



BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT

Polymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy

(1750-1964)

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José Vicente de Sá Pimentel
editor

BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT

Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy
(1750-1964)

Volume I



Brasília – 2016

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Printed in Brazil

Originally published as *Pensamento Diplomático Brasileiro – Formuladores e Agentes da Política Externa (1750-1964)*

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Map of the front cover:

Designed under Alexandre de Gusmão's guidance, the so-called "Mapa das Cortes" served as the basis of the negotiations of the Treaty of Madrid (1750).

Map of the back cover:

World-map made by the Venitian Jeronimo Marini in 1512, the first one to insert the name Brazil in it. It is also unique in placing the Southern Hemisphere at the top.

Printed in Brazil 2016

B827

Brazilian diplomatic thought : policymakers and agents of foreign policy (1750-1964) / José Vicente de Sá Pimentel (editor); Rodrigo Sardenberg, Paul Sekscenski (translation). - Brasília: FUNAG, 2016.

3 v. - (História diplomática)

Título original: *Pensamento diplomático brasileiro: formuladores e agentes da política externa.*

ISBN 978-85-7631-547-6

1. Diplomata 2. Diplomacia brasileira. 3. Política externa - história - Brasil.
4. História diplomática - Brasil. I. Pimentel, Vicente de Sá. II. Série.

CDD 327.2

Depósito Legal na Fundação Biblioteca Nacional conforme Lei n° 10.994, de 14/12/2004.

FOREWORD TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

In 2013, the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (Funag), a think tank linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, convened a group of historians, international relations scholars, and diplomats, to discuss the formation of ideas and concepts throughout the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy. As a result of these meetings of highly respected intellectuals, the conclusion was reached that Brazilian diplomacy has historically developed its own patterns of thought in support of its actions. The promoters of the initiative endeavored to inspire further research and debate in order to advance and deepen the analysis of this broad and enriching field of study.

“Brazilian Diplomatic Thought – Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy (1750-1964)” constitutes the outcome of Funag’s pioneering project of promoting public debate in the area. This three-volume publication identifies and analyzes the underlying concepts of Brazilian diplomacy since its inception – even before the independence of the country in 1822 – up to the year 1964.

The work highlights the contributions of remarkable personalities who distinguished themselves in this conceptual elaboration. It also discusses the contexts in which core values and interests guided Brazil's diplomatic actions during the period in question and beyond.

Until recently, the available bibliography on this subject was limited. It even lacked an answer to the fundamental question: "Is there a Brazilian diplomatic thought?" And then, if one answers that question positively, "What are the foundations upon which Brazilian diplomatic thought was built, and what are its main features?" Additionally, one can ask: "What was the genesis of this thought, and where can one find the sources to document its evolution?" Then finally, "Who were the outstanding figures responsible for its formulation and implementation?"

Given the importance of Brazil's regional standing and its global projection, this exploratory effort in the nation's diplomatic history is of equal interest to researchers and scholars abroad. The English and Spanish editions of this collection are, therefore, justified by making the findings accessible to a larger segment of the public.

This scholarly work underscores the central role of diplomacy in the process of building the Brazilian nation-state. It also reveals how diplomacy helped to preserve the integrity of a land with continental dimensions, and peacefully settle the country's borders with ten neighboring countries – among which were two European powers. The challenges of maintaining unity against a background of domestic ethnic and cultural diversity – in addition to external forces of fragmentation – were gradually overcome, and a common identity was forged. In a world in which nationalism and ethnicity, even today, make the concept of identity hard to achieve and sustain, this narrative on the construction of Brazil and the role played by its diplomats and statesmen will be of great interest to audiences beyond the country's geographic borders.

Being acquainted with South American history, one can better gauge the contribution of Brazilian diplomacy to establish long-lasting conditions for peace in the region. Geopolitical factors in South America make this continent one of the few areas in the world without serious interstate conflicts. This is not, however, an accident. In contrast to what happened in North America, much of it derives from the patterns Brazil established through the peaceful settlement of its borders based on international law principles negotiated bilaterally or through international arbitration. Such conditions were not the result of fortuitous circumstances; nor did they occur by chance. Rather, they were created by diplomatic effort and initiative, which consolidated a regional paradigm of foreign policy.¹

This three-volume collection should serve as a stimulus to further research on the evolution of Brazil's foreign policy principles, traditions and practices in order to promote knowledge on how South American rivalry, conflict and instability transitioned into confidence-building measures and, ultimately, an environment of international peace, cooperation and stability.

The role of diplomacy in Brazilian history and the making of its identity are of such importance that one of the greatest heroes of the nation was a career diplomat, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, also known as the Baron of Rio Branco. Inspired by good neighborliness and a commitment to international law, Rio Branco's successful negotiations of border issues established not only the final shape of Brazil's territory, but also a regional and hemispheric standard, with positive consequences for the international community as they enhanced principles and values, contributing to the consolidation of diplomacy, *jus gentium*, and the rule of law.

¹ Examples of Brazil's *soft power* are frequent in this work; they shape the narrative and characterize the country's foreign policy. Although less conspicuous, cases in which *hard power* was used also play an important role. Brazil was, for example, the only country in Latin America to have participated in the two World Wars. In the Second World War, it was, again, the only Latin American nation to have fought in the European military theater.

In contrast to the fragmentation of Hispanic America, territorial integrity and the integration of diverse regions were challenging symbols of nation building in both the Imperial and Republican eras of Brazil. The dual processes of ensuring national unity through integrity and integration included elements of political, legal and diplomatic judgment, which were gradually formulated and established as a historical paradigm by diplomats and political leaders alike.

There are always methodological difficulties in the elaboration of a project such as this one. We readily acknowledge, for example, that the selected figures do not exhaust all foreign-policy makers and agents who contributed to the realization of the principles and ideas that represent Brazilian diplomatic thought. One aim of this initiative is to inspire others to improve and complete the narrative, in both its temporal dimension – beyond 1964 – and its geographic scope. The chapters in these three volumes could be enhanced by the inclusion of new research conducted by scholars, both Brazilian and foreign.

This edition is a valuable input on the subject matter; a further step towards meeting the growing demand for publications in English on Funag's digital library webpage. The success of this initiative – launched originally in Portuguese, in 2013 - is largely due to the authors' vast knowledge on the subject. What the readers have before their eyes is a contribution to the knowledge and the study of Brazilian diplomacy – its founders, circumstances, and ideas – all part of the history of the Americas.

Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima

President of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation

PREFACE

What is Brazilian diplomacy good for? What does a diplomat do? Throughout my career, I have often heard those questions and thought that Itamaraty could make more of an effort to ensure that the answers reach as many citizens as possible.

There would be good reasons to make such an effort. First of all, Brazil is one of the countries that has benefitted the most from its diplomacy. After all, we have more than 16,000 kilometers of borders with ten neighbor countries, which have had and still have serious disputes among themselves, but with which we live peacefully, without any war since 1870. That is no small feat. The Brazilian continental dimensions were established by negotiations, thus avoiding regional resentments that can be re-heated by opportunistic leaders and trigger stressful backlog. Moreover, even today, in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, national interests and the very image that we project are continuously marked and defended in international

fora by diplomats or other agents responsible for *ad hoc* diplomatic tasks.

Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (Funag) is co-responsible for that effort, since its main mission is to divulge foreign policy and to encourage dialogue with scholars and other opinion makers.

This book is Funag's attempt to address issues relating to the significance of Brazilian diplomacy through chronologically linked analyses based on the contribution of individuals whose legacies deserve to be recalled, discussed and, if applicable, revered.

Historically, the debate concerning the prevalence of the individual and ideas is both long and rich. The circumstances and the character of society have undeniable importance, but it seems doubtless that, when there are alternatives, individual choices have a powerful impact on the course of history.

Being acquainted with these outstanding personalities and their biographical journeys would be a valuable teaching tool. The image and the example of remarkable figures, to whom the readers may relate – or not – makes it easier to understand the historical facts and how the alternatives at stake are linked to one another.

The public *par excellence* of Funag is university students, professors, researchers and others interested in quality debates on the motivations, challenges and achievements of Brazilian diplomacy. The ambition of this book is to become a reference for that public. It intends to offer a starting point for debates on characters and circumstances of the diplomatic evolution that impacted Brazilian foreign projection and influenced the perception that Brazilians have of themselves and, in turn, the view foreigners began to have about us.

Some people might find a shortcoming in the title of the book. After all, it is not only about *thought*, since the political agents stand out for the actions and not necessarily for the reflections that

they leave in writing; it is not only *diplomatic*, since the characters often seek inspiration in legal principles or in military theories, for example; it is also not only *Brazilian*, given the foreign origin of many of the ideas that have borne fruit here. In his introductory note to this volume, Paulo Roberto de Almeida exhausts that matter with remarkable expertise.

Nevertheless, what must be emphasized, and the title of the book does just that, is that the distinct diplomatic style of the Brazilian Chancellery has, to a great extent, been crystallized by contributions made by the characters depicted here. As such, we must remember their legacies – legacies that provide the foundations to deal with the increasingly complex conflicts that the current global environment presents to us. Similarly, we must preserve that style that has ensured the respect and won the confidence of our fellow negotiators in the international instances.

This project depended on the contribution of high-level intellectuals whose wisdom played a part in the design of the best work possible. Fortunately, they were available and became integrating members of an Editorial Board, or a scientific council that traced the execution lines of the project and defined the necessary methodology. They also helped to choose the characters who they felt best illustrated the history of diplomatic thought, and then sought out the scholars and diplomats (for the idea was to engage both) who would be in charge of writing the essays. A further landmark of Funag was that the scholarly authors were not centered only in the Brasília-São Paulo-Rio de Janeiro axis, but that they also came from other regions of the country.

I must emphasize the role played by Paulo Roberto de Almeida in assisting to compile the works. It was he who suggested names of possible members of the Editorial Board, organized the calendar of precursory meetings in which the periods that the book would

address were defined, and suggested the basic methodology to be followed. Once that took place, the Publishing Committee, coordinated by Paulo Roberto and made up of Guilherme Conduru, Francisco Doratioto, Antônio Carlos Lessa, Estevão Martins and Eiiti Sato, chose, in the course of several remarkable meetings, the 26 characters and the 26 authors of the following texts. I want to acknowledge the participation of each one of them in producing this work and my admiration for their intellectual brilliance, for their commitment to the project and for the humbleness of giving up personal preferences, embracing majority opinion and admitting that what was possible should prevail.

The first meeting of the Editorial Board that I presided took place on December 12th, 2011. At that occasion, we established the goal to launch the book at the National Conference of Foreign Affairs – CORE, Conferência Nacional das Relações Exteriores – when Funag meets with scholars from all over Brazil and that often marks the end of the Foundation’s public activities of that year. The 2013 CORE had been scheduled for November 11th and 12th, which stressed the need to have all the texts proofread, as well as their typography and layout arranged and sent to the printer’s by October. Time created difficulties, but, on the other hand, it provided a horizon for each one to complete their obligations.

The invitations were issued on January 7th, 2013. Almost all of those invited accepted the challenge to write close to twenty pages about characters to whom they had already devoted an extensive and fertile research. Some of them expressed a preference for characters other than those offered to them. Professor Stanley Hilton, for example, would have rather written about Oswaldo Aranha. In that case, however, I chose to honor a great diplomat and historian, João Hermes Pereira de Araújo, who wrote in 1996 a chapter of the book “Oswaldo Aranha, a estrela da revolução.” Once

again, Paulo Roberto de Almeida was kind enough to volunteer to sum up that work.

The scope of the project is to follow Brazilian diplomatic action since the Treaty of Madrid, which set the bases for the conformation of the national territory, until modern day. Given its extent, the current stage of the task ends in 1964, when the military coup began a period of political exception in Brazil, nourished instinctively in an international power configuration right after World War II and consolidated in what became known as the Cold War. The next step might be to continue the analysis until the restoration of democracy in Brazil, with the passing of the Constitution of 1988, one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the division of the world power into two blocks, led respectively by the USA and the USSR.

The characters depicted in this book stood out in unique historical periods and, thus, the work was divided into three major parts. Initially, the founding conceptions of the diplomatic thought are examined; in that first volume, the contributions made by Alexandre de Gusmão, José Bonifácio, Paulino Soares de Souza, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, Francisco Varnhagen, the Marquis of Paraná and by the Viscounts of Rio Branco and Cabo Frio are assessed. The second part is devoted to the First Republic and it includes analyses of the achievements made by Joaquim Nabuco, the Baron of Rio Branco, and also by Afrânio de Melo Franco, Rui Barbosa, Euclides da Cunha, Manoel de Oliveira Lima and Domício da Gama. The focus of the third volume is on the reform of the Brazilian State and the modernization of diplomacy, and the characters depicted are Oswaldo Aranha, Cyro de Freitas Valle, José Carlos de Macedo Soares, Admiral Álvaro Alberto, Edmundo Barbosa da Silva, Helio Jaguaribe, José Honório Rodrigues, Afonso Arinos, San Tiago Dantas, Augusto Frederico Schmidt and João Augusto de Araújo Castro.

It is obvious that all those figures do not have the same magnitude. Retrospectively, the diplomatic range of Rio Branco is undeniably above all others. It is enough to say that he was directly responsible for the increase of the national territory by almost 1 million square kilometers – one France and one Germany together! Rio Branco also had the visionary sensitivity to anticipate the need for a strategic partnership with the United States of America and to promote a Pan-American understanding that freed Brazil from wars and provided the conditions for the ongoing development of the country. His legacy is still a landmark for the performance of all his successors.

The chosen characters were also not the only ones to stand out in their respective periods. Others would also deserve to be studied and will certainly be in other works that this one intends to inspire. In order to make up for such an absence, an introductory assessment for each of the three periods was entrusted to three remarkable intellectuals. Those texts, written by Amado Cervo, Rubens Ricupero and Eiiti Sato, are the pillars of the book, which besides making the reading and the understanding of the historical evolution easier, help the chapters to fit alongside each other.

A project such as this one demands a certain formal homogeneity in the treatment of the characters. In our case, it was not a simple task. Just as when choosing the characters, the choice of authors also relied on somewhat arbitrary criteria, placing well known professors of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, traditional intellectual centers of Brazil, side by side with emerging talents from other regions. Different approaches on the characters' works were respected, but, a deadline was established upon invitation for the essayists to submit the first drafts of their texts, which were then shared with the other members of the project, with whom they exchanged opinions in a seminar organized by Funag, in Brasília, in July, 2013 – that is, half way to CORE.

There were basically two possible methodologies: either strict parameters had to be established in an effort to homogenize both the form and the substance of the work, or, conversely, allow for a greater amplitude so that authors may express their own ideas. The former, like the Anglo-Saxon scholarly search for patterns with certain constraints, in many cases actually helps both the writing and the reading of collective works. But there are certain things that do not work very well below the equator and, for that reason, we opted for an approach that loosened the creative reins of the authors. They were able to choose the approaches that seemed most adequate for them to their assessment of the characters. The basic criterion is their common sense. I start from the understanding that, within a few decades, the attentive readers that go through those pages will have as a bonus a sample of the authors' thought, a portrait of the Brazilian *intelligentsia* in 2013, providing an additional angle for researchers regarding the shades that mediate between the scientific strictness and the political views of each one.

Time was short and it placed an extra burden upon the shoulders of Funag's team. I am happy to see that they excelled themselves, were able to complete all the stages of the work and print it on schedule so as to present the work in the opening of CORE, carried out at the University of Vila Velha, on November 11th, 2013. For the sake of justice, I emphasize the merits and make public my gratitude for Funag's publishing team, led by Eliane Miranda.

Despite the devotion of my collaborators, there were some hiccups as a result of bureaucracy and other issues that delayed the presentation of some texts. This meant that some supplements that such a work should present had to be sacrificed.

I hope that the essays are, above all, useful for young diplomats and colleagues who will be in charge of keeping a light that has illuminated the characters depicted in these volumes. I also hope that they inspire new candidates to the Rio Branco Institute. To them, I wish successful careers, and hope that the examples of our greatests show that people make the difference.

José Vicente de Sá Pimentel

Brasília, November, 2013

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Amado Luiz Cervo

BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT:
METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE IDEAS
AND ACTIONS OF SOME OF ITS REPRESENTATIVES

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Historically, Brazilian diplomacy has its own set of ideas – its own patterns of thought – which support its actions. These patterns of thought include concepts such as: an undeniable adhesion to international law; the absence of the recourse to force, to resolve disputes among States; nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries; the observance of human rights; and a set of values unique to our civilizing heritage.

Whenever it was threatened, Brazil resorted to all the resources of international law – and, sometimes, to the power of its arms – to ensure its territorial integrity, its national sovereignty, or the honor and defense of its homeland. Thus, the country has relied on these ideas, this set of values and principles – this collection of thought – adapted to its specific needs, and to the circumstances that controlled the decision-making process of each challenge at hand.

Early challenges Brazil faced were often related to the definition of its boundaries, which were always set by negotiation since the country's independence in 1822. As history progressed,

the challenges also concerned matters, such as freedom of access in the Platine region; relations with the great European powers, and later, with the great hemispheric power; and the balance of powers in general. In addition, on the economic front, there were challenges related to the opening of markets for the country's products, as well as access to funding sources for its development, and an equitable participation in the definition and maintenance of the world order, working adequately towards multilateral cooperation.

The ideas and actions utilized by Brazil were those of its political leaders and rulers, its body of diplomatic professionals and, in general, its intellectuals and elites. Ideas and actions do not exist in the abstract. Rather, they are linked to people; to the intellectual roles of people in society; to their engagement in public affairs, their initiatives and the mobilizations of causes that go beyond the specific dimensions of their private lives and professional activities. In this manner, these people personify the State's interests.

Studies of intellectual history applied to foreign affairs are an acknowledged gap in the specialized bibliography of Brazil. *Brazilian Diplomatic Thought* represents a modest, though important, step towards filling that gap. It is probably the first attempt of its kind, in a field that will need to be explored in greater detail in the future. It is a precursor of more elaborate monographic studies; a general synthesis in this same historiographic category.

This kind of study has a special interest for professional diplomats. It is also of interest to anyone with a desire to know more about the formulation and implementation of Brazilian foreign affairs. Scholars, such as political scientists, who create templates for international relations, and historians, who deal with *a posteriori* interpretations, will find it particularly useful.

In this general introduction, we will examine the conceptual principles of this initiative of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (Funag). A simple proposal originally, the project was welcomed and immediately started to materialize through the efforts and support of Funag's then president, Ambassador José Vicente Pimentel, who deserves the credit for proceeding with it, even facing the well-known budget restrictions that always affect eminently-cultural projects in tough economic moments.

To begin our study, we will look at what justifies the association of these three independent terms – “Brazilian Diplomatic Thought,” two adjectives and one noun – which, when combined into a single intellectual unit, attempt to discover some identity of purpose in the long continuum of ideas and actions in Brazilian diplomacy and international politics over more than two centuries.

First of all, we should ask: are the terms – and the concepts they represent – the appropriate ones for this endeavor? Are they coherent, justified, and adequate, to attain the goals of the small group of scholars and diplomats that organized and debated the initial drafts of the project and decided to proceed at an unprecedented pace? We will separately analyze each of the elements that compose the title, as each requires an explanation.

BRAZILIAN

The first term in this English translation of the work's title – “Brazilian” – is, of course, an adjective, which qualifies a place of birth or nationality. Is it, therefore, our intention to say that the “diplomatic thought” discussed in this work is specifically from Brazil?

As previously stated, Brazilian diplomacy has always been guided by certain values and principles that were present in the

speeches and official decisions of its agents. Again, these principles include an absolute respect for the norms of international law; the peaceful solution of controversies; non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; an unyielding defense of the concept of national sovereignty; and bilateral and multilateral cooperation to the benefit of the harmonic development of all people. Is there, however, anything exclusively Brazilian in all of these elements? Are they not, after all, also shared by many other States? And just what does it mean to be “Brazilian”?

Alexandre de Gusmão, the figure who begins this series, was a diplomatic agent of the Portuguese Crown. Born in 1695, in Santos, Brazil – at the time a colony of Portugal – Gusmão acted on behalf of the interests of the metropolis. The territories he added to the “homeland” were, therefore, “pieces” of a Portuguese America, begun on a relatively limited strip of coastline, and then, by the actions of Portuguese explorers and the *bandeirantes* [early “Brazilian” explorers who went into the interior in search of minerals and slaves], expanded well beyond the Tordesillas line decreed by the famous treaty of 1494, and developed into the land that became the country of Brazil.

Hipólito da Costa, another Portuguese diplomat, was born in 1774 in the Colonia de Sacramento, currently a part of Uruguay, but then one of the “pieces” of Portuguese America. In London the year the Portuguese royal family moved to Brazil, 1808, da Costa, founded a newspaper, which after some thought, he called “Correio Braziliense,” explaining that the second word in his title – “Braziliense” – was chosen to distinguish those born in Portuguese America – such as himself – from those who merely traded in brazilwood – an important source of a red dye at the time, and the reason the name “Brazil” was given to the land. But when did Brazil, itself, begin?

Historian and diplomat Evaldo Cabral de Melo has stated that Brazil only emerged as a “homogeneous” entity, sometime after its independence from Portugal in 1822. Another historian and diplomat, Luís Cláudio Villafañe Gomes Santos, argues that a Brazilian national identity came about only with the creation of a national unit in administrative, political and economic terms, assisted by the geographic connection of the country through the extension of the telegraph into unknown and unexplored lands into the twentieth century. Indeed, as the writer, Euclides da Cunha, and explorer, Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon – both of whom worked on the telegraph-extension project – verified, there were Brazilians at the time who lived in such remote areas, that they did not even know they were Brazilians.

Not all the figures included in this work were born in Brazil. All, however, were or became “Brazilian” by their deep identity with the land, the territory, the State that is now recognized in geopolitical terms as being contemporary Brazil. All of them served on behalf of a Brazil that was being shaped – in the case of Gusmão, or José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, for example – or of a Brazil that would be realized in their lifetimes through diplomatic measures; that is, by instructing or by obeying instructions tied to a Secretariat, be it concerned mainly with foreign business matters, or eventually, with the entire gamut of foreign affairs. Such are the cases, for example, of Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, Paulino Soares de Souza, and Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, who participated in the building of the nation, after they had inherited an embryonic State threatened by regional fragmentation, and deeply marked by the Portuguese diplomatic traditions from which it had belatedly separated.

How does the term “Brazilian” relate to the concept of “Thought,” and more specifically, to the concept of “diplomatic thought”? Can a variety of it be identified as essentially Brazilian,

different, for example, from the general mixture of doctrines, legal principles, political and economic ideas, which are also developed in other nations?

In reality, none of the statesmen or thinkers of the Imperial or Republican eras represent an exclusive contribution to the stock of practical knowledge applied to diplomacy. The concept of *uti possidetis*, for example, used both intensively and extensively as one of the negotiating principles throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to consolidate the national borders, was a resource of Ancient Roman law used to regulate land occupations. And in the field of asymmetric relations – so well studied by Rubens Ricupero in his text about José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, the Baron of Rio Branco – the jurists and diplomats from Argentina were able to innovate in the field of international law with the Calvo Clause, concerning the exhaustion of internal resources, followed by the Drago Doctrine, which sought to apply the unilateralist Monroe Doctrine against foreign interventions in the Americas – even against Monroe’s homeland itself. Such kinds of “legal nationalism,” presented as a defense mechanism of the national jurisdiction before foreign interests, plus the previous defensive formula, against the decision of the powerful, were not taken into consideration by the counselors of the Brazilian Empire.

Brazilian politicians, professors and writers of treaties, members of the Imperial Council and tribunes of the Republic, were all experts in the best literature available at the time. They had all read the enlightenment philosophers and the theoreticians of the State and public administration. Men such as Paulino Soares de Souza applied the then emerging principles of administrative law and of laws specific to the needs of the Brazilian people. It cannot be said, however, that they created doctrines or a Brazilian thought with general validity or of theoretical permanence, at least not in such a way as to justify an exclusive qualifier of origin. Rui

Barbosa may have been the most theoretical of the formulators of Brazilian thought in international politics, yet even his “lessons” of diplomacy do not stray far from the main tenets of international law.

What Rui Barbosa demonstrated, however, was that law admits a single interpretation: that of the sovereign equality among all nations, not the *de facto* inequality that the powerful nations intended to see formally consecrated. This thought continued to be addressed in the speeches and declarations of Brazilian diplomacy, either in the League of Nations, as was clear in the actions of Afrânio de Melo Franco, or at the moment of the creation of the United Nations – mainly in the definition of the role of that entity’s Security Council. Even today, as the democratization of those aging structures is being debated, this Brazilian thought continues to be voiced.

All the figures selected for this volume – either Brazilian by birth or by option – thought and worked based on the stock of knowledge and practical experiences available to educated citizens of their respective times. They formulated suggestions for action based on their studies, their readings, and the observations they made from books and lessons learned in school. They also acquired much through living with other statesmen, magistrates, professors, diplomats or the military – others with whom they could discuss opinions and proposals, in order to determine those that were best for Brazil in the context of its regional and international relations. There was an extensive margin for the exercise of free will, but it is most likely that their decisions were based not on abstract considerations but, rather, upon reflecting on the best paths to take while facing concrete challenges.

Is the adjective “Brazilian” the result of a simple geographic accident? Is “diplomatic thought” a concept within the context

of a more general set of ideas and actions, which can be applied to Brazil, but also to the country's American neighbors, as well as to other national States in Europe and in Asia? In a certain way, the answer to both of these questions is, yes. The title of this book, therefore, could also be, "Diplomatic Thought in Brazil." I believe that the country has not innovated "lessons" of diplomacy or of international politics in an unprecedented way. Yet the set of "solutions" applied to its external, regional and international challenges, might be the foundation for some overview of diplomacy as applied to foreign affairs.

DIPLOMATIC

Methodologically, there are no doubts about the political or functional meaning of the term "diplomat." Diplomacy is precisely the art of the word. As such, it is entirely concerned with ideas, concepts, and arguments, which later are incorporated into bilateral agreements, multilateral treaties, and universal declarations, to guide the external actions of States for cooperation or even conflict with other States. The central argument of this work concerns the possible link between diplomacy and some set of ideas – or "thought" – that might be considered specifically Brazilian.

The issue involves several nuanced questions that cannot be answered abstractly. Does the term "diplomatic" refer more to the players or to the acts themselves? In other words, does it derive from the quality of the agents, or from the nature of their actions? This is not meant as an exercise in Hegelian Dialectics; rather, it has a more practical sense, making it closer to English empiricism than to German philosophy. In order to avoid a useless terminological debate, therefore, without much relevance to the purpose of this work, let us say that "diplomatic thought," refers to

an ideal-typical formulation. It is a guide to be used for the actions of public men – as opposed to theoretical reflection, or a purely speculative concept, detached from history or from any concrete application.

What we are discussing here are the contributions of thinkers – and practical men – their words, their writings and their actions, as well as the positions they performed for the State, which, in various ways, impacted on the external actions of that State.

For various reasons, some of the individuals presented here did not leave an articulate body of proposals concerning an “ideal” foreign policy for the country. All of them, however, either as theoreticians or observers of that specialized activity, knew how to conduct themselves, through their values, and their principles, and each had ideas of how the country should respond to external challenges, and how it should affirm itself in the international order. Even when the “thought” was embryonic – as in the early phases of the construction of the Brazilian State – the options taken, in either regional or broader contexts, were always diplomatic.

For example, the debate on whether or not to preserve trafficking and slavery was an essential condition for the maintenance of the economic and social formation that characterized agrarian-exporter Brazil in the early nineteenth century. The preservation of those institutions, even in the context of the growing abolitionist movement since the beginning of that century, required a diplomatic action that involved most of the public men of that era. Although there was no absolute need to continue the institutions – as José Bonifácio had already argued to no avail – once this option was adopted, the diplomats of the Brazilian Empire had to defend the cause against the arrogance of the hegemonic power of the time, the British Empire – as, the young Tomaz do Amaral, the future Viscount of Cabo Frio,

discovered from an early age. They then continued to defend the cause until the country's Foreign Minister, Paulino José Soares de Souza, wisely, decided to end that sad defensive episode of Brazilian diplomacy.

Two examples of diplomatic decisions taken by non-diplomats were whether or not to participate in a foreign war that was not strictly in defense of the national territory, or more precisely, whether to become an ally of the enemies of the Argentine strongman, Juan Manuel de Rosas, in order to overthrow the dictator of Buenos Aires in the early 1850s; and whether or not to send troops to the front lines of World War II, against the forces of Nazi-Fascism. The men involved in those decisions – Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão and Paulino Soares de Souza, in the first case, and Oswaldo Aranha and Getúlio Vargas, in the second – may not have produced any substantive diplomatic explanation to justify their decisions, but they were fully aware of the relevant national interests.

Another example of bold and original diplomacy was the decision not to use arbitration to resolve the issue of Acre at the beginning of the twentieth century. Arbitration seemed to be the way such disputes were solved in the nineteenth century, as various arbitration treaties had already been signed.

It is known that Rui Barbosa, considered as one of the major “thinkers” of Brazilian international relations, rejected the Baron of Rio Branco's solution for Acre that was presented to Bolivia, and he was kept off the negotiating delegation mainly for that reason. Rio Branco, however, who controlled as few others the thought and the action of diplomats, was able to innovate, whereas the Viscount of Cabo Frio managed explosive issues within the traditional standards to which he was accustomed since the beginning of the Second Empire.

THOUGHT

What does the concept of diplomatic “thought” represent in the context of a study concerned with the history of ideas; of essays concerned with intellectual historiography? Is thought a too abstract concept for such an endeavor, and would a study of it be akin to gathering the writings of some esoteric club?

Is “thought” a topic more appropriate for a scholarly monograph, or could it be defined with a compilation of individual essays of varied styles and methodologies, such as those presented here? Could such a study be a precise set of articles about concrete action proposals that, throughout time, guide the leadership of a nation’s diplomatic corps?

Although there are some excellent examples of sectoral histories in this area – for example, there are some very good synthetic essays in the political field written by Nelson Saldanha, João de Scantimburgo, and Nelson Barreto; plus some brilliant philosophical work has been done by Antonio Paim and Ricardo Velez-Rodriguez, following up on pioneer efforts of João Cruz Costa – in reality, the history of ideas has scarcely been studied in Brazil.

One example that perhaps comes closest to the concept is the multi-volume work, *História da Inteligência Brasileira*, by the literary critic Wilson Martins, whose seven tomes, published from 1976 to 1978, addressed the growth of Brazilian intellectual writing from 1550 to 1960. As its name implies, national thought is represented therein by the intelligentsia of Brazilian culture, which, together with their respective schools, are correlated with the dominant ideas in each era. In this manner, Martins emphasized, in an elegant and refined analytical style, the contribution of each intellectual to what he called the construction of Brazil’s national intelligence.

This current endeavor is not as ambitious as the above-mentioned work, and it has its own set of limitations. Rather than having one author, for example, it is a collective work, and therefore subject to different historiographical approaches and to varied analytical methodologies.

Another limitation of this current book is that it does not encompass the complete universe of those who – with their writings, words and actions – contributed to the creation of what is being called, with some conceptual freedom, “Brazilian diplomatic thought.”

Many representatives of Brazilian thought and action related to the country’s international relations do not appear in this compilation of biographical and intellectual studies, even though they followed similar paths of those who were selected for the project. One reason for these omissions is that only a few of the selected figures have already been the objects of monographs specifically analyzing their thought in the field of international diplomacy. Those individuals who are included had an actual impact and a real influence on Brazil’s foreign policy, which can be assessed by their ongoing presence in the historical records, in the expert literature, and in the collective memory of the country. Thus, the present work comes close to a “history of Brazilian diplomatic ideas,” bringing together a set of essays about figures in the country’s history who influenced or led its international policy in certain fields or sectors. Therefore, there is a hope that the existing gap might be partially filled. At the very least, the endeavor represents a collection of studies focused on the contribution of the selected figures to the development of a national intelligence in the field of diplomacy.

The fact that this work is being published now indicates an intellectual maturation by the professional diplomatic

community. It also reveals the growth of the scholarly community in this specialized field of the humanities: the study of Brazilian international relations. The task was not simple. Beyond biographical sketches on each of the individuals, the work included analyses of their specific contributions in the fields of foreign affairs and diplomacy, as well as some qualifications of those contributions in a historical context.

The purpose of the project was not so much to offer summarized biographies of individuals who have had an impact on Brazilian diplomacy, as that has been done before. Rather, we hope to offer a conceptual and human framework for the development of the previously mentioned diplomatic intelligence, through an analysis of the writings, works and actions of Brazilian thinkers and operators in the international arena. Regardless of whether or not the study constitutes a primary reference in this field, the books intend to be the seed of a more comprehensive project of systematic analysis of the contributions made by many generations of thinkers and practical achievers who gradually added their conceptual and pragmatic bricks to the building of Brazilian diplomacy.

One of the most important thinkers of Brazilian diplomacy was the Baron of Rio Branco. Even though he did not write much about the subject – as he was, above all, a major diplomatic formulator – almost all of his writings were about eminently practical situations. That was what distinguished him from most of his colleagues and admirers outside the realm of career diplomats, a field he had joined belatedly.

Oswaldo Aranha, in turn, who can be considered a kind of spiritual and practical follower of the Baron of Rio Branco, was not a career diplomat. Even before taking on incumbencies and functions in Brazilian diplomacy, however, he was already the

most diplomatic of Brazilian politicians. His path included a long line of pragmatic negotiations, involving both politicians and the military, in order to reach goals with which he fully identified. The overthrow of the “rotten Republic” was one of those goals, and he exercised much “negotiating diplomacy” between figures from Minas Gerais and his fellow *gaúchos* [natives of the state of Rio Grande do Sul], before joining the revolution that overthrew Washington Luís in 1930. In the same way, Aranha considered the sending of troops to the European theater in World War II as the most diplomatic of all decisions the country would make, as it would ensure a place for Brazil in the post-war international order.

From the decisions highlighted above, it can be seen that even when “thought” is presented as something diffused; its specifically diplomatic nature immediately stands out. This becomes clearer by reviewing the ideas and the actions of the figures selected for these volumes, regardless of whether they were professional politicians, “improvised” diplomats, or even members of the military who exercised themselves more in writing and by their words than by their swords. If, as Clausewitz stated, “war is the continuation of politics by other means,” diplomacy is precisely an attempt to preserve the word when the sword is ready to be unsheathed. All the thinkers and agents previously mentioned were able to combine the virtues of soldiers and diplomats in order to achieve goals that had been defined as corresponding to the permanent national interests. In that sense, they were diplomats raised to the condition of statesmen. But was there – or is there – a special Brazilian type of diplomacy?

Using a popular Brazilian term, there is no “jeitinho” in diplomacy – meaning there is no special “knack” of doing things based on circumventing rules or breaking conventions. Those types of peculiarities are few and fortunately not persistent. For example, legislation of 1831 concerning slave trafficking, which

resulted from one of the first bilateral treaties signed by the newly independent State – the convention for the abolition of trafficking, between Brazil and Great Britain in November 1826 – has been consecrated in literature, as something “for the Englishman to see.” The expression is still in use today, even though few people know that its origin had to do with a peculiarity of Brazilian politics of that time.

Yet, if Brazil did not always innovate according to standards or procedures, its rulers always sought to choose the best diplomatic solutions for the country’s challenges. That was the case in the conflicts that took place in the River Plata region, as well as in both global conflicts of the twentieth century: World War I and World War II. In its foreign affairs, Brazil always sought to conduct itself according to the same principles that guided the so-called “civilized nations.”

In a certain way, Brazil wanted to be like Europe, to have French manners, while it was supported by British money, even while it displayed a façade of parliamentarism, and maintained a stubborn slavery. The country was, however, able to maintain a relatively functional State and a certain sense of national unity. While neighboring nations were dismembered under *caudillos* and involved in civil wars, the Brazilian Empire at least wanted to advance and, roughly speaking, law prevailed. This allowed the president of Venezuela, Rojas Paul, to proclaim, in 1889, that Imperial Brazil, at the time of its demise, was the only Republic on the continent.

When the Brazilian educator, historian and statesman, João Pandiá Calógeras summarized the political and diplomatic evolution of the Empire at the end of the First Republic, he wrote:

The tasks carried out by the Empire had been large and noble. Brazil was threatened to be disintegrated by

multiple factors and, nevertheless, it remained united... Regarding foreign affairs, the same ascending march was noticed... The generalized hostility against the Empire by the South American Republics... gradually weakened and was replaced by an environment of mutual trust. Both from Europe and from North America, identical proof of political and international credit flowed into Brazil... There was no doubt about the important place of the Empire in South America. New demonstrations of such feelings were lavished on the country at the Congress on Private International Law in Montevideo, as well as at the First Pan-American Conference in Washington, in 1889. (Formação Histórica do Brasil, 1930)

The important position of Brazil reflected in the text by Calógeras was largely due to the competent work of Imperial diplomacy, which at the time was already professional, despite adhering to criteria peculiar to the values of the monarchy. The Republic, at least as far as diplomacy was concerned, sought to preserve – although not always successfully – a sense of law, respect for the most advanced standards of international law, a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other peoples, peaceful coexistence among nations, and respect for sovereign equality among them, as Rui Barbosa stated at the Second Peace Conference of the Hague (1907).

Such a way of being and type of behavior, inherited from the Empire, had its principles and values incorporated into the professional diplomatic body by those who guided national foreign policy in the years and decades following the declaration of the republic (1889). This contributed to the practice of ascribing to Brazilian diplomacy those marks of quality, respect and seriousness that remained its acknowledged features throughout the period covered by this work. The features are so identified with Brazil, in

the exercise of its foreign affairs, that after World War II, they were fully integrated into the training process for Brazilian diplomats, carried out by the Rio Branco Institute. Important intellectuals, respected professors, elite tribunes and major public celebrities not only trained several generations of diplomats, but they also served, in embassies or in delegations sent to international conferences, contributing with their eclecticism and professionalism to what became a distinctive feature of Brazilian diplomacy.

IDEAS AND ACTIONS THROUGH TIME, BUT ABOVE ALL THINKERS AND PLAYERS

Ideas and actions do not exist in a vacuum; they are not the result of some “Hegelian spirit” that hovers like Minerva’s owl over foreign ministries. They cannot express themselves without the support of those who formulate and carry out foreign policy, in a certain historical context and in the circumstances offered by foreign, regional or global environments, with all the constraints such variables impose on the State and its agents. This, therefore, was the reason we opted for the mini-biographies of the selected figures. Each invited collaborator offers a synthesis of the contribution that each selected figure made to the collective thought of Brazilian diplomacy.

The expression “Brazilian Diplomatic Thought,” by means of its major figures, is thus justified and legitimized by a specific collective culture of the country’s diplomats, produced by the high level of socialization obtained in their training, and the adhesion to a certain esprit de corps, even by those who are “diplomats” only temporarily. And finally, the concepts embodied in those three words have been strengthened by successive waves of authorities in charge of the Brazilian Foreign Service, since Rio Branco

enhanced it with his pragmatic spirit and his dominance over work dossiers based on a broad historic and political culture and on strict observances to the standards and principles of international law.

Certain figures presented here were much more practical than theoretical, or more enterprising than reflexive. This was true for Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, a diplomat “on horseback,” as described by diplomat/historian Luís Cláudio Villafañe Gomes Santos in his chapter on the Baron of Ponte Ribeiro.

Practicality may also be used to describe Oswaldo Aranha, a politician and diplomat, who understood Rio Branco and adhered to his international political teachings. Aranha was also influenced by and had much respect for Afrânio de Melo Franco, a great negotiator and an expert in international law. These men were some of the most distinguished among the many leaders of thought and action who built Brazilian diplomatic tools of the greatest quality throughout more than 200 years. The same can be said of the work and devotion of thousands of employees, and those who are called, both occasionally and regularly, to perform in the Foreign Service of the nation. The first of whom was the patriarch of Brazilian independence – and its diplomacy – José Bonifácio, who although he failed in his bolder endeavors, offered a complete agenda of economic and social change to the structure of the recently independent nation.

The Marquis of Paraná, the Viscount of Uruguay, and the Viscount of Rio Branco were all more successful than Bonifácio in their efforts to rebalance the power relationships in the Platine borders, albeit at the cost of having to resort to the power of arms, when that of words had failed.

Some of the figures – such as Rui Barbosa and Joaquim Nabuco – were perhaps more eloquent than practical. Many of these were exclusively diplomats, such as Cabo Frio, Freitas-

Valle, Edmundo Barbosa da Silva and Araújo Castro. Others were basically pragmatic. This latter group includes men such as Domício da Gama, Macedo Soares, and Álvaro Alberto. Some of them were important professionals in their respective areas, such as the historians Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, Oliveira Lima, and José Honório Rodrigues, and the jurists Afrânio de Melo Franco and San Tiago Dantas. Still others seemed to be visionaries, maybe even ideologues (in the positive sense of the word); men such as Euclides da Cunha, Augusto Frederico Schmidt and Helio Jaguaribe.

The individuals in this book represent a comprehensive range of men of thought and action. Ultimately, their impact on diplomacy will be measured by the work of scholars and collaborators known for solid research, with publications focused on the times and themes in which the individuals have distinguished themselves.

CHRONOLOGY AND THE STRUCTURAL DIVISION OF THE WORK

One of the first points discussed at the beginning of the project was what historical time frame to use. Obviously, it should start with the formation of the Brazilian State – and the inauguration of an actual national diplomacy – and end somewhere in the contemporary era. The organizers opted to use 1964, the moment of the authoritarian break with the Republic of 1946, as the ending point.

The starting point is actually before 1822, the date of the country's political independence from Portugal, since a reference work such as this one could not exclude the contribution of the "grandfather of Brazilian diplomacy," the figure for whom the foundation in charge of the project, Alexandre de Gusmão, is

named. Gusmão, therefore, is the focus of one of the first chapters of the book. The initial section also includes some of the “founding fathers” of the country, as well as of Brazilian diplomacy itself – men such as: José Bonifácio; Paulino Soares de Souza, the Viscount of Uruguay; Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, the Baron of Ponte Ribeiro; Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, the Viscount of Porto Seguro; Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Parana; José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, and the longest lasting general-secretary in the history of the ministry, Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio.

The second part of the book is directed towards the international politics of the First Republic. It mainly deals with some of the major names of the Empire, those who ennobled the diplomacy of the Republic, starting with Joaquim Nabuco. The Baron of Rio Branco also stands out in that phase, as do his friends, and occasional aids, Rui Barbosa and Euclides da Cunha, who carried out diplomatic missions even though they were not foreign-service professionals *per se*. This section also includes the jurist Afrânio de Melo Franco, who started a diplomatic career, then went into politics, and later carried out several diplomatic missions during the Old Republic – among which was the failed mission to turn Brazil into a member of the council of the League of Nations. Melo Franco also served the military junta that negotiated with the revolutionaries, continued under Getúlio Vargas’ provisional government, and he was the first Foreign Minister of the new Vargas regime. Two other diplomats, Manoel de Oliveira Lima, who was also a historian and essayist, and Domício da Gama, a journalist, writer and diplomat complete that first Republican cycle.

The third and last part of the book covers the Getúlio Vargas era, plus the Republic of 1946. It begins with the reform of the State, and the modernization of diplomacy initiated under Afrânio

de Melo Franco and continued by Oswaldo Aranha, the man who ended the unification of the ministry's careers. Aranha also led the Revolution of 1930, and he kept Brazil firmly in the democratic fold during the dark times of the rise of Nazi-Fascism in Europe and the Estado Novo in Brazil (1937-1945).

The first name to represent the multilateral diplomacy of Brazil was that of Cyro de Freitas-Valle, who had on his economic team, Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva, although both individuals are today, relatively unknown to the younger generation. Other names that illustrated both the Vargas era and the later democratic period were those of the businessman and politician, José Carlos de Macedo Soares, who was a foreign minister in both regimes. A representative from the military, Admiral Álvaro Alberto, is also identified both with the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) as well as the country's nuclear program.

The end of the period, which encompasses the optimistic phase when Juscelino Kubitschek was the president and the turbulent years of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, was represented by individuals such as the sociologist, Helio Jaguaribe, the historian, José Honório Rodrigues, the poet, Augusto Frederico Schmidt, and the politicians/jurists, Afonso Arinos and San Tiago Dantas. Finally, the assessment of the major personalities ends with the name of Ambassador Araújo Castro, the last foreign minister prior to the military coup of 1964, who continued to shape Brazilian foreign affairs in the years following Goulart's ouster, and is still influential today.

Many names were excluded due to practical difficulties of the project itself, as it is already very broad and perhaps overly ambitious. Among those not included, is Raul Fernandes, a jurist who participated in the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles

and the creation of the first International Court of Justice. His name is connected to the so-called “optional clause of compulsory jurisdiction.” João Neves da Fontoura, a colleague of both Getúlio Vargas and Oswaldo Aranha in the Revolution of 1930, and twice Foreign Minister under the Republic of 1946, also deserves mention. They are examples of figures to be included in future editions of the book.

The decision to end in 1964 – at the beginning of the military regime – was due to practical considerations. Some of the figures who performed in the recent phase are still present in either the design or in the execution of diplomacy. A project for the contemporary phase, almost one of “immediate history,” would, therefore, have to be guided by other methodological requirements.

THE MEANING OF INTELLECTUAL ENTERPRISE

This work is one of the most serious intellectual projects carried out by Itamaraty. Not only is it a collection of brief biographies, with many analytical considerations about the ideas and actions of the selected figures, but it is also intellectual history. Although some of the figures have performed more by the practice of telegrams, memoranda, and speeches, than in the form of systematic writings, they still had precise ideas of what Brazilian diplomacy should be. All of them produced narratives outlining their views on foreign policy, either in official papers or in the works they carried out and the memories they inspired. They were statesmen in the broad sense of the word; in the sense in which a certain idea of Brazil was always present, guiding their steps in the most significant decisions.

It is that tradition this project seeks to rescue and bring to light. Even with its limitations, the work is a pioneer effort, to

identify and present the ideas and concepts that oriented and guided the formulation and practical execution of Brazilian foreign affairs, since its dawn, as an autonomous State, until almost the end of the second third of the twentieth century. It is the hope and desire of the project's organizers, that this project will inspire similar enterprises that will continue its important work.



PART I

**FOUNDING IDEAS OF
DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT**



INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DIPLOMATIC IDEAS OF THE IMPERIAL PERIOD

Amado Luiz Cervo

The large number of historical studies published on the subject of international relations over the past few decades have increased attention on the role of the statesman, the politician and the diplomat – in addition to that of the social environment – while also uncovering occasional ingenuities in the discourse of leaders. All of this was made clear in the monumental 2012 work, *Pour l'Histoire des Relations Internationales*, organized by Robert Frank, heir to the group of intellectuals known as the French school of international relations. In their book, Frank and his collaborators followed the metamorphoses of studies conducted by various schools and research groups, beginning with, *Introduction to the History of International Relations*, published in 1964, by Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. In these studies, categories of analysis and interpretation are brought up to date, including: economics; culture; national identity; internal, external and transnational interactions; the complexity of the decision making process; and the multiple causes the French school called “forces profondes” (deep forces).

For their part, studies by Adam Watson, Hedley Bull and Brunello Vigezzi – the core of the English school – were mainly concerned with the European international society of the early nineteenth century and the international order derived from it throughout that same century. They also, however, apply their findings directly to a secular liberal-conservative understanding of the international insertion of Latin American nations since their independence. This is especially true for Vigezzi, for whom the concept of international society transforms into a powerful instrument tied to an expansion of capitalism as practiced by the central powers – an expansion carried out by inherent components, such as technological superiority, the law, diplomatic behavior, commerce, and the use of arms.

My own study of Brazil in the world of international relations began several decades ago. Most recently, I have focused on the role of schools of thought as the generator of ideas that inspire decisions. My 2008 book, *Inserção Internacional: Formação dos conceitos brasileiros*, for example, identifies three social groups of concept builders: major thinkers of national destiny; political and diplomatic thought; and academic production.

An interaction exists between the concepts of diplomacy, foreign policy, and international relations, and from this interaction the concept of international insertion is derived. The interaction is accomplished in such a way that one can perceive an intimate connection between political thoughts that explore the national interest, diplomatic negotiation conducive to results, and non-governmental players who act externally in search of specific interests. The sum of all this is equivalent to the national interest. In short, without diplomatic thought – one of the sources of applied concepts – and without measuring its impact on the national formation, one cannot satisfactorily study the international relations of any country. In other words, no globalization produced

in the market without the participation of the state – as envisioned by authors imbued with a fundamentalist liberal dream – erases these conditionings of international relations.

Three major external goals of the Brazilian monarchy – derived from its interpretation of the national interest – were made evident by the country's incipient diplomatic thought: the acknowledgement of sovereignty and the acceptance of Brazil's autonomy by other governments; foreign trade and the flow of immigrants into the society and economy; and finally, a peaceful co-existence with the country's neighbors, accomplished through the drawing of national territorial boundaries.

The "Patriarch of Independence," José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of an independent Brazil, formalized a diplomatic thought that preceded the national formation. He conceived a community of sovereign nations made up of territories of the Portuguese colonial Empire on both sides of the South Atlantic – an idea that was quite utopian for rulers of colonial nations. Bonifácio also foresaw cordial and cooperative relations with neighboring countries, who mainly sought security in the face of attacks made by Portugal and Spain. He considered the benefits that could result from reciprocal relations with the United States and European countries. His ideas, however, did not coincide with those of the Emperor, Pedro I, and, in 1823, he was excluded from the ruling group and, indeed, spent the next six years in exile. In his absence, Brazil signed twenty treaties of recognition, between 1825 and 1828. The agreements were imposed on the country by the international powers, thereby interfering in the internal decision-making process, creating asymmetries between Brazil and the advanced capitalist nations along with deep roots of backwardness and dependence. In recognizing this international environment – and assessing the treaties as detrimental to the country – José Bonifácio de Andrada

e Silva becomes the originator of a truly *Brazilian* diplomatic thought.

The historical legacy of the independence era – beyond the diplomatic recognition issue – is viewed as an impoverishment of the national formation. In addition to stunting the fragile industrialization process initiated by Dom João VI, the interests of the agricultural sector as well as those of the exporters of primary products were also ignored by the European negotiators.

In exchange for nothing, Brazil became a market for European manufactured products and surrendered the possibility of its own industrial modernization. From that adverse conjuncture came the critical thought that emerged in the Brazilian parliament, in 1826, as well as in the diplomatic environment after the abdication of Dom Pedro I, in 1831. This thought, paradoxically, reinforced the decision-making autonomy concerned with foreign policy, while also subjecting it to the economically hegemonic group of planters and exporters of cotton, sugar, coffee and other primary products.

Three phases of Brazil's national formation can be observed during the more than six decades of monarchy that followed independence in 1822. Each phase had its own perception of interests that many at the time believed the nation's rulers needed to promote.

The Regency, 1831 to 1840 – when Pedro II was five to fourteen years old, and a series of regents governed the country – saw the forging of a nation State capable of exercising decision-making autonomy, with notable statesmen involved, although they were constrained by the internal environment as well as the international system.

Midway through the nineteenth century, an industrialist thought emerged, along with the first phase of capitalist modernization. This, however, was a short-lived experience, and

it became weakened. There were difficulties in providing national security in the face of instability in the Platine basin, a relatively backward region compared to Brazil itself, especially concerning the implementation of a nation State capable of managing a country. Despite a coherent border policy, its design was slow in the making.

The final decades of the monarchy, disrupted by the Triple Alliance War, prolonged and consolidated the liberal-conservative paradigm which, itself, lasted more than a century – 1810 to 1930 – thereby spanning the dates of the country's formal independence, 1822, to its change of political regimes, 1889.

The ideology embraced by Brazil's rulers in the nineteenth century was that of European liberalism. Such liberalism was extended to the building of the monarchy's political institutions and, later, to those of the Republic, as well as to the organization of society, with the exception of slavery. Liberalism determined how to establish property rules, how to organize production and trade, and how to behave with foreign countries. Liberal ideology was present at the time of the Regency, when the institutions of the national State were founded, and there was great controversy surrounding the issues of power centralization and decentralization. It was also present in the 1840s, when the unequal treaties of the independence period expired, and another intensive debate took place between free trade advocates and protectionists concerned with foreign trade policies and industrialization. In addition, liberal ideology prevailed during the second half of the nineteenth century and into the First Republic, 1889-1930, embedded in the mentality of the social group that held economic power and established a political system to benefit itself.

The domestic environment interacted with foreign policy as much as with systemic constraints. The agrarian exporter elites considered the State as part of their property, and they extended

that “property” to diplomatic functions and positions. This all-powerful group interpreted the national interest from the top down and made decisions applied to the internal organization of the country as well as to its external actions. Diplomatic thought, as will be seen, when not fused with political thought – either in the idea or in the person – becomes intermixed with it, without jeopardizing that degree of freedom to think and decide, which comes from looking at an issue from multiple angles.

JOSÉ BONIFÁCIO, THE PATRIARCH OF INDEPENDENCE, AND NATION BUILDER

The chapter written by the diplomat and historian, João Alfredo dos Anjos, reveals the comprehensive thought of Brazil’s first Minister of State and Foreign Affairs (1822-1823), José Bonifácio, a theorist of the nation itself and of its insertion into the international community. Bonifácio’s foundational ideas included a belief that Brazil’s recognition should not be bargained for – as it eventually was – with the sacrifice of national interests; rather, he said, it should only be traded for actual Brazilian interests. He also believed in a sovereign Brazil included in the modernizing trends of an international economy; a more equitable distribution of power; cooperation with the country’s southern neighbors, in order to provide regional security based on an efficient armed forces; negotiation with advanced nations – such as Great Britain, France, and the United States – to obtain the reciprocal benefits of foreign trade; a modernization of the new nation; a financial system open to capital from the outside, yet with a zealous concern for the nation’s wealth; and a maintenance of the country’s territorial unit, to avoid the disintegration of sovereignty, as had occurred with Spanish America. These and other facets of the

diplomatic thought of José Bonifácio – at once an intellectual and a coherent public manager – are expanded upon and detailed by João Alfredo's remarkable text.

During the sixty-seven years of the Brazilian Empire, three other statesmen – Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná; Paulino José Soares de Souza, the Viscount of Uruguay; and José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco – also exemplified diplomatic thought comparable to that of the Patriarch of Independence.

HONÓRIO HERMETO CARNEIRO LEÃO, THE MARQUIS OF PARANÁ, CONSOLIDATES NATIONAL DIPLOMATIC STANDARDS

Ambassador and historian, Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, explains the link between the thought of José Bonifácio, the originator of Brazilian foreign relations, and the maturity of the imperial institutions that elevated Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná, to the beginnings of a stable and rational management of the State, in both domestic and foreign matters. Paraná considered external actions the other side of the coin of domestic management, giving rise to the traditions of rationality and continuity in Brazilian foreign policy. At a time when the dangers came mainly from the south – from the Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel Rosas, and from a long war in Uruguay – Carneiro Leão conceived a national defense based on arms, and he invented a way to deal with the threats that caudillos presented to the nation's integrity. He struck a balance between neutrality and intervention, subject to the opportunity of success, while preparing a future phase of understanding and co-existence.

PAULINO JOSÉ SOARES DE SOUZA, THE VISCOUNT OF URUGUAY, FOLLOWS IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE MARQUIS OF PARANÁ

Although she does not make much direct reference to it, political scientist Gabriela Nunes Ferreira places both the thought and the work of Paulino José Soares de Souza, the Viscount of Uruguay, at the same level as those of Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão. Consolidating the centralized Empire and opening stable foreign perspectives, Paulino expelled the invaders from the Platine region, bringing stability to the area and creating an environment much friendlier to Brazil. He also negotiated the borders with a policy that proved generous to the Americas. In the north of the country, the Viscount of Uruguay avoided the penetration of American freebooters into the Amazon, while he encouraged the navigation of rivers along the borders. He also suppressed the trafficking of slaves, thereby avoiding another confrontation, and he stabilized the country's relations with England.

JOSÉ MARIA DA SILVA PARANHOS, THE VISCOUNT OF RIO BRANCO: THE IDEAL STATESMAN

Historian Francisco Doratioto describes José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, as the epitome of the ideal statesman of his era, viewing him as logical, profound, and thoughtful, yet a man of firm action, seeking results. For these reasons, he saw Rio Branco as above petty struggles for power, able to face both domestic adversities and foreign arrogance, which, according to him, came from caudillos, such as those of the Spanish American foreign offices. Rio Branco's work contributed not only

to the political maturity of Brazil, but also to the formation of stable States in the Southern Cone.

GUSMÃO, PONTE RIBEIRO, VARNHAGEN: GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

Alexandre de Gusmão, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, and Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, whose activity and thought are written about by Synesio Sampaio Goes Filho, Luis Villafañe, and Arno Wehling, respectively, were concerned with the territorial formation of the country as well as its history. All three of these early diplomats were, above all, scholars. Gusmão formalized the doctrine of *uti possidetis*, the ancient Roman principle of using human occupation as a legal right to a territory – a principle he included in the Treaty of Madrid of 1750. And for his part, Ponte Ribeiro persuaded both imperial and republican diplomats that this was the best doctrine to justify the Brazilian border policies, as well, according to him, as those of its neighbors. In turn, Varnhagen was an assistant to leaders in their border negotiations, and he was involved in several other diplomatic issues of his time, although his *métier*, even while pursuing the career of a diplomat, was that of a historian. The three of these men were, thus, instrumental in the configuration of the nation, as a single territory, one population, and a sovereign unit.

Many diplomats from the time of the Empire continued into the Republic with their behavior patterns, their diplomatic and political thought and, in some cases, even their noble titles. They became the institutional and functional continuity of diplomacy. Among those who spanned both eras were Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio; José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco; and Joaquim Nabuco, the first full ambassador of Brazil to the United States (1905-1910).





ALEXANDRE DE GUSMÃO

Alexandre de Gusmão was born in 1695 in the then small village of Santos, a port in what would become the state of São Paulo, Brazil, although at the time it was a part of the colonial empire of Portugal. While details of his early life are somewhat sketchy, it is known that as an adolescent he studied in the colony's capital of Salvador, Bahia, and later moved to Europe, where he studied in both Coimbra and Paris. After working as a diplomat in Paris, and then for a number of years in Rome, Gusmão became the private secretary to the Portuguese king, Dom João V; a position he held from 1730 to 1750, during which time he had great influence on decisions concerning his native Brazil. He was, for example, at the core of efforts to prepare the colony, as well as the mother country, for treaty negotiations, and in consolidating the Portuguese occupation in strategic zones – especially in South America – as well as encouraging cartographic studies.

Alexandre de Gusmão was one of the first Portuguese diplomats to clearly espouse the principle of *uti possidetis*, i.e., a

land belongs to those who effectively occupy it. He also believed in the use of natural geographic features – rivers, mountains, plains, etc. – as national borders. Both of these concepts were consecrated in the Treaty of Madrid, the agreement for which he is most known, which was signed in 1750.

Almost forgotten in history – Gusmão was never a minister, nor did he sign any instructions or documents – this Portuguese diplomat is, however, currently considered the individual who gave the map of Brazil its basic shape. He died in Lisbon in 1756, just a couple of months short of 58 years of age.

ALEXANDRE DE GUSMÃO: THE STATESMAN WHO DREW THE BRAZILIAN MAP

Synesio Sampaio Goes Filho

DISCLOSURE OF THE UNKNOWN

In his 1942 biography of Bartolomeu de Gusmão, an eighteenth century Portuguese priest and inventor, Brazilian historian, Affonso d'Escragnole Taunay, wrote the following about Bartolomeu's younger brother, Alexandre:

What is currently known about Alexandre de Gusmão is fragmentary and, above all, incomplete. It represents only part of the definitive study that, in a few years, will be written about this immortal Brazilian... (p. 21).

Indeed, until then, little had been said about Alexandre de Gusmão. Most early histories of Brazil were written by Europeans, and writers such as Robert Southey, from Great Britain, and Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius and Gottfreid Heinrich Handelmann, from Germany, do not even mention Gusmão. Likewise, already in the twentieth century, Brazil's most famous early historian, João Capistrano de Abreu, who wrote a remarkable overview of the

country's colonial period, ignored Gusmão. And Caio Prado Junior, whose classic, *Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo*, is a valuable study on the settlement of colonial Brazil, including its material and social life, also overlooks this early Portuguese diplomat.

It is interesting to note, however, that unlike books written specifically about history, Alexandre de Gusmão is more often mentioned in literary volumes, including collections of classics. In 1841, for example, a work entitled *Collecção de Vários Escritos Inéditos, Políticos e Litterários de Alexandre de Gusmão* (A Collection of Various Unpublished Political and Literary Writings of Alexandre de Gusmão) was published in Porto, Portugal. Reissued in São Paulo, in 1943, under the name *A. Gusmão – Obras* (A. Gusmão – Works) the book was included in the series, *Os mestres da língua* (The Masters of the Language). In that work, the Santos native is specifically noted for the boldness and irreverence with which he treated the powerful of his time. Other books about his writings, including the 1981 volume, *Alexandre de Gusmão – Cartas*, dedicated to his letters, are part of the official collection: *Biblioteca dos Autores Portugueses* (Library of Portuguese Authors). The collection enjoyed much editorial success. By the late nineteenth century, Camilo Castelo Branco, in his *Curso de Literatura Portuguesa*, equated Gusmão to two of Portugal's greatest writers:

For [his] wisdom of observation and cunningness of critique – and for those who put sociological studies before linguistic prolixity – the secretary of Dom João V is greater than Antônio Vieira and Dom Francisco Manuel de Mello (Cited in JORGE, 1946, p. 114).

Assessing Gusmão as a politician, Castelo Branco also does not withhold his praise. Indeed, in his opinion, Alexandre de Gusmão should be compared favorably to the Marquis of Pombal:

All of those measures for which Sebastião de Carvalho [Pombal] has been praised – currency matters, national industries, the colonies, business in America, Brazilian mines, [and] the obnoxious distinctions between new and old Christians – can be found in Gusmão's writings (Cited in JORGE, 1946, p. 119).

There is definitely exaggeration in Castelo Branco's assessment. What should be kept in mind, however, is that this prolific Portuguese writer places Gusmão at the greatest heights, comparing him favorably to the Jesuit, Antonio Vieira, in literature, and the Marquis of Pombal, in politics.

Today, we can make a more balanced assessment of Gusmão as a universal man who, although he never became famous as a writer, wrote very easily and gracefully. As the Portuguese historian and literary critic, Fidelino de Figueiredo, wrote of Gusmão's work (1960, p. 300):

The boldness of the language, almost arrogant, with which the secretary allowed himself to caution and censor the great ones of the Kingdom on behalf of the sovereign, is what delighted Camilo [Castelo Branco] and other readers of the nineteenth century.

In addition to his writings, Gusmão's work as a statesman – mainly in the conception and negotiation of the Treaty of Madrid – ensures him a significant place in Portuguese-Brazilian diplomatic history.

Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, a nineteenth century Brazilian diplomat and historian, was one of the first to write about Gusmão. Although he only wrote a few lines, concerning Gusmão's role in the negotiation and writing of the Treaty of Madrid, those few lines do the Santos native justice: "On the Portuguese side, one who really understood everything in that negotiation was the

famous Brazilian statesman Alexandre de Gusmão” (1975, Tome IV, p. 84).

José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the head of Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for ten years, (better known by his title, Baron of Rio Branco), also wrote favorably about Gusmão. In his *Efemérides Brasileiras* (Brazilian Diary), published by the *Jornal do Comércio*, he said that “the real negotiator of the Treaty [of Madrid] was the honorable Alexandre de Gusmão, from São Paulo, even though his name does not appear on the document” (2012, vol. VI-A, p. 54). Later, when Rio Branco defended Brazil in the boundary dispute of Palmas, he also left no doubt about the importance of Gusmão’s work.

In 1916, Ambassador Araújo Jorge, a frequent collaborator of Rio Branco, gathered several historical essays into a book, including a chapter he entitled: *Alexandre de Gusmão, o Avô dos Diplomatas Brasileiros* (Alexandre de Gusmão – the Grandfather of Brazilian Diplomats). The book gives Gusmão the distinction he deserves, especially for his work during the final 20 years of the reign of Dom João V. Araújo Jorge paints a picturesque view of Portugal at the time of that king – especially Lisbon with its alleys full of life, mystery and dirt before the earthquake of 1755. He also includes a summary of the “Brazilian” works of Gusmão; a review of the problems of the Colony of Sacramento (now a part of Uruguay); a brief history of the conflicts for ownership of the southern lands that became Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay; as well as a debate concerning the crucial points of the Treaty of Madrid.

Finally, in the 1950’s, there was the imposing nine-volume work, *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madri*, by the Portuguese historian, Jaime Cortesão, an expert in the territorial formation of Brazil. Cortesão’s work is unparalleled due to its great amount of documentation, which definitely rescues the political and diplomatic actions of Gusmão. The study has five parts. The first part (in two volumes, recently published by Funag), is a compilation of Gusmão’s

studies of Brazil. (An analysis of the antecedents leading up to the Treaty of Madrid, along with the negotiations and execution of the treaty deserve special attention.) The other four parts (seven volumes) include all of the available documentation on the treaty. The work is not precisely a biography of Gusmão. Rather, it is a broad study of the “man and his greatest achievements and, as such, it is strictly concerned with the period of his life related to the Treaty of Madrid” (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome I, p. 9).

Thus, unlike most of the other individuals in this collection of thinkers and performers of Brazilian foreign policy, Alexandre de Gusmão does not have an extensive written biography, nor is there a large record of his speeches available to historians, as for example, there is with Araujo Castro, to cite another figure in this series.

In reality, according to scholars, such as the Brazilian historian, Fernando Novais, who has written extensively about his country’s colonial period, Gusmão is not even a Brazilian, as his birthplace of Santos – although currently located in the state of São Paulo – was, at the time, a part of the Portuguese Empire. We agree with Novais on this matter: Alexandre de Gusmão was Portuguese. Due to his expertise and qualities as a statesman, however, he proved himself an articulate and successful advocate of the territorial interests of that part of the Portuguese Empire, which later became Brazil.

Gusmão’s “diplomatic thoughts” and ideas are most present in the Treaty of Madrid, as well as in the letters and documents related to it. Indeed, it was because of his work on that treaty that the publisher of this book, “The Alexander de Gusmão Foundation” (Funag, from its native Portuguese), took his name. Additionally, it is for this same reason, Gusmão is one of the three figures – together with the Baron of Rio Branco and Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro – honored in the “Room of Treaties” of Itamaraty.

Although Portuguese by nationality, Gusmão is considered a precursor of Brazilian diplomats and is included in several

works about Brazilian foreign policy, including two books written this decade: *Missões de Paz*, by Raul Mendes da Silva (org.), and *Diplomacia Brasileira Para a Paz*, by Clovis Brigagão and Fernanda Fernandes (org.).

We cannot talk about Gusmão without discussing his “masterpiece,” the Treaty of Madrid, but first let us anticipate a question concerning the importance of that treaty; namely: What was Brazil like before the treaty was signed in 1750? In response: Brazil was a large amorphous territory, not very well known, and no one really knew what it included, or even where it ended. If it is true that the exact line of the Treaty of Tordesillas was ignored in the early days of colonization, at least then there *was* a theoretical border. With the occupation of the Amazon River basin, however, along with the foundation of the Colony of Sacramento across the estuary from Buenos Aires, and the discovery of gold in the Central-West region of the colony, the notion of borders was completely lost. Where, for example, were the borders of the southern region of Brazil, the current states of Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul? There is no one definitive answer to that question, as it depended on who drew the maps. According to a map of South America made by the famous French geographer Bourguignon d’Anville, in 1748, Brazil was a land constituted by only a very narrow coastline – almost squeezed by a large Paraguay – and this may, indeed, have been a neutral and realist viewpoint at the time.

Portuguese historian, André Ferrand de Almeida, (1984) saw the colonial territory of Brazil in the following manner:

Well into the eighteenth century, Brazil appears as an archipelago of a few islands [...] a huge space fragmented into several population centers, specialized in various economic activities, and separated from one another by huge distances (p. 44).

It is, therefore, easy to imagine the insecurity of the Portuguese rulers, caused by an abundantly rich colony with ill-defined borders and an uncertain territory. By 1730, in addition to the traditional sugar cane plantations in the Northeast region, gold was being mined in the Central-West provinces of Minas Gerais, Cuiabá and Goiás. Additionally, for domestic use, livestock was being produced on the broad area of pastures, known as the *vacarias*, located between the Uruguay River and the coastline – currently parts of the state of Rio Grande do Sul and the country of Uruguay.

BIOGRAPHICAL FEATURES

Born July 17, 1695, in the “village of Santos,” as people called it at the time, Alexandre de Gusmão was from a relatively poor yet locally-prominent family. His father, Francisco Lourenço Rodrigues, was the head medical doctor of the village jailhouse. Among twelve siblings, three took the family name of their father’s friend and family protector, the Jesuit, Alexandre de Gusmão, a writer and founder of the Belém Seminary, in Salvador, Bahia. (As is evident, Alexandre, himself, has both the given and the family name of this somewhat famous Ignatian priest.) One of his older brothers, Bartolomeu Lourenço de Gusmão, became a Jesuit, himself, and was known as “the flying priest,” due to his experiments with hot air balloons – one of which was involved in a disaster in front of Dom João V and his court.

When Alexandre was 15 years old, after studying at the school of his godfather and namesake in Bahia, he crossed the ocean and went to Lisbon. There the young man obtained royal protection, acquired – according to some authors – because the king, Dom João V, liked a poem written by the Santos native about his “royal person,” to use another expression of the time. After studying at

Coimbra, his royal protection, as well as his talents, which had already revealed themselves, rendered him an appointment to a diplomatic post in Paris with the Portuguese Ambassador, Dom Luís Manuel da Câmara, Count of Ribeira Grande. On his way to Paris, Gusmão spent a few months in Madrid, where he got to know the problem that became the focus of his professional life: the colonial borders of South America, including the importance that the enclave of the Colony of Sacramento had for their establishment. In Paris, where he remained for five years, he attended higher education, obtaining a doctorate in Civil, Roman and Ecclesiastic Law. (As a curiosity, it should also be mentioned that while in France, perhaps due to his poor finances, he opened a gambling house and had problems with the police, activities that would not be acceptable for a diplomat today.)

After his years in Paris, Gusmão returned to Lisbon, where he was assigned, once again, to a mission abroad; this time to Rome, where he stayed for seven years. During his time in Rome, among other achievements, he acquired for his king the title of *Fidelíssimo*, thereby equating him to the kings of Spain and France, who already had obtained the respective papal titles of *Católica* and *Cristianíssima*. His mission was not a complete success, however, since he did not obtain the automatic cardinal hood for the nuncios in Portugal as Dom João V desired.

Gusmão returned to Lisbon for good in 1722 and began an intense literary and academic life. He also became part of a group, nicknamed the *estrangeirados*, derived from the Portuguese word for foreigner. The group believed that Portugal should free itself from old traditions, and open itself to the new winds of enlightenment and rationalism coming from France and England. At that time, one could already notice the humor and tendency to caricature that were to characterize Gusmão's style of communication throughout his career. Below are examples of this

style, taken from letters he wrote when he was already in service to the crown.

In one letter, Gusmão satirized the reaction of the Portuguese court – full of religious superstitions – to proposals made by a fellow *estrangeirado*, Dom Luiz da Cunha, the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris, who had recommended that Dom João V play a more active role in the negotiations of European peace, in 1745:

I tried to speak to His Venerable [Cardinal da Mota, Prime-Minister] more than three times before he listened to me, and I found him telling the story of the appearance of Sancho to his Lord. That brought Father Causino into his Holy Court, whose story was listened to with great attention by the Duke of Lafões, the Marquis of Valença, Fernão Martins Freire, and others. He answered me, saying that God had left us in peace, and that Your Excellency wanted to put us into quarrels, which was tempting God. Finally, I talked to the King, (Praise be God!). He was asking the parish priest how much was yielded by the alms of the souls, as well as the masses that were said for them! He told me that Your Excellency's proposition was very appropriate to the French elites, with whom Your Excellency has co-nationality; and that he would not continue further (GUSMÃO, 1981, p. 128).

In the same vein, the French Ambassador in Lisbon, who complained about the Portuguese king for the delay to proceed with a certain topic, was admonished, although with grace:

Even though the King thinks he is free from giving explanations to Your Excellency, he commanded me to tell Your Excellency that he had already answered His Majesty, "Cristianíssima," more than six months ago, as his Minister of State [the French Premier] has discussed the subject with Ambassador Dom Luiz da Cunha. Therefore,

Your Excellency should not complain about the procedures from this court, but instead about those from France, whose Minister forgot the fact that he is Your Excellency's Ambassador ... (GUSMÃO, 1981, p. 49).

Gusmão also once wrote a strongly worded letter to a major figure of the Kingdom, Dom Antônio de Almeida, Count of Lavradio, at the time, the governor of Angola. He began his letter by saying: "Your Excellency rules that kingdom like the Turkish pashas ..." (GUSMÃO, 1943, p. 34).

In 1730, Alexandre de Gusmão was designated the private secretary – "the Clerk of Purity," according to many papers of the time – to king, Dom João V. That same year, he became a member of the Overseas Council. From then on, Gusmão became very influential in the decisions of the Portuguese government, above all in Roman affairs – although in Lisbon, he had much competition from the likes of cardinals, nuncios, chaplains, and confessors. On matters dealing with Brazil, however, it was *he* who was "the Pope" – as he was extremely prepared for functions related to this subject area.

Gusmão knew Brazil very well – less from having been born there, but more because he had studied a great deal about the colony. He also knew how important Brazil was to Portugal, which at that time had already lost several of its eastern possessions to England and the Netherlands. Therefore, to ensure that Portugal's firm grip on its American colony went much beyond the Tordesillas line, he began the work that ensures him permanence in the history of Brazilian diplomacy. When his work was completed, in 1750, Portugal had signed an agreement with Spain on borders for Brazil, such that its territory included all lands occupied by the Portuguese-Brazilians.

In many ways, Alexandre de Gusmão was a polygraph who thought and wrote about a great variety of topics. When Jaime

Cortesão studied his work from all available sources, he was surprised with its extent. Cortesão's study included:

Official, unofficial and family mail; political and geographic memoirs; essays on political economy, literary reviews, social habits, and even a study about the new Portuguese orthography; academic speeches and panegyrics; opera librettos, poems, translations of poems and rhyming dictionaries; opinions as a member of the Overseas Council, and as an aid to Dom João V; and, finally, his drafts of laws, ordinances, charters, seals, letters and all kinds of royal orders, plus, above all, diplomatic instructions and mail about acts or treaties being negotiated with the Apostolic See, Spain, France and Great Britain (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome I, p. 9).

Gusmão also wrote a very funny and almost lewd theatrical play, *O Marido Confundido* [the Confused Husband], which was both staged and translated.

Among his extensive volume of work, of special significance to this current book, are Gusmão's studies about Brazil. There, the hand and mind of this native of Santos can be seen in every major policy of Portugal related to the colony, especially during the years of its territorial formation between 1730 and 1750. Some of the topics included in his writings were the emigration of Azorean couples to occupy Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina; the *capitação*, i.e., a per capita tax on gold production; the visit to Brazil of specialists in the determination of longitude, to get an exact idea of what lands Portugal occupied; and the written defense of those Portuguese occupations in South America.

Once the Treaty of Madrid was signed in 1750, Gusmão's star went out. His protector, Dom João V, died that same year, followed by the subsequent rise of Dom José I, along with his all-powerful minister, the future Marquis of Pombal, who was not a friend of

Gusmão. Soon there came the sad times of political persecution and attacks on the agreement. There was also bitterness in his personal life, as his wife died, and he lost his home in a fire. On May 9, 1753, Alexandre de Gusmão, himself, died in Lisbon – poor, abandoned, and frustrated.

Today, however, more than 250 years after his death, Gusmão's star is shining again; no longer with the ephemeral character of life, but with the permanence of his work. When he took on roles in the Court, his knowledge of both Brazilian history and its geography, insurmountable at the time, made him certain that it was absolutely essential, to ensure next to Spain the maintenance of the physical base, won with such sacrifice by the bandeirantes, soldiers, religious people and simple dwellers. With this objective in mind, he thought, acted and was lucky enough to complete his work. His negotiator qualities, served by his vast knowledge of the land of his birth, made him a great advocate of Brazilian interests in the eighteenth century – just as the Baron of Ponte Ribeiro, would be during the period of the Empire, and the Baron of Rio Branco at the turn of the twentieth century, the two men with whom he shares the "Room of Treaties."

PRODUCTIVE IDEAS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE TREATY OF MADRID

In order to make an agreement that would divide an entire continent, it was necessary to be prepared in technical terms. The geographical knowledge of the Iberian nations was very poor, despite being pioneers in exploration at the time of the great discoveries, especially in South America. Portugal, however, through the direct encouragement of the Crown, was able to react, and in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, there was a real

renaissance in the study of both navigation and geography. Experts from several European nations were invited to Lisbon and two of them – called “the mathematician priests,” as they were Jesuits – were sent to Rio de Janeiro in 1729, with a mission to elaborate a new atlas of the colony. What the Portuguese government wanted was to have a clear idea of the location of the occupied territories, in relation to the Tordesillas line, especially after the recent advances in the Central-West region of the colony. The Crown’s reaction had been spurred by the 1720 publication of the first scientific map of the Earth, with latitudes and longitudes observed from astronomic measurements, made by the French geographer, Guillaume Delisle. As a result of this publication, maps of South America showed that the Colony of Sacramento, the entire Amazon River basin, and the mines of Cuiabá and Guaporé were outside the territory assigned to Portugal by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. Dom Luiz Cunha, one of the greatest Portuguese statesmen of the century, who was in Paris at the time, had sent the maps to Lisbon, and Alexandre de Gusmão certainly got to know them.

It was shocking that an expert from another nation could carry out a work about South America – a region in which access was difficult for foreigners and geographic information was secret – while neither the Portuguese nor the Spanish, both with large colonial Empires and many interests in the area, had yet done so.

Jaime Cortesão exposed Portugal’s reaction to the Delisle maps in the following manner:

The King and the educated classes woke up to the study of geography, cartography and, as a consequence, to astronomy as well. It cannot be denied that sovereignty ... and the desire to affirm it on new, broad and rich territories, were at the base of that renaissance. But [whatever the motivation], Delisle’s maps were the warning sign (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 281).

And what did Spain do, especially, considering that it was also interested in proving that its American territory had been invaded, as it had reason to suppose? Cortesão answers the question by saying that Spain did nothing, or almost nothing; adding that: “such a cultural imbalance [meaning cartographic] had an influence... on the negotiations of the Treaty of Madrid, in favor of Portugal” (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 299).

The propositions on which the Treaty of Madrid are based include the following: Portugal occupied lands in America, but Spain benefited in the East; the borders would no longer be abstract geodesic lines, such as that of Tordesillas, but rather, whenever possible, they would be easily identifiable landforms; the origin of the right to property would be the actual occupation of the territory; and, in exceptional cases, there could be an exchange of territory.

A document from 1736, handwritten partly by Alexandre de Gusmão, with corrections and additions by Dom Luís da Cunha, proves the direct affiliation between the ideas of Gusmão and the basic articles of the Treaty of Madrid. As was common at the time, the document, originally in French, has a long title; translated it reads: “An essay that geographically describes the treaties between the crowns of Portugal and Spain concerning the borders of their dominions in America, this is to say, on the banks of the Plata River.”

The document’s goal was to spread in Europe the Portuguese position on yet another divergence between Portugal and Spain, concerning ownership of the Colony of Sacramento and the so-called Platine War (1735-1737). The essay is a complete anticipation of the Treaty of Madrid; it is easy to link articles of the latter to paragraphs of the former.

The dominant opinion today, in both Brazil and Portugal, is that no uncertainty exists concerning the fundamental role of

Alexandre de Gusmão in the design and negotiation of the Treaty of Madrid. That, however, was not always the case. In the past, influenced by the fact that Gusmão never had the title of Minister of State, there were dissenting voices about the decision-making powers of this native of Santos in the final twenty years of the reign of Dom João V. The controversies began in his time, as he was hated by the “most genuine and orthodox” part of the nobility, which accused him, *sotto voce*, in that period of exacerbated religiosity, of being a new Christian. (He had Jewish friends, and his brother, Bartolomeu, the priest, had been accused of having converted to Judaism and was persecuted by the Inquisition.)

Even more recently, there have been dissenting opinions on Alexandre de Gusmão, as evidenced in the book, *História Diplomática de Portugal* (1992), by Pedro Soares Martinez. In his book, Professor Martinez is not sympathetic towards the estrangeirados, and he is annoyed with Gusmão’s critical and irreverent personality – which does not spare even the King whom he served. The historian alleges that Gusmão was merely a “scribe” of Dom João V, which he says is what justified so many official documents written by him. In addition, Martinez decreases Gusmão’s importance in the negotiations of the Treaty of Madrid, and he claims, curiously, that it is even “doubtful that the Treaty of 1750 was advantageous to Portugal” (p. 193). Because of the agreement, Martinez said, the country lost the much desired Platine border. This, in fact, was also the belief of the Marquis of Pombal, who in 1751, even said that there had been a trade of a large territory, stretching from La Plata River to the Ibicuí River, for “seven miserable Indian villages” – a statement which was not exactly true.

The case for Gusmão’s power, however, is strong. In the absolutist government of Dom João V, power was exercised by whoever had the confidence of the King, not just anyone who had an official position. Three examples prove the prestige and

importance of Gusmão in the court. The first, concerning his prestige, is the perception of a foreigner who knew him well, and even had differences with him: the Count of Baschi, the French Ambassador to Lisbon. In a dispatch to Paris, on the occasion of Gusmão's death, in 1753, Baschi wrote that it was: "A great loss for Portugal [...] this man of the Kingdom was very much a genius" (ALMEIDA, L.F., 1990, p. 49).

Other examples of positive assessments of Gusmão's power are from respected, and more current, Portuguese historians: José Hermano Saraiva, for example, has written that:

The king [Dom João V] was paralyzed in the last few years and the ministers were, similar to him, both old and tired. There was one exception: Alexandre de Gusmão, an "estrangeirado," who had seen Portugal submerged by the waves of superstition and ignorance (SARAIVA, 1989, p. 247).

And António Henrique de Oliveira Marques, wrote:

Alexandre de Gusmão was appointed private secretary to the king and was practically Prime-Minister, between 1720 and 1750. (MARQUES, 1998, vol. II, p. 336).

Let us add that Gusmão's famous caution or reprimand letters – which he penned to important noblemen and administrators for several years in a row – could never have been written, had he not enjoyed full royal authority.

As for the lost territory – currently Uruguay – it is enough to verify that the Portuguese-Brazilians never dominated in that region. They only had *de facto* control of the Colony of Sacramento, as the territory was, in the Spanish view of the Treaty of Utrecht, not beyond the perimeter of "a cannon shot." Isolated from the Portuguese nuclei of the Atlantic coast, Sacramento could not be defended if the Spanish from Buenos Aires and Montevideo were

ever really tempted to take it over. In Gusmão's expressive words, it was nothing more than "a [Portuguese] jailhouse enclosed in Spain's dominion" (1943, p. 132).

We have already extensively mentioned the work by Jaime Cortesão, which was crucial in establishing credibility for Gusmão's major diplomatic work; now I would like to mention the Portuguese historian Luís Ferrand de Almeida, who may be the most important expert in the formation of Brazil's borders in the Rio Grande do Sul region. Ferrand de Almeida's book, *Alexandre de Gusmão, o Brasil e o Tratado de Madrid*, published in 1990, is devoted exactly to that subject matter. The book reviews the existing facts and opinions, and it has no doubt about giving a major political protagonist role to the famous *Secretário d'El Rei* – to use the title of a play by the historian and diplomat, Manuel de Oliveira Lima – confirming the *Secretário* as the basic engine of the agreement that gave Brazil its present shape.

In one part of his book, Ferrand de Almeida lists and comments upon eleven documental proofs, contemporary to the Treaty of Madrid, which conclude "that Alexandre de Gusmão's role, both in the draft and the final text of the treaty, was actually fundamental" (1990, p. 57). Let us mention only one of the documents, chosen because it is a letter of the rival of the Portuguese, Dom José de Carvajal, the chief Spanish negotiator for the treaty. The letter, written in 1751, refers to the new Portuguese minister, the Marquis of Pombal, who had criticized the agreement:

I find it very interesting that you desire to destroy the opinion of a Minister who represented your Court [Gusmão]. He was very capable in this matter [the borders of Brazil] and very prepared for this work [the negotiation of the treaty]. Because of this [Gusmão's abilities and preparedness], it was necessary to pretend there were errors in the unresolved matters. (p. 54).

Despite one or another opposing opinion, the *mainstream* of the current historical thought is that Alexandre de Gusmão was the statesman who most clearly saw the advantages of using the rules of *uti possidetis* and natural borders, to limit the huge colonial areas at the center of South America. Gusmão was also courageous to accept the trade for the Colony of Sacramento and give up the old dream of the Platine region – after so much effort, so many struggles, and so many deaths.

We should not, however, exaggerate. Alexandre de Gusmão's ideas were not random; they were already present in an embryonic form in the documents of previous colonial administrators, as was justly stated by the North-American historian, David M. Davidson, in his book, "Colonial Roots of Modern Brazil" (1973, p. 73):

Like the members of the Council of India of the 1720's, Gusmão suspected that much of the Brazilian hinterland was located west of the Tordesillas line and like his predecessors, he considered that an occupation was a much more solid base for sovereignty than the traditional division, and that the geographical landforms were the only appropriate marks to set the boundaries of the territory. Even though Gusmão was the first Portuguese official to state in a clear and sophisticated manner the principles of uti possidetis and natural borders, he relied on policies that were already present in the official Portuguese thought.

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF MADRID

Shortly before mid-eighteenth century, with Gusmão active in the decision making, Portugal was prepared to negotiate with Spain. Capistrano de Abreu (1963, p. 196) makes it clear that a border agreement was urgent:

The rapid expansion of Brazil – in the Amazon to the Javari [river], in Mato Grosso to the Guaporé [river], and now in the South – made urgent the need to deal head-on with the matter of borders between the Portuguese and Spanish possessions, which had [previously] always been delayed yet then always re-emerged.

What was missing during those delays was the historic opportunity that arose with the ascension to the Spanish throne, in 1746, of Ferdinand VI, the son-in-law of Dom João V. The dealings began immediately thereafter. In that same year, there were also two nominations made that helped to move the issue forward: the competent Dom José de Carbajal y Lancaster was appointed a Minister to the Spanish king, Ferdinand VI; and Tomás da Silva Teles, Viscount of Vila Nova da Cerveira, arrived in Madrid as the new Ambassador of Dom João V. (Although today it is known that the main articulator of the Treaty of Madrid was Gusmão, according to Admiral Max Justo Guedes, who rarely abused superlatives and said that one must not forget the important role played in the negotiations by “the very skilled Tomás da Silva Teles” (1997, p. 28)).

Among the many documents released by Jaime Cortesão, concerning the positions of each of the parties involved in the negotiations, two sets stand out. First, there was the initial Portuguese proposal with room for adjustments, along with the Spanish reply; and then there was a second Portuguese proposal, this time already articulating an agreement, along with a new Spanish reply that improved formal aspects of the proposal and introduced some new items.

It is interesting to note that the often-mentioned Article 21 of the future Treaty – which disallowed that any war be fought on the South American continent, even if the European powers were in combat – was, according to Cortesão, *not* written by Gusmão. Rather, he says that Carbajal is its author. The thesis – considered

by many to be the seed of Pan-Americanism, and thereby links its author to the Monroe Doctrine – had been accepted by several Brazilian historians and diplomats, including the Baron of Rio Branco. It had also been disseminated by Rodrigo Otávio, an attorney, who gave a presentation at the Sorbonne in 1930 under the title “Alexander de Gusmão and the American Spirit in International Politics.”

Portugal sought to negotiate a balanced treaty which, at the expense of conceding the Platine region, if necessary, preserved for itself the Amazon and the Central-West region. The agreement would create a strategic border in the South, and block any Spanish attempt in the region where the balance of power tended towards Buenos Aires. Later, in 1751, when Gusmão defended the Treaty from accusations made by Brigadier Antônio Pedro de Vasconcelos, a former governor of the Colony of Sacramento, he said that its purpose was to “provide a large and competent base ... to round out the country and hold it together” (GUSMÃO, 1943, p. 132). The primary goal for Spain was to stop for good the Portuguese expansion, which had gradually taken pieces of its Empire in South America; then, to reserve the exclusiveness of the Platine estuary for Spain, thus avoiding the smuggling Andean silver which was going out through the Colony of Sacramento. And finally, with the peace provided by the agreement, the many European nations who were enemies of Madrid would be precluded from taking advantage of the peninsular rivalry and settling into the Americas.

The Portuguese proposals, developed by Alexandre de Gusmão, revolved around the following points:

- It was necessary to conclude a general boundary treaty and not make successive adjustments on specific parts of the border, as Spain had originally wanted to do;
- Such a treaty could only be accomplished by discarding the meridian of Tordesillas, which had been violated by

the Portuguese in America, and even more by Spain in the Eastern Hemisphere;

- The foundation of the agreement would be the two principles of *uti possidetis* and natural borders, as referred to respectively in the preamble: “each party shall keep what it currently has” and “the borders of both domains ... are the origin and course of rivers, and the most remarkable mountains”;
- The Colony of Sacramento and adjacent territory were Portuguese, if not by the Treaty of Tordesillas, then definitely by the second Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1715;
- It could be said [clearly with the Colony of Sacramento in mind] “that a party trades with another party that which is most useful to it; that which does the most damage to it to own” (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 285).

Spain, in reply, argued the following points:

- Since the historical circumstances that led to Spanish sovereignty over several Pacific islands are complex, it is best for the negotiations to do without any claims in that hemisphere;
- It was intolerable for Spain that the Colony of Sacramento be the “reason for the loss of the riches of Peru” (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 296);
- It was advisable to trade the Colony of Sacramento for an equivalent area “easy to find in the territories of Cuiabá and Mato Grosso, even though, upon the death of Felipe V, the Spanish government would study the means to get it back” [supposedly without anything in exchange] (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 297).

As the negotiations advanced, there was a gradual focusing in on the territory of the *Sete Povos das Missões* as the bargaining chip

for the Colony of Sacramento. The Sete Povos das Missões had been founded by Spanish Jesuits between 1687 and 1707, in western Rio Grande do Sul; some of the missions were set in the remains of settlements that had escaped the destruction by bandeirantes, who had explored there in the early decades of the seventeenth century. Spain also agreed to give up some of its settlements on the right bank of the Guaporé River – where, today, the Prince of Beira Fort stands, and the Jesuit mission of Santa Rosa had once been located. In compensation, Spain got a strip of land formed by the Solimões and Japurá rivers, where there was a Portuguese fort that was an ancestor of Tabatinga.

Little by little, the description of the borders became more accurate. The changes can be perfectly accompanied by reading the detailed letters that Gusmão sent to the Portuguese trader in Madrid. (The letters, however, were not signed by him, but rather the minister, Marco Antônio de Azeredo Coutinho.)

The borders described in these letters are basically those included in the treaty itself; the first draft of which was sent to Madrid in late 1748.

To serve as a visual support for the negotiations, in early 1749, Gusmão sent to Silva Teles a map, drawn up under his supervision, with the proposed boundaries. It is the first map of Brazil with the almost triangular shape that we all know today. This deservedly famous map, known as the *Mapa das Cortes*, was crucial to the Portuguese. On the map, which skillfully combined other well-known and trusted maps of South America, the extra-Tordesillas area of Brazil was greatly diminished, which gave the impression of there being meager territorial gains to the west of the meridian. The map, despite this defect, was the best there was at that time, because it included the data obtained by the latest penetrations of backwoods explorers. Accepted by both delegations, it was the basis for both the final negotiations and the subsequent demarcation

campaigns. The map was rediscovered by the Baron of Rio Branco, and Itamaraty has one of the original copies in its map collection.

Roberto Simonsen, a Brazilian diplomat, economist, and historian is quoted by Cortesão, as saying the following about the Mapa das Cortes:

The map of Brazil is clearly deformed, with Cuiabá under the same meridian as the mouth of the Amazon River, next to which the line of Tordesillas was supposed to pass through (an error of nine degrees). This construction, which showed the occupied area smaller than it actually was, may have been made this way in order to make it easier for the Spanish to accept the uti possidetis principle, which integrated into Portuguese America much land to the west of the meridian of Tordesillas (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tome II, p. 329).

Cortesão, himself, is even harsher: “The Mapa das Cortes was deliberately tainted in its longitudes for diplomatic purposes” (s.d., Tome II, p. 332). Nevertheless, he advocated such a procedure:

At the time, Alexandre de Gusmão represented a policy of secrecy, which the Portuguese had been practicing in its geographic discoveries since the 1400's. Dom João V, according to a secular tradition, kept the cartography of the mathematician priests a secret. The Mapa das Cortes was nothing more than the necessary consequence of an old policy that was still officially being used (s.d., Tome II, p. 333).

Leaving aside possible ethical considerations, the Spaniards also adapted maps to their political interests. This was revealed in a study published in a recent issue of the specialized magazine *Imago Mundi*, concerning a large map of South America drawn by Cruz Cano y Olmedilla that was used as the basis of the Treaty of San Ildefonso. (The map is displayed at the General Secretariat of the Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia.)

The Treaty of Madrid was signed on January 13, 1750. Thus, the occupation of the Amazon, the Centro-West and the South of Brazil, which had been carried out at various times throughout the 250 years of colonial life, was legalized, and the old Platine dream was abandoned. Although later annulled, the treaty provided close to natural borders for Brazil. Cortesão quotes the German geographer B. Brandt, who said that:

The borders [of Brazil] are considered, on the whole, reasonably natural lines, in correspondence with the configuration of the surface. In the South they almost coincide with the limits between the Brazilian mountains and the Platine plains; [and] in the North, the main dividers are the Amazon, the Orinoco and Guyanian rivers. In the West, they do not reach the area between the Brazilian plains and the mountain chain of the Pacific, but they stay in the Amazon River basin. There too, however, given the frequent river obstacles, they do not free themselves from nature. It can be said, without being very inaccurate, that they often come close to the continental divide of the river flow (CORTESÃO, s.d., Tomo II, p. 381).

This was the myth of the “island of Brazil” which, with the imperfections of reality, was materializing.

DEATH AND LIFE OF A TREATY

Several reasons led to the annulment of the Treaty of Madrid, in 1761. In the South, there was the Guarani War; while in the North, demarcation difficulties proved insurmountable.

Although controversial, some authors, such as Brazilian historians, José Carlos de Macedo Soares and João Pandiá

Calógeras, allege that it was opposition from the Jesuits that provided the greatest obstacle to the treaty:

When one weighs the factors in the decision to annul Madrid, it seems that, in the environment of ill will against the precursory work of Alexandre de Gusmão, the major element was the long campaign of the Jesuits against the cession of the territory of the Sete Povos das Missões (1972, vol. 1, p. 224).

Others, however, such as the Brazilian journalist and historian, Hélio Vianna, believed that the charges against the Jesuits were not supported by documents. Rather, he said there were excuses found at the time, to attack the Society of Jesus, which later, in 1759, was expelled from Brazil. The Portuguese historian, Viscount of Carnaxide (1979, p. 10), an expert on relations between Brazil and Portugal at the time of the Marquis of Pombal (1750-1777), arrived at an intermediate conclusion that distinguishes the reactions of local Jesuit rulers of the lands of the Sete Povos das Missões from the orientation of their European headquarters. In Carnaxide's words:

The missionary Jesuits [in Brazil] opposed the transmigration of the peoples from Uruguay, ordered in the Border Treaty of 1750 [Madrid]; while the Society of Jesus [in Europe] made as great an effort as the governments of Portugal and Spain for the transmigration to take place.

The deterioration of relations between both crowns, caused in 1760 by the rise of the Spanish king, Carlos III, an opponent of the agreement, and the consolidation of powers of another opponent, the Marquis of Pombal, of Portugal, was an important cause of the rapid death of the agreement – a death, however, which was only apparent, as the future revealed. Pombal was against the Treaty of Madrid because he did not agree with the

cession of the Colony of Sacramento to Spain, an attitude that was admired at the time, but certainly exaggerated in the face of the evident advantages of the exchange. Perhaps the antipathy that the powerful minister harbored for his predecessor, Alexandre de Gusmão, also contributed to explain his stance.

The fact is that, in 1761, both countries signed the El Pardo agreement, whereby, according to its text, the Treaty of Madrid and the actions it caused were “cancelled, repealed and nullified as if they had never existed.” Thus, at least in theory, the uncertainties of the Tordesillas division were back, although disrespected on the ground and changed by subsequent agreements. In practice, however, no nation wished to renounce its territorial conquests or their legal titles. This was so much the case that it was exactly during the Pombal era, that major forts were built or re-built – Macapá, São Joaquim, São José de Marabitanas, Tabatinga, Prince of Beira, and Coimbra – which delineate until today the boundaries of Brazil.

The Treaty of El Pardo only created a pause during which one could await the proper moment for a new adjustment of boundaries. That moment came in 1777, the year in which a woman – an unprecedented fact in the history of Portugal – Dona Maria I, ascended to the throne and began the policy of reacting to Pombalism – a policy which became known as *a viradeira* (the turnaround).

A new treaty was already being negotiated, but the fall of Pombal in Portugal, and the replacement of Prime-Minister Grimaldi with the Count of Florida Blanca, in Spain, changed the balance of power “for the worse as far as Portuguese interests were concerned” (REIS, 1963, vol. I, p. 376). Spain made demands and imposed the signing of a Preliminary Treaty of Borders, which took the name of a palace of the Spanish Crown, San Ildefonso, near Toledo. By the Treaty of San Ildefonso, Portugal kept the western and northern borders for Brazil that had been negotiated in Madrid, although they were more accurate in certain respects.

The Portuguese Empire, however, gave up the Colony of Sacramento, without receiving any compensation in return, for example, the territory of the Sete Povos das Missões. Thus, Rio Grande do Sul ended up in a fragile position and had only half of its current territory – a situation, which was almost the same as how it had been defined in the Treaty of Madrid.

The borders of Brazil



Treaty of Tordesillas (1494)
Treaty of Madrid (1750)
Treaty of San Ildefonso (1777)

There is no doubt that because of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, Portugal lost territory in the South as compared to what it had gained from the Treaty of Madrid. However, it cannot be said that the treaty was totally bad for Portugal, as it confirmed the

inclusion within the national territory of almost the entire area of the two thirds of current Brazil that is beyond the Tordesillas line. Most Brazilian historians, however, condemn the agreement, in line with Varnhagen (cited in VIANA, 1958, p. 71), who claims that San Ildefonso's articles were "dictated by Spain almost with weapons in hand." Capistrano (1963, p. 305) is the exception. Always thinking independently and believing that patriotism cannot overcome fairness, Capistrano considers the treaty to be "more humane and generous" than that of Madrid, since it did not impose any Indian transmigrations, which he considered hateful.

Similar to most of their Brazilian counterparts, a number of Hispanic-American historians also condemn San Ildefonso, but for opposite reasons. According to them, Spain could have obtained much more at the time. The Argentine, Miguel Angel Scenna (1975, p. 62), for example, says: "San Ildefonso...was bad [for the Spanish] because when it was negotiated, Spain already had victory in hand, and it had the conditions to invade Brazil militarily." Indeed, at the time, the governor of Buenos Aires, Viceroy Pedro de Ceballos, occupied the island of Santa Catarina and his position *was* strong compared to that of the Portuguese-Brazilians in Rio Grande do Sul.

Maybe those Hispanic historians who, along with Capistrano, consider the Treaty of San Ildefonso a satisfactory agreement, reflecting the balance of power at the time – more favorable to Spain than when the Treaty of Madrid was signed – are closer to the correct assessment. Argentine internationalist, Carlos Calvo (Cited in SOARES, 1938, p. 168), for example, stated the following on San Ildefonso. Saying it was:

More advantageous to Spain than the treaty of 1750, leaving it in absolute and exclusive domination over the Rio de la Plata, flying it's flag in the Colony of Sacramento, and extending its domination to the land around the Ibicuí [the

region of the Sete Povos das Missões] on the left bank of the Uruguay [river], without sacrificing more than the return of the island of Santa Catarina, which had been seized by conquest.

Variations of the southern border



Madrid (1750) -----
San Ildefonso (1777)
Current -----

In 1801, the situation worsened with a new war between the peninsular nations, known as the “War of the Oranges,” taking place. In Europe, Portugal had part of its territory amputated with the Spanish conquest of Olivença and, in America, the Portuguese-Brazilians recaptured, this time for good, the territory of the Sete Povos das Missões, pushing the border all the way to the Quaraí River. Different from what had happened during the Guaraní

War, the occupation was quite easy: “The Spaniards were not able to defend the territory ... they lacked the Jesuits to organize the Indians and lead them in an effective way in war” (MAGALHÃES, 1992, vol. III, p. 35). In the end, the southern border was nearly the same as that which had been set in 1750; it descended in the west from the Ibicuí to the Quaraí rivers, tributaries of the Uruguay, and then went from the tip of Castillos Grande to the Arroio Chuí, a small stream on the coast.

The conflict ended the same year it began with the Peace Treaty of Badajós (1801), which did not revalidate the Treaty of San Ildefonso, or any other previous border treaty. This was an omission that was inconsistent with the usual practice among the Iberian nations – to confirm borders when peace treaties were celebrated. In addition, it did not order that the *status quo ante bellum* be restored and, for that reason, Olivença became a Spanish city, and the western region of Rio Grande do Sul belonged to Brazil. Thus, in the early nineteenth century, even though the boundary line was not legally closed, there was a solid basis of occupation, which almost coincided with the historical outline of the colonial treaties. Therefore, as the Brazilian historian Francisco Iglésias has said: “By the end of the colonial period the Brazilian map was almost defined” (1993, p. 294). It is interesting to note that this did not take place in the rest of South America, nor in North America, where the major border changes took place after independence. (An example of this is that the United States “inherited” from England almost one tenth of its current territory.)

There are differences between Brazilian and Hispanic Americans on the validity of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, especially after independence. Most Spanish-speaking authors agree with the Peruvian historian-diplomat, Raúl Porras Barrenechea (1981, p. 23), who, in his *Historia de los Límites del Perú* (History of the Borders of Peru), characterized the treaty as “that which

permanently fixed the borders between the colonies.” And Barrenechea further said:

The Treaty of San Ildefonso was the final agreement signed between Spain and Portugal concerning the borders of their respective colonies. It was the treaty in effect when the independence of South America was proclaimed. Brazil, however, following the expansionist tradition of its Portuguese colonizers, crossed over the Treaty of San Ildefonso line in many places. In diplomatic talks, when countries neighboring Brazil attempted to invoke the rights given to them in the treaty, Brazil denied the substance and the validity of San Ildefonso (p.23).

The Brazilian doctrine, developed during the Empire, was not attached to the text of the Treaty of San Ildefonso which, according to its official title, was “preliminary,” and it had been annulled by the 1801 war – which Brazil always disputed. Its basic principle, *uti possidetis*, was the same as that of the Treaty of Madrid. San Ildefonso was actually useful, but only as a supplementary guide and, in those areas where there was no occupation by any of the parties involved. The doctrine was formulated in its most complete version by the Viscount of Rio Branco, in a memorandum presented to the Argentine Government in 1857.

Ultimately, after Brazil had further defined its borders in bilateral treaties at the end of the Rio Branco era at Itamaraty, it was the concept of possession – the principle of *uti possidetis* – that continued to define the country’s territory. In this way, Alexandre de Gusmão’s work has lived forever.

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JOSÉ BONIFÁCIO

José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, universally known in Brazil as “The Patriarch of Independence,” was born on June 13, 1763, in the modest port city of Santos, then part of the Portuguese colony of Brazil. Born into a well-to-do family of civil servants and merchants, he had nine brothers and sisters, two of whom, Martim Francisco and Antônio Carlos, also actively participated in Brazil’s process of independence. After his early years as a student in São Paulo, a 20 year old Bonifácio was sent to study at the University of Coimbra, in Portugal, as were many of his contemporaries from wealthy Brazilian families. At Coimbra, he studied law, philosophy, and mathematics, as well as the natural sciences – the latter in which he excelled. After graduation, he remained in Europe, joined the Lisbon Academy of Sciences, in 1789, and began a 10-year trip across the continent to further his scientific studies.

Upon returning to Portugal, in 1800 – already a renowned scientist due to courses he had taken, texts he had published, and memberships he had attained in recognized scientific academies

– Bonifácio was integrated into the ruling elite of the Kingdom of Portugal. He was also appointed to various administrative positions, such as the inspector-general of Portuguese mines and natural resources. In addition, he taught at the national mint, as well as at Coimbra, where he created the discipline of Metallurgy. An early advocate of the environment, Bonifácio planned the recovery of forests and rivers, such as the Mondego, the longest river within the boundaries of Portugal.

When Napoleon's army invaded Portugal, José Bonifácio fought the French invaders as a member of a volunteer corps of scholars, from 1807 to 1810, and due to his scientific knowledge, he also supervised the manufacture of ammunition used in the conflict.

Interested in political affairs in addition to science, in 1813, Bonifácio wrote a letter to Domingos Antônio de Souza Coutinho, the Count of Funchal, stating his views on the reforming role of the State. He believed, for example, that the State should stimulate science and remove obstacles to industry. In his writings, he also presented three issues he considered crucial to development in his native Brazil: the end of slavery, the assimilation of the native Indian population, and the promotion of miscegenation.

After 36 years in Europe, in 1819, at the age of 56, Bonifácio returned to Brazil with his wife, Narcisa Emilia O'Leary, and their daughters. He had planned to retire, but in 1820, he accepted the title of adviser to the king, João VI, who was still living in Brazil. That same year, José Bonifácio made a scientific trip around the province of São Paulo, accompanied by his brother, Martim Francisco, to research development opportunities in fields such as minerology, which he had studied and taught in Europe.

After a revolution that began in the city of Porto spread across Portugal, 1820-1821, João VI returned to Lisbon. At the

same time, Bonifácio took on a leadership role in the government of São Paulo. After the decisive moment in January 1822, when João VI's son, Pedro, declared that he would not follow his father back to Portugal but, rather, he would stay in Brazil – an event known as the *Fico* (Portuguese for “I shall stay”) – the 23 year old prince regent invited the 58 year old Bonifácio to be “Minister of the Kingdom and Overseas Affairs,” a position that combined the functions of prime and foreign minister. It was the first time a Brazilian-born figure had taken on the office of minister of State.

Throughout 1822, Bonifácio's role in the executive branch of the government was instrumental in driving the process of Brazilian independence, which Pedro declared on September 7th of that year.

As minister, José Bonifácio worked to keep the country united, organize the new State, and prepare for its defenses. As the head of the newly independent country's foreign office, he was in charge of issuing the initial instructions to its first diplomats, as well as developing Brazilian foreign policy.

In 1823, once a constituent assembly was installed, Bonifácio presented a proposal to end slavery. Growing opposition to his policies, however, led to a coup d'état and a closure of the assembly. Pedro, now the Emperor of an independent Brazil, centralized powers, and a number of political elites – including the Andrada brothers – were exiled. José Bonifácio spent the next six years in France. When he returned to Brazil, in 1829, he also returned to politics.

In April 1831, mainly due to a power struggle back in Portugal, Pedro abdicated and returned to Europe as his father had done a decade earlier. Before he left, he appointed José Bonifácio as tutor to his son and heir to the throne, Pedro Alcantara, who was then but 5 years old. Bonifácio, however, still had enemies, and after a

couple of years, he was defeated in fierce political disputes with – among others – the powerful, statesman/priest, Diogo Feijó, then the justice minister and later (1835) the Regent, as Brazil waited for Pedro to come of age.

In 1833, José Bonifácio was removed from his position as tutor to the heir to the throne and, indeed, he was charged with treason and kept under house arrest on the small island of Paquetá, in Guanabara Bay. Although ultimately acquitted of the treason charges, Bonifácio basically retired from politics. He died, on April 6, 1838, two months short of his 75th birthday, in Niterói, just across the bay from Rio de Janeiro.

JOSÉ BONIFÁCIO: THE PATRIARCH OF BRAZILIAN DIPLOMACY

João Alfredo dos Anjos

[...] Senhor d'Andrada goes further; I heard him say in the Court, in front of twenty people, all of them foreigners, that a grand alliance – or an American federation with freedom of commerce – was necessary; that if Europe refused to accept this, they [Brazil] would close their ports and become like China. If we attacked them, their forest and mountains would become their fortresses, and, in a maritime war, we would lose more than they [...].

Correspondence of the Baron de Mareschal to the Prince of Metternich, Rio de Janeiro, May 17, 1822.¹

Although he is known as the “Patriarch of Brazilian Independence,” few also identify José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva as the creator of his country’s foreign policy. In truth, however, as the “Minister of the Kingdom and Overseas Affairs,” 1822-1823, he was the figure most responsible for the formulation of foreign policy for the newly independent nation. Bonifácio saw it his duty to rid the nascent State of Portuguese paradigms, and establish new guidelines and initiatives. Under his leadership, Brazil’s foreign

¹ Correspondence of the Baron de Mareschal, In *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, Tome 80, Rio de Janeiro, 1917, p. 65.

policies included initiatives such as a more cooperative approach to Buenos Aires; the preservation of the decision-making autonomy of the Brazilian State, especially in relation to the hegemonic powers of the time; the building of efficient armed forces in defense of sovereignty; and the protection of the country's domestic industry. In his search for the construction of a national territorial unit, the new minister established policies that built upon some of the ideas he had expressed much earlier in his life. He called for the "civilization" of the native (Brazilian) Indian population, an end to slavery, and the integration of indigenous and African communities into the national fabric. He also advocated agrarian and educational reforms, as well as economic development, with the diversification of Brazilian exports, environmental preservation, and the rational use of natural resources.²

Although his family was relatively wealthy, and his hometown of Santos was still a modest port when he lived there during the second half of the eighteenth century, while Bonifácio was a student at the University of Coimbra, he did not limit his studies to legal matters, as was more common for Brazilian-born students at the time. Rather, being a good representative of the era of "Pombaline Enlightenment," he studied and excelled in many fields – especially the sciences.

After graduation – and a ten year scientific study tour around Europe – Bonifácio made contacts with the major European scientists of his time and published research papers in specialized media. When he returned to Portugal, despite being Brazilian-born, he became a member of the Portuguese elite, holding several

2 The reference texts for the related themes are the following: *Representação à Assembleia Geral Constituinte Sobre a Escravatura; Apontamentos para a Civilização dos Índios; Lembranças e Apontamento do Governo Provisório da Província de São Paulo para os seus Deputados; Memória Sobre a Necessidade e Utilidades do Plantio de Novos Bosques em Portugal*, published in the volumes organized by Jorge Caldeira (*José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva*. São Paulo: Ed. 34, 2002) and Miriam Dolnikoff (*Projetos para o Brasil*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1998).

public and academic functions, and getting involved in intense dialogue with high authorities of the Kingdom. It is no wonder, therefore, that when he returned to his native Brazil, in 1819, he was known as an expert and was called upon to take part in a variety of activities, including politics – especially those triggered by the so-called Liberal Revolution of Porto, in 1820.

Recognized as bringing stability to the government in São Paulo, Bonifácio became a political reference. In that capacity, he exercised a leadership role in the effort calling for the permanence in Brazil of the crown prince, Dom Pedro, whose father, Joao VI, had recently returned to Portugal, leaving his son as regent.

As a spokesman for São Paulo, Bonifácio made personal and decisive contact with Dom Pedro.³ In January 1822, Pedro appointed Bonifácio, *Ministro do Reino e Negócios Estrangeiros* (Minister of the Kingdom and Overseas Affairs). His administration of the diplomatic functions of that office was marked by pragmatism, especially in negotiating the recognition of Brazilian independence with European powers. Regionally, he sent a political representative to Buenos Aires, instructing him to propose the creation of a confederation with the provinces of the Plata. And concerning the United States, José Bonifácio took the initiative to propose an agreement of cooperation and defense early in 1822 – a year and a half before the statement made by President James Monroe of that country that became known as the Monroe Doctrine.

Unlike the interpretation of traditional historiography, concerning negotiations for the recognition of Brazil's independence, which mainly came in 1825, Bonifácio had a different view of the independence recognition process. He believed that diplomatic recognition *would* come sooner or later, a view he based

3 On José Bonifácio's background and his political rise, see Dolhnikoff, Miriam. *José Bonifácio*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012.

on the qualities of Brazil and on the commercial interest of other countries, especially Great Britain, France and the United States. A study of Andrada's view of the recognition process corrects some of the still ongoing *ex post facto* impressions concerning the inevitability of negotiations mediated by Great Britain, and its value to Brazil.

The Brazilian foreign office under Bonifácio was not willing to offer compensation or accept compromises that represented direct or indirect losses to Brazil. Such compromises had occurred with the Treaties of 1810 that Portugal had made with Great Britain. Instead, the minister used the economic interest of other nations – especially those of Great Britain, France and the United States – as a bargaining tool in the process. In this manner, Brazil would defend its own interests, and not merely conform to those of others.

Bonifácio instructed Felisberto Caldeira Brant, the Brazilian negotiator in London, to make Great Britain realize that Brazil was an independent country, and although recognition was important, the country would take its place in the international arena with or without any formal “recognition.” He also wanted it made clear that Brazilian ports would be closed – from the Plata to the Amazon – to all States that did not recognize the independence and sovereignty of the country.

In addition to the recognition issue, Bonifácio did not authorize Caldeira Brant to take loans out in London, a recourse insistently advocated by the Brazilian representative. On the contrary, he sought an internal solution to the country's financial problems, with the emission of national treasury bills and the establishment of a fund for national emergencies (*Arquivo Diplomático da Independência*, I, Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia

Fluminense, 1922 to 1925).⁴ Later, while in exile in France, due to the coup d'état against the Constituent Assembly, Bonifácio criticized the agreement of 1825, which he considered “a kick to the gut” of national sovereignty. He also criticized the role of Great Britain in the process, which he said wanted to “trick Brazil” into sharing “the burden of an agonizing Portugal” – a reference to the Portuguese government’s debt of 2 million pounds sterling – while actually arming itself to dominate Brazil. By the agreement, in Bonifácio’s own words, the debt entered onto the list of debts of the nominal “Empire of the Equator” (CARTAS ANDRADINAS, 1890, p. 10-11).⁵

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AT THE TIME OF BRAZIL’S INDEPENDENCE

With the Industrial Revolution and the consolidation of its naval powers, Great Britain had become the global economic and military leader in the early nineteenth century. Since 1780, its foreign trade exceeded that of France and, in 1848, it was twice as large as that of its closest international rival. The defeat of Napoleon also meant the end of a cycle of more than 100 years of wars between Great Britain and France, with the establishment of military supremacy, especially naval, of the former over the latter. One of Britain’s goals in its war with France was economic: “to eliminate its main competitor in order to reach total predominance

4 For the Decree, see: Instructions and correspondence from Bonifácio to Brant, on August 12, 1822, see p. 5 to 14. For the loan, see: *Obra Política de José Bonifácio*. Brasília: Federal Senate, 1973, I, p. 139; *Obras Científicas, Políticas e Sociais*. Santos: Executive Work Group of the Tributes to the Patriarch, 1963, II, p. 244-246.

5 The dissolution of the Assembly is considered as a “coup d’état” in the *Réfutation des Calomnies Relatives aux Affaires du Brésil*, written by the three Andradas brothers. See *Obras Científicas, Políticas e Sociais*, II, p. 387-446.

in European trade markets and have total control over overseas colonial markets which, in turn, implied maritime control.” The British political game, therefore, was to maintain the balance of power on the continent, making it infeasible for any possible rival to prevail. Then, with the end of the old colonial system, the new markets would be at the mercy of Britain’s business interests (HOBBSAWM, 1977, p. 41 and 69).⁶

British participation in the independence process of the Iberian-American countries must be understood as part of a strategy of new and promising markets for Great Britain’s manufacturers, while simultaneously ensuring their supply of cotton and other raw materials necessary for the industrialization process. This was a successful strategy, as Hobsbawm (1977, p. 51-52) said, when he pointed out that in 1820 imports of British fabrics by Latin American countries “amounted to more than a quarter of European imports of the same product.” As early as 1840, textile imports by Latin America reached “almost half of all that Europe imported.” China, which Bonifácio considered an example of the type of resistance Brazil should emulate, also lost, even with the ever-present aid of the British Navy, as it was forced to open its market to British traders during the Opium War (1839-1842). In practice, both Brazil (in 1808) and Buenos Aires (in 1809) had opened their markets to English products even before independence or, according to historian Amado Cervo (1998, p. 84), the colonial monopoly “fell apart” before “independence.”

On the other hand, France had started the revolution that profoundly changed the European political environment, influencing the States under formation in Iberian America. The Napoleonic invasions had installed the new administrative framework, the Civil Code and other French institutions, outside of

6 See p. 101 for an assessment of the Anglo-French War and the British strategy.

France. Even with Napoleon's defeat, the panorama permanently changed with the destruction of feudal institutions and reforms of the State. Likewise, the French Revolution proved that "nations exist regardless of their States; people regardless of their rulers" (HOBBSAWM, 1977, p. 108-109). This political aspect of the liberal-bourgeois revolution matches its economic counterpart: both revolutions, the English and the French, formed the core of liberalism as people understood it in the early nineteenth century. Industrialization was based on the advance of technical knowledge and world trade, supported by faster and safer means of transportation – albeit still without large commercial steamers and trains – and finally, within the legal framework of a constitution and civil law, as a guarantee of the bourgeois rights and freedoms.

Opposite this political revolution, there was the French Restoration, as well as the conservatism of Austria and Russia – representatives of institutions that had not modernized, and thus were relentlessly defeated. France had tried almost everything, since 1789: a parliamentary monarchy, the unicameral Republic of the Convention, the bicameral Republic of the Directory, and even the "plebiscitary" monarchy of the Empire. After 1814, it tried to conciliate a monarchy – supported by the historical legitimacy of the Bourbon dynasty – with constitutional principles. The conservatives, however, saw the constitution as a minor concession, to avoid the greater evil of Jacobin radicalism (WARESQUIEL, 2002, p. 7).

Concepts such as liberalism, constitutionalism and legitimacy were frequently utilized in that period and were at the center of the ideological struggle. The principle of legitimacy, so often repeated in conversations with Brazilian diplomats by Prince Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, resulted from a political need (Diplomatic Archive of Independence, IV, p. 58ff, letter from Teles da Silva to Bonifácio). On March 31, 1814, while in the midst of discussions

about how the allies would treat the succession in France, Talleyrand argued that “intrigue” and “force” were not enough to establish a stable and lasting government in France: “... you must act according to a principle...” he said. That principle, legitimacy, returned the Bourbons to the French throne, as the dynasty that had been defeated by the Revolution was seen as the only entity that could be placed in front of the State. The reality of 25 years of revolution, however, came at a price, and the Bourbons had to live with institutions, laws and practices that were consolidated with the bourgeois order built by Napoleon. On the other hand, the absolutist monarchists saw the constitution – linked to the old European order – as a threat. In the words of the Abbé de Rauzan: “every constitution is a regicide.” Thus, Louis XVIII viewed the Senatorial Constitution drafted in 1814 as a “suggestion,” as, he believed, it was not the people that should give the law to the monarch, but the monarch that should offer it magnanimously to the people (WARESQUIEL, 2002, p. 36 and 61).⁷

This conservative backwardness was promoted by the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia, established in 1815. Later, in the early 1820s, Austria suppressed liberal movements in Piedmont and Naples, and in 1823, France invaded liberal Spain, to restore Ferdinand VII to the throne. At this same time, in Portugal, Dom Miguel was encouraged to stage a coup d'état against the Cortes of Lisbon, an episode known as *Vilafrancada*, which resulted in the restoration of João VI, returned from Brazil, to power. One could also add to this list, the coup d'état carried out by Dom Pedro, another Bragança, against the Brazilian constituent/general assembly in Rio de Janeiro, in November 1823.

7 For the “Senatorial Constitution,” see p. 45 and ff.

JOSÉ BONIFÁCIO IN THE GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL

Although 1823 was the year of the conservative counter-revolution in Brazil and Portugal, a Constitutionalist and Liberal environment existed just prior to that year, and it was such an environment that led José Bonifácio to join the ministry of Brazil's regent prince, Pedro. Early in 1822, a few days after Pedro declared that he would not return to Portugal and would stay in the country – his famous “Fico” speech of January 6, 1822 – a tense atmosphere also existed in Rio de Janeiro, caused by the threat of rebellion of Portuguese troops under General Jorge Avilez.

José Bonifácio's appointment as the *de facto* prime and foreign minister of Brazil's Prince Regent resulted from his multifaceted career of scientist and public servant, as well as that of political advisor. His political career began in 1820 – soon after returning from Portugal – when he was named an elector from Santos. In June, 1821, amidst the unrest caused by a number of military uprisings by liberals, he played a decisive role in the restoration of political stability in São Paulo, while preventing the removal of the governor appointed by the Crown, João Carlos Augusto Oeynhausen-Gravenburg, the future Marquis of Aracati. During that time, Bonifácio, joined the São Paulo government and was acclaimed Vice Governor of the province. Although they had deeper roots, the events of 1821 were also influenced by the Porto rebellion, which began the previous year in Portugal (SOUSA, 1988, p. 122ff).⁸

After he left the ministry, Bonifácio discussed his political thoughts on Brazil's independence in an interview with *O Tamoio*, a Rio de Janeiro newspaper. In that interview, he said he had made enemies because he was the first to preach:

8 It is also from 1821 the publication of the *Estatutos para a Sociedade Econômica da Província de São Paulo* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1821), which may be consulted in the Manuscript Section of the National Library of Rio de Janeiro, 5,1,39.

the independence and freedom of Brazil, albeit a fair and sensible freedom, under the tutelage of a constitutional monarchy, the only system that could preserve this majestic and indivisible piece of social architecture from the Plata to the Amazon, [keeping it] both united and solid; ... about that I am certain, except if the salvation and independence of Brazil imperiously require otherwise (our emphasis).

Ultimately, therefore, Bonifácio believed that a constitutional monarchy was the best form of government for Brazil: to keep such a large and diverse nation united.⁹

As early as 1822, the management of foreign affairs under Bonifácio had two major achievements: the first administrative; the second, political. Administratively, he had presided over the autonomous reorganization and professional upgrading of the foreign office as well as of the nation's negotiators abroad; and politically, with the publication of his August 6th "Manifesto to Friendly Governments and Nations," and his instructions to Brazilian negotiators working abroad, his actions prescribed the paths an independent Brazil would follow in the realm of foreign policy.¹⁰ Amado Cervo summarizes the foreign policy principles from the "Manifesto" with the following seven points:

1) The maintenance of political and commercial relations, without giving priority to any particular one; 2) The

9 Interview in *O Tamoio*, of Tuesday, September 2, 1823, in *Obras Científicas, Políticas e Sociais*, II, p. 381-386. He was called "Old Man from Rocio" (or "Rossio"), a reference to the square in Rio de Janeiro where he lived. According to Hobsbawm (1977, p. 77), the "classical liberal bourgeois of 1789 (and the liberal of 1789-1848) was not a democrat, but rather a believer in Constitutionalism, a secular State with civil liberties and guarantees for private enterprise and a government made up of taxpayers and owners."

10 Historical Archive of Itamaraty, Laws, Decrees and Ordinances, 321-1-1. Castro, Flávio Mendes de Oliveira. *História da Organização do Ministério das Relações Exteriores*, Brasília: Editora UnB, 1983, p. 16-22. According to Fernando Figueira de Mello, in the dissertation *A Longa Duração da Política: Diplomacia e Escravidão na Vida de José Bonifácio*, UFRJ-PPGIS, 2005, p. 153, "[...] José Bonifácio was the first one to make an effort towards the administrative structuring of a Brazilian government agency in charge of both diplomatic and international affairs."

continuity of relations established since the arrival of the Royal family [in Brazil]; 3) Commercial liberalism; 4) Mutual respect and reciprocity in business dealings; 5) The opening up of immigration; 6) Facilities for the acceptance and use of foreign scholars, artists and entrepreneurs; and 7) An opening up to foreign capital.

One can also understand from the text of the document that Brazil would begin to act internationally, without requiring political recognition as a condition. After all, since the country had been declared the seat of a kingdom in Vienna in 1815, it would not accept attacks on its territorial integrity, its sovereignty, or on measures affecting its foreign trade. Commercial liberalism should be regulated by the State as it is in charge of managing trade relations with foreign countries in accordance with national interests (CERVO, 1978, p. 47-48).

On matters related to defense, Bonifácio organized a “peacemaking army,” commanded by General Pierre Labatut, of France, contracted to counter the siege of the Portuguese troops led by General Inácio Luis Madeira in Bahia in 1823. He also hired the services of Admiral Thomas Cochrane and hundreds of other British and French officers; plus he organized militias, and sought to integrate Indians into the fight in defense of independence.

On the naval front, with an efficient administration of public resources, Bonifácio made funds available for the purchase of six war frigates with 50 cannons each, in addition to resuming shipbuilding in the arsenal of Rio de Janeiro. Several measures were also adopted to develop and diversify the Brazilian economy (Diário da Assembleia Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil, 2003, I, p. 15-19).¹¹

11 See the case of the “Indian” Inocência Gonçalves de Abreu, who received “40 to 50 shotguns with ammunition” in order to constitute “an artillery of shooters” (sic). *Obra Política de José Bonifácio*, I, p. 414-415. For the economic measures, see Sérgio Buarque de Holanda Fund, Unicamp, doc. 1696 or *Obra Política de José Bonifácio*, I, p. 166-168, 261 and 369.

THE FIRST STEP IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY WAS TOWARDS THE PLATA.

After the initial domestic policy measures were reviewed, José Bonifácio turned his attention to foreign matters, beginning with the Plata. Already in May 1822, four months prior to the actual declaration of independence, he summoned Antônio Manuel Corrêa da Câmara, to represent the country in Buenos Aires, with the purpose of establishing direct relations of understanding and cooperation. Corrêa da Câmara's mission was broad. He was to act not only on matters related to the government of Buenos Aires, but also on those related to Paraguay, the provinces of the so-called Argentine Mesopotamia – Entre Ríos and Santa Fe – as well as those of Chile. This was José Bonifácio's first foreign policy initiative (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, V, p. 235-238).

The priority to establish relations of political coordination with Buenos Aires, which might currently seem natural, was not as obvious in the Brazil of the early nineteenth century. On the contrary, the Hispanic and Portuguese Americas had a history of conflict and political intrigue, exemplified in the matter of the Cisplatine and in the plots of Carlota Joaquina, the Spanish-born wife of Joao VI, who once aspired to the throne of the Vice-Kingdom of the Plata. Under Bonifácio's leadership, Brazil left the paradigm of competition between Portugal and Spain and took the first step in the direction of a cooperative relationship with the Plata region.

Corrêa da Câmara was charged with expressing the commitment of the regent prince to recognize the independence of neighboring nations in addition to explaining:

... the incalculable benefits that could result from having a confederation – or an offensive and defensive treaty – with Brazil, to oppose with other governments of Spanish America

the knowledgeable management of European powers; ultimately demonstrating to them that none of those governments could gain a more loyal and willing friend than the government of Brazil; in addition to the great advantages that would result from trade relations that they may reciprocally have with the Kingdom (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, V, p. 235-238, our emphasis).

Bonifácio was fully aware that the proposal would only have resonance if mistrust of the Brazilian government's good faith was overcome. The minister argued exactly that point to Corrêa da Câmara, when he told him that he, himself, must be convinced that a country like Brazil, engaged in a contentious struggle for independence, could not stop being friendly with its neighbors. The delicacy of the mission assigned to Correa da Câmara pervaded the entire dispatch of Bonifácio's instructions, which ended with Pedro's recommendation that "the years and experience of the world, force him to work with full maturity, calmness and cold blood ..." (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, V, p. 235-238).

In Rio de Janeiro, Bonifácio worked to create a solution to the Cisplatine dispute. For example, it seems clear the minister played a role in the permanence of Lucas José Obes in Rio de Janeiro, in 1822, as well as in his inclusion on the Council of Prosecutors of the Provinces. Obes was one of the directors, who signed the minutes calling for the Constituent Assembly in June 1822. He was also appointed to the Council of State, and he was honored, at Pedro's coronation, with the Order of the Cross – the same level as the Baron of Laguna, a military commander in Montevideo. Bonifácio and Obes shared the same antislavery opinion and, as Bonifácio eventually proposed in the constitutional text under

discussion in September of 1823, they both understood the need to grant special status to the “Cisplatine State.”¹²

As a member of the Constituent Assembly, José Bonifácio proposed a special formula to incorporate Montevideo, in the draft constitution presented for discussion in September, 1823. Article 2 related the Brazilian provinces, from Pará to Rio Grande [do Sul] “and by, federation, the Cisplatine State.” Manoel Bomfim thought that such a solution “might have gracefully resolved the case of the South.” Bonifácio’s formula of special legal recognition for the Cisplatine State was, however, excluded from the text that the Emperor imposed after the coup against the Assembly.¹³

In Buenos Aires, Corrêa da Câmara carried out a rapprochement with the foreign minister, Bernardino Rivadavia,¹⁴ and Manuel José García, the finance minister. The Brazilian representative suggested to the Argentines the importance of deepening the “bonds of friendship and understanding” between their two governments. Câmara, however, considered that such an understanding should not have “untimely publicity,” so as to not “shock” the neighboring countries, or attract their “free” opposition. While visiting García, on August 10, 1822, he said

12 As João Paulo Pimenta explains in, *Estado e Nação no fim dos Impérios Ibéricos no Prata (1808-1828)*. São Paulo: Hucitec; Fapesp, 2002 p. 178, Obes was the defense lawyer of two female slaves accused of having murdered their female master in Montevideo, in 1821. Obes defense presented to the Court “is a real manifest against African slavery, which he considered a savage and degrading institution.” See the *Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro*, supplement to the issue of 12/3/1822, in the digital archives of the *Coleção da Biblioteca Nacional*, (www.bn.br). Bonifácio included Obes among the first people to receive the Order of the Cross at the officer’s level, the same as that of the Baron of the Laguna. *Diário da Assembléia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil*, II, p. 689.

13 In the *Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro*, of 12/10/1822, there are several official documents Bonifácio ordered published that address the acclamation of Dom Pedro as “Emperor of Brazil and of the Cisplatine State” or “Constitutional Emperor of Brazil and of the Cisplatine State.” See the *Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro*, *Biblioteca Nacional*, digital archives (www.bn.br). Bomfim, Manoel, *O Brasil Nação*, Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1996, p. 73-74, nota 22, p. 596. *Diário da Assembléia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil*, II, p. 689.

14 Bernardino Rivadavia was President of Argentina from February 8, 1826 to July 7, 1827. See Floria, Carlos Alberto; Belsunce, César A. García. *Historia de los Argentinos*, I, p. 467-471.

that: “Brazil is a giant; nothing will ever force it to return to what it was [...]. I am certain that only a sincere and perfect union of all American States can give this part of the world ... the strength it needs” (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, V, p. 261, 262 and 263).

Rivadavia became the president of Argentina in 1826, and he attempted to resolve with Brazil, the impasse regarding the Cisplatine. Accordingly, he sent Manuel José García to negotiate peace. García signed an agreement with the Empire of Brazil, on May 24, 1827, giving up the Banda Oriental; thereby confirming that which Bonifácio had envisioned in 1822. Due to problems related to the short-lived Argentine Constitution of 1826, however, the agreement was poorly administered, and the crisis in Buenos Aires deepened. Rivadavia ended up rejecting the agreement and presenting his resignation to the Argentine Congress – believing he could return to office with renewed powers. But his resignation was accepted by a vote of 48 to 2, and Bernardino Rivadavia went into exile as a former president, in 1829.¹⁵

RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN

Relations with Great Britain during the period of independence – mainly under the management of José Bonifácio – can be seen from two different perspectives: first, Brazil’s need to affirm its sovereignty and ensure the indivisibility of its territory;

15 According to Raul Adalberto de Campos, in his *Relações Diplomáticas do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia do Jornal do Comércio, by Rodrigues & Cia, 1913, pp. 134 and 135, García had been sent to Brazil, as a “confidential agent, from 1815 until June, 1820”. Later, he was an Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister, until May 7, 1827, when he “came to negotiate peace, under the mediation of the British government.” He signed the peace treaty dated May 24, 1827, “by which the United Provinces of the Plata River gave up their claim to the territory of the Cisplatine Province.” The treaty, however, was not ratified by the government of Buenos Aires (Flórida; Belsunce, 1992, p. 452, 478 and 479).

and, second, the British desire to maintain and expand its political ascendancy over South America, especially by attempting to reproduce in Brazil the control it exercised over Portugal. In this context, while the Brazilian government sought recognition of its independence, Great Britain sought to use its power to ensure and improve its mechanisms of control over the new country. The British used two weapons in its quest: 1) the protected trade of its industrialized products, and 2) its naval superiority. Commercial protection was given to it by means of a 15% *ad valorem* rate on British products in the Brazilian market, as compared to a payment of 16% by Portugal and 24% by other nations; rates that had been established by the Treaties of 1810.¹⁶

Great Britain's naval supremacy had been tested successfully in the continental blockade during the Napoleonic wars and in the war against the United States (1812-1815). Once peace was established, the British Kingdom sought legal sanction for its *de facto* naval superiority. One way of doing this was by obtaining recognition of the right of warring nations to carry out searches in neutral vessels on the high seas.¹⁷

Concerning Portugal (and Brazil), Great Britain went further in that area. Within the context of discussions about

16 The treaties of 1810 include the Treaty of Trade and Navigation and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, both dated February 19, 1810. Later, by decree on October 18, 1810, British commodities transported by Portuguese vessels also began to pay 15% *ad valorem*. The rate charged to Portuguese commodities became equal to that of the British in 1818. See Lima, Manuel de Oliveira. *Dom João VI no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1996, p. 255, 256 and 265.

17 One of the British victories in the Congress of Vienna had been that it excluded from the deliberations of the winning powers the matters that involved the law of the sea. (Kissinger, 1973, pp. 33 and 34). Nicolson (1946, *passim*) defines "maritime rights," on p. 282, as being "a phrase employed by Great Britain, to designate what other countries called freedom of the seas. The British contention was that a belligerent had the right to visit and search neutral vessels on the high seas. The opposing contention was that neutrality carried exemption from interference on the principle of 'free ships, free goods'. Britain claimed that if this principle were agreed to, no naval blockade would prove effective since any blockaded country could import goods in neutral bottoms. Others said that to extend British maritime supremacy to the point of interference with legitimate neutral commerce was against the rights of nations."

the abolition of slave trafficking¹⁸ – the central issue in relations between these countries in those years – British Foreign Minister, Lord Castlereagh, in 1817, obtained approval of the Portuguese government “for the first time, a new public law of Europe, the right to search in times of peace – in limited cases – the merchant ships of other nations by the warships of any power.” Given the huge disparities between the navies of Great Britain and Portugal, the guarantee of reciprocity of this right was only a formality. As stated by Oliveira Lima (1996, p. 283): “If you stop for a moment to think about the naval importance of both countries, you will see at once how illusory [the concept of] reciprocity was.”

To the maritime and commercial supremacy of Great Britain, one must add its financial superiority. British loans granted to the new Hispanic-Portuguese American nations brought advantages to Great Britain by (1) ensuring the increased exports of industrial goods with the binding of credit, denominated in pounds, to purchases in the English market itself; (2) compromising new governments, by creating dependence on Great Britain; and (3) resolving the problem of increasing liquidity arising from British trade balance surpluses. The loans, granted to American governments by commercial houses supported by the British Government, were made with extortionate interest rates and foresaw the payment of fees and commissions in advance. Some authors, such as Hobsbawm (1977, p. 63), have argued that the loans ultimately proved to be unprofitable:

18 This issue has been the object of an extensive specialized bibliography, and a detailed discussion of it would not fall within the scope of this article. The study by Leslie Bethell, *A Abolição do Comércio Brasileiro de Escravos: a Grã-Bretanha, o Brasil e a Questão do Comércio de Escravos (1808-1869)*. Brasília: Federal Senate, 2002, stands out. In addition, although more general, see the volume by Robin Blackburn, *The Fall of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848*. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2002. In it the author reviews the most important items concerning the issue. He agrees, in general, with the thesis that the economic and strategic-military interests of the British campaign against slave trafficking, go beyond the justification of humanist and philanthropic elements.

Loans to the South Americans, which seemed so promising in the 1820's, and to the North Americans, who were emerging in the 1830's, often became worthless pieces of paper: from 25 loans granted to foreign governments between 1818 and 1831, sixteen (which represented about half of the 42 million pounds sterling at emission prices) had not been paid by 1831.

For this reason the London financiers exerted pressure on the borrower governments to guarantee loan repayments with revenue from customs duties, income that would have gone to them after independence, which was the main source of public budgets.¹⁹

Bonifácio understood the importance of maintaining good relations with Great Britain; he even clearly recommended to the Brazilian diplomatic representative in London, to act cautiously in order to avoid friction. On the other hand, he sought to get out of the trap in which Portugal had lived since the Treaty of Methuen, signed in 1703. He did this through the affirmation of sovereignty of the Brazilian State over its territory, from both military and commercial points of view. This led to the conflicts that emerged in Brazilian ports and in its territorial waters; the decision to avoid foreign debt as much as possible; and the care taken in reviewing the renewal of commercial and legal advantages obtained by Great Britain in the treaties of 1810 – which were up to be “revised” in 1825 (LIMA, 1996, p. 257).

As Alan Manchester recognizes in his *British Preeminence in Brazil*, Great Britain wished to do to Brazil what it had done to Portugal since the restoration in 1640; that is, to turn it

19 “In theory, these loans should have yielded to the investors 7 to 9% of interest, but they actually yielded, in 1831, an average of only 3.1%.” In Fodor, Giorgio. *The Boom That Never Was? Latin American Loans in London 1822-1825*, Discussion paper n° 5. Trento: Università degli Studi di Trento, 2002, p. 22 and 23. It should be noted that Brazil of the First Empire was not among the debtor nations. Concerning this issue, see Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. *The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

into a “vassal” by means of extortionate and unequal treaties. Nevertheless, as Manchester also recognizes:

[...] Brazil resisted in such a persevering manner that, around 1845, the special privileges granted to England were revoked, the treaties that regulated the trade and the trafficking of slaves were cancelled, and the Court of Rio de Janeiro united in full revolt against the pressure exercised by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MANCHESTER, 1964, p. 220-221).

Bonifácio contributed decisively to the establishment of an autonomous foreign policy, especially in relation to the hegemonic power of the period. As far as the Treaties of 1810 were concerned, the Minister warned by note to the British representative in Rio de Janeiro, Henry Chamberlain, that the Brazilian Government, by free will, observed “a treaty that any other government would find reason to consider as expired, after the dissolution of the social and political pact that made Brazil an integral part of the Portuguese monarchy.” Carneiro de Campos, who succeeded Bonifácio as foreign minister, maintained that policy with Chamberlain on the same terms. In July, 1823, Campos argued that the Treaty of 1810 existed *de facto*, “because the Emperor wished that to be so,” but not *de jure*, “since it was celebrated originally with the Portuguese Crown, having, therefore, expired when the separation [of Brazil and Portugal] occurred [in 1822]” (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, I, p. LXIV, LXIII).

In his talks with Chamberlain, the position of the Brazilian foreign minister was clear:

Brazil wants to live in peace and friendship with all other nations, [and] will treat all foreigners equally well, but it will never allow them to intervene in our domestic affairs. If there is a single nation that does not want to be subject to

this condition, we will be very sorry, but that will not mean that we shall humiliate ourselves or subject ourselves to its will (DRUMMOND, 1885/86, p. 45).

José Bonifácio was opposed to slave trafficking, and he advocated the gradual abolition of slavery itself. The Andrada brothers included a section on this matter in a draft of the Brazilian constitution being written by the constituent assembly, in 1823. This proposal, however, was later withdrawn, when the Emperor, Pedro, closed the assembly and imposed a constitution on the country in 1824.

In a country whose elite survived from slave trafficking and the agrarian production of a single-culture crop raised on large estates, it is not hard to understand the opposition which the Andrada reforms endured (SOUSA, 1988, p. 196; CALDEIRA, 1999, p. 359ff; CARVALHO, 2006, p. 19).

BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Shortly after becoming Brazil's Minister of the Kingdom and Overseas Affairs, Bonifácio began intense discussions with the North American representative in Rio de Janeiro, Peter Sartoris, in an effort to sound out U.S. thoughts on the possibility of joint action in the field of mutual defense, especially in regard to the European powers.

As Acting Consul of the United States, Peter Sartoris was emphatic in his government communication. He spoke with the new minister as early as January 20, 1822, two days after the new foreign minister's appointment. Indeed, by February 3, Sartoris had met twice with José Bonifácio – whom he called “Prime

Minister” – and he left the meetings convinced that Bonifácio was firmly committed to making Brazil independent.

For his part Bonifácio asked Sartoris to respond to two questions: (1) would the American government be willing to have a friendly relationship with the Brazilian government; and (2) could Brazil count on the support of the United States, if it became necessary? The American representative reported to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, that he did not hesitate to answer Bonifácio’s first question, as he quickly said, yes. But he avoided even offering an “opinion” on the second question, claiming he did not know his government’s position (*Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States...*, 1925, II, p. 728-731).

By March 4, Sartoris had already had “three or four” interviews with Bonifácio. The central theme of their meeting was always the desire of the Brazilian minister to know if Brazil could count on the United States in case of a conflict with Portugal – as well as with Great Britain, because of its treaties with Portugal. Always cautious, Sartoris repeated himself, saying that it was beyond his powers to state any position on the matter, or even provide any personal opinion, as he did not wish to mislead the Brazilian government. He did, however, leave the following sentence in the air: “The government of the United States will always be glad to see both the happiness and the independence of other American nations” (*Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States...*, II, p. 732-733).

In late June, 1822, Peter Sartoris received a communication from the U.S. Secretary of State, informing him of President Monroe’s message, concerning the recognition of the newly independent States of Hispanic America, and he immediately communicated this to José Bonifácio. As Sartoris later wrote to Adams, the news “seemed to be especially satisfying to him

[Bonifácio], and I have always noticed that both a desire to be close to and have a good understanding with the United States are very dear matters for him.” According to the American representative, the actual separation of Brazil from Portugal could be very profitable for American commerce (Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States., II, p. 737-738).

In the same conversation with the Brazilian minister, Sartoris expressed his opinion about sending Brazilian diplomats to the United States. According to him, it should occur after the installation of the Constituent Assembly, which would ensure the immediate and unconditional recognition of Brazilian independence by the United States and Great Britain. José Bonifácio replied in the following manner:

Dear Sir, Brazil is a nation, and it shall take its place as such, without expecting recognition by other powers or asking for it. Public agents or ministers shall be sent to represent it. Those that host them as such will continue to be accepted in our ports, and their trade will be favored. Those that refuse to accept [our ministers] will be expelled from our ports. Simply put, this will be our policy.

Once again, the message was clear: Brazil was already a nation, and the Brazilian State had sovereignty over its territory. For that reason, it did not need to wait for approval or to ask for the recognition of other States. The problem of recognition was, therefore, a false one, since Brazil already acted in a sovereign manner and expected treatment in reciprocal terms from any nation that wished to have a commercial and political relationship with it. José Bonifácio took that stance in mid-June, 1822, when the Zea manifesto to the European nations – which suggested that Colombia would close its ports to the nations that did not recognize its sovereignty, and was published in April of that year –

may still have been unknown. At the same time, the United States recognized the independence of Colombia, which led the pragmatic British to accept in its ports vessels from the independent nations of the new world with their new flags (*Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States...*, II, p. 739).

José Bonifácio's administration of Brazil's foreign affairs in 1822 and 1823, and the actions of the first Brazilian consul to the U.S., Antônio Gonçalves da Cruz, contributed decisively towards the recognition of Brazil's independence by the United States, which occurred a few days after the first Brazilian ambassador, Silvestre Rebello, arrived in Washington, in 1824. A year earlier, the choice of Gonçalves da Cruz, also known as "Cabugá," to represent Brazil as the first consul of an independent Brazil to the U.S. brought with it a double message: To Brazilians it restored the role of a patriot, as Gonçalves, a participant of the Revolution of Pernambuco, had been sent as an emissary to the United States by the leaders of that rebellion, in 1817; and to the North Americans, the action showed that the monarchical system did not harm the constitutional and free spirit of the new government – that Brazil desired to establish constructive relations with the other countries of the Americas.

As historian and diplomat Manuel de Oliveira Lima observed at a conference in the United States, in 1913, "The Brazilian Empire sought, to no avail, both an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States. Washington's position not to engage in alliances was both dogmatic and political." (LIMA, 1913, p. 6) Nevertheless, Rio de Janeiro made the proposal not just with Rebello's arrival in Washington, in 1824, but as early as 1822. The fact that it was not successfully acted upon, to build stronger cooperative relations between the two countries, was a direct result of political decisions and international policies of the United States.

ANDRADA'S VIEW OF BRAZIL'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

Territorial unit from the Plata to the Amazon region

The main concern of Brazil's first foreign minister with the problem of territorial unity calls to mind the figure of another noted Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior – more commonly known as the Baron of Rio Branco – who once referred to José Bonifácio as “the great minister of independence.” Álvaro Lins, in his biography of Rio Branco, observed similarities in the backgrounds and actions of the two Brazilian statesmen and diplomats:

[In many respects] the personal history of José Bonifácio was repeated in Rio Branco: the education abroad and the execution of a profoundly Brazilian work. [...] José Bonifácio was the leader of Brazil's independence, while Rio Branco drew its geographical map and built its territorial integrity (Lins, 1996, p. 254).

José Bonifácio decisive actions should receive credit for some of the consolidation of the Brazilian territory as it exists today, be it in his persuasion of the recalcitrant provinces, or by their subjugation through the use of force as, for example, the case of Bahia in 1823. In this sense, Bonifácio's concerns with the problem of territory and with the development of the Brazilian State during the process of independence were present, once again, in the actions and thought of Rio Branco, who served as the foreign minister during Brazil's transition from just after the fall of the monarchy into the first decade of the federal republic, 1902-1912. According to Joaquim Nabuco – who, himself, defended federalism – Rio Branco (1999, p.192), in a letter reproduced by Alvaro Lins (1996, p. 248), emphasized the need to preserve “above all, the national unity.”

Bonifácio, in his struggle for territorial unity, had to fight on two fronts: first, against provincial elites, who were eager for

autonomy, or even for independence themselves, either from Rio or from Lisbon; and next, against foreign States, including Portugal, which hoped to take advantage of the possible fracturing of the Brazilian territory.

Great Britain, which saw in a Brazil under Dom Pedro the possibility to continue the domination it had over Portugal, did not oppose the maintenance of unity for the Brazilian territory. It should be kept in mind, however, that, after the 1824 failure of the Confederation of Ecuador – which attempted to create a separate country in the Brazilian northeast – Manuel Paes de Andrade Carvalho, the leader of that rebellion, sought refuge on an English vessel and later found asylum in Great Britain itself.

Perhaps the mindset of European leaders at the time can best be summarized by the French prime minister of the period 1821-1827. A practical man, Jean-Baptiste de Villèle, observed to Borges de Barros, the Brazilian representative in Paris, that European interest was to see South America “butchered,” for the new countries to remain colonies “under other names” (Arquivo Diplomático da Independência, III, p. 138, 151, 167-8).

When one studies José Bonifácio, the first foreign minister of an independent Brazil, it is evident that the current geographical configuration of the country is due, to a large extent, to his actions – because of his organization of the armed forces that imposed unity on the provinces, and through the establishment of contacts and international negotiations that aided in maintaining that unity.

Brazil, “a transatlantic power”

The transfer of Dom João’s Court to Rio de Janeiro, in 1808, represented not only a political transformation for the colonial capital, but, above all, the beginning of a new economic era. Rio de

Janeiro became the principle center of commerce for the Portuguese Empire, the point of intersection between the old metropolis and its Asian and African colonies, as well as with the Platine Republics (FREYRE, 1996; QUARRY, 2006, *passim*; DONGHI, 1975, p. 100-101).

José Bonifácio believed that Brazil had the conditions for economic self-sufficiency, which could allow it to use its consumer market as an important instrument of power. He, therefore, said that the new State should use its market, and the advantages of access to it, as a means to obtain diplomatic recognition of its independence.

Bonifácio further believed that Brazilians were the “Chinese” of the new world. According to him, Brazil was similar to China due to the magnitude of its territory, the size of its population, and because it had great agricultural production and basic manufacturing, characteristics he said would allow it the possibility of giving up imports of “luxury” products from Europe. The comparison to China is not surprising. According to Oliveira Lima (1996, p. 239): “in Brazil, in fact, economic life was very similar to [that of] the Chinese, with agriculture producing everything that the population needed – although one should not include labor and luxury manufacturing in the comparisons.”

In order to attain the condition of a transatlantic power, however, Brazil had to overcome the binomial that Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2005) divided into “domestic disparities” and “foreign vulnerabilities.” Jose Bonifácio’s vision saw two types of domestic disparities in Brazil: social and economic. He believed that the country’s social disparities could be overcome by “civilizing” the Indians – his word for assimilating them into the country – and by ending slavery. Economic disparities, he said, should be fought through reforming the use of and access to arable land, as well as through mass education and specialized

technical training. Additionally, he believed it was necessary to manage the country's natural resources, to enable their long-run economic exploitation.

In the foreign sphere, Bonifácio sought to fight Brazil's vulnerabilities by: (1) creating a truly national Armed Forces, through the replacement of Portuguese troops with Brazilian militias, the inclusion of Indians and migrants in combat forces, and a modernization of the Navy; (2) establishing cooperative relations with Buenos Aires and the United States, in order to avoid recolonization attempts sponsored either by the Holy Alliance, or by Great Britain in association with Portugal; and (3) preserving the State's autonomy, to avoid unequal treaties and international loans.

FINAL THOUGHTS

José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva's thought – diplomatic and otherwise – was expressed in two dimensions: first, the practical, concerning actions of the public man; and second, the intellectual, that of the thinker and formulator of policies for the Brazilian nation. As the *de facto* prime minister from January 1822 to July 1823, Bonifácio was in charge of preparing the country to assume its condition as a sovereign State. Likewise, as the *de facto* foreign minister, he was in charge of the autonomy of the foreign office operations and the elaboration of the first foreign policies of an independent Brazil.

While Bonifácio sought to establish diplomatic relations with other nations, he always endeavored to ensure the preservation of Brazil's capacity to act and avoid agreements harmful to the country's sovereignty or to the public treasury. Along those lines, on February 6, 1830, in Rio de Janeiro, he told Charles-Edouard Pontois, the French ambassador to Brazil, and future Count of Pontois:

[...] all those trade and friendship (Treaties) made with the European powers were mere foolishness. I would never have let them happen if I had been here. Brazil is a transatlantic power, it is not involved in any entanglements with Europe, and it does not need foreign nations; they, to the contrary, need Brazil very much. So let all of them come here to negotiate – nothing more – but in perfect equality, without any other protection than the universal rights of man, and with the express condition of not getting involved, in any way, in the affairs of the Empire. Otherwise it would be necessary to close our ports to them, and forbid them to come into the country (RODRIGUES, s.d., II. p. 25).

In the domestic sphere, José Bonifácio organized and structured the Brazilian armed forces, thereby creating not only the political, but also the practical conditions for the territorial unity of the Empire, from the Amazon to the Plata. The intimate relation between diplomacy and military power was always clear in his mind. The contingent facts of the centralization of power in Rio de Janeiro, or around the heir to the Portuguese monarchy, cannot be seen as crucial in Bonifácio's political thought. In practice, it was he who began to build a proper legislative body for Brazil with the convening, on February 16, 1822, of the Council of Procurators of the Provinces, which later became the constituent and the legislative assembly.

Bonifácio considered Brazil a “transatlantic power.” As such it could not accept submitting to the interests of foreign powers, especially European, which were the main enemies of the consolidation of a united and independent Brazil. It was, therefore, necessary to: (1) take the indispensable steps to provide the country with effective defense forces (an army and a navy); (2) develop the country economically, by diversifying its industrial and commercial activities; (3) ensure a proper public administration,

directed towards building the nation, by both organizing and moralizing the public service; and (4) avoid engagements that limited national sovereignty and made unacceptable ties – unequal international treaties and loans – that subordinated Brazil to other countries.

Bonifácio believed that the diplomatic recognition of an independent and united imperial Brazil was important but not crucial to its practical existence. As the country's first foreign minister, he believed that recognition would be achieved, guided by the self-interest of countries that had – or desired to have – commercial relations with Brazil, and that the rules of the “Law of Nations” would be sufficient to provide guarantees to foreign trade in Brazil. The key was to obtain and preserve territorial unity and sovereignty.

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PAULINO JOSÉ SOARES DE SOUZA

Magistrate and Conservative Party politician, Paulino José Soares de Souza (1807-1866), the Viscount of Uruguay, played an important role in the building of the Brazilian sovereign state – in both domestic and foreign policy spheres – during the Empire. He was a provincial representative in Rio de Janeiro (1835); a general representative (1836); the president of the province of Rio de Janeiro (1836-1840); the minister of justice (1841), and twice the minister of foreign affairs (1843-1844, and 1849-1853); a Senator for life (appointed in 1849); and a councilor of state (1853). As the justice minister, he invested in the political and administrative centralization of the government; and as the foreign minister, he left his mark on the definition of Brazil's foreign policy as well as the organization of its diplomatic corps. At the end of his life, Paulino de Souza devoted himself to writing two lengthy and thoroughly researched works on the Brazilian sovereign state.



PAULINO JOSÉ SOARES DE SOUZA, THE VISCOUNT OF URUGUAY: BUILDING THE INSTRUMENTS OF BRAZILIAN DIPLOMACY

Gabriela Nunes Ferreira

Paulino José Soares de Souza, given the title, Viscount of Uruguay, in 1854, was a central figure in the formation of Brazil as a sovereign state. It is difficult to understand fully the thought of this important political author and participant in the Empire without taking into account his roles in both domestic and foreign policy matters.

The future Brazilian viscount was born in 1807 in Paris, the son of a French mother, Antoinette Gabrielle Madeleine Gilbert de Souza, and a Brazilian father – from Paracatu, Minas Gerais – José Antônio Soares de Souza, a medical doctor who had studied medicine in France. With the fall of Napoleon, Paulino de Souza moved with his parents to Portugal in 1814, and four years later the family moved, again, this time to São Luis, Maranhão. After finishing his primary studies in Maranhão, Paulino de Souza returned to Europe, to study law at the University of Coimbra. Due to political problems in Portugal, however, he returned to Brazil to finish his studies, graduating from the Law School of the Largo

de São Francisco, in São Paulo, in 1831. One year later, he entered the magistracy. He began a political career, in 1835, as a provincial representative in Rio de Janeiro. The following year, he became president of the same province, a position he occupied almost uninterruptedly until 1840. Since 1832, he was tied by marriage to a family of large landowners to which Rodrigues Torres, the future Viscount of Itaboraí, also belonged. Along with Torres, and Eusébio de Queirós, he was part of the so-called “Saquarema Trinity,” a central core of the Conservative Party.

In 1836, Paulino de Souza also became active in the central government, as he was elected a general representative from the province of Rio de Janeiro. His election was part of the *Regresso*, a conservative movement seeking a return to political centralization. In the Second Empire, he served in a variety of positions including the minister of justice (1841 to 1843) and twice the minister of foreign affairs (for a few months in 1843/1844 and, again, from 1849 to 1853). He was designated a senator-for-life in 1849, and a councilor of state in 1853. In 1854, he received the title of Viscount of Uruguay. Towards the end of his life, he continued to act in the Senate, as well as the Council of State. He was twice appointed to missions abroad; and he devoted himself to writing. He died in 1866, at the age of 58, disillusioned with the decline of the Conservative Party.¹

Twice during the 59 years of the Empire, Paulino de Souza had an especially remarkable performance in the formation and consolidation of the Brazilian sovereign state. In the period of the *Regresso*, first as a general representative and later as the minister of justice, he was one of the political and administrative

1 The only extensive biography of the Viscount of Uruguay was written by his great-grandson, José Antônio Soares de Souza, *A Vida do Visconde do Uruguay* (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1944). Also see: Ilmar Mattos, “O Lavrador e o Construtor: o Visconde do Uruguay e a Construção do Estado Imperial”; as well as, José Murilo de Carvalho, “Entre a Autoridade e a Liberdade.” In: José Murilo de Carvalho, *Visconde do Uruguay*.

leaders who crafted a greater centralization of power. In 1837, as a member of the Provincial Assemblies Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, he signed the opinion that gave rise to the 1840 “Law of Interpretation of the Additional Act,” which stated that the Provincial Assemblies created in 1834 had modified the judicial and police structure of their provinces and, therefore, weakened the uniformity with which the Empire should be governed.

By drastically limiting the powers of the provincial assemblies and submitting the judicial system as well as the police to the jurisdiction of the central government, the Law of Interpretation allowed for revisions, assigning more powers to the central authority. This was accomplished, in 1841, through a reform of the Criminal Procedure Code, which radically modified the structure of the 1832 code, centralizing enforcement with the national government. The predominance of an electoral system was replaced by a hierarchal system in the administration of justice and the police, thereby giving broad powers to the authorities appointed by the central power.

The reports and speeches of the future Viscount of Uruguay while he was justice minister expressed some of his main ideas concerning Brazilian society and its political institutions. They clearly show the impact that the provincial rebellions of the Regency and the period immediately thereafter had on his generation of politicians. The image described by Paulino de Souza, in the early 1840s, was that of a “spirit of anarchy” and chaos in some of the provinces. He also described Brazilian society as heterogeneous, marked by major disparities among the provinces. He contrasted the relative civilization of the coastal region with the barbarism of the hinterland – with its dispersed population – a region into which the law did not penetrate. He was also harsh on the country’s elites, saying that if the bulk of the population lacked education, morals and healthy habits of

subordination and work, those with power were moved only by private interests, which reinforced disorder and arbitrariness.

Finally, as far as the political and administrative institutions were concerned, Paulino de Sousa said that the liberal order during the Regency was the result of inexperience, a lack of confidence in relation to power, and a lack of paying attention to the Brazilian social reality.

Paulino de Souza justified the centralization of power as a way to remove it from the various factions in Brazilian society, thus enabling the country's authorities to maintain public order and, thereby, increase the individual safety of the population. He believed it was necessary to listen to the voice of "national reason" – the only one attentive to the public's needs – as opposed to the "petty voices of the provinces."

In addition to the Law of Interpretation of the Additional Act and the Reform of the Code of Procedures, the re-establishment of the Council of State – an institution provided for in the Constitution of 1822, made extinct by the Additional Act in 1834 – was also part of the centralizing reforms of 1841. The minister explained that his goal was to increase the "moral force" of decisions made by the Crown and reinforce administrative powers, by creating fixed parameters, preserving traditions and, in the end, ensuring a stability that would serve as a counterweight to the changing winds of politics.

In the early 1860s, in a phase marked by a resumption of the debate on the political and administrative order of the Empire, the Viscount of Uruguay devoted himself to systematize his studies and ideas in two major works: *Ensaio Sobre o Direito Administrativo* (Essay on Administrative Law), in 1862, and *Estudos Práticos Sobre a Administração das Províncias no Brasil* (Practical Studies of the Administration of Brazilian Provinces), in 1865. In these

works, Paulino de Sousa doctrinally justified and substantiated the sovereignty model that he also advocated in practice. Although in the second work he occasionally made a type of self-criticism – considering excessive the then current centralization plan – the idea that Brazilian society and politics required, at least in the medium term, a hierarchically organized administration, able to generalize the principle of order and to ensure the country's unity, remained intact.

The second moment when Paulino de Souza played an important role in the construction of the Brazilian sovereign state occurred when he was foreign minister for a second time, in the early 1850s. He took over the ministry in October 1849, and faced challenges, such as the trafficking of slaves, which exposed the country to strong pressure exercised by England. He also tackled the definitive demarcation of the country's borders, and the political situation in the Platine region – at the time dominated by Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas. When he left the ministry, in October 1853, these matters had largely been addressed.

The political path of the Viscount of Uruguay reflects the building and consolidation of the Brazilian centralized state in the mid-nineteenth century. The same man who, in the early 1840s, had talked about spreading order to the country's hinterland and ending the "barbarism of the backwoods regions," at the beginning of the next decade turned his attention abroad – to the "barbarism" of others. He believed it was then necessary to consolidate matters in a regional context, a delicate task considering – as a phrase common at the time stated – Brazil was an "exotic plant in America," since it was a monarchy surrounded by republics.

With the defeat of the last provincial revolts (the Praieira Revolution, 1848-1850), the country entered a period of political

stability. Indeed, political scientist and historian, José Murilo de Carvalho, has designated 1850 as a dividing line between two phases in the development of the Brazilian nation state. Once the task of accumulating power had been completed, new performance horizons could be exploited. In that year, the reform of the National Guard completed the political and administrative centralization process begun in 1840, and the government felt strong enough to confront issues such as immigration and a reform of the agrarian structure of the country, as well as ending the slave trade. A new commercial code was also approved, thereby providing legal certainty at a time that promised new business opportunities (CARVALHO, 1996, p. 229-237).

It was not by chance that 1850 was also the year in which significant policy shifts began in the Empire's foreign policy: shifts led by Paulino José Soares de Souza.

It must be noted that the foreign minister did not act alone. Rather, he worked within a political context in which several institutions – including the Parliament, the Council of State, and the Crown – guided and controlled his actions. Intervention in the Platine region took place in a domestic environment marked by the political dominance of the Conservative Party, during a period in the Second Empire in which there was remarkable stability in the government. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, this was the only period during the Empire in which the same minister remained in office for almost four consecutive years. In contrast, in the years immediately prior – 1844 to 1849 – no fewer than eight ministers had occupied that post. Continuity during the Paulino de Souza years allowed for the careful preparation and gradual execution of an action plan for the Plata region after 1849.

As early as 1843, during Paulino Soares de Souza's first administration in the ministry of foreign affairs, there were

elements of the proper and indelible marks he imposed on Brazilian diplomacy during his second term.

IMPERIAL POLICIES IN THE RIO DE LA PLATA RIVER BASIN

The formation of nation states

To understand the deeper meaning of the actions and policies pursued by the Imperial government in the Rio de la Plata region during Paulino de Souza's second term as foreign minister, it is important to review the processes of formation of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay as nation states.

Traditional historiography treats the independence of Hispanic America as if it were a moment of materialization or birth – after a long period of national gestation – of countries that were ready to be born. The countries in question, however, were not “born” directly from their respective independence processes. Rather, the historical period that started with independence witnessed the emergence of several alternative national development projects – projects that were often antagonistic to one another, with different territorial and socio-political outlines.

With respect to Argentina, two central points are worth mentioning: First, the rivalry between Buenos Aires and the provinces of that territory, with a huge advantage given to Buenos Aires. Since the formation of the Río de la Plata Viceroyalty in 1776, its capital, Buenos Aires, had political and economic supremacy over the rest of the territory. This supremacy was renewed after independence, with the opening of the port of Buenos Aires to foreign trade. And secondly, even superseding the rivalry between Buenos Aires and the provinces, since the time of independence there were two competing proposals for the organization of the

Argentine nation state: federalism *versus* a unitary system of government.

Tensions related to the above issues complicated the Argentine nation-building process. Several attempts to provide a constitutional organization to the provinces failed, and halfway through the nineteenth century, the matter of national organization was not yet resolved. Since 1831, there was an alliance of autonomous provinces – the so-called Argentine Confederation – led by the governor of Buenos Aires, Juan Manuel de Rosas. Although Rosas was a leader of the Federal Party in Argentina, paradoxically he was able to assemble a centralized power system under the hegemony of Buenos Aires. One of the pillars of this hegemony was the exclusive monopoly exercised by Buenos Aires over foreign trade and navigation in the Platine river basin.

A major difference with the formation of Brazil, as compared to Argentina, is its independence movement. Unlike what had happened in Spanish America, where it was necessary to create new legitimate powers to replace the monarchy, in Brazil, the permanence of the monarchy as the legitimate power created a sense of continuity in the transition from colony to the Empire. This relative continuity did not, however, lead to “political unity,” as there were also several paths and possibilities involved in the Brazilian transition. The unitary, centralized, monarchist, and socially based on slavery sovereignty model that prevailed in Brazil after independence resulted from a process that was completed halfway through the nineteenth century.

The history of the creation of the country of Uruguay is proof that the various Ibero-American states were not born directly from their independence processes. The territory that eventually became Uruguay had already been the subject of much dispute between Portugal and Spain during the colonial period. Once the

emancipation of Spanish America was triggered, the Uruguayan territory was successively the scene of struggles of local forces against Spain, Buenos Aires, and Portugal.

In 1828, after having been the object of a war between Brazil and what was to become Argentina, Uruguay was created as an independent country, complete with its own constitution. It did not, however, lose its historic vocation, to integrate different national political-organization models – such as the reconstruction of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, credited to Rosas, or the creation of an “Uruguay Grande” that would incorporate the coastal provinces of Argentina and Rio Grande do Sul, as dreamed of by the Uruguayan General, Fructuoso Rivera. The focal point of all of these “projects” was the fate of Uruguay.

Uruguay was valuable due to its strategic location on one of the banks of the Platine estuary. It also had great livestock potential as the area was a reservoir of wild cattle and good pastures, and livestock was the main economic activity of the province of Buenos Aires as well as the region that became Rio Grande do Sul. The history of Uruguay also clearly shows the political overlap that existed among several countries in the region as political alignments crossed the still-open borders.

In Uruguay, the political fights were between the *Blancos* and the *Colorados*. In the 1840s, an alliance was formed between the Blanco Party in Uruguay and the Federal Party of Rosas. Opposing the Blancos, there was an alliance of the Colorado Party, that included *Unitarios* – members of the Argentine Unitarian party, who advocated a centralized government in Buenos Aires – and, in Rio Grande do Sul, the *Farrapos*, who were the protagonists of the longest rebellion of the Brazilian Empire, the *Revolução Farroupilha* (1835-1845).

Since 1843, the Blanco general, Manuel Oribe, who was supported by Rosas, had surrounded and blockaded, Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay, where a government of Colorado resistance had been formed. If Oribe seized power in Montevideo, that would have meant a huge victory for Rosas – a victory which would have indirectly spread his power throughout Uruguay. Thus, the *porteño* (someone from the port city of Buenos Aires) would have been closer to achieving the goal attributed to him: that of restoring the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, including both Uruguay and Paraguay – the independence of which Rosas did not recognize.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Brazil was further ahead in its state-building process than its neighbors. One of the great threats to the nation's still fledgling sovereignty, however, was the persistence of the question of which national political-organization model would succeed in the neighboring republics. Brazil was still vulnerable as the country's boundaries had not yet been fully established. The closing of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers held by Rosas also made the country's internal integration more difficult, since it jeopardized access to its hinterland. The Brazilian government considered the plan – attributed to Rosas – to restore the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata with the virtual cancellation of independence of Uruguay and Paraguay, as a serious threat. Finally, and very importantly, although the *Farroupilha* rebellion had ended five years prior, several of the factors that had originated it had not yet been settled.

Rio Grande do Sul

Rio Grande do Sul had a delicate insertion into the Empire. Economically, a source of tension and conflict existed between that province and the central government of Brazil. Rio Grande do Sul played a subsidiary role in the entire country's economy, especially with the production of *charque* (a type of beef jerky, mainly used to

feed slaves). The central government was interested in obtaining cheap charque, whether from the province of Rio Grande do Sul or from Uruguay, while the southern producers were interested in obtaining higher profits for their product, as well as government protection, to counter foreign competition. This situation was the cause of many complaints of Rio Grande do Sul charque producers.

Rio Grande do Sul was also unique for a variety of factors, including its military tradition, developed in recurring fighting on the open border; the personal ties of its inhabitants, especially its elite; its economic and social profile; and its geographic position, in the southernmost part of Brazil, giving it proximity to the country's neighbors in the Platine region. The province often served as a conveyor of the Platine conflicts, bringing them across the Empire's borders.

At various times, Rio Grande do Sul advocated, along with Uruguay, policies that were inconsistent with those from Rio de Janeiro. It is also worth emphasizing that the Imperial government was hostage to the Brazilian ranchers who lived on the border – with estates in both countries – who, with their small, private armies, were in charge of defending the open border. The government was often dragged into the conflicts of the neighboring Republics due to the actions of these border warlords.

When Paulino de Souza became the foreign minister, in October 1849, he was faced with an avalanche of complaints signed by the Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Argentine Confederation, Tomás Guido, who spoke on behalf of Rosas and his ally Oribe. Some of the most serious sources of tension were the actions of the Brazilian ranchers, who were also landowners in Uruguay. Unsatisfied with Oribe's measures – such as a ban on the passage of cattle across the border and the requirement of heavy war duties that had been established in 1848

– they made armed incursions into Uruguay, to retrieve cattle and recapture fleeing slaves. According to the representative of the Argentine Confederation, these kinds of actions were politically motivated and supported by the “savages” of the Unitarian party.

Foreign powers in the Plata river basin

Another key element in the calculations of Paulino Soares de Souza, when he designed the policies of the Empire in the Plata river basin, was the presence of both France and England in the region. Both countries had business interests there, which led them to engage directly in the Platine conflicts.

These powers were interested in peace in the region, because a state of permanent war was very harmful for trade and the free movement of goods. They were interested in the freedom of navigation on the rivers of the Platine basin, as well as a guarantee of the internationalization of the Plata River, mainly through the maintenance of an independent Uruguay.

Paulino de Souza took into account the presence of both France and England in announcing his policy, and he proved skillful, especially at avoiding English interference. He waited for the right moment to set into motion the new policy in the Plata river basin, when both powers were about to end their intervention in the region. He also sought to increase Brazil’s margin of success, by resolving a source of conflict with England: the matter of slave trafficking.

In 1850, when tensions with England had reached a critical point, the minister advanced the adoption of effective measures against slave trafficking. Alongside Eusébio de Queirós, minister of justice, who signed the anti-trafficking bill that bears his name, Paulino de Souza played a key role in the matter. He helped to obtain the approval of government measures against trafficking, first within the scope of the Council of State and later in the

Parliament. In July 1850, he addressed a memorandum to the members of the Council of State concerned with the trafficking of slaves, and he submitted several questions to them, the formulation of which led to the following response: the only feasible way for the government to face English pressure would be to take effective measures to abolish slave trafficking. A few days later, on July 15, the foreign minister addressed the Chamber of Deputies in an attempt to convince representatives to support the government in these measures. The argument he used was clear: it was useless to swim against the tide and continue to face a powerful nation such as Great Britain, which had been making an effort for over 40 years to end slave trafficking in the world.

Attempting to use a neutral tone, without attacking the traffickers, Paulino de Souza demonstrated that slave trafficking was a lost cause condemned by civilization almost all over the world. Brazil should accept this and get ahead of the process, rather than continuing to expose itself to episodes of national humiliation (NUNES FERREIRA, 1999, p. 141-142).²

An interesting link existed between the end of slave trafficking and policies related to the Plata River basin. In a September 30, 1850 letter to the head of the Brazilian delegation in London, Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, Foreign Minister Paulino de Souza, himself, made the link explicit:

It will be very bad if the new direction that the Imperial government has attempted to take, concerning the business of slave trafficking, does not make us more favorable to the British government. One of the main reasons why I sought that direction was because I realized that the accumulated complications during seven years of our relations with generals Rosas and Oribe were causing major problems;

2 See speech by Paulino de Souza dated July 15, 1850 in: CARVALHO (2002), p. 537-572.

*and poor Brazil, having within itself so many elements of dissolution, might not survive a war in the Plata River basin, [including] the irritation and shocks produced by the hostilities of English cruisers. Nec Hercules contra duo. We cannot burn in two fires.*³

From neutrality to intervention

The policy pursued by the Imperial government after 1850, under the leadership of Paulino de Souza – whose most immediate goal was to overthrow Rosas and his allies – represented a turning point in Brazil's conduct in the Plata River basin, hitherto guided by a position of non-intervention.

The underlying reason for the new policy in the Plata region was the consolidation of the Brazilian state. For this to happen, it was crucial to ensure the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* in the region, that is, to ensure the existence of Uruguay and Paraguay as independent states, and thereby put an end – in a manner favorable to Brazil – to the uncertainty as to which national political-organization model would prevail in the neighboring republics. It was, therefore, necessary to remove the specter of the restoration of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and pave the way for solutions to problems that hindered the consolidation of the nation state, including the matter of boundaries with neighboring republics; navigation on the rivers of the Platine basin; and a more definitive pacification of the territory of Rio Grande do Sul.

Although the Imperial government tried to remain neutral in the Platine conflicts during the 1840s, that did not stop it from attempting to influence regional policy. When he was foreign minister the first time, from June 1843 to February 1844, Paulino de Souza took measures that anticipated the policies he developed

3 Letter quoted in SOUZA (1950).

in his second administration. In October 1843, he named José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, the Marquis of São Vicente, to the post of *chargé d'affaires* in Asuncion. Instructions he wrote to São Vicente recommended the “use of all of his skills, to avoid that Paraguay become a member of the Argentine Confederation, and to counteract and decrease the influence of Rosas [in the region].” In more concrete terms, he said that Pimenta Bueno should formally recognize Paraguay’s independence – which Rosas did not accept – and negotiate a treaty of friendship, navigation and trade with the new republic.⁴ Additionally, Paulino de Souza’s instructions to the Marquis of São Vicente said that the Brazilian diplomat should:

Suggest (to the government of Paraguay) that Brazil is greatly interested in supporting its independence as it is not advantageous to Brazil if Rosas increases his power. Therefore, the Republic of Paraguay can find in Brazil a strong ally against the ambitious views of that governor [Rosas], and – since both [Brazil and Paraguay] have the same interests – it would be very beneficial to both countries, to sign treaties affirming their friendship.

Since that time, Paulino de Souza was convinced Rosas planned to reconstitute the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, and that he would carry out this plan as soon as he defeated his enemies in the *Banda Oriental* (Uruguay). Therefore, from the time of his first term as foreign minister, Paulino de Souza’s diplomatic thought exhibited a lack of trust in Rosas and a mistrust of the expansionist intentions of the government of Buenos Aires – policy-determinant traits of Brazilian foreign relations that were pursued after 1850.

An interesting aspect of the instructions to Pimenta Bueno is that Paulino de Souza recommended caution in dealing with

4 Instructions from Paulino de Souza to Pimenta Bueno. In: RIBEIRO (1966), p. 3-15.

the Paraguayans, and that he denoted a feeling of superiority of the Empire as compared to the republics of Spanish origin. This sentiment was also present in many other documents. The Brazilian foreign minister said Pimenta Bueno should keep in mind that:

Americans of Spanish origin inherited from their grandparents a degree of aversion to the descendants of the Portuguese race, by which, we are often not appreciated. This aversion has been fueled by the jealousy that the greatness of our territory inspires in them; the excellence of our geographic position; the greater respect that we receive from Europe; our greater wealth, and abundance of resources; [and] the greater prosperity and tranquility that we have enjoyed, as compared to the maelstrom of revolutions that almost all the republics of Spanish origin have experienced.

In the end, the treaties were not signed. The Brazilian representative did, however, solemnly recognize Paraguay's independence in September 1844, an action that sparked a protest from the Argentine representative to the imperial court, Tomás Guido. The fact that Brazil recognized Paraguayan independence was also important in widening the distance between Brazil and the Argentine Confederation.

A summary of the main measures of the new policies pursued by Paulino José Soares de Souza in the Plata river basin begins with the first and the most decisive: the breaking of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the Argentine Confederation, in September 1850, after an exchange of increasingly aggressive diplomatic messages from each side. On the same occasion, the Empire's relations with Oribe's government in Uruguay were also broken, and Paulino de Souza came to expect the outbreak of a war involving Brazil. In an October 14, 1850 letter written to Rodrigo

Souza da Silva Pontes, the Brazilian *chargé d'affaires* in Montevideo, the minister reported: "We're preparing. Two more battalions have already been sent to the Rio Grande and the Northern provinces shall send troops. Rego Barros has already gone to Europe to enlist troops" (Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty-AHI, 429/5/3).

The second measure taken by Paulino de Souza was the decision to provide financial support, in the form of a loan, to Montevideo, to counter the siege that Oribe had imposed since 1843. This step was all the more necessary since the French government, which had been financing the city's resistance, decided to withdraw its allowance. In order not to jeopardize the Imperial government, however, on record the author of the loan was Irineu Evangelista de Souza, the future Baron of Mauá.

A third part of the new policy was to seek alliances in order to form a coalition of anti-Rosas forces. To achieve this goal, Paulino de Souza turned to the governments that had conflicting relations with the governor of Buenos Aires, at least potentially. One of these governments was that of Paraguay, whose independence Rosas had refused to recognize. The government of Buenos Aires was also struggling domestically with the dissatisfaction of governors from provinces affected by the centralization policies of Rosas. Among these, Justo José de Urquiza, the governor of Entre Ríos stood out. In addition, there was an intellectual and politically very active group of Argentine immigrants, who were enemies of Rosas and were, therefore, eager to see his downfall.

In a letter to Silva Pontes dated December 16, 1850, Foreign Minister Paulino de Souza wrote:

Rosas relies much on Brazilian domestic difficulties, those which our patriots can cause us, but he is also very vulnerable in that sense. I think that I will soon receive propositions made by emigrated Argentines and others in

the Confederation, who offer to promote the fight against Rosas in the provinces themselves, if there is a war. Their only condition is that Brazil should not attempt anything against the independence of the Argentine Confederation. Rosas [therefore] runs the risk of being wounded with the same gun with which he intends to hurt us. (AHI, 429/5/3).

Then on March 11, 1851, when Justo José de Urquiza, the governor of Entre Ríos, was already signaling his intention to break with Rosas, Paulino de Souza wrote to Pontes one of the most important letters of their entire correspondence; it concerned with the Brazilian government's policies in the Plata region. In that letter, he clearly outlined his plan of action:

If Urquiza comes forward and decides to promote the candidacy of Garzón [General Eugenio Garzón, from the Colorado Party, a candidate for the presidency of Uruguay] (which Rosas would consider a terrible blow and a crime against humanity), we will break with Oribe because of the grievances we have against him [...] and aided both by Urquiza and Paraguay, it will be easy to expel from the eastern territory [Uruguay] the Argentine troops that support Oribe. If this works and Garzón is elected president, once the [Uruguayans] are regrouped, Rosas will not be able to fight against [Uruguay], Urquiza, Paraguay, and Brazil, and put Oribe back at the head of [Uruguay]. He will have to retreat quickly as his fortunes will have changed. Garzón and Urquiza will have no choice but to seek the support of Brazil and be loyal to it. [...] It will be easier, then, if we carry out a prudent and strict policy, providing definitive and advantageous solutions to these matters, in order to secure the future [...] Without declaring war against Rosas

(the case of Article 18 of the Convention of 1828), we will indirectly give him a fatal blow.

The idea of attacking Rosas “indirectly,” rather than directly, served the minister’s concern not to cause British intervention.

Urquiza’s formal statement was made on May 1, 1851, when he reassumed the leadership of his province’s foreign affairs, placing it on the side of the Confederacy. The government of the coastal province of Corrientes, led by Virasoro, went along with the decision of the governor of Entre Rios, also declaring that it was a sovereign state. On May 29, an agreement was signed in Montevideo for an offensive and defensive alliance between Brazil, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the state of Entre Rios. The purpose of the alliance was to:

maintain the independence and pacify the territory of Uruguay, as well as overthrow General Manoel Oribe and the Argentine forces that he commands and, once things return to normal, cooperate to ensure that there is a free election of the president of the republic, according to the constitution of the Eastern State [Uruguay] (Art. I).

The expected alliance with Paraguay did not, however, materialize. Although Brazil and Paraguay signed a treaty of defensive alliance in December 1850, the Brazilian government was unable to make the agreement an offensive one as well, and it could not attract Paraguay into the coalition against Rosas.

In conducting his policies in the Plata region, the Brazilian foreign minister did not lose sight of the long-term goals that needed to be achieved. While the immediate goals were the expulsion of Oribe from Uruguay and the overthrow of Rosas, it was also necessary to think about what would happen once these goals were accomplished. It was necessary to “ensure the future” and prevent the emergence of new situations unfavorable to

Brazilian interests. In a letter to Pontes on April 22, 1851, Paulino de Souza listed the main problems that had to be resolved, to ensure a favorable position for Brazil. His list included:

- safeguards against “new ambitions” in Uruguay, such that “new Oribes and new Rosas” did not emerge;
- the resolution of border issues, and all matters concerning border policy and the extradition of slaves and criminals, as well as the fate of Brazilian subjects and estates in Uruguay;
- agreement on the navigation of the Plata River and its tributaries, and matters related to the Martin Garcia Island, so that its owner could not use it to lock the Plata river to people who used it (Letter from Paulino de Souza to Pontes, dated 4/22/1851-AHI, 429/5/3).⁵

The same combination of short and long-term goals marked Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro’s mission to the South American republics that border the Pacific Ocean, for which he received instructions from Paulino de Souza on March 1, 1851. The first purpose of the mission was to neutralize the influence of Rosas in the republics and “explain the broad, straightforward and generous policies of the Brazilian Imperial government.” Ponte Ribeiro was also in charge of negotiating treaties of trade, navigation and borders with Peru and Bolivia, with the latter being based on the *uti possidetis* principle (Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute - IHGB, File of the Viscount of Uruguay, Canister 2, Folder 8).⁶

The main “victories” achieved, from the Brazilian point of view, took place between late 1851 and early 1852. In October

5 Paulino de Souza also listed these long-term goals of imperial rule in his letter to the president of Paraguay dated June 13, 1851.

6 About Brazil’s relationship with these countries, throughout the imperial period, see Luis Cláudio V.G. Santos, *O Império e as Repúblicas do Pacífico: As Relações do Brasil com Chile, Bolívia, Peru, Equador and Colômbia (1822-1889)*.

1851, General Oribe surrendered to the forces of General Urquiza, putting an end to the *Guerra Grande* (the long civil war of Uruguay), and soon thereafter, treaties favorable to Brazil were signed with Uruguay. The treaties – of alliance, borders, trade and navigation, extradition and assistance – resolved or at least dealt with matters of importance to the Empire. On October 13, 1851, in a dispatch to Silva Pontes, addressing the five treaties that had been signed the day before, Paulino de Souza defined them as “a system that would be both lame and imperfect if one of them is not ratified” (AHI, 42953). The Treaty of Alliance converted the special and temporary alliance determined in the Agreement of May 29 into a perpetual alliance, the purpose of which was to support the independence of both states against any foreign domination (art. I).

It is obvious that concerning the “support of independence,” it was the defense of Uruguay’s, rather than that of Brazil, that was at stake.

Article I of the border treaty between Brazil and Uruguay⁷ declared that all previous treaties upon which both countries based their territorial claims were thereby considered null. It also explicitly mentioned the rights established in the Convention of January 30, 1819, as well as in the Treaty of Incorporation of the Banda Oriental into the Kingdom of Portugal, signed on July 31, 1821. The new treaty, however, also implied an invalidation of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, signed by Portugal and Spain in 1777, as it included the territory of the Seven Peoples of the Missions. Therefore, if taken as the basis to establish borders, the new treaty would have resulted in a much larger territory for Uruguay than that which finally prevailed.⁸ The criterion that was to be used

7 Tau Golin (2004, vol. 2) carefully analyses the circumstances that led to the signing of this treaty, its subsequent modifications and the resulting demarcation work.

8 On the border treaty, Uruguayan historian Julius Caesar Vignale (1946, p. 130) said: “the Brazilian Empire appeared to defend us from Rosas, when in fact what it expected was to take from us another

would basically be *uti possidetis*, that is, the current and *de facto* ownership by the respective countries, with the introduction of some modifications.

Also included in the treaties of 1851, were the issues of trade and navigation between Brazil and Uruguay. A duty charged for ten years by Uruguay on the export of cattle to the province of Rio Grande do Sul was abolished, making the passage of cattle across the border free. This resolved an ancient source of conflicts. In an important point for Brazil, the treaty declared that the navigation of the Uruguay River and its tributaries (Art. XIV) should be shared, and it was determined that the other riparian states of the Plata and its tributaries would be invited to sign a similar agreement, to make the navigation of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers free (art. XV). In addition, the treaties also determined the neutralization of Martin Garcia Island, a small piece of land at the mouth of the Uruguay River (Art. XVIII).

The treaties also included provisions “for the reciprocal delivery of criminals and deserters, and the return of [fugitive] slaves” – the latter benefitting only Brazil, since slavery no longer existed in Uruguay. Finally, on the same day, Brazil and Uruguay signed a treaty of assistance.

As a whole, the system of treaties signed between Brazil and Uruguay on October 12, 1851⁹, represented a victory for Brazil since they advantageously resolved several important issues that had caused, and still could cause, problems for the Empire. The treaties were, therefore, a significant advance in terms of

portion of territory, as had been done in the unjust treaties of 1851!” On the other hand, after the Treaty was signed, some people in Brazil condemned it because it was harmful to the Empire. The adoption of the criterion of *uti possidetis* in the demarcation of boundaries between both countries has generated intense controversy, most notably in the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute. See: GOLIN (2004), vol. 2, Chapter 5.

9 The five treaties of October 12, 1851 are attached to the 1852 report presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the General Assembly (Annex F).

the consolidation of the Brazilian state. At the same time, they left the door open for Brazil to exercise a direct influence on the neighboring republic – Uruguay – especially through the treaties of alliance and assistance.

The main agent of the next steps of Brazilian policies in the Plata region was Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the future Marquis of Paraná. Soon after news of the fall of Oribe reached Rio de Janeiro, Carneiro Leão was sent to the Platine region, with full powers, as the person in charge of a special mission to the governments of Paraguay, Uruguay, Entre Rios and Corrientes. José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the future Viscount of Rio Branco¹⁰, was appointed secretary of the mission. In a letter to Pontes dated October 21, 1851, Paulino de Souza stated its purpose:

It is necessary to seize the opportunity, to pressure Rosas, drag him to the ground, and obtain the amendment to the treaties of the 12th of this month, linking those governments to our system and our policy. [...] The first act of the play ended very well, but a strong second act is necessary (AHI, 429/5/3).

Paulino de Souza began his instructions to Carneiro Leão, dated October 22, 1851, by emphasizing the benefits of seizing the moment that the countries of the Plata region were undergoing, deriving from the ongoing events “the greatest possible advantage to the Empire. He assured the future marques that due to the importance of his position, resources would be made available to him, thereby launching a secure basis for lasting peace and tranquility.”

Rosas was finally defeated, on February 3, 1852, at the battle of Monte Caseros. Brazil participated in the battle with a division

10 See RIO BRANCO (1940). Later, in April 1852, Paranhos was appointed resident minister in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, where he remained until December of the following year.

of 4,000 men led by Manuel Marques de Souza. It was the only possible outcome of a situation that had been outlined for quite some time, after the formation of the coalition against Rosas and the progressive dilution of his power.

After the fall of both Oribe and Rosas, the Brazilian government continued to consolidate the gains obtained in the Plata region. In both Uruguay and Argentina, the period after the fall of Rosas was marked by internal conflicts. In Uruguay, the Colorado Party – in charge of the alliance against Oribe and Rosas, and the treaties of October 12 – was defeated by the Blanco Party. In Argentina, a rebirth of the dispute between Buenos Aires and the other provinces of the Confederation – united since mid-1852 under Urquiza's provisional government – characterized the entire process of national formation. It was in just such a context that Brazilian diplomacy sought to consolidate the advances of its policy in the region – always balancing itself between distinct poles; seeking to take advantage of disagreements in neighboring countries.

A phrase the foreign minister said to José da Silva Paranhos – resident minister of Brazil in Uruguay since June 1852 – summed up the Brazilian stance: “As do you, I still believe it is necessary to place ourselves between the Blancos and the Colorados, and between Urquiza and his opponents – as far as the circumstances allow us to do that – at least until we obtain a more fixed and secure position” (Letter from Paulino de Souza to Paranhos dated 7/18/52, AHI, Private File of the Viscount of Rio Branco, 321-322).

In Uruguay, the new political forces in power questioned the system of treaties. Both the wisdom and the assurance of Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, moving deftly “between Blancos and Colorados,” ensured recognition of the validity of the treaties. And, as made clear in a May 1853 letter from Paulino de Souza

to Paranhos, the situation of Uruguay's financial weakness also favored Brazil:

The financial difficulties [of Uruguay] were what gave us the treaties of October (1851); let us see if we can still take advantage of them in order to consolidate the policy that they founded. Therefore, we must continue to maintain the financial crisis (excepting the adoption of projects related to the consolidation of debt and the creation and improvement of incomes) in order to compel the eastern [Uruguayan] government to enter a true and good path. We must not let the eastern government fall off the cliff, but it is worth keeping it on the edge for the amount of time necessary such that, once grounded by its deep problems, it places things in the right direction. This is what will cause the legislative majority to decrease its popularity, creating positive outcomes [for us], forcing it to comply clearly with the treaties [of October 12] (Letter of May 12, 1853-AHI, Private File of the Viscount of Rio Branco, 321-322).

Likewise, the division between the Argentine Confederation and the province of Buenos Aires was useful to Brazilian interests, favoring Argentina's accession to the "system of treaties." Paulino de Souza and his agent in the Plata region were suspicious of Urquiza and his ambitious plans. Even so, in a letter to Carneiro Leão dated March 1852, he showed optimism – from the Brazilian point of view:

As for me, if Urquiza wants to inherit both the tyranny and the system of Rosas, anarchy and disorder in the Argentine Confederation can only result. Busy with domestic matters [and a] lack of resources, it will not be able to turn against us, and it will [therefore] not be very difficult for us – not having to deal with a solid and united organized power, such

as that of Rosas – to obtain from such circumstances real advantages for the Empire, and consolidate our influence on the Eastern State [Uruguay] (Private letter to Carneiro Leão of March 20, 1852- AHI, special mission to la Plata River, 272/1/3).

In a speech to the Chamber of Deputies in June 1852¹¹, Paulino de Souza advocated the policy he pursued in the Plata river basin by comparing Brazil's situation in the region before and after the "inauguration of the new policy." Before the new policy the head of the Argentine Confederation was General Rosas, a sworn enemy who had forced a diplomatic rift with Brazil and sought to incorporate Uruguay and Paraguay into the Confederacy, thereby forming what he called, "a colossus at our feet, which would have caused us serious harm." He told the deputies that Brazilians were mistreated in Uruguay, and that their complaints, as well as those of the Imperial government, were neglected. He also reminded them that General Rosas supported the 1777 Treaty of San Ildefonso, which would tear from Brazil more than a third of the territory, and would prohibit navigation on the Plata River and its tributaries vessels under the Brazilian flag. The foreign minister added that Brazil did not have any friends among the parties that split the Plata republics, and that the country had been considered militarily weak, by both its neighbors and the European powers.

Paulino de Souza said that the situation had changed completely after the new policy was implemented. The head of the Argentine Confederation was now General Urquiza, who Brazil had helped in the task to "free and regenerate" his country, and who was willing to celebrate with Brazil a definitive peace treaty. The independence of Uruguay and Paraguay were also ensured. The treaties of October 12, 1851 had provided guarantees to Brazilian

11 Speech delivered on June 4, 1852, reprinted in CARVALHO (2002), p. 599-631.

subjects who live in Uruguay against new arbitrary acts and violence. The *uti possidetis* principle had already been recognized for the establishment of the country's borders with Peru and Uruguay, creating a valuable precedent, and navigation of the rivers of the Plata river basin was virtually guaranteed – opening an outlet to the ocean, which would bring great benefits to the province of Mato Grosso, as well as São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. In addition, the victory of Monte Caseros had restored Brazil's prestige among the country's neighbors in the Plata region and the European powers.

The foreign minister was correct in saying that the policy developed in the Plata from 1850 to 1852 had produced positive results for the Empire. From the point of view of the consolidation of the Brazilian state, its greatest merit was to ensure the Platine *status quo*¹², thereby helping to establish Paraguay and Uruguay as independent states. Opportunities then developed for the resolution of issues with the neighboring republics on terms that were favorable to Brazil.

BORDERS AND NAVIGATION: THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY

In his last report to the Assembly as foreign minister (1853), the future Viscount of Uruguay made clear one of the most common concerns throughout his term in office: the demarcation of the Empire's territorial boundaries. According to Paulino de Souza:

In order to avoid the seizing of new lands by other countries, further complicating the future, it is essential to set the Empire's cardinal points [north, south, east and west] (which is all that is possible at the moment), and later,

12 This *status quo*, according to Doratioto (2002, p. 44), was characterized by an imbalance in favor of Brazil in the Platine region. In reality, this was Brazilian hegemony in the region.

through other diplomatic missions, determine, develop and explain the lines that should link them.

As a general principle the minister believed *uti possidetis* should always prevail in border treaties. He, thus, directed his instructions to the several people in charge of carrying out treaties with the neighboring republics: Peru and Bolivia (Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro), Venezuela and Colombia (Miguel Maria Lisboa), and Paraguay (Felipe José Pereira Leal). Even though not all the missions were successful, the concentrated effort of the minister laid the foundation for the demarcation of all the borders of the Empire, establishing the theory of non-validity of the Treaty of San Ildefonso (1777), and consecrating *uti possidetis* as the general norm of Imperial diplomacy. Later, even when he was no longer foreign minister, the Viscount of Uruguay became involved in the matter of national borders with the British and French Guianas.

The main motivation for the establishment of the Empire's borders should be – Paulino de Souza stated on several occasions – the search for the security and stability of the territorial *status quo*: this should be greater than any prospect of aggrandizement of the national territory.

In addition to the demarcation of borders, the navigation of rivers was also considered fundamental to the consolidation of the state and the defense of its security and sovereignty. The free navigation of the Plata River was, therefore, one of the main goals of Paulino de Souza's policies in the region. The restoration of the former Viceroyalty of the Plata River – or even the strict political control of the government of Argentina over a Confederation of Uruguay and Paraguay – represented, as far as the matter of navigation was concerned, the worst of all worlds for the Empire. It would have given to a single country – indeed, a rival – control over the waters of the Platine river basin. The defense

of the independence of Uruguay and Paraguay was a guarantee of internationalization of the Uruguay, Paraná and Paraguay rivers – a goal shared by the European powers interested in trading in the region.

It is worth drawing attention to the contradiction regarding the issue of river navigation among the policies that the Imperial government adopted in the Plata region and those it adopted in the Amazon. While in the South, Brazil demanded the opening of the Plata River to international navigation, in the North it closed the Amazon to the republics located on the river. The Brazilian rulers themselves, who attempted to reconcile both positions, acknowledged this contradiction. In a query made by the Foreign Affairs Section of the Council of State, dated June 1845, rapporteur Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos observed:

If as owners of the Paraguay (river) – or of parts of the Paraguay, Paraná and Uruguay [rivers] – we believe we were perfectly entitled to navigate them until the mouth at the sea ...it would not be fitting to restrict the populations of Bolivia, Peru, New Granada, Ecuador and Venezuela from navigation on the Amazon. Our interests regarding the navigation of rivers are different or opposite in various points of the Empire. This is why we invoke the conventional law that establishes for us the use of the rivers that cross and divide Brazil (Council of State – 1842-1889 – Queries of the Foreign Affairs Section. Vol. 1 – 1842-1845).

The solution, therefore, is to adhere to conventional law, and seek to obtain and regulate – through agreements with the neighboring republics – the rights of navigation of the rivers, and refrain from considering it as a “perfect right.”

As foreign minister, Paulino de Souza had to deal with the pressures of opening up the Amazon River to foreign navigation –

pressure not only from other countries that shared the river, but also from France and England, as well as the United States, which exercised especially strong pressure in this regard. A campaign in the press, by political and intellectual means, was carried out by U.S. Navy Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury who, after an expedition to the region, was convinced of the importance of opening up the Amazon River and the internationalization of the region. In his writings, Maury supported the view that the Amazon was an area of natural projection of the South of the United States, which, he believed, should send settlers – along with their black slaves – to populate and develop the region.¹³

In a report Paulino de Souza submitted to the Foreign Affairs Section of the Council of State, in 1854, the former minister's opinion on the matter was clear: he expressed an intense nationalist and defensive stand against "powerful nations." He said the United States, whom he described as a very powerful democracy, was so close to Brazil, it represented a more present threat than did European nations, especially France and England. As an example of the expansionary and invasive tendencies of the Americans, he recalled that the United States had annexed five Mexican provinces.

According to the future Viscount of Uruguay, the Americans were also interested in expanding into Brazil, using adventurers and greedy emigrants as their main instruments. The right to free navigation of the Amazon was, therefore, crucial to the American plans.

France and England, Paulino de Souza's report also said, were interested in participating in "the imagined great commercial feast that the opening of the Amazon region would bring about." And the three countries – the United States, England, and France – were encouraging the ambitions of other nations of the river basin, such

13 About that, see HORNE (2010), Chapter 6.

as Peru and Bolivia, to increase pressure on Brazil, to open the river to international navigation. Paulino de Souza concluded that, as in the case of slave trafficking, it was useless to go in the opposite direction and persist in a position that everyone condemned, and against which there were powerful interests. According to him, the riparian nations should have the right to navigate the Amazon River, and the exercise of this right should be established through reciprocal agreements, or sovereign acts of each of these nations. Those rights, however, should not be extended to the tributaries of the river that began in neighboring states, and the passage of warships on the river should also be strictly forbidden.

Concerning the non-bordering states, Paulino de Souza said the Imperial government should allow navigation on the river, but only through specific agreements with the individual countries involved. He also said that a good way to reduce the influence of the United States, France and England on the riparian countries, would be to tie the granting of the right of free navigation to previous resolutions concerning the matter of borders with these neighboring countries.

In addition to the issue of navigation rights, Paulino de Souza voiced his opinion on other matters related to the Amazon. He said, for example, that the Brazilian government should encourage the occupation of the region, by establishing colonies there and supporting the national steam navigation company of Irineu Evangelista de Souza with an increased annual grant – thereby enabling it to compete advantageously with foreign steam navigation concerns.

Paulino José Soares de Souza remained committed, throughout his life, to the construction and the consolidation of the Brazilian state. It is difficult to dissociate his domestic efforts for the development of a solid and centralized state, from his zeal

for the safety and sovereignty of such a state in the foreign arena. More than obtaining immediate gains, the Viscount of Uruguay was concerned with “ensuring the future.”

Externally, he believed an active policy, marked by clear guidelines would lead Brazilian foreign policy henceforth. As the minister of foreign affairs, he developed the formulation of a doctrinal basis that guided the basic issues and themes of Brazilian diplomacy of his time – such as the Platine policy, relationships with the foreign powers, the setting of territorial borders, river navigation, and international trade.

It was not by chance that it was also during his administration of the foreign ministry that the structure of diplomacy itself was improved. Law no. 614, of August 22, 1851, for example, organized the Brazilian diplomatic corps. The law was later regulated by two decrees issued on March 20, 1852: no. 940, which approved the Regulation of the Brazilian Diplomatic Corps (Regulation Paulino Soares de Souza) and no. 941, which regulated the number, the categories and the complement of diplomatic missions abroad. Finally, the Decree of April 6, 1852 established for the first time a table of wages, representations, bonuses and work funds for the diplomatic service.

After the legal instruments outlined above, the diplomatic corps gained the features of a career, with entrance through public competition and clear advancement criteria.¹⁴ The scale of priorities in Brazilian overseas representations was also redesigned, which considerably increased the importance of the legations of America.¹⁵

14 Cf. Flávio Mendes de Oliveira Castro, history of the Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Book 1, Chapter 7.

15 According to Miguel Gustavo de Paiva Torres (2011, p. 176): “In Decree no. 941, dated March 20, 1852, which determined both the amount and the category of Brazilian diplomatic missions, the priority that Paulino gave to the American neighborhood was clear”.

Thus, it can be said that – both in the realm of the doctrine and in that of bureaucratic organization – Paulino José Soares de Souza was in charge of the development of the basic instruments that, from then on, would be used to lead Brazilian diplomacy.

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**DUARTE DA PONTE
RIBEIRO**

A physician, diplomat, geographer and cartographer, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro was, during the Empire, the greatest Brazilian expert in the border matters between Brazil and its neighbors. He was *chargé d'affaires* in Peru (1829-1832 and 1837-1841), Mexico (1834-1835) and Bolivia (1837-1841), resident minister in Argentina (1842-1843) and extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary in charge of the Special Mission to the Pacific Republics and Venezuela (1851-1852). He wrote almost 200 memoirs, mostly about the Brazilian borders. He organized the Itamaraty map collection and was in charge of the restoration or the elaboration of maps and studies about the entire extensive line of Brazilian borders.



DUARTE DA PONTE RIBEIRO: DEFINING THE TERRITORY OF THE MONARCHY

Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Santos

INTRODUCTION

Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro (1795-1878) was certainly the best synthesis of a man of action and an intellectual of the Brazilian diplomacy under the Imperial period. His career began belatedly, when he was more than 30 years old, although, up to that time, he had a successful career as a physician, a trade he had embraced since his adolescence. He started his diplomatic activities in 1826, with the unsuccessful attempt to be nominated Consul at the Spanish Court – which would have meant the recognition of Brazilian independence, a decision, which at that point, the Government of Madrid did not consider convenient. From 1829 to 1832, he was the first diplomatic representative of Brazil in Lima, and after that he served as *chargé d'affaires* in Mexico, from 1834 to 1835.

In 1836, he was nominated once again *chargé d'affaires* in Peru and, on that occasion, also in Bolivia. By the way, shortly after the arrival of Ponte Ribeiro to Bolivia, early in 1837, both countries joined in a Confederation, which eventually did not last

long. At that time, Ponte Ribeiro already had extensive experience in maritime voyages. After all, he had arrived in Brazil when he was 13 years old, with the Portuguese Court in 1808 and, later, as a physician on-board, he traveled to Europe, Africa and Asia, often under difficult conditions. As a diplomat, he had already crossed the Atlantic, both to Europe and North America, and he had also reached the Pacific Ocean, going around Cape Horn, in his first stay in Peru. During his second mission in the countries of the South American Pacific coast, he did not go by sea and crossed the continent from East to West by land. He toured in a mule's back the path from Buenos Aires to the Bolivian capital, Chuquisaca (presently Sucre), from there he went down to Tacna, already in Peru, and continued his journey to the Peruvian capital, where he arrived in June, 1837. The journey from Rio de Janeiro to Lima took almost one year, full of difficulties and discomfort, an epic worthy of the great adventurers. In Lima, he witnessed the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation's defeat to Chilean invaders and its dissolution, with the restoration of Bolivia and Peru as distinct sovereignties. In 1841, near the end of his mission in the Peruvian capital, he signed two treaties with that country: one of Peace, Friendship, Trade and Navigation and another one of Borders and Extradition. However, none of these treaties was ratified.

In late 1841, back in Rio de Janeiro, he took over the leadership of the Third Section of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in charge of the American themes, and devoted himself to researching and writing memoirs on border matters. On that occasion, he studied the limits with both English and French Guyana. His stay at the Court in Rio de Janeiro was, however, short-lived and, in April 1842 he was appointed Minister Resident in Buenos Aires, where he remained until the following year.

From 1844 to 1851, he resumed his functions in the Third Section of the Secretariat of State and started to consolidate his

reputation as an expert on border disputes between the Empire and its neighbors. For that reason, he became a logical choice to head the Special Mission in the Pacific Republics and Venezuela, in 1851. That was certainly the most important initiative of Imperial diplomacy directed towards the countries of the West coast of South America. Ponte Ribeiro signed with Peru, in October 1851, the Special Convention of Trade, River Navigation, Extradition and Limits, which both countries ratified and which became a basic model for the subsequent border and navigation negotiations of Brazil with its other neighbors.

Back in Rio de Janeiro, by late 1852, he was placed in active availability with the post of Minister Plenipotentiary, as an acknowledgement to his “long and good services in the diplomatic career” (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1853, p. 5). Ponte Ribeiro did not take over the third section once again, but he continued to render advice to the successive ministers. He ended his career as a diplomatic representative, explorer and chronicler of the various countries where he served. From then on, however, he consolidated his fame as the most renowned scholar of the Brazilian boundaries (which had already been outlined in his stints at the Third Section of the Chancellery).

Castilhos Goycochêa consecrated Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro as the “major border expert of the Empire”. That author (1942, p. 20) noted that:

The greatest and the best part of the works by Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro was made after his retirement, in 1853. ... Until that date he had only written 45 of the famous Memoirs, each of which became a real treaty on the subject that he explored, from 1853 to 1876 he wrote 140 other

*Memoirs. Not to mention those that his widow donated to the government in 1884.*¹

The importance of Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro in the discussion and consolidation of the Empire's doctrines concerning the Brazilian borders and its territoriality –ideas that were later inherited by the Republican government and that are effective, to a large extent, until today – cannot be minimized. The “major border expert of the Empire”, negotiator of pioneer treaties, renowned cartographer and author of nearly 200 memoirs about the borders was decisive for the establishment of the doctrine for the definition of the Brazilian territory. He supported it with detailed and meticulous empirical studies, documentary research and the elaboration of maps which, for its technical qualities, remained effective as an inescapable reference for many decades after he died.

Of all the Brazilian border, from Cape Orange to the Chui stream, more than 16,000 kilometers long, running over mountain ranges, along the thalwegs of rivers, the margins of ponds, wetlands and dry lands, there might not be any fraction of a meter that Ponte Ribeiro has not studied, which he has not drawn or that he has not ordered to sketch, about the rights of which he has not meditated in sight of the documents that he gathered and that served as comparison with one another or with elements that might have adjacent sovereignties (GOYCOCHÊA, 1942, p. 28).

Beyond the matter of *stricto sensu* borders, it must be recalled, to paraphrase Yves Lacoste,² that *geography served, above all, to*

1 The collection donated by Baroness da Ponte Ribeiro was a catalog object organized by Isa Adonias and was published, in 1984, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2 Cezar (2005) refers, of course, to the 1976 book of Yves Lacoste, *La Géographie ça Sert à Faire la Guerre*.

unify the Empire. As many authors have already pointed out,³ the discourse about a pre-existing “Brazilian” territory was one of the most important founding myths of the Brazilian identity. That territory (which in some readings possessed natural limits and therefore predated the colonization itself) would have its unit protected and legitimized by the centralizing monarchy against the dangers of the separatist and anarchizing tendencies to which the neighboring republics were subject.

BODY OF THE COUNTRY, SOUL OF THE MONARCHY

Today there is a consensually accepted interpretation that, when it separated from Portugal, there still was not in the former colony anything close to a national consciousness. As the French naturalist Saint-Hilaire concluded in an insightful manner, in a well-known passage, “there was a country called Brazil, but definitely there were no Brazilians”. Like the other nations of the American continent, Brazil had to invent itself as a nation, from an incongruous collection of “small-homelands”, some of which had scarce economic, political and cultural ties with one another. In the neighbouring countries, the option for the building of a fully nationalist identity since the beginning of their independent lives reinforced or even invented cultural differences and local policies that led to the fragmentation of the former Spanish colony.⁴ In the Brazilian case, the impossible quest for a nationality that included

3 See, among others, the book of Magnoli (1997), “O Corpo da Pátria”, which analyses in detail the construction of the discourse about the Brazilian territoriality.

4 The question of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the former Portuguese colony in contrast with the fragmentation of America before Spanish is of course a fairly complex question to which merged many diverse factors, structural and random orders (SANTOS, 2004, p. 52-56). There is no doubt, however, that the common interest of the various regional elites, albeit in very different degrees, in the maintenance of slavery and the slave trade figure so important in this explanation.

both masters and slaves was avoided. The answer to the difficult challenge of the building of a politically operational identity that united such disparate regional realities and that preserved, at the same time, the main features of an extremely conservative proslavery society underwent two major themes: monarchy as a symbol of belonging to a specific civilization project and the idea of preexistence of a common origin, based on the notion of a single territory and of alleged natural and anthropological characteristics prior to colonization itself, emphasized, in a subsidized manner, by a common history (SANTOS, 2010, p. 108-113).

Poured in terms that were still dynastic, the identity of the new country was based on the idea of preexistence of a territory that would define it, and for the integrity of which the monarchy had to care. This was one of the key concepts for a Brazilian identity that united the various “small-homelands” of the former colony preserving both the hierarchies and the institutions inherited from the colonial period. As Magnoli emphasized (1997, p. 17): “in terms of legitimacy, the past is all the better the more remote it is. Perfection is about anchoring the nation in its own nature, turning it previous to men and history”. The core of this notion of a single territory, which was clearly identifiable and preexisting, was based on the formulation of the myth of an “Island-Brazil”: a portion of segregated land, outlined by the Atlantic Ocean, on one side, and, on the other, by the course of mighty rivers, the springs of which supposedly met in a legendary unifying lake located in the South American hinterland. Thus, Brazil, reified in its territory, supposedly had always been, according to Jaime Cortesão (1956, p. 137), “a geographical whole geometrically defined and almost isolated”. This territorial unit would have been equivalent to a “human Island-Brazil, which was both pre-historical and proto-historical”, expressed in the alleged homogeneity of the indigenous tribes that inhabited that territory. Cortesão even suggested that

since the sixteenth century, “the Island-Brazil was, above all, a cultural island and, specifically, the island of the *general language*,⁵ which became a strong unifying bond of the colonial State” (CORTESÃO, 1956, p. 141-142).

The imperial State would be in charge of preserving this territory, going on with the task carried out by the Portuguese Crown, which expanded the Portuguese colonization towards the “natural” limits of Brazil, ignoring the artificial line established by the Treaty of Tordesilhas. According to that logic, the Brazilian monarchy was the guarantor of the integrity of that Island-Brazil, sold as a gift of nature that the colonizer rescued and that the independent country would be in charge of preserving. The monarchy was related to the unity of the territory, in an ideological operation that turned it into being responsible for the maintenance of the “greatness” of Brazil. On the other hand, the Hispanic neighbors, by their political system, supposedly caused the fragmentation of the Spanish heritage in several small and anarchical Republics.

Therefore, such idea of greatness equated the immensity of the territory and the preservation of its integrity to the monarchy. The Brazilian identity was based on the territory and on the monarchy, having as a corollary the preservation of a certain civilization project: a highly hierarchical, oligarchic and proslavery society, in the molds of the Ancien Régime, a model that had been undermined by the American and French revolutions and was still being challenged within the autonomist movements of Spanish America, which recognized their new societies as Republics: a break with Europe and with the practices, ideas and forms of legitimacy of the Ancien Régime. On the other hand, the elites that promoted

5 The *general language* was a language invented by the jesuits - based on a mix of “Tupi” and “Guarani” languages - to be used as “língua franca” among the various indigenous groups.

Brazilian independence imagined themselves as being “European” and civilised, in a challenge to geography and to its own logic, when it sees in the proslavery reactionary monarchy a bastion of the lights and of civilization in the midst of the warlord barbarism of the Republican America.

DUARTE DA PONTE RIBEIRO: A NEGOTIATOR WITH HIS OWN IDEAS

Born in Portugal, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro became Brazilian in the great naturalization that followed independence. During the colonial period he had occupied small public offices, without hindering his career as a physician: treasurer of the village of Praia Grande (Niterói), in 1819, and treasurer of the estate of the sick and the dead of the same locality, in 1820. His early diplomatic missions, however, were only obtained during the First Empire and, thereafter, he abandoned medicine in a definitive manner. After his scarcely successful mission in Spain (1826-1828), during his first stay in Lima, from 1829 to 1832, he started to engage directly with themes concerning the limits.

The foreign policy of D. Pedro I was basically reactive and scarcely consistent (SANTOS, 2012b, p. 20-31) and, within this framework, Ponte Ribeiro’s first mission in Peru, like that of Luiz de Souza Dias in Great-Colombia, represented only a response to the missions of the Peruvian José Domingo Cáceres (1826) and the Colombian Leandro Palacios (1827) to Rio de Janeiro. Both Hispanic-American envoys were unsuccessful in their attempts to discuss the Brazilian borders with their countries, since the Imperial government claimed not to have the necessary information to initiate these discussions, since much of the documentation and maps that would be indispensable were in Lisbon and new surveys

and investigations would have to be undertaken to support the negotiations. The instructions provided by Ponte Ribeiro, as far as the possible Peruvian interest in defining the frontiers with Brazil was concerned were also in that same direction. He should repeat the argument about the lack of elements to negotiate “always saying that the Imperial government is taking care of clarifying everything, so that later it enters the negotiation of such a treaty” (Aracati to Ponte Ribeiro. In: CHDD, 2008, p. 108).

In fact, more than missing elements to discuss on a technical bases a certain stretch of the border, there was not any established doctrine to define the limits in broader terms. The Brazilian Consul in Asuncion between 1824 and 1829, Manuel Corrêa da Câmara, even addressed the outline of the border with Paraguay, without reaching an agreement, because the Paraguayan dictator Francia wanted the recognition of the lines defined by the Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777, and the Brazilian diplomat sought acceptance of the *uti possidetis* principle. As far as Uruguay was concerned, there was no continuation to what had been determined by the Preliminary Peace Convention (signed with Argentina, it should be noted), Article 17 of which provided for the conclusion of a “Definitive Peace Treaty”, which would determine the borders between Brazil and Uruguay. As it has been mentioned before, as far as Great Colombia and Peru were concerned, D. Pedro I’s diplomacy refused the proposals to start discussions on border issues. Thus, consistent negotiations about the limits of the Empire began only in the Second Empire.

The important aspect was the recognition or not, of the treaties and other arrangements between Portugal and Spain as the basis for the negotiations between Brazil and its neighbors. Once such logic was obeyed, the discussion would be focused on documentation exchanged between both ancient metropolises, on colonial maps and, as an alternative, only in the omissive cases or

in those that were less clear, on actual occupation of the territory by the citizens and subjects of each of the countries. Another radically opposite alternative, adopting the *uti possidetis* principle, would be to regard the moment of the independences as the initial mark and delimit the sovereignties according to the actual possession of the land at that time, with or without titles, and even, occasionally, going against the provisions of the old treaties between Portugal and Spain (even though these could serve as a subsidiary source, mainly in the case of the uninhabited areas).

It was only during the Second Empire that it was defined a coherent policy for the establishment of the Brazilian borders and Ponte Ribeiro had been one of the major players in this debate since the Regencies. After a brief stay in Mexico (1834-1835), Ponte Ribeiro was once again appointed *chargé d'affaires* to the Peruvian Government and, this time, to the Bolivian government as well. In December, 1836, Ponte Ribeiro arrived at the Bolivian capital, Chuquisaca, without instructions to negotiate the borders, but from Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian Chancellor Gustavo Pantoja had sent a Note, dated December 15th, 1836, suggesting that the border between Brazil and Bolivia was established according to the Treaty of San Ildefonso, a proposal which the Bolivian government rejected.⁶ In the same line of taking as basis the agreements between the old metropolises, in 1844, Brazil signed a Treaty of Alliance, Trade, Navigation and Limits with Paraguay, which proposed to define the borders according to the Treaty of San Ildefonso.

In Lima, considering the interest of the Peruvian Government to negotiate its borders with the Empire, Ponte Ribeiro began discussions about a Treaty of Limits, despite having no specific instructions or powers to deal with this theme, which forced him to introduce a safeguard in the text, making it clear that he was

6 That matter is addressed in details in Soares de Souza, 1952, p. 83-99.

negotiating *ad referendum* of his government. Going against the philosophy that prevailed until then (though irregularly), Ponte Ribeiro decided to adopt as a criterion for the negotiation the *uti possidetis* principle. He wrote to Rio de Janeiro to request powers to negotiate and instructions about what criteria he should use. The response to his request to accept the Peruvian proposal and instructions about how to carry out those negotiations came many months later, and when they finally arrived they contradicted frontally the criterion which had been chosen by Ponte Ribeiro and on which he had already been basing his activity, incidentally without having been authorized. Even so, against his instructions, he kept his negotiating strategy unchanged and explained to the Imperial government why he would not obey the guidelines received:

Even if [the dispatch] that includes instructions for me to stick to the Preliminary Treaty of 1777 had arrived in due time, I would still be forced to practice what I've been doing after the government of Bolivia stated that it does not recognize as valid and binding to it the treaties between Spain and Portugal; and I would have always expressed to Imperial government, as I did, my certainty that, instead of implementing them by force, Brazil should take advantage of that statement and argue only with the uti possidetis principle, which is favorable to us. I'm convinced that I have settled the common law principles that Brazil can claim in its favor, after the old treaties were unknown by that government (PONTE RIBEIRO, 2011, p. 153).

The Treaty of Limits and Extradition signed between Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro and the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuel Ferreyros by the end of the second mission of the Brazilian diplomat in Lima, in 1841, was the first legal instrument signed

by a Brazilian negotiator according to the *uti possidetis* principle. However, it was rejected by both governments.

In 1842, the Treaty was examined in the State Council (session of June 16th) and the adoption of the *uti possidetis* principle was the subject of strong criticism, which resulted in the recommendation that it should not be ratified:

... far from being better defined by the uti possidetis clause, it fully exposes our limits to an innovation of the old conventions between Portugal and Spain; innovation all the more dangerous as the government of Your Imperial Majesty is not for the recognition of its advantages and prepared with previous and secure assessments. The foedera finium is one of those conventions in which any alteration or change should be made without the most scrupulous investigation of all the general circumstances that claim them (REZEK, 1978, p. 105-106).

In fact, it was only in Paulino Soares de Souza's second term as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1849-1853) that *uti possidetis* was consecrated as doctrine to mark out the Brazilian border negotiations. Soares de Souza went beyond the theoretical recognition of this principle as being the most favorable for Brazil. Under his direction, it was triggered an important diplomatic offensive for the definition of the Brazilian borders. In 1851, Paulino commissioned Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro to be the head of the Special Mission in the Republics of the Pacific and in Venezuela, with accurate instructions on how to negotiate not only the boundaries, but also trade and the river navigation, when that was the case.

In the late 1840's, with the internal pacification driven by the prosperity derived from the soaring exports of coffee, the Brazilian State finally began to consolidate itself and the foreign policy

became consistent. However, in 1849, even though it was already strengthened and more confident, the monarchy still faced strong domestic resistances against a more active role in the Plata region, the politics of which had been dominated by the Argentinean leader Juan Manuel de Rosas since the 1830's. The memory of the military and political disaster of the Cisplatine War was still present and, in the same way as that defeat had contributed to the resignation of D. Pedro I, a humiliation in front of Rosas would be a serious source of lack of prestige for young D. Pedro II and could jeopardize the monarchic institution itself.

With the fall of the Cabinet of the Viscount (later Marquis) of Olinda, Araújo Lima, in 1849, and his replacement by José da Costa Carvalho (Viscount and Marquis of Monte Alegre) – with Paulino as Chancellor – it was verified a strong transformation of the Brazilian attitude, towards an active and, even interventionist policy in the Plata region. The Empire started to support, even financially, the leaders of the Colorado Party besieged in Montevideo by the forces of Blanco Party of warlord Manuel Oribe, an ally of Rosas. In May 1851, the Brazilian Government signed a Treaty of military alliance with the Argentinean provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes. It also became an ally of Paraguay. In August, it began the invasion of the Uruguayan territory controlled by Oribe and then Rosas declared war on the Brazilian Empire and its allies.

The Special Mission to the Republics of the Pacific, whose instructions date from March 1st, 1851, was initially designed to ward off alliances and dispel any sympathies for Rosas in the rest of the continent, including acting next to the press of those countries to publish reports that were favorable to the Empire. In the Plata region, the military victory against the forces of Oribe was swift and, in November 1851, once the Uruguayan territory had been dominated, the allies already pointed their guns directly against Rosas. The Argentinean dictator was defeated in the battle

of Monte Caseros on February 3rd, 1852. The promptness with which the campaign against Oribe and Rosas progressed and the little sympathy that the Argentinean arose both in Chile and in Peru allowed Ponte Ribeiro to focus in his negotiations about limits, trade and navigation with the government of Lima, after a brief stay in Chile.

Having been received by the Peruvian President, on July 12th, 1851, Ponte Ribeiro started talking to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joaquín de Osma, who presided the Peruvian delegation in the first four sessions of the negotiation – held, respectively on August 8th, 11th and 17th and on September 2nd. The last three (October 18th, 19th, and 21st) were in charge of the interim Minister, Bartolomé Herrera. Ponte Ribeiro reported that the greatest difficulty was the adoption of the *uti possidetis* principle to set the limits. Peruvian negotiators insisted on referring to the Preliminary Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777, which was rejected by the Brazilian. Finally, Ponte Ribeiro's position prevailed, "setting the border from Tabatinga to the mouth of the Apoporis River, and along the Javari River to the South; and that there was the inclusion of the clause that the already determined Joint Commission, will propose the exchange of land for the border to have natural limits" (Ponte Ribeiro, 2010:136). In a long and detailed letter dated October 26th, Ponte Ribeiro informed the Chancellor Paulino Soares de Souza of the signing of the Treaty "and the difficulties and incidents that occurred during the negotiation" (PONTE RIBEIRO, 2010, p. 133-138).

The Special Convention of Trade, River Navigation, Extradition and Limits between Brazil and Peru was signed on October 23rd, 1851, and, where it was ratified both by the Peruvian Congress and by the Brazilian Emperor, its ratification instruments were exchanged on October 18th of the following year, in Rio de Janeiro. From the Peruvian capital, Ponte Ribeiro went to Bolivia, where

he tried to negotiate, to no avail, a similar agreement with that country. In 1852, the Special Mission was divided into two and the negotiations with Ecuador, New Granada and Venezuela were entrusted to Miguel Maria Lisboa.

The practical justification for the adoption of *uti possidetis* as doctrine and for the urgency in setting the borders was made very clearly by Paulino Soares de Souza in his 1852 report presented to the Parliament:

Experience has shown that the population of neighbouring States with much smaller areas than the Empire, and especially of the landlocked ones, tends to expand across our borders, while our population, formerly drawn to those points by the mining industry, and led to that by the system of our old metropolis, currently tends to come closer to the coastline. Thus, not only new settlements have not been formed in our borders, but also part of the old ones have been abandoned, or are undergoing decadence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1853, p. 10).

Thus, the *uti possidetis* doctrine acquired, in practical terms, an eminently defensive sense, in order to ensure a border, which seemed to be at its maximum, since the Brazilian population seemed to flow towards the coastline. In terms of speech, this idea fit perfectly in the argumentation about the preservation of the territory bequeathed by the Portuguese colonization, defined in natural limits. The Brazilian territoriality was seen as a legacy of nature, which the metropolis had unveiled and populated along with the Indian tribes that gave, in this view, an anthropological support for the notion of a preexisting Brazil. Not by chance, indigenism was the most striking current of Brazilian romanticism, an intellectual movement whose self-proclaimed mission was to develop a national literature. On the contrary, on the one hand,

with the United States – one of the basis of whose identity was territorial expansion, and the idea of an ever-expanding frontier – and, on the other hand, with most Hispanic-American countries – that very early on cultivated a sort of “withering territory syndrome” as part of their nationalist discourse – the Brazilian diplomacy has been building the narrative of a country “satisfied” with its territory, limited by natural borders (and, therefore, not historical ones) and whose origin and legitimacy preceded colonization.

The narratives can be suitable or not, consistent or inconsistent, but in itself, it is not very pertinent to discuss whether they are “true” or “false”. The States and the historiographies of the neighbor countries tend to insist on the narrative of territorial losses. Sometimes, with enough concrete bases, for example, when territories populated and actually controlled by a State were attached by another one after bloody wars. Other times, based on projections of territories, some of which were sparsely populated, which supposedly belonged to the Spanish Crown and, therefore, could be “transmitted” to the political units that succeeded the metropolis, based on titles and imprecise ambiguous and imprecise limits. Anyway, these quarrels would have to be analyzed in each individual case. It turns out, however, that the mere crossing of all demands and complaints about “lost” territories among the Hispanic-American countries would show that it is impossible to satisfy everyone, because the same territory is often simultaneously claimed by three or more countries. It must also be noted that even in countries considered as “usurpers” of the territory of neighbors, the idea of territorial loss remain present in versions of their national historiographies, as in the case of Chile, to mention a single example, which conquered territories of Bolivia and Peru, but which registers in some narratives that it has “lost” Patagonia to Argentina.

As far as Brazil is concerned, the idea of a nation “satisfied” with its territory, naturally outlined and that came before nationality itself, was developed slowly and often against the facts. Like moments in which one could argue (and in each case, with greater or lesser intensity, actually did) about territorial losses, recall the Cisplatine episodes, the limits with British Guiana, the clauses of the Treaty of Petropolis concerning the the border with Mato Grosso, the adjustment with Peru of 1909 and the rectification of boundaries with Uruguay promoted by the Baron of Rio Branco.

In the First Empire, the discourse about a country that was secure in its territory would seem highly incongruous with reality, not only of still undefined borders, such as it was threatened by its neighbors. The “loss” of Cisplatine seemed to be a major trauma, an unacceptable breach of the territorial integrity. It must be emphasized that the “withering territory syndrome” could have been an option for the identity discourse in Brazil as well. The Coat of Arms adopted by the Brazilian Empire was a simple adaptation of the personal banner of Prince D. Pedro, only with the addition of an Imperial Crown and nineteen stars representing the Brazilian provinces (which included the Cisplatine one). According to Pimenta (2002, p. 173, emphasis by the author), “since 1825 its consolidation [of Cisplatine] as an integral part of the Brazilian Empire acquired almost the same sense of *integrity of the nation*.” It is true that the province enjoyed a quite autonomous government, with its own laws and institutions and Spanish as its official language. However, that situation was no stranger to the political concepts of the Ancien Régime, a political model whose preservation attempt was embodied by the project of continuing monarchy in the former Portuguese colony. Therefore, the extraordinary nature of Cisplatine in the context of the colony and of the emerging Empire is highly debatable. The economic and social ties with the Province of São Pedro were intense, with

that territory being one of the major suppliers of jerked beef to the colony. In addition, the port of Montevideo served as a gateway to the trade of slaves and commodities to the South of the Portuguese colony. In addition, both the communications and the transportation between Montevideo and the capital and the main cities of the Empire were much easier and constant than among many provinces. Even the language difference must be put into perspective, since many inhabitants of the Portuguese colony often communicated in general language, of Indian origin. Montevideo, in turn, traditionally housed a large population of foreigners and many languages were spoken there besides Spanish and Portuguese. In what currently is the territory of Northern Uruguay, the Portuguese language prevailed until the late nineteenth century.

The Cisplatine war was both unpopular and wearing for Pedro I, but the loss of the territory was seen, correctly from the perspective of the time, as a serious threat to the integrity of the Empire and was a very tough blow. The Congressman at the time and future Marquis of Abrantes, Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, summarized well, on a speech delivered on May 15th, 1827, the feeling about the possible loss of the province:

Everyone talks against the war, but I have no doubt about ensuring that it is extremely rare the Brazilian who wants to lose the Cisplatine. Let us grant, however, that the war is unpopular, but it should be noted that, if peace is made with the loss of Cisplatine, this peace will be even more unpopular (apud CALÓGERAS, 1998, v. II, p. 436, emphasis by the author).

Therefore, a narrative about a supposed territorial spoliation could have been adopted by the Empire. In fact, the defense of the integrity of a territory against threats from neighbor countries

was one of the keys to the discourse on territoriality. The other cornerstone of this vision was the idea of natural limits and the contours of this territory, certainly, would seem more “natural” if it was marked off to the South by the Plata estuary rather than by the Quaraí-Jaguarão-Chuí line that currently separates Uruguay from Brazil. Much has been argued during the First Empire and the Regencies about the need to restore this “natural border”. Even an appeal for the European monarchies to help the Empire in this task was made, as proved by the Mission of the Marquis of Santo Amaro (1830). However, once Brazilian historiography accepted the existence of the Uruguayan nationality, it hid that breach of territorial integrity when it emphasized the own cultural traits that distinguished the new nation from the Empire and the precariousness of the Portuguese domination in the area.⁷ The narrative that stood in Brazilian historiography turned out to conceal such imperfection in the speech about territoriality with the notion that one could not lose what it actually never had. It should be noted that this argument is inconsistent with the doctrine of *uti possidetis*, since in 1822 the territory that currently belongs to the Uruguayan State was (after a brief fight) under the control of the Brazilian Empire. In terms of the doctrine that supports the construction of the Brazilian territoriality, that fact, regardless of the specific circumstances of such ownership, would be the only condition necessary to legitimize this region as part of the Brazilian territory.

7 The legitimacy of the Uruguayan nationality is obviously not in question, but it is only highlighted that, like the Brazilian one, by the way, it was to a great extent built by the State that came before it.

THE MAJOR BORDERS EXPERT

The decisive importance Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro's action in the establishment of *uti possidetis* as a doctrine for the discussions the Brazilian limits with its neighbours must be highlighted. In the negotiation of the Treaty of 1841 with Peru, the diplomat acted initially without accurate guidance from Rio de Janeiro and, later, going against the express instructions from his superiors. According to the opinion of Soares de Souza (1952, p. 116):

I believe that this was Ponte Ribeiro's masterpiece as a diplomat, a personal work, which he started alone, since 1838; established in 1851 by the Viscount do Uruguay, and concluded by the Baron of Rio Branco in 1910. The work had been eminently national, which had been carried out by the former surgeon from Praia Grande, since, regarding the fact that it was of the Empire, the Republic accepted it, and our greatest statesmen always defended it.

In fact, apart from his personal contribution as a negotiator for the definition of Brazilian borders (the treaties of 1841 and 1851 with Peru), the Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro's performance in the Chancellery turned out to be key for the consolidation of the *uti possidetis* as principle position of the Brazilian diplomacy. Since that doctrine, an entire narrative about the limits that lingers to this day was gradually assembled, detailed in each specific case. Since his retirement in 1853, until shortly before his death in 1878, Ponte Ribeiro worked hard on the crystallization of this view and in the creation of solid foundations to sustain it. According to Adonias (1984, p. 76), after 1853 "there is the emergence of the memorialist and the geographer that records the process of our formation and depicts the profile of our territory". Still as Chief of the 3rd Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ponte Ribeiro had proposed the creation of a Commission of Limits, "intended

to collect writings and maps, and survey the Empire's border chart, accompanied by a historical exhibition of data on which it is founded" (ADONIAS, 1984:9). That Commission, which turned out not to be established, should base its work on the "Abstract of the State of the Empire's Border, which he wrote in 1842. Two years later, Ponte Ribeiro published another general memoir: "Notes on the State of the Brazilian Border in 1844".

After 1853, Ponte Ribeiro went on to devote himself exclusively to the study of the matter of limits and one of his first initiatives was to organize and update the Map Collection of Itamaraty, by transferring to there maps that were in other public offices, by purchasing and exchanging maps in other countries and by making charts and maps at Itamaraty itself. A special effort, supervised personally by Ponte Ribeiro, was made in relation to Portugal and resulted, in 1867, in an agreement between both governments for the exchange and copy of maps between them. Portugal received 78 rolls and 157 lots of maps, in exchange for the 182 lots surveyed at the Portuguese Military Archive, the Overseas Archive and the National Library of Lisbon.

The Map Collection, whose initial survey of 1852 recorded the existence of 127 maps, was the subject of priority attention, together with the restoration of the Archive. In 1854, in the first catalogue of the Map Collection organized by Ponte Ribeiro, that number grew slightly, to 138, and in 1876 it already had 433 maps (Ponte Ribeiro, 1876). This last catalogue (updated in 1896) was undoubtedly the greatest systematization work of cartographic information available, with analytical notes by Ponte Ribeiro on each of the charts, which he organized into ten different sections: a) maps of the entire territory of the Brazilian Empire; b) maps of the Brazilian coastline; c) maps of the Provinces of the Empire; d) maps of the colonies and States that share limits with Brazil; e) maps of Southern America; f) maps of Northern America;

g) maps of Asia and Oceania; h) maps of Africa; i) maps of Europe; and k) maps of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The 1876 Catalogue was, in fact, a subproduct of the Ponte's participation on the draft of the General Charter of the Empire of 1875, a large-sized map (122 x 131 cm) published by a Commission created specifically for that purpose, under the chairmanship of General Henrique de Beaurepaire Rohan "with the support of the Hon. Sir Baron of Ponte Ribeiro", as pointed out in the very title of this document, one of the most important Brazilian cartographic works of the nineteenth century. That charter was based on the map drawn by Conrado Jacob Niemeyer in 1846, which in a new edition, of 1873, had border details either corrected or added by Ponte Ribeiro. The General Charter of the Empire was one of the main attractions of the Brazilian stand at the Philadelphia International Exhibition of 1876. This General Charter of the Empire was "the best one we owned for nearly half a century, that is, until the appearance in 1922, of the *Chart of Brazil to the Millionth*, organized by the Engineering Club in 46 pages" (ADONIAS, 1984, p. 52).

Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro was also an active member of the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB), which, is the main Brazilian scientific institution and a crucial legitimacy *locus* of the theses that were created concerning both the Brazilian limits and its territoriality. It should only be mentioned the heated debate in 1853, and reprinted in the pages of the IHGB Review, between Ponte Ribeiro and José Joaquim Machado de Oliveira, who had criticized the Treaty which defined the limits of the Empire with Uruguay⁸. Ponte Ribeiro, in response, became a staunch advocate of the Brazilian State's official position. Other members

8 The discussion deserved an issue of the Review (3rd Series, n. 12, 4th Quarter of 1853) devoted entirely to it. Available at the website of the IHGB Magazine: <<http://www.ihgb.org.br/rihgb.php?s=19>>, Tome XVI (1853), p. 385-560. Access on 03/11/2013.

of the Institute, such as Cândido Baptista de Oliveira and Pedro de Alcântara Bellegarde also became involved in the debate ended by Gonçalves Dias who moved the Institute away from either one of both positions on behalf of its neutral and scientific character.

With the diplomatic negotiations established on a firm base and, from then on, almost invariable, the discourse on the evolution of the Brazilian borders and the legal bases of the Brazilian position was gradually crystallized already during the Second Empire, a process which the Baron of Rio Branco continued and was a major exponent during the Republic. Shortly, the argument developed about the borders followed the evolution of the negotiations between Portugal and Spain since the Treaty of Madrid overcame that of Tordesilhas in 1750 (with emphasis on the figure of Alexandre de Gusmão), with an important highlight on the supposed invalidation of the treaties between both metropolises because of the so-called “War of the Oranges”, in which Portugal faced an alliance between Spain and France (1801). This narrative recognized the signing of the Treaty of San Ildelfonso (1777), but the war between both metropolises broke that legal tie and, to the extent that the Peace of Badajoz (1801) did not restore the *status quo ante bellum* there was no basis to define the borders by the Treaty of 1777. According to Ponte Ribeiro “by the universal principle of Public Law that, by war, the previous treaties are broken and the things as they were at the moment of the Peace Convention, must be considered legitimate” (apud SOARES DE SOUZA, 1952, p. 271). Thus, in the absence of valid legal instruments, the *status quo* prevailed, namely the actual occupation at the time of the restoration of peace, or in the South American case, of the independences. The matter, therefore, was reduced to the process of determining the actual possession and, eventually, making mutual agreement adjustments. Thus, the Brazilian borders ought to be established according to the *uti possidetis* principle, except for

the border between Brazil and French Guiana, since the Treaty of Utrecht was recognized as valid.

Such doctrine prevailed since 1851 and was maintained and even reinforced by the Republican governments. In the troubled early decades of the Republic, beset by rebellions, messianic movements and a difficult civil war, the defense of the integrity of the territory won a renewed ideological importance, as a point of national union. The Brazilian greatness was compared once again to the integrity of the territory and initiatives such as the Treaty of Montevideo (signed by Quintino Bocaiúva, it shared the region of Palmas with Argentina on behalf of Republican friendship) were severely criticized. In addition, the occupation of the Island of Trinidad by the British caused a real national commotion, even though, according to Rio Branco, that island was a “worthless rock, not even for England, nor for us, but which is considered among us a *sacred piece of the fatherland*” (apud VIANA FILHO, 2008, p. 272, emphasis by the author).

The narrative about the Brazilian limits was crystallized with the work of Rio Branco, not only as a result of successful negotiations with the neighbor countries, which resulted in treaties that legally ensured all the extremely long borderline, but also in terms of the discourse on evolution of the Brazilian borders. The defenses that he wrote for the arbitrations of Palmas and Amapá, the study of the borders with British Guyana and the exposure of reasons that Rio Branco presented to Congress for the ratification of the treaties signed in his long administration are documents considered, until today, to be the final word on the subject from the point of view of the narrative consensually accepted in Brazil. Since then, Brazilian diplomacy (and its historiography) remains firmly tied to the arguments and to the spirit of that doctrine, in whose origin the figure of Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro played a prominent role.

His intellectual influence, in that sense, surpassed by far all his already important role as diplomat and negotiator *stricto sensu*.

According to Goes Filho (2012, p. 649), “the current view in Brazil about the formation of our land borders comes from Rio Branco: from the facts he presents and from the versions he gives them. The former are well chosen, while the latter are well articulated”. In fact, the work of Rio Branco as a negotiator and thinker of the Brazilian limits was invaluable, but the doctrinal bases, the arguments and much of the systematic survey empirical works of each sector of the border were inaugurated and structured mainly by Ponte Ribeiro: as a negotiator, in the treaties of 1841 and 1851 with Peru, as an intellectual, in his role as promoter of the adoption of *uti possidetis* and of the argument that sustained such doctrine, and with its thorough investigations about the entire borderline, and with his work as a geographer and cartographer, as well as by his tireless efforts in search of maps and documents.

CONCLUSION

From the point of view of the Brazilian thought on international relations, the matter of the territory might have been the most important theme for the diplomacy of the Empire and of the early decades of the Republican period. In addition to the structuring of generic arguments, the development of a detailed and consistent narrative and the support of each specific case, of each singular stretch of the boundaries, with empirical data, documents and maps was a first-rate negotiator effort, a monumental intellectual task.

The importance of that work, of thinkers and negotiators, often confused as being the same person, as in the case of Rio Branco and Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, was highlighted in a recent

text by Ambassador Synésio S. Goes Filho (2012, p. 649), who compared the historiographical versions about current limits in Brazil and its neighbours:

Without thinking that we are always right, we see that de facto errors which occur in other histories do not exist or scarcely exist in ours. Personally, I'm not aware of any such error. The interpretation, yes, might sometimes be debatable. It is not an irrefutable truth to say that the Treaty of 1777 was annulled by the war of 1801; or that the one of 1867 was good for Bolivia. One can perfectly disagree with those versions, as our neighbors always did and we may eventually do, today, with a more ecumenical view of history. The point to be emphasized is that in the appropriate moments we had good agents and presented good arguments.

Ponte Ribeiro was, at his time, one of the keenest negotiators and, certainly, the most important Brazilian thinker on the frontiers of the Brazilian territory. He left an important intellectual heritage, superbly exploited and enriched by Rio Branco. Such legacy endures to this day, not only by the limits actually fixed and legally established, but also as a narrative for the diplomacy and to historiography.

Besides, Ponte Ribeiro also devoted himself to other matters of the period's diplomatic agenda. Since his first mission in Lima (1829-1832), he sought to regulate by means of treaties the river navigation of the upper riparians along the Amazon basin to the Atlantic Ocean. According to the instructions, dated March 9th, 1829 (Aracati to Ponte Ribeiro. In: CHDD, 2008, p. 107), Ponte Ribeiro should point out to the Peruvian government the Brazilian intention to “animate and strengthen the political and commercial relations between both”. If there was good receptivity,

the Imperial government would be “ready to enter the negotiation of a Treaty of Trade and Navigation”. That treaty should be “based on liberal principles, or to say it better, on the American politics, in order to increasingly animate the relations of friendship and good neighborliness between both neighboring States”. On that occasion, for lack of Peruvian interest, no agreement was reached.

The Brazilian government’s stance regarding the river navigation, however, then would change because of the interest shown by Europeans and, mainly, Americans to navigate along the Amazon. While in the Plata basin one of the priorities of the Brazilian policy was to ensure navigation to the interior of the continent through the international rivers, in the Amazon such franchise started to be seen as a possible threat to sovereignty. The Chancellery started to have as a rule to keep the navigation of the Amazon and its tributaries along the Brazilian territory to the exclusive will of the authorities of the Empire. Even so, on his second mission in Peru, one of two treaties signed by Ponte Ribeiro predicted that after ten years the Peruvian vessels would be free to navigate to and from the Atlantic Ocean through the rivers of the Amazon basin (PONTE RIBEIRO, 2011, p. 309). Since he had no instructions or powers to deal with it, he let the final word on the topic, for the Brazilian Chancellery, but he did not forget to clarify that “if this right is denied to Peru, Brazil may scarcely demand it from Buenos Aires, when it comes the desired time when we can sail along the Paraguay River until the Jauru. However, the *ad referendum* clause leaves to the will of the Imperial government to adopt, or not to admit the treaty” (PONTE RIBEIRO, 2011, p. 321). In fact, the treaty was not ratified, but the thesis of the river navigation regulated by bilateral agreements began to prevail again after 1851, with Ponte Ribeiro having rescued that principle in the negotiations of the treaty he signed with Peru on that year, during his Special Mission in the Republics of the Pacific.

Ponte Ribeiro was also a dissenting voice regarding another subject that currently occupies the center of Brazilian foreign policy: regional integration. The Empire saw itself as a foreign body in a convulsed continent of republics ruled by warlords. The only South American monarchy always resisted the calling of successive American meetings of the nineteenth century, with the fear that they led to the emergence of a large anti-Brazilian Alliance to adjust the boundaries in a coordinated manner, to demand the end of slavery or, even, to support a republican revolt against the peculiar form of Government in Brazil.⁹

Against the general opinion, already in 1841, Ponte Ribeiro prepared an interesting document entitled *Reflexões Sobre as Vantagens da Reunião do Preconizado Congresso Americano* (PONTE RIBEIRO, 2011, p. 356-359), in which he analyzed the prospects of convening of a new American Congress, as the one held in Panama in 1829. Despite the reticence of the Imperial rule against this kind of initiative, Ponte Ribeiro was clearly in favour of the participation of Brazil and of the need to create, among the American countries, a “uniform system of policy and of foreign public law, adapted to peculiar circumstances of this new world”. His conclusion about that pioneering trial of South American integration could not be more optimistic:

The Congress shall organize that system, in which our right must be effective and the other's must be respected; it must be religiously observed in all fellow States; and there must be no fear that the old nations are opposed to it, because it suits them not only to respect it, but still give it strength and permanence, for their complaints that enter the sphere of common law to have good and prompt result in the sphere of the common law. ... Let me conclude by repeating

9 The theme is extensively addressed in Santos (2004).

my persuasion that it is interesting to Brazil the convening of the American Congress; that it should play an active role in its tasks; and that it can result from them, for now, the elements of order and stability that the Empire needs to see consolidated as soon as possible in the neighbors States.

As it turns out, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro may also be considered as a precursor of the idea of South American integration. It was, during the Empire, one of the few voices that proved to be sympathetic to the participation of Brazil in the Interamerican Congresses. Even though his point of view on that matter did not advance, once again it was confirmed his intellectual independence and the firmness with which he defended his positions.

In 1873, the diplomat received the title of baron of Ponte Ribeiro. It was the crowning of his career as a diplomat and intellectual, a man of action and ideas, whose legacy remains embedded in the discourse about Brazilian territoriality. More than just *a diplomat of the Empire* – title whose apparent modesty reveals the admiration of one of his main biographers – Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro was one of the most influential voices of the Brazilian Chancellery and a prominent intellectual also within the main scientific institution of its time, the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute. No one summarized better his role on the theme of the Brazilian limits than his other biographer, who condensed his performance in the title he gave Ponte Ribeiro's biography: *O Fronteiro-Mor do Império*.

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FRANCISCO ADOLFO DE VARNHAGEN

Born in São João de Ipanema, Sorocaba, on March 17th, 1816, Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen was the son of the German engineer and soldier Frederico Luís Guilherme de Varnhagen and of the “paulista” Maria Flavia de Sá Magalhães. He studied in Portuguese military schools, where he graduated in engineering and fought in the liberal troops of D. Pedro against the absolutists. He studied paleography and diplomacy in Portugal, where he began his historical researches. Back to Brazil, he entered the diplomatic career, to which he belonged from 1842 to 1878, when he died in Vienna, having served the country in Portugal, Spain, Paraguay, Venezuela, Peru, Chile and Austria. He was both Baron and Viscount of Porto Seguro.

He stood out for the historical research, carrying out critical editions of documents and publishing an extensive bibliography in

the spheres of history, literary history, ethnography, public policies and fiction, with his most important works being *História Geral do Brasil* (1854), *História das Lutas Com os Holandeses no Brasil desde 1624 a 1654* (1871) and *História da Independência do Brasil* (posthumous).

FRANCISCO ADOLFO DE VARNHAGEN, THE VISCOUNT OF PORTO SEGURO: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT

Arno Wehling

Was there a diplomatic thought in Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen? The question may sound preposterous if it is considered exclusively from the point of view of a professional career that spanned 36 years of uninterrupted activity and was exercised by someone with strong political, intellectual and scientific convictions. It would be perfectly reasonable to suppose that a diplomat under these circumstances had “clear and distinct ideas” both in relation to the international stance of his country and the functions inherent to his profession.

The doubt was instilled by fellow diplomat Manuel de Oliveira Lima (1911, p. 81), in his swearing in speech at the Brazilian Academy of Letters, in the seat of which Varnhagen is patron. According to the historian from Pernambuco:

Our historian had negative qualities in diplomacy: he was impulsive with bursts of choleric and let himself be instigated by considerations of equity and dignity. For him diplomacy was not the supreme art of swallowing insults

and disguising pressure. He thought it was compatible with frankness and honesty. He was repulsed by lying, even on behalf of others, and he did not see quite well why he should hide what was fair.

Once the rhetoric of the Belle Époque psychologist was deducted, which condescended in the typologies of the personality, the portrait described by Oliveira Lima showed an anti-Machiavellian Varnhagen, grounded on moral values and principles. He was to be a diplomat hostile to *Realpolitik* and, therefore, scarcely suited to the international circumstances of the times of Metternich and Palmerton, which were soon succeeded by the no less difficult Bismarckean era.

It is true that in this same speech the author remembered other presumably diplomatic qualities that he ascribed to his patron, such as being a “perfect hall man” and his interest in what we would currently call “cultural diplomacy”, by the contact with the intellectual circles of the countries in which he served.

The picture that remained was that of a diplomat that, if not rude, was at least dull and who had cultural and scientific interests that went much beyond his performance as a representative of his country: “... of refractory ordinary putting himself diplomatically in evidence, a strict post that is not a passive observant of his government’s instructions...” (LIMA, 1911, p. 80).

The reading of the diplomatic documentation produced by Varnhagen in his mission in the countries of the Pacific as well as the better knowledge of his performance, either diplomatic or not, before and after, which was due to successive researchers, shows a different portrait than the one described by Oliveira Lima. The very change of conception of what a diplomatic agent was, together with the transformations in perception that followed the

First World War, contributed to the dating of the profile originally defined by Oliveira Lima.

An additional explanation for the dull perception of the diplomatic role - and thought - of Varnhagen is in the dimensions of the work itself. The work of historian, either by the books, or by the critical edition of documents, overshadowed the other aspects of his life, including his intellectual production. Thus, his contributions in the field of literary historiography or ethnology were pale in comparison to the weight of his role in the field of historical research. Similarly his role as a publicist, in the nineteenth century sense of the word, has stood out only very recently.¹

THE STEPS OF A DIPLOMATIC CAREER

Even though he had military and engineering training, Varnhagen opted for the diplomatic career at a time when it, like the rest of the Brazilian state bureaucracy, still organized itself, turning elements of ancient Portuguese administration and of the new constitutional model compatible with one another. His major interest at the time, as he reiterated in various occasions, was history. Since 1839 he collaborated in the critical edition of documents with the newly founded Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute, and when he applied for a diplomatic position, he did not fail to point out that this would allow him to do some research of sources about Brazil abroad.

At 26 years old he became a First-Class Attaché in Lisbon, where he remained from 1842 to 1847, and was also Acting

1 See: Wehling, Arno. O Conservadorismo Reformador de um Liberal: Varnhagen, Publicista e Pensador Político. In: Glezer, Raquel; Guimarães, Lucia. *Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen*. Rio de Janeiro: Miguel de Cervantes Foundation, 2013, p. 160ff. It is the introduction to the critical edition of Varnhagen's *Memorial Orgânico*.

Secretary of the Legation. In 1847, he was appointed as Secretary of the Legation in Madrid, remaining there until 1851. For two months, in 1847, he was acting *chargé d'affaires*.

In both two stations, aware of his diplomatic responsibilities, he devoted himself tenaciously to historical research both in the Portuguese and the Spanish archives. The result of those researches appeared not only in critical editions of important sources for colonial history, but also in his works, such as *História Geral do Brasil*, which he started to publish in 1854, in the *História das Lutas com os Holandeses*, 1871 and in more specific works, such as those dedicated to Amerigo Vespucci. Probably the comment by Oliveira Lima according to which, in his own researches in the Torre do Tombo Archive, “in almost all of those papers” he found “the discreet pencil mark” which he identified as being the “V.” of Varnhagen (LIMA, 1911, p. 63) was due to the work of that period.

After a short interregnum in Brazil, in which he advised the Viscount of Uruguay with regard to border issues he returned to the Madrid Legation as *chargé d'affaires*, where he remained for seven years.

During the sixteen years in which he stayed at the Iberian Peninsula, being aware of the historical research, he often expressed himself on a wide range of diplomatic issues, clearly preferring the routine ones that had to do with the problems of the Brazilian State from the international point of view or, in his own words, which referred to the “greatness of the country”.

Both versions of the *Memorial Orgânico* are from halfway through that period. They were published in 1849 and 1850, in which, as a publicist, he outlines a real *project* for Brazil, in which he does not cease to consider the international problems of the country.

From 1859 to 1867, the South American experience of Varnhagen took place, as the Brazilian representative of Brazil to Paraguay (1859), Venezuela (1861-1863, cumulatively with the representation in Colombia and Ecuador) and Peru (1863-1867, cumulatively with Chile and Ecuador). It was a period of less activity in historical research, due to the difficulty of access to the sources, but no less rich in terms of episodes and even diplomatic incidents, as the ones that occurred in Asuncion and Lima. In the first one, regarding the confrontation between Peru, Chile and Spain for the control of Peruvian coastal islands, Varnhagen's position condemning the threats of blocking and bombing Chilean ports by the Spanish fleet was unauthorized by Brazilian Government, which aspired to pursue mediation in the conflict. In the second one, the criticism of Peruvian President Mariano Ignacio Prado to allies in the war against Paraguay, on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the Constituent Congress of the country, led Varnhagen, who was present at the ceremony, to protest. After a few months, without receiving the apology that he considered to be due to Brazil, but also without the authorization from Rio de Janeiro, he asked for passports and withdrew to Guayaquil, then heading to the capital of the Empire (WEHLING, 2005, vol. I, p. 7ff).²

It was mainly due to this South American experience, in which the Peruvian President referred to Varnhagen, according to his own correspondence to the Ministry, as "very susceptible", that Oliveira Lima grounded the assessment of his diplomatic performance and the profile that was supposedly scarcely appropriate to the functions.

2 WEHLING, Arno. Introdução, in *Varnhagen – Missão nas Repúblicas do Pacífico: 1863 a 1867*. Rio de Janeiro, FUNAG, 2005, vol. I, p. 7ff.

The last ten years in diplomacy elapsed in Vienna. The representation at the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to whose house the Reigning Brazilian Emperor was so close, was an important post and a recognition of Varnhagen's merits, as well as his decoration with the titles of Baron and Viscount of Porto Seguro.

The stay at the Court of Franz Joseph allowed him to continue his historical and ethnographical research and the publication of new works. There, too, he wrote a legal-diplomatic work called *Asilo nas Embaixadas*, which was published only posthumously. But there was also an intensive diplomatic activity, twice receiving Emperor Pedro II in his visits to Austria, in 1871 and 1877 and acting directly in the Saint Petersburg Statistical Congress (1872), Stockholm (1874) and Budapest (1876), in the Universal Exposition of Vienna (1873) and in the Congress of Paris (1875), with the focus on the dissemination of Brazil and in the promotion of exports of the country's products.

We can find the ideas that guided the diplomatic thought and action of Varnhagen along its trajectory in the official documents, such as reports that he sent to his superiors in Rio de Janeiro, in his correspondence with various personalities, in his work about the right to asylum and even in his historiographic work, especially in the points in which he analyzed and appreciated attitudes and procedures of diplomatic agents in crucial moments, such as the negotiations of the colonial treaties of limits.

Such ideas, clearly exposed despite not being systematized, can be grouped or sorted in different ways. We will be close to the way the author thinks if we gather them in some large sections, such as state and foreign policy, borders and Americanism, strategic view, war and economics and international law.

STATE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Varnhagen's diplomatic thought is clearly inseparable from his idea of state and both are not different from the West European standard in relation to the theme.

Varnhagen ascribes to the State a seminal and guiding role in leading society, which is not new, neither in doctrinal nor in empirical terms.

In the first case, a Hobbesian-Hegelian perspective that ascribes to the State the role of organizer of the society, which in turn will only have an actual organicity if it becomes a *nation*, predominates in his ideas. Along with him, as in so many other intellectuals of the nineteenth century, are the premises of the political philosophy of the Enlightenment, a historicist reaction to the French Revolution and to nationalism.

From the Enlightenment political philosophy flow both the contractualist and the systemic views of the State, self-balanced by a system of checks and balances that prevents the hypertrophy of power over others. This *mixed government* defined by Montesquieu – one of Varnhagen's favorite authors, even though he disproved his climate theory – and exemplified in the English institutional practice since the eighteenth century, was improved by a political and electoral representation that came from Locke and which foresaw the electoral body's bottleneck by the census procedure.

However, the Hobbesian-Hegelian idea of State – Domingos Gonçalves de Magalhães, in a controversy concerning the indigenous peoples, expressly accused Varnhagen of being a Hobbesian – does not exhaust the view of the historian-diplomat. The mechanistic excesses of this combination are mitigated by the clear adherence to historicism, which makes him seek in past experiences to solve the challenges of the present. Instead of seeking the timeless laws and principles in the intellectual offices of rationalism in order to

apply them to Brazil, he says, in the *Memorial Orgânico*, that it is necessary to know the Brazilian historical experience and that of its Iberian origins, in order to apply them to the country.

Nationalism, in turn, was perceived as a culture broth indispensable in order to amalgamate the nation – consisting of a people, as he said in different opportunities, that was ethnically heterogeneous and fragmented by slavery and the not acculturated indigenous populations of the hinterland. A culture broth, moreover, that needed to be industriously drawn from State initiatives, such as the building of monuments, the institution of civic dates and the establishment of a strong historical knowledge based on documentary research – for which, by the way, the diplomatic missions abroad should collaborate.

That idea of State and nation implied in assuming that the Brazilian foreign policy was subject to the strict interests of both. The momentous question of slave trafficking in the 1840's was thus seen as a matter of national interest, not by the fragility of the country before the English pressure or even due to anti-slavery international movement, but because the ongoing import of slave labor entailed the increase of the risk of social upheaval, such as happened in Haiti and in the delay of the solution he advocated, that is, the introduction of the European immigrant (WEHLING, 1999, p. 83ff).³

From the point of view of the State interest, a good example of that absolutely conditioning perspective by the author is his position regarding the relations with Buenos Aires, when, upon writing to the Emperor D. Pedro II from Asuncion, in 1859, he admitted that a war was inevitable:

3 WEHLING, Arno. *Estado, História, Memória: Varnhagen e a Construção da Identidade Nacional*, Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1999, p. 83ff.

those who know best these countries are certain that as soon as the current fight between Buenos Aires and Urquiza ends, the winner will add the Eastern State to the Confederation and, if it is able to do that without being punished, it will soon take their ambitions to Paraguay and even, as Rosas did, to Rio Grande and Santa Catarina Island themselves, by the mere fact that these provinces were someday subject to the Viceroyalty.

Thus, it seems that the day will come, when our Southern neighbors will provoke us to a war, and since it would be impossible to avoid it, we would be better off getting prepared for it and break as soon as the treaties are violated for the first time (VARNHAGEN, 1961, p. 275).⁴

He proved to be a bad prophet, based on the tradition of D. João's diplomacy of fear of the reconstitution of the Vice-Kingdom of Plata and on the then recent Platine agreements of the Farroupilha Revolution, since five years later there actually was a war, but against Paraguay and with the Alliances of both Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

Such perspective was nothing more than understanding the foreign policy of the Empire as a clear continuity of Portuguese politics, especially the Bragantine one. To defend the mouth of the Amazon since the seventeenth century, to prevent the descent of the French Guyana until the great river and to establish "marks" in the Western Amazon, in the Midwest of Mato Grosso and in the Platine South seemed to him to be backgrounds that should be recognized, valued and certainly followed by the imperial policy.

Thus, there would be a line of continuity in foreign policy, with D. Luís da Cunha, Alexandre de Gusmão and D. Rodrigo de Sousa

4 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. *Correspondência Ativa*, collected and noted edition by Clado Ribeiro Lessa, Rio de Janeiro, INL, 1961, p. 275.

Coutinho taking as their successors and followers the Viscount of Uruguay, the Viscount of Rio Branco and the Marquis of Paraná.

The reading of many of Varnhagen's diplomatic documents, his correspondence and historiographical works enables to identify some premises or postulates as grounds for his ideas and attitudes in relation to what should be a Brazilian foreign policy and the behaviour of their agents.

Even though they have never been embodied in a creed or a handbook, they can, nevertheless, be identified with relative ease, especially if we remember the pillars on which *Weltanschauung* are based – the Hobbesian-Hegelian view of society, the historicist or culturalist perception, very close to that of Vico and Herder, of history and the appreciation of the nation, although this was more the result of a political will, as in the French model, than the action of the deep “*Geist*” of culture, as in the German model (WEHLING, 1999, p. 75).⁵ Those premises or principles that guided his professional activity as a diplomat flow from the combination, not always consistently, of orthodox or non-contradictory elements.

They are the uncompromising defense of the Brazilian material interests as professional duty of the diplomatic agent, observing the rules of the law of the people and the justice of the claims; the zeal for the international prestige of the country, which is regarded as a valuable symbolic capital especially in an international framework dominated by large colonial powers and the emergence of countries such as the United States and Russia – in what proved to be the reader of Tocqueville, quoted in the preface to the *História Geral do Brasil*; and what today we call economic diplomacy, which became sharper during his stay in Vienna, when he took on the role of promoter and facilitator of

5 WEHLING, Arno. *Estado...*, op cit, p. 75.

the Brazilian exports and of the import of machinery, tools and qualified professionals.

Even though the theoretical positions that founded Varnhagen's diplomatic and intellectual ideas came from Europe, he always practiced their suitability to the conditionings of the Brazilian foreign policy with great sense of reality. The own relationship of foreign policy with the internal context of the countries was diverse. In the nineteenth century Europe, the big international policy often conditioned the domestic life of the states, as occurred with Germany, Austria and Italy, while in Brazil, including, but not only due to its continental size, the opposite happened – a diverse circumstance that has not gone unnoticed to Varnhagen.

BORDERS AND AMERICANISM

One of the unsolved matters in Brazilian diplomacy of the mid-nineteenth century had to do with the demarcation of the borders with the various neighboring countries. In addition to matters that unfolded in the more densely populated border areas, such as those with Uruguay, Paraguay and the United Provinces of the Plata, there were also difficulties with Peru, due to problems between Brazilian and Peruvian traders in the Amazon region. This aspect becomes larger when we recall that the opening of the navigation of the Amazon River was at stake, which was the object of intense controversy in Brazil in the 1860's. From the Peruvian side the matter had already been settled when Varnhagen arrived at Lima, in 1863, by a recent law which allowed foreign vessels to navigate along the Peruvian Amazon rivers on the same conditions as the national ones.

What did Varnhagen think about the demarcation and the opening of the Amazon to international navigation?

His ideas on the subject are expressed in *Memória Sobre os Trabalhos Que se Podem Consultar nas Negociações de Limites do Império, Com Algumas Lembranças Para a Demarcação Destes*,⁶ presented to the Chancellor Paulino José Soares de Sousa in 1851. It must be recalled that Varnhagen interrupted his activity in Spain by order of the Minister, since the Brazilian Government needed his advice, as a competent historian and geographer, to provide subsidies to the actions of the Brazilian diplomacy in the negotiations of limits. *Memória* does not exhaust Varnhagen's manifestations on the topic, which can also be found in the *Memo-rial Orgânico* of the previous year and, sparsely, in *Correspondência* and in his *História Geral do Brasil*.

Varnhagen separated the situation of the French and the English Guyanas from the countries of Spanish origin. In the case of French Guiana, he understood that "one must not discuss the role concerning the Oiapoques or not Oiapoques and of the Pinzons or not Pinzons" since the Convention of 1816 had defined the matter, although with the mistake of drawing geodesic limit lines. However, the matter remained open and this was exactly the matter that was discussed in the negotiations conducted by Rio Branco. As far as British Guyana was concerned, he considered absurd the English claim to bring domination until the watershed of the Rio Branco, suggesting the delimitation along the course of the rivers or even the division of the territory into equal parts. Even though he did not believe that Great Britain would impose its interests by force, he suggested the possibility to negotiate the

6 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. *Memória Sobre os Trabalhos Que se Podem Consultar nas Negociações de Limites do Império, Com Algumas Lembranças Para a Demarcação Destes*, [Memories of available works on boundary negotiations of the Empire, with some references to their demarcations.], National Library, Manuscript Section, I, 4,4, 112.

support from other powers to the Brazilian cause, “even though this service would have to be returned with some trade treaty” (VARNHAGEN, 2013, p. 215).⁷

For the definition of the limits with the countries of Spanish origin, three aspects stand out.

First of all, the flexibility of criteria. Varnhagen understood that the traditional principle of *uti possidetis* was fair and it often served the Brazilian interests. Thus, it should preside the demarcation, having as subsidiaries the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso. That was stated in the *Memorial Orgânico*. But in the *Memória* presented to Paulino Soares de Sousa he considered that there were drawbacks in taking on a strict position in relation to the principle, since it “invites you to a possession acquired gradually and deceptively,” which could end up being disadvantageous to Brazil:

If we wanted first to impose general or overt bases as preliminaries for negotiations which are not defined at once, we can cause fears to our weaker neighbors and provide weapons to France and England that they will know how to sharpen and turn them against us: let us focus, therefore, openly on our and their public convenience and let us give some time so that they also give up something to us (VARNHAGEN, 1851, item 15).⁸

Second of all, the option for the criterion of the watershed rather than that of the course of the rivers. The latter, which, was widely used in the diplomatic negotiations of the eighteenth century, had a great chance of being correct when the geography of the place was well known, as often happened in Europe, which

7 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. *Memorial Orgânico*, op. cit., p. 215.

8 Idem, *Memória*..., item 15.

had a reasonable cartography since the Roman era. That was not the case of the South American countries, where the names of the landforms were often mixed up – mainly rivers and mountain chains – in different sources. This difficulty was well known to Varnhagen who, by then, had already studied the documents relating to the demarcation attempts of the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso.

The criterion of the watershed by the river sheds, in turn, had the advantage of being simple and the possibility to avoid expensive, complex and eventually controversial delimitations.

Once again flexibility was necessary, since the interests of the country were at stake. In the case of the limits between Paraguay and Mato Grosso do Sul, Varnhagen, in the late 1850's, addressed a note to the Foreign Minister of Paraguay in which he advocated that the limit should be the course of Apa River, on behalf of the *uti possidetis* principle of both countries and what was written in the colonial treaties (LESSA, 1954, p. 141).⁹ Thus, he gave up his preferred thesis of the watershed, since it entailed not only a large territorial loss for Brazil but because it also violated another criterion, *uti possidetis*, and meant the lack of compliance with the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso.

Thirdly, the concern about the restoration of the Vice-Royalty of Plata, as a way to avoid the formation of a powerful state in southern Brazil. Expressed in some occasions, this concern was present in the *Memória* delivered to Paulino Soares de Sousa. From that point of view, he advocated the strengthening of Paraguay and Bolivia and consequently the establishment of best possible relations with these countries, which would include special

9 LESSA, Clado Ribeiro. Vida e obra de Varnhagen, *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, vol. 225, oct-dec 1954, p. 141.

treatment to their territorial claims on the demarcation of the borders. He said:

Bolivia and Paraguay are our natural allies in the claims against the navigation of the Paraná and Paraguay, which are likely to have the nations that control the mouth of the Plata River and in this sense it is even advantageous for us to give them all the political importance, for which the size of the territory might contribute a lot (VARNHAGEN, 1851, item 28).¹⁰

He also suggested to Bolivia an outline of limits that would turn its access easier for the export of products by the rivers of the Amazon basin, until Belém (LESSA, 1954, p. 130).¹¹

An aspect that must be recalled concerning Varnhagen's performance in the matter of the demarcation of the borders is his insistence in the bilateral, rather than the collective negotiations. He was worried about the fact that these could involve a front against Brazil, given the official preventions and those of publicists and intellectuals expressed mainly in relation to the size of the country as compared to its neighbors and its form of government, a Monarchic exception within a Republican subcontinent.

When he was in Santiago, in early 1864 and he became aware of the convening of an American Congress in Lima, to discuss, among other things, matters of limits, he suggested to the Minister Marquis of Abrantes that he should postpone the adhesion of the country in order to "gain time". The risk, he said in a letter to the Minister dated February 8th, was the country having the situation of facing one vote against 9 only from the South American countries. Thus, he suggested that the Brazilian position should be that, in

10 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. *Memória...*, item 28.

11 Aspect already emphasized by Clado Ribeiro Lessa, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

the discussions of limits, there should be a plenipotentiary of the country and a representative of the other countries, or rather a larger representation for Brazil. The argument was historical: since before independence there were six separate governments in Spanish America against ten leading captaincies in Brazil, without the government of the vice-roys meaning an effective unit, the claim was founded (VARNHAGEN, 2005, p. 96).¹²

Despite this and other expressions that showed discomfort and even fear about what he considered negative in South American Republics – their form of government, their domestic fights and what he saw as a tendency to the presence of warlords – Oliveira Lima was given the task of drawing attention to the diplomat's *Americanism*. Or what we could call in a less categorical manner an Americanist manifestation.

Oliveira Lima's assessment referred to Varnhagen's note offering his solidarity to the position of other diplomatic representatives accredited in Chile against the way in which the commander of the Spanish fleet had addressed the country in what was already a consequence of the Peruvian-Spanish conflict, including presenting an ultimatum. The communication, according to the historian from Pernambuco referring to Varnhagen, "honors his spirit of justice, confirms his independence of character and casts a bright light on his Americanism" (LIMA, 1911, p. 80),¹³ although it has been overruled by the Brazilian government.

It can be added to Oliveira Lima's interpretation that at that moment various expressions of solidarity towards Paraguay were already occurring in the Spanish speaking countries, mainly through the newspapers, since the war of the Triple Alliance had

12 Letter dated February 8th, 1864, from Varnhagen to the Minister Marquis of Abrantes. In: *Varnhagen – Missão...*, vol. I, p. 96.

13 LIMA, Manuel de Oliveira. Op. cit., p. 80.

already begun. Varnhagen himself (2005, vol. I, p. 466), in correspondence sent to the Brazilian Chancellery on December 2nd, 1865 expressed concern with anti-Brazilian news published in the press of Valparaíso.¹⁴ The performance of the Brazilian representative in favor of Chile, in that context, could only be welcomed.

The position of Rio de Janeiro discrediting Varnhagen was perceived by Chilean sectors in that climate of exalted patriotism, not as an attempt to maintain neutrality so that it could apply to mediate the conflict, which was actually the intention of the Brazilian government, but as an ideological solidarity between both monarchies.

There was still time, between Varnhagen's note and its discrediting, for the American government to send, on behalf of the Monroe doctrine, a representative to Rio de Janeiro in order to congratulate Brazil for its "American fervor". According to Oliveira Lima's comment, when the delegate arrived "he found himself facing its disapproval [Varnhagen's note] and he had to swallow his congratulations" (LIMA, 1911, p. 80).¹⁵

As a result of the diplomatic misunderstanding, Oliveira Lima emphasized the Americanism of Varnhagen. Nevertheless, knowing the concerns of the Brazilian diplomat regarding the countries of Spanish origin, based on extensive research about the colonial era, which demonstrated to full capacity the conflicts between both colonizations, another hypothesis can be suggested.

Varnhagen demonstrated with that attitude less of an active anti-European Americanist solidarity – he himself was keen to point out, in correspondence sent to the Ministry, his respect and admiration for Spain, where, he recalled, until recently he had

14 Letter dated November 24th, 1865 to the Minister José Antonio Saraiva. In: *Varnhagen – Missão...*, vol. I, p. 466.

15 LIMA, Manuel de Oliveira. Op. cit., p. 80.

been the *chargé d'affaires* – than the defense of the fairness of the Chilean case, even more accentuated by the inability of the Spanish Admiral Pareja. Oliveira Lima himself, whose references to the spirit of Varnhagen's fairness and dignity referred exactly to the Chilean episode, can be called upon as a support to the hypothesis.

STRATEGIC VIEW, WAR AND ECONOMICS

According to Varnhagen's idea, diplomatic performance should basically, be guided by a strategic perspective of national interests. Diplomacy would be nothing more than a means, like others, to achieve goals that would lead to the "greatness of the country".

What were these larger goals to which the public agents would abide by and for which they should fight for is stated, in the situation of the early 1850's, in his *Memorial Orgânico* (VARNHAGEN, 2013, p. 205ff).¹⁶ From then on, although they were no longer systematically exposed, they made up a benchmark that almost did not change until 1878 and to which he reported in the concrete situations.

In the booklet, the author emphasized the definition of borders, the geographical situation of the capital, internal communications, territorial division, the defense and the homogeneity of the population as matters that were unsettled and critical for the future of Brazil. He gave a strategic approach to all of them, but the properly diplomatic interface is given mainly to protection.

Considering the Brazilian territory and its fluvial and maritime hydrographic potential, the naval strategy and the resulting diplomatic care are his major concerns.

16 VARNHAGEN, Francisco Adolfo de. *Memorial Orgânico*, op. cit., p. 205ff.

To better understand such perspective, it must be recalled that his thought was basically geopolitical and geostrategic, which indeed was dominant in the diplomacy of his time. By proposing to transfer the capital to the central Plateau, he certainly presented as a reason, defense matters and the clearance from the coastline, but the place chosen occurs by the easy connection with the three rivers that make up the three basins, the Amazon, the San Francisco and the Plata: rivers Tocantins, San Francisco and Paraná/Paraguay.

In the case of the rivers, the navigation along the Amazon and the risk of foreign control of its basin were discussed on various occasions. When the future Viscount of Uruguay was the Plenipotentiary Envoy to Emperor Napoleon III, Varnhagen recommended strongly to him that, in the problem of French Guyana, the Brazilian interest in protecting the Amazon and its tributaries from external action was not forgotten, noting that he should reckon specifically with the risks of an American penetration in the region (LESSA, 1954, p. 132-133).¹⁷

His attentions were still directed towards the Amazon basin when he was *chargé d'affaires* in Venezuela, signing agreements on the navigation of people from both countries along the Orinoco and the Amazon Rivers (LESSA, 1954, p. 143).¹⁸ And when he was in Peru the country opened foreign navigation in the stretch under its sovereignty, which was also a cause of great concern to him.

In the case of the Paraguay River, the focus was the defense of free navigation by Brazil, indispensable for the integration of Mato Grosso, including that of the Guaporé River region, although

17 LESSA, Clado Ribeiro. Op. cit., vol. 225, p. 132-133.

18 Idem, p. 143.

it also recognized the problem of the transfer of cattle herds from Mato Grosso through Paraguayan territory.¹⁹

Certainly Varnhagen (1961, p. 342) shared the prevailing opinion in the successive Brazilian governments, noticing the matter of navigability of the Paraguay River within the larger context of the balance of power in the Plata region. He showed samples of that perspective in 1870, when he was already in Vienna, when, in a correspondence he sent to D. Pedro II regarding the possibility of future problems with Argentina, he suggested, in addition to quartering Brazilian forces in Paraguay, the reinforcement of Brazilian ships in the area.

As for the war itself, even though he had not theorized about the topic, it is obvious in Varnhagen's different manifestations who saw it as the other side of diplomacy and politics, in the style of Clausewitz. Even though he proposed a defensive, rather than an aggressive or expansionist foreign policy in South America, it was clear to him that deterrence was an important political instrument and an indispensable helper of diplomatic action. In that sense we understand both his interest and his effort to strengthen the Navy and the Army of the country.

Varnhagen (1967, vol. 175, p. 147) has already been portrayed a defender of war, although Américo Lacombe considered that he was only concerned about the security of the borders, in the context of "armed peace" in which he lived. That second aspect seems to be more compatible with his diplomatic and political thought; the criticism of the "defence of war" really appears, but in the controversies in which he was involved in the relationships with the indigenous people and the defense of the action of the bandeirantes, do not relate to the nineteenth century foreign policy.

19 Notes exchanged between Varnhagen and minister Nicolas Vasquez; National Library, Manuscripts Section, I-29, 25, 22.

In that context, the improvement of the Brazilian fleet caught his attention when, from Vienna, he helped Arthur Silveira da Mota, the future Baron of Jaceguai, who was on assignment in Europe, with information about ships, weapons and visits to shipyards (LESSA, 1954, p. 160-161). Still concerning weapons, he also collaborated with the Minister of War João José de Oliveira Junqueira, keeping him informed about new artillery pieces that the Austrian government was using.

Typical of this defensive point of view was the proposal, in the *Memorial Orgânico*, of military “border territories” in the new territorial configuration proposed for the country, which would become outposts to the defense of the country, in an updated evocation of the Pombaline policy of establishing army units in extreme points of the country. Ten years later, when he was on his way to Paraguay, he wrote from Montevideo to the Emperor suggesting him, that same logic, that is, to install a garrison in Bagé, with a dissuasive purpose:

In addition, I believe that with these [Platine] countries the less we hire (sic) and the less we intervene, the better. Currently, however, prudence called for having an army in the fields of Bagé, ready to maneuver from one day to the next. And with this simple step we would avoid having to maneuver (VARNHAGEN, 1961, p. 270).

As for economic relations, Varnhagen understood that he was in charge, as a diplomat, of facilitating the placement of Brazilian products abroad and the import of machinery, tools and technology. He made an effort in 1876 for the consumption of the mate herb in Austria and in Hungary, suggesting that these attempts should also occur in Hamburg, not without directing criticism to the Minister of Agriculture regarding frauds and negligence of the exporters, which sent the product with an

overweight of sticks, stones and leather (LESSA, 1954, p. 160). In the Statistical Congresses of Budapest and St. Petersburg he organized and wrote by himself works with data on Brazilian products. For the first of those congresses he published the text entitled *Quelques Renseignements Statistiques Sur le Brèsil Tirés des Sources Officielles par le Delegué au Congrès de Buda-Pesth*.

The actions of Varnhagen the diplomat in the economic area, only gets better clarified when we understand Varnhagen the publicist.

Can a supporter of economic liberalism, as he positioned himself on several occasions, put his diplomatic action on behalf of private interests, even though they benefit the country as a whole due to the growth of national wealth? That question, which was recurrent in discussions on the scope and limitations of economic liberalism, had already been answered by the famous words of William Pitt – “the Empire is trade”. But there is further data on Varnhagen, that is pointed out in the passage from the first to the second version of the *Memorial Orgânico*, in 1850.

For him, in a country with scarce resources and population and great territorial extension such as Brazil, notwithstanding the liberal profession of faith and the quotation of classical economists, it would be necessary, in addition to the supervision of the State, direct state *promotion* – the word is his – in certain areas in order to stimulate the production and circulation of goods (WEHLING, 2013, p. 2013). That position was recurrent in the Brazilian political and economic thought, promoting cohabitation of liberalism with some degree of State interventionism and that repeated itself in the next generation, when an enthusiast of Spencer such as Rui Barbosa did not hesitate to praise the mercantilist economic policy of the Marquis of Pombal.

THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM

Early in his stay in Vienna, Varnhagen wrote a short text in French, *L'Asile dans Les Ambassades*. In a correspondence sent to the Emperor, dated March 9th, 1870, gave news of the – work, which he had started a few years earlier in Lima, informing that he was advancing it after stopping the review of *História Geral do Brasil*. On June 20th he informed to the same interlocutor that the work was ready and that he had sent it to his friend Ferdinand Denis, who was the Director of Saint Geneviève Library in Paris (VARNHAGEN, 1961, p. 340-347).

Contrary to the author's expectations, the text had never been published at the time. That happened only in 1955 in *Anhembi* magazine (p. 232ff).

Varnhagen was not a jurist, despite the extensive use of legal sources and the text, which revealed the author's training as a historian, in a history of the matter of asylum and the indication, in conclusion, of a few suggestions to be implemented.

Anyway, *L'Asile Dans les Ambassades* is a significant text, which allows one to be surprised by the objective elements being debated about the topic in the second half of the nineteenth century (BOCK, 1863, vol. I, p. 135) as well as understanding the increase of the author's readings in political and legal matters.

On both versions of the *Memorial Orgânico*, of 1849 and 1850 respectively, the authors worked were Montesquieu, Jean Baptiste Say, Humboldt, Vattel, Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira, Guizot, Foissac, Andrés Bello and Richard, among others just mentioned. Twenty years later appear basically jurists as Charles Paschal, Gentil, Vera y Zuñiga, Marsclær, Grotius, Wicquefort, Thomasius, Binkershoeck, Charles Martens and a dozen others just mentioned; of those mentioned in the earlier work, only Montesquieu, Vattel and Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira remain.

The very nature of the new text explains the specialized readings, the result of which the author showed with the erudition of all time, although without giving the article a proper legal framework.

Note that *L'Asile* is not only the result of a Cabinet job. It also corresponded to concrete experience he lived as a diplomat in South American countries and in Spain, in addition to the observation of what occurred at the time in other countries. The fall of governments and persecutions to those who were defeated often required him to foreign representations in search of protection. The failure to observe the right to asylum, in turn, caused situations such as the one that occurred in the American legation in Paraguay, quoted by Varnhagen (1955, p. 259), when Minister Washburn was unable to secure the integrity of Paraguayan refugees and was accused of conspiring to depose Solano Lopez (Cardozo, 1996, p. 297).

The text by Varnhagen (1955, p. 252) begins by distinguishing between the right of asylum in embassies and the old exemptions for gentlemen and corporations of the middle ages. These, according to the author, had a breadth that the right of asylum for humanitarian issues did not seek to achieve. On the other hand, the inviolability of the diplomatic representatives was based on the ratification provided by Canon law to the law of *jus gentium*.

The Brazilian diplomat distinguished two situations here, one of which was positive and the other one was negative. The former distinguished both rights by their own origin. The right of asylum in modern times was an exercise of sovereign power of the State, represented by the King, subjecting itself voluntarily to the law of nations. The corporate rights and guarantees of cities, for both lay and ecclesiastical Lords and guilds corresponded to a different time and they were only welcome or tolerated, from the point of view of absolute monarchy, – when they were not revoked. Varnhagen

himself (1955, p. 252), exaggerating its scope and above all its effects, quotes the Ordinance of Francis I, from 1539 to conclude in favor of elimination of the privileges of the Lords would receive, at that time, “their final coup de grace”.

The positive argument asserts that the right to asylum was a consequence of canon law, which placed it within the wide area of common law received from the Roman world and the middle ages, giving such a scope to it that it somehow forced the State, which at the time was an absolute monarchy, to recognize rights observed since before its own Constitution.

This was Montesquieu’s conclusion about the inviolability of ambassadors, quoted by Varnhagen (1955, p. 254):

The jus gentium wanted the princes to exchange ambassadors ... no obstacle should hinder their action. ... Therefore, it is necessary to obey, concerning the ambassadors, the reasons taken from the Law of Nations and those that derive from political convenience.

After the history of the matter of asylum in the major scholars of public international law, Varnhagen leads his reasoning to conclude that it derived “logically” from the Law of Nations. Furthermore, although he did not say it, but he assumed it: in the same way as its main prerogative, inviolability.

To that purely theoretical argument Varnhagen added a practical consideration, that in the nineteenth century, “in some countries more or less civilized and moralized than others”, such as the American Republics and Turkey, the ongoing conflicts produced abuses that could be avoidable by means of the proposed resource.

The author identified in part of the legal doctrine a tendency to refuse the right of asylum as a form of interference of the diplomatic agent in the domestic affairs of the country. But he

considers that the jurists with such a position did not consider the nuance that the asylum was *requested* or *offered* by the diplomat. And he asks:

Thus, no diplomatic agent has the right to offer an asylum at his own house. But, we ask, if an individual that thinks he is being followed, or who fears he might be, due to political passions, enters a legation ... and asks for hospitality to its head, as he could ask for it to the diplomat's country (if by luck he had managed to get there), should he be handed over, other than by extradition? Would it be fine for a diplomatic agent to play the role of executioner or police? (VARNHAGEN, 1955, p. 255-256).

The author also recalls that all his references have to do with “the so-called political criminals” and not common criminals, although several of the scholars cited by him, writing at the time of absolute monarchy, could refer to those accused of crimes of *Lèse majesté* and similar ones. That typification without distinguishing between each of them came later in criminal law and was present in the nineteenth century, including the Brazilian one of 1830.

The author had two central theses around which he based his arguments. The first one, that “while the ambassadors are privileged, the asylum will not be abolished”, in a reasoning similar to the civil law principle that the accessory follows the main. The second one, metajuridical, states that the asylum is an act of humanity that “civilization should not abandon, in favor of tolerance in the political opinions” (VARNHAGEN 1955, p. 258).²⁰

A point established by Varnhagen that is worth recording is the statement that the law of the people – referred to the contemporary constitutional framework, and, therefore, of the idea of sovereignty

20 Both aspects are also included in the entry about the right to asylum of the dictionary directed by Maurice Bock.

based on the context after the French Revolution and no longer of the Ancien Régime – could not be changed by “one nation alone, by itself”. That implied the existence of a supranational law, or at least of some supranational rules, replacing and continuing the common law and canon law as they came from the Middle Ages.

At the conclusion of his work, Varnhagen (1955, p. 263) pragmatically presents five “stipulations” to apply the doctrine to the practice of the embassies: the asylum cannot be offered by the diplomatic agent; if he is prompted and he grants it, he must communicate the fact in 24 hours to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he shall shelter the refugee inside the house, without any communication with the outside world, not even with family members, in order to eliminate the possibility of interference in the country’s politics; if the government decides that the refugee must be moved abroad, the diplomat will agree and shall have the right to accompany him to “outside the borders”; the failure to observe any of these stipulations, which are “authentically proved” will cause the temporary exit from the country of the diplomat and of asylum-seekers in 24 hours.

The effects of such measures, to Varnhagen (1955, p. 263), would cease conflicts and threats to legations, the diplomatic agents would be more careful regarding asylum, the Governments themselves would win with the removal of “active conspirators” and “the cause of civilization would win, receiving from the concurrence of diplomacy, in moments of bloody struggles, new pledges of tolerance and humanity”.

Although I have written very little about his idea of history, as compared to the volume of research and work arising therefrom that he prepared, the coordinates of Varnhagen’s historical thought can be identified. As far as his diplomatic thought is concerned, considering almost forty years of activity, can we say the same?

It is certainly possible to find in it some directing principles that have guided his career and his demonstrations. Those principles shaped his diplomatic thinking and are expressed both directly, in the reports, papers and diplomatic correspondence, and indirectly, in private correspondence and in his production as a historian and publicist.

There is a clear sense of Justice in his propositions and conclusions, which led Oliveira Lima to do a constraint about him of “having negative qualities in diplomacy”, which in some situations could sound almost naive. The honesty of purposes and the frankness, which he often advocated in the diplomatic practice and based on which he issued several value assessments in his historiographical work, which did not move him away, however, from *Realpolitik*.

He was not in any way an idealist *to the utmost*, hitting himself against reality like D. Quixote. On the contrary, he set an anchor on it and from there he also established his position, which ensured to his assessments contained a large dose of concreteness. In the episode of the conflict between Chile and Spain, his “Americanist” position not only coincided with the diplomats accredited there, but it also entailed an option – surely it cannot be stated if it was taken out of pure “sense of justice” or political calculation – which could benefit the Brazilians in Spanish speaking countries when some of them began to position themselves in favor of Paraguay in the Triple Alliance War. His overriding by the Brazilian government cannot be interpreted as a rebuke to a professional mistake, but as a result of another ongoing policy, the offer of mediation between Chile and Spain, of which he was actually unaware.

Another example of this thought can be found, among others, in the *História Geral do Brasil*. Referring to the preliminary aspects of the Treaty of Madrid, it claims that the solution proposed as

general criterion for the allocation of territory, *uti possidetis*, served the justice of the Portuguese case and that it was recognized by Spain. He adds that such recognition only came after Portuguese traders showed that to put the Treaty of Tordesilhas into effect for Brazil, as was the initial position of Spain, entailed that it should also be done in the East, forcing the return of the severance pay for Maluku and the delivery of the Philippine archipelago to Portugal (VARNHAGEN, 1975, vol. IV, p. 85).

Another way that he found to temper the application of an absolute sense of justice was to fix it by equity, which he demonstrated many times. That adaptation of reality took it away from its historicist perception of the world and it appears clearly in the defenses that he made for the predominance of law rather than of force in the relations between states, without, however, dismissing Clausewitz's recourse to war in the context of a political action.

The principle that he advocated, that of the predominance of the law without abandoning the injunction of the use of force, turned him into a *pragmatist* in the context of nineteenth century diplomacy, without being *a priori* either a pacifist or an advocate of war.

His own appreciation of the State, within the framework of Brazilian circumstances of a nation in formation and of the political philosophy of the time, which was so Hobbesian-Hegelian, found limits that were both domestic, in the defense of the constitutional monarchy, and foreign. In the study about the right of asylum that becomes clear by advocating the recourse to the law of the people as an instrument of moderation of the harassing outbursts of the governments.

On the other hand, it must be recalled that the specifically diplomatic and legal aspects of Varnhagen's thought cannot

be explained satisfactorily without the perception of his *Weltanschauung*. He was a man of *order*, which in the nineteenth century semantics meant to defend a conservative, but not necessarily reactionary position, which sought the midway between the Jacobin revolution and the return to the Ancien Régime. In terms of relations between States, that *order* corresponded, in turn, to the equilibrium of the *balance of power*, so that no power – like France of Louis XIV or Napoleon I – could obtain an international hegemony. The counterpoint that he suggested to Paulino Soares de Sousa at the time of his mission next to Napoleon III, to avoid the American penetration in the Amazon or the need to establish counterweights to England in the case of Guyana, clearly show that perspective.

He also defended *civilization*, in the sense of the term that was current at the time, to which the emergent ethnography and anthropology sought to give scientific outlines. To be in favour of *civilization* supposed to admit previous historical stages of savagery and barbarism that modern States exceeded by procedures based on enlightenment and the law – nevertheless they could impose on “not civilized” people the war without quarter whenever they refused to add to the “civilized” practices.

Oliveira Lima’s skeptical and disenchanted assessment about the “negative qualities” of Varnhagen as a diplomat, which after all had been drawn from a dated table of values taken as absolute, proved to be subsistent to this day only in one aspect, namely that of style.

When Varnhagen was in Lima, he oriented the General Consul of Brazil in Loreto, concerning conflicts between Brazilians and Peruvians, to act *fortiter in re, suaviter in modo*. The Jesuit maximum of the General Acquaviva was followed in diplomatic matters, by Varnhagen himself. However, applying only the *fortiter*, both in

the thing itself, the national interest as he noticed it, and in the form. And by the form he sometimes got lost.

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HONÓRIO HERMETO CARNEIRO LEÃO

The son of Antônio Netto Carneiro Leão, a non-commissioned officer from Paracatu, and Joana Severina Augusta from an established family in Vila Rica de Ouro Preto, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão was born in the village of Arraial de Jacuí, on January 11, 1801, in the same province of his parents, Minas Gerais. The young Honório Hermeto was mainly raised and educated in Vila Rica, to where his father had moved in 1806 after becoming a widower and re-marrying, this time to a niece of his late wife. With assistance from an uncle, who was a prosperous merchant in Rio de Janeiro, Honório Hermeto studied Law at Coimbra University in Portugal from 1820-1825, and in 1826, upon his return to Brazil, he married his cousin, Maria Henriqueta Leme, the daughter of his benefactor uncle. In that same year, Carneiro Leão, the future Marquis of Paraná was appointed itinerant circuit judge in the village of São Sebastião (São Paulo). In 1828, he went to Rio de Janeiro, first as a magistrate and shortly thereafter as an

appeals court judge for Bahia, as well as an auditor-general of the Navy. From 1830 to 1841 he served three consecutive terms as an elected representative from Minas Gerais in the lower house of the country's legislative body, the Chamber of Deputies.

In 1832, together with Bernardo de Vasconcellos, a fellow representative from Minas Gerais, and others, Carneiro Leão founded the Conservative Party. In 1842, he became governor of the province of Rio de Janeiro, and he was appointed to the Council of State. One year later, his native province of Minas Gerais again selected him to represent it, this time in Brazil's upper house of the legislature, the Senate. The Emperor also placed him in charge of organizing the Ministry, in which Carneiro Leão reserved for himself the post of Minister of Justice, as well as the interim head of Foreign Affairs. He was later appointed governor of the province of Pernambuco, a post he held from 1849 to 1850, and from 1851 to 1852, having been nominated the diplomatic representative of Brazil to the Plata, he headed the political and diplomatic operations that led to the fall of the Argentine caudillo (strongman), Juan Manuel de Rosas, as well as the institutional stabilization of Uruguay.

Upon his return to Brazil, the Emperor again asked him to form the Ministry, which eventually became known as the Conciliation Cabinet. In that body, Carneiro Leão served as the chief of the government (prime minister) as well as the Minister of Finance.

In 1852, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão was awarded the title of Viscount of Paraná, and two years later, that of the Marquis of Paraná, the name by which he is remembered in Brazilian history. Paraná died at the height of his power on September 3, 1856, a few months before he would have turned 56.

HONÓRIO HERMETO CARNEIRO LEÃO, THE MARQUIS OF PARANÁ: DIPLOMACY AND POWER IN THE PLATA

*Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa*¹

Brazil became an independent nation in 1822 due to a fortuitous set of circumstances well exploited by a small group of visionaries. The work of this first generation of Brazilians, whose main exponent was José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, the “Patriarch of Independence,” was relatively brief. Above all, it was distinguished by a nativist and anti-Portuguese sentiment, which eventually created tension with the Emperor himself. Shortly thereafter, the group was followed by another generation that – from the time of the abdication of that Emperor, Dom Pedro I, in 1831, through the period of the Regency, 1831-1840, and the hurried beginnings of Dom Pedro II’s long reign – built the

¹ This text includes elements belonging to previous essays of the author, among which are: *O Brasil e a Argentina: Uma aproximação Histórica na Construção do Mercosul* (Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1998); *A Missão Carneiro Leão no Prata: A Guerra Contra Rosas*. In: *O Marquês de Paraná*. Brasília: FUNAG, 2004; *Da Colônia ao Reino Unido e à Independência: A Inserção Internacional do Brasil* (Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 2008).

foundations upon which the Brazil that we know today emerged: a nation with all its contradictions, polarities, shadows and luminosities; a huge country, new and disjointed, formed according to conservative ideas and the imperative of unity. Brazil was both a prodigy as well as a historical mystery.

One individual who stands out in Brazil's multi-faceted process of independence is Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, awarded the title of Visconde (Viscount) in 1852, and two years later, that of Marquês de Paraná (the Marquis of Paraná): the name by which he is known in the country's history. The somewhat overbearing Paraná has also been called: "The most insolent man of the Empire," "The Vassal Equal to the King," and "The man who did not bow."

Honório Hermeto was born in the province of Minas Gerais in 1801; he spent his childhood and youth between his father's home village of Paracatu, and the provincial capital of Vila Rica (currently Ouro Preto). He earned a degree in Law from Coimbra University in Portugal, where he studied between 1820 and 1825, and upon his return to Brazil, after a brief period as a judge; he took the path of politics, eventually representing his native Minas Gerais in both houses of the Brazilian legislature: first the Chamber of Deputies, and later the Senate. He also served his country as Minister of Justice and of Foreign Affairs, as well as a State Councilor; plus at varying times, he was governor of the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco. He thereby participated in the major events that, since the period of the Regency, marked the formation of Brazil's political institutions. The Marquis of Paraná died at the height of his power, while President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) in the so-called Reconciliation Cabinet in 1856. He was authoritarian and even choleric, yet in the Brazilian political tradition, his temper did not prevent him from utilizing an array of conciliations. He thus embodied, as few others, the

essence of his time. Brazilian writer/statesman Joaquim Nabuco called Paraná: “the strongest arm that our politics has produced” (NABUCO, 1997, p. 346).

As with the statesmen who preceded him, as well as those who accompanied and succeeded him – men such as José Bonifácio, Diogo Antônio Feijó, Euzébio de Queiroz, the Baron of Mauá, the Viscounts of Uruguay and Cairu, the Marquises of Abrantes and Olinda, the Duque de Caxias, and the Baron of Rio Branco, among many others – in the midst of countless domestic and foreign challenges, Paraná proved fully able to assess the peculiarities of the country being formed. His political path was invariably supported by a view of the future unity of his country and solidity for monarchical institutions. According to his spirit, both national unity and the monarchy were absolute values, and foreign policy was a projection and an integral part of domestic politics; one could not be understood without the other. Therefore, just as it was essential to eliminate any separatist movement within the country, it also became essential to ward off any possibility of fragmentation that came from the Platine or the Amazon borders. Foreign matters became important for what they represented, either positively or negatively, to the consolidation of Brazil’s unity under the monarchy. And therein may lie the key to understanding the importance the Brazilian ruling elite ascribed to foreign policy: to preserve the territory, to maintain unity, and to ensure the monarchy.

Diplomacy, combined with the use of armed force, was crucial in building the Brazil which, still today, remains territorially united, despite its huge size and anemic cohesion; despite its fragmented social reality. All of this happened because, in the past, men such as Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná, and so many others had the foresight, the courage and the determination to idealize and consolidate it in the midst of so many needs and so

many challenges. Both feared and respected for his determination and his sense of authority, Paraná embodied the essence of the times in which he lived, updating simultaneously both his era and his world.

If Paraná's contribution to the establishment of Brazilian political and institutional patterns was constant throughout his public life, his direct involvement with international affairs was rather casual and almost limited to matters related to the Plata region. Although as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1843) and as State Councilor (1842-1856), he had expressed his opinion on several recurrent problems on Brazil's southern border, it was his mission in the Plata region, beginning in 1851, that was crucial to the establishment of certain ideas and of an operating style that remained intrinsic to the manner Brazil dealt in relations with its Platine neighbors: Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The main elements of the process that led to the construction of Brazil's territory during its colonial period were an impulse to expand, duly followed by effective consolidation policies. Expansion and consolidation historically succeed one another in a *sui generis* dialectical contraposition process in the Brazilian historical formation; forcing the country to develop successively active policies of review and revision in the foreign sphere, on the one hand, and of conservatism and *status quo* on the other. As a result of these policies, Brazil inserted itself into the world in an isolated fashion: definitely expanding yet contained in its own neighborhood; isolated in a closed relationship with an exhausted colonial power; all within the marginal and peripheral geographic

space of South America, where strategic interest lines of the great powers rarely crossed.

As Brazil had been colonized by a country devoid of a power surplus, it had to deal with foreign antagonisms inherited from its Portuguese uniqueness in South America. In addition, at least initially, it had a relatively small territory, circumscribed by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which albeit was inapplicable in practice. Also initially, the country was thought to be without any apparent metallic riches, while surrounded by Hispanic units rich in gold and silver that were colonized by a country far more powerful and more integrated into the European concert.

In 1530, the Martim Afonso de Souza expedition along the southern coast of South America, in what is currently the Uruguayan city of Maldonado, left its mark on the area for Portugal. In response, the Spanish felt compelled to protect the Plata estuary, and in 1536, they founded the port, which later became the city of Buenos Aires. Helio Vianna (1994, p. 255) observes correctly in his *História do Brasil* that these happenings were the “basis for future international actions between the Portuguese and the Spanish, as later occurred between their Brazilian and Hispanic-American descendants.” These disputes lasted just over three centuries, until the fall of the Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, in 1852, an episode that distinguished Carneiro Leão, as both a strategist and a diplomatic negotiator; raising him to leadership levels in the Imperial government as well as into the ranks of the nobility.

With the Iberian Union (1580-1640), a wave of expansion gradually allowed for Portuguese ownership rights on the territory that later became Brazil. With the end of the union, Dom Manuel Lobo, governor of Rio de Janeiro, disembarked onto the current Uruguayan coast in 1680 and founded the Colony of Sacramento, a land which became the scene of one of the most extraordinary

adventures of the South American colonial period: an extended cycle of conflict between Spain and Portugal for the possession of the eastern bank of the Plata River. The conflict between the two European nations lasted until the Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777; and that between Brazil and its neighbors remained until 1828, with the proclamation of the independence of Uruguay after the so-called Cisplatine War. The conflicts left many scars on the patriotic sensitivities of the civilian and military leaders of the countries in the region. It was a total of 148 years; a century and a half of war, the alternation of sovereignty, and diplomatic negotiations; all of which created the backdrop for the war against Rosas.

In 1801, the year in which Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão was born, the European events that would decisively affect Brazil were already underway. After the apogee of its colonial expansion, Portugal had declined to the point of becoming a peripheral State in the European context. With the Napoleonic Wars, however, it went on to represent a strategically valuable part of the continental balance of power. Since it was impossible to preserve the Portuguese territory, it became necessary to protect the Braganza Royal House as the core of the State. That was, at least, the logic that – when Honório Hermeto was but six years old – led to the transmigration of the Portuguese court to Brazil under the inspiration and protection of England.

Skillful Luso-Brazilian diplomacy had traded the Colony of Sacramento – an indefensible piece of land on the left bank of the Plata River, opposite what would later become the large city of Buenos Aires – for the entire extension of hinterland that had been explored by the *bandeirantes* in search of Indians to enslave and metals to exploit. Once the fort – which the Portuguese had used for decades to challenge Spanish power – was destroyed, Sacramento was abandoned, thus allowing the Spaniards to

dedicate themselves to developing the port of Buenos Aires, upon which the country of Argentina would be built. Over time, both diplomacy and weapons defined the geographic territory of Brazil, the country that Carneiro Leão helped to consolidate, both physically, with his diplomatic performance in the Plata, and institutionally, with the reconciliation of parties and electoral reform, the so-called “Law of Circles.”

During the Brazilian reign of Dom João VI, an opportunity appeared for a new Portuguese onslaught in the Plata region. In 1817, Portugal annexed the Banda Oriental, or in other words, all of current Uruguay, then called the Cisplatine Province. This Portuguese decision was consistent with its permanent obsession to reach the left bank of the Plata. It was also justified, to a certain extent, by Portuguese frustration with the adverse results of the Congress of Vienna. The decision was made against British interests, and in that regard, it represented a gesture of autonomy, of seeking affirmation of Brazil’s own strategic interests.

From then on, the game of forces was characterized by periodic Argentine ambitions to rebuild the boundaries of the Viceroyalty of the Plata and, as well as by Rio de Janeiro’s strong will to maintain – at any cost – a *status quo* that prevented the formation of a formidable rival along the southern borders of its country. Emperor Dom Pedro I addressed this issue in successive “Speeches from the Throne.” In 1826, for example, he said:

The entire Empire is silent, except for the Cisplatine Province. ... Ungrateful men, who owed a lot to Brazil, rose against it, and today they are supported by the government of Buenos Aires, which is currently fighting against us. National honor requires that the Cisplatine Province be saved, as it is bound to the integrity of the Empire.

Then in 1827, he asserted:

This war [in Cisplatine] ... still continues and will continue while the Cisplatine Province, which is ours, is not free from the invaders, and [while] Buenos Aires does not recognize the independence of the Brazilian nation and the integrity of the Empire, including the incorporation of the Cisplatine, which freely and spontaneously wanted to be part of this same Empire.

In 1828, the Emperor pragmatically recognized the situation when he stated: “I have started peace negotiations with the Republic of Buenos Aires, establishing foundations for a fair and dignified agreement... If Buenos Aires does not acquiesce... it will be necessary to continue with the war.” Then, in 1829, he announced, without any comment, a Preliminary Peace Convention with the Government of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata (FALLAS DO THRONO 1823-1889, 1889, p. 123, 124, 132, 141-2, 165).

The Spanish opposition to the Luso-Brazilian presence – no longer only in Sacramento, but throughout the Banda Oriental (the east bank of the Uruguay River) – was decisive in affirming Buenos Aires, in the context of the Viceroyalty of La Plata, as the center of Hispanic power in the southern part of the continent. For its part, Buenos Aires initiated the war of liberation of the Cisplatine Province (1825-1828). Inconclusive on the battlefield, the war ended under British diplomatic mediation with the independence of Uruguay – described as the “cotton between the crystals,” by a British diplomat.

Juan Manuel de Rosas, governor of the Province of Buenos Aires since 1829, became the leader of the Argentine Confederation in 1835. With a brief interruption, he remained in power until 1852 when, defeated by combined Entre Rios, Brazilian and Uruguayan forces, he sought asylum on an English frigate in the

port of Buenos Aires and left for exile in Great Britain. While in power, Rosas had led a strong, nationalist government, basing his power on the predominance of the port over the Argentine provinces. Buenos Aires held the monopoly of foreign trade and the competence to lead the Confederation's Foreign Affairs. Little by little, by imposing provincial governors who were docile to his command, the *caudillo* also began to exercise administrative and legal control over nearly the entire country. In order to ensure his power, Rosas maintained three armies: one in the north, one in the south, and the third one in the center of the country. Additionally, he had considerable backup power in Uruguay under the behest of his ally, General Manuel Oribe. During his long period in power, Rosas won countless rebellions in many parts of the Confederation.

In the foreign sphere, Rosas also faced a permanent framework of challenges. In the north, he found himself grappling with a war against Bolivia, which ended with the interference of Chile in 1839. He also had to deal with the French who had occupied Martin Garcia Island in the Plata River (at the beginning of the Uruguay River) and blocked the port of Buenos Aires. Arguing that the Argentine Confederation had the right to control access to the Paraná River, Rosas preached the inviolability of the Plata River basin to international navigation, something that naturally went against British, French, and certainly Brazilian interests.

In 1845, the British broke through a blockade that Rosas had imposed in *Vuelta del Obligado*, going up the Paraná River as far as Corrientes. There, they started a trade with the Argentine coastline that later reinforced the anti-Rosas and anti-Buenos Aires claims made by leaders of the Provinces of Corrientes and Entre Rios. Between 1846 and 1849, the English and French succeeded one another in vain military and diplomatic initiatives in the Plata region. Rosas repelled these French and British attacks with great domestic advantage.

In Rio de Janeiro, the events in the Plata were always followed with great concern. The southern provinces were still only loosely tied to the Empire. Since the independence of Uruguay in 1828, separatist ideas and men, the Farroupilha, crossed into Rio Grande and threatened the Empire's unity. The intent to reorganize the territory of the old Viceroyalty of Plata under the leadership of Buenos Aires was attributed to Rosas. It was also believed that Uruguay's independence was threatened. Rio de Janeiro was concerned about the possibility of the emergence in the South of a great national unity of Spanish origin, capable of unbalancing relationships so painstakingly developed since the colonial period, with the ability to jeopardize the territorial gains that Luso-Brazilian diplomacy had achieved and legitimized through negotiation. It was also believed that Rosas intended to fragment the Brazilian Empire into various small republics (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 82), and that, among other threats, he could encourage separatism in the southern provinces, as well as create obstacles to the free navigation of the rivers of the basin. The Empire was also concerned about continued French and British interventions in the region, which, in one way or another, had become a secondary theater on which these European nations exercised their global rivalries.

In addition to all of the above, there was also the problem of fixing the boundaries with Uruguay; a problem which was by no means easy to resolve, especially in light of the instability that prevailed in the Cisplatine country, and of the continued interferences by Rosas in support of Manuel Oribe, his *caudillo* ally, who controlled much of the country and represented a constant threat to the Brazilian borders.

Formally, the Preliminary Peace Convention that enshrined the independence of Uruguay established that the contracting parties – Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay – were supposed to

negotiate a final peace treaty, which would specify the liability of each in defending the integrity of the Banda Oriental. The parties also agreed to maintain the free navigation of the rivers in the Plata basin. The negotiation of a definitive peace treaty, however, was hindered both by the instability that began to reign in Argentina, and by the threats to the continuity of the monarchical order in Brazil that had arisen with the abdication of Dom Pedro I in 1831.

The Treaties of 1828 that ended the Cisplatine War and ensured the existence of Uruguay as an independent country did not necessarily ensure the stability of Brazil's southern border. Uruguayan and Argentine strongmen, as well as leaders from Rio Grande, alternated in disputes that put at risk the balance achieved in 1828 under British influence and threatened Rio Grande do Sul. In 1835, Manuel Oribe took power in Montevideo, Rosas installed himself for the second time in the government of the Province of Buenos Aires, and Bento Gonçalves put Rio Grande do Sul in rebellion against the Regency that was then ruling the Brazilian Empire. Rio de Janeiro feared, and reasonably so, the possibility of the emergence of a large Platine State. Several attempts were made for a diplomatic understanding without a favorable evolution of the situation according to Brazilian interests. Uruguay – divided between Oribe and José Fructuoso Rivera – oscillated between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Rosas feared the Uruguayan *caudillos* would give support to his enemies on the Argentine coast (Corrientes and Entre Rios) regimented under the leadership of General Justo José de Urquiza, of Entre Rios. Eventually, Oribe prevailed in Uruguay, having succeeded in immobilizing Rivera in Montevideo.

Over time, the Empire had to face constant antagonisms of perceptions and national projects in the Americas. On one side, there were the descendants of the Portuguese monarchy, inscribed within the context of the Restoration process that was occurring

in Europe; and on the other side, there were the Hispanic countries plus the United States, imbued with republican and liberal fervors that would become the engine of subsequent changes in the international system.

These differences explain the circumstances and the transactions that surrounded the independence of Brazil; the so-called protectionist and egotistical way with which the country was inserted into the world; the perceptions of political leaders, including Carneiro Leão; as well as the variant course taken by the relations between an independent Brazil and the Hispanic countries throughout the entire nineteenth century. In the nine years of the Regency – when Carneiro Leão began his rapid political rise – in spite of all the existent instability and threats of secession in some provinces, both the young country's isolation and the control exercised by the conservative monarchical elites were so large that republican ideas did not seduce Brazilian society very much. Perhaps out of fear of the disorder in which the neighboring South American republics lived, Brazilian elites soon associated the image of a republic with conflicts, political instability, and the loss of unity – values considered to be absolutes in Brazil.

These elements, then, both positively and negatively, distinguished Brazil's insertion into the world. The country remained united, but with a very peculiar cultural mosaic, characterized by remarkable breadth and plasticity. Even as an independent country, it remained somewhat isolated. As if it had been in a time capsule during its long colonial period, therefore, Brazil found itself on the sidelines of ongoing transformations in the world.

Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão had lived in Coimbra during the period of Brazilian independence, and there is no information he expressed himself on the matter. When he returned to Rio de Janeiro, he married a cousin, Maria Henriqueta, the daughter of

the benefactor uncle who had paid for his studies in Coimbra, and who had opened the doors to his career in the Court. He then passed through the Empire of Pedro II as a prominent figure of the Conservative Party.

Already established as a coffee farmer in the Paraíba Valley, and having been elected and re-elected a representative from Minas Gerais (1830, 1834 and 1838), Carneiro Leão was appointed governor of the Province of Rio de Janeiro in 1841. In 1842, he was asked to join the original nucleus of the Third Council of State, which was created by Dom Pedro II and lasted until the end of the Empire in 1889; Carneiro Leão remained a State Councilor until the end of his life in 1856.

In 1843, he was the head of the Ministerial Cabinet, while also accumulating the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs. At that time, however, he stayed in the cabinet only briefly, as he resigned in 1844 due to a controversy with the young Emperor, indirectly related to the negotiation of a tariff treaty with England. Prior to resigning, however, he voiced his nationalist sentiment, abolishing the position of a conservative judge that had been established in Brazil by England at the time of Dom João VI, to decide on issues related to British subjects.

Carneiro Leão's career accelerated again in 1848, when he was appointed governor of the province of Pernambuco with a mission to appease the local situation still upset by the consequences of the *Praieira* revolt, the final internal rebellion of the Empire. He fulfilled the mission with his individual talent, alternating between firm attitudes and pragmatic policies. As a result of his success in Pernambuco, in 1851 he was asked to pacify the southern border threatened both in Argentina and in Uruguay by the *caudillo*, Juan Manuel de Rosas, governor of the Province of Buenos Aires; and

it was this mission that turned out to be his greatest diplomatic accomplishment.

THE MISSION OF CARNEIRO LEÃO IN THE PLATA

After Dom Pedro II was declared an adult in 1840 – allowing him to take the throne of the Empire – and stability was later achieved in southern Brazil with the winding down of the Farrapos War, conditions were created for the Empire to focus on resolving instability in the Platine region overall. Diplomatic envoys of Fructuoso Rivera, from Montevideo, and Juan Manuel de Rosas, from Buenos Aires, arrived in Rio de Janeiro, each committed to obtaining Brazilian support for his own purposes. In 1843, the envoy of Rosas, General Tomás Guido, proposed to Carneiro Leão, then in charge of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, an alliance to overthrow Rivera, whose support for the insurgents of Rio Grande do Sul was notorious. Carneiro Leão agreed to negotiate with Guido, but he conditioned the alliance against Rivera to a definitive peace agreement with the Province of Buenos Aires.

The Argentine representative rejected Carneiro Leão's conditions. He insisted that Rivera should first be neutralized, and only after *that* occurred should a peace agreement be negotiated with Buenos Aires. Carneiro Leão, having become aware of evidence that tied Rivera to the Farroupilhas in Rio Grande do Sul, eventually accepted the Argentine proposal. He signed the agreement, and the Emperor approved it on behalf of Brazil. The Argentine strongman, Rosas, however, rejected it.

Feeling betrayed, Carneiro Leão put Brazil back in a position of neutrality regarding the *caudillo* battles on both sides of the Plata River. Before leaving the Ministry, he issued detailed instructions to Montevideo, in which, by exposing the complexity

of the relationship Brazil/Rio Grande Sul/Uruguay/Buenos Aires, he clarified the goal of the Empire:

The goals of the Imperial Government ... are to bring peace to the province of Rio Grande, and to maintain the independence of the Eastern State. But as the independence [of the Eastern State] is secondary to the pacification of Rio Grande, the Imperial Government should prefer to work with Rosas, rather than remain sympathetic to the cause of the Eastern State and, thereby, endanger peace [in Rio Grande].

Carneiro Leão, however, instructed the *chargé d'affaires* not to put this in writing. Rather, he said: "In your written communications to the government, always remain neutral, leaving only to verbal and confidential conferences to inculcate that propensity of the government" (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1964, p. 107 and 109). Implicit in Carneiro Leão's formula was the pragmatic position of even accepting the incorporation of Uruguay into Argentina if that acceptance ensured the integrity of Rio Grande do Sul and its maintenance in the Empire. Although the situation unfolded in a different manner, and therefore the option he had considered was not necessary, the flexibility with which Carneiro Leão had planned the alternatives – according to the larger goal defined at the time – as well as the subtlety of his political-diplomatic maneuvers, clearly shows insight into his reasoning.

Carneiro Leão's successor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paulino Soares de Souza, the future Viscount of Uruguay, maintained the neutrality policy until Rosas blocked Montevideo. This action led the Brazilian representative in the Uruguayan capital, the Viscount of Sinimbu, to express himself emphatically against the policy pursued by Rosas and not recognize the blockade. In Rio de

Janeiro, Soares de Souza reiterated the Brazilian determination to remain neutral in the fight between Rosas and Rivera. In practice, however, the autonomy with which the diplomatic representatives operated took the question to the extremes. Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, the Brazilian representative in Buenos Aires, retrieved his passport and was induced to leave the post. Meanwhile, the Argentine representative, Tomás Guido, taking advantage of the lack of clarity on Brazil's part, was obstinate in his efforts to attract support for Rosas. Disagreements followed. Rosas, for example, became angry with Brazil's recognition of Paraguay's independence in 1844.

From 1836 to 1846, the Emperor's Speeches of the Throne increasingly made alarmist references to republican and separatist struggles in Rio Grande and the efforts of the government to gather dissidents around the Imperial Crown. In 1846, Dom Pedro II announced the pacification of the Province. The main goal of the Empire in the region had been attained.

In 1849, as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paulino Soares de Souza - who, according to the words of Teixeira Soares (1955, p. 115), was "the real creator of the doctrine of firmness in the Plata River" - established the conviction that Rosas was determined to keep the situation "on ice" until he was able to overthrow Rivera, control Montevideo, and attack Rio Grande do Sul. War seemed inevitable. Guido retrieved his passport and left Rio de Janeiro in October 1850. Brazil guaranteed financial, diplomatic and military support so that Rivera would not abandon Montevideo to the forces of Oribe and Rosas. As peace in the Rio Grande had been ensured, the independence of Uruguay became the major goal once again.

Carneiro Leão, who had recently ended his mission in Pernambuco, was assigned to negotiate and sign a peace treaty

with Montevideo. At the time a dividing line between both States based on the *uti possidetis* of the Empire was strictly recognized. Shortly thereafter, the governor of Entre Rios, General Justo José de Urquiza, expressed acceptance of Brazilian support to overthrow Rosas.

On May 29, 1851, the Brazilian Empire, the Republic of Uruguay, and the Provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes signed a Treaty of Alliance, the goals of which – both offensively and defensively – were expressly, to ensure the independence of Uruguay, and to pacify its territory, as well as to secure the expulsion of General Oribe and the Rosas' forces that he commanded.

Nominated governor of Rio Grande do Sul and the head of Brazilian troops that would intervene against Oribe, Luis Alves de Lima e Silva, the future Duque de Caxias, arrived in the South in July 1851. Whether his actions were slow or General Urquiza's were excessively quick or malicious; the fact is that the latter acted on his own and hastened the defeat of Oribe, without the help of the Brazilian forces. The *caudillo* from Entre Rios had decided to weaken Rosas and fight against him militarily, but as he did not have the resources necessary for such an ambitious endeavor, he sought financial, logistic and military support from Brazil. For his part, Caxias turned Urquiza's needs into virtues and minimized the participation of the Empire in carrying out his power projects.

After Oribe capitulated, the Treaty of May 29 was supplemented by another treaty, which Carneiro Leão signed in October 1851. It was necessary to act quickly, in order to avoid Urquiza's resourcefulness, to create facts capable of reducing the importance of Brazil in the resolution of the Platine dispute.

As a result, the problems between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires worsened. Brazilian monarchist elites perceived the situation predominant in Argentina as being threatening and revealing of

uncivilized political customs; and Argentine perceptions about monarchical Brazil, the “Africa of America,” according to the words of diplomat Juan Bautista Alberdi, in turn, were extremely negative (ALBERDI, 1998 Cited in SEIXAS CORRÊA, 2004).

Appointed plenipotentiary on October 20, the future Marquis of Paraná left for Montevideo on the 23rd, accompanied by the young secretary he had chosen, José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the future Baron of Rio Branco. At that time, Carneiro Leão was a senator for Minas Gerais; he also occupied his seat on the Council of State. He was 50 years old and was one of the most powerful politicians in the country. With an irascible and authoritative personality, he did not possess attributes often associated with diplomats. It was the Foreign Minister, Paulino Soares de Souza, later named the Viscount of Uruguay, who suggested his appointment to Dom Pedro II; perhaps because he considered that the mission required not a diplomat of traditional character, but rather a politician of the importance, representativeness and temperament of Carneiro Leão. The moment required a man of authority, to prevent the anti-Brazilian and antimonarchical action of Rosas and his eastern allies from jeopardizing the country’s integrity. The symbiotic relationship between Brazilian domestic and foreign policies prevailed. Soares de Souza summarized in an objective manner the mission: Carneiro Leão should be in charge of calling attention to the institutional question – monarchy versus republic – which separated Brazil from its Platine neighbors. As he put it: “We must seize the opportunity, pressure Rosas, and pin him to the ground, in order to obtain the complement of Treaties on the 12th of this month, connecting those governments to our system and our policies” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 14).

Carneiro Leão took with him to Montevideo and Buenos Aires, the experience acquired as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1843, when he had dealt with threats posed to the integrity

of the province of Rio Grande do Sul that had rebelled against the Empire. He had also gained vast experience on international matters as a member of the Justice and Foreign Affairs sections of the Council of State, when he had dealt with a variety of issues, including: disturbances in the Plata region; disputes with Great Britain about slave trafficking and the joint bilateral commissions; migratory problems and the settlement of accounts with Portugal; interferences by foreign consuls; episodes related to the guarantee of the independence of Uruguay established by the Convention of 1820 that had ended the Cisplatine War; Paraguayan themes and many others – all of which made him keenly aware of the Empire's foreign agenda, enabling him to act with sharp political and strategic sense in Montevideo and Buenos Aires.

Responses to questions the Minister of Foreign Affairs had formulated in July 1844 when Carneiro Leão was Rapporteur – are also useful to illustrate his thoughts about the Plata region. For example, in response to: “Does Brazil have the right to intervene [in Uruguay]?” The Council responded, in Carneiro Leão's handwriting: “Of course Brazil has the right to intervene” as the Treaty of 1828

separates the Cisplatine Province from the Empire, making it an independent State.... Therefore, if the independence disappears, Brazil has the right to intervene, to save it, or even to reincorporate the province back into the Empire; as it was only separated under the condition of it being an independent State.

Underlying that statement was the risk that a possible victory in Uruguay by the caudillo, Manuel Oribe, could have led to that country's annexation by the Argentine Confederation, as championed by Oribe's great ally, Rosas. And if *that* occurred, the Council was emphatic, “Brazil must prepare for war!”

Among the reasons for intervention mentioned in the report is the pacification of Rio Grande do Sul, which reinforces the thesis that foreign policy at the time was practiced under a logic similar to that which ruled domestic policy. Both of these issues related to the territorial integrity of the Empire. In addition, foreign policy was a tool to preserve monarchical institutions: "... if a foreign war begins, the rebels will give up their criminal attempts and support the Imperial Army; thus, atoning for their crimes, they will be able to re-enter – without disgrace or tarnish – the community of the Brazilian family."

In a subsequent lengthy report, also signed by Carneiro Leão, the legal and political circumstances of the Brazilian relationship with Uruguay and the perennial ambition of Rosas, to incorporate the eastern bank of the Plata River into Argentina, are discussed. After analyzing the problems that this would create for Brazil, the report concludes that "the policy conceived as being less harmful is that of preserving the independence of the Uruguayan State"; and it went on, "Our statesmen shudder at the idea of turning Montevideo into a part of Buenos Aires" (STATE COUNCIL 1842-1889, 1978, p. 201, 103, 205, 225, 336).

The correspondence between Foreign Minister Paulino Soares de Souza and Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão is abundant, and virtually all of it is deposited in the archives of Itamaraty. Historian José Antônio Soares de Souza used this documentation to write his broad study: "Honório Hermeto no Rio da Prata, Missão Especial 1851-1852" (Honório Hermeto in the Plata River, Special Mission 1851-1852), published in 1959 as part of the *Brasiliana* collection of the *Companhia Editora Nacional*, and by virtue of a publication of the Center for History and Diplomatic Documentation of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation, these documents are fully identified and listed (INVENTÁRIO..., 2001).

Carneiro Leão's mission in the Plata lasted six and a half months. He arrived in Montevideo on October 31, 1851. After a brief contact with General Urquiza's son, Diogenes, while he was still anchored in the harbor, he disembarked in Montevideo on November 2 and presented his credentials to President Joaquin Suarez three days later.

When the war against Oribe was over, it was necessary to put an end to the constant threats that came from Buenos Aires. The treaties signed with the interim government in Montevideo laid the foundation for the relationship with Brazil. Caxias' troops were already stationed in Uruguay. Urquiza let the Brazilian side know that he wished to cross the Paraná River at the head of an army of 20,000 men, to attack Rosas in early December. An agreement was quickly negotiated and completed. It was signed in Montevideo on November 21, by Carneiro Leão, for Brazil, Diogenes Urquiza, for Entre Rios, and Manuel Herrera y Obes, a diplomat for Uruguay. By that document, in support of the initiative of Entre Rios, Brazil undertook: (1) to offer the use of the Brazilian fleet (Urquiza did not have boats that would allow him to cross the Uruguay River so that he could then march to Buenos Aires); and (2) to provide 3,000 infantrymen, two batteries of artillery, one cavalry regiment and 1,000 swords. The Empire also ensured a loan to the Provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes totaling 400,000 silver coin currency (*patações*), to be released in four monthly disbursements at 6% interest per annum.

The negotiation had been skillfully conducted. The agreement was legally configured as to define its objective as an offensive action against Rosas rather than a war against Argentina. It was, so to speak, a foreign war that looked like a civil war. For his part, Carneiro Leão could not be more incisive about the goals of the agreement that he had signed: "The results that the Imperial government must derive from the direct and effective intervention

that it has recently undertaken on the matters between the states of the Plata region cannot be achieved without the fall of the governor, Juan Manuel de Rosas” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 25). Contrary to what was written in the agreement, however, the Brazilian Empire did not plan merely to “assist” in the matter. In order to respond to the “susceptibilities of Spanish nationalism,” as Carneiro Leão wrote in a letter to Rio de Janeiro, the Empire planned to play a very important and indispensable role in the fight, which, in fact, actually occurred, as Brazil contributed to the outcome “with its money, its naval fleet, and its soldiers” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 25). Moreover, Brazilian military forces would not be scattered; they would be preserved in a single block, and they would be commanded by Brazilian officers.

Carneiro Leão was perfectly aware that in order to obtain the expected benefits of the intervention the role that Brazil played in the fight should be dominant. He wrote to Foreign Minister Soares de Souza that the Empire should not be “afraid” of France and England, which he described as: “powers that desire to compete for the influence that is Brazil’s, and that [therefore] is proper for Brazil to exercise in the states of the Plata region.” If Urquiza won alone, the glories would belong to him alone, regardless of the Empire’s financial aid. If he lost, Brazil’s assistance to him would be “too late,” because surely then the European powers would intervene on behalf of Rosas (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 27). That type of thinking was impeccable reasoning; the result of a political view of power that Brazil needed to exercise in the region in order to preserve its interests. There was actually considerable mistrust among the Brazilian leaders concerning Urquiza’s true intentions. The understanding was not universal, nor was our ally’s behavior absolutely clear.

It became essential to ensure the exact fulfillment of the treaties and the timely implementation of the provisions of the

military campaign. In a letter dated early December, General Urquiza assured Carneiro Leão that around the 15th of the month he would be underway “to pursue ... without interruption the enemy of the Empire and the tyrant of my country” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 63).

Operations began on time and successfully. On September 17, 1851, a Brazilian fleet of eight warships – including four steam corvettes, carrying three battalions, under the command of Admiral John Grenfell – managed to force through the Tonelero Pass on the Paraná River, despite strong opposition of the Rosas’ forces. Then, surpassing the territory controlled by Buenos Aires, they arrived to meet the forces of Urquiza in Corrientes. Significantly, aboard the Brazilian flagship, the *Dom Afonso*, were two future Presidents of Argentina: Bartolomé Mitre and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento.

Between December 23 and 24, 1851, the allied army crossed the Paraná River on Brazilian boats, ferries and on horseback. On January 1, 1852, Brazilian troops stationed in Colônia, under the command of Manuel Marques de Sousa, arrived by river to Rosário. On January 6, the Uruguayan and Brazilian divisions joined the bulk of the Army at Espinillo.

At this point, a series of incidents occurred. On one side, there was Urquiza’s concern to minimize the role of the Brazilian forces in the battle; on the other, the determination of Marques de Sousa to comply with the political strategy outlined by Carneiro Leão, to actively participate in the operations. As evident of this, Marques de Sousa complained bitterly that Urquiza did not greet him when he arrived on the scene, and that Urquiza had given him neither instructions nor support.

Despite the susceptibilities, it was essential to increase the tempo of the battle, as leadership in Rio de Janeiro feared a possible British intervention in favor of Rosas. Carneiro Leão

obtained from Urquiza a commitment to accelerate the attack. At the same time, he and Caxias planned the idea of sending a contingent of Brazilian troops to the outskirts of Buenos Aires – a maneuver that forced Rosas to keep an important part of his forces in the capital, thereby weakening the troops that defended Caseros, another locality in Buenos Aires Province, named for its owner, Diego Casero. The Caseros site subsequently became one of the most important battles in the conflict.

The Brazilian strategy had left Rosas without the freedom of initiative. Fearful of an attack by the Brazilian Army encamped at the Colony of Sacramento; he remained in Palermo, a district of Buenos Aires, for almost the entire month of January. He finally left Buenos Aires on the 27, to fight a pitched battle with the Allied forces.

The meeting of the two armies took place at dusk on February 2, 1852. At night, Rosas consulted with his staff, and he hesitated. Reportedly, he even thought about negotiating with Urquiza because, as he supposedly commented to his generals, “our real enemy is the Empire of Brazil, because it is an Empire” (LYNCH, 1984, p. 366). Yet the inexorable course of hostilities disposed in the theater of operations – the port vs. the hinterland; the Empire vs. the republican caudillo – prevailed.

On February 3, 1853, the two armies fought at a site near Morón, a creek 30 km west of Buenos Aires. The *Battle of Caseros* was concentrated around two buildings where the bulk of Rosas’s troops were located: the farmer Casero’s house and his pigeon coop. The superiority of the allies was absolute and the battle lasted only four and a half hours. Just as Carneiro Leão had ordered, the Brazilian cavalry played a decisive role in the Allied forces victory. The military action had responded efficiently to the political goal. However the matter is analyzed, the participation of

Brazilian diplomacy, as well as the country's arms and funding were crucial. Soon after the ground battle ended, however, divergences regarding the role played by Brazil began to emerge.

Caxias arrived in Buenos Aires on February 4, 1852. Urquiza was already installed there. Accompanied by José Maria Paranhos, Carneiro Leão arrived on February 8.

During their first visit, in Palermo, Carneiro Leão, the Brazilian plenipotentiary, only had congratulatory words for General Urquiza. He realized, however, that the violence continued and the political intolerance, which had characterized Rosas' regime, also remained; corpses hung from trees in Palermo. Lodged at the Lezama Residence – current headquarters of Argentina's National History Museum, in downtown Buenos Aires – Carneiro Leão remained in the city for 16 days. During that time, and subsequently, there were episodes that well reveal the discrepancies between the parties. Carneiro Leão became angry with Urquiza's stubborn determination to minimize the Brazilian role in the overthrow of Rosas. On at least two occasions, known as "the Palermo incidents," the two leaders strongly disagreed; both times over the same issue. Gustavo Barroso recounted these disagreements in dramatic terms in his 1929 book, *A Guerra do Rosas* (The War of Rosas). Paraphrasing Barroso: On February 10, Carneiro Leão felt attacked, and he screamed his rejection of Urquiza's accusation – made in the midst of a conversation about the Uruguayan situation – that the Alliance held on the Brazilian Emperor's head, the crown that was about to fall. The insinuation was not dislodged from Urquiza's mind, however, as on the 23rd of that same month, when Carneiro Leão was bidding farewell to the governor, the Argentine general and political leader repeated the same comment to Carneiro Leão's secretary, Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos (BARROSO, 1929, p. 209-214).

Between one incident and the other, there was a parade of Brazilian troops in Buenos Aires. The Brazilian military leaders' satisfaction with the victory was very evident; seeing it as true restitution for the defeat at Ituzaingó (*Passo do Rosário*) suffered on February 20, 1827, during the Cisplatine War.

On February 18, 1852, the eve of the anniversary of Ituzaingó, the Brazilian troops made their triumphal parade along the streets of Buenos Aires. There had been expectations they might be intimidated to parade alone and, therefore, not do so. It was also reported that, having given an order to convey to Marques de Souza that the parade would start at one pm Urquiza led his troops at noon. The Brazilians, however, were not intimidated. Argentine historian José Maria Rosa commented:

The Brazilians majestically entered ... Flowers fell all around them, applauses saluted the parade of flags... There was an emotional moment while going under the Arch of Triumph of the Recoba Vieja... Honório (Carneiro Leão), unbowing, alongside the arch, exalted the great victory of his country...perhaps he was thinking what would have occurred in Rio de Janeiro if an Argentine division had entered as the victor, to the beat of the Ituzaingó March, with their blue and white flag displayed, intent on passing beneath the Arch of Ipiranga (ROSA, 1963).

Carneiro Leão was certainly aware of the historical significance of the undertaking produced under his diplomatic leadership. The consolidation of the Imperial influence in the Plata region was a goal that corresponded to the Brazilian idea of power, but that, historically, was etched from an ancestral strategy of Portuguese origin. The parade of victorious Brazilian troops in Buenos Aires put an end to three and a half centuries of European and American wars. The palatial intrigues, diplomatic

negotiations, arrangements, agreements and treaties; were all linked, in one way or another, to the definition of the borders between the Portuguese and Spanish colonizers in South America, and later among the nations formed from the collapse of the Iberian colonial empires.

Through a powerful, persistent and well-articulated combination of military might, diplomatic skills and national vision, Brazil had attained the goals it had established for itself. With the overthrow of Rosas, the dream of the formation of a large Spanish State derived from the Viceroyalty of Plata was definitively buried, and a modern Argentina was born, led by Justo José Urquiza. The rivers of the Plata basin were opened for navigation, and the dangers to the integrity of the Brazilian Southern provinces were gone. At the same time, the national personalities and the independence of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia – which had been threatened by the expansionism of Buenos Aires – had been ensured. An historical cycle – key to the building and consolidation of the Brazilian State – had ended in the streets of Buenos Aires.

Having considered his mission in Buenos Aires completed, Carneiro Leão left the city on February 24 going to Montevideo. Involved in a succession of intrigues that characterized the reorganization of power in Uruguay, he remained in the Uruguayan capital during March and April. The Blancos controlled the situation. Several politicians fought for Carneiro Leão's support to occupy higher positions. Once Juan Francisco Giró was elected president, Carneiro Leão also tried to create the conditions for the approval of the treaties that ensured Uruguay's independence and the borders agreed to with Brazil. He opened the halls of his residence to both the Blancos and the Colorados. Incited by Buenos Aires, however, the Blancos decided to repudiate the treaties previously signed with Brazil. Carneiro Leão tried to dissuade them, enticing them with the possibility that Brazil would agree

to the common navigation of the Mirim Lagoon and the Jaguarão River. However, once a stalemate was reached – which he blamed on “sectarians of Rosas, who intended to demoralize the alliance between the Empire and Uruguay ... since they did not conceive the independence of the Republic” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 172) – Carneiro Leão consulted with both Caxias and Soares de Souza about beginning the withdrawal of the Brazilian troops that occupied Montevideo. Meanwhile, Urquiza, the new Argentine leader still sought further financial assistance from Brazil.

Throughout his time in Montevideo, Carneiro Leão remained perfectly in tune with Rio de Janeiro. In official correspondence, Foreign Minister Soares de Souza restated to him: “The Imperial government is willing to take coercive measures in order to enforce the rights of the Empire ... and if these measures are not enough, a war could break out between the Empire and the Eastern Republic” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 183). For his part, Carneiro Leão was extremely cautious. In a letter to Soares de Souza he said: “They suppose that I do not follow the policy prescribed to me ... but, rather, my own policy. Be certain, sir, that I will do everything that is humanly possible to uphold our rights and interests. There is no sacrifice of self-love that I have not made” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 184.)

Carneiro Leão was, however, obstinate about one point: that Urquiza not send Tomás Guido to Brazil as a diplomatic representative, the same Tomás Guido who had previously served Rosas. Soares de Souza accepted the future Marquis of Paraná’s considerations and rhetorically asked: “Guido will come here? Don’t you think the nomination of a man...who sought to bribe our press and our senior officials and shall serve Urquiza here as he served Rosas is improper and unpleasant?” (SOARES DE SOUZA, 1959, p. 186). In the end, Carneiro Leão’s recommendation, joined by those of Caxias, were enough to prevent Guido’s appointment,

thereby avoiding yet another problem in the already troubled relationship with Buenos Aires.

On May 1, 1852, Carneiro Leão returned to Buenos Aires, to bid farewell to Urquiza as the personal relations between them had been re-established. They reached an agreement about Uruguay in the last interview they had on May 5, and on May 8, Carneiro Leão went back to Montevideo, and never again returned to Argentina. Rosendo Fraga, an Argentine political scientist and historian, synthesized his country's appreciation in a contribution he made to a seminar organized in Brasilia (Funag/IHGB) in 2001 on the centennial of the birth of the Marquis of Paraná: "For Argentine historians, Carneiro Leão remains a figure with overwhelming style. Some consider him to be overbearing. From the point of view of Brazilian interests, however, he obtained almost all the goals sought by his country" (FRAGA, 2004 p. 159).

On May 18, 1852, the Peace Treaty between Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina was signed, and soon afterward the political situation in Paraguay would be resolved. Urquiza ratified the treaty immediately. He sent a highly complimentary and affectionate letter to Carneiro Leão, praising him for having fulfilled his mission in an honorable and satisfactory manner, with both patriotism and political acumen. Two days later, after bidding farewell to President Giró on May 25, Carneiro Leão left Montevideo.

The Brazilian forces also soon left the city marching towards the border. At the end of an impressive parade that took place in Montevideo, there was, however, not a lack of boos and antagonistic gestures coming from those who perceived Brazilian policies as having been negative for their country. That was the high price to be paid for interventionist policies, whether justified or not!

Gustavo Barroso, again (1929, p. 231), described the scene:

A whooping and hollering crowd rampaged through the streets of the Uruguayan capital, celebrating the departure of their unwanted liberators. The chanting people raved, howling the worst verbal attacks against Brazilians and Brazil. At the front of the crowd, a comical person took on his shoulder a monkey wearing our army's uniform ... shouts of DIE exploded everywhere. Passing in front of the closed Imperial Mission, a scoundrel broke the windows with stones [...]

Yet for Brazil, the country's goals had been fully accomplished. Its actions had ensured the borders that it sought with Uruguay; prevented the resurrection of the Viceroyalty of Plata; ensured the independence of Uruguay and Paraguay; and established the right to free navigation of the Plata river basin. Brazil had imposed its order on a region in which instability had threatened its Southern border; unity, and by extension, the country's monarchical form of government had been preserved.

On June 6, 1852, Carneiro Leão arrived in Rio de Janeiro. The following year, the Emperor summoned him to preside over the Conciliation Cabinet, a position he was performing when he died on September 3, 1856. In his short but crucial performance in the Plata region – and more specifically in the 30 days altogether that he spent in Argentina on three separate occasions – Carneiro Leão contributed decisively, with vision, boldness and strategic direction to the consolidation of the Brazilian national territory as well as its external security.

Study of that period – especially of the interaction between Carneiro Leão and the Argentine and Uruguayan leaders – proves to be valuable for an understanding of certain profound characteristics of the relationship between Brazil and Argentina.

Influenced by a history that grew out of confrontations between Portugal and Spain, both countries developed a kind of adversarial interaction that more than a few times has led to diplomatic predicaments. Forces of expansion, growth, and consolidation on the Brazilian side versus impulses of prevention, containment, and a search for balance, on the Argentine side, are cyclical and occasionally counterbalanced by attempts at accommodation.

Argentines learn that their country only became possible because, in the first historical moment, it prevented the definitive establishment of the Portuguese Colony of Sacramento, and later it refused to allow the incorporation of Uruguay into an independent Brazil. The link between protective policies against Brazil and the success of the Argentine national project is something that is embedded in the Argentine imagination. For Brazilian society, relations with Argentina are contained within the present, while Argentine public opinion believes that interaction with Brazil still reflects the vicissitudes of the past. Rosas, the despot whose overthrow was due largely to Brazilian diplomacy and Imperial arms, is a Peronist hero.

These circumstances determine, on the Argentine side, a certain anxious behavior, sometimes aggressively defensive – as the one that Urquiza revealed in the negotiations with Carneiro Leão, in the episode of the parade of Brazilian troops in Buenos Aires and in the swagger of Palermo. On the Brazilian side, the historical experience and an excessive valuation of the country's size, lead to a behavior in relation to Argentina that is characterized by a certain self-proclaimed pragmatism, which often degenerates into insensitivity.

Two military battles help define the relationship between the two countries: *Caseros*, the battle in 1852, in which the Brazilian naval and ground forces made victory viable for General Justo

José de Urquiza, the caudillo from Entre Rios, thereby enabling the overthrow of Juan Manuel de Rosas; and *Ituzaingó* (or *Passo do Rosário*), the Argentine victory in 1827 that ultimately led to the independence of Uruguay. Together, these battles compose a *tandem* of warfare episodes that established – real or imagined – bilateral antagonisms that one could characterize as the paradigm of the divergence between the countries.

Later, the Paraguayan War, in which Argentine and Brazilian forces fought shoulder to shoulder to maintain the *status quo* threatened by the expansionism of General Solano Lopez, established the convergence paradigm.

Going from armed conflict, passing through dissimilar positions in both of the World Wars, to the long diplomatic conflict concerning the use of the waters of the Paraná River – the so-called Itaipu-Corpus dispute – up to the integration provided by the re-democratization of both countries in the 1980's; from Caseros to MERCOSUR, there has been a long trajectory in which the perceptions outlined above occasionally continue to be felt, in the decisions and the reactions of the leaders of both countries.

Throughout that trajectory, the long shadow left by the soaring and imperial view of Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná – his coherence, his firmness to defend the clearly established Brazilian interests, as well as his ability to impose his will in a hostile context – have become permanent references in Brazilian diplomacy.

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VISCOUNT OF RIO BRANCO

José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, was a military engineer, journalist, teacher, politician, and diplomat born on March 16, 1819, in the city of Salvador, Bahia, then part of the Portuguese empire in Brazil. His father, Agostinho da Silva Paranhos, a prosperous merchant born in Portugal, died when José Maria was still a child; and his mother, Josefa Emerenciana de Barreiros, from a prominent Bahian family, died in 1836. Not long after his mother's death, José Maria was sent to Rio de Janeiro, where he attended the *Escola Naval* (the Brazilian naval academy), from which he graduated in 1840. The following year, he enrolled in the *Escola Militar* (the military academy), and in May 1843, he was appointed as a substitute professor of mathematics back at the naval academy. Then, after earning a doctorate in Mathematical Sciences from the military academy, in 1846, Paranhos became a professor at that school. Throughout his career as a statesman and politician, he continued his academic work, until 1875 when

he retired as the director of the *Escola Politécnica*, an engineering school that split off from the military academy under the name of the *Escola Central*, in 1858, and is now part of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

In the 1840s, José Maria da Silva Paranhos worked as a journalist at a number of newspapers in Rio de Janeiro, including *Novo Tempo* (1844-1846), *Correio Mercantil* (1848-1849) and, beginning in 1850, the *Jornal do Comércio*. In 1845, he also began his political career, being elected a *deputado* (representative) in the province of Rio de Janeiro with support from the Liberal Party. He was appointed secretary of the government of that province in 1846, and its vice-president the following year. Also in 1847, he was elected to the General Assembly of the Brazilian Empire, but his tenure there lasted only until 1848, when the assembly was dissolved.

In 1851, Paranhos was sent on a diplomatic mission to the Plata River region as the secretary of José Honório Hermeto Leão, the future Marquis of Paraná. The following year, he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary in Montevideo. While in that post, he was again elected to the General Assembly from Rio de Janeiro, and he returned to the Brazilian capital in 1853, taking over the position of Minister of Navy (1853-1855, and 1856-1857) in the Conciliation cabinet of his former superior in the Plata region, the Marquis of Paraná.

Paranhos subsequently held the top ministerial positions in Foreign Affairs (1855-1856; 1858-1859; 1861; 1868-1869), and Finance (1861-1862), and he undertook special diplomatic missions to the Plata region in 1857-1858; 1862 and 1869-1870. In 1862, he was the most voted candidate of those on a three-name list, to represent the province of Mato Grosso as its senator; and the emperor, Pedro II, selected him for the position.

In 1869, Pedro again chose him, this time to negotiate peace with Paraguay, the success for which he was awarded the title: Viscount of Rio Branco. He also attained the most important position of the monarchical state – that just below the emperor – as the president of the Council of Ministers (basically, prime minister), a post he held simultaneous with that of Minister of Finance, between 1871 and 1875 – the longest such tenure of the Second Empire. It was while he was the council president, in 1871, that the Law of Free Birth – which he proposed – was promulgated. The *Lei Rio Branco*, as it is often called, basically declared that children born to slave women should be free. In addition to his positions in government, Paranhos also reached the highest level of masonic hierarchy – degree 33, the Grand Master of Brazil.

José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, died on November 1, 1880, in Rio de Janeiro, at age 61.



THE VISCOUNT OF RIO BRANCO: SOVEREIGNTY, DIPLOMACY AND POWER

Francisco Doratioto

Contemporaries called José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, one of the greatest public men of nineteenth century Brazil. Although that perception faded somewhat over the years – partly due to the projection onto the national scene of his son, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco – many historians also come to the same verdict.

Paranhos, who was born in Salvador, Bahia, in 1819, was part of the generation that consolidated the monarchical state in Brazil, during which time the feeling of being a Brazilian reached all provinces of the country. He also helped to build a solid foreign policy in defense of the gigantic territory inherited from the Portuguese. Joaquim Nabuco, a contemporary Brazilian historian, jurist, journalist, politician and diplomat, defined Paranhos as: “the most lucid monarchical awareness the Empire had.” He also said that among the Brazilian Empire’s foreign policy statesmen, Paranhos was: “the most moderate, constant and intelligent

advocate of [the country's national] interests" (s.d., t. 4, p. 187-188). The more current historian and political scientist, José Murilo de Carvalho, ranks Paranhos as "the brightest" diplomat of the Empire (1996, p. 15).

Towards the end of his life, in 1879, at the conclusion of a lengthy trip to Europe – during which he had visited southern France, Italy, Germany, Holland, Belgium and England – the Viscount of Rio Branco wrote to the writer and historian, Alfredo Taunay, that he needed to think more before expressing himself in detail on what he had just seen. He did, however, venture one conclusion: "[This overseas trip] made me feel even more Brazilian than I already was," he said (TAUNAY, p. 35-36).

Paranhos' childhood did not seem to destine him to develop such strong feelings towards Brazil nor, for that matter, undergo a successful political career. His father, Agostinho da Silva Paranhos, had been a prosperous Portuguese merchant in Salvador, who sided with his native land after Brazil declared independence in 1822. In fact, Agostinho favored the Portuguese general, Madeira de Melo, who resisted independence until the Portuguese troops were defeated by Brazilian patriots, on July 2, 1823. As a consequence, his father suffered great financial losses, although remaining with considerable possessions. But upon Agostinho's death, while José Maria was still a child, those possessions and assets were used to settle alleged debts, leaving José Maria's mother, Josefa Emerenciana de Barreiros, financially strapped, unsuccessfully attempting to overturn the legal judgements against Agostino's diminished wealth (BARON OF RIO BRANCO, 2012, p. 151).

Relying on the support of his maternal uncle, the colonel of engineers, Eusébio Gomes Barreiros, the young José Maria continued his primary studies in Salvador. Within a few years after his father's death, however, his mother also died, and the

teenaged orphan was sent to Rio de Janeiro, where he enrolled in the *Escola Naval*. Next, after graduating from the naval academy, in 1841, Paranhos entered the *Escola Militar* for further studies, being promoted to second lieutenant of the Corps of Engineers in 1843. While still a student, he was also appointed to a chair in the artillery department of the naval academy. In 1845, he transferred his teaching career to the military academy where, three years later, he was appointed to a full professorship and the school's chair of Artillery and Fortifications.

In 1856, Paranhos began to teach Mechanics at the *Escola Militar*, and in 1863, that same discipline at the *Escola Central*, which had split off from the military academy. He then accepted the position of a new chair of Political Economy, Statistics and Administrative Law, in which he taught the pioneer statistics course in the Brazilian academic environment (POUBEL, 2011, p. 7). The *Escola Central* was renamed the *Escola Politecnica*, and he was named its director in September 1875, a post he kept until his retirement in March 1877. Thus, Paranhos, the son of a Portuguese merchant who had resisted Brazilian independence, found in the country's military schools an environment in which to develop feelings of being "Brazilian": his paternal affiliation had not determined his fate.

Paranhos had arrived in Rio de Janeiro during a particularly politicized period in the Brazilian Empire's history. Members of the literate sector of the political elite were often profuse, wordy, and emotional in debates held in the legislative assemblies, as well as in the press. Paranhos, however, used his training in mathematics in the debates in which he participated. He presented arguments that were connected to one another with a line of reasoning having a cause and effect relationship; he used logic instead of grandiloquent expressions infected with quotes from French authors, which were typical of the then current pretentious

speech of college graduates in Brazil. Joaquim Nabuco stated that in Paranhos “the logical structure of his speech was vigorous; the language was perfect in terms of being appropriate and clear, current and spontaneous” (s.d., I, p. 169). He did not, however, lack erudition, and he could equal his pretentious colleagues – as can be verified in some of his replies to queries in parliamentary sessions. His scientific training was also present in his actions as a politician and as a diplomat, which were characterized by a definition of clear goals and methods of “the right and methodical rule.” He “very rarely lost his composure,” as “patience was his best feature” (TAUNAY, p. 19, 26).

The future Viscount was a rare individual in the elite circles of Rio de Janeiro. Despite the fact that in Imperial Brazil, wealth usually defined one’s social position and sustained political success, while he had to live off the payments of his own activities. Paranhos had a successful political career in the monarchy, reaching its apex: the presidency of the Council of ministers. As such, he was a member of the restricted circle of civil servants, whose loyalty was to the crown and the interests of the monarchy. And although this small group had been trained in the values of the slave society, by no means did all of its members automatically identify with the interests of the economic elite. They were bureaucrats in the Weberian sense, and they distinguished the state’s interests from those of the slave owners – although the latter were often pillars for the former – a situation which created important restrictions on the actions of men and public institutions.

Paranhos began his public life by identifying himself with the Liberal Party. In 1844, he became editor of the newspaper *Novo Tempo*, which belonged to that political bent. The following year, he was elected to the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro, in a rising political career that led him to be appointed secretary of the government of that province in 1846, and later, its vice-

president. He subsequently was elected to the General Assembly of the Empire, although he remained there for only a year because, with the creation of the figure of president of the council, in 1847 – which in practice introduced the Parliamentary system – Pedro II soon dissolved the *Camara dos Deputados* (the lower house of the legislature), in 1848. The Emperor then called the Conservative Party back into power, appointing the Viscount of Olinda, as the leader of his cabinet.

While he was president of the council, Olinda sought to put an end to the Liberals' control in his home province of Pernambuco. This action caused an armed uprising known as the *Revolução Praieira*, named for the street in Recife on which the rebels met. Part of the rebel Liberals, especially those of urban origin, had radical claims, such as federalism, the end of the moderating power of the emperor, and universal suffrage, albeit with a number of restrictions. Although the rebels were defeated when they attacked Recife in 1849, the *praieiros* sustained a guerrilla war against the forces of the Imperial government until the following year (FAUSTO, 1995, p. 178-179). The radicalism of the claims and the harsh repression by the Imperial government frightened the more moderate sectors of the population, which led to a strengthening of the Conservatives in the central government (the core of which were nicknamed the *saquaremas* for a village in the province of Rio de Janeiro, their stronghold). The Conservative domination of the General Assembly was astounding; from 1849 to 1852, for example, 99 percent of the representatives in the legislature were members of the Conservative Party, and from 1853 to 1856, they were 100 percent.

After losing his position as a deputado, Paranhos became editor of the newspaper, *Correio Mercantil*, which was basically an arm of the Liberal Party. According to a Paranhos biographer, Lídia Besouchet, while he had attended the naval and military schools,

he had become a Liberal because everything in Rio de Janeiro at that time “converged” towards liberalism: “schools, journalism, the intellectual Bohemia of the Court ... the parliamentary debates.” Thus, a generation of liberals formed, and they led the political process “that caused the successes, [and also] led to the revolt in Pernambuco in 1848.” The radicalism of the latter had an impact on Paranhos who, also following the trend of the Masonic Order to which he belonged, eventually abandoned the Liberal Party. In 1853, he was elected a representative to the General Assembly, again; but this time from the Conservative Party without, however, changing his socio-political thinking (BESOUCHET, 1985, p. 28, 69).

Besouchet said that the Viscount of Rio Branco’s public figure should either be studied from the point of view of his individual path as a successful politician, or “as a national expression,” but never, she said, “as a regional power”: he did not represent any immediate regional or economic interests. Instead, she believed, he was an individual driven by a nationalist ambition, based on an interpretation of Brazil as a “child of Portugal, heir of a monarchy, with the ability to seek its natural evolution within those traditions.” His liberalism was not limited to the initial phase of his political career; it persisted throughout life and, at times, put him in disagreement with conventional conservatism. “Everything seems to indicate” that his transition from one political party to another reflected the evolution of the political stance of the Masonry, of which Paranhos was already a member by 1840 (BESOUCHET, 1985, p. 64-66). In the South Central region of Brazil – which was both official and moderate, as compared to that of the North, which was revolutionary – he found a warm atmosphere for his personal convictions, including an aversion to radical changes –such as those that had victimized him when he

was young – an adherence to social reforms, and a compass for his political actions.

Concerning the influence of his affiliation with the Masons, Besouchet is precise:

His entire public life can be explained by his belief in the policies of Masonry; no one followed its instruction with greater zeal ... A transformation began in Paranhos that can only be explained by the change of the general policies of the Masonry in the course of [Brazil's] political evolution. It is evident that the nationalism – “the “Brazilianism” – of Paranhos’ work can also only be understood as resulting from his affiliation with the Masonry movement in the country. (BESOUCHET, 1985, p. 67).

In 1850, Paranhos left his position as editor of the *Correio Mercantil*, devoting himself to teaching, as well as to writing a weekly column called “Letters to an Absent Friend,” in the *Jornal do Comércio*. In his column, he characterized his adhesion to the political ideology of the Conservative Party, which ruled the Empire through the Olinda cabinet, made up of Eusébio de Queirós, Paulino José Soares de Souza and Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres: the “Saquarema Trinity.” The following year, Olinda left the ministry over a disagreement with an armed intervention being planned in Rio de Janeiro against the leader of the Argentine Confederation, Juan Manuel de Rosas, which he considered risky (NABUCO, s.d., v. I, p. 116). The new leader was the conservative Viscount of Monte Alegre (1849-1852), who appointed Paulino José Soares de Souza, the future Viscount of Uruguay, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In his column, “Letters to an Absent Friend,” Paranhos addressed varied topics, ranging from aspects of life in the Court to Brazilian foreign policy. The beliefs and opinions that he expressed in these “Letters” show that his thinking had converged towards

the goals and values of the Conservatives in power. Paranhos supported the foreign policy carried out by the foreign minister, Soares de Souza, who occupied that position from 1843 to 1844, and again, from 1849 to 1853.

The new minister, the future Viscount of Uruguay, defined the goals and methods that should be used in the relationship with neighboring countries, especially those of the Plata region. He also maintained his refusal to allow the subordination of Brazil to the interests of the major powers. This refusal manifested itself in the first half of 1840, with the nonrenewal of trade treaties that had been signed by Pedro I. The treaties had granted privileges to Great Britain and other European powers in order to obtain recognition of Brazil's independence.

At the beginning of Pedro II's reign, his government needed to improve tax revenues since the low customs duties levied on imported goods – that had been established in the aforementioned trade treaties – jeopardized the Imperial treasury. In 1844, the Imperial government established the protectionist Alves Branco Tariff with import taxes ranging from 30% to 60%. Then, in July 1845, in an effort to demonstrate more autonomy, the Imperial government decided to end the validity of the 1826 Convention it had signed with Great Britain on the slave trade. The British government retaliated with the Aberdeen Act.

Under the unilateral Aberdeen Act, the classification of piracy that had been given to slave trafficking by the Convention of 1826 continued valid, and British warships began to pursue and seize Brazilian ships that carried slaves; their crews were judged solely in Courts with only British judges; while British warships violated the Brazilian maritime sovereignty, and even exchanged shots with fortifications of the Empire.

In his weekly column in the *Jornal do Comércio*, Paranhos repeatedly repudiated the British action and supported the Imperial government's position on the matter. He blamed the "excesses that ... were perpetrated in the name of the law on people England had invented exclusively for itself," and further said that the British actions showed they "were against weaker nations." Although he said he was an "English enthusiast" in many ways, Paranhos classified the British government as arrogant, adding: "I do not forgive them for the villainy with which they are oppressing weaker nations, the markets of which they very much need in order to maintain their industrial power." He believed that the real reason for the imposition of the Aberdeen Act was to force Brazil to return to the British commercial privileges that had been lost.

Paranhos also wrote that all Brazilians, regardless of their political affiliation, were subjected to "this humiliation," and that no one was so naive as to believe that the arrogance of Lord Palmerston, the official in charge of the British foreign office, was motivated by a concern for the Africans. He further wondered: "would not an advantageous trade treaty calm their rage?" Playing the devil's advocate, he suggested that the Empire respond to Britain "in a material fight ... and ... strengthen its alliances with other nations" – actions that would have been very harmful to British trade. It was a matter of commercial retaliation, he believed (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 33, 37, 51).

The cause of Paranhos' resentment was not the same as that of the slave traders and their owners, for whom the British action meant a permanent threat of financial loss. The future Viscount of Rio Branco was angry with the British government for what he considered the commercial motivation of the Aberdeen Act, as well as the attacks on the sovereignty of the Brazilian Empire. If this affront was accepted, he said, it could repeat itself on other matters; thus setting a standard in Brazilian foreign affairs. Paranhos

condemned slavery “in all its nakedness and horror” (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 419), considering it “an evil that we inherited.” He said, however, that it was an evil from which “[Brazil] can only unbind gradually” (per a vote in Proceedings of the Full State Council 1865-1867, p. 37). Between the prudence of reform and the boldness of rupture, he opted for the former on behalf of preserving national production. Even prudent changes, however, were intolerable for more conservative and influential sectors of the Brazilian elite; as was seen in the critiques of the Law of the Free Birth (1871), an initiative of the Viscount of Rio Branco.

Despite the Aberdeen Act, slave trafficking persisted, reaching its apogee in 1848. The causes were various, including an increase in British demand for Brazilian-made products (ALMEIDA, 2001, p. 340). Ultimately, an end to the trafficking was imposed by the Eusébio de Queirós Law, in 1850.

The end of the slave trade is often related to the reinforcement of the British fleet in the Southern Atlantic, in that same year of the Queirós Law, 1850, and with official instructions to pursue slave ships in the territorial waters of the Empire, including its ports. The fact, however, is that only in the late 1840s did the Brazilian State have sufficient resources and means to impose major changes on the slave traders, and later, with the *Lei de Terras* (Land Law of 1850), was it able to restrain landowners who appropriated large tracts of public lands.

Brazilian justice minister, Eusébio de Queirós – author of the law that finally ended the slave trade – stated, in a session of the General Assembly, on July 16, 1852, that the Aberdeen Act postponed the end of the trade, which he said the Imperial government was ready to ban in 1848. The enactment of Aberdeen by the British government – and the first seizures of slave ships by the same – caused such popular opposition that it became

politically infeasible for Brazilian authorities to implement the ban at that time. Paranhos, himself, repeated this argument, in 1855. Speaking before a session of the General Assembly of the Empire, as the foreign minister; he said:

The assembly knows that the Imperial government considered the moment opportune to deal its ultimate and decisive blows against slave traffickers. One of the obstacles with which it had to fight, in its own conscious and in public opinion, [however] was the Act of Lord Aberdeen (FRANCO, 2005, p. 37).

Another frequent subject in Paranhos' "Letters to the Absent Friend" was the foreign policy of Paulino Soares de Souza, which he often complimented for its resistance to British abuses, and its firm stance on matters related to the Plata region. The adhesion of Paranhos to the management of foreign policy by the future Viscount of Uruguay led him to defend the permanence of Soares de Souza in the position on behalf of the "honor" of the Conservative Party. It was as if he already considered himself a part of that policy, and of the "honor and interests of the Empire"; which, he wrote in one column, "require that the mind that conceived and initiated the new Brazilian policy – concerning the serious matter of the Plata region – also guide it towards full development" (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 148).

The Platine policy that Paranhos praised concerned containment of the dictator of the Argentine Confederation, Juan Manuel de Rosas, including the Brazilian preparations to confront him. Even after Rosas' fall, the consequences continued to be a part of Brazilian diplomacy until well into the twentieth century – the early 1980s – in order to contain the influence of Buenos Aires in the region. As far as borders were concerned, the *uti possidetis* principle – that the territory should belong to the country whose

authorities or citizens were there when independence took place – was what was utilized. The justification for imperial diplomacy to use this principle was that the Treaties of Madrid (1750) and San Ildefonso (1777), signed by Portugal and Spain, had been unable to set indisputable colonial borders, and the official borders that existed had subsequently become obsolete.

The *uti possidetis* principle is fundamental in Brazilian diplomatic doctrine, but it is not the only policy. The statesman and diplomat, Rubens Ricupero, for example, recalls that several generations of Brazilian diplomats added political elements to the mix, in an action “that today we would call ‘soft’ or ‘smart power,’ used to achieve, in a peaceful manner, the goal of consolidating the territorial heritage” (RICUPERO, 2012, p. 35). The first diplomats to utilize such actions were Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, the Baron of Ponte Ribeiro; Paulino José Soares de Sousa, the Viscount of Uruguay; Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, the Marquis of Paraná; and José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco.

The goals of Brazilian foreign policy, regarding the Plata region, established during the administration of the Viscount of Uruguay as foreign minister, were to define the borders, obtain the freedom to navigate on the international rivers of the region, and support the independence of both Paraguay and Uruguay. Free navigation was important for trade with western Rio Grande along the Uruguay River, as well as for regular, administrative and commercial contact between Rio de Janeiro and the isolated province of Mato Grosso, located on the Paraguay River. Maintaining the international character of the Paraná, Paraguay and Uruguay rivers was one of the reasons the Brazilian Empire was interested in defending the independence of Uruguay and Paraguay.

Economically, *gaucho* (from Rio Grande do Sul) ranchers desired livestock and land access in Uruguay, which would have been very difficult if the latter became a province of Argentina. In the strategic sphere, Uruguay and Paraguay were “buffer” states between Brazil and Argentina, reducing the extent of a common border, thereby making the Empire less vulnerable to an invasion by Rosas’ troops. Soares de Souza, however, was convinced that the Argentine Confederate dictator would attack Brazil as soon as possible. He further believed that after Rosas’ *blanco* allies won the Uruguayan civil war – thereby reducing Anglo-French power in the region – the Argentine dictator would annex Paraguay. It would then be the time for Rosas to “come upon [Brazil] with greater resources and forces than he ever had, and involve the country in a fight in which much blood would be shed and huge sums of money spent” (Report of the Foreign Affairs, 1852, p. XIX-XX).¹

Juan Manuel de Rosas was, in practice, the dictator of the Argentine Confederation since the mid-1830s, although formally he was only the governor of the province of Buenos Aires, the capital with the same name located on the banks of the Plata River. That strategic position allowed Buenos Aires to monopolize the foreign trade of other Argentine provinces and isolate Paraguay, the independence of which Rosas did not recognize. Under the mantle of nationalism, he blocked international navigation on the Platine river network, which helped him maintain better control over the Argentine hinterland and the commercial monopoly of Buenos Aires. All of this led to the hostility of the British and the French governments, as well as an internal rebellion in the province of Corrientes.

With all this opposition, Rosas proposed an alliance with the Brazilian Empire, to end the Uruguayan civil war, which, in

1 The reports are available at: <<http://brasil.crl.edu/bsd/bsd/hartness/relacoes.html>>.

turn, would make it easier for the Imperial government to put an end to a rebellion, the *Revolução Farroupilha*, then ravaging the southernmost province of the country. After some hesitation, the Imperial government of Pedro II and foreign minister, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, accepted the proposal, and Pedro II signed the treaty. When the document arrived in Buenos Aires, however, Rosas refused to sign it, under the pretext that General Manuel Oribe, the leader of the *blancos* in the Uruguayan civil war and his ally, had not been consulted. The real reason Rosas rejected the treaty, however, was that he no longer needed it, since the foreign pressures had subsided, and the revolt in Corrientes had been subdued.

In the Uruguayan Civil War, which began in 1839, the two political parties, the *Partido Colorado* and the *Partido Nacional* (known as the *blancos*), whose leaders were, respectively, Fructuoso Rivera and Manuel Oribe, fought one another. The *Colorados* identified themselves with a pro-European liberalism, while the *blancos* were antiliberal nationalists. Political disputes between the parties triggered the Civil War, which began with Rivera's uprising, supported by Argentine Unitarians, opponents of Rosas against Oribe, who had taken shelter in Buenos Aires, and obtained the support of the governor of that province. The regional situation was delicate because the *farroupilha* movement in Rio Grande had started in 1835, and by 1836, it had proclaimed the Riograndense Republic. Forces loyal to Rio de Janeiro controlled Porto Alegre and the coastline, while the separatists, led by large ranchers, controlled the southern part of the gaucho territory. In summary, the Uruguayan Civil War involved the interests of the federal Rosistas, in favor of Oribe; the Argentine Unitarians, in favor of Rivera; the revolutionaries of Rio Grande, who had obtained shelter and armament in the Eastern territory; and the European

powers – since Rivera received both financial and military support from Great Britain and France.

The farroupilha revolt ended in 1845, after an agreement negotiated between the Imperial government and the rebels; fighting continued, however, in Uruguay. Rivera, besieged in Montevideo by the *blancos*, lost English and French support, including financial, which made it impossible for him to sustain his position. Then, the Brazilian foreign minister, Soares de Souza, implemented a policy to support Rivera and isolate Rosas, by means of loans made to the latter by the bank of the Baron of Mauá.

In 1850 diplomatic relations between the governments of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires were broken and, in 1851, Justo José Urquiza proposed an alliance with the Empire, with the goal of defeating Oribe and his allies, as well as bringing peace to Uruguay. The treaty was signed on May 29, 1850, by the Brazilian Empire, Uruguay and the Argentine provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes, with a provision stipulating that if there were an opposing reaction by Rosas, he would be considered an enemy of the Alliance. Urquiza advanced along the Uruguayan hinterland and obtained Oribe's surrender, while Rosas declared war on the Empire. Urquiza's performance at that moment and in the following months aroused suspicions by the Imperial government, since the *caudillo* from Entre Rios tried to minimize Brazil's participation in the political and military events.

So that they would not be surprised by a scheme against Imperial interests, immediately after Oribe's surrender, on October 12, 1851, Brazil named Honório Hermeto Leão, the future Marquis of Paraná, and Antonio Paulino Limpo de Abreu, the future Viscount of Abaeté, to negotiate and sign five treaties with the Uruguayan representative in Rio de Janeiro, Andrés Lamas. They

were treaties of alliance; borders, using the *uti possidetis* principle as a criterion; trade and navigation; the exchange of criminals, deserters and fugitive slaves; and for the rendering financial aid to the Uruguayan government. According to the treaty of alliance, the Empire would provide military aid to Uruguay, when requested, and lend a considerable sum of money to the Uruguayan government – part of the so-called, “diplomacy of *patacões*” – referring to loans made on behalf of the Brazilian allies in the Plata region, named for a silver coin of the era.

In his “Letters to the Absent Friend” newspaper column, Paranhos supported the performance of the Imperial government in the Plata region and allied himself with those who advocated a Brazilian armed intervention as a solution to the crisis. He classified Rosas as “nefarious,” and an “abominable ... beast of the Pampas,” an enemy of progress and civilization (Paranhos, 2008, p. 49, 150, 388, 147). He considered Rosas not only a threat to the interests of the Empire, but also an obstacle to the progress of civilization, which the future Viscount of Rio Branco, consistent with his adherence to the principles of Masonry, was an enthusiastic supporter: “Forward! Forward! That is the motto of the nineteenth century” he said (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 131).

Paranhos was in favor of peace. In the absence of an international legal system that enabled it, however, he also believed that the Latin adage: *si vis pacem, para bellum* (if you want peace, prepare for war) was not only a military maxim, but also be a guarantee of domestic and foreign security for all civilized nations” (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 224). He was, therefore, a realist even before the theory of realism – outlined in the mid-twentieth century by Hans Morgenthau – became more widely accepted. The future Viscount of Rio Branco believed that peace “must surely be the alpha and the omega of our foreign affairs,” and that it was the necessary condition “of all the well-understood

and stable progress.” Peace, however, was not an absolute value, as it was subject to the defense “of dignity and national interests” (PARANHOS, 2008, p. 211).

Paranhos was a monarchist. His writings and declarations in Parliament during the 1850s show him to be certain that Brazil and the world experienced an upsurge in scientific advances and material progress which, in the Brazilian case, he attributed to the political stability of the monarchy. He also believed that civilization would be ensured in Brazil through conciliation between both political parties, and greater attention paid to national interests (idem: 138-139). Accordingly, he advocated a foreign policy in defense of sovereignty against Britain, and interventionist action in the Plata River region that would guarantee borders and defeat Rosas, who he saw as the greatest threat of the time.

The arguments Paranhos used to justify his support for the Imperial government’s foreign policy led to an invitation by Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, who until then had never met him personally, to accompany him as his secretary on a diplomatic mission he was to perform in the Plata River region.

Carneiro Leão, one of the most important politicians of the Conservative Party and, like Paranhos, also a Mason, was chosen by the Imperial government to negotiate a peace agreement with Uruguay, and to deal with the alliance against Rosas after the latter had declared war on Brazil. He left Rio de Janeiro on October 23, 1851 accompanied by Paranhos, and on November 21, the alliance between the Empire, the Uruguayan government and the provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes was signed. A few months later, February 1852, in the battle of Monte Caseros, troops led by General Justo José de Urquiza, among which there was a Brazilian cavalry regiment, defeated the Confederation’s dictator, Rosas, who went into exile in England, where he spent the rest of his life.

By late 1851, elections were held in Uruguay for the country's legislative body, which would subsequently elect the president of the Republic. The *blancos* obtained a small majority in the legislature and in March of the following year, they managed to elect one of their own, Senator Juan Francisco Giró, as president. The new president, then, sought to change the content of the treaties signed in 1851, by submitting them for ratification to the legislative power, which he knew was hostile to them. Carneiro Leão, however, had conditioned the signing of the peace treaty – among Brazil, the Confederation and Uruguay – to the declared acceptance and ratification by the Giró government. The Brazilian negotiator said, however, that if ratification occurred, the Imperial government – “encouraged by a desire to see the deal concluded peacefully” – could accept changes to the peace agreement, “to meet the demands of public opinion [in Montevideo] and facilitate compliance with [the treaties of 1851]” (Report of Foreign Affairs, 1852, p. 11) The Uruguayan government then submitted a list of proposed modifications to the treaties of the previous year, all but one of which were rejected by the Brazilian negotiator. The one that was accepted reduced the matter of the Jaguarão River in recognition of the *uti possidetis* principle.

The opposition of the Uruguayan government to validate the agreements of 1851 was considered a cause for war, and Carneiro Leão made Giró aware of that. As Paranhos, himself, stated, years later, in 1862 (FRANCO, 2005, p. 201):

Since the requirement [of the recognition of the treaties of 1851] made the resolution of the matter more difficult, the Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Argentine Confederation offered the guarantee to replace it, and the Brazilian Plenipotentiary accepted the offer. The Treaty of May 15, 1852 that modified the borders drawn

by that of October 12 – from Chuí to Jaguarão – thereby reduced the matter to [the principle of] uti possidetis and recognized in full and in force the treaties of the latter date [.....] (Report of Foreign Affairs, 12).

The signing of the peace treaty on May 18, by representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, marked the beginning of the Empire's hegemony in the Plata region; a hegemony that remained unchallenged until December 1864, when Paraguay declared war on Brazil. The Platine policy of the Conservatives had opened the waterways of the region to free navigation; removed foreign threats from Rio Grande do Sul; facilitated the maintenance of domestic order; reaffirmed Uruguay's independence; and led to the recognition of Paraguay as a sovereign State by the Argentine Confederation.

When he accompanied the future Marquis of Paraná in negotiations in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, Paranhos made contact with some of the most important Argentine and Uruguayan figures of the day, consequently getting to know their political motivations. He also deepened his knowledge of the Plata region as he remained in Uruguay as the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Empire, after Carneiro Leão returned to Rio de Janeiro soon after the peace treaty was signed.

The perception that the future Viscount of Rio Branco "owed his career to his own efforts and to no one else," (BAPTISTA PEREIRA, 1934, p. 75) does not represent the whole truth. Carneiro Leão had recognized Paranhos' qualities, thereby creating the conditions for him to take over his diplomatic functions, which then catapulted him into a political career in the Conservative Party as he was elected a *deputado* to the General Assembly from the province of Rio de Janeiro, in 1853 – even as he remained in Montevideo.

In Uruguay, Paranhos was in charge of overseeing the approval of the Treaties of 1851 by the Congress and compliance by Giró's government. The Uruguayan president sought to integrate into his government both major political parties in his country. One example of this was his appointment of Venâncio Flores, from the Colorado party, as the Minister of War and Navy; but the partisan struggle was only intensified.

In September 1853, a Colorado rebellion against the government took place, supported by private creditors who were threatened by a presidential initiative that had taken control of customs duties away from them. To stop the unrest, the Uruguayan government requested troops from the commanders of British and French naval stations near Montevideo. Invoking the 1851 Treaty of Alliance, which established Brazilian support to Uruguay when requested, Giró asked Paranhos to send Imperial forces. Paranhos, however, rejected the request.

Paranhos considered Giró responsible for the situation because he was surrounded by more exalted *blanco* politicians, and because he had ignored the advice of moderation given to him by the Brazilian diplomat (FRANCO, 2005, p. 46-48). Remaining evasive, therefore, he rejected the initial request for support from the Uruguayan president.

Giró was unable to end the disturbance, and he obtained asylum in the French Legacy. A triumvirate replaced him in power on September 25, 1853, and only on October 30 – after Giró had already been ousted – did Paranhos inform him that the Imperial government had communicated to him that he could rely on the support of Brazilian naval forces in the port of Montevideo and on land forces that could march from the Brazilian border “for the re-establishment of your constitutional authority.” It was made clear that the Brazilians should be an auxiliary line of the

constituted authorities, to maintain order, and not the main force that imposed a government against the will of the nation.

Giró had been out of power for a month, and he did not have an armed force under his authority when he received the Brazilian offer of “auxiliary” support to a nonexistent main force. The offer by the Imperial government fulfilled the function of maintaining appearances and earned from Giró the educated reply that he “was unable to say anything about this topic” (FRANCO, 2005, p. 51-53).

The triumvirate that took over in Uruguay consisted of Fructuoso Rivera, Venancio Flores, and Antonio Lavalleja. The latter died the following month, in October of that year, and Rivera died in January 1854. Thus, to re-establish order and turn the domestic struggle to its advantage, Flores requested the intervention of Brazilian forces. This time, there were no delays or doubts by the Imperial Legation: Flores, who was from the Colorado faction sympathetic to the Empire, received the help he requested at once, in the form of a large Brazilian force of troops.

By December 15, 1853, Paranhos was no longer in Uruguay, as he had returned to Rio de Janeiro, to take over the naval ministry in the “Conciliation Cabinet” of the Marquis of Paraná. In June 1855, the foreign minister, Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu, the Viscount of Abaeté, left the cabinet, to go on a mission to the Plata region, and Paranhos replaced him, thus beginning a sixteen year span in which he was – off and on – Brazil’s top diplomat four times: June 1855 to May 1857; December 1858 to August 1859; then again, for about a month during the year 1861, in the cabinet of the Duque de Caxias; and finally, nearly decade later, during the critical period from 1868 to 1871.

While at both the Ministry of Navy and Itamaraty, Paranhos carried out modernizing measures. In the former, their purpose

was to improve human resources, mainly of the sailors and the Imperial seamen, predecessors of the marines. In the latter, in 1859, the reforms –which were put into effect by Decree 2358, of February 19, 1859 – increased from 25 to 34 the staff allotted to the State Secretariat, while also updating wages, which had not been readjusted since 1842, even though prices had “doubled or tripled.” The structure of the ministry was increased from four to five sections and the function of Ministry Consultant was created – first occupied by José Antonio Pimenta Bueno, the Viscount of São Vicente, and later, by Paranhos himself (Report of the Foreign Affairs, 1858, p. 2-4, 7).

During his years as a minister, Paranhos gave many speeches in parliament, including in them his thoughts and ideas on foreign policy. Before the general assembly on July 17, 1855, he stated that diplomatic action should not only defend the interests of the country, but also those of its subjects (FRANCO, 2005, p. 35). Before and after his missions in the Plata region, Paranhos’ speeches defended both the State’s interests as well as those of *gaucho* farmers in Uruguay, with an interest in that country’s cattle for the jerked beef industry of Rio Grande. Later, after the war in Paraguay, he defended the interests of Brazilians who had suffered material damages as a result of Paraguayan invasions of Mato Grosso and Rio Grande do Sul; accordingly, he sought indemnity from the Paraguayan government.

Before the same general assembly, in the session of August 6, 1855, when Paranhos justified his performance as Minister Plenipotentiary in Uruguay, he also defended the need for “strong and energetic” governments. He did, however, say that force was not only about the use of material resources, as he believed that “the authority that is able to use more lenient means, rather than the extreme resource of force, often gives proof of courage and strength” (FRANCO, 2005, p. 75). When strong governments are

recognized by other parties in the international sphere, they can give up the use of force in favor of negotiation and persuasion, and still achieve their ends. This position was based on his diplomatic experience in the Plata region, both by accompanying Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão's negotiating practice, which was supported by the military and financial power of the Empire in the negotiations in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and by watching Giró's government adopt intransigent positions in relation to the Empire as well as with the domestic opposition in Uruguay. Paranhos successfully used this negotiation strategy when he went on a mission to the Plata region in 1857/1858.

The government of Carlos Antonio López, in Paraguay, had created obstacles to the free navigation of the Plata River by Brazilian ships, even though this had been ensured by a treaty signed in Rio de Janeiro, in April 1856, by representatives of both countries. Before he arrived in Paraguay, Paranhos stopped in Paraná, capital of the Argentina Confederation, where he signed treaties for the extradition of criminals, deserters and fugitive slaves, as well as one that regulated navigation and trade on rivers belonging to both countries. On the same occasion, Urquiza received from Brazil a new loan of 300,000 *patacões* and, on December 14, a reserved protocol was signed. Throughout all of this, the Confederation, along with Uruguay, claimed the opening of the Paraguay River to free navigation, with the demand coinciding with Paranhos' presence in Asuncion.

A military alliance had never been established against Carlos Antonio López because Paranhos rejected the Argentine claim regarding the definition of the border with Paraguay. The claim was for the possession of the Chaco region as a whole, on the right bank of the Paraguay River until 22 degrees south latitude, while the Brazilian diplomat accepted such ownership only to the Bermejo River (BANDEIRA, 1985, p. 190).

The reserved protocol created the possibility of cooperation between the Confederation and the Empire. In the event that a war broke out against Paraguay, the Argentine government would provide 6,000 troops, while Brazil would add 8,000, plus naval forces, to impose a river blockade of the enemy and attack the Paraguayan position. The allied Commander-in-Chief would be General Urquiza. Even if it did not participate in the conflict against Paraguay, the government of Paraná would allow Imperial forces to cross the territory of Corrientes. The Empire, in turn, would commit to prevent, with its navy, a possible attack on the Confederation carried out by Buenos Aires, which had refused, in 1852, to join it, and had become an autonomous state (BANDEIRA, 1985, p. 198-199). Paranhos also signed a border treaty, based on the *uti possidetis* principle, although it did not come into effect because the Argentine Congress did not ratify it. The border proposed in 1857 was that which was eventually defined between Brazil and Argentina in 1895, as a result of an arbitration verdict provided by the president of the United States, Grover Cleveland.

Paranhos was aware of the resistance from some neighboring countries, to accept the *uti possidetis* principle as the basis upon which to set their borders with Brazil. They believed that the principle was “a subtle invention” by the Imperial government, to increase its territory. In reality, however, it is a principle “enshrined in the law of nations and is the territorial basis of almost all nations.” He further stated that the Empire did not need new territory, on the contrary: “we actually need productive people to live there.” Therefore, he said, the Imperial government’s goal was not to extend the border “beyond that which we have the right to originally due to our holdings and tenure” (FRANCO, 2005, p. 128).

Paranhos’ thought reflected the belief of the generation that consolidated Brazil, both territorially and institutionally. The

country did not need more territory; it had to approve of that which it received at independence. It had to populate the territory, and – to use a term dear to the future Viscount of Rio Branco – “civilize it.” This thought guided Paranhos in his negotiations of borders with the Argentine Confederation and, in 1856, with Paraguay. In that case, by virtue of not reaching an agreement designating which country had sovereignty over the territory between the Apa and Branco rivers, a six-year moratorium on the subject was established, during which time the *status quo* would be maintained. The governments of both countries vowed not to install any of its citizens in the disputed area.

Paranhos’ stance on this issue, and in the negotiations of 1858 in Asuncion, showed that his thought was more conciliatory and subtle than when he was writing his “Letters to the Absent Friend” newspaper column. He considered the use of force by the Empire in the Plata region in a discrete manner, seeing it as a tool to assist diplomatic negotiations; to be used with caution, even with speech. This was not a radical change of stance, since the possibility to use force still existed; rather it resulted from the adaptation of his thinking to the new regional context. The difference was that now, there was no direct potential threat to Brazil, as there had been in the Rosas case. Furthermore, in the mid-1850s, Paranhos had acquired greater political maturity, after the diplomatic experience he had had in the Plata region. In addition, when he was the foreign minister, he had been in charge of making decisions and coping with their consequences. Whereas when he was a journalist, he had analyzed decisions, but was not then responsible for their results.

When he arrived in Paraguay in 1858, Paranhos observed “that all the provisions of the government were pointing towards war.” When he passed in front of the Humaitá fortress that controlled navigation on the river, for example, there was a large

military exercise made with the clear purpose of impressing him. In Asuncion, shortly after his arrival, there were live round exercises at the city's military garrison – another way to show him that Paraguay was not defenseless. He was, however, not intimidated, and he maintained “with firmness and dignity,” a defense of the Empire's rights (FRANCO, 2005, p. 222). The Imperial government's determination to ensure free navigation on the Paraguay and Paraná rivers – including through the use of force – led the prudent and pragmatic Paraguayan leader, Carlos Antonio López, who had ruled his country for over a decade at that point, to cede. On February 12, 1876, Paranhos and the Paraguayan government signed a covenant on “the real intelligence and practice” of the 1856 treaty that, in practice, ensured navigation on the rivers.

There was, on the part of the Empire, a linkage between the search for a diplomatic solution – its priority – and a recourse to the use of force. The Imperial government was prepared to resort to the latter if Carlos Antonio López refused to observe the 1856 treaty as far as free navigation was concerned (FRANCO, 2005, p. 225). Furthermore, Paranhos' strategy included isolating Paraguay on the matter, which was also in the interest of Argentina and Uruguay. The strategy relied on the support of the government of Uruguay, which depended on Brazil to have free navigation of the Jaguarão River and the Lagoa Mirim. It also required the cooperation of the Argentine Confederation, in the case of an eventual conflict between the Empire and Paraguay.

Paranhos obtained authorization for Brazilian forces to use Argentine territory as a base, as well as the possibility of military support from the Confederation. This shielded his position – both diplomatically and militarily – allowing him to arrive confidentially in Asuncion and negotiate out of strength with a psychological advantage.

Four years later, in 1862, during a session of the General Assembly, Representative Tavares Bastos questioned Paranhos about the military preparations that accompanied his mission to Paraguay, including the decision to send gunboats to the Plata region, and the purchase of 20,000 tons of coal to be used as fuel for the boilers of those warships. Paranhos replied that the treaty of February 1858 “was not dictated by the cannon; it [was] the result of much study and long negotiations.” He confirmed that he did not reject the use of force in Brazilian foreign policy but that he favored negotiation: “force is an auxiliary means, which does not dispense effort and intelligence to reach an amicable solution” (FRANCO, 2005, 225-226).

Diplomatic negotiation and military force, therefore, came together in the Plata region, where the Empire had become hegemonic. Even when it did not have the advantage, such as with the attempts of Great Britain, France and the United States to use the Amazon, the Imperial government did not retreat: it kept the Amazon closed to free navigation of boats from non-riparian countries, such as the United States, and it opposed British and French attempts to obtain territorial expansion into the Amazon river basin from the Guianas (DORATIOTO, 2003).

In the debate with Tavares Bastos, Paranhos clarified that his 1857 mission to the Plata region was motivated by the “vital” interest of the Empire to obtain from Paraguay the guarantee of free navigation: “that was the urgent objective, the *causus belli*.”

In that debate, Paranhos also said that the definition of borders was postponed for six years by the treaty of 1856, but that this problem had never been urgent to the Imperial government. He was adamant as he said that it “should not be, I repeat, it should not be such that you are at the point of *wanting* to resolve [the matter] by means of a war.” Paranhos ended his reasoning by

arguing that Paraguay “cannot” provoke a war against the Empire, because “it is not in their interest to do so; one cannot disregard the inequality of resources between one country and the other” (FRANCO, 2005, p. 230, 233). He was, however, wrong on that point, as war began two years later, in 1864; although he was correct in that its immediate trigger was not the matter of borders.

The Paraguayan War began and was fought largely during administrations of Liberal cabinets (1862-1868). The conflict resulted from Platine political battles against a backdrop of the construction and definition of nation states in the region. It took Liberal diplomacy by surprise. The interests of the government of the Republic of Argentina, founded in 1862, presided over by Bartolomé Mitre; of Francisco Solano López, the ruler of Paraguay, 1862 to 1870 (the son of Carlos Antonio López); of the Argentine *federales*, whose main leader was Justo José Urquiza; and of ranchers from Rio Grande, all intersected in the Plata region, culminating in the Uruguayan civil war that was triggered by general Flores against the constitutional *blanco* government in Montevideo. Mitre and the Brazilian Imperial government – driven by a misguided assessment of the situation and pressured by gaucho farmers – supported Flores; while the Uruguayan government, led by the *blanco*, Atanasio Aguirre (preceded by Bernardo Berro), had the sympathies of Solano López and Urquiza. In October 1864, the Empire intervened militarily against Uruguay, reportedly in retaliation for the refusal of the Berro government to punish Uruguayan officials who had committed acts of violence against Brazilians in that republic. The intervention was preceded by an *ultimatum* to which the Paraguayan government reacted in an official note to the Brazilian delegation in Asuncion, stating that such an intervention would be considered contrary to Paraguayan interests. Francisco Solano

López declared war on the Empire in November of that year, and the following month Paraguayan troops invaded Mato Grosso.

The war took the Imperial government by surprise. From Rio de Janeiro's point of view, there was no reason for Paraguay to feel threatened by events in Uruguay. In fact, the Liberal cabinets of Zacarias de Góes e Vasconcellos (January 15, 1864 to August 30, 1864) and Councillor Francisco Furtado (August 30, 1864 to May 12, 1865) had many doubts concerning what was happening in Uruguay. In November 1864, the gravity of the situation prompted Furtado, the president of the Liberal Council of Ministers, to send Paranhos on another mission to the Plata region. Months later, Paranhos explained in the Senate that he had accepted the invitation because he believed "that foreign policy should not be subject to the vicissitudes of domestic politics; it must have traditional and fixed principles that are shared by all parties" (FRANCO, 2005, p. 306).

Because the Empire did not have enough military force to attack the city of Montevideo by itself, Paranhos left Rio with instructions to negotiate with President Mitre a joint Brazilian-Argentine intervention in Uruguay in support of Flores. His instructions resulted from common interests between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, whose relations in 1864 had reached unprecedented levels of cordiality in the history of bilateral relations. Mitre, however, could not undertake such action, as that would have caused an internal reaction from the opposition in his country and even from divergent sectors of liberalism. Meanwhile, Uruguayan President Aguirre's term ended, and he was succeeded by another *blanco*, Tomás Villalba. The new president was pressured to negotiate peace, by merchants who would have suffered losses from a blockade of the Port of Montevideo declared by the Imperial navy.

Negotiations were opened on February 2, 1865, and a peace agreement was achieved, articulated by Paranhos and signed by him, by Manuel Herrera y Obes, a representative of Villalba, and by Venancio Flores, for Uruguay. As a result of this agreement, Flores – an ally of the Brazilian Empire became – president of Uruguay. His rise was a diplomatic success for Paranhos. Even more significant was the fact that the surrender of Montevideo had been obtained without any combat, as the seizure of the city would have cost thousands of lives. Despite this success, however, Paranhos lost his position, as he was dismissed by the Imperial government. The supposed justification was that he had been unable to punish Uruguayan officials who had attacked Brazilians and dragged a Brazilian flag through the streets of Montevideo. In reality, his dismissal was due to Brazilian domestic policy, as Furtado's cabinet used foreign policy to strengthen itself against criticism for clashes between moderate and progressive factions of the party, and for not having responded to a financial crisis in Rio de Janeiro. Thus, "the cabinet tried to rely on belligerent public opinion with a measure of impact to redeem its foreign policy and to recompose its internal support base," dismissing Paranhos under the guise that the agreement of February 2 had failed (BARRIO, 2010, p. 141).

The dismissal, however, was perceived as an act of injustice that left Paranhos even stronger, and the Furtado cabinet was overthrown shortly thereafter. Paranhos reported on his mission and defended himself before a session of the Senate, which Francisco Furtado attended. In a speech that lasted eight hours, he ended with the following:

We did not enter Montevideo stepping over corpses and ruins; the doors of that capital were wide open to us, covered

with flowers. We were greeted by general applause, with the sympathies of all of the peaceful population of Montevideo.

(...)

The noble former ministers may say whatever they want about the diplomatic act of February 20, but they will not be able to take from me this grateful belief: that, because of my decision, I saved the lives of two thousand of my fellow countrymen; I avoided an important capital to be ruined; and I attracted the general sympathies of the Plata region to my country (FRANCO, 2005, p. 398, 405).

The Paraguayan attack on Corrientes, in April 1865, led to the signing of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance by the Empire, Argentina, and Uruguay. The document, among other things, determined the future borders of Paraguay with Argentina and Brazil. It also determined that the entire Chaco, up to *Baía Negra* on the border with Mato Grosso, would be Argentine, as well as the area of the Missions, located between the left bank of the Paraná River and Iguaçu River. The Empire's border with Paraguay was bound by the line of the Igurei River, which the Imperial diplomacy had not claimed, up to the *Serra do Maracajú*; as well as by the Apa and Paraguay rivers. The allied countries undertook not to suspend the war except in mutual agreement and only after the withdrawal of Solano López from power. The treaty clearly forbade any separate peace initiative by any one of the allied countries.

The secret text of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was submitted to the Council of State by the Imperial government in 1867. Its content was heavily criticized by members of the Conservative Party, particularly with regard to the transfer of the Chaco to Argentina. This, according to them, was contrary

“to the traditional policy” of Brazil in relation to Paraguay, which had been designed to maintain Paraguayan independence and sovereignty over the territory, and was necessary to prevent direct contact between Mato Grosso and Argentina.

The solution presented by the Conservatives was that the border between Argentina and Paraguay should be the Pilcomaio River. For Paranhos, the Argentine claim regarding the Chaco region was “outrageous,” but he did not think it prudent to make amendments to the treaty while the war was ongoing (Report of the Full State Council, 1867-1868, p. 21, 23).

At the beginning of the war, the liberal nuclei that led the Brazilian and Argentine governments established a climate of mutual trust. The long-running conflict, however, generated mistrust between military and political leaders from the two countries, especially concerning the intentions each had for Paraguay after the war ended.

In 1868, power in Brazil returned to the Conservative Party and, in Argentina, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento was elected president; both were critical of the Alliance and wanted to end it as soon as possible. The Conservatives feared that Argentina planned to annex Paraguay – which had been destroyed and was unable to resist – while Sarmiento thought the Empire wanted to establish a protectorate over the defeated country (Paranhos to Cotegipe, Buenos Aires, 05/22/1869. Archive of the Viscount of Rio Branco, Itamaraty Archive, 272-3-12).

With the return of the Conservatives to power, Paranhos became the foreign minister and, in February 1869, he left on a mission of more than a year’s duration, again going to the Plata region. His goal was to establish a provisional government in Asuncion, under Brazilian military occupation, in order to ensure the continuity of Paraguay as a sovereign State. It was with great

difficulty that Paranhos convinced Sarmiento to accept this proposal. Ultimately, however a provisional government was installed – albeit precariously – in August 1869. Only the allied countries recognized the government, however, because Solano López remained fighting in Paraguayan territory, and European countries, as well as the United States, recognized him, as the head of state.

Francisco Solano López was killed on May 1, 1870, and the war ended. The allied representatives signed a protocol with the Paraguayan provisional government, which formalized peace. In the protocol, the provisional authorities accepted “en su fondo” the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. It was also established that definitive peace treaties would be signed by a future Paraguayan constitutional government. Paranhos used an earlier statement of the Argentine foreign minister, Mariano Varela, according to which “victory does not provide territorial rights” over the defeated, to include a partial acceptance of the alliance treaty by Paraguay in the protocol (Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1872, v. I, p. 122). This enabled the Paraguayan authorities to question their surrender of the Chaco region to Argentina. The future Viscount of Rio Branco then used all his shrewdness – and the contradictions of the Sarmiento government – to remove from that surrender the determinative, ultimate, and undisputable character that was present in the treaty.

Paranhos was convinced that Argentina planned to occupy the Chaco and use it as a base from which to expand its influence over the rest of Paraguay (Paranhos to Cotegipe, Asuncion, 04/23/1870. Archive of the Baron of Cotegipe, Can 920, Folder 133). He was further convinced that Argentine rulers desired a chaotic political climate in the Guaraní country “so that they could say that Paraguay, as a nation, no longer existed” (Paranhos to Cotegipe, Asuncion, 03/13/1870. Archive of the Baron of Cotegipe, Can 920,

Folder 133). Such a situation would have made it easier for them to annex Paraguay; and thereby Argentina would not only expand its territory, but also add a population that would rapidly multiply and whose men would eventually make a “great infantry.”

“Surrendering” Paraguay to Argentina, Paranhos said, would mean the Empire would have as a neighbor “a power more dangerous than that of Lopez” (Paranhos to Cotegipe, Asuncion, 04/13/1870. Archive of the Baron of Cotegipe, Can 920, Folder 133). He and other statesmen and opinion makers of his time believed that a war between the Empire and Argentina was very likely, with the latter playing the role of aggressor.

A year and a half after leaving Rio de Janeiro, in August 1870, Paranhos returned to that capital. He did so only after the election of a Paraguayan constituent assembly and after directing the presidential election to the victory of the candidate who was aligned with the Empire. Paranhos remained in Rio de Janeiro for a mere three months; it was then when he received the title of Viscount of Rio Branco from the emperor, Pedro II. He then returned to the Plata region, to negotiate with the governments of Argentina and Uruguay the terms of the definitive peace treaty, to be submitted to the Paraguayan constitutional government. As far as Paraguay was concerned, the fulfillment of the goals set by the Imperial government depended on the contents of that treaty.

The allied representatives met in Buenos Aires and Carlos Tejedor, the new foreign minister of Argentina, defended the terms of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. They rejected a proposal made by Rio Branco that the allies ensure Paraguayan independence forever. The refusal reinforced the Brazilian diplomat’s suspicions that Argentina planned to annex Paraguay at some point in the future (Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1872, Annex 1, p. 185-187).

Rio Branco, however, was called back to Rio de Janeiro, as he had been appointed by Pedro II, to preside over the Council of Ministers. His subsequent tenure in that position was the longest in the history of the Second Empire (1871-1875). João Maurício Wanderley, the Baron of Cotegipe, was sent to the Plata region in his stead, and he continued the informal alliance between one winner of the war, the Brazilian Empire, and the loser, Paraguay, against the other major winner, Argentina.

In 1872, Cotegipe signed a separate peace treaty with Paraguay, in Asuncion, making the end of the Triple Alliance explicit; this caused a huge backlash in Buenos Aires. The press of both countries even talked about war between the Empire and Argentina. The Rio Branco cabinet, however, did not flinch, as it ratified the peace treaty and maintained support for Paraguayan sovereignty over the Chaco. Only in 1876 – one year after the end of the Rio Branco cabinet – did the peace treaty between Argentina and Paraguay get signed. By that agreement, the possession of the Chaco Boreal was to be decided by arbitration of the president of the United States; who eventually decided that it belonged to Paraguay.

The Viscount of Rio Branco was in charge of carrying out the policy in the Plata region that had been designed in the 1840s: to ensure free navigation on Platine rivers; to contain the influence of Buenos Aires and defend the independence of Paraguay and Uruguay; and to define the borders of the Empire according to the *uti possidetis* principle. In this work, Paranhos was guided by his belief in the avoidance of radical ideas and actions; in defense of the monarchical state and its territorial integrity (both in the Plata and in the Amazon region); and in the use of diplomatic action as an instrument of progress. His performance in the Plata region – as well as his experiences as a minister plenipotentiary, as the foreign minister, as a special envoy, and as president of the

Council of Ministers – were all intertwined with the building of the monarchical state's hegemony in the region. He considered the monarchy an instrument of progress, both because it corresponded to Brazil's historical reality, and because it ensured political stability. He also believed in the movement of goods, which required free navigation, as well as ideas that were propitious to progress. In this manner, in 1866, he was in favor of the opening of the Amazon River to navigation (Reports of the State Council, 1865 to 1877: 79-80).

The Viscount of Rio Branco was pragmatic. He advocated that international problems be resolved through diplomatic negotiation, dialogue, and the use of legal and historical arguments, albeit recognizing that military force was an auxiliary element necessary for the Empire to defend its rights. He was also optimistic concerning the future, stating, in 1870, that:

Christianity and the modern civilization that is based on it gradually establish a fraternity of thoughts and interests among peoples, which tends to put an end to the antagonism of races, the selfishness of retrograde policies or illegitimate ambitions. [And], from the point of view of religion and philosophy, all people are headed to the same destination, and it can be said, make up a single family, that is, the large family called humanity (FRANCO, 2005, p. 468).

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**JOAQUIM TOMÁS DO
AMARAL (1818-1907)**

Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio, was born into a *carioca* (native of Rio de Janeiro) family of civil servants on August 16, 1818. His father, Antônio José do Amaral, had been instrumental in the creation of the Royal Military Academy, in 1810, in Rio de Janeiro, when the Portuguese royal family lived in Brazil. Joaquim Tomás' brother, José Maria do Amaral, was a diplomat, as well as a journalist and poet. At age 22, Joaquim Tomás abandoned medical studies, to pursue a career in government service. In that capacity, he worked in a number of diplomatic missions abroad, including Sierra Leone, France, Great Britain and Belgium. An additional four years he spent in the Plata region was a real education in Brazilian diplomacy for him due to political fermentation in the area. Throughout his career, his accumulated experience, thoughts and knowledge were directed towards overcoming foreign relation challenges, including such diverse matters as dealing with the arrogance of

the British diplomatic representative in Rio de Janeiro, William Christie; instability in the Plata region; the Paraguayan War; and establishing the country's borders – all issues on which Brazil's peace and tranquility depended.

Amaral enjoyed great prestige within the political and diplomatic environment. He was awarded titles by both Brazil – including being named the first Viscount of Cabo Frio – and foreign nations, receiving honors from the governments of Belgium, Prussia, Spain, Italy, and China. The fact that his diplomatic career spanned the years of the Brazilian Empire *and* the First Republic attests to his competence, as recognized by such figures as Quintino Bocaiúva, the Republic's first foreign minister, and Floriano Peixoto, Brazil's second president.

Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio, died in his native Rio de Janeiro on January 17, 1907, at age 88, after having worked more than six decades in service to his country, during four of which he was the director-general of Brazil's foreign office.

JOAQUIM TOMÁS DO AMARAL, THE VISCOUNT OF CABO FRIO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRAZILIAN ADMINISTRATIVE THOUGHT

Amado Luiz Cervo

INTRODUCTION

Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio, was the director-general of the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs (which later became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) for over forty years: from 1865 until just before he died in 1907. He, consequently, continued to exercise this function despite the country's change of political regimes – from monarchy to republic – in 1889. One of the first questions a scholar may, therefore, ask is: How could the services of a senior government official have been requested by both an emperor, Pedro II, and those who overthrew him – the generals, Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca and Floriano Peixoto – plus four civilian presidents?

Specialized literature has produced controversial images of the Viscount. He has, for example, been called a “living archive,” in reference to his vast knowledge of Brazilian and foreign diplomatic documentation, which he believed to be essential to the instruction of informed decisions on matters dealing with the foreign relations

of his country. He has also, however, been called an introverted “bureaucrat,” with a short-sighted view of foreign policy – which presumably obstructed innovation in that field.

Our working hypothesis is that the Viscount of Cabo Frio supersedes these and other images that history has given him. He was a complex individual, and ultimately, an example of great devotion and effort in the exercise of public service. His main contribution to the evolution of Brazilian diplomatic thought was the development of the administrative workings of the nation’s foreign office; something we here call, his “administrative thought.”

Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, Brazil’s foreign minister, 1979 to 1985, has said: to avoid that “everything end in a small cup of coffee,” diplomatic negotiation must weigh the potential liabilities with the final results. While Joaquim Tomás do Amaral was the director-general of Brazil’s foreign ministry, his concern with diplomatic efficiency focused the work of that agency on the end results. Other renowned Brazilian diplomats of the Empire, predecessors of Cabo Frio, had established the foundation of the agency’s administrative procedures, but it was Amaral who had the merit to give those procedures permanent value; indeed, making them useful to any area of government administration.

In this chapter, we will first analyze the interpretations of the specialized literature concerning the thought and actions of Cabo Frio; next we will delve more deeply into the genesis and profile of his “administrative thought”; and finally, we will point out some of the benefits and risks of his way of thinking – and working – in the diplomatic arena. Studies concerned with Brazil’s foreign relations during the passage from the nineteenth to the twentieth century will be used to illuminate the context of Cabo Frio’s thought and to analyze its applicability. We will also analyze the diplomat’s own writings, to identify the essence of his thought. And to conclude,

we will join together both categories of sources in order to assess the benefits and the limits of his style of administrative thought, as it is applied to the conduct of Brazil's foreign affairs.

ASSESSMENTS OF CABO FRIO'S PERFORMANCE AND THOUGHT

With the exception of a short biographical essay published in 1903, by José Antônio d'Espinheiro, monographic studies of Cabo Frio are almost nonexistent. There are, however, insightful references of his performance as a diplomat inserted into the writings of such historians and political scientists as Sérgio Correa da Costa, Luís Viana Filho, Álvaro Lins, Pandiá Calógeras, Nícia Vilela Luz, Zairo Borges Cheibub, and Clodoaldo Bueno, among others. Most of these studies concentrate on the mature Cabo Frio, during the early years of the Brazilian Republic.

Sérgio Correa da Costa, for example, identified traces of Cabo Frio's thought based on empirical evidence he found in the huge amount of diplomatic documentation available to scholars. According to this diplomat and historian, one trait Cabo Frio brought to the Republic was an aversion to treaties, a trait that had been cultivated by his experiences in imperial diplomacy. One such example came out of his perceptions of the infamous independence-recognition treaties – which, along with Amaral, most Brazilian statesmen of the nineteenth century said restricted the decision-making autonomy of the government and hindered national development. Such thinking was reinforced after the fiasco of a border treaty with Argentina, signed by the Brazilian republic's first foreign minister, Quintino Bocaiúva. Similarly, a trade treaty with the United States hastily signed by the young republic, in 1891, also bolstered his beliefs on such matters.

Another concrete example of an aversion to treaties can be gleaned from a proposal made by Portugal during the time of the Count of Paço d'Arcos, the first Portuguese diplomat to the Brazilian republic, 1891-1893. Portugal had also sent a special envoy, Matoso dos Santos, to Rio de Janeiro, with a mission to negotiate a trade treaty, as Brazil had already signed the aforementioned one with the United States. Justo Leite Chermont, the second foreign minister of the Brazilian Republic, welcomed Matoso dos Santos and analyzed the proposal.

Leite Chermont was in favor of negotiation, but Cabo Frio – who had been kept on as the director-general – was suspicious of the agreement, and believed it more appropriate for Brazil to block it. This disagreement took place in the midst of instability in the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs – as indeed, from the Proclamation of the Republic, in 1889, to the beginning of the administration of the Baron of Rio Branco, in 1902, Brazil had no fewer than eleven foreign ministers. The ministers moved in and out so quickly, they often did not impose their will on the agency – nor on its director-general, Cabo Frio, who remained firm, feared and conservative. In many ways, he *was* the institution.

Correspondence of the Count of Paço d'Arcos reveals Cabo Frio as an individual with erudite qualities, yet also as someone who was very suspicious of other nations. He believed that many sought to deceive and exploit Brazil, and he included Portugal in this lot of deceivers, because in his mind that country still conceived of Brazil as its colony. Thus, Paço d'Arcos' correspondence shows that Amaral was against the trade treaty, as indeed, he was against almost all treaties, since Cabo Frio simply was suspicious of and distrusted all nations.

Accordingly, as the director-general of the foreign office, Cabo Frio blocked Leite Chermont's initiatives through the use of

bureaucratic tricks, and even sarcasm, which he employed during negotiations on the treaty. Although the treaty was signed, on January 14, 1892, under foreign minister Fernando Lobo Leite Pereira, due to the opposition of President Floriano Peixoto – or perhaps that of Cabo Frio, himself – the Brazilian parliament did not ratify it. In fact, they neither received nor examined the treaty. The matter was at a standstill when a second naval revolt broke out, in 1893, and due to the hostile environment, the Brazilian president did not believe his country should be bound by *any* treaty with *any* nation at that time. Cabo Frio and Floriano (the name by which Brazil's second president is universally known), thus, shared an aversion to treaties. This particular treaty eventually lost validity as the ratification period expired. Cabo Frio reported this to the Portuguese government with irony – without any formal refusal – and the treaty was dead (COSTA, 1979, p. 213-218).

Cabo Frio triumphed in the early Republic partly because of his conservatism, and partly due to these and other issues related to problems with treaties. For example, a border treaty with Argentina concerning “the Missions” region – that had been negotiated under Brazil's first president, Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca and signed on January 25, 1890, just over two months after the Republic had been declared – was badly received by a majority of Brazilian political figures of the time. In addition, the trade treaty with the United States, signed in 1891, sparked complaints, as France and Germany, along with Chile, were frustrated when proposals for trade treaties negotiated by *their* diplomats in Rio de Janeiro failed.

Thus, in the early years of the Republic, some traditions of Imperial diplomacy – including an aversion to treaties, a proud negotiating style, and an elegant manner of making deals – were maintained. Referring to a note of May 13, 1894, by which the Brazilian government broke diplomatic relations with Portugal

due to its stance on the naval revolt that had been put down in March of that year, the diplomat and historian Sérgio Correa da Costa said:

The note represents the best traditions of Imperial diplomacy built during the Republic and consolidated under the leadership and zeal of the Viscount of Cabo Frio. In short, it reflects the firm and patient personality of Marshal Floriano [Peixoto], as well as the archive of experience and knowledge of the old server of our diplomacy, [Joaquim Tomás do Amaral] (p. 71).

Correa da Costa, therefore, offers a clear interpretation of Cabo Frio's role as the real driver of diplomacy, which – with the exception of a few cases – was greater than that of the pageant of foreign ministers during the early years of the Republic.

Most biographers of the Baron of Rio Branco tend to provide an unflattering profile of Cabo Frio, including the fact that the patron of Brazilian diplomacy [Rio Branco] did not often appreciate him. According to Luís Viana Filho, for example, Rio Branco only tolerated Amaral due to his position as director-general of the foreign office. Alvaro Lins and Pandiá Calógeras agree with Viana Filho in that respect.

For his part, Lins derided Cabo Frio, considering him a “dominating and dry figure” with “absence of imagination and creativity.” He added that beginning in 1865, the Viscount ruled the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs as a bureaucrat, not even acknowledging the transition from monarchy to republic:

[Cabo Frio] represented the past and tradition, but a stagnant past, and a stagnant tradition. Since the beginning of the Republic, he had been the de facto minister, except for the periods of Quintino Bocaiúva and Carlos de Carvalho. Because of his knowledge of foreign

policy, and his continuity – ultimately for life – in the post of director-general, he created a situation of dominance within Itamaraty. He was the indispensable employee, the schoolmaster on whom the ministers relied, and to whom they eventually, almost completely, handed over the affairs of the ministry (LINS, 1996, p. 309).

João Pandiá Calógeras, a Brazilian historian and politician, was equally harsh on Cabo Frio. He accused him of ignoring any minister with ideas for new foreign policies, as he said the long-tenured director-general believed such ideas were nonsense. Although Cabo Frio also placed a value on competence, Pandiá says, he believed that tradition was most important; and he, therefore, used tradition as an almost exclusive source on which to make decisions and draft the opinions and procedures to be followed in the foreign office.

For his part, however, during his own decade-long tenure as the foreign minister (1902-1912), the Baron of Rio Branco wrote that Cabo Frio should stay in office until he died. Although they were not friends, the Baron, who was 26 years the Viscount's junior, feared antagonizing Amaral.

Rio Branco followed his own advice, as he kept the older diplomat in office until the year Cabo Frio died, 1807. He did, however, end the director-general's "functional dictatorship," by not giving him any of the powers of a minister, thereby breaking his role of "minister-without-a-ministry." In contrast, previous foreign ministers – many with ephemeral mandates and often no knowledge of diplomatic art – had allowed Amaral to be the *de facto* minister. In any event, throughout Cabo Frio's four decades as the ministry's director-general, his superiors often showered him with kindness, praises and honors – and gave him salary increases.

Alvaro Lins concludes his assessment of the relationship between Rio Branco and Cabo Frio during the former's long tenure as foreign minister:

Both spirits remained at Itamaraty: that of Rio Branco and that of Cabo Frio, that of the minister and that of the director-general. Rio Branco, with the projection of his domineering personality, had the style of a great diplomatic policy maker and the stature of a statesman; while Cabo Frio was the figure of an efficient bureaucrat, with both the rank and the regularity of character of an admirable employee (LINS, 1996, p. 312).

Indeed, when he accepted the position of foreign minister, in 1902, Rio Branco outlined modernizing reforms for Itamaraty, but he took care not to let Cabo Frio know that the proposals would be sent to the president. (He felt Cabo Frio would eventually find the appropriate way to accept the necessary reforms.) In this way, Rio Branco avoided repeating the mistake made by one of his predecessors, Inocêncio Serzedello Correa – who had been foreign minister for less than a year, in 1892. Then, Cabo Frio had found out about Serzedello Correa's proposals, and he boycotted them – with both ideological coherence and practical success.

Did the image that both Lins and Calógeras portrayed of the Viscount of Cabo Frio – of a dominant, introspective man, who lacked innovative thinking, a product of his time – correspond to reality? Most historians today do not believe this to be true; some earlier scholars, however, were less sure.

According to historian, Nícia Vilela Luz, the republican regime in Brazil brought encouragement to industrialists, who in turn, expected progress and support from it. Amaro Cavalcânti and (again) Serzedelo Correa, Brazilian politicians of the era, were confident representatives of that way of thinking. Cabo

Frio, himself, isolated as he was in his traditionalist bureaucracy, ignored such criticism. He was also unaware of the opposition of liberals, such as Joaquim Murtinho and Américo Werneck, to industries with exaggerated protectionism, which raised production costs. He acted as if the national formation owed nothing to the maintenance of primary economic structures or to the advancement of industrial modernization.

Among academic studies on Cabo Frio's performance, Clodoaldo Bueno, a modern analyst of Brazilian international relations during the advent of the Republic, does not think the Viscount stands out in the formulation of the new republic's foreign policy. He suggests that although the director-general was a man with a worldview, he was stuck in his belief in the traditions of Imperial diplomacy; he was an administrator without creativity, not an innovator.

A dissertation presented in 1984 by Zairo Borges Cheibub goes beyond the usual sporadic and conventional observations in that it places the position of the director-general within the institutionalization of the ministry and the perspective of the evolution of the diplomatic career. According to Cheibub, diplomats during the Empire were no different from other sectors of the administration: they were rarely professionalized and were considered property of the elites. Order was perpetuated in that way, especially considering the existence of a stable and homogeneous elite. The Brazilian state was truly an expression of that order since, unlike its neighbors, it boasted a continuity of policies and thought. At least some of that continuity was due to Cabo Frio.

On the matter of borders, for example, the rationality inherent in diplomatic action derived from the post of the director-general, which superseded even that of the foreign minister. After

Cabo Frio became the director-general, in 1865, and remained there until shortly before his death, in 1907 – he had more than sufficient time to imprint his personal mark on the position and on the agency. This mark we will call his *administrative thought*.

According to Cheibub, Cabo Frio's importance to the institutionalization of the diplomatic career is perceived in many ways, including: a) the maintenance of the diplomatic tradition; b) an extension of the Imperial tradition into the Republic; c) a stability that overlapped the changes of ministers; and d) the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not change as much as other sectors of the national administration at the advent of the Republic. Cabo Frio "represented the institution regarding the maintenance of rules, customs and traditional behaviors. Power and prestige were not based on the personal element, but rather on its symbols, which were represented by Imperial traditions." (CHEIBUB, 1984, p. 41).

Cheibub goes on to say that the Baron of Rio Branco both inherited and innovated in the foreign office; he modernized Itamaraty, and raised its prestige. He centralized the management around him, which generated an inevitable dispute with Cabo Frio and with section chiefs. He broke habits of reactionaries, and strengthened the minister's cabinet to the detriment of the structure of the ministry. According to Cheibub's severe judgment, Rio Branco weakened the institution and he strengthened the person. For that reason, he argues, only in 1931 was the function of Chief Secretariat-General – that of the current Secretary-General – created. (CHEIBUB, 1984, p. 42).

Cheibub concluded his study by establishing that: a) Itamaraty initially belonged to the elites, and it was only democratized after World War II with the creation of the Rio Branco Institute; b) that such an evolution did not prevent it from adapting its institutional

structure to various foreign policy needs – such as: instability in the Plata region; the definition of borders; foreign trade and foreign debt matters; and industrialization – especially when the impulse for that adaptation came from outside the institution; c) the diplomatic corps analyzed foreign policy, a noble and superior purpose in and of itself, and it could create special moments, such as when the nation's Independent Foreign Policy was developed; and d) it alone defined the country's foreign policy – not other ministries, universities, federations, or confederations.

To summarize Cheibub's analysis, we conclude that the administrative strengthening of Itamaraty underwent institutional continuity with Cabo Frio, as it also experienced an elevation in prestige despite a weakening of structure under Rio Branco. In addition, there has been a consolidation of the institutional balance since 1931 – when the current position of Secretary-General was created – and there has been a democratization and professionalization of the ministry since the creation of the Rio Branco Institute after World War II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE THOUGHT

The central argument of this chapter is that the development of administrative thought in Brazilian diplomacy was the work of Joaquim Tomás do Amaral; it is his personal legacy. The genesis of that administrative thought takes its strength from three mechanisms: Cabo Frio's instructions to the Council of State during the monarchy; his opinions written for the various ministers of the foreign office during his lengthy tenure as the director-general; and ultimately, dispatches he sent to the heads of overseas legations – which were sometimes simply signed by those heads and assumed to be their own.

In addition to these three main mechanisms that strengthened his thought on how administrative matters should be conducted at Itamaraty, Cabo Frio honed his mental maturity through an extensive correspondence maintained with great personalities of the time – both Brazilian and foreign – as evidenced by documents concerned with his missions in Brussels, Buenos Aires, London, the Plata region, and Montevideo. These are records of his participation in administrative and international matters.

When he wrote these texts, Cabo Frio used the collection of Itamaraty documents that had been established with zeal and institutional responsibility since the era of Brazilian independence and were enriched with sources that even predated that period. He considered these documents useful to diplomatic management, and he extracted from them facts concerning the country's insertion into the world, which he then used in his writings. Thus, Cabo Frio's administrative spirit gave more weight to the historical experience, as opposed to the critical or innovative side.

It should not be supposed, however, that Cabo Frio ignored the level above diplomatic action, the one that tames and guides it: foreign policy. He knew very well that it was foreign policy that provides diplomats with the correct content with which to negotiate; by furnishing the data and information on interests, values and behavioral standards upon which the needs and desires of the nation are based.

When one assesses the means, purposes and risks of a foreign policy decision – taking into account both its domestic and international impacts – the decision maker raises that policy to the highest degree of the strategy level corresponding to its international insertion. It is not realistic to suppose that Cabo Frio was endowed with all the features of a Brazilian foreign relations

strategist; he did, however, furnish the facts and data upon which those strategists could make informed decisions.

Since the time he took over the post of director-general, in 1865, Cabo Frio was requested to write routine instructions, granting requests from members of the Council of State. When we examine these instructions, in the *Consultas da Seção dos Negócios Estrangeiros*, which have been published, we notice that Cabo Frio frequently sent multidimensional instructions – ranging in length from just one page to full volumes – some of which have also been published.

The Council of State, which according to historian, José Honório Rodrigues, was the fifth power in the Imperial government – along with the emperor, the legislature, the judiciary, and the rather unique Brazilian entity of the moderator – was in charge of all the relevant matters of Brazilian foreign relations in the Empire. At the Emperor's request, this council of advisors issued instructions on decisions that it endorsed. The work of the writer of those instructions went to the heart of policy decisions. Cabo Frio knew that. In fact, in his writings he took advantage of the political environment that he understood and mastered.

For the purpose of empirical demonstration, let us analyze some aspects of Cabo Frio's actions, concerned with instructions he wrote on foreign policy matters. Our goal is to grasp his acquisition of administrative thought over time.

In July 1859 – six years before Joaquim Tomás do Amaral was the director-general of the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs – José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the most important statesman to lead the Brazilian Empire's foreign policy, requested Cabo Frio to write instructions concerning the neutrality of the Island of Martin Garcia, located at the mouth of the Plata River not far from Buenos Aires. The legal status of the island was crucial to the control the

estuary, and thus it was a very delicate security and geopolitical issue. While reserving to himself the operational decisions and a calculation of the risks, Paranhos asked Cabo Frio to send instructions to the commanding officer of the naval forces in the Plata region. Cabo Frio's function, as Paranhos understood it, was to make the commanding officer aware of the facts concerning the island's historical position as well as the negotiations going on between the regional governments.

A decade later, in 1869, the same Paranhos requested an opinion from Cabo Frio, by then the director-general of the foreign office, concerning a consular convention with Northern Germany and the Brazilian Empire. After he studied the Secretariat's papers, however, Cabo Frio did not see any link between the facts and the decision. The consular conventions, five in all, beginning with one with France, ruled on the rights of foreign residents. Cabo Frio wrote that they were serious matters, but he excused himself from giving an opinion, leaving that to higher levels of government.

Often, therefore, the director-general sent to the foreign affairs office of the Council of State sets of documents concerning a particular matter under examination, without providing any opinion, only verifying the authenticity of the documents with his usual signature: *According to the Baron de Cabo Frio*. Sometimes, however, he did offer his opinion in writing.

Again in 1869, for example, based on previous resolutions, which were pertinent or similar – precedents – the director-general considered it just, to charge a duty on goods that entered the country by land from Uruguay, as a similar fee was already being charged on goods that arrived via navigation. Besides, he added with his usual practical sense, it was useful to raise funds, to pay for the wages of the consuls.

Cabo Frio also gave his opinion on such matters as the naturalization of Moroccans who had returned to their country, i.e., should they remain under the tutelage of the Empire or should they now be subject to the Sultan of Morocco? And he expressed himself on requests made by foreign governments for the extradition of alleged criminals. In all such cases, prior to issuing his statements, he consulted the relevant diplomatic correspondence and legal basis of agreements, treaties, and additional terms and arrangements already existing in other legal texts.

Procuring and compiling documents, and later sending them to the Council of State without offering an opinion was the most common task of Cabo Frio's work as the director-general. Many state documents concerning such issues as border matters, reparation requests, guardianships, the presence of foreign companies in Brazil, and various other items, therefore, crossed over his desk. Although seemingly mundane, this work made him aware of the vast archive of documents present at Itamaraty and of their applicability and usefulness to diplomatic matters.

Cabo Frio did not always refuse to issue a written opinion on a matter debated in the Council; he even seemed to prefer to do so when the matter was relevant to foreign policy decisions. On those occasions, he provided details relevant to the facts of the issues at hand, using the vast amount of documentation that he handled each week, and he invested in the opinion a discernable common sense and political calculation. Such was the case of an opinion he sent concerning reparations resulting from the Paraguayan War. In this situation, Brazil, the victor, had every right to request reparations, as it is common throughout history to do so. On behalf of his country, therefore, Cabo Frio issued an opinion regarding reparations on January 15, 1875. The opinion was full of balance and common sense. It was a real lesson of political and diplomatic art.

The initial reparations requested of the Paraguayan government, a nation that at the time was both ruined and impoverished by Brazilians and foreigners residing in Brazil, were so high that they corresponded to the country's total annual income. Cabo Frio recognized the anguish of the Paraguayan government, as expressed in official documents, which he had in his hands, and he knew they were unable to pay the huge sum. He, therefore, issued an opinion, which said it was a bad deal to take the loser to ruin, and that it was desirable to reduce the requested sum – which, according to Cabo Frio's calculations, was as much as 10 million pesos, plus another 4 million pesos in interest.

The solution to the matter would come from a commission in charge of arbitrating the issue. Cabo Frio argued that the considerations of the Paraguayan government and its representative in Rio de Janeiro should be taken into account, along with those of the arbitration judges, whom he said had a sense of justice and fairness. In addition to providing the spirit that guided the decision, Cabo Frio revealed a full knowledge of the case under review, and he pointed to concrete ways of making the political decisions conform to the political spirit that suited them. He said that: a) the agreement should exempt interest payments; b) Paraguay should be allowed to pay in annual installments; c) the debt should be reduced; d) it should be received in insurance premiums; and e) reparations for damage to the public patrimony of Paraguay should be deleted.

Demonstrating the ability to supersede his role as a bureaucrat who only authenticated papers, Cabo Frio offered his advice to the council members through a draft treaty on the Paraguayan war debt based on the terms outlined above. As a result of his suggestions, the Council of State advised the Emperor: to reduce the debt to two million pesos, to reduce the interest charged, and to have the interest payments only begin in 1876.

Another important issue with which Cabo Frio diplomatically dealt provided a solution to a political situation involving the foreign section of the Council of State that had emanated from the Emperor's announcement of 1882. More specifically, the issue concerned a pending adjustment derived from the Convention of June 2, 1858, which had created a joint commission set up to hear and settle Anglo-Brazilian complaints during the time of slave trafficking. Many of the issues revolved around the repression of that trafficking by the British Navy. The Council of State sought instructions from the director-general of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Cabo Frio, who thereby signed two letters of advice, called *Informações*, addressed to the Council.

The first *Informação* was eighteen pages long. In it, Cabo Frio detailed such matters as: the work of the joint commission; notes written by the British representative in Rio de Janeiro, William Christie; interpretations of the respective governments concerning the Convention of 1858; opinions of the Council of State; the amount of requested compensation – challenged and recalculated – as well as changes made by the commission. Cabo Frio, however, revealed that all negotiations had been useless, as no understandings had been reached by February 14, 1880, the date he signed the document. The director-general then made the suggestion that the complaints of both governments be judged separately – and later that same year that is precisely what was done.

Despite being technical, inconclusive regarding the sovereign judgment of the Council of State, and very detailed – reproducing abundant quotes of diplomatic documents on both sides – the content of the *Informação* had led to a rational solution. Cabo Frio had been charged with writing about “the state of the matter,” and he had used his knowledge and skills to resolve the issue.

The second *Informação* – this one of nine printed pages – was signed two years later, on February 27, 1882. In it Cabo Frio summarized the “state of the matter” since 1880. He seemed, however, to lose his temper as a result of the interminable discussions of the Council of State, and the inability of both countries’ diplomatic corps, to reach a renewed decision. This impasse caused him to change the tone of his wording, as he became clearly opinionated. Thus, in this second document, Cabo Frio went further than he had in the first. He reproduced the bilateral conventions on slave trafficking and their historical settings since before the date of Brazilian independence, 1822. He also raised the issue of the *Aberdeen Bill* and its impact. He concluded by saying that there were undeniable abuses committed by the British Navy against Brazilian ships, violating the terms included in the agreement.

Unlike the first document, more than half of the text of Cabo Frio’s second *Informação* clearly spelled out his personal opinion. He was no longer merely the bureaucrat; rather, he had become the manager. He had condensed into his nine pages a detailed review of the relevant diplomatic history, the legislation, and a history of slave trafficking – and its repression – ending his instructions with enough information for the Council of State to make, at last, a conclusive decision.

Cabo Frio also dared to warn the Imperial government that if it continued to insist in lodging complaints, as it had done for several decades, the situation would be “difficult, if not impossible.” Without losing his respect for the Councilors, he wrote of his concern for diplomatic efficiency. Again, changing his role from bureaucrat to manager, he wrote: “there is another way, which might be feasible: to compromise.” One solution, he said, might be if each government removed their claims and indemnified their own subjects. The Brazilian costs, according to Cabo Frio’s

calculation, would reach 1,000 *contos* (a form of expressing Brazilian currency at the time; a *conto* being short for *conto de réis*, with one *conto* equivalent to 1000 *réis*). Such a compromise would avoid the creation of another joint committee, which had actually been considered. In Cabo Frio's opinion, however, it would fail just as the previous ones had failed, thereby extending the bureaucratized, useless and inconclusive diplomatic discussions.

Cabo Frio's thoughts were those of a manager concerned about the outcome of the diplomatic action when that diplomacy is extended indefinitely in sterile discussions – recorded in endless conventions, notes, correspondences, meetings, commissions, treaties and negotiations – without achieving an end result. In contrast, Cabo Frio's style of diplomacy – using administrative thought – induced a better way. It was a self-assessment of diplomatic action.

Cabo Frio presumably observed the need for efficient management in diplomacy during his experiences in Africa, in the Platine States, and in Belgium. His intervention, prone to results, was decisive to obtain, in 1863, the appraisal report that ended the Christie Affair. In short: diplomatic efficiency was what mattered to the director-general.

Another burning matter before the Council of State, on which Cabo Frio did not refuse to give a written opinion, concerned the unresolved border issue between Brazil and Argentina. This issue was addressed by instructions he sent to the foreign section of the Council for its session of January 29, 1884. Facing three alternatives – the appointment of a bilateral commission to study the proposal, the appointment of an arbitrator, or some combination of the two – Cabo Frio agreed with the proposal made by the Argentine minister in Rio de Janeiro: that it would be advisable to objectively study the commission's findings, and

offer them to the arbitrator as a basis for the judgment. This was another demonstration of the director-general's rationality and good administrative sense.

Cabo Frio dealt with the matter of borders with Argentina via both personal opinion and by compiling a huge documentary dossier on the subject. The written opinion, addressed to the Council, was included in the instructions mentioned above, and was inspired by an extensive survey of sources. The dossier, which was exhaustive in terms of documentation, was published in two tomes that same year, 1884.

Tome I of the dossier consisted of 138 pages; Tome II, 160. Together, they gathered diplomatic documents of both sides concerned with the arduous matter of boundaries between the two countries. They are an excellent compilation that was able to later instruct Rio Branco's defense before the eventual arbiter of the matter: U.S. president, Grover Cleveland, in 1895.

Cabo Frio, therefore, performed two routine tasks in his relation with the Council of State: he sent selected dossiers for the appropriate debate under analysis, and he wrote opinions based on the documentation included in the dossiers. As a result of his work, Amaral developed his knowledge of foreign policy, including its twists and turns. He, thereby, had an influence on the decisions made at the heights of power, as well as on the diplomatic actions that took place after the decisions were made. Diplomacy, therefore, is not just about public and notorious performances – the kinds easily conveyed in the press. Often, it is the logistical support rendered to the manager that is most important. As with the case of the borders between Brazil and Argentina, Cabo Frio rarely had an instruction or an opinion praised in public.

Cabo Frio's administrative thought was characterized by one key feature: a predisposition towards results. Diplomatic

negotiation can go on for an indefinite period of time; it should, however, be questioned if it seems like it is going to be endless. The travel, the commissions, the meetings, the stewardship, and the conversation between acquaintances or new companions – would all this without results be enough to satisfy the opinion of those who pay the expenses? These types of functional abuses were absent from Cabo Frio's administrative thinking. In their stead, thought and action, characteristics of an effective manager, were included.

LIMITS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE THOUGHT

A predisposition towards results does not seem enough to qualify administrative thought in an appropriate manner. Two examples will be helpful to determine the quality of Cabo Frio's administrative thought in the early stages of the Brazilian Republic.

The first example concerns a mission carried out by the initial envoy sent by Brazil to the Plata region, whose work led to the Treaty of Montevideo, on January 25, 1890. Negotiated and signed with the full support of republicanism – Brazil had finally become equal to the American states as far as its political regime was concerned – the Treaty divided the territory of Palmas in half, conforming to a proposal made by the Argentine foreign minister, Estanisláo Zeballos. The treaty, however, ignored the findings of lengthy bilateral negotiations; it also strangled the southern region of Brazil which, in turn, jeopardized the region's security and integrity. Ultimately, the treaty did not conform to the national interest, which caused the indignation of public opinion and, ultimately, rejection by the national Congress. The situation was then returned to that which existed prior to the Republic,

and the issue of borders between Brazil and Argentina was sent to arbitration.

In the second example, Rui Barbosa – a contemporary of Cabo Frio, who had organized much of the government during the early days of the Republic – had ideas to modernize the country. According to a study by diplomat and sociologist, Carlos Henrique Cardim, Barbosa's aspirations included a series of innovative goals and measures aimed at raising the middle class such that it would eventually replace the predominance of elites in Brazilian society – a major change from the structural backwardness and monarchical conservatism of the past.

Rui Barbosa's modernizing evolution would take place by means of:

- a) An appreciation of the State through both hierarchy and order, with its power centralized in the Union;
- b) The defense of individual freedoms by force of law and its application;
- c) The promotion of a decentralization of power; in a federalism without excesses;
- d) A struggle for rapid material progress;
- e) A diversification of the economy by industrialization, immigration and education;
- f) An effort to allow for social mobility and a preservation of the new *status* that is attained;
- g) A universalist view of the role of Brazil in the world; and
- h) An importance placed on the role of a good foreign perception of Brazil (Cardim, 2007, p. 21).

This set of ideas put forward by Rui Barbosa went unnoticed by Cabo Frio, who was incapable of thinking about innovation and progress as a basis for correcting archaic economic and social

structures. This fault revealed a second limitation to the director-general's style of administrative thought, namely, an inability at times to recognize reality. In other words, a predisposition towards results is not always sufficient to obtain success; an accurate perception of how those results fit into the nation's reality is also necessary.

Cabo Frio's personal level of alienation in the face of reality, therefore, did not allow him to operate amidst the three currents that competed for order in Brazil at the beginning of the Republic – which, according to a recent study by political historian Regina da Cunha Rocha, included: Jacobinism, as influenced by the French; liberal-federalism, of American influence; and positivism, inspired by Auguste Comte.

There was a need for an appreciation of the people, of their work, of entrepreneurship, and of social liberty. Why should one alienate oneself in the face of such matters? Why, for example, did Cabo Frio did not become a master to the lineage of diplomats on which the Republic relied at its beginning, figures such as Lauro Severiano Müller, Domício da Gama, Octávio Mangabeira, and even ushering in Oswaldo Aranha, Afonso Arinos, San Tiago Dantas, and Araújo Castro. Was it more comfortable for him to settle into conservatism and not think about reality, instead of reacting to the face of uncertainties and the effervescence of ideas that accompanied the implementation of the Republic?

The conservative current to which Cabo Frio's intellect belonged did not impose itself on the minds of his time; it did, however, lodge itself in the administrative environment. The overriding foreign policy objective for Amaral was the resolution of unresolved issues – not the projection of goals and strategy. To obtain "his" results, he was willing to accommodate, forget reason, and mock the innovator, as he had with Inocêncio Serzedelo Correa,

when the latter offered to inject the ideas of modernization and progress into the formulation of foreign policy.

Cabo Frio's style of administrative thought, however, was both operational and conceptual. In his mind, an appreciation for the past – tradition – advised an inspiration able to shake the indolence of reasoning. On an operational level, Cabo Frio's administrative thought, although conservative, did consider changes in the decision-making process of foreign policy. A proper reading of the national interest, for example, led him to overcome the model of international insertion designed at the time of the country's independence, which had promoted a dependency based on unequal treaties. The new decision-making process incorporated the criticism of the 1840's, including industrialist thought, into that model.

Other features were added to Cabo Frio's model over time: a decision-making autonomy, a zeal for security, as well as definite borders outlined with all of the country's neighbors, and a proud resistance to the massive claims of the great powers. Additionally, during the final decades of the monarchy changes in the foreign policy decision-making process were included to settle threats from neighbors, and to open the country to relationships with powers around the world, such as the United States, Russia, the European nations, Egypt, and China.

On a conceptual basis, showing maturity, Cabo Frio's administrative ideas added the best that had been displayed by the evolution of thought applied to foreign affairs during the nineteenth century. These additions included: a cautious cooperation when dealing with powerful nations; an indispensable decision-making autonomy; a regional geopolitical balance; and the insertion of economic liberalism, tamed by the national interests – all used to preserve and promote a rapprochement

between political thought and diplomatic action. The exponents of that evolution, who exhibited different strands that sought to dominate the decision-making process, were all figures of intellectual stature, politicians and diplomats – or sometimes both in the same person. At times they paid more attention to economic and commercial affairs, at other times more to security. Sometimes they were more regionally involved; desiring to resolve matters “in their neighborhood.” And sometimes they had a more universal view, and they were more interested in the world. Occasionally, they were brilliant – with the ability to embrace all aspects of foreign relations – such as the case of José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco.

The constellation of Brazilian diplomatic thinkers – whether or not they were members of the Council of State, members of the parliament or ministers – is long and illustrious. Included on this lengthy list are: José Bonifácio de Andrade e Silva, Raimundo José da Cunha Matos, Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, Diogo Antônio Feijó, José Clemente Pereira, Holanda Cavalcânti de Albuquerque, José Antônio Saraiva, Antonio Francisco de Paula, Francisco Gê Acaiaba de Montezuma, Francisco Carneiro de Campos, Pedro de Araújo Lima, Manoel Alves Branco, Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu, Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, Francisco de Sales Torres Homem, Irineu Evangelista de Sousa, Aureliano Tavares Bastos, João Lins Cansanção de Sinimbu, José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, Paulino José Soares de Sousa, Carlos Carneiro de Campos.

Some of those named above – especially a number of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs – elaborated a consistent administrative thought, based on the idea of nation building with an evolution of stages towards a maturity of the historical process.

Accommodated within the comfort of his style of low assertiveness or constructive liability, Cabo Frio skirted this lineage of diplomatic leaders. The Brazilian transition from monarchy to republic, which his long career at Itamaraty spanned, did not entail changing the paradigm of international insertion, nor the nineteenth century liberal/conservative model that lasted until 1930. Instead, it merely mirrored the changes of the ruling group, that is, the old Imperial aristocracy and the rise of new elites linked to the same social stratum of coffee planters and exporters.

Ensconced within his conservative way of thinking, Cabo Frio contributed to the adaptation of Brazil's foreign policy, to the interests of the new elites. In that context, he is at least partly responsible for the conservatism that was extended in the maintenance of the paradigm. A change of the paradigm would have required an awareness of four factors: the idea of nation building; a proper reading of the national interest in different stages of evolution; political elaboration resulting from both of these factors; and the ability to evaluate the results of strategic decisions, either past or planned.

Generally speaking, together with the new elites, who appropriated the State and submitted it to their group interests, Cabo Frio was not aware of the necessity of the paradigm shift. Indeed, the shift was in evidence in Brazil when the monarchy fell in 1889, and it would not be seen there until 1930. This flaw of the director-general, however, must not be ascribed only to Cabo Frio, as most of the renowned leaders of the time displayed similar imperfections.

CONCLUSION

Many early scholars of the diplomatic performance of Joaquim Tomás do Amaral, the Viscount of Cabo Frio, did not appreciate his work. He was seen as a conservative depositary of the traditions of Imperial diplomacy; someone who extended the hold of the past and obstructed change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This less than flattering assessment of his performance, however, was often tempered by a common recognition of his domination, in detail, of the diplomatic archives, and by the shrewdness and agility with which he gathered documents on any matter relevant to the intricacies of negotiation.

The current literature – scant as it is – does slightly more justice to specific features of Cabo Frio's performance. It praises not only his ability to assemble full documentary dossiers, but also how to analyze them, and know what to issue in instructions – and when to offer opinions and advice – to the Councilors of State during the monarchy, and to ministers, the heads of legations, and other authorities throughout his four-decades long tenure as the director-general of the foreign office. His contributions in this manner were an invaluable asset to the country's diplomatic efforts.

Most of the literature also does not clearly show the superior quality of Cabo Frio's performance that can be deduced from an analysis of the many documents that he, himself, wrote. Indeed, Cabo Frio created and expressed an administrative thought through his many writings, with a strong predisposition towards results as the main reason for diplomatic negotiation.

Cabo Frio was annoyed by endless and inconclusive negotiations, and by the abuses that he observed – supposedly in pursuit of diplomatic conquests; abuses considered by some

to be natural to diplomatic action. The efficiency of Cabo Frio's administrative thought was in stark contrast to these abuses.

Cabo Frio's work was guided by an ingrained conservatism, at times showing an ignorance of the way foreign policy was made. He also at times lacked an inability to see economic and social reality, especially those that suggested changes in the transition from the monarchy to the republic; and he had a general ignorance of the role of the external sector, to advance an archaic stage of the national formation toward a more modern one.

In short, Cabo Frio was a complex man. He has been described as an uncritical bureaucrat, who valued tradition over the more creative or innovative trends that may have sped the evolution toward the nation's maturity. Yet he was also a dedicated public servant who greatly cared about positive results in his work within the diplomatic arena of the nation he served for so many years.

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