The Road Ahead

The 21st-Century World Order in
the Eyes of Policy Planners

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation

The Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation – FUNAG, established in 1971, is a public foundation linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose goal is to provide civil society with information concerning the international scenario and aspects of the Brazilian diplomatic agenda. The Foundation’s mission is to foster awareness of the domestic public opinion with regard to international relations issues and Brazilian foreign policy.

FUNAG is headquartered in Brasília-DF, and has two units in its structure: the International Relations Research Institute – IPRI, and the Center for History and Diplomatic Documentation – CHDD, the latter is located in Rio de Janeiro.

Benoni Belli
Filipe Nasser

(Editors)

The Road Ahead

The 21st-Century World Order in
the Eyes of Policy Planners

2nd edition

Brasília – 2019

Copyright ©Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco H

Anexo II, Térreo, Sala 1

70170-900 Brasília-DF

Phone numbers: +55 (61) 2030-6033/6034

Fax: +55 (61) 2030-9125

Website: www.funag.gov.br

E-mail: funag@funag.gov.br

Editorial staff:

Eliane Miranda Paiva

André Luiz Ventura Ferreira

Gabriela Del Rio de Rezende

Luiz Antônio Gusmão

Graphic design and cover:

Varnei Rodrigues / Propagare Comercial Ltda.

First edition, 2018

The opinions expressed in this work are solely the authors’ personal views and do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Brazilian government’s foreign policy.

Dados Internacionais de Catalogação na Publicação (CIP)

_____________________________________________________________________________

R628 The road ahead: the 21st-Century world order in the eyes of policy planners / Benoni Belli, Filipe Nasser (editors). – 2. ed. – Brasília : FUNAG, 2019.

397 p. - (Coleção relações internacionais)

ISBN: 978-85-7631-815-6

1. Política externa. 2. Ordem econômica mundial. 3. Economia internacional. 4. Política internacional. 5. Globalização da economia. I. Belli, Benoni. II. Nasser, Filipe. III. Série.

CDD 338.91

_____________________________________________________________________________

Depósito legal na Fundação Biblioteca Nacional conforme Lei n° 10.994, de 14/12/2004.

Bibliotecária responsável: Kathryn Cardim Araujo, CRB-1/2952

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD

Aloysio Nunes Ferreira

PREFACE

Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima

TURKEY

AN ENTERPRISING AND HUMANITARIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Burak Akçapar

ITALY

A BRAVE NEW WORLD DISORDER

Armando Barucco

BRAZIL

COUPLING MULTIPOLARITY WITH MULTILATERALISM

Benoni Belli e Filipe Nasser

GERMANY

THE 21ST-CENTURY WORLD ORDER FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLICY PLANNERS

Ralf Beste e Axel Gugel

EUROPEAN UNION

PREPARING FOR PREDICTABLE UNPREDICTABILITY

Alfredo Conte e Julia de Clerck-Sachsse

CHILE

FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES 2030

M. Del Carmen Domínguez e Camila García

UNITED STATES

POLICY PLANNING IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

Brian Hook

SINGAPORE

THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Tommy Koh

SPAIN

The 21st-Century World Order: A Global Agenda

Ricardo López-Aranda

EGYPT

THE MODERN SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE
21ST CENTURY

Amal M. Mourad

MEXICO

MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY

Hector Ortega

PORTUGAL

PORTUGUESE FOREIGN POLICY

Pedro Sanchez da Costa Pereira

ARGENTINA

Argentina IN THE WORLD

Fulvio Pompeo

INDONESIA

THE NEW GLOBAL LANDSCAPE

Siswo Pramono

UNITED KINGDOM

THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE
21ST CENTURY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DIPLOMATIC PLANNERS

Liane Saunders

RUSSIA

MOVING TOWARDS A POLYCENTRIC WORLD

Oleg Stepanov

CHINA

STRENGTHENING THE REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

Sun Weidong

JAPAN

OVERVIEW OF JAPAN’S DIPLOMACY

Naoki Takahashi

FRANCE

POSSIBLE WORLDS

Justin Vaïsse

LIST OF AUTHORS

FOREWORD

Making Sense of the State of World Affairs

As we speed through a highway, our view reaches only a few hundred meters down the road, allowing us to anticipate at best our next move or the following one. Realizing what the road ahead looks like – and how to plan our actions accordingly – is a task made easier when the weather is clear and, as importantly, if we know exactly what the rules of the road are.

Unfortunately, these conditions are seldom present in the current international landscape. When the weather does not offer enough visibility for those travelling on the highway, it is often wise to pull aside, take a breather, and gather some clarity in order to avoid crashing against a wall.

Making sense of the current state of world affairs is an unavoidable, permanent task confronting policy-makers, pundits, journalists, and the citizenry at large. Since our day and time are particularly difficult to read, as currents events often point to opposite directions, we must sharpen our navigation instruments and fasten our seatbelt.

One such instrument is the kind of strategic planning put at the service of foreign ministries around the globe, what came to be known as policy planning. If one considers how ancient diplomacy is, systematic policy planning entrusted to a specific unit at foreign ministries – dating back only as far as the postwar period – is a relatively new instrument. But it is a valuable one if one wishes to walk on the world stage with a coherent and clear-sighted attitude.

Foreign troops clash in far-away lands, diplomats meet and negotiate constantly, businessmen trade and invest all across the globe, and politicians give speeches and make decisions in capitals North and South. Facts on the ground happen seemingly detached from one another and from broader global trends. It is the effort in policy and strategic planning that allows facts and figures to be bundled together and made sense of. It should also assist countries in navigating an intrinsically complex environment where nearly two hundred sovereign nations interact not only amongst themselves but also with a plethora of non-State actors.

Whereas scholars are charged with building theoretical approaches that are both coherent and intelligible, it is up to elected officials and diplomats to translate such intellectual frameworks into coherent foreign policy strategies that tie the national interests and values to the ebbs and flows of global affairs.

A conscientious foreign policy strategy stiches together several different actions: official visits, meetings, multilateral conferences, trade missions, embassies opened and managed, cables flowing to and fro, visas issued, hands shaken, pictures taken, press statements delivered, tweets posted.

Policy planners find themselves at the crossroads of the worlds of ideas and political action. Not being strictly academic, for they serve, first and foremost, their country, policy planners are somehow detached from the nitty-gritty of diplomatic routine. They face the difficult mission of interpreting fast-paced events in order to advise decision-makers on which route to charter in the murky waters of both present and future.

This book put together by Itamaraty’s Policy Planning Staff and published by the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation is both timely and important. It is also an exercise that has never been tried before. What it is set on doing is not only deciphering the thinking of policy planners based in various capitals the world around, but also amplifying their voice and allowing their unique points of view to be contrasted with one another.

Understanding the others’ rationale is key not only as a negotiating tool but also as a means to find convergence and compromise, especially in times when meaningful dialogue is being captured by cacophony. A moment in which – as stressed in the Brazilian chapter – diplomacy is regretfully in short supply. Trying to understand how others think and where they are coming from helps develop an attribute singular to great diplomats: empathy.

The Road Ahead. The 21st-Century World Order In the Eyes of Policy Planners brings together an impressive selection of officials from a truly global cohort of countries – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union – that gladly heeded to the invitation to take part in this effort of forward-looking and thoughtful reflection. All these countries (and, of course, the EU) share a longstanding tradition in policy planning and strategic thinking. I am thankful to each and every one of the authors for joining us and making this project come to fruition.

The result is a rich, colorful, multifaceted mosaic of perspectives that merit the attention of International Relations thinkers and foreign policy practitioners alike. The issues currently on the international agenda as well as the timeless questions of war and peace, disarmament and non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism, the liberalization of trade, regional integration, and democracy and human rights are seen from various angles through different sets of lenses, often-times complementing each other, at times showing opposite sides of the argument.

Hopefully, this pioneer exercise will also contribute to emphasize the critical role of diplomacy in tackling the most pressing issues facing the 21st century world order. It might even play a modest role in building understanding and empathy across countries, cutting through the cacophony, and turning the road ahead into a smoother and more pleasant ride.

Aloysio Nunes Ferreira

PREFACE

It is common knowledge that diplomacy has been a critical element in the making of Brazil, not only in its geographic dimension, but also throughout its history. Research, expertise and knowledge were necessary tools in this process. According to Brazilian thinker Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987), the ethos of the nation was organized and defined by the Baron of Rio Branco – the founding father of modern Brazilian diplomacy – while leading Itamaraty¹, which inspired the respect of our neighbors and other countries in the beginning of the 20th century. Alexandre de Gusmão (1695-1753), the patron of FUNAG, also contributed to that legacy. Brazil’s diplomatic traditions have shaped the way in which foreign policy was formulated and carried out to put the country ahead of its time².

Although the concept of planning is modern, in Brazil the idea could be associated with the decades of study in preparation for the negotiations of our borders during the Empire (1822-1889), followed up by Rio Branco in the waning of the Monarchy and the outset of the Republic. Those exercises of research and planning were of critical importance to preserve the integrity of a land with continental proportions, and peacefully settle Brazil’s territorial limits with ten neighboring countries among which three European powers. This represents an outstanding diplomatic feat and a major contribution to the rule of law and a culture of peace in international relations.

The Policy Planning Staff, as such, was first created in 1947 in the aftermath of the Second World War. The decision was made by the Secretary of State George Marshall to discharge Americans new international responsibilities in a bipolar world which included above all planning the future of Europe and the containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. One of the greatest American diplomats was then chosen to set up the office and head it, George F. Kennan, inaugurating not simply a bureaucracy, but rather one of the most critical structures to plan and develop policies, which would shape international relations in the 20th century under scholars such as Paul Nitze, Walt W. Rostow and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

At Itamaraty, only in the late fifties, inspired by the experience of other foreign services, a Policy Planning Staff was first established to assist the Foreign Minister in economic planning. Later, in the sixties, a new staff was created to carry out research and diplomatic planning in areas of strategic importance for the country. They included topics of global interest with the purpose of developing new thinking outside the traditionally geographic and functional areas directly responsible for them. Their research and planning capacity were being undermined by the daily bureaucratic burden.

In the seventies, following high-level exchanges with senior diplomats, Brazil started a more systematic cooperation with major powers through a series of Memoranda of Understanding on Diplomatic Consultation established with other Ministries of Foreign Affairs, such as the State Department, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Quai d’Orsay and the Auswärtiges Amt.

Generally, the planning process in foreign policy identifies the objectives to be achieved, formulates strategies to attain them, and, by assessing the means available, implements and monitors the measures taken. Policy planning is key to assess how to accomplish national goals with the means and power available. A country cannot just react to what happens abroad in a world increasingly interdependent and global. Research, exchange of ideas, information, and open debate are part of the process of foreign policy formulation and planning to safeguard and advance national interests. It also involves dialogue and exchanges with partners, like-minded countries, and allies.

As its predecessors, the Brazilian Secretariat of Diplomatic Planning (Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático – SPD) functions as a source of independent policy analysis and advice for the Foreign Minister. Its mission is to take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and present recommendations to the Minister. The mission of diplomatic planning has an anticipatory role in relation to the challenges to come, by reassessing initiatives and devising basic policies crucial to Brazilian foreign policy.

The institutional relation between SPD and FUNAG has been one of dialogue and cooperation. Both institutions contribute to public diplomacy. The role played by the latter as a think tank can be useful to the analysis and the systematic work of formulation and planning of the former. So it was not with surprise that in January 2018 I received Benoni Belli and Filipe Nasser, the editors of this book, to discuss their idea of inviting representatives of policy planning of key countries to write essays on how they see the world today.

Such an exercise would enable the participants to introduce the role of their respective institutions within the diplomatic bureaucracy and offer their own perspective on current and future international politics. The final goal was to edit those writings in a book, to be published by FUNAG. It is a groundbreaking initiative for the Foundation and it falls well within the purview of its editorial rules. This book promises to enhance the knowledge on diplomacy, foreign policy, and international relations. It also contributes to create greater awareness on the role of diplomacy in the shaping of the global agenda. It has the additional merit of promoting mutual knowledge and appreciation for the work of similar policy planning institutions in their interpretation of the world trends, challenges and opportunities.

SPD invited representatives of diplomatic policy planning from key countries and the European Union to engage in this pioneering exercise. Turkey, Italy, Germany, Chile, the United States of America, Singapore, Spain, Egypt, Mexico, Portugal, Argentina, Indonesia, United Kingdom, Russia, China, Japan, France, besides Brazil, prepared manuscripts to be included in this collection. Those essays represent a sample of different visions on how key countries assess international politics in this second quarter of the 21st century. They add scholarship, insights and transparency to the whole exercise. All chapters coincide in one aspect: a matter of concern with the uncertainties within a multipolar global system and the difficulties in building alternative scenarios in an ever-changing interconnected environment with different degrees of interdependence.

If there is a common prescription across the essays, it is the recognition that it is becoming more and more difficult for a single country, no matter how powerful, to shape globalization and face global transformations on its own. Such a trend recommends an unprecedented degree of international cooperation and greater awareness on the systemic risks for global governance and humankind as a whole. Yet the nature of the system does not make foreign policy either predictable or necessarily coherent. Furthermore, the sovereign decisions made by major players can be disruptive and generate instability and uncertainty.

The merit of this book lies exactly in the diversity of visions as well as in the questions it raises on the resilience of principles and values to build a common understanding on the challenges for the 21st century diplomacy. Readers will find an interesting and diverse analysis of current and future predicaments.

Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima

TURKEY

AN ENTERPRISING AND HUMANITARIAN FOREIGN POLICY³

Burak Akçapar

1. The Art and Science of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is formulated at the juncture of the global, regional, and national. It reflects the national political culture, political leadership, as added to existing national assets and attributes. It responds to the global and regional, and pursues a self -defined national interest. As well defined as national interests may be, the uncertainty and unpredictability intrinsic to world events poses an intricate dilemma to policy-making efforts. Nations have varying capacities and tools to help shape external conditions to limited degrees. Hypothetically speaking, advanced information gathering and analysis, coupled with capabilities to influence the international setting, may help narrow down margins of error and increase predictability.

Yet this has its limits. No nation has the capacity to steer all external and internal conditions and fulfil all its aspirations. Therefore, policy planners do not have the illusion that world affairs proceed at a preordained direction and content. Many of them apply scenarios-based thinking and trends analysis, rather than work on concrete, actionable roadmaps. At any rate, as essentially bureaucratic actors they do not make policy but rather assist the political leadership to pursue their objectives. For most policy planners work starts by identifying trends that have the possibility to endure beyond the immediate or short-term impact and suggest appropriate mental frames to help identify politically tenable courses of action over the long haul.

However, among the mayhem of daily chores does anyone have time and energy for speculative prose about events yet to occur? Or can a bureaucratic unit really add value to what can be purchased from the vast market of knowledge production? Can a policy planner be really useful?

The answer to these questions can be sought at the level of the choices of the political masters. Policy planning at the foreign ministries began in the United States with George Kennan who helped the United States formulate the policy of containment against the Soviet Union in the wake of World War II. Although Kennan’s association with Secretary Marshall is considered exemplary, perhaps an even tighter relationship existed between Henry Kissinger and his Policy Planning Director Winston Lord, who followed Kissinger from the National Security Council to the State Department. However, his case demonstrated that “For planners concerned with being effective, usefulness defines not so much what may be explored, but what is practical to present.”⁴

The Minister finds the work of the Policy Planners useful because it reflects the Minister’s (and President’s) criteria of relevance. This circumscribes the independent thinking of the very unit that is theoretically tasked to do just that in support of better policy. Yet, as Madar notes, “if, on the other hand, they are not involved at the top, they will have substantive independence, but no effectiveness.”⁵

A study of German policy planning shows similar challenges as do anecdotal evidence from almost every contact in the policy planning world.⁶ Ideally, between relevance and vision, the policy planner must find a way to choose not one or the other, but both. This may only be possible when the policy planner learns to live in two-time dimensions, namely today (but not necessarily this very “moment” as operational departments must do) and the not so distant speculative future and meet the political masters’ criteria of usefulness.

2. The Global Flux

Policy planning concerns prognostication of and intervention in events that did not yet occur. The past and present do not necessarily indicate the future. Cumulatively, foreign policy planning takes place in an ideational environment that recognizes that all three pillars of foreign policy, namely national, regional, and global interact and that there is a need to seek the optimum and not the ideal in policy choices and discourses all with regard to an uncertain future.

Given the uncertainty within the global system, mapping its evolution over the long run in an accurate and reliable way would be an overly ambitious goal probably for anyone. The United States may be better equipped than most in this regard, but its National Intelligence Council contends with providing scenarios in its open source global forecasts. It remains to be seen what artificial intelligence can bring to improve long-term visibility and predictability. However, irrespective of the likely inaccuracies of long-term projections, the “long-term global” is a layer that needs to be analysed and built into foreign policy planning exercises. This may be possible through building alternative scenarios or mind maps of likely developments.

I am of the view that political risk assessment approaches originating in business administration in many cases also serve a diplomatic policy planner rather well. At any rate, the policy planner needs to be literate in what the prolific knowledge market already provides. Analysis and scenario development in this context benefits from (and challenged by) a vast sector of inter-governmental and non-governmental, public or private, knowledge production institutions. These include various political risk assessment and management consultancies. Others that take a stab at building and disseminating such assessments and scenarios internationally comprise a wide variety – including scores of think tanks, political risk consultancies, investment banks, the World Economic Forum, the World Bank and UNDP, and, of course, NATO among many other examples.

Reading through the products of this industry of analyses, most seem to agree that there is a demographic shift in which the developing world is growing in population, whereas the developed world is shrinking; technological transformation is causing disruptive technologies to put pressure on labor markets; the proliferation of unaccountable and even unregulated social media and other sites on the cyberspace rather than promoting accuracy and mutual understanding is causing the spread of fake news and polarization; exclusionary and extremist tendencies and political polarization are on the rise as a global phenomenon, including in the developed world; international institutions are coming under increased criticism; terrorism and armed conflicts are directly targeting the peace and security of nations and testing the nation-States; great powers competition is stoking proxy wars; climate change and epidemics are having an impact on humanity, but the overall level of violence is at a historical low in most but not all of the world.

The global context has an impact on everyone but not always in the same way. There can be alternative descriptions of the global system with its challenges and opportunities for individual actors. Geographical location, relative size and power, political culture and aspirations, institutional engagements influence the way each actor perceives the international system. These may also distinguish how each actor may be impacted by the global context. Yet, in 2018 almost all analysts seem to agree that the international system is under immense pressure to stay relevant in today’s circumstances. This hastens the phenomenon of change and unpredictability in global affairs. Rapid change and unpredictability may be the overarching trend in global affairs.

Change is, in fact, ubiquitous and a permanent feature of life itself. Time does not stand still and even in the most seemingly stable of times, international system has always been, in fact, in motion. However, in our day change has been hastened because of a number of concomitant factors. One reason is the perceptions. The “feeling” of rapid change has set in among the practitioners, students and observers of international affairs. Secondly, the Industrial Revolution 4.0 is changing the fundamental basis of the developed economies, with the top five or more companies representing a different industry than what has been the case in the last century or so. Thirdly, the distribution of power among States has been shifting away from the dominant polities of the 19th and 20th centuries, although the jury is still out on that one. Fourthly, several companies are wealthier and perhaps more influential than a host of nation-States.

Last but not least, ideational underpinnings of the current international system, an idealized version of the domestic political system of the biggest power, are weakening. If there was a time when economic growth was relegated to a secondary position compared to liberal values, that time may have passed. The idea of security, stability, and fast economic growth is gaining on the idea of free will and individual rights and liberties. This is what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov probably has meant when he asserted in 2007 that “for the first time in the last decade and a half a real competitive environment has formed in the market place for ideas”, “particularly with regard to [value] systems and models of development.”⁷ On the other hand, the support for the idea of nationalism at the cost of breaking up existing nation-States and causing new cycles of violence in this age of post-decolonization is increasingly becoming marginal.

Cumulatively, these and other much talked about shifts are causing a quest for a new system. Unlike 19th and early 20th centuries, this time this search is not captured and grounded in formal ideologies. People know what they are against but hardly what they are for. There are no leaders in this global but fragmented and incoherent wave. Thus, a handful of strong leaders that defeat such fragmentation and curry staunch following are unusual and precious.

Defining and measuring change and predictability in the international system would make a separate article. Political scientists and economists tend to write different stories, but in many respects the current intensity of the quest for a new system is rare in history. This is not what John G. Ikenberry called a “dramatic moment of upheaval and change within the international system, when the old order has been destroyed by war and newly powerful States try to re-establish basic organizing rules and arrangements.”⁸ In modern history, 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, 1945, and 1989 are all examples to extraordinarily critical turning points where the victors acquired the opportunity to shape the new politics and set out the new rules and principles of international relations. Those were the periods when a new distribution of power emerged, and the leading or hegemonic States faced hard choices about how to use their newly acquired power – choices that ultimately shape the character of postwar international order.⁹

However, in our contemporary period the old order was not destroyed by war. In fact, it has not been destroyed, but is living and breathing with all its institutions still up and running. As concrete failures in real life mount, the faith in the system supported by the UN Security Council in peace matters, the Bretton Woods institutions in development matters, the WTO in trade matters, the United States in leadership matters, and the European Union in normative matters is eroding fast. All alliances, values, norms are subject to scrutiny if not hostile interrogation.

The emerging contender for the “biggest power” status appears to be China but the questions to the “old” international system are posed foremost by the incumbent biggest superpower itself, namely the United States. If nothing changes the current trajectory will make China the new comprehensive superpower and the US the old-timer. It remains to be seen, of course, how the US will act beyond the current leadership to reverse the trend and what steps the US could and would take to reaffirm its lead.

At any rate, most planners would follow how the rise and decline of major powers would take shape. There are debates and theses. One debate is whether the first and second largest economy would be able to avoid the Thucydides’ Trap, a war between an established dominant power and its main competitor.¹⁰ That war could of course be economic or cyber and as these lines were written skirmishes were reportedly already underway in trade and cyberspace.¹¹ The competition takes place erstwhile in the economic field powered by technology as “While about 20% of per-capita gross domestic product growth is driven by labor and capital, the remaining 80% is determined by how rapidly an economy is developing and applying new technology to increase production.”¹² There are a lot of known unknowns and unknown unknowns in the longer planning horizon.

The 2008 world financial crisis could perhaps be designated as a symbolic breaking point for the extant international system. The Industrial Revolution 4.0 with its gigantic strides towards a new economy prepares to exact new and as of yet unclear demands on how the globe is governed. The impact of greater gaps between the “haves” and “have nots” within and among nations is yet to be seen. The rise of Asia, including the rise of the problems and rivalries in Asia, is promising a tidal wave over and above other trends and uncertainties.

Henry Kissinger once argued that there were only two roads to stability: hegemony and equilibrium. There is no expectation for either and unless a semblance of equilibrium is attained, a long and winding road of further instability may be awaiting the world. Therefore, we are in most likelihood “in between” two global systems. Even if the old one has not yet died, its heir is already born, waiting for its time to come of age. I had argued in an earlier essay that the elements of the emerging world system might already be living alongside the elements of the current system.¹³

Instability in the international system is likely to endure for the foreseeable future because the old (senescent) system is no longer able to define, steer, and contain today’s international power relationships and the enthroning of a new (nascent) system will be long and probably painful in the making. Great power politics, power relations, proxy struggles, international institutions and multi-centric thinking will likely endure, and existing alliances will be tested. The temptation to act alone or in shifting alliances and live within variable institutional geometries could remain strong. The capabilities for self-help should be critical in this anarchic world.

Turkey aims to infuse a sense of direction, purpose, and dynamism to amend the global context by making use of several international platforms. In this regard, I would highlight a small set of key issues and initiatives carried out by Turkey. These include an effective fight against terrorism; UN Reform and strengthening of international institutions; peace policy entrepreneurship; humanitarian and development assistance; and G20 as a growing locus of international power.

2.1. The Fight against Terrorism

Countering terrorism is a vital necessity whose shortcomings at the global level create serious problems at the local level and vice-versa. As a crime and a scourge against humanity, terrorism poses a threat to the human, State, regional, and international systemic levels. While all States appear to agree that terrorism poses a major threat to international peace and security, transcending geography, faith and nations, they cannot agree on a universally accepted common definition of the term. On the darker side, terrorist organizations benefit from open or covert assistance from State and non-State actors. Advice on how to address the root causes of terrorism is copious, but the reality is that addressing the scourge of terrorism requires a multi-layered, multi-dimensional, prolific, consistent, patient, long-winded efforts at national and international levels.

Turkey has been facing a diversity of terrorist organizations pursuing different agendas. PKK and its numerous affiliates in Syria, Daesh, and Al Qaeda and similar terrorist groups, Fetullah Gülenist Terror Organization (FETÖ), as well as DHKP-C are among those terrorist organizations that threaten Turkey and her population centres. Turkey’s simultaneous fight against these organizations will continue with resolve. Turkey adopts a robust stance against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations with a view to leading by example. Her counter-terrorism efforts aim both at groups that directly target Turkey and any group which employs terrorism and poses a threat to the safety and security of humans anywhere.

The Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), was initiated by Turkey and the United States in 2011. Turkey co-chaired the GCTF over five years and the “Horn of Africa Working Group” set up within the GCTF, together with the EU until September 2017. Turkey also actively participates in the working groups within the framework of the Global Coalition Against Daesh, including “Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group” (co-led by Turkey) and “Counter-Finance Working Group.” International cooperation and multi-layered efforts are necessary to effectively confront this transnational threat.

2.2. UN Reform and Strengthening International Institutions

There is broad consensus that the United Nations needs to be reformed in order to function more effectively and tackle current challenges. Its working methods and procedures need to be reformed, particularly in areas of peace and security and sustainable development.

In this context, Turkey shows her support to reform efforts through her membership in the Geneva Group and has signed the Declaration of Support for UN Reform made at the 72nd General Assembly. The primary test of an international system and international organizations is their ability to prevent and resolve armed conflicts. Therefore, Turkey works with the United for Consensus group in order to reform the UN Security Council whose shortcomings in fulfilling its peace and security tasks have been striking. The global reality is captured in the maxim that “the world is larger than five.”¹⁴

When founding the UN the vision was to create an effective and functional organization to face peace and security problems, with the Security Council playing a central role. The UNSC reform should address the need to act more swiftly and resolutely in the face of increasing global challenges and become a more effective, democratic, representative, transparent and accountable Council. It is not clear how this can be attained by increasing the number of permanent members with veto powers, which would mean more vetoes and more stalemates. Turkey has advocated therefore the abolishment of permanent memberships and an increase in the number of the non-permanent memberships. Two-year terms could also be extended.

The UN is much more than the UNSC and the imperative of reform is broader. In this regard “as the first point of order, there must be a massive effort to upgrade the work of the UN, particularly in weaving together peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights. The emphasis should be on forging a humanitarian-development nexus. The UN can do more in that regard, and the first World Humanitarian Summit held last May in Istanbul was a good start.”¹⁵

The UN is a human achievement and we all have a stake in having it function effectively. The problems that haunt humanity cannot be resolved without effective international cooperation. The UN is also the pinnacle of multilateralism and must itself provide the best examples of effective multilateral solutions in peace and security issues, terrorism, growing inequality within and among countries, climate change and environmental destruction and many others. For the UN to function effectively, its organization must be efficient in the first place.

2.3. Peace Policy Entrepreneurship

Turkey’s activities in the field of mediation amount to a role as policy entrepreneur producing transformative influence both in policy and institutional terms. Into its eighth year, the processes established by Turkey in partnership with various actors including Finland and most recently the OIC General Secretariat have proven significant in shaping debates and policies. Turkey is not the only policy entrepreneur in the crowded field of conflict prevention and resolution. Nevertheless, Turkey’s mediation profile has already transformed the normative framework and geographical reach of mediation and diversified the small group of States that traditionally led the field.

In this regard, since the launch of the Mediation for Peace initiative by Turkey and Finland in 2010, there have been significant activity at the United Nations and regional organizations to promote the application of mediation to conflicts around the world. The UN General Assembly, the OSCE, and recently the Organization of Islamic Conference have set out to develop norms, procedures, and capacity in a bid to promote the use of mediation in resolving increasingly complex conflicts. The United Nations Group of Friends of Mediation, co-chaired by Turkey and Finland, includes 56 members, including 48 countries and eight regional and international organizations. The Group was instrumental in moving four ground-breaking resolutions through the UN General Assembly which contributed to the development of capacities and normative basis of mediation and its salience around the world. A similar group was also formed within the OSCE in March 2014. Building on the success of these initiatives, Turkey has taken the lead to develop mediation within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Accordingly, as the Chair of the OIC Summit and the Executive Committee, Turkey initiated the OIC member States Conferences on Mediation in Istanbul in November 2017. The first Conference was organized in collaboration with the OIC General Secretariat. This conference together with the Istanbul Conferences on Mediation helped form advance cognition and the epistemic basis of mediation in support of instilling a culture of prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts worldwide. The Conference of the Parliamentary Union of the OIC member States passed a resolution in January 2018 to commend these activities. Further institutional steps are being taken, including the launch of a dedicated mediation certificate programme by the Turkish Diplomatic Academy to serve the OIC membership and a task force on mediation within the OIC.

An earlier global initiative which could also be characterised as policy entrepreneurship has addressed various forms of discrimination and intolerance towards specific communities, which trigger the rise of marginalization and extremism. These include social exclusion, xenophobia, and animosity against Islam. These phenomena can only be addressed through effective international cooperation. With this understanding, Turkey and Spain initiated the “Alliance of Civilizations” in 2005, which became a UN initiative after its endorsement by the UN Secretary-General. In more than ten years of its existence, the Alliance has worked towards a more peaceful, more socially and culturally inclusive world by undertaking actions that promote understanding among peoples of different origins. The Alliance today is composed of 146 members, including UN member States and international organizations.

2.4. Humanitarian and Development Assistance

The global landscape of development and humanitarian assistance can no longer be imagined without the important contributions of several emerging donors like China, Turkey, India, Brazil, among others.

Turkey’s development and humanitarian official and non-official assistance reach more than 140 countries. The history of the Turkish development assistance efforts shows how quickly Turkey has transformed “from dwarf to giant” in international humanitarian assistance.¹⁶ The journey began during the Cold War in 1985 with an aid package for Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Niger, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somali, and Sudan (aka the Sahel countries) worth USD 10 million. The numbers jumped with the emergence of the newly independent States in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus in the 1990s. From 2003 onwards, the Middle East and Afghanistan started rising as a destination for Turkish assistance funds. While the bulk of Turkish assistance now goes to Syria, “the Syria crisis only accelerated a trend in Turkey’s rising humanitarian status that had been taking shape since the end of the Cold War”.¹⁷

A particular milestone was the extensive peace-building and nation-building programme that was launched in Somalia. The display of “virtuous power” through the visit in 2011 by the Prime Minister of Turkey, his spouse, and six cabinet ministers to Mogadishu, Somalia, which no major foreign leader visited in two decades was “the turning point in Turkey’s rise as a global humanitarian superpower”.¹⁸ The Turkish leader has been personally engaged in addressing natural and manmade disasters in the panoply of examples, be it in the earthquake in Pakistan and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2010, the typhoon in Philippines in 2013 be it the ongoing plight of the Rohingyas in Myanmar.

Turkey is the number one refugee receiving country and ranks among the most generous nations in the world. According to the 2018 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, Turkey ranks as the first largest donor country worldwide with 8.07 billion US dollars in humanitarian assistance. Turkey also ranks as the first in terms of the ratio of official humanitarian assistance to national income. Turkey’s efforts and indeed high profile in international humanitarianism won her the pride of hosting the first ever World Humanitarian Summit organized by the UN in Istanbul in May 2016.

The figures for Turkey’s aid programmes will likely move up or down over the course of the ensuing years as it did over the previous three decades. However, all other things being equal, there is sufficient reason to expect that both the public institutions and the civil society maintain their strong humanitarian emphasis in Turkey’s external relations over the long haul. In fact, humanitarianism forms a significant part of Turkey’s overall concept of “enterprising and humanitarian” foreign policy.

2.5. The G20 as a Growing Locus of International Power

The existing global institutions do not only include formal treaty-based organizations. Perhaps, the most promising of the nascent global institutions without a founding treaty is the G20, which represents the world’s leading economies.

The Group was established in 1999 with the purpose of promoting the integration of the major emerging economies into dialogue with the G7 countries comprising the most developed, namely the US, Germany, Japan, UK, France, Italy, and Canada. The G20 format thus includes the G7 countries, BRICS countries, MIKTA countries, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and the representative of the European Union.

Between 1999 and 2008, the G20 met annually at the level and within the mandate of the national finance ministers as well as central bank representatives. The group of the twenty top economies has been re-energized at the Heads of State and Government level by the US in November 2008 in order to create a broad global platform to tackle the financial crisis. The G20 did indeed make a good start in that regard when it pulled together USD 1 trillion in support of the IMF at its second Summit in London in April 2009.

I argued in 2009 that the G20 was the institution of the future and that “for the G20 to reach its full potential, it needed to be conceived not only as a financial gathering but as a global political -economic forum that supports minimum world order and helps harmonize national policies of the twenty leading powers in the world.”¹⁹ The meeting of Foreign Ministers held in 2012 under the Mexican presidency was important in that regard. Turkey has led the G20 in 2015 and continues to play an active role as the group consolidates its increasingly vital position among the future pillars of any future global system.

The checklist of global issues and forums is long, but one cannot conclude this section without underscoring the sustainability of the environment and development as well as the non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. These are critical issues that need constant attention at the global level. Turkey is a strong supporter of the United Nations’ Agenda 2030. This is true across the span of the 17 SDGs. In this regard, protection of the environment and tackling climate change also carry particular importance for Turkey as a country of the Mediterranean region, which is severely affected by the adverse impacts of climate change.

In another pillar, Turkey is party to all major international non-proliferation instruments and export control regimes, and wishes to see their effective implementation and further strengthening. On nuclear issues, Turkey regards the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which is a critical component of global peace.

In their totality, these initiatives and stances aim to strengthen the tenets of order and dynamics of positive evolution at the global level.

3. The Complex of Turkey’s Multiple Neighbourhoods

The fundamental and distinctive challenge of Turkish foreign policy is simultaneously managing a multiplicity of distinct strategic basins. This is not a consequence of policy but rather an imperative of geography. This sets Turkey apart from most other actors including those of comparable size.

In addition to the global context, the existence of “multiple neighbourhoods” around Turkey forces her to think in terms of what engineers call complex adaptive systems, where many parts interconnect in intricate ways (Joel Moses) and the “overall emergent behaviour is difficult to predict, even when subsystem behaviour is readily predictable”.²⁰ Local, or “regional” in Turkey’s case is not one nor two but a number of diverse localities. Every “region” is a political construct and there is still no single construction of a single concept of Turkey’s region although most of Turkey’s immediate neighbours, except Iran, including Turkey herself, was once united under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire.

In our era, the characteristics and dynamics of various neighbouring regions have diverged, leaving the Republic of Turkey as the only common denominator among this diversity. In this context, Turkey’s European region includes her EU and fellow NATO member neighbours in the West and other countries in the Balkans. Turkey’s Middle Eastern region includes Iran, Iraq, Syria as neighbours and the Gulf countries, as well as others all the way to Libya. Turkey’s Asian region includes southern Caucasus, Ukraine, Russia, and Central Asia.

This is the minimum conceptualization of the “regional” and could easily be expanded in all directions to Western Europe in one direction, to North Africa, even the Sahel, in the other and to Chinese borders in yet another. The Mediterranean by itself forms a multiregional subsystem. This is a neighbourhood that is also home to more than half of the world’s armed conflicts and human displacement. In fact, most international news headlines worldwide are almost dominated by events in that wider neighbourhood. Although these strategic basins have different dynamics, they are marked by the capacity for simultaneous albeit unconnected instabilities.

In other words, different regions, or in other words, the existence of multiple neighbourhoods, tend to exert simultaneous and largely autonomous pressures on Turkey’s overarching interest in maintaining security and stability in her surroundings that are conducive to her economic development. Planning foreign policy in such diversity and tumult is not a straightforward exercise.

3.1. The Middle East

The Middle East is a region where crisis management imposes itself as priority. This strategic basin is home to a number of concurrent wars and terrorist entities, as well as micro-nationalism, sectarianism, terrorism, competition among outside and local powers in the creation of spheres of influence, suspicions of shock doctrines and imperialisms, royal family feuds, various religious and other extremisms, economic underdevelopment, brain drain, weak institutions, poor governance, youth bulges, armed conflicts, massive humanitarian displacement, and man-made disasters.

Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and most other countries in the Middle East are confronted by domestic and transnational forces that threaten their survival. Syria alone accounts for most of the human loss, human displacement, terrorist activities, foreign terrorist fighter in-flows, and proxy fighting among rival regional and global players. The vulnerabilities of the nation-States in this region make them susceptible to all sorts of interventions by foreign countries and non-State actors. Turkey and the rest of Europe have been suffering from the problems of this region. Massive flows of migration, terrorist attacks, environmental degradation and disruptions in economic and commercial activities in the Middle East have been creating significant strain on Turkey and Europe. The chaos in the region also acts as an incubator of current and future threats against the United States.

Daesh (ISIS) and PKK/YPG are two terrorist organizations that have caused major damage to peace in this region. The two organizations converge on their raison d’être, which is destroying the existing nation-States and building their own State upon the territories they captured. Both aimed at establishing their terror corridors on the ruins of Iraq and Syria. Both have received external assistance. The United States has been providing weapons to the PKK/YPG and, in all likelihood, this could be remembered among the greatest policy errors on their part.

The policy of arming one terrorist group to fight against another may appear to be a plot from a very bad movie with a very low metascore. In reality, it is not that innocuous. If it had been left unchecked, this policy could have destroyed any chance for peace in the region. The folly of the poor choice of partners in the fight against Daesh was revealed very quickly.²¹ The US-armed YPG terrorists on the assumption that they would be necessary against Daesh. That assumption proved false. The Daesh has lost militarily thanks to the decisive action of the Iraqi military and a global coalition operating from Turkey with the US armed forces dealing only the final blow. The Turkish army became the first NATO army to directly confront Daesh and immediately shattered the aura of invincibility of Daesh by crushing the terrorist organization through Operation Euphrates Shield in Jarablus in 2016. Turkey also acted to eliminate another threat to regional peace by confronting the aggressive YPG terrorist build-up across its borders in Afrin through Operation Olive Branch in 2018. Cumulatively, Turkey’s hard power has stopped the territorial disintegration of two of its neighbours and put Syria and Iraq back on the map. Turkey has also reaffirmed a fundamental tenet of the fight against terrorism: one cannot and should not differentiate between so-called good and bad terrorists.

The ideology behind Daesh and similar terrorist groups will continue to lure recruits. Our cities will continue to be menaced by terrorists who would aim to forcefully disrupt our way of life and draw attention and support to their cause through violence. The fight will have to go on with particular emphasis on timely intelligence gathering and sharing along with measures to curb financial lifelines, radicalization and recruitment.

The negative trends in the region, such as micro-nationalism, sectarianism, poor governance, terrorism, economic woes, and others, cannot be rectified by arbitrary redrawing of the arbitrarily drawn borders. Nation-States must form the basis of any order and stability in the Middle East and safeguarding their territorial integrity must be the starting point.

Nowhere is this more relevant than in Iraq and Syria. In 2003, when the Turkish Policy Planning unit was asked to evaluate the regional dynamics and define an optimal endgame for the Middle East, my prognosis was that the existent status quo was untenable, and the region would likely implode under the weight of its poor governance, economics, and demographic challenges in addition to outside interventions that could destroy the traditional tenets of stability. Change – benign or otherwise – happens through disruptions. It may be that the pendulum is now swinging from destruction towards consolidation. Now that the formation of terror corridors across Iraq and Syria is being prevented, an opportunity for moving the region forward might be appearing.

Accordingly, if Iraq can be put back on its feet, this time as a peaceful, stable, prosperous State thriving under its extant constitutional order, it can complement Turkey as the critical pivot the region needs. Ultimately, from Iran to Israel, from Palestine to Morocco, the region that is labelled as the Middle East and North Africa needs a vision of peace. Tumult has reigned supreme since the Ottoman order was destroyed a century ago in what was then known as “A Peace to End All Peace.”²²

Recurring great power follies such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 or support to PKK/YPG and many others have made already difficult circumstances even worse. In the 21st century, the region must be able to benefit from the fact that it links two of the three centres of global economic power, namely Europe and Asia. It needs the logic of sustainable development and not geopolitics to hold sway. Europe in this regard must step in together with Turkey as a transformative economic and normative power. The US role would also be critical in this regard, including in convincing the Gulf countries as well as Egypt to play along. The first step would be to manage and resolve ongoing conflicts and sow the seeds of a new political process towards a regional stability and prosperity architecture inspired by both the Neighbours of Iraq process, which Turkey initiated before the 2003 war, and the Helsinki process in Europe.

3.2. Europe

Geographically, Ankara is closer to Vienna than it is to Baghdad, Damascus or Tehran. Istanbul is even closer; and two EU member countries, Greece and Bulgaria, directly border on Turkey. Irrespective of one’s ideological stance, the immutable fact is that Turkey is part and parcel of Europe, has been so, and will always be so. Turkey is a member of almost all European institutions – in fact, it is a founding member of the Council of Europe and many other European fora.

I once asked a group of thoughtful Europeans what really kept the EU away from admitting Turkey as a member. All converged on the point that Turkey is a genuinely large country with strong State traditions and a political culture that emphasized sovereignty. They disagreed among themselves when some of them argued that it was religion and so-called civilization. They disagreed because the greatest achievement of the European integration project was not the Steel and Coal Community or the European Parliament. It was instead the idea of unity in diversity, which has allowed, among other things, for people of different denominations to coexist. That same achievement should allow Muslims, Jews, other religionists and atheists to partake in the European project.

However, it is true that Europe is facing backslide in its hard-won achievements and Turkey is concerned about Europe’s direction. Millions of Turks live in various EU countries and the EU is Turkey’s main economic and defence partner, the latter due to NATO. There is rising xenophobia in Europe, including their violent manifestations. Anti-EU sentiments in the EU are rising. Populism has replaced strategic thinking and extremist political parties and movements are gaining strength. The centre, rather than standing its ground, is ceding ground to extremes by adopting their language and approaches.

This policy’s recklessness is revealed again and again in successive elections. European leaders and intellectuals must stand up, gather their courage and explain to their people the truth: that their prosperity and security owes a significant degree to Turkey as the easternmost European nation-State. Instead, European intelligentsias and political classes are betraying their people by either not taking time to understand and explain how a new Europe has been built since World War II, including by essential Turkish contributions, first by holding up dozens of Soviet divisions in the Southeast then by filtering myriad contemporary risks and threats before they could reach the EU. Turkish immigrant “workers” have already turned into local businesspeople, ministers, professors and white-collar workers.

Europe is living amidst an increasingly complex and challenging external neighbourhood. The Middle East and North Africa are replete with risks for Europe and two large geopolitical players are building up along Europe’s borders, one already having entered Europe economically. The EU matters not only because it is the second economy in the world, between the US and China.

As Europe is encircled by conflicts and instability, we have already seen their spill-over effects in Europe, as the alarming socio-political tendencies demonstrate. In view of these, we have no other choice but to join our forces. Turkey is doing more than her fair share in this respect, from stemming the flow of irregular migrants to preventing the Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) from travelling. By virtue of her geostrategic location, Turkey is the frontline country in Europe in forestalling challenges and responding to threats to Europe as a whole. Without all these efforts, Europe could not feel as safe.

Turkey is working with the EU in finding solutions to some pressing issues and challenges including energy, transport, irregular migration, security and counter-terrorism. The EU is important also because it has the opportunity to be a global normative power. The EU is already facing a major reduction due to Brexit, should that really occur as promised. Turkey and the EU must find a way to move forward towards Turkey’s membership. In addition, the Turkish economy continues to expand at an impressive pace; its growth rate of 7.4% in 2017 was higher than any G20 country. This is settling into a long-term trend. Turkey is, therefore, Europe’s most robust economy and most effective security provider.

Turkey’s membership in the EU would be to everyone’s benefit and the pace is controlled not by Turkey but by the EU. But let us set our optics right: without Turkey, Europe will be left exposed and vulnerable. It would also be susceptible to the manipulations of its individual members. In the economic sense, too, Turkey is an asset, thanks to an economy that is growing at levels that any European country would love to emulate. The idea that Turkey will be a burden to the EU is therefore incorrect. It should be appropriate to prepare our populations for the positive eventuality of Turkish membership rather than caving in to extremists that threaten to redefine the political centre in too many European countries. Protecting European democracy, peace, and prosperity will depend on how Europe tackles the drift to the extremes and Turkey is part of the solution.

In the big picture, Europe, including Turkey, has no option but to unite forces to integrate the Balkans into Europe, project prosperity and stability to the Middle East and North Africa, and forge connections deep into Asia. A common agenda exists to turn vulnerable polities into resilient ones that can ward off negative trends and cultivate positive ones within and around the EU. It is, however, nowhere certain that European publics, politics, and intelligentsia can take up such a globally strategic venture and this is a major dilemma for Turkey, which simply cannot do it alone. The big powers in Europe, including Turkey, must come together to think strategically and across institutional and jurisdictional silos.

3.3. Asia

The 21st century proceeds on the premise that this will be an Asian century. As axiomatic as that sounds its content is yet to be defined. Central and Western as well as Southern parts of Asia have serious infrastructure shortfalls and no strong dynamic to propel the region to the level of development attained in the East. The East is facing a build-up of geopolitical tensions and an arms race that could be hard to contain. The middle income trap is looming large over most of the continent. The evidence is not yet decisive to reassure us that the rise of Asia will be everyone’s rise and that it would be carefree.

However, there is room for great optimism as well. Facts do show that some 45% of world population and currently some 30% of global economy are based in Asia. Most importantly, much of the Eastern shores of the continent have been experiencing sustained rapid development in the last thirty years or so, thereby driving the global economic performance, as well. This has been taking place in the absence of a European or Transatlantic-style collective security arrangement or economic-political integration process.

The transformation of China has been particularly spectacular. Although it seems to be slowing before it has reached Turkey’s level of per capita income, in aggregate China is already the second national economy in the world. The argument that the Chinese success story would collapse due to the incongruence between its political and economic systems is less popular these days.²³ However, China’s external relations are becoming increasingly more difficult to manage as wary and even resentful regional neighbours are pulled in different directions.

Other nations in Asia-Pacific have also been developing quite impressively. Such dramatic transformation, caused by rapid economic growth and demographic concentration, is bound to affect the global system and have repercussions on regional affairs. As expected, geopolitical competitions and rivalries are heating up. The 1950 Korean War holds a significant place in Turkish military and diplomatic history and stands as a reminder that no region is really too far. There really is no justification for not giving Asia its due importance and forging strong links.

Turkey is well represented in the region. There is a Turkish Embassy in every ASEAN country. Strategic Partnerships have been formed with Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, and a Strategic Cooperation with China. Turkey has acceded to ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2010 and formed the Sectorial Dialogue Partnership in 2017. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Turkey has been a Dialogue Partner since 2012.

Turkey’s links in Central Asia and the Caucasus are even stronger and benefits from kinship ties. Turkey has made significant efforts to help consolidate the independence of the countries in these regions and has invested heavily in their prosperity. She has also provided for a Western outlet to hydrocarbon resources from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan.

The central landmass between China and Turkey now comes under the economic belt built by China as part of its Belt and Road initiative. Despite the initial scepticism, some of which persists to date, President Xi Jinping’s announcement in 2013 at a speech in Kazakhstan heralded the only big economic idea for Asia in this century. The Belt and Road initiative is short for the “Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” and will cover more than 60 countries between mainland China and Europe including Africa. Some 30% of the world’s GDP and 35% of world trade would be carried from a multiplicity of sea and railroad connections between two of the top three economic basins in the world. The project is hugely important not only because of the infrastructure that would be built on these lanes, but also because the free movement of economic goods would mean compatible national customs, markets, and policies.

The promise of the project is in its economic development and market integration aspects as well. This is a vision which neither the EU nor the US could muster. It is not that the US did not think this to be a goal, but its reach just fell short, probably due in part to bad policy investments made particularly in the Middle East. The initiative also means greater Chinese influence along the belt and the road and deep into Europe. The latter part and the prospect of sizeable debts to China seems to create concerns on the part of several countries. Promoting development in this region and at home is a strong priority for Turkey which has aligned her own middle transportation corridor through Central Asia and Turkey with the Belt in 2015. With the Belt and Road or without it, strengthening the resilience of the countries in Turkey’s neighbourhood, including in Asia, distinguishes itself as a multifaceted imperative and may open new vistas of cooperation with a multitude of partners and creating new fora in due course.

4. The Concept of Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy

The ability to comprehend and manage complexity has become the basic hallmark of foreign policy planning. Turkey’s response has been the development of the concept of “enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy.” Announced by the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu at the annual Ambassadors Conference in January 2017, the concept operationalizes President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s vision of a Turkey that maintains a robust economy, speaks up for the downtrodden in an unjust world and employs a mixture of hard and soft power to counteract dangers and threats.

Strategic values include foremost Turkey’s membership to NATO, strong and cooperative strategic relations with the United States, and her accession to the EU. The strategic thinking behind the concept of enterprising policy proceeds from the premise that, if left alone, the global and regional dynamics pose challenges to Turkey’s security and prosperity and tend towards deterioration. Therefore, Turkey needs to take initiative to stem negative trends and help correct the course.

It goes without saying that national interest is paramount. Nevertheless, Turkey defines her national interest as part of a larger whole in which the security, stability and prosperity of the neighbouring regions are tied with Turkey’s own. Turkey wants to grow safer, more secure and prosperous not in opposition to her neighbourhood but in the spirit of win-win.

Turkey’s domestic vision of a democratic, secular, social State governed by the rule of law, nurturing a G20 economy of a near trillion-dollar size and a formidable armed force supported by state of the art defence industry is both a source of stability and source for prosperity in her broad neighbourhood. Turkey’s own economic ascendancy can promote development and prosperity in the neighbourhood. However, the immediate crises and wars need to be managed and adverse dynamics contained.

This dialectic between Turkey and the complex of diverse regions surrounding Turkey creates the “regional imperative.”²⁴ Turkey is a multiregional power that needs to be vigilant in keeping watch on developments in multiple neighbourhoods and form tactical alliances with key stakeholders to help stem the negative fallout from instabilities, and even warfare in these regions and take initiative as necessary. This requires the employment of different forms of power – both soft and hard – in service of the goal of preventing, pre-empting, and addressing risks, threats and challenges. Turkey’s initiatives can help create conditions for peace and interconnected sustainable development in the surrounding regional complex.

This is a multifarious policy framework that does not question Turkey’s fundamental alliance with NATO and its course towards EU membership, which remain as strategic anchors to Turkey’s foreign policy. Fundamental alliances and friendships at the regional level including with Russia are recognized as part and parcel of this concept. A new component would be added to the regional dynamics through the Belt and Road initiative to which Turkey approaches from the vantage point of advantages and opportunities rather than risks.

The second and inseparable pillar of the foreign policy concept is the humanitarian approach, which encapsulates the philosophy that humans must be at the front and centre of all good policy. Foreign policy must reflect the culture of the Turkish people who have been bastions of moderation and co-existence reflected in the philosophies of Rumi, Hacı Bektaş-i Veli, Hacı Bayram Veli, and Yunus Emre.

A number of practical examples in Turkish foreign and security policy demonstrate the concept of enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy in action. On the humanitarian side, examples are aplenty. Turkey hosts 3.5 million Syrians under temporary protection and has become the most generous nation in terms of per capita expenditure on humanitarian assistance. She has taken steps to integrate Turkey into a global network of people-to-people connectivity. Some 54 Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers operate in 43 countries. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency TIKA took up development cooperation activities in 170 countries through its 58 Programme Coordination Offices located in 56 countries across five continents. More than 120,000 applicants from 172 countries sought scholarships to study in Turkey. African Ministers of Education have convened in Istanbul to discuss cooperation possibilities.

Turkey’s humanitarian foreign policy is carried out through the engagement of various ministries, agencies, mayoralties, institutes, as well as Turkish Airlines. Cumulatively, Turkey’s humanitarianism creates a global connectedness to reflect the love of humanity embedded in the culture and self-image of the Turkish people.

On the enterprising side, examples are also building up. For instance, Turkey’s diplomatic initiative that culminated in the establishment of the Astana Process in Syria between Turkey, Russia, and Iran aimed first to evacuate almost 50,000 civilians from the besieged city of Aleppo. Turkey used military power twice in Syria, first in Operation Euphrates Shield and then in Operation Olive Branch. These operations were conducted against two terrorist organizations – Daesh and PKK/YPG – above all as an act of self-defence. Together, these operations have also cleared roadblocks to peace created by the opponents of Syria’s unitary future. As Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu explained:

The massive PKK/YPG terrorist encampments across our borders served a double purpose. One was to open a supplementary front for PKK terrorist operations, in addition to the one in northern Iraq, and unite them to form a continuous terrorist belt. The weapons and military infrastructure we have seized in Afrin decisively prove this assessment. The second purpose of the terrorists’ encampments was to form territorial beach -heads for their own statelet to be built upon the carcasses of Syria and Iraq on the areas vacated by DAESH. Olive Branch stops the descent into a broader war and soaring terrorism that would engulf Europe and the United States. Instead, it opens an artery toward peace.²⁵

Utmost attention was given to avoiding human casualties and the results have set the Turkish operations apart from most all other military operations in the field. As these operations were underway, massive diplomatic activity was also ongoing, both in the Astana Process, together with Russia and Iran, and in the context of bringing vitality to the UN-led Geneva Process in a bid to promote a political solution to the Syrian war.

The enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy was also in action at Turkey’s policy entrepreneurship in the field of mediation as summarised above. Turkey took initiative to flesh out her mediation capacity at the OIC, which is host to over 60% of all conflicts in the world. Some 58% of refugees come from Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan alone. Turkey acted on the premise that conflicts are becoming increasingly complex and greater emphasis must be given to preventing and peacefully resolving conflicts including through wider employment of mediation. Yet another example was the emphasis given to inclusiveness during Turkey’s G20 presidency, which encouraged the G20 to address the inclusion of women and youth as well as least-developed countries in economic development.

In these and other examples, Turkey took initiative on critical issues and junctures rather than waiting for others to do so. It has rallied the international community or taken action herself.

The purpose in each time was not self-aggrandizement or power maximization in an old-fashioned way. Instead, Turkey’s purpose has been to promote an environment that is conducive to peace and development at home and abroad. That is the overarching strategic rationale of Turkish statecraft encapsulated by Atatürk’s enduring dictum: “Peace at Home, Peace in the World.” The present perfect of Turkey’s foreign policy should then be expected to shed sufficient light on its future under foreseeable circumstances.

ITALY

A BRAVE NEW WORLD DISORDER

AN ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE²⁶

Armando Barucco

Le cose del mondo sono sí varie e dependono da tanti accidenti, che difficilmente si può fare giudicio del futuro; e si vede per esperienzia che quasi sempre le conietture de’ savi sono fallace…di cosa nasce cosa.

Francesco Guicciardini,
Ricordi, 96

Prediction is very difficult about the future (and the present…)

Anonymous

1. Introduction

Policy planners are not fortune-tellers, necromancers, or, worst, professional forecasters. Nobody really knows how the world will look like in 2030, much less 2050.

Too many variables are at play, especially in a world more and more defined by connectivity and by the role of networks and flows. A world where the magnitude of shocks (political, economic, cultural, technological, etc.) is amplified by the very mechanisms of globalization.

The conventional wisdom of a true Renaissance man like Francesco Guicciardini²⁷ echoed five hundred years later in the words of Hannah Arendt:

Predictions of the future are never anything but projections of present automatic processes and procedures, that is, of occurrences that are likely to come to pass if men do not act and if nothing unexpected happens; every action, for better or worse, and every accident necessarily destroys the whole pattern in whose frame the prediction moves and where it finds its evidence.²⁸

Ignoring these warnings could prove to be a mortal sin.

Nevertheless, some megatrends have emerged in the past decades, which could help us understand how the future of the world could be shaped, and also which foreign policy is needed to build a peaceful, sustainable, and inclusive world order.

2. 12 Megatrends

2.1. Crises and Conflicts

In the past five years, war-related deaths have increased dramatically with casualties in Syria ranging from 400,000 to 500,000 and in Iraq around 100,000.29 By 2030, almost half of the global population will live in fragile situations or in areas affected by conflicts.³⁰ These conflicts will be caused mainly by intra-State tensions, including religious, ethnic, tribal grievances, and political and economic marginalization of some sectors of society.

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the most affected States will probably be Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia, as well as the Sahel region. In these States/areas, authorities lack full territorial control due to fragmentation and inter-ethnic/tribal conflicts; human trafficking and smuggling are widespread; people suffer from famine and epidemic outbreaks and are a victim of constant violations of basic human rights and suppression of fundamental freedoms is the rule.³¹ External powers and stakeholders could exacerbate these tensions – which could escalate in inter-State conflicts – in order to pursue their specific geopolitical and geo-economic interests.

2.2. Military Expenditures

Projections of military expenditure in 2045 suggest that while the US will continue to be the largest spender, China is expected to narrow the gap considerably, followed by Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United Kingdom.³² Also, most Middle Eastern countries currently engaged in – or close to – conflicts, such as Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran have (and will continue to have) very high levels of military expenditure relative to GDP.

2.3. Demography

The global population will reach almost ten billion people by 2050³³, fostered by demographic growth in India, Nigeria, Pakistan, the DRC, and Ethiopia. Africa has the world’s fastest growing population, and sub-Saharan Africa has the highest fertility rates on Earth: average rates are expected to remain high, at 3.1 children per woman in 2050.34 Therefore, Africa’s youth population is expected to more than double by that year. In 2015, 226 million people aged 15-24 lived in Africa, accounting for 19% of the global youth population. By 2030, it is projected that the number of youth in Africa will increase by 42%.³⁵

2.4. GDP Growth

According to economic projections, the global GDP will increase steadily in the next decades, reaching a total amount of $ 220 trillion in 2060.36 However, the gap between the largest economies (USA, China, and India) and the rest of the world might increase,³⁷ leading to even stronger economic inequalities between countries. According to estimations, there will be a shift in global economic power away from today’s leading economies in North America, Western Europe, and Japan over the next decades.

China has already overtaken the US to become the world’s largest economy in PPP terms, and is projected to surpass America in terms of GDP values by 2028. At the same time, India would be the second-largest economy in the world by 2050 in PPP terms, and emerging economies such as Brazil and Indonesia will be larger than Germany, the UK, and France in PPP terms by 2030.38 However, despite the overall growth, poorer countries are expected to lag behind: Africa sees steady but considerably slower growth than the rest of the world, with much lower levels of per capita GDP across the continent.³⁹

2.5. Inequality

Although we expect a fall in global inequality and a consequent decline in the Gini index,⁴⁰ inequality between countries and within countries will remain high. According to the United Nations HDI, income inequality has increased over time in several areas,⁴¹ and the gaps between rich and poor are growing all over the world, with global wealth remaining concentrated in the hands of 1% of the global population.⁴² While in 1980 in Western countries (EU and US) 1% of the population concentrated 10% of the wealth, this percentage has increased up to 12% in the EU and 20% in the US in 2017. Similar processes are taking place everywhere, especially in Africa, where the 10% of the population at the top of the economic ladder control the highest share of national income compared to the rest of the world.⁴³

2.6. Youth Unemployment

By 2030, global youth population is projected to grow by 7%, to nearly 1.3 billion. Africa has the largest “youth bulge” in the world. Countries witnessing rapid growth in numbers of youth are among those with very high youth unemployment rates, in particular Arab countries (with almost 30% of youth unemployed).⁴⁴ Almost half of the ten million graduates churned out of the over 668 universities in Africa yearly have serious difficulties in finding adequate jobs.⁴⁵

2.7. Migration

According to the most recent estimations by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), there are today 258 million international migrants around the world⁴⁶ – with Europe hosting 78 million of them⁴⁷ – and this number is projected to increase at a considerable rate⁴⁸ up to 405 million in 2050.

The IOM also forecasts up to one billion environmental migrants by 2050, moving either within their countries or across borders, on a permanent or temporary basis.⁴⁹ Without proper management and adequate public policies, these flows could be a source of instability and tensions both within hosting countries and among countries of origin, transit, and destination.

2.8. Technological Innovation

Artificial intelligence will influence almost half of the global economy.⁵⁰ As a consequence of automation, 47% of the working force risks being replaced by machines by 2040, resulting in an increase of global unemployment rates of up to 25% in 2050.51

2.9. Energy

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global energy needs will expand by 30% between today and 2040, fostered by population growth and increase in per capita GDP. However, even if the share of energy produced by renewable resources is projected to increase by 40%, fossil fuels will remain one of the main energy sources in the future, making energy security an increasingly sensitive element in international relations, and a source of further tensions among States.⁵²

2.10. Environment

If global CO2 levels continue to rise, the average temperature of the Earth’s lower atmosphere could rise more than 4oC by 2100.53 In addition to causing millions of premature deaths because of air pollution, climate change risks causing a number of environmental problems such as desertification, drought and decrease in soil humidity, as well as a dangerous increase in the sea level.

2.11. Water

Due to unchecked population growth, urbanization and industrialization, the world will face a 40% global water deficit by 2030.54 This deficit could affect half of the world’s population by 2050⁵⁵, with the most affected areas being North Africa and the Middle East.

2.12. Urbanization and Megacities

Urban population will reach 70% of the global population in 2050⁵⁶, with Africa leading the way as the world’s most rapidly urbanizing continent. However, cities and emerging mega-cities might not be able to keep up with the increasing demand for services and infrastructure, leaving a significant proportion of the urban population with no basic services⁵⁷ and increasing social tensions.

***

This particular selection of megatrends is, of course, highly disputable. However, they all point to what came to be known as the three “C”s in the long internal EU negotiations in 2015/16, which finally led to the EU Global Strategy⁵⁸, submitted in June 2016 by the H.R. Federica Mogherini to the European Council: a vision of the world as a more connected, contested, complex place.

They also point to several macro-themes that are essential to frame a sustainable foreign policy in our times. First of all, the importance of the internal/external nexus according to which the evolution of globalization and of the process of democratization (or “de-elitization”) of foreign policy requires a comprehensive vision in which internal policies should be framed taking into account external policies, and vice versa. This has substantial consequences in terms of content and process: the credibility of foreign policy and, in general, of the external action of a State or of an Organization is directly linked to its consistence in terms of internal policies (N. Tocci).⁵⁹

Secondly, the need to overhaul the values vs. interests dilemma that stands in the way of any contemporary foreign policy.

Finally, the emphasis on crisis and volatility, which has a special importance in the context of this analysis.

3. Theory vs practice?

The emphasis on connectivity, complexity, and volatility echoes very much the analysis of authors such as A.M. Slaughter⁶⁰, Parag Khanna⁶¹, as well as others who focus on a vision of the world order in which the role and influence of the State, and some of the main traits of classical sovereignty (defense and security, control of the borders, economic policies, etc.) are challenged by the combined action of globalization, technological innovation, and the increasing power of global links.

Transgovernmental and transnational networks play a major role in the vision according to which the relationships between States, societies, corporations, NGOs, and other non-State actors all concur to the proper functioning of the order (and of its tools, including foreign policy), and in which connectivity is the ultimate guarantor of systemic stability.

The same concept of hegemony is challenged by the vision of a “multiplex world order” where “crosscutting if not competing international orders and globalisms” can coexist and interact (Acharya⁶²). The structure of the international system is thus perceived to be more pluralistic, more transnational, while remaining mostly State-based. World politics is not only becoming increasingly multi-level, but also multi-nodal, whereby decisions are negotiated through structured points of access connecting dense webs of powers and politicking, as well as economic and social connections (Cerny⁶³).

The notion of a more contested world is directly linked to the events of the past seventeen years, especially in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, to the crisis in Ukraine, as well as to the situation in other areas of the planet, in particular Asia and Africa but also to a global shift of power in which new and/or re-emerging economic (and political) powers in Europe, Asia, and in the Americas are challenging the post-WWII equilibrium, and a new equilibrium is still “in fieri”.

Moreover, the “liberal order” created by the Euro-Atlantic area is also contested, not only by alternative world actors, but within the same Western political sphere. It is not just a vision of a “world in disarray” (Haas⁶⁴). But of a systemic re-balancing process in which the three elements of connectivity, complexity and conflict interact and influence each other to draw a picture of a new world order in transition with enormous challenges and opportunities.

Transition towards what? A new unipolar, or multipolar, or even a-polar G-Zero world order (Bremmer⁶⁵)? A neo-Westphalian world still centered on the quest for a new balance of power by States playing (or reasserting) their role as the dominant actors in the re-building of a “vintage” world order (Kissinger⁶⁶)? Or, expanding to popular culture, a world order in which multilateral organizations achieve the most sought-after objective of a United Nations Federation, both in its utopian and dystopian versions (Roddenberry vs. Dick)?

Or finally, and more to the point, a world order of States finding a new oligo-polar balance (also with non-State global actors), and readapting International Organizations and instruments to an environment redesigned by connectivity, networks, and technological innovation.

All these models (and many others) represent an intellectual challenge and a stimulus for the foreign policy community. However, beyond any theoretical model, our main concern, as the hybrid creatures policy planners tend to be – half practitioners and half theorists – should rest on how to contribute to shaping foreign policy in ways that, while defending our values and promoting our interests, also considers values and interests of others. Foreign policy also has to be flexible and versatile enough to adapt to ever mutating circumstances while maintaining its focus and effectiveness.

4. Some Key Concepts about Italian Foreign Policy

The Italian debate about national interests – which has taken place, in different forms, since the very aftermath of World War II – has been the expression of opposite ideological visions. In a country where the Cold War was fought for almost 50 years with effects still perceived in the political scene, this debate has been strongly influenced by domestic and international politics.

Following Joseph Nye’s classification⁶⁷, Italy’s essential interests (those on which the very survival of the nation depend) are historically determined by the process of the reconstruction of the State and by its international positioning in the aftermath of World War II; derive “naturally” of its geopolitical location at the center of the Mediterranean; are deeply rooted in the values that shape the overall identity of the country; and are a direct expression of its social and economic fabric.

For Italy – a founder of the European Union and NATO’s original member – the European project and the transatlantic relationship are two essential pillars of its foreign policy.

Italy is a power with a multilateral vocation, interested in the development of a “rules-based world order” centered on the United Nations system and built on fundamental rights and the rule of law, as an essential framework for guaranteeing stability and “peace and justice among nations.”⁶⁸

Italy is a regional power. The stability, security and prosperity of the “enlarged” neighborhood (Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa) represent a vital strategic interest for Italy, and are pre-conditions of its own stability, security, and prosperity.

Italy is an economic power with global projection interested in open markets based on a real “level playing field”. For a large manufacturing country like Italy, this condition is essential to ensure the competitiveness of our economic system, the protection of employment and the sustainability of our social model.

Italy is a “cultural” power lato sensu, relying on a “soft power” of global reach to which the political, economic, cultural, scientific, artistic, creative, historical dimensions contribute, multiplying the effectiveness of our action⁶⁹.

5. Crisis? What Crisis?

How Italian essential interests and priorities fit into the scenarios and models described in the previous pages?

As said before, Policy Planning has little or nothing to do with forecasting. We are not “haruspices”.⁷⁰ Italian diplomacy is marked by the “original sin” of an innate pragmatism grounded in our history and in a culture built through centuries of recurring crisis, but also through interaction with others and a geopolitical location in the middle of a sea which we still call “Mare Nostrum”, but which etymologically – also in the language of the other great travelers of the Middle Age, the Arabs – is the “sea of the middle.⁷¹

The key words for the coming years will be volatility and unpredictability. The key priority will be the ability to focus our foreign policy on lines and actions strengthening our (and our partners’) resilience to tackle volatility and/or to respond to chaos.

The response to volatility represents the starting point for a reflection on the future world order and the foreign policy we need to shape it. I will focus on the three crises which are affecting the three main orders in which Italian foreign policy acts: the European order, the “Global Mediterranean” (including Africa), and, finally, global governance.

6. The Reconstruction of the European Order

The recent signs of economic recovery should not result in excessive over-indulgence and self-complacency on our side. The European Union is going through one of the most difficult phases of its history. We live in a three-pronged crisis, both ideal and material: (1) the crisis of an economic and social model that no longer guarantees growth, employment and social security;
(2) the crisis of a security model which has to cope with internal/external threats on the same European territory; (3) the crisis of an open-society model, that is unable to respond with cohesion and solidarity to the emergency of migration.

On the background of these three crises, there is a fourth that binds them all: the crisis of the integration process, of the “reasons to stay together” in a Union of 28 (soon 27) countries that seems ever more divided between blocs of countries with diverging priorities and between transnational pro-European, sovereignty-based and/or apathetic public opinions.

The outcome of the British referendum has unlocked this looming “multi-crisis”. We are at a historical conjuncture in which the various dimensions of the European path are shaken from their very bases and require firm and shared responses. The EU is now faced with its biggest challenge yet, which is also an opportunity, perhaps unique, of a 360 degrees reflection on the future of European integration.

The Declaration adopted by 27 member States on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Treaties of Rome⁷² was a central moment in this reflection: not only must the Union face the multi-crisis and its side effects, but also the consequent threat of the rise of a populism that is challenging the main tenets of liberal democracies.

To tackle this unprecedented set of crises both at a global and European level – the 27 – while reaffirming the principles of cohesion and solidarity, sanctioned the possibility to proceed “at different paces and intensity where necessary” through forms of differentiated integration. This differentiation would be guided by functional and pragmatic needs, rather than the willingness to create closed clusters, composed of a limited number of member States.

Differentiated integration shall be based on a strategic and medium-long-term vision, but must also provide concrete/effective responses to the different crises. Enhanced cooperation must be inclusive and open in principle to all countries that want to join. The various crises mentioned above represent the areas on which Italy intends to promote enhanced cooperation among certain member States.

“In primis”, our focus must be on greater integration among the countries of the Eurozone (or, at least, among the like-minded). The road ahead consists of a mix of short, medium, and long-term measures, seeking to: foster growth and enhance the overall adjustment capacity of the economic system; and strengthen the convergence among national economies as well as the resilience of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to cope with potential new crises.

In this context, a fundamental issue is the role of fiscal policy as a tool for promoting growth and macroeconomic stabilization, contributing to the reduction of structural imbalances among euro-zone countries, also through the use of the tax lever for the promotion of public and private investment. It is necessary to foster a balanced (“growth-oriented”) interpretation of financial discipline, which should lead to the definition of growth-enhancing policies guaranteeing sustainable social protection.⁷³

The internal negotiations for the EU budget for the next few years – the Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027) – represent for Italy a major opportunity to pursue the priorities of the EU’s political and economic agenda and review its instruments. We are focusing our reflection on the concept of “European public good” – that is to say, the need to use EU resources where there are distortions in market dynamics that individual member States cannot cope with by themselves: integration of markets, material and immaterial interconnections, promotion of a model of sustainable growth, increase of social and territorial cohesion, border control, management of migration flows. The tools proposed to achieve these results are, “in primis” a greater flexibility and transparency, a genuine system of “own resources” (also through newly established “own resources”), and finally the creation of new tools and procedures for financing the schemes of differentiated integration that the member States will decide to implement.

The second sector for differentiated integration is common security and defense. In this respect, the basic objective remains the EU’s strategic autonomy, developed within the framework of a close EU-NATO relationship. The Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defense (PESCO), established in November 2017 with the participation of 25 of the 27 member States, is an example of functional integration. It is an inclusive, output-oriented, and legally binding defense cooperation framework, which has the goal of addressing the most serious challenges in the international arena, also through the steady increase of defense budgets in order to reach the agreed goals.

The need for security of European citizens must find an effective European response. We need to integrate the response to external crises and to the problems of internal security (in line with the EU Global strategy approach). In this context, a strengthened cooperation in the field of combating terrorism is of paramount importance.

Thirdly, with regard to the crisis of the model of an inclusive and open society, Europe needs to manage migration flows through a common European response, forward-looking, responsible, and humane. Migration flows are the main challenge for the next few decades, and it is, therefore, essential to define clear lines of action in the short, medium and long term.

In the short term, the proper management of migratory flows is key to tone down the widespread perception of insecurity among our citizens. This requires a common European approach to migration, both in terms of solidarity among the EU member States in the management of migrants reaching the European territory, and in terms of the Union’s cooperation with countries of origin and transit. In this respect, in 2016, Italy put forward the proposal for a “Migration compact” which has brought new impetus to European policies in particular towards African countries.

The pillars of our Migration compact are still valid. Migration should not be perceived as a threat, but rather as an opportunity. Structural economic migration is the real challenge in the medium/long term. Addressing this challenge requires a mix of policies, in which the management of the migratory phenomenon at the external borders of the EU and in the countries of origin and transit must be accompanied by decisive actions on its structural causes, through the promotion of socio-economic development and resilience, particularly in the African continent (also relying on circular migrations).⁷⁴

Finally, a European Union with differentiated levels of integration – in which the single market will, in any case, represent the main circle within which strengthened cooperation is to take shape – can restore the credibility of enlargement, perhaps the most effective instrument of our external action.

7. A New Order for the Global Mediterranean

The “Global Mediterranean” is a region that comprises today a vast area ranging from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, even Sub-Saharan Africa. In this macro-region, a series of historical processes are underway (migration, terrorism, crisis of some State systems, growth and transformation of the African continent, etc.). All these processes put the Mediterranean at the center of the globalized world.

Within this framework, some phenomena are interacting with different intensity: demographic growth; urbanization; the collapse of authority and of the traditional mechanisms of disputes resolution; the increase of inequalities between the elites and the rest of the population; the rise of a new middle class with increasing expectations and of newly educated, digitized, and connected generations; climate change and fragility; the affirmation of new values conveyed by globalization and social networks that clash with traditional society and new extremisms.

We are therefore witnessing a constant reshaping of the equilibrium in an unprecedented context of fluidity, which nurtures the more or less declared tensions among regional powers and the revisionist ambitions of other powers.

The Middle East and North Africa are an integral part of the “global Mediterranean”: the problems are common, the needs and expectations are similar. Three major cleavages persist in this region: (a) between authoritarian regimes and those who demand rights and modernization; (b) between Shiite and Sunni (and amongst Sunni) regimes, also in the form of clash for regional hegemony, with the confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia; (c) between the vast majority of Muslims (whether Sunni or Shia) and a jihadist minority. The role of regional powers such as Israel and Turkey and the renewed assertiveness of Russia add further complexity to this framework.

The long-lasting conflict in Syria and the fight against Daesh have deeply destabilized the region. The post-ISIS management of the Syrian-Iraqi crisis is bringing into light key issues for the equilibrium of the area (above all the Kurdish question), exacerbating the tensions among regional powers, as well as among global powers involved in the area, in particular the United States and Russia. The warning issued repeatedly by Pope Francis on the current “world war fought piecemeal” or a “third world war in pieces” cannot be ignored. The disorder that crosses our Southern neighborhood is an existential challenge for Italy and for the very future of Europe. The European Union is called to a decisive test, having to respond to these transformations in line with its values.

It is a primary interest of Italy that the European Union is able to play an autonomous and decisive role in these scenarios and that it expresses itself with a coherent strategy, which should, of course, consider the specific circumstances. A gradual disengagement of the United States from the region is a systemic risk, with further destabilizing consequences. Although the most immediate priority remains the final defeat of Daesh (and of its offspring) and the end of conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, we must imagine a new regional equilibrium, on which progress and prosperity can finally blossom.

Strengthening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Mediterranean countries is, therefore, a priority. Propping up the resilience of countries in the area responds to the need to contain the forces of disintegration and lay the foundations for a new security architecture. This requires the full involvement of the regional powers that must take responsibility for peace and stability in the area.

In the context of the “Global Mediterranean”, Italy and the European Union attach the greatest importance to the stabilization of Libya. The temporal horizon must necessarily be of medium to long term with a threefold directive: gradual reacquisition of control over the territory by the Government of National Agreement and the definitive defeat of Daesh; contrast of human trafficking; valorization of Libyan resources.

Italy has managed to maintain the cohesion of the international community through a relentless political-diplomatic action, ensuring the full involvement of all regional actors while avoiding external interferences to transform Libya into a battlefield between regional powers. The security component will undoubtedly remain a priority and it is crucial to ensure full compliance with the United Nations resolutions and the maximum support for the UNSG’s Special Representative, in the context of a situation that is gradually consolidating the conditions for the elections. The basic objective is a global plan for the socio-economic development of Libya and the reduction of the gaps between the different regions, which could valorize the country’s resources and exploits its potential as a hub for connecting Africa and Europe.

8. Africa as a Part of the Global Mediterranean

As part of a vision of the “Global Mediterranean”, the development of the African continent is one of the main challenges of the 21st century. Africa shares a large part of the structural problems of North Africa. The narrative on the “African Miracle” has suffered a setback; growth remains unbalanced and dependent on the demand for raw materials (and the fluctuations of relative prices). With few exceptions, the agricultural and manufacturing sectors represent a modest and steadily declining contribution to GDP.

The interdependence between the management of migration flows and development (the fight against “root causes”) represents the heart of the already mentioned Italian “Migration Compact” and points at a pragmatic and constructive strategic approach for the European Union’s action in the continent.

The initiatives of the “global” actors, and in particular of China, which is already developing very ambitious plans for infrastructural development and links with the large Asian markets, represent for Italy and Europe a challenge and an extraordinary opportunity to transform “the curse of resources” into a large process of correction of structural imbalances.

The promotion of public-private partnerships, which represents an instrument of risk-sharing between the public and private profit sectors, is now increasingly an essential tool for the revival of strategic investments in Africa. For this reason, Italy, as one of the main global investor in Africa – in addition to directly financing development cooperation projects – invests on the full involvement of the private sector, supporting companies that embrace a model of sustainable and responsible development.⁷⁵

The 2030 Agenda places the right emphasis on the challenges inherited by the 20th century for what seemed to be the “lost continent”, from respect for human rights and minorities to socio-economic resilience and the management of migrations. Only by tackling the deep roots of these imbalances, will it be able to achieve long-lasting progress. The very fight against terrorism, with its ramifications from the Horn of Africa to the Atlantic and Mediterranean shores of the continent, must be fought also with a vision of the future of the macro-Saharan region as a shared area of security and prosperity.

9. A Positive Agenda for the Global Mediterranean

Italy is promoting a positive agenda that wants to radically reverse the course of the recent past, drawing momentum from the prospects that the whole region offers. Tangible evidence of the Italian commitment are the presence of the second largest international military force (after the US) on the field in Iraq and Syria, the large-scale effort to stabilize Libya, as well as the Sahel, also through the approval of a new mission in Niger.⁷⁶

This comprehensive agenda aims at the stabilization of the entire region through a multidimensional strategy on four main layers: politics and security, economic and social development, management of migration flows, culture, and civil society. These challenges have been at the very center of the G7 Italian Presidency, our membership of the UN Security Council in 2017, and the current Presidency of OSCE (as well as of our Presidency of the OSCE Mediterranean Contact Group last year).

They are also at the basis of the ROME MED-Dialogues that have become in just three years the main international forum on the widest range of issues concerning the wider Mediterranean area and its bridging potential between Europe and Africa. All the elements of the Italian positive agenda may be found in a comprehensive report presented at Rome MED-Dialogues 2017.77

It is necessary to make the most of the extraordinary geo-strategic location of the Mediterranean basin and its southern coasts as a fundamental hub for trade in goods and services and for the circulation of ideas and people between the African continent, Europe, and the rest of the world. This also in the light of the doubling of the Suez Canal’s capacity and of the progress of the Belt and Road Initiative, which will have one of its poles in this basin.

A positive agenda for the global Mediterranean must be hinged on a strategic vision and complementary approaches aimed at strengthening the resilience of the institutions and of the socio-economic fabric of all the countries of the region.

At the socio-economic level, the creation of more solid and inclusive economic systems and the strengthening of socio-economic resilience is crucial. States of the region should be able to guarantee basic services to their citizens (healthcare, education, food security, etc.). Being aware that our stability and prosperity depends also on that of our neighboring countries, we want to contribute to the definition of a new pact for the future between these States and their citizens, drafting also from the experience and success of the European social model. In this respect a more analytical standard should be that of human security. In contemporary societies, security should be referred not only to States, but also to people. Insecurity may be produced by factors such as sudden loss of guaranteed access to jobs, the absence of healthcare, insufficient levels of social welfare, and the lack of education.⁷⁸

Moreover, it is important to concentrate investments in public and private strategic fields (infrastructures, industrialization, education, research, etc.), prioritizing the cultural and environmental endowments, promoting widespread small-medium entrepreneurship, and improving access of SMEs to international markets, fostering regional integration processes. In the meantime, on a more global level, it is important to channel the penetration of external actors (China and other emerging economies) within shared and responsible strategies and increase the attention towards environmental and social sustainability as well as inequalities. All local development processes must in any case promote ownership of various regional actors, involving institutions, civil society, NGOs and media, and foster youth and women empowerment.

The implementation of this agenda requires the cooperation and support of the international community as a whole, which must mobilize adequate financial resources while being aware that the future of the enlarged Mediterranean is a challenge of global interest.

The various ongoing and future cooperation and assistance initiatives must, therefore, be coordinated within a framework of a more coherent and ambitious socio-economic development strategy. In this context, a fundamental element could be the creation of a Bank for the development of the global Mediterranean, also as a pivotal institution for the development of the area and partner of all other global investors, in particular from the Gulf and from China.

10. Global Governance 2030

Systemic interdependence is a fact. Any issue – sustainable development, migration, combating climate change, management of resources, etc. – can be dealt with only on the basis of shared rules and responsibilities.

Italy wants to contribute to the creation of a new, more resilient, representative and legitimate world order based on common and shared institutions and rules. This is the basic vision of the 2030 Agenda, which commits all countries to work jointly and intensify efforts to share prosperity, strengthen people’s livelihoods, secure peace, and protect the planet for the benefit of the current and future generations.

The development of a global framework to properly manage migration flows, in the pursuit of target 10.7 of the 2030 Agenda, is one of Italy’s main priorities. We have been one of the main supporters of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants⁷⁹, and we are playing an active role in the elaboration of the 2018 Global Compact for a safe, orderly and regular migration.

In order to improve migration governance, we need to shift the focus from emergency to a comprehensive and long-term approach, turning massive irregular flows into predictable and manageable migration channels. In our view, the Global Compact should confirm that safely, orderly, and regularly managed migration can work for all and bring benefits to States of origin, transit, and destination as well as to their populations.

Accordingly, sustainable solutions to major global issues are only achievable through a renewed commitment by all international players to multilateralism as confirmed by the outcome of COP21, which led to the Paris Agreement, adopting an innovative working method open to instances not only of States, but of the most qualified expressions of civil society.

Similar efforts are needed to revive the other major negotiations in progress starting with those in the WTO context. Global competition, however, postulates transparency and real opening of economic systems – on a true and not apparent “level playing field” – as pre-conditions for sustainable socio-economic development. The most difficult, but also more promising, challenge of globalization concerns the creation of a shared set of rules that will amplify the benefits of open markets, without multiplying the distorting effects produced by different national standards, for instance on social security, environment protection, freedom of association, role of the State in the economy. This is essential for countries such as Italy with a strong manufacturing vocation, whose opening to the international markets requires not only the constant updating of its production system but also common rules that do not distort competition with forms of social dumping and other factors.

But there is also a new future global agenda “in fieri” which relates to the growing inequality in our society, to the new technological revolution already happening with artificial intelligence and automation, to freedom of internet and the right to privacy, to cyber-security⁸⁰ and to the regulation of media and information/disinformation in the cyberspace (also in the realm of cyber-enabled information warfare). The way we will address these issues will shape the future world order. Italy, the EU, and its allies and partners need to lead this process in line with our values and commitment to multilateralism through an inclusive dialogue with all players.

The success of 21st century multilateralism will be measured by our ability to involve new actors (States and non-States) in the setting and implementation of these agendas. Inaction would increase the risks of systemic imbalances and frictions would grow exponentially. It is unrealistic to imagine that our demand for more accountability and a stronger sense of responsibility in addressing collective global challenges will be met by emerging global economies without redefining the governance of major multilateral forums.

In order to be more effective, the multilateral system must become more accountable, inclusive, transparent, and representative.⁸¹ We must thus involve all new global actors on the world stage in a structured and constructive dialogue, which ensures the implementation of wider multilateral views and the completion of the ongoing negotiations, and contributes to the definition of a new multilateral SDG-oriented agenda. Once again, the promotion of a genuine level playing field with regard to the level of openness and transparency of economic systems is an essential element of this process. But it is also crucial to have an ambitious vision on the implementation of the SDGs, nurturing issues like respect for human rights and minorities and socio-economic resilience; and to facilitate the action of forums such as G7 and G20 for greater accountability of their members towards a more integrated and shared approach to global challenges.

11. Crisis? What crisis? This Time is for Real

Let us spend a few final words on crisis prevention and management, considering that the proliferation of crises all around the world is also related to the ongoing unpredictability of the process of redefinition of global governance.

Diplomacy performs its most noble function in maintaining peace and in safeguarding human lives. Prevention, resolution and crisis management, post-conflict reconstruction, and reconciliation processes are essential components of a contemporary foreign policy based on values and on the national interest (in its most noble interpretation), and projected towards the future.

Over the last 30 years, Italy has developed its own model of “governance” based on different factors and principles.

Firstly, the quality of the so-called “situational awareness”, i.e. the ability to intercept and interpret the signals/indicators on the field, pointing at potentially destabilizing situations and conditions of the fragility of the institutions and society.

Secondly, the crucial importance of social and economic resilience, which requires a deep analysis and understanding of the so-called “root causes”, those structural components of the political, economic, and social systems potentially at risk, among others: underdevelopment and economic inequalities; lack or dysfunctions in provision of basic services; unemployment, in particular youth unemployment; political, economic and social marginalization of groups on an ethnic, tribal, religious basis.

Thirdly, dialogue and inclusiveness as key instruments to rebuild peace and stability, i.e.: the key role of preventive diplomacy in a multilateral framework; the relentless search for a political solution because the military option, even when necessary, is never decisive; the involvement of the most relevant regional actors; attention to the positive role of women and traditional “leadership”, especially religious.

Finally, the need to develop a “comprehensive” civil-military-socio-economic-cultural approach, which requires, inter alia: investment in “institution building”, including the judicial system and security forces; strengthening of socio-economic resilience; promotion of multi-cultural dialogue; combating corruption and all form of patronage; protecting minorities and most vulnerable groups particularly women and children; protection of cultural heritage.

12. Conclusion

The foreign policy of a responsible international actor could be described as a river flowing regularly, with no floods or droughts. In the words of the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, addressing the Diplomatic Corps on December 15, 2017:

Italy reaffirms its characteristic positions at international level, which are rooted in its Constitution (…) In compliance with Art. 11 of our Constitution, we are committed to fostering the international organizations which aim to favor a legal order capable of assuring peace and justice among nations and, therefore, we are convinced that only an effective multilateralism, based on dialogue and mutual understanding, is capable of managing an interconnected reality.

The Italian Republic believes that foreign policy cannot draw inspiration from the arid logic of a zero-sum between the contrasting interests of different Countries, but rather the instrument with which to build increasingly common and mutually convenient spaces between peoples, an exercise in which it may be possible to build respect for the coexistence of interests, values, and aspirations of the different parties involved”.

The axes we just described – through the conceptual framework of the response to volatility – correspond to the priorities of Italian Foreign Policy after WWII: European Integration and Transatlantic Partnership, the Enlarged Mediterranean and Africa, Multilateralism and the commitment to the liberal world order.

The issue of partnerships and alliances to implement this agenda (within the EU, the UN, or other multilateral fora, globally) is part of a broader vision in which the fundamental choices of Italy’s foreign policy – NATO membership, commitment to European integration, accession to the United Nations, support for a “rules-based liberal world order” – are now part of our international “material Constitution”. They correspond to the essential interests of Italy (and Europe), and because they are anchored in our values system, are part of the DNA of Italian diplomacy.

There is no contradiction between these fundamental choices and a more assertive and autonomous political-diplomatic action – including through systems of variable-geometry alliances/coalitions – for the promotion of our national interests. This is also the case when such interests are not shared by other partners and/or are not in line with the prevailing position within the European Union or other multilateral fora.

We owe our allies and partners respect, loyalty and solidarity, according to the spirit and the nature of our obligations. But, in an age increasingly marked by unprecedented polarization and sectarianism, we owe them first of all intellectual honesty in seeing reality as it is, speaking with frankness and telling uncomfortable truths when we disagree on some issues. When we did so we were often proven right.⁸²

The underlying reasons of our action will of course correspond to the essential interests already described and, above all, should always be framed in tactical/strategic terms through: a “collective” and pragmatic formulation, able to promote sustainable alliances and coalitions; as well as a global view of the issues at stake.

A few analysts (not only at home) sometimes misinterpret Italian foreign policy as naïve. Italian foreign policy has never been naïve. And it has never considered that support to European Integration and/or to multilateralism constitutes by itself the fundamental instrument to promote national interests. True naïveté lies in a monolithic view of foreign policy based solely on conflict and the struggle for political, economic, or even cultural supremacy; and in which one aspect of foreign policy, for instance security or trade promotion, becomes the only lens through which one looks at the world.

Liberal democracies are shaken all over the world, especially in Europe and in the US, by waves of criticism for their real or perceived inability to respond to the expectations and fears of citizens for their future and the future of their children. Contemporary liberal elites (in particular of the progressive kind) are under attack for their unwillingness or inability to adapt their proposals and their language to the new environment created by the explosion of digital information and social media. Digitized direct democracy and disintermediation are not only challenging our system of political representation, but also the key role of intellectuals – who often prefer the comfort of self-referential transnational bubbles – as mediators between society and power. Cultural hegemony in the Gramscian sense needs to be re-shaped to adapt to this new digitized and de-elitized environment.

As a matter of fact, movements that appeal (not entirely without reason) to the “forgotten” and the “left behind” are at a crossroad: either they join the ranks of the ongoing “values counter-revolution” against globalization, liberal democracy, the model of an open society, in general the “others”; or they work responsibly within the multilateral system, contributing to address its faults and make it more just and fair.

12.1. How Would We Stand in this World Order?

Finally, back to the future, and to a vision of the world in 2030 or 2050.

Italy and the EU cannot share a vision of a brave new world dominated by authoritarianism, supremacism and a Hobbesian state of perennial conflict. We will, of course, stand as an integral part of the EU, contributing to its global role, and to the overall systemic sustainability of the new order, defending our values and promoting our interests. A major challenge for us will be to avoid that the increasing multipolarity, based on capabilities, would take the lead on multilateralism, based on predictability and inclusiveness.

Most analysts point to the rise of a G2, G3, G4, or even G5, in which according to preferences and ideologies (or optimism/pessimism) only the US and China are certain to be among the poles.

We are now faced with an apparent (and temporary) withdrawal of the US as the main sponsor and guarantor of the liberal world order, to which Italy owes its political, economic, social and cultural rebirth after WWII. Current signals of strategic divarication between the EU and the US (on trade, environment, European defense, the Middle East and the Iran nuclear deal, etc.) are there. They must be monitored, but not overemphasized. We are not (yet) at a paradigm shift in the transatlantic relationship. “America First” is a new/old recurring concept in US politics. Though a “my country first” seems to be a much more consistent approach on the part of some emerging or re-emerging international actors.

However, our focus should not be on the other two (or three, or four) but on the EU as a possible pole of the 21st world order.

In a world divided (again) in spheres of influence which is gradually morphing into a world of regional hegemons, the weaker pole will, of course, be the one which has no culture or vocation for hegemony. The real issue will then be our ability to build and project the EU as a credible and strong pole within the new order, a much-needed balancing and mediating actor, and a force for sustainable and inclusive development, stability, and peace.

BRAZIL

COUPLING MULTIPOLARITY WITH MULTILATERALISM

BRAZIL AND THE WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY⁸³

Benoni Belli
Filipe Nasser

Each generation doubtless feels called upon to reform the world. Mine knows that it will not reform it, but its task is perhaps even greater. It consists in preventing the world from destroying itself.

Albert Camus, Nobel Literature
Award acceptance speech, 1957

Every succeeding generation in Europe since the beginning of the nineteenth century has felt it was living in an unprecedented era. Does the very constancy of the convention show it was unfounded? Or was it a kind of premonition, confirmed by our own experience as false for our predecessors but true for us?

Raymond Aron, The Dawn of
Universal History, 1960

1. Introduction: Is Turmoil the New Normal?

In his 2009 book, Le Dérèglement du Monde, Franco-Lebanese author Amin Maalouf described what he saw as an unraveling “world disorder”. In his view, the world had stepped into the new century deprived of a guiding compass and at the same time suffering from multiple disorders: geopolitical, financial, climatic, intellectual, and ethical. He thought of the book as a necessary wake-up call in the face of mounting risks and dangers, which would demand innovative and collectively-devised global solutions to be dealt with.⁸⁴ It’s not hard to see that Maalouf’s diagnosis has not lost its validity and may actually prove a useful conceptual framework to understand the current state of world affairs.

There is no shortage of pundits and commentators pointing to what they depict as a fast-paced erosion of the postwar international order. There might be disagreements about the root causes and the long-term consequences of the phenomenon, but they would mostly agree that the current state of world politics offers little reason for optimism.

International cooperation is probably at its lowest in the last few decades and, in a number of areas, even minimal consensus on international principles seems to be evaporating. Competition among great powers is sadly on the rise. In the eyes of many, democracy is in retreat across the globe. International institutions and regimes find themselves under attack while a new distribution of global power takes root and an anti-globalization sentiment surges among the former guarantors of the postwar international order.

Although there is ground for this bleak diagnosis, we also recognize that the risk of overly romanticizing the recent past in detriment of the present might blind our judgment and, hence, thwart our collective ability to act upon reality. In order to assess more critically the state of the international system, it is important to demystify the past and perform a reality check on some of the utopian promises once made for the future. After all, only just about a decade ago the global economy was, for all we knew, on the verge of collapse, fifteen years ago the occupation of a sovereign nation on dubious grounds shook the pillars of the Westphalian system of States, and almost two decades back the terrorist attacks of 9/11 demolished long-held truths. Although scarred, the international system has survived.

At least as far as the global economy is concerned we are far away from doomsday. Will economic progress hold the international order together or will the latter succumb to the darkest forecasts flying around? Can the global economic growth be sustained if protectionism thrives and nations start erecting barriers to investments and against the mobility of labor force? The stakes are too high for irrational policies to prevail, but it would be both presumptuous and imprudent to assume that rationality will always supersede irrational impulses when it comes to international politics.

Inspired by Aron’s and Camus’ memorable quotes opening this chapter, a handful of questions come to mind: Might we be mistaking normal tidal waves for a truly paradigmatic shift in international relations? Might we be allowing ourselves to be carried away by the events broadcasted in an unprecedented fashion by social media as well as the 24/7 news cycle to a point where we presume that something structural in the foundations of the international system is taking place before our eyes when in fact it is just a slightly different version – if at all – of business as usual? Or maybe what we are witnessing is a mix of old and new challenges in which a structural long-term change goes hand in hand with the acceleration of history in a breathtaking roller-coaster ride that leaves us all dizzy and often-times clueless?

Yes, if there ever was such a thing as an international liberal order – or the semblance of it – it is facing a major existential crisis. The dramatic changes both in the distribution of global power and in the very nature of transnational problems made the “liberal” in it in even higher demand, however flawed and imperfect it might have proven to be. What seems to be beyond dispute is that the rules-based international order – a description closer to our own thinking – needs repairing, urgently so.

In the next few pages, we hope to do away with the smoke screen of daily headlines and try to identify – from a Brazilian viewpoint – the long-term trends that might shape our collective future as an international community and hint at what course to charter. In doing so, we are committed to not succumbing to the hapless pessimism regarding the future, as bumpy and slippery as the road ahead may look like. We would rather pay heed to Marx’s famous adage according to which “mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve.”

***

As seen from Brasilia, there are three simultaneous phenomena underway sending shockwaves through the system, which might shape the patterns of behavior of States and non-
-State actors on the world scene:

The redistribution of world power and the making of a truly global multipolar world order.

Heightened great power competition (the so-called “return of geopolitics”), boosted by the unilateralist tendencies displayed by more than one great power.

The Siamese-twin authoritarian-nationalistic surge, with ramifications at both the national and international levels.

Perhaps a fourth phenomenon to be reckoned with is the growing ability of non-State actors (big multinational companies, philanthropists, NGOs, terrorist organizations, hackers, whistleblowers with a security clearance in their pockets, the list keeps growing) to shape international events. Although not the focus of this essay, we’ll keep this phenomenon in the back of our heads as it points to a much more diverse world taking shape, one “with a far greater range of voices and views”, in the words of Andrew Hurrell. Our Weltanschauung matches Hurrell’s view of the international system as increasingly characterized by a diffusion of power, a diffusion of preferences, and a diffusion of ideas and values.⁸⁵

2. Neo-Multipolarity (or however you might want to call it)

Eurasia’s CEO Ian Bremmer famously speaks of a “G-Zero” – a world where effectively no big powers take responsibility for the maintenance of order and the provision of international public goods – blossoming from the ashes of the unipolar era.⁸⁶ On a less pessimistic note, Richard Haas, of the US. Council on Foreign Relations, sees a “non-polar” world shaping up, “a world dominated not by one or two or even several States but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power.”⁸⁷

In our view, these prominent thinkers are both right and wrong. On the one hand, they are right in that they distinguish between more shades of grey than meets the eye when it comes to the current world order’s outlook. On the other hand, their self-styled catchphrases miss the big picture as they offer slight variations of the broader theme of multipolarity.

What seems strikingly clear now is that the “unipolar moment”, as the late American conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer coined the immediate post-Cold War interregnum in which it fell on the US the role of the only remaining superpower, belongs now in the history books.⁸⁸ There is no “hyperpuissance”, to employ former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine’s coinage, capable of imposing its views and interests in all domains of international affairs. Such quasi-imperial moment, if it ever really existed, could be considered stillborn and has been replaced by something else: a multipolar formula perhaps less clear-cut in form, but no-doubt more universal in scope and pluralistic in its composition.

For the first time in the history of international system there is a fully operational universal multipolar world order that relies on a fluid balance of power of profoundly interconnected powers of all continents, different levels of development, and entirely distinct cultural traditions. The current multipolar order is truly global because, unlike previous experiments, it is not confined to the space comprised between the Thames and the Bosphorus: it now reaches the whole globe over, encompassing both Western industrialized traditional powers and non-Western emerging countries from every continent under the sun. Global power is not only more scattered geographically, but also more dispersed among the units.

The underlying causes of the rise of a multipolar world order are certainly deeper and more remote, but it’s safe to say that over the past twenty years a handful of emerging powers started somewhat simultaneously to translate their newly-acquired economic muscle into political ambitions on a global stage which had become less permissible to single-handed hegemonic claims. China first of all, but also Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, and Russia, their own individual shortcomings notwithstanding, have stepped up to the plate and began asking not only for a louder megaphone but also for a seat at the table (arguably China and Russia already had one, at least as far as having a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council is concerned; Russia was also the “1” in the G7+1/G8 from 1997 to 2014). This is the phenomenon Oliver Stuenkel describes as the build-up of a “post-Western world”⁸⁹.

Some could argue that what we are witnessing today is no more than the late stages of a transition from Krauthammer’s “unipolar moment” to a newly-minted bipolarity with the US and, this time around, China leading the pack. In the same vein, others would argue that it is Graham Allison’s “Thucydides’ Trap”, the dynamics according to which China’s sheer rise would likely be the single biggest reason for a confrontation between the rising and the established power, which is currently at play now as the major storyline of our times⁹⁰. Even if the impressive rise of China strikes as the bigger story when it comes to the coming of age of developing countries from the Global South, there are others to be watched closely.

Instead of a “G2” of shared competitive hegemony – along the lines of the condominium staged by the US and by the USSR in the days of détente – whereby superpowers 2.0 would find themselves vying and scrambling for their respective zones influence, a more plausible hypothesis departing from the notion that China and the US stand out in the crowd even among other great powers would point to an order structured along the lines of bi-multipolarity (in theoretical-speak: “2+N” or “1+X+N” – China being the providential “X” – as opposed to the classical bipolar “A vs. B” and also to the multipolar “N”).

Powers that were otherwise seen as peripheral par excellence (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Russia, South Africa, Argentina, Colombia, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, among them), alongside the other more traditional great powers (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the European Union), are now key regional players with trappings of global outreach, even if – safe perhaps Russia across its vast Eurasian frontiers – they don’t individually size up to Washington and Beijing, at least for now. In a multipolar setting, the world’s main power centers are poised to be as asymmetrical amongst themselves as they might be in regard to other important countries which are not yet universally perceived as agenda-setters and norm-shapers.

That is to say that these somewhat lesser great powers would rather preserve their autonomy and policy space by playing a bigger game with multiple influential players on the chessboard at the same time, instead of being bossed around by any patrons. That is a notion close to Daniel Kliman’s and Richard Fontaine’s “global swing States”⁹¹, emerging powers that are not irremediably attached neither to other power centers nor with one another, seeing themselves as influential players in their own right, want a better seat at the table.

At any rate, bi-multipolarity, neo-multipolarity, or however we might want to call it, is yet another varietal of good old multipolarity, only one suitable for the world circa 2018.

The remaining questions to be grappled with in this part of the chapter relates to the character – fundamentally benign and cooperative or intrinsically unstable and conflictive – that such order takes up.

In other words, if we argue that the multipolarization of the international order is an undisputable objective reality, in what light should it be judged? From a Brazilian perspective, assuming Brazil ranks among the prominent new poles of this fresh, renewed multipolarity, could we say that the country’s interests and values are safeguarded in a multipolar order or do we need something else in addition to a more polycentric world?

There is a stream of thought that posits that multipolar orders are intrinsically more unstable and, hence, more prone to military confrontation between great powers. Neorealist author Kenneth Waltz counts among them:

Admittedly, crises also occur in a multipower world, but the dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definition of vital interests easily obscured. The skillful foreign policy, where many states are in balance, is designed to gain an advantage over one state without antagonizing others and frightening them into united action. (...) In a bipolar world, on the other hand, attention is focused on crises by both of the major competitors, and especially by the defensive state. To move piecemeal and reap gains serially is difficult, for within a world in confusion there is one great certainty, namely, the knowledge of who will oppose whom.⁹²

Others, conversely, argue that multipolar orders are potentially conducive to more stability by virtue of the attempt at equilibrium embedded in the system, what could be exemplified by the virtual hundred years of peace among great powers in 19th century Europe resulting from the balance of power architecture devised by statesmen of the likes of Metternich, Castlereagh, and Tayllerand at the Congress of Vienna. According to Brazil’s former Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota:

Two centuries ago a unipolar period came to an end and gave rise to a multipolarity of sorts, after the defeat of the Napoleonic army by the combined strength of Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia. At the Vienna Congress of 1815 a diplomatic effort aimed at reorganizing the European geopolitical landscape can be said to have brought about several decades of relative stability based on new forms of cooperation. (...) The Holy Alliance – though conservative in its objectives and repressive in its methods – could be considered a pioneer exercise in preserving peace. (...) It was clear from the outset that the objective of thwarting a return to unipolarity constituted a strong unifying factor.⁹³

Another argument that helps dispel the myths against multipolarity is that a multipolar world order is not only preferable from the point of view of its leading “poles” and self-elected power centers. It also tends to empower middle and small powers, who are not only offered more options in terms of the number of influential States they might choose to align or at least be associated with, but also, as a consequence, reduce the level of dependency from the reigning superpowers of the day. The diversification of external partnerships as a broader foreign policy strategy that encompasses political as well as economic dimensions is made easier in a multipolar setting, hence expanding the purview of governments to make decisions.

We would not go so far as to suggest that multipolarity would necessarily make the international order more democratic, but there is little doubt it paints it in a broader, more diverse, and, dare we say, interesting palette of colors. As far as policy-makers are concerned, it is critical that, instead of chaos and mayhem, we make sure this “rainbow multipolarity” breeds peace, cooperation, and stability.

3. Real Realpolitik

Walter Russell Mead labeled “the return of geopolitics” what he perceives as heightened competition among major powers – and its obvious corollary, diminished international cooperation – a phenomenon unveiled in the wake of two or three decades where integration, interconnectivity, cooperation, and multilateralism had supposedly prevailed over the brute dealings of realpolitik.⁹⁴

The question is not so much if geopolitics is back as it is whether it had ever left. Our guess, watching it from the Global South, is it didn’t, even if it has been manifesting itself through its own set of means (e.g. jockeying for positions within multilateral fora; soft power pageants; administered rivalries among the great powers – the triumph of the “frenemies” archetype; inter-State clashes confined in the periphery of the system, etc.). Russell Mead acknowledges that the new element was not “geopolitics”, but the new distribution of power that allowed the so-called “revisionist powers” to pursue their interests more assertively.

Analysts see great-power rivalries manifesting in various parts of the world concurrently, in some cases, interconnectedly: in the Middle East, in Eastern Europe, and in the South Pacific. And not all of them result from the perceived competition between Washington and Beijing. That’s where the effects of a global multipolar world order kicks in.

The war in Syria is a case in point. The collective failure of the international community to come together to stop the bloodshed and bring about a meaningful political solution represented the sum of all fears for those, like us, who are enthusiasts of diplomacy, multilateralism, and rule of law at the international level. The toolbox at our disposal proved either ineffective or insufficient to prevent the situation from escalating, leaving behind a trail of half a million corpses, 5 million refugees and many more internally displaced people – simply put, the greatest humanitarian tragedy of our lifetime. The accumulated expertise on collective security accrued in the past century or so has been of little use in Syria. If the conflict recedes and the international community is brought along to aid the Syrians reach a political solution and rebuild their country, we ought to do much better if we ever want to deserve being called an international community.

That the war in Syria is the playground for great power saber-rattling is a theory hard to contend with. More importantly for the argument we are trying to make here, it is not the outcome of bipolar frictions between the established and the rising powers, but rather one of the byproducts of the more multifaceted nature of a multipolar world order with no clear direction. In this case, the concepts of bipolarity or multipolarity are not in themselves the key to understand the conundrum in Syria and other complex conflicts, but a mere description of the relative weight of different actors on stage. A bipolar world could be as tough, just ask those caught up in the middle of the “ideologically-powered” conflicts during the Cold War, from Vietnam to Cambodia, Afghanistan or Central America, not to mention the Cuban missile crisis.

4. A Malaise Up in the Air

There are three different simultaneous phenomena which, because they are deeply intertwined, have been usually bundled together under the same label. Those are the crisis of democratic governance in traditionally democratic Western nations manifested through the rise of hypernationalistic and populist forces, whose commitment to democracy itself is thin to say the least, and the empowerment of xenophobic constituencies that see foreigners and immigrants as essentially a threat against the homeland and the outside world as a perennial source of problems. There have also been recorded setbacks in the commitment to rule of law and popular sovereignty in more fledgling democracies.

The corrosion of the pillars of the so-called international liberal order is in a way the expression at the global level of the malaise in regard to democratic governance, but also the direct consequence of increased competition between great powers in a globalized, multipolar world order where the boundaries between the foreign and the domestic are blurred. Isolationism, multilateral disengagement, scarce incentives for international cooperation, zero-sum games overcoming win-win situations, trade wars, the race for the top, squandering of soft power, demonization of the “other” are all the causes and symptoms of the souring of the international landscape we have been witnessing.

How much truth is there in these assumptions? Some, for sure, but they do not tell the whole story. The much-vaunted proposition that the international liberal order is being rapidly eroded by the rise to power of xenophobic populist movements in the heart of the system can be challenged. For the one thing, the anticipated far-right tsunami has not spread like the virus it was thought to be (fair enough, as with everything else in history and human affairs, it still might), but we must bear in mind that even without rising to high office, populist political forces have been able to influence public debate and shape the political agenda to the point that establishment parties have conceded to more extreme proposals in areas such as immigration and trade.

Perhaps more importantly, the rumors that the international liberal order is dead have been grossly exaggerated, firstly because it is simply not true, but also by virtue of a simple idea: although inspired by liberal values and principles, the order was never all that liberal in practice.

It is undeniable that the thinly-disguised hierarchy between great powers and the rest of us adds a structural element of injustice in the system condemning developing countries to the periphery. The United Nations Security Council calcified membership, the imbalanced voting system at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are but illustrations of the brute reality that the idea of a more balanced and inclusive representation has not been fully embedded in decision-making processes. Needless to point out every occasion in the past seventy years where international norms were fragrantly flouted to please the interests of the great powers. It is the 21st century and yet one still hears echoes of the Melian Dialogue: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”.

This is not to say that a rules-based international order does not exist at all or its survival is not desirable. Quite the contrary. It is the high interest of peace-loving nations, for whom systemic stability and some measure of global rule of law are requisites for maintaining a broad web of diplomatic relations, trading freely through freely-navigating seas, providing welfare for their peoples, developing, thriving as independent nations.

It is not a preposterous proposition that it was exactly when global power started shifting away from the West towards other power centers that it was suspected that the so-called “US-led international liberal order” had all of a sudden lost its footing. There is a bit of a fallacy in the argument that international liberalism is currently on the ropes because when it was “US-led” the institutions were well-oiled and, now that the US is retrenching from the world stage, mayhem logically ensues. Inasmuch as we cannot deny the important – critical, really – role that the US plays worldwide and its key contribution to the creation of postwar institutions, the responsibility for enforcing international rules and preserving systemic stability is a collective endeavor.

The major refugee crisis confronting us offers a sobering illustration of how the self-reinforcing cycle between domestic and international dynamics plays out. The complete inability of the international community to bring about a meaningful solution to the greatest crisis of forceful displacement since World War II is as much the byproduct of the collective paralysis in face of the misnamed “Arab Spring” as it is the result of lack of willingness on the part of nations to open their doors to those in need. A few countries – in particular, the neighboring countries – were touchingly welcoming to the millions of Syrians fleeing war, terror, famine, and death. Others not so much. Worse off, the arrival of thousands of refugees onto the shores of rich countries – or the simple possibility that one day they might – triggered a xenophobic reaction that played in the interests of politicians who live off instilling fear and nurturing hate in their constituencies.

We may find ourselves in an unwelcome “Catch-22” situation: on the one hand, the international order is not shored up and made more efficient and legitimate because it is faulted for the evils of globalization and, on the other, the imbalances of the globalizing world are made more difficult to address precisely due to the lack of reform of global institutions and also to the retrenchment of powerful actors from international regimes.

One way to avoid such dilemma is by recommitting to international rules and norms and making institutions more inclusive in order to increase their efficiency. In the event that this vision proves right, disputes among States will be settled through peaceful means, preferably under the guardianship of multilateral institutions whenever parties are not able to find an accommodation bilaterally; trade will be encouraged and practiced freely and fairly; integration will happen by fiat; leaders will choose dialogue over bravado; immigration will be welcome, not only because it is morally right to admit people seeking refuge from war, authoritarianism or natural disasters, but also because it is good for the receiving country.

All in all, the change in distribution of power and the erosion of liberal internationalism might go either way: more friction and chest-thumping among the great powers in a multipolar arrangement leading to rules being torn apart in a vicious circle where posturing and authoritarianism – within and outside borders – make the world less safe and prosperous; or else a path where the upsides of multipolarity are taken advantage of in order to reinforce diplomacy, cooperation, International Law, integration, and multilateralism as means of international coexistence. The international community ought to muster its best efforts to take the second route and never look back.

A decisive reaction to the anti-globalist movement is badly needed in order to save the post-World War II order from being undermined, which would lead to disorder and a downward spiral in the world economy, among other nefarious consequences. But the malaise towards globalization exists and it would be both foolish and naïve to deny it. Many people benefitted from globalization and its increased flows of goods and capital the world over. It is also true, though, that structural unemployment due to technological change, increasing inequality, and the stagnation of income in different countries have contributed to stir a sentiment of disenfranchisement. The left-behind of the new cosmopolitan and global economy have real grievances that must be dealt with. It is the lack of response by traditional political systems to these grievances that led to the rise of populism, which is, to paraphrase American writer H.L. Mencken, always ready to offer to complex questions an answer that is clear and simple but also utterly wrong.

5. Multi-Multi

Perhaps what we are witnessing is a crisis of transition, whereby the old US-led political foundation of the liberal order will give way to a new configuration of power, new coalition of states, new governance institutions. This transition might be leading to some sort of post-American and post-Western order that remains relatively open and rules-based. Others see a deeper crisis, one of liberal internationalism itself. (...) Despite the upheavals and destruction of world war, economic depression, and the rise and fall of fascism and totalitarianism, the liberal international project survived. It is likely to survive today’s crises as well. But to do so, as it has done in the past, liberal internationalism will need to be rethought and reinvented.⁹⁵

G. John Ikenberry, one of the leading proponents of the concept of a US-led international liberal order, provides a valid framework to make sense of world politics in the last seventy-plus years. The author seems to agree with us that, in face of insurmountable challenges presently facing the international community, the rules-based international order needs a speedy overhaul.

We have already settled that one of the defining features of the current world order is that it is increasingly multipolar, admitting that there might be considerable asymmetries within a rather fluid selection of big and middle powers. Which is another way of saying that the rules-based international order will not or should not be led by one or two great powers but rather that global governance should be a more collective endeavor as well as one informed by a universally-accepted set of rules.

Bearing Ikenberry’s counsel in mind, then how can we reconcile a perceived higher potential for instability associated with multipolarity with its upsides in terms of pluralism and legitimacy? We have to go back to the title of this chapter: by coupling multipolarity (i.e. a power reality) with multilateralism (i.e. a normative prescription).

Inasmuch as the system remains anarchical in nature, the rules of the road should be created democratically (or at least as democratically as possible) and applied, observed, and enforced universally. It is high time that the norm-setting and legislative processes at the international level take into consideration the broader interests of the international community. The points of view of countries of every continent, size, cultural and linguistic tradition, and predicament must be accounted for in the global decision-making processes.

Climate change is a case in point. Both rising and established powers were, of course, indispensable for reaching the 2015 Paris Agreement – without them a deal would not have been possible or would have been otherwise meaningless – but the particular circumstances of small island States, whose very survival as viable and independent polities might be jeopardized in the face of rising sea levels, had to be factored in. Your typical geopolitical power play alone would have left the Earth warmer – and damaged by all the associated fallouts – if the voice of small, otherwise powerless countries was not ultimately heard in the process.

A departing point to kick-start a reformist agenda is the recognition that we live – no matter what some people might do or say to the contrary – in an essentially interdependent, interconnected, globalized world that remains nonetheless rooted in a system of nation-States. Therefore, engagement is not only desirable on the part of what used to be called “responsible stakeholders”, it is essential that the upholders of the world order shoulder responsibility and provide global public goods when necessary. Shying away and sticking your head in the sand is not really an option in our days. Arnold Toynbee’s maxim that “the greatest punishment for those who are not interested in politics is being ruled by those who are” applies perfectly well in the case of global governance.

The United Nations remains the preferential multilateral venue. It carries both the legal as well as the moral legitimacy to organize international life and offers a trusted permanent dispute-settlement platform. It has served the international community well in good and bad times, especially the latter, in its seventy years of history, despite its shortcomings and occasional toothlessness. But it is no secret that the organization is, as of today, critically impaired and outdated.

There are two big risks associated with leaving the UN slide into irrelevance or, worse, perish: the lesser risk is leaving the international community to rely on an ad hoc problem-solving mode, in which case plurilateral groupings would come and go without much fanfare and the legitimacy of actions undertaken by a letter soup of “variable geometries” arrangements would be up for grabs.

At some point, there were rumors around that the G20 could grow a political arm to act on behalf of the international community whenever an unbreakable stalemate at the UN Security Council would thwart action or at least where broad consensus could be worked upon with fewer obstacles (i.e. a G8 on steroids and with a different complexion).

Whereas it is not a problem per se that international actors might choose to gather to find collective solutions for common problems – and Brazil certainly attaches a great deal of importance to the various groups it has helped create or adhered to in the past couple of decades, from the BRICS and the IBSA Forum to the BASIC for climate change negotiations and the G4 for UN Security Council reform– they are far more legitimate and likely durable when blessed by UN-sanctioned multilateralism.

In the case of UN Security Council reform, the formulas for updating the organ are basically known. Adjustments to them could be made for the sake of pragmatism and political expediency, but fundamentally membership needs to be expanded – as far as Brazil is concerned in both permanent and non-permanent members (a fact recognized by more than two-thirds of the member States) – and work methods need to be improved to the benefit of greater transparency. What remains truly lacking is political will on the part of more than one of the key actors involved.

When we look into the future, can we see a reformed, more muscular, legitimate, representative, effective, 21st century-like Security Council? What is the spark that would put geopolitical rivalries and narrow national interests in the backseat to the benefit of the larger global good? It certainly hasn’t been the greatest humanitarian tragedy of our lifetime (war in Syria and the ensuing massive-scale refugee crisis) nor the various other dossiers where consensus among the permanent members has not been achieved. Would that spark be true, meaningful pressure on the part of public opinion on global leaders? #UNSCreformnow

A similar logic could be applied to the World Trade Organization, although it’s not necessarily reform that is badly needed, but rather the strengthening of the political commitment towards the whole multilateral trade system. The case for it is clear-cut: The WTO introduces an indispensable measure of fairness, stability, and predictability to international trade that, to put it simply, is good for businesses, workers, consumers, and nation-States alike.

Eight rounds of trade negotiations sponsored by the WTO’s predecessor – the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) – resulted in across-the-board economic liberalization, leading to greater trade flows and increased prosperity worldwide. It is true that the Doha Round has been dragging for longer than anyone would have thought, but the recent 2013 Bali Trade Facilitation Accord, although not the tariff-slashing apotheosis expected from Doha, has provided the international community with a useful toolbox to cut down red tape, dismantle customs obstacles and overcome trade barriers. Furthermore, the WTO in-built dispute-settlement mechanism is a truly groundbreaking innovation brought along by the Marrakesh Treaty, as it makes it easier – or at least more plausible – that the legislation presiding international trade is followed through and enforced.

In our days, as protectionist temptations lurk on the horizon – stemming out of political expediency alone – leading to increased great power competition and resulting in a general drop in prosperity levels, the WTO is a lifeline that we, the enthusiastic supporters of the rules-based order, need to hold on to as long as and hard as we can.

The second risk of allowing the UN to die a slow death is undermining multilateralism as a principle of collegiate decision-making and as means of administered international coexistence. In that scenario, lawlessness would tend to subdue international rule of law and the strong would find it easier to prey on the weak. It means retreating to an era in which the international community was deprived of a legal body and a repertoire of action. Laying it to waste would breed a less peaceful and stable international system. That is exactly why we argue that a multipolar world structure ought to be equipped with a solid rock multilateral armor.

Former Brazilian ambassador to the UN Gelson Fonseca Jr. argues that multilateralism is a provider of rules that ensure the international interaction benefits all participants.⁹⁶ Multilateral institutions do not eye abolishing self-interest altogether, but rather create rules to discipline the pursuit of national interests in a way that is seen as acceptable and legitimate by all.

In other words, no one is under the illusion that the birth of a Pollyanesque world free from egotism and self-help is remotely possible. The option for multilateralism is not tantamount to discarding realism outright. In fact, it updates the realist logic by replacing the shortsighted pursuit of tactical interests, not always through legitimate means, with a longer-term, strategic attitude about advancing one’s national interests. A multilateralist attitude also operates under a version of realism that considers that our interdependent world demands collective action in order to tackle the most pressing problems of our time.

6. Parallel 15, Meridian 47

Saying that Brazil is a peace-loving country might strike at first as your typical diplomatic punchline, but history and the facts alone make it hard denying. The country – sharing an almost 17,000-kilometer long border with ten countries – has not been involved in armed conflict in its neighborhood for almost 150 years. Aside from our shouldering with the Allies in the two world wars (and actually deploying over 25,000 troops in Europe in the 1940s) and regular engagement in peacekeeping, which serves its own foreign policy rationale, Brazil has not partaken of war in a very long time.

Brazil is also a big developing country, which means that overcoming the middle-income trap and providing development for millions of people is a task of humongous proportions. Our utmost national priority is building a fair and more prosperous society, which is done by diminishing inequality, growing the economy, lifting people out of poverty, promoting development, improving living standards and social indicators, enhancing productivity and competitiveness in the economy, overhauling infrastructure, putting younger generations through school. In a nutshell, making life more livable for large swaths of underprivileged Brazilians and better off for everyone else. All that under a democratic regime that protects individual freedoms and upholds the rule of law.

Even if Brazil is largely self-sufficient when it comes to water supply, energy, and food, we fully acknowledge that not only can the world represent a critical source of resources for our development, but also that Brazil can offer a positive contribution to peace, stability and the strengthening of a multilaterally-oriented multipolar world order. The way we see it, Brazilian engagement with the world triggers a self-reinforcing virtuous cycle beneficial to Brazilians as well as to the international community at large.

Playing traditional geopolitics is not currently at the top of the list in Brazil’s playbook, which, of course, does not preclude its foreign policy to remain very much mindful of the geopolitical game in order to ward off unpleasant surprises. In times in which the specter of great power competition haunts the multipolar order and the erosion of the social fiber jeopardizes the post-World War II architecture, Brazil does not want to be caught up in the middle of rivalries to which it is a stranger. We would rather be recognized as a standard-bearer for multilateralism, cooperation, and diplomacy in the concert of nations.

To someone sitting in Brasilia, the quest for a peaceful and stable world is not just words blown in the wind. For us peace, stability, free navigation of the seas, open trade routes, reliable consumer markets for our exports (from prime beef to cool flip flops, from coffee to air jets) are essential prerequisites for the attainment of our national goals. Only in such scenario will we be able to focus our energies on sorting out our own national predicament. As far as we are concerned, a rules-based international order, whereby international law curbs unilateralism and conflict, is not only morally superior to lawlessness; it is also in the high interests of an emerging power that benefits from an environment where the law of the strong – i.e. the rule of thumb in the Melian Dialogue – is not put to the test every time.

A Foreign Minister of times past, Santiago Dantas used to say that “the non-fungibility of principles is the defense weapon for the protection of the sovereignty of militarily weak nations”. Perhaps it was the case in his time, but it is certainly not why Brazil remains a multilateral nation by choice. Our military’s chief mission is the protection of our homeland and our waters – i.e. it is not an instrument for power projection – and our overseas military engagement lies exclusively in UN peacekeeping operations, which is also a testament to Brazil’s essentially multilateral soul in its dealings with the outside world. We are truly a multilateralist nation because we believe in the virtues of multilateralism and because we benefit from them.

Surely not to the detriment of our bilateral relationships – in fact reinforcing them – Brazil sees in the multilateral arena the most suitable platform for helping shape the global body of law, influence international behavior, and bring about the best outcomes for mankind at the same time we seek to embed in them the Brazilian flag colors and our points of view.

By virtue of its broad, non-excluding network of bilateral relationships, global in its nature and outreach, as well as this steadfast commitment to multilateralism, especially under the aegis of the United Nations and its associated bodies, Brazil sees itself as a global player, one that deliberately practices a universalistic foreign policy as a means to advance our interests, promote our values, and carve out a place for us in the concert of nations. We are tied in no military alliances and we do not nurture professed enmities. That does not mean we wish to be friends with everybody just for the sake of being on good terms regardless of circumstances, but at least we are committed to keeping an open and productive dialogue with everyone around. That we rank 9th in number of foreign missions worldwide⁹⁷ is a living proof of the universalistic approach, fitting as it is to a country that sees itself as one of the pieces in the global multidimensional chess game of the 21st century.

South America is a centerpiece of that strategy. We want it to be an integral part of a region where peace, diplomacy, dialogue, trade, investment, integrated infrastructure, social progress, and human development prevail over the alternatives. Brazil feeds no rivalries with its neighbors; quite the contrary we have an accumulated heritage of cooperation, dialogue, and friendship with all other South American countries. The region is privileged to be a nuclear-free zone – a conscious collective decision of which Brazil was a big part of – where it is also possible to avoid the pitfalls of great power rivalries.

Instead of pursuing a realpolitik-like strategy in the region, Brazil has opted, even from a long-term historical perspective, to burnish our diplomatic credentials and give sufficient evidence to our partners of the consistency of our bona fides. It helps that not only is Brazil a territorially-satisfied nation, it has also defined its frontiers with its neighbors through diplomatic negotiation rather than by military conquest.

Such are the root causes of why Brazilian diplomats see the notion of leadership in a different light when it is applied to its relationship with the neighborhood. Ambassador Sérgio Danese, Brazil’s top diplomat in Buenos Aires, reflects upon the issue:

Leadership is not preached nor pleaded – it is wielded. This is a fact of life. But when leadership is, even if in a contrived way, declined as a legitimate or viable option, any gesture that might be mistaken for leadership will be delegitimized as power-grabbing, pursuit of prestige, unilateral move, or attempt at imposing one’s will upon others. This tension, ever existing in the exercise of leadership, is aggravated when the power surplus of the alleged leader scares or when the resistance to this aspired leadership is all too disproportional, as it is the case with Brazil. What am I trying to say by that? Any gesture on the part of Brazil that vaguely echoes a claim for leadership, even when objectively legitimate from the point of view of the Brazilian national interests or those of our partners, tends to be contested in both its motivations and reach.⁹⁸

For Brasilia, regional integration is both a foreign policy priority and a strategic imperative, not to mention, surprisingly for some, a constitutional obligation. In the past thirty-plus years, Brazil has been an enthusiastic sponsor – when not the very engine – of the construction of an institutional architecture in South America (Mercosur and Unasur) as well as in the broader Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC) as a means to build confidence, reduce tensions, stimulate exchanges, whether they are political, economic, cultural, or people to people among our countries.

Even if these schemes may experience turbulence, they provide venues that will ultimately prove themselves useful to spur cooperation and integration. Mercosur, for instance, was basically paralyzed for a long time, but over the last two years or so it has received new oxygen and showed dynamism, eliminating trade barrier among its members and opening up new avenues of cooperation and negotiations with other countries and trade blocs.

Critical in that long-term process of regional integration was the rapprochement between Brazil and Argentina devised about three decades ago, which replaced a long history of rivalry and chest-thumping with a strategic decision to integrate economically and partner up in managing regional as well as global affairs. In Brazil’s eyes, the Brasilia-Buenos Aires entente – eventually expanded into Mercosur – was the single foreign policy accomplishment responsible for cutting off the chains of the past and allowed the country to nurture aspirations in the region as well as on the world stage commensurate to its size, diplomatic credentials, and national spirit. The landmark quadripartite agreement among Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sets an example for the world on how to overcome mistrust and build a credible and transparent safeguard system in the field of nuclear nonproliferation.

South America is not an intrinsically conflict-ridden region, far from it. Political differences among countries in the region will arise from time to time, but they do not invalidate the structural movement towards integration, based on open trade, sustainable development, and a shared commitment to democracy. In fact, the latter is the cement of the regional integration edifice, ensuring that the gains of development will flow to the people and not only to the ruling elite.

This is one of the reasons why the region has been urging the current Venezuelan regime to negotiate meaningfully with the opposition in order to put the country back on a democratic track. Brazil has coordinated efforts with its neighbors and partners in several regional groupings – Mercosur, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Lima Group – to impress upon the regime in Caracas the need to urgently reinstate democratic freedoms, release political prisoners, allow for free and fair elections, stage a comeback to normalcy, and pave the way for a democratically-elected new administration to step in and usher a new era of democracy and national development.

On a rather more positive note Mercosur and the European Union are bound, as we write these words, to conclude a free trade agreement. Negotiated at times tirelessly and at times sluggishly over the past two decades, it looks like the ink will finally meet the paper. There is little doubt that the deal will benefit the economies on both sides of the Atlantic, generating income, creating jobs, and increasing competitiveness across South American and European countries. But perhaps more importantly it will inject the global trade system with the dynamism and confidence it’s been lacking (that Mercosur is also holding talks – at different stages –with Canada, South Korea, India, Singapore, and the European Free Trade Association is illustrative that there is a free-trading heart still beating in the international system).

Not to downplay the key economic role trade plays for promoting development on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, a Mercosur-EU deal would also show that these two regions, which are deeply intertwined culturally as well as historically, have made a strategic decision to walk side by side on the world stage. As committed as all our countries are to a rules-based international order, the conclusion of an ambitious bi-regional agreement would help preserve peace and stability worldwide – based, by the way, on a rather Kantian proposition – and provide a powerful counterweight to the disengagement forces at play.

7. Brazilian Savoir-Faire

Soft power is the one-size-fits all concept created by professor Joseph Nye. It is as useful as a foreign policy framework as it is misused in both academic literature and political discourse. As the founding father of the term has himself recognized, it is not only about the global immaterial power of McDonald’s, the Louvre, Renaissance painters, and carnival in Rio, although there is little doubt that cultural symbols might be put to use as part of a broader foreign policy strategy. Soft power is above all a means by which a given country seeks to achieve its goals on the world stage through convincing, seduction, and agenda-setting rather than by physical coercion or financial encouragement.⁹⁹

Soft power is Brazil’s preferred foreign policy tool long before the concept was devised and became a household name in foreign policy circles, even predating the country becoming altogether an independent member of the community of nations. Which is another way of saying that diplomacy has been – and will keep being – the principal instrument in our international standing from times immemorial, whether it has been by advancing our own national interests or offering our perspective on pressing international issues. Beyond soft power, Brazil chooses to apply a soft touch to its diplomatic relations, both in its region and across the world, as a way to widen and deepen its footprint in the world. We have a sense that such approach to foreign policy simply works better in the long run than the alternatives.

Ambassador Rubens Ricupero argues in his monumental work Diplomacy in the Making of Brazil that the country’s inclination towards diplomacy is reminiscent of the Portuguese. The transfer of the Portuguese royal court to Rio de Janeiro during the Napoleonic wars effectively turned the tropical city into the capital of an Empire as far-flung as any of its day. Portugal, an ultramarine hyper power but militarily weaker than other European great powers (and an altogether smaller country), had always relied on diplomacy as a means to ensure its survival as an independent kingdom and the possession of its overstretched colonial domain. In the words of Ricupero:

[The Portuguese] knew intuitively what professor Joseph Nye teaches at Harvard University: beyond the hard power of military and economic coercion, there is a softer power of persuasion and negotiation. Among the varieties of soft power, one that stands out is the smart (or clever) power, a kind of power borne out of knowledge, of intellectual and cultural preparation. (…) [In the case of Brazil] the most remarkable outcome of knowledge-based diplomacy was the making of Brazil’s current map. Two-thirds of the territorial mass would be located outside our borders had it not been for diplomacy.¹⁰⁰

What the Ambassador does is update and refresh the concept of smart power, which Nye has defined originally as a combination between hard power and soft power tools, by replacing it with the idea that knowledge and wits are also an expression power, a meaning arguably much truer to its semantics.

So it has been when Portuguese and Brazilian diplomats were fixing our limits with Spain as well as with our neighboring Hispanic countries in the course of centuries and so it has been in Brazil’s 21st century multilateral diplomacy in the realm of trade, climate change, disarmament, human rights, or Internet governance.

That is not to say Brazil is unaware of the allure of its culture or is naïve about its soft power potential. Quite the contrary: we would like to share the wonders of our multicultural and multiethnic pluralistic society with the rest of the world and reap the diplomatic and economic benefits of a country that frankly – please forgive us the naked hubris – is easy to like. World-class soccer, tropical weather, beautiful beaches, the bittersweet magic of samba, telenovelas, Pelé, Ronaldo, Gilberto Gil, Tom Jobim and Vinicius de Moraes, caipirinhas mixed to perfection, a melting pot like probably no other, and a hospitable, smiley people yes – we do not even fake denying the most truthful stereotypes – but also Machado de Assis, Jorge Amado, Fernando Meirelles, Oscar Niemeyer, Lúcio Costa, and Paulo Mendes da Rocha, cutting-edge jets, tropical agriculture and tropical medicine second to none, electronic voting, and last but not least a foreign policy for whom diplomacy is both king and queen.

Fairly or not the UK-headquartered Monocle magazine places Brazil on the 19th place on its 2017 soft power survey, down from 17th place in 2012 – (the fall is quite understandable given the bumpy few years the country went through recently), but up from 22nd in the previous survey. Diplomacy, no surprise there, has ranked consistently as one of Brazil’s prime assets for promoting its image overseas.

Brazil has the assets it needs to increase its influence in regional and global affairs. By its sheer size (territory, population, and GDP), the country is seen as a natural provider of public goods. The most important aspect of Brazilian international identity is what we make of the material and immaterial resources at our disposal. How we use it to project our values and interests is what really counts in carving out a place for the country at different decision-making tables. Brazil wants to be a “shaper nation”¹⁰¹ and sees itself as a force for moderation, stability, peace, and prosperity regionally and worldwide.

Hopefully this savoir-faire that places greater emphasis on dialogue, consensus building, and building bridges will be reinforced and put to good use as we all build collectively an international multipolar order firmly glued by multilateral norms and organizations.

8. Closing Remarks

We live in a world of uncertainty and turmoil for sure, but also of unprecedented progress. If one looks not at the present century or the previous one, but further back to the First Industrial Revolution, it is amazing how much progress was made in living standards, access to health care, drop in mortality rates and levels of violence, and in virtually any other social indicators.

Why is it that we are so unhappy with the current features of our time? Is it because humans are intrinsically troubled, incapable of enjoying life to the fullest? Not really. We believe that humanity has raised the bar and adopted new standards to measure the level of satisfaction with life of individuals and nations. And by the standards enshrined in universal documents such as the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we still fall behind of what was expected when such rules were drafted and adopted.

The most distinctive feature of the postwar order was the creation of universal mechanisms to deal with problems in the fields of peace and security, human rights, development, financial crises, and trade. Such set of norms and institutions established new standards of behavior, constraining even the most powerful not to act as they please. The order was never perfect, neither was it foolproof. It had embedded in it the fundamental inequality of special rights for the great powers, but it also created real constraints to the stronger, with a system of checks and balances of sorts. It became much more difficult to shroud outrageous behaviors under the legitimating mantle of national sovereignty, especially in the face of unilateral aggression and systematic human rights abuses. The innovation of recent times is not the well-known criticism to the international institutions such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, which we all agree have flaws, but a self-destructive rhetoric and action against the postwar international liberal order when we need it the most.

In a nutshell, the international order is undergoing two major breakthroughs of epic proportions. Firstly, we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of 500 years of Western-centered history, if the projections are right concerning countries such as China, India, and Brazil, among others, joining the former great powers and becoming leading nations in a number of areas, especially in the economy.

Secondly, because most current international problems are also transnational, nations need to cooperate at the global level in order to keep their populations safe, well-nourished, and healthy. Unilateral action is not effective to deal with transnational crime, terrorism, climate change, food insecurity, epidemics, nuclear proliferation, Internet governance, cyber-security, the risk of trade wars, and financial crises.

We believe Brazil is well-equipped to be part of a wide coalition of countries, developed and developing alike, committed to a rules-based international order and not fearful of fully embracing the cause of updating multilateral institutions to make them reflect the new realities of power and the aspirations of emerging countries. Reform this order to prevent it from being undermined should be the motto of such a noble enterprise.

Why should Brazil increase its involvement in world affairs? The most obvious reason applies to everyone else: if you remain isolated, others will make the decisions for you and on your behalf. It is thus important to influence those decisions and shape the rules adopted at the international level to maximize autonomy and project your values and interests.

The other reason has to do with Brazil’s international profile: a country that has led by example and uses primarily diplomacy and soft power to attain its objectives outside its borders. As pointed out by Foreign Minister Aloysio Nunes Ferreira: “in times of turbulence, Brazil should be part of the solutions to problems facing the international community. We must advance our interests and project the Brazilian values in the different international chessboards.”¹⁰² There is a promise in the Minister’s words: Brazil will not shy away from the affairs of the world and will always add its voice to help build solutions collectively.

In a world so desperately in need of diplomacy to overcome the tensions derived from the ongoing power transition, the example of Brazil comes in handy. Similarly, Brazil’s commitment to negotiated deals and shared norms is befitting an era of global problems and challenges that need global action. The world direly needs the scarce commodity of diplomacy and Brazil can be a critical provider. In doing so, it will increase its influence by helping to craft joint solutions to global challenges.

As we take the road to the coming years and decades, the future seems more uncertain than ever. Is the double challenge of power transition and global problems giving rise to a more conflictive order? Is cooperation doomed and new forms of competition and rivalry destined to make a new and more resounding comeback? How can the core of the current international order be preserved and made stronger in light of criticism from within (former guarantors and main beneficiaries of such order) and from without (the new rising powers seen somewhat simplistically as troublemakers)?

We will not dare to try to provide definitive answers to these questions. By raising them we want to highlight the importance of foresight based on actual historical and evidence-based analysis of the past and the present. The crisis of the international liberal order is serious, but given the renewed sense of gravity and urgency it gives us a priceless opportunity to fix what was wrong. We should not let pessimism take the upper hand, even if the challenges facing humanity cannot be underestimated.

In the process of drafting this essay and brainstorming with colleagues in the Foreign Ministry, in other agencies and outside the government, we were constantly reminded of the justified pride of a country that owes its contours to diplomacy and to the intensive use of knowledge, common sense, and fair play in its international dealings. It may sound too optimistic to prescribe diplomacy as an antidote at a moment when many are talking coercion, big stick, protectionism, and power politics. We beg to differ. Given the current nature of world affairs, diplomacy offers the only effective remedy to conflict, disorder, and chaos.

Policy planners as we are, the one thing we can all agree on is that the future has not yet been written. The best way of predicting the future is shaping it. Let’s do it.

GERMANY

THE 21ST-CENTURY WORLD ORDER FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLICY PLANNERS

A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE

Ralf Beste
Axel Gugel

1. Introduction

The 21st century is certainly keeping policy planners on their toes: instability, unpredictability, technological innovation, and major power shifts have become defining features of this century so far. These trends have revealed many deficiencies in what is generally described as the “world order.” And while some of these challenges had already been identified decades ago, the end of the Cold War, followed by a “unipolar moment,” and the powerful chimera of the notion of the “end of history” led political elites in many places to become somewhat complacent and even self-deceiving.

Yet when we put this concept of world order into a historical context, we see, of course, that the ideal of a single all-encompassing, coherent, stable, and legitimate world order has rarely been achieved in the modern era. Instead it is something that is not fixed but rather constantly shifting, with various thematic and regional manifestations. This realization is perhaps slightly unsettling, at least for some of us: not only is the world emerging from a period of power distribution that provided orientation and stability, namely the bipolar Cold War followed by the unipolar moment of the 1990s and early 2000s, but for many in the West, the 20th century ended on a rather positive note. The struggle against communism had been won, European integration was advancing and globalization was – from a Western perspective – still viewed as a linear success story.

2. Symptoms and Causes of a Struggling World Order

Now, almost two decades into the 21st century, the sobering truth of a more fragmented order is revealing itself on many levels: protracted and deadly conflicts, not only in the Middle East and Africa, are once again morphing into proxy wars. Emerging powers, especially in Asia, are conducting a proactive or even assertive foreign policy that has the potential to unhinge whole regions and their balance of power. Transnational challenges such as climate change, international terrorism, migration, and cybercrime continue to elude the mechanisms and institutions of global governance in the existing order.

Some States have begun to create and advocate their own set of rules and ideas for international order. Other actors knowingly violate international law and use a wide array of instruments (such as hybrid warfare) to shift balances of power to their advantage. Those affected retaliate with bellicose rhetoric and confrontational policies. To make matters worse, many of these symptoms and challenges are conflated and even amplify each other, for instance in Africa, where regional instability, migration, and climate change are closely intertwined.

Among the many causes of these phenomena, a few, in particular, stand out: firstly, large parts of the current structure of institutions and regulations lack inclusivity and do not reflect the changed geopolitical, economic, and demographic landscape of today’s world. This lack of input legitimacy has been registered by many emerging countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Secondly, the current world order is still mainly State-driven. Only slowly is policy-making beginning to incorporate other major actors in today’s world, such as (mega)cities, civil society organizations, international foundations, or multinational companies that often have deeper pockets than is the case with many nation-States. Particularly important are the new tech giants in the US and China, which hold enormous power through their reach, resources, and data. Yet they are – at best – only marginally included or regulated. It is this ongoing technological revolution, in particular, that is changing whole societies, economies, and the international balance of power. Characterized by a new kind of hyper-connectivity and the transnational supply chains, transportation hubs, and capital flows that come with it, this technological revolution has had a profound effect on national and global governance, first and foremost by exposing the limitations of the status quo.

Thirdly, the change in US policy and positioning has had massive repercussions for the world order. The country’s turnaround regarding many policy areas such as trade, climate change, and even the ideal of multilateralism as such leaves a vacuum in leadership, resources, and values. With the US redefining its approach of how to best safeguard its interests, the liberal and rules-based world order it has promoted and institutionalized for more than 70 years is about to lose its lifeline.

Needless to say, this change has concrete repercussions in many regions of the world, where US. leadership is now lacking (most notably in the Middle East, but also in Asia). This turn inwards and the ensuing disruption of institutions and leadership, especially global ones, have occurred in parallel with the advancement of authoritarian regimes. We see this in regional conflicts such as those in Syria or Iraq. However, this phenomenon is also becoming apparent in Western democracies, where authoritarian regimes are exploiting the inherent openness of democratic systems by aiming to influence and undermine their economies, societies, and political systems.

A fourth (and closely related) aspect is the wedge that globalization and its discontents have driven into many societies, including in Europe. Not only have inequality and a lack of opportunities in many parts of the world led to mass migration to Europe, these grievances are also felt there, undermining many people’s belief in their own political systems. As a result, a dangerous amalgam of populism, nationalism, and identity politics, nurtured by targeted and deliberate attempts to exert influence from the outside, is threatening to destabilize a growing number of societies. Omnipresent social media outlets accelerate and sometimes exacerbate existing discontent. National skepticism towards elected governments, which are seen as self-servingly promoting a “globalism” that benefits only a few, is subsequently directed against a world order built on multilateralism and cooperation.

Of course, world orders come and go. But when and how does change come about? Most of the time, people cannot fully grasp the order they live in but can only make out its contours (and the changes to it) in hindsight. Having said this, two observations about the present we experience in this day and age seem justified. Firstly, we are experiencing an in-between age, an era of fuzziness and instability. This in-between age allows most domestic issues to become global and vice versa. The reference point for one’s place in the world is no longer necessarily one’s neighbor, city, or country. Thanks to technology and smartphones, it can be anywhere in the world. This has the potential to turn whole societies, countries, and regions upside down.

Secondly, we have entered a phase of renewed competition over types of governance, values, the organization of societies, and the rules of the game in the international arena. Old dichotomies from previous centuries seem to be coming back to haunt us: liberal vs. authoritarian, freedom vs. control, open vs. closed societies, cooperation vs. confrontation, and multilateralism vs. bilateralism. We see parallel sets of rules, standards, and institutions emerging, especially in the wake of China’s attempt to reclaim a central role on the world stage.

And while this world order was never perfectly equipped to deal with international conflict, injustice, and power politics in the first place, the crises, confrontations, and general instability we are experiencing at present bring home the urgency of rethinking the current structure while skillfully and carefully navigating the current transitory phase.

3. Future World Orders?

The literature on “world order” and its potential future nature is constantly growing, with intellectual heavyweights such as Henry Kissinger, John Ikenberry, and Ian Bremmer dedicating whole books to the subject. It is also a popular topic in academic journals, newspaper editorials, and social media. While a detailed examination of this debate goes beyond the scope of this essay, two ideas do deserve a closer look, as they have gained particular traction in German discourse: firstly, that of a Sino-US dualism and secondly, that of a multipolar “G-Zero world” with varying degrees of a commonly accepted set of rules.

While the US, with its military and economic power, continues to be the most powerful country in the world, China is also increasingly assuming a global role. It is challenging the US in Asia and expanding its engagement in international organizations, peacekeeping, and the provision of development aid and infrastructure projects. Opinions differ considerably on the likelihood of either a future Sino-US tandem or a major conflict¹⁰³ between China and the US Most observers agree, however, that this relationship will be the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century.

Conjuring up a picture of a potentially stabilizing and effective Sino-US dualism might sound tempting to those who reminisce almost nostalgically about the clear orientation provided by the Cold War antagonism between the US and the Soviet Union. But this kind of comparison may well fall flat. Whereas the US and the Soviet Union stood at opposing ends on literally all areas of policy, the US and China have a far more complex relationship. They are economically highly intertwined and interdependent, but compete in the field of technology and even oppose each other geopolitically, especially in Asia. The attempt to match a new bipolar world with outdated assumptions deriving from the Cold War could, therefore, be a dangerous pitfall.

Sino-US dualism might also reduce the room for maneuver for the rest of the world. Neglecting roughly 80% of the world’s population, as would be the case in this scenario, would evidently be an impediment to the creation of a stable and legitimate order. In addition, any confrontation between these two actors in one area might not only have severe repercussions on Sino-US bilateral relations as such, but also unpredictable effects on everyone else.

The second analytical framework is Ian Bremmer’s “G-Zero world.” It describes a world in which no single country or bloc has the ability or leverage to shape and push for an all-encompassing international agenda. One result is that regional centers of gravity emerge. Finding global solutions to global challenges might, therefore, be difficult. The same would most likely apply to maintaining long-term stability. Depending on the accompanying set of rules (if any), a “G-Zero world” might turn out to be simply another transitory phase on the path to a more stable balance of power.

One potential trajectory could be a multitude of parallel and even overlapping orders, mirroring different issues, capacities, and regions. It would thus be a highly complex (and potentially fragile) order with many necessary nuts and bolts to maintain (but also potentially disrupt) its stability. Another possible trajectory could be a Westphalian 2.0 model. But without a commonly accepted set of rules, “might makes right” would quickly become the predominant mechanism of the international order once again.

All of these concepts provide useful ideas when assessing one’s own strategic options. They also show the challenges in building an order that is viable for a longer period of time and able to provide peace, freedom, stability, and development. This caveat also applies to China’s currently emerging vision of international order, which focuses mainly on infrastructure spending, its new set of institutions and rhetoric that promises straightforward, “no-strings-attached” development across the board. However, this economic appeal has not yet been supplemented by a similarly attractive political or societal vision.

4. A German Perspective

Whether we will see a “bipolar disorder”¹⁰⁴ dominated by China and the US or a multipolar “G-Zero world,” we have to ask ourselves two basic questions: firstly, which new elements would any future world order have to incorporate and address? And secondly, how do we protect our interests and position in such an in-between and multipolar world?

In response to the first question, we believe three features to be paramount: firstly, any order needs to address the unique circumstances of the 21st century. In the face of massive changes arising from technology and connectivity, it is impossible to build global or even regional governance with instruments from the 20th century. This includes aspects such as how we conduct diplomacy, how we communicate, how we build resilience, and how we engage with a multitude of new actors. We will not be able to do 21st-century math with an abacus. Policy planners have a particularly important role to play here, as they are often at the forefront of advocating reforms, new methods, and technologies. In this vein, incorporating new instruments such as scenario planning and early warning systems into our toolboxes would be one example of moving forward, while expanding capacities for strategic communication and the use of digital technology would be another.

Secondly, we need an open mindset for new concepts put forward by new actors. Both existing and new governance structures need to reflect the evolving landscape of the 21st century. Just because some of these institutions might not be those we have traditionally relied on in the post-WWII era (most of them based in Vienna, Geneva, Washington, or New York) does not mean that we cannot engage in them, participate, and collaborate. Sober analysis and our own interests and principles should guide us in dealing with geopolitical changes, not nostalgia for a bygone age or outdated ideology. To do this properly, it will be crucial to fully understand other actors’ concepts of a future international order.

In the same vein, it is important to incorporate actors that the system does not yet sufficiently consider or represent, such as (mega)cities, non-governmental organizations, international foundations, and corporations. They all exemplify the ongoing dynamic of globalization and trends that have the potential to turn out either beneficial or harmful for stability, growth, and the social fabric in and between societies. Including such actors in the decision-making processes will help to create joint ownership and responsibility for building the international order of the future.

Thirdly, it is our profound conviction that any international order must be built on the principles of cooperation, multilateralism, and the rule of law. These are of course the very values enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, which must remain a guiding principle for any discussion on a future international order. We subscribe to these values not simply because we have been a member of the UN since 1973. Just as importantly, Germany’s adherence to these values reflects our own war-ridden past, the subsequent success of European integration, and economic prosperity that is highly dependent on a rules-based order. Moreover, we believe that these values are of crucial importance for others, not least for countries that cannot or do not want to engage in a neorealist arena, in which zero-sum games prevail, spheres of influence partition the world, and power trumps the law. A multipolar world lacking these basic values would be highly susceptible to instability, or worse.

5. How Will Germany Take On the In-Between World?

It will probably come as no surprise that one part of the German answer will always be “Europe”. Not only has Europe and especially the European Union been crucial to the creation of a peaceful order in the continent after World War II, but European integration and its institutions have also served as guarantors of economic growth, prosperity, and wealth. But most importantly in this context, by developing its own unique model of sovereignty, integration, collaboration, and diversity, Europe has in itself become a feature in the debate on international order, one with an attraction all of its own. To be clear, the model of European integration is not meant to be simply transferred to other regions of the world. It is not a blueprint. However, we believe that its main components – multilateralism, the rule of law, and solidarity – are important pillars of any legitimate and stable order.

It is, therefore, clear to Germany that we will invest heavily in the continued success of the European project, in its cohesion, economic power, security, resilience, and ability to muster substantial political, economic, and military power. We want a Europe that is based on values, while also having the ability to be pragmatic and project power when necessary. We want a Europe that is able to lead and initiate, especially on issues such as climate change, technology, and trade, but also on connectivity, infrastructure, and development in Europe and its neighborhood. And we want a Europe that honors its close transatlantic partnership, yet fosters substantial and diversified relationships with Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America. Together with Europe and as a part of Europe, Germany is in a position to take on the competition over values and different international modi operandi. It is through and with Europe that Germany can play a formative role in a changing world order.

The second aspect is Germany’s commitment to NATO and the transatlantic alliance. Both are cornerstones of our security to which we remain deeply committed. With Germany’s long-standing transatlantic history, tradition, and overlap of interests and values, the relationships with the US and Canada continue to be essential for us.

It is clear that we can only strengthen both the EU and NATO by engaging with our two most important partners: France inside Europe and the US outside it. This is not only a consequence of history, but also reflects a realistic analysis of the present situation. Both countries are our single most indispensable partner for guaranteeing our position in the relevant multilateral organizations and, as is especially true in the case of the US, for safeguarding our security.

Thirdly, we continue to support multilateral mechanisms and institutions of regional and international governance. The UN will remain the most important actor and forum for international cooperation and we are determined to work as a driving force within the UN system. This determination is reflected in our continued financial support, our commitment to UN peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and our efforts to support the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Germany is also an outspoken supporter of the UN when it comes to its reform efforts. This pertains especially to the organization’s efficiency, structures, and missions, but also includes improvements in representation. Germany, along with Brazil, India and Japan, therefore strives to play a constructive role in reforming the Security Council. Only with such reform will the Council be able to fully regain its legitimacy and reflect the demographic, economic, and political make-up of the 21st century.

The fourth aspect is our understanding of the rule of law as the decisive pillar of a fair, stable, and legitimate international order. Upholding international law such as the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, or the WTO rules is paramount to us. At the same time, we will be a constructive partner when reforms are needed and new rules and regulations have to be found. This applies particularly to the cyber sphere, disarmament, and autonomous weapon systems.

The fifth aspect is diversity. The fuzziness of the 21st century world order and its less demarcated alliances mean that more States than before will pursue flexible and multi-vectorial policies. At the same time, a growing number of States is becoming more self-assertive and adopting a more active role internationally. Germany has understood both these trends and is ready to engage globally. This is particularly true for Africa, Asia, and Latin America. New partnerships can help to foster trade, investment, and growth. More importantly, such cooperation has the potential to lead to stronger support for a rules-based order. To get there, however, our rules-based order must be less about liberal market ideologies and instead more about social justice and “order dividends” for everyone. In turn, a higher level of support and legitimacy would mean a greater chance of forging compromises when tackling transnational challenges such as climate change, migration, or terrorism.

This issue of diversity pertains especially to the role of middle powers and liberal democracies. It will become more important for these actors to create their own networks and pool resources, especially in countering any rising trends of big-power dualism or unilateralism. Thinking in – at times overlapping – networks requires the old mental maps to be rearranged. Yet such networks could have wider positive effects. As middle powers and liberal democracies are often most susceptible to an erosion of international law and multilateral mechanisms, they have an intrinsic interest in becoming a cornerstone of a rules-based order.

This leads to flexibility as the final element delineating the German take on this in-between world. We are moving towards a world order that is characterized by more actors, more ad hoc and short-term agreements, more flexible coalitions, and more regional solutions. In addition, bilateral relationships are becoming more and more complex. A relationship can often no longer be defined by one singular category, as all labels – partners, competitors, or even enemies – might be applied simultaneously. It will, therefore, be important to replace ideology with flexibility and exchange path dependency for pragmatism.

6. Outlook

When do orders fade and others take their place? History teaches us humility, and urges us to examine our own viewpoints self-critically. At the Congress of Vienna, Metternich showed himself to be extraordinarily prescient: the injection of the power of the people into politics that had started with the French Revolution would change everything. The Austrian Chancellor sensed the coming demise of the old order. Still, from 1815 onwards it would take another century for this pressure to bring about a complete change to the world order: Most of the empires that had been victorious in 1815 eventually collapsed in 1918. By comparison, the post-WWII order seems to be proving relatively short-lived after all and we can no longer be sure if 1989 will prove to be a lasting marker for the emergence of something new.

At present, we seem to live in a time of parallel orders, overlaps, and frictions. This turmoil also shows us that parts of the current international order need to be updated. If the rules, institutions, and mechanisms of the 20th century are not made fit for the 21st century, which is marked by technological revolution, geopolitical power shifts, and increasing frustration with the apparent deficiencies of the current structure in delivering satisfactory results, these rules, institutions, and mechanisms will simply not survive.

We should be sanguine in our approach to this phase of transition. As discussed, the international order has always been subject to change; a pragmatic and flexible take is needed for the 21st century. The current trends neither spell out the end of the “Westernistic” order¹⁰⁵, nor do they indicate that a liberal international order will – eventually and in the absence of more attractive models – prevail.¹⁰⁶ It is important that we see beyond such binary notions, which encompass only antagonism or failure, clouding our vision of the world as it is.

Furthermore, we should not perceive this need for an update solely as a threat. The shifting landscape could also be an opportunity – an occasion to update our current set of rules and institutions, a chance to find like-minded partners to join us in this endeavor of preserving, modifying, and creating a common set of rules, institutions, and – ideally – inclusive and global governance solutions. Even though this quest can at times seem like an uphill battle, we should approach it with optimism. While a positive outcome is not guaranteed, there is a great opportunity to evolve as a foreign policy actor and to reach out to new partners.

It is equally important that we do not compromise on fundamental elements and principles in which we firmly believe. Democracies need to become more resilient against authoritarian tendencies; their characteristic features such as transparency, open debate, and democratic institutions, however, are the most effective instruments for countering this threat. We are thus entering this current competition over values and models with a healthy dose of confidence. Political and social participation, a rules-based order, individual freedom, and a focus on sustainability and social justice have been and will continue to be highly attractive, especially to those who do not have the power and resources to sway others with different means.

The ongoing competition and the gray zones characteristic of such a transitory phase make planning, predicting, and advising very challenging for policy planners and can even create the temptation to only operate on a tactical level. Yet in order to navigate the uncharted waters of an evolving world order, an underlying compass is needed now more than ever, one guided by long-term interests, values, and principles. In these in-between times, Germany aims to be a voice of reason, a voice to rely on, a voice to offer alternatives, and a voice that will always be guided by a firm commitment to peace, freedom, multilateralism, and a rules-based order.

EUROPEAN UNION

PREPARING FOR PREDICTABLE UNPREDICTABILITY

STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

Alfredo Conte
Julia de Clerck-Sachsse

Summary

Confronted with an ever more fluid global environment, strategic planning has become more difficult and yet more important than ever. This chapter traces the European Union’s experience of strategic planning at a time of considerable uncertainty. It demonstrates that in times of global upheaval, the European Union is ready to engage on a global scale and to contribute to peace and security internationally. To confront today’s challenges and reap the benefits of the current global circumstances, forging closer global partnerships will be essential. At the same time, greater flexibility will be needed to adapt to the requirements of a rapidly changing world.

1. Introduction: Strategy Making in Times of Uncertainty

In times of uncertainty, strategic planning has become more important than ever. In the midst of a proliferation of crises and a 24-hour news cycle, it is essential to stay ahead of the curve to be able to set and shape the international policy agenda instead of merely reacting to it. This implies having a firm core of principles and priorities. For the EU, it is also essential to develop a clear perspective on where it can add value for its member States and to the overall aim of achieving global peace and prosperity.

Today’s world is caught in the tension of the global challenges of an ever more connected world and their local consequences. Terrorism and transnational crime spread in ungoverned places, radicalization thrives on poverty, while poor governance, climate change, and conflict drive war and destruction that can also lead to mass displacement and migration.

People around the world understand that events in places far removed from them have the capacity to affect their day-to-day lives, sometimes with dramatic consequences. At the same time, these phenomena can feed the temptation to try and escape increasing global connectedness by turning inwards. Populist leaders thrive on this sentiment. They promise a return to the “good old times” by shutting out the rest of the world, turning against ‘the other’, and entertain the illusion that the negative effects of globalization can easily be overcome by “taking back control”.

In the wake of growing unpredictability and fluidity of the global strategic environment worldviews that are geared towards confrontation and competition rather than cooperation have gained new currency.

In this context, the European Union has made it clear that it takes its global responsibilities seriously and will engage more prominently in external affairs. The EU Global Strategy, presented in 2016 in the midst of uncertainty for Europe and the wider world, presents a compass to navigate uncertain times. It does so by outlining the Union’s core interests, principles, and priorities. This makes it clear to the rest of the world what we as a Union stand for and helps our members to rally around our core beliefs and priorities in times of crises.

In the European Union, we believe that the current fluidity of the global system also brings opportunities to reform and reshape the international order in a way that reflects new political and economic realities. We are guided by the overarching aim to work with partners towards upholding a rules-based international order. It is clear that none of today’s most pressing challenges can be tackled by any one power alone.

In addition to new powers, regional organizations, cities, and non-State actors play an increasing role in global affairs. With a view to the growing importance of identity politics in global affairs, religion also exerts an increasing influence. As a result, the European Union focuses on responsible engagement tailored to the interests and needs of our partners and a joined-up approach that transcends policy silos.

To confront today’s challenges and reap the opportunities that the current reordering of international relations presents, the EU engages with partners around the world on the basis of its interests and values in a flexible and agile manner. A core aim of this global engagement is to protect and further develop a rules-based global order while at the same time charting the way for reform and innovation.

This chapter starts with the assumption that in order to prepare for a more peaceful and prosperous future, we need to adopt a much broader concept of security than has been traditionally the case. Fighting against climate change and for better education is as much a contribution to global security as is fighting terrorism and cyber attacks. This means not only focusing on a broader range of policy areas, linking up internal and external policies; it also means including an ever wider range of actors in global diplomacy.

To illustrate this new understanding of security, the chapter goes on to focus on four overarching fields of activity for our foreign policy. It starts out with the need to develop stronger European capacities for security and defense policy, both in terms of the level of ambition as well as the capabilities that can deliver on a wider agenda. While focusing on hard security and defense will be crucial to achieve this, it is not enough. This is why the European Union commits itself to an integrated approach to conflicts and crises. The integrated approach considers all stages of a conflict, focusing on human security, and aims wherever possible to prevent conflict and defuse crises before they erupt. The chapter goes on to develop the concept of resilience, which underlies the idea of responsible engagement that the EU promotes. In an unpredictable strategic environment, it is paramount to focus not on stability as an aim above all, but instead to promote ways for States and societies to adapt to changing strategic context, preventing crises and conflicts and, where these do erupt, to recover more quickly from them.

A central priority for the European Union will be to uphold a rules-based global order at times when this is increasingly contested. We are convinced that as the world becomes more complex, cooperation in pursuit of joint interests and values is the most effective way to tackle global challenges and prevent war. Pursuing competitive agendas that see international relations as a zero-sum game will only breed more confrontation and instability.

A red thread running through our global engagement is the pursuit of global partnerships. The European Union is itself a microcosm of cooperation. Seeking compromise and finding joint solutions to shared challenges, while at the same time reaping the benefits of pursuing common interests, is in our DNA. In a rapidly changing global environment, it is also clear that we need to be more adaptive in forming multilateral as well as bilateral alliances on the basis of our core interests and values.

2. A Global Understanding of Security

One of the most dramatic developments of our times is the increasing link between the internal and external dimension of policies. This implies the need to upgrade our approach to security, notably by taking a broader focus than the traditional one. Security spans policies from climate and energy to health and economic development. The rapid spread of global pandemics, the impact of climate change or the ripple effect of the war in Syria are just a few examples of how internal and external aspects link.

Today, providing a secure and prosperous future for our citizens hinges on providing energy security and managing migration, as much as on tackling climate change, fighting terrorism and hybrid warfare. Sustainable healthcare, education, and community dialogue can do as much for our security as border monitoring and the training of security forces.

For the European Union promoting human rights, sustainable development, or tackling climate change is a direct investment in sustainable security and peace. We know that peace cannot be secured with tanks and checkbooks alone. Sustainable peace means that people need to believe that a better future is possible.

Take the example of Syria, where the European Union invests heavily in the education of children who fled their homes as well as those who are still in the country. We are also providing essential humanitarian aid in Syria and the region to help those that are in most dire need. We take the same approach in Ukraine, where our support for the country ranges from creating new economic opportunities to building up the judicial sector, from civil society support to energy security. As a result, we ensure that all aspects of security are considered in our approach, focusing above all on preventing conflict wherever possible and keeping human security at its heart.

3. Taking Responsibility for our Security

The last twelve months have seen momentous developments in the area of security and defense of the European Union. Instruments of hard security remain an essential component of our security, even if, when considered alone, they are not sufficient. Cooperation among member States is increasing with the Union aiming to prove its value as a cooperation platform that helps its members achieve their security objectives in cooperation with others.

Still, looking into EU documents dealing with security and defense, there is a certain ambivalence between priorities being mentioned but with no clear sense of prioritization among them. This cautious approach can best be explained by a legitimate EU concern aiming at preserving some necessary margin of maneuver, protecting existing human resources and, above all, respecting EU member States’ and third countries’ sovereign choices. These concerns are legitimate to the extent that they do not paralyze the need to bring new and out of the box thinking into EU institutions.

The EU Global Strategy has defined five priorities for the years to come. To deal with them, the European Union does not have infinite time, funding, and human resources. This means that, among all priorities, only a few will be implemented and even fewer will be recognized as successful. One of the tasks of EEAS Strategic Policy Planning Department is to accompany these legitimate concerns while presenting open scenarios and political options. To be successful, in the years to come, clear choices have to be made.

3.1. Defining Critical Priorities on Security and Defense

A critical security priority is one which is at the heart of EU security values: defending the Union’s population, its territory and ensuring the supply of its critical needs. This is why the Global Strategy has clearly targeted terrorism and organized crime, illegal migration, cybercrime, and energy security as essential priorities to protect EU citizens and EU infrastructures from inside and outside threats. Today, EEAS reflection on these topics remains compartmentalized. The role of the EU Strategic Planning is to strengthen a flexible and interdepartmental dialogue on topics that evolve rapidly. A political reflection on Counter-Terrorism (what is next after Daesh and de-radicalization), organized crime (what are the links between counter-terrorism and organized crime?), EU critical infrastructures protection (is this protection really effective today?), or cyber defense could be useful.

3.2. Taking Responsibility

Contrary to its member States, who are sovereign in their political choices, the European Union sometimes feels it is not entirely free to establish a hierarchy among political priorities, mainly due to potential divergences of views among EU member States. This is a legitimate concern, but one that can be addressed. The EEAS has the legitimacy to make proposals that may at first not be echoed by all member States but will be respected if they are well articulated with sound reasoning. Strategic Planning, because of its unique mandate to think long term with a strategic perspective, has a role to play to open up this kind of new thinking.

4. Investing in Resilience at Home and Abroad

Resilience is a concept that has received growing attention from policy-makers in a wide range of fields. The G20, for example, has recently adopted guidelines to promote economic resilience, while NATO sees resilience as a core element of collective defense. Many people were nonetheless struck by how prominent a place resilience has in the EU Global Strategy. With EU Ministers endorsing the strengthening State and societal resilience in 2017 as a strategic priority of the EU’s external action, why has this concept emerged as such a powerful organizing factor in EU foreign and security policy?

To answer this, it is useful first to look at how the Global Strategy describes the EU’s external environment and how it seeks to reframe the way in which the EU will pursue its interests and defend its values.

The Global Strategy describes a complex, interconnected and contested world, where the pace of change is increasingly rapid and the pressures on States, communities, and societies is increasingly disruptive. These pressures range from demographic, migratory, and climatic challenges beyond the power of single States to influence, to the unintended consequences of global economic integration, the erosion of societal cohesion within a State through poor governance or unmanaged conflict, violent extremism, and the deliberate acts of hostile powers to destabilize perceived adversaries. They affect not just the interests of our partner countries, but also have a direct impact on the interests of the citizens of the Union.

The EU’s external policy has traditionally been predicated on its role as a provider of global public goods – development, humanitarian and environmental; as a contributor to norms; as a defender of universal values; and as a peace and security actor. In other words, the greater part of EU external policy has been about affecting positive change in third countries and building multilateral collaborative regimes. The Global Strategy re-states the EU’s commitment to this agenda. But, in an important shift, it also underlines that in a more fluid global environment of risk, the EU is not insulated from the pressures affecting its partner countries. In defending its values, the EU must also defend its interests. In this sense, EU external policy is beginning to resemble more the classic pre-occupations of national foreign policy. What we are seeing, as a result, is a much tighter integration of the EU’s internal and external policies, particularly in the area of security.

This is where the concept of resilience comes in.

Resilience is a measure of how a system – which in this context means a State, a society, a community, or an essential public service – maintains its core purpose and integrity under pressure. Those pressures may be sudden-onset shocks (e.g. war, recession or earthquakes), recurrent (e.g. drought, ethnic conflict), or long-term stresses (demographic or migratory pressures, protracted crises).

For the European Union, resilience is a measure of adaptabil-
ity to societal change, political, economic, environmental, and demographic pressures. In this sense, it is an important dimension of inclusive sustainable growth, and the prevention and mitiga-
tion of violent conflict. Resilience is also a measure of the capacity to maintain the core functions of a State, social and political cohesion in a global environment of increased risks. In this sense, it is an important factor of peace and security.

When we understand the factors of resilience in a given context, it can help us to plan against pressures and contingencies in a more effective manner. The concept of resilience provides an analytical lens through which to increase the positive impact of interventions by taking better account of both the political context and power relations, and the inter-linkages between the vulnerabilities and risks that affect States, societies, or communities. It can help identify and build upon strengths while addressing weak links. It recognizes the capacity of communities to identify adaptive strategies while forcing us to think about the capacity and willingness of States to reform to meet the developmental and security needs of its population.

The last two years have seen the culmination of a global process to identify, quantify, and address some of the major strategic challenges facing the world. The Sustainable Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction represent an unprecedented body of international consensus on the strategic objectives to pursue, and the means needed to achieve them.

The EU and its member States shaped this body of work and is now taking the lead in its implementation. Taken together with the major review of the European Neighborhood Program and of relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, and the establishment of a new level of ambition for the EU’s security and defense policy, the European Union is establishing a robust framework of policy to guide its external action, anchored in the EU Global Strategy and linked to commitments it has taken at a global and regional level.

The European Union’s approach to resilience aims to anchor progress towards these goals. It marks what some have seen as an attempt to reconcile a more realist view of the world with a continued commitment to the values upon which the Union is founded, a balance encapsulated in the EU Global Strategy as “principled pragmatism”. It aims to foster an approach that combines a long-term focus on our strategic goals, with the short and medium term flexibility to react to pressures and shocks that would otherwise threaten them. It is an approach that requires putting in place mechanisms to anticipate emerging pressures so that the necessary public policy response can be made in time to prevent, mitigate, or recover from them.

The novelty of this approach is threefold: it offers a dynamic, rather than static concept of sustaining progress; it presents a departure from the linear models of development that have often been used in the past; and rather than looking exclusively at resources and inputs, it asks us to look at institutional, social, and political dimensions of a problem in a holistic manner.

The power of the conceptual framework that a resilience approach offers was quickly recognized among practitioners in the European Union. But in developing an operational policy around it, we had to work through three main debates:

How do we maintain the right balance between developmental and security policy objectives? For a number of member States preoccupied with the security dynamics on their borders, “resilience” needed to be about equipping friendly neighboring countries with various forms of defense and recourse against the coercive actions of hostile third countries, and about better identifying and addressing external threats to the EU. For others, resilience was primarily a way of improving the effectiveness of our development and humanitarian assistance, and for ensuring that we could meet commitments under the SDGs and Paris agreements.

Is resilience an objective in its own right? A means to an end? Or a process? We took the view that resilience is a characteristic of a system, and that while it could be useful to identify factors of resilience (say in an economy, or in a liberal democracy, or in a defense alliance), we should not seek to prescribe these in normative terms.

What are the risks of promoting State resilience? A recurrent critique that we heard of the concept of resilience in the EU Global Strategy is that it tended to favor regime stability over good governance. Authoritarian regimes can indeed appear quite resilient, given their ability to suppress dissent. However, we explicitly distinguish between the deceptive and often brittle forms of stability that authoritarian regimes foster, and instead work with a concept of resilience that is grounded in respect for human rights and effective institutions of governance.

5. A Multilateral Order Fit for the 21st Century

The European Union’s commitment to a rules based multilateral order with a strong United Nations at its core remains the cornerstone of our external policy. In the world of unprecedented interdependence and numerous worldwide challenges, we see the UN as a foundation for internationally coordinated local and global responses serving universal security, sustainable development, and preservation of the global commons. This is why the EU Global Strategy makes strengthening and further developing a global order based on international law a central priority.

The international environment is safe and prosperous when neighborhoods are stable, international law and agreements are respected, multilateral arrangements serve resolution of crises, and co-operative regional and global orders prevail.

Our goal as a Union has been to expand peace, to deepen partnerships, to develop international co-operation, and to strengthen rules. We intend to be a reliable global partner and security provider. We see investing in multilateralism and in the UN system as an investment in our own European security and the well-being of our citizens.

At the UN General Assembly this year we presented an ambitious and forward looking range of initiatives to strengthen and structure the EU-UN partnership and at the same time support ongoing reform efforts at the UN. The European Union strongly backs the reform agenda of UN Secretary-General António Guterres and his efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the organization across the three respective pillars.

Forging partnerships with like-minded countries and organizations across the world is an important element of our agenda of multilateral co-operation on peace and security. There are high hopes for such multilateral partnerships with partners, including the region of Latin America and the Caribbean.

As a strong and vital partner for peace, security, and human development, we want to strengthen multilateral co-operation on crisis management and joint work on preventive diplomacy and mediation. With the enhanced toolbox that we have been developing and more effective instruments that we apply through our integrated approach to conflicts and crises, we work towards prevention of new human tragedies, like those created by wars and mass migration resulting from conflicts. The European Union is actively engaged in the UN processes leading to the adoption of Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees.

The EU will continue to lead on and deliver on the commitments on sustainable development and climate change. An important strand remains the implementation of the Paris Agreement and drawing synergies between different policy areas in order to deliver effective results. We underpin the Sustainable Development Goals within the new European Consensus on Development. Driving reform in the EU development policy, the SDGs also inform the renewed partnership with the ACP States post-Cotonou.

The European Union’s support to democracy, human rights, women empowerment, and good governance runs like a red thread through all its policies. Our latest initiative dedicated to the elimination of all forms of violence against women and girls was launched within the framework of last year’s UN General Assembly meeting.

An important element of multilateralism remains economic exchange. We work towards a balanced, transparent, values-based, and progressive European trade policy to harness the benefits of globalization. Concluding open and fair trade agreements is an important part of our efforts to defend our strategic interest, while at the same time creating mutual benefits, promoting international standards, making use of economic opportunities, and creating jobs and growth.

The European Union actively co-shapes effective global governance. Our core activities are based on partnering with States and organizations, as well as with non-State actors, civil society, and the public sector. Support to regional stability and prosperity may manifest itself via strengthening co-operation with regional orders, another EU objective. Partnering strategically in that respect has a potential to strengthen the multilateral order.

This commitment to co-operative multilateralism is important to both regional and global security. In times of uncertainty our efforts to strengthen the multilateral order is a central aspect of addressing a growing range of global challenges.

6. Partnering Strategically to Advance Shared Values
and Interests

At times of growing contestation, it has become all the more important to partner strategically with a wide range of actors, State and non-State, to pursue shared interests and values that can underpin global security and prosperity. As most global challenges today present an intricate mix of local, regional, and global dynamics, in addition to strengthening longstanding alliances and partnerships, we also need the flexibility to build new partnerships specifically tailored to tackle the issues at hand.

This means we are taking a new approach to engaging in our neighborhood, to our east and south, which focuses on State and societal resilience, tailored to the needs of each in individual country and region. We are working with partners in Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Middle East to forge a partnership of equals where we set priorities together, identify the problems and opportunities together and take joint responsibility on reaching our common goals. We believe that deepening global partnerships is the best way to advance our interests and values with the overall aim of upholding agreements on global commons from which all our societies benefit. They are also central to sustaining and reforming a rules-based multilateral order that binds all of us in a joint effort to advance global peace and security.

Our dedication to upholding a rules-based multilateral order includes a firm commitment to work with regional partners around the globe. EU relations with Brazil are an excellent example to illustrate the European Union’s multifaceted approach, combining strong historical and economic bilateral relations with each of the EU member States, a Strategic Partnership with the European Union, regional engagement through Mercosur and CELAC, and strong cooperation at the multilateral level, not least through the UN and the WTO. Our partnership spans a particularly broad range of policy areas and actors and has demonstrated a deep mutual commitment to work together on the basis of shared values. This does not mean agreeing on every topic, but agreeing to engage in honest, constructive, and mutually respectful manner.

6.1. Partnerships with Non-State Actors

The broad understanding of security that underlies the EU Global Strategy means that foreign policy can no longer be the domain of diplomats alone. Partnering strategically involves not just State actors, but increasingly a wide range of non-State actors. This is why our diplomacy focuses increasingly on civil society and the private sector as well as on religious groups.

The European Union has made support for civil society groups around the world a core aim, helping to fight back against tendencies in some parts of the world to restrict the space in which it can operate. We are also aware that the private sector is an essential partner in building sustainable peace and prosperity. Businesses need a stable environment to operate and invest. Together with many civil society groups, they are often strong advocates of reforms that favor the rule of law and independent institutions. The European External Investment Plan is a good example of how the European Union helps establish a stable environment for businesses to invest in and in turn to create jobs and stable incomes for societies ravaged by conflict.

We are also investing in strong relations with religious groups around the world and have stepped up cooperation in international fora to do so. The EEAS together with the United States State Department has established a network (the so-called Transatlantic Policy Network on Religion and Diplomacy – TPNRD) which includes diplomats from the EEAS, USA, Canada, Switzerland, and ten European member States. We have also stepped up our in-house expertise to help us and our partners recognize the different shades and forms of religion we encounter in foreign policy and how to engage when religious concepts or realities enter our diplomatic work.

7. Conclusion

We live in a world of predictable unpredictability. Today, the connections between local, regional, and global dynamics have become much more intimate. New powers have risen, and new actors beyond the State have entered the scene. As a result, power is much more diffuse, and sometimes elusive, than we would have ever imagined.

In Europe, we see this diffusion of power as a challenge, but not as a threat. Sharing sovereignty, in order to strengthen accountability and effectiveness in the exercise of power, is in our DNA. It opens new opportunities to combine forces and reach new horizons. Europe has the strength and the history that makes it able to understand and shape complexity. In a world where power is increasingly shared, acting alone, driven only by short-term considerations, is not playing it safe. It is suicidal. In Europe, we have learned that when we lose sight of our shared interests and act alone, it is painful at best and disastrous at worst.

At a time when global dynamics risk pulling us in different directions, the European Union is committed to charting a way for a cooperative global diplomacy underpinning a world order based on the force of law and not the law of force. At the heart of our strategic planning as we go forward, is not the attempt to predict the future. It is the recognition that by rallying around our core beliefs and priorities, we will be able to shape our future. Instead of being pulled into a zero-sum game of global competition that will undermine peace and spread insecurity, we strive to build partnerships and work towards a cooperative order that that can provide peace and prosperity for all.

CHILE

FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES 2030¹⁰⁷

M. Del Carmen Domínguez
Camila García

The best-laid plans of mice and men
often go awry.

Robert Burns

Never have Robert Burns’ words been truer that in today’s highly dynamic world; one shifting so quickly that it’s difficult to understand and assimilate the impact and, even harder, to anticipate and prepare for changing circumstances. Policy planners are sidelined as the ever-changing daily national and international political landscape is addressed by harried and multitasking foreign ministers.

There is an increase in protectionism, nationalism, and xenophobia and the withdrawal of key actors from international and regional accords is troublesome. We are also in the midst of an economic power shift, a move from bipolar to multipolar, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Further complicating our work is the (re)emergence of some problematic trends. The threat of nuclear warfare, which at some point seemed to be negligible, has reared its ugly head, and conflicts between State and non-State actors have multiplied. Migration has risen to almost unsustainable levels, as people escape from terrorism, political and economic instability, warfare, and natural disasters, the latter being often a byproduct of climate change.

At the domestic level, voters are disengaged and distrustful of local and national leaders, who seem incapable of responding to the challenges, be it inequality and discrimination in all its forms, the impact of climate change, or ending protracted conflicts.

All this takes place in a context of rapid scientific, technological, and innovative change, which cannot be discarded but rather must be incorporated fully into our policymaking.

Furthermore, in September 2015, all 193 UN member States agreed to implement Agenda 2030 and its seventeen SDGs, seeking to achieve sustainable development, as countries mobilize efforts to eradicate poverty, fight inequalities, and tackle climate change, while ensuring that no one is left behind. This framework for global, regional and national action is integral to foreign policy today, as it is the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, adding more complexity to policymaking.

Paradoxically, as we need more leadership, at the national and multilateral levels there seems to be a growing lack of consensus, as many countries and leaders focus inwardly, rather than search for common responses.

The “new normal” forces us to permanently review foreign policy objectives and adapt our actions, so as to take advantage of new opportunities, while building on the old ones. This is not an easy task, as the much needed stability when it comes to foreign policy can be challenged, particularly given the multiplicity of actors in the international arena, the number of complex issues to be addressed, and the growing demands of our citizens for effective and transparent policies. Nonetheless, continuity must be preserved given that it provides credibility and substance.

A year ago, the Directorate of Strategic Planning of the Chilean Foreign Ministry addressed this new world, bringing together a crosscutting, interdisciplinary group of stakeholders to discuss what Chile, a medium sized and middle-income country, could be in the year 2030 and how foreign policy could contribute to the achievement of that goal. All this taking into account the challenges in the domestic and international fronts.

This exercise allowed us to identify the main trends shaping the international scene, to define where Chile should play a role and who should be its partners; highlight our foreign policy priorities; and discuss the actions that would contribute to the ultimate goal: inclusive and sustainable development. The horizon of the year 2030 was chosen as a reflection of the continuity in the pursuit of our national interests that goes beyond any presidential term, as well as for being the target year for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The debates and discussions were based on certain assumptions. First, Chilean foreign policy is and will continue to be based
on three main principles: i) respect for international law and the promotion of peace, democracy, and human rights; ii) the promotion of free trade, closely aligned with sustainable development and inclusion for the most vulnerable; and iii) the responsibility to cooperate with other nations and institutions. These principles ensure coherence and cohesion regionally and internationally and underlie our position as a country that builds consensus among different partners, identifies opportunities for joint responses to global threats, and resolves conflicts by peaceful means.

Secondly, we once again acknowledged that our development is highly dependent on events abroad. A political crisis in a neighboring country might entail thousands of migrants crossing our borders, a shift toward internal consumption in a major trading partner could affect negatively in the exports of our commodities, or an oil spill somewhere in the Pacific could have a long-term impact on our marine biodiversity.

In parallel, Chile is bound by commitments in numerous international, regional and bilateral treaties and accords, including the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the 2030 Agenda and its seventeen SDGs, as well as our more than 50 trade agreements in place. We must live with this reality, maintaining a certain level of flexibility to adapt to the trends, while complying with our international obligations.

Furthermore, Chile wishes to build on its trade policy success story. Its emphasis on opening markets and creating new opportunities for the private sector, has spurred economic growth, generated wealth, and created new opportunities. Today, 26 trade agreements allow preferential access for Chilean products to 64 economies, equivalent to 86% of the world production and 63% of the global population. Among these agreements are the Pacific Alliance, the Association Agreement with the European Union and the new Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), as well as Free Trade Agreements with the United States and China.

In the next decade, the challenge for trade policy will be to ensure and expand these achievements in accordance with the evolution of the 21st century’s economy and the transformations undergone by our trading partners. To meet this goal, we need to jumpstart negotiations for new agreements and update the existing ones; cut down-tariff barriers; promote the export of services promoted; support the attraction and promotion of investments; and include labor, environmental, and gender chapters aimed at expanding the overall benefits for all.

We must also consider complementary mechanisms so that the benefits of trade liberalization are available to different actors and sectors of the economy, in order to involve small producers/firms of goods and services. These efforts can be enhanced through developing regional value chains for large world markets.

Once the above-mentioned premises were accepted, we gauged which internal and external factors would be key to the maintenance of our place as a country known for its commitment to democracy, its open and healthy economy, the efforts to reduce extreme poverty and discrimination through a mix of effective economic and social policies, and the defense of peace, human rights and the environment. This status was achieved with the participation of all Chileans and through an active foreign policy. It is part of our “soft power”, an asset that we cannot afford to squander.

Lastly, we examined various areas of our foreign policy and defined priorities. Again, we looked closely at the trends and their impact on Chile and the region, at the alignment of our domestic and international agendas and, last but not least, at what actions and areas are fundamental for our sustainable development.

As a result, we confirmed the centrality of our relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, especially with our close neighbors, the growing role and opportunities in the Asia Pacific region, the need to modernize our trade agreements and open new markets, the importance of development cooperation, and the relevance of multilateralism to maintain peace and security and strengthen democratic institutions, and the defense of human rights. In addition, we explored our future role in relation to strategic issues, where we may have comparative advantages, such as the protection of the marine environment, Antarctica, astronomy, renewable energies or technological change, and the growing importance of alliances with like-minded parties in these new areas.

In light of the above, we came up with a series of actions, establishing a basic roadmap for a foreign policy that can help us move towards a more developed, stable and equitable Chile by the year 2030. In view of the rapid pace of change, these projections should be regularly reviewed in the coming years.

Focus was placed on some key areas – regional integration (Latin America and Asia Pacific); future work with the United States and the European Union and other regions; and multilateral challenges, including emerging issues – while defining the steps needed to reach our goals.

1. Regional Integration

No shortage of threats and opportunities can be identified in Latin America and the Caribbean in this day and age: scarcity of natural resources; a burgeoning middle class and increased intra-regional migration; the impact of climate change on oceans, agriculture, melting of icecaps, and the movement of people from the country to the city; governance challenges, and disruptive technologies. In addition, the region is made of essentially middle-
-income countries, a category not fully recognized internationally, but one that entails more responsibility with less foreign aid, technical assistance, or even attention.

The best response is integration. It is from a Latin America and the Caribbean standpoint that Chile speaks to the world. Together we can present a shared vision that reflects our realities, needs, and challenges, even though there are diverse economic and political perspectives on how to advance the development of the region. Recognizing these differences is an act of political realism since there will always be some conflicting interests within the region, but it does not mean that we cannot seek common views. This belief underlies the concept of “Convergence in Diversity” coined by Chile.

Closer integration will not only increase trade and investment among our countries but would also create new opportunities and initiatives that benefit students (scholarships), women (empowerment initiatives), and business people (visa-free movement), among others.

There is a strong association between long-term foreign policy goals and regional integration. Advancing in this area is urgent for improving regional interconnection and to achieve more efficient links with other parts of the world. By 2030, we will hopefully have turned rather declarative statements into more infrastructure, gigabytes, and megawatts crossing borders. This requires action on three fronts: border crossings, digital connectivity, and energy. It also includes clear targets to build roads, ports, and tunnels, as well as advancing on energy integration, communications and transportation.

Within this framework are the construction of the bi-oceanic corridors (Puerto Murtinho-Puertos, Cristo Redentor System passage corridor, Las Leñas) and new and improved border crossings (Agua Negra tunnel, Central Transandino railway, among others). At a minimum, three border crossings with Argentina in different latitudes (North, center, and South) operating 365 days a year should come to fruition. In addition, we must toil to cut down the red tape in order to facilitate the transit of goods and people.

On energy integration, together Latin American and the Caribbean can advance toward a market of regional surpluses to guarantee energy security, with a broad and long-term perspective. For that to succeed we must build upon the growing links with Argentina and Peru, so that by 2035, the interconnection of Chile with the other member countries of SINEA, as well as with other South American countries, particularly those of Mercosur, is a reality.

To finance these projects, we must not only rely on existing mechanisms such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) but also on two sources underused to date. First, the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) to which Chile could be incorporated as a type A shareholder. Secondly, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – to which Chile has recently adhered – facilitating the scope of projects required in the region. In addition, we should develop more public-private partnerships and innovative financing mechanisms, given that most countries in our region, given their middle-income status, cannot count on official development assistance or concessional loans.

Chile can be a facilitator of integration between the two main economic blocs in our region, the Pacific Alliance (Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru) and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay). This effort should not be restricted to trade, but rather be translated into ambitious productive and technological commitments, which would help moving towards more complex value chains.

As far as trade is concerned, one of the greatest challenges within the region is the adoption of provisions in trade agreements that improve compliance. This implies strengthening measures to reduce and eliminate non-tariff barriers, in addition to improving the regional infrastructure.

The constitution of a regional free trade area is possible by 2030. According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 80% of intraregional trade already benefits from tariff preferences. A regional trade negotiation would include exceptions, but it would also serve as a powerful stimulus to harmonize the multiple existing norms and respond to protectionist pressures.

The agenda with our neighbors (Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia) complements very well bilateral and regional links with the rest of Latin America. We are working closely with Latin American and the Caribbean countries on the creation of the necessary physical and digital infrastructure to promote the free movement of goods, services, and capital within our region. Likewise, our closest partners on issues such as the environment, migration, energy, defense, science, technology, risk management, institution building, the promotion of human rights and democracy are in the Americas.

As Chile continues to consolidate its status as one of the countries with the highest rates of development, economic growth and institutional stability in our region, South-South and Triangular Development Cooperation will have an increasingly relevant role in strengthening ties, particularly with Central America and the Caribbean.

Cooperation efforts are currently focused on areas in which Chile has generated expertise, such as technical cooperation and capacity-building; humanitarian assistance and gender; and natural disasters management. These include cooperation projects on social development, protection of the environment, use of natural resources and renewable energies, reduction of risks of natural disasters, territorial and local development, and agriculture and food security. The expansion of these issues together with the increase in the number and type of stakeholders, increasingly non-States actors, are new challenges facing Chilean development cooperation.

To ensure that cooperation remains an important part of our foreign policy, administrative and resource management procedures should be improved, and bilateral and triangular cooperation mechanisms already in place, should be strengthened. At the bilateral level, an increase in available resources for the Chile Fund should be favorably considered.

Additionally, when it comes to triangular cooperation, it is important to constantly enhance the evaluation schemes for the proper functioning of the different cooperation mechanisms, especially with traditional partners such as Mexico, Australia, and Canada, regional blocs such as the European Union and multilateral organizations such as the World Food Program and the United Nations Agency for Food and Agriculture.

At the core of this cooperation policy is the fulfillment of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which provides common ground for cooperation and exchange of best practices at different levels, including bilaterally, regionally, and within international organizations, such as the UN and the OECD.

2. The Asia Pacific Region

The economic weight of the Asia-Pacific will continue to increase, particularly in China, India, and Indonesia. This new status quo will have an important impact on the world in the coming decades.

Experts agree that in order to achieve a stronger connection to Asia, it is important to increase intra-regional trade and investment and to deepen physical and digital connectivity between South America and Asia. Such actions require stronger alliances, regionally and bilaterally.

Likewise, it is necessary to establish broader and deeper people-to-people relations with Asia, including through increased tourism, visitation, flow people, the development of networks among civil society organizations, strengthening language skills, and learning the culture and customs of our Asia Pacific neighbors.

With that in mind, it is essential to promote the specialization of officials of the Chilean Foreign Ministry and to re-examine our diplomatic missions in the region, in terms of physical and human resources, as well as, the opening of new consular and trade offices, especially in provinces that have a population close to 100 million inhabitants.

Regarding trade, reorienting the promotion of our exports, moving from raw materials to more competitive products with higher added value, is especially important in Asia, as emerging markets offer greater opportunities than consolidated markets with higher barriers to entry, such as the European Union or the US. Greater access for goods and services initially left out of previous agreements and the inclusion of mechanisms that reduce new trade barriers must become an integral part of our negotiation toolbox.

A crucial part of these efforts is the approval and imple-
mentation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which involves the economies of eleven countries of the Asia-Pacific region, representing 15% of the world’s GDP. The CPTPP reflects a new paradigm of doing business in the context of sustainable development, since it goes beyond reducing trade barriers by incorporating provisions on governance, labor, and environmental standards. We must recognize that many of these provisions, originally developed bilaterally, with Canada, the United States, and the European Union, have served us well.

Faced with the growing proliferation of trade agreements, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) could play a relevant role in deepening regional economic integration by promoting the harmonization of standards and institutions. The roadmap to increase the competitiveness of services by 2025 is a topic of special interest for Chile, consistent with our national strategy to promote this sector.

In this sense, the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) could become a reality, constituting the largest free trade zone in the world, providing new momentum to the members’ economies and taking regional economic integration to a higher level.

To move this forward, Chile could also host APEC once again before 2030, in line with the growing importance of the Asia Pacific region to our country.

Chile should build upon its adhesion to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN, to have a closer approximation in the three key pillars: security and defense, cooperation for development, and trade.

Regionally, the Pacific Alliance has also become a successful platform for closer links with the Asia Pacific region, as the negotiations of ambitious trade agreements between the Pacific Alliance and the four future association members (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Singapore) illustrates. There has been a shared interest among the Pacific Alliance countries in establishing joint trade promotion offices in countries and cities of economic interest.

An additional task as a region will be to implement the Action Plan that is currently being put together between ASEAN and the Pacific Alliance, which will provide momentum for more trade and investment between the Pacific Alliance and Asian markets.

Our bilateral relations with China are both important and intense, covering a broad range of areas, such as trade, investment, cultural diplomacy, and educational exchanges with an emphasis on scientific-technological issues.

We fully acknowledge the demographic and consumption transformations that China is experiencing. This can be an opportunity, as the Chilean agro-industry is able to respond to the growing demand for countercyclical seasonal produce by Chinese consumers. Chile should also promote and attract greater Chinese investment. For this, we must recognize cultural differences and seek opportunities in sectors of interest, such as energy, mining and services. Three mechanisms should consolidate the attraction of Chinese capital by 2030: i) The Agreement to Avoid Double Taxation of January 2017; ii) the establishment of a branch in Chile of the Chinese Bank of Construction, and iii) the incorporation of our country to the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (BAII).

At the regional level, the CELAC-China Forum – a reflection of China’s growing interest in the region – can improve coordination between the CELAC countries and come up with initiatives that will benefit both China and Latin America and the Caribbean. Lastly, the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative could be an important platform for building closer links in key areas of which digital infrastructure is a prime example.

3. Future Work with the United States, the European
Union, and Other Regions

3.1. United States

It is essential for Chile to continue strengthening our trade, economic and investment ties with the United States, our second trading partner and principal investor, as well as the main destination for our non-copper shipments and service exports. Chile and the United States are developing triangular cooperation programs in Central America. Santiago and Washington collaborate closely in various regional processes such as the Summit of the Americas, the Pacific Alliance, and APEC.

In the area of defense and security, the United States has been a key partner for Chile such as cybercrime, peace operations, and joint military operations. Additionally, Chile is the only Latin American country that benefits from the US Visa Waiver Program.

Chile should increase ties at the State level, especially those sharing common interests or traditional relationships. This will allow us to deepen our relationship with the United States as a whole; and, in the future, will lead to working on specific topics with greater density, connecting people and ideas. Today, the Chile-California, Chile-Massachusetts, and Chile-Washington State Plans have become important contributions to the bilateral agenda, not only through scholarships and programs for the preparation of human capital, but also by addressing relevant issues such as energy, education, technology, and health.

This State level work will feed into a broad agenda with the United States; one including science, technology, and innovation, taking advantage of the existing openings which could be expanded and strengthened, providing us with knowledge and tools decisive for the future of the country. An example of this is Chile’s Production Development Corporation’s (CORFO) International Centers of Excellence Programs which seek to promote better and stronger links between companies and the world of knowledge, complementing the capabilities of the national ecosystem in the areas of science, technology, and innovation (e.g. CEI UC Davis Chile and the Emerson-Chile International Research Center).

3.2. The European Union

The European Union and its 28 member States have been close allies of Chile on the basis of our shared fundamental principles regarding democracy and human rights, the protection of the environment, climate change, and ocean governance. Our future agenda focuses on issues such as innovation, astronomy, and scientific cooperation, as well as close political, trade, and investment issues.

It is up to Chile to take advantage of a renewed Chile-European Union Association Agreement, which covers the trade dimension, but also opens up new opportunities for cooperation on political, multilateral, and cultural issues. This updated version of the agreement will lead to progress in emerging areas such as Innovation (R & D, productivity, etc.), Science, Technology and Digital Agenda (Copernicus and astronomy), Environment, Climate Change, and Oceans, all of which are fundamental issues for Chile’s development. In addition, it will allow us to deepen spaces of strategic interest, such as the mining sector, industries, investments, services, the modernization of the State, and decentralization.

Chile has signed with the EU a specific agreement on international security focusing on cooperation in peace initiatives, including peace operations. Chile should continue to participate in operations such as “Althea” and maintain a permanent dialogue with Brussels to implement initiatives supported by the United Nations Security Council.

3.3. Africa

Africa is a continent with great vitality and prospects for growth by 2030 and beyond. Chile must dedicate attention and resources to position itself among the partners that this continent will require for its progress.

The continuation of the development cooperation agenda, materialized through technical cooperation projects via the Chile Fund and the Nelson Mandela Scholarships, will be central to strengthen the Chilean presence in Africa, generating trust and, at the same time, contributing to the achievement of the SDGs and the strengthening of institutions within our partners in the continent.

With the same perspective, we have sought in recent years to articulate an institutional framework to increase trade and position Chilean goods and services in Africa’s growing industry and middle-income sectors. Investing in Africa could also be very interesting for medium-sized entrepreneurs in light of blossoming opportunities in agriculture, aquaculture, services, manufacturing, forestry, mining, among others.

In 2016, according to data from the Chilean Central Bank, Chile’s exports to Africa represented 0.31% of total national exports and are mainly concentrated in South Africa. This means that there is an enormous potential to increase trade ties with a continent that, according to estimates, to will supply domestically only 13% of its food demand by 2050.

The recently-installed Trade Offices in Casablanca and Johannesburg will be key in this strategy. The first will focus on opening spaces in the north of Africa and the second in the southern African region. We can also build upon the work already done on a trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and on closer trade and cooperation links with Morocco and Egypt.

4. Multilateral Challenges

The multilateral order – whose main pillar is the United Nations, but also integrated by other international organizations and forums, both global and regional – has been a high-performance political space for Chile, used successfully to increase its soft power and its capacity to influence foreign affairs. Multilateral diplomacy is the diplomacy of globalization, which offers countries of limited “hard” power (surface, population, natural resources, GDP, military capacity), the opportunity to intervene in global governance, which is vital for the success of a development model based on openness.

Chile has managed to establish itself as a serious, reliable and cooperative actor of the global community. This diplomatic profile has had a positive impact on our bilateral relations, particularly in the neighborhood.

Today, the multilateral agenda is a set of “global commons” or global public goods, whose provision and defense is the responsibility of each and every member of the international community. Global threats to security – from armed conflict to pandemics, including terrorism and organized transactional crime – cannot be addressed individually by any State, no matter their size and power. By definition, global threats transcend national and regional borders and can be addressed solely through international cooperation.

Given this context, global challenges both threaten Chile and open opportunities to stand out and exercise leadership deriving from its multilateral experience and its ability to articulate consensus and operate in “like-minded” groups.

Amongst the global public goods, the pillars of peace and security, human rights and democracy, and sustainable development are of special interest to Chile.

4.1. Human Rights and Democracy

The defense and promotion of human rights and democracy are at the core of Chile’s multilateral foreign policy. It is highly desirable, therefore, to maintain the lines of work defined since 1990 regarding the support Chile lends to the global system of protection and promotion of human rights – civil and political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights – and our commitments to fight violence and discrimination in all its manifestations. The latter is even more important in view of the 2030 Agenda and its commitments.

Combating gender inequality and protecting human rights in the context of migration are subjects that will acquire increasingly more importance, especially as a result of the impact migrants have in the development path of the country, as well as the absence of modern regulation, in the case of migration. Our participation in the negotiations of the United Nations Global Pact on Migration reflects the importance of this new phenomenon and will allow us to work more closely with allies within our region (the source of most migrants entering Chile), as well as with like-minded countries in other regions.

Finally, it is undeniable that companies have a fundamental role in the protection of human rights. Therefore, another challenge is to increase the adherence to the National Action Plan on Business & Human Rights.

4.2. Peace and International Security

Chile has collaborated in the design and advancement of a global international security agenda that incorporates the so-called “new” threats, among them, the world drug problem, transnational organized crime, terrorism and human trafficking, among others.

We have also promoted the assimilation of the interdependence of the three pillars of the multilateral system in the operationalization of collective action (for example, peace operations). It is important to continue promoting an interdisciplinary approach, with a preventive focus that highlights the social dimension of conflict prevention and politically motivated violence.

As a candidate for the 2029-2030 period to the United Nations Security Council, we will once more face the challenge of occupying a seat in a key instance of global governance. This will include the continued participation of Chile in peacekeeping operations and missions adopted by the Council, as well as the continued implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security and 1820 (2008) on sexual violence in armed conflicts, in our missions and nationally.

It is on this basis that Chile has contributed to peace and security, through our long-term participation in the stabilization of Haiti, as well as our role in the peace negotiations between Colombia and the FARC and today between Bogotá and the ELN. In the same vein, we have sought, along with other countries in the region, to promote dialogue in countries in conflict. This will to contribute toward the objective of peace has become part of Chile’s DNA.

Chile’s Foreign Policy must also continue to increase its presence the Middle East and Africa while promoting peace and peaceful solution of conflicts. This includes: exchanging best practices on transitional justice and institutional strengthening with the countries of the region that are undergoing peace-building processes; being open to participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN Security Council; and targeting cooperation projects for development with countries and banks in the region.

The renewed risk of armed conflict, including nuclear ones, make it necessary for Chile to maintain and intensify, as the case may be, its traditional activity in forums and global mechanisms of disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, relying on the “like-minded” groups that we integrate. A key concern is to preserve Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace. It is also necessary to support the implementation of the central instruments of International Disarmament Law and International Humanitarian Law.

In parallel, our country must participate in the multilateral debates that are addressing the development of weapon systems activated and operated by artificial intelligence. This topic will become increasingly important as technology evolves and becomes more accessible.

5. The “New” Emerging Multilateral Issues

5.1. Environment, Oceans, and Antarctica

The adaptation to climate change and global warming and their consequences are among the main challenges for humanity. With this in mind, Chile, through the Paris Agreement, has committed to reducing its emission of greenhouse gases by 30% by 2030. A decision that includes the sustainable management of 100,000 hectares of forest and the recovery of another 100,000, measures equivalent to almost 600,000 CO2 tons per year.

As a country highly susceptible to natural disasters, Chile needs to maximize its cooperation in the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, as well as the internalization of the concept of Disaster Risk Management, which seeks the resilience of society, institutions, and communities towards disasters.

As a consequence, Chile has developed a strategic vision for Antarctica while considering its importance in terms of natural resources, as well as Chile’s potential as a gateway to this continent. Promoting and implementing this vision will be a permanent task in the future as would the reaffirmation at the multilateral fora of the importance it attaches to the protection of Antarctica in all of its dimensions.

Similarly, Chile should maintain and increase the global leadership it has achieved in matters of oceanic protection and conservation. This means continuing to raise the issue in the international agenda, implement the recent Oceanic Policy, including the vast marine protected areas, and continue to innovate in ways to protect our oceans.

5.2. Science, Technology, and Innovation

Finally, due to the importance that science, technology, research, and innovation (STI) have in the development of countries, Chile must insert itself even more deeply into the international networks of STI as a way to strengthen and diversify its trade, modernize industries, and project itself as an exporter of sophisticated technology-based services.

In addition, Chile has the conditions to project itself as a “natural laboratory”, as a country with optimal conditions for astronomy, and a platform for “Big Data” services and future “Big Science” projects. This may be possible through the generation of a virtual network among our national graduate programs of excellence and the expansion of the Chile Scholarship abroad program, together with strategic partnerships, such as those established with some regions of countries, such as the States of California, Massachusetts, Washington, in the United States; and São Paulo, in Brazil.

6. Final Thoughts

As the world has become more complex, so has foreign policy-making. Diplomacy is as essential to navigating these choppy waters as are planning and exercising foresight. This means that Foreign Ministries must develop this capacity. Diplomats and foreign policy professionals must develop new tools and skills, including a broader cultural know-how and the capacity to quickly adapt to changing circumstances, while managing multiple variables (political, economic, strategic), when defining policy.

Like in all areas, this will require working with others in the international community, in particular with regional allies and like-minded nations, to better understand the ongoing trends and challenges and define the best practices, thereby also creating resilience to change.

This important exercise put together by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry is one such effort.

UNITED STATES

POLICY PLANNING IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

PRINCIPLES, PRIORITIES, PRACTICES

Brian Hook

In his memoir Present at the Creation, Secretary of State Dean Acheson summarized former Secretary of State George Marshall’s view of the role of the Policy Planning Department:

The General conceived the function of this group as being to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them. In doing this the staff should also do something else – constantly reappraise what was being done.

While Policy Planning has always retained a prophetic character, Marshall’s vision of Policy Planning as a think tank sequestered from the “sturm und drang” of daily events did not unfold completely according to plan. There is likely not a Policy Director, or equivalent, on earth who has not found himself, by necessity, attracted into “the smoke and fire of current battle.”

Over the years, the Policy Planning department has by necessity often been preoccupied with fighting each day’s battles, rather than surveying the horizon from the mountaintop. In the words of President Eisenhower, the urgent has a tendency to crowd out the important. Nevertheless, the State Department’s Policy Planning unit has always maintained an operational capacity for considering what is to come. So it is the case for the Trump Administration.

As we look ahead, we see a resurfacing of old themes in international affairs. The world is a competitive place. The assumptions many foreign policy theorists made at the end of the Cold War about a convergence of interests among various powers as we reached the “end of history” were proven wrong. Over the previous two decades, many expected that powers, from China to Russia, from Iran to North Korea, would gradually join the community of responsible nations that abide by certain key principles of political freedom, adherence to the rule of law, and economic fair play. This has not happened. Great power competition is back, and the National Security Strategy released last December states this with clarity.

To compete effectively, America needs allies. The multiple threats we face come in various forms and are dispersed across various regions. They target, first and foremost, the core of American strength: our alliances. Geopolitical solitude is dangerous. While the United States will continue to provide security guarantees and other forms of support, the first responders to such threats need to be the allies themselves. First responders have to be local responders. To support our allies, the Trump Administration is committed to maintaining America’s historic role as a truly global power.

Our first instinct and overwhelming preference is to use diplomacy for the furtherance of our interests and those of our allies.

***

That commitment to our allies begins with America’s engagement in the Western Hemisphere. The United States seeks friendship and stability with our neighbors through the common threads of strong economic ties, security relationships, and support for democratic governance. During the Trump Administration’s first year, former Secretary of State Tillerson clearly signaled that the stability, prosperity, and sovereignty of the states in the Western Hemisphere is in the strategic interest of the United States.

Much of our hemisphere is facing a key moment in 2018. With elections in many of the major economies, including Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and several others, populations are poised to signal a new direction that will set the tone for years to come. The recent regional trend favors pragmatic, accountable leadership that focuses on bringing results, and if the trend holds, this presents a real opportunity for the region to move away from destructive ideologies.

The core challenge is for candidates and regional leaders to make our democratic systems work better, for more people, and to do so more quickly. Growing dissatisfaction with democratic governance, political parties, and the status quo is on the rise and it is incumbent on regional leaders to respond to this with durable solutions, not failed models of the past. Ensuring fair democratic governance is in the self-interest of all nations in the Western Hemisphere. Democratic states connected by shared values are more likely to work together to reduce the violence, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration that threaten our common security, and will limit opportunities for adversaries to operate from areas of close proximity to us.

The United States views our relationships in the Western Hemisphere through the prism of opportunity. What distinguishes the United States from other world powers engaging in the Western Hemisphere is our desire to achieve our goals through partnership. Russia and China have a more transactional approach to the region. China seeks to pull the region into its orbit through lopsided infrastructure and loan arrangements. The United States will pursue its interests, but, recognizing that our prosperity is shared, we do so with a consideration for what is best for our partners.

We recognize, for example, that the United States, Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean are facing a historic opportunity to build out a more flexible and robust energy system in our hemisphere. By taking advantage of energy resources, together we can lift more people out of poverty. And we can make our hemisphere the undisputed seat of the global energy supply.

By 2040, North America is expected to add more oil production to the global markets than the entire rest of the world combined and more gas production than any other single region. The flow of crude oil, natural gas, refined products, and electricity already crosses our borders in both directions, leading to greater reliability, more efficiency, and lower costs to consumers. Many countries in Latin America have significant undeveloped oil and natural gas resources. The United States is eager to help our partners develop their own resources safely and responsibly, as energy demand continues to grow.

Taking advantage of this opportunity requires the opening of more market economies. The opening of energy markets in Mexico, for example, has led to greater private investment, more competition, and more energy trade with the United States than ever before. Further south, we are partnering with Central America to strengthen its regional electricity market and modernize its grid. Creating stronger Central American economies by lowering energy costs is critical to building a more secure Central America. In South America, we believe the focus on linkages and breaking down barriers to trade, through infrastructure development and trade facilitation and energy development will help lower energy costs, spur economic growth and opportunity. The United States looks forward to building these modern partnerships across the region.

On other economic fronts, we are modernizing our trade agreements and deepening our economic ties with the region and ensuring that trade is fair and reciprocal. More broadly, it is the Trump administration’s conviction that the benefits of trade must be more widespread and felt by a wider swath of our population. In other nations, we will encourage further market-based reforms and transparency to create conditions for sustained prosperity.

It is impossible to build thriving economies in an unstable security context. The United States is committed to addressing se-
curity and development issues side by side. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are the most immediate security threat to the Western Hemisphere. By some estimates, transnational crime now consumes up to 3% of the gross domestic product of South America and the Caribbean. In some Central American countries, the damage is more than double. In their pursuit of money and power, TCOs leave death and destruction in their wake. As humans, weapons, opioids, and other drugs are smuggled, law enforcement and civilians become the targets. We understand that it is often US. demand for drugs that drives this violence and this lawlessness. We acknowledge our role as the major market for illicit drug consumption. We are seeking solutions based on this understanding, and in partnership with supply countries that have also not escaped the ravages of these criminal organizations.

That is why we continue to employ a coordinated, multilateral approach to diminish the influence of criminal organizations. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and the Alliance for Prosperity in Central America are essential tools for sustaining security in the hemisphere. Pursuing security in our bilateral relationships is equally important. Our expanded dialogue with Mexico on TCOs and our longstanding partnership through the Merida Initiative are essential as is our continued deep cooperation with Colombia and other South American states including Peru, Argentina, and Brazil. Although there is much work to be done to destroy drug network supply chains at the source, the toll that drug consumption imposes on society motivates the United States to remain eager and willing in the fight.

***

America’s commitment to maintaining our global influence and advancing our values extends far beyond just the Western Hemisphere. The Indo-Pacific, including the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and the nations that surround them, will be one of the most consequential parts of the globe in the 21st century. America will compete in that region.

One of the most important geopolitical developments of the late 20th and early 21st century is China’s economic ascendance. Levels of migration from the countryside into cities, the scale of which is unprecedented in world history, have helped spur the growth of a Chinese middle class. China has expanded its economic reach deep into places like South America and Africa. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is seeking to attract many nations into its orbit through increased foreign direct investment in infrastructure projects.

But China’s actions in pursuit of power and influence have not been entirely benevolent. China’s provocative actions in the South China Sea directly challenge the international law and norms that the United States and our partners in the region stand for. Its financing arrangements with countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka have disproportionately benefited China and have forced the countries into debt-for-equity swaps on unfavorable terms. The United States seeks constructive relations with China, but we will not shrink from China’s challenges to the rules-based order. Nor will we shy away when China subverts the sovereignty of neighboring countries and disadvantages the United States and our partners and allies.

The United States is willing to be a partner with any nation in the Indo-Pacific region that shares our values of a rule-based order, national sovereignty, free markets, and democratic values. One such partnership that the United States is pursuing – with an eye toward the next one hundred years – is our relationship with India. India’s youth, optimism, democratic underpinnings, and growing stature on the world stage makes it a natural partner for the United States. It is time to grow closer ties with a democratic partner who is rising responsibly. Our two countries can be the voice the world needs, standing firm in defense of a rules-based order to promote sovereign countries’ unhindered access to the planet’s shared spaces, be they on land, at sea, or in cyberspace.

In particular, India and the United States must foster greater prosperity and security with the aim of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Home to more than three billion people, this region is the focal point of the world’s energy and trade routes. Forty percent of the world’s oil supply crisscrosses the Indian Ocean every day – through critical points of transit like the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz. And with emerging economies in Africa and the fastest growing economy and middle class in India, whole economies are changing to account for this global shift in market share. Asia’s share of global GDP is expected to surpass 50% by the middle of this century.

We need to collaborate with India to ensure that the Indo-Pacific is increasingly a region of peace, stability, and growing prosperity, not one of disorder, conflict, and predatory economics.

The world’s center of gravity is shifting to the heart of the Indo-Pacific. The US and India – with our shared goals of peace, security, freedom of navigation, and a free and open architecture – must serve as the Eastern and Western beacons of the Indo-Pacific.

First, we must grow with an eye to greater prosperity for our peoples and those throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans. By the year 2050, India may boast the second largest economy in the world. India’s population – with a median age of 25 – is expected to surpass that of China’s within the next decade. Getting our economic partnership right is critical.

Economic growth flows from innovative ideas. Fortunately, there are no two countries that encourage innovation better than the United States and India. The exchange of technologies and ideas between Bangalore and Silicon Valley is changing the world. Prosperity in the 21st century and beyond will depend on nimble problem solving that harnesses the power of markets and emerging innovations in the Indo-Pacific. This is where the United States and India have a tremendous competitive advantage. Our open societies generate high-quality ideas at the speed of free thought. Helping regional partners establish similar systems will deliver solutions to 21st century problems.

But for prosperity to take hold in the Indo-Pacific, security and stability are required. The fact that the Indian Navy was the first overseas user of the P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft, which it effectively fields with US Navy counterparts, speaks volumes of our shared maritime interests and our need to enhance interoperability. The proposals the United States has put forward, including for Guardian UAVs, aircraft carrier technologies, the Future Vertical Lift program, and F-18 and F-16 fighter aircraft, are all potential game changers for our commercial and defense cooperation.

We must train our eyes toward including other Indo-Pacific nations which share our goals, and equip other countries to defend their sovereignty, build greater connectivity, and have a louder voice in a regional architecture that promotes their interests and develops their economies. We welcome those who want to strengthen the rule of law and further prosperity and security in the region.

In particular, our starting point should continue to be greater engagement and cooperation with Indo-Pacific democracies. We are already capturing the benefits of our important trilateral engagement between the US, India, and Japan. As we look ahead, there is ample room to invite others, including Australia, to build on shared objectives and initiatives. It is also important to acknowledge the important role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific, as member States have long served as close partners in promoting stability and prosperity in the region. We look forward to continued collaboration with ASEAN across the Indo-Pacific region.

***

As we consider our security relationships, we have encouraged nations to assume greater responsibilities for maintaining their own and our shared security and stability. Nowhere is this more true than in the Middle East. The destabilizing effects of terrorism in Muslim-majority nations have taken untold numbers of Muslim lives and suppressed economic, social, and political ambitions. Eradicating terrorism is the first step in helping many nations in the Middle East achieve their full potential.

In May 2017, President Trump traveled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Islamic American Summit. It was there that he issued a call to action to leaders of Muslim-majority countries, insisting they more aggressively combat terrorism inside their own borders and counter violent extremism abroad:

When we see the scenes of destruction in the wake of terror, we see no signs that those murdered were Jewish or Christian, Shia or Sunni. When we look upon the streams of innocent blood soaked into the ancient ground, we cannot see the faith or sect or tribe of the victims – we see only that they were Children of God whose deaths are an insult to all that is holy.

But we can only overcome this evil if the forces of good are united and strong – and if everyone in this room does their fair share and fulfills their part of the burden.

Terrorism has spread across the world. But the path to peace begins right here, on this ancient soil, in this sacred land.

America is prepared to stand with you – in pursuit of shared interests and common security.

But the nations of the Middle East cannot wait for American power to crush this enemy for them. The nations of the Middle East will have to decide what kind of future they want for themselves, for their countries, and for their children.

It is a choice between two futures – and it is a choice America cannot make for you.

A better future is only possible if your nations drive out the terrorists and extremists. Drive. Them. Out. Drive them out of your places of worship. Drive them out of your communities. Drive them out of your holy land, and drive them out of this Earth.

Greater burden-sharing among Middle Eastern allies is a necessary countermeasure against terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. But President Trump’s rallying cry was an encouragement to stop all terrorists in the Middle East, not just those affiliated with al-Qaeda, ISIS, and related groups. The Iranian regime is the world’s foremost State sponsor of terrorism. Through its network of proxy forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria and the Houthi rebels in Yemen, it has sought to destabilize legitimate regimes in the Middle East. In its pursuit of regional hegemony, Iran seeks a territorial “Northern Arch” stretching from Iran, through northern Iraq and Syria, down to the Israeli border. In the face of such a threat, the President’s presence at the Gulf Summit in Riyadh reassured partners throughout the region that the United States is committed to helping them counter Iran’s attempts to alter the balance of power in the Middle East.

The United States’ strategic push in the Middle East and elsewhere, encouraging nations to take on a greater responsibility for their own security, flows out of an acknowledgement of this reality: the nation-State is the organizing principle of the international order. Each nation-State must exert its sovereignty in the pursuit of its interests. The less nations exert sovereignty toward security, prosperity, and liberty, the more each nation is at the mercy of other nations and non-State actors. In an age in which terrorists, rogue regimes, hackers, drug cartels, and other threats carry out operations with alarming speed and precision, nations cannot have an expectation that the protecting power of other nations will always be sufficient to provide for their security interests. As President Trump said in his speech to the United Nations in September 2017: “All responsible leaders have an obligation to serve their own citizens, and the nation-State remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition.”

This importance of sovereignty underlies the United States’ approach to North Korea. Since March 2017, the United States has undertaken a pressure campaign of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the DPRK. The pressure campaign is intended to motivate North Korea to come to the table for serious negotiations on complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. This campaign has been undertaken in concert with an unprecedented number of allies and partners. Additionally, the UN Security Council has passed three unanimous resolutions imposing the toughest sanctions against North Korea in history. Our strategy does not make vague demands on “the global community” to hold North Korea accountable. In nearly every bilateral meeting, former Secretary of State Tillerson asked other countries how they can contribute to the pressure campaign. The combined efforts of individual nations acting in concert with one another are holding the Kim regime accountable for its illegal nuclear and ballistic missile activity. And as a result, we know from intelligence and open sources that sanctions are beginning to have an adverse effect on the Kim regime.

Much ink has been spilled in the press fretting that the United States is abandoning the international order and our time-honored alliances. The United States will remain an ironclad member of the NATO alliance and all others, one committed to deterring and defending against common threats. But we ask that nations assume a greater share of the burden for common defense, as NATO nations have already committed to do under the Wales Pledge.

In the past decade, the situations in Georgia and Ukraine, election interference in Western democracies, and most recently, the assassination attempt of Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom attest to a resurgent Russia willing to employ hybrid warfare tactics. While the United States will always help those we have committed to help, including by honoring Article Five of the NATO treaty, local threats such as Russian aggression demand local responses.

Similarly, the President’s new strategy for security, peace, and reconciliation depends in large part upon Pakistan’s willingness to eradicate instigators of terrorist activity and stamp out terrorist safe havens inside its own borders. This willingness to work with Pakistan attests to the fact that sovereign nations working together need not be mirror images of another if they desire common goals. As the President told the UN:

We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government. But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation. This is the beautiful vision of this institution, and this is the foundation for cooperation and success. Strong, sovereign nations let diverse countries with different values, different cultures, and different dreams not just coexist, but work side by side on the basis of mutual respect.

***

To return to Acheson’s memoir, the former Secretary wrote, “Our difficulty is that, as a nation of short-term pragmatists, accustomed to dealing with the future only when it has become the present, we find it hard to regard future trends as serious realities.” Perhaps we can revise Acheson’s observation: the future never instantly becomes the present; it is always making incursions into it, whether they be gradual or sudden.

Strengthening relationships in the Western Hemisphere, expanding engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, and convincing allies and partners to assume greater burdens reflects a prudential calculation, based on observable trends, of how important these initiatives are to American security and prosperity tomorrow. Of course, these are not our only areas of focus; omissions of policy areas in this essay do not signal their unimportance to the Administration or the American people.

The Policy Planning Department will continue to plan for all critical issues that will be with us ten or twenty years from now: China’s aspirations, stopping terrorists in cyberspace, achieving stability and peace in Syria, and many others. In every area of foreign policy, it is our job to consider what comes next, even as it happens now.

SINGAPORE

THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER OF THE 21ST CENTURY

A VIEW FROM SINGAPORE

Tommy Koh

From 1947 to 1991, the world was divided into two rival blocs: the Eastern Block led by the Soviet Union and the Western led by the United States. During this period, which is often referred to as the Cold War, the international order was clear. It was a bipolar world and countries were under pressure to choose sides. Those who did not want to align themselves with either superpower, chose instead to join the Non-Aligned Movement which Singapore was a member of and remains so today.

1. End of the Cold War: Unipolar World

This stable international order came to an end in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For a while, we seemed to have lived in a unipolar world, a world dominated by one hegemon, the US. We can be certain that this period began in 1991 but there is no agreement on when it ended. In 2008, Fareed Zakaria published a book, titled “The Post-American World”. His central thesis was that, a Post-American World order is emerging in which the US will continue to be the most powerful nation but its relative power will be diminished. Zakaria believes that a historic power shift is taking place. Power is shifting from the US towards several emerging countries, especially China and India.

2. Post-American World

Zakaria’s book appeared in the same year as the collapse of the venerable American bank Lehman Brothers, which triggered a chain reaction that placed the US financial system and economy in great jeopardy. Many feared that the US would plunge into another Great Depression, like the one from the 1930s. That did not happen, but the prestige and credibility of the US were badly dented. It would not be wrong to say that the unipolar world ended in 2008, if not earlier.

3. World in Flux

If we do not live in a bipolar world or a unipolar world, what kind of a world do we live in?

I think the answer is that we live in an increasingly multipolar world. The US is still the most powerful pole and the world’s only superpower. Economically, however, the world’s largest economy is not the US but the European Union, leaving the US as the second largest economy. The third largest economy is China, which is rapidly catching up with the US. Japan is in fourth place, followed by Germany, the UK, France, and ASEAN, in that order. In terms of economy size, China is on track to overtake the US in the next few decades. China’s per capita income is, however, relatively low. It will take several more decades before China’s per capita income will match that of the US.

In terms of military power, the US is in a class by itself. No country or combination of countries can match the military power of the US. However, China is making rapid progress in this respect. I interpret President Xi Jinping’s recent address to the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to mean that China aims to be a superpower by the year 2050. The second most powerful pole is clearly China.

What are the other poles in the global system? I would mention Japan, India, Russia, and Brazil.

3.1. Russia

Russia is a pale shadow of its former self, the Soviet Union. However, Russia is still a great military power and has not hesitated to use its military power against its neighbors. It has also intervened successfully to support President Bashar Al-Assad in the Syrian civil war. Economically, Russia has become overly dependent on its oil and gas resources. It has not succeeded in
using its natural resources and talented people to build a First World economy. Nevertheless, Russia is a pole in the international order.

3.2. Japan

Japan is a First World country with a First World economy. The country is very competitive in several sectors of the economy. It has world-class companies and deep strength in Research and Development. However, its bright economic future is threatened by a shrinking population. To survive and prosper, Japan has to overcome its cultural allergy to accepting new immigrants.

Politically, the current government seems determined to amend its so-called Pacifist Constitution and to become a “normal” country. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution outlaws war as a means to settle international disputes involving the State. The Pacifist mood of the Japanese people is being affected by North Korea’s policy to acquire nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles. If Japan’s policy objective of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is unsuccessful, and if the country were to harbor any doubts about the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella, I foresee the possibility that Japan will amend Article 9 of its Constitution and become a great military power, including by means of the development of nuclear weapons. Even without nuclear weapons, Japan is a pole in the international order.

3.3. India

India is the only country in the world that matches China in terms of the size of the territory and population. Although India’s economy is only one-fifth the size of the Chinese economy, it has the scale and potential to match China since the Indian economy is growing strongly at around 7% a year while the Chinese economy is maturing and slowing down.

The dynamic Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, is determined to drive India forward, expanding its manufacturing sector, building up India’s infrastructure, opening up the Indian economy, and establishing 100 smart cities. If India can grow at 7% per annum for the next twenty years, it will become a middle-income country.

India’s “Act East Policy” seems to have inspired the leaders of the US, Japan and Australia, to downplay the concept of the Asia-Pacific in favor of the new concept of “Indo-Pacific”. The leaders of the four countries have recently spoken about a “free and open Indo-Pacific”. The Quad has been reborn. China will no doubt see this as an anti-China coalition.

3.4. Brazil

With a territory of 8.5 million square kilometers and a population of over 208 million people, Brazil is the largest country in Latin America, the world’s fifth largest and sixth most populous country. Brazil’s economy is the eighth largest in the world. Until 2010, during the period of the commodity boom, Brazil was one of the fastest growing major economies. Brazil is a regional power with the potential to become a global power. If the country can achieve political stability, embrace good governance, and open up its economy to the world, it will have a very bright future. Brazil is, therefore, a potential pole in the international order.

4. Conclusion

The world is in a state of flux. For 44 years, from 1947 to 1991, we lived in a bipolar world. From 1991 to 2008, we lived in a unipolar world. Since then, the international order has become a multipolar one. The US is still the most powerful country in the world and the strongest pole. The second pole is China, the challenger. The other poles are Japan, India, and Russia. Brazil has the potential to become a global power and a new pole in the international order.

To finish up, I would like to add that the rise of China, India, and ASEAN are the three biggest growth stories of the 21st century. Unlike the situation in the US and parts of Europe, East Asia continues to believe in free trade, globalization, and multilateralism. There is, therefore, a better alignment between Latin America and East Asia than between Latin America and the US or Europe. We should seize this moment to establish or enhance the economic, political, and cultural links between the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur, on the one hand, and ASEAN and East Asia, on the other. As the leader of Mercosur, Brazil can lead the way.

SPAIN

The 21st-Century World Order: A Global Agenda¹⁰⁸

Ricardo López-Aranda

Introduction: A changing world

Contrary to what one might intuitively think, the job of a policy planner is not to try to correctly guess what the future will bring. That would be futile and even dangerous since a certain vision of the future can quickly become a cognitive bias that prevents us from recognizing new patterns and developments.

The task of a policy planner is rather to propose policies that allow us to be better prepared for future developments. For example, it is difficult to foresee if and when a nuclear arms race will take place, but it is possible to point out that the conditions for this to happen are increasingly present, and, therefore, to underline the relevance of preventive strategies, such as the nuclear agreement with Iran. That might look less attractive than providing visions from a crystal ball, but it is challenging enough since – and that would be a second feature of what policy planners do – calling to action on long-term trends is more difficult that one might think, as the attention of political practitioners tends to focus on a reality that unfolds in the short term.

So, once the disclaimer has been made – that a neat picture of the coming world will not be provided here – there is still one thing about the future that can already be anticipated: it will be quite different from the present, and different in ways we have difficulties in apprehending right now. The features of the present time tend to be perceived as permanent, but if we look back, what we consider now to be normal would be seen as unbelievable only a few decades ago, and the chances are that this tendency will accelerate.

The current rate of change is exceedingly rapid compared to previous periods of human history, characterized by economic, political, and technological stability. In an enormously interconnected world, events known as “black swans”, which can turn predictions upside down, are increasingly likely. Long-term trends that used to be quite stable also point to a global shift.

1. Global trends

Demography, to begin with, tells us that the global population will possibly stabilize at around 11 billion by the end of the century, from 7.6 billion today. Contrary to Malthusian predictions, this stabilization will not come out of the limitation of available resources, but mainly thanks to increasing education levels, especially of women, that usually accompany economic progress.

The UN World Population Prospects provides us with an approximate idea of what the distribution of that population will be like: Africans will double in number by 2050, and almost double again from that figure in 2100. By then, nearly 40% of the world population will be African, from a share of 16% at present. Despite largely declining total fertility rates in the Middle East and North Africa, the momentum of population growth will mean that this region will surpass China by 2100, reaching a billion persons, from 570 million today.¹⁰⁹

Asian population, on the other hand, will grow at a slower pace in absolute terms (with an increase of 500 million by 2100), but will decrease significantly in terms of its share of the world total, down to 43% from nearly 60% today (again, due to the comparative expansion of Africa and the Middle East).

Europeans, for their part, will be less present both in absolute and relative terms (close to 6%), whereas Latin Americans and North Americans will increase slightly in absolute terms, but decrease in relative terms, to around 6.5% and 4.5% of the world population, respectively. Taken together, those three regions, which today add up to 23.5% of the world population, will represent less than 17% in 2100. In Europe in particular, the working-age population will decrease significantly, while it will surge in Africa and continue to be high in the Middle East. This surge will bring growth opportunities to these regions, but also social and, therefore, political challenges, especially if job opportunities do not follow.

Another global demographic trend is urbanization and the spread of megacities. In 2050, 66% of the world population will live in cities, from 54% at present. The management of cities in environmental and mobility terms will be increasingly crucial.

Summing up, demographically, the 21st century will still be Asian, but much more African than it is today. Relative population decline and aging, particularly in Europe, and income differences between regions will make migration a crucial issue in the 21st century, a blessing or a curse, depending on how it is managed.

Even if Malthusian predictions are not bound to be fulfilled in their original formulation, we witness a new kind of Malthusian omen: the possible consequences of climate change in terms of resource depletion, in particular food and fresh water scarcity. These phenomena are set to affect particularly the population in tropical countries, which also tend to be poorer, and can have critical effects in already fragile environments, acting as threat multipliers with destabilizing effects. Two telling examples are the growing desertification in the Sahel, and the plight of small insular developing states in the Pacific, which face disappearance due to rising sea levels, a phenomenon which has the potential to also affect coastal cities and agglomerations (75% of the world’s large cities are located on coasts). In addition, climate change can impact economic growth, through the destructive effects of natural disasters, and also has financial implications, through rising insurance premiums.

As for the world economy, in little more than a century, the global GDP has multiplied by twenty, after millennia of relative stability. In the last 50 years, in particular, globalization has brought unprecedented levels of growth to developing countries and has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty.

But the Great Recession has left question marks on the ability of the world economy to provide growth and jobs as in the past, as many advanced economies experience a decline in their working-age populations and emerging ones reach maturity.¹¹⁰ In the case of advanced economies, this phenomenon is accentuated by lower productivity growth, an increasing propensity to save and a decreasing propensity to invest, which might result in what has been labeled as secular stagnation.¹¹¹ There are also indicators suggesting that global trade growth may be settling down on a new, lower trajectory.

Regionally, the rise of the Asia-Pacific region, which has been spectacular in the last decades, seems to be set to continue, albeit at a slower pace, to reach 53% of the world economy by 2050 (from 34% at present). By then, the Americas would represent 25%, Europe 15%, and the Middle East and Africa around 7%.¹¹² China, the US, and India will probably tower above other national economies. By 2030, two thirds of the world’s middle class will live in Asia, something exporting economies across the world are already factoring in. Economically, the world will be more Asian, but Europe and the Americas will still represent a sizeable part of it, and, in general, current highly-developed countries are likely to remain ahead in per capita terms.

For their part, a series of countries and entire regions across the globe (including India, most of Africa and many countries in the Middle East) are marked by a strong demographic growth and, despite their diversity, share a certain number of challenges. The key issue is whether their economies will be in a position to deliver a promising future, in terms of job opportunities, to the successive waves of young people arriving in the labor market. If not, the experience of the “Arab Spring” comes to mind, where the younger generations, many of them educated, translated their frustration with unemployment and economic and social stagnation into street protests, with known results. The emerging picture of a future economic environment, characterized by lower levels of growth and a technological change that no longer reward low wages – but which, on the contrary, will require infrastructures, advanced technologies, and skills – seem to indicate that the model of development that allowed for East Asia’s economic miracle cannot be extrapolated to the future evolution of other regions.

This potential lower growth and technological improvements, such as fracking, will also impact on the economies based on commodities exports, which should not expect soaring prices to boost their development as they have in the past, during the commodities super-cycle. In the case of crude oil, this tendency will be reinforced by the gradual shift towards renewable energies.

Additionally, although globalization has increased equality between countries, it has exacerbated inequality within societies, both in the developed and in the developing world.¹¹³ Some economists point out that capital returns tend to accumulate while labor revenues stagnate or dwindle, thus increasing inequality.¹¹⁴ Inequality, in turn, limits potential growth since the concentration of income in only a relatively small group reduces aggregate demand.

If globalization, in the shape of increased exchanges, in particular trade, has contributed to lifting millions out of poverty in the developing world, it has probably generated growing inequality in developed economies, since its low skilled jobs have suffered competition from developing countries, or have delocalized there, generating unemployment. In many countries of the developed world, the income of the median households has fallen. The subsequent sense of stagnation, coupled with identity issues, tends to generate social tensions that contribute to the rise of populism and nationalism and increase the likelihood of internal and international conflict.

The technological change humankind is experiencing also seems to exacerbate inequalities within societies. In the digital age, some highly skilled workers are much better off, but others face either redundancy or dwindling wages.¹¹⁵ The potential effect of new technologies on our future world is not limited, however, to rising inequality and growth. On the contrary, the development of ICT and biotechnologies is the single trend that is more likely to change the shape of the future world in ways we have yet to imagine. It will affect (and is indeed already affecting) not only the economy, society, and culture, but also the political sphere, creating new agoras for public debate, but also new risks of manipulation and social control by political power and private interests. It is indeed providing non-State actors, ranging from companies to terrorist groups, with the possibility to directly influence internal public opinions.

We are probably in the eve of an epochal change that will include the extension of life expectancy thanks to biotechnologies developments and a mutation in the relation between work and wages, as the use of AI and robotic devices is generalized. This is a massive challenge to which an answer will have to be found as it fully unfolds.

Finally, the world is also shaped by the way we perceive it, and our ideas are the lenses through which we filter reality. They can even go as far as defining our identity.¹¹⁶ And in many quarters the perception is gloomy.

It seems indeed of no help to positively know that we are living in the best of times, in terms of life expectancy, literacy, health, safety, and nearly any other indicator of human welfare.¹¹⁷ On the contrary, we are witnessing a wave of pessimism, at least in developed societies.¹¹⁸ Nationalist and xenophobic ideologies are on the rise, and in many quarters, migrants are made a scapegoat of all ills, especially in countries that are in demographic decline and whose identity feels threatened. The gloomy way advanced societies see their present probably has to do with their perceived future. And as we have seen, a better future is not guaranteed. On the contrary, the hallmark of our time seems to be uncertainty.

At the same time, many developing countries are undergoing a demographic boom. There, new generations, even as they are better educated than any in the past, are confronted with the prospect of rising unemployment and inequality. In the recent past, this combination has led to upheavals in the Southern Mediterranean: unemployment and the lack of opportunities breed discontent, especially among the young, that easily morphs into sectarianism and identity politics. More so when State institutions that are supposed to provide the conditions of inclusiveness are prone to inefficiency and corruption, that leads, ultimately, to injustice.

The indignation that this feeling of injustice provokes can lead to anger and eventually to violence. Thus, a feeling of discontent, rather than genuine religious sentiments, is often at the origin of the motivation of jihadist terrorists: the egalitarian and moralizing message of jihadism is presented as an alternative to the reality of injustice and corruption. When we talk about addressing the root causes of terrorism we should also be referring to the need to address that injustice and lack of expectations, provoked by corrupt institutions, based on rent capture and political patronage.

All this takes place in a context where the Western cradle of liberal ideas (human rights, democracy, rule of law), has lost some of its luster due to the consequences of the recent economic crisis, whereas the US seems to be taking a turn toward nationalism and isolationism and China’s economic success appears to offer an alternative model of authoritarian capitalism that further erodes the notion of universal values.

Ideas matter, as they permeate everything, and the battle for the future is consequently also a battle of ideas.

2. Redistribution of power

A redistribution of wealth and population entails a redistribution of power. True, power is more fragmented, and thus more difficult to read.¹¹⁹ But the essence of “hard power” – the monopoly of force – still remains mainly in the hands of the States. The world has transitioned from a bipolar to a more complex multipolar system of States, with a brief interlude of overwhelming US dominance. At present, different regional orders coexist, in all of which the US plays a decisive, but not exclusive role.

2.1. World Order

Before analyzing these regional orders, it is worth making a conceptual distinction between “rules-based world order” and “liberal world order” (and then see how those concepts relate to the real world). There is a certain tendency to conflate both ideas since they indeed aspire to converge and are embodied in the same institutions: the international architecture built after World War II.

The fundamental distinction between the two concepts is, however, that the core idea behind a rules-based order is essentially a notion of legitimacy that rests ultimately on due procedure: a method on how to agree upon international norms and their implementation; whereas the core of liberal order is ideological: respect for individual liberties and human rights, freedom of exchanges, democracy, and the rule of law.

To visualize the difference one can imagine a perfectly illiberal regime fully respectful of the rules-based world order since this order does not exclude per se any particular form of government. Whether a liberal power can break the rules-based order and remain liberal is a more complex issue: if one of the basic tenets of liberalism is respect for the law, by breaking international law a nation seems to put itself outside the liberal camp. There are, however, some significant cases in which international law has been strained precisely in the name of liberal ideas.

As for what they entail in terms of relations between nations, whereas the concept of “rules-based world order” is essentially inclusive (all can respect a law they can contribute to shape), the idea of “liberal order” is essentially exclusive: only those sharing certain values can consider themselves rightful members of that order.

The current debate on the crisis of world order actually refers to both liberal and rules-based orders, but in different ways.

With regard to the liberal order, the emergence of China (which seems to validate a model of “authoritarian capitalism”), the tensions with Russia (which does not share that “liberal” agenda), the reluctance of a “Global South” – that the BRICS group seeks to epitomize – to have a vision of the world imposed on it, and the West´s own internal soul-searching, have come to question its general validity. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that the tide of democracy, which expanded form 1991, seems to be receding. According to Freedom House, since 2006, 113 countries have seen a net democratic decline, and only 62 have experienced a net improvement.¹²⁰

In reality, the liberal order is still alive and kicking. All in all, in spite of its recent decline, democracy has gained considerable ground in the last half a century. Moreover, in many aspects, little by little, the international order has been permeated by liberal ideas. One significant example is the place of human rights in international law and institutions, coming a long way from the sacrosanct principle of non-interference in internal affairs to, first, the “droit de regard”, then the development of a series of mechanisms of international scrutiny, regional and universal, including the Human Rights Council, and more recently to debates, still open, on ideas such as the Responsibility to Protect.

As for the rules-based world order – a set of rules and international institutions embodied in the UN System – it operates as a safety net for the international community, since it includes basic principles of international coexistence, such as non-aggression, the prohibition of the use of force, humanitarian law, or the law of war, which, among other things, prohibits the use of chemical weapons, etc. Its preservation should, therefore, be a paramount priority for the international community as a whole.

The fact that they share those basic principles with the rest of the international community does not mean that democracies must give up furthering their own vision of the world or their agenda of promotion and protection of human rights and support for democracy and the rule of law. It does mean, however, that they should do so without jeopardizing the legitimacy of a space for dialogue on issues, such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the fight against terrorism or against climate change, etc., where international cooperation between actors that do not necessarily share the same ideology is indispensable to advance a truly global agenda.

In any case, one cannot but recognize that even this basic intentional legal order is struggling. Firstly, it has somewhat aged. Indeed, the main elements of the international institutional scaffolding date back to the Second World War, with some subsequent additions (passage from the GATT to the WTO in 1995), some of them very hard to reach (reform of the IMF to increase China’s weight, which dragged until 2016). The last significant contribution to this international architecture has been the creation of the International Criminal Court, in 1998, which started to be undermined practically as it was created. In a number of aspects, this institutional architecture is somewhat out of step with respect to the evolution of the contemporary international community. A clear example is the composition of the Security Council, which reflects the international reality of 1945, not the present one.

Secondly, in recent years we have witnessed a growing questioning of the essential elements of this rules-based order: the legal framework of multilateral trade provided by the WTO; the coordination of international responses to global economic challenges within the G20; the collective security system, as the Security Council is frequently blocked; certain non-proliferation agreements, such as the one signed with Iran, and, potentially, of disarmament and arms control regimes (INF Treaty); the fight against climate change embodied in the Paris Agreement, etc. Behind every sectorial objection lies a latent amendment to the entire international legal framework, since the rising nationalist agenda has little tolerance for international limitations to national freedom of action.

Thirdly, the international agenda in recent decades has moved away from the initial path marked after the Second World War, characterized by a relatively “strong” institutionality – embodied in the Charter of San Francisco and the Organizations that make up the United Nations System – and has evolved towards more informal settings (such as the G20, launched at the level of heads of State in 2008). It has gone from the aspiration of approving a legal framework of binding international agreements to a series of commitments, such as the Millennium Development Goals first, and then those of Sustainable Development, or the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, which imply obligations of behavior which grant States ample margins of maneuver.

This observation does not demean these agreements, which are steps of humanity in the right direction, but it points out the declining relevance of internationally-binding agreements. In that sense, they can be interpreted as symptoms of the present difficulty in generating norms of universal scope and obligatory compliance, backed by specific institutions that respond to the challenges of our time in the same way that those created after the Second World War responded to the challenges of theirs.

Furthermore, whereas in the fields of economic coordination, sustainable development or the fight against climate change a new functioning “soft governance” or “soft institutionality” seems to have been shaped, in the area of collective security the present outlook is much less flattering. There, in the face of cases of paralysis at the Security Council, ad hoc forums and initiatives of some prominent countries have emerged to resolve successive international conflicts, but they have frequently ended up competing with each other and their high international (and internal) profile is not always proportional to their achievements. The international response to the Syrian crisis is a clear example of this phenomenon. Actually, although it is true that the United Nations has its own shortcomings, no ad hoc initiative, no matter how visible, has the extra international legitimacy that the support of the international community embodied in the UN provides. Therefore, rather than in ad hoc formats, the improvement of global governance in matters of collective security should be sought through a reform of the Security Council that provides it with greater legitimacy and effectiveness.

Ultimately, the present world order combines elements of international law, liberal values, other competing ideologies, and unilateralism. This complex and imperfect state of affairs is, however, very different from a state of nature or a purely hegemonic system. Our current multipolar world also embraces and coexists with a series of regional realities with their own complexities.

2.2. Regional realities

The 20th century has witnessed the consolidation of multilateral institutions and of universal rules, but even if our present world is less Hobbesian, power (political, military, technological, economic, and cultural) still remains basic for a country to advance its national agenda. And even if the world is more global, regional balances of power still crucially matter.

In that new system, one can only recognize the difficult moment “the West” is undergoing. Since the first globalization – initiated by Spanish and Portuguese maritime expansion during the Renaissance – the West has been instrumental in shaping the international agenda. But, as we have seen, it seems now to be declining demographically and economically compared to Asia.

In truth, especially in the case of the US, it’s not so much the West declining as others rising, and this, in turn, has to do with the fact that emerging economies continue catching up from previous unfavorable positions. Even if this reinforces a sensation of decline, it makes sense economically and even morally for the West, as it means that millions enter the global economy, as they are lifted out of poverty. It also politically entails the need to find a new balance where all actors have to adapt to the new reality.

Western external relative decline reinforces some internal uneasiness and pessimism,¹²¹ prompted by a mix of different phenomena: rising inequality and decreasing expectations of the middle classes, frequently coupled with identity issues: the sense of the cultural majority to be losing their dominant position in favor of other racial, ethnic, or cultural groups, be it black and Hispanic minorities in the US, or Muslim immigrants and refugees in some European countries and also in the US.¹²²

Within the West, the evolution of the United States is particularly relevant. America is a cornerstone of the current rules-based world order, and yet in some areas, it acts as a revisionist power, questioning the benefits of multilateralism in the name of a markedly nationalistic agenda (“America First”). This is particularly visible in the area of trade (withdrawal from the TTP negotiations, renegotiation of NAFTA, aloofness from the WTO, paralysis of the TTIP negotiations, and announcement of new tariffs) but is extensive to other key areas, such as the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, or the threat to withdraw from the JCPOA with Iran, enshrined in Resolution 2232 of the Security Council.

Whether this trend will become a defining feature of American foreign policy is too early to know. The US has probably entered a period of introspection after half a century of foreign military interventions of, at best, limited success. It is undergoing an internal process of adaptation to new economic and demographic realities (by 2040 “non-Hispanic whites” will for the first time represent less than 50% of the total population) and might be transitioning to a nationalist self-perception, away from a cosmopolitan or imperial one.¹²³ At the same time, the US remains the indispensable nation when it comes to sustaining a rules based-world order with liberal values at its core. If only for that reason the rest of the West must redouble its efforts to keep the US anchored to a common international agenda.

But will the European Union be in a better position to advance this agenda? The EU is undergoing its own internal and international crisis.

Internally, it is in a permanent state of tension between, on one side, the determination of member States’ governments to keep control of the political agenda, and, on the other side, the magnitude of present-day international challenges, which demand quasi-federal responses. A good example of these tensions and the dysfunctions it produces is the inadequate way in which the Eurozone reacted to the effects of the international economic crisis. The 2015 refugee influx is another case of a crisis originated in the member States but for which the solutions can only be found – after much wrangling – at the European level.

Externally, the EU runs the risk of losing some relative weight in the coming decades. It will see its share of the world’s GDP fall by almost half by 2050, as emerging economies continue to surge.¹²⁴ In foreign affairs, Europe pays a price for failing to be a more relevant actor in the crises in the Middle East and the Mediterranean or in Eastern Europe, which directly affect its security. And still, in spite of its own internal soul-searching and the negative impact of the Great Recession, the European model remains an international transformative power. The EU has a distinct voice in the international arena in defense of a rules-based world order, in particular in areas such as human rights, climate change, free trade, and regional integration, as well as the respect of basic norms and principles necessary to preserve peace and security, including the prohibition of the resort to force or the threat of force, and the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States.

To sum up, in order to be relevant in a world in which its relative weight will decrease, the EU needs to deepen its integration. Although this seems clear from a theoretical point of view, the internal debate between the member States and among European citizens is far from over. Outside observers can be forgiven for confusing this permanent state of negotiation with a permanent existential crisis. The European Unions is, however, more resilient than meets the eye, among other reasons because integration is part of the national project of some key member States, including Spain.

The idea of the West would be incomplete without Latin America. This group of nations shares indeed the legacy of Renaissance and Enlightenment that ultimately brought about the contemporary ideas of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. But it is an emerging West, since some of its economies, such as the Mexican or Brazilian, are set to rank among the largest ones in future decades.

At the same time, ideologically, many in the area consider themselves part of a “Global South” that disputes the economic and ideological dominance of the industrial North. But there should be no dilemma between South and West for Latin American and the Caribbean countries and citizens. On the contrary, they benefit from the particular perspective that history has bestowed on them, a perspective which provides an added value to their contribution to the management of world affairs, in which they are actively engaged, particularly in the UN and regional organizations.

Growing economically, with increasingly consolidated democracies, Latin America occupies now in geopolitical terms a more pivotal place in world affairs, due to the economic and political boom of the Pacific: it is no longer in the periphery of the West, but truly at its center, looking at both sides, to Asia and Europe.¹²⁵ For their part, the US and the EU should draw the necessary lessons: in a world in which the West will be quantitatively smaller, the US-Europe-Latin America triangle should be reinforced and expanded to countries which uphold democracy and human rights in Asia and the Pacific, such as Japan, Korea, or Australia. Ultimately, the paradox for “the West” is that, the more a Western-inspired rules-based order becomes universal, the less it can be presented as “Western”.

As for Russia, its attitude toward the world order is clearer once one acknowledges the distinction between liberal and rules-based orders: Russia declares itself in favor of the latter and against the former. The reality is, however, more complex – another example of selective use of international law by the great powers – as the annexation of Crimea and its activities in Eastern Ukraine clearly show. Such actions are illegal and cannot be condoned, nor can the international community be expected to remain closed-eyed in the face of violations of international law.

On the other hand, as much as the US is indispensable, Russia – with an undoubted military power and diplomatic capacity – is unavoidable for preserving an international order worthy of that name. It is an essential interlocutor at least in the entire security chapter of international relations: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fight against terrorism, access to global commons, etc. Russia also has a vested interest in underpinning a rules-based world order that perpetuates its status as a great power, in particular in the Security Council.

As a consequence of this dual attitude, Russia will remain simultaneously a status quo and a revisionist power. Its revisionism will continue to challenge the West, for, like a mirror, this challenge gives it back the image of itself as a superpower. Considering the forces at play – Russia’s demographic decline, the probable broad stability of oil and gas prices within the low end of the fluctuation band, and China’s growing international weight – Russia will have to struggle to keep its status in the 21st century.

China represents another example of ambivalence towards rules-based order, committing with it in aspects that coincide with its interests and questioning it when they do not (its reaction to the recent Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea is a case in point). The rise of China is considered to be a defining feature of this century, in particular in the Asian-Pacific region. Different hypotheses are being advanced on where the regional equilibrium will stand as a consequence (balance of powers, regional cooperation, attempts at hegemony, etc.).¹²⁶ In the academic world, there is an ongoing debate on whether China and the US, respectively as an emerging and as a supposedly declining power, are bound to military confrontation.¹²⁷ After the announcement of unilateral tariffs on China’s exports by the Trump Administration, a clash with China on trade seems unavoidable. And trade is only part of a potential for conflict that covers freedom of navigation, political influence in the region, cybersecurity, etc. On the other hand, an open conflict between China and the US would be catastrophic for both countries, while the rising China is a pragmatic power whose aspirations for a greater role in world affairs can be accommodated.¹²⁸

Henry Kissinger points to this more optimistic scenario, but he also warns on the dangers of the rise of the “triumphalist current” in Chinese politics, which shares the view that a confrontation with the US is unavoidable.¹²⁹ From the economic perspective, China still has potential for growth, as its urbanization and the development of its services sector fully unfold. Reform of State-owned enterprises could also generate business opportunities, although China’s extremely defensive policy towards external investments limits their scope.

But from a longer-term perspective, the issue at stake in the coming decades is not so much the rise of China, as it is its stabilization process and the dangers it entails. China is immersed in a difficult transition from a capital-intensive economy to a consumer one, with declining growth rates, very high levels of debt (believed to be around 280% of GDP), and a population in the process of accelerated aging (by 2050, a third of the Chinese population will be over 65). It has yet to prove it can avoid the middle-income trap and evolve into an innovative economy.

In times of crisis, recourse to increasing nationalism cannot be excluded. It is a phenomenon we are already witnessing across the wider region. There is no shortage of territorial and historical disputes with more or less distant neighbors to fuel that sentiment, for instance, in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and along the Sino-Indian border.

In any case, security in the region cannot be represented as a purely Sino-American affair. Other significant actors are at play – India, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia – whose interests and preoccupations need to be factored in. The role of regional organizations, such as ASEAN, is precisely to offer a space for partnering between relevant actors.

As in other regional frameworks, the evolution of US foreign policy – epitomized by the US withdrawal from the TPP negotiations – introduces an element of uncertainty that complicates the security calculus of regional powers and increases the chances of exacerbating a conventional arms race, and, combined with North Korea’s acquisition of the nuclear bomb, of unleashing a regional nuclear arms race.

With regard to demography, it is interesting to note that not only mainland China, but also Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan growth rates are below replacement level. On the other extreme is India. If in the 21st century China will have to get its stabilization right, India must ride its own boom. By 2050, it will be the most populated country in the world, and, therefore, the largest democracy. It will probably rank among the world’s three largest economies. It will also face the potential imbalances that such growth entails: to be able to generate enough growth to absorb a massive afflux of young people to the labor market.

In summation, if the 21st century will be Asian, this in itself does not guarantee peace and prosperity for the region. There remain unsolved tensions with the potential of flaring up: the security environment is far from being stable, as China’s and the US’ relative positions evolve; in many parts the population will decline, while in others it will boom; the economy will grow, but not as in the past; nationalism is on the rise across the region; and climate change poses its own challenge, particularly to coastal urban areas, which represent a huge portion of the economy and of the population. Asia can prosper in the 21st century, but it will have to make the right choices.

As for Africa, as we have indicated, it is also booming demographically. The African continent is extremely diverse in political, economic, and cultural terms, and this heterogeneity is likely to be even more marked in the future.¹³⁰ It hosts most of the least developed countries in the world, but also some of its fastest-growing. Some have the worse inequality indicators, while in many a new middle class is thriving. Most of its economies are heavily dependent on commodity exports and have, therefore, suffered a decrease in foreign direct investment (FDI) after the end of the commodities super-cycle, although FDI is already bigger than development funding.

Africa – the different “Africas” – face many hurdles: the risk of remaining extractive economies, thus subject to the vagaries of international markets and foreign investments, resource scarcity aggravated by climate change, the need to overcome a backlog of deficiencies in basic infrastructure and services, etc.

From a security perspective, terrorist groups have emerged and developed, particularly in West Africa (Boko Haram), the Sahel (AQIM), and the Horn of Africa (Al Shabaab), inspired by radicalism and connected with organized crime and illegal trafficking. Illegal trafficking and security of navigation in the Gulf of Guinea are also phenomenon that raise concern in the region and beyond.

The EU and its member States are supporting African efforts against these threats (as attested by an important number of EU missions on the ground, in all of which, by the way, Spain participates). They are being joined by an increasing number of international actors playing a bigger role in African security with different motivations, the fight against terrorism (US AFRICOM), or to secure its commercial interests (China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti). Some Gulf States and Turkey are also increasing their cooperation in this field (coupled with a religious “Mosque diplomacy”).

But African countries are reinforcing the cooperation between themselves to find “African solutions to African problems”, both in the framework of the African Union and of regional organizations such as ECOWAS or the Sahel G5. This includes an emerging coordination to protect democracy, for instance, in response to the crisis in Gambia, but also economic integration, since many of the challenges these countries face are transnational by nature.

For its part, the Middle East has fallen prey to a profound upheaval since 2011 that cannot be disconnected from the demographic and social changes we have pointed out: the massive arrival of younger, better-educated people to the labor market, and frustration for the lack of expectations. These movements have ended up more often than not in conflict and even war.¹³¹

The Syrian crisis, which was at the beginning essentially a movement for the improvement of local economic conditions, has become the opportunity for different regional and external actors to try to play their hand and gain influence in the region. The by-product has been of course a war that, according to some sources, has already claimed nearly 500,000 lives, and the rise of Daesh, a terrorist organization whose menace goes beyond the region itself.

A ramification of this regional power struggle is the current debate on the future of the so-called “Iran nuclear deal”, or JCPOA. This agreement, reached after a painstaking process initiated in 2003, has probably avoided a war in the region and can be considered a starting point from which to build a broader regional security architecture. To simply tear it apart would significantly increase the risk of conflict and would probably mark the start of a nuclear arms race in the region. Evidently, Iran’s actions raise legitimate concerns to the international community as a whole, regarding, for instance, what will happen after some of the clauses of the nuclear agreement lapse in 10-15 years’ time, as well as concerning the purpose of Iran’s ballistic missile program and its support of armed militias in the region.

But a solution to these concerns can only be found by building on the present agreement, not on its ashes. The method chosen to reach a solution was the correct one: diplomatic negotiations that entail concessions, but also achievements for the international community in terms of peace and stability. This diplomatic method needs to be applied to conflicts in Yemen, in Libya, or concerning Qatar, and possibly in Afghanistan. Attempts at military solutions seem to have reached their limits everywhere. The need for diplomacy includes indeed the “dean of all conflicts” in the area, between Israel and Palestine, which has taken a back seat to other crises, but which has a systemic impact on the whole region.

Beyond the settlement of bilateral disputes and of complex sets of affinities and rivalries, the region needs a security architecture inspired by the same principles that lead to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe during the Cold War. But evidently first the regional and extra-regional actors need to be convinced of its need, as was the case in Europe at the time.

Finally, the religious dimension of some of these conflicts calls for an inter-religious and intercultural dialogue, a policy to which Spain is deeply committed, in particular, but not only, through the UN’s Alliance of Civilizations. Some of these conflicts, however, are not essentially religious, but political – about the allocation of power and resources – and, therefore, need to be tackled by political means. For this reason, preventive diplomacy, mediation, and the full toolkit for peaceful resolution of conflicts are needed more than ever.

3. A Global Agenda for the 21st Century

This description of the current state of affairs and of their likely evolution seem to project a disturbing picture of the future: a world divided between an ageing humanity, driven by fear and protectionist instincts, and a young booming one, marked by frustration and anger, willing to rip off the straitjacket of a world order that marginalizes it. The deep forces of demography, economy and technological change can indeed put humanity in that track, exacerbating the trend towards identity politics on both sides of this divide.

But this does not need to happen. Identifying current risks has precisely the objective of devising the policies that might avert them. And there are at least five policy areas where international concerted action can make a substantial difference: a) Economic policies for growth and employment; b) Equity (including gender equality); c) Cooperation on migration; d) Action against climate change; and e) International legitimacy in conflict resolution.

a) As indicated, job creation must be a priority, and this implies growth. Contrary to the “secular stagnation” hypothesis, emerging economies could have enough growth potential to pull the global economy further. But for this to happen the right policies need to be pursued: a better business environment (rule of law, better financing), coupled with skilled labor (education) and better governance (fight against corruption). A crucial factor is also the incorporation of new technologies, which may help developing economies to leapfrog to advanced positions, as technologies become more affordable (this has already happened with smartphone banking and can be a reality in the future in sectors such as renewable energies, 3D printing, etc.). International investment in infrastructures also has a crucial role to play. Initiatives such as the Chinese “Belt and Road” are, therefore, welcome, insofar as they generate local jobs, do not create excessive financial dependence for developing countries, and are coherent with other aspects of the global agenda, such as the fight against climate change.

But even if the gloomy scenario of secular stagnation materializes, it is still in our hands to avoid the policies that might make it worse. That means avoiding obstacles to global trade, which has been instrumental in generating global growth. True, global trade has benefited emerging countries but may have eroded the situation of vulnerable layers of the population in developed economies. But the benefit of trade for developed and developing societies as a whole has been spectacular, and, therefore, the solution is not to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs, via protectionism, but rather a greater State activism in developed societies for the protection of those who have been left behind.

There are other areas in which more can be done, in particular in the framework of the G20: pursue the ongoing work against fiscal base erosion and profit shifting; combat tax evasion; coordinate policies against economic and monetary fluctuations and limit current account imbalances; a concerted fiscal stimulus policy when needed; and even establish a global growth objective (as was discussed at the G20 Brisbane meeting in 2014).

In the pursuit of growth and employment, traditional development tools have to be complemented with new instruments that have demonstrated their economic performance, such as new financing for development, trade, and remittances.

b) Growth is paramount, but an inclusive growth, i.e., one which integrates the human aspiration to a fair treatment and the opportunity of a better future, an aspiration that relates to the idea of equity or justice. As noted, we are already witnessing a growing erosion of one aspect of equity: internal equality. True, equality within countries seems essentially an internal issue but, as pointed out, it is an internal issue with an increasingly international relevance, since, on the one hand, it limits the potential for global growth and, on the other hand, it can generate frustration, which combined with identity policies, can translate into international instability. Corruption and State capture by interest groups are other forces that undermine the idea of justice upon which any well-grounded human society ultimately rests.

The tools at our disposal to counter this are education and training, but also good governance in terms of respect for the rule of law, equality before the law, and social inclusion. International cooperation for development can play a key role in improving this chapter of internal governance.

Equity means also equality between men and women. There is indeed a strong correlation between women emancipation¹³² and economic and social modernization, as education for women permeates into society in terms of lower fertility rates, infant and child mortality rates, and maternal mortality rates, and more investment in childhood education and health.

Beyond the role of women in developing economies, which is well documented, it is also crucial in advanced economies.¹³³ Women empowerment is a force for modernization. Filling this gap can benefit particularly Middle Eastern¹³⁴ and African countries.

c) Cooperation on migration. As indicated, current demographic trends point to increased migratory movements, which take place mainly within the developing world, but also between North and South. If managed correctly, these migratory flows can be mutually beneficial for societies of origin and destination. With this aim, since the mid-2000’s, Spain has developed together with its African partners a model of partnership based on integral cooperation in the security, intelligence, political, and development fields between destination, transit and origin countries. This is the model the EU is subsequently developing.

But we need to go even further. It is increasingly clear that a migratory policy based solely on barriers results in illegal trafficking, deaths, and ultimately in growing insecurity on both sides of the barriers. There is a rational case in favor of regulated migration, in particular in Europe, as a way to compensate for the aging of the local population. At the same time, attention needs to be paid to the recipient countries’ absorption capacities, in particular in the context of the identity crises some are undergoing.

This is why we need to rely more on regulated migration. Circular migration, for instance, offers opportunities for migrants, without putting excessive pressure on recipient countries. Special protection should be provided to vulnerable migrants as well as refugees, and the international community as a whole must avoid the erosion of the international refugee protection regime.

The United Nations has launched a process which should result in the adoption of global compacts on migration and refugees in an intergovernmental conference that will be held in Morocco in December 2018. This process is an opportunity to improve the governance of migration. Building mutual trust between countries of origin, transit, and destination is a key element of a successful migratory policy in the long run.

d) Action against climate change. Limiting climate change and its potential effects, including, desertification, fresh water scarcity, flooding, etc., is a perfect example of a global public good which demands a global response. The Paris Agreement embodies this global response. The agreement commits the majority of humanity to limit the rise of global average temperatures to below 2ºC. This entails an international concerted effort to limit the emission of greenhouse gases so as to make it compatible with the massive increase in population described above, and with growth and jobs identified as a priority. It is indeed a global challenge: more growth means more manufacturing output and infrastructure development; more people means more housing and transport, more consumer goods, more heating and electricity consumption, etc.

To take up this challenge both emerging and developed economies must do their share. Emerging countries need to grow more to close the economic gap with mature economies, but, at the same time, many are more vulnerable to the possible consequences of global warming. They need to be supported in their transition to more sustainable models.

Developed countries for their part are already engaged in a path of gradual decrease in carbon emissions but need to continue leading by example. The financial dimension, in order to incentivize investment in clean energies, is also critical.

Both emerging and developed countries can benefit from the opportunities that the green economy also offers, in terms of the development of renewable energies, in particular, solar and wind generation, as well as carbon capture. The dizzying technological progress is making possible steady cost reductions across these industries; research and development are thus key.

e) International legitimacy and the resolution of conflicts. As we have seen, the current international society is very different from the one that emerged after World War II and the international institutional architecture needs to consider those changes.

In particular, the United Nations Security Council, which is the body responsible for preserving international security, must take into account the greater relevance of the African States and the growing weight of emerging powers, and at the same time has to ensure a more democratic, legitimate, accountable, and effective function, allowing access for all States to the Council, and introducing rules that prevent it from being blocked when faced with situations in which international peace and security is at stake.

From a Spanish perspective this means more seats in the Council for the African States; no new permanent members, since the very fact that they are permanent limits the possibility of other States to be elected to the Council; and no additional vetoes, since vetoes reinforce the likelihood for the Council to be unable to reach decisions in response to international crises. With regard to existing veto powers, it means restraining their use when the international community is confronted with mass atrocities. Other ideas in this field are also worth discussing, such as the possibility to require two vetoes instead of one to block a decision by the Council, so that the interest of a single country does not obstruct measures deemed to be necessary by a vast majority of the international community represented at the Council.

These reforms face numerous obstacles. For instance, some emerging States aspire to become permanent members of the Council and consider they should benefit from all the privileges current permanent members have, including veto power. In order to accommodate their aspirations, longer-term seats in the Security Council (without veto power) could be envisaged. What is clear is that the overall objective of the reform has to be to provide the international community with peace and security, not to grant particular States a special status.

Beyond the Security Council, the UN System needs an in-depth reform that is not possible to address here. Suffice it to say that the current Secretary General is pushing forward that reform, an endeavor for which he has Spain’s full support. Apart from peacekeeping operations, development and a better general management of the organization, other areas in which multilateral frameworks are crucial are the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (NPT), guaranteeing access to global commons, and the regulation of a free, open, and safe cyberspace.

It is also worth noting that, as indicated, the protection of human rights, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration and other international covenants, is part of the legal bloc of the rules-based world order, and legally binds the international community as a whole. On top of it, there is also ground for an international liberal agenda, an agenda that does not need to be shared by all actors, but that is crucial for some of them. In this area, for instance, the Spanish Foreign Policy Strategy reaffirms the universal and indivisible character of human rights, and the willingness of Spain to support countries as they undertake their own internal transition to democracy.

***

Since World War II, the international community has been structured by multilateral norms and institutions and a common understanding of the relative strength of the different actors. Today the balance between the different actors is changing, and it remains to be seen to which extent this will affect current norms, institutions, and understandings.

Power fragmentation and complexity make deciphering the present – let alone the future – increasingly difficult. To some extent, we need to accept this complexity as part of a more fluid and, in many ways, richer world. But at the same time there is a need for a structuring agenda that provides some sense of direction in the face of the global challenges humanity is facing. The 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change are crucial elements of this agenda, but only a part of it, since it also has to cover the economic, social (migration, justice), and political dimensions. It would be a fatal mistake to conceive these challenges as blind, unstoppable forces instead of seeing them as the solvable problems most of them are.

The 21st century world order is not something for us to discover as it unfolds, but something for us to shape with vision and perseverance.

EGYPT

THE MODERN SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE
21ST CENTURY¹³⁵

Amal M. Mourad

1. Introduction

Is the post-World War II order, which is sometimes referred to as the “liberal international order”, coming to an end? Is it being replaced by a State-centric international order that is driven by competing States exclusively serving their direct national interests and little bound by common principles, rules, or institutions?

This is one of the main issues implicitly or explicitly discussed in international fora today. To contribute to this debate, this chapter focuses on the role of the position of the modern sovereign “State” in the post-WWII international order, rejecting the dichotomous formulation that seems to put State sovereignty and common international principles at odds with one another or as mutually exclusive alternatives. The sovereign State has always played an indispensable role in the post-WWII order, and it is the current existential challenges facing it that are among the main causes of the instability and uncertainty marring that order.

The adaptation of the State to these challenges will play a major role in defining the future trajectory of the international order. The needed reinvigoration of the State does not have to come at the expense of developing common principles, norms and institutions; it could well need to enhance them and might depend on its capacity to reform them in order to accommodate changes in the international environment.

Massive technological, demographic, economic, and cultural
changes are contributing to a major transformative redistribution
of power within the international system. This redistribution is transforming what was, since the end of the Cold War, a unipolar international system into a much more complex and pluralistic international system.

More than a few scholars consider this new system a multi-polar one, due to the significant rise of a large number of new globally influential powers. There are those who consider it hetero-polar due to the unprecedented diversity introduced in the system by the rising role of non-State actors on the global stage. Others, however, consider it non-polar because the diversity of its actors and the complexity of its issues are preventing the evolution of coherent alliances and favoring rapidly shifting alignments.

This diffusion of power, with its prospects and its challenges, is causing an escalation of global and regional geo-strategic competition, complicating the management of the international system, and putting into doubt the adequacy of existing mechanisms to effectively confront common global challenges. This is disseminating a sense of uncertainty about the continued validity and sustainability of the international principles, norms, and institutions that form the foundation of the post-WWII international order.

The Middle East is a region where this instability and uncertainty are manifesting themselves the loudest. There are complex deep-rooted internal reasons for the plethora of crises and conflicts that mar the region today. However, the way in which these crises have unfolded since the inception of the 21st century, their resistance to resolution or containment, and their wider regional and global fallout are manifestations of the wider implications of power diffusion in the global space. The complex trajectory of the conflict in Syria is symbolically representative of the nature of the crises of the new, more complex international system. The continued carnage in the region provides evidence of the inadequacy of the current regional and international order in confronting those complex crises.

In diagnosing this critical state of the international order, this chapter will focus on the current condition of the modern sovereign State, the essential building block of the international order and the first subject of its rules and institutions, exploring the extent of its contribution to the instability and uncertainty characterizing the current international scene. It argues that the generic modern sovereign State is confronting existential challenges that are undermining its ability to perform crucial functions that only it can perform in the international system.

The chapter starts by examining the role of the State in the post-WWII international order. It then analyzes the nature and causes of its current generalized crisis. Finally, it explores the possible future trajectory of the State and its implications for
the future of the international order. This focus on the State does not claim to provide a comprehensive prognosis to the troubles of the international order; it simply seeks to contribute to the mosaic of perspectives that this volume hopes to create.

2. The Modern Sovereign State and the Post-WWII International Order

The notion of “international order”, as used in this chapter, refers to the set of international principles, rules, and institutions of an international system that conditions the behavior of its actors and shapes their expectations on the behavior of others. In an international space that is usually not amenable to the centralization of authority, international order has always been partial and contested. It is the distribution of power within the international system and the hierarchy of States it creates that are crucial in shaping the scope, content, and limits of international order at any point in time.

However, order at the international level would not be possible without a shared belief in the feasibility and benefits of checking individualistic State interests for wider common benefits. These wider common benefits are labeled as “peace and security”, “sustainable development”, and “universal human rights” in the United Nations Charter, the most legitimate international order-building document in history.

The liberal internationalist scholar G. John Ikenberry depicted the complex set of principles, norms, and institutions that formed the post-WWII international order as the combined product of two distinct “order-building” projects.¹³⁶ The first such project is that of the modern sovereign State system. Traceable to the creation of the Westphalian State system in 17th century Europe, this order-building project has limited goals, which are, first and foremost, focused on ensuring stability and preventing war. It considers understandings among great powers the guarantor of the implementation of its principles.

This order-building project provided our current international order with some of its most essential and legitimate components, namely State sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, and self-determination. The United Nations Security Council is a clear example of an institution based on this order-building concept. Even though those principles have been at times abused or ignored, it is generally recognized that failure to uphold them is directly linked to instability and creating the conditions of war.

The second order-building project contributing to the post-WWII international order is the liberal internationalist project, which derives from a belief in the possibility of advancing international space into a global society that shares common principles and applies universal rules. It is organized around diverse subjects and objectives that include promoting free international trade, constructing collective security, guaranteeing universal human rights, and multilateral governance mechanisms.

Although this project is closely linked to the Western alliance, many of its principles, rules, and mechanisms gained wider and deeper legitimacy, prodded by the relative merits of its vision, its contribution to decolonization, the materialization of the geographically expanding economic growth it promised, and the end of the cold war. This project gave our current international order free trade rules, collective security mechanisms, universal human rights, mechanisms for managing the globalized economy and promoting development, environmental agreements, and regional integration.

Based on this conceptualization, it becomes clear that the current international order is an eclectic combination of two overlapping order-building projects locked by history in a relationship of interdependence without being fully harmonious or perfectly compatible. The possibility, legitimacy, and validity of the “internationalist” components of the order presume as its foundation the prevalence of the stability and legitimacy that only sovereign States can achieve.

As professor Ikenberry aptly formulates, it is only when the realistic threats of anarchy and insecurity provided by stable effective States – what he calls the “problems of Hobbes” – are adequately addressed, that the promise of economic, social, and political freedoms according to universally applicable norms – what he calls “the promise of Locke” – can be pursued in the international space.¹³⁷ At the same time, the internationalist components of the order were not only essential for the regulation of the pursuit of conflicting national interests in a world made smaller by progressive globalization, these components helped open opportunities for the diverse members of the international community that were essential to sustain the socio-political compact on which State legitimacy is built.

Thus, the sovereign State is not a precursor to an alternative internationalist order that supersedes it; it is its pre-condition and main beneficiary. Although the way in which it performs its functions changed drastically over history, the State is the only actor that controls the power and generates the legitimacy that can impart security and stability in the system. It is the main conveyor of legitimacy onto the international level. Its sovereignty is also an equalizer between countries and the source of the security necessary for State engagement in profound international cooperation. By contrast, a world where States fail to perform their basic functions or where their sovereignty is violated is a world of insecurity, in which war is likely.

The sustainability of that mixed international order has been dependent on the political resolution of the inherent tensions between its equally valid and useful “sovereignty” and “internationalist” components: tensions created by the contradictions between sovereignty rights that provide every State with wide freedom to act and internationally determined principles and rules that limit that sovereignty. Failure to arrive at a reasonable resolution of these tensions threatens the sustainability and legitimacy of the order as a whole.

It is important to recall that it is the balance of power in the sovereign State system that effectively determines the substance of the resolution of these tensions whenever they arise. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, the balance between sovereignty rights and internationalist principles was different from what it has come to be in the uni-polar world that followed the end of the Cold War. The current complex and pluralistic international system, faced with new challenges and opportunities, is in search of an appropriate balance that matches it.

3. The Current Crisis of the State

The generic modern sovereign State finds itself today in a general condition of crisis due to historical transformations linked to globalization, a crisis that is, in turn, one of the roots of the instability and uncertainty characterizing the international scene. The Middle East provides ample evidence of the vitality of stable and effective sovereign States in the creation of regional order.

The current crisis of the State is a main reason behind the destabilization – or near break down – of the regional order. It provides the condition that stirs global and regional geo-strategic competition and raises the risk of full-fledged regional inter-State conflict. The crisis of the State and its repercussions are evident not only in States that literally collapsed, but it is also acknowledged in the more resilient States that are intent on reform or others that seemed immune to instability.

That crisis of the State in the Middle East, while having its historical roots and unique circumstances, is part of a system-wide predicament facing, not any particular State, but the generic modern sovereign State itself. A tide of global, technological, demographic, socio-economic, and cultural changes have merged in unexpected ways, since the beginning of the 21st century, to challenge the purview of State sovereignty, undermine the compacts upon which its legitimacy is built, and complicate the performance of some of its most basic functions.¹³⁸

To start with, the globalized and deregulated international economy seemed to transfer the formulation of the socio-economic choices that form the compact upon which State legitimacy is built away from the autonomous purview of the State, subjecting it to the requirements of international markets, agreements, and institutions. Although the transfer of sovereign purview has mostly been voluntary, in pursuit of the potential security and economic benefits of interdependence and globalization, it took a life and dynamic of its own and its full repercussions for the legitimacy and stability of the State crystallized only gradually.

These negative repercussions were made more evident after the global economic crisis. Besides the technical challenges of containing the financial aspects of the crisis in a dauntingly complex system, the crisis exposed the systemic inequality that deepened the divide between the winners and losers of the neo-liberal global economic order that has been establishing itself since the early 1980s. In that complex globalized and deregulated system, the correction of this inequality, that seemed socially and politically disruptive in various types of States, seemed to rest beyond the purview of any single State.

Moreover, in an interdependent world that is more pluralistic than ever before, the challenge of reform that is both geographically and socially just seems immense and difficult to agree on. It is possible to view the rise of the anti-globalization sentiment in Western developed countries – with its right- and left-wing versions – partially as a result of the perceived limits imposed by intense unfavorable global economic competition on their capacity to respond to the prevalent socio-economic malaise. For the dissatisfied sections of the public, the democratic choice seemed to have been voided of its substance. The vote for exiting the European Union is a clear reflection of a desire in a large portion of the British public to reclaim the ability to reshape the socio-economic foundation of legitimacy on the State level.

It is also possible to perceive the 2011 Arab uprisings, partially, as the outcome of the failure of the States of the region to maintain the compact upon which their legitimacy had been built, as they failed to respond to demands for social justice due to limits imposed on them by international markets and institutions. It is important to point out here that the rights and wrongs of any specific policy or demand are out of the focus of this article. The focus here is solely on the de-stabilizing impact of what seems like a partial hollowing of the State from the flexibility needed to reformulate the compact upon which its legitimacy is built.

Simultaneously, the combination of global economic liber-
alization and the revolution in information and communication technologies transferred significant authority away from State institutions to non-State and sub-State actors, as well as to individual citizen groupings. This undermined both the hierarchical and territorial characteristics thus far associated with the modern State. The proliferation and rising influence of non-State actors presented all types of States with competing actors that have considerable influence but that are insufficiently susceptible to regulation and accountability.

At the same time, political authority and political establishments were subjected to new levels and types of public scrutiny that qualitatively surpassed the existing accountability mechanisms. Moreover, political communities and identities are constantly defying State territoriality. National polities are polarized and fragmented in a way that is testing governance mechanisms and complicating the capacity to develop the necessary sense of community. Sub-national, racial and sectarian identities are on the rise in defiance to what seemed to be established norms of modernity. The spread of separatist movements threatening various types of States is a testimony to the disruptive impact of the de-territorialization of identity and the diffusion of authority on stable governance.

Many of the technological developments at the root of these changes are contributing to strengthening societies, opening economic opportunities, and empowering citizens in improving their lives. They are also advancing the causes of accountability and transparency. However, this diffusion of power away from State institutions, this fragmentation of polities and de-territorialization of political community are challenging most governance mechanisms and causing testing degrees of instability in diverse types of political systems, including developed democratic States. That this is happening in tandem with widespread economic stagnation and social malaise is magnifying the disruptive impact of these changes.

Furthermore, this is accompanied by an exchange of accusations of foreign manipulation of this new scene of diffused power within the State, in parallel with the development of hybrid warfare methods, threats to cyber-security and alarming awareness of the use of “fake news”. This reference does not imply a validation of any of these abundant claims and counter claims. It is rather a demonstration of the widespread sense of inadequacy and insecurity generated in various types of the modern State that have not yet produced internal or international legitimate mechanisms of regulation to ensure the security and stability of societies without hindering the positive potential of these technological developments.

In parallel, cross-border threats (or perceived threats) that diluted the significance of both of political borders and territoriality are proliferating. International terrorism, international networks of organized crime, global environmental hazards, uncontrollable movements of populations, and globally-transmitted diseases all conspired to unveil the mounting inadequacy of the State in performing the most basic function of protecting its citizens. Most of those cross-border threats are not new phenomena and result from deep-rooted causes long in play, but recent socio-economic changes and technological advances opened unforeseen and hitherto unregulated avenues for their proliferation and magnified risks.

For example, terrorism is an age-old phenomenon that has different reasons in different societies. What is significant today is that terrorism (as an example) was qualitatively transformed by globalization and the de-regulation and digitization that came with it. The atrocious 9/11 attacks have come to be the epitome of the State’s inadequacy in the face of the terrorist threat; but it was not the last event to show for it. Moreover, the failure of the territorialized reaction to that attack (military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq) came to be a symbol of the limits on even the most powerful State in facing de-territorialized asymmetric threats. The ability of terrorism to use the tools of globalization to defy containment and to expand reach is wreaking havoc in the Middle East and Africa. Isolated territorial responses on the State level, while essential and ongoing, remain inadequate in the face of that scourge’s ability to recruit, finance, and arm using the digitized sphere.

The positive military victories achieved against the territorial control of ISIS/Daesh in Iraq and Syria are not seen as an end to the fight against that organization or organizations with similar objectives and tactics. Besides the need to address the underlying conditions of their existence, there is the challenge to better combat their capacity to defy political boundaries and depend on the digital space, through a new level of commitment to collective action.

On a different level, the integrity and sovereignty of the State were seriously shaken by unchecked major power military interventions. While not the only example, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 remains a striking case of a major power undermining the rules of the order it is supposed to guard. The detrimental effect of that invasion on Iraq and on regional stability is obvious, but the focus here is on its damage to the sanctity or mere validity of some of the organizing principles of the international order. Besides its assault on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as a fundamental component of the international order, it involved a clear abuse of “internationalist principles” of democracy and human rights to the detriment of both components of the order.

On the one hand, it increased the destabilizing sense of insecurity that State sovereignty evolved to guard against, the sense of insecurity that might have been at the root of subsequent extremely destabilizing behavior of some States, and not only in the Middle East. It also undermined the legitimacy of the universal democratic and human rights principles of that order by reducing them to blatant tools of great power hegemony. It is noteworthy that this instance was followed by other major power violations of territorial integrity across the globe.

These systemic challenges facing the generic modern State are contributing to unsettling more States in different regions and diverse governance systems to the detriment of order in the global space. Developments in numerous mature advanced democracies support the view that we are going through a general crisis of the State that might not be manifesting itself in total in every single State and not to the same destabilizing degree, but that defines the overall condition in which every State finds itself. Rather than assume it is dealing with isolated cases of State fragility for which there are already evident prescriptions, the international community seems to be facing a general crisis of the State and this crisis is at the heart of the current international instability.

4. The Reinvigoration of the State

Even with the decline of its relative power in the international system in favor of other sub-national, supra-national, and non-
-territorial actors, the sovereign State remains the indispensable and irreplaceable unit of the international order. Only it commands the power and generates the legitimacy that can impart security and stability in the system, and only it can legitimately regulate and negotiate needed international cooperation. Therefore, the prospects and parameters of the future international order will depend to a considerable extent on the ways the State responds to its current crisis, and on the models of the State that provide compelling answers to the new problems of security, stability and inclusive growth posed by a transformed world.

The needed reinvigoration of the State is likely to involve a political reformulation of the socio-economic foundations of the compact upon which its legitimacy has been built, as well as the constitutional and institutional innovations that match it. This is likely to amount to a reconfiguration of the norms and mechanisms of the exercise of the internal sovereignty of the State vis-à-vis society. It will mark yet a new phase in the continual historical evolution of governance in the modern sovereign State.

While being primarily prompted and guided by the common systemic challenges facing the State, the reinvigoration process will also be shaped by the characteristics and specific challenges and opportunities of each particular State. Given the speed of technological and socio-cultural change, this is generally going to involve sailing in uncharted waters. This reconfiguration will entail neither more nor less power for State institutions vis-à-vis society across the board. It is likely to entail more authority where it is effective and desirable and, hence, capable of acquiring legitimacy and achieving objectives and it will entail less authority where it is not.¹³⁹

Although replicable innovations and models will evolve, there could be no “one size that fits all”. In a geographically, economically, and culturally pluralistic international system, it is not likely that there will be a single trajectory defining the future of the State. It is quite certain that unless a sufficient number of significant States adequately reinvigorate their legitimacy and appropriately reconfigure their governance, the future of the international order will remain unstable and uncertain. However, a plurality of governance models does not automatically mean a fragmented international order that is unable to find common purpose and principles. In principle, successfully reinvigorated States are better equipped for building common ground.

State renewal might also involve a “renegotiation” of the nature of the State’s sovereignty vis-à-vis other States. Again, this renegotiation of the exercise of external sovereignty will not entail more or less protection of sovereignty rights across the board. It might require balancing the rights associated with sovereignty with responsibilities towards other States, given the extent of interdependence and the measure of common threats.¹⁴⁰ There is a larger incentive for arriving at a more balanced approach to the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty in a pluralistic international system than it was in a bi-polar or a uni-polar world. Pluralism increases the benefits of abiding by rules, as rules are not just seen as limits on one’s power, but also protections from numerous other potent actors.

5. The Trajectory of State Renewal and the Future of
the International Order

There have been calls for rolling back globalization and reclaiming the prerogatives of full sovereignty and reinforcing stricter territoriality for as long as there has been globalization. What is new is that those calls now are raised from within major countries and small ones, developed economies and developing, reluctant globalizers and champions of globalization, and for practical reasons as well as dogmatic ones. The reverberations of these calls can be seen as symptoms of the general crisis of the modern sovereign State we elaborated upon earlier.

Although these calls are not to be dismissed or sidelined, a closer look reveals that they are mostly expressions of dissatisfaction with current affairs rather than a viable alternative world order. However, if these calls for the full reclamation of “sovereignty” unbound by international rules become a “national project” for the internal reinvigoration of the challenged State in internationally or regionally significant countries, it might cause a breakdown of the international order and major confrontation to be a scenario to grapple with. The rise of new world powers is producing a condition of power transition, whereby power is spreading from mature States in the North and West to rising States in the East and South. Historians and international relations scholars associate this condition with potential confrontation or even major war.

This condition of power transition is already professedly generating an escalation in geo-strategic competition between mature global powers and rising ones and is driving military escalation in the conventional, nuclear and new forms of warfare. In the context of such a complex and pluralistic international system, the resort of one major power or more, due to the internal dynamics of its politics, to national projects based on claims to sovereignty and unchecked search for national interests might lead to transforming rational geo-strategic competition to confrontation. This scenario can unfold in already volatile regions, such as East Asia, the Middle East, or Europe where miscalculation can be driven by the dynamics of such sovereignty-based projects. The inter-war period (1930s) might be an appropriate historical reference to imagine the disastrous dynamics that could lead to such a scenario, unlikely as it might seem now.

Though this scenario cannot be dismissed under the current circumstances, it is neither inevitable nor necessarily the most likely one to materialize. In reality, there is a diversity of factors making this scenario undesirable and avoidable.

First, the network of intricate interdependence across the globe diminishes the incentive for confrontation. The exercise of the zero-sum pursuit of national interest is likely to back fire.

Second, the geographically and socially wide constituency supporting various components of the globalized world order increases the interest in maintaining it. For example, rising developing countries are intentionally presenting themselves as champions of globalization and the internationalist principles and mechanisms it requires to function as well as showing rising commitment to multilateralism and the United Nations System, even if they have a vision to reform it.

Third, the complex pluralism of the current international system checks hegemonic nationalist projects by the high cost that confrontation would entail.

Finally, the continued eminence of cross-border challenges to which there are no unilateral or territorially confined solutions reaffirms the benefits of international cooperation, multilateralism and the preservation of common ground. In this context, the existing network of norms, agreements, and institutions form such an indispensable asset that is hard to replace, no matter how daunting it could be to reform it in accordance with the requirements of new realities and demands.

All these factors make a return to an imagined world of singular unbound sovereign States fending freely for themselves neither widely desirable nor practically possible. These factors are more likely to collude towards a gradual renegotiation of a reformed international order that appropriately rebalances and reformulates its “sovereignty” and “internationalist” components to allow both the space for the essential State reinvigoration and an adaptation of the principles, norms, and mechanisms to a new global scene. This negotiation will not be exclusively, or even mainly, a formal diplomatic process. It will be the outcome of the interaction of the wills of States in search for State renewal. However, diplomacy will be called upon to step up to the constitutive requirements of the current phase of the international order.

Enhancing the likelihood of a positive scenario that combines successful State reinvigoration and a continued commitment to rules-based international order that contributes to peace and security, sustainable development, and universal human rights will depend on the international community’s handling of some key issues. First, the needed reinvigoration of the State within an open international order will depend on the evolution of a formula for the growth of the global economy that is both geographically and socially inclusive, to bridge the gap between the winners and looser of globalization across the board. There is a trend to acknowledge the limits and shortcomings of the neo-liberal policies of de-regulation for managing the global economy and guiding national policies. However, there is yet little to show for it in terms of concrete reforms and policy recommendations.

The formulation of narrow solutions for the socio-economic agonies in developed societies at the expense of the socio-economic prospects of developing countries, either in matters of trade, development and environmental financing, or movements of population, will undermine the possibilities of that positive scenario and all attempts of reform. A formula of inclusive global growth can only be arrived at through a more open-minded democratic governance of the global economy, an update of its principles, norms, and policy recommendations that considers justice on the national and global levels as a priority.

Second, the successful reinvigoration of the State within an inclusive international order will require the international order to better accommodate the diversity of State governance models and avoid their evolution into ideologically opposed systems that rehash historical experiences that led to major wars. The de-politicization of the rich body of principles and multilateral mechanisms dealing with good governance and human rights can provide a basis for evolving common grounds in that field.

Third, the successful renewal of the State within an open order will depend on the success in establishing stricter checks on the use of force among states, including the collective regulation of new forms of warfare that remain outside regulation (drone attacks, the use of artificial intelligence and cyber-attacks). This effective regulation of the use of force will undo the negative impact of the excesses of uni-polarity on the international order (preventive attacks, unilateral foreign military action on grounds of counterterrorism, abusing or misusing the Right to Protect). It will also contribute to a momentum towards a general de-escalation of geo-strategic conflict.

Fourth, steadfastness in upholding territorial integrity, rejection of land grabbing and resisting change of political borders, that might present itself as a false solution to the crisis of the State and fragmented political community, will be central to the future of the international order. In the current international context, resorting to changing political borders can prove to be like chasing a mirage. Not only does it represent a territorial formula to face the de-territorialization of the political community, it is likely to further fuel geo-strategic competition and to delay the acknowledgement of the inevitability of the reform of global governance. The future trajectory of the conflict in Syria will be an important test of the direction in which the international community will choose to take.

6. Conclusion

The future of the international order in the 21st century will be dependent on a large number of global, regional and State level factors. This chapter focused on one factor only: the condition and future trajectory of the modern sovereign State, that unmatched center of power, the indispensable enforcer of rules, and the unchallenged conveyor of legitimacy to the international stage. It was argued that the general crisis in which the State finds itself is a result of the massive transformations that have taken place in the past decades and is responsible for an important part of the instability and uncertainty that characterize the current international scene. Although this is a very visible problem in the Middle East, it is not exclusive to that region.

Hence, the future of the international order in the 21st century will depend, in part, on how the State responds to its structural crisis and the degree to which the international system provides it with the appropriate space to adapt and renew itself. This reinvigoration and adaptation will be essential for the evolution of an international order capable of contributing to peace and security, sustainable development, and universal human rights.

This necessary process of renewal, while essential, does carry risks of setting States against one another. However, it does not have to come at the expense of preserving and developing common principles, norms, and institutions. In fact, it might depend on the capacity to reform and enhance existing ones. Diplomacy needs to step up to the tasks of this critical phase in the evolution of the international order.

MEXICO

MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY

MULTIPLE IDENTITIES IN A SHIFTING WORLD

Hector Ortega

In an ever-changing and interconnected global context, foreign affairs ministries have become neuralgic centers for every State. Globalization, technological change, and increasing economic interdependence have given way to shared challenges that make cooperation more necessary and urgent than ever. We are living in an era of profound and fast-paced changes in the international system, marked by uncertainty and shared risks. The world faces a redistribution of economic, political, and social power. Terrorism, climate change, human displacement, and nuclear weapons stand out as some of the most alarming phenomena that call on globally coordinated solutions.

Mexico is no stranger to this collective task. At the crossroads of international and domestic politics, Mexican foreign policy has gained ground as one of the main strategic components of government action. Besides taking care of routine issues, top officials are trusted with the duty of leading the way towards medium and long-term foreign policy goals. Naturally, these are focused on protecting national interests, such as economic prosperity or national security, but they also reflect the image Mexico has of itself, how it understands its role in the international system, and what are its core values.

Thus, foreign policy is usually defined by both a combination of structural conditions and national capabilities, as well as a set of multiple, intersecting identities and values. Structural conditions are understood as characteristics that cannot be easily modified or cannot be modified at all. These include geographic location, availability of natural resources, long-term economic development, and the political system, among others. National capabilities are related to a country’s economic power, military assets, and global presence and activism. As part of the international community, States also promote certain values or worldviews in accordance with their cultural or political identities, which are useful for advancing their national interests and strengthening their alliances with other global actors.

However, the international system poses its own constraints on foreign policy design. The unprecedented global challenges the world faces today create inextricable bonds between State and non-State actors. Isolated actions are hardly ever fruitful. Dialogue and cooperation are imperative conditions for a harmonious global community that is prepared to undertake the challenges of tomorrow.

In this regard, Mexico is an interesting example of foreign policy formulation and implementation, precisely because of its unique combination of multiple identities, structural conditions, capabilities, and values. The country has a privileged geopolitical location, with access to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, abundance in natural and human resources, and a population of more than 120 million people with a substantial demographic bonus.

Furthermore, as a booming emerging market, Mexico is one of the twenty largest economies in the world and an export powerhouse. The Mexican economy is highly integrated into global value chains through thirteen free trade agreements with 52 countries¹⁴¹, which amount to more than 60% of the world’s GDP. Mexico offers an attractive business environment, legal certainty, and economic sectors with strong potential for development. Macroeconomic indicators are solid and public finances are sound. Cultural appeal is also one of Mexico’s strongholds. With 35 cultural and natural sites recognized as part of UNESCO’s World Heritage List, Mexico is a popular international travel destination, ranking as the eighth country with the most international tourist arrivals in 2016.142

In recent years, Mexico has made significant progress in diversifying its relations with strategic partners and participating actively in multilateral fora. A country with the diplomatic prestige, geographical location, and the cultural and economic importance of Mexico cannot stand aside while the rest of the world is changing, especially given our commitment to democratic principles, liberal values, and multilateralism. The international community expects an active and committed participation from Mexico in order to strengthen international institutions, to improve its way of promoting the great causes of humanity, and to address current global challenges.

1. Mexico’s Multiple Identities

Mexico is a country with multiple and intersecting identities related to geography, economy, and values that define its national interests and foreign policy actions. Regardless of the ever-changing international system and the emergence of new challenges, the stability of these characteristics allows for long-range policy planning.

1.1. Mexico’s Geographic Identities

Mexico is a natural bridge between North and Latin America, and between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean. The country shares a cultural background, and economic and political characteristics with most Latin American countries. In the last few years, Mexico has strengthened its trade, investment, and cooperation relations with the region, with the objective of reinforcing constructive dialogue. Latin America and the Caribbean are the main destinations for Mexican businesses looking for new markets, making up more than 60% of Mexican foreign investment. For example, Mexican companies have invested more than USD 30 billion in Brazil, Mexico’s top investment destination in Latin America, USD 14 billion in Peru, and USD 7 billion in Chile.

Additionally, trade with South America amounts to more than 30 billion USD per year. Mexico is among the top trading partners of various countries in the hemisphere. The country also promotes regional integration mechanisms like the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru), which aims to build a deeply integrated area with a common market and use it as a political and economic platform toward the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁴³

Mexico is also bound to Central America and the Caribbean by heritage, proximity, and the common goal of making this region more peaceful, inclusive, and prosperous. Mexico is committed to continuing cooperation and integration with Central America.
In this regard, the Mexican government created a fund to support infrastructure projects to contribute to its development. Bilateral trade with Central America amounts to almost 8 billion USD and will surely increase, since the entire region’s economies have experienced moderate but sustained growth in recent years.

Moreover, Mexican private investments in Central America amount to more than 10.6 billion USD. Mexico promotes a vision centered on shared responsibility to foster development, specifically in the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras). Regarding the Caribbean, Mexico recognizes challenges and opportunities. The most pressing hardships include the vulnerability to natural phenomena, as well as the economic, political, and social ability to mitigate its effects. Hence, Mexico is contributing to build resilience to natural disasters and to improve their management in the short and long term. On the other hand, opportunities exist to increase bilateral trade and investments, and to develop a policy of sustainable tourism.

Mexico is inextricably linked to the United States and Canada with whom it has a multidimensional, complex, and strategic relationship. Recently, a new phase of dialogue and negotiation in the North American region began. Mexico has been a close partner of both countries, by virtue of the variety and scope of their economic, social, and cultural ties. Mexico exchanges 1 million USD per minute with the United States and more than 1 million people and 447,000 vehicles with proper documentation cross the shared border every day. Additionally, Mexico is the second or third biggest market for 31 of the 50 US states and bilateral trade supports 5 million American workers. Canada is Mexico’s fourth trade partner and second export market. Both countries accounted for 53% of FDI in Mexico between 1994 and 2017.

Furthermore, Mexico is part of the Pacific Rim, one of the oldest trading routes in the world. Today, Asia-Pacific is Mexico’s second largest trading partner as a region, trading almost 160 billion USD a year. The Mexican government has adopted an unprecedented rapprochement policy towards Asia since it is key to the country’s diversification efforts. In particular, Mexico seeks to continue deepening its political, economic, and investment relationship through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), with its members making up the third largest economy in the world, the third largest population with 495 million people, and the first trading bloc with over 4.8 trillion USD in exchanges. Mexico has also sought to strengthen bilateral relations with China, Japan, and South Korea. With China, Mexico fosters a stronger relationship through the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership, established in 2013. Japan is Mexico’s fourth trading partner and the only country in the region with whom it has a Free Trade Agreement. Finally, South Korea is Mexico’s sixth trading partner, while Mexico is its first export market in Latin America.

1.2. Mexico’s Economic Identities

Not all of Mexico’s relationships are conditioned by geography. From an economic perspective, Mexico is an emerging country. It is estimated that, by 2050, Mexico will become the seventh largest economy in the world (PWC, 2017). Today, it is the third most open market worldwide and the second among G20 members regarding the trade of goods and services (World Bank, 2016).

As a member of the G20, Mexico affirms its role as an active global actor by participating in the decision-making process on global financial governance and the future of the world’s economy. G20 countries represent 86% of the global economy and 64% of the world’s population. Mexico’s membership to the G20 allows the country to review its bilateral relation with each of its members. With some of them, like the United States and Canada, there already exists a developed alliance. This also holds true for European countries with whom Mexico shares a close association based on common values, such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and international cooperation.

The relationship with the European Union and other European countries is strong, as Mexico consolidates its links drawing from shared values and goals. Regarding the EU, in 2013 it was decided that the Global Agreement signed in 2000 should be updated and, while doing this, to revise the bilateral relation as a whole, which by then also included the Strategic Partnership and its Joint Executive Plan. The negotiations that started in 2016 were based on goals of common prosperity, the projection of Mexico and the EU as strategic partners with global responsibilities, and the promotion of economic and social exchanges. All previous legal instruments have been included into a single one, thus adopting the most up-to-date mechanisms to further deepen the relationship.

The new Agreement will have a significant economic impact as it will allow both parties to increase their commercial exchanges. Since the entry into force of the Global Agreement, bilateral trade has grown by more than 233%, and currently, the EU represents 9% of Mexico’s foreign trade, making it its third largest partner. The EU is also the second investor in Mexico, with a total of over 153 billion USD between 1999 and the first trimester of 2017. The Agreement also entails great political importance, since it will not only reinforce current political relations, but it will also send a strong message to the rest of the world in favor of dialogue, cooperation, free trade, and multilateralism.

1.3. Principles and Values

Mexico designs and conducts its foreign policy within the framework of its constitutional principles.¹⁴⁴ These principles also rest on the precept that Mexico is an actor with global responsibility and that having an active and coherent foreign policy is key to its internal development, to affirm its national sovereignty, and to grow stronger domestically.

Mexico’s values and interests translate into a longstanding multilateral vocation. Mexico firmly believes that today’s international challenges need a global response and rejects the false dilemma that confronts cooperation with closed borders and the defense of sovereignty with multilateral dialogue. No country, no matter how powerful, can shape globalization and face global transformations on its own.

Mexico is convinced that multilateral collaboration is the only way to address the most pressing current global challenges. Multilateralism is the key element that distinguishes an international system where States simply coexist and an international community where States commit themselves to cooperate harmoniously and responsibly. As such, Mexico is devoted to the goals and principles of the UN and is willing to take the lead on those issues where it can most contribute and make a difference.

2. Current Global Challenges

Today’s global challenges are numerous and complex. They are a result of the transformation process that the world has undergone and that has been greatly accelerated in the last decades, giving prominence to issues such as globalization, rapid technological change, the emergence of new security threats, the worsening of climate change, unprecedented flows of migrants and refugees, and a new phase of geopolitics. In an interconnected and interdependent world, these issues have to be addressed collectively and with a comprehensive approach. From a Mexican perspective, the following are some of the biggest challenges the world is currently facing and in which Mexico will continue to assume a responsible role.

2.1. Globalization and Regional Arrangements

There is no denying that globalization has brought substantial benefits and opportunities. Greater openness for trade and financial flows, more integration and cross-border mobility, and technological developments have advanced the world’s prosperity. However, it is also true that, as the world becomes more globalized, new challenges arise. In the past few years, the 2008 financial crisis and growing inequality around the world caused a political backlash against the benefits of globalization that has been accompanied by the resurgence of nationalism and protectionism. Rejection of openness, free trade, cooperation, and multilateralism have already translated into dramatic political changes driven by populism, xenophobia, and discrimination in some countries. The emergence of new transnational actors has led to a dispersion of power, which in turn has changed the way States relate to one another as it affects their ability to deal with global issues. In this scenario, the best strategy for emerging economies such as Mexico is to broaden their scope of action, strengthen their relations with historic allies, and diversify their links to non-traditional actors.

Mexico recognizes that globalization has its limits. Listening to the voices of those who have been left behind must be the priority of any government concerned with the welfare of its population. However, this is no solitary mission. Mexico is certain that no matter how powerful a country, it cannot deal with the effects of globalization on its own. The system is too intricate and interwoven, and as such, it demands collective action to strive for a comprehensive, sustained, and equitable development.

In this scenario, Mexico is aware that the fluidity of today’s global interactions demands flexible structures comprised of like-minded partners. In the last few decades, informal consultation groups such as the G20 have increased policy harmonization and coordination efforts. Mexico’s membership to the G20 has made it possible to develop closer relations with other countries outside its traditional sphere. For example, since 2013 Mexico’s partnership with Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia through MIKTA provides a platform to advance joint priorities. These include the reform of international energy governance and the promotion of energy access, counter-terrorism and security, peacekeeping, trade and the economy, gender equality, and sustainable development. MIKTA has emerged as a group that “fosters renewed and innovative partnerships to provide pragmatic and constructive solutions to global challenges”¹⁴⁵, by bridging developed and developing countries on the path towards effective global governance.

2.2. Exponential Technological Change

Another phenomenon with an enormous impact on the current global context is exponential technological change. Unprecedented scientific and technological advances affect the dynamics of domestic and international interactions and have repercussions on peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights. The so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution – a concept introduced by Karl Schwab in 2016 – with its new emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, have effects that are difficult to predict and impossible to revert in the international arena.

Technological change has some negative implications, which we can already foresee. Automation could affect labor worldwide by generating unprecedented rates of unemployment. The advantages of technology, if not well distributed, will exacerbate inequality and differentiated development among nations, as uneven access to new inventions has been the historical trend of innovation. The uses of artificial intelligence in cutting-edge weapons will completely change the way war is waged, making arms more lethal than ever before.

Additionally, it opens up the possibility for transnational companies to enter the tech sector, as well as transnational hackers to exploit information for questionable purposes. Moreover, governments do not have the capacity to regulate the enormous amount of data generated every second. Thus, another challenge that derives from technological advancement is cyber-security (third place in the World Economic Forum’s risks landscape for 2018). The international community has to be able to guarantee an open and free cyberspace while keeping it safe.

Mexico is conscious of the present and future implications of technological advances and is certain that the only way to successfully manage these changes is through cooperation among all nations and stakeholders. For these reasons, Mexico has recently championed the discussion of exponential technological change inside the UN system, in order for an international response to be formulated after a thorough process of discussion and deliberation inside the multilateral organization. Mexico has defended that technological change is a cross-cutting issue that should be addressed by all agencies in the UN system, as well as from the scope of action of national and subnational governments, the private sector, civil society, youth, and academia. A global governance mechanism and coordinated domestic policies are fundamental to ensure that technological advances benefit societies around the world.

2.3. Global Peace and Security

The world faces the immense challenge of undertaking conflicts in a comprehensive manner. It is not enough for the international community to engage in military or humanitarian operations where conflicts exist. Structural causes of conflict must be addressed in order to offer sustainable and long-lasting solutions. In this regard, an important shift of paradigm is occurring within the UN since 2016: the adoption of the concept of sustaining peace, which focuses on the prevention of conflicts by encountering their root causes through economic and social development, taking into consideration aspects such as security, justice enforcement, and human rights. In short, peace-building through development and prosperity. Mexico strongly believes in the importance of this new model and as a result, became a founding member of the Group of Friends of Sustaining Peace as an effort to reform the peace and security pillar of the United Nations.

UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are an instrument to achieve sustainable peace and political solutions for conflicts. In 2014, in his intervention at the high-level General Debate at the UN General Assembly, Mexico announced that it would return to participate in peacekeeping operations, performing humanitarian tasks for the benefit of civilians. This decision stemmed from a will to reinforce its commitment to the UN system and the belief that UN operations are a valuable instrument to help countries solve conflicts and establish the necessary conditions for a lasting peace. Since resuming its participation in peacekeeping operations in 2015, Mexico has deployed elements to four operations (Haiti, Lebanon, Western Sahara, and Central African Republic) and two special political missions in Colombia.

Beyond conflicts, other urgent matters threaten international security. Today, nine countries own approximately 15,000 nuclear weapons. Nuclear risk is very much present, as can be seen in the escalation of tensions in the Korean Peninsula, a situation that Mexico strongly condemns as a serious threat to international peace and security that places millions of people in danger. After the first nuclear explosion occurred in 1945, nuclear energy used for warfare purposes has become a worldwide threat. Since then, Mexico has adopted a national commitment to peace by unilaterally deciding to never develop, use, produce, acquire, or store nuclear weapons. Mexico is convinced that the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons is the only full guarantee against any catastrophic harm caused by their use, either intentional or accidental.

More than 50 years ago, Mexico was the promoter of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which created the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world, showing that multilateral negotiations can be successful given the right opportunity and political will. Today, Mexico is deeply committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its three pillars: non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and disarmament.

In April 2012, sixteen countries, including Mexico, issued a joint statement on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. After a series of three international conferences (one of which was held in Nuevo Vallarta, Nayarit, in 2014), there was sufficient demand for actions to advance nuclear disarmament negotiations. Mexico became one of the first countries to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on November 28, 2017, honoring the country’s long-standing tradition in favor of disarmament and against nuclear proliferation.

Wars between States have become less frequent; instead, violence perpetrated by non-State actors is one of this century’s main threats. Globalization and technological advances have facilitated the spread of transnational organized crime and terrorism. For example, ISIS is known for using social media to attract foreign fighters, to spread terror worldwide, and to communicate between its members. Terrorist threats have become harder to address because they have a wider reach.

States cannot handle terrorism on their own. The international community needs to articulate new initiatives that contribute alleviating the terror threat around the world. To this end, it is vital that States share information and intelligence, and that they adopt international laws to fight and punish terrorism. Mexico condemns all forms of terrorism and rejects violent and extremist ideologies. Moreover, it has actively participated in regional and international fora such as the G20 and the Organization of American States (OAS) to tackle the financing channels of terrorism and to strengthen national capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.

International criminal organizations, acting as global enterprises with a great ability to adapt and change, defy the capability of States to counter them and thus affect the development, security, stability, and well-being of many countries. As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) states: “organized crime affects all States, whether as countries of supply, transit or demand. As such, modern organized crime constitutes a global challenge that must be met with a concerted, global response.”¹⁴⁶ Traditional criminal activities like arms or drug trafficking and illegal trafficking of wildlife represent a challenge for the prevalence of the rule of law and the respect of human rights.

The UNODC calculates that the illicit arms trade is worth more than 1 billion USD each year. It is also estimated that every year more than 500,000 people die because of armed violence. In Latin America, and particularly in Mexico, cross-border traffic from the United States has strengthened the armed capacity of criminal organizations. Aware of the lethal impact of gunfire violence, Mexico was an active participant in the design and negotiation of the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first global instrument that establishes legally binding laws for the control of conventional arms deals. Mexico is determined to encourage the accession of a greater number of nations to the ATT, in particular, those that produce and export arms. This should be done in order to promote compliance from a position of shared responsibility to what is clearly a transnational challenge, push for cooperation, exchange of information, and transparency between countries in order to halt the traffic of arms.

Regarding the world drug problem, Mexico considers it an issue of the utmost importance, which requires deep and long-
-lasting solutions given that it is a public health and security issue that affects the entire world. In 2012, along with Colombia and Guatemala, Mexico convened a Special Summit on drugs, which was celebrated in the UN General Assembly of 2016. Today, Mexico seeks an all-inclusive approach that considers aspects related to public health, justice, human rights, development, and security, while promoting cooperation and the concept of shared responsibility as a means to fight this problem.

2.4. Unprecedented Flows of Migrants and Refugees

During the last few years, the world has witnessed unprecedented migratory and refugee flows. According to the 2017 UN Secretary-General’s Report Making migration work for all, there are an estimated 258 million international migrants.¹⁴⁷ Every minute twenty people are displaced because of war and persecution; and in 2016, after one of the worst migratory crises in history more than 65.6 million people had been forced out of their homes.¹⁴⁸ These conditions have strained the resources and capabilities of State agencies and institutions in significant ways.

Consequently, migration has become a priority of the international agenda and one of the most pressing shared challenges. As a country of origin, transit, destination, and return of migrants, Mexico is in a privileged position to contribute to the solution of this issue with a multidimensional approach. It also understands the importance of cooperation and co-responsibility in order to harvest the potential benefits of this phenomenon. In this regard, Mexico strongly advocates for the recognition of migrants’ human rights and their economic, social, and cultural contributions to society.

Mexico has engaged in serious multilateral actions to address international migration. The country is an active promoter of the consolidation of global governance mechanisms that champion a comprehensive approach to international migration. One of the main efforts in this regard has been the Global Compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration, in which Mexico played a leading role as co-facilitator. Although the Global Compact will not be a binding instrument, it represents a great opportunity for dialogue and policy coordination. Mexico remains profoundly committed to this and future multilateral initiatives, to address both migrant and refugee flows.

2.5. Sustainable Development

Nowadays, some of the most pressing global challenges stem from environmental degradation and social and economic inequalities. Climate change threatens the very survival of our species, by testing to the limit our capacity to adapt to increasingly extreme weather conditions. Biodiversity loss menaces food security and the natural balance of the world’s ecosystems. Land erosion, water scarcity, and natural resources depletion are phenomena, which will increase the propensity of conflict and affect the livelihoods of millions, aggravating hunger, poverty, and marginalization. Inequality and underdevelopment are pervasive in the world, affecting the possibilities of a large portion of the global population to fulfill even their most basic needs.

The solutions to all these problems can go hand in hand if the international community works together to adopt a sustainable development approach. As former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon once said: “At its essence, sustainability means ensuring prosperity and environmental protection without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.”¹⁴⁹

In this respect, the 2030 Agenda is one of the most ambitious, innovative and relevant global efforts in the last decades, a true achievement for multilateralism and proof of what the international community can accomplish if it sets to work together. The agreement represents a paradigm shift since it recognizes that the development model previously followed generated inequality and damaged the environment while being unable to end poverty and exclusion. In multilateral negotiations, Mexico was an adamant supporter of including a multidimensional concept of poverty in the Agenda, in order to ensure prosperity for large segments of the global population.

Due to its firm commitment, Mexico has played a leading reference on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda at a regional scale and has presided the Forum of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development as a follow-up mechanism on the advances towards the Sustainable Development Goals.

Besides economic and social development, the dimension of environmental conservation is paramount for the continuation of our way of life. In its 2013 Assessment Report, the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for the first time was categorical about climate change being real and human activities being its main cause. The impact of human agency means that it is still possible, through technological and scientific innovation, as well as changes in behavior, to limit global warming.

Mexico is a firm believer that multilateralism is the only effective way to face the problems posed by climate change and its consequences. Mexico will maintain its leadership in the matter while promoting cooperation with other countries under the principle that climate change is a global challenge, which entails shared but differentiated responsibilities. The 2015 Paris Agreement is the right step into the consolidation of a climate regime of cooperation in which all countries, regardless of their level of development, make commitments and agree to work toward the creation of a solid international framework to combat climate change.

Mexico is devoted to continuing its active role in the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where its leadership is recognized due to its inclusive and active participation and its push for a competitive, resilient and low-carbon global economy. In line with this responsibility, Mexico was the first developing country to submit its Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement framework.

Mexico is also elevating its cooperation efforts to promote resilience in the Caribbean, which has very little responsibility regarding climate change – it is a region where carbon emissions are practically nonexistent – but that has been deeply affected by natural disasters, leading to huge losses due to lost tourism revenue and infrastructure damages.

3. Conclusions

New and demanding global issues, as well as the difficulties of overcoming longstanding and deep-rooted problems, defy even the most skilled foreign policy-makers. Mexico’s unique combination of geography, economy, and values has paved the way towards a multifaceted and versatile foreign policy able to adapt and respond effectively to all of the most pressing global challenges.

In a world where emerging economies are playing an increasingly important role in international affairs, Mexico has not only the ability but also the responsibility to influence global decision-making processes in those areas where it can make a substantial difference. Being a country with multiple identities and interests, Mexico must be present in all the international and multilateral main debates and act at all times with confidence, conviction, and consciousness. Mexico is particularly committed to encouraging and defending multilateralism as the only effective way to adapt to the rapid changes occurring in the world and address them. Only by being proactive, open, and decisive, will it contribute to make the world a better place.

Mexico’s participation and involvement in current international affairs is a consequence of its historical role as an engaged actor with the most relevant issues for humanity. As such, Mexico will continue to develop fruitful relations and active strategies to find diplomatic and peaceful solutions to tackle the most pressing global challenges, while defending humankind’s prosperity and well-being.

Mexico is convinced that these issues can become opportunities to bind the international community together in the search for effective solutions that contribute to our planet’s welfare, peace, and sustainability. The way the world decides to undertake today’s challenges will define global policy-making for future risks.

PORTUGAL

PORTUGUESE FOREIGN POLICY

CONSTRAINTS AND RESPONSES

Pedro Sanchez da Costa Pereira

1. Introduction: Characterization of Portuguese
Foreign Policy

It is conventional wisdom that the April 1974 revolution marked the beginning of a new era in Portuguese foreign policy, and that, since then, this policy has developed in accordance with three main priorities: Europe, the Atlantic, and the Portuguese-speaking world. Although these priorities remain fully relevant, the current Government introduced three additional dimensions, namely the importance of and support to Portuguese communities, the internationalization of the Portuguese economy, and the reinforcement of multilateralism.

This depiction of Portuguese foreign policy is the backdrop of the exercise we have set forth: reflecting on how the main challenges and factors of change in the international order affect Portuguese foreign policy and how it has adapted and evolved in the pursuit of its underlying interests.

The first three axes – Europe, the Atlantic, and the Portuguese-speaking world – derive from well know geographic and historical constraints. Portugal is a European country, however, not a continental one. It is, above all, an Atlantic nation. One could even argue that it has an Atlantic centrality (in the words of Fernando Pessoa, “Portugal is the face with which Europe regards the West”). However, culturally, it finds itself in the Latin and Mediterranean world and not in the Anglo-Saxon space. In the European context, Portugal is a peripheral medium-dimension country, but it has nonetheless the third largest exclusive economic zone of the European Union. The closest capital to Lisbon is Rabat and not another European capital. It has a centuries-old stable single-land border.

Even since before the 15th century, Portuguese foreign policy has been built upon the possible balance between the continental pressure and the possibilities offered by the oceans, at each given time. Therefore, Portugal has alternated cycles of proximity towards and distance from the European continent, established alliances that would counter the weight of Spain, and searched a unique space beyond the European continent and the Atlantic that would enable its existence as a sovereign nation. This is how the Portuguese-speaking world emerged and consolidated, an axis materialized through the country’s special relationship with Portuguese speaking African countries, as well as with Brazil and Timor-Leste, all of which today jointly form the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP).

After 1974, following the fall of the Estado Novo and the stabilization of democracy, the pursuit of these three axes became clear and consensual. Since 1976, all governments have included these three axes in their programs. The country engaged fully with Europe, where it is naturally immersed, and committed itself to the European project. This engagement entailed substantial changes to Portuguese-Spanish relations and gave depth to Portugal’s founding presence in NATO. While positioning itself as an integral part of the Ibero-American space, Portugal also developed strong relations with the Portuguese-speaking African States and Timor-Leste as it had previously done with Brazil.

Simultaneously, Portuguese foreign policy had to respond to the needs of various communities of Portuguese origin around the world, generated by successive migratory waves from the late 19th century onwards. Nowadays, about one-third of Portuguese nationals and individuals entitled to Portuguese citizenship reside outside of Portugal. In general, these diverse communities are welcomed, well integrated, and economically stable. Given their increasing relevance to Portuguese external action, these communities now constitute an autonomous fourth guiding axis of its foreign policy, which is distinctive from the axis of the Portuguese-speaking world where it was previously addressed.

In addition to this fourth dimension, a thorough analysis of Portuguese Foreign Policy cannot ignore that, in recent decades, the country has endeavored to internationalize its economy. This aspect has warranted increasing attention and fully justifies the creation of a new Secretariat of State for Internationalization at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The internationalization of Portugal’s economy is now an autonomous line of action and a key axis for the understanding of the global success of Portuguese foreign policy.

Concurrently, we also witness a growing Portuguese presence at the multilateral level and in various organizations, mainly in the framework of the United Nations. This presence is the visible face of a conscious option: to value and support multilateralism as a principle, an objective, and as a practice at the service of the common good. The strengthening of multilateralism constitutes the sixth key axis of Portuguese foreign policy.

Conceptually, these are the six core dimensions of today’s Portuguese external action. This foreign policy has proven to be extremely successful in the past 40 years. European integration enabled the consolidation of Portugal’s democratic system and offered the country an unprecedented period of economic and social development during the 20th century. Its presence in both the Euro-Atlantic space and NATO gave Portugal a place at the side of allies with whom we share fundamental values and in the dominant bloc that emerged at the end of the cold war. The construction of an autonomous political space of Portuguese-speaking nations brought about a new understanding of our own identity and belonging to a multi-continental space with a common historical and linguistic matrix. An identity anchored on deep political and economic relations between independent and sovereign States that today share what was once Portugal’s historical presence in the world. Portugal underwent a notable process of commercial, cultural, and political internationalization. At the multilateral level, especially at the United Nations, Portugal’s contribution is ever more visible.

2. Portuguese Foreign Policy: Constraints and Challenges

Portuguese foreign policy faces complex constraints and challenges, which, however, can also present opportunities depending on how they are addressed. Some of these are related to known and predictable global trends and developments, while others arise from unresolved tension points or unexpected events.

2.1. The European Space

Europe became, once again, Portugal’s natural space of existence following the end of the colonial empire. Since joining the former European Communities in 1986, Portugal has consistently engaged with the building and consolidation of the European project. Portugal perceives the European Union to be the most effective instrument to ensure peace and prosperity in Europe and to preserve and promote its fundamental values. The European Union provides adequate responses to complex and transnational challenges, which often require joint and coordinated solutions.

The participation of Portugal in the European project has been extremely beneficial. In fact, the consolidation of its democracy was, contrary to common belief, the main reason behind the accession to the former European Communities and not so much the economic and financial advantages – albeit very real – provided for by European structural and cohesion funds. Portugal developed, modernized and, above all, reinvented itself around a project that enjoyed broad consensus across Portuguese society.

We lived times of euro-enthusiasm and have overcome difficult moments, as was the case of the economic and financial crisis that started in 2008 – one of the most complex crisis ever faced. Its effects were felt at the acutest moments of the migratory crisis and the intensification of terrorism. The European Union is, nowadays, simultaneously stronger and weaker. Stronger, thanks to its ability to build new instruments, some of which are of extraordinary pragmatism and efficiency. But also more fragile due to the emergence of new challenges, unprecedented in both scale and dimension. A good example of such trials is the increased difficulty in the decision-making process of an enlarged Union, which has expanded to 28 member States and that is currently facing the first real test to its integrity with the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. Another example is the emergence of populist and anti-European movements, as well as new blocks built around regional affiliations, political and economic shared interests, or ideological, historical, and linguistic affinities that impact negatively on European consensus. Even though the rallying of member States around shared interests is normal and an integral aspect of the European experience, entrenched positions contrary to the building of a common project can contribute to the notion of “multiple Europes” and are often difficult to reconcile with the European project.

Additional challenges include the effective resolution of the migratory crisis, latent and far from being resolved; the difficulty in building consensus on the modalities of a true and indispensable Economic and Monetary Union, that would enable us to face inevitable future economic and financial crisis; the building of a European defense and security pillar, capable of projecting security in close coordination with NATO; the fight against terrorism, a major challenge today; as well as, and although not exhaustive but as a backdrop for all this, the challenge of ensuring the necessary means of action and EU financing in the context of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (one of the EU’s major budgetary contributors) and the continuous advent of several challenges that demand new means of efficient response.

Portugal, as many of its European partners, remains vulnerable to these challenges and to others presented by the internal and external agendas of the European Union. Portugal upholds an impeccable positive and constructive approach in the search for truly European solutions that promote and ensure the success of the European project. Portugal deems the success of this project as of vital interest on its own. Therefore, Portugal is often available to accept solutions, even when not in our national interest in the short term, as long as they enjoy European consensus with the purpose of maintaining unity and allowing the assertion of truly European decisions.

2.2. The Atlantic Axis

Contrary to what many may think, the so-called “Atlantic axis” does not refer, first and foremost, to the Atlantic Ocean per se. From the perspective of Portuguese foreign policy, all oceans, and not only the Atlantic, are of the utmost importance. What is effectively at stake here is the security dimension of the Atlantic area, reflected above all in Portugal’s membership of the Atlantic Alliance and in its relationship with our most important partners in this context: the United Kingdom, for nearly seven centuries, and the United States, from the mid-20th century onwards.

Today, this situation requires adjustments. Within the European Union, the United Kingdom, like Portugal, has always been particularly in favor of strengthening the European defense pillar without duplication and complementarily to NATO, which should remain the main collective defense organization. However, the United Kingdom will soon leave the European project and thus weaken the Atlantic influence in the European Union. Additionally, the recent change in the US Administration has entailed a substantial shift in its relationship with Europe. This trend has become particularly visible within the framework of NATO, with increased US demands for greater European commitment and its changing attitude towards foreign trade. The stalemate of negotiations of a broad trade agreement between the US and the European Union (TTIP) is an unfortunate example of this trend.

Moreover, the international context is rapidly changing and increasingly affected by greater uncertainties and insecurity. Despite NATO’s desire to project security in all its fronts, in practice, it continues to pay more attention to threats emerging from its Eastern and Southeastern borders. Even when it acts in other areas, as in the Atlantic, it does so with the primary, if not exclusive, concern of counteracting and addressing threats from the East. It is less open to act in the Maghreb and the Sahel, from where the greatest threats to the Southern flank of the European Union, and where Portugal stands, could emerge. For these reasons, Portugal holds as a priority to foster coordination, in a spirit of complementarity and non-duplication, between the existing security and defense instruments, while respecting their specificities and, if needed, to enable new tools that project stability and guarantee a 360-degree defense circle that would truly include the South of the Mediterranean.

No matter the circumstances, Portugal remains a loyal ally within NATO while committed to deepening the European project in the field of European security. The same is true for any other alignment in which it may participate with its partners in order to address common threats.

At the national level, Portugal has addressed the reduction of the US presence in the Azores by presenting various initiatives. Both the “Atlantic International Research Center – AIR Center” – a project aimed at promoting cooperation and international scientific research in the fields of oceans, climate, and space – and the creation of an “Atlantic Defense Center” – which would benefit from the Azores’s strategic location – are concrete examples of Portugal’s interest in initiatives that enhance the country’s strategic position in the Atlantic.

An important aspect is Portugal’s centrality in the Atlantic. It should only take a map or a close look at Portugal’s engagement in the European Union and NATO, CPLP, and the Ibero-American Conference to understand that it is here that Portugal’s geopolitical centrality resides. Its location – at the crossroads of the North and South Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, between Europe, the Americas, and Africa – in itself justifies the pursuit of this strategic axis of action.

2.3. The Portuguese-Speaking World

The Portuguese speaking world is embodied in – but not limited to – the Community of Portuguese-speaking countries. It faces significant challenges. This Community comprises countries with specific regional dynamics and different perspectives regarding their membership to this organization. These varying views concern both the national objectives each country pursues with its membership and the common interests of the organization as a whole. Young in its years, the CPLP wants to be seen by the citizens of its member States as an entity capable of delivering concrete benefits or providing a common identity.

Nonetheless, its potential is vast. The CPLP and the Portuguese-speaking world are built upon a common identity that shares historical and linguistic roots and offers wide opportunities, as it embraces an immense demographic and commercial space of deep cultural affinity across nine countries in America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. The Portuguese language is currently one of the fastest growing European languages and the most widely spoken in the Southern Hemisphere. It is estimated that by 2050, 400 million people will speak Portuguese and that by 2100 this number will rise to 500 million, mostly in Africa. The CPLP has numerous projects and fosters relations of cooperation, not only between member States but also among several civil society organizations. Its dynamic interaction is greater than what is often perceived by public opinion. A sign of its vitality, often underestimated, is the interest the CPLP has evoked in third countries. Today, numerous international partners, in numbers that exceed that of its membership, are Observer States or are in the process of acquiring this status.

As of January 1, 2019, Portugal will provide the Executive Secretary of CPLP. Portugal devotes special attention to the CPLP and considers it the best means to foster cooperation between friendly countries that share a common history, language, and fundamental values. In this ever-integrated and globalized world, Portugal hopes that the CPLP will continue to reinforce a space where citizens can feel at home, in full respect of their national identities, and where its member States can support each other to overcome the challenges they face. Increasing the visibility of the CPLP among its constituents requires additional outreach efforts towards the average citizen. Only by promoting initiatives with a wider impact will the organization be perceived as truly useful, and thus reinforce the feeling of belonging to this shared space. It is with such spirit that Portugal strongly believes in the Portuguese-Cape Verdean proposal to facilitate mobility, residence permits, mutual recognition of academic degrees and professional qualifications, as well as the portability of social rights within member States.

Much more can and should be done to consolidate the global presence of the Portuguese-speaking world, its language and cultural richness and diversity. This is a real challenge. Hence the decision to reinforce the centrality of the Institute for Cooperation and Language (Instituto Camões) in Portugal’s foreign action. “The global assertion of the Portuguese language, the international projection of Portuguese and Portuguese-speaking cultures, and the manner by which we carry out partnerships for development” are strategic for Portuguese foreign policy.

2.4. Supporting and enhancing Portuguese communities

Portuguese communities continue to grow and diversify. The main objective is, naturally, to contribute to their well-being and security and to promote a qualitative and meaningful integration in their host country, while preserving their Portuguese roots and memory. In order to understand the dimension of this phenomenon we should take into consideration that Portugal has ten communities of more than 120,000 people spread across the world, dispersed over three continents (Europe, Africa, and America), in addition to relevant populations in Asia and Oceania.

The importance of Portuguese communities abroad fully justifies that they be considered an autonomous axis of Portuguese foreign policy. They are increasingly diverse and heterogeneous (Portugal now offers consular services in 148 countries) and pose additional challenges to the country’s foreign policy due to its changing profile and subsequent shift in expectations concerning the role of the State. Moreover, in the case of large and geographically dispersed communities, it is almost inevitable that, at any given time, at least one of them might be affected by natural, human, or political crisis upon which Portuguese foreign policy is called to act. Responding to the needs of Portuguese-speaking communities implies understanding their heterogeneity, their different origins, and their expectations. It also implies wide and persistent proximity, despite geographical dispersion, and an understanding of the specific context of each community.

At the same time, the management of consular services has become much more demanding and complex. Portugal has sought to provide consular services that are able to respond – including through the use of technological means – to the daily needs of Portuguese citizens living abroad. The monitoring effort, in its political, social, and economic dimensions, is constant. Economic and social crises, situations of serious insecurity or other situations require close monitoring, up-close analysis of the areas where these communities live and political-diplomatic efforts.

We do not forget, on the other hand, the huge political, cultural, and economic potential of Portuguese communities living abroad. These communities are generally well integrated in their societies – in many cases, are second and third generation – and constitute a privileged network for the promotion of investments and trade, for the dissemination of Portuguese language and culture, and for the strengthening of political ties between States. Portugal has actively sought to create structures that take advantage of this potential and is well aware, in its foreign action, that a well-integrated community in its host country is often very important for the pursuit and defense of Portuguese interests.

2.5. The Internationalization of Portugal

Portugal is increasingly a global nation. Portuguese exports, which accounted for 27% of its GDP in 2005, currently represent 43% (2017). If we exclude the European Union, our main fifteen export markets include the United States, Angola, Brazil, China, Morocco, and Switzerland. Portugal has recently achieved a remarkable trade balance and a noteworthy diversification of trade partners.

These tendencies, which derive mainly from the dynamism of economic and business sectors, are not, however, totally autonomous from the guidelines and action of Portuguese foreign policy. The State does not replace Portuguese entrepreneurs and their options but actively seeks to open paths and establish the best conditions for the success of Portuguese economic operators.

That is not all. The internationalization effort is not only aimed at exports in the classical sense but also at other areas such as language – which the potential we have already mentioned – culture, cooperation, mobility, and science. All these areas offer enormous possibilities for synergies with one another. Foreign policy is called to contribute to all of them, by promoting, invigorating, and establishing ties, and seeking to create long-lasting connections. Bilateral dialogues on a regular basis, at the political level, with an increasing number of partners, greatly contribute to this internationalization effort.

Portugal aspires to be ever more present in an increasing number of spaces. It does so with the conviction that such an effort of openness promotes prosperity and growth, but also with the awareness that the more it opens up the more the country exposes itself to the weaknesses and uncertainties that may exist or emerge in the spaces where it is present. The promotion of international stability, the respect for clear rules which are commonly accepted and generate predictability and security, is therefore of the utmost importance for Portugal.

2.6. Multilateralism

Portugal, as a country with a truly global vocation, fully believes in multilateralism as a necessary condition for an international order based on conciliation and on the respect of international rules. Portugal is a member of almost all major international organizations. It is aware that by cooperating with other international partners in the pursuit of compatible goals, the country gains weight and influence and is also able to maximize its presence and influence and overcome frequent limitations of means further accentuated by the ample dispersion of its interests.

Given the numerous challenges at the international level, Portugal actively promotes multilateralism. This is simultaneously a trademark of its foreign action and a major goal of its foreign policy. Hence, the continued importance Portugal has given to the United Nations as the central element of multilateral action in the issues that comprise the international agenda and that are also of great relevance to Portugal, including the Sustainable Development Goals, climate change, migrations, protection of refugees, maritime issues, and the sustainable use of oceans.

Portugal has been very successful in the multilateral framework. It has been elected three times to the United Nations Security Council. It was elected with a very significant number of votes for the mandate in the Human Rights Council it has recently concluded. Furthermore, the election, by acclamation, of António Guterres as the United Nations Secretary-General and more recently of Antonio Vitorino as the next Director-General of the International Organization for Migration, albeit a clear recognition of the merits of the candidates, is also a success of Portugal’s diplomacy at the multilateral level.

The fact is that today many countries perceive Portugal as a country without a self-serving national agenda that is able and ready to understand and voice their concerns while remaining committed to the promotion of the common good and respect for international rules. This general perception is the result of a foreign policy that reinforces multilateralism, is based on values and dialogue, and benefits from a Portuguese presence in multiple spaces at a global scale.

The promotion of multilateralism in all dimensions of Portugal’s foreign policy and the country’s active participation in the most relevant international organizations, mainly in the framework of the United Nations, constitute structural and identifying pillars of Portugal’s foreign policy.

3. Conclusion

Portugal has a stable foreign policy that is the natural result of its history, geography and also of its conscious choices. As our first space of assertion, Europe remains a priority. The Atlantic ensures a unique strategic depth to Portugal’s foreign policy that otherwise it would not have. The pressure of continental Europe led Portugal to turn towards the oceans, explore them, and create a global Portuguese space that is rooted in a common language and widespread communities. Portugal, a lead agent of the first globalization, views the internationalization of its economy as a road to prosperity. It is in the multilateral framework, which Portugal privileges, that it counterweighs its relative small dimension.

Throughout the years, Portugal was able to project a true image of a country that can easily engage with others, without imposing its vision and remaining committed to a world governed by internationally accepted rules. Thus, Portugal’s primary goal in the multilateral system is that of building bridges and seeking common ground. Portugal has shown to be a moderate, balanced, tolerant, and independently minded country, committed to fully respect fundamental values, the rule of law, and human rights. True to its identity, Portugal has demonstrated that generosity and responsibility can be pursued as key goals of its foreign policy. No one can judge Portugal’s actions in regard to the self-determination and independence of Timor-Leste for any other reason than the fulfillment of these two objectives.

These are the main parameters that shape Portuguese foreign policy, and which should continue to guide Portugal’s endeavors in addressing future challenges.

As demonstrated by numerous positive elections to several international bodies over the past decades, its undeniable success has earned Portugal respect and trust. Other countries increasingly perceive Portugal as a balanced actor that respects others, is trustworthy in the pursuit of the common good, and credible in the way it furthers its goals and faces its challenges.

ARGENTINA

Argentina IN THE WORLD

AN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Fulvio Pompeo

1. Overview

We live in an era of transformations, in which the dynamics of political, technological, and cultural changes increasingly challenge collective efforts at global governance. One aspect of this phenomenon points to the increase in the level of uncertainty and instability worldwide. The complexity of this scenario requires the development of flexible and pragmatic international strategies.

However, we should be aware that there are multiple opportunities that could boost growth and development. Argentina’s foreign agenda is therefore based on this notion of today’s world as opportunity.

One of the main challenges President Mauricio Macri took on was to launch a new international insertion strategy for Argentina. This is a strategy that articulates domestic goals with the opportunities that the current world order has to offer.
This strategy considers the country’s insertion taking into account the different federal realities. Finally, this foreign policy strategy turns international projection into an instrument for the promotion of the country’s development.

Argentina needed to develop better, broader and more varied relations with the world and foster international confidence. The country needed to improve its ties to the world in a smart way in order to reduce poverty, defeat drug trafficking, and unite Argentines. Some of the primary goals are to expand our export capacity, increase foreign investments, improve the quality of education, science and technology, and strengthen Argentina’s cultural presence around the globe.

It is up to us in government to find concrete solutions for the welfare of our people. Moving towards a poverty and exclusion-free society requires the creation of the necessary conditions for the expansion of our economy by way of political stability, investment, and social development.

There are plenty of reasons to be optimistic. Since 2017 we have witnessed the recovery of international trade. The task is to translate this trend into a more sustainable path of growth, which entails States cooperating in order to expand the benefits of global commerce, technological innovation, and urban development.

2. Global Challenges

The world order has become more unpredictable as a consequence of the diffusion of power. The resulting international system is a rather more diverse one, in which a multitude of stakeholders pursue their own interests and goals. This has increased the challenges for collective action that are key to manage complex agendas such as terrorism, poverty, climate change, gender inequality and refugee crisis, among others.

Moreover, the main global threats facing the international community are not conventional inter-State armed conflict, but rather the activities of transnational criminal networks that operate on a global scale. Drug trafficking, terrorism, smuggling networks, and human trafficking have a great impact on human security and the welfare of millions of people around the world. In order to tackle these challenges, Argentina is committed to strengthening inter-State cooperation bilaterally, regionally and globally.

Among the aforementioned challenges, terrorism is perhaps the most pressing one in terms of its tragic effects on social stability. The fight against this scourge requires a more globally integrated response on the part of the international community – that is, States, international organizations, private sector and civil society. Such a response should include not only the primary agencies dealing with the threat – intelligence and security – but also the active efforts of other relevant systems, particularly the judiciary and the educational ones.

Cybercrime is another global threat requiring a comprehensive response. This challenge needs a response based on inter-State coordination, since its scope transcends national borders and puts massive pressure on governments’ human and material resources. President Macri’s government has started a profound reform of our State institutions to respond to this challenge. A great interagency effort is taking place in which all relevant State’s actors work together to respond to cyber threats.

Refugee flows also jeopardize global stability as they increase tensions within societies, most notably in relation to the distribution of the State’s health, education and welfare resources. An effective response to the current humanitarian crisis must be based on multidimensional and multi-sectorial approaches in which governments collaborate with the private sector and the civil society to develop and implement socially inclusive strategies.

Climate change certainly constitutes one of the most pressing concerns for the global community. The increase in the frequency, severity and magnitude of extreme weather events has produced humanitarian crises around the globe. Taking into account that Latin America’s long-term prosperity relies on natural resources, climate change is particularly threatening. Cutting global greenhouse gas emissions is a crucial aspect of the fight against climate change. Argentina actively supports multilateral efforts to counter this threat.

It is also important to keep on working so that women can access the same opportunities as men. There is no possible growth if half of the population is not an active part of it. Gender equality will help unleash the potential that women can contribute to development.

3. Argentina to the World

Achieving economic development is one of the main endeavors of this government. We have embarked on a vast reform agenda that includes: the stabilization of macroeconomic indicators, the liberalization of international trade and an ambitious infrastructure plan. Argentina plays a key role in ensuring the sustainability of food security. Argentina’s population is 40 million-strong but it can feed as many as ten times that number. Unleashing our full potential will both help our development and the future of global food security.

Another crucial issue for this government is security. Our security policy is based on the care of our citizens. We aim to improve domestic security. In order to achieve that objective, we need well-trained security forces working under the rule of law and following Argentina’s democratic principles.

We know that in this century we cannot seek the development of our countries individually. Only through a deep integration that strengthens our capabilities and resources will we be able to establish the bases we need to grow and generate more and better opportunities for all.

Multilateralism has a significant relevance in protecting sovereignty and contributing to solve global challenges. Argentina is also committed to promoting cooperation across the world.

We are diversifying our partners. Latin America is the platform from where we project ourselves to the world, and updating Mercosur to the 21st century is one of our top priorities. Democracy, human rights, and individual freedoms are the values that bind us together and are also those we are determined to promote.

Bridges have been built with the Pacific Alliance, and a closer relationship has been promoted with the European Union. At the same time, there are enormous opportunities in strengthening ties with Asia. We have continued to work on a broad agenda that includes agricultural, energetic, scientific, and technological issues, among others. We have also applied to become part of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an organization of enormous importance to enhance our development and acquire better instruments for our public policies.

A fundamental truth is that a smart foreign policy begins at home. Foreign policy has always been about projecting our
domestic values abroad. And these values aim to strengthen
our domestic institutions, our democratic culture, and our respect for human rights. Thus, we are developing our international outlook based on a solid domestic consensus, because uniting Argentines around a consistent set of goals will give us an unprecedented boost to our foreign policy.

In order to help achieve these objectives, Argentina has embarked itself in a crucial step by becoming the 2018 G20 president. This is the first time a South American nation holds such position. In this capacity, we will emphasize the aspirations and concerns of this part of the world which has a vibrant and diverse population eager for new opportunities. This duty is embedded in Argentina’s G20 presidency motto: building consensus for fair and sustainable development.

4. Final Considerations

The shifting global landscape encourages us to not be afraid of change and, above all, to unite in the face of those challenges that are too complex to be addressed alone. Therefore, we must build specific ties and coalitions for each issue on the global agenda, enabling an alignment with our interests.

Argentina’s international strategy attempts at connecting domestic goals with external opportunities, recovering international trust, diversifying partners, expanding cooperation spaces, and identifying niches where Argentina can be a protagonist. This is based upon a deep-seated conviction that the world, though in deep transformation, offers a scenario for growth and development.

INDONESIA

THE NEW GLOBAL LANDSCAPE

AN INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE¹⁵⁰

Siswo Pramono

Change in a global landscape is something natural. The question is how the international community manages to harness the change. Constructive engagement is necessary to reconcile the contending interests among parties: the interests of those who are on the rise and those who are on the descent. This kind of dynamics has already been captured by Paul Kennedy’s “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” (1987) and Kishore Mahbubani’s “The Great Convergence” (2013).

The purpose of this paper is to observe how our modern international system, despite of its flaw and limitations, is struggling to save the world. Another delicate question is how the system attempts to strike the balance between a declining United States (while it remains the most powerful economy and military power in the world), and the rise of China, India, and the rest. Against the backdrop of the increasing differences of the rest (i.e. the increasing role of India and other middle powers), the paper will depict Indonesia’s experience in surfing the tides of global change. One of them is the “withdrawal” of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was once considered as its very “pivot to Asia”.

1. A Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) without the US

Obama’s TPP is meant to be the US’ pivot to Asia. Officially, it was not intended to contain China. China is simply too big to be contained. In 2015, President Joko Widodo of Indonesia told President Obama that Indonesia may consider joining the TPP.¹⁵¹ Indonesia then conducted the inter-ministerial study to determine whether or not it should join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and in what circumstances. A year later, the study was completed and a conclusion was drawn. Indonesia will suffer some losses if it joins TPP, but the country will even suffer more, if it fails to join.

However, there was an unexpected regime change in the US. Most Indonesians, and many Americans as well, expected that Hillary Clinton would win the US Presidential elections – and thus expected that the US’s TPP would be materialized soon. However, it was Donald Trump who won. Just a month after Indonesia completed the study on TPP, President Trump decided to pull out from it.

President Trump’s decision to give up on TPP has already depicted the reality of the global economic shift to Asia. In 2015 (note, to the rest of this paper, the author will often refer to the year 2015 as a crucial time), the heyday when TPP was drafted, the US’s total trade with the TPP-11 countries accounted for USD 1.52 trillion, out of this amount, the US has suffered a deficit of USD 163 billion.¹⁵² President Trump hates deficit, since it is deemed prejudicial to his “American First” principle (i.e. America must win all aspects of international relations). Worse, while China was not part of the TPP, most of the TPP-11 countries, except Mexico and Canada, have traded more with China than with the US. For President Trump, that is another source of irritation.

All the more noteworthy, the US’s main allies in Asia (which, in the recent US National Security Strategy/NSS, are qualified as the “Quad” powers), such as Australia and Japan, have long been economically attached to China. About 35% of Australia’s trade with its Top 15 partners, was with China. The US participation in Australia’s total trade was only 9%.¹⁵³ Japan’s trade with China reached 21% of its global trade, while its trade with the US accounted for only 15%.¹⁵⁴

On the opposite side, 64% of Mexico’s total global trade was with the US, and only 10% with China. Canada also devoted 64% to the US and only 8% to China¹⁵⁵. For President Trump, who considered himself as a master of the deal¹⁵⁶ (and now a master of trade war). subtracting Canada and Mexico from his TPP calculation, would result in TPP-9, out of which the US total trade with TPP would drop to only USD 413 billion. Yet, the US still suffers a deficit of about USD 90 billion!¹⁵⁷ Thus, it is understandable that Trump, driven by his short-term calculation, decided to withdraw from TPP, and cling instead to the re-negotiation of NAFTA, with Canada and Mexico.

With Mexico and Canada, the most loyal to the US market, NAFTA counted a total trade of USD 1.1 trillion (2015), which was still much larger than TPP-9, but with only a US deficit of 70 billion (which was much smaller than the US deficit with TPP-9). As such, Trump decided to put Obama’s economic “pivot to Asia” to an end. Australia, Japan, and Canada now attempt to proceed with TPP, even without the US. How will TPP progress without the US, is yet to be seen.

As TPP is falling into the abyss of uncertainty, East Asia is now devoting more time and energy to speed up the finalization of the ASEAN-based RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership).¹⁵⁸ However, due to the nature of economic inter-dependence in East Asia, it is likely that China will play an important role in the RCEP process. Beyond RCEP, the world is also anticipating President Xi Jinping’s vow in January 2017 in Davos that China will fill in the gap left open by the weakening of US global leadership.¹⁵⁹

2. The Rise of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), introduced by President Xi Jinping in 2013, represents China’s mega project diplomacy. BRI is a supply-driven investment scheme, stemming from China’s excess production of steel, cement, and other building materials as well as labor.

Since 1985, the EU, Japan, and the US have reduced the production of steel, while China, on the contrary, has increased its production. By 2015, 50% of the global steel production was made in China to the point it now has difficulty to channel its excess production.¹⁶⁰ By the same token, China also has excess an production of cement, glass, and other building materials.¹⁶¹ Therefore, if China wins any infrastructure projects, domestic or abroad, it will help overcome the issues of overproduction.

Leaving, the overproduction of building material aside, Bloomberg reported that China has to face an increasing urban unemployment rate that may be triple of the official measurement (a common phenomenon in developing countries, which used to be called “hidden unemployment”). In the last five years, from 2012-2016, the urban unemployment rate has increased from 4% to about 13% (while China’s official data keeps the unemployment rate at a flat 4%). Just like the case of steel, cement, and other building materials, any infrastructure projects will be helpful to ease China’s increasing rate of unemployment.

BRI is also meant to be a strategy to boost the performance of China’s economy, amid its declining economic growth, which has fallen from a historical height of 15.24 % in 1984, to 6.9 % in 2017 (while some would consider it the “new normal” for China). Connectivity projects in Western province of China will help improve the performance of the regional economy. The impact will even be more positive if the poor regions of the country can be connected with centers of growth in Eastern provinces and even the centers of growth beyond the region, in particular, those which are westward, including Central Asia, and all the way up to Western Europe.

For China, BRI is meant to be a tool to bridge the gap between the Eastern provinces, which are relatively rich, including Jiansu with USD 1 trillion of Provincial GDP and Guangdong with USD 1.1 trillion, and the relatively poorer Western Provinces, Qinghai with USD 37 billion only and Tibet with barely USD 15 billion (2012) among them.¹⁶² At the national level, despite poverty in many parts of western and Central China, five provinces in the eastern coast of China (the Provinces of Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guandong) accounted for about 40% of China’s total GDP. Thus, BRI is China’s attempt to ease uneven development back home.

As it concerns the maritime silk-road, the development of the so-called by Western media “strings of Chinese pearls”, stretching from Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Eastern Coast of Africa as well as the Red Sea, will help ease the pressure on the need of ports and harbors to serve the fast-growing China’s merchant fleets. According to data from 2015, China is the country with the largest number of merchant’s ships in the world (4,966), which was larger than Greece (4,017 vessels) and Japan (3,986 vessels). Ships need ports. Thus, for China, engaging in port building and port development abroad will best serve China’s ambition to become the largest maritime economy in the world.¹⁶³

As portrays in the official explanation of BRI, the project is meant to be a tool of “China’s region in pursuing opening up” by connecting Northwest China to Northeastern China, and connecting Southwestern China with inland and coastal regions. Then, to connect the better integrated China with centers of growth in Asia, Africa, and Europe. This is the very essence of BRI as China’s mega project diplomacy.

The BRI projects are not without controversy. As reported in many media outlets, China’s mega project diplomacy has incited geopolitical concerns in the Indian Ocean Region, Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Western Europe. Thus, more strategic dialogues should be pursued by China with regional powers such as India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Russia and some key European countries.

The BRI Summit, held in Beijing in May 2017, represented the first test to see how the global community perceived China’s initiative. The absence of leaders from key countries, such as India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Netherlands, Germany, and France, might complicate the implementation of BRI Projects in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and Western Europe. The next BRI Summit, scheduled to be held in June 2018 in Hong Kong, which will discuss about 170 investment projects, will serve as the second test for the future of China’s mega project initiatives. The competition will be tough, particularly with Japan and India, which have recently offered an initiative to promote the Asia-
-Africa Growth Corridor.

3. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) was introduced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India in 2017, while the root of the ideas can be traced back in 2015. It also represents an Indian-Japanese mega project diplomacy. AAGC is a demand-driven investment scheme, stemming from Japanese experience in promoting connectivity project in Asia, including the implementation of the Master Plan of ASEAN connectivity about a decade ago.

The purpose of AAGC, in the words of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is to deepen economic engagement, promote the growth of trade, enhance manufacturing and investment ties through partnership and cooperation on infrastructure, and skilled development as key priorities. For Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, it is important to improve connectivity between Asia and Africa, with ASEAN (who has experience with the development of its connectivity projects) as the hinge of the two regions. As such, the project will integrate the fast-growing economy of East Asia and South Asia with Africa, which is rich with natural resources and a promising market, and also relatively high economic growth rate.

In 2015, Asian countries only represented 11% of FDI’s flow to Africa. Among the largest Asian investors were China and India. However, as Asian attention to Africa is growing, one can expect the increase of investment from Asia to Africa. This year, China is going to organize the China-African Summit at a leaders’ level, while Indonesia is going to host the Indonesia African Forum (IAF) at a ministerial level¹⁶⁴ (these are two separate events).

Competition between China’s BRI and Japan-Indian’s AAGC is unavoidable. There will be a contest between supply-driven project proposals and demand driven project proposal. Such competition is healthy, since it will give more options for the region to choose which scheme is the most favorable in the pursuance of their respective national interests. It is also important for both BRI and AAGC to consider which African countries represent the best (or the least risky) entry point for investors. For instance, using the application provided by the Heritage’s index of economic freedom, one can observe, at least in 2017, that Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, South Africa, and Uganda provide the prospective entry points for doing business in Africa. After all, connectivity is not only about trade, it is also about trust-building and peace-building.

4. Connectivity, Trade, and Peace

As previously discussed, China, Japan, and India have claimed that their respective investment schemes are inclusive. It is important and timely for the main investors to engage in more dialogue and cooperation so that the respective schemes can be complementary. At the same time, the regions also saw the gradual shift of the global landscape, in which Asia is now becoming the center of economic gravity. The following table depicts the fast-growing development of the GDP in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (GDP-PPP), and how the global economy is now shifting towards Asia.

Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity)
in USD trillion

| 1985 | 2000 | 2015 | 2021
China | 0.7 | 3.7 | 19.7 | 31.7
EU | 5.5 | 11.8 | 19.4 | 24.4
USA | 4.3 | 10.5 | 15.0 | 22.8
India | 0.6 | 2.1 | 8.0 | 14.2
Japan | 1.6 | 3.2 | 4.5 | 5.6
Russia | N/A | 1.6 | 3.7 | 4.9
Indonesia | 0.3 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 4.5
ASEAN | 0.7 | 2.4 | 6.9 | 10.5
Mexico | 0.6 | 1.2 | 2.2 | 2.9
South Korea | 0.2 | 0.8 | 1.9 | 2.5
Turkey | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 2.6
Australia | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.5

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) – processed by PADA, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

It is clear from the depiction in the table above that the global economy is now concentrated more in Asia (China, India, Japan, Russia, Indonesia/ASEAN, South Korea and Australia). And, the new centers of growth in Asia will develop rather quickly, if compared with those in other regions.

However, the real change has also happened as far as international actors are concerned. Now the actors are no longer only States but also (if not mostly) private companies, many of which are Asian-based. In terms of numbers, out of 98 actors with large economic capacities, 62 are private companies and only 36 are State actors¹⁶⁵6. But in terms of total revenues, these 62 private companies account for USD 10.3 trillion, while the 36 State actors account for USD 19.5 trillion. It can thus be inferred that in terms of monetary value, the role and power of private companies are, at the moment, somewhat limited; but in terms of physical number, there are more private companies, with big economic potentials than State actors.

If wealth represents power, which to some extent includes political power, then the revenue of the Royal Dutch Shell, which is USD 420 billion, is much larger than the revenue of the States of Iraq, Portugal, Poland, and South Africa combined, the total of which is USD 381 billion. The revenue of Toyota Motors (USD 252 billion) is much larger than the revenue of Argentina (USD 117 billion) and Colombia (USD 114 billion) combined.

Diplomacy might involve the Government (G) to Government negotiations, Government to Business (B) talks, and B to B deals. The complexity abounds when it comes to institutionalized diplomacy. For instance, G to G relations are normally governed by the United Nations or other forms of international norms, but who is supposed to govern G to B or B to B relations? This only highlights the growing complexity in the performance of mega project diplomacy (such as BRI and AAGC) in the Asian context and beyond.

The point is that an effective connectivity among actors, whether States or major private companies, will result in stronger trade or economic ties. Intensive ties will promote converging interests. Connectivity, intensive ties, and convergence of interests will result in the kind of economic interdependence that sustains peace. The situation in East Asia is the case in point. Hopefully, a similar situation could inspire Africa and the Middle East as well, where regional economic interdependence is still relatively weak.

In East Asia, despite the existing robust ASEAN-led regional architecture and the market-oriented, open economy, all States and entities rely on the regional markets (East Asia market) rather than the market outside the region. For instance, about two-thirds of Indonesian exports went to Asian markets. Half of China exports also depend on Asian markets. So is the case with South Korea and Japan. This means that, despite the persistent tensions in East China Sea and South China Sea, no power in the region is likely encouraged to wage war with its own neighbors, which are actually its own markets. Messing around with neighbors means messing around with one’s own market. Those who do so will suffer from economic consequences.

Major intra-State war has been absent in East Asia in the last 50 years. Amid the threat of the Trump’s trade war, trade and economic interdependence in Asia have functioned as confidence-building measures and self-restraint mechanism. This is an example of interlink between connectivity, trade, and peace in the Asian context.

5. Conclusion: an Indonesian Context

As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, change in the global landscape is actually a natural phenomenon. The change, however, must be harnessed so that it can become a momentum for progress that benefits the international community. It is also normal when the change engenders dynamics that lead to a potential conflict of interests. Therefore, a careful anticipation is needed.

The global landscape we see taking shape today witness the rise of new powers with huge potential, such as China (GDP-PPP of USD 19.7 trillion) and India (GDP-PPP of USD 14.2 trillion); the dynamic repositioning of middle powers, such as Mexico (USD 2.2 trillion), Indonesia (USD 2.5 trillion), South Korea (USD 1.9 trillion), Turkey (USD 1 trillion), and Australia (USD 1.1 trillion) – known as MIKTA –; as well as Brazil (USD 3.3 trillion), Russia (USD 3.7 trillion), India, China, and South Africa (USD 0.75 trillion), known as the BRICS. The rising economy notwithstanding, there is also the existing (or even the descending) economies which actually have already enjoyed global leverage for the last 70 years. It will be also natural that the rising ones will demand a new interpretation of the existing rule-based societies (or even promote a new norm-setting process) while the existing powers, such as the US. (with a GDP-PPP of USD 15 trillion) and European Union (with a GDP-PPP of USD 19.4 trillion) will at best try to defend the status quo. Strategic dialogue is thus timely and important. It is, in this dialogue process, that inclusiveness is a necessity, and the contribution of ideas and best practices from groupings like G20, MIKTA, and BRICS is highly expected.

The new global landscape is also characterized by the dynamics that reflects the current, increasing contention between globalization and right-wing/ultra-nationalism (of which the latter is now rampant in the existing economic powers like the US and the EU). The mega projects on connectivity (such as BRI and AAGC) play a central role in facilitating, and hence strengthening, globalization. Dialogues, too, are timely and important to be vigorously pursued to mitigate distrust that might lead to geopolitical contention.

For Indonesia, it is always important to be vigilant and adaptive. Indonesia needs to do its homework. To enable Indonesia to seize the opportunity for change, while mitigating its negative impacts, it needs to speed up programs to attain better competitiveness, ease of doing business, innovation, and complementarity. Good governance is the key word.

Last but not least, Indonesia has a long track record of contributions in the making of new, inclusive global order, through the power of idea and the convening power. For instance, as the world shifted from the era of colonization into the new era of decolonization, Indonesia come up with the idea of new world order known as the Bandung Spirit (Dasasila Bandung), by convening in 1955 the Asia Africa Conference in Bandung. As the world plunged into the Cold War, Indonesia was a promoter of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). As the liberal economy was eventually taking place, in conjunction with forces of globalization, Indonesia is an active supporter of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and helped design the Bogor Goal to assure that the path and speed of economic liberalization can be pursued in the most comfortable way for both developing and developed economies. And as the world is again entering a new global landscape, with the rise of China, India, and other middle power in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, vis à vis the existing power of the US and EU, Indonesia is committed to promoting strategic dialogue to assure that all nations will benefit from the inevitable change.

Change in global landscape is something natural, but all nations and entities, big and small, need to work together in harnessing the change to the benefit of all.

UNITED KINGDOM

THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE
21ST CENTURY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DIPLOMATIC PLANNERS¹⁶⁶

Liane Saunders

Winston Churchill once said that politicians needed the ability “to foretell what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month, and next year – and to have the ability afterwards to explain why it did not happen.”¹⁶⁷ Planners are usually required to do the same for the next twenty, 50 years or even the next century, though we are given rather more leeway than politicians when explaining why we got it wrong. We are also, at least in my experience, afforded more sympathy by fellow policy-makers. Our attempts to set out a picture of the future in an interconnected world are complicated by the huge quantities of information available to all. The authority and credibility of such information is increasingly harder to verify, and the immediacy of interactions between people, institutions and leaders makes the global system in which we work more chaotic, dynamic and unpredictable.

Planners are, at their heart, sense-makers and interpreters of the “what might be” rather than forecasters of the future. So any planning vision is much more akin, to use an analogy from Harry Potter, to a “subtle science and exact art.”¹⁶⁸ In other words, we try to use data where we can but accept that we also need a bucket load of creativity to present a credible picture of the remaining 82 years of the 21st century.

Such an approach is never more important that when presented with the phrase “International World Order”. This term can mean so many different things, all of them likely to offend somebody somewhere and none of them doing full justice to the complex dynamics of the planet the human race perches on. For the purposes of this article, I have chosen to define the international world order as the operating or eco-system for global governance. While this definition includes the traditional academic international relations idea of how power and authority are distributed across the international system, I do not plan to focus on the specific power balance between great, emerging and nascent powers and how that might change.

Instead, I am looking ahead to some areas which represent a potential challenge or significant change with the potential to affect the whole system. I have taken this approach because my definition also covers the institutional structures, communities of interest, ideology/ideas, and wider economic underpinnings. These enact governance, setting standards and norms which enable the health of the system, and protect it from man-made threats and natural hazards. I confess to using the term quite loosely for which, as a diplomatic practitioner rather than an academic, I seek forgiveness rather than permission.

Having started with a Winston Churchill quote, I thought I would do a standard Planners trick and turn it on its head. So here are a few things that I do not think are going to happen to the international order in this century.

The national State will die and so will the Rules Based International and Economic System.

Automation, Artificial Intelligence and algorithms take over at the United Nations.

We will face fewer, shorter conflicts.

Equality will be achieved for all.

We will operate in the same planetary climate as we do now.

Before you skip to the next article on the basis that, coming from a strong nation-State which has been a leading proponent of the rules-based international system, it is not surprising that I am forecasting it will not die, let us explore why that is not the same as suggesting that the international system will not change through the century ahead. A debate has been running for at least the last 25 years about whether the demise of the nation-State, and its power over the international order, is waxing or waning.

Even the simplest of internet searches tells you simultaneously that the death of the nation-State is inexorable or that it is grossly exaggerated. That’s before someone points out that reaching first for global tools like Google or Wikipedia (other search engines and information portals are available!) is proof that the sources of authority we trust are no longer those in national governments. Nor is there trust in the diplomats and technical specialists who represent States in the trans-national and international institutions and organizations that underpin the international order.

There clearly is a changing context in which nation-States and the international order is operating. The phenomenon of large companies which need to be taken into account and have influence in the world and with governments is not new. The development of some Middle East States is inextricably bound up with the expertise and risk management strategies of large oil companies. As far back as the 16th and 17th centuries, the fortunes of the “new” nation-
-States of France, the Netherlands and England (it was not yet a United Kingdom) were dependent on the strength, expeditionary attitude to risk and political presence internationally of trading companies such as the various Levant and East Indies Companies.

By the 18th century, the British Empire leaned in no small part on the East Indies Company to run its Empire. And, of course, the industrial revolution depended on the power of growing big business Businesses rose or fell depending on their ability to adapt to their States’ war effort in the searing experience of the World Wars of the 20th century. Ironically, it was the sense that the primary purpose of the post war international order was to promote harmony and prevent conflicts which diminished Business involvement in the evolution of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system. Conflict prevention was not seen as the business of Business and so the nation-State became the preeminent actor in global governance.

The change that we have been watching and participating in over the last three decades is that greater inter-connectivity has created not only large national companies but global transnational businesses which now operate with an economic power and reach that equals or exceeds that of many nation-States. Faster transports, developments in logistics, and the advent of the internet has facilitated at rapid pace new markets, services, operating models and research and development priorities.

The manufacturers’ need to reach sources of rare earths, mineral and organic components has made supply chains more complex and more global. With the costs of entry so much lower and the availability of technological assistance to move faster up the value chain, large companies with diversified portfolios have become a feature of the international landscape. At the international level we need greater coherence of regulatory frameworks to keep pace with changing technology and developments in the global business environment. We need to be better at anticipating how behaviours of individuals, institutions and States will change as a result of these innovations and managing the consequences of such changes.

While there is a certain, natural creative tension between businesses that take risks and push boundaries to protect their profits, and the international system which provides global governance and hard power, it is not a given that this is a binary choice with one in the ascendant while the other is in terminal decline. With the start of the discussion between internet service providers, national governments and international rules setting institutions, I see the prospect of a world order which is expanded to include those companies who provide goods and services on a global basis.

Standards and norms of behaviour are important to business because adherence to them helps establish, maintain and evidence credibility and reputations. Perhaps more than “fairness”, which has become a politically charged word, they help ensure greater certainty and predictability in which markets can operate. But companies also depend on nation-States, national governments and regional and international bodies to bring effect. This includes through hard power, but also enforcement of standards and regulation that bring stability to the geographical space we all live in. While businesses can and will use their influence to shape parts of the world order, both through their investments and their influence over individual behaviour, there is still room for nation-States and the international system to provide the security and stability through governance on which business depends.

This brings me to my second assertion on Artificial Intelligence, automation, and algorithms. We will see a huge amount of automation over the remainder of the century and beyond. We do not yet fully understand what this will mean for the world order. It will certainly bring challenges for the rules-based system. Some might argue that we have been here before, particularly in the automation of production lines from the 1970s where newspaper headlines regularly prophesied the end of work as we knew it.

They would suggest that, as we survived with limited impact through a diversification of roles and proliferation of service industries, we can survive future developments too. But the real difference is in the versatility of the new generation of automation. Previous iterations could only do one job, but increasingly the focus is on multi-functional automation with assistive technologies able to replace humans in cognitive as well as manual tasks. So disruption of our workforces and patterns of work seems likely from automation.

In the case of artificial intelligence (AI), while I find both Professor Stephen Hawking’s proposition that the development of full artificial intelligence could ultimately spell the end of the human race, and Elon Musk’s assertion that AI represents “our biggest existential threat” compelling, I do not think this inevitable, or likely by the end of the 21st century.¹⁶⁹

What is certainly true is that we will face increasing challenge and threats unless the international community spends more time planning and regulating for the impacts of AI and digitally assisted technologies than we have done so far in the first two decades of the century. We have yet to deal with the ethics of assistive technologies for populations that are aging and likely to spend a greater proportion of their life in poorer health. Safeguarding issues and the questions of the boundaries of the Turing tests for patients who are suffering pain or prolonged end of life care should occupy a much greater portion of time and attention in the 21st century world order.

We are already beginning to see debates at the national level about the ethics of remotely-assisted warfare, but have yet to address fully the changing nature of the battlefield internationally. The rules of war that have been developed from the experience of the world wars of the 20th century will undoubtedly need to be rewritten before the end of the 21st. So far, changes have been made incrementally and often retrospectively after the existing rules have proved insufficient, e.g. the responsibility to protect civilian populations revised after the Balkan Conflict of the 1990s. With the speed and range of robotic, remote and potential AI technological developments and battlefield applications, I anticipate that we will need a new convention on assistive technologies of war by the end of the century.

It is not just the frontline technologies that affect the international order. Data mining, algorithm predictive services, and real time digital data and behavioural sets all offer challenges and opportunities. An active debate has begun over what is defined as public or private in terms of spaces and identities. While we each individually make decisions about where the balance should lie for our own personal data – where we are aware we have a choice – there is still limited understanding of how these individual choices impact collective datasets. There is a huge variation in how these datasets are used, and regulated at subnational, national or international levels. We need to think about the benefits and risks of interactions between datasets collected at these different levels. It should be possible to agree on broad principles on the use of data in the “global commons” space but I anticipate that this will be a conversation that will span the century.

Unless we force the pace of change by bringing more scientific and technical practitioners into the international community’s work, we are likely to see this conversation driven, as in the rules developed in the last century, largely retrospectively. Change will follow situations resulting as a consequence of the use of algorithms to control/direct particular behaviour or of datasets and data-mined insights being withheld from national and international bodies. This is unfortunate but almost inevitable given the complexity and diversity of applications. It will continue to be difficult to anticipate and define the precise use and misuse of technologically assisted services sufficiently to enable the establishment of standards and norms without a change in the way we look at these issues and the experts we involve.

Despite this – and mindful that planners are often either seen as doomsday-mongers or as eternal optimists – I do not think that diplomats and technical experts in the international space will be out of a job by the end of the century. They, like many other sectors in the global economy, should be reliant on continually improving technology. Their work will be enabled by different data tools, and some of the routine bureaucracy undertaken by automation. I predict this will enable them to spend more time on work higher up the value chain such as building relationships and understanding and formulating action on a broader range of perspectives.

However, the inherent unpredictability of people at the systems level makes it hard to envisage a scenario where all negotiation and norms setting can be automated. It is just possible – though unlikely – that we will see protocol droids of the kind portrayed in George Lucas’ Star Wars universe, but as C-3PO remarked, these are likely to be “not much more than an interpreter”.¹⁷⁰ Important though such roles are, they remain at the enabling rather than controlling level in the international order.

This brings me to the third of my assertions. Historian Eric Hobsbawm, speaking earlier this century, has described far more eloquently that “war in the 21st century is not likely to be as murderous as it was in the 20th. But armed violence, creating disproportionate suffering and loss, will remain omnipresent and endemic – occasionally epidemic – in a large part of the world. The prospect of a century of peace is remote.”¹⁷¹ The likelihood and nature of conflict will continue to be one of the enduring preoccupations of the international order in the 21st century. It is where the intersection between national power, the international order and sub-national or transnational groups is most keenly felt. National governments are likely to continue to control and fund professional conventional armed forces to defend States and their interests.

They will also form regional and international alliances and coalitions, whether institutionalised and formalised such as NATO or ad hoc defence and security groupings such as the counter-Daesh coalition. The UN may well acquire greater capability to act – the UN Secretary General’s reforms to peacekeeping operations and peace-building programmes acknowledges that to have a more sustained effect, UN forces must have more power and better capacity for inter-operability between forces that are contributed. I doubt we will see the formation of a UN Armed Force this century but we may see more consistent exercising at the UN level of troop and technology contributing nations. This, in turn, may well guide changes to conflict operations codes of conduct and doctrine though I anticipate this will remain a contested field.

The late 20th century and early 21st century has seen a resurgence and transformation of sub- and trans-national groups espousing violence to inspire terror and instability. They do not need to use conventional sources of power to achieve their ends. We may well see more fragmented, localized conflicts that develop an unpredictable dynamism, including with external influence and support, such as that in Syria. This requires the international community to improve the adaptability of forces, and use of hard security power to counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons that support such local conflicts.

The international rules based system will continue to need to tackle both the symptoms and the causes of conflict and instability. It will need to increase norms and standards governing conflict. This is also the century where, to change the trend on conflict, we need to do more trans-institutional work across the international instruments designed to develop and sustain stability. Organizations such as the OECD with its regulations on official development assistance, the International Financial Institutions with their ability to provide structural and technical support, and including newcomers like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will be key to this effort.

We should recognize that conflict and war will not be confined to those lower on the development scale. New forms of hybrid warfare by States and organizations bent on disrupting and undermining the power, authority, and trust of mature democratic States (what some have called “war in the information age”) is also likely to become an increasing threat as the century progresses.¹⁷² The ability of the international world order to agree on responses and norms is likely to be challenging given differing approaches and perceptions of the threat among State actors. But the international rules based system needs to consider how it can prevent or respond to actions that, unchecked might lead to a hybrid war. That conversation needs to involve the private sector, and sub-national government mechanisms as well as the traditional State actors.

Sadly, conflict management and building stability is one area where AI is unlikely to provide effective assistive technology this century. We have yet to see anyone succeed in creating a conflict model that would enable the international community, both governments and civil society to predict, prevent and manage conflicts more capably or sustain peace for longer. I would love to be proved wrong on this – perhaps in the meantime, the best we can hope for is for is improved tools, particularly virtual reality assisted exercises and scenarios to enable those working on conflict prevention and stabilization to test and explore new approaches.

The implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals agreed in 2015 is a powerful counter-weight to the upward trends of localized, diffuse and complex intra-State conflicts we see around the world. It is often forgotten that the subtitle of the SDGs is: “Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” I am not optimistic that we will see anywhere near full implementation of these seventeen global goals in that timeframe.

These stretching goals covering a broad set of social and economic development with a proper set of measures of success will continue to hold the international community to account through the century. My pessimism about our ability to implement the SDGs accounts for the fourth and fifth of my assertions.

Building equality for all is slow work when what we really mean is moving people out of vulnerability and instability to prosperity. It is even slower when we look at the obstacles we face in giving an effective voice to all, fostering environments internationally, nationally and locally where individuals, however they choose to identify themselves, are protected by law and have a safe and secure life experience.

Overcoming the sense of marginalization and lack of societal status, of being left behind by the speed and nature of change is tough. It requires sustained treatment at all levels of the World Order and across all geographical dimensions. At this point, it is difficult to see how this will play out across all. I expect to find that gains in some areas find negative response in others. I have, however, been struck by the increasing use of the words ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ in the international public discourse. If we can start to define what disenfranchised communities and individuals understand these words to represent and how they can be realized, then there is some chance we can bring about the economic and social change identified in the SDGs and the benefits they envisage. It also helps us work out how to counter those who develop alternative narratives aimed at driving vulnerable people into more radical and extremist paths.

We are already seeing manifestations of the power of collective voices outside classic political parties and structures. Although the ‘Time’s Up’ campaign against sexual harassment in the media industry has been criticized by some as a celebrity campaign focused on a first world problem, it represents a campaign which not only defines what it is fighting against, but what it is fighting for, including the need for standards and awareness raising about rights and norms of behaviour for all who work in any industry and the wider workplace. It has the potential to be the 21st century equivalent of the campaign for female suffrage in the 20th century. It will succeed in supporting equality only if the learning on standards and re-norming behaviour is adapted and applied to workplaces around the world.

At an even more basic level, over the remaining century, I hope we will continue to see investments in capabilities to support and facilitate local solutions and empower local voices in the justice and reconciliation process. Work to support especially women and girls in peace and reconciliation processes is needed as well as the wider work to support them through education.

Limited evidence is emerging that when women are included in peace processes there is a 20% increase in the probability of an agreement lasting at least two years, and a 35% increase in the probability of an agreement lasting at least 15 years.¹⁷³ That work also shows that the more inclusive the level of participation in local conflict and reconciliation processes, the stronger the likelihood of resolution. So, whether you espouse a Westminster democracy type model of government at the national level or not, it does seem that supporting locally owned and structured forms of equal participation and agency should remain an important focus for those working to support the health of the international world order.

While the negative role of social media in applying undue peer pressure, fostering trolling, cyber-bullying and hate crimes is likely to continue to threaten individual dignity and respect, there is also a place for social media to play an affirming role, supporting and empowering identity communities and raising awareness of rights and acceptable standards of behaviour. I think it likely that a growing manifestation of civil society will be through groups that have either formed or are networked purely through their digital identities.

However identities are expressed, individuals and governments will remain connected in the physical geographies they live in – increasingly through the century, we are likely to see more mega-cities and sub-national State entities continuing to emerge as entire eco-systems of governance and social and economic interaction, with economic and security power and authority. The international world order is currently under-prepared to work in partnership with these. The recent pledge by US cities, states, and businesses to meet the US’s commitments on emissions despite the Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Climate Change Agreement highlights the need for better networking between different levels of governance in the international world order.

This will be particularly important since my fifth assertion is the one with the strongest degree of certainty. Though the UN remains optimistic that we can, with sustained effort, keep the global temperature rise below 2ºC this century, various climate change models show that individual places may experience extremes of temperature at different times of the year – with Greenland possibly ice-free in the summer by 2030. Although it is difficult to predict sea level rises connected with climate change, most models show some rise. Even a rise below 3 feet (0.9 meters) could affect up to four million people.¹⁷⁴ If only a portion of these are displaced from their locations, unless we succeed in radically reducing the levels of forcible displacement for other reasons during the century, this figure would come on top of the 65.6 million people currently forcibly displaced worldwide – a total already bigger than the population of the United Kingdom.¹⁷⁵

Even if temperatures and sea levels rise only by a small amount, and extreme weather events are managed, the international world order will need new mechanisms to manage resources more effectively and collaboratively to prevent drought, water shortages, species and manage food security – in short, to maintain the health and diversity of the planet. Communities will need to make changes to the built environment and the utilities to ensure sustainability, and power to make decisions will be diffused across many more layers of governance than currently. Communities and individuals seeking to future-proof themselves against the impacts of climate change will expect to manage resilience to a range of risks themselves.

Events like the 2017 Urban Resilience Summit show that cities are beginning to think about this.¹⁷⁶ However they will continue to expect national and international governance to set standards, support them with early warning and manage the consequences of extreme weather. As a variety of recent events show, the international community is not currently well equipped for this task. In parallel with the work to hold governments to account for the collective Climate Change agreement, the international system needs to begin this work.

While climate change statistics and impacts will continue to be contested until they become the norm, there is at least some convergence on the governance needed in the international world order to tackle these issues and to manage the consequences. But there is another threat to the planetary climate where those that keep us safe are more likely to wield a microscope than a periscope or range finder. Anti-microbial resistance is one of those issues where effects can be large scale but relatively hidden. Professor Dame Sally Davies, the Chief Medical Officer for England has warned that if antibiotics lose their effectiveness it will signal “the end of modern medicine”.

Without the drugs used to fight infections, common medical interventions will become risky and transplants too risky to carry out. Currently, we are at the stage of watching each of the warning lights on a car dashboard coming on one by one. If we wait until they are all on, we will not be able to respond. Professor Davies has warned of the threat of a “post-antibiotic apocalypse” if the international system does not start work now to map the scale and spread of the problem and to work together to raise awareness and respond to it.¹⁷⁷ We must apply the same urgency and creativity to this issue as we have done to the climate change agenda if we are to stand any chance of adapting in time.

Having now dealt with my five assertions for the next century, I find, as all planners do, that I have barely scratched the surface of the priorities for the international world order, and particularly the policy implications of the picture I have painted. The case for an evolving international rules-based system to continue to support the international world order seems clear. The remainder of the century will continue to see governance structures focused on many of the same things it has focused on over the last fifty years. But it will add a range of new responsibilities and challenges to its agenda.

That is inevitable given the complexity of the global system we are operating in. It puts the capabilities of traditional actors and mechanisms in the world order under greater pressure than ever before. We will need new ways of burden-sharing to cope. In conclusion, I want to touch on the wider range of engaged actors and the larger number of generations we now span. Together with improved modelling and behavioural science, they bring great potential to the international world order’s ability to tackle the complex global challenges, threats, and opportunities we face now and through the rest of the century.

The challenges we face are now so great and so cross-cutting that the international order needs to refresh instruments to tackle them. We need to recognise that increasingly the international order involves non-State actors on the side of good as well as on the side of harm. Non-governmental international development organisations have delivered real change and hope to vulnerable communities. They hold power in their own right because of the work they do and the communities they deliver development in.

They are beginning to recognise that they need to adhere to
the same standards for which governments hold themselves accountable in the delivery of development assistance. In particular, they are stepping up work on safeguarding against sexual exploitation and abuse to ensure the vulnerable around the world, and particularly in areas where instability and conflict are rife, are protected from harm. I expect we will see more work over the next few decades of the century to broaden this approach to the wider international order. Governments and NGOs will hold one another mutually to account.

Development NGOs, whether local or international, are increasingly able to leverage significant resources, financial and expertise, to tackle conflict. Creativity and innovation are most needed, particularly where tried and tested methods have proved insufficient to resolve conflicts or sustain peace. In the field, agencies and governments are working closely together but at the strategic international level, we need more such collaborative approaches. The Climate Summit in the margins of the UN General Assembly in 2014 brought NGOs, businesses, scientists, and academics together with diplomatic and government specialists and politicians. This approach was remarked on as unusual – it drew on a similar approach to involving the civil society sector in the formation and drive for entry into force in 2013 of the Arms Trade Treaty.

If there is to be real innovation in the way the international community tackles conflict, we need this integrated approach to become more systematic. While requiring the international rules based system to be more inclusive, this approach also requires some non-governmental actors to calibrate their own approach, to build different partnerships, including with entrepreneur philanthropists, and to recognise the constraints that exist in the contested space of national interests and interpretations of “common public goods”.

In addition to the increased creativity and knowledge brought by international NGOs, social entrepreneurs and scientists, we also need to understand the value of ancestral knowledge and heritage in individual communities and integrate local practice into our modern global toolkit. For the 21st century world order to thrive, we need to connect in different ways, including blending fresh ideas from young people. While aging populations may expect to live longer in poor health, individuals can also expect to have many more productive years; they may need or choose to work longer depending on where they live and the quality of their health. Likewise, the youth ‘bulge’ in parts of the globe means that with an effective digital education, we will see more young people wanting to understand, collaborate and take action on global issues. We need to harness the experience of our older practitioners, and the networked talents of our young people and build links across generations.

Finding better mechanisms to share ideas and knowledge, and experiment with new approaches across a wider range of sectors and individuals will be crucial if we are to stand any chance of ending the century with a healthier, more prosperous, more engaged and more secure global population than we began with. In the face of the threats and challenges we face that will be no mean feat. I am realistic that, even with reinvigorated multilateral, multi-sectorial and multigenerational approaches, our planetary eco-system faces considerable challenges ahead.

But if we can acknowledge that governments do not have all the answers, that responsibility for the governance in an interconnected world rests with all of us, and we make space to work together holistically on these challenges, we stand a better chance of success. And while a quick use of a life expectancy calendar suggests that at best I will be able to check my assumptions at the half-century mark and certainly will not be around at the end, I hope that, by then, the international world order will still be proving my first two assertions wrong, and have gone some way to changing the trends on my last three to a more positive direction.

RUSSIA

MOVING TOWARDS A POLYCENTRIC WORLD

Oleg Stepanov

The world we live in is undergoing deep and dynamic transformations. Globalization has generated a major shift in the global balance of power, shaping the conditions for a polycentric order. It is now virtually impossible to envision the international arena without a number of players, some of them quite new, wielding growing economic and political influence. However, the overall situation remains fluid. Among systemic destabilizing issues is the short-sighted obstinacy of some in the West to preserve, at all costs, its waning domination in global affairs.

We could better understand the reasons for such behavior if we recall that Western, primarily Anglo-Saxon, world hegemony originated in the centuries of colonialism. It was during that time that colonial powers ruthlessly plundered natural and human resources of Africa, East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Forced labor, expropriation of lands, and the establishment of reservations were widely practiced, as well as the unequal exchange of goods. Flourishing slave trade cost Africa at least fifteen million human lives. Basic norms of humanism and Christian morality were trampled upon for the sake of material profit.

Today, colonialism is an outdated phenomenon. But State borders once defined by metropolitan powers are a lingering problem. The lines on the map were drawn randomly, often with just a ruler. Historically established habitation areas of tribes and nascent peoples were cut into pieces for the sake of creating colonial domains. Thus, geopolitical time-bombs were planted. Their occasional “detonations” lead to conflicts between and within currently existing States.

It is now abundantly clear that the process of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s was of fundamental importance to global development. Unlike many others, Russia supported by word and deed the liberation of peoples from colonial oppression. It provided, often free of charge, comprehensive financial, material, and technical support to young independent States. With this help, many former colonies reduced poverty, built industry and agriculture, laid down foundations for social protection, education and healthcare systems.

Unfortunately, the answer to the question of whether these and other challenges of the past have been addressed appropriately is still a resounding “no”. One of the reasons is that the West, led by US, has mastered neocolonialist policies to dominate developing countries through unequal economic exchange and direct military pressure and using transnational corporations. Among other tools employed are official corruption, incitement of ethnic and religious conflicts, clandestine weapons deliveries, bonded lending system, and so-called humanitarian interventions.

Russia is strongly opposed to such policies. And we are not alone. The West has lost its monopoly to determine the only vision of market economy. New engines of economic growth, primarily China and India, emerged on the world stage. New business actors from large emerging countries operate in a more predictable and careful way, respecting State sovereignty and showing commitment to long-term investment and equal distribution of income.

With a succession of crises undermining the political and economic cohesion of the US and the European Union, today we face a completely new global line-up where the real aggregate GDP calculated on the purchasing power parity basis of the so-called “Emerging Seven” (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey) exceeds the total GDP of the G7. It is a striking testimony to the promise of a more just world order based on cooperation and international law, not on strife and confrontation.

With this in mind, Russia has been steadily advancing a positive and realistic foreign policy agenda designed to put the international architecture on a more sound and fair basis through increased cooperation of States and multilateral bodies. The emerging polycentric system reflects the political, cultured, and civilizational diversity of the world as we know it. As a responsible member of the international community, Russia seeks to strengthen security and stability, while ensuring that universally recognized principles of international law are respected, and all parties’ interests are considered. We are open to engaging in mutually beneficial cooperative terms with all those who are prepared to reciprocate.

We are not against cooperation with the West. It is important to emphasize that while criticizing the outdated policies of the West, we do not seek a confrontation. On the contrary, we want to see the West among our partners, but only on the basis of justice in world affairs and equal consideration of interests. This approach applies in full to the ethics of inter-State relations at large – not only between Russia and Western countries. The voice of all countries – big and small, developed and developing – should have an equal weight in the world order which should be renewed on a polycentric foundation. We believe that this is the only way to move forward if we want to achieve a better future for humankind and its children in a complex and insecure world.

A model for this future in terms of regional integration is an emerging space for peace and cooperation in Eurasia. This is also one of the key objectives that Russian diplomacy envisions in the 21st century. In 2016, President Vladimir Putin used his speech at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum to lay out a concept for a Great Eurasia Partnership that would encompass all countries in Asia and in Europe. The underpinnings of this initiative are co-existence and harmonized interests of all nations of the Eurasian landmass. It is focused on the establishment of a common economic and humanitarian space stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean while enforcing the principle of indivisible security. Russia recognizes that a need for equal security is universal, and, as such, it should be dealt with earnestly by all responsible players, as required under international law.

While the Great Eurasia Partnership is a long-term objective, in a more immediate future the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), founded in 2015, remains a priority for Russia. The EEU brings together Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia – five nations with a combined population of almost 190 million and aggregate GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms standing at about US$ 4.5 trillion. The EEU was set up to lift trade and administrative barriers and to strengthen open-market cooperation mechanisms with other countries.

The Union has already turned into a center of broader economic gravitation. More than fifty countries want to sign a preferential trade agreement with the Union. A Free Trade Agreement between the EEU and Vietnam is in force and serves as a model for similar arrangements with other ASEAN member States. An economic and trade cooperation treaty between the EEU and China has been finalized. Free trade negotiations are ongoing with Israel, Serbia, Egypt, India, Iran, and Singapore. The EEU and China’s One Belt One Road project are destined to complement and strengthen each other by putting an added value on the Russia-China good-neighborly ties and establishing a framework for a new type of regional cooperation, involving more than 60 countries of Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

With these ambitious and constructive efforts underway, it is of paramount importance for Russia and its partners to prevent the creation of new division lines in the European continent, both as an outcome of NATO’s eastward enlargement and as an unintended consequence of the “soft” economic expansionism by the European Union. Russia sees a constructive alternative in nurturing ties between the EEU and the EU seeking to establish a Eurasian free trade zone stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok and further East in the future. Regrettably enough, today the EU is misguided by a biased approach to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, which resulted in unilateral EU sanctions imposed on Russia under heavy pressure from the United States. However, it is our hope that, sooner or later, those among our European partners who are capable of sober analysis and realistic assessments will prevail, and Europe will come back to build a mutually invigorating and advantageous working relationship with Russia.

I strongly disagree with the notion floated by some in Western media and political community that the Eurasian integration is a demonstration of Russian efforts to engineer an “imperial revival”. On the contrary, the economic integration in Eurasia can set an example for the rest of the world as a model for regional cooperation. The Eurasian Economic Union is designed as an economic mechanism to keep its member States up-to-date with current globalization trends. It was a logical step to take in order to foster economic growth both in Russia and in neighboring countries by establishing a single market with uniform rules. Development plans for the EEU fully correspond with the well-established logic of regional integration: from free trade area to customs union to economic union.

The Eurasian Economic Union rests upon the principles of equality, mutual respect, and consideration of interests of all member States. The decision-making process in the EEU institutions and bodies (Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission) rests upon consensus on all agenda issues. Each country, regardless of its economic, financial and demographic clout, or the size of its membership fee, is entitled to have just one vote. In supranational bodies, all executive positions are distributed equally among member States, each country is represented by one member on the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission and two members on the Board. Directors of departments and their alternates are also appointed in accordance with the principle of equality. This approach reflects a high degree of mutual trust among partners.

While constructing a shared space of peace and cooperation in Eurasia we have to take into consideration another important and relatively new fixture on the Eurasian political economic and security map – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan as its member States. Bear in mind: this body represents about 43% of the world population and 25% of global GDP. Over the sixteen years of its existence, the organization has become an influential regional platform for multilateral political, economic, humanitarian and security cooperation and has gained broad international recognition. Strict adherence to the principles of equality, mutual respect and consideration of interests through cooperation is a key to the SCO successful evolution.

With a growing number of countries and international bodies striving to join the organization in some capacity, the SCO’s relevance as a cooperation model is something to be hold: Iran and Afghanistan applied for their status to be upgraded from observers to full members, Sri Lanka applied for its status to be upgraded from dialogue partner to observer; Bangladesh and Syria applied for the observer status; Ukraine, the Republic of Maldives, Egypt, and Israel applied for the dialogue partner status.

Perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon reflecting the change in the balance of power not only in Eurasia, but on the world stage, is the emergence of BRICS. This grouping was formed back in 2006 and now consists of five major countries with emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The BRICS’ GDP accounts for nearly 27% of the global economy, comprising 2.88 billion people (42% of the world’s population) and 26% of the Earth’s land surface.

BRICS has a distinct civilizational dimension, as it unites five world pillars. Brazil is a symbol of Latin America’s global ascent, India and China are unique in their cultural and historical richness, Russia stands for Eurasia and the Republic of South Africa represents the African continent with its vibrant traditions. The goal is to develop sustainable, intensive, pragmatic, open, and transparent dialogue and cooperation. This serves not only common interests of the member States but also the purpose of building a harmonious world, achieving a lasting peace and universal prosperity. Relations within BRICS are based on the UN Charter, universally recognized norms of international law, principles of mutual benefit, pragmatism, and solidarity, as well as readiness to cooperate with third parties.

BRICS is important because its participants are influential members of the leading international and regional organizations (the UN, the G20, the Non-Aligned Movement, the G77). The Russian Federation is a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia, China, and India are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. Brazil is a party to the Union of South American Nations, the Common Market of the South, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. South Africa is a member of the African Union and the Southern Africa Development Community. India is a party to the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation.

Being a relatively young forum, BRICS is already an influential player in world politics and economy. Its five participants are an engine of the global economic growth and a foundation of the emerging polycentric world order. Together with the other four countries, Russia promotes a constructive agenda, not seeking to counter anyone. Instead, we engage in the collective and equitable search for solutions to common challenges and ways to shape favorable conditions that improve the security and welfare of our nations.

Over the last few years, BRICS has shown its relevance as a key mechanism for multilateral cooperation and has made great steps toward its intensification, diversification, and institutionalization. Financial and economic cooperation among the five countries is gaining momentum, as reflected by the recent launch of the New Development Bank and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement. Efforts are underway to jointly develop measures to implement the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy.

BRICS priority is its to strengthen security and stability in the world. All the parties are convinced that this stability must be durable, and security must be indivisible, founded on solid guarantees. The five countries are determined to act together fighting global challenges and threats. They stay united in their view that the most effective way to combat terrorism is only through joint efforts of the entire international community in strict compliance with the principles and norms of international law. The same approach is required in the fight against transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, corruption, and many other pressing problems, such as threats to international information security. The launch of a number of new areas of collaboration, including through the establishment of appropriate working groups gave a powerful impetus to the development of intra-BRICS cooperation. The five countries have significantly advanced their dialogues on the subjects like countering WMD proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism and extremism, transnational organized crime, corruption, facilitating conflict resolution, and ensuring information security.

The BRICS participants actively cooperate on the humanitarian track, regularly organizing youth summits, film festivals, football tournaments, and academic and civil forums.

BRICS external relations are developing at a fast pace. The association expands its global reach its circle of its friends. BRICS was launched as a club of like-minded partners, and, in just ten years, transformed into a full-scale mechanism of global cooperation with willing partners from all over the world.

It is through this prism that Russia sees its burgeoning cooperation with the States of Latin America and the Caribbean. We stand for a strong, economically sustainable and politically cohesive Latin America that is to be a pillar of the emerging multipolar world order.

Russia maintains diplomatic relations with all 33 States of Latin America and the Caribbean. The political dialogue with major capitals in the region is gaining momentum. Bilateral visits at the highest level, negotiations between the heads of foreign offices and contacts “on the margins” of different multilateral events are held on a regular basis. Inter-parliamentary ties are flourishing. Chairpersons of both Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation visit Latin America regularly, and they host their colleagues from the region in Moscow. Different ministries and agencies cooperate among themselves. High-level inter-governmental commissions for trade and economic cooperation have been established with a majority of Russia’s partners in the region.

The convergence of interests and shared commitment to promote ties underpin our relations with key Latin American partners, most prominently with Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Russia and Latin American countries mostly share similar views on international relations. We adhere to the norms of international law and strive to tackle all issues on a multilateral basis through negotiations while respecting the sovereignty of all States. We reject external intervention into internal affairs and condemn the use of pressure and unilateral sanctions to achieve political goals. Russia and Latin American countries believe that sanctions are illegitimate unless they are approved by the United Nations Security Council. Latin Americans have expressed support for Russian priorities at the United Nations General Assembly, including our initiatives on international information security, transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space, and the prevention of the glorification of Nazism.

Our ties with integration groupings in Latin America have been consistently strengthening. We maintain active dialogue at the ministerial level with the steering quartet of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) are held regularly. The relations with the Andes Community and Caribbean Community are developing, pursuant to relevant memoranda on promoting political dialogue. There are plans to establish dialogue mechanisms with the Pacific Alliance. Relations with the Central American Integration System (SICA), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) are maintained, as well.

Russia takes advantage of its status as a permanent observer to the Organization of American States (OAS) to promote cooperation with the countries of the region on combating drug trafficking within the framework of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) and on counter-terrorism at the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE). Constant collaboration with the OAS on the use of Russian experience and practices in the areas of technological support for electoral processes is taking place, while possibilities for educational cooperation in other areas are being explored.

Russia has an observer status at the Latin American Integration Association (LAI), Association of Caribbean States (ACS), and the Association of Latin American Peacekeeping Training Centers (ALCOPAZ). Russia’s application for the status of an extra-regional observer to the Central American Integration System (SICA) is awaiting approval.

There are prospects for cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, Andean Community Mercosur, Pacific Alliance, and Caricom.

Visa-free travel between Russia and Latin America and the Caribbean is going to be expanded to cover almost all South and Central America. This will facilitate free movement of people and the development of cultural and humanitarian ties.

Long-standing friendly relations with Brazil – the largest Latin American nation and a regional leader – are a policy priority for Russia. The atmosphere of mutual trust between our countries underpins joint initiatives and plans, top-level dialogue over a broad agenda that encompasses highly intensive and diversified contacts between foreign ministries and other government agencies, people-to-people communication, and cultural exchanges.

Our countries have many things in common. We endorse similar attitudes toward the ways and means of strengthening the multipolar world order and achieving sustainable global development. Over the last fifteen years, the relations between Russia and Brazil have reached a new level. Since 2002, the strategic partnership between our countries has been developing successfully, based on such principles as mutual respect for national sovereignty, compliance with the norms of international law, commitment to peace and stability, protection of human rights. Our countries joint efforts to address new challenges and threats.

We cooperate constructively on issues such as the peaceful exploration of outer space, international information security, conflict settlement, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Russia, Brazil, and a number of other countries co-sponsor UN General Assembly Resolutions on the no-
-first placement of weapons in outer space and on combating glorification of Nazism. We expand our bilateral dialogue on economic modernization, on the creation of highly technological, innovative, competitive industries, on energy development, including nuclear and renewable sources. Brazil is a key Russian trade partner in Latin America (bilateral turnover has reached 5 billion USD in 2017) and I am sure that there are good prospects for expanding our commercial ties much further.

In conclusion, I would like to express satisfaction that Russia and Brazil, as two forward-looking nations, promote fruitful cooperation both through bilateral channels and within the BRICS format. Our countries have similar or coinciding attitudes toward a wide variety of international and regional issues. Our belief is that Russia and Brazil will continue to play important roles in the international arena of the 21st century – for the benefit of our two peoples and all humankind.

CHINA

STRENGTHENING THE REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

WORKING TO BUILD A COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED
FUTURE FOR MANKIND

Sun Weidong

Today, our planet where over seven billion people live is undergoing changes at an accelerated pace. To enhance the global governance and reform the global governance system has become a prevailing trend and a major issue that defines the era. It is timely and relevant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil to provide this platform. I would also like to share my views on the international situation, as well as China’s positions and plans on global governance.

1. The Call of the Times

It is noted in the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that “the world is undergoing major developments, transformation and adjustment, but peace and development remain the call of our day.” This is China’s fundamental judgment of the world trend. It is also the precondition for promoting the global governance. The trends of global multi-polarity, economic globalization, IT application, and cultural diversity are surging forward. Countries are becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent. The tides of times that feature peace, development, cooperation and win-win are becoming vigorously robust. Meanwhile, risks and challenges facing the mankind keep emerging and increasing. Promoting the evolution of the global governance is the general trend and an inevitable path towards the building of a community with a shared future for mankind and a better world.

First, reforming the current global governance system represents the fundamental need that the times call for. The current global governance system, established in the aftermath of the Second World War, has increasingly fallen behind the global trends and grown inadaptable to the reality. The lack of representation, fairness and efficiency is increasingly salient. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, emerging markets and a large number of developing countries have secured rapid development and greater global influence. The multi-polarity trend becomes more evident. Today, emerging countries and developing countries have surpassed developed countries in terms of shares of global GDP, contributing 80% to world economic growth. An increasing number of issues in the world demand wide international consultation. Setting up global mechanisms, following international rules and pursuing international justice reflect the consensus among most countries. The ideas of consultation and global governance take root globally.

The global governance system itself is facing its share of challenges. In politics, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be complied with more thoroughly; in economy, an open world economy is facing challenges posed by trade protectionism; in security, traditional and nontraditional threats are intertwined and fundamental principles of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and peaceful settlement of conflicts are often ignored, even tramped upon; in emerging areas, blind spots and vacuum remain in the governing rules of new frontiers including cyber space, outer space, polar regions and deep sea. There is a growing contradiction between the rising need and deficiency in global governance. Calls for reform in global governance are growing louder.

Second, enhancing global governance represents inexorable requirement for addressing global challenges. As globalization continues to develop, the interests and destiny of all countries have become so inextricably linked that a community of shared interests has taken shape. Countries should work together to solve worldwide challenges including energy and resources security, food security, water security, cyber security and climate change. No country can address various challenges facing mankind alone; nor can one country afford to retreat into self-isolation. Only by enhancing global governance in a cooperative manner can countries address challenges through thick and thin.

Third, enhancing global governance represents the path of necessity towards building a community with a shared future for mankind. Building a community with a shared future for mankind is the lofty goal of Chinese foreign policy and the historic mission of all countries as well. At its core, it boils down to the principle of pursuing peace, development, cooperation and win-win as opposed to war, poverty, confrontation or zero-sum game. This principle is no other than the fundamental objective of enhancing global governance. Facing the world brimming with both hopes and challenges, we should continue to enhance global governance in a bid to deliver a more just and equitable global governance system.

Fourth, enhancing global governance represents the corollary of transformation in international values. The traditional means
of snatching national interests by war, colonization and division of sphere of influence are anachronistic and increasingly at odds with the trend of the times. The practice of big, strong and rich nations bullying small, weak and poor ones becomes less and less popular. The governing philosophy, system and model of unilateral altruism can hardly adapt itself to the new global landscape and trends of the times. Most countries have reached consensus on developing a set of new thoughts on global governance as well as setting up new mechanism based on mutual respect, openness and inclusiveness, and mutual benefits.

2. China’s Significant Contributions to the Reform and Development of Global Governance System

As a Chinese saying goes, when eating fruits, remember the tree; when drinking water, remember the source. The development of China is attributable to the international community, and China has contributed to global development as well. China is forging ahead hand in hand with other countries, rendering the aspiration of humankind for long-lasting peace and sustainable progress attainable.

China spearheads global development in a responsible manner. Over the past five years, China has, through successfully hosting the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, the 22nd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting and the BRICS Summit in Xiamen, helped all parties see innovation and structural reform as the main thread for a new phase of global growth, thus contributing positively to boosting global growth. China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative to strengthen inter-State connectivity and deepen win-win cooperation with a view to common development. To date, China has signed BRI agreements with more than 80 countries and international organizations. China has carried out framework cooperation on production capacity with upwards of 30 countries. A host of early harvest projects have been materialized. Following the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration, the Belt and Road Initiative has been well-received worldwide. It not only responds to the wishes of accelerating development of other countries, but also affords improvement of global governance system and expansion of global cooperation, a new prospect. China has initiated the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and set up multilateral financial institutions including the Silk Road Fund, vigorously providing public goods for the international community. Meanwhile, China has actively offered international development assistance, establishing a one-
-billion-dollar China-UN Peace and Development Fund, a 20-billion-yuan South-South Climate Cooperation Fund, and an Assistance Fund for South-South Cooperation. China’s role as a major and responsible country has become more prominent.

China pursues world peace vigorously. China has actively engaged in helping address international and regional hotspot issues. On the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, China has all along been firmly committed to the goal of denuclearization of the Peninsula, to peace and stability on the Peninsula, and to resolving the issue through dialogue and consultation. China has strictly and fully implemented the DPRK-related resolutions of the UN Security Council. China has actively promoted a “dual-track” approach and a “suspension-for-suspension” proposal, and played a unique role in implementing the resolutions, promoting peace talks, upholding stability and preventing chaos on the Peninsula. China has facilitated the six-party agreement on Iran nuclear issue and promoted the political settlement of hotspots and thorny issues relating to South Sudan, Syria and Ukraine. China has encouraged Afghanistan and Pakistan to agree on a bilateral crisis management mechanism, contributing to Afghanistan’s domestic reconciliation and reconstruction and improving Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. We actively mediated in the Rakhine issue and put forward a three-step proposal, which has been well-received by Myanmar and Bangladesh.

China responds to global challenges robustly. China has taken an active part in international counter-terrorism cooperation and sent fleets to perform escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. China has been committed to promoting green and low-carbon development and has announced its Actions on Climate Change Beyond 2020. China has urged all parties to reach and implement the Paris Agreement, leading the international community in addressing climate change. We promoted the formulation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and taken the lead in announcing the National Action Plan for the implementation of the agenda, actively boosting balanced development on a global scale. We have actively participated in establishing rules and regulations in emerging areas including cyber space, Polar Regions, deep sea and outer space. We initiated and hosted the first World Internet Conference, with a view building a multilateral, democratic and transparent global internet governance system. We have worked actively with others to combat corruption and promote building up of the global anti-corruption cooperative network.

China resolutely upholds the interests of developing countries. Since 1950s, a large number of Asian, African and Latin American countries have gained national independence and begun to pursue economic growth, playing crucial roles in the process of globalization. The key of enhancing global governance is to increase the representation and strengthen the voice of developing countries and emerging countries in international affairs, to ensure equal rights, equal opportunities and equal rules for all. As the largest developing country in the world, China upholds justice for developing countries on the issue of reform of global governance system to better protect the common interests of developing countries. We have initiated a series of international organizations and cooperation mechanisms with developing countries as their major participants, ensuring the complete coverage of multilateral mechanisms networking developing countries. We strive to strengthen the weak link by the southern part in the global governance system and enable the BRICS, the SCO and other mechanisms to play a greater role in regional as well as global governance. Guided by the BRICS’s spirit of openness, inclusiveness, cooperation and win-win, we have promoted the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), expanded people-to-people exchanges, introduced in the new cooperation mode of “BRICS plus” and held dialogues between emerging countries and developing countries. We have made meaningful exploration to improve global governance by establishing a new influential platform for South-South cooperation, which is also forged as an important platform for emerging countries and developing countries to engage in global governance.

China encourages innovation in the concept of global governance. Under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, we have put forward a series of concepts and vision on global governance with distinctive Chinese characteristics including the road of peaceful development, win-win cooperation, a new model of major-country relations, the right approach to justice and shared interests, the vision on development, cooperation, security and globalization. It is worth mentioning that the Belt and Road Initiative and the notion of building of a community with a shared future for mankind, widely received across the world and being cited in numerous UN documents, have substantially enriched and advanced theories on international relations, thus contributing Chinese wisdom and perspective to the reform and development of global governance system.

3. Advancing the Reform and the Development of the Global Governance System and Promoting the Building of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind

The Report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) noted that China follows the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration in engaging in global governance, continues to take an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system, and keep contributing Chinese wisdom and strength to global governance. This is China’s solemn commitment to strengthening global governance. We will participate in the reform and development of global governance and promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind through the following five aspects, including peace, security, economy, culture and ecology.

First, advancing global equitable governance and contributing to durable world peace. Sovereign equality is the premier principle in international relations as well as the foremost one in global governance. Countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are all equals in the international community, and equally entitled to engaging in decision-making, enjoying rights and fulfilling obligations. We remain firmly committed to sovereign equality and promoting equal rights, opportunities and rules for all countries. We should firmly uphold the existing international system with the UN at its core, uphold the basic norms governing international relations with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as the cornerstone, maintain the authority, status and centrality of the UN in international affairs. We should give better play to the collective security mechanism enriched in the UN Charter and improve the capacity and efficiency of the UN governance so as to seek for a sustainable world peace.

Second, advancing the global security governance and realizing universal security. Under the new circumstances, all countries need to foster a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and respect and accommodate the legitimate security concerns of all parties. All countries are entitled to the right of equally engaging in regional security affairs and shouldering responsibilities in safeguarding the regional security. We need to resolve disputes and differences through dialogue and consultation and eliminate security threats through collaboration in a bid for common security. We need to cooperate in new domains of deep sea, polar regions, outer space and cyberspace. We need to strengthen coordination by building a global united front against terrorism in order to safeguard the peoples. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM) and World Health Organization (WHO) need to play its role of planning and coordinating the global efforts to tackle global challenges such as migrants and refugees and world health security.

Third, advancing the global economic governance and promoting common prosperity. Development remains the top priority for all countries. It is common development that the community with a shared future for mankind pursues. China will not close its door to the world; we will only become more and more open. We will, together with other countries, forge an open world economy, maintain and strengthen an open, multilateral, transparent, inclusive and non-discriminatory trading regime, promote FTA arrangements, regional economic integration, and trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and make economic globalization more open, inclusive and balanced so that its benefits are shared by all. We should make sharing of the pie fairer while making the pie bigger. All countries, especially the major economies, need to strengthen the macro-policy coordination and solve deep-seated issues. We need to optimize our partnerships so as to address the issue of unbalanced development between the North and South as well as intraregional development to a maximum. We should deliver more benefits to everyone and inject new impetus into the efforts to boost comprehensive and sustainable global growth.

Fourth, advancing the global cultural governance and advocating an open and inclusive world. The diversity of civilizations is the basic feature of the world and the source of human progress. Diversities bring exchanges, exchanges bear integration and integration leads to progress. The reform of the global governance system is not possible without guidance of the vision and culture. The reform of the global governance system bears on everyone, and requires consultation among us all, especially more engagement by developing countries with more representation and voice commensurate with their status and influence. We need to stick to cooperation, win-win, or all-win as opposed to confrontation, or zero-sum game. We seek to expand common ground and cooperation, guide all parties to reach consensus and strengthen coordination so as to deliver the benefits of global governance to various countries, classes and groups.

Fifth, advancing global climate governance and promoting a clean and beautiful world. Man and nature form a community of life, and any harm inflicted on nature will eventually return to haunt us. Building an ecological civilization bears on the future of mankind. We encourage green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable ways of work and life, advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in a balanced fashion, pursue a model of sustainable development featuring increased production, higher living standards, and healthy ecosystems and cultivate the global ecosystems featuring respect for nature and green development. Paris Agreement on Climate Change is the milestone in the history of global climate governance and all parties should work on its implementation. China will continue to take action to cooperatively tackle climate change, honor our commitment in its entirety and protect our homeland – the planet.

This planet belongs to over seven billion people. The future of the world rests in the hands of the peoples of all countries. We can make the world better if we can work and resolve together. China will continue to act as a responsible major country to contribute to world peace, promote global development, and uphold the international order. We will first run our own affairs and then, together with other countries, follow the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration in engaging in global governance, take an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system and make greater contributions to preserving world peace, promoting common development and creating a bright future for all.

China and Brazil, as promising emerging markets and influential developing countries in the Eastern and Western hemispheres respectively, enjoy a 200-year-old history of friendship and an ever-expanding common interest and a bright future of cooperation. Both China and Brazil are important members of the UN, the G20, the BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral frameworks. Both two countries play key roles in many regional organizations and contribute positively to a multipolar world, democracy in international relations and economic globalization.

In recent years, we have maintained close coordination and cooperation in addressing international and regional issues such as the international financial crisis, climate change, contributing greatly to protecting the overall interests of the developing countries and increasing the representation and voice of emerging markets and developing countries in international affairs. Going forward, we should, while developing ourselves, join hands to strengthen our coordination and cooperation in the UN, the G20, the BRICS and other frameworks, actively fulfill international responsibilities, pool the strengths of developing countries and uphold international fairness and justice.

We should continue to play a constructive role in the reform of global governance system, enhance global economic governance, and make the international order more just and equitable with greater institutional rights and voice for developing countries.

JAPAN

OVERVIEW OF JAPAN’S DIPLOMACY

Naoki Takahashi

1. Introduction

Protectionism is on the rise, even among countries that have been enjoying the benefits of free trade, including in Western countries. Such an inward-looking tendency is a backlash to globalism.

Moreover, the international order based on fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, which have underpinned the stability and prosperity of the world, including Japan, is being challenged by actions that unilaterally change the status quo by means of coercive measures as well as by the expansion of terrorism and of violent extremism.

The security environment surrounding Japan is facing extremely severe conditions. We have entered an era in which Japan and various other countries must take on greater responsibilities and roles, both in order to maintain the existing international order, and from the perspectives of free trade, national security, and the preservation of the global environment.

Against this background, I will outline an overview of the international situation. I will then present Japan’s foreign policy for dealing with it. Japan-Brazil relations will also be briefly touched upon at the end of the chapter.

2. Overview of the International Situation

2.1. Change in the International Situation in the
Mid-Term:

2.1.1. Change in the balance of power

Since the turn of the 21st century, the rise of the so-called emerging countries, including China and India, and the shift of the center of the global economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific have become more evident. While the rise of emerging countries has become the driving force of the global economy, changes are also being brought about in the balance of power.

Aside from State actors, non-State actors, including international terrorist organizations, have become more influential. At the same time, it has become more frequent the attempt by State actors at disguising the use of military means while conducting armed attacks or interfering in democracy, such as through the control of information.

2.1.2. Diversification and Complexification of Threats

The global security environment has gotten more complicated with the enlargement of the so-called “grayzone” – situations where neither pure peace nor war over territorial sovereignty or other national interests, are dominant – due to the insufficient institutionalization of cooperative security frameworks. This is especially true in Asia.

Issues related to the uncontrolled transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the development of ballistic missiles, including the possibility of acquisition and use of such weapons by international terrorist organizations, constitute a major threat to the entire international community, including, of course, Japan. The development and launches of ballistic missiles and the repeated nuclear tests by North Korea in contravention of relevant UN resolutions are good examples of such.

There is also a growing concern about large-scale acts of terrorism targeting soft targets. We also ought to be alarmed at the use of communication tools, including social networking services (SNSs), in the diffusion of violent extremism and expansion of the range of activities by terrorist organizations.

Recent advances in science and technology have accelerated activities in new areas such as outer space and cyber space. While this presents big opportunities, it also brings about new risks and threats. The applicable norms for such situations are still being developed.

Furthermore, innovations in unmanned and automated weapons technology and cyber technology might change the very concept of security.

2.1.3. World Economic Trend (the Emergence of Protectionist and Inward-Looking Trends)

Economic interdependence has been strengthened by the development of global supply chains and financial systems in line with the evolution of globalization and digital technology. While those factors create further opportunities for growth, they also make it easier for an economic shock in one region or fluctuations in commodity prices and other factors to simultaneously impact other regions and the entire world economy. Furthermore, in order to make cross-border economic activities easier and smoother, the importance of the maintenance and management of a rules-based economic order is paramount.

The global economy in 2018 is on track to recovery. However, there are still downside risks present, such as a vulnerability in financial systems, geopolitical tensions, and political uncertainty. On the other hand, the protectionist and inward-looking trends observed in Europe, in the US, and in other quarters remain significant. The underlying causes may vary from rising income inequality, unemployment, and trade deficits to greater migration flows and global environmental problems.

2.1.4 Growing Concern over Global Issues

While the poverty rate has been decreasing in recent years, there are data that indicate that the poorest people, living on less than 1.9 US dollars a day, still account for about 10% of the world’s population. Poverty undermines freedom and human potential at the same time it tends to trigger social injustice, political instability, and violent extremism.

The number of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and asylum-seekers has increased in recent years due to both new crises and protracted conflicts, reaching approximately 65.6 million people, the largest number since the end of World War II. The issue of refugees and other displaced persons is a serious humanitarian problem, and has caused friction within the international community. There is also a reason to believe that the problem will be further prolonged and aggravated.

Furthermore, there is a legitimate concern that global warming will have a serious impact on the global environment, including in the frequency of natural hazards and the gravity of the damage caused by such disasters. The number of people crossing borders has now increased dramatically due to globalization, posing an increasingly serious threat of the outbreak and transmission of infectious diseases. The growth of the global population, coupled with the acceleration of industrialization and urbanization, may also aggravate disputes over water, food and health in the future.

To deal with these issues, it is important to implement faithfully the “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).” It is estimated that by achieving SDGs, the world could create economic value amounting to 12 trillion US dollars and 380 million jobs, attracting the strong attention of not only national governments but also local governments, business communities, and civil societies.

2.1.5. Middle East/Violent Extremism and Terrorism

The Middle East is located at a geopolitically important position and is a critical region when it comes to the supply of energy resources to the world, including Japan. Its stability is crucial for the peace and stability of the international community, including Japan.

The Middle East faces, nevertheless, various challenges with potentially destabilizing impacts, such as the existence of violent extremist groups, including the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL);” the massive refugee and IDPs flows within the region and into nearby regions; the prolongation of the Syrian crisis; the situation in Iraq; the Middle East Peace Process; as well as the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia; the situation surrounding Qatar; and the domestic situations of Afghanistan, Yemen, and, Libya.

Although ISIL’s dominated areas have diminished in Iraq and Syria, terrorism threats are expanding all over the world, including Asia, as foreign terrorist fighters return to their home countries or relocate to third countries. In May 2017, a group of militants which called themselves “ISIL East Asia” occupied a part of Marawi, Philippines. Even though the clean-up operation is over, the situation in Mindanao, including Marawi, needs continued and careful attention.

2.2. The Increasingly Severe Security Environment in East Asia

2.2.1. North Korea

It is no exaggeration to say that the security environment now surrounding Japan is the most severe in postwar history. In the past two years, North Korea forcefully conducted three nuclear tests and launched as many as 40 ballistic missiles, including those with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) range that can reach the East Coast of the United States. Its growing nuclear and missile capability poses an unprecedented, grave, and imminent threat to the peace and stability of Japan and the international community.

2.2.2. China

The peaceful development of China brings favorable opportunities for the international community and Japan. However, China has been expanding its military capabilities and increasing its national defense budgets without sufficient transparency. China has also been continuing its unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion at sea and in the airspace in the East and South China Seas, based on its own claims, which are inconsistent with the existing international order.

In the East China Sea, Chinese government-owned vessels have continued to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, military vessels and planes of the Chinese Navy are also intensifying their activities. In addition, China has been continuing unilateral resource development in areas pending delimitation. In recent years, many cases of survey activities have been conducted without Japan’s consent in Japan’s EEZ, including the East China Sea.

In the South China Sea, China has been undertaking large-scale and rapid building of outposts, as well as their use for military purposes, on disputed features. From 2016 to 2017, Chinese aircraft carried out test flights over the Spratly Islands, surface-to-air missiles were installed on Woody Island, bombers and other aircraft carried out patrols in the airspace above the Scarborough Shoal, and an aircraft carrier of the Chinese Navy sailed in the South China Sea.

According to a US think-tank, China is steadily building military outposts on a group of contested islands in the South China Sea. The total area of permanent facilities that have been constructed or are under construction amounted to approximately 290,000 square meters in 2017. Regarding the dispute over the South China Sea between the Philippines and China, China continues to make its own claims, such as rejecting the Arbitral Tribunal’s final award, which confirmed the illegality of its actions such as landfill operations.

3. Japan’s Foreign Policy: Six Priority Areas

With the existing international order facing various challenges, Japan needs to take on greater responsibilities and roles than before.

In order to protect and promote Japan’s national interests as well as to make further contribution toward international peace and prosperity, Japan intends to work on the following six priority areas of its foreign policy: (1) Strengthening the Japan-US Alliance; (2) Enhancing relations with neighboring countries;
(3) Promoting economic diplomacy; (4) Initiatives for global issues, (5); Engagement in the Middle East Peace and Stability; and
(6) Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.

3.1. Strengthening the Japan-US Alliance

The Japan-US Alliance is the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy and security. It contributes to stability and prosperity for the entire region and the world. As is seen in the North Korean situation, the region’s security environment is becoming increasingly severe. Under these circumstances, the Japan-US Alliance has become even more important.

In January 2017, Mr. Donald Trump took office as the President of the US. In February 2017, soon after his inauguration, Prime Minister Abe visited the US and held a Japan-US Summit Meeting. The two leaders issued a joint statement that affirmed their strong determination to further strengthen the Japan-US Alliance and their economic relationship. In November, President Trump started his first-round visit to Asia and paid a visit to Japan as his first stop. The two leaders confirmed that both countries are 100% together on the issue of North Korea, and that the US commitment to the region is unwavering, backed by the US. presence based on the robust Japan-US. Alliance. In addition, both leaders affirmed that Japan and the US would work together to promote the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” They also met the family members of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea and promised to work closely to resolve the abductions issue as soon as possible. The visit demonstrated to the world the unwavering ties of the Japan-US Alliance amid growing tension in the region.

Under the Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines for Japan-US. Defense Cooperation, Japan is conducting “seamless” responses from peacetime to contingencies through a wide range of consultations and coordination mechanisms with the US. Through the Japan-US. Non-Proliferation Dialogue in June 2017, Japan-US. Security Consultative Committee (2+2)
in August 2017, and other exchanges of views between top-officials, Japan will continue to promote security and defense cooperation with the US, further enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the alliance.

Japan-US cooperation in the economic field, along with security and personnel exchange, is essential to the Japan-US Alliance. The year 2017 provided various opportunities to construct a renewed Japan-US economic relationship. At the Summit Meeting in February, both leaders decided to establish an Economic Dialogue led by Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso and Vice President Mike Pence. The first round of the Economic Dialogue was held in Tokyo in April and the second meeting was held in DC, in October. Japan’s cumulative direct investment in the US is the second largest after the United Kingdom (approximately 421.1 billion US dollars (2016) and Japanese companies are contributing to job creation (approximately 860,000 jobs) in the US.

It is also important to strengthen multilayered cooperation with allies and partners and to build the alliance network based on the Japan-US Alliance. In this perspective, along with Japan-US-Australia and Japan-US-India frameworks, senior officials of diplomatic authorities of Japan, the US, Australia, and India met in Manila in November 2017 and discussed measures to ensure a free and open international order based on the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific.

3.2. Enhancing Relations with Neighboring Countries

Enhancing our relations with neighboring countries constitutes an important basis for making the environment surrounding Japan stable.

Relations with China constitute one of Japan’s most important bilateral relationships. China and Japan, which are the world’s second and third largest economic powers respectively, share a responsibility to work shoulder to shoulder to address regional and global issues, including the issue of North Korea. In the year of 2017, which marked the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, both countries actively held high-level communication, providing great opportunities to develop the Japan-China relationship in a better direction. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship. It is important to further improve the relationship from a broad perspective, in accordance with the concept of “mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests”. Toward this goal, Japan intends to realize mutual visits by the leaders of the two countries, to promote people-to-people exchanges, and to strengthen the economic relationship.

At the same time, China’s attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea is completely unacceptable. Meanwhile, Japan continues to respond in a firm but calm manner while strengthening cooperation with relevant countries. Japan will enhance communication with China to make the East China Sea a “Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship”.

A firm relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea (the ROK) is essential in ensuring the peace and prosperity in Asia-Pacific region. Since President Moon Jae-in was inaugurated in May 2017, Japan and the ROK have maintained frequent communications at the summit and foreign minister levels.

The Task Force to Review the Agreement on Comfort Women Issue, which was established in the ROK, submitted a report stating the results of its assessment of the 2015 Japan-ROK agreement on the comfort women issue. In response, the government of the ROK announced its position on the Japan-the ROK agreement in January 2018. It is completely unacceptable for Japan that the ROK asks Japan to take further actions. Japan continues to strongly urge the ROK to steadily implement the agreement that confirmed a “final and irreversible” resolution of the comfort women issue. It is important for the two countries to build a future-oriented relationship by appropriately managing these difficult issues.

With Russia, Japan held political dialogues at various levels, including the four summit meetings and five foreign ministers’ meetings in 2017. Regarding the issue of the Northern Territories, which is the main outstanding issue of concern between Japan and Russia, we will implement initiatives to realize joint economic activities on the Four Northern Islands based on the agreements between the two leaders. We will also implement humanitarian measures for the former island residents. Japan will continue to persistently negotiate with Russia based on its basic policy of resolving the issue of the attribution of the Four Northern Islands and concluding a peace treaty.

Nuclear tests and repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea pose an unprecedented, grave, and imminent threat and are completely unacceptable. Japan, in cooperation with the US, the ROK, China, Russia and other relevant countries, is maximizing pressure on North Korea in every possible means and cornering it into changing its current policy.

Through these measures, Japan will also pursue the comprehensive resolution of the outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear, and missile issues. As well as being a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and safety of Japanese citizens, abductions by North Korea constitute a universal issue among the international community as violations of basic human rights. As it is Japan’s top priority, Japan in close cooperation from relevant countries, including the US, will make its fullest efforts to resolve this issue.

With regard to India, summit meetings were held three times in 2017, including one during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to India in September, and, with the steady progress of the high-speed railway plan as seen in the groundbreaking ceremony, great strides are being made in bilateral relations.

Japan and Australia share fundamental values and strategic interests based on a “Special Strategic Partnership” as reaffirmed during Prime Minister Turnbull’s visit to Japan in January 2018 and in Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Australia in January 2017. Japan will steadily strengthen its cooperation with Australia in a wide range of areas, including security, the economy, and regional affairs.

The further integration, prosperity, and stability of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are vital for the peace and stability of the region. Japan will continue to support the centrality and unity of ASEAN and strengthen its relationship with ASEAN and each of the ASEAN countries.

In addition, while utilizing regional frameworks such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan continues to strengthen its relationship with Europe in a multilayered approach. Japan also continues to promote security and defense cooperation with the UK and France. Furthermore, Japan continues to strengthen its relationships with the Pacific island countries, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Latin America and the Caribbean as well. For example, for Central Asia, in addition to fostering bilateral ties with each country, Japan established the “Central Asia + Japan” Dialogue, which is designed to lead to the “open, stable and autonomous” development of Central Asia as a region.

3.3. Promoting Economic Diplomacy

In 2017, the Government of Japan advanced its economic diplomacy centered on the following three aspects: (1) rule-making to strengthen a free and open international economic system; (2) supporting Japanese companies’ overseas business expansion by promoting public-private cooperation; and (3) promoting resource diplomacy and attracting investment and tourists.

For Japan, which has promoted economic growth on the basis of free trade, it is critically important to maintain and develop an open and stable international economic order based on the rule of law. In the G7 Taormina Summit and the G20 Hamburg Summit, Japan played the leading role in achieving an agreement on issues such as the world economy, trade, and excess capacity. Furthermore, as the pressure of protectionism continues to rise, Japan led the discussions to promote free-trade and inclusive growth through frameworks such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Japan will host the G20 summit in 2019. As the holder of the next G20 presidency, Japan will exercise strong leadership in addressing pressing issues in the global economy.

Regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement signed in February 2016 as an initiative to promote free trade, even though the US. administration of President Trump announced its withdrawal from the TPP in January 2017, Japan led discussions among eleven countries of the TPP, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP11) was signed on March 8 in Santiago, Chile. Japan also finalized the negotiation of the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in December 2017. Japan will continue to devote maximum efforts toward an early entry into force of these Agreements. In addition, Japan will promote various other EPAs, such as a high quality Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among Japan, China, and the ROK. Japan will make further efforts to promote 21st century rules for free and fair trade and investment to the world.

To incorporate the vigorous economic growth abroad, including that of emerging countries, and to support the steady growth of the Japanese economy, Japan has engaged its diplomatic missions overseas to support Japanese companies in their efforts to promote and expand their businesses overseas. Regarding the import restrictions enacted in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, Japan is quickly sharing information with the government of each of the relevant countries and the general public in order to abolish restrictions on a scientific basis.

Japan has made efforts to strengthen energy, resources, and food security in the country and the world. In July 2017, Japan presented the vision for its future energy and resource diplomacy based on the principle that Japan’s energy security will be enhanced through its contribution in providing solutions for global energy challenges. In January 2018, Japan expressed its determination to promote diplomacy in view of the importance of renewable energy.

Japan has also been working to promote inbound tourism to Japan through strategic relaxation of visa requirements as well as by promoting diverse attractiveness of Japan, which contributed to increasing the number of foreign visitors by 28.7 million in 2017.

3.4. Initiatives on Global Issues

The issues of disarmament and non-proliferation, peace-building, sustainable development, disaster risk reduction, climate change, human rights, women’s empowerment, and the consolidation of the rule of law are related to the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. These issues cannot be dealt with by one country alone, requiring a united response by the international community.

The initiatives for these issues are one critical part of Japan’s “Proactive Contribution to Peace” initiative. Japan is advancing international contributions under the notion of “human security” with a view to lending a hand to socially vulnerable people all around the world with respect for the fundamental values of human rights, freedoms, and democracy and to help build a society where individuals can make the most of their potential.

Additionally, Japan reinforces safety measures for Japanese nationals overseas including travelers, students, Japanese companies operating overseas including small and medium enterprises, and educational institutions.

3.4.1. Promotion of international peace cooperation

Japan has placed importance on cooperation in the field of peacekeeping and peace-building, including UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) from the standpoint of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Since 1992, Japan has dispatched more than 12,500 personnel to 27 missions. From 2012 to May 2017, Japan dispatched engineering units to the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Japan has also been dispatching four staff officers to UNMISS since 2011.

3.4.2. Measures against terrorism and violent extremism

Against the threat of the expansion of terrorism and violent extremism, based on the G7 Action Plan on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, which Japan has coordinated at the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in 2016, Japan is addressing comprehensive counter-terrorism measures consisting of: (1) Improvement of counter-terrorism capacity; (2) Measures to counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism; and (3) Social and economic development assistance to create a foundation for a moderate society. Japan also strives to strengthen the collection of information through the International Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Collection Units and intensify cooperation with relevant countries for counter-terrorism.

3.4.3. Proactive initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan is determined to lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation to realize a world free of nuclear weapons. Japan attaches great importance on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. While dealing with immediate security threats, Japan is promoting realistic and practical measures to advance nuclear disarmament worldwide.

In May 2017 then Foreign Minister Kishida attended the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2020 NPT Review Conference and presented Japan’s view on the path towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Kono attended the tenth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 2017 and also co-hosted the ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) with Germany that month calling for substantial nuclear disarmament measures at both conferences. Thereafter, Japan submitted the draft resolution on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which was adopted at the UN General Assembly with the support of 156 countries, including nuclear-weapon States and States that supported the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In November 2017, the first meeting of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament was held in Hiroshima seeking to obtain recommendations for a common ground where all States can work together through rebuilding cooperation and trust towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

3.4.4. Multilateral Cooperation and UN Security Reform

Japan served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for two years from 2016 to 2017 after being elected for the eleventh time, more than any other UN member State.

There is an urgent need to reform the Security Council in order to reflect the realities of the international community in the 21st century and to address todays’ issues effectively. For this reason, Japan is making tremendous efforts, together with Brazil, Germany, and India to advance Security Council reform, including its admission as a permanent member in a reformed Council. Furthermore, Japan is running for non-permanent membership on the Security Council at the elections to be held in 2022 in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Furthermore, in response to the issues addressed by the UN and other international organizations, Japan is making intellectual and personnel contributions through the active roles of Japanese staff, in addition to financial and political contributions, and is making efforts to increase the number of Japanese nationals working in international organizations.

3.4.5. Proactive Efforts to Strengthen the Rule of Law

Japan is working to maintain and promote the “Free, Open and Stable Seas” based on the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea.” Furthermore, Japan is strengthening its cooperation with various countries by actively participating in initiatives to ensure the security of sea lanes of communication through anti-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, supporting the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCCAP), and international rule-making to strengthen the rule of law in the Arctic as well as outer space and cyberspace.

3.4.6. Human Rights

Human rights, freedom, and democracy are fundamental values, and their promotion and protection serve as the cornerstone of peace and stability in the international community. In this field, Japan proactively participates in bilateral dialogues and a number of multinational fora such as the UN, and makes contributions including constructive dialogue with the UN human rights mechanisms in order to improve the human rights situation globally.

3.4.7. Toward a Society where Women Shine

Japan has been promoting women’s active participation in society including through cooperation with international organizations such as UN Women, contributing to conflict prevention/resolution and peace-building through efforts against sexual violence in conflict and the formulation of a National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325. The fourth World Assembly for Women (WAW!2017) was held in November 2017, inviting top leaders from various fields related to women from around the globe. The outcomes of the WAW!2017 was issued as “WAW!2017 Tokyo Declaration” and registered as a UN document.

3.4.8. Development Cooperation Charter and ODA Utilization

Under the Development Cooperation Charter decided by the Cabinet in February 2015, Japan has been making proactive and strategic utilization of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in order to contribute to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community and eventually to secure Japan’s national interests through realizing them.

3.4.9. TICAD

Since 1993, Japan has taken the initiative to support the development of Africa through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). In August 2017, Foreign Minister Kono attended a TICAD Ministerial Meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, as a co-chairperson, in which progress made since TICAD V and VI was reviewed.

3.4.10. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

The “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the 2030 Agenda)” adopted in September 2015 lays out a set of SDGs which are to be undertaken by all countries. Then Foreign Minister Kishida attended the United Nations High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) held in July 2017 and promoted initiatives for the SDGs based on the concept of Public Private Action for Partnership (PPAP) and international cooperation related to the SDGs. In the fourth meeting of the SDGs Promotion Headquarters held in December 2017, “SDGs Action Plan 2018” was decided on which contains measures to promote Japan’s SDGs model. In the field of water and sanitation (SDG 6), for example, Japan has long been the top donor by drawing on its extensive knowledge, experience, and technology. H.I.H Crown Prince Naruhito of Japan attended the 8th World Water Forum held in Brasilia in March 2018, where he gave the keynote lecture at the “High Level Panel on Water and Disasters”.

3.4.11. Global Health

Health is critically important when considering “human security.” Based on the “Basic Design for Peace and Health” decided in September 2015, Japan is working to enhance health systems, starting with the promotion of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) that ensures all people can receive the health services they need at an affordable cost throughout life. In December 2017 Japan hosted “UHC Forum 2017” in Tokyo, which was attended by high and senior level officials from the governments of various countries, representatives of international organizations, and experts on global health.

3.4.12. Climate Change

The Paris Agreement is a fair and effective framework that all parties joined for the first time to address the issue of climate change. Negotiations are currently being conducted in order to adopt the implementation guidelines in 2018, and Japan actively participates in conferences such as COP23, which was held in November 2017 in Germany.

3.4.13. Utilizing Science and Technology for Diplomacy

Science and technology constitute the foundational elements for peace and prosperity. Japan is advancing initiatives which utilize the power of science and technology in diplomacy in both bilateral relationships and multinational frameworks. To this end, Professor Teruo Kishi was appointed as Science and Technology Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and has supported the activities of the Minister from the perspective of science and technology since 2015.

3.4.14. Quality infrastructure

Under the concept that infrastructure investment should contribute to the “quality growth” of developing countries, Japan is promoting investment in “quality infrastructure” based on the “G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment.” To promote the concept of “quality infrastructure,” Japan, together with the OECD Development Centre and Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), co-organized the “First International Economic Forum on Asia” in April 2017. In September 2017, Japan also co-hosted a High-Level Side Event on “Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investments” with the EU and the UN.

3.5. Engagement in the Middle East Peace and Stability

Peace and stability in the Middle East are directly linked with the peace and economic prosperity of the world, including Japan. Therefore, Japan intends not only to enhance Japan’s economic relationships with Middle Eastern countries but also to strengthen its political engagement in this region. From religious and ethnic viewpoints, Japan is in a neutral position. Japan has not left any negative footprint in the history of the Middle East. Moreover, Japan has a strong alliance with the United States, which has significant influence in the Middle East. There is a role that can be played by Japan exactly because of these advantages. In September 2017, Japan held the first “Japan-Arab Political Dialogue” in Egypt, and Foreign Minister Kono announced the “Kono Four Principles”: (1) Intellectual and Human Contribution; (2) Investment in “People; (3) Enduring efforts; and (4) Enhancing Political efforts.

3.6. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy

A free and open maritime order based on the rule of law is the cornerstone for the stability and prosperity of the international community. More than half of the global population lives in the Indo-Pacific region, which extends from the Asia-Pacific through the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and Africa, and is key to global development and prosperity. Maintaining and strengthening the free and open maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region as an “international public goods” will bring stability and prosperity equally to all countries in this region.

In order to implement this strategy, Japan advances its efforts based on the following three pillars. First, we will ensure that principles such as the freedom of navigation and over-flight, the rule of law and free trade spread and take root. Second, we will pursue economic prosperity by enhancing connectivity through the development of quality infrastructure in accordance with international standards. Third, we will ensure peace and stability by supporting the development of maritime law enforcement capabilities.

Japan has been cooperating with, and gained support from, relevant countries to create a free and open Indo-Pacific, making use of such opportunities as Prime Minister Abe’s visit to India in September 2017, US President Trump’s visit to Japan in November 2017, and Australian Prime Minister Turnbull’s visit to Japan in January 2018.

4. Japan-Brazil Relations

In spite of a great geographic distance, Latin America and the Caribbean is linked to Japan through friendly relations established by human ties of immigration and mutually beneficial economic relations. In addition, this region is an important partner of Japan in the international community, sharing fundamental values.

Japan has strengthened its relations with Latin America including Brazil and the Caribbean on the basis of the three guiding principles of Japanese diplomacy for the region, so-called “JUNTOS” – meaning “together” – declared by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his visit to São Paulo in August 2014. These are:

Inspirar juntos (Inspire together, such as the promotion of human exchanges, cultural, sports, etc.)

Progredir juntos (Progress together, such as the strengthening of economic ties)

Liderar juntos (Leading together, such as international cooperation);

With a population of over 200 million people, Brazil is also rich in natural resources and has the ninth largest economy on the planet. The country has great future potential and, based on its large domestic force, it also plays an active role in international fora.

In Brazil resides the largest community of Japanese immigrants and descendants in the world, with about 1.9 million people and history that dates back more than a century. Japan is home to the third largest Brazilian community abroad, with about 190,000 people. Thus, Japan and Brazil have a traditional relationship of friendship based on these human ties. The 2018 marks the 110th anniversary of Japanese immigration to Brazil.

Japan opened its first Japan House in São Paulo in April 2017, with the aim to nurture deeper mutual understanding between Japan and the international community, by creating hubs overseas to showcase and communicate Japan to the international community with an “All-Japan” approach. I encourage all Brazilians to visit Japan House to directly learn and experience the various charms of Japan.

5. Conclusion: Japan as a Beacon for the World

In this multipolar age, Japan wishes to develop and prosper together with the world while taking on appropriate responsibilities and roles. Japan will not be a “follower” in the world. We will grasp the signs of change, respond rapidly to the intense fluctuations of the global tides, and, together with our partners, lead the world to be more peaceful and prosperous. Japan must become a beacon for the world.

Lastly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil for their initiative to publish this valuable book.

March 2018.

FRANCE

POSSIBLE WORLDS

Justin Vaïsse

In order to apprehend the world in 2030, and before going into the details of the trends that will – or will not – prevail, we are going to put forward a synthesized vision of the international system, organized in two dimensions.

The first is the traditional dimension of power distribution. This distribution may be concentrated in the hands of a few States – one, two or several – or may be dispersed throughout the international system, between States and also within civil society in the wider sense, be it constructive (businesses, NGOs, trade unions, or local government) or destructive (mafias, criminal groups, terrorists). The system can thus take a variety of forms, depending on the degree of concentration of power, ranging from a unipolar situation, with one dominant State, and a zero-polar situation, where no State is dominant and power is de-concentrated, or bipolar and multipolar situations.

The second organizing principle of the international system is that of international cooperation. At global level, there can be a more-or-less institutionalized system of cooperation between the system’s various players. That can mean an oligarchy reaching agreement on common rules of engagement, multilateral cooperation enabling the negotiation of norms by a number of States and players, bilateral relations based on reciprocal expectations, or a total lack of cooperation resulting in a “free-for-
-all” and thus the law of the strong over the weak. This ability to cooperate more or less will determine the degree of organization of the world around a basis of common rules.

If we combine these two axes, eight possible worlds emerge. There are, however, three caveats to bear in mind.

Firstly, the eight possible worlds presented below are each a simplified “ideal”, none of which will correspond precisely to the world of 2030 which will clearly be at the intersection of several theoretical worlds.

Secondly, we know that several realities can co-exist at the same time: the international system may be dominated by one State as far as relations between great powers are concerned, but be multipolar or zero-polar at regional level.

Thirdly, it must be remembered that the world is changeable and often difficult to read for those living in it. In 2030, we will not necessarily know which world we are living in, any more than we are capable of precisely describing the one we live in now. Our current world is both the legacy of a post-1945 world, where people hoped to see an institutionalized concert of nations emerge, and of a post-Cold War world, where America’s super-power status seemed unrivalled. It is subject to rapid change in the international order, with the emergence of new powers, the return of nationalist movements and revisionist forces, the multiplication of non-State actors, for example, that blur the wider picture. In many ways, the United States continues to dominate the international system, at least by default in that nothing seems to be decided without it. But China is waiting in the wings, focusing on its regional affirmation and hesitating to take on a role of leadership or disruption on the global stage. Putin’s Russia and Trump’s America suggest nostalgia for the diplomatic practices of the 19th century, and yet the multi-stakeholder multilateralism of COP21 gave us a glimpse of what 21st century diplomacy might look like.

Several possible futures thus emerge in the form of eight worlds – eight simplified ideals. Before we decide which are most likely, it is time to present them.

Review of the eight worlds

1. Pax Americana

In this scenario, the United States proves capable of once more consolidating its position of hegemony over the international system, driven by a desire to advance the whole world towards greater prosperity, democracy and security, to maximize their own profit. While this world appears possible and realistic, this development would require both a less isolationist political rebalancing in Washington, which is far from certain under Trump’s presidency, and a brutal crisis compromising the emergence of other powers. At this time of de-concentrated power, the cost of leadership has become too high for a single country to bear it alone.

2. Tyrant’s World

In this scenario, which is the non-cooperative pendant of Pax Americana, one State – most likely the United States – dominates all the others without seeking any sort of cooperation with other State or non-State actors. The instability engendered by the lack of international rules brings the dominant State to use arbitrary and despotic methods that have an impact on the rest of the world, in order to preserve its own interests and maintain some sort of global order. The country returns to the interventionist instincts
of the George W. Bush era when its interests are directly threatened, or, conversely, completely withdraws from non-strategic regions, where order then breaks down. The possibility of a situation emerging between now and 2030 where a State dominates all others in a context of widespread chaos appears highly unlikely, as it would require a conjunction of other powers weakening. Moreover, the dominant State of 2030 could realistically be only the United States: China will become old before it becomes rich and unstable before it becomes powerful, so it is unlikely it will overtake the United States in all areas within just over a decade.

3. G2 World

In this scenario, two superpowers – the United States and China – share power in a fixed, accepted framework. This G2 world is not totally improbable, but in a more distant future than 2030. In the event of a shift towards a duopoly, the rivalry between the two countries will be such that it will take several years for tensions to calm down, for the geographical distribution of spheres of influence to be clarified, particularly in Asia, and for the two parties to agree on an organization of the world. Moreover, certain indicators – such as the share of the Renminbi in the global economy – and fundamental disagreements (environment) mean that the likelihood of this world should be nuanced.

4. Pacific War

In this scenario, the non-cooperative equivalent of the G2 world, two States would stand out as superpowers – the United States and China. They would fall into a bipolar structural rivalry. The world gradually organizes around a China-United States duopoly made up of tensions and occasional cooperation within a weakened UN framework. Russia is relegated as a declining power in crisis. Constellations of formal organizations or “minilateral” coalitions, equivalent to expanded spheres of influence, form around these two poles. The two economic and military giants, each aspiring to hegemony, will inevitably find themselves in a situation of rivalry. The intensity of tensions will depend on internal political factors on both sides and the initiatives of China’s neighbors. The likelihood of a war is limited by interdependences between the two powers and the possession of nuclear weapons.

5. Concert of Nations

In this scenario, the Western world has definitively lost the monopoly of power, which it has to share with others. Kant’s vision prevails over that of Hobbes: as a world order governed by international law is established, “perpetual peace” appears achievable. This scenario remains unlikely for 2030 given the current environment. Russia, China and Europe are struggling to rival the United States on all fronts of American domination (security, economy, soft power). China and Russia are employing asymmetric strategies that do not allow for collaboration, while Europe is attempting to develop a third way founded on cohesion, cooperation and solidarity, which is still struggling to gain a foothold because of a lack of outreach. On their side, the United States currently have no intention of fostering the rise of this multipolarity.

6. Carnivores’ World

In this scenario, the non-cooperative variant of the Concert of Nations, power is concentrated in the hands of a few super-
-States which clash at the edges of their spheres of influence and act as predators over the rest of the planet. The reaffirmation of American power instigated by President Trump along nationalist and transactional lines works well for the United States. Trumpism is emulated, especially among the world’s authoritarian leaders who claim the right to act unilaterally on the basis of their own interests. In these circumstances, the “Western consensus” on the norms governing the global economy and the multilateral system collapse, leading to outbreaks of trade war between the different blocs and a rise in protectionism contributing to the relative decline of the European Union which remains committed to cooperative, law-based practices.

The “carnivorous powers” engage in bloody and endless proxy wars, while Europe, a herbivorous power vainly seeking to revive multilateral regulation, tears itself apart between contradictory allegiances and blackmail.

This world could easily take hold if the United States and Russia continue on their current paths and the brakes possessed by Europe (through law) and China (through the economy and by force) are not powerful enough to hold them back.

7. Global Village

In this scenario, the de-concentration of political power and the spread of technology have empowered individuals who, along with cities, NGOs, businesses and interest groups have replaced the nation-State as the basic unit in the international system. All the great States, even the authoritarian powers, are subject to their influence. A new organization is reached between State and the major non-State actors. The result is a multi-actor polylateralism more capable of addressing global challenges.

Global governance is renewed through a multi-actor arrangement that draws simultaneously on local levels, which are more relevant and legitimate for the implementation of major political priorities, and on the private sector, which holds the majority of resources and expertise (such as the digital giants and the health care and telecommunications sectors). The involvement of a great number of stakeholders, which results in the weakening of centers of power and the rise of interdependence, makes greater cooperation and negotiation essential.

The Paris Climate Agreement showed that such de-concentrated cooperation was possible, although it was largely instigated by States. It remains true that a single great power remains capable of undermining the efforts of all the others. The test of this Agreement’s survival will therefore teach us a great deal for the future.

8. Rule of Nature

In this scenario, which is the non-cooperative equivalent of the Global Village, the world is extremely fragmented: no State is sufficiently powerful to impose its rule or lead others, while the fragmentation of societies and the rise of individualism lead to community isolationism and identity politics. Nobody respects what is left of the international organizations, and criminal actors proliferate.

Western democracies turn inwards for the long term. They are swamped by the pace set by the digital giants, which constantly disrupt the balance of laws through their innovations, and eventually leave them to produce norms and impose their products on societies.

After a few years of caution, China and Russia eventually realize there is a lot to be gained from this passive stance in the West and step up their presence even more firmly in their respective spheres of influence with no second thoughts.

Despite multilateral forums formally remaining, the isolationism and powerlessness of the Western powers deprives them of any effectiveness. Latin America, South Asia, and Africa fall prey to a booming informal economy based on illegal exploitation of mining resources and trafficking in drugs, weapons and persons. Isolationism, violence, instability and disorder prevail, and the economy is no longer able to develop. Progress and knowledge are no longer driving forces. While it is unlikely that such a world will emerge by 2030, certain current developments do bear its seeds.

2030: A crossroads

The theoretical worlds presented above do not all have the same chances of coming to be. Following a reflection, which obviously reflected the subjectivity of the group, the following probabilities were determined: the Carnivores’ World was deemed the most likely (25%), followed by a cooperative world (the Concert of Nations, 20%), while non-cooperative worlds came in third and fourth: Pacific War (16%) and the Rule of Nature (16%). The other worlds, including Pax Americana (9%), the G2 World (6%) and the Global Village (6%), all appear less likely, while the Tyrant’s World (2%) is deemed very unlikely.

The diagram above reflects those results. The size of each world and its distance from the center are proportional to their probability as determined from our reflection, while the number indicates their place in the ranking. These results give rise to two conclusions: If you look at the vertical axis – the distribution of power – then multipolarity clearly wins out in our predictions for 2030, with almost half of all votes (45%), ahead of bipolarity and zero-polarity (each with 22%), while unipolarity is deemed unlikely (11%). If you look at the horizontal axis, meanwhile, that of cooperation, competition clearly comes out on top: the four non-cooperative worlds predicted for 2030 cumulate almost two thirds of votes (65%), suggesting a Hobbesian world where norms are ignored and the rule of force prevails.

These conclusions give us a view of a 2030 world with certain key elements.

The first is that of a weakening of the leading global power – the United States – which will cease to play a predominant role. The second is the persistence of competition between the great powers. This multipolarity, first and foremost built on the return of power games, the vitality of non-State actors, and the digital revolution, will affirm itself in the face of global turbulence.

The third key element of the 2030 World is the irrepressible vibrancy of civil society. The constant and growing vitality of non-State actors, be they constructive or destructive will profoundly alter the world we live in. Nation-States will lose the monopoly on international relations and will have to take on board these new players.

The fourth key element is the undermining of international cooperation. Most of the thematic and regional analysis that follows tends to bet more on deregulation, in the absence of political will: financial and budgetary rules will remain weak, UN forums will have failed to show their effectiveness and have become discredited, global challenges will appear so insurmountable that there will be no desire to address them, national and sovereignist temptations will be widespread, norms seen as “Western” will be undermined, and individualism will prevail.

In that case, the 2030 World will be closest to the Carnivores’ World, or even the Rule of Nature. The chances of a sudden awareness of the situation and a shift towards a more cooperative, regulated world, built on global governance, are not inexistent but will be more a response to upheaval or major disasters than the fruit of collective responsibility and a shared desire to establish common rules and better regulate globalization.

LIST OF AUTHORS

Alfredo Conte is a career diplomat who entered the Italian Foreign Ministry in 1993, and currently Head of the Coordination Unit of the Secretariat General. A lawyer by education (with a degree from the University ‘Federico II’ of Naples), he served in Hong Kong at the time of its return to China in 1997 and in Berlin during the crises of September 11 and the war in Iraq, among other places. He was an adviser to various Italian Foreign Ministers in Rome (Franco Frattini, Gianfranco Fini, Massimo D’Alema), and to High Representative Javier Solana, whose Policy Unit in Brussels he joined in 2008. Mr. Conte was present at the creation of the European External Action Service where he was Head of Strategic Planning from 2011 to 2017.

Amal M. Mourad is currently Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for Policy Planning and Studies in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She has been serving as an Egyptian diplomat since 1984. Throughout her career she worked on disarmament, environment, regional cooperation, Arab and European affairs. She served as Egypt’s Ambassador to the Czech Republic and non-resident Ambassador to Montenegro. She holds a B.A. and M.A. in Political Science from the American University in Cairo.

Armando Barucco is the Head of the Unit for Policy Analysis, Planning and Historic Diplomatic Documentation of the Secretariat General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy since march 2015. He was Ambassador to the Sudan between 2011 and 2015. He was also Antici Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of Italy to the European Union, in charge of general coordination, Institutional Affairs, and of the preparation of the European Council and Foreign Affairs Council (2007-2011); Consul General in Mumbai (2002-2003); Counselor at the Permanent Representation to the European Union (2000-2002); Deputy Head of Mission in Kuala Lumpur (1996-2000); Deputy Head of the Italian Delegation in Mogadishu during the 1992-1993 crisis. He holds a Masters in Law from the La Sapienza University of Rome and a Masters in Advanced European Legal Studies from the College of Europe in Bruges. He is a Fellow of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. He also studied and researched extensively at the Institute of Studies on Religions and Cultures of the Gregorian University in Rome.

Axel Gugel is a career diplomat at the German Federal Foreign Office. Before joining the Ministry’s Policy Planning Staff in Berlin in 2015, he served as a Press & Media Officer at the German Embassy in Beijing, China, and as Deputy Consul at the German Consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. He holds a M.A. in Public Policy and Administration from Konstanz University (Germany).

BENONI BELLI is the Director of the United States Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil. From January 2017 to January 2019, he was the Foreign Ministry’s Director of Policy Planning. A career diplomat since 1994, Mr. Belli served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (December 2012 to January 2017). He also headed the Foreign Ministry’s Argentina and Uruguay bureau (2008-2012). Previously, he served as Political Counselor at the Brazilian Embassy in Algiers (2006-2008), and head of the Trade Promotion, Investment and Tourism Office at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires (2002-2006). From 1999 to 2002, he worked at the Brazilian Mission to the UN in New York, covering human rights and humanitarian affairs. He holds a PhD in Sociology (University of Brasilia), a Masters in Political Science (University of Campinas), and a degree in Law (Federal University of Santa Catarina). Mr. Belli is the author of two books published in Brazil: Zero Tolerance and Democracy in Brazil and The Politicization of Human Rights. @BenoniBelli

BRIAN HOOK is the U.S. Special Representative for Iran and Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State. Prior to this appointment, he served as Director of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff. Previously, he was the founder of Latitude, LLC, an international strategic consulting firm based in Washington, DC. He held a number of senior positions in the Bush Administration, including Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations; Senior Advisor to the US Ambassador to the United Nations; Special Assistant to the President for Policy in the White House Chief of Staff’s office; and Counsel, Office of Legal Policy, at the Justice Department. He practiced corporate law at Hogan & Hartson in Washington from 1999-2003. Before practicing law, he served as an advisor to Iowa Governor Terry Branstad and to US Congressman James Leach.

Burak Akçapar is the Director General for Foreign Policy, Analysis and Coordination at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. Ambassador Akçapar is also responsible for coordinating Turkey’s international mediation efforts, including the UN Mediation for Peace initiative. Ambassador Akçapar is a career diplomat celebrating his 30th year in service. His previous postings include New Delhi, Washington DC, NATO International Staff, Hamburg and Doha. He completed his Dr.Iur/Ph.D at the University of Hamburg, School of Law II; authored three books, several articles; and lectured on international security and political risk analysis in various universities. @Akcapar

CAMILA GARCIA is an adviser at the Directorate of Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. She holds a Masters in International Affairs (University of Chile) and a degree in Political Sciences (Diego Portales University). Ms. García has also mixed her international career with sport affairs, currently as executive board member of the International Federation of Professional Footballers (FIFPro). @CamiGarciaP

FILIPE NASSER is First Secretary at Brazil's Permanent Mission to the United Nations. A career diplomat since 2006, Mr. Nasser served in as a Political Officer at Brazil's Embassy in Washington, DC (2011-2014), as the Head of the Political Section at the Embassy in Santo Domingo (2016-2017) and as an Advisor for the Policy Planning Department at Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017-2018). He was a Speechwriter (2009-2010) and an Advisor for multilateral affairs (2015-2016) at the Foreign Minister’s Office on different occasions. He holds a Masters in Public Administration (Harvard University) and in Diplomacy (Rio Branco Institute), as well as a B.A. in International Relations (University of Brasilia). He founded and served as first Editor-in-Chief of JUCA, the Brazilian diplomatic academy’s yearly journal. @filipenasser

FULVIO POMPEO is the Secretary for Strategic Affairs of Argentina. Mr. Pompeo holds a BA in International Relations and Political Science and a MA in International Relations and Political Theory from the University of Westminster, London. He is an Associate Professor of the University of Belgrano and Member of the Executive Committee of the Argentinian Council for International Relations (CARI). In the past, Mr. Pompeo was an elected member of the Chamber of Deputies, Undersecretary for International and Institutional Relations of the Government of the City of Buenos Aires, and Undersecretary (Ambassadorial rank) for Institutional Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina. He is also the Secretary for International Relations of the political party Propuesta Republicana (PRO). @FulvioP

Hector Ortega is Head of Congressional Affairs at the Embassy of Mexico in the United States. Member of the Mexican Foreign Service. Abroad, he has served as Consul in El Paso, United States (2005-2007), and at the Permanent Mission to the OAS (2007-2011). At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was appointed Deputy Head of Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director for Regional Mechanisms (2011), Advisor to the Undersecretary for Latin America and the Caribbean (2012), and Chief of Staff to the Deputy Foreign Minister (2013-2017). Additionally, he was Sous Sherpa for the G20 and Senior Official for MIKTA (2013-2017). @hectorortegamex

Julia De Clerck–Sachsse is Senior Adviser in the Strategic Policy Planning Department of the European External Action Service. Previously, she was Speechwriter and Communications Adviser to the EU High Representative for foreign and security policy. Julia is a member of the board and adjunct professor in the Global Diplomacy Program at Vesalius College of the Free University Brussels and a Council Member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. She holds an MPhil and DPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford.

JUSTIN VAÏSSE is Director General at Paris Peace Forum. He was named Director of the Centre d’Analyse, de Prévision et de Stratégie of the French Foreign Ministry in early 2013, after six years working as a Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. A historian by training, he is the author of many books on American foreign policy, including Neoconservatism – The Biography of a Movement (HUP, 2010) and Zbigniew Brzezinski – America’s Grand Strategist (HUP, 2018). @JustinVaisse

Liane Saunders has been the Strategy Director and Strategic Programs Coordinator at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office since May 2017. A career diplomat, she has served in the Near and Middle East. London roles include leading Counter-proliferation work and running the Foreign Office Crisis Centre. She was a Middle East Director during the Arab Spring. Liane returned to the FCO after five years working on national security at the Cabinet Office in a range of jobs including acting as Deputy National Security Advisor (Foreign Policy) and Chief of the Assessments Staff, and as a Director General for Capability and Engagement. She coordinated for the National Security Advisor the government process of learning lessons from Sir John Chilcot’s Report on Iraq. Liane holds a doctorate in diplomatic history from Oxford University and a Masters in Public Administration from the Open University. She was appointed an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) by Her Majesty the Queen in 2004.

M. del Carmen Domínguez was Director of Strategic Planning at the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Chile from June 2014 to October 2017. She is currently the Deputy Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations. @chicadominguez

NAOKI TAKAHASHI is Director of First Africa Division of African Affairs Department, and the Director for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan since 2017. A diplomat since 1996, Mr. Takahashi had postings in Paris and New York. In Tokyo, he worked in various fields such as the United Nations, international cooperation, and international trade. He holds a degree in Liberal Arts (University of Tokyo). (As of March 2018)

Oleg V. Stepanov is the Director of Foreign Policy Planning Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation since June 2016. He joined the Foreign Service in 1994 and since then was on different assignments within the Department for North America. Mr. Stepanov has had diplomatic appointments in San Francisco, Tbilisi, and more recently Washington, DC, where he rose to the rank of Minister-Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission. Moscow State University of International Relations by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, graduated in 1994 with Master Degree in International Journalism and Public Relations. He has a Master degree in International Journalism and Public Relations from the Moscow State University of International Relations.

Pedro Sanchez da Costa Pereira was born on November 28, 1962, in Luanda, Angola. Graduated in International Relations in the Higher Institute of Social and Political Sciences of the Lisbon Technical University; Post-graduate degree in European Studies in the College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium); Assistant in the College of Europe (1986-1988) and in the Higher Institute of Social and Political Sciences of the Lisbon Technical University (1991-1992). Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1990; Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in November 1992; in the Portuguese Embassy in Paris, in December 1994; in the Portuguese Permanent Representation to the European Union, in Brussels, in July 1998; European Affairs Advisor to the Prime-Minister, Lisbon, in August 2002; Head of Department at the Directorate-General for European Affairs, Lisbon, in August 2004; Minister-Counsellor in the Portuguese Embassy in Brasilia, in September 2005; Deputy Director-General at the Directorate General for Foreign Policy and National Coordinator for the Ibero-
-American Conference, Lisbon, in August 2009; Deputy Permanent Representative in the Portuguese Permanent Representation to the EU, Brussels, since May 2011; Director-General for European Affairs, in Lisbon, October 1st 2014; full rank Ambassador since August 2015; Director-General for Foreign Policy, since July 1st 2017.

Ralf Beste serves as Ambassador at the German Embassy in Vienna. We was Head of Policy Planning at the German Federal Foreign Office (2014-2016). His previous assignments were as Director for Strategic Communication and Deputy Head of Policy Planning. Prior to joining the Foreign Office, Mr. Beste was the parliamentary correspondent for the German news magazine, “Der Spiegel,” and the daily “Berliner Zeitung”. He has also worked as spokesman for the Ministry of Finance in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate. Mr. Beste earned a Master of Arts in History from the University of Bielefeld and a Master of Arts in History from Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. @D_Botschafter

Ricardo López-Aranda was the Policy Planning Director at the Spanish MFA between 2014 and 2018. He joined the diplomatic service in 1997 and has served, among other postings, as Deputy Head of Mission in Nicaragua, Deputy Representative at the Political and Security Committee of the EU, Deputy Director General for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Deputy Head of Mission in South Africa. Mr. López-Aranda is currently the Ambassador of Spain to Côte d’Ivoire. @RLAranda

Siswo Pramono, Dr., LL.M., is the Director General/Head of Policy Analysis and Development Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. He attained Ph.D degree from the Australian National University, and LL.M degree from Monash University, Australia. Dr. Pramono completed his professional diplomatic training in the diplomatic school of Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Jakarta, and the Clingendael Institute of International Relations, the Netherlands. As a career diplomat, he served in various Indonesian diplomatic missions abroad, including the Indonesian Embassies in the Netherlands and in Germany.

Sun Weidong is the Chinese Ambassador to India. He was Director-General of the Policy Planning Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2017-2019). He served as Political Counselor of China to India and Deputy Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Sun Weidong is also a former Ambassador of China to Pakistan.

Tommy Koh is currently Ambassador-At-Large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Special Adviser to the Institute of Policy Studies; and Chairman of the Governing Board of the Centre for International Law at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He is the Chairman of the International Advisory Panel of the Asia Research Institute (NUS) and Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Master’s Degree on Environmental Management (NUS). He is also the Co-chairman of the Asian Development Bank’s Advisory Committee on Water and Sanitation. He is Rector of the Tembusu College, at NUS, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the SymAsia Foundation of Credit Suisse. He had served as Dean of the Faculty of Law of NUS, Singapore’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, Ambassador to the United States of America, High Commissioner to Canada and Ambassador to Mexico. He was President of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for and the Main Committee of the UN Conference on Environment and Development. He was the founding Chairman of the National Arts Council, founding Executive Director of the Asia-Europe Foundation and former Chairman of the National Heritage Board. He was also Singapore’s Chief Negotiator for the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.
He acted as Singapore’s Agent in two legal disputes with Malaysia. He has chaired two dispute panels for the WTO. He is the Co-Chairman of the China Singapore Forum, the Japan-Singapore Symposium and the India-Singapore Strategic Dialogue. In 2006, Professor Koh received the Champion of the Earth Award from UNEP and the inaugural President’s Award for the Environment from Singapore. He was conferred with honorary doctoral degrees in law by Yale and Monash universities. Harvard University conferred on him the Great Negotiator Award in 2014.

1 FREYRE, Gilberto. Ordem e Progresso. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1959. 1º tomo: CLI.

2 KISSINGER, Henry. Years of Upheaval. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999, p. 741 (quoting former Foreign Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira (1974-1979).

3 The views expressed in this article represent the personal opinions of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the position of the Turkish Government or any institution.

4 Madar, Daniel, “Patronage, Position, and Policy Planning: S/P and Secretary Kissinger”, in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 42, 1980, 1066-1084, p. 1083.

5 Ibid.

6 Gohlert, Ernst W., “Planning in German Foreign Policy”, International Journal, Vol. 32, No. 4, Planning and Prediction (Autumn, 1977), 769-790.

7 Owen, John, “The American Way of Seeking Security: Ideology and Pragmatism.” In G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, Zhu Feng (Eds.), America, China, and the Struggle for World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 315.

8 Ikenberry, John G., After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 3.

9 Kennedy, Paul, Commentary, Paul Kennedy Says New World Order Will Emerge: Year in Review, Bloomberg, January 3, 2009.

10 Allison, Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? London: Scribe, 2017.

11 Sanger, David, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age. New York: Crown, 2018.

12 Sharma, Ruchir, “The Coming Tech Battle With China”, New York Times, June 28, 2018.

13 Akçapar, Burak, “The Mutual Existence of Nascent and Senescent World Orders”, Occasional Paper, Portland State University, 2009. In this section, I have drawn extensively from that essay.

14 Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/09/539522-turkeys-erdogan-challenges-world-leaders-un-assembly-end-bloodshed-syria>, accessed on 1 April 2018.

15 Akçapar, Burak “We must help the Secretary General of the UN to succeed”, The New Indian Express, 8 January 2017.

16 Binder, Andrea and Claudia Meier, ‘Opportunity Knocks: Why Non-Western Donors Enter Humanitarianism and How to Make the Best of It’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884, 2011, p. 1146.

17 Gilley, Bruce, ‘Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism’, Perceptions, Spring 2015, Volume XX, Number 1, 37-58, p. 38.

18 Ibid.

19 Akçapar, Burak, The Mutual Existence of Nascent and Senescent World Orders, op. cit, p. 85-86.

20 Sussman, Joseph, Collected views on complexity in systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division Working Paper Series, 2003.

21 Çavuşoğlu, Mevlüt, “America Has Chosen the Wrong Partner” , The New York Times, Jan. 28, 2018, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/opinion/us-turkey-syria-allies.html>, accessed on 2 April, 2018.

22 Fromkin, David, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, London: Phoenix, 2000.

23 For an influential version of this argument see: Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, New York: Crown, 2012.

24 Akçapar, Burak, Turkey’s New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007, p. 77.

25 Çavuşoğlu, Mevlüt, “The Meaning of Operation Olive Branch”, Foreign Policy, April 5, 2018.

26 The opinions expressed in this article are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Special thanks go to my colleagues at the Policy Planning Unit: Fernando Pallini Oneto, Massimo Carnelos, Pietro De Martin, Ugo Boni, Tommaso Coniglio, and Marta Dionisio.

27 GUICCIARDINI, F. (1512), Ricordi, 96: “The affairs of the world are so shifting and depend on so many accidents, that it is hard to form any judgment about the future; nay, we see from experience that the forecasts even of the wise almost always turn out false (…) from anything, something else is born”.

28 ARENDT, H. (1970), On Violence.

29 European Political Strategy Centre, Brief 8 June 2018.

30 World Bank, Fragility, Conflict & Violence. Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview>.

31 International Crisis Group (2018), 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2018. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2018>.

32 Goldsmith, B., Reuters (2016), Just 10% of world military spending could wipe out poverty by 2030. Available at: <https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-04-04/just-10-percent-world-military-spending-could-
wipe-out-poverty-2030>.

33 ECOSOC (2015), World population projected to reach 9.7 billion by 2050. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/2015-report.html>.

34 ENGELKE, P., ARONSSON, L., NORDENMAN, M., Atlantic Council (January 2017). Mediterranean Futures 2030. Toward A Transatlantic Security Strategy. Available at: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/Atlantic_Council_Mediterranean_Futures_2030_web_0201.pdf>.

35 UN ECOSOC (May 2015), Youth population trends and sustainable development. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/YouthPOP.pdf>.

36 OECD (2018), Domestic product - GDP long-term forecast - OECD Data. Available at: <https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gdp-long-term-forecast.htm>.

37 LUXTON, E. World Economic Forum (2016), What will global GDP look like in 2030? Available at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/what-will-global-gdp-look-like-in-2030/>.

38 ICEF Monitor (2015): Global economic power projected to shift to Asia and emerging economies by 2050 Available at: <http://monitor.icef.com/2015/03/global-economic-power-projected-shift-asia-emerging-economies-2050/>.

39 World Economic Forum (2016): What Will Global GDP Look Like in 2030? Available at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/what-will-global-gdp-look-like-in-2030/>.

40 Roser, M., Our World in Data (October 2016), Global Economic Inequality. Available at: <https://ourworldindata.org/global-economic-inequality>.

41 UNDP. Human Development Data (1990-2015). Available at:< http://hdr.undp.org/en/data#>.

42 Global Opportunity Network. Global Opportunity Report 2017: Rising Inequality. Available at: <http://www.globalopportunitynetwork.org/report-2017/rising-inequality/>.

43 Global Finance (August 22, 2012), Income Inequality and Wealth Distribution by Country. Available at: <https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/wealth-distribution-income-inequality>.

44 UNDESA (May 2015), Population facts: Youth population trends and sustainable development. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/YouthPOP.pdf>.

45 African Center for Economic Transformation (2016), Unemployment in Africa: no Jobs for 50% of graduates. Available at: <http://acetforafrica.org/highlights/unemployment-in-africa-no-jobs-for-50-of-graduates/>.

46 IEA (2017), World Energy Outlook 2017. Available at: <http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/weo2017SUM.pdf>.

47 UNDESA (2015), Population Data. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml>.

48 However, the 2018 Report remarks also that, in formulating global population projections, international migration was the variable that had shown the greatest volatility in the past and was therefore most difficult to project with some accuracy. What is sure is that “the increase in international migrants has been evident over time – both numerically and proportionally – and at a greater rate than had been anticipated by some”.

49 IOM, Migration, Climate Change and the Environment. A Complex Nexus. Available at: <https://www.iom.int/complex-nexus>.

50 MANYIKA, J.; MCKINSEY and Co (2017), Technology, jobs, and the future of work. Available at: <https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/technology-jobs-and-the-future-of-work>.

51 State of the Future report, The Millennium Project (2016), Future Work/Technology 2050 Real-Time Delphi Study. Available at: <http://107.22.164.43/millennium/Future-WorkTechnology_2050.pdf>.

52 IEA (2017), World Energy Outlook 2017. Available at: <http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/weo2017SUM.pdf>.

53 UN and Climate Change (2015), What will the weather be like in 2050? Available at: <http://www.un.org/climatechange/blog/2015/03/will-weather-like-2050/>.

54 UN World Water Development Report (2016), Water and Jobs: Facts and Figures. Available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002440/244041e.pdf>.

55 UNESCO (2015), The UN World Water Development Report 2015. Available at: <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/water/wwap/wwdr/2015-water-for-a-sustainable-world/>.

56 ECOSOC (2017), World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. Available at: <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf>.

57 UNHABITAT (2016), World Cities Report. Available at: <http://wcr.unhabitat.org/>.

58 EEAS (June 2016), Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Available at: <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf>.

59 TOCCI, N. (2017). Framing the EU Global Strategy.

60 SLAUGHTER, A. (2004). A new world order.

61 KHANNA, P. (2016). Connectography.

62 ACHARYA, A. (2014). The end of American world order.

63 CERNY, P.G. (2010), Rethinking World Politics.

64 HAASS, R. (2017). A World in Disarray. American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order.

65 BREMMER, I. (2012). Every Nation For Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World.

66 KISSINGER, H. (2014). World Order.

67 NYE, J. (1999). Redefining National Interests. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1999-07-01/redefining-national-interest>.

68 A principle that is also recalled in Article 11 of the Italian Constitution: “Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages international organizations furthering such ends”.

69 Available at: <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/italy#ranking-details>. Just as an example, Italy classified first in terms of heritage and cultural influence in the rankings by US News (2018).

70 Haruspex, haruspices: Roman word that refers to priests and diviners in ancient Rome who based their predictions on the interpretation of animal entrails, natural prodigies, and unusual meteorological phenomena.

71 The adjective and noun Mediterranean comes from the classical-Latin adjective mediterraneus, meaning “inland, far from the coast”. In classical Latin, the Mediterranean Sea was usually called mare nostrum, “our sea”. The word Mediterraneus only began to designate it in post-classical Latin (3th or 4th century). The original sense of the proper name seems to have been “the sea in the middle of the earth” rather than “the sea enclosed by land”. In modern Arabic it is also known as “al-Bahr [al-Abyad] al-Mutawassit” which means “the [white] sea of the middle”. Further information available at: <https://wordhistories.net/2017/11/26/origin-of-mediterranean/>.

72 “We will make the European Union stronger and more resilient, through even greater unity and solidarity amongst us and the respect of common rules. Unity is both a necessity and our free choice. Taken individually, we would be sidelined by global dynamics. Standing together is our best chance to influence them, and to defend our common interests and values. We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later. Our Union is undivided and indivisible.” From: European Commission (March 25, 2017), Rome Declaration of the Leaders of 27 Member States and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission. Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-767_en.htm>.

73 Italian Position Paper (December 2017), Reforming the European Monetary Union in a stronger European Union. Available at: <http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Position_Paper_Governance_UE.pdf>.

74 Italian Non-Paper (2016), Migration Compact. Contribution to an EU strategy for external action on migration. Available at: <http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/immigrazione_0.pdf>.

75 In 2016, Italy was the first European investor in the Africa continent with twenty organized projects and USD 4 billion spent, becoming the fourth largest investor after China (USD 36.1 billion), United Arab Emirates (USD 11 billion) and Morocco (USD 4.8 billion). In particular, Italian investments in 2016 amounted to 4.3% of total foreign direct investments in Africa. Compared to 2015 when Italy ranked as the first global investor in Africa, the number of projects increased (16 in 2015), despite a reduction of the overall value of investments (USD 7.4 billion dollar in 2015, equal to 10.4% of foreign direct investments) EY (May 2017), EY’s Attractiveness Program: Africa. Connectivity redefined. Available at: <http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-attractiveness-program-africa-2017-connectivity-redefined/$FILE/ey-attractiveness-program-africa-2017-connectivity-redefined.pdf>.

76 See: Paolo Gentiloni speech at the year-end press conference held in December 2017: “If we give our contribution to consolidate that country’s (Niger) resilience, we’re doing something sacrosanct for Italian interests.”

77 MAECI (2017), The Italian strategy in the Mediterranean: stabilizing the crises and building a positive agenda in the region. Available at: <https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2017/11/verso-rome-med-2017.html>.

78 Of course, human insecurity is also connected to violations of human rights, extremism, domestic violence, the spread of conflicts and displacement.

79 UN General Assembly (13 September 2016), New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. Available at: <https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/NY_Declaration.pdf>.

80 See the G7 Declaration on responsible States behavior in cyberspace (Lucca, 11 April 2017) approved during the Italian Presidency of G7.

81 These principles are also at the basis of the compromise proposals presented by the “Uniting for Consensus” group – Italy exerts the role of “focal point” of the UfC – within the framework of the Inter-Govermental Negotiations for the reform of the UN Security Council.

82 See, for instance the case of the UNOSOM/UNITAF operations in Somalia (1992-93): Machiavelli Vs. Rambo, Frances Kennedy, The New York Times, 22 July 1993. See also, for the Libyan crisis, the intervention of the Italian MFA, Franco Frattini, at the EU Foreign Ministers’ Council dedicated to the crisis in the countries of North Africa (February 21, 2011).

83 The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the Brazilian government. The authors are especially grateful to Ambassadors Rubens Ricupero, Gelson Fonseca Jr., and Sérgio França Danese as well as to Counselor Braz Baracuhy Neto for their sharp comments and valuable recommendations. The mistakes and equivocations are entirely our own.

84 See MAALOUF, Amin. Le Dérèglement du Monde. Paris: Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, 2009.

85 See HURRELL, Andrew. Beyond the BRICS: Power, Pluralism, and the Future of Global Order. Ethics & International Affairs, 32, number 1 (2018). p. 93.

86 See BREMMER, Ian. Every Nation for Itself. Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World. Portfolio/Penguin, 2012.

87 See HAAS, Richard N. The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow US Dominance. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2008 issue. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/age-nonpolarity>.

88 See KRAUTHAMMER, Charles. The Unipolar Moment. Foreign Affairs. America and the World 1990 issue.

89 See STUENKEL, Oliver. The Post-Western World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.

90 See ALLISON, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Avoid Thucydides Trap?, 2017.

91 See KLIMAN, Daniel & FONTAINE, Richard. Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and the Future of International Order. Brookings.

92 WALTZ, Kenneth. The Stability of a Bipolar Order. Daedalus. Vol. 93, no 3, Summer 1964, p. 884.

93 PATRIOTA, Antonio de Aguiar. Is the world ready for multipolarity? Rising Powers Quarterly. Volume 2, Issue 2, 2017, p. 18.

94 See RUSSELL MEAD, Walter. The Return of Geopolitics. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2014 issue.

95 IKENBERRY, G. John. The end of liberal international order. International Affairs, 94: I (2018), p. 8.

96 See FONSECA JR, Gelson. O Interesse e a Regra: ensaios sobre o multilateralismo. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2008.

97 According to the Lowy Institute’s Global Diplomacy Index 2017 Country Ranking. Available at: <https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/country_rank.html>.

98 DANESE, Sérgio França. A escola da liderança. Ensaios sobre a política externa brasileira e a inserção internacional do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Record, p. 154-155. Free translation.

99 See NYE JR., Joseph S. Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

100 RICUPERO, Rubens. A diplomacia na construção do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro, Versal Editores, 2017, p. 37. Free translation.

101 See HITCHCOK, William et alli. Shaper Nations. Strategies for a Changing World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017.

102 NUNES FERREIRA, Aloysio. A Nova Política Externa Brasileira. Cadernos de Política Exterior, Ano II, número 6, 2017. p.19.

103 For instance, Graham Allison’s Destined for War (2017) or Christopher Coker’s The Improbable War (2014).

104 HEISBOURG, François. “War and Peace after the Age of Liberal Globalization”, Survival (Feb.-Mar. 2018).

105 See SEGAL, Gerald “A Western theme”, Prospect (February 1998).

106 See IKENBERRY, G. John, “The end of liberal international order”, International Affairs 94:1 (2018).

107 The views expressed here are those of the authors. A key source of material for this article is Politica Exterior 2030, a document written by the Directorate of Strategic Planning of the Chilean Foreign Ministry, and presented in January 2018.

108 The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain.

109 Mckee, Musa; Keulertz, Martin; Habibi, Negar; Mulligan, Mark; and Woertz, Eckart, Demographic and Economic Material Factors in the MENA Region. Available at <http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/menara_wp_3.pdf>.

110 The World in 2050. The long view: how will the global economic order change by 2050? PwC, available at <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/world-2050/assets/pwc-the-world-in-2050-full-report-feb-2017.pdf>.

111 This concept has received recent attention from economists, including Larry Summers. Available at <http://larrysummers.com/2016/02/17/the-age-of-secular-stagnation/>.

112 Long-term macroeconomic forecasts, Key trends to 2050, The Economist Intelligence Unit, available at <http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Long-term_macroeconomic_Forecasting-upto-2050.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=ForecastingTo2050>.

113 Milanovic, Branco, Global inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization, Harvard University Press, 2016.

114 Picketty, Tomas, Le Capital au XXIe siècle, Seuil, 2013.

115 Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Andrew Mcafee, The Second Machina Age, W.W. Norton and Company, 2014.

116 Mukand, Sharun, and Dani Rodrik, The Political Economy of Ideas: On Ideas versus Interests in Policymaking, NBER Working Papers Series, Working Paper 24467. Available at <https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/the_political_economy_of_ideas.pdf>.

117 Pinker, Steven, Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Allen Lane, 2018.

118 Ipsos, Global Trends 2017, available at <http://www.ipsosglobaltrends.com/>.

119 Naím, Moisés, The End of Power: from Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be, Basic Books 2014.

120 Available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018>.

121 Ipsos, Global Trends 2017.

122 Inglehart, Ronald F., and Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural. Backlash. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Harvard Kennedy School, August 2016.

123 Huntington, Samuel P. Who are we? Simon & Schuster, 2004.

124 Global Europe 2050, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/global-europe-2050-report_en.pdf>.

125 Why does Latin America matter? Carlos Malamud coord., Real Instituto Elcano, 2018, available at <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/508f77cc-f90e-42db-89e6-44155289971/informe-elcano-22-why-does-latin-america-matter.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=508f77cc-f90e-42db-89e6-344155289971>.

126 KISSINGER, Henry, World Order, Penguin Books, 2014.

127 Allison, Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.

128 ETZIONI, Amitai, Avoiding War with China, University of Virginia Press, 2017

129 KISSINGER, Henry, On China, Penguin Books, 2012

130 EU ISS, African futures: Horizon 2025, available at <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/african-futures-horizon-2025>.

131 Arab Human Development Report 2016, UNDP, available at <http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/report/AHDR%20Reports/AHDR%202016/AHDR%20Final%202016/AHDR2016En.pdf>.

132 The Global Gender Gap Report 2017, WEF, available at <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf>.

133 Economic Benefits of Gender Equality in the European Union, European Institute for Gender Equality, available at <http://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/policy-areas/economic-and-financial-affairs/economic-benefits-gender-equality>.

134 Zahidi, Saadia, Fifty Million Rising. The New Generation of Working Women Transforming the Muslim World, Nation Books, 2018

135 Consistent with the idea of this book, this chapter is not meant as an expression of an official position, and is solely the expression of the views of its writer.

136 This conceptualization of the post-WWII international order has been elaborated in the works of G. John Ikenberry, including in his article “The Future of the Liberal Order, Internationalism after America” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90, No. 3 (May/June 2011), p. 56-62, 63-68.

137 Ikenberry, ibid.

138 This subject has been thoroughly studied in the astute work of Professor Philip Bobbit since the early 2000s.

139 For example, for any given State, there could be less sovereignty vis-à-vis more autonomous regions a claim to more sovereignty in the digital space as it becomes more threatening. This is a work in progress.

140 RICHARD, Haas. World Order 2.0. Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb, 2017.

141 Taking into account the recent signature on March 2018 of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

142 United Nations World Tourism Organization, Tourism Highlights: 2017 Edition, Madrid, 2017, p. 6.

143 Recently, the Pacific Alliance created the category of Associated States and started negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Canada, to adopt trade agreements that will foster exchanges and investment.

144 According to the Mexican Constitution, to lead foreign policy, the President shall observe the following principles: the right to self-determination; non-intervention; the peaceful solution of controversies; outlawing the use of force or threat in international relations; equal rights of States; international cooperation for development; the respect, protection, and promotion of human rights; and the struggle for international peace and security.

145 “MIKTA’s vision statement”, available at <http://www.mikta.org/about/vision.php?ckattempt=1>, accessed on March 2, 2018.

146 UNODC, “Organized Crime”, available at: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro.html>, accessed on March 2, 2018.

147 United Nations, Making migration work for all. Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/72/643 (2017), p. 2.

148 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016, Geneva, June 19, 2017, p. 2.

149 Ban Ki-Moon Centre for Global Citizens, “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS)”, available at: <https://bankimooncentre.org/sdgs>, accessed on February 27, 2018.

150 This paper represents the author’s personal opinion. The author wishes to convey appreciation for Arsi Dwinugra Firdausy for the help rendered in the preparation of this manuscript.

151 “Indonesia Wants to Join TPP: President Jokowi”, The Diplomat, available online at <https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/indonesia-wants-to-join-tpp-jokowi/>.

152 US Trade in Goods with TPP Countries in 2015, processed by PADA, source: the United States Census Bureau.

153 Australia’s trade in goods and services 2016, Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), available online at: <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/australias-trade-in-goods-and-services/Pages/australias-trade-in-goods-and-services-2016.aspx>.

154 Available online at: <www.trademap.org>, 2015.

155 Available online at: <www.trademap.org>, 2015.

156 President Trump’s tweets: “Deals are my art form. Other people paint beautifully or write poetry. I like making deals, preferably big deals. That’s how I get my kicks” on his Twitter account, available at <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/549590421190770688?lang=en>.

157 US Trade in Goods with TPP Countries in 2015, processed by PADA, source: the United States Census Bureau.

158 RCEP is a free trade agreement (FTA) between ASEAN and Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand.

159 “In Davos, Xi makes case for Chinese leadership role”, Reuters, 17 January 2017, available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-davos-meeting-china/in-davos-xi-makes-case-for-chinese-leadership-role-idUSKBN15118V>.

160 World Steel Association, 2015.

161 Reuters, China Prohibit Expansion of Glass, Cement Capacity in 2018, 12 February 2018, available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/china-commodities-cement/china-prohibits-glass-cement-capacity-expansion-in-2018-idUKL4N1Q21DX>.

162 The China Compass: Figures, Forecast, and Analysis, The Beijing Axis, October 2015, p. 69.

163 Merchant Fleets, source: UNCTAD, 2015.

164 Africa Investment Report 2016, available online at: <https://www.camara.es/sites/default/files/publicaciones/the-africa-investment-report-2016.pdf>.

1656 FREUDENBERG, Nicholas, “100 Largest Governments and Corporations by Revenue”, 27 August 2015, available at: <http://www.corporationsandhealth.org/2015/08/27/the-100-largest-governments-and-corporations-by-revenue/>.

166 Please note that the views expressed in the article are the author’s own in the tradition of planning to inform and provoke discussion and debate. It is not an official statement of UK Government policy.

167 Newspaper interview (1902), KAY, Halle, Irrepressible Churchill. Cleveland: World, 1966. Cited in Churchill by Himself (2008), ed. Langworth, PublicAffairs, p. 489.

168 ROWLING, J.K, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone, Bloomsbury (1997), p. 102.

169 Press Association Report: 02 Dec 2014 as reported in the Telegraph Newspaper on line version: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11268738/Artificial-intelligence-could-mean-end-of-human-race-says-Stephen-Hawking.html>.

170 Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (1977) Written and Directed by George Lucas cited in: <http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Protocol_droid>.

171 “War and Peace” article in the Arts and Humanities section of the Guardian newspaper, 23 February 2003 cited in: <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2002/feb/23/artsandhumanities.highereducation>.

172 ‘The nature of war is changing: It’s time governments caught up’, General Sir Richard Barrons writing in Wired, 14 November 2017 cited in: <http://www.wired.co.uk/article/innovation-will-win-the-coming-cybersecurity-war-richard-barrons-opinion>.

173 STONE, Laurel (2015). Study of 156 peace agreements, controlling for other variables, Quantitative Analysis of Women’s participation in Peace Processes in Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes, Annex II cited in: <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-and-security/facts-and-figures#notes>.

174 ‘See How Your City may be affected by rising sea levels’, Justin Worland and David Johnson, Time Magazine, March 14, 2016 cited in: <http://time.com/4257194/sea-level-rise-climate-change-miami/>.

175 UNHCR Global Trends, June 2017 (figures are correct up to end of 2016) cited in: <http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/stories/2017/6/5941561f4/forced-displacement-worldwide-its-highest-decades.html>.

176 Organised by the 100 Resilient Cities, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, cited in: <http://www.100resilientcities.org/summit2017/>.

177 The Guardian Newspaper, 13 October, 2017 cited in: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/oct/13/antibiotic-resistance-could-spell-end-of-modern-medicine-says-chief-medic>.

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