionalization through the Pan-Americana Operation, decided in the Catete Palace instead of the Itamaraty.

Another extremely relevant paradigm in the work by José Honório Rodrigues is the definition of the *national interest*:

The national interest is the one that defends both the permanent and the current aspirations of the nation, and its purpose is basically to ensure two goals, namely the well being of the people, its rights and guarantees and those of the political unit and the territorial integration of the Union (p. 77).

Historically, in the foreign sphere, he claimed that he did not believe in doctrinary influences of the national policy and, consequently, of the domestic or foreign national interest. There was a radical constant, anti-Europeanism, because of what it meant in terms of the struggle against supremacy, preponderance and submission of our interest to the Europeans, mainly the British and the French (p. 84).

Later, this situation led to alliances with the United States and Chile, against Argentina and Europe, which allowed the Brazilian elite to take on the “Polar Star Thesis”. Rodrigues claimed that

the advocates of interdependence have existed for a long time and rank themselves in the same ideological group of the export economy rather than that of the production

for Brazil as the priority economic solution. His ideal is an associated or interdependent development, having as its gravity axle the Polar star. The Polar Star Thesis, formulated in 1913 by Columbian Marco Fidel Suárez, stated “el Norte de nuestra política externa deve estar allá, en esa poderosa nación, que más que ninguna outra ejerce decisiva atracción respecto de todos los pueblos de América”, gained many supporters (p. 212).

The assessment that José Honório Rodrigues made of the Republican foreign policy, right after 1964, is as follows:

During half a century as a republic, the Brazilian foreign policy was unreal, too modest, shy, irrelevant, but was never so hopeless about international victories indispensable to development, before the deadlines are over, which the demographic boom shortened. Thus, the interdependent policy is an ideology as abusively internationalist as the universal communism and for that reason it cannot be accepted neither by the civic nature of the patriots nor by the policy of the consequent nationalists, the first major task of a healthy policy is the progressive nullifying of the alienations of the sovereignty (p. 215).

CONCLUSION

The work by José Honório Rodrigues is based on a deep analysis of the Brazilian history, specifically of the colonial and imperial periods and of the early decades of the Republic. Then it extracts elements to argue in favor of the autonomy of the international action of Brazil. The notion of *nationalism* is inescapable, which permeates the author's view in all the books

and articles that he wrote. Although he did not exercise any political and diplomatic function, his classes had great influence on more than one generation of diplomats and politicians. As far as the most recent period (1950's and 1960's) are concerned, his studies became more instrumental and prescriptive, also strongly based on the analysis of the major international events, instead of only on the Brazilian foreign policy. Throughout the entire work, the structural significance of the relations between Brazil and Africa as support for the Brazilian international insertion is axial.

However, there are two issues that denote a sort of analytical frailness: the mystification of the "people" and the idea that what is "fair and rational" must impose itself on what is dysfunctional in a nation. In the same line, its engagement in favor of the Independent Foreign Policy turned obscure his assessment about the diplomacy of the Military Regime. In this point, he was more interested in the appearance than in the essence and its continuity elements. Before 1964, his work had a more academic focus and, later, it was more engaged in political terms, although it was controversial. The South American dimension of the Brazilian Foreign Policy is absent, even when it addresses the need to unite the developing countries (Third World).

Curiously, his progressive stance coincided with the one considered "conservative" by Gilberto Freyre about the benefits of mixed-race for Brazil. The diplomacy of Presidents Lula and Dilma, which is largely based on the view by Rodrigues, among others, considers Brazil a "multiracial and multicultural" country, thus denying what he considered the essence of the Brazilian nature: a mixed-race country. The racialization that dominated the direction of the current social relations eventually merge the "Brazilian people" in sectorial struggles and hides the social contradictions,

which pleased a certain anthropology that was popular in the North Atlantic nations.

Nevertheless, his contribution is decisive concerning the division of the ruling elite, with part of it betting on a “minor Brazil”, *junior partner* of the United States and Europe, as well as in the identification of the controversial notion of *national interest* and in the long-term elements of history and of the international insertion of Brazil. In the same line, his defense of a more proactive stance for our diplomacy and of a global and extra-hemispheric engagement, denote solid intuition regarding the future imperatives. The foreign policy of the 1970's and 1980's, and later that of the 21st century, reveal to what extent his view was right. This is also true about the notion that Brazil should have a proud stance as compared to the major powers. In short, even though he was a man of his time, José Honório Rodrigues showed that he had a view of the future. By tortuous paths, the later evolution showed to what extent his perception was right, rooted in national history.

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AFONSO ARINOS

Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco was born on November 27, 1905, in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais. He graduated from a law school in Rio de Janeiro, in 1927. Returning to his native Belo Horizonte, he was the director of the newspapers, *Estado de Minas* and *Diário da Tarde*, in 1933. He also founded another newspaper, the *Folha de Minas*, in 1934. In 1943, Arinos was one of the main writers of the *Manifesto dos Mineiros*, an open letter calling for an end to the *Estado Novo* of Getúlio Vargas and a redemocratization of the country. In addition, in 1945, he wrote the inaugural manifesto of the *União Democrática Nacional* (UDN), a conservative political party opposed to Vargas. Arinos became a *Deputado Federal* (federal representative) in 1947. He was a professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Rio de Janeiro, in 1949, and the University of Brazil, in 1950, the year in which he was again elected a federal representative. In 1951, the Brazilian Congress approved the so-

called Afonso Arinos Law, making racial discrimination a federal crime.

Arinos became the head of the *Udenista* (members of the UDN party) bench in Congress in 1952, and he was re-elected a federal representative, in 1954. In 1955, he published his major literary work, *Um Estadista da República* (A Statesman of the Republic), a biography of his father, Afrânio de Melo Franco, who had been a politician, as well as Brazil's foreign minister for the four years immediately following the Revolution of 1930.

Afonso Arinos was elected to the Brazilian Academy of Letters, in 1958, and that same year as a Senator from the Federal District. He was made the president of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 1959, and he became the country's foreign minister, in 1961, during the Jânio Quadros administration. Also in 1961, as well as in 1962, he headed the Brazilian delegations to the sixteenth and seventeenth UN General Assemblies respectively, and he led the Brazilian delegation to the first (1962) and second (1963) sessions of the UN Disarmament Conferences. Arinos was also foreign minister, again, in 1962, in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Francisco de Paula Brochado da Rocha, during the country's relatively brief period of parliamentarism following the resignation of Jânio Quadros.

In the political field, Arinos participated in the formation of the *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (ARENA – National Renewal Alliance) political party. In the legislature, he defended parliamentarism and agrarian reform, and secured the right to vote beginning at age 16. He also wrote the chapter on Individual Rights and Guarantees of the Constitution of 1967; supported Tancredo Neves as a presidential candidate, in 1984; and he coordinated the commission that prepared the Constitutional reform project in 1985. Elected Senator, in 1986, he headed

the Systematization Commission of the Constituent National Assembly. In 1988, he helped found the *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (PSDB) a democratic socialist political party.

Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco died August 27, 1990, at the age of 84, while he was still a federal Senator.



AFONSO ARINOS DE MELO FRANCO: HIS TIMES AND PARADOX

Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães

Brazil's fate is to be a satellite of the United States for an undefined period.

Raul Fernandes, Brazilian Foreign Minister,
August 26, 1954 to November 12, 1955

I repeat; I am a man without conditions or restrictions of any kind or nature.

Jânio Quadros, interview to the press, October 19, 1960

We, therefore, have a triptych of values that must preside over the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy: sovereignty, democracy and peace.

Afonso Arinos, in his *Memoirs*

Sir, allow me to congratulate you on the firmness and fidelity with which you planned the outlines of our foreign policy in the federal Chamber of Deputies. I am proud to have you as a partner in the government.

Jânio Quadros, to Afonso Arinos, September 5, 1961

Although at the time I still could not clearly evaluate the deep causes of the difficulties that Brazil faced, any Minister of Foreign Affairs who desires to be successful should be willing to carry out a policy of true national affirmation.

Afonso Arinos, in his *Memoirs*

[...]I can evaluate his extraordinary qualities as a major manager of Brazilian foreign policy

Afonso Arinos, in his *Memoirs*

[...] a conservative ministry, to carry out revolutionary politics.

Pedroso Horta, cited by Castello Branco

THE TIMES AND PARADOX OF AFONSO ARINOS

The foreign policy that Afonso Arinos, Minister of the Exterior under Jânio Quadros (1961), directed with great political and diplomatic skill was extraordinary. It addressed the need to open up markets for industrial products – in Africa, the Near East and Asia – caused by balance of payment difficulties, and a re-focusing of the economy and foreign trade on primary products. It recognized the need to maintain political and economic relations with all nations, regardless of their domestic political organization – just as all developed countries do – even as the press attempted to limit this. It sought an integration of South America, with a priority given to relations with Argentina – a policy which continues to be criticized today by those desirous of destroying the Mercosur trade bloc – composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela – resurrect the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and prevent the strengthening the Union of South American Nations (Unasur).

Arinos defended the vital principles of non-intervention and self-determination – even more critical today for the coexistence of sovereign States – despite their being ignored by those with the most powerful arms. He also recognized the importance of China at a much earlier time than other countries.

Arinos saw a relationship between social development and world stability, the benefits of which can be seen in the fight against poverty and misery today. And, finally, he believed in a democratization of the Brazilian foreign office itself, Itamaraty. All of these thoughts were central to the foreign policy of Afonso Arinos and Jânio Quadros. They remain as challenges in the current world.

The paradox of Afonso Arinos is that he was a conservative politician; a member of Brazil's landed, social elite; a founding-member and parliamentary leader of the UDN (*União Democrática Nacional*), the main conservative political party in Brazil, (1945-1965); and a friend, until 1961, of Carlos Lacerda, the main political conservative of his era. Yet, Arinos brilliantly conducted a progressive program – Brazil's "independent foreign policy" – in defense of development and peace, marking a new period for his country in the international arena. As such, he was a precursor of policies that recognized the potential of the Brazilian State and society. "Brazil is the largest and richest country of Latin America and has the potential to become a world power. Its good will and cooperation are of maximum importance to us" (Outline for the Policy of the United States towards Brazil, 1961. US State Department).

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT

No foreign policy can be understood and even less evaluated without taking into account the international, regional and national environment of the times in which it is implemented; when it reaps its fruits, be they bitter or sweet. It is also interesting to examine and compare the personalities and experiences of foreign ministers with those of the presidents they served. This is especially true of Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, during his meteoric 205 days at the head of Itamaraty during the administration of President Jânio Quadros.

The diplomatic experience of Afonso Arinos stretched over much of his lifetime, beginning when he attended meetings of the League of Nations in the 1920s with his father, Afrânio de Melo Franco, and extended to a period as president of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, two periods as Brazil's foreign minister – first under Jânio Quadros in 1961, and next during the country's brief period of parliamentarism, under Prime Minister Brochado da Rocha. He also had lead roles in the Brazilian delegation to the Sixteenth and Seventeenth UN General Assemblies, as well as the UN Disarmament Commission. He stood out in all of these situations, yet none more than when he was foreign minister, in 1961, during the seven-month administration of President Jânio Quadros.

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The international environment during the 1950s and up to 1961 were different from those of today, although some of their characteristics – such as the interventionist policies of the major powers – survive. In those earlier times, during the Cold War, people

were told that actions were taken in defense of freedom, democracy and Christian civilization; today the reasons are disguised as the so-called right to “protect” populations from being the victims of human rights abuses. There is still a vagrant disrespect for the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, both of which are consecrated by the UN and are keys for sovereign States to live together, especially weaker ones.

The 1950s and early 1960s were the height of the Cold War. Images of the successes of the Soviet Union were projected onto the world scene, symbolized by the launch of the first satellite, Sputnik, in 1957, and the success of the first manned space flight of the astronaut, Yuri Gagarin, four years later. These events also had important military implications, as they revealed Soviet technological, scientific and military capabilities in areas such as intercontinental missiles, thereby exposing the vulnerability of even the Americas.

The ideological dispute of the Soviet Union and its socialist Eastern European allies with the United States and other highly developed capitalist countries – albeit still recovering from the effects of World War II – was intense. The successes of the Soviet Union and socialism had major repercussions in the underdeveloped world, which was going through the beginning of the decolonization process. This was especially true in Africa, starting with the independence of Ghana in 1957, led by Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Pan-Africanism.

The peaceful coexistence policies of Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, were announced in February 1956 at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In his speech, Khrushchev proclaimed that socialism would overcome capitalism, while confrontations would take place on the periphery, with the Soviets supporting socialist liberation movements. Later that year, in November, the Soviet military intervened in Hungary.

Less than five years later, tensions in Germany led to the building of the Berlin Wall.

In Asia, the Korean War, which began in 1950 and ended with an armistice in 1953, had no winner. The war demonstrated that although the United States was able to mobilize its allies and obtain support for its military actions through a resolution of the UN General Assembly, the socialist countries, mainly China, were able to face up the that power.

The French had lost at Dien Bien-Phu, in 1954. Later, U.S. President John Kennedy began his country's military presence in Vietnam, which turned out to be disastrous with the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1973. The lasting effects of the war were the transformation of the American military from a drafted army into an enlisted force, and the eventual conversion of a reunified Vietnam from socialism to capitalism.

Ideological divergences and Russia's refusal to transfer nuclear technology to the People's Republic of China led to a Chinese-Russian schism in 1960, and, therefore, to the end of the monolithic nature of the communist bloc. As a consequence, a competitive phase between the USSR and the People's Republic of China developed, especially concerning their support of national liberation movements in Africa. Along with the competition, there was a poignant denunciation of Russian revisionism.

The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 – attended by the Chinese premier, Chou-En Lai; the president of Egypt, Gamal Nasser; the prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru; the long-term president of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito; and Sukarno, the president of the host country – was the beginning of the future association known as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The major principles of NAM were: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; the equality of all races and nations; non-intervention and self-determination; the right

of each nation to defend itself, both individually and collectively; the refusal to participate in a collective defense directed towards serving the interests of the superpowers; abstention from every act or threat of aggression against the integrity or the independence of another country; and the peaceful solution of controversies.

While France and Great Britain began to grant independence to their colonies – at times after serious conflicts, such as the Algerian War, which ended in 1962, and the fight in Kenya, which created the basis of economic neocolonialism – there was the crystallization in the southern part of Africa, of a white racist stronghold, led by South Africa and Portugal.

In a dispute for the support of allies among the new States, the United States was also interested in the decolonization of Africa. Its participation in the process was especially important in UN political and economic forums, with a goal of eliminating obstacles put in place by the European colonial regimes to the actions of its huge companies. Likewise, the Soviet Union was interested in obtaining the support of the former colonies, as it sought to prevent American control of the new States. And finally, China had an interest, especially considering its ideological and political confrontations with the Soviet Union.

The European Economic Community emerged in Western Europe, in 1957. It had six founding members, a supranational structure, and agreements with the former colonies to create a European common market with a goal of maintaining peace in Europe, as well as recovering its power and influence in the world, both of which were destroyed by the two world wars.

In military terms, the world was divided into two blocs, the West structured around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO (1949) and the East, structured around the Warsaw Pact, (1955). In Europe, there was a system of bases and military

agreements with the United States, which actually extended through the Near East, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, all of which surrounded the communist world. China, which had not yet employed its first nuclear device, was a world apart, as it was confronted by the United States in Taiwan, Japan and Australia and, to the north, by the Soviet Union.

The risk and fear of nuclear war were real concerns in Europe as well as in the United States, where millions of residential bunkers against nuclear attacks were built. The United States had emerged from World War II as the major economy in terms of production, trade, finance, technology, and science, and it participated in a hegemonic manner in the world's economic organizations, mainly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The U.S. dictated the rules to the capitalist countries, whether they were developed or not. The Soviet Union was the political, social and economic rival to the United States. Its high growth rates showed the world's underdeveloped economies and societies that economic planning and State intervention in the economy could lead in a short period of time to industrialization and better standards of living.

Both Africa and Latin America had high demographic growth rates, and mostly rural, underdeveloped economies, which mainly produced and exported primary goods. They were without significant industrial parks, without military might, and without technological vigor. In Asia, the newly industrializing countries had not emerged, and an unarmed Japan had not yet experienced its "miracle," as it was still in the process of recovering from World War II. China did not begin its rapid and sustained growth process until considerably later, in the late 1970s.

It was, therefore, in this tense and highly asymmetrical international scenario – with the dangers of an arms race and a

world nuclear war threatening humanity – that the foreign policy of Afonso Arinos was developed under President Jânio Quadros.

THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT

One characteristic of Latin America during the Cold War was an absence of political ties amongst neighbors, a situation that often led to conflicts, resulting from past grievances – although the conflicts were usually limited to States located in well-defined subregions, such as the Southern Cone, the Andes, and Central America.

The United States exercised military hegemony in the region through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty for the city in which it was signed in 1947, along with bilateral military agreements. Politically, it acted through the ideology of Pan-Americanism, and the Organization of American States (OAS), created in 1948. Ultimately, it exercised hegemony through its support – and even the organization – of *coups d'état*, as occurred in Guatemala, in 1954, when the democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz was ousted.

The disjointed economies of South America had been structured by the foreign trade interests of Great Britain, with British loans and investments made to the governments, to build railroads from production zones to export ports, and to supply electricity and sanitation in urban systems.

The populations of Latin American societies were predominantly rural and illiterate; they were in a precarious state of health and poverty, and there was a great demographic and economic emptiness in the center of the continent. Despite an incipient industrial development in some countries, which had

been encouraged by the disorganization of international markets during the Great Depression and World War II, the basic practice of exporting primary products had been maintained. Transportation and power systems were very precarious, with the latter often relying on imported oil to move vehicles as well as to generate electricity. Transportation ties among the countries of the region were almost inexistent.

Commercial ties among the Latin American countries were extremely tenuous, even inexistent. Many countries competed with one another on the global market as exporters of agricultural or mineral raw materials. They had very incipient industrial parks and scarcely diversified export agendas. Investments of national capital in other countries of the region were non-existent, with the prevalence of foreign investments mainly coming from the United States after World War II, due to the devastation of Europe during that war.

The political and economic scenario of the region was greatly changed in 1959 with the victory of the Cuban Revolution, and the consequent Russian challenge to Pan-Americanism. All of this, combined with the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States, led to American hegemony on the continent. It was, therefore, also in this tense and asymmetrical global scenario, combined with a regional scenario of poverty and vulnerability that the foreign policy of Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos developed.

CONDITIONS WITHIN BRAZIL AT THE TIME

When Jânio Quadros was elected president, in 1960, Brazil had 71 million inhabitants. The 55 percent of its population that lived in the countryside were illiterate and poor, and subject to political, economic and social rules set by traditional and conservative rural

chiefs. The urban population was mainly distributed along the coastline, with the great majority professing to be of the Catholic religion, and subject to the influences of its leaders.

Three major parties dominated the political system in Brazil at the time of the Cold War. The *Partido Social Democrático*, represented rural interests and was tied to the bureaucracy. The party had been founded by Getúlio Vargas, who was ousted in 1945. It then remained that of the subsequent administrations of Eurico Dutra (1945-1951), the return of Vargas (1951-1954), the brief interregnum of Café Filho (1954-1955), and Juscelino Kubitschek (1955-1961). The *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro*, a labor party, which was also founded by Vargas, mainly represented the interests and claims of industrial workers. The UDN included representatives of the urban middle classes, and included intellectuals, merchants, and professionals, such as lawyers. Many UDN leaders had fought the *Estado Novo* dictatorship of Vargas begun in 1937, but they failed in their various attempts to take power through the electoral process.

There were other political parties, but most were minor or had only state or regional influence. These included the Progressive Social Party (PSP) of Adhemar de Barros; the Liberator Party (PL); the Christian Democrat Party (PDC); the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB); and the Popular Representation Party (PRP), of Integralist origin. The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), although illegal, was still the eternal bogeyman of the Brazilian political, economic and military elites.

The economy was at the beginning of industrialization, mainly concentrated in the consumer non-durable goods sector. An automobile industry had just emerged, aiding the effort to integrate the large national territory through the building of roads, thereby facilitating major domestic migrations. Foreign trade, however, still was concentrated in a few agricultural and primary

products. On the import side, products of necessity, such as oil and wheat, were brought into the country in large quantities, and a large foreign debt to public and private creditors, mainly from the major developed countries, accumulated.

Social agitation, such as the Peasant Leagues led by Francisco Julião in the Northeast region of the country, caused major fear in Brazilian elites as well as in the foreign elites associated with them. A great importance was given to programs such as Sudene (*Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste*), a government development entity, in search of American funding for projects in that region.

Inflation and the debt service – which always relied on irregular currency incomes due to fluctuations in the prices of commodities and weak demand in the markets of developed countries – were the two main concerns of the government and of society in 1960. They were the same concerns of previous moments in Brazilian history, and for that matter, are still valid.

Inflation, which monetary economists blamed on budget imbalances, corruption and the intervention of the State in the economy, was considered the greatest evil – mainly because of differentiated systems of currency exchange and the action of state companies. Inflation was also having an impact on relations with foreign creditors, who conditioned a renegotiation of debt deadlines and the granting of new loans, on the implementation of severe domestic economic adjustment programs that mainly affected workers.

And so it was, again, in this tense and asymmetrical world scene – militarily weak, politically disjointed, and economically poor, within an undeveloped and traditional national scene, with deep tensions – that the Brazilian foreign policy of 1961 developed with the participation of Afonso Arinos.

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Brazilian foreign policy seemed destined to remain within its traditional guidelines, exclusively concerned with hemispheric topics; aligned with the United States in regional matters, as well as those in confrontation with the communist bloc; in solidarity with the colonial policies of Portugal and France, in Africa; and, within its economic sphere, maintaining strong commercial and financial ties with Western European countries, as well as with the United States – the main investor in and lender to Brazilian projects, and the largest purchaser of Brazilian coffee. For many years, however, there were signs of a desire to reorient the policy. During the 1920s, for example, Afrânio de Melo Franco, Afonso's father, had vigorously defended that the country receive a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations, which the major European powers rejected, and led to Brazil's withdrawal from the League. The arguments Brazil then presented, to justify its claim for a permanent seat on the Council, were very similar to those put forward much later – from 1945 to the present – in its campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Another sign of change and a desire for greater autonomy was the Brazilian close relationship with Germany in the 1930s – not only in the trade sphere, but also militarily. In the commercial field, Brazil made trade deals with Germany in which payments were delineated in *deutschmarks*, the German currency at the time. This drew firm American objections, since the United States was engaged in building a network of bilateral agreements based on the most favored nation clause. In military terms, Brazil made agreements to acquire equipment and hosted German training missions.

Before the United States entered World War II, in late 1941, Brazilian president, Getúlio Vargas, skillfully led a policy not to

declare itself between the conflicting parties; the purpose of which was to obtain funding and technological help – from either side – for projects such as the construction of the country's first modern steel plant and the re-equipping of its Armed Forces.

American interest in strategic raw materials found in South America, coupled with the a desire to use the Brazilian Northeast as a support point for American military operations – due to its location as the closest part of the Americas to Africa and a possible German invasion point – led the United States, in 1940, to grant funding to build what became the Volta Redonda steel plant in the state of Rio de Janeiro. In return, Brazil agreed to the construction of eight air bases in the North and the Northeast regions of the country.

The purpose of sending a contingent of over 25,000 soldiers of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force to fight in Italy, in 1943 – which the British resisted – was to create the conditions for Brazil to attend post-war negotiations in an advantageous position. The goal was a greater inclusion in the world, especially as a permanent member of the Security Council of the new organization that was already known to be under creation: the United Nations.

Thus, with the United States as a victor in World War II, and the subsequent American supremacy in the world, Brazil began to request that it be treated as a preferred U.S. ally in Latin America with political expectations of a position on the Security Council and economic access to the resources of the Marshall Plan.

The denial to become a permanent member on the Security Council and later disappointment with the American refusal to provide more assistance for development projects, as well as a denial to participate in the Marshall Plan – the U.S. thought that Brazil should help Europe after World War II, and refused to create a “Marshall Plan for Latin America” at the meeting

of the “Committee of the 21,” in 1958 – gradually generated growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the building of a privileged relationship with the United States. Even during the Dutra administration (1946-1951), which was sympathetic to the United States, with its domestic anticommunist policies and the following of conservative economic guidelines, Brazil complained about the lack of financial assistance.

In the second government of Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954), friction points with the United States multiplied with a long list of issues, such as: Brazil’s refusal, in 1951, of an American request to send troops to Korea; the 1953 creation of Petrobrás as a State monopoly in all stages of the extraction, refining, distribution and trade of oil; a decree signed in 1954, which limited the remittance of profits to 10% of the capital expended without the possibility to include reinvestments in the calculation of the capital; the creation of Eletrobrás; and finally, Brazil’s closer relations with Argentina, whose antagonistic relations with the United States, since much before World War II, became more serious in 1946, with the rise of Juan Perón; Perón being the individual who created the concept of the “Third Way,” a precursor to the non-aligned movement.

After the brief sixteen-month period (08/24/1954 - 11/08/1955) of President Café Filho’s administration – and its policy of closer ties with the United States – more tensions developed during the Juscelino Kubitschek years. This was especially true in 1959 with Brazil’s split from the IMF due to pressures from that entity to accept a strict economic adjustment program, leading to a paralysis of Kubitschek’s *Plano de Metas* (program of targets). In addition, the Pan-American Operation, launched a year earlier, in 1958, after the failure of U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon’s visit to Latin America, required major financial support from the United States, yet it did not obtain the sympathy of the Republican president, Dwight Eisenhower. Only the Cuban Revolution and

John F. Kennedy's Democratic administration turned it into the Alliance for Progress, a program full of conditionalities, although that term only appeared later, to describe the limited ambition of a 10-year program of 20 billion dollars encompassing 20 countries. In the same year, 1961, however, there was the creation of a program at the School of the Americas, in Panama, to train Latin American military in "domestic and revolutionary war," which led to a future wave of military coups in the region.

Therefore, in 1961, because of the Cold War environment and tensions that derived from the Cuban Revolution, as well as continued inflation, budget imbalances, plus currency and foreign debt problems, one could predict that in the incoming government of Jânio Quadros – elected with the backing of the UDN and strong support from the conservative and business classes, as well as the Catholic church and the middle class – Brazil's foreign policy would be one of alignment with the United States and the West. That, however, did not occur.

JÂNIO DA SILVA QUADROS, JÂNIO QUADROS

Jânio Quadros established his political views, from age 28 to 43 years, as the national, regional and international contexts evolved between 1945 and 1960. He was born in Campo Grande, in 1917, then part of the state of Mato Grosso (currently, Mato Grosso do Sul). His father, Gabriel Nogueira Quadros, a physician, originally from the state of Parana, and his mother, Leonor da Silva Quadros, often moved, from one small city or town to another – Campo Grande; Curitiba, Parana; Garça, Bauru, and Cândido Mota, São Paulo – as well as to rural areas. For this reason, the young Jânio studied in many places between childhood and adolescence. According to available records, he was not an outstanding student.

In the early 1930s, his parents moved to São Paulo, and Jânio studied at the *Colégio Arquidiocesano* administered by the Catholic Archdiocese of that state capital city. In 1931, after one more move, he attended the *Ginásio São Joaquim*, in Lorena, a small city about 160 miles east of the capital, and finally, in 1933, he returned to study at the *Colégio Arquidiocesano*, back in the city of São Paulo.

Jânio (as he was universally known) began his political life as part of the student movement. He was also Secretary of the *Centro XI de Agosto*, an entity that offered pro bono legal services to the poor of the city of São Paulo, located at the Largo de São Francisco Law School – which he attended from 1933 to 1939. In that capacity, he served on the board headed by Francisco Quintanilha Ribeiro, a dear and intimate friend, and his future chief of staff. In order to support himself, he taught Geography, History and Portuguese in a traditional school of São Paulo, the *Colégio Dante Alighieri*, as well as in the *Ginásio Vera Cruz*, a high school located in the working-class neighborhood of Brás. He lived modestly with his wife, Eloá, the daughter of a pharmacist, whom he married in 1941. He and Eloá had a single daughter, Dirce Maria, named after his sister, who had died when she was 15 years old. An accident with perfume spray at a carnival ball when he was 18 years old had affected his left eye, making him slightly cross-eyed.

His career rise was meteoric, marked by a reputation of efficiency and austerity, and by activities he conducted above and beyond the work of the political parties, which he ostensibly despised. He was an intransigent anti-communist. He was concerned for the *petit bourgeois*, the media, the causes and effects of matters, as well as the pure Portuguese vernacular and metric pronunciation. Above all else, however, he had an extreme concern for his authority.

Jânio Quadros was elected to the São Paulo city council with 1,707 votes, in 1947. In 1950, he was the most voted state representative, with 18,000 votes, and in 1953, he was elected mayor of the city of São Paulo – an office he held for only one year – with 284,000 votes. In 1954, he became governor of the state of São Paulo with 660,000 votes, and he was elected a federal representative – by the state of Paraná – in 1958, with 79,000 votes. He reached the pinnacle of political success as the President of the Republic, in 1960, at age 43, with 5,600,000 votes, almost 48% of the total, 2 million more than the second place candidate, General Henrique Teixeira Lott, who had had the backing of the then current government.

In his campaigns, Jânio represented himself as the candidate of the poor, of the “penny against the million,” the candidate of “the broom,” to sweep up corruption, and a man of austere habits. Often he would resign, or threaten to resign from elected offices and candidacies, including his presidential candidacy. On those occasions, parties and political leaders would urge him to return, and make concessions. Ultimately, however, he was deceived by this practice, as he was surprised when he resigned from the presidency of the Republic, in 1961, and the Brazilian Congress quickly accepted the resignation. The interests affected were much more powerful and external, not being limited to the influence of parties and politicians or to the distribution of municipal and State offices.

As a city councilman and state representative, Jânio worked intensely in the poorest areas of São Paulo. In his rallies, he appeared with shaggy hair, dandruff on his shoulders, and eating bologna sandwiches. He submitted more than 2,000 projects to the Council and the state legislature, but he never attended a session of the federal Chamber of Deputies, except for his inauguration. After winning the election, he often embarked on extensive trips

aboard long haul cargo ships. This allowed him to be away from the political pressures of the parties that supported him, which he did not respect, or rather, he despised for the organization of his government teams, at the municipal, State and presidential level.

His administrations, both as mayor of São Paulo and later as governor of the state, were characterized as economic endeavors. He appointed Carlos Alberto Carvalho Pinto, from an old *paulista* (someone from the state of São Paulo) traditional family – a great nephew of former-President Rodrigues Alves – as Secretary of Finance, with full powers to sanitize the spending with the purpose of balancing the budget.

His group of closest and oldest friends – including those from his days at law school, whom he addressed formally – was composed of old militants from the paulista state politics, such as Francisco Quintanilha Ribeiro; Carlos Castilho Cabral, who founded the Jânio Quadros Popular Movement (MPJQ); Oscar Pedroso Horta, a great criminal lawyer; Lino de Matos, Emilio Carlos, and Auro de Moura Andrade. José Aparecido de Oliveira, from Minas Gerais, an ally of Magalhães Pinto, joined this group many years later. All, including Jânio, were politicians with scarce or no experience in national policy matters and even less in the foreign arena, although José Aparecido, his private secretary – and a friend of Afonso Arinos – had a great interest in the subject area and was a growing influence on Jânio. Aparecido was the progressive or leftist influence on the government, always in a dispute with Pedroso Horta, who represented the traditional interests and views of the conservative political party, the UDN.

Jânio Quadros had always demonstrated his admiration for Abraham Lincoln, Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Nasser, and Josip Broz Tito, with whom he spoke in 1959, while still a deputado federal representing the state of Paraná, before taking over as president

the next year. He, also, visited Cuba, Egypt, India and Yugoslavia, plus the Soviet Union, where he spoke with Nikita Khrushchev.

Upon an invitation of Fidel Castro, in 1959, Jânio Quadros visited Cuba, a trip on which he then invited Afonso Arinos – who since 1952 was the leader of the UDN in the Camara dos Deputados, as well as its most respected scholar – and a large contingent of political journalists, organized by José Aparecido, including Castello Branco, Villas Boas Correia, Hélio Fernandes, Murilo Melo Filho, Rubem Braga, Márcio Moreira Alves, and the young Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, a future major historian. Quadros also invited Dom Jorge Marcos de Oliveira, the Catholic bishop of Santo André, but the bishop refused the invitation.

On the domestic policy front, Jânio Quadros aligned himself with the ideas of the most conservative currents of the time, represented in the governments of Café Filho and Eurico Dutra. Their main and permanent concern was the control of inflation which, according to them, was caused by the budget deficit, the intervention of the State in the economy (various subsidies, artificial exchange rates, etc.), and restrictions on foreign capital, all of which reduced the ability to increase the production of goods in the country.

A permanent challenge for Brazilian governments of all political leanings is the foreign sector of the economy, so often complicated by difficulties to expand and diversify primary exports, deterioration in exchange rates, increases in the demand for imports – especially for basic products, such as oil and wheat – along with the payment obligations, including interest and amortization payments on the foreign debt.

One of the biggest issues facing the Quadros government was a renegotiation of the foreign debt, which had reached 700 million dollars in 1961, a high amount for the GDP and for the foreign

trade of that time. The purposes of the renegotiation was to increase the country's ability to import, guarantee the possibility of new loans for investments, and attract new investment capital, all of which had been a challenge for the previous governments and for ministers as varied as Oswaldo Aranha, Lucas Lopes, and José Maria Alckimim. Renegotiation was also the permanent recommendation to the Brazilian government of the International Monetary Fund, the Treasury Department, and creditors of foreign private banks.

Jânio Quadros chose Clemente Mariani – a member of the UDN party, a banker from Bahia, and former president of the Banco do Brasil in the administration of Café Filho – as his finance minister. Mariani immediately took measures that corresponded to the recommendations and expectations of the conservatives: an end to subsidies for the purchase of wheat and oil; an end to the systems of control and currency exchange; cuts to the Banco do Brasil's credit, as well as cuts in various other areas of government spending.

The measures caused a strong inflationary impact, which left the middle class, workers, and sectors of the industrial business community unhappy, but satisfied the exporters of coffee and other commodities.

The general dissatisfaction in the country was joined by a sense of isolation caused in part by the personal nature of the president, who believed he was beyond the classes and beyond political parties. Quadros' ostensive hatred for Congress caused the Church and members of the military to be concerned with his foreign policy, the more it unfolded and became explicit. This set of factors helps to explain the scarce support he received after his unexpected resignation on August 25, 1961, despite his clear

expectation that “he would not do anything to come back, but that his return was inevitable.”

AFONSO ARINOS DE MELO FRANCO, AFONSO ARINOS

Afonso Arinos, the faithful, loyal and intelligent conductor of foreign policy, could not have been more different from Jânio Quadros, except for their shared conservatism in terms of domestic policy. A scholar with great legal and literary culture, a writer – member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters – a full professor of Constitutional Law, a journalist, a four-time elected representative to the federal Chamber of Deputies, and a federal senator, Arinos belonged to a traditional family of politicians from the state of Minas Gerais. Both sides of his family – maternal and paternal – were involved in politics.

Afonso’s mother, Silvia, was the daughter of Cesario Alvim, who had been president (the term formerly used for governor) of the province of Rio de Janeiro during the Empire, and, of the State of Minas Gerais, during the Republic. He had also been a representative in the federal legislature, the Minister of Justice, in 1890, and, according to Arinos himself, a descendent of an older lineage than his father’s side of the family – the Melo Francos – since the Alvim family had been among the first to settle in the province of Minas Gerais. His father, Afrânio de Melo Franco, born in 1870, whose biography Afonso wrote, was a professor of International Law, a federal representative, the Minister of Transportation in the administration of Rodrigues Alves, and during the provisional period of Delfim Moreira, he exercised the so-called Melo Franco Regency; later he was a leader of the government of President Epitácio Pessoa. He was also the first and only Brazilian ambassador to the League of Nations, and a

member of the Diplomacy Commission of the House since 1906. A revolutionary of 1930, he was the Foreign Minister of Getúlio Vargas from 1930 to 1933, until he resigned, to demonstrate solidarity with his son, Virgílio, whom Vargas had neglected in the appointment as interventor for the state of Minas Gerais.

As a young man, Afonso Arinos accompanied his father on many diplomatic missions, and he exercised many of the positions that he had occupied such as a professor of law, a federal representative, a member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters, and the country's foreign minister. Afrânio de Melo Franco, an example that Arinos always mentioned with affection and admiration, died in January 1943.

Afonso's brother, Virgílio Alvim de Melo Franco, eight years his senior, had distinguished himself as one of the first revolutionaries of 1930. As the liaison between political forces and the "lieutenants," he earned the nickname of "civil lieutenant." After the Revolution, Virgílio expected to be appointed to the position of interventor (governor) of Minas Gerais, in a dispute with Gustavo Capanema and with the support of Oswaldo Aranha with whom he was tied politically. Getúlio Vargas, however, chose Benedito Valadares, an obscure federal representative from Minas Gerais. This greatly dissatisfied Virgílio and he moved to the opposition, eventually becoming the secretary general of the UDN party when it was founded in 1945. A year later, Virgílio did not want to be a candidate to the Constituent Assembly of 1946; instead, he convinced his brother, Afonso, to be one.

As one of the main creators of the *Manifesto dos Mineiros*, an open letter published in October 1943, on the anniversary of the Revolution of 1930, criticizing the government of Getúlio Vargas. He was also one of the founders of the UDN political party, whose name was supposedly his suggestion. As such, Afonso Arinos

participated in the political battles against Vargas. The UDN assembled the strongest opponents of Vargas since the revolt of 1932, and worked nonstop until the military coup of 1964, when they mistakenly imagined that they would participate in power. Although this did not occur, many of the party's most important members – such as General Juarez Távora, Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, and General Golbery do Couto e Silva – collaborated with the military governments, the latter having major influence on the foreign policy of the military governments due to his geopolitical views.

The foreign policy of Jânio Quadros had major repercussions on Brazilian domestic policy. Many say it was the main cause of the implacable opposition of Carlos Lacerda to Jânio Quadros, partly the cause – or pretext – of Quadros' resignation, and for the distrust of the military leaders who never sought, firmly, to keep him in power or promote his return. This episode, as so many others in Brazilian history, reveals the entangled domestic and foreign policies and, therefore, the need to assess them together along with economic matters.

When Jânio Quadros invited Afonso Arinos to head Itamaraty, Arinos was a consecrated conservative politician, a famous writer, scholar, and professor of Constitutional Law. He had also been a journalist, both in Minas Gerais and in Rio de Janeiro.

Arinos was well connected. In addition to his connections in national politics, as well as those of Minas Gerais due to the situation of his father, Afrânio, and his brother, Virgílio, Afonso had married Ana (Anah) Rodrigues Alves, a grand-daughter of former President Rodrigues Alves. He had also developed a friendship and kinship with the Nabuco family, descendants of Joaquim Nabuco, who had great influence in Rio de Janeiro.

A citizen of immaculate behavior and reputation, with the best and most traditional political and social ties of the time, his family origins, and his own political activities, Afonso Arinos' circumstances could not have been be more different from those of Jânio Quadros, the son of a modest physician, who had travelled from one city to another in the states of São Paulo and Paraná, without any political, social or economic relationships. In contrast to Arinos, Quadros – who had been an obscure high school teacher – was a demagogical politician, tied to the popular classes.

Arinos had been a parliamentary leader of the UDN for seven years, a historical landmark, and as such, he was an inexorable adversary and accuser of Getúlio Vargas during his administration, from 1951 to 1954, making memorable speeches, including one in which he asked for Vargas' resignation, which he regretted after Vargas committed suicide.

Arinos, as the leader of UDN and the opposition, also fought intensely against the government of Juscelino Kubitschek, 1956-1961. He did not, however, support the attempt to nullify the election of 1955 based on the thesis of the absolute majority, and the communist votes were illegal, as Prado Kelly advocated. The political climate was such that Representative Carlos Lacerda said that Kubitschek could not be a candidate; if he was a candidate, he could not be elected, and if he was elected, he could not be inaugurated. Since Brigadier General Eduardo Gomes had been defeated in 1950, and Juarez Távora, in 1955, the inconsolable UDN saw a unique opportunity in October 1960, to win and get some revenge with the candidacy of Jânio Quadros, even though Quadros considered himself outside of parties. Their hope to achieve power, however, was frustrated once again.

INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy of a country is not only the one carried out by its foreign office; it is also conducted by other organisms of the State, not only by the foreign minister, but by other ministers as well. It is also not disconnected in any way from the contingencies and needs of domestic policy. A balance took place in the government of Jânio Quadros, in which the strategy to carry out a conservative economic domestic policy and a bold and left-leaning foreign policy has been attributed. In fact, both policies were deeply interconnected since the crucial issue in the foreign sector was the economy.

Afonso Arinos was not especially tied to Jânio Quadros; he had supported him earlier on due to his strong ties to Carlos Lacerda, who had been instrumental in his own election as a Senator – with the greatest number of votes in the history of the Federal District, Rio de Janeiro – in 1955.

Neither Arinos nor Lacerda listened to the warnings of Juracy Magalhães, the candidate who lost out at the UDN convention of 1959, which chose Quadros as its candidate for the presidency. Juracy had foreseen that everyone would regret the selection. He prophesized this would quickly come true, due to Jânio's public loathing of the allies and politicians who helped him get elected.

For his part, Jânio Quadros was convinced that his crushing electoral victory – by more than 2 million votes over General Henrique Lott, out of a total of 11,700,000 electors – granted him a mandate that went beyond the parties. He further believed it gave him great freedom of action, as in his previous experiences, as mayor of the city of São Paulo and governor of its state.

Although Quadros was provincial, with little experience in the complexities and meanderings of national policy, and with limited and biased knowledge of politicians outside of São Paulo,

in terms of foreign policy, he had extremely bold ideas – even when compared to those emanating from the main countries of his time, developed or not. Hence, there was interest, admiration, and some perplexity raised by his actions. His foreign policy strategies were based on the principles of self-determination, non-intervention, continental solidarity, a struggle for peace and disarmament, a struggle against any type of colonialism, the struggle for development, and a struggle against communism.

When Jânio Quadros chose Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco as his foreign minister, he chose a citizen of conservative reputation, an advocate of the continental solidarity, a member, in 1945, of the old Society of the Friends of America, a strong adversary of communism, with Christian values, great political experience as a federal representative and senator, the president of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and acknowledged intellectual skill as an author and Constitutional Law professor. He was, therefore, not suspected of being someone who would execute and carry out an independent foreign policy.

During the electoral campaign, Jânio Quadros had made clear the principles that would guide his foreign policy. The parties that supported him in the campaign might have heard it, but most believed his statements had been made to attract voters from the left, and they did not believe he would follow through on them – at least not with determination. They also felt that, if it became necessary, they would have the political means to persuade him of the inconvenience or the contradictions of the policies, and he would return to the earlier commitments and traditions of Brazilian foreign policy, which were Christian, Western and aligned. Two foreign policy events right at the beginning of the Quadros administration, however, were keys to warn his adversaries that Jânio would carry out the principles he had announced with determination.

The first event was the incident of the ship *Santa Maria*, hijacked by the Capitan Henrique Galvão in January 1961. The incident served to highlight, the diplomatic skills of Afonso Arinos and his knowledge of international law. The second event was the visit to Brazil of U.S. Ambassador Adolf Berle Jr., in an attempt to obtain Brazilian support for an invasion of Cuba that was being prepared with the political, propagandistic, financial and armed support of the United States.

The outcome of the first incident – that of the *Santa Maria* – took place on Quadros' inauguration day, and it was a message to the Salazarist Portuguese community in Rio de Janeiro – and to the world – to show that the policies the new president had announced during his campaign would be carried out. The captain of the ship, Henrique Galvão and his associates, alleging a shortage of fuel and supplies, had requested to refuel in Brazil before returning enroute to Angola. The ship had 600 passengers – including many Americans – and 300 crew members. The Portuguese classified the incident as an act of piracy and demanded that the ship, the passengers and the hijackers be returned. After an interpretation of international conventions and talks with the hijackers, however, the passengers and crew members were allowed to disembark, asylum was granted to Galvão and his associates, and the ship was then returned to the Portuguese government.

In the second incident, Adolf Berle Jr., special envoy of U.S. President John Kennedy, who had been an ambassador in Brazil in 1945, had gone to Brasília to meet with Jânio Quadros on March 3, 1961, the still new capital of the country. In order to preserve him, Quadros ordered Arinos to remain in Rio and not travel to Brasília to attend the meeting. In fact, Arinos often did not accompany the President in his interviews, but he usually hosted the visitors beforehand, which is what happened with Berle, and the meeting was useful.

Direct dispatches by Arinos were rare; talking by phone was always difficult, so the President constantly sent his instructions by telex. Kennedy's special envoy, who eventually had a rough conversation with President Quadros had waited for two hours in the waiting room. When the two finally did meet he represented the American plan to conduct military interventions "on the right," in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, to "justify" interventions "on the left," in Cuba. Quadros, however, firmly refused to give Brazilian approval to the enterprise – which eventually failed.

This episode was the second warning to the press, traditionally aligned with the United States on the pretext of the struggle against communism and the defense of the West and the Christian values, as well as to the community of political and economic interests tied to the United States. It strongly announced that Brazil would strictly apply the policies of non-intervention and self-determination that Jânio Quadros had talked about during the presidential campaign.

Immediately, at the beginning of his administration, in a Cabinet mainly composed of politicians from the UDN and members of the military that tended to side with the UDN – such as Silvio Heck, Odílio Denys and Grun Moss – plus some rather unknown figures of national politics, Jânio Quadros appointed Clemente Mariani, a conservative banker from the state of Bahia, as his Finance Minister. The new president also made three foreign policy decisions of major domestic importance, sending: 1) Roberto Campos – a diplomat and economist with impeccable credentials who had served Kubitschek – to negotiate with European creditors the extension of debt deadlines that were about to mature, as well as the taking out of new loans; 2) the banker and Ambassador Walter Moreira Sales to both the American government and to international financial entities, such as the IMF and World Bank, without the support of which the private loans would not be

granted; and, finally, 3) as a political and economic counterpoint, he sent his strong supporter, João Dantas, the owner of the *Diário de Notícias*, to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe in search of new markets for Brazilian exports. This last mission was one that would mainly depend on political gestures – such as the recognition of these governments, and the establishment of diplomatic relations – due to the centralized character of the economies of those regimes.

Three days after his inauguration, Jânio Quadros also ordered the revocation of the symbolic credentials of the representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Right from the outset Brazil re-established diplomatic relations with Hungary and Romania, created legations in Bulgaria and Albania, announced measures to re-establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, and reassess the country's position at the UN on the credentials of mainland China. In August 1961, a trade mission was sent to China, headed by Vice-President Goulart, with great repercussion on the political and military scenes. With less repercussion, an important trade mission was also sent to the Soviet Union, headed by Minister Paulo Leão de Moura. Jânio, himself, in a visit to the Soviet Union, while he was still a candidate, had the opportunity to meet with the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev. Those initiatives led to some apprehension on the part of American authorities, who increasingly feared an even more intensive turn to the left by Quadros.

The João Dantas mission to Eastern Europe would have major domestic policy repercussions. The so-called Hallstein Doctrine – named for the German Chancellor – adopted by West Germany, forbade relations with countries that recognized the government of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). This was important to Brazil due to the significant German economic, investment and financial interests in the country, and because

of the populations of German origin in Brazil, which were largely sympathetic to Bonn.

João Dantas, a journalist acting as an Ambassador on a request from President Jânio Quadros, had been sent to East Germany on a trade mission. There, he signed a *memorandum* with the East German Minister of Foreign Trade in Pankow, the district of Berlin in which much of that government's agencies were located. The document implied an implicit recognition of the communist regime. The memorandum even announced an invitation to visit Brazil, and it foresaw the signing of a future trade agreement. Urged by Roberto Campos, who was conducting financial negotiations in Europe, Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Secretary-General of Itamaraty, distributed a press release, without previous knowledge of Arinos or Quadros, unauthorizing the agreements of João Dantas.

Jânio Quadros, who had already announced in his presidential message to the Congress that he supported Bonn (the seat of the West German government) instead of Pankow as the only German government, for authority reasons considered that Vasco Leitão da Cunha committed an act of inexcusable indiscipline, and he requested that Leitão da Cunha be fired. This caused major concern to Arinos, who considered him his best and oldest friend. However, when Arinos addressed Vasco, he had already requested and announced his resignation, which caused major shock within the political and social environment, as well as at Itamaraty. The credentials of Leitão da Cunha, his prestige within the UDN, and within the traditional conservative environment can be evaluated by the fact that, later, he was appointed foreign minister in the Castelo Branco administration.

In order to make way for the successful missions of Roberto Campos and Moreira Sales, Jânio Quadros had previously taken economic measures that the Brazilian conservative circles

considered to be very positive. The measures mainly concerned large farmers and the exporters of commodities, such as coffee and sugar, as well as relations with international creditors. Instruction 204 of the Superintendence of Currency and Credit (SUMOC), for example, re-established the so-called “currency exchange truth” by eliminating subsidies to oil and wheat and by depreciating the Brazilian currency at the time, the *cruzeiro*, by 100%. On the negative side, the measures seriously affected Brazilian companies, especially industrial ones, and those with debts abroad, while they increased the cost of living, especially for the middle class. Major reductions to the official credit of the Banco do Brasil to companies and several measures to reduce government expenses were also announced.

Quadros’ entire foreign policy was guided by means of the famous and ridiculed “small notes,” messages that surrounded the traditional, slow and formal communication of public administration, a practice that Jânio had applied as the mayor of São Paulo. The messages were sent by the telex installed in his office and were often announced to the press, which placed huge pressure on the bureaucracy. In addition, Itamaraty was still located in Rio de Janeiro at the time; there was only a small office in Brasília, and only a few diplomats served there. For the other ministries, the notes were delivered by motorcyclists with as many as 1,200 being used – approximately 400 of them just for Itamaraty alone. It was, in a certain way, an anticipation of the current claims of transparency and efficiency of public administration.

The new foreign policy – which Arinos, himself, did not like to call “independent” – according to him, suffered strong resistance from the older, higher level diplomats of Itamaraty, those deeply involved in Rio de Janeiro by the influential Portuguese, American and European circles, as well as by the traditional UDN, which could be characterized as anti-Vargas, anti-industry, and anti-

Kubitschek due of the move of the capital to Brasília. Itamaraty, itself, did not officially move to Brasília until 1970.

A third and innovative aspect of Jânio Quadros' foreign policy had a major impact on the country's domestic policies due to the reaction it caused in the conservative media, especially in Rio de Janeiro. This was the position taken against Portuguese colonial policies in Africa – which was greater than the position against European colonialism in general – as well as initiatives to develop closer relations with new African States.

Since the beginning of the decolonization movement, Brazil had been in favor – albeit timidly – of the independence of the European colonies, even those in Africa. Its vote in favor of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the fifteenth UN General Assembly in December 1960 – when 16 countries had already become independent in Africa – exemplifies this. Emphasizing the special character of its relations with Portugal and the civilizing role of Portugal in its colonies, however, Brazil abstained from condemning Portugal.

Afonso Arinos seemed to have tended towards a more careful treatment in relation to Portugal than Jânio Quadros. He sought an agreement that would fulfill the commitments of a 1953 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation. He, thus, attempted to avoid a direct and more vigorous condemnation of Portugal at the United Nations. Arinos considered that his entire training was in Portuguese, but that, before being Portuguese, he was Brazilian and, for that reason, he could not support the Portuguese policy that he considered destined to fail.

The origin of the anti-colonial thought by Afonso Arinos can be found in his position against racial bias in Brazil; in his certainty about the moral debt that Brazil has to Africa; in his perception

that Brazil, having been a colony, should be against all colonialism, and that since its society was the result of a mixing of races it should be against any type of racial discrimination. Thus, Brazil should provide the world with an example of its ethnic fraternity – very similar to the justifications of the current Brazilian policy towards Africa.

The Kubitschek administration had been in full support of Portugal. Jânio Quadros' position oscillated in the beginning, initially attempting to persuade the dictatorial and racist Salazar administration to organize a new political regime, a type of federation with its African colonies, and thereby, give them a high degree of autonomy. That, however, was in vain, as the Portuguese authorities, and Salazar himself, refused to accept what Afonso Arinos directly conveyed to them in Lisbon. Having fulfilled the obligation of consultation, Brazil considered itself with free hands to address the subject in the United Nations.

The sometimes stated purpose of the African policy was that Brazil, by getting closer to the recently independent countries of Africa, both in bilateral terms and through the United Nations, because of its non-colonial past and its ethnic characteristics, could help to preserve the influence of Western values in Africa. Brazil could be a bridge to Europe, the West and Africa, and avoid the expansion of communism in the new African states. Another goal, of a truly economic nature, was justified by the urgent need to expand Brazilian exports, as it was felt that Africa could become an important market for Brazilian manufactures.

Four symbolic facts, marked Jânio Quadros' new African policy: 1) a trip by Afonso Arinos to Senegal's leader, Leopold Sedar-Senghor, to celebrate that country's independence – Arinos being the first Brazilian foreign minister to Africa; 2) the opening of new Brazilian embassies in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and

Ethiopia and, mainly, the urgency shown to occupy them; 3) a scholarship program for African students, and 4) the appointment of Raimundo de Souza Dantas, a black writer and journalist, as the Ambassador of Brazil to Ghana.

One of the justifications of the new Brazilian policy towards Africa had to do with concern for African competition – considered to be “unfair” to Brazil – in markets for tropical commodities because of lower labor costs in Africa, which the colonial regimes had degraded. The independence of the colonies provided new rights to the workers and, by giving them the right to better wages, caused them to increase the prices of their products on the world markets. This is a somewhat similar argument to one made much later, concerning the so-called “social clause,” which the developed and highly industrialized countries often advocate in current trade negotiations. Additionally, there was a concern for the extension of preferences that the new African States enjoyed in their former colonial powers to all members of the European Economic Community (EEC), especially Germany.

The Independent Foreign Policy initiative, which according to Leite Barbosa was the most important event on Jânio Quadros’ foreign agenda, also included efforts to obtain closer ties to Argentina. The Argentine president at the time, Arturo Frondizi, a radical civilian, elected with the support of Juan Peron, met with Jânio Quadros in Uruguaiana, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil in April 1961, in a meeting at which a Friendship and Consultation Covenant was signed.

There were natural resentments and historical suspicions on the behalf of the military of both countries, specifically Argentine concerns about the foreign policy of Jânio Quadros. The Argentine military was considered anti-American and pro-communist. Brazil was interested in closer ties with other South American countries

in order to promote and encourage economic integration. This had been one of the main reasons for the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LATFA), in 1960; the country's political defense of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, and their common interests in relation to the United States. Finally, there was the economic goals, to reduce the trade deficit with Argentina and to obtain Argentine commitments to import manufactured products, mainly of the steel industry.

The meeting between presidents Quadros and Frondizi took place in Uruguaiana because of the difficulty Quadros had obtaining a license from Congress to leave the national territory after the episode of the Senate refusal of José Ermírio de Moraes as the Ambassador in Bonn. The Friendship and Consultation Agreement as well as the Joint Declaration established commitments of common action, to resolve international matters; the preservation of democracy and freedom to benefit of development; the repulsion both of extra continental interference and the intervention in the sovereignty of other nations; a continental joint action, to defend political and social stability in the Americas; and a defense of natural resources.

The Declaration reflects a willingness to cooperate and coordinate positions, as well as identify common points of view and interests between Brazil and Argentina. The meeting also, however, demonstrated to Jânio the difficulties of Frondizi, who had to face 60 military declarations during his administration. Uruguaiana was an important moment of inflection for the nation's foreign policy since previous attempts of friendship and cooperation, such as the meetings between Vargas and Perón, in 1954 – known as the ABC Pact, for Argentina, Brazil and Chile – had failed. The failure was due to reciprocal suspicions of hegemony, the fear of military imbalance, and a strong domestic opposition in Brazil, which feared a “labor union republic.”

Another theme of great importance and controversy was that of neutralism and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Brazil, whose foreign policy was admired by the main leaders of NAM, received a letter of invitation signed by Gamal Nasser, Josip Tito, and Sukarno, to attend the Preparatory Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries that would take place in June in Cairo. Due to internal matters at Itamaraty, however, only one observer, Minister Araújo Castro, was sent.

The Cairo Conference approved three principles that made it difficult, or even impossible, for Brazil to participate in NAM: 1) not to participate in military alliances with the major blocks; 2) not to grant military bases in its territory to foreign powers, and 3) to actively support national liberation movements. The meeting was difficult; on several occasions, Arinos had to defend the distinction he made between neutrality, neutralism and independence.

Relations with the United States were crucial for both domestic and foreign policies during the period Arinos was at the head of Itamaraty. One item given much importance was Jânio Quadros' position in favor of legislation to limit the remittance of profits by foreign companies – an issue that had also generated serious problems to Vargas and, in turn, led to similar problems for João Goulart, and that was revoked at the beginning of the Castelo Branco administration.

After Jânio Quadros visited Cuba, in March 1960, Arinos sought to define Brazilian policy in relation to the Cuban Revolution based on the principles of self-determination, non-intervention, and solidarity, plus the goal of bringing Havana and Washington closer together. Arinos was an intransigent defender of the non-intervention principle and of self-determination. He considered the latter a fundamental starting point for world peace, and that the non-intervention principle prohibited *any* intervention, either

individual or collective, even if done to impose a democratic regime. He did, however, agree that the principle of continental solidarity imposed a defense against communism, and thus, he said that Brazil should be against an intervention in Cuba if done strictly to fight communism. At the same time, he believed that Brazil should agree to preemptive measures, to avoid the risks that communism would bring to the most fragile countries of the Americas. He also defended the isolation of Cuba in a type of *cordon sanitaire* and the adoption of a statute similar to that of Finland. In the case of Brazil, Arinos said that the best defense against communism was the revitalization of democracy, especially in a social context, through the elimination of misery, injustice, inequality, and the promotion of economic development.

Shortly after the meeting of Jânio Quadros and Adolf Berle Jr., in February, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba took place, in April 1961. The failed incursion was carried out by mercenaries who were funded, armed and supported by the United States. The attack had been planned by the Eisenhower administration – specifically by the brothers, John Foster Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Allen Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State. With the 1960 elections, and the change in presidents, John F. Kennedy, who had been elected by only 120,000 votes more than his Republican rival, Eisenhower's vice president, Richard Nixon, inherited the plan and made the decision to go forward with it.

The failure of the invasion caused an assessment made by high-level special envoys, such as Adlai Stevenson and Douglas Dillon. The political damages had increased the fear the Americans had concerning the Cuban Revolution, including a fear that social and economic conditions in Latin America could bring about similar revolutions in the region. Thus, in his first speech on foreign policy, on March 13, 1961, Kennedy, the first Catholic president of the United States, a scion of a family of Irish origin, launched the

Alliance for Progress, a 20 billion dollar program, to be conducted over 10 years in 20 Latin American countries. The plan sought to condition access to the resources and support given by the United States to a process of gradual political isolation that would lead to the future exclusion of Cuba from the Interamerican system. The plan was used to justify an American blockade, as well as a trade, financial and political isolation of the island country.

A meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES, for *Conselho Inter-Americano Econômico e Social*) was called, to represent the program of the Alliance and to obtain the adhesion of the Latin American countries. Cuba was the only country that did not accede, because it considered its resources insufficient and the conditions unacceptable.

The CIES meeting held in Punta del Este, Uruguay eventually had a decisive effect in the Brazilian domestic policy. On his return from the meeting, Che Guevara, the Cuban Minister of Finance and head of the his country's delegation, went to Buenos Aires and met Frondizi; then from Buenos Aires, he went to Brasília, where he met with Janio Quadros, who asked to intervene in a matter dealing with Catholic priests in Cuba. Quadros also awarded Che with the Order of the Southern Cross.

Members of the Catholic Church attacked the act of awarding Guevara the Order of the Southern Cross. Despite the award's political meaning, however, it was not such an unusual gesture, as the award – which is only given to foreigners – had already been given to many others, including a president of Cuba, foreign ministers, and even to Soviets. Arinos also recalls in his *Memórias*, that a letter defending the Cuban church was written at the request of the Apostolic Nuncio and delivered by Jânio to Che, who was asked to give it to Fidel Castro.

Che Guevara's award, however, was only the pretext to trigger the political crisis that was already being articulated by Carlos Lacerda and the entire conservative press and media. Lacerda had published a series of violent articles in the *Tribuna da Imprensa* on August 22, 23, 24 and 25, all against Jânio Quadros, mainly opposing his foreign policy. On television the evening of August 24, Lacerda also accused Quadros of organizing a coup d'état which, supposedly, would be announced by Quadros' own justice minister, Pedroso Horta. In all the controversy, Afonso Arinos vigorously defended the administration's foreign policy in the press and in the Congress, and he was praised for this by Jânio Quadros. Arinos was, however, also virulently attacked by others. And as a sign of protest, military people, returned awards – except for the Southern Cross, which was exclusively given to foreigners.

Feeling attacked in his authority and declaring that he could not rule, Jânio Quadros, abruptly resigned on August 25, 1961. He did so in a calculated manner, however, expecting to return to power. After attending ceremonies celebrating Soldier's Day that morning, he flew to Cumbica airport in São Paulo, where he waited for the resignation letter he had written to be delivered – and the outcry for his return. As Jânio had ordered, Pedroso Horta delivered the letter to Senator Auro Moura Andrade, at 3:00 pm, and the senate promptly declared the position to be vacant. At 5:00 pm, Ranieri Mazzili, the president of the Chamber of Deputies was inaugurated as the country's president.

Thus, the first and glorious period of Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy headed by Afonso Arinos had ended, and a new period began under a new series of foreign ministers, including San Tiago Dantas, Hermes Lima, Evandro Lins e Silva and Araújo Castro. The policy lasted until 1964, when it was both condemned and rejected on the very first day of the Castelo Branco administration. Then, after a brief interlude, the policy

was revived during subsequent military governments – albeit under other names – thereby demonstrating its compatibility with Brazil's needs as an underdeveloped and peripheral country. In 1990 and for a long period thereafter – with the exception of the Itamar Franco administration (1992-1995), the governments gave up their independence as well as their desire for autonomous development, as they were immersed in globalization and encouraged by neoliberal optimism.

AFONSO ARINOS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

In his speeches at the Sixteenth UN General Assembly, Afonso Arinos revealed how advanced his political positions were. Included among the many and varied topics he spoke about were: a belief that human rights are also social; that freedom depends on social progress; that the world was not divided only into East and West, but also into North and South; that peace could only be attained with respect for self-determination; that the path to peace was disarmament; that there existed a domestic colonialism in South Africa; that Brazil was absolutely against any type of colonialism; that, although Brazil had chosen democracy, the United Nations could not impose any form of government on its members; that, in the Organization of American States, the adoption of a form of government other than representative democracy may lead to the exclusion of the State from the Organization, but that it does not justify intervention.

The eighteen-nation Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was created by a UN General Assembly resolution in December 1961, with a mission to submit a project for a general and complete disarmament treaty under effective international control. The work started in Geneva with the presence of Minister

San Tiago Dantas who, back in Brazil, made Afonso Arinos head of the delegation. At the Conference, Arinos focused his efforts in the negotiations to obtain a treaty to ban nuclear tests. He also emphasized the importance of the reconversion of militarized economies, and the destination of resources liberated to constitute an international fund to eliminate poverty as well as economic inequalities among States.

Afonso Arinos' second administration at Itamaraty was short lived as he served only under the government of the Brochado da Rocha Cabinet which, itself only lasted from July 12 to September 18, 1962. Arinos had intended to give priority to trade matters, and he was concerned about preferences granted by the EEC to former colonies, with the protectionism of the Common Agricultural Policy, as well as the transformation and deepening of the Latin American Free Trade Association.

Afonso Arinos led Brazil's delegation to the seventeenth UN General Assembly in 1962. The position was obtained via an invitation from Hermes Lima, another of the country's prime ministers, September 18, 1962 to January 23, 1963 (the latter date marks the end of the parliamentary experiment). Arinos and Hermes Lima were friends since they were students and later professors together at the National Law School as well as fellow representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. In this UN Assembly, Arinos addressed new themes, such as the regulation of radio and television programs that broadcast by satellite, the denuclearization of Latin America, and the calling for a conference on trade and development, which became Unctad (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). He also addressed old issues that concerned him, such as disarmament, a ban of nuclear tests, and decolonization.

In the second session of the Conference on Disarmament, which began in February 1963, regional denuclearization treaties were Arinos' major concern. The treaties aimed to stop nuclear experiments and provisional agreements to suspend tests. The issue of control was the object of special attention for Arinos, who made a great contribution to the so-called *Memorandum of the Eight Powers* that established a system of flexible distribution of inspections and was rejected both by the United States and the Soviet Union.

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SAN TIAGO DANTAS

Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas was born in Rio de Janeiro, on October 30th, 1911. In 1928, he was accepted to study law at the University of Rio de Janeiro, where he graduated in 1932. His political activity began, between 1932 and 1937, when he was a member of the Brazilian Integralist Action. He made a career as a university professor, which began in 1937, when he became permanent, by competition, as Professor of Legislation and Political Economy of the National School of Architecture. In 1940, also by exam competition, he became a full Professor of Civil Law of the National Law School of the University of Brazil, of which he was dean between 1941 and 1945. His international activities began when he was appointed, in January 1943, delegate to the First Conference of Ministers of Education of the American Republics, in Panamá. In March 1951, he was the Brazilian delegate to the 4th Consultation Meeting of the American Chancellors, in Washington, D.C. In 1952, he was appointed Member of Permanent

International Arbitration Court, in The Hague and an expert of the UN in the Committee on Food Obligations and Execution of Sentences Abroad, in Geneva. In 1953, he was the Brazilian Delegate to the 3rd Meeting of the Interamerican Council of Jurists, in Buenos Aires and, in 1954, Councilor of the Brazilian Delegation to the 4th Meeting of the Political and Social Interamerican Council, in Rio de Janeiro. Between 1955 and 1958, he was elected member and President, since May 12th, 1955, of the Interamerican Legal Commission, seated in Rio de Janeiro. In 1959, he was Councilor of the Brazilian Delegation to the 5th Consultation Meeting of the American Chancellors, in Santiago in Chile. In 1958, he was elected Federal Representative by PTB of Minas Gerais and he carried out his term until 1963. In 1960, he was the Chairman of the Executive Commission of PTB. In 1961, the President Jânio Quadros nominated him head of the Permanent Delegation of Brazil to the UN. He did not take over the function because of Jânio's resignation. Between September 1961 and July 1962, he was nominated Chancellor in the Parliamentary government of Tancredo Neves. As Chancellor, he headed the Brazilian delegation to the 8th Consultation Meeting of the American Chancellors in Punta Del Este, travelled to Argentina, Uruguay, Switzerland, Poland, Israel and the Vatican, and accompanied President João Goulart to the United States and Mexico. In June 1962, he was appointed to head the Council of Ministers of João Goulart's parliamentary government, having been defeated in the House of Representatives. He was re-elected Federal Representative by PTB of Minas Gerais. Between January and June 1963, he was the Minister of Finance of João Goulart's presidentialist government. In 1963, he was chosen the first "Intellectual of the Year", and given the Juca Pato Award, by the Brazilian Union of Writers and was elected "Man of Vision 1963". He died in Rio de Janeiro on September 6th, 1964.

FRANCISCO CLEMENTINO SAN TIAGO DANTAS: THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT AND THE LIMITS OF THE RATIONAL ARGUMENT

Gelson Fonseca

Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas became Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 11, 1961 in an especially difficult political context. Domestically, President Jânio Quadros had resigned just a few weeks prior, and a parliamentary system of government had been installed, albeit not out of the conviction of the political elite or through the popular will of a vote. Rather, parliamentarism was established in a negotiated and artificial way, designed to allow Vice President João Goulart – whom rightwing groups and military sectors opposed – assume a weakened office of the presidency. Tancredo Neves, a respected representative in the Chamber of Deputies (Brazil's lower house of the federal legislature) was chosen Prime Minister, and Neves invited San Tiago Dantas – an elected representative of the *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* (a Brazilian labor party) in that same legislative house – to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also known as *Itamaraty*. Externally, the Cold War was at full strength, as evidenced by the construction of the Berlin Wall, which had begun in August that

same year. In the Americas, the Cuban problem dominated the agenda. For its part, Brazilian foreign policy had acquired new outlines with Jânio Quadros, who without abandoning Western values had proposed a more universal conduct of diplomacy.

It was, therefore, in this context that San Tiago Dantas carried out his functions as Foreign Minister for a period of ten incomplete months, until June 1962, when Tancredo Neves resigned as Prime Minister and a new Ministry was selected, including the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Despite his relatively short tenure at the head of Itamaraty, San Tiago Dantas left a significant mark on the history of Brazilian diplomacy. How can that mark be characterized, and what were his specific contributions to the evolution of Brazil's presence in the international arena? The purpose of this essay will be to outline answers to those questions, while focusing on San Tiago Dantas' views on the East-West conflict.

San Tiago Dantas' knowledge of international issues began long before he became Foreign Minister. Marcílio Marques Moreira, who has served Brazil in positions as Finance Minister and Ambassador to the United States, once stated that "the familiarity, both theoretical and practical, of San Tiago with international problems was gradually built on a long path"; a path that included participation in the negotiations of the Abbink Mission, in 1948; attendance at conferences held at the Escola Superior da Guerra (ESG, Brazil's military academy) in the 1950s; tenure as president of the Inter-American Committee of Jurists, 1955 to 1958; attendance at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the Organization of American States, Santiago, Chile, 1959; as well as the authorship of various

newspaper articles on international matters.¹ A need to articulate his “diplomatic thought” in a more complete manner, however, emerged when San Tiago was appointed Foreign Minister, to which he left a legacy in his book, *Política Externa Independente* (*Independent Foreign Policy*), published by *Civilização Brasileira*, in 1962. In that book – with the assistance of Professor Thiers Martins Moreira and diplomat, Dario Castro Alves – he gathered and organized the texts that were important while he was Foreign Minister; texts that include such matters as the foreign policy of the first parliamentary government, speeches given at his inauguration as Foreign Minister, his visit to Argentina, and joint releases issued in bilateral meetings with other Foreign Ministers. The texts are published with two lengthy transcriptions of debates in the Chamber of Deputies, one concerning the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the other about the Conference of Punta Del Este, which, in January 1962, led to the exclusion of Cuba from the Inter-American system. The transcriptions of the debates and related themes occupy more than 140 of the book’s 255 pages, thus demonstrating their importance in San Tiago Dantas’ administration not only for diplomatic reasons, but also for public opinion, as reflected in the sessions of Congress.

In both cases, the debate followed the Cold War logic. Although the themes *are* new, they are also not untold in the history of Brazilian diplomacy. Ideas of restoring diplomatic relations with socialist countries, especially with the USSR, which Jânio Quadros had launched, had actually been initiated during Juscelino Kubitschek’s government in the 1950s – although then, they were limited to the commercial sphere. The Cuban issue had been outlined with the fall of the dictatorship of Fulgêncio

1 See DANTAS, 2011, p. 351. Marcílio lists all the documents and the activities of San Tiago Dantas that, since the 1930’s, and are relevant to the international process.

Batista, in 1959. At that time, after initial applause, Fidel Castro's nationalization measures triggered a growing antagonism between Cuba and the United States – plus other western hemisphere countries, especially many in Central America – and major implications ensued.

The first model to deal with the presence of a socialist country in the hemisphere had been outlined by San Tiago Dantas' predecessor in the Foreign Ministry, Afonso Arinos, who had presented it in a lengthy session of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.² A difference between the time of Arinos and that of San Tiago Dantas, however, is that in the first stage of the Independent Foreign Policy (although it was not yet known by that name), the Soviet, and especially the Cuban, issues were more intellectual than diplomatic. In the case of Cuba, the Organization of American States had not yet established a forum that would open the game of pressures and counter pressures in order to obtain a decision on how to live with socialism within the Inter- American system.³ That forum occurred during San Tiago Dantas' tenure as Foreign Minister, when the policy to reunite with the USSR was also a core issue. The two issues became critical processes that demanded from the Foreign Minister an intensive work of intellectual elaboration and diplomatic strategy, which, as will be seen, Arinos had outlined

2 "Trechos da Audiência do Ministro Afonso Arinos na Comissão de Relações Exteriores da Câmara de Deputados", FRANCO, 2007, p. 77.

3 During the Quadros administration, Brazil restored relations with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Restoration with the USSR, however, did not immediately follow. That proposal had generated controversy because of its more complex political connotations, as it was the USSR that led the socialist bloc. In addition, the break had taken place in a dramatic manner, together with domestic measures, such as the prohibition of the Brazilian Communist Party and the suspension of its members' political rights. As for the Cuban problem, the grounds of the Brazilian position were brilliantly outlined in a memorandum signed by Secretary Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, Chief of the Political Division of Itamaraty, on May 8, 1961 (as transcribed in FRANCO, 2007, p. 64). San Tiago Dantas incorporated many of this memo's arguments into his proposal.

but had not carried out.⁴ In short, the fulcrum of San Tiago Dantas' diplomatic thought has to do with crises in the bipolar East-West confrontation.

DEVELOP AND SYSTEMATIZE

Only one text of San Tiago Dantas' aforementioned book does not correspond to the period of his administration of the foreign office: the introduction, written in 1962. In that text, San Tiago summarizes the general sense of Independent Foreign Policy. The text begins with a curious statement, which is worth transcribing:

Independent Foreign Policy, which I found already initiated at Itamaraty, and sought to develop and systematize, was not conceived as a doctrine or designed as a plan before coming to fruition. The facts came before the ideas. Activities that had been taken on because of concrete situations the Foreign Ministry faced, revealed themselves to be of an internal nature, thereby allowing for their unification around a central thought of the government.

This does not mean that the policy's elaboration was either empirical or fortuitous. In the origin of each position – during the establishment of each policy – one constant was present: the exclusive consideration of the interests of Brazil, seen as a country that seeks (1) development and economic emancipation and (2) a historical conciliation

4 In a meeting of the political planning commission that took place on December 27, 1961, Ambassador Araújo Castro, said: "Something that had to be said very carefully concerns the issue of foreign policy. In fact, the problems are much more serious than they were one year ago. At that time we were at the stage of the enunciation of principles and now it is all about the application of those principles. The Jânio Quadros administration actually did not have any foreign policy problem, except the case of the Santa Maria." (Cited in FRANCO, 2007, p. 232).

between a representative democratic regime and a social reform movement capable of suppressing oppression of the working class by the ruling class (DANTAS, 2011, p. 9).

The text is meaningful for many reasons, but one in particular stands out. When San Tiago Dantas reviewed his performance as Foreign Minister, he indicated that besides the political aspects of the work, there was also an intellectual component, designed to “develop and systematize” what used to be merely reactions to “concrete situations” – while constantly being guided by principles. For those who study San Tiago Dantas’ thought, the questions are immediate: Did he fulfill his goal to systematize the operation of Brazilian diplomacy that had begun with Jânio Quadros? And if you respond positively to *that* question: How did he do it?

His concern about systematizing expresses one of the distinctive features of San Tiago’s personality, namely, his extraordinary ability to think in a clear and consistent manner, that is, to *systematize*. Another question relates to the criticism embedded within his statement that prior to then, Brazilian foreign policy was about empirical reactions, which, he said, did not result in consistency. San Tiago Dantas, himself, proposed criteria to assess his own thought; criteria which must undergo the two sieves of development and systematization. In fact, San Tiago believed the two need to be seen together as he said: *development identifies itself with systematization*. Indeed, he believed that foreign policy at the time lacked a doctrine to organize itself. For him, Independent Foreign Policy would become that doctrine.

In analyzing San Tiago Dantas’ statement, we can begin with the idea of systematization and later evaluate to what extent it develops previous theses. We are, of course, dealing with very flexible categories, beginning with limits to the concept of “systematic” diplomatic thought. Nevertheless, in the context of

the Cold War, certain requirements were identifiable to define it, the first of which concerns how to address the bipolar East-West antagonism. In this case, San Tiago said, the antagonistic condition itself opens a range of possibilities that allow you to treat it, at one extreme, as an absolute conflict – the purpose being to destroy the enemy; and at the other extreme – the variation of *détente* – there is competitive coexistence, that is, the parties remain adversaries, yet they admit various forms of *rapprochement* – the purpose no longer being to destroy each other, but to win by other means.⁵ These variations in the diagnosis of global antagonism lead to adjustments of diplomatic behavior. If the perception is one of conflict, the possibility to have a relationship with the “enemy” is restricted or even blocked. If, on the other hand, the perception is one of competition, diplomatic behavior will necessarily be more flexible.⁶

As has already been seen, the two core problems of San Tiago Dantas’ administration were modelled by understandings of the East-West bipolar antagonism, on whose central dynamic we had scarce influence. That, however, had a direct repercussion on our options, even when it was transposed to the domestic debate. This situation was shown in an eloquent manner in parliamentary sessions about Cuba and those concerning the restoration of diplomatic ties with the USSR.

Ultimately, to be worth more than the paper on which it was written, any foreign policy doctrine created at the beginning of the Cold War, would have to be made with a view of the bipolar East-West conflict.

5 The Cold War admits several relationship standards between both blocs, from the antagonism that characterizes the diplomacy of Foster Dulles to the proposals of Kissinger about *détente* in the 1970’s. In the USSR, the variations oppose Stalin and Gorbachev.

6 The best theoretical discussion of the problem is that of the constructivists.

THE COLD WAR AND THE RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

San Tiago Dantas believed that the first key to understanding the Cold War was in recognizing that

instead of being a simple stage...it is a permanent coexistence from which we will only leave when the evolution of events has overcome the present forms of antagonism that oppose the West and the East (DANTAS, 2011, p. 118).

In this statement, it is necessary to emphasize the idea of a “permanent coexistence” – which removes any idea of an immediate, short-term solution; it does not, however, preclude competition. Another important aspect to note is that San Tiago Dantas does not make both sides equivalent. Rather, he continues:

If it is a coexistence that will last for an unpredictable period, the immediate conclusion imposed on us is that, for us to fight for the ideals of Western and democratic civilization, we have to start from the conviction of the uselessness of measures of force, as they will inevitably generate other, similar measures. Therefore, in all circumstances, we have to seek not the aggravation of international tensions, but rather their progressive reduction (DANTAS, 2011, p. 118).

San Tiago Dantas further explains that the isolation of both ideological spheres would only be harmonized with a policy that, consciously or unconsciously, focused on

the elimination of one of the antagonists through a military decision, and while that may have been a certainty that existed in 1947 and the years immediately thereafter – when the West had a monopoly of atomic weapons and the Cold War could seem to be the prelude to a real conflict

[...], today, [...] – when the perspectives opened by atomic retaliation are those of mass destruction – not only of the vanquished, but also of the victors – one can no longer suppose, nor above all hope, that the chronic tensions between the U.S. and the USSR could be resolved by war. Therefore, as the prospect of splitting the world into two tight influence spheres is no longer conceivable, [...] what remains as the only solution is to accept coexistence, with a deliberate effort to reduce tensions through understanding and trade (DANTAS, 2011, p. 11).

Once the nature of the Cold War was thus defined, San Tiago Dantas explored some of the implications for Brazil in the international sphere, the first being the need to universalize diplomatic contacts, even with those located at the other extreme of the ideological spectrum. The second – if dialogue with the antagonist is accepted – is the need to be certain that the arguments used in that dialogue are the very best available. Accordingly, it is worth going back to the crystal clear words that the Foreign Minister used in the Chamber of Deputies, when he discussed the restoration of relations with the USSR. The political and economic arguments, he said, related to the need for coexistence. Explaining why the great Western countries should exchange embassies with Moscow, he said:

The one and only reason is simply the desirability of diplomatic contacts between the peoples of the nations in question. As even when there are profound differences, when the points of discord and friction are deep – which is the majority of time – it is advisable to keep open channels, to discuss and to talk, such that the frictions and antagonisms do not exacerbate and become even greater disagreements.

It is the duty of every public man to reveal to the people that political isolationism is a bellicose position (DANTAS, 2011, p. 71).⁷

Dialogue, therefore, should be the means to “provide peace,” and thus it is the core purpose of Brazilian diplomacy in the world.⁸ The absence of dialogue – or restrictions to its universalization – becomes its opposite: an aggressive and bellicose policy.⁹

In further analyzing San Tiago Dantas’ thought on the Cold War, we find the second key to his beliefs: that the west should accept dialogue because it has advantages, or to remain in the same verbal sphere – it has *better arguments*. For San Tiago, democracy is the key, and because of democracy, dialogue should be encouraged as we have more to offer than socialism:

The belief in the West has been that the reciprocal knowledge of democratic and socialist societies favor the influence of the former over the latter because of the higher levels

7 It could be added that, for San Tiago Dantas, controversy is natural. As he said in his farewell speech at the Foreign Ministry: “All human personalities bring with them an indelible mark that they take to the offices they occupy or to the place where they live... It was natural that I brought to this office a mark that could not be separated from my public life and my destiny, which has been controversial. Being controversial and enjoying it, not believing in the pacifications imposed by artifice, but, on the contrary, being certain that it is through the fight and the antagonism that the stages of stagnation are overcome and new development stages are reached, I never renounced entering a fight in order to find through it the paths of truth and peace” (Lessa; Hollanda, 2009, p. 254).

8 As stated in the program of the Parliamentary Government, “The goals that we pursue – and according to which we make our decisions – are the following: first, to preserve world peace, which is currently a common and supreme purpose of the international action of all peoples, but in relation to which our political calling rose early, inspired since the beginning of the nationality by the pacifist ideas and the formal repudiation to war as a means of international action [...]” (Lessa; Hollanda, 2009, p. 22).

9 It is worth recalling that, unlike San Tiago Dantas, those who argue against the decision to restore relations with the USSR state that dialogue with Moscow will always be tainted because the USSR intended to transform Brazil into a center of espionage and subversive propaganda of a “poisonous doctrine” – as Father Vidigal said when he interrupted the Foreign Minister during his statement (Lessa; Hollanda, 2009, p. 70)

of individual freedoms that democracy ensures (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 12).

San Tiago Dantas had no doubts that the distinctive feature of the West is democracy; that, in the sphere of the government's goals, an ideological commitment to the principles of representative democracy is crucial; yet also that there was no "ideological ambiguity" in also believing in *rapprochement* with the USSR (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 54). This theme, summarized in the preface of his book and recurrent in his work, is always with the same emphasis, as evident in the following passage of testimony he gave in the Chamber of Deputies: "Of all the forms of government, democracy is the one that best resists confrontation and, therefore, it is the one that best survives in an environment of coexistence" (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 72).

The political argument allows for the dissolution of the antagonist's threat, which, in turn, leads to implications for the diplomatic options of Brazil. Therefore, there is room for pragmatism, such that, in the relationship with the socialists, the consideration of economic advantages prevail.¹⁰ Again, in testimony to the Chamber of Deputies, San Tiago Dantas made a detailed report of the Brazilian economic situation, pointing to the need to increase the country's trade flows. In his analysis of Brazil's export markets, he did not see any dynamism with respect to the United States, and with the creation of the European Common Market, he saw threats more severe than those of the African countries. In the final analysis, his report showed that international trade with the

10 It should be noted that the dissolution of the threat is not absolute and the restoration allows for both diplomatic missions, in Moscow and in Rio de Janeiro, a statute of limitations for the displacement of their employees, as, in fact, San Tiago Dantas himself explained in his statement in the Chamber of Deputies. Many years later, when the relations with Cuba were restored, a similar statute was negotiated, in both cases, by inspiration of the security division of João Goulart administration and later that of Jose Sarney.

Soviet bloc was that which was growing the fastest. Consequently, he favored the “concrete” advantages of restoration.

It is interesting to establish the evolution of San Tiago Dantas’ argument because, I believe, it is one of the main girders of his thought. The confrontation among ideologies has its own logic, and in the case of the Cold War when the conflict is dissolved by the mutual contention imposed by the nuclear impasse, coexistence and competition *must* prevail among the blocs. In the long run, he believed, democracy would prevail because it has intrinsic advantages over socialism – freedom being its greatest advantage. This situation had political consequences, the first being the need to sustain dialogue, even under difficult or adverse conditions. As will be seen, this was the conceptual base that guided San Tiago Dantas’ thoughts in relation to Cuba. The second consequence is to disconnect diplomatic options from ideological parameters. The restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR, for example, took place not because of any sympathy towards the socialists, but because of the concrete advantages that were predicted. In fact, pragmatism was one of the core elements of San Tiago Dantas’ thought and, in the case of Cuba, his “defense” that the regime should remain in the Inter- American system had more to do with continental stability than with any sympathy towards the socialism of Fidel Castro. In fact, one of his few criticisms of the politics of Jânio Quadros was that it had been ideological in the consideration of the Cuban problem.¹¹

11 The criticism is not public. It was made during a closed meeting with the summit of Itamaraty in a house in the Gávea Pequena neighborhood, the Casa das Pedras that belonged to Drault Hernany, a theme that we will return to the theme. “In that line, there was a slight touch of ideological sympathy and a systematic refusal [...] sometimes having avoided talking about the democratic character of Fidel Castro’s government [...] our idea was the opposite. We started by recognizing that the Cuban regime was not democratic. [...] That eliminated the problem of ideological sympathy. The Brazilian government has no ideological sympathy for the regime of Fidel Castro. Even though some political groups within the government might have it, the government has sympathy for what is written in the Constitution and the treaties” (Fonseca, 2007)

Another implication of the perspective of the Cold War as an environment of coexistence is perhaps curious and raises the issue of relations between the national and the international spheres. According to San Tiago Dantas, however, although democracy is able to prevail ideologically over socialism, socialism does have something to teach democracies. This theme, included in the preface of his book, begins with the idea that contacts between the socialist and the democratic worlds are beneficial to democracies. This is especially true for democracies such as that of Brazil,

in which the regime of political freedoms – a characteristic of the State of Law – is superimposed on a social structure based on the economic domination of one class by another, and, therefore, on the actual denegation of freedom itself. This situation results in a permanent encouragement of social reform, with the creation of growing societal pressures that can be captured for progressive structural modifications without breaking the continuity of the democratic regime (DANTAS, 2011, p. 12).

The statement is actually an indirect tribute to socialism, and it reflects the idea, popular at that time, that the main difference between the two ideologies was that democracy offers freedom at the expense of inequality, whereas socialism offers equality at the expense of freedom. In other words, capitalism could be the solution for economic development, yet it alone would be insufficient for social progress. Hence, San Tiago Dantas emphasized the necessity of solving the problem of inequality, first as a goal in and of itself, and next as the best antidote to avoid an unwanted turn to the left by the regime. Capitalism, he believed, could be “corrected,” since it is grounded in freedom, and therefore, contains the possibility of political debate – which can then lead to change.

It is also worth emphasizing that San Tiago Dantas' policy of defending coexistence was rooted in the Brazilian diplomatic tradition. Therefore, his position – or that of the Goulart administration – was not new. On the contrary, one of its merits is precisely its continuity. Therefore, he said, that the policy of “peaceful coexistence is not an invention of the [then current] Brazilian government...it is not an idea that may be considered new, neither by the Congress, nor by the people,” and in order to demonstrate the tradition, he quoted a long passage – which he called “refined” – of Horácio Lafer, Foreign Minister at the time of President Juscelino Kubitschek.¹²

To what should we ascribe the importance of emphasizing continuity within a conceptual framework of newness? The structural reason is that international relations involve commitments (mainly treaties), which tend to be permanent. Keeping commitments, therefore, reinforces the credibility of a country. The norm, especially for a country that values, as one would say today, *soft power*, is to emphasize continuity, in order to reinforce to its partners the notion that it is trustworthy.¹³

12 According to Lafer: “The development of nuclear weapons led war to no longer be an alternative instrument of politics. Given the inadmissibility of warlike solutions, the world is confronted with the need to adjust, through negotiations, differences between nations. Therefore, the single path in search of solving problems of our time is through permanent negotiation, the idea to always negotiate. The United Nations is not a super state, but the affirmation is that the world has to live in a continuous state of stubborn, patient negotiations. They are the mechanisms that provide the maximum opportunities for encounters and lines of commitment. If it is true that this negotiation process involves the permanent risk of deadlock, it is no less true that it is the only way in which solutions that ensure the survival of mankind can still be found.” (Cited in Dantas, 2011, p. 147).

13 Another mention of the theme of continuity is made in the chapter on foreign policy of the parliamentary style of government: “Not only in this one, but in any other regime, continuity is the indispensable requirement of all foreign policy, since, in relation to the administrative problems of the country, the drawbacks are minor resulting from the quick liquidation of an experience of change of an adopted path. In relation to the foreign policy, it is key that the protection of the State behavior within the international society ensures credit to the commitments made. Brazilian foreign policy has responded to that need for consistency in time. Although the immediate goals are transformed under the action of the historical evolution of which we participated, the Brazilian international behavior has been that of a State conscious of its own purposes, thanks to the administrative

Additionally, there were some very specific reasons that led San Tiago Dantas to reinforce the idea of continuity. As Brito Cruz showed in a key study of the period, San Tiago Dantas' Independent Foreign Policy is different from that of Afonso Arinos for many reasons, one of them being the ideological care by which the government, born "under suspicion," avoided accusations of being leftist (CRUZ, 1989). Continuity, therefore, supported by the quote of Horácio Lafer, serves as an attempt by San Tiago Dantas, to reinforce the policy's pragmatism, based on the country's permanent development interests.

BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVES REGARDING THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

San Tiago Dantas' model of interpreting the Cold War was tested for the first time in the episode of the restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR. The argument that sustains the advantages of the restoration is basically pragmatic, based in the perspective to obtain concrete advantages, opened by the interpretation of bipolar antagonism as competitive coexistence. It was also considered that the restoration could be limited to the bilateral sphere (which was not a theme that could be discussed in multilateral forums – as, he believed, the Cuban one could be). The second test was the policy concerning the Cuban Revolution, the solution of which is considerably more complex for several reasons: First, because there is a clash of principles between the policy of non-intervention and the preservation of democracy as the goal of the Inter-American system; and second, because the solution

tradition of which the Brazilian Foreign Ministry became a trustee, a tradition that has provided us a fair concept in international circles." Celso Lafer pointed that reference to me from his book, *A Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a Política Externa*, p. 26.

involves multilateral politics, in which an internal equilibrium should be sought among Latin Americans, as well as between them and the United States. Yet another factor concerns the fact that, more than the restoration of relations between Brazil and the USSR, the Cuban issue had greater domestic repercussions. It had become an ingredient of national political debate. Before discussing this directly, however, a brief explanation of the term “clash of principles” needs to be given.

The principle of non-intervention resulted from a long battle within the Inter-American system, culminating with its acceptance by the United States at the VII Inter-American International Conference (1933). The principle was conceived as an instrument to contain the frequent interventions by the United States in Latin America – mainly in Central America – throughout the 20th century. The principle became a binding rule of International Law, consecrated in Article III of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter (as well as in the UN Charter). In the words of San Tiago Dantas: “It can be said that the Organization of American States has flourished in the last few decades as an instrument *par excellence* of the non-intervention policy” (DANTAS, 2011, p. 115).

The perspective that the principle had embedded within it an absolute rule was always “qualified” by political circumstances and realities within the Inter-American system itself. Accordingly, the U.S. intervention in Guatemala, in 1954 and, on the socialist side, the Soviet intervention in Hungary, in 1956, should be remembered. In theory, the principle serves to legally protect a State against forms of aggression – whether open or not – by foreign powers that want to interfere in its domestic processes of political organization. Thus, during the Cold War, the legitimacy of ideologies competes with that of sovereignties, sometimes operating as an argument to supersede them. In what sense is this true? In either of the world’s then two ideological blocs (Soviet or

Western), the sovereign is limited (words of Nikita Khrushchev, Premier of the USSR, 1953-1964) when a State practices models of social organization that diverge from the loyalty necessary for the ideological character. This, then, was cited as the core “legitimacy” for the interventions carried out by the superpowers. The Cuban case generated special tension because it opened the possibility of the presence of a socialist State within the Western influence sphere (a situation which happened again, later, with Salvador Allende’s Chile). At the time of the Cuban issue, the question was not would the USSR defend Cuban loyalty, but rather to what extent it would do so? Also, would the United States allow such a divergence from its sphere of influence? (The sphere of influence in Latin America was deemed to be nothing more than the confirmation of ideological fidelity, and therefore, the open door to intervention).

There would be, however, a specific argument, which became effective, especially after the explicit adhesion of Fidel Castro to Marxism-Leninism, since, according to the interpretation of the United States and some Latin American countries, a socialist regime was, by its very nature, interventionist.¹⁴ If that were true, those countries argue, Cuba deserved some kind of “punishment,” an isolation, to prevent any interventionist actions that it might attempt. Another factor in the equation is that in the Inter-American system, self-determination (and, therefore, the domestic condition that a non-intervention policy should protect) was tied to the idea of democracy – a condition ratified at the Fifth Consultation Meeting, held in Chile, in 1959, which San Tiago Dantas had attended as a delegate of the Chamber of Deputies and to which he had made a significant contribution. At the time, then Foreign Minister Horácio Lafer had appointed him to write and present the Brazilian proposal on democracy and human rights of

14 The accusations of Cuban interference in other countries were common and started right after the Revolution.

the Declaration of Santiago, suggesting that its mechanisms be added to the national legislations. As Marcílio Marques Moreira later reminded me, Lafer's choice was based on the fact that San Tiago Dantas had presided in the previous year (1958) at the Inter-American Legal Committee that had received the mission to develop the theme. The final declaration of that conference, among other elements, characterized the democracy that the American countries desired as the supreme Law of the land. It is a principle that places rulers under the authority of the legal norm, via free elections, the rotation of power, and the protection of individual rights.¹⁵ Cuba, by the authoritarian solution that it had adopted, denied its citizens the principles of self-determination.¹⁶

Therefore, San Tiago Dantas' challenge, in the intellectual perspective he had outlined concerning the dynamics of the Cold War, was to deal with the Cuban problem, which clearly evolved while he was Foreign Minister. As we have seen, he worked with the preference for dialogue, even when there are antagonisms; this explains his recommendation to coexist with the socialists. The Cuban case becomes more complex, however, because coexistence was not simply of distant adversaries, but also of close ones, and it took place in a context in which important principles of Brazilian diplomacy clearly clashed.

Now, let us look at the Brazilian reactions. Fidel Castro took power in January 1959, initially to general applauses as we stated earlier. Gradually, however, the Cuban problem turned into

15 In August 1959, San Tiago Dantas submitted to the Chamber of Deputies a report on the Meeting, which was motivated by institutional instability in the Caribbean and friction between the Dominican Republic and Cuba (Lessa; Holanda, 2009, p. 41-58).

16 In Guerreiro's memorandum, the problem was clearly presented: "Although the other American republics may verify that Cuba hasn't organized itself as a representative democracy, and it cannot be said that the regime currently installed there should be respected because of the principle of self-determination, they will have to respect it because of the principle of the sovereignty and the independence of States. They may only intervene if they consider that such a regime is a threat to the peace and security of the continent" (GUERREIRO, 2010, p. 67).

a crisis for the Inter-American system when the United States broke diplomatic relations with the country in January 1961, and simultaneously, began to work towards a policy of multilateral isolation of the island nation. It was then – with the adhesion of majorities in multilateral bodies – that interventionist interests, especially regarding regime change, gained legitimacy, and eventually exceeded their unilateral origin. Hence, this explains the North American policy, which at that moment, in 1962, was partially victorious.¹⁷

Brazilian responses to the situation were, therefore, required, with this coming precisely at the beginning of the implementation of what would become known as Independent Foreign Policy. And since the evolution of the Cuban problem took place in several stages, it required our diplomacy to have differentiated responses. Initially, during the administration of Afonso Arinos, the forum in which the issue would eventually be discussed had not yet been created. This allowed Afonso Arinos to have a position limited to a declaration of principles, without any diplomatic conflicts.

The context allowed Arinos to acknowledge the problem – the contradiction between non-intervention and the “commitments pertaining to the defense of America against ideological intervention, or, better said, against Marxist ideology, against the communist threat” – as recommended in the resolutions of the Conference of Bogotá, in 1948, and again in the Declaration of Santiago, in 1959 (Cited in FRANCO, 2007, p. 84).¹⁸ Yet, precisely

17 Victory in a forum is part of the legitimization process, but it is not the only one. In the Consultation Meeting, in 1962, the lack of support from Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Chile, turned fragile the legitimacy obtained by the U.S.’ policy.

18 The position of Arinos is interesting because it goes beyond conceptual terms, when it characterized “the contrast between what we could call the national sovereignty and the international organization, the contrast in what the national sovereignty ensures to the subsistence and the survival of the State and what the international organization, at least in its most current, deeper, and more moral meaning, claims as being the statement of the human rights” (Cited in FRANCO, 2007, p. 79). Thus, Arinos

because it was unnecessary to define negotiating positions, Arinos completed his argument with two other elements, including a categorical statement of broad repudiation of intervention: “we shall fight against the invasion of capitalism, which tends to repress our wealth and constrain our development”; as well as a statement against international communism: “the purpose of which is to subvert the democratic principle, enslave the freedom of the peoples and intervene in the American way of life” (Cited in FRANCO, 2007, p. 86). All of this meant opposition to either the United States or the USSR imposing a regime on Cuba. The statement also expressed the hope that through negotiations and agreements, Cuba would evolve to become representative democracy. The Arinos formula which tried to resolve the contradiction between fidelity to non-intervention and fidelity to democracy – was based, therefore, on a hypothesis concerning the future behavior of Cuba, which would be influential in negotiations and agreements attempting to return it to the democratic fold. At that moment, however, given the new closeness the USSR and the nationalizations that heralded a state economy, the expectation concerning the behavior of Castro’s government was perhaps only an expression of “wishful thinking.”

With the change in Foreign Ministers in 1961, it was left to San Tiago Dantas to define Brazil’s behavior in the next stages of the Cuban problem. Circumstances had also changed, as we have seen, as there was a diplomatic attempt to resolve the confrontation with the announcement of a Consultation Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to be held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962. It is worth recalling that at first San Tiago attempted to avoid that the meeting take place, yet with pressure from the United States, as well as from some countries in Latin America –

anticipated what became one of the axes of the problem of the modern international legitimacy, i.e., Limits to sovereignty for the values tied to human rights.

especially Colombia – the meeting did take place. It is also worth noting, that the major countries of the continent, namely Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, were not satisfied with the outcome of the meeting.

At the time of Arinos, there was a need to express foreign policy, but not necessarily diplomacy.¹⁹ Initially, the situation that San Tiago Dantas faced was similar in that: relations between the United States and Cuba had been severed, the rhetorical confrontation between both countries had increased, nationalizations in Cuba were continuing, and the socialist mood of Castro became more clear; yet Brazilian policy was basically the same, as it was still based on the hypothesis of a return of Cuba to democracy. The modalities of action, however, were necessarily different.²⁰ The clearest fear was that with pressure from the United States, violent action against Cuba would be precipitated, thereby creating a clear violation of the non-intervention principle. Therefore, the first *diplomatic* goal of Brazil was to “slow down the hurried proposals to resolve the Cuban case by violent means,” with this to be followed by important discussions with Argentina and Mexico. The goal required two negotiations, one with the United States, which assured a “moratorium on violence,” although not for an indeterminate period, and the second with Cuba, based on the fact that the country, after Batista was ousted, had signed the democratic commitment at the Fifth Consultation Meeting.

San Tiago Dantas met with the heads of Itamaraty in the beginning of his administration to determine how to carry out the Ministry’s goals. The meetings were recorded in minutes called

19 The diplomacy was more of a bilateral sense, with Brazil dealing, for example, with refugees in its Embassy in Havana, besides gestures, such as an award given to Che Guevara, etc.

20 At Casa das Pedras, the meeting about Cuba started from the idea that “Brasil hopes to see Cuba recovered to continental friendship status, by persuasive means”. See “Colóquios da Casa das Pedras”, in: Dantas, 2011, p. 343.

the *Colóquios da Casa das Pedras*, as they took place in a stone house located in the neighborhood of *Gávea Pequena* just outside of Rio de Janeiro. There, a plan calling for the *Finlandization* of the island nation was conceived – the name referring to the neutralization of the Scandinavian country bordering on the USSR.²¹ Although never carried out, the plan was a perfect conceptual elaboration based on assumptions about the Cuban behavior: Conquests of the Revolution would be maintained; “democratic externalities” restored; purchases of weapons from the USSR interrupted; and the Cuban regime would not make any ideological propaganda. A counterpart of the plan was the restoration of relations between Cuba and the United States, which would reopen the market for sugar from the island nation. There would also be gestures by the U.S. government in relation to anti-Castro refugees. And an allowance of continued economic relations with the USSR – with restrictions on military cooperation – would be allowed, thereby creating a *socialist showcase* in the hemisphere (DANTAS, 2011, p. 346).²²

Before moving to the next stage of the Cuban issue, a few comments should be made concerning the *Fino Plan*, the clear merit of which was to offer diplomatic consistency to the goal of ensuring respect for the non-intervention rule. The plan clearly noted that the goal would not be sustained without a process of negotiated grants that involved Cuba, the United States and the USSR. The plan’s “persuasive methods” of allowing the return of

21 Earlier, Guerreiro had talked about a “Yugoslavization” of Cuba (FRANCO, 2007, p. 72).

22 Maria Regina Soares de Lima observed that, “the most current and innovative element of San Tiago Dantas’ idea of foreign policy was the suggestion to create a special statute for Cuba that preserved the non-intervention principle, so important to the powerless countries and, simultaneously, allowing for the coexistence in the hemispheric scope with a socialist country [...]. If it had been accepted, it would have been victory of the principle of universalism in the region and a powerful antidote with relation to the penetration of the Cold War and all its harmful effects on the stability of domestic political institutions and the very destiny of democracy in the region”. See Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “Independent Foreign Policy”. In: Moreira; Niskier; Reis, 2007, p. 70.

Cuba to the Inter-American system had a very concrete and specific *roadmap*. However, as will be seen, the conceptual clearness was relatively disconnected from reality, as it was mainly based on the hypothesis that the course of the Cuban Revolution could be negotiated, as was mentioned above, to maintain democratic externalities, to abandon the purchase of weapons from the USSR, and to give up propaganda. It was not understood, that due to the unique character of Castro's regime, its very nature became stronger with the deepening of its socialist character. Another false hypothesis was that the United States would accept the presence of an antagonistic regime in its "backyard," if some of the features of that regime were diluted. San Tiago Dantas' ideas about the need for dialogue between adversaries did not apply since the U.S. government considered Castro to be a threat, and the maintenance of the regime meant a strategic defeat of the United States by the USSR. (U.S. opposition to the plan also grew due to domestic policy implications, along with the growth in numbers of Cuban exiles arriving in Florida). In short, in this sort of context, there was no space to negotiate only to confront.²³ The rationality of the arguments had found its limits in the universe of political needs, those of both of the United States and those of Cuba.

The actions that followed were completely diplomatic. The ideas were open for debate in the Consultation Meeting of Punta Del Este, which San Tiago Dantas attended as head of the Brazilian delegation. The forum for decisions about Cuba was now open, and the meeting demanded from Itamaraty a careful preparation that had begun at the *Colóquios da Casa das Pedras* and continued in the

23 In his testimony to CPDOC, former Minister Saraiva Guerreiro recalled a conversation with the head of the Caribbean Desk of the State Department in which, in personal terms, he suggested that the United States could avoid the deepening of the revolution if they made low-interest loans available to Cuba, to make up for the nationalizations. To Guerreiro's surprise, the reaction was strongly negative.

Planning Commission, as the documents of the time show.²⁴ The new and key piece of information was that the Cuban situation had changed when Castro proclaimed, in November 1961, that the regime he presided over was Marxist-Leninist. The contradiction between the defense of non-intervention and the democratic commitment became stronger. After all, the possibility to maintain “democratic externalities” had disappeared and the interventionist attitude resulted from the announcement of Cuba’s adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology. According to San Tiago Dantas:

The evolution of the revolutionary regime in the sense of the configuration of a socialist state, or – according to Prime-Minister Fidel Castro – Marxist-Leninist, inevitably created deep divergences, and even incompatibilities, between the Cuban Government’s policy and the democratic principles upon which the Inter-American system is based (DANTAS, 2011, p. 103-104).

In other words, the political position of defending non-intervention on principle had to be reviewed or, at least, other sources of legitimacy had to be found. In addition, for San Tiago Dantas, as Marcílio Marques Moreira has reminded me, it was a core concern because he believed that “having legitimacy in his favor represented an extraordinary reinforcement of power in any conflict of interests. Rational and moral certainty was his ally.” (The quotation, which Marques Moreira suggested, is from the first, still unpublished, lecture that San Tiago Dantas made at the ESG, on March 24, 1953.)

24 The first one was the “Exposição aos Chefes de Missão dos Estados Americanos,” of January 12, 1962, the “Declaração Sobre a Nota dos Ex-Ministros das Relações Exteriores”, of January 17, the statements made during the Consultation Meeting and, later, the “Exposição feita em Cadeia Nacional de Rádio e Televisão”, of February 5 and, finally, the debate at the Chamber of Deputies, on May 29, when the censorship motion was discussed with the minister in Punta Del Este (Dantas, 2011).

The articulation of the policy's legitimacy was, therefore, based on three pillars: an "objective" view of the Cuban reality, an evaluation of its consequences to the Inter-American system, and a perspective of values that should guide the Brazilian foreign policy. It is worth analyzing them separately.

San Tiago Dantas believed that Cuba had become a communist country whose political organization was, therefore, incompatible with the values of the Inter-American system. In this sense, he disagreed with the attitudes of Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos, who, according to him, articulated the policy in relation to Cuba with some sympathy for the Castro regime. San Tiago Dantas explained:

In that vein (during the time of Jânio Quadros-Afonso Arinos), there was a slight amount of ideological sympathy and a systematic refusal to talk about the democratic nature of Fidel Castro's government.... Our idea was the opposite. We started with the recognition that the Cuban regime was not democratic... Thus, the problem of ideological sympathy was eliminated. The Brazilian government has no ideological sympathy for Fidel Castro's regime: although some political groups within the government might have it, the government only has sympathy for what is written in the Constitution and in the treaties (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 314).

That is, by moving away in ideological terms from the West, from democracy, Cuba is on the opposite side of Brazil. The diplomatic problem is clearer and, at the same time, it is more complex. As San Tiago Dantas admitted, the defense of the *status quo*, of non-intervention and the maintenance of diplomatic relations, opened one side of the argument. He, however, raised questions that he imagined would be made to him later:

“they’re against breaking relations, but what do they think? The more Marxist and Leninist, the better? To what extent, besides protests, what do we have to explain?” (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 315).²⁵ Thus, when Castro’s regime chose “the other side,” the Cuban issue was inserted within the larger framework of the East-West conflict: “... the Cuban case is inseparable, in its meaning and its treatment, from the great problem of antagonism between the West and the East and the struggle for democracy versus international communism” (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 130).

The socialist condition led to consequences in two spheres: that of the evaluation of the facts (what Cuba is) and that of the prediction of behaviors (what Cuba can be). Initially, there is the risk of the country becoming a disturbance factor in the continent; then in dealing with the future of the regime, which becomes a key parameter for us to understand San Tiago Dantas’ thoughts on the subject. Thoughts which he shared with Arinos concerning the expectation that Cuba return to the Inter-American system:

We do not believe that Cuba is interested in remaining for a long time outside the system that it contributed to build. Geopolitical factors strictly condition the life of nations, and Cuba, because of its culture and the imperatives of its economy, must feel the need to return to the American democratic universe, through a natural evolution that is greater than political passions and ideologies (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 106).

In fact, both elements go together as the risk of disturbance must be contained precisely for Cuba to return to the system. It is also important to emphasize that the negative consequences of Cuba’s socialization – and the radicalization of its regime – affect

25 It is good to recall that the phrase was said in a closed meeting and in speculative terms, but it clarified that San Tiago Dantas himself knew Limits of his argument and tested them.

the Inter-American system. When it divides the member States on key points of interpretation of the OAS Charter, this affects the political lives of the States taken individually.²⁶

Once the diagnosis of the reality of the Cuban Revolution has been made, and its perspectives have been analyzed, we reach the core of the diplomatic argument itself. The clearest challenge is to conciliate the fidelity to non-intervention with the interventionist trend that is common to the behavior of governments of the Marxist model, beginning with the USSR. There exists a line of thought that wishes to deny Cuba's fundamental right of self-determination (greater than during the time of Arinos), justifying it with the principle of non-intervention based on a defense of the Inter-American system. The base of this argument remains a legal one, founded on rules and laws. San Tiago Dantas believed that the essential value of the Inter-American system was to offer a set of rules, which become a reference of stability for the nations of the continent. To defend the system was, therefore, to defend its laws, starting with that of non-intervention. It must be respected and protected because it is a founding tenet of the system, that ensures coexistence among unequal partners, yet who are equal in the sovereign condition. In this manner, San Tiago Dantas believed that any "punishment" of Cuba that violated non-intervention should be challenged and discarded by definition.

San Tiago Dantas did not recognize legality in the proposals that suggested punishment for Cuba, such as the hypothesis of military intervention, which was suggested and subsequently abandoned, and especially, the expulsion of Cuba from the Inter-American system. He was right when he stated that, unlike the

26 Marcílio Marques Moreira, who accompanied the Foreign Minister in the final stage of his life, indicated that one of the constant concerns of San Tiago Dantas was the perspective of radicalization that the Cuban Revolution brought to the Latin American politics, and in the case of Brazil, with divisions that could lead, as they did, to the collapse of democratic institutions in March 1964.

UN Charter, the OAS Charter had not foreseen norms to suspend a member-State and, therefore, for that to happen, it would be necessary to call an Inter-American conference to introduce such a rule, followed by the ratification of the decision by the respective parliaments. That was different from the possibility to suspend Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board (IDB), since the IDB had been created at a Consultation Meeting, hence a meeting of equal status could set the legal requirements for such an action. Respect of non-intervention became the core of his argument to prevent the OAS, through the Consultation Meeting, from suspending Cuba and going against the legality of the Charter. Non-intervention, therefore, not necessarily protect Cuba; it protected the system and its legality.

The defense of non-intervention raises some problems, beginning with how to deal with our loyalty to democracy in the face of a regime that clearly had authoritarian connotations. To address this question, San Tiago Dantas began with the recognition of democracy defined as another key element of the system, a definition that is in the OAS Charter, and that gained consistency at the Conference of Santiago, Chile, which, as we have seen, San Tiago attended as a delegate of the Chamber of Deputies. In order to overcome this dilemma, San Tiago Dantas proposed a distinction between *rules*, which the Inter-American system *imposes*, through the OAS Charter and other treaties, and *aspirations*, which are set by statements, which, in turn, are goals that the States should *seek*, without any real sense of obligation. Non-intervention, he said, is an inevitable rule, and democracy is an aspiration that should not overrule it.

San Tiago Dantas further believed that the principle of non-intervention should only admit exceptions in the very specific cases foreseen in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty, the Rio Pact, signed in 1947):

If the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro was made for the common defense against concrete facts, against armed attacks or equivalent aggressions, it cannot be used against a regime, because this refutes a basic principle of the peoples of this hemisphere: the principle of non-intervention of one State, or group of States, in the domestic affairs of another (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 129 e 175).

In other words, there were no rules that allowed the OAS to sponsor regime changes, even when such changes corresponded to the realization of a continental aspiration. Fidelity to democracy required fidelity to the *rule of law* and, therefore, we are prohibited from expanding its interpretation, and using it in support of interventions.

Still within the legal sphere, San Tiago Dantas recovered something that was in the Finlandization plan, developed in the *Colóquios da Casa das Pedras*: the idea of “negative obligations.” He explained that, unlike the UN, in which being “peace loving” is sufficient for a State to be admitted, the OAS demands of its members:

full agreement with the principles and goals set out in the Charter of Bogota, which requires “the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy.” The momentary loss of that effectiveness does not involve a permanent incompatibility with the system and the body in which it is found, although the deliberate and permanent acceptance of a political ideology that it contradicts and fights generates a crucial situation of incompatibility, from which legal consequences are necessarily drawn (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 126).

Although San Tiago Dantas does not list what negative obligations Cuba would have to accept, I believe he had in mind

those that he had organized for the Fino plan. The solution he proposed in the Consultation Meeting was less substantive than procedural, with the creation of a

body composed of the various opinions represented at the Consultation Meeting, with enough latitude to take charge of a study about the obligations and the status of relations between Cuba and rest of the Hemisphere, and about which the OAS Council would make a statement once the parties were heard (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 127).

The procedural solution revealed limits to the non-intervention argument as San Tiago Dantas recognized, as an assumption of the argument, the incompatibility between the Cuban regime and democracy. And while doing nothing – simply becoming a type of spectator protected by principle from what would happen – may have been a way to “stop history” – the Foreign Minister knew that that was impossible as well. Therefore, the statute of negative obligations would have to protect democracies from the undesired consequences of the socialist State established on the continent. It would be the “realistic” reverse side of the argument of simply *hoping* that Cuba maintained the desire to return to the system.

To complete the legal argument, San Tiago Dantas developed another argument, which was basically of political design, one that discusses the negative effects of the punitive solutions to the crisis. The parameter here is San Tiago Dantas’ view of the global conflict. In a certain way, it adapts to his interpretations about the Cold War and what was happening in the regional sphere, with the important addition of addressing what the immediate consequences radicalization of the Cuban process would cause to political stability of the nation States. The general line of the argument has been presented in previous paragraphs and, as we have seen, there is no military solution for the Cold War; dialogue is

the necessary path among the countries that diverge in ideological terms; and trust in the Western values ensures that, in terms of the exposure to dialogue, democracy has clear advantages over socialism.²⁷

Although the firm position of maintaining Cuba within the system had a legal dimension, it also had a political one: dialogue would be the natural instrument to relieve tensions and allow for the country's (desired) return to the Inter-American system. In this context, punishment no longer made sense:

Interventionist or punitive formulas, which have no legal grounds and only result in an aggravation of passions and the exacerbation of incompatibilities, cannot expect the support of Brazil (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 106).

In addition, San Tiago Dantas said that measures such as the breaking of diplomatic relations or trade embargos would not bring advantages, and that they would reduce influence on the Cuban government, thereby undermining possibilities to grant asylum to dissidents. More importantly, such measures would "displace the Cuban issue from the continental sphere to the area of litigation between the West and the East, whereas we believe it should not go beyond the limits of the Hemisphere" (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 107). A trade embargo, he said, was simply a politically useless action, given the low level of trade between Cuba and the rest of Latin America.

Another political factor that suggests dialogue and moderation are the domestic repercussions of the measures. Military action, for example, would cause a justified reaction in the Latin American public opinion, which would favor the

27 "Wherever an alternative, an open door, has been left for the democratic system, that system will have the sufficient attractive force to impose itself, sooner or later, and to eliminate any competing system" (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 130).

radicalization of the domestic policies of the countries of the Hemisphere, while simultaneously weakening the ties of mutual trust; ties, which, San Tiago Dantas said, are the keys to the very existence of the Inter-American system (Cited in FONSECA, 2007, p. 106). Therefore, while San Tiago acknowledged that it was necessary to do something about Cuba, he also believed the solution must be calibrated in such a way that the consequences did not harm the goals of maintaining Cuba within the Inter-American system, thereby avoiding national political fractures and ensuring the stability of the system.

Ultimately, San Tiago Dantas' position was defeated at Punta Del Este, since Cuba was suspended from the OAS. San Tiago, however, pointed to the fact that Brazil, together with other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Ecuador, had avoided the worst, in that the imposition of sanctions or even military intervention – that some had suggested – had not occurred. Had they done so, San Tiago says, they would have gone against International Law with disastrous political effects ensuing. In May 1962, in a debate in the Chamber of Deputies on a censorship motion against him, San Tiago Dantas added the following argument to prove that the Brazilian stance at Punta Del Este was valid. In defense of the policies he had elaborated, he rhetorically asked:

What happened after Cuba was excluded from the Organization of American States? Was the regime modified? Were its activities changed? Did the American States acquire some new way to influence Cuban public opinion or to change from this or that manner the evolution of its own domestic situation? Everyone knows that the answers to these questions are no. Already at that moment, therefore, the exclusion did not represent anything more

than a verbal punishment that did not correspond to the desire we actually had and for which we contributed with the ideas that we took to the Consultation Meeting, concerned with setting limits to the expansion of the Cuban regime and containing it in the face of any possibility of armed expansion or of subversive activities abroad (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 250).

To complete the argument, San Tiago Dantas stated that the fact that Brazil maintained diplomatic relations with the Cuban government was useful for the democratic cause, as the Embassy became a shelter for dissidents, that Brazil

is a State that has intervened several times to soften the strictness of a political situation [in Cuba]; and that Brazil has above all, been the open door through which the democratic world maintains its presence in that country, whose traditions of fidelity to democratic principles will certainly triumph over a momentary episode of dictatorship (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 250).

If we grant to “rhetoric excess” the reference to democratic tradition in Cuba, what can be seen in those words is the perfect closing of his argument and, especially, his views of the Cold War. According to San Tiago Dantas, what must prevail is the constant search for dialogue. Punitive measures, such as cutting communication, are useless, as they do not transform regimes. Cuba, at that moment, completely demonstrated his thesis, and even more so, it was the correct policy of Brazil, to keep its Embassy in Havana open. From the general conception of the East-West confrontation to the diplomatic problem of relations with Cuba, the diplomatic argument was fully concluded.

The analysis of the Cuban issue clearly shows that, for San Tiago Dantas, Brazil had a role to play in the world, and that,

especially on continental issues, it was an important player in the political game. As he once eloquently stated: “We are a country whose future perspectives make certain that we will be a major power, in charge of our own destiny and able to ensure our citizens full participation in the benefits of culture and civilization.” He acknowledged, however, that negative factors still had a weight and prevented the complete fulfillment of that destiny (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 255). Brazilian policies were an example of what he considered “independent” in the arena of foreign affairs, with positions clearly based on national values and interests. He even contrasted independence with neutralism, when, in a document after April 1964, he said that

While it has all the inconvenience of rigidity, independence allows the country to move from one political and military bloc to another, opting for positions that best suit it, while also effectively serving the community of nations – without being permanently subordinated to any of them (LESSA; HOLLANDA, 2009, p. 314)

CONCLUSIONS: SAN TIAGO DANTAS’ CONTRIBUTION

It is now time to return to the initial questions concerning San Tiago Dantas’ specific contribution to Brazilian diplomatic thought. It is important to emphasize that this essay did not address other issues that were the object of reflection and action of the Foreign Minister, for example, his views of relations with Argentina and other Latin American countries, his position in relation to colonialism, and his defense of disarmament have all not been addressed. In fact, these issues broaden the scope of reflection and introduce dimensions that go beyond those which

the East-West conflict proposed. In the case of Argentina, for example, cooperation between equals stands out, and his speech to the Commission of Disarmament is a landmark, since the positions defended in it became permanent. Yet, in conclusion, we remain with San Tiago Dantas' own ideas on the theme in question, which seem sufficient to understand some of the key aspects of his thought.

Initially, an observation about the style of his argument is worth mentioning; in whose construction two characteristics attract attention. The first of which is the careful manner in which the Foreign Minister relied, almost exclusively, on the advantages of logic, and on the intrinsic value of the argument. For him, there are no resources outside of reasoning, that is, the authority comes from the clarity and logic of what is said. In the book called *Fantasia Desfeita*, Celso Furtado (1989, p. 153-165) made a revealing statement when, in speaking of San Tiago Dantas, he said: "I met few men who deposited so much faith in reason as an instrument to remove obstacles."

The contrast between the debating styles of San Tiago Dantas and Afonso Arinos –his immediate predecessor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a man not less distinguished nor less clear than he – also helps to emphasize the point. Arinos had a more traditional style, sometimes quoting authorities from outside the discourse to complete his argument. One example was when, in a hearing at the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, in May 1961, he presented a long list of antecedents concerning evolution of the defense of the human rights, starting with the French Constitution of 1791, "reminiscence of old professor", he said (FRANCO, 2007, p. 82). Although San Tiago Dantas also made use of quotations, he often used them more to puzzle his opponent and throw him off guard, than merely to reinforce his ideas. The source was not anticipated, but eventually revealed after the quotation.

The previously mentioned, Horácio Lafer's quotation, for example, was used to demonstrate that his view of the Cold War was not new in Brazilian politics. On another occasion, in order to refute some angry arguments by the federal representative, Abel Rafael, San Tiago quoted a document of the Consultation Meeting, that had been elaborated by a commission that included the U.S. delegate, Walt Rostow. The quotation was compatible with the position he defended. In order not to lose the argument, Abel Rafael ultimately said that he did not know Rostow's ideological roots and talked about the communist infiltration in the US Senate and the US State Department (Franco, 2007, p. 144).

A second element to be emphasized in San Tiago Dantas' character is his lack of concern with newness just for the sake of something being new. He does not, for example, claim that he developed a new method of foreign policy, and nor is newness, as I indicated previously, necessarily, the most explicit argument in diplomacy. It cannot, however, be said that San Tiago did not innovate, because he did. He merely felt no need to say that he did. The values he praised, such as Brazil's philosophy of peace, have greater value precisely because they are sustained historically, not because they are new.

Finally, then, what was San Tiago Dantas' contribution to Brazilian diplomatic thought? And going back to what he himself had asked: Did he systematize the diplomatic project of Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos?

When Ambassador Álvaro da Costa Franco analyzed the paragraph transcribed in the beginning of this essay, he qualified the statement of the Foreign Minister in a pertinent way:

It is understandable that, for San Tiago Dantas, with his mental organization and discipline, the non-systematized

and explicit thought of President Jânio Quadros, did not seem sufficient for a foreign policy.

Yet, according to Costa Franco:

[...] under instructions of the president – that were apparently isolated and apparently disconnected – there was an evaluation of the geo-political climate, an idea of the role that Brazil should play in the global scenario, a desire of – as far as possible – to fulfill the potentials of the State and the nation – to paraphrase an expression by General De Gaulle: “a certain idea of Brazil”...

the seven incomplete months of Jânio Quadros as president saw an innovation of our foreign policy, abandoning the practice that was later called automatic alignment, which had tended to prevail since 1942 ... Once the path was open, San Tiago Dantas was able to continue the policy that his predecessor began, give it a name, and develop it, far from the coercive tutelage that Jânio Quadros had imposed on his ministers (FRANCO, 2007, p. 11).²⁸

The doctrinarian foundation of the Independent Foreign Policy corresponded to an “implicit system.” What San Tiago Dantas did was to apply this system to the diplomatic issues he faced. The general outline of Independent Foreign Policy was published in Jânio Quadros’ famous October 1962 article for *Foreign Affairs*, in the chapter on foreign policy of his Presidential Message to the Congress, in the inauguration speech of Afonso Arinos at Itamaraty, and in other actions by the Foreign Minister

28 In fact, San Tiago Dantas complained precisely about the lack of support from the President and the Prime Minister. He said in one of the meetings at the Casa das Pedras: “Today, foreign policy lacks an interpreter with a very affirmative reputation in the country. President João Goulart is not in charge of foreign policy; Tancredo Neves has been very neglectful in terms of foreign policy. As for me, since the position of Foreign Minister is very limited, and because I am not so much that kind of public man, I am considered more as a man of ability in my role rather than a man of extreme roles” (Fonseca, 2007, p. 317).

(FRANCO, 2007, p. 21-135). San Tiago Dantas had no intention of reinventing Jânio Quadros' foreign policy; he was, however, the correct choice when given the role of "systematizer." As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, there are many ways to speak about foreign policy. To simplify the matter, Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos talked about the perspective of the principles of a pre-diplomatic, pre-negotiating, and pre-confrontation stage, and they proposed diplomatic behaviors that opened space for a new place of Brazil in the world. Their key contributions were in the sphere of political innovation. When San Tiago Dantas articulated for the Brazilian international agenda ways to *think* diplomatically, in some respects, he completed what they had begun.

San Tiago Dantas' greatest contribution was not so much to initiate new political guidelines, but rather to carry out policies from a new perspective. During his tenure, he had inherited the two core issues related to the East-West conflict during, namely, the restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR and the Cuban crisis. The positions were set forth in general outlines and there was no interest or reason to change them. The restoration was inexorable, and we could not stop the historical evolution of the Cuban Revolution. However, the task to "develop" arguments and to think about them "systematically" had barely started with Arinos. In the first case, San Tiago would extend the motivations, give them a concrete sense, reveal advantages, and overcome ideological traps – as, for example, conservative sectors strongly challenged the restoration of relations with the USSR. In the more complex issue of Cuba, it was necessary to go beyond the positions of principle or, more accurately, to turn the principles into diplomatic arguments.

In neither of these issues, did San Tiago Dantas change the political principles that Jânio Quadros and Afonso Arinos had elaborated. He did, however, extract consequences and supply

doctrinarian outlines more complete than those of the first stage of Independent Foreign Policy. The reflection on the meaning and limits of confrontation in the Cold War is a good example: although it had originated with Arinos and, even before, with Lafer.²⁹ It was San Tiago Dantas who more fully elaborated it. Likewise, in face of the debate on the restoration of relations with the USSR, San Tiago made a great elaboration of the theme, and as we have seen, by having proposed an interpretation of the nature of the bipolar confrontation, which exempted from danger rapprochement with socialists, he validated the pragmatic benefits of the restoration, and the position, thereby gained systematic consistency – there was an articulation between the general and the private.

Another example of San Tiago Dantas' diplomatic philosophy is seen in the process of setting the Brazilian position in relation to Cuba. The core of the conceptual problem is the limit of the non-intervention principle, but who had intervened against the principle: the countries that wanted to punish Cuba, or Cuba itself, when it took on Marxism-Leninism? San Tiago Dantas understood the complexity of the debate as well as the contradiction among values included in the norms and resolutions of the Inter-American system. When he accepted democracy as a basic requirement to participate in the system, this created a dilemma for him: Where, for example, should he place Cuba in that scheme? In practice, hadn't Cuba denied democracy to its people?

It is interesting to observe the several stages of San Tiago Dantas' argument. How, for example, he accompanied the evolution of the Cuban process, and how he combined the legal argument concerning defense of non-intervention with its

29 If we look at the history of Brazilian speeches at the UN, between 1946 and 1963, we rarely used a partisan or engaged language concerning the East-West conflict and, when the political practice is analyzed, except for Dutra's administration, the alignment with the United States always had some kind of nuance.

political counterpart, that of respect for the norm as a tool for the contention of radicalization of the national situations. In this way, he garnered broader support and, again, a *systematization* of the Brazilian position. In the entire argument, what stands out is the expectation that Cuba would correct itself and, somehow, return to the Inter-American system. The idea had come from Arinos; it was included in the *Fino Plan*, and it remained even after the self-proclamation of the regime as Marxist-Leninist. The idea that the revolution was irreversible was clear since early 1961; Guerreiro's memorandum is explicit about that.³⁰ The dose of "wishful thinking" was justified, first, because Cuba was a "novelty" – an untold political reality, socialism implemented by means of a popular revolution (different from the Soviet and the Chinese models) – *and* because Cuba is in the periphery of the United States.

It was difficult to make safe bets about the future of the Cuban regime and, although optimistic, the ones made by Afonso Arinos and San Tiago Dantas were not completely unrealistic. On the other hand, without the perspective of regime change, and given the fidelity of both Foreign Ministers to the values of Western democracy, the non-intervention argument did not complete its task. The principle may have been valid in itself; it may have ensured the stability of the Inter-American system; and it may have avoided radicalization from being transplanted into the national picture – but this may have achieved little, if the defense of the *status quo* did not mean a reversal, even if in the uncertain future, of what had caused such a crisis with so broad consequences.

The period in which he was Foreign Minister seems short for the decisive landmark that San Tiago Dantas left on foreign policy.

30 "The Cuban socialist dictatorship, regardless of how efficient and ideologically more solid it is, does not provide perspectives of change or suppression in the future, by action of the domestic oppositions." (GUERREIRO, op. cit., p 66).

He gathered the best that there was in the Foreign Ministry into an open dialogue with its employees; a policy that represented the vanguard of diplomatic thought. In rough parliamentary debates, he consistently presented arguments that supported controversial positions. He articulated in a skillful manner the Brazilian position at the Consultation Meeting of Punta Del Este. In short, in a variety of ways, San Tiago Dantas transformed the quality of the Brazilian diplomatic argument – as if he were teaching diplomats to practice diplomacy. In addition, his positions reinforced key values of the Brazilian view of the world.

Maria Regina Soares de Lima, a professor of Political Science at the *Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro*, has said that “the specific contribution by San Tiago Dantas was to combine this movement of national affirmation with a proposal that built the common interest to the entire international collectivity.”³¹ This contribution can be observed in many of his more general speeches, such as that concerning disarmament – revealing his Grotian tendency – which Celso Lafer considers a permanent feature of Brazilian diplomacy. Lafer adds that when San Tiago accepted the idea of an *international society* among sovereigns, he conceptually combined the need to affirm political autonomy with the perspective to build a more stable global order with more solid anchors for peace. It is not by chance that one of the permanent features of San Tiago Dantas’ discourse is that peace is the only option for the international system – a situation that became particularly true at the moment opposing ideologies and superpowers each acquired huge nuclear arsenals.

Finally, let us recall that the goals to obtain autonomy and act with independence – keys in San Tiago Dantas definition of the international philosophy of the Brazil – were nuanced by a careful

31 Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “Política Externa Independente”, in: Moreira; Niskier; Reis, 2007, p. 72.

realism. In a context in which ideologies dominate, as occurred during the Cold War, and they conditioned the options of domestic and international policies, San Tiago Dantas understood that, in our case, choices of foreign policy inspired by ideological fidelity were limiting, both in the national and in the diplomatic spheres. The policies he recommended toward Cuba were symptomatic of this understanding. Through his thought, as articulated at the Consultation Meeting of Punta Del Este, he showed that the best policy for Brazil was to understand Cuba as it really was – an authoritarian government – and in this manner, to shift the axis of legitimacy of support to the non-intervention principle. His realism did not exclude values, however and, in that case, the preference for democracy is an intrinsic factor in the argument. The work of Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas as Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs demonstrates that values are, indeed, and important part of the formula: they do not reduce diplomatic flexibility, but rather, they provide consistency to the outcome.

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In the field of international relations, San Tiago Dantas left circumstantial texts, almost all of which were written because of his positions, as a legislator and as a minister. One exception to this list is the introduction he wrote for the book *Política Externa Independente*, published by *Civilização Brasileira*, in 1962. It is a short text, of less than 10 pages, which summarizes, with the clarity and sense of synthesis that characterize San Tiago Dantas' texts, the core of his thought on Brazil's international presence. The book includes almost all the texts that San Tiago Dantas wrote about foreign policy. To this some parliamentary interventions could be added, such as his speech on the Declaration of Santiago,

and the case of the Santa Maria ship, both transcribed in his book of the *Perfis Parlamentares* collection, organized by Marcílio Marques Moreira and published by the Chamber of Deputies, in 1983. FUNAG re-edited the book *Política Externa Independente* in 2011. Besides recent articles about San Tiago Dantas' foreign policy, the book transcribed the *Colóquios da Casa das Pedras*, informal meetings that San Tiago Dantas had with the leadership of Itamaraty, to discuss the issues that he would face as minister. Another document that failed to appear in the original edition of *Política Externa Independente* is the set of reports by the Planning Commission of the Ministry that continued and complemented the debate carried out in *Colóquios*. The reports were transcribed in *Documentos da Política Externa Independente*, Brasília, FUNAG, 2007, vol. 1, p. 221-247.

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**AUGUSTO FREDERICO
SCHMIDT**

Born in Rio de Janeiro, on April 18, 1906, he lost his father when he was 10 years old and traveled to Europe during the war, where he saw violence and hopelessness. When back in Brazil, he was raised by his grandfather. His harshness resulting from these experiences, his shyness and his obesity have made him a lonely young man. After a period in São Paulo, he returned to Rio de Janeiro in 1928, and his meeting with Tristão de Athayde enabled the birth of the poet, who published more than twenty books, and merged his literary activity with a business and political career. His failure in publishing has led the businessman to the trade and financial sector, activities which he performed brilliantly. He joined politics, without ever having had an elective office, though Juscelino Kubitschek and had the opportunity to participate in the creation and implementation of Pan-American Operation (OPA), one of his legacies to the Brazilian diplomatic history. He died of a heart attack on February 8, 1965.



AUGUSTO FREDERICO SCHMIDT: THE POET OF ACQUIESCENT DEPENDENCE

Carlos Eduardo Vidigal

INTRODUCTION

“I want to get lost in the world to escape from the world”. It only takes a fragment of *Canto do Brasileiro*, by Augusto Frederico Schmidt, of Heraclitean inspiration, to notice the versatility and strength of his thought, regardless of the assessment made on the quality of his poetry. The eccentric man, who was president of the Botafogo Regatta Club and who raised a white cockerel – the name of his memoirs was *O Galo Branco* (1948; 1957) –, was a successful businessman and a politician who never had any elective office. His friendship with Juscelino Kubitschek, of whom he was an adviser even before he became President, opened the path to politics and diplomacy (TOLMAN, 1976, p. 15). Schmidt was responsible for creating the slogan for JK’s Presidential campaign, “50 years in 5”, that is, 50 years of economic growth in 5 years of government.

As an adviser to the President, he developed the idea of Operation Pan-America, OPA, an initiative that had the purpose of challenging the Eisenhower administration as to engage in a broad

program of development support for Latin America.¹ Juscelino, frustrated after unsuccessfully trying to obtain preferential loans and direct investments from Washington after 2 years of government, was convinced that the initiative was reasonable. He then asked Minister Horácio Lafer to intervene with the Head of the Political Department of Itamaraty, Manoel Pio Corrêa, to receive Schmidt, who would introduce him to OPA (CORRÊA, 1996, p. 603).

Pio Corrêa stated in his memoirs that there was a mutual antipathy between Schmidt and him, which was both “solid and sincere”. To the diplomat, Schmidt thought of himself as a genius of diplomacy, but in fact he was just an “obscenely obese” writer, a seller of sausage and jerked beef, who annoyed him with his arrogance, and his pathological “and almost feminine vanity in its jealous susceptibility”. Receiving him in the room where the Baron of Rio Branco worked and died was a sort of sacrilege. Therefore, it was with “ice cold politeness, typical of the House,” that Corrêa received “all the 20 stones of the big man” and tried to convince him that OPA was a “joke”. At least in the rhetoric and the extensive use of adjectives, Schmidt found an intellectual up to his own level.

Corrêa’s behavior, praised in his own memoirs, reveals the conservative nature of certain sectors of Itamaraty in the defense of corporate values and their apprehension when faced with an

1 Pan-American Operation, created under the instruction of Augusto Frederico Schmidt, was conceived after the trip of the US Vice-President Richard Nixon to South America in May 1958, in which he faced demonstrations and protests in Peru and Venezuela. Its launching took place by means of a letter from Kubitschek to the US President Dwight Eisenhower, dated May 28, in which he proposed investments in economically backward areas of the continent by means of technical assistance programs, the protection of commodities, and resources from international financial institutions to the benefit of development. The negotiations took place in the OAS, mainly in its Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES), and culminated in the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), in 1959, in whose headquarters a bust of Juscelino was inaugurated in 2006.

initiative that was not formulated within its own rooms and that could move its bureaucracy away from its comfort zone.

Although Corrêa thought OPA was a “venerable foolishness”, which Juscelino supported only because of Schmidt’s insistence, that was not the President’s thinking. The resistance against OPA within Itamaraty explains the replacement of Chancellor Macedo Soares by the politician Negrão de Lima, in July 1958. Before that, Juscelino sent to Washington the Secretary of the Presidency, Vítor Nunes Leal, to meet Amaral Peixoto, who at the time was the Brazilian Ambassador to Washington, in order to deliver him a letter from the President to start OPA. Amaral Peixoto considered Schmidt an intelligent man, with great culture, but “a lunatic”. His craziness could harm the Brazilian position in the United States, but unfortunately he had already convinced the President who, in his naivety, saw in OPA an opportunity to stand out in the international scenario (CAMARGO, 1986, p. 415-416). Only a politician with the experience of Amaral Peixoto could consider Juscelino Kubitschek naive.

Among the advisers to Amaral Peixoto in Washington was Miguel Ozório de Almeida, who asked for vacations when he learned that Schmidt would arrive soon, since the poet would probably arrive without any text and request a draft of OPA within 24 hours. Almeida was right. Schmidt arrived at the Embassy without any papers and, in Peixoto’s view, without a proposal. Almeida had to assemble the team that would provide consistency to Schmidt’s initiative.

Ozorio de Almeida coordinated the work group made up, among others, by Holanda Cavalcanti, Lindenberg Sette, Otávio Rainho, Osvaldo Lobo and Saraiva Guerreiro, whose main idea was to warn the United States of the possibility of an advance of communism taking place in Latin America, including in Brazil,

which would put Washington's own interest at stake. When Juscelino Kubitschek learned of their work, he praised what had been done, but said that that he wanted a bolder project than that.

Ozorio de Almeida complied and asked for freedom to work with some economists and diplomats of his choice. Since the USA had excess liquidity in its economy and foresaw inflation in the horizon, it should relocate investments in its own economy to the Latin American market. The Brazilian proposal should be that the North-Americans made public investments in the form of international aid to be applied in universities, schools, training, and improvement, among other areas, including, for example, in Brazilian ports (ALMEIDA, 2009, p. 59).

What boldness was there in requesting public resources from the US to be allocated in universities, schools, training, and improvement? Was this proposal in agreement with Schmidt and his idea that a country must be built from on its own resources, but supported by foreign capital? Or was the Brazilian diplomacy, placed at the service of Schmidt, working to empty OPA? The conflict between productive investments and aid investments was outlined, around which the poet had already taken sides, as can be verified in his articles published by the *Correio da Manhã* newspaper.

WITHOUT THE NONSENSSES OF FALSE PATRIOTISMS

Schmidt was realistic. He was aware of the peripheral condition of Brazil, both regarding its political power and in international relations, and he considered that the destiny of millions of Brazilians was at the hands of few men capable of running the country, both domestically as well as abroad, in the

struggle against colonialism. The agents of that struggle were neither the labor unions, or the oppositionists or the people.

He believed that the struggle for the country to become richer, on which depended our survival and our national continuity, had many adversaries, both foreign and domestic, located among the scholars, the pseudoscientists, the Jacobins, the false technicians, and the representatives of the overpowering bureaucracy.

According to the writer, “the adversaries are those who do not know what Brazil is, nor what it could become if there was a healthy revolution in the people’s mentality, a renewal, a clarification that took it out of the shadow where it has been for so long” (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 64). Schmidt’s realism was marked, largely, by elitism and, consequently, he was aware of the idealism.

In the key aspects, he was not different from the other men of his time. Overcoming the Brazilian problems through the action of scholars endowed with an extraordinary ability to understand the nation was the prerequisite to identify the problems, their causes and, therefore, the policies needed to overcome them. The scholars of the decade that started with the suicide of Getúlio Vargas, whose best example were the members of the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB), who supposedly had the keys to access to the knowledge of the society, presented themselves as followers of Getúlio’s last message, in particular in relation to nationalism and developmentalism. More than his heirs, they were ideologists who intended to gather forces that enabled nothing less than the transformation of the real (PÉCAUT, 1990, p. 104).

The transformation of the real, according to the chronicler of *Correio da Manhã*, consisted in the economic development of the country, based on national resources but supported by foreign resources, which left him partly displaced from the nationalism of the time. Schmidt believed that in Brazil it would not happen

what took place with certain European countries, which received a huge amount of US resources in the form of funding, donations and loans without interest (and without a deadline) (2002, p. 74). The motivation of the White House was to avoid the communist expansion in the West, a challenge that justified its efforts to accelerate the reconstruction of Europe and to strengthen it economically speaking. What Schmidt knew from his observations and readings on the international scenario was verified in the Brazilian historiography of the following decades: the priority of the United States was to stop the Soviet expansion and, in that context, Latin America was a region of relatively secondary importance.

The problem was that maybe in no other Latin American country the level of expectations regarding the US cooperation was as high as in Brazil. A majority of its elites, both civilian and military, believed in a “new era” of the special relation with the United States. In Latin America, its economic, military and political hegemony was unquestioned and Brazil emerged as the privileged partner in the building of the new international order (MALAN, 2007, p. 72-76). That interpretation justified, to a great extent, the alignment that Eurico Dutra’s government promoted with the United States and the huge spending that took place in his government.

Schmidt considered that money was key in the economic life of a country and the Brazilian reserves were, undoubtedly, insufficient to cope with the country’s needs, which made it one of the countries that most depended “on everything”. The Brazil of the early 1950’s, without increases in its exports, could not nurture the fantasy of industrial development, since it had no conditions to build industrial plants with its own resources, always needing foreign machinery and materials in order to supply its emergent industries. There would neither be foreign financial aid without

the country demonstrating it would be able to pay it back. The criticisms to the US foreign capital turned that kind of nationalism a harmful doctrine to the country, “an ideal of reclusion and a condemnation of Brazil to misery and backwardness” (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 69). The opening to foreign capital emerged naturally as the realistic alternative for those who did not want to wait for the “miracle of coffee”.

Schmidt believed that the Minister of Finance, Horácio Lafer, should turn his attentions to the topic of exports, a concern as important as living within the budget. His experience as a cashier and businessman allowed him to apply the basic notions he had acquired in the daily life of business to the major themes of the national economy. In a country where everything was an indiscriminate improvisation, it was praiseworthy the care with which Horácio Lafer addressed the budget, but the minister could advance to extend and diversify the “real” riches of Brazil. In that sense, Schmidt valued the effort of the minister in order to endow the country with services of transportation, power, ports, among other resources, which would become feasible thanks to the studies of the Joint Commission Brazil-United States. Almost half a century before Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Schmidt concluded his article, published in the *Correio da Manhã*, in mid-April 1952, with the following exhortation to Lafer: “Export, anyhow, in order to survive!” (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 69-70).

Exporting was the natural path for either the businessman or for the liberal thinker. In the path towards development, the free exchange rate was key, rather than “the slave exchange rate”. Unlike what many managers of the government of Getúlio Vargas thought, the exchange rate could not depend on restrictions, since it needed freedom to reach its beneficial purposes. The role of the exchange rate freedom was to bring the exchange rate problem back to reality, which was aggravated by a management of “bad

sampling, one-eyed and grotesque”. The economic interventionism, although presented under the mantle of good intentions, intended to suffocate everything that existed in the country, in favor of the more traditional privileges.

The main political dispute in the Brazil of the 1950’s was between economic liberalism and state planning, between the forces of the economic progress and those of backwardness, which became clear with Cepal’s intellectual production, of the advocates of development and the early advocates of dependence. It was always convenient for the North-Americans to encourage the liberals and, if necessary, the Cepal scholars, whose creation had been boycotted by Washington (FURTADO, 1997, p. 61). The communists, however, had little weight in the national political game or in the North-American concerns.

Schmidt was aware of the domestic and foreign contexts of the time. He knew that the Brazilian communism had no significance to the State Department, especially because the Brazilians were “not dangerous”. In addition, the new North-American President, Eisenhower, would not foster blind investments. Besides:

Who sees all that from up close, without scales in their eyes, without demagogical inflation, without the stupidities of false patriotisms and the assumption that we are very important in the US global political game, who sees this very clearly, necessarily concludes that the image of a generous

and providential United States, a kind of Father of Them All, must be swept from the imagination (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 74-75).

It was neither the assumption about the importance of the country in the international scenario, or the belief in the role of

provider of the United States. Critical of the performance of the political and diplomatic elites, Schmidt took as the starting point the decision of the Brazilian society to help itself, as this was the only way in which the country would be able to rely on the North-American help. The United States had rebuilt and restructured the economy of European countries, including Germany, its former enemy, while Latin America had been forgotten. In the case of Brazil, the investments would depend on how much the country was prepared to receive foreign aid, the serious cooperation, and the responsible management of the resources. Our difficulties derived from the fact that we trusted the rule of the country to unskilled and incompetent men.

The poet often attributed the country's failures to our nature, to our fatalist mentality, to the perpetual bad public management, to the insensitivity of our elites with regard to inequality, to the hindsight and neglect, the difficulties that afflicted the country. In that analysis, which imitated the text by Paulo Prado about the Brazil of the first Republic, published in 1927 under the title *Portrait of Brazil* (PRADO, 1997), Schmidt questioned himself about the colonial – and republican – heritage and if, without it, the country could have avoided the debt, the budget imbalance, and the import of food. The Brazilian problems were rooted in its history and could not be ascribed to the United States. The Brazilians themselves were in charge of Brazil.

However, the lack of mobility was not the solution. Once the heritages that had a negative influence on the country's development efforts were verified, the false ideas that misplaced our policies through unfruitful paths were nullified, and the path of development was identified, it was necessary to take the first step, that is, to favor the entrance of foreign capital. The closest example, in November 1953, was that of Juan Perón, whose government had abandoned its strict nationalism and had opened

the country to the foreign capital. According to the chronicler, while Perón returned or seemed to return to reason, Brazil was not showing any sign of an objective policy in terms of foreign investments. Argentina was also considered an example in the oil sector, an area in which Brazil needed to recover the foreign trust. Schmidt trusted the work of Osvaldo Aranha, who had returned to the Ministry of Finance that year, to fight the backward mentality (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 86).

The articles written for the *Correio da Manhã* between 1947 and 1953, partially summarized in the paragraphs above, express the thought of Augusto Frederico Schmidt about development and the international insertion of Brazil even before the beginning of Juscelino Kubitschek's government. A peripheral country of relative importance in the international scenario, distant from the main conflicts of the international politics and an exporter of commodities, Brazil was in charge of fostering its own development, with the help of foreign capital. The greatest challenge was to overcome its historical heritage and the atavistic nationalism.

WITHOUT GETTING LOST IN VAGUE DAY DREAMS

Operation Pan-America was not a magic trick, as its idealizer pointed out. It would be impossible to sustain a development surge, or development itself, without a base on culture, i.e. without the creation of a mentality and the elaboration and a doctrine towards development. OPA, which brought within it the challenge to take millions of human beings out of misery, could not be restricted to a set of economic measures, but it needed to raise awareness, "without getting lost in vague day dreams" (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 92-93). Realism and idealism walked together in the thinking of the poet: the initiative of JK's government should be a continental

revolution, accompanied by an “Operation Brazil”, a movement that relied on the adjustment of the Brazilian thinking.

The obscenely obese scholar, seller of sausage and jerked beef, was aware of the resistance of Itamaraty against OPA and he certainly noticed the cold politeness with which the head of the Political Department of Itamaraty received his 20 stones. In concrete terms, Pio Corrêa argued that the mere mention of the Brazilian leadership in Latin America was enough for its Hispanic neighbors to articulate themselves against Brazil, and that we had no resources to participate in a hemispheric project of economic development (CORRÊA, 1996, p. 603). The refusal to support OPA was mainly because it was conceived outside Itamaraty by a businessman and poet who was a friend of the President. What Pio Correa considered a “venerable foolishness”, the JK government considered the only alternative to years of unrequited concessions.

The relationships with Latin America would have their historical logic inverted, from the fear of the Brazilian expansionism to a cooperation in favor of development. As for the resources of the country, there was no doubt that Brazil, as well as its neighbors, faced difficulties, but it would be neglectful to deny the existence of domestic resources, be it mineral wealth, arable lands, traditional manufacture or human resources. The studies of Cepal had already indicated the importance of the integration and the cooperation amongst Latin American countries. Obviously, most of the resources and the technical knowledge would come from the United States, which had to be convinced of the advantages of playing the role of *paymaster* of the regional development.

It was around that issue that Schmidt’s most original contribution to Brazilian diplomacy was formed: the possibility of articulation of Latin American countries among themselves and before the United States in order to join efforts in favor of

the fight against underdevelopment. Aware that leadership is not to be declared, but to be exercised in the diplomatic practice, it was up to the Brazilian Chancellery and the Presidency to convince the neighboring countries of the benefits that could arise from the coordination of the regional interests. That was the political arm of the integrationist ideas of Cepal and the Inter-American forums.

The persuasion of the neighbors would result from two movements, from the power of the Brazilian example and its recognized *ars diplomatica*. In the first one, the Brazilian example was that of the developmentalist economic policy and the Plan of Goals, with which JK infected the Brazilian society and impregnated it with a rare optimism. The diplomacy was used, for example, even before the official launching of OPA, in order to obtain the support of Argentina to the Brazilian initiative. With that double movement, Kubitschek's government opposed the diabolic forces – in a pre-Christian sense – of political conservatism, the symbolic elements of the construction of Brasília.

Gibson Barboza revealed in his memoirs that the coincidence of having two developmentalist governments, in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, has made the negotiations easier. Having received the task from JK to convince Arturo Frondizi, the President of Argentina, to support the Brazilian initiative, Gibson Barboza found a politician interested in bringing alternatives for the promotion of the economic development in his own country and in the region, and Barboza handed him a letter from JK, dated June 15, 1958, in which he introduced OPA (BARBOZA, 1992, p. 67).

Frondizi's support has made Kubitschek feel confident of the initiative's results and contributed for him to give the speech that can be considered the launch of Operation Pan-America, a name which was disclosed on that occasion. On June 20, 1958,

Kubitschek showed his proposal to the diplomatic representatives of the American States accredited with the Brazilian government. He stated that Brazil and the other countries of the continent were already mature enough to refuse the role of being in the background in the Inter-American political game. He urged for a dynamic participation by the Latin American countries in the world's problems, preceded by a rigorous analysis of the continental policy, as he had indicated to President Eisenhower.

Without confronting the United States, whose political and economic influence in Latin America had to be recognized, Kubitschek proposed the multi-lateralization of Pan-Americanism. Although Pan-Americanism had long been considered multilateral, by definition, it lacked consistency to that dimension, through a more active participation of Latin American countries and with a division, even if disproportional, of the responsibilities. Such change would bring about at least two advantages: it would contribute to reduce the weight of the United States in such negotiations, supposedly alleviating its burdens, and would favor the overcoming of the regional rivalries, by refusing a leadership role from individual countries, starting with Brazil. Juscelino believed that the OPA was not his idea, "but of all the peoples of America" (OPA n. 1, 1958, p. 34-37).

The role that the United States should have in the building of a new Pan-Americanism was essential, considering its natural importance in the relationship with its neighbors. In the same speech, Kubitschek mentioned the Marshall Plan² and its

2 The Marshall Plan (Mar 12, 1947), elaborated by the then US Secretary of State, General George Marshall, was the program of economic aid of the United States to Europe, which was targeted to the economic recovery of the European countries that had suffered with the War. Washington's determination to fight communism and the amount of resources directed towards Europe have made Latin American rulers of the time, and even of the following decades, to nurture a hope that Latin America would also receive a similar plan. In that context, the overvaluation of the presence of Communism in Brazil became trite.

“uninterested” aid, the US loans to the Latin American countries after the War and the help directed towards the European reconstruction, which supposedly neglected the development needs of countries that still had rudimentary economies. The Brazilian president himself oscillated between the investments in the industry and welfare, demonstrating that the domestic contradictions of the country corresponded to an ambiguous and ambivalent foreign policy. Was Schmidt convinced that it was possible to obtain financial and technological resources for industrial development, along with actions on welfare? On the other hand, would it be possible to convince the United States of the strategic character of the “autonomous development” of Latin America?

How to convince the White House, the Congress and the State Department that OPA could bring great benefits to the United States? For that to happen, the diplomatic and political dimension of the Brazilian initiative should be joined up with the technical and economic dimension, of which Ozório de Almeida was in charge. Indeed, the assembly of a team of diplomats-economists, with the support of other diplomats and economists, bore fruits. As Marcílio Marques Moreira recalled, Washington had a group of diplomats who had brilliant careers ahead of them in Itamaraty: Geraldo Holanda, Lindenberg Sette, Sérgio Paulo Rouanet, Amaury Bier, Saraiva Guerreiro, Maury Gurgel Valente, among others. He claimed that OPA was welcomed at the Embassy and that the studies that Ozório de Almeida coordinated provided consistency to the initiative. According to Moreira, the importance of Schmidt was more linked to the missions in which he participated rather than to the elaboration of OPA, which supposedly gained in density only with the arguments presented in the study *‘Tendências Básicas das Economias Brasileira e Mundial no Período 1958-1980’* (Basic Trends of the Brazilian and Global Economies for 1958-1980). The

study foresaw, among other things, that the Soviet economy would overcome the North-American one in 1972, becoming the world's greatest economy in 1980 (MOREIRA, 2001, p. 46).

The document considered that the democracies had to face a challenge: to offer the underdeveloped nations a solution to the problem of development or to allow them to be attracted by the totalitarian nations. Both Europe and the United States were still not aware of that reality, which explained the neglect with which the Latin-American problems were treated. Thus, OPA presented itself as the best alternative to avoid serious consequences to the major economies and their democratic regimes, besides contributing for the unity of thought of the Latin American countries (MRE, 1958).

The greatest vulnerability of the country was in its reduced import capacity, which would demand from the Brazilian State the use of resources that could otherwise be destined to the private industry sector, by means of infrastructure works. At that time, the country had a low growth rate, depended greatly on imports, had a rapid population growth, low capitalization and the national resources were still insufficient to leverage an industry with greater added value, as was intended. OPA could channel resources to increase the exports, whose expansion was estimated, on realistic bases, from US\$ 1,470 million, in 1959, to US\$ 4,449 million, in 1980.

The study that Miguel Ozório and the other diplomatic and economic authorities elaborated converged with Schmidt's ideas regarding the main problem of the national economy, the low level of exports and the need to tackle the advance of communism. The main difference was in the fact that *Tendências Básicas* put the potential economic growth of the communist bloc in numbers, while the poet's discourse only had a voluntarist approach, according to which the project of OPA should be embraced by

Washington when it considered Brazil a partner decided to deal with the overcoming of its historical constraints, with correcting the misbehavior of its politicians and with making a preponderant use of its own resources in the development process. The US perspective, however, did not consider any of these arguments.

To the United States, fighting communism in Latin America was not as urgent as it was in Greece and Turkey right after the War, or in Eastern Europe and Japan shortly thereafter, nor was it a complementary area in economic and financial terms, as was the case of Western Europe. The official announcement of the Alliance for Progress, on August 18, 1961, signaled for the US help to Latin America countries, but without addressing what was the most essential in Juscelino Kubitschek's proposal, the actual development – potentially autonomous, as conceived by Cepal – of the Latin American economies.

A MEETING OF EXUBERANT SPEECHES

OPA had quick divulgation in May and June 1958 and was under discussion by the neighboring countries for the following months. The multilateral meetings, the exchange of correspondences among the American presidents and the debates in the press justified it being welcomed by the OAS. The Inter-American Economic and Social Council was in charge of creating a committee, the Committee of the 21, to analyze the feasibility of the Brazilian proposal and to identify the best means for its realization. In August, the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, Douglas Dillon, announced in the CIES the creation of an Inter-American development institution, which may not have been exclusively a result of the political and diplomatic movement of

the Latin American countries in the previous months, but was, at least, a response to it.

It was clear that OPA was a program to eradicate underdevelopment from the Latin American countries, whose resources were supplied mainly by the United States, under the pretext of providing stability to the continent in its fight against communism. The Committee of the 21 was assembled three times: between 1958 and 1960 (in Washington, Buenos Aires and Bogotá), occasions when the USA would reveal their resistance in providing actual support to the initiative. Even in mid-1958, the USA did not hide the coldness with which they received the proposal of OPA, but they revealed their interest in creating a financial institution, marking the beginning of the process that resulted in the created of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).

The US government welcomed measures in favor of the stabilization of commodity prices, the integration of Latin American markets and the strengthening of institutions in charge of financing development projects, such as the Eximbank and the IBRD. This positioning, reinforced by the negative consequences of Nixon's visit to South America, has brought reinvigorated support for the Latin American countries, although, in a certain way, they would not support the proposal of OPA, which urged for an increase of US investments in the region and the establishment of a medium-term investment timetable.

In that context, it is likely that Schmidt devoted more attention to the internal criticisms against OPA than to the path of the Brazilian proposal within the scope of the Organization of American States (OAS), in whose Committee OPA was emptied by the US diplomacy. The State Department instructed its representatives to dismiss the argument of the Brazilian representatives, which tied the economic development to the fight

against communism. The US strategy was to request from the neighboring countries concrete and specific proposals, respecting the budget limitations. It meant, in practice, to delay responses to the claims of countries that, for administrative or political reasons, were unable to elaborate consistent projects at that time, and to limit substantially the developmentalist dimension, in favor of welfare actions (VIDIGAL, 2009, p. 42).

According to Schmidt, the works of the Committee of the 21 confirmed, at first glance, the acceptance of OPA by Washington; however, the slow pace of the negotiations, the recurrent way in which the US negotiators presented the resistance from its Congress in authorizing the release of resources, the progressive lack of interest demonstrated by the neighboring countries and the internal criticisms to OPA changed his mood. In an article published in *O Globo*, of December 1960, two years and a half after the launching of OPA, and based on the government program of Jânio Quadro's campaign, which proposed the continuity of the Pan-American policy of Juscelino, Schmidt (2002, p. 105) was categorical: "OPA is irreversible".

Three months later, he regretted that, in the beginning of OPA, both Brazilian and North-American journalists accused him of incompetence to fulfill the international missions of which he had been in charge, without him asking for them or wishing them, and of being unethical, because he used methods that seemed more like blackmail than diplomatic action. There seemed to gather a wave of unwillingness around his name and OPA had been received with "cold indifference by the State Department". On the other hand, Schmidt recognized that some sectors of the neighboring countries had valued the initiative and that even in the Brazilian press there were some voices of support; after all, for as long as Latin America continued to be undervalued, left to

an uncharacterized background, there would be a need for OPA to exist (2002, p. 108).

It was with that resignation spirit in face of the difficulties, both domestically and in the dialogue with the United States, that Schmidt witnessed the progressive watering down of OPA and attended the Uruguiaiana Meeting, between the Presidents Jânio Quadros and Arturo Frondizi, in April 1961, in which 14 protocols of bilateral cooperation between Brazil and Argentina were negotiated, without any consideration of OPA, except for one mention that did not relate to the previously agreed commitments. The title of two articles published within less than one month, between May and June 1961, set the tone of a new moment: *The Disappearance of OPA* and *The Denial of OPA*. According to the poet, “instead of OPA, it was the Alliance for Progress that started its career, using much of what we did and thought and putting in the background what might seem to us the most important of being treated as priority” (2002, p. 113).

Schmidt’s pessimism derived from the fact that the North-Americans themselves refused beforehand any kind of planning directed to the economic development of the continent. The President of Colombia Lleras Camargo, who had praised the change of behavior of Brazil in relation to its Latin American neighbors as a very significant event, recalled that the Brazilian proposal was seen with much distrust. Among the problems that Brazil faced in Jânio’s government was the fact that Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco did not value the effort made in the negotiations of OPA. Schmidt insisted that the Alliance for Progress derived from the negotiations made in the Committee of the 21. The US initiative could not be mixed with OPA, because Melo Franco had no sympathy at all for Juscelino or for Schmidt himself (2002, p. 113).

OPA could be forgotten, but it should not be abandoned, since it was a good project that the Brazilian diplomacy was barely starting to execute. According to Schmidt, OPA's central idea – that the defense of the West, through the fight against communism, would be more effective with the economic strengthening of the Latin American countries – was becoming “increasingly solid and unquestionable”. Schmidt did not hide his disagreements with Jânio and Afonso Arinos, but he demanded a respect to OPA that the following governments were unwilling to pay.

MUCH CLOSER TO THE MOON

The contradictions with which Schmidt referred to the Alliance for Progress were not just superficial, but they expressed his difficulties in accepting the denial from Washington regarding the Latin American development claims, as well as the use of the Kennedy government's initiative in criticisms directed to Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy program (PEI). Indeed, both Schmidt and Juscelino valued the Alliance for Progress, interpreted as a North-American response to OPA, but they did not hide the atmosphere of animosity that accompanied the negotiations of the Committee of the 21. It was that perception that led Schmidt to call attention, in a harsh but safe way, to the indifference our allies showed for the future of the region.

The poet recalled that, “more than once I found it convenient to use slogans that were against the public opinion of the United States, showing the insensitivity and coldness that guided our relations”. In addition:

To the representatives of the State Department and the international journalists who followed the works of the UN

*General Assembly – witnesses of my several irritations [...],
I complained about that coldness, not to say disdain, with
which our longtime allies analyzed what I brought to tell
them (2002, p. 149-150).*

Schmidt's resentment in relation to the United States might not have been so different from the frustrations accumulated during the governments of Dutra and Vargas, but because of the new regional context, had a deeper impact on him.

The extent of the disagreement between both countries was not seen only in the meetings of the Committee of the 21, where there were strong frictions between Schmidt and Thomas Mann. The Brazilian president even stated clearly that the United States not only did not help Brazil, but it also hindered its negotiations with the IMF, according to an interview given to Moniz Bandeira (2011, p. 76). The US government was not satisfied with the program of currency stabilization adopted in late 1958 and started to demand the reduction of public investments, mainly in Petrobrás, which would make the Plan of Goals unfeasible. The result of that disagreement was the aggravation of the bilateral tensions, and Kubitschek, unable to confront the United States, chose to break with the IMF³. The conflicts between Rio de Janeiro and Washington, despite the dramatic character it embarked upon in mid-1959, were not enough for the president and the poet to take their resentments to the next level. Both adopted a dubious position in relation to the Alliance for Progress.

During João Goulart's government, Schmidt, as a chronicler for *O Globo* and other Brazilian newspapers, triggered a systematic

3 The break of the relationship of the Brazilian government with the IMF took place on June 9, 1959, and was accompanied by the perception that the institution, as well as the "enemies of the independent Brazil", were trying to force a "national capitulation", so that the industry started to be controlled by the foreign capital (Speech by Juscelino Kubitschek, *Correio da Manhã*, Rio de Janeiro, 06/18/1959 and 06/27/1959, apud BANDEIRA, 2011, p. 77).

campaign against what he considered to be treason to the country (TOLMAN, 1976, p. 17). In the “Open Letter to President Goulart – I” (*O Globo*, 1962, April 3), Schmidt admonished to the president, on the occasion of his upcoming trip to the United States. The Alliance for Progress was the last opportunity the country had to free itself from underdevelopment. The problem was that the Foreign Minister (San Tiago Dantas) was a loyal follower of Jânio’s policy and his intelligence, which besides being very small, was directed towards the Eastern lands of coastal Africa. In other words, “I can see inside that Mr. Dantas is wearing today the same strange and exotic uniform with which Jânio Quadros meets his most important visitors”. Nothing could be expected from the Foreign Minister, as he was so well-trained in the hard task of agreeing, as in the case of the Independent Foreign Policy.

A more consistent lesson was in Schmidt’s view about the role of the IMF and its relations with the North-American interests. Despite the view of Roberto Campos about Schmidt, who considered him the expression of the *nouveau riche*, of bad taste, of datedness and the lack of information, the poet did not accept the argument of the economic abstractionism of Campos, about the differences between the IMF and the White House. Indeed, there was no difference, since the IMF was not only an institution, but a whole way of thinking, “a kind of freemasonry”. The goal of the monetarists of the fund was to prevent the developed world from being more elastic in relation to the needs of the developing countries. What characterized the fund’s ideology was the despise for the reality in which its rules would be applied.

In the second “Open Letter” (*O Globo*, 1962, April 5), Schmidt stated that we did not lack the conditions for development and that we were able to make welfare and social justice work by our own means. Goulart should show that he was aware that we were not claiming given money, but the commitment to pay what would

be trusted to us. In the bitter and melancholic Latin America, we were a country that was able to grow and move ahead of the others. Goulart should make himself understood by President Kennedy that Brazil did not wish the rosy Alliance for Progress, with its soft landscapes, with its children playing, but a fundamental impulse, a deep “operation”.

As for the “Inventor of Independence” (*O Globo*, 1962, April 26) and its fluid words, so well linked together that were easy to remember, they made Schmidt bored and saddened for its lack of authenticity. According to him, the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) resulted from the theoretical elaboration of partisan intellectuals of a policy grounded on the submission and on the lack of affirmation from Brazil. He was among those who were convinced that the famous “Independence of San Tiago” was nothing more than a folding screen to hide a neutral sectarianism of scarcely noble origin. Nobody could wish for their own country another position that was not independence. San Tiago Dantas positioned himself as a “servant of popularity, of bad-taste leftism, of the missionary spirit”, according to Schmidt, “for the simple fact that I fight him and repudiate him”. Ultimately, “this Dantesque independence is of the most partisan nature”.

Going on with his argumentation, in a slightly less aggressive tone, Schmidt recalled that Brazil had been receiving aid and collaboration from the United States to build its own democracy and that we should not complain about the collaboration that could only be legitimately received from allies. The policy by Dantas, on the other hand, invited the participation of countries in universal causes. For Brazil, however, exactly because it was an independent country, it would be more important to fight in favor of democracy and for the freedom of our beliefs. The Independent Foreign Policy was not even an original idea, as Jânio Quadros had inaugurated it and had renewed the own criteria of the country, including the

geographic ones, inserting it in “amid the neutral zone, among the Sukarnos and the Nassers”.

Introverted in his criticism of the “Inventor of the Independence”, the poet condescended with welfare and distinguished it into two different types, what contributed and what did not contribute to the Brazilian development. The thesis of developmentalism had become a difficult theme to be dealt with, in face of those who advocated welfare without development. The ideal would be that the American cooperation was received in a priority scale for the investments, starting with the industrialization, on which the funds of the Alliance for Progress should be applied:

increase the already existing conditions to allow the creation of a really important industrial park; increase of our steel production capacity and of all the elementary chemical industries; expansion of the industries that use national raw materials (O Globo, 1962, October 5).

The US policy would enable and facilitate welfare more substantially than just installing fountains in the drought polygon, as was being planned.

Schmidt’s conservatism turned his articles in *O Globo* into pieces of artillery against the Parliamentary government of João Goulart, with the weapons either turned against San Tiago Dantas, or to the President of the Council of Ministers, Brochado da Rocha, or towards the Archbishop Dom Hélder Câmara (among others). Goulart, however, was the main focus.

The reforms that the president announced in late 1962 – the plebiscite that restored Presidentialism would take place on January 6, 1963 – pointed to the adaptation of institutions towards the economic growth of the Kubitschek government and, according to the president himself, the main sector responsible

for them would be the business sector. Schmidt denounced the fact that the businessmen did not attend any of the meetings or made any agreements on the measures that destroyed the private initiative, they in fact disagreed with these initiatives. According to the poet, “the businessmen cursed to the heavens and others angrily punched their desks, the more desperate pulled their hairs out.” (*O Globo*, 1962, April 12)

The attacks on Goulart became more intense along 1963 and included criticisms to his ministers, his policy and the electorate, since “the nation accepts anything, if not delighted, at least in a faded and lethargic manner”. Thus the coup advocator was born, who placed himself among the “crazy people or considered to be crazy” because they were against the “insubstantial mass”. The latter played a ridiculous role, noticed by the government itself, which considered them moody and hasty. The victory was of Goulart, who “found in the clergy, in the nobility and in the people puppets to handle, vassals to serve him” (*O Globo*, 1963, May 12).

Schmidt asked himself if Goulart was really aware of what was going on in the country, if he knew what he was doing or if he was unaware of the dangers to which Brazil was subjected. As a parody of the famous sonnet by Machado de Assis, he asked himself “has Brazil change or have I?” Goulart certainly had not changed. He was still the same young man that Brazil got to know, who left the Ministry of Labor, in the Vargas government, because of the famous manifesto of the colonels. As the president, Goulart led, almost without any opposition, the disintegration ball (1964, p. 71).

Not by chance, Schmidt would be included among the “civilian generals” of the 1964 military coup – the Revolution, according to the version of its protagonists – and was almost considered a candidate to the presidency, but soon discarded (TOLMAN, 1976,

p. 17). A personal friend of General Humberto Castelo Branco, he supposedly insisted that Juscelino promoted him to Division General, in August 1958. The president supposedly accepted Schmidt's suggestion without enthusiasm. When the military dictatorship started to repeal the civilian politicians, including Kubitschek himself, Schmidt tried to defend him, intervening with President Castelo Branco, but was unsuccessful. He could not avoid the repeal and the apparently honorable solution of the voluntary exile of his main defender.

In the defense of Operations Pan-America, supposedly transformed into the Alliance for Progress, Schmidt was one of the fiercest adversaries of the Independent Foreign Policy, either under Quadros-Melo Franco, or under Goulart-Dantas. His stance was easily understood because of his conservatism, of his admiration for the United States, of his belief in the country's ability to be the main one in charge of its own development. In Goulart's government, he was against the establishment of an unstable situation in the country, the relative detachment from Washington, through PEI, and the emphasis given to neutralism.

PEI changed Schmidt's willingness in relation to the Alliance for Progress. The welfare approach of Kennedy's initiative was unquestionable. Lincoln Gordon clearly expressed that it was a cooperative effort, without the foreign resources replacing the internal ones and without being configured as a bilateral cooperation between the United States and each Latin American country. Part of the initiative was led by Inter-American institutions and global international agencies. The ideological dimension was given by a motto: "the common devotion to the democratic institutions and the respect to the human being". With the "operation alliance", Brazil not only could accept the challenge of its heavy social and economic problems, but become a model (GORDON, 1962, p. 1-19). The deconstruction of OPA was underway.

Schmidt avoided embracing that interpretation, especially because his priority was the relationship with the United States and obtaining resources for the Brazilian development. But from 1961, his discourse changed substantially. Before that, still as head of the Brazilian delegation to CIES, in OPA conferences in Washington and Buenos Aires, he was aware of the American neglect and, as previously observed, the neglectful way with which OPA was received in the United States. The Brazilian representative stated more than once that the “United States are much closer to the Moon than to the countries of our community” (Senhor, March 1961). Wasn’t the universal character of PEI the response to that observation?

CONCLUSION

OPA was a white cockerel. That might have been Schmidt’s assessment when he considered the rareness, the visibility and the strength of its crow. In the context of the post-war era and of the Latin American demands for resources to foster its development, the Brazilian initiative was actually a rare action moment, in which the interests at stake became explicit. Juscelino spared no efforts in order to call the attention of the Latin American presidents and the White House itself for the Latin American problems. However, he knew that OPA would only gain density with the adhesion of the neighboring countries, starting with Argentina, which, in a certain way, did happen.

When the historian of Brazilian international relations, Clodoaldo Bueno, commented on the meaning of OPA, he used his habitual academic refinement to state that, “as a response to OPA, however, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) is often considered as its only concrete outcome. But the Latin American

Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Alliance for Progress of President Kennedy were related to the Brazilian proposal” (BUENO; CERVO, 2011, p. 314). No doubt, OPA directly contributed to accelerate the creation of IADB and had a positive influence on the creation of LAFTA. However, as mentioned above, the Alliance for Progress was more of a counterpoint than a natural consequence.

Other analysts identified OPA as a division milestone in the changes of the Brazilian foreign policy guidelines, which since then started to be characterized by the diversification of international partners of the country, besides making clear the conflict of interests between Rio de Janeiro and Washington (OLIVEIRA, 2005, p. 86-87). Schmidt did not actually formulate the idea of the autonomy by means of the diversification of the international ties of Brazil, but saw the deepening of the bilateral relations with the Latin American countries and in the multilateral instances, such as the OAS and its Committee of the 21, IADB and LAFTA, as instruments to coordinate the development of the region and to overcome the backward conditions.

The context in which Schmidt elaborated his ideas was the same in which Cepal profoundly reviewed its texts from the previous years, still considered to be valid, but insufficient for the purposes of industrialization. The theory of the belated industrialization proposed the progressive differentiation of the productive systems, which would lead to a self-sustained growth (FURTADO, 1997, p. 61). That was, from another perspective, what Schmidt was suggesting since the late 1940's.

In December 1947, when he analyzing the situation of Panama and the abandonment of the US bases in the region, Schmidt stated categorically that the position and the concept of the United States in the world were reinforced when they yielded in face of the fair claims of Panama. There was in the US resignation a sense

of high continental policy and a movement to recover confidence, which the Americans needed (something that would happen again later, in May 1958). The main difficulty was to establish a balance and greater tranquility in the continent, which required facing the central problem of the region, the differences between the nations.

The poverty and the misery of certain Latin American countries should be of great concern to the American empire: “will Pan-Americanism actually exist, as the American people gradually become free from *economic dependence* and poverty” (SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 17). According to the poet, the union of the Americas would require a support to the economic development of the poor areas of the continent. That is the sense of Schmidt’s assent faced with the dependence in relation to the United States. In the case of Panama, the United States had proven that its imperialism was very different from the Soviet one.

In his liberal and conservative view, which favored the narrowing of the bilateral relations with the United States, the poet believed, based on the natural, financial and human resources already available in the Brazil of the 1950’s, on the possibility to advance along the path of industrialization. He might have made a mistake in relation to Washington’s purposes, both when OPA was launched and in the meaning of the Alliance for Progress for the development of the region. He certainly made a mistake in relation to the power of the most backward economic sectors of the country and its behavior in face of an autonomous foreign policy.

However, Schmidt understood as few others did, the limits imposed on Brazil by the international scenario, the presence of US interests in the country, and our financial and technological frailty. Aware of those limitations, he recognized Brazil’s condition of a dependent country and acquiesced in face of the influence of Washington on the affairs of Brazil and its neighboring countries. The poet of acquiescent dependence and of political conservatism

was not an advocator of autonomy, but, just like a cockerel that announces the dawn, he turned Operation Pan-America into a presage of PEI, even though he rejected it.

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**JOÃO AUGUSTO DE
ARAÚJO CASTRO**

He was born in Rio de Janeiro, to a family from Maranhão, on August 27th, 1919. He entered the diplomatic career in 1940, and graduated from the Law School of the Federal Fluminense University, in 1941. Throughout his career he occupied the following main positions: in 1951, officer at the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN, in New York; in 1958, Head of the Political and Cultural Department of Itamaraty, and member of the working group charged with the formulation of the Pan-American Operation (OPA), launched by President Juscelino Kubitschek; in August 1961, he accompanied Vice-President João Goulart's delegation, in a special mission to Moscow and the Far East – this trip was interrupted in Beijing on account of the resignation of president Jânio Quadros (on August 25th, 1961); in August 1963, he was named Minister of Foreign Affairs of President João Goulart's government (1961-1964); in the following month of November, he headed the Brazilian Delegation to the 18th Session of the

UN General Assembly, in New York – in his speech in the General Debate, he launched the policy of the “Three Ds”– Disarmament, Economic Development and Decolonization; in 1968, he was appointed head of the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN and represented Brazil in the Security Council; in May 1971, he became the Ambassador of Brazil in Washington, where he died on December 9th, 1975. He was married to Míriam Sain-Brisson de Araújo Castro, with whom he had three children.

JOÃO AUGUSTO DE ARAÚJO CASTRO: DIPLOMAT

Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg

Among the many issues that Araújo Castro¹ addressed throughout his diplomatic career, were his speech in the UN General Assembly about the Three D's – Disarmament, Economic Development and Decolonization, as well as his statements about the freezing of the world power and the negotiations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As an introduction to the present chapter, concise notes on those two issues are included next.

THE THREE D'S SPEECH

In the remarkable legacy of Araújo Castro concerning international relations, the formulation of the so-called “Three D's” – Disarmament, Economic Development and Decolonization

¹ The opinions expressed in this chapter are of exclusive responsibility of its author, except when mentioned otherwise.

– which proved to be core themes in the international politics of his time – stand out. In the speech he made at the opening of the 18th UN General Assembly, in 1963, Araújo Castro argued that within the UN itself it was possible to notice the emergence of a Parliamentary articulation, – at the margin of the East-West confrontation – gathering small and medium powers around those three themes. According to him,

[...] the struggle for disarmament is the struggle for Peace itself and for the juridical equality of States that strive to place themselves beyond the bounds of fear or intimidation. The struggle for development is the struggle for economic emancipation and social justice. The struggle for decolonization in its broader sense is a struggle for political emancipation, for freedom and human rights (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 27).

Araújo Castro claimed that the great powers hesitated to accept the importance of those elements as major components of the world scene, in those early 1960s, although they had already been contemplated in the UN Charter itself, signed in 1945, in San Francisco. The efforts in favor of disarmament, although remarkable, advanced very slowly, while the arms race continued at a fast rate, consuming precious resources that could be channeled to economic development and to other important peace building purposes.

Araújo Castro made reference to the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, which assembled in Geneva and of which Brazil was a member, noting that the negotiations carried by it remained tough and concluded that “an elementary sense of realism leads to admit that we are still very far from signing a general and complete disarmament treaty [...] as far as the text

of such treaty was concerned, we advanced very scarcely beyond a few paragraphs from the preamble” (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 28).

He understood that, given the difficulties to reach a more general agreement, the Powers should advance one step at a time, as they identified coinciding points of view and, in that sense, he suggested the advance in stages that started from the limitation of the nuclear experiences, so that they could later move towards an acceptable agreement that stopped the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the ways to prevent war by the accidental launching of that kind of armament. His considerations reflect, largely, the stage reached in the international debate on the nuclear issue in the early 1960s. He had very much in mind the memory of the crisis lived by the whole world in the 13 days before October 28th, 1962, when Nikita Khrushchev finally decided to withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba, after protracted negotiations with John F. Kennedy.

As for the economic development, Araújo Castro noted that such issue tended to become a source of growing pressure on the stability of the nations and on the international order itself, which could not disconnect from the emergence of social tensions with the growing potential to become political turbulences.

At that time, few people noticed, as he did, that the unsteadiness between the efficiency in the programs to reduce infant mortality rates and endemic and epidemic diseases, on the one hand, turned growing pressures on the economic and social development. On the other hand, the demonstration effect itself, carried out by the wealthier nations, turned the demand for economic development into an aspiration and a source of pressure on the international order. In that sense, he claimed that even though development was a struggle that would take place in several fronts, the UN was in charge of the role to lead internationally and articulated strategy in that effort. “The

activities of the UN in the field of development must, according to my government, fulfill three priority areas: industrialization, mobilization of capitals towards development and international trade”, stated Araújo Castro, in the same speech of 1963 (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 33).

Decolonization had gained a strong impulse after World War II. The recognition of India’s independence started the movement for the establishment of new States born from the separation from their metropolises. In fact, it was a new movement that involved mainly Africa and Asia, since Latin America had become independent in the early 19th century, and the new colonial domains were established in those continents, by the end of the same century. Araújo Castro noticed the anachronistic nature of the colonial process, which helped to incite problems and was an obstacle to the progress of regions with huge populations, which required an improvement in their life conditions.

Why those regions that were colonized late should not follow the path of countries such as Brazil or the United States? That condition generated growing pressures, wherever it was in place, and it led to the establishment of political associations and “national liberation movements”. Many years later, Araújo Castro observed that “the liquidation and the eradication of the historical and sociological archaism of colonialism represented a measure of high defensive interest of the economies of all former colonies, regardless of the stages of their political liberation and regardless of what continent they belonged” (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 37).

In a certain way, reports by the UN itself shared Araújo Castro’s point of view, who saw the colonialism as a historical and sociological anachronism. However, the political advance of the process still required both time and effort[s] – Angola, for example, became independent only in the mid-1970s. However, thanks to

Castro's views, the Brazilian foreign policy professed, since then, a new way to understand the international order.

BRAZIL AND THE FREEZING OF THE GLOBAL POWER: THE TREATY OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

A remarkable element in Araújo Castro's view on the international order was the notion that there was a tendency towards the freezing of the global power. According to him, "when we talk about power, we do not talk only about the military power, but also of the political, the economic, and the scientific and technological ones."² Araújo Castro believed that such dimension was a conditioning factor of the standing of nations such as Brazil in the international scene, since it limited their actions and turned harder the development of economic, technological and social potentialities. In other words, such freezing trend in the standards of Power distribution was a problem for small and medium Powers, to which the economic and social development was a priority and to which the social and political change was an inevitable consequence.

Araújo Castro emphasized the case of the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) as a visible demonstration of that trend. He argued that the TNP had been the summit of the process of building the *détente*, that is, the policy of limiting tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had become stronger after the previously mentioned crisis of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. At that time, the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation were debated in Geneva, with both superpowers presiding, a practice that deserved a bitter opposition by Araújo

2 Lecture delivered to the trainees of the Higher War Course, Washington, D.C., on June 11, 1971. In: AMADO, 1982, p. 200.

Castro, since it discriminated against the countries that did not have nuclear weapons. The US agenda was directed towards all countries, while the Soviet one seemed to be more focused on preventing the military nuclearization of Germany and Japan, the powers defeated in World War II, and sought to immobilize the distribution of the strategic power that had been established in 1945. According to Araújo Castro,

the superpowers carry out a joint effort towards the stabilization and the freezing of the global Power as a result of two historical and arbitrary dates: October 24th, 1945, when the UN Charter came into effect, and January 1st, 1967, deadline for the countries to be qualified as militarily nuclear powers, according to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 200).

The assumptions that sustained the NPT contributed with new problems for the international order, as they established different categories of nations, a few of which were nuclear power States, which were to be considered strong, adult and responsible, while the others were taken as non-adults and non-responsible. Araújo Castro argued:

The Treaty derived from the assumption that, unlike all historical evidence indicates, Power brings within it both prudence and moderation. It institutionalized the inequality among the nations and seemed to accept the assumption that the strong countries will become increasingly stronger and the weak countries will become increasingly weaker. On the other hand, the NPT extends to the field of Science and Technology some privileges and prerogatives in the specific field of peace and security, that the UN Charter had limited to the five permanent members of the Security Council (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 200-1).

That statement reflected how much Araújo Castro remained up to date in relation to current theoretical and analytical literature on international relations. In that literature, the influence of thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau was remarkable for their devotion to Power politics.

The *détente* policy promoted a relative peace as the major goal in the international order. Among the main designers of that policy, the so-called realists, one should mention Professors Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington.

In 1963, Brzezinski, who was later the National Security Secretary of Jimmy Carter's government, published, together with Samuel Huntington, a study of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, in which emerged the notion that, in the international order, both superpowers had more convergent than divergent interests with one another (BRZEZINSKI; HUNTINGTON, 1963). Both Powers profited from international stability, while the competition and divergence brought instability, insecurity and uncertainty, while, in fact, the military nuclear elimination of one or another was out of the question.

Araújo Castro saw a problematic side on this agreement as regards countries like Brazil, which were supposedly condemned to remain in the second class among categories of international order. As Brzezinski and Huntington were publishing their book on the role of the relations between the USA and the URSS within the international order, Castro already identified the "invisible veto" that was expressed in international forums and that paralyzed initiatives such as those relating to disarmament, made more difficult to advance the decolonization process and reduced the pace of the economic and social development in the peripheral regions.

Araújo Castro stated:

It is against that invisible veto that the efforts of nations with common desires and claims – those of peace, development and freedom – must be directed because, in the struggle for peace and development, freedom cannot be jeopardized (apud AMADO, 1982, p. 28).

OTHER SEMINAL TEXTS

This chapter will assess four other especially remarkable moments of Araújo Castro's diplomatic performance, which nowadays are not always praised, namely:³

- Lecture at Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) in 1958, by the young Counsellor Araújo Castro;
- Inauguration Speech, in March 1963, as Minister for Foreign Affairs;
- Speech as Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN on the Strengthening of International Security, in the UN General Assembly in 1969 and 1970;
- Speech as Permanent Representative of Brazil against Apartheid in the United Nations, in 1970.

The lecture at ESG, in 1958, and the inauguration speech in Itamaraty, in 1963, are seminal occasions. They enabled Araújo Castro to articulate both ideas and concepts, developed throughout his political and diplomatic career. In turn, the texts on the strengthening of international security and about the condemnation of the *Apartheid* regime in South Africa as a crime against humankind, both from 1970, are remarkable for their theoretical scope and for their political perception.

3 At the end of this chapter, see a brief note on Araújo Castro's ironic view of life.

As was noted in the beginning, Araújo Castro had an extremely broad array of substantive concerns. His immediate themes in New York and, later, in Washington, were, without trying to be exhaustive, peace and war; the political and strategic evolution of the Cold War to the *détente*; the international security and the freezing of Power; the bitter international realities and the possibilities to build a more fair and equitable order; the United Nations as a debating and negotiation forum, as a legal and political commitment and as hope of international reordering; the nuclear arms race and the pressing need of disarmament; the decolonization, the struggle against racism and the needs of development of the poor countries; the handling of the ecological theses; the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the access of all peoples to the achievements of contemporary science and technology and to the characteristic welfare of the economically developed societies.⁴

The diplomatic reputation of Araújo Castro derived mainly from his themes of intrinsic importance, scope and repercussion, from the quality and the innovative capacity of his analysis, and from the political courage to the success of his enterprise.

It is worth recalling that in the months before the 1964 military movement, Araújo Castro was the Foreign Minister of João Goulart's government (by the way, his appointment broke the taboo preventing employees of the Ministry to become its head). Thus, at the maximum moment of his creative power, he had to co-exist with an especially disturbing domestic political situation.

4 About that, see the opening chapter of "Araújo Castro", by Ronaldo M. Sardenberg, published by the Universidade de Brasília Publishing House, 1982, which includes the texts of the lecture at ESG and of the inauguration speech, as well as translations into Portuguese of speeches made in English.

LECTURE AT ESG, IN 1958, BY THE YOUNG COUNSELLOR ARAÚJO CASTRO

In 1958, when he was still a Counsellor of the diplomatic career, Araújo Castro gave at the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) his first lecture that had repercussion, under the title, which was standard at the time “National Power: Domestic and Foreign Limitations”. This text marked the beginning of his public life and of his highly successful career. He proposed ideas and concepts that were later worked upon and deepened. Therefore, already in 1958, Castro projected himself as a valuable source of political and diplomatic thinking.

The year 1958 was very special for Brazil. The lecture reflected the positive climate that prevailed in various fields. Hopes emerged of a better Brazil, and a proposal of a renewed, open and constructive foreign policy was within the range of the political discussion.

Also in 1958, the Vice-President of the United States, Richard Nixon, visited eight Latin American countries, which became, as a result of serious street incidents, a symbol of a lack of understanding in the hemispheric relations. It was also the year of the launching of the Pan-American Operation, by President Juscelino Kubistchek, and of the beginning of the painful reclaiming of the Brazilian role in the Inter-American relations, a role which experienced remarkable difficulties in the following decades.⁵

In the global sphere, the relaxation of tensions process (*détente*) still had not really started. That was the time of the long East-West post-war confrontation, among the remains of

5 OPAS does not seem to be a symptom of political weakening of Itamaraty in relation to the Presidency of the Republic. Although the Chancellors at the time, Macedo Soares and Negrão de Lima, were overcome by the events, important diplomats moved ahead its process of formulation and execution, starting by Araújo Castro himself.

the earlier relaxation that took place after Stalin's death, in 1953. However, the prospects of that incipient decrease in tension underwent a great change due to the events of Suez and Hungary, in 1956, that is to say, the invasion of Egypt by forces of the United Kingdom and France, as well as the occupation of Hungary by the Soviet Union and associated countries to it. It was only with the visit of Khrushchev to the USA, in 1960 that the détente policy gained momentum, although brief (and opposed by People's China). Détente finally prevailed after the crisis generated by the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. That crisis enabled the strengthening of the nuclear disarmament talks in Geneva, as if the members, starting by the superpowers, had suddenly noticed their vulnerability to the nuclear stalemate.

On his lecture at ESG, Araújo Castro revealed his remarkable way of thinking. He sought historical and sociological support for the diagnosis of the international relations, but he always sought to look ahead, he always anticipated the hypotheses of evolution of the world order and outlined possible paths for the Brazilian foreign diplomatic action. He consistently avoided fatalism, since his proposals were always mediated by political instances.

As one reads that text, it becomes clear the author's determination not to enter, as he says, in "fligrees of interpretations and subtleties," while he emphasizes the ambiguities of the concept of power and the variations in its application to the domestic and the foreign orders. Castro warned against the surplus of rationalism and intellectualism that led to the lack of trust and skepticism, but also to the surplus of naivety and attachment to overcome political myths.

The theories of power, which he brilliantly articulated in the following years, did not emerge suddenly in his thinking. They were elaborated gradually. In that lecture, he even turned relative all forms of power and placed them almost at the point

of indetermination. He distinguished a clear dose of convention and will in the formulations of international politics current at the time.

One of the many interesting topics of that lecture was the recourse to the thought of Machiavelli, the first modern philosopher of power:

Man, iron, money and bread make up the power of war, but among these four elements, the first two are the key ones, because man and iron find money and bread, but bread and money do not find man and iron.

Although he admitted that each of those elements retains its key importance in the contemporary world, he emphasized that, in modern times, they would equate in a different way and under a different political logic from that of the Renaissance. He warned that today Machiavelli might have very few to learn about the deep reasons, the psychology and the goals of war, but certainly many new things would be revealed to him concerning the means used and the resources, weapons and tools that support domination and conquest.

He noted that, in the international balance of power, the wealthier and more developed countries will always be the strongest ones: no specific military preparation, regardless of how intelligent it is, may correct the vulnerabilities, weaknesses and shortcomings of an underdeveloped economy, and he added:

We will continue to need the four elements of Machiavelli, but they will no longer be enough. The improvement of the life conditions of a people, its health, and its social welfare, is a key element for the strengthening of the national power.

Therefore, Araújo Castro took the risk of reinterpreting Machiavelli from the perspective of the main requirements of the Brazilian life and conciliated our need for development with

a realistic picture of international politics. Besides, he sharply anticipated the importance of the social problems and their interrelation with strategy.

The lecturer explained without hesitation the different features of the national problem and the insertion of Brazil in the world. He stated that, despite the lack of adjustments and uncertainties of the economic and financial panorama, the goals of development – that are mixed up with strategic and security goals – will have to be kept and extended.

It is not surprising that Araújo Castro has resorted to Machiavelli, since, in fact, he used what is best in the traditional and contemporary political literature.⁶ The major currents of thought are represented, in his research and bibliography, but it can be seen in them, mainly, a solid reading of realistic authors, and even conservative ones, within the context of the Cold War, such as Hans Morgenthau, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Robert Strauss-Hupé and Stephan T. Possony, among others.

However, he did not do that to display knowledge, but because he noticed that, in order to look ahead, it is necessary to add the Western political experience. For that reason, he assessed very carefully the available literature. Taking advantage of the opportunity, his effort was, above all, to develop, with new shades, the concept of national power that, at the time, was outlined at ESG. He made clear the usefulness of that concept, as well as the need to review it permanently. However, he did boast that:

6 He mentioned, for example, the entire lineage of authors devoted to the theme of the universal government, since Dante and his *De Monarchia* until the draft of the World Constitution, organized by Professor Robert Hutchins, of the University of Chicago. He recalled Weber and Manheim. He quoted major geopoliticians, such as Mackinder and Haushofer, Ratzel and Mahan. He did not forget Spengler and Toynbee, Bertrand Russell and Harold Laski. He mentioned George Kennan, the great theoretician of containment and the Cold War. He did not leave out the Brazilians, such as the sociologist Guerreiro Ramos, the scholar San Tiago Dantas, the politician Juarez Távora and the jurist Themístocles Brandão Cavalcanti, among others.

The words are man's slaves and name the things and concepts that he wishes to establish, turn accurate or limit. However, in our case, not always we will be able to keep them loyal to the single, immobile and intangible concept of national power.

In his great task, Araújo Castro reinterpreted his sources and overcame them. He placed himself, in an advanced manner, in an international scenario dominated by the ideological confrontation and, in the scenario of the Brazilian foreign policy, in a process of reform that had just begun. Already in that first attempt, he attested his quality as a theoretician on international relations and foreign policy.

He emphasized that “the quickest and most direct path towards strengthening the national power is that of economic development itself.” Despite scarcely encouraging indications as for the possible evolution of the international order, Castro believed in Brazil and favorably considered the path to be taken, despite all difficulties.

He pointed out that, only 20 or 25 years earlier, therefore, in the 1930's, Brazil was a small power with illusions of medium power, and that in 1958 it was already placed, with advantage, in the category of the medium powers, despite afflicted with some undesirable, and even dangerous features, or the psychology of a small power.

With the safeguard that, at the time, Brazil was on the eve of the industrial revolution and the fading of the “still remarkable vestiges of our political and social ruralism” – he observed how all that is recent in the Brazilian history – he evaluated that our country already had specific weight in the international politics game, even though he recognized that such perception was

received, in certain sectors of the national life, with reservation, distrust or skepticism.

He foresaw that in a few years, Brazil would become an exporter of manufactured goods and that such strengthening of the economic power would certainly lead to an important strengthening of the national power. Both the domestic and the foreign field were, according to his *avant-garde* view, strongly intertwined and the overcoming of the limitations and vulnerabilities of the former would soften or would lead to the disappearance of the latter.

In that context, he cautioned the need for ensuring that our mentality or psychology about the international field be adjusted to the new relative position of Brazil and avoid to tie itself to semi or paracolonial conceptions and attitudes.

In his conclusion, Araújo Castro warned, in a perceptive manner, that we Brazilian waver between boastful nationalism and despair, between the rosier optimism and the gloomiest pessimism, between the goal of our economic development and the “unfortunate metaphor of the cliff about to swallow us.” Using correctly an image by Arthur Koestler, he concluded that “we went too quickly from the ultraviolet to the infrared, in a world of power that encompasses all the gradations and shades of the spectrum.”

He insisted that power is neither eternal nor unchangeable, and that it was enough to recall the world situation since the 1930s to observe how the European power migrated to the East and the West. He observed that power had nomad habits, it moves easily and, thanks to the new resources of technology, it may settle anywhere in the world. I comment this observation, which was reconfirmed by the transformations, sometimes gradual, other times sudden, in the international order, such as the variations of the insertion of China in the world political and strategic spectrum.

The lecturer clearly saw that the progress and the development of Brazil would be inevitably affected by what happened in the world. He added that geopolitics did not foresee the technological revolution that, in a relatively brief period, changed the political panorama of global power. Despite all dreams, that picture is still ruled by power politics. National power determines, as Hans Morgenthau wrote, the limits of the policies of each State. If it was necessary to validate Araújo Castro's ideas and to verify their longevity, it would be enough to emphasize those considerations.

He suggested, at that moment – and this is another precious proposal for the analysis of foreign policy –, that the national power be the object of an accurate, unbiased and objective evaluation, so that the useful limits on internal or external action not to be overcome, but also not to leave them unexplored. In other words, so that not even by pride we lose the sense of reality, not even for the lack of action we may leave still means and resources that may be mobilized to our advantage in both the domestic and the foreign spheres.

Araújo Castro's diplomacy was not reduced to the multilateral sphere. It contemplated the global insertion of the country and did not stop taking care of the bilateral relations. His thought, as well as his later political action must be evaluated without any biases. Above all, we must avoid any anachronistic shift of Araújo Castro's public performance – which, let us not forget, extended from the already remote years of 1958 to 1975 – to nowadays.

Having said that, it is only historical justice to recognize the wealth of his reflection, whose principles provide an important contribution to the discussions that, in the last few decades, mainly, address the themes of the globalization, regionalization fragmentation. When one talks about globalization, it is postulated, very naturally, a violent displacement of the perceptions of that

time. It is still being verified the reality of the disappearance of the East/West confrontation, while the so-called North-South dialogue is strongly shaded. The compass of international politics stopped guiding itself by the cardinal points, as Araújo Castro had already anticipated. The theories concerning the center and the periphery of the world do not seem operational anymore. Despite that, each region, each country of the so-called peripheral world and even each sector of those societies seeks to adapt to the new reality – the globalization model – and to create a new kind of relation with the dominant poles of the global economy and politics.

Araújo Castro was actually right in the observations that power takes new contents and that the reality is not in accordance with pre-established models. It is for that reason that his theory, expressed in the 1970s, on the fallacy of the freezing of the world power had so much interest and continues to serve as a parameter for the political analysis.

In turn, the phenomenon of regionalization has now new nuances. I point out that regionalization now seems a stage of the globalization process, or at least as the way by which different countries, in a same region, unite themselves, get closer to one another, and ultimately integrate themselves to defend themselves of the worse consequences of the globalization and to maximize their opportunities in the world sphere. That is true especially as far as the so-called open regionalization is concerned. Getting out of the straightjacket of the East/West confrontation, the tendencies to fragmentation, which remain subjacent to the international system, appear with more strength and clearness.

Today, more than previously, the role of the national State is questioned. Global tendencies are redirected beyond the Cold War, without abandoning, however, the concept of power. Moreover, it is exactly the view of power, as an aspect of reality,

which makes Araújo Castro avoid any shadow of romanticism, or of romanticized idealism in his thought. That view turns him pragmatic and useful, and makes his thinking into a tool that can be applied to different strategic and diplomatic situations.

Certainly Araújo Castro would be fascinated with the current ambiguities of the concept of national power, when the States seem weakened, as paradoxical as it is, they self-affirm exactly in the peak moments of financial, military or terrorist crisis. The self-affirmation continues to take place in decisive moments, but all the attentions turn to resources in the hands of the States. It is only after listening to the statements by the governments, the international economic organs and the markets are encouraged to seek again solutions for problems that seemed impossible to deal with. The power of the States is also reaffirmed in the moments of organized international violence when the society, the market and the citizenship often feel threatened. Only the States can take the risk of generating military solutions for international policy matters, and when they do not do that, they risk losing their credibility.⁷

Today, Araújo Castro would certainly pay attention to analyses about the circumstances in which the concept of global power and its ambiguities were almost entirely deleted from the discourse on the international order. The analysis of this issue has key implications for the Brazilian foreign policy. Curiously these implications actually became absent from the specialized literature. That did not lead, however, to the end of the iniquitous structures of global power, which only transformed themselves throughout the decades.

7 Nowadays, the mitigation of the powers of the State can be seen in the incidents of breach of secrecy, in the USA, in the sphere of information, and in the diplomatic documentation.

I believe that even Araújo Castro, who often emphasized the historical improbability of the freezing of the global power, would have been surprised with the flexibility of the international power relations. Those relations still subsist today, despite the disappearance of the East-West confrontation and of the stress on the economic questions, as keys of our times. In the context of globalization and how to carry it out, in a near unipolar world, the international power is still present, despite several and well-known differences between the Cold War and the post-Cold War. In order to assess such differences, it is enough to mention a few of the basic tendencies of our time, such as the information technology society, the volatility of the short-term capitals, post-Fordism and, perhaps, post-modernity.

Nevertheless, already in 1958, Araújo Castro proposed a comprehensive national security policy to face global challenges, a general strategy that included a decided effort for the building of the national power, by means of the recovery of man, the development of the economy and society, the modernization of the Armed Forces, the consolidation and improvement of the national institutions, the extension of the scope of diplomacy, and the improvement of the collective security system of the Hemisphere to which it should now be added the financial stability and the strengthening of the international security. This last idea was, in the late 1960s, an original contribution of Castro himself.

In 1975, again in a lecture at ESG, Araújo Castro assessed the advances already made, the lessons already learned, and stated, “Today nobody is able to understand Brazil, except when placed in the world map. Brazil belongs to the world, to its human problems and its desires for peace, security and development.”

In the years before the latest world economic crises, both the Western experts and its media had seen the tendency towards

globalization in an extremely optimistic manner. On the hand, Araújo Castro's ideas seemed condemned to gradual irrelevance. However, the positive consensus was broken. The globalization process might go on, but the international reality proved that it does not accept a model fatally pre-established. The noises asking for review were already present and still are. Not that the old ideas should or can be revived, but the building of an innovative way of thinking and its discussion must restart where they were interrupted, at the point in which the technological innovation, as it mistakenly seemed, started, for the first time, to overcome its social and political repercussions.

That debate will start very closely from the point where Araújo Castro left us. In that emerging context, the dialogue capability and the diplomacy action will be valued. Considering the new world problems, the so-called global ones, the need for qualified diplomatic personnel becomes decisive again. Araújo Castro, our Ambassador and Chancellor, always stated the need for a focus on foreign policy. The current students of the Rio Branco Institute and the young diplomats – those who will soon be Ambassadors and Chancellors – throughout their careers will review the current and past ideas, and then afterwards evaluate them, as Castro said, “in the relentless scale of the defense of national interest and of the promotion of the ideals of humanity.”

ARAÚJO CASTRO'S INAUGURAL SPEECH AS THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BRAZIL, IN 1963

This speech is a diplomatic jewel, a beautiful analysis of the global insertion of Brazil expressed in an accurate and elegant style.

First, the new Chancellor reminded everyone in the attendance that his inauguration was taking place in the old and symbolic working office of the Baron of Rio Branco, in the Itamaraty Palace, in Rio de Janeiro. He recalled that in the preceding administration of Professor Evandro Lins e Silva, Itamaraty had prepared an evaluation of the Brazilian foreign policy and what had to be done to carry out the reactivation of the different sectors of the Ministry. He emphasized, the “practical, direct and objective treatment given in that document to all our diplomatic subjects, without preconceived ideas, without strict and unmovable positions, and with the clear and lucid notion of the new responsibilities of Brazil in the international sphere.”

The inaugural speech was, above all, thematic. It was devoted to the major concerns of the humanity and Brazil. It moved away from minor issues that often made up the daily life of diplomacy. No doubt, the new Chancellor showed that he was interested in solving the existing bilateral differences that hinder diplomacy and block the main difficulties as well as the solution of broadly collective problems. He proposed a useful thesis, which still finds echoes, according to which “every political problem is characterized by its extreme complexity and it cannot be reasonably expected that absolutely any initiative that we take is immediately victorious or even understood”. He stated that “all that involved the problem of the political maturity of the Chancelleries” – and I add, of the public opinion. He also stated that, in all moments, it is “indispensable that our thoughts are directed towards Brazil and towards what this country represents, as a new experience in the history of mankind [...]. He concluded that it is indispensable that, when we pursue such broad goals, we do not lose the sense of objectivity and political realism that we have been able to keep in our diplomacy”.

He recalled that he had previously emphasized that today,

Brazil is in an ideal position to make a positive and original contribution to deal with the major international problems [...], since it has neither pending political problems in the foreign sphere, nor restraint or limit conditions upon its sovereignty, nor historical causes of resentment, nor territorial claims.

In addition, he averred that

We have natural bridges to all people and all continents. What we did not have, until a short time ago, was the will or the tendency to use these bridges. Now, we are willing to use all of them, since such a young and vigorous country as Brazil cannot be condemned to isolation, or anyway wants to close its ports that were open during the colonial era. We cannot allow hurried generalizations or false options to jeopardize such effort to adjust the tendencies of our diplomatic action to the universal calling of the Brazilian people.

He also emphasized that

Today Brazil is sufficiently mature and aware so that it can negotiate and take on commitments with anyone. To the alarmed and unfaithful, wherever they are, in the center, to the right or to the left, I ask to trust a little more both our country and Itamaraty.

He ensured that

We have never been so present or so active in the international scene. What is indispensable is that the Brazilian people unite, in all its social classes, in all its political or partisan groupings, when a legitimate Brazilian interest appears abroad. The only purpose for the existence of Itamaraty is to defend the permanent

interests of Brazil, and those interests of our homeland include the establishment of a climate of peace, agreement and understanding among all members of the community of the nations, and the permanent work in favor of the improvement of life conditions of the underdeveloped and unprotected part – and it is much more than a part – of the humanity.

This was certainly the core of the inaugural speech. However, Araújo Castro also alludes to items that were already being discussed in the diplomatic agenda, such as the need for political persistence in relation to the major issues of disarmament, economic development e decolonization, which led to his great speech on the 3D's at the opening of the 14th Session of the UN General Assembly.

He acknowledged that “it becomes clearer every day that those three goals inform an entire political action, to be developed, in full and strict cooperation with the sister nations of the hemisphere and with all those that want to join us in a common diplomatic effort.” He explained that “when we claim an effective and ongoing action in those three major areas of political and social progress, we will be claiming nothing more than the fulfillment of the promises made in San Francisco.”

Araújo Castro restated the Brazilian position regarding the multilateral negotiations of the disarmament, a crucial issue since the Thirteen Days in October 1962. He predicted, having in mind the soon upcoming I UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) that Brazil will have to carry out major efforts to obtain from the international organs the recognition of the strict correlation between the structure of the international trade and the problem of the economic development. That's why, as he stated, Brazil fought and would continue to fight for the

“establishment of an International Trade Organization, which corrects the harmful effects of the distortions that determine and condition the pernicious deterioration of prices of raw materials and commodities in the international market.” He stated that Itamaraty will do anything for “the expansion of our foreign trade, diversification of the export agenda and the intransigent defense of the position of our products, mainly coffee, in the international market”.

In that broad picture, he revealed our major goal is that of relying on a collective security system in the economic sphere, parallel to the one we helped to build in the political and security spheres.

Before ending his speech, he sought to detail the core issue of the insertion of Brazil in the world. In what became one of the main points of future speeches of his career, he emphasized the universalist, humanitarian and generous calling of the Brazilian foreign policy – a picture in which he included the policy in favor of decolonization, in whose context he stated that we must be intransigent in the defense of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.

He said that Brazil did not belong to any block, but that it was a member of the Inter-American one, which, however, he restricted with the observation that for us the system is a work tool in favor peace and the understanding among nations. He emphasized, “it is crucial that the Inter-American system becomes a dynamic element of renewal and social justice.”

He explained that, on the one hand, for us, Pan-Americanism is “a solidarity attitude in face of common problems, rather than a rhetorical position of legalism or academicism. The Latin American problems are too urgent and serious for us to be satisfied with the restatement of the inexpressive formulas – and, exactly

for that reason, unanimous ones – that characterized certain collective statements of the past. We cannot allow an extremely serious political problem to hide under the lyric language of the communicated classics and proclamations.”

He noticed, on the other, the need for us “to work decisively to solve some pending economic issues in the field of the bilateral relations with countries that were traditionally our friends.” He professed “a stance of calmness and objectivity, without preconceived attitudes, suspicions and resentments. In this, as in other cases, Brazil only wants the open and sincere dialogue.”

He emphasized that the entire Itamaraty shared that responsibility and that, as far as possible, he would continue to carry out the Independent Foreign Policy – of Brazilian affirmation, continental fraternity and universal calling – that “will be totally preserved and that places Brazil in the world where it will have to live.”

Finally, he recalled the friends and peers of the House, where he already worked for 23 years, “[my] peers who always fought for a more living and acting voice of Brazil in the international sphere [...] always rebelled against the routine, conformism and the exteriorities and conventionalities of a diplomacy that had been surpassed for a long time”, and he concluded that “this generation of diplomats takes on a serious responsibility towards the government and towards Brazil.”⁸

8 His appointment to be Chancellor broke, in a decisive manner, the taboo of not appointing career diplomats for that position. The Itamaraty modernized itself. In the following decades, the Government may benefit from the diplomatic experience of that professional staff.

THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Araújo Castro had an extraordinary ability to formulate global theses, which allowed him to find, in a moment, the path to articulate concepts and to outline, beforehand, his future reasoning, mainly when it had to do with the core tendencies of the international scene.

On the 25th Anniversary of the UN, in 1970, it became necessary to establish a relation, a tie, between the solution of its vices and the political behavior of its members, as well as a relation of what happened in the sessions of the UN main organs and what actually happened in international politics. Based on that diagnosis, Araújo Castro engaged in the defense of the strengthening of the international security, a subject that until then was controlled by the most powerful countries. He universalized the international concern with that theme and he explored the lack of flexibility of the permanent members of the Security Council, when he used the issue of reform of the UN Charter, which was the true symbol of the immobility of the international power macrostructure since 1945.

Benefitting from the general interest to ensure that the celebrations of the silver anniversary of the UN, in 1970, were brilliant, with the approval of significant declarations, Araújo Castro led many delegations in the negotiations about the elaboration of a Declaration on the strengthening of the international security, an item that, in the previous year, had been included in the agenda of the General Assembly, on the initiative of the USSR. The inclusion of that item raised scarce interest, and even hostility, in many member States, mainly in the Western ones.

First, Araújo Castro worked together with the Latin American group, which gave him unanimous approval to submit a draft Declaration, whose writing was mainly a task given to the Brazilian

delegation. That maneuver forced the other political groupings (Socialists, Western and Non-Aligned) to submit their own projects and, later, all those groups to gather to negotiate, under the coordination of Araújo Castro himself, a conciliation text that was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly at the end of that process.

He used all possible parliamentary techniques to reach a positive result. He even circulated a supposed internal memorandum of the Brazilian Delegation, to which he gave the fictional number 63, with a series of ideas to break the impasses that had appeared during the negotiations. He claimed that his aids wrote that *memorandum*, when, in fact, the text was elaborated under his own guidance.

Araújo Castro made two speeches about the strengthening of the international security in the First Commission (Political Commission) of the General Assembly, on October 13th, 1969 and September 28th, 1970, in which he detailed the principles of the Brazilian initiative. The USA and other Western countries soon provided an adverse and symmetric resistance.

Araújo Castro, however, changed the pace of the debates and renewed the reading of the item, when he snatched it from the USSR Delegation and placed it at the service of the “non-aligned countries,” or, as he used to say, of “all members of the UN.” In order to attract the attention, he used his rhetorical qualities and gave new political substance to the item. Besides addressing the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation – after all, the TNP had been signed in 1968 – he introduced, in those speeches, other clearly relevant variations for the role of the United Nations in the major security issues of that time.

When he referred to the procedures of the issues concerning disarmament and non-proliferation, he claimed that the tendency

to move away certain international issues prevailed in the UN and, consequently, the Organization was being condemned to silence, inaction and impotence. He went on to say that some people preached that certain items exacerbate tensions, poison the world atmosphere and feed the fears of the danger that the “political pollution is added to the hazards of the physical pollution,” which have an impact on the environment and contaminate it.

Nonetheless, on the one hand, he observed, never in history the medium and small nations felt so vulnerable and crime, violence, aggression and piracy, subversion and terrorism were so abundant, spread so much along the different crossroads of the world. As it is well known, these plagues still exist.

He emphasized, on the other hand, that, “with the concept of superpower, power became respectable and became the object of a new cult”. The world threatened to be divided among “adult, responsible and powerful countries” and the non-adult ones and, consequently, irresponsible and non-powerful.

Araújo Castro stressed, however, that no collective solution for the conflicts would be possible if it was based on the “quicksands” of power and violence or on the freezing of certain situations. “For the States, national security corresponds to the preservation of peace”. Security is a previous requirement for the existence and the development of the States and, consequently, for the “normal” operation of the community of nations, which shall not be degraded to the condition of a community ruled by fear and intimidation.

Araújo Castro disapproved the measures towards “depoliticizing” the United Nations. His proposal was exactly the opposite of that process, since he insisted that a reform of the Charter will be necessary to accommodate the emergent world circumstances. In addition, he said that it must be based on refraining from

using or the threat of force, as well as of the political and military pressure. There must no longer be space for the existence of spheres of influence, deriving from the unbalance of power, of the arrangements confined to the closed doors negotiations carried out by the superpowers.

In his two speeches, Araújo Castro made explicit a lucid theory of peace, when he stated that:

- for the superpowers, engaged in the nuclear career, peace gradually started to be only the survival of the humanity and the absence of a nuclear outcome;
- for the medium and small countries, peace is much more than the opposite of war. It is a daily effort of understanding and creative behavior or, more simply, it means immunity from aggression, preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity. For those countries, any use of force, outside terms of the Charter, is against the peace.

SPEECH AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICAN *APARTHEID*, IN 1970

As another example of performance that stood out in burning issues that shook the world order, recall the speech made in 1970, before the 25th ordinary session of the General Assembly, in which Araújo Castro qualified *apartheid*, for the first time in the history of the Brazilian diplomacy, as a crime against the humanity. Thus, that crime could be compared to those that the Nazi committed during World War and it could lead to international responsibility.

Thus, he revealed not only the needs of the moment, but also deeper dimensions. The first of these, the moral need to fight, on behalf of the humanity, racial prejudice, segregation and injustice,

wherever they are located, and to prevent that evil thrives, as well as that harmful and anti-human practices may consolidate in some way.

Aware of the racial complexity of our country, Araújo Castro was concerned about the interface of the Brazilian diplomacy with its own ethnic panorama. In that context, he claimed that *apartheid* could not be left to be forgotten, since it was a direct aggression to the Brazilian experience, to our desires and to the mode of organization of our society. That dimension had to do, specifically, with the African policy of Brazil and our parliamentary position in the United Nations.

As in other episodes, Araújo Castro made diplomacy with braveness, in face of an issue that was emotional to the international public opinion and affected established interests. “The cruel nature of *apartheid* justified considering it a crime against the humanity”. Only much later, after three decades and after so many changes in the international relations that theme started to leave, thanks to the task carried out by the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation of South Africa itself, the agenda of the moral concerns of the humanity.

Without favor, that speech was an important parliamentary achievement, a victory, thanks to the understanding that the Brazilian delegation was able to forge among the Latin American countries and those of Africa and Asia, a victory against the direct Western opposition. The speech against *apartheid* resulted from a deep research that dissected the racist behavior of the South African authorities of that time.

Besides rejecting insinuations about an undesired partnership relation or a Brazilian alliance with South Africa, Araújo Castro aligned different South African legal devices of racist content, such as the institutionalization of the massive inequality based

on racist criteria, the field of the fundamental rights of man, the use of brutal force and racial discrimination, the denial of the basic unity of the human species, which went against the spirit of time, when it reduced the blacks to a situation inferior to the human condition; of the confinement of the non-white African population in impoverished “reserves”; of systematic exploitation of labor, of the systematic denial of the access to the benefits of the development; of the reduction to the condition of labor mass; without the right to property and education; the total absence of control over its own job; and, finally, when it violates the right of the peoples to the self-determination. He culminated his speech when he stated that those facts, reported in a cold and unpassionate way, “make up the integral violation of the aspirations of the non-white population of South Africa, which is a crime against humanity”.

FINAL COMMENT

Araújo Castro expressed, in all the themes studied, a way to face the human adventure, an analysis of the international relations and a doctrine of Brazilian foreign policy, attention levels that interact in a creative manner. He rejected the tendency to consider the foreign policy as a serial reaction to external events more or less topical, separate and, to some extent, impossible to understand. He sought to integrate those events from a specifically Brazilian perspective, as well as of a global view of the movement and the fate of the international relations.

He understood that, alone, neither of those two currents is enough to formulate the foreign policy. For that reason, he systematically compared them and submitted them to the filter of the humanistic ethics. He was concerned about the international

profile of Brazil in a world threatened by insecurity and violence, the arms race and hunger.

Araújo Castro taught that, in practice, it is possible to imagine original foreign policy solutions that, by reflecting, in terms of sovereignty and development, the needs of Brazil and other countries, enrich the worldview and the understanding of the major problems that humanity lived. He represented a new, modern and democratic Brazil. He was concerned that the international profile of Brazil showed what we actually are, as culture, and what we want to be, both as a country and as a society. He was against clichés, trivialities and mannerisms, which showed values and behaviors against our realities and, sometimes, against our interests.

His key view has to do with freedom, which he defined as the major goal of the political activity, when he stated that nothing will be gained, if the freedom to live, to think and to act cannot be ensured – that having been said in a Brazilian moment when the political struggle was being radicalized.

He distrusted the import of political models. He considered the foreign experience an important reference, but he used it only as part of the material available to build the set of his ideas. He rejected mimicry and copy in the sphere of diplomacy, as well as in the broader political and ideological universe.

He did not feel inferior because he was Brazilian, which had been a very common attitude in the past and that still has traces nowadays. Although he was fiercely patriotic, he did not see Brazil as a country better than the others, but he also rejected that the nation could only learn and that it had nothing to teach. He faced the world with a cold and attentive view and clear critical willingness, without fascinations.

BRIEF NOTE ON ARAÚJO CASTRO'S IRONY

Even today, in the corridors and dispatches of Itamaraty, certain observations by Araújo Castro are used to clarify certain arguments. Not only his comments on interpersonal relations, but also those on the evolution of international politics itself have a fine irony.

Everyone called him simply "Araújo Castro." In Washington, he had fun when some American peer, trying to be intimate, called him "João." So he used to tell us, with a naughty smile: "imagine that, even Miriam (his wife) calls me Araújo Castro."

In the conclusion of the 24th Session of the General Assembly, when he spoke on behalf of the Latin American and Caribbean Group, he thanked the Norwegian president of that Session, who was very strict and had importuned many people with punctuality and, aware of other ironies, he proposed that it should be considered the possibility to grant him an imaginary Patek Philippe Peace Award. Neither did the Norwegian like the idea, nor did Araújo Castro's proposal appear in the "verbatim records" of the session.

The ability to see the many sides of a same situation, and the willingness to laugh from some of them, often gave a sense of reality to the ambitious hypotheses for the building of a fairer order and of a better life he articulated. His irony was not focused on skepticism or in the softened form of Nihilism, but on a permanent self-discipline that submitted the evolution of his thought to the determinants of the reality. On the other hand, it was not about mere conformism, since he consistently attacked those determinants when he revealed its meaning of oppression of the potentialities of man and domination of the international life.

Thus, for example, he fustigated the irony that the United Nations devoted itself to the maintenance of the peace when its Charter reflected the power distribution that resulted from World

War II. He saw a deeper irony in the fact that the international community was already organized for the maintenance of the peace, without, at the same time, predicting a distributive justice system among the nations, when, ultimately, peace depends on justice and not simply on power relationships.

Another fine observation had to do with the negotiations of the disarmament, which he described as an issue of power and, consequently, as one of the issues that, traditionally, have been solved by the use of power itself. Irony served as a starting point for him to deepen the analysis and as a tool to reach perfectly realist syntheses. He was a remarkable diplomat, who marked his time and who still enriches those who plunge into his diplomatic thought.

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Graduated in Philosophy from the N. S. Medianeira College of Philosophy, Science and Letters (1971) and holds a PhD in Philosophy and History from the Universitaet Muenchen (Ludwig-Maximilian) (1976). A professor (since 1977) and full professor (since 2008) of the University of Brasília. Completed Post-PhDs in Theory and Philosophy of History and in History of the Ideas in Germany, Austria and France. He works with the following themes: theory and methodology of history, political and institutional history of Brazil, historical culture, contemporary history (Europe, European Union and international relations) and political history (Brazil, Western Europe and international relations).

**EIITI SATO**

Master in International Relations from Cambridge University and PhD in Sociology from the University of São Paulo. He is a professor of International Relations of the University of Brasília since 1983, where he has been teaching and researching on international political economics, Brazilian foreign policy and theory and history of international relations. He was the President of the Brazilian Association of International Relations (2005-2007) and Director of the Institute of International Relations (2006-2014). In addition to articles on his themes of interest, he published in 2012 the book *Economia e Política das Relações Internacionais*. He was a consultant for the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs and one of the editors of the collection *Clássicos IPRI* with classical works by authors considered key for the study of international relations.



EUGÊNIO VARGAS GARCIA

A Ph.D. in History of International Relations from the University of Brasília and a diplomat. He was born in 1967, in Niterói-RJ. He graduated as a Bachelor in International Relations from the University of Brasília in 1991 and he later concluded his graduate course in the same university. He entered the diplomatic career and served in the embassies in London, Mexico City and in the Brazilian Mission to the United Nations, in New York. He worked in the Secretariat of Diplomatic Planning of the Itamaraty and was an assistant in the Chancellor's Office from 2005 to 2009, besides being a Full Professor of the Rio Branco Institute. He was an Associate Visiting Researcher at the Center of Brazilian Studies of Oxford University in 1999-2000 and a Professor of Socioeconomic History of Brazil at the Center of Latin American Studies from the School of Philosophy and Letters of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in 2004-2005. In addition to articles in specialized journals, he published the following books: *O Sexto Membro Permanente: o Brasil e a Criação da ONU*; *Diplomacia Brasileira e Política Externa – Documentos Históricos, 1493-2008*; *Entre América e Europa: A Política Externa Brasileira na Década de 1920*;

Cronologia das Relações Internacionais do Brasil; and *O Brasil e a Liga das Nações (1919-1926): Vencer ou Não Perder*. He is currently a minister counsellor in the Brazilian Embassy in Asunción.



FRANCISCO FERNANDO MONTEOLIVA DORATIOTO

Bachelor and licensed in History and Social Sciences from the University of São Paulo and Master and PhD in History from the University of Brasília. He wrote books and articles on the history of Brazilian foreign policy and Brazilian military history. He is a Professor in undergraduate and graduate courses of the History Department from the University of Brasília, and teaches History of Brazilian International Relations at the Rio Branco Institute. He is a correspondent member of the *Academia Nacional de la Historia* (Argentina); the *Academia Paraguaya de la Historia*; the Military Geographical and Historical Institute of Brazil and the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute.

**GABRIELA NUNES FERREIRA**

Professor of Political Science at the School of Philosophy, Letters and Human Science of the Federal University of São Paulo (Unifesp), researcher and treasury director of the Center for Studies of Contemporary Culture (Cedec). Bachelor in Social Science from the University of São Paulo, she is a master and Ph.D. in Political Science from the same university. She wrote *Centralização e Descentralização no Império: O Debate Entre Tavares Bastos e Visconde de Uruguai* (São Paulo, Editora 34, 1999) and *O Rio da Prata e a Consolidação do Estado Imperial* (São Paulo, Hucitec, 2006). She organized the volumes *Os Juristas na Formação do Estado-Nação Brasileiro* (São Paulo, Editora Saraiva, 2010) and *Revisão do Pensamento Conservador: Ideias e Política no Brasil* (São Paulo, Hucitec, 2010), and published various articles in the fields of political theory and Brazilian political thought.



GELSON FONSECA

A career diplomat. He was President of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation – FUNAG (1992-1995), Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations (1999-2003), Ambassador in Santiago (2003-2006) and General Consul in Madrid (2006-2009). He wrote *A Legitimidade e Outras Questões Internacionais* (Paz e Terra, 1998), *O Interesse e a Regra: Ensaaios Sobre o Multilateralismo* (Paz e Terra, 2008) and various articles on Brazilian foreign policy and international relations.



GUILHERME FRAZÃO CONDURU

A diplomat graduated in History from the Federal Fluminense University, in 1983. He attended the Rio Branco Institute between 1994 and 1995. He is a Master in History from the University of Brasília, in 1998, when he defended the dissertation “A Política Externa de Rio Branco e os Tratados do ABC”. He was a Visiting Researcher of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Center for Brazilian Studies at Oxford University during the academic year 2000-2001, when he submitted the essay “Os Acordos de Roboré: Estudo de Caso do Processo Decisório da Política Externa de Juscelino Kubitschek”. In Brazil he worked in the Division of Archive and Documentation, in the Special Advisory of Federative and Parliamentary Relations and in the General Coordination of Cultural Exchange and Sport Cooperation. He was an assistant professor of International Relations of Brazil in the Rio Branco Institute in 1999/2000 and in 2008/2009. He served in the Embassy in London and in the General Consulate in Montevideo and Buenos Aires. The *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* published his article “O Subsistema Americano, Rio Branco e o ABC” (vol. 41/2, 1998) and the *Revista Estudos Históricos*, “Cronologia e História Oficial: A Galeria Amoedo do Itamaraty” (vol. 23, n. 46, 2010). FUNAG published in the book *O Barão do Rio Branco: 100 Anos de Memória*, of 2012, his article “Rio Branco, Patrimônio e

História: A Cronologia na Galeria Amoedo do Itamaraty” and, in 2013, his thesis for the Course of High Studies from the Rio Branco Institute: “O Museu Histórico e Diplomático do Itamaraty: História e Revitalização”.

**HELDER GORDIM DA SILVEIRA**

An Assistant Professor of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUC-RS) since 1990, has been working in the Department of History and was the coordinator of the Graduation Program of History. He was born in São Borja, Rio Grande do Sul, on February 15th, 1963. He graduated from Colégio São Pedro in 1979, a high school of the Marista friars in Porto Alegre. He made his Higher Studies at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) and at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), obtaining the degree of Licensed in History (1985) from the former, and Bachelor in Legal and Social Science from the latter (1998). In his graduate studies, he became a Master (1990) and Ph.D. (2000) in History of the Iberian and American Societies, from PUCRS. The core theme of his research work is foreign policy and the international relations of Brazil within the American system throughout the 20th century, by focusing in specific studies and publications, the political relations between Brazil and Argentina and the forms of ideological legitimation of the regional and hemispherical insertion of the country, in the press and scholars. He worked professionally as an elementary and high school teacher in the public education system of Rio Grande do Sul State and in the town of Porto Alegre, between 1984 and 2002.



JOÃO ALFREDO DOS ANJOS

A diplomat from Pernambuco, he has graduated in Law from the Law School of Recife and is a Master in History from the Federal University of Pernambuco.

**JOÃO HERMES PEREIRA DE ARAÚJO**

Director of the Historical and Diplomatic Museum of Itamaraty (1992-2005). He was born in Rio de Janeiro, on March 30th, 1926. Son of Walter Pereira de Araújo and Maria da Glória da Fonseca Hermes Pereira de Araújo. Bachelor in Law from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-RJ). He attended the course of Rio Branco Institute and was Third-Class Consul, in 1951. Promoted by merits to Second Secretary, in 1956; to First Secretary, in 1965; to Counsellor in 1967; to Second-Class Minister, in 1971; and to First-Class Minister, in 1976. He was the head of many divisions of Itamaraty, between 1975 and 1981, Head of the Americas Department, between 1975 and 1981. Third and Second Secretary in the Vatican (1954-1960), First Secretary and Counsellor in Buenos Aires (1964-1967). Ambassador in Bogotá (1981-1983), Buenos Aires (1984-1987), and Paris (1988-1991).



JOSÉ VICENTE DE SÁ PIMENTEL

He graduated in Law from the University of Brasília and served in the Embassies in Washington, Santiago, Paris, Guatemala, New Delhi and Pretoria. He was General Consul in Rome and Los Angeles. He was an Assistant Secretary of the State Minister; Special Assistant to the Undersecretariat General for Political and Economic Planning; Head of the Secretariats of Press and Diplomatic Planning; General Director of the Department for Africa and the Middle East. Thesis for the Course of High Studies from Rio Branco Institute: “François Mitterrand e os Países em Desenvolvimento: O Dito, e o Feito”. Among others, he published the following works, *Relações Entre Brasil e a África Subsaariana* and *O Padrão de Votação Brasileiro na ONU e a Questão do Oriente Médio*. He was the Director of the Institute for Research on International Relations (2011/2012) and former President of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation.



KASSIUS DINIZ DA SILVA PONTES

He is a diplomat and the author of *Euclides da Cunha, o Itamaraty e a Amazônia* (FUNAG, 2005). He is a Bachelor and Master of Law from the University of Brasília (UnB) and Master in Diplomacy from the Rio Branco Institute (IRBr).



LUÍS CLÁUDIO VILLAFAÑE G. SANTOS

He is a diplomat, historian, Ph.D. and Master in History from the University of Brasília. He took postgraduate studies in Political Science at New York University. He wrote several books on the history of Brazilian foreign policy, among them, *O Império e as Repúblicas do Pacífico* (UFPR, 2002), *O Dia em que Adiaram o Carnaval* (UNESP, 2010) and *O Evangelho do Barão* (UNESP, 2012).



LUIZ FELIPE DE SEIXAS CORRÊA

Ambassador. General Consul of Brazil in New York. He started his diplomatic career in 1965, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was the Brazilian Ambassador to Mexico, Spain, Argentina, Germany and the Vatican. He was the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the World Trade Organization and to the United Nations, in Geneva. In Brazil, he was Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs twice (1991 and 1999-2001). He taught International Relations and Diplomatic History of Brazil at the Rio Branco Institute and he is a member of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute since 1993. He published several books and articles on Diplomacy, International Relations and History.



PAULO ROBERTO DE ALMEIDA

Ph.D. in Social Science (University of Brussels, 1984), Master in Economic Planning (University of Antwerp, 1977), a career diplomat since 1977. Professor in the Master and Ph.D. programs in Law from Uniceub - University Center of Brasilia. Minister-Counsellor of the Embassy in Washington (1999-2003), head of the Division of Financial Policy and Development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1996-1999), economic counsellor in Paris (1993-1995) and alternate representative in the Delegation to ALADI (1990-1992). Selection of books: *Integração Regional: Uma Introdução* (2013); *Relações Internacionais e Política Externa do Brasil* (2012); *Globalizando: Ensaio Sobre a Globalização e a Antiglobalização* (2011); *O Estudo das Relações Internacionais do Brasil* (2006); *Formação da Diplomacia Econômica no Brasil: As Relações Econômicas Internacionais no Império* (2001; 2005); *Os Primeiros Anos do Século XXI: O Brasil e as Relações Internacionais Contemporâneas* (2002); *O Brasil e o Multilateralismo Econômico* (1999). Website: www.pralmeida.org.

**PAULO FAGUNDES VISENTINI**

Full Professor of International Relations of Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul - UFRGS. He was born in Porto Alegre, in 1955. Graduated in History and Master in Political Science from UFRGS, Ph.D. in Economic History from University of São Paulo - USP - and Post-Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics. He was a Visiting Professor in the University of Leiden/Netherlands, in NUPRI/USP and in the University of Cape Verde. He was the Director of the Latin American Institute of Advanced Studies, Coordinator of the Brazilian Nucleus of Strategy and International Relations and, he is currently the Director of CEBRAFRICA and of the Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies of UFRGS. Researcher level 1B of CNPq. He wrote several works, among which were *A Política Externa do Regime Militar Brasileiro*, *As Relações Diplomáticas da Ásia* and *A África e as Potências Emergentes*.



ROGÉRIO DE SOUZA FARIAS

Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Brasília (2012), he worked in Brazil's Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX), in 2005, and at the Ministry of the Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), in 2009 and 2010, as an Expert in Public Policies and Governmental Management of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MPOG). He published, in 2009, the book *O Brasil e o GATT: Unidades Decisórias e Política Externa*. His thesis "Industriais, Economistas e Diplomatas: O Brasil e o Sistema Multilateral de Comércio (1946-1993)" got Honorable Mention in the CAPES Award of Theses in the major field of Political and International Science in 2013, having been chosen the best one in the subfield of international relations.




RONALDO MOTA SARDENBERG

Brazilian diplomat. He graduated from the National Law School – University of Brazil (RJ), in 1963. He passed the exam of the Rio Branco Institute (IRBr), in 1964, and was promoted to First-Class Minister in 1983. He served as Ambassador of Brazil in Moscow and Madrid. He was twice the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations (ONU), in Nova York. He was the head, in 1993-94 and 2004-05 biennia, of the Brazilian Delegation to the UN Security Council. He served as Head of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic, in charge of the nuclear and space-related policies; the themes of the Sipam/Sivam Project; the research on the security of communications; the 2020 Brazil Project; and the Calha Norte Program (PCN). He was Minister of Science and Technology, from July 1999 to 2002, in charge of achievements of the presidency of the National Conference of Science, Technology and Innovation; launching and institutionalization of the Sectorial Funds for Scientific and Technological Development; creation of the Center of Management and Strategic Studies (CGEE); the National Programs of Information Society; Elementary Industrial Technology and the Technological Services for Innovation and Competitiveness, Science and Technology for Social Development. He was also in charge of structuring the international cooperation of the Ministry

of Science and Technology, the nuclear and space-related policies, and headed the Inter-ministerial Commission on Global Climate Change.

**RUBENS RICUPERO**

A career diplomat, born in São Paulo (March 1st, 1937), Rubens Ricupero retired after being the Ambassador of Brazil in Geneva, Washington and Roma. He was Minister of the Environment and the Amazon, as well as Minister of Finance of Brazil, when he was in charge of launching the new Brazilian currency, the Real, in 1994. Between 1995 and 2004, by election from the UN General Assembly, he headed, as Secretary-General, the Conference of the United Nations on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in Geneva. He is currently the Director of the School of Economics and International Relations at the Armando Álvares Penteado Foundation (FAAP), in São Paulo. He taught History of the Brazilian Diplomatic Relations at Rio Branco Institute and Theory of International Affairs at University of Brasília. He wrote several books and essays on diplomatic history, including two biographical studies of the Baron of Rio Branco, in addition to works on international relations, economic development and world trade.



SAMUEL PINHEIRO GUIMARÃES NETO

A Bachelor of Law, from the National Law School (1963); Third Secretary of the Diplomatic Career, Rio Branco Institute (1963); Director of the Advisory Board for International Cooperation of Sudene (1964); Head of the Technical Service of Analysis and Planning of Itamaraty (1967); Master in Economics from Boston University (1969); Economist at Serete S.A Engenharia (1972); Professor of International Trade at the University of Brasília (1977); Professor of Microeconomics at the Rio Branco Institute (1978); Vice-President of the Brazilian Films Company (Embrafilme) (1979); Promoted to Second-Class Minister, by merit (1986); Head of the Economic Department of Itamaraty (1988); Promoted to First-Class Minister (1994); Director of the Institute for Research on International Relations of Itamaraty (1995); Professor at the Course of Master of Law at Rio de Janeiro State University (1997); the author of *Quinhentos Anos de Periferia*, Contraponto Editora (1999); General Secretary for Foreign Affairs (2003); *Desafios Brasileiros na Era dos Gigantes*, Contraponto Editora (2006); Scholar of the Year of 2006, by the Brazilian Union of Writers, Juca Pato Award winner (2007); Professor at the Rio Branco Institute (2008); Doctor *Honoris Causa* from the Integrated Colleges of Brazil (UniBrasil) (2009); Minister of State, Secretary for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic (2009);

Doctor *Honoris Causa* from Cândido Mendes University (2010); Doctor *Honoris Causa* from the National University of Rosario, Argentina (2010); High General Representative of Mercosur (2010 - 06/2012).



SÉRGIO EDUARDO MOREIRA LIMA

A career diplomat, with a degree in Law from the Rio de Janeiro State University, a Master's in International Law from the University of Oslo and a High Studies diploma from the Rio Branco Institute. He is a licensed member of the Order of Attorneys of Brazil. He served in the Brazilian Mission to the UN and at the Embassies in Washington, Lisbon, London, Tel Aviv (cumulative with Ramallah), Oslo and Budapest. He was President of the Governing Council of the UN Common Fund for Commodities (the Hague). He was Secretary for Internal Control and Director of the Institute of Research on International Relations. In 2014, he was appointed President of Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation. His publications include *A Time for Change; The Expanding Powers of the UN – Security Council and the Rule of Law in International Relations; A Reflection on the Universality of Human Rights – Democracy and the Rule of Law in International Relations*. He presented and organized the Spanish and English versions of *Brazilian Diplomatic Thought – Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy / 1750-1964*. He received the Grand Cross of the Order of Rio Branco, the French, Norwegian and Hungarian Orders of Merit, the Portuguese Order of Christ and the British Royal Victorian Order.

**STANLEY HILTON**

He was born in 1940 and concluded High School in Long Beach, California, in 1957. He graduated in Spanish from California State University (Long Beach), in 1962. During his master's course in History at the University of Texas (Austin), he studied with Professor José Honório Rodrigues, who had a major influence on his decision to focus his research on Brazilian History. He completed his master's in 1964 and his Ph.D. from the same university in 1969. He taught at Williams College (State of Massachusetts) during 1969-1972, and CAPES hired him for the biennium 1972-1974 so that he could collaborate in the organization of the master's course at the Federal Fluminense University. In August 1974, he became a Professor of Latin-American History at Louisiana State University (LSU), remaining there until he retired, in December 2012. Since the 1980's, his intellectual interest gradually evolved towards Military History. He was a Visiting Professor in the History Department at the United States Air Force Academy, in 1980-1981 and at the Air War College, in 1989-1990. During 1998-2012, he headed a master's course of Military History at LSU. He wrote several books, both in English and in Portuguese, among which are *Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939*; *Hitler's Secret War in South America*; *A Guerra Civil Brasileira: História da Revolução Constitucionalista*

de 1932; Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917-1947; and Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia. He has received the Order of Rio Branco.

**SYNESIO SAMPAIO GOES FILHO**

Diplomat, (1967-2010), born in Itu, São Paulo, on June 13th, 1939. He graduated in Law from University of São Paulo, 1960-1964. At Itamaraty, he was Head of the Protocol, Inspector of Foreign Service, Chief of Cabinet of Chancellors Celso Lafer and Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Abroad, he was Minister in London, Consul in Milan, Ambassador in Bogotá, Lisbon and Brussels.

Former Professor of Diplomatic History at the Rio Branco Institute and International Trade at Armando Alvares Penteado Foundation (FAAP). As far as Brazilian themes are concerned, in addition to chapters in collective works, he has written articles in the journal of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute, of which he is a member, and in “Política Externa” journal of the University of São Paulo. In 1999, he published *Navegantes, Bandeirantes, Diplomatas* (Martins Fontes) and, in 2013, *As Fronteiras do Brasil* (FUNAG) and *A Bela Viagem – Frases Para Pensar* (Migalhas).



TEREZA CRISTINA NASCIMENTO FRANÇA

Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Brasília, Master in History from the Rio de Janeiro State University (2000), graduated and licensed in History from the same university (1996). She was born in Rio de Janeiro, on May 1st, 1967. Tereza Cristina Nascimento França is currently a Professor of the Nucleus of International Relations (NURI) at the Federal University of Sergipe.









Formato	15,5 x 22,5 cm
Mancha gráfica	10,9 x 17 cm
Papel	pólen soft 80g (miolo), cartão supremo 250g (capa)
Fontes	Electra LH 17, Chaparral 13 (títulos); Chaparral Pro 11,5 (textos)